NUCLEAR CRISIS–9 MONTHS ON / Focus on radiation screenings ended up claiming patients’ lives
The Yomiuri Shimbun
This is the second and last installment in a two-part series that looks into problems facing the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency, among other issues, and what is needed for a new “nuclear safety agency” to be established in April.
It was the early morning of March 14, three days after the outbreak of the crisis at the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant following the massive earthquake and tsunami. The Soso Public Health and Welfare Office in Minami-Soma, Fukushima Prefecture, was filled with patients and residents transferred from hospitals and homes for the elderly within 20 kilometers of the plant.
These patients–many of whom were bedridden elderly people with serious conditions–boarded buses to leave the government-designated evacuation area. When the buses arrived at the facility, some patients had blood backflow in their intravenous lines, while others had fallen out of their seats.
Earlier, the central government told the Fukushima prefectural government to evacuate about 840 people at medical and other facilities in the 20-kilometer evacuation zone, saying the power plant was “in a critical state.”
The prefectural government asked the Self-Defense Forces to transfer the patients to the Soso Public Health and Welfare Office, about 25 kilometers north of the power plant, because it was designated as a radiation screening site.
“We believed they had to undergo radiation screenings first to be accepted at evacuation centers,” a prefectural government public health official said.
However, Prof. Yoshio Hosoi of Hiroshima University–an emergency radiation medicine expert who was dispatched to the prefecture in response to the accident–could not help wondering if it was necessary for these patients to undergo the screenings. The professor believed they had probably not been exposed to excessive radiation because they remained indoors after the accident.
In fact, screenings for the 840 patients found none of them had been exposed to a level of radiation high enough for them to require decontamination treatment.
Among them were 132 patients and residents from Futaba Hospital and the Deauville Futaba home for the elderly, both of which were in Okumamachi. After arriving at the welfare office and undergoing radiation screening, they were then moved to Iwaki, in the southern part of the prefecture, via Fukushima city and Koriyama.
They traveled about 200 kilometers during the 12-hour journey before arriving at Iwaki-Koyo High School. Three patients died in transit, while an another 11 passed away hours after arriving at the school.
“The public had excessive radiation exposure fears,” Hosoi said as to why authorities put more focus on radiation screenings rather than the swift transfer of the patients.
Medical institutions also suffered from such fears.
At the crippled nuclear power plant, 11 workers were injured when a hydrogen explosion occurred at the No. 3 reactor at 11 a.m. on March 14. About three of those requiring hospital treatment were refused by some medical institutions over radiation fears.
The three workers were finally admitted by Fukushima Medical University in the prefectural capital the following day–about 20 hours after the blast. Examinations found none of the workers had been exposed to high levels of radiation.
“Radiation screenings are meant to find those requiring advanced treatment for radiation exposure or decontamination,” Hosoi said. “However, the screenings were necessary [for evacuees] to be accepted by residents in the areas to which they have been evacuated.”
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Govt unprepared for screening
The Nuclear Safety Commission was in disarray over the screening.
On March 14, the Fukushima prefectural government raised the standard for designating people requiring full-body decontamination from 13,000 counts per minute (cpm) or more, which was based on its radiation emergency medicine manual, to 100,000 cpm or more. The cpm refers to the number of atoms in a given quantity of radioactive material to decay in one minute.
There were fears that, under the original standard, there would be too many people requiring full-body decontamination, preventing smooth evacuation due to staff shortage.
Also, water necessary for decontamination was in short supply due to suspension of water services.
“Decontamination was difficult in the situation. It was irrational to apply the normal standard to an emergency situation,” said Hiroshima University Prof. Koichi Tanigawa, who suggested the prefecture raise the standard.
However, the NSC’s Technical Advisory Organization, an emergency panel convened by the commission in a nuclear emergency, announced the same day the previous standard was appropriate.
This resulted in double standards between the central and prefectural governments. There were fears evacuees from Fukushima Prefecture would have been denied entry to evacuation centers in other prefectures, where the standard for full-body decontamination was lower than Fukushima Prefecture.
However, in a sudden reversal, the advisory organization on March 19 approved the increase of the standard to 100,000 cpm.
“To evacuate people to areas outside of the prefecture smoother, the standards should be unified,” a panel source said.
“It took us time to understand the situation in the prefecture,” NSC Chairman Haruki Madarame, explained.
It was not until April 17, more than one month after the March 11 disaster, when advisory panel investigators visited Fukushima Prefecture for the first time.
Taking the situation into consideration, the NSC began discussions in October aimed at revising screening purposes and standards for full-body decontamination.
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Radiation Council fell short
While the NSC appeared to lack the ability to respond to the crisis, the Radiation Council of the education ministry was unable to demonstrate its use.
The Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology Ministry council consists of 19 experts on radiology.
The council is designed to set standards for people’s radiation exposure to prevent radiation-caused health problems.
On March 14, the council was asked by the Health, Labor and Welfare Ministry for advice on raising the radiation exposure limit for workers at the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant to 250 millisieverts from 100 millisieverts, in emergency situations. The council gave their approval the same day, although council members did not meet, but communicated via phone and e-mail.
The members of the council convened on Aug. 4 for the first time after the nuclear accident occurred.
Former council Chairman Takashi Nakamura, professor emeritus at Tohoku University, who participated in the meeting as an observer, said, “Don’t you think the council should be more proactive with proposals in emergencies?”
“I guess so,” incumbent Chairman Otsura Niwa, replied.
However, legally the council is limited to only giving opinions to ministry inquiries.
When government ministries and agencies were reorganized in 2001, most councils were left with only minimal functions, while others were integrated. Many councils were criticized as merely bureaucratic tools to form ministry policies.
As a result, the Radiation Council lost its ability to make proposals.
The government has already decided to transfer council functions to a new nuclear safety agency scheduled to be launched in April next year. The new agency will be an external bureau of the Environment Ministry. The NSC and the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency will also be integrated into the new agency.
A senior Environment Ministry official responsible for drawing up the new agancy’s organizational structure said, “After the nuclear disaster broke out, the expectation of the Radiation Council’s role has changed.”
“After the creation of the new agency, we have to combine the functions of the council and the commission to create an organization to quickly respond to the needs of society,” he added.
(Dec. 17, 2011)