[NYTr] Newsweek Talks to Critical Brit Gen. Jackson about Irraq
 
Date: Fri, 7 Sep 2007 16:18:33 -0500 (CDT)


Via NY Transfer News Collective  *  All the News that Doesn't Fit
 
Newsweek - Sep 6, 2007
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/20629345/site/newsweek/?from=rss

Gen. Sir Mike Jackson Speaks Out on Iraq

The former head of the British Army is outspokenly critical of U.S.
military policy in Iraq. 

Gen. Sir Mike Jackson discusses planning for the Iraq War, the problem
with Washington's neocons and the military withdrawal from Basra City.

By Stryker McGuire 
Newsweek

Sept. 6, 2007 - Gen. Sir Mike Jackson has retired his British Army
uniform, but not his penchant for straight talk and controversy. In his
new book, bSoldier: The Autobiography,b to be published next week, the
63-year-old former Army head is highly critical of Washingtonbs
approach to the war in Iraq. bThe Americans had the naive idea that the
people would be so happy to be liberated that nothing else mattered,b
he writes. He blames, in particular, former U.S. secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld and his neoconservative coterie for ba very ideological
approach, and one that is intellectually bankrupt.b Jackson was chief
of the General Staff from just before the 2003 invasion until last
year, when he left the service. His comments represent the most
outspoken criticism from a senior British officer of American military
policy in Iraq. In an interview with NEWSWEEKbs Stryker McGuire on
Thursday, Jackson sought to make clear his respect for the U.S. armed
forcesbif not necessarily for their political masters. Excerpts:

NEWSWEEK: So I see from your book that your Army superiors spotted very
early on your btendency to ebullience and flamboyant behavior.b 

Sir Mike Jackson: [Laughs.] I think I got ticked off for it.

Letbs go straight to the Iraq War planning, which you had some issues
with. The plan originally was for the British troops to come from the
north, from Turkey. That was the original plan. But all the signs
coming out of Turkey, if it went to a formal decision, were that it
would be bno.b So I think it was late January, if my memory serves me
right, when the British government said, OK, webre going to have to
rejig and come in from the south. Quite a complicated thing, because
American plans were also based on us coming from the north, so the
Coalition as a whole had to rejig.

This is not like changing family vacation plans.

Under two months. But it was done, and we know what the results wereba
stunning operation. I would like you to include this: my criticism is
not one of the United States or its Army; it was of a particular view
that was held. Ibm one of the greatest admirers of the American Army,
and what was done in just under three weeks was stunning. Absolutely
brilliant.

What about the bparticular viewb that you speak of?

What was thought would happen after Saddam Hussein was deposed seemed
to me to stem from that very tight group of so-called neocons. Take the
head off the regime, put in a temporary government, composed mainly of
these basically Iraqi expats, if we can put it like that. And somehow
everything would be fine. Well, we know, it was going to be much more
difficult than that.

So postwar planning was the problem.

Webd had experience with Kosovo, webd had experience with Bosnia. Where
the [American] thinking just didnbt get it was regime change. The
deposing of Saddam Hussein was not the end state. Defeating the Iraqi
armed forces was not the end state. The end state is an Iraq whichbitbs
very easy to say this now, I knowbis at peace with itself, at peace
with its neighbors, with representative government, an economy which is
starting to get momentum. Easy to say, very complicated and difficult
to do.

Now, you made the point in the book that the British were the junior
partners in this war and therefore their influence, by definition, was
somewhat limited. Were you dismayed that your government didnbt make
more of an effort with the Americans on planning, for example? I donbt
know. I really donbt know.

There was postwar planning butb

In the [U.S.] State Department! Then we had this decision to shift it
from State to the Pentagon. I think in late January, early February.
Quite late in the day. And to the best of my knowledge, the Pentagon
hadbwell, I think we know what happenedbis that Donald Rumsfeld just
didnbt see it that way. And therebs a lot of frustration amongst the
American senior military leadership at this time b& Webll never know,
but my judgment is that things may well have gone better had that State
Department planning been allowed to go forward.

You had a lot of experience in Northern Ireland. What did you learn
about insurgency that tells us something about Iraq? Even with a
comparatively large number of [Coalition and Iraqi] security forces,
insurgents using, letbs say, guerilla-style tactics, theybre going to
hurt, but theybre not going to win. Equally, it would be remarkable in
my view if such a terrorist organization at some stage says, bWe
surrender.b The security forcesb role is to hold the ring, as we say,
until a political settlement emerges. A political problem [like the one
in Iraq] can only have a political solution in the end.

But a military process can aid a political solutionb

Of course. But when you look at it over time, as I say, it has to be a
political outcome.

Whatbs your sense of what has happened in Basra [in southern Iraq]
since 2003? Your forces got there and it was relatively peaceful. Not
any more. On my first visit after the [invasion], two or three weeks
afterwards, walking through Basra, walking through the souk, everybody
smiling, saying shukranbthank you. So thatbs where we began. And
perhaps not entirely foreseen, or given as much weight, was the
[internal] power struggle that was going to ensue. How much Iranian
influence, I donbt know, I just know there is something there.
Everybody jockeying for position for the future. But increasingly using
violence to do that, sadly, rather than the ballot box. But we stuck to
our gunsbof building up Iraqi security in numbers and training and
capability. And then on a case-by-case basis, a formal handover of
primary security responsibilities to the Iraqis. The handover of Basra
City [from British to Iraqi forces on Sept. 3] was part of this
strategy. There was an appalling headline the other day: FIRST DEFEAT
OF THE BRITISH ARMY IN TWO GENERATIONS. Well, itbs nonsensical.
Absolutely nonsensical. But itbs a political comment, that [headline].

But thatbs the thing. Can you argue that the failure of Iraq is a
political failure? That itbs not a military failure? Is that fair? Itbs
a very good question. I donbt believe itbs a military failure, no.

Youbve expressed admiration for U.S. Gen. David Petraeus [who has
studied and written about counterinsurgency, has been executing
President George W. Bushbs bsurgeb strategy and is due to report soon
on Coalition military progressbor the lack of itbin Iraq]. This to me
is showing how the U.S. Army adapts itself. It was at one point
boverwhelming force wins outbbI paraphrasebbut events have shown itbs
more complicated [than that], and youbve seen the U.S. Army adapting.

And armed forces can only adapt within the parameters set for them by
the politicians? In a democracy, thatbs how it has to be. Rightly. [In
Iraq] much, therefore, is on the shoulders of the politicians who set
defense policy.

B) 2007 MSNBC.com 

 
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