NRC: The Good, The Bad and the Ugly

NRC: The Good, The Bad and the Ugly

… and why it is unsafe To restart San Onofre



A GOOD NRC enforcement example:


Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station is a nuclear power plant in Oak Harbor, Ohio. On March 5, 2002, maintenance workers discovered that corrosion had eaten a football-sized hole into the reactor vessel head of the Davis-Besse plant. Corrosion had been clogging the plant’s filters for months, requiring repeated filter replacement, but the cause was not investigated until after a worker leaned against a control rod drive mechanism, and it toppled over. Although the corrosion did not lead to an accident, this was considered to be a serious nuclear safety incident. Some observers have criticized the NRC’s Commission work as an example of regulatory capture [See Note 1] and the NRC has been accused of doing an inadequate job by the Union of Concerned Scientists.  The Nuclear Regulatory Commission kept Davis-Besse shut down until March 2004, so that FirstEnergy was able to perform all the necessary maintenance for safe operations. The NRC imposed its largest fine evermore than $5 million—against FirstEnergy for the actions that led to the corrosion. The company paid an additional $28 million in fines under a settlement with the U.S. Department of Justice. The NRC closely monitored FENOC’s response and concluded in September 2009 that FENOC met the conditions of the 2004 order. From 2004 through 2009 the NRC reviewed 20 independent assessments conducted at the plant and verified the independent assessors’ credentials. The agency also conducted its own inspections and reviewed FENOC’s reactor vessel inspections conducted in early 2005. NRC inspectors paid particular attention to the order’s focus on safety culture and safety conscious work environment to ensure there were no new signs of weakness. The NRC task force concluded that the corrosion, occurred for several reasons:


·    NRC, Davis-Besse and the nuclear industry failed to adequately review, assess, and follow up on relevant operating experience at other nuclear power plants;
·    Davis-Besse failed to ensure that plant safety issues received appropriate attention; and
·    NRC failed to integrate available information in assessing Davis-Besse’s safety performance.



A BAD NRC enforcement example:

At San Onofre by Region IV and the NRC: The papers shown below have been obtained from Public Domain written by Dr. Joram Hopenfeld and a former SONGS Employee based on his investigation of the steam generator issues, review of the plant data and discussions with several Key SONGS Insiders. These papers confirm that Southern California Edison wants to restart unsafe Unit 2 nuclear reactor at 70% power under false pretenses, just for profits, and as an unapproved risky experiment by subverting the NRC and Federal regulatory process.  The true Root Cause (See Note 2) of the unprecedented tube-to-tube wear in Unit 3 has NOT been officially established, as required by NRC Confirmatory Letter Action 1 for restarting the defectively designed and degraded Unit 2.  NRC has not even completed their review of Unit 2 Return to Service Reports, nor have they finished Special Unit 2 Tube Inspections, nor have they (publicly?) reviewed SCE’s Response to NRC’s Requests for Additional Information (RAIs).
NOTE: NO FINES ARE MENTIONED – WHY?



An UGLY NRC enforcement example?:

Now, SCE wants the NRC to approve a new shady License Amendment, undermining public safety and they want it done without the involvement of Public Safety Experts, Attorneys and/or Citizens/Ratepayers.  After the review of the Mitsubishi Root Cause Evaluation and the Draft SCE License Amendment, it is crystal clear that the NRC needs to follow the example of their own enforcement at David Besse together with the lessons learned from Fukushima, when it comes to NOT approving this new Shady License Amendment for restarting San Onofre Unit 2’s defectively designed and degraded replacement steam generators.  In light of the unanticipated/unprecedented tube leakage at San Onofre Unit 3, the health and safety, along with the economic concerns/objections of 8.4 million Southern Californians’ MUST OVERRIDE and PREVENT the restarting of Unit 2 at ANY power level.  In a Democratic Society, truth must prevail over profit motivations, misleading propaganda of electricity service disruption and/or projected probabilistic temporary inconveniences to the public based on phony data, because America cannot afford a trillion dollar nuclear eco-disaster!


Our Safety must override SCE’s profits and prevent them from restarting Unit 2.
Notes:

1: Regulatory capture occurs when a regulatory agency, created to act in the public interest, instead advances the commercial or special concerns of interest groups that dominate the industry or sector it is charged with regulating.  Regulatory capture is a form of government failure, as it can act as an encouragement for firms to produce negative externalities. The agencies are called “captured agencies”.

2. Human performance errors resulting from the negative safety culture of production (profits) goals overriding public safety obligations.




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Additional Information:


The full DAB Safety Team’s Media Alert 5 Parts:

https://docs.google.com/folder/d/0BweZ3c0aFXcFZGpvRlo4aXJCT2s/edit?pli=1&docId=15V8BD4YK0MjwUV6gPZt6ILS_lP7CpClzgnZentLfx8U

The complete five (5) part presentation, see the eight (8) titles listed below:

Aging Nuke Plants On Fault Lines In Tsunami Hazard Zones = Fukushimas… Any Questions?
PLEASE Turn off a light for Fukushima USA / San Onofre

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San Onofre Unit 2 Retainer Bars Could Cause Massive ? Leakage


In an accident like a main steam line break at San Onofre, the badly designed retainers bars in Unit 2 could actually make things much worse by causing more damage to any of the 9,727 already fatigued tubes in each of its steam generators which could lead to additional leakage of highly radioactive reactor core coolant and/or cause a nuclear incident or worse a nuclear accident like Fukushima!


Radioactive Leaks and ruptures can happen without notice:



Allegation/Violations

The NRC has decided in AIT follow-up report dated 11/09/2012, “Item 3. “(Closed) Unresolved Item 05000362/2012007-03, ‘Evaluation of Retainer Bars Vibration during the Original Design of the Replacement Steam Generators” as a non-cited violation in accordance with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC’s Enforcement Policy.”  However, as shown below, SCE/MHI’s failure to verify the adequacy of the retainer bar design as required by SCE/MHI’s procedures have resulted in plugging of several hundred tubes in the brand new replacement generators. This has resulted in these violations:

1. Failure to meet NRC Chairman Standards on Nuclear Safety by SCE,
2. Failure to meet Senator Boxer’s Committee on Environment and Public Works
(EPW) Standards on Nuclear Safety by SCE,
3. Failure to enforce SCE Edison Contract Document instructions to MHI by SCE,
4. Failure to meet SONGS Technical Specifications by SCE,
5. Failure to meet general design criteria (GDC) in Appendix A, “General Design
Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants,” to 10 CFR Part 50, “Domestic
Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities GDC 14, “Reactor
Coolant Pressure Boundary” by SCE/MHI,
6. Failure to demonstrate that Unit 2 retainer bars will maintain tube bundle
geometry at 70% power due to fluid elastic instability during a main line
steam break (MSLB) design basis event, and
7. SCE/MHI took shortcuts by avoiding the 10 CFR 50.90 License Amendment
Process under the false pretense of “like for a like” replacement steam
generator.  SCE added 377 more tubes, increased the average length of the
heated tubes and changed the thermal-hydraulic operation of the RSGs without

proper safety analysis and inadequate 10CFR 50.59 Evaluation.

This intentional action to produce more thermal megawatts out of the

RSGs compromised safety at SONGS Unit 2 due to the failure of 90

percent through wall thickness of a tube by the inadequate design of the

r

etainer bar.

Recommended Actions:

NRC San Onofre Special Panel is requested to resolve the above listed Allegations and/or Violations within 30 days of receipt of this email and prior to granting SCE’s permission to do any restart “testing” of Unit 2. Answer all allegations factually, don’t just void them.
 
See Full Document:
Media Alert: San Onofre Retainer Bar Problems

Aging Nuke Plants On Fault Lines In Tsunami Hazard Zones = Fukushimas… Any Questions?
PLEASE Turn off a light for Fukushima USA / San Onofre

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San Onofre Legacy (SOL Part 1, 2 and 3)

The DAB Safety Team released three Media Alerts today!


Together they describe (in technical detail) the current situation at San Onofre, along with what SCE, their experts and other public nuclear watchdogs are now saying about all the NRC RESTART QUESTIONS they have been told to answer:


snip:
The following paper shows that the entire NRC Regulatory Process is underfunded, broken and needs additional funding, oversight and extensive overhaul to ensure public safety.
snip:
The presentation by SCE, Mitsubishi and other experts to the NRC was very disappointing and disturbing to 8.4 million Southern Californians.  The presentation did not address U.S. Sen. Barbara Boxer and Congressman Edward J. Markey’s concerns expressed on February 6, 2013 in her letter to NRC Chairman McFarlane, “Southern California Edison was aware of problems with replacement steam generators at its San Onofre nuclear power plant but chose not to make fixes.
snip:
The structural integrity of SONGS degraded retainer bar system to withstand combined loads that result from postulated accident conditions events has not been demonstrated.
Aging Nuke Plants On Fault Lines In Tsunami Hazard Zones = Fukushimas… Any Questions?
PLEASE Turn off a light for Fukushima USA / San Onofre

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Unsafe NRC Computer Model Requires Investigation

Snip from:

Press Release 13-01-22 ATHOS Validity Questioned, Qualifying Investigation Required

The validity of the ATHOS T/H computer model for San Onofre Unit 2 at Main Steam Line Break  conditions requires that the NRC Office of Nuclear …

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Unsafe NRC Computer Model Requires Investigation

Snip from:

Press Release 13-01-22 ATHOS Validity Questioned, Qualifying Investigation Required

The validity of the ATHOS T/H computer model for San Onofre Unit 2 at Main Steam Line Break  conditions requires that the NRC Office of Nuclear …

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NRC Violating Presidential Directive and the Public Trust

SCE’s PR Machine Is Capable Of Overcoming ALL Hurdles,

Except Good Science And Safety

Albert Einstein also described INSANITY as

Doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results. 

The DAB Safe…

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NRC Violating Presidential Directive and the Public Trust

SCE’s PR Machine Is Capable Of Overcoming ALL Hurdles,

Except Good Science And Safety

Albert Einstein also described INSANITY as

Doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results. 

The DAB Safe…

Continue reading

SCE Violated Federal Reg.’s And the Public Trust

Nuclear Experts Agree, San Onofre’s Replacement Steam Generators Are Unsafe

Summation: Based upon our ongoing review of evaluations, engineering analyses, inspections, technical and operational assessment reports prepared by the NRC’s Augment…

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SCE Violated Federal Reg.’s And the Public Trust

Nuclear Experts Agree, San Onofre’s Replacement Steam Generators Are Unsafe

Summation: Based upon our ongoing review of evaluations, engineering analyses, inspections, technical and operational assessment reports prepared by the NRC’s Augment…

Continue reading