IPS-English COLOMBIA-VENEZUELA: Why Did Chávez Mobilise Troops? Date: Sat, 08 Mar 2008 10:09:05 -0800 Analysis by Humberto Márquez CARACAS, Mar 7 (IPS) - When Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez ordered the movement of troops to the Colombian border, newspaper offices in Caracas immediately began to be flooded by phone calls from people who talked about a repeat of the ”Malvinas syndrome”. But there may be many reasons for the leftwing president's decision, which could be more political than military. Chávez ordered the movement of troops during his weekly TV and radio programme on Sunday, Mar. 2, after Saturday's bombing raid by Colombian forces on a Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) camp inside Ecuadorian territory, in which the rebel group's ”foreign minister”, Raúl Reyes, was killed along with two dozen other insurgents. The Venezuelan leader's decision, which raised the stakes and further heated up -- in the words of Peruvian President Alan García -- the serious diplomatic conflict between Colombia and Ecuador was also Chávez's way of demonstrating in a compelling manner that, since he is involved in the regional effects of Colombia's long-running armed conflict, he must obligatorily be involved in any possible solution. Chávez's move took advantage of his successful mediation of the release of Colombian lawmakers held hostage for years by the FARC. But above all, the decision to beef up troops along the border with Colombia after that country made an incursion into Ecuadorian territory points to an escalation of the conflict, which would bolster Chávez's calls for the creation of a group of countries that could help broker solutions to Colombia's armed conflict, along the lines of the ”Contadora group”. Contadora was created by democratic governments in the region to bring about peace in Central America in the 1980s, and the idea has now caught the interest of governments like those of Brazil and France. But due to his antagonistic relationship with Chávez, Colombian President Álvaro Uribe has flatly opposed Venezuela's participation in such an initiative. Colombian analyst and writer Plinio Apuleyo Mendoza said the ”Galtieri síndrome” would explain ”Hugo Chávez's latest absurd move, in which he threatened Colombia for a problem that is none of his business.” The analyst said Chávez is thus ”seeking to hide the acute problems he is suffering at home, created by his incompetence and his histrionic extravagances.” In April 1982 Argentina, ruled at the time by a dictatorship led by General Leopoldo Galtieri, occupied the Malvinas/Falkland Islands, a British colony in the south Atlantic that has long been claimed by Buenos Aires. Observers ranging from political leaders to historians agree that the invasion, which failed after a bloody war with Britain, was aimed at overcoming the internal crisis of the military regime, which had an appalling human rights record. The Malvinas defeat crushed the power of the Argentine military, and accelerated the return to democracy. In December, Chávez suffered his first-ever defeat after 12 elections since 1998, in a referendum on controversial constitutional reforms, one of which would have allowed him to run for re-election in 2012. And the badly weakened and splintered opposition movement, which attempted to remove him from power in a short-lived 2002 coup and a 2003 recall referendum, is showing signs of recovery, and may win a few important victories in the November regional elections. (Chávez allies currently govern most of the country's municipal and provincial governments). Despite record oil revenues, there is scarcity of certain basic food items on supermarket shelves, inflation is higher than 20 percent a year, there are street protests over the government's failure to combat the country's high rates of violent crime, and Chávez is seeing his popularity slide because people increasingly blame him for the lack of solutions, pollsters Alfredo Keller and Oscar Schémel told IPS. Opposition politicians Julio Borges, the leader of the centre-right Justice First party, and Ismael García of the centre-left Podemos party, which backed Chávez until last year, concurred in statements to IPS that the movement of troops to the Colombian border is aimed at diverting attention from the government's ”failure and inefficiency” in addressing social demands. In reaction to Uribe's announcement that he would accuse Chávez before the International Criminal Court of providing financial and logistical support to terrorist groups (because of his alleged but so far unsubstantiated ties to the FARC), Chávez challenged the Colombian leader: ”let's both appear before the Court to see who is condemned for supporting terrorism and genocide.” Chávez's insults against his adversaries are well-known, like calling U.S. President George W. Bush a ”devil” or ”alcoholic” or his description of Uribe as a ”lying, criminal mafioso and drug trafficker, and pawn of the (U.S.) empire.” The relations between Chávez and Uribe had their ups and downs since 2002, until last November, when the Colombian president abruptly cut short the Venezuelan leader's efforts to mediate a humanitarian exchange of hostages held by the FARC guerrillas for imprisoned insurgents. Despite Uribe's decision, the rebel group has released six hostages as a goodwill gesture to Chávez in the last two months. Chávez ”was very upset over the death of Raúl Reyes, which he saw as a severe blow to the group's strategies, but also because it occurred just when he was enjoying a political and public relations victory over Uribe by receiving hostages handed over by the FARC,” Carlos Romero, director of the graduate programme in International Studies at the Central University of Venezuela, told IPS. Another aspect, which was mentioned more than any other by the recently deceased political scientist Alberto Garrido, is that Colombia is key to Chávez's aim to spread his ”Bolivarian revolution” throughout the region and build an anti-U.S. alternative power bloc in South America. The FARC are ”an important piece in the confrontation or asymmetric war that Chávez sees as inevitable between the forces of the empire and those of the regional Bolivarian revolution,” Garrido said in one of his interviews with IPS. Chávez, who says he does not support the FARC, is in favour of a negotiated solution to Colombia's civil war. He has stated that ”it is not possible to defeat the guerrillas militarily and they cannot defeat the government either.” The RCN media outlet in Colombia quoted unidentified military sources who alleged that Chávez moved troops to Venezuela's borders with Colombia to protect FARC chief Manuel Marulanda, who is reportedly ill and hiding out somewhere in western Venezuela. Whatever his reasons for beefing up security along the border, the order was not, as many say, an error by a military leader (Chávez is a retired lieutenant-colonel), but part of a strategy to increase the sensation of an escalation of the conflict. General Raúl Baduel, a former Chávez supporter and ex-defence minister, criticised the ”media circus” and the public announcement that troops would be mobilised, and other retired military officers said the units are not prepared to engage in combat immediately. Whatever the case may be, Chávez can now include the withdrawal or demobilisation of those units as part of any future agreement to reduce tension in the Andean region. Possibly for that reason as well, Bogotá decided to continue ahead with its plans to ask the International Criminal Court to bring genocide charges against Chávez, against the advice of the Foreign Relations Advisory Committee made up of former Colombian presidents and foreign ministers. The Organisation of American States (OAS), which discussed the crisis this week, did not refer to Venezuela in its search for solutions to the conflict between Ecuador and Colombia. But Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa believes, as does Chávez, that the crisis is not bilateral, but regional. In an interview with the IPS correspondent in Mexico, German political analyst Heinz Dieterich, who has inspired Chávez in the past with his theory on ”21st century socialism”, agreed that the Venezuelan leader was seeking to use the crisis to his benefit, although he predicted that the move could contribute to the search for peaceful solutions to Colombia's armed conflict. ***** + A Nation Torn - More IPS News on Colombia (http://www.ipsnews.net/new_focus/colombia/index.asp) (END/IPS/LA IP/TRASP-SW/HM/DCL/08) = 03080026 ORP001 NNNN