[NYTr] TIME Rag, others on Venezuela's Oil Industry - Profits for Social Needs - Horrors! Date: Fri, 30 Nov 2007 12:24:26 -0600 (CST) Via NY Transfer News Collective * All the News that Doesn't Fit Venezuela Information Office (VIO) http://www.rethinkvenezuela.com excerpted from VIO Venezuela Daily News Roundup - Nov 30, 2007 [Time reports on Venezuela's oil industry today, which it notes is under attack by those who criticize the new commitment on the part of the state oil company, Pdvsa, to social spending. According to the article, Pdvsa reinvested $5.5 billion into the oil industry last year, while dedicating $30 billion in profits to what Time calls "a vast social-welfare crusade that has helped reduce official poverty and jobless rates appreciably." -VIO] [Moody's meanwhile, give an optimistic assessmen of Venezuela' banking industry. Jens Erik Gould in The New York Times also reports on a growing system of domestic barter exchange in place of using currency. In addition, The New York Times gets into Chavez's social spending from oil revenues.Apparently the Times wanted an interview on funding and social spending, and got no reply. boo-hoo, Would you talk to one of the Romero-Forero twins if you were an Venezuelan offcial? It just gives them a frame on which to hang their anti-Venezuela disinfo. ] *** Time RAG - November 29, 2007 http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,1689226,00.html Is Chavez Taking Too Many Oil Risks? By Tim Padgett and Jens Erik Gould The world's largest oil-refinery complex sits on an arid peninsula off the western coast of Venezuela. The ParaguanC! facility processes more than 700,000 bbl. of crude each day for the state-owned oil monopoly, PetrC3leos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA), while tankers line up on the Caribbean horizon to ship it around the world. Towering burn-off pipes, as loud as jet engines, shoot flames above giant posters of President Hugo ChC!vez. His fist raised, he roars, "Of course we can!" The question is, Does he really want to? Last year the government announced a $280 million plan to upgrade ParaguanC! and increase its capacity to process Venezuela's abundant heavy crude from 50,000 bbl. to 130,000 bbl. per day. But workers say they have yet to see the project move ahead, and some complain the refineries are underperforming. "It's precarious," says a veteran supervisor. "The plant isn't living up to its original design because [PDVSA doesn't] want to cover the costs." So is this good or bad for Venezuela and the U.S.? The answer is yes. As oil nears a once unthinkable $100 a bbl., ChC!vez can afford to delay costly drilling and refining expansions like ParaguanC!'s and spend that money on socialist programs and other political pursuits. In a bravado performance at a Nov. 18 meeting of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), ChC!vez and his new best friend, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, mocked the U.S. and blamed the weak dollar, not Venezuelan production capacity, for the high price of oil. "The fall of the dollar is not the fall of the dollar," ChC!vez crowed. "It's the fall of the American empire." Oil experts say Venezuelan production is slipping and ChC!vez's industry policy for the long term is risky. Venezuela, like Mexico and Iran, needs reinvestment and foreign investment to keep its $100 billion industry in prime condition. But with China's and India's demand for crude inspiring projections for exponential growth and the U.S.'s determination to remain a slave to oil, the oil industry may well have hit a point when the short term is the long term--every barrel not pumped today will be worth more tomorrow. "The Venezuelans are investing as much as they want to," says economist Mark Weisbrot, a co-director of the Center for Economic Policy and Research in Washington. "That is, they're not in a hurry at all to expand production." Venezuela B.C.--before ChC!vez--could usually be relied on to do that, especially when things got dicey in the Middle East. In the 1990s, a more U.S.-friendly PDVSA ambitiously raised output (even defying its OPEC quota) to earn revenue for new drilling projects. But when ChC!vez and his anti-U.S. agenda took office in February 1999, prices were languishing at about $10 a bbl.--so the former paratroop commander campaigned to revive OPEC, persuading the cartel to rein in production to boost prices. The effort paid off when the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq shook oil markets and prices began their awesome ascent. The spike also helped ChC!vez recover from a reckless and devastating 2002 strike by his opponents inside PDVSA. It's less certain that PDVSA really recovered. Before the strike, Venezuela pumped more than 3 million bbl. of oil a day (m.b.d.). ChC!vez and his loyal Energy Minister, Rafael RamC-rez, who is also PDVSA's president, say they're back to 3.2 m.b.d., but even OPEC says Venezuela's output is 2.4 m.b.d. PDVSA's exploration and production vice president, Luis Vierma, warned last July of an "operational emergency" because of a lack of drilling rigs. In recent years, there has been a troubling string of accidents; and oil corruption, the blight that ChC!vez vowed to eradicate, became an issue this year when Vierma was investigated--but not charged--for handing lucrative contracts to rig operators who had no experience. Venezuela may be sitting atop one of the world's largest oil deposits--ChC!vez claims there are more than 200 billion bbl. in the Orinoco Belt, which, if true, is nearly 10 times as many proven reserves as the U.S. has. But most of the stuff is extra-heavy crude. Tapping and processing that tarlike oil require billions in investment. Analysts say PDVSA has been slow to start those projects, including joint stakes with China's CNPC, Brazil's Petrobras and Iran's Petropars in southeastern Venezuela. Then, to complicate matters, ChC!vez mandated this year that the state own a majority stake in heavy-oil developments. Two major investors, ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips, walked away, taking critical technology with them. Abandoning its Petrozuata and Hamaca heavy-oil ventures, plus an offshore project, cost Conoco $4.5 billion in impairment charges. The French oil corporation Total signed a deal earlier this month to help fill the void. Still, Venezuela's output "is declining," says Rafael Quiroz, an oil economist at Venezuela's Central University. "If it dips below 2.1 m.b.d. ... it could bankrupt the industry." The risk to ChC!vez is that his brand of socialism runs on oil. PDVSA sends more than a third of its revenue to the government, which spent more than $30 billion last year for a vast social-welfare crusade that has helped reduce official poverty and jobless rates appreciably. PDVSA runs many of the programs, and while that might sound more like Marx than Rockefeller, it "reflects our right to set globalization's terms in our people's favor for once," RamC-rez has told TIME. Critics say it also means a hyperpoliticized PDVSA, in which RamC-rez demands employee allegiance to ChC!vez and his Bolivarian revolution. The irony is that ChC!vez and RamC-rez are adamant that Venezuela can keep delivering to the U.S.--about 1.3 m.b.d., or 12% of U.S. imports. They also insist that in the next few years, investment and output will climb. In 2005 PDVSA launched a seven-year plan, but analysts consider its goals--5.5 m.b.d. by 2012 and $11 billion a year in total investment--a pipe dream. Investment reached half that last year. Venezuela is counting on the state-run oil companies of allies like China to replace Western oil outfits--a prospect that pains Washington, especially since ChC!vez is ratcheting up oil exports to China to reduce dependence on the U.S. market. Chavistas argue that if the U.S. is so concerned about global oil supply, it should lean on its own petro-allies--like Mexico and Saudi Arabia--which ban the foreign participation in oil ventures that Venezuela at least still allows. (Oil production in Mexico is also in serious decline.) Venezuela's 26 million people have seen four straight years of near record economic growth, and they are driving up domestic oil demand: almost 500,000 new cars are expected to be sold this year. (Why not, with gas at 12B" a gal.?) But the bolC-var is sharply overvalued, inflation is the highest in Latin America, and even ChC!vez fears that his "21st century socialists" are living like capitalist nouveaux riches, the so-called boli-bourgeoisie. For now, "ChC!vez can keep raking in tons of cash without expanding production--even with production declining," says David Mares, an oil-politics expert at the University of California at San Diego. "He's taking advantage of the situation we consumers dropped in his lap." Mares says ChC!vez has to invest more in his oil industry in the future. Although it also wouldn't hurt if Americans learned to consume less oil. *** Thomson Financial via Forbes - November 30, 2007 http://www.forbes.com/markets/feeds/afx/2007/11/30/afx4389674.html Venezuela's banks outlook stable - Moody's BANGALORE - Moody's Investors Service said the outlook for the ratings of Venezuela's banks are stable citing a core of well-managed first-tier institutions, good financial standing and economic growth. However, the ratings agency said government intervention on the banking system is intensifying, seriously affecting banking activity. The Venezuelan banks are subject to a number of controls, including floors and caps on interest rates, mandatory lending buckets, controls on commissions and fees, and a high cash reserve requirement, constraining the banks' activities. *** The New York Times - November 30, 2007 http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/30/business/worldbusiness/30chavez.html Venezuela's Fateful Choice By Jens Erik Gould CARACAS, Venezuela, Nov. 29 ? As petrodollars stream into oil-producing countries, Western officials have begun to demand greater accountability for how they are spent. Some countries known for corruption, like Nigeria and Azerbaijan, have heeded the call, increasing their financial transparency, or at least paying lip service to it. But Venezuela under the leadership of President Hugo ChC!vez appears headed in the opposite direction. Oil revenue supports a diploma-granting program on the edge of Caracas. "We see Venezuela on the other side of the road," said Mercedes de Freitas, executive director of Transparency International here. The group, which tries to combat corruption worldwide, ranks Venezuela as the least transparent country in Latin America and 162 out of 179 nations globally. And that could soon fall even lower. On Sunday, Venezuelans will vote on constitutional changes that would, among other things, grant Mr. ChC!vez unparalleled power to run the country's finances as he sees fit. If the referendum is approved, government accounting is expected to become still harder to fathom, and foreign businesses, many of them already afraid to invest, will find Venezuela even more forbidding. Already, Mr. ChC!vez's government is putting large amounts of oil revenue into development funds and state-owned companies that operate outside the official budget and are not subject to audits or legislative approval. The Fund for National Development, a leading fund of this sort, has received more than $30 billion since 2005 without regularly disclosing its balance, the progress of projects it finances, the whereabouts of billions of dollars it invests in bonds, or how often it receives revenue injections from the state oil company, PetrC3leos de Venezuela. Under the proposed changes, Mr. ChC!vez seeks to formally strip the central bank of its autonomy, giving him the power to dictate monetary policy and the spending of excess foreign-currency reserves. Another measure would eliminate an already neglected rainy-day fund. Opinion polls released in the last week have found Mr. ChC!vez's proposals tied or trailing the opposition position among likely voters, after months of polls showing it likely to pass. In recent weeks, students have rallied in Caracas to protest the changes, and some of those demonstrations have turned violent. On Thursday, tens of thousands of people flooded the streets of the capital in opposition to the referendum proposals. Venezuela's foreign minister, NicolC!s Maduro, asserted on Wednesday that a United States Embassy official was conspiring to defeat the referendum proposals, and threatened to expel the diplomat. And Mr. ChC!vez said this week that CNN was trying to instigate his assassination. Like this sort of political volatility, reduced access to information on public finances is expected to make investing in Venezuela a riskier prospect, said Francisco RodrC-guez, who teaches economics and Latin American studies at Wesleyan University. Investors in Venezuelan bonds already struggle to ascertain what assets back the country's debt and what resources it could count on in the event of a financial crisis. Oil profits are the basis of Mr. ChC!vez's intended socialist revolution, which aims to help the poor in Venezuela and other countries. Petrodollars finance social benefits including free health care, free education and government-subsidized food, and oil profits permit the vast public spending that has helped create nearly four years of economic growth. But large chunks of revenue have been managed opaquely ? to a degree that it is hard to measure the state's success in carrying out its social projects or in monitoring corruption. "It's not really clear how the money is invested," said Theresa Paiz-Fredel, a senior director of Fitch Ratings. The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, a program started by the British government with support from the World Bank, says that a lack of clarity in oil-revenue management can be a sign of the "resource curse," where natural resources fuel corruption and undermine the rule of law instead of contributing to long-term growth. Venezuela is not one of the 15 signers of the initiative, and some economists say it is laboring under the curse. They point to corruption charges this year against the state oil company, leveled by a pro-ChC!vez lawmaker. Officials denied wrongdoing, but eventually conceded that the oil company had too few rigs. Separately, a director of PetrC3leos de Venezuela resigned after a shadowy incident involving company executives, a charter flight to Buenos Aires with a Venezuelan businessman, and a briefcase with $800,000 in cash. Facing mounting criticism, Finance Minister Rodrigo Cabezas has released two reports this year disclosing the Fund for National Development's revenue balance, and he promised in May to conduct a comprehensive audit of all projects the fund financed to give it "more transparency." But analysts trying to gain access to the data are still frustrated, saying that the reports are neither detailed nor frequent enough. The New York Times requested interviews to obtain details on the fund from the finance ministry, the central bank, PetrC3leos de Venezuela and the state-run Banco del Tesoro. After more than two months of efforts, none of those organizations granted an interview or provided any information. SimC3n Escalona, vice president of the National Assembly's finance commission, said he had not "seen any lack of transparency" in the development fund. But, Mr. Escalona was unable to provide updated information on its total assets, bond investments or on transfers from the state oil company to the fund. Mr. ChC!vez has long sought control over Venezuela's foreign reserves. The central bank has already lost much of its independence; a report in March by Barclays Capital said transfers from the bank to the Fund for National Development were determined more by Mr. ChC!vez than the bank. Still, the central bankers occasionally criticize government policy, a practice likely to end if the referendum passes, as will most public debate on state spending, Mr. RodrC-guez of Wesleyan said. And the unfettered spending of reserves could increase inflation, at 17 percent already the highest in Latin America. "They will stop being foreign reserves," Mr. RodrC-guez said, and become just "another account." In October, Fitch Ratings lowered Venezuela's outlook to negative from stable, saying that inflation and a weakening currency had made it vulnerable to a decrease in oil prices. Still, oil-producing countries are not generally known for their transparency. Qatar, for instance, does not publish figures for its large investment fund, which is fed by oil revenue, according to Luc Marchand, an analyst at Standard & Poor's. But even Russia, despite criticism that the government is weakening institutions, is adopting a system used by Norway that will integrate its main oil fund into the budget and make it easier to track, according to Frank Gill, also of Standard & Poor's. And authorities in Moscow have strict investment criteria for the oil fund. Venezuela differs from Russia and many petrostates, including Nigeria, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, in another way. Those countries all run budget surpluses, while Venezuela's heavy social spending results in a deficit, according to data compiled by Mr. Marchand. Some economists, like Mark Weisbrot at the Center for Economic and Policy Research in Washington, say that social spending, which he puts at 21 percent of the gross domestic product last year, is proof that Mr. ChC!vez is combating the resource curse. Mr. Weisbrot points to government statistics showing that poverty has fallen to nearly 30 percent from 44 percent since Mr. ChC!vez was elected nine years ago, and unemployment has dropped to 8 percent from 15 percent. Mr. ChC!vez frames his designs on full control of oil revenue as part of a crusade against Washington-based institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, which he says advance American business interests. A deputy finance minister, Rafael Isea, told state television last summer that eliminating the central bank's autonomy would curb the I.M.F.'s ability to "manage our reserves and influence internal policies." The government has nationalized electric and phone companies here that once had American companies as stockholders, has ceased filing financial reports of the state oil company to the Securities and Exchange Commission, and has announced plans to withdraw Venezuela from the I.M.F. and the World Bank. In September, Mr. ChC!vez ordered the oil company to convert its investment accounts from dollars to euros and Asian currencies. The march to socialism has not been as smooth as he may have hoped. Officials became aware that plans to leave the I.M.F. could conceivably result in a default of Venezuelan debt. Months after the announcement, the country is still part of the I.M.F. Students of history warn that the 1970s oil boom also coincided with heavy spending and questionable accountability. In his book "The Magical State," Fernando Coronil, a professor of history and anthropology at the University of Michigan, documents how policies intended to spur development in the 1970s loaded Venezuela with debt and helped create financial crisis in the 1980s and '90s. "It's one thing to declare the intent to use these resources for the benefit of the population, it's another to prove it," he said, "and in order to do that you have to have checks and balances." *** The New York Times - November 30, 2007 http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/30/business/worldbusiness/30chavez.html Venezuela's Fateful Choice By Jens Erik Gould CARACAS, Venezuela, Nov. 29 ? As petrodollars stream into oil-producing countries, Western officials have begun to demand greater accountability for how they are spent. Some countries known for corruption, like Nigeria and Azerbaijan, have heeded the call, increasing their financial transparency, or at least paying lip service to it. But Venezuela under the leadership of President Hugo ChC!vez appears headed in the opposite direction. Oil revenue supports a diploma-granting program on the edge of Caracas. "We see Venezuela on the other side of the road," said Mercedes de Freitas, executive director of Transparency International here. The group, which tries to combat corruption worldwide, ranks Venezuela as the least transparent country in Latin America and 162 out of 179 nations globally. And that could soon fall even lower. On Sunday, Venezuelans will vote on constitutional changes that would, among other things, grant Mr. ChC!vez unparalleled power to run the country's finances as he sees fit. If the referendum is approved, government accounting is expected to become still harder to fathom, and foreign businesses, many of them already afraid to invest, will find Venezuela even more forbidding. Already, Mr. ChC!vez's government is putting large amounts of oil revenue into development funds and state-owned companies that operate outside the official budget and are not subject to audits or legislative approval. The Fund for National Development, a leading fund of this sort, has received more than $30 billion since 2005 without regularly disclosing its balance, the progress of projects it finances, the whereabouts of billions of dollars it invests in bonds, or how often it receives revenue injections from the state oil company, PetrC3leos de Venezuela. Under the proposed changes, Mr. ChC!vez seeks to formally strip the central bank of its autonomy, giving him the power to dictate monetary policy and the spending of excess foreign-currency reserves. Another measure would eliminate an already neglected rainy-day fund. Opinion polls released in the last week have found Mr. ChC!vez's proposals tied or trailing the opposition position among likely voters, after months of polls showing it likely to pass. In recent weeks, students have rallied in Caracas to protest the changes, and some of those demonstrations have turned violent. On Thursday, tens of thousands of people flooded the streets of the capital in opposition to the referendum proposals. Venezuela's foreign minister, NicolC!s Maduro, asserted on Wednesday that a United States Embassy official was conspiring to defeat the referendum proposals, and threatened to expel the diplomat. And Mr. ChC!vez said this week that CNN was trying to instigate his assassination. Like this sort of political volatility, reduced access to information on public finances is expected to make investing in Venezuela a riskier prospect, said Francisco RodrC-guez, who teaches economics and Latin American studies at Wesleyan University. Investors in Venezuelan bonds already struggle to ascertain what assets back the country's debt and what resources it could count on in the event of a financial crisis. Oil profits are the basis of Mr. ChC!vez's intended socialist revolution, which aims to help the poor in Venezuela and other countries. Petrodollars finance social benefits including free health care, free education and government-subsidized food, and oil profits permit the vast public spending that has helped create nearly four years of economic growth. But large chunks of revenue have been managed opaquely ? to a degree that it is hard to measure the state's success in carrying out its social projects or in monitoring corruption. "It's not really clear how the money is invested," said Theresa Paiz-Fredel, a senior director of Fitch Ratings. The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, a program started by the British government with support from the World Bank, says that a lack of clarity in oil-revenue management can be a sign of the "resource curse," where natural resources fuel corruption and undermine the rule of law instead of contributing to long-term growth. Venezuela is not one of the 15 signers of the initiative, and some economists say it is laboring under the curse. They point to corruption charges this year against the state oil company, leveled by a pro-ChC!vez lawmaker. Officials denied wrongdoing, but eventually conceded that the oil company had too few rigs. Separately, a director of PetrC3leos de Venezuela resigned after a shadowy incident involving company executives, a charter flight to Buenos Aires with a Venezuelan businessman, and a briefcase with $800,000 in cash. Facing mounting criticism, Finance Minister Rodrigo Cabezas has released two reports this year disclosing the Fund for National Development's revenue balance, and he promised in May to conduct a comprehensive audit of all projects the fund financed to give it "more transparency." But analysts trying to gain access to the data are still frustrated, saying that the reports are neither detailed nor frequent enough. ********** NOTE THIS PARAGRAPH ************* The New York Times requested interviews to obtain details on the fund from the finance ministry, the central bank, PetrC3leos de Venezuela and the state-run Banco del Tesoro. After more than two months of efforts, none of those organizations granted an interview or provided any information. ********************************************* SimC3n Escalona, vice president of the National Assembly's finance commission, said he had not "seen any lack of transparency" in the development fund. But, Mr. Escalona was unable to provide updated information on its total assets, bond investments or on transfers from the state oil company to the fund. Mr. ChC!vez has long sought control over Venezuela's foreign reserves. The central bank has already lost much of its independence; a report in March by Barclays Capital said transfers from the bank to the Fund for National Development were determined more by Mr. ChC!vez than the bank. Still, the central bankers occasionally criticize government policy, a practice likely to end if the referendum passes, as will most public debate on state spending, Mr. RodrC-guez of Wesleyan said. And the unfettered spending of reserves could increase inflation, at 17 percent already the highest in Latin America. "They will stop being foreign reserves," Mr. RodrC-guez said, and become just "another account." In October, Fitch Ratings lowered Venezuela's outlook to negative from stable, saying that inflation and a weakening currency had made it vulnerable to a decrease in oil prices. Still, oil-producing countries are not generally known for their transparency. Qatar, for instance, does not publish figures for its large investment fund, which is fed by oil revenue, according to Luc Marchand, an analyst at Standard & Poor's. But even Russia, despite criticism that the government is weakening institutions, is adopting a system used by Norway that will integrate its main oil fund into the budget and make it easier to track, according to Frank Gill, also of Standard & Poor's. And authorities in Moscow have strict investment criteria for the oil fund. Venezuela differs from Russia and many petrostates, including Nigeria, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, in another way. Those countries all run budget surpluses, while Venezuela's heavy social spending results in a deficit, according to data compiled by Mr. Marchand. Some economists, like Mark Weisbrot at the Center for Economic and Policy Research in Washington, say that social spending, which he puts at 21 percent of the gross domestic product last year, is proof that Mr. ChC!vez is combating the resource curse. Mr. Weisbrot points to government statistics showing that poverty has fallen to nearly 30 percent from 44 percent since Mr. ChC!vez was elected nine years ago, and unemployment has dropped to 8 percent from 15 percent. Mr. ChC!vez frames his designs on full control of oil revenue as part of a crusade against Washington-based institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, which he says advance American business interests. A deputy finance minister, Rafael Isea, told state television last summer that eliminating the central bank's autonomy would curb the I.M.F.'s ability to "manage our reserves and influence internal policies." The government has nationalized electric and phone companies here that once had American companies as stockholders, has ceased filing financial reports of the state oil company to the Securities and Exchange Commission, and has announced plans to withdraw Venezuela from the I.M.F. and the World Bank. In September, Mr. ChC!vez ordered the oil company to convert its investment accounts from dollars to euros and Asian currencies. The march to socialism has not been as smooth as he may have hoped. Officials became aware that plans to leave the I.M.F. could conceivably result in a default of Venezuelan debt. Months after the announcement, the country is still part of the I.M.F. Students of history warn that the 1970s oil boom also coincided with heavy spending and questionable accountability. In his book "The Magical State," Fernando Coronil, a professor of history and anthropology at the University of Michigan, documents how policies intended to spur development in the 1970s loaded Venezuela with debt and helped create financial crisis in the 1980s and '90s. "It's one thing to declare the intent to use these resources for the benefit of the population, it's another to prove it," he said, "and in order to do that you have to have checks and balances." *** Reuters via the Wash Post - November 29, 2007 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/11/29/AR2007112901356.html Venezuela tests Chavez socialism at barter market By Enrique Andres Pretel URACHICHE, Venezuela (Reuters) - Neris Pineda will never make a cent from selling bananas at her local Venezuelan market, but she likes it that way. The community market is an experiment in bartering promoted by President Hugo Chavez as he seeks to enshrine socialism as a state priority in a new constitution that goes to a referendum on Sunday. Pineda swaps her produce for anything from haircuts to cellphone cases, using a currency named after an indigenous cult goddess that only circulates in this poor farming town at the foot of lush mountains near the Caribbean coast. "Barter is not just the exchange of merchandise, it's an exchange of values, of solidarity, of love," said Pineda, 52, plying her wares on a recent Sunday morning. "The idea is to become integrated with the community." Barter exchange is the latest weapon in the anti-U.S. president's ideological crusade to turn the consumer-driven oil republic into a Cuba-inspired socialist state and wipe out capitalist values he says are destroying the planet. Economists have largely dismissed his experimental economics as a quirky sideshow while consumerism booms on record oil revenues and Wall St. banks lap up Venezuelan debt issues. Aged whisky at parties and out-sized sport utility vehicles on the roads are common even as Chavez's price controls prompt periodic shortages of milk and eggs on supermarket shelves. But the alternative economics of a man who calls capitalism evil are central to his vision of a revolutionary society. Chavez vows to accelerate his revolution through a referendum on Sunday, when Venezuelans vote on constitutional changes that create new forms of "collective" and "social" property and formalize the economy as socialist. The reforms would also allow Chavez to stay in power for as long as he keeps winning elections, and increase state powers to expropriate private property. Venezuela's military already uses Chavez's slogan of "Homeland, socialism or death" as its salute and the state oil company spends more on social programs such as school-building than on exploration. After remolding state institutions, Chavez has focused on remaking the OPEC nation's economy to match his promised "21st Century socialism." He has proposed solving economic imbalances by passing aggressive anti-hoarding laws, empowering community councils to scrutinize businesses, and creating barter markets with "alternative currencies" to eliminate financial speculation. TRUE BELIEVERS In Urachiche, Chavez has true believers. Rather than pure barter exchange, shoppers at the market in the town of 23,000 residents use a currency named after the Venezuelan goddess Maria Lionza who devotees pay homage to at a nearby mountain. The market has about 100 members and opens once every two weeks with more and more people coming to spend their laminated cardboard "Lionzas." Its leaders say the money is a socialist currency because it cannot be used for accumulation or speculation. "We call ourselves 'pro-sumers' because it unites consumer and producer in the same word. The capitalist system divides us: producers on one side, consumers on another," said Pablo Mayayo, who helped create the market. Chavez will have to rely on a massive state-backed get-out-the-vote machine to win the referendum on Sunday. While he is popular with the majority poor, many moderate supporters are alarmed his redrafting of the constitution could water down private property rights and give too much power to the president. Critics say he is establishing a dictatorship. Polls say the "Yes" and "No" camps are neck-and-neck, making turnout crucial. That may give the advantage to Chavez against an underfunded opposition, political analysts say. It is the toughest campaign of Chavez's career. Since taking power in 1999, he has handily swept to victory at the ballot box about once a year, thanks largely to his spending of oil income on health and education services for the poor. Venezuelans in 2003 spontaneously created barter systems to swap services like dentistry and auto repair after a failed opposition strike nearly shuttered the oil industry and left millions without jobs or much income. But this is precisely the opposite of Venezuela's current situation in which record oil revenues, heavy government spending, and burgeoning monetary liquidity have left the country with more money than it knows what to do with. With Venezuelans enjoying unprecedented consumption growth, critics say bartering makes little sense. Opposition councilman Biagio Pilieri from the municipality around Urachiche said Chavez wants to return Venezuela to the era of Spanish colonial rule. "Barter exchange is long on rhetoric and short on logic," he said. * ================================================================= NY Transfer News Collective * A Service of Blythe Systems Since 1985 - Information for the Rest of Us Our main website: http://www.blythe.org List Archives: http://blythe-systems.com/pipermail/nytr/ Subscribe: http://blythe-systems.com/mailman/listinfo/nytr =================================================================