[progchat_action] Strategies of the Left in Latin America
 
Date: Tue, 24 Jul 2007 01:18:05 -0500 (CDT)


Strategies of the Left in Latin America

Claudio Katz
International Viewpoint: IV391 - July-August 2007

The call to build socialism of the twenty-first century has re-opened the
strategic discussion on the Latin American left. Once again
characterizations of socialism and courses of action are being analyzed to
advance the socialist objective.

This reflection includes six large themes: material conditions, relations of
social forces, social subjects, popular consciousness, institutional
frameworks and the organization of the oppressed. [1]

Maturity of the Productive Forces

The first debate takes up once again a classic controversy. Have the forces
of production in Latin America matured sufficiently to begin an
anticapitalist transformation? Are the existing resources, technologies and
qualifications sufficient to open a socialist process?

The countries of the region are less prepared but more urgently in need of
facing up to this change than are the developed nations. They endure
nutritional, educational and sanitary disasters more intense than those in
the advanced economies, but have weaker material premises with which to
solve these problems. This contradiction is a consequence of the peripheral
character of Latin America [within the global economy - ed.] and its
resulting agrarian backwardness, fragmented industrialization and financial
dependence.

On the Left there are two traditional responses in the face of this
situation: to promote a stage of progressive capitalism or to initiate a
socialist transition adapted to the regional insufficiencies. In a recent
text we have expressed various arguments in favour of the second option. [2]

But another equally relevant debate centres on the opportunities of each
course. After a traumatic period of productive depression and banking
collapses, Latin America is going through a phase of growth, increasing
exports, and recomposition of business profits. One could object that in
these conditions, no collapse justifying anticapitalist transformation is
foreseeable.

However, the socialist option is not a conjunctural program to overcome
recessionary cycles and in this respect strictly differentiates itself from
Keynesianism. [3] It aims to overcome the exploitation and inequality that
characterize capitalism. It seeks to do away with poverty and unemployment,
to eradicate environmental disasters, to put an end to nightmarish wars, and
to stop financial cataclysms.

This polarization is taking place in the current Latin American conjuncture.
The increase in profits and consumption of the comfortable sectors contrasts
with terrifying indices of misery. These calamities - that become more
visible in the peaks of economic disaster - justify the battle for
socialism. The situations of collapse do not constitute the only apt moment
to eradicate the system. The anticapitalist turn is an open option for an
entire period and can begin in whichever conjuncture of the cycle. The
experience of the twentieth century confirms this fact.

No socialist revolution coincided with the zenith of an economic crisis. The
majority of cases erupted as a consequence of war, colonial occupation or
dictatorial oppression. In contexts of this kind the Bolsheviks took power
(in Russia), Mao imposed himself on China, Tito won Yugoslavia, the
Vietnamese threw out the United States and the Cuban revolution triumphed.
Most of these victories were completed during the full postwar boom; that is
to say during a stage of record capitalist growth. No automatism links,
therefore, the debut of socialism with economic collapse. The penuries that
capitalism generates are sufficient to support its reversal, in whatever
phase of the periodic fluctuations of this system.

One objection to starting socialist processes highlights the impediments
created by globalization. It is argued that the current internationalization
of capital makes an anticapitalist challenge in Latin America impractical.

But where exactly is the obstacle? Globalization does not constitute a
barrier for a project of universal scope, such as socialism. The overflowing
of borders extends the imbalances of capitalism and creates better objective
bases for a socialist transformation.

The presentation of globalization as a stage that makes alternative models
impossible is a tributary of the neoliberal vision which proclaimed the
inexistence of alternatives to the rightist model. But if one discards
socialism for this reason it is also necessary to reject whatever Keynesian
or regulated capitalist alternative. It is inconsistent to argue that the
totalitarianism of globalization has buried the anticapitalist project, but
tolerates interventionist forms of accumulation. If it has shut out all
options for socialism there are also no openings for neo-developmentalism.

However, in reality globalization does not constitute the end of history and
all alternatives remain open. It is merely that a new period of accumulation
began, sustained by the recomposition of profits at the expense of the
oppressed and by transfers of major international imbalances to the weakest
economies. These regressive media give new life to the necessity of
socialism as the only popular response to the new stage. It is the only exit
which can remedy the instabilities created by the expansion of global
capital in a framework of nation states, and in the face of tensions
generated by the overflowing of financial speculation, imperialist
polarization and the divorce between markets and technological advance.

What is the Correlation of Forces? The pre-eminence of relations of forces
favourable to the oppressed is a condition for socialist change. The popular
majority cannot prevail over its antagonists of the dominant classes if it
faces a very negative balance of power. But how do we assess these
parameters?

The correlation of forces is determined in Latin America by the positions
gained, threatened or lost by three sectors: the local capitalist classes,
the oppressed masses and American imperialism. During the 1990s a massive
global offensive of capital over labour was consummated on a global scale.
The initial Thatcherite forcefulness of this broadside has decreased, but it
left behind an adverse general climate for workers on an international
scale. What happened in Latin America?

The capitalists of the region actively participated in this attack, but
ended up suffering various collateral consequences from the process. With
commercial opening they lost their competitive positions and with the
de-nationalization of the productive apparatus they gave up their defences
against their external competitors. Later, the financial crisis thrashed the
establishment and took away their direct political presence. As a
consequence the right has been left in a minority and centre-left
governments replaced many conservatives in the management of the state
(especially in the Southern Cone). [4] The capitalist elite are no longer
able to fix the agenda of the entire region with impunity. They have been
affected by a crisis of neoliberalism that could result in the structural
decline of this project.

The regional relation of forces has also been modified by massive popular
uprisings, which in South America precipitated the fall of various heads of
state. The rebellions in Bolivia, Ecuador, Argentina and Venezuela have had
direct repercussions on the dominant classes as a whole. They challenged
business aggression and in many countries imposed a certain accommodation
with the masses.

The combative impulse is very unequal. In certain nations popular
protagonism is visible (Bolivia, Venezuela, Argentina, Ecuador), while in
others an ebb in the tide prevails as a consequence of deception (Brazil,
Uruguay). A new development is the awakening of worker and student struggles
in countries that lead in neoliberal ranking (Chile), and in nations
overwhelmed by social abuses and haemorrhages of migration (Mexico). The
correlation of forces is extremely varied in Latin America, but a general
trend of popular initiatives is reaffirming itself throughout the entire
region.

At the beginning of the 1990s American imperialism launched a politics of
recolonization in its backyard through free trade and the installation of
military bases. This panorama has also changed. The original version of the
Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) failed because of conflicts between
globalized and dependent corporations in internal markets, clashes between
exporters and industrialists and extensive popular rejection of the project.
The counteroffensive of bilateral trade agreements that the US Department of
State has launched does not compensate this setback.

The international isolation of Bush (electoral collapse of the Republicans,
failure in Iraq, loss of allies in Europe) has closed the space for
unilateralism and spurred the resurgence of geopolitical blocs adverse to
the United States (such as the Non-Aligned countries). This American retreat
is sharply reflected by the absence of military responses to the challenge
of Venezuela.

The correlation of forces has registered, therefore, various significant
changes in Latin America. The dominant classes no longer count on the
neoliberal strategic compass, the popular movement has recuperated its
street presence, and American imperialism has lost capacity of intervention.

Diversity of Subjects The actors of a socialist transformation are the
victims of capitalist domination, but the specific subjects of this process
in Latin America are very diverse. In some regions indigenous communities
have occupied a leading role in the resistance (Ecuador, Bolivia, Mexico)
and in other areas peasants have led the resistance (Brazil, Peru,
Paraguay). In certain countries the protagonists have been formal urban
workers (Argentina, Uruguay) or precarious informal urban workers
(Venezuela, the Caribbean, Central America). The new role of indigenous
communities and the weaker role of factory unions stand out. The
multiplicity of sectors reflects the differentiated social structure and
political particularities of each country.

However, this diversity also confirms the variety of participants of a
socialist transformation. As the development of capitalism expands the
exploitation of salaried work and collateral forms of oppression, the
potential actors of a socialist process are all the exploited and oppressed.
This role does not fall exclusively on the salaried workers who directly
create business profits, but to all the victims of capitalist inequality.
What is essential is the convergence of these sectors in a common battle,
which unfolds around ever-changing focal points of rebellion. Victory
depends on this action against an enemy who dominates by dividing the
popular camp.

In this struggle certain segments of salaried workers tend to play a more
central role because of the place they occupy in the vital branches of the
economy (mining, factories, banks). Capitalists profit from the privations
of all the dispossessed, but their profits depend on the direct labour force
of the exploited and from profit which is made specifically from certain
activities.

This centrality is verified in the current conjuncture of economic revival,
which tends to recreate the significance of salaried workers. In Argentina
unions are reclaiming their pre-eminence in the streets, in comparison with
the role played by the unemployed and the middle class during the crisis of
2001. In Chile the strikes of the miners are playing a leading part, in
Mexico certain unions are establishing a role, and in Venezuela the
centrality of the petroleum workers since their battle against the coup
attempt (in 2002) persists.

Problems of Popular Consciousness The eradication of capitalism is a project
entirely dependent upon the level of consciousness of the oppressed. Only
these convictions can direct a process of popular struggle toward socialism.

The primitive vision of this development as an inevitable transformation of
history has lost intellectual consensus and political attractiveness. No
pattern of historical evolution of this type exists. Socialism will
constitute a voluntary creation of the vast majorities or it will never
arise. What occurred under "real socialism" illustrates how terrible it is
to substitute popular determination with the paternalism of functionaries.

But the consciousness of the oppressed is a sphere subject to sudden changes
and is conditioned by the experience of struggle. Two opposing forces
influence its development: the learning that the oppressed assimilate in
their resistance against capital and the dejection which is generated by
stifling work, anxiety for survival and daily alienation.

The inclination of salaried workers to question or accept the existing order
stems from the variable results of this conflict. In certain circumstances
critical vision predominates and in other moments resignation prevails.
These attitudes depend on many factors and operate on very distinct
generational perceptions of capitalism. For example, contrary to the 1970s
the bulk of contemporary youth grew up without expectations of better jobs
or education, observing exclusion, unemployment and inequality as normal
facets of the functioning of the system. With this new outlook of the
existing order, the new Latin American generation has taken up again the
bellicosity of its predecessors.

But specifically socialist consciousness does not depend only on the
predominant image of capitalism. On this level conclusions drawn from the
class struggle and the impact provoked by key international events are more
important. These milestones determine the extent of certain "average degrees
of socialist consciousness," that translate into levels of enthusiasm toward
or disillusion with the anticapitalist project. The victories achieved in
Russia, China, Yugoslavia, Vietnam or Cuba brought about a positive
socialist perception that was not shattered by the numerous defeats that
also occurred in those periods.

The current Latin American generation did not come of age as did their
parents in a context marked by great triumphs. This absence of a successful
anticapitalist reference - close to their immediate experiences - explains
their greater spontaneous coldness toward the socialist project.

The biggest differences between the current period and the era of 1960-1980
are situated more on the level of political consciousness, than on the
terrain of the relationships of social forces or change in popular subjects.
It is not the intensity of social conflicts, the disposition of struggle of
the oppressed or capacity of control of the oppressors which has changed
substantively, but rather the visibility of and popular confidence in a
socialist model.

The collapse of the Soviet Union caused a crisis of international
credibility of the socialist project which has conditioned the action of the
left. Latin America was not an exception, but the effective scope of this
impact has been more limited in the region. The Latin American left had
already traveled a great distance from the Soviet model before the collapse
of the "socialist camp" and its dejection was due more to the inheritance
left behind by the dictatorships, the failure of Sandinismo or the blockade
suffered by the Central American insurgency. [5] Also on this level, the
survival of the Cuban revolution functioned as a counterweight.

In any case the climate of disappointment was gradually replaced by an
impulse to rebuild the emancipatory program. The advance of antineoliberal
consciousness is illustrated in the forceful rejection of privatizations and
deregulations (much greater than that observed in other regions, such as
Eastern Europe). A rebirth of anti-imperialist consciousness is also taking
place without the regressive components of ethnicity or religion that
prevail in the Arab world.

However, the anticapitalist connection is the great missing link in this
antineoliberal and anti-imperialist drive. This deficiency has curbed until
now the radicalization of popular consciousness and therefore it is
important to debate the socialism of the twenty-first century, a discussion
initiated by the Bolivarian process (in Venezuela). This ideological
reconstruction is possible because of the presence of many features of
continuity on the left, which has suffered fewer fractures than in other
regions. Neither the collapse of the historic political identity of the
workers or the distancing from the left that occurred in various Eastern
European countries is notable.

The Constitutional Framework The Latin American left faces a relatively new
strategic problem: the stabilization of constitutional regimes. For the
first time in the history of the region the dominant classes manage their
governments through non-dictatorial institutions, in almost all the
countries and after a significant period. Neither economic collapses or
political crises or popular insurrections altered this form of government.

The return of the military is for the most part a discarded hand for the
hemisphere's elites. In the most critical situations presidents are replaced
by other leaders with some type of civic-military interregnum. What is
discarded for now is the reinstallation of dictatorships to fight
fragmentation from above or rebellion from below.

The current regimes are not real democracies but rather plutocracies in the
service of capitalists. The institutions of this system have served to
perpetuate social abuses which many dictatorships would not even have dared
to suggest. These aggressions diminished the legitimacy of the system, but
did not lead to a popular rejection of the constitutional regime equivalent
to that suffered by the old tyrannies.

This change in the rule of capitalist domination has contradictory effects
on the action of the Latin American left. On the one hand it amplified the
possibilities of political action in a context of public freedoms. On the
other hand the stabilization of parliaments, parties and functionaries
offered capitalists more political security and growing confidence in their
business affairs.

A system which reduces and at the same time consolidates the power of the
oppressors represents a great challenge for the left, especially when this
regime is for the most part perceived as the natural mechanism for the
functioning of any modern society.

This last belief is encouraged by the right - which has grasped the
usefulness of conducting their political activity within the constitutional
context - and by the centre-left - which preserves the status quo under
progressive masks. Both stoke false electoral polarizations in order to
present the simple alternation of figures in power as meaningful change.

The current example of this complementariness is the "modern and civilized
left" that arrived in government with Lula (Brazil), Tabari (Uruguay) or
Bachelet (Chile), in order to perpetuate the supremacy of the capitalists.
However, other situations are more problematic because institutional
continuity was broken with fraud (Caldersn in Mexico) or presidential
resignations (Bolivia, Ecuador, Argentina).

In certain denouements these convulsions concluded with the reconstruction
of the bourgeois order (Kirchner in Argentina), but in other countries the
crisis resulted in the unexpected entrance to government of nationalist or
reformist presidents, who are rejected by the establishment. This is the
case of Chavez (Venezuela), Morales (Bolivia) and probably Correa (Ecuador).
These results have been the consequence of the non-institutional character
the crises and insurrections in these nations initially assumed.

In these processes the electoral terrain has shaped up to be an area of
struggle against reaction and a point of support for coming to terms with
radical transformations. This conclusion is vital for the left. For example,
since 1998 all of the elections deepened the legitimacy of the Bolivarian
process in Venezuela and transferred to the ballot box the defeat dealt to
the right in the streets. The electoral sphere and the victories of
mobilization complemented one another.

The constitutional setting significantly altered the framework of action of
the left, which for decades had been accustomed to confronting a dictatorial
enemy. The battle within these systems is not easy because institutionalism
functions with permanent pretences of reproducing the existing order.
Therefore it is necessary to combine direct action with electoral
participation. For this path, times of arising popular power - which every
revolutionary process requires - and the maturation of socialist
consciousness - which to a certain degree is processed through the
constitutional arena - complement one another.

Movements and Parties Popular consciousness translates into organization.
The grouping together of the oppressed is indispensable to creating
instruments of an anticapitalist transformation, since without their own
organisms the exploited cannot initiate an alternative project for society.

Movements and parties constitute two modalities of contemporary popular
organization. Both options perform an essential role for the development of
socialist convictions. They reinforce confidence in self-organization and
develop bases of collective functioning of popular power for the future.

Movements sustain immediate social struggle and parties fuel more developed
political activity. Both instances are necessary to facilitate direct action
and electoral participation. However, this complementariness is frequently
questioned. There are exclusive advocates of movements and of parties.

But these objections only invalidate the actions of certain parties and not
the general function of these structures, which are irreplaceable for acting
on the political level. No emancipatory project can progress exclusively on
social terrain, or dispense with the specific platforms, the links between
demands and strategies of power, which party organizations provide. These
groupings contribute to overcoming the limitations of a spontaneous
rebellion. The party facilitates the maturation of an anticapitalist
consciousness, which does not emerge abruptly from protest action and which
requires differentiating struggle for improvements under capitalism and the
battle for socialist objectives.

The disqualification of parties is as inadequate as the vice of superiority
that some organizations on the left still exhibit. They maintain the old
vanguardist conception, act with iron verticalism and reward themselves with
permanent self-proclamation. This cult of the organization leads to
sectarian practices and a quest for hegemony in all social movements.

This form of political action feeds itself from the small-group caudillista
tradition, or the tradition of strong-man, top-down leadership. In some
countries this behaviour also expresses persistent bad habits from an
organizational culture built during decades of clandestine action and
antidictatorial resistance. In the current framework of public freedoms and
party competition the confused character of this conduct is patently
obvious. Those who maintain these practices can thrive, but they will never
lead a socialist transformation.

Reform and Revolution Material conditions, correlation of forces, social
subjects, popular consciousness and popular organization shape the hexagon
of themes that surround the strategy of the left. The postulated programs
connecting action, conviction and proposals in a socialist sense depend on
these six foundations.

However, rarely are these components coincidental. Sometimes the maturity of
material conditions does not converge with the correlation of forces, with
the protagonism of social subjects or with the aptitude of the political
context. Less common still is the connection of these elements with the
level of organization, consciousness and popular leadership required for an
anticapitalist project. The strategy of the left is a search for paths to
overcome these discordances and the analytical distinction of six great
questions aiming to facilitate this analysis.

The biggest problem is situated in the links that connect these pillars. The
routes to follow are extremely varied because the universalism of the
socialist program is not synonymous with uniformity. The experience of the
twentieth century has illustrated how the bases of this process combine
together in differentiated forms in each country. It has also been confirmed
that the temporary nature of a socialist debut differs significantly between
accelerated insurrectional conclusions (Russia) and prolonged confrontations
of dual power (China, Vietnam). [6]

There are two grand responses - traditionally counterposed - to the dilemmas
created by this disconnect between components of socialist change: reform
and revolution. The first path promotes combining the disarticulated
elements through a progression of social improvements that reinforce the
positions of the workers and consolidate their political weight,
institutional presence and organizational force.

But these reforms - which are feasible under capitalism - do not accumulate
and are not irreversible. Sooner or later their consolidation (or deepening)
clashes with the rule of profit and suffers employers' abuse which provokes
major conflicts. In these circumstances the consequent popular response
demands advancing toward socialist change.

Reforms are only valid as a link in the struggle for socialism. The absence
of this perspective leads to the abandonment not only of an anticapitalist
future, but of the improvements themselves. It's incorrect to attempt first
the "resolution of immediate problems" in order to "discuss socialism
later." If capitalism could structurally solve those problems socialism
would be unnecessary.

The second idea of socialist change promotes revolution and rejection of
reforms. It calls for overcoming the disconnection between objective and
subjective conditions through action which articulates the peaks of the
crisis of capitalism with the disposition of struggle of the masses and
socialist convictions. However, this connection is not so easy, even when
there occur conjunctures close to the Leninist model of a revolutionary
situation ("those from above can no longer continue dominating and those
from below play a leading role in a historical eruption").

In South America we have observed in the last several years various
circumstances of this type without any socialist result. Crisis of hegemony
or authority of the dominant classes (loss of consensus and leadership
capacity in Gramscian terms) converging with the revolt of the subaltern
classes is not enough. [7]

Socialist maturity requires a prior process of learning which is not
improvised in the expeditious path toward power. That preparation includes
social achievements and democratic conquests that are obtained through
reforms. This last term is not a bad word, nor is it situated in the
antipodes of revolution. It is a useful instrument to gradually develop the
revolutionary leap forward, building bridges which move the oppressed closer
to the socialist goal.

A combination of reform and revolution can enable the link between immediate
conquests and radical ruptures with capitalism. The first type of
achievement is indispensable for creating popular power and the second for
defeating an enemy that will not renounce its privileges.

To connect reform with revolution is the way to adapt the correlation of
forces and popular action with the possibilities of anticapitalist
transformation in each country. But it is necessary to replace the old
counterposing of both roads with their confluence.

Optimism and Reason To discuss strategies presupposes searching for a guide
for inspired action in past experiences, but always remaining open to new
circumstances and experiences. This inquiry includes unprecedented
hypotheses and no simple calculus of models to repeat.

The strategy of the left includes a liberated dimension that cannot be found
in other political formations. It raises humanist objectives associated with
a communist horizon which no bourgeois current can offer. But the
credibility of these goals depends on the behaviour of its organizers and
this conduct presupposes an attitude of spontaneous resistance to inequality
and intuitive rejection of injustice.

The function of strategy is to transform indignation in the face of misery
and solidarity with the oppressed into rational projects. And this
development demands intellectual bravery to face up to the thorniest and
most unpleasant problems. If there is no disposition to tackle the
difficulties, the roads to socialism will invariably remain blocked.

The current Latin American conjuncture invites renewing strategic
controversies on the left with frank, open and respectful debates. It is the
moment to adopt the achievements and weigh the limitations with an
enthusiastic and critical attitude. Both positions contribute to forging
reasoned optimism which the battle for socialism demands.

Claudio Katz teaches at the University of Buenos Aires and is involved in
the Argentine network 'Economistas de Izquierda' (EDI, 'Left Economists').

NOTES

[1] This is a challenging theoretical text available for the first time in
English. Claudio Katz' interventions in the thriving debates on the future
of socialism in Latin America have been much discussed in the magazines,
journals and websites of the left throughout Latin America and Spain. In
providing a translation of Katz' most recent contribution New Socialist is
attempting to introduce to North American readers a taste of the character
of discussions around building a socialism for the twenty-first century
currently taking place on the ground in Latin America. The editors added the
explanatory footnotes to the original text. Claudio Katz is an economist at
the University of Buenos Aires, a researcher with Conicet, and a member of
Economistas de Izquierda, Economists of the Left, in Argentina. This article
was translated by New Socialist editor Jeffery R. Webber.

[2] Claudio Katz, "Socialismo o Neo-desarrollismo," (Socialism or
Neo-Developmentalism), available in Spanish at: www.lahaine.org, 1-12-06, or
www.rebelion.org, 1-12-06.

[3] Keynesianism refers to the reformist economic theory of John Maynard
Keynes. It was most influential between the end of the Second World War and
the 1970s.

[4] The Southern Cone refers to Argentina, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay.

[5] Sandinismo refers to the ideology and practice of the Sandinista
revolutionary government of Nicaragua, in power between 1979 and 1990. The
Central American insurgencies referred to here were the unsuccessful
revolutionary guerrilla wars waged in Guatemala and El Salvador in the
1980s.

[6] Dual power refers to an unstable and unsustainable period of a
revolutionary situation in which popular institutions of the exploited and
oppressed emerge alongside and in opposition to the existing institutions of
the state.

[7] Antonio Gramsci was an Italian Marxist who developed the most
influential Marxist theory of hegemony.

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