*****************************************************************
12/31/02 ****     RADIATION BULLETIN(RADBULL)       **** VOL 10.339
*****************************************************************
   RADBULL IS PRODUCED BY THE ABALONE ALLIANCE CLEARINGHOUSE
*****************************************************************
Send News Stories to news@energy-net.org with title on subject
line and first line of body

                         NUCLEAR POLICY
 
1 [toeslist] Iraq Belongs on the Back Burner
2 BLAIR'S NUCLEAR CONUNDRUM
3 U.N. Inspectors Visit 3 New Sites in Iraq
4 Annan: No Reason Now for Attacking Iraq
5 Expelled U.N. Inspectors Arrive in China
6 Agency: N. Korea Nuke Effort Now Shrouded
7 N. Korea Accuses U.S. of Plotting War
8 Roh Skeptical on 'Containment Policy'   
9 NK: Kim Jong Il's miscalculations
10 Baghdad: Why is North Korea’s case different? 
11 US: Are we wary yet? Getting to the bottom of 2002
12 North Korea situation can be resolved diplomatically: Bush
13 Kim, Roh Pledge to Bring Peace on Peninsula 
14 IAEA Set to Complete Report on NK Nuclear Program 
15 U.S. and the Republic of Korea Agree on Joint Nuclear Energy 
16 *North Korean radio denounces USA as "nuclear war fanatic"* /
 
                         NUCLEAR REACTORS
 
17 WPost: Putting a Lid on Chernobyl
18 UK LIB DEMS: NO MORE NUCLEAR REACTORS
19 UK: People power fails to split atom security
20 US: NRC Draft review standard available 
21 US: NRC SRP review available (Power update testing) 
22 US:  Browns Ferry restart TVA's biggest move of 2002
23 AU: Joh's secret '70s dream: a nuke plant - 
24 Bulgaria starts closing nuclear reactors
25 US:  Robinson Nuclear Plant focuses on tighter security, relicensing
26 US: Law makes nuke plant trespassing a felony 
27 US: New Seabrook owners to cut 190 jobs 
28 US: Seabrook nuclear plant is facing job cuts /*
 
                          NUCLEAR SAFETY
 
29 US: [radiation-survivors] Lawyers give up on TMI cases
30 US: [radiation-survivors] Depleted uranium br a killer disaster
31 Studies track Gulf War illness*
32 US: Fallon father's survey confirms cancer fears
 
                         NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE
 
33 US: Vitrification plant boss garners passing grade
 
                         NUCLEAR WEAPONS
 
34 Pakistan: N-programme in safe hands: FO 
35 Inconsistencies lead to war
36 Russia Warns NK on NPT Withdrawal   
37 US: Historic bomb shelter found
38 US: 50 Facts About U.S. Nuclear Weapons
39 US: George Orwell: You and the Atom Bomb
40 Defusing a lethal legacy (Project Saphire)
41 Project Sapphire series: Day 2 Getting ready to go in
42 Project Sapphire: The Mission
43 Nuclear taboo losing its potency
 
                        US DEPT. OF ENERGY
 
44 Lockheed Martin: High Levels of Toxic Rocket Fuel Found in
45 DOE/NNSA Cites Los Alamos National Laboratory for Price
46 DOE: LANL ROD on Technical area 18 
47 LANL Floodplain barrier 
 
                          OTHER NUCLEAR
 
48 Crisis in Korea: View from Pyongyang -- The Washington Times
*****************************************************************
*****************************************************************
                         FULL NEWS STORIES
*****************************************************************
*****************************************************************
 1 [toeslist] Iraq Belongs on the Back Burner
 
Date: Tue, 31 Dec 2002 01:42:09 -0600 (CST)

 
Iraq Belongs on the Back Burner
By WARREN M. CHRISTOPHER
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/31/opinion/31CHRI.html

[L] OS ANGELES
North Korea's startling revival of its nuclear program, coupled with the 
unrelenting threat of international terrorism, presents compelling reasons 
for President Bush to step back from his fixation on attacking Iraq and to 
reassess his administration's priorities.

North Korea's reopening of its plutonium reprocessing plant at Yongbyon 
puts it within six months of being able to produce sufficient weapons-grade 
material to generate several nuclear bombs. Contrast this with Iraq. Not 
only is North Korea much further along than Iraq in building nuclear 
weapons but, by virtue of its longer-range missiles, it has a greater 
delivery capability.

Every option for dealing with this situation  including the 
administration's "structured containment"  is fraught with danger and 
potentially disastrous consequences. Having participated in the discussions 
leading up to the now-violated 1994 agreed framework with North Korea, I am 
convinced that this crisis requires sustained attention from top government 
officials, including the president. It's important to remember that 
devising a solution for the North Korean crisis will require sustained 
diplomatic efforts with China, South Korea and other countries of the 
region. All this will take time, energy and attention.

And then there is the war on terrorism. Deadly terrorist attacks continue 
around the globe, wreaking havoc in far-flung places such as Indonesia, 
Kenya, Jordan and Yemen, where three American missionaries were killed by a 
gunman yesterday. Here at home, we remain highly vulnerable to terrorist 
attacks and woefully unprepared to cope with the consequences. We cannot 
put this issue on the back burner.

In foreign affairs, Washington is chronically unable to deal with more than 
one crisis at a time. As deputy secretary of state in the Carter 
administration, I helped to negotiate the release of 52 Americans held 
hostage in the United States Embassy in Iran. I recall how this relatively 
confined crisis submerged all other issues for 14 months, including the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Similarly, in the early years of the 
Clinton administration, our concentration on Bosnia and Haiti may have 
drawn our attention away from the killings in Rwanda.

While Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld may be right in saying that our 
military can fight two wars at the same time, my experience tells me that 
we cannot mount a war against Iraq and still maintain the necessary policy 
focus on North Korea and international terrorism. Anyone who has worked at 
the highest levels of our government knows how difficult it is to engage 
the attention of the White House on anything other than the issue of the 
day. For example, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict  a major crisis by any 
standard  now seems to be handled largely by an assistant secretary of 
state. Likewise, Afghanistan, which is at risk again of becoming a haven 
for terrorists, seems to be getting less attention than it deserves.

A United States-led attack on Iraq will overshadow all other foreign-policy 
issues for at least a year. In the early months, the news media can be 
expected to offer wall-to-wall combat stories, covered with characteristic 
one-dimensional intensity. Even if the optimistic predictions of quick 
victory prove to be accurate, we would then find ourselves absorbed with 
the occupation of Iraq and efforts to impose democracy on the fractious 
elements of that country.

Unless the president has been provided intelligence about Iraq's capacities 
that he has not shared or even hinted at in his public statements, the 
threats from North Korea and from international terrorism are more imminent 
than those posed by Iraq. No doubt the world would be better off without 
Saddam Hussein reigning in Iraq, but we must recognize that the effort of 
removing him right now may well distract us from dealing with graver threats.

We now have in place in Iraq a much stronger inspection regime than we had 
only a few months ago, and it would be both consistent with our obligations 
to the United Nations and conducive to sound relations with our allies to 
let that effort run its natural course. The present murky picture of Iraq's 
capacities and intentions may become much clearer after a sustained period 
of regular and surprise inspections and interrogations of Iraqi scientists 
in noncoercive circumstances.

Under our constitutional system, the president has pre-eminent power to 
establish priorities in foreign affairs  reinforced in the case of Iraq by 
Congressional action. Nevertheless, the decision to start a war, especially 
a pre-emptive war, requires a vision wider than the sole question of 
whether a favorable outcome is possible or likely. Before President Bush 
gives the signal to attack Iraq, he should take a new, broad look at the 
question of whether such a war, at this moment, is the right priority for 
America. In light of recent developments, failure to revisit the question 
would reflect a level of confidence in the present course that is 
unwarranted and unwise.

Warren Christopher was Secretary of State from 1993 to 1997.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
      Drusha L. Mayhue, Chapter Organizer, Gallatin-Park Chapter
      Montana Conservation Voters, http://www.mtvoters.org/
      PO Box 1372, Bozeman, MT  59771
      phone: 406/585-0816
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to:
toeslist-unsubscribe@egroups.com

Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/ 

*****************************************************************
 2 BLAIR'S NUCLEAR CONUNDRUM

thisisGloucestershire

11:00 - 30 December 2002

One of the first issues in Tony Blair's in-tray demanding a 
decision early in the New Year is whether to close down Britain's 
nuclear energy programme forever.

His Government's long-awaited and much-delayed energy white 
paper, covering the next 50 years, will be published in February 
and the biggest arguments it generates are sure to centre on 
nuclear power.

Energy minister Brian Wilson is its biggest supporter in the 
Government - he has a nuclear power station in his constituency - 
and he is desperate to at least keep the option open.

But many other ministers believe its time has passed, and the 
focus should now be on renewable energy.

There is also growing resentment at the subsidies the energy 
industry gets, compared with rivals such as coal. There is now a 
Treasury insistence it must pay its way if it is to continue.

In the West, the white paper is being eagerly awaited because if 
the green light is given for a new generation of nuclear power 
stations, up to three could be sited in the region.

And the many campaigners who have spent decades lobbying against 
nuclear energy know any new stations will be expected to operate 
for most of the century.

The arguments are strongest around Hinkley, in Somerset, which is 
due to close in 2011 but will be at the top of the list if a new 
reactor is built.

But leaked Department of Trade and Industry documents have 
suggested Oldbury-on-Severn near Bristol, and Berkeley, 
Gloucestershire, could also be included, if planning laws can be 
speeded up.

Nuclear power plants currently produce a quarter of Britain's 
energy, so if they are to be scrapped, effective and reliable 
alternatives will have to be in place.

And a decision will have to be made soon, because of the present 
generation, only Sizewell B in East Anglia will still be 
operating in 2024.

Because the stakes are so high, it is looking increasingly likely 
the Government will fudge making a final decision either way.

Instead, Mr Blair is expected to endorse an extensive programme 
to boost the supply of renewable energy - but keep open the 
nuclear option if it is needed to make Britain's green targets.

Professor David King, the Government's chief scientific adviser, 
is among those who believe that may happen, even though he has 
never been a big supporter of nuclear power.

He says that even if the target of 20 per cent of energy supply 
from renewable sources by 2020 is achieved, there may still be a 
need for nuclear power to avoid carbon monoxide emissions.

But Jim Duffy, of the Stop Hinkley Group, says it is time to give 
renewable energy a good try to see if it can prove itself.

Environment groups say with enough investment, especially in wind 
power, renewables can meet Britain's needs.

Mr Duffy says that apart from the pollution levels from nuclear 
energy, and the health problems he believes it causes around 
plants, there is still the issue of what should be done with the 
waste.

But he says ministers seem to be split and suspects Mr Blair is 
pro-nuclear.

He said: "We thought back in 1996 it was the end of the story, 
but the nuclear industry is like Robocop, it keeps getting up 
from what seemed a desperate situation.

"We think it is time to put an end to its future once and for 
all, and start closing down existing power stations."

This complex situation becomes even more complicated because of 
the nuclear industry's huge financial problems.

British Energy, which runs Hinkley B, is on the brink of 
insolvency and relying on Government hand-outs.

There are claims these financial problems could force the closure 
of the plant, possibly as early as next year, along with one in 
Scotland and one in Lancashire.

A spokesman for British Energy said efforts were now being 
focused on restructuring the company, rather than on whether new 
generators should be built.

"We don't know where we will be after March as the company could 
still go into administration - we are just trying to survive," he 
explained.

BNFL, owners of the defunct Hinkley A and Oldbury, have also 
reported record losses, and would have no real future if at least 
£48million in liabilities, such as clean-up costs, are not being 
switched to a new Government body.

<http://www.thisisgloucestershire.co.uk
*****************************************************************
 3 U.N. Inspectors Visit 3 New Sites in Iraq

December 30, 2002 By NADIA ABOU EL-MAGD ASSOCIATED PRESS 

BAGHDAD, Iraq (AP) - U.N. inspectors searching for banned weapons 
Iraq may be hiding visited three new sites Monday, including a 
water purification station and the government's main health 
laboratory. 

One inspection team headed toward the border with Iran, 
Information Ministry officials said, but its destination was not 
immediately known. 

Also Monday, 13 U.S. religious leaders and experts on a 
humanitarian mission to Iraq were scheduled to visit a hospital, 
mosque and a church in Baghdad. The delegation, which arrived 
Sunday, is headed by Bob Edgar, general secretary of the National 
Council of Churches. 

Speaking to another visiting delegation, of 140 peace activists 
from Spain, President Saddam Hussein's chief science adviser Amir 
al-Saadi repeated Iraq's assertion that it has no nuclear, 
biological or chemical weapons or the missiles to deliver them. 
If Iraq can convince the U.N. inspectors of that, it could avoid 
a threatened U.S. military strike. 

In Washington Sunday, Secretary of State Colin Powell said U.N. 
inspectors, working with U.S.-supplied intelligence information, 
should be given time to ferret out Iraq's weapons before any 
decision is made to apply military force. 

While taking that measured approach in television interviews 
Sunday, Powell said he had no doubt the United States and its 
allies would defeat Saddam Hussein's forces in a war. 

Seven U.N. inspection teams carried out separate inspections in 
Iraq Monday. The inspectors have been in Iraq for more than a 
month, arriving four years after the last examinations by a 
previous U.N. organization that left Iraq shortly before U.S. and 
British bombing in 1998. 

On Monday, the latest teams of arms experts visited three new 
sites - the Central Health Laboratory, the General Commission of 
Plants Protection and the Al Mahmoudiya water purification 
station on the Euphrates River. 

The inspectors spent an hour at the water plant, where they 
examined yellow cylinders filled with chlorine and white bags 
containing another agent for water purification. The materials 
have both civilian and military uses. 

One team also re-examined the al-Samood factory, about 25 miles 
west of Baghdad. The factory, part of the Al Karama State 
Company, manufactures components for al-Samood missiles, which 
have a range of more than 30 miles. 

Under U.N. resolutions adopted after the Gulf War, Iraq cannot 
possess missiles with a range greater than 90 miles. U.S. and 
British intelligence reports contend Iraq is extending the 
al-Samood's range beyond permitted limits. 

Other teams revisited Al Nidaa factory south of Baghdad, which 
manufactures mechanical parts and equipment for different types 
of missiles, and the Thaat Al Sawari plant, a fiberglass 
production plant in the al-Taji area, 18 miles north of Baghdad. 
While repeating that Iraq has no forbidden weapons, al-Saadi 
accused the United States of playing politics and ignoring Iraqi 
efforts to cooperate with the weapons inspectors who arrived in 
November under U.N. Security Council resolution 1441. 

Iraq has maintained it is following to the letter the latest U.N. 
resolution, but leaders of the new inspection program have said 
Iraq's required declaration on its past weapons programs issued 
Dec. 7 is incomplete. The United States was severely critical of 
the declaration and has repeatedly threatened to attack Iraq. 

Al-Saadi said Iraq did not fear war as long as the United States 
abides by the Security Council resolution. "If America chose a 
different path, that is its business, but the whole world will 
see this action," he said. 

All contents copyright 2002 and 2003 Las Vegas SUN, Inc.
*****************************************************************
 4 Annan: No Reason Now for Attacking Iraq

Las Vegas SUN
 
December 31, 2002 
 
ASSOCIATED PRESS 

JERUSALEM (AP) - U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan said on 
Tuesday that he did not yet see any justification for a military 
strike against Iraq now since Baghdad had not hampered U.N. 
weapons inspectors operating in the country. 

In an interview with Israel's Army Radio, Annan said the United 
States should wait for a report from the weapons inspectors 
before launching any offensive. 

"Obviously they (inspectors) are carrying out their work and in 
the meantime Iraq is cooperating and they are able to do their 
work in an unimpeded manner," Annan said. "Therefore I don't see 
an argument for a military action now." 

The United States has expressed displeasure over an Iraqi 
declaration issued Dec. 7 about its weapons programs. U.N. 
weapons inspectors sent to Iraq in November say the declaration 
is incomplete. President Bush has repeatedly threatened to attack 
Iraq. 

Iraq has repeatedly insisted that it has no nuclear, chemical or 
biological weapons nor the missiles to deliver them. 

    All contents copyright 2002 and 2003 Las Vegas SUN, Inc.
*****************************************************************
 5 Expelled U.N. Inspectors Arrive in China

Las Vegas SUN: 
 
December 31, 2002 By YUSOF ABDUL-RAHMAN ASSOCIATED PRESS 

BEIJING (AP) - Two U.N. nuclear inspectors expelled by North 
Korea arrived in China on Tuesday, leaving behind a nuclear 
program hidden from the international community that fears it 
will be used to build atomic weapons. 

The two inspectors - believed to be a Lebanese man and a Chinese 
woman - emerged from the hall at Beijing's Capital Airport after 
a flight from Pyongyang and said they would head to the 
International Atomic Energy Agency's headquarters in Vienna as 
soon as possible. 

"We cannot comment on anything at this stage," the man said, 
mobbed by reporters. 

North Korea ordered the expulsion of the two U.N. monitors on 
Friday, depriving the U.N. atomic agency of its final means of 
monitoring a nuclear program Washington fears will be used to 
produce atomic weapons. 

On Monday, Russia, North Korea's longtime ally, warned the 
communist regime not to withdraw from an international agreement 
to halt the spread of nuclear weapons. 

Russia's comments were a blow to the North's efforts to cast the 
nuclear issue as a dispute strictly with the United States. 

South Korea expressed alarm at signs its neighbor was preparing 
to exit the treaty, which seeks to confine nuclear weapons to the 
United States, Russia, Britain, France and China. Still, the 
South insisted dialogue was the only way to resolve the problem 
peacefully. 

South Korean President-elect Roh Moo-hyun requested that the 
United States consult South Korea, a close ally, before 
formulating a new approach in its North Korea policy. 

"Success or failure of a U.S. policy toward North Korea isn't too 
big a deal to the American people, but it is a life-or-death 
matter for South Koreans," he told reporters Tuesday.

"Therefore, any U.S. move should fully consider South Korea's 
opinion." 

Washington rules out any talks before the North changes course. 
Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly will go to South Korea 
next month to talk to U.S. allies - but not to North Korea "at 
this time," Secretary of State Colin Powell said Sunday. 

The Bush administration said Monday that North Korea is 
dangerously isolating itself from the world community, including 
China, by its declared determination to revive its nuclear 
weapons program. 

"The international community has made clear that North Korea's 
relations with the outside world hinge on its termination of its 
nuclear programs," deputy White House spokesman Scott McClellan 
told reporters covering President's Bush's holiday respite at his 
Texas ranch. 

The diplomatic flurry followed Pyongyang's hints in a statement 
Sunday that it might abandon the Treaty on the Nonproliferation 
of Nuclear Weapons, a move that would deepen the crisis over the 
isolated country's decision to restart its nuclear facilities and 
expel U.N. nuclear inspectors. 

Withdrawing from the pact means the impoverished North is intent 
on raising pressure on the United States to negotiate over energy 
sources - and is prepared to turn its back on its international 
obligations to do so. Yet leaving the pact could be a largely 
symbolic gesture, as U.S. officials believe North Korea already 
has one or two nuclear bombs. 

In recent weeks, the North cut U.N. seals and impeded 
surveillance equipment at a nuclear reactor in Yongbyon and its 
spent fuel pond, a fuel fabrication plant and a reprocessing 
facility. North Korea had agreed to freeze the facilities under a 
1994 deal with the United States in exchange for energy supplies. 

Pyongyang said earlier this month it planned to reactivate the 
facilities to produce electricity because Washington had halted 
promised energy sources. The embargo was put in place after North 
Korea admitted in October to covertly developing nuclear weapons 
using enriched uranium, in violation of the agreement.

After Washington warned it away from reviving the Yongbyon plant, 
North Korea said U.S. policy was leading the region to the "brink 
of nuclear war." 

In Moscow, Mikhail Lysenko, the director of the Foreign 
Ministry's security and disarmament department, also warned 
Pyongyang against withdrawing from the treaty. He said Russia 
supports the 1994 agreement and insists on a "constructive 
dialogue" among all involved, and that Moscow was consulting with 
both Koreas, the United States, Japan and China. 

Outgoing South Korean President Kim Dae-jung, who won the Nobel 
Peace Prize in 2000 for his efforts to reconcile with the North, 
vowed Monday to continue his "sunshine" policy of engaging North 
Korea. Critics say this policy gives North Korea too much in 
return for little. 

But President-elect Roh, who takes office in February, told the 
military to set up a contingency plan in case the United States 
reduces the strength of its 37,000 troops stationed in South 
Korea as a deterrent against the North. 

There are no confirmed U.S. plans for a withdrawal. But Seoul 
worries that if the United States reduces its forces - reacting 
to anti-U.S. sentiment among South Koreans - the South would be 
more vulnerable to an attack from the North. 

The nonproliferation treaty was adopted in 1968 and ratified by 
187 countries, though not by at least three countries known to 
possess nuclear weapons - India, Pakistan and Israel. North Korea 
signed the treaty in 1985 but tried to withdraw in 1993 over 
suspicions it was producing weapons. That crisis was averted by 
the 1994 energy deal with the United States. 

The North's foreign news outlet, KCNA, said anti-U.S. "mass" 
rallies were held in two North Korean cities - Wonsan and Hamhung 
- on Monday. 

"If the U.S. imperialists finally ignite a war of aggression 
while threatening the (North) Korean people with force ..., only 
corpses and death will await the aggressors," KCNA quoted a 
speaker as saying. 

All contents copyright 2002 and 2003 Las Vegas SUN, Inc.
*****************************************************************
 6 Agency: N. Korea Nuke Effort Now Shrouded
 
    Las Vegas SUN: 

December 31, 2002 By GEORGE JAHN ASSOCIATED PRESS 

VIENNA, Austria (AP) - The expulsion of two U.N. inspectors from 
North Korea has crippled international efforts to monitor whether 
the reclusive nation is making atomic weapons, the international 
nuclear agency said Tuesday. 

"We were the eyes of the world," said Melissa Fleming, 
spokeswoman for the International Atomic Energy Agency. "Now we 
virtually have no possibility to monitor North Korea's nuclear 
activities nor to provide any assurances to the international 
community that they are not producing a nuclear weapon." She 
spoke after the two nuclear inspectors arrived in Beijing Tuesday 
on a flight from Pyongyang. 

Another agency official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, 
said one of the inspectors - a Chinese national - would stay on 
in Beijing for a few days but the other would head to IAEA 
headquarters in Vienna as soon as possible, with arrival in the 
Austrian capital expected Wednesday. 

North Korea ordered the expulsion of the two on Friday. In 
Vienna, Fleming said the expulsions left the agency reliant on 
satellite imagery. 

"It's a position this agency does not like to be in," she said. 
"We need to be on the ground at the facilities directly, in order 
to be in a position to verify a given country's nuclear 
declaration." 

On Monday, Russia, North Korea's longtime ally, warned the 
communist regime not to withdraw from a nuclear nonproliferation 
treaty. Moscow's warning followed South Korean alarm over signs 
its communist neighbor was preparing to exit the treaty, which 
seeks to confine nuclear weapons to the United States, Russia, 
Britain, France and China. 

Fleming, the IAEA spokeswoman, said the agency had heard of South 
Korean concerns but that as of noon Tuesday, North Korea had not 
declared to the IAEA that it was abandoning the treaty. 

In recent weeks, the North cut U.N. seals and impeded 
surveillance equipment at a nuclear reactor in Yongbyon and its 
spent fuel pond, a fuel fabrication plant and a reprocessing 
facility. North Korea had agreed to freeze the facilities under a 
1994 deal with the United States in exchange for energy supplies. 

Pyongyang said earlier this month it planned to reactivate the 
facilities to produce electricity because Washington had halted 
promised energy sources. 

The nonproliferation treaty was adopted in 1968 and ratified by 
187 countries, though not by at least three countries known to 
possess nuclear weapons - India, Pakistan and Israel. North Korea 
signed the treaty in 1985 but tried to withdraw in 1993 over 
suspicions it was producing weapons. That crisis was averted by 
the 1994 energy deal with the United States. 

    All contents copyright 2002 and 2003 Las Vegas SUN, Inc.
*****************************************************************
 7 N. Korea Accuses U.S. of Plotting War
 
Las Vegas SUN: 

December 31, 2002 By PAUL SHIN ASSOCIATED PRESS 

SEOUL, South Korea (AP) - North Korea accused the United States 
on Tuesday of planning an invasion and vowed to fight "to the 
last man," hours after it expelled two U.N. monitors, leaving its 
feared nuclear program shrouded in secrecy. 

Meanwhile, both South Korea's president and president-elect urged 
negotiations to end the standoff over their communist neighbor's 
nuclear ambitions, and warned that pressure from Washington for 
economic sanctions might not work. 

The U.N. inspectors - a Lebanese man and a Chinese woman - 
arrived in Beijing Tuesday after leaving North Korea, which is 
preparing to reactivate its suspected nuclear weapons program in 
defiance of world opinion. 

"We cannot comment on anything at this stage," the man said, 
mobbed by reporters at Beijing's Capital Airport. 

An official with the International Atomic Energy Agency, speaking 
on condition of anonymity, said one inspector would stay on in 
Beijing for a few days but the other was expected to return to 
IAEA headquarters in Vienna on Wednesday. 

North Korea ordered the expulsion of the two U.N. monitors on 
Friday, depriving the U.N. atomic agency of its final means of 
monitoring a nuclear program Washington fears will be used to 
produce atomic weapons. 

In Vienna, an IAEA spokeswoman said the expulsion of the two U.N. 
inspectors had blinded the "eyes of the world" and crippled 
international efforts to monitor North Korea's nuclear 
facilities. 

"We were the eyes of the world," said Melissa Fleming on Tuesday. 
"Now we virtually have no possibility to monitor North Korea's 
nuclear activities nor to provide any assurances to the 
international community that they are not producing a nuclear 
weapon." 

Fleming said the expulsions left the agency reliant on satellite 
imagery. "It's a position this agency does not like to be in," 
she said.

"We need to be on the ground at the facilities directly, in order 
to be in a position to verify a given country's nuclear 
declaration." 

Escalating the crisis, North Korea's ambassador to Moscow was 
cited by Russian news agencies as saying that - because of U.S. 
pressure - Pyongyang could not make good on its commitments under 
the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, which is designed to halt 
the spread of nuclear weapons. 

Ambassador Pak Ui Chun said that Washington had threatened North 
Korea "with a pre-emptive nuclear strike," the Interfax news 
agency reported. 

"These conditions also make it impossible for us to abide by the 
treaty, whose main provision bans nuclear powers from using 
nuclear weapons against countries that do not have them." 
Meanwhile, U.S. officials said they were considering using heavy 
economic pressure on the communist North to give up its nuclear 
ambitions. 

North Korea blamed Washington for raising tensions over its 
nuclear issue. 

"The U.S. is stepping up preparations for a war against (North 
Korea), persistently turning aside the latter's constructive 
proposal for concluding a nonaggression treaty," said the North's 
official newspaper, Rodong Sinmun. 

"If the enemy invades even an inch of the inviolable territory of 
(North Korea), the people's army and people of will wipe out the 
aggressors to the last man," the report said. 

South Korea's President-elect Roh Moo-hyun raised doubts about a 
possible U.S. strategy to contain North Korea. He worries that 
pressure could backfire and trigger armed conflicts on the 
world's last Cold War frontier. More than two million troops are 
massed on both sides of the Korean border. 

"I am skeptical whether so-called `tailored containment' 
reportedly being considered by the United States is an effective 
means to control or impose a surrender on North Korea," Roh told 
reporters. 

Roh, who begins a five-year term in February, supports outgoing 
President Kim Dae-jung's "sunshine" policy of engaging North 
Korea. They believe that dialogue is the only viable way to 
resolve the North's nuclear issue peacefully. 

Roh requested that the United States consult South Korea, a close 
ally, before formulating a new approach in its policy toward 
North Korea. 

The outgoing president, Kim, stressed the importance of a strong 
alliance between South Korea and the United States in dealing 
with the nuclear issue, said his spokeswoman, Park Sun-sook. "The 
United States is by far the most important ally for us," the 
spokesman quoted Kim as saying at a dinner meeting with Cabinet 
members Monday night. He also told the Cabinet members that 
economic pressure would not necessarily work against the 
reclusive North Korea. 

South Korean officials are alarmed at signs that North Korea may 
withdraw from the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, a move that 
would drastically escalate the nuclear crisis. 

On Tuesday, Fleming said the Vienna-based nuclear agency had 
heard of such concerns but that as of noon Tuesday, North Korea 
had not declared to the IAEA that it was abandoning the treaty. 

In recent weeks, North Korea removed monitoring seals and cameras 
from its nuclear facilities at Yongbyon that were frozen under a 
deal with the United States in 1994. 

North Korea says that it is willing resolve concerns over its 
nuclear program if the United States signs a nonaggression 
treaty. Washington rules out any talks before the North changes 
course. 

The Koreas were divided in 1945. The 1950-53 Korean War ended in 
an armistice agreement, not in a peace treaty. 

All contents copyright 2002 and 2003 Las Vegas SUN, Inc.
*****************************************************************
 8 Roh Skeptical on 'Containment Policy'   
 
  Digital Chosunilbo (English Edition) : Daily News in English

Updated Dec.31,2002 17:23 KST      
      
  by Choi Jun-seok (jschoi@chosun.com)
 
President-elect Roh Moo-hyun told a press conference Tuesday he 
was skeptical as to whether the United States' "tailored 
containment policy" was an effective measure to control or defeat 
North Korea. The president-elect also expressed discontent, while 
calling for the necessity of prior discussions on the issue 
between Korea and US rather than just adopting a unilateral 
policy. 

Roh said any US policy on North Korea should respect South Korean 
opinion, as he expressed doubts on some people denouncing the 
government for not agreeing with the US policy. According to Roh, 
the US understands the dignity of a sovereign nation as a matter 
of course, but headstrong ideas exist in the country. He said, 
"Even people around me became very sensitive about this. I 
thought of Korea as a stuffy country." 

On Monday Roh asked the heads of the military whether they had 
any preparations for a possible withdrawal of US troops from the 
country. With respect to this, the president-elect said he did 
not have any information on the issue; however he intentionally 
gave a kind of warning to the responsible people about whether 
they have well prepared measures on such an important issue. 

Regarding the North Korea nuclear crisis, the president-elect 
said he would announce a program to persuade both Pyongyang and 
Washington to talk in early January. 

Roh added that as promised the National Assembly would hold 
confirmation hearings on the selection of the heads of the 
National Intelligence Service, Supreme Public Prosecutor¡¯s 
Office, National Police Agency, and National Tax Service. With 
respect to forming a cabinet, Roh said he would employ three 
steps; first, a cabinet selection committee will recommend 
candidates publicly; secondly, the morality of the candidates 
will be investigated; and third, regional balance will be 
maintained. 

The president-elect said a thorough review would be made on 
location and efficiency of relocating the country's 
administrative capital, and then it would be given to people to 
discuss. He continued that if the ruling and opposition parties 
do not have a big struggle on this, the decision could be made 
without a referendum. 

Roh said although there could be some constitutional debate he 
did not think the adoption of a comprehensive tax system 
including inheritance and gift tax was unconstitutional. He said 
even some constitutional basis could be prepared if the debates 
open up. 

*****************************************************************
 9 NK: Kim Jong Il's miscalculations
 
Mainichi Interactive - Top News

The summit meeting between Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and 
North Korean leader Kim Jong Il was supposed to bring about a 
dramatic transformation in the relationship between Japan and 
North Korea, and the geopolitics of northeast Asia. Kim Jong Il 
apologized for the kidnappings of Japanese citizens and spy 
missions carried out by his special agents, and returned five 
abductees to Japan. Subsequently, however, North Korea has 
betrayed expectations and adopted a defiant posture toward the 
international community. Kim Jong Il may have hoped that after 
expressing sincerity on the kidnapping and spy ship issues, and 
providing information on the whereabouts of abductees, his 
country would be in a position to gradually deal its other cards: 
arrange meetings with relatives, and then send abductees on 
visits to Japan, at first on a temporary basis, and later 
permanently. And he might have assumed that progress would be 
made toward a normalization agreement and economic assistance 
would be forthcoming from Japan.
 
In May this year, North Korea had ordered the five abductees and 
their families to take up residence in a different section of 
Pyongyang, and they began to enjoy better food and housing. Prime 
Minister Koizumi had decided to go ahead with a summit meeting 
with Kim Jong Il during the same month.
 
But Kim Jong Il miscalculated because he did not anticipate that 
the information that North Korea provided regarding the 
kidnapping victims would spark an uproar in Japan. The families 
of the victims and the Japanese people were stunned and outraged 
by the news that eight of the abductees had already died. And the 
details that were provided regarding the deaths of the abduction 
victims seemed to have been fabricated.
 
Prior to meeting with Prime Minister Koizumi, Kim Jong Il had 
told a Japanese wire service that the kidnapping issue was "not a 
major problem." But his dismissal of the significance of this 
issue may have led to his first miscalculation.
 
Kim Jong Il has miscalculated on an even larger scale in his 
dealings with the U.S. At the beginning of October, North Korea 
officials admitted that they were pursuing a new nuclear 
development program after they were confronted with evidence by a 
visiting deputy U.S. secretary of state. North Korea probably 
thought that its "brinksmanship diplomacy," which produced the 
Agreed Framework with the U.S. in 1994, would bear fruit once 
again.
 
But U.S. President George Bush stood fast. While stressing the 
importance of reaching a diplomatic solution, he also insisted 
that the U.S. would not negotiate under threat, and halted oil 
shipments to North Korea.
 
Japan had also misjudged the nuclear issue. The U.S. was taken 
aback when it learned that Japan had agreed to hold a summit 
meeting with North Korea. The U.S. expressed misgivings, turned 
over materials to Prime Minister Koizumi which proved that 
Pyongyang was pursuing a uranium enrichment program, and urged 
Japan to postpone the meeting.
 
While the joint declaration issued by Prime Minister Koizumi and 
Kim Jong Il made an indirect reference to the need to remove 
nuclear weapons from the Korean Peninsula, both countries agreed 
to resume normalization discussions which would culminate in a 
Japanese agreement to send massive amounts of economic assistance 
to North Korea.
 
The U.S. concluded that it would have to act alone in forcing 
North Korea to suspend its nuclear program, and confronted North 
Korea with evidence. Instead of promoting peace and stability, 
the summit meeting exposed the dangerous side of North Korea.
 
North Korea has dismantled monitoring cameras and broken seals to 
its nuclear facilities, restarted a mothballed nuclear reactor, 
and expelled inspectors from the International Atomic Energy 
Agency. Kim Jong Il ought to recall the words spoken to him by 
Prime Minister Koizumi: "make preparations to make the people 
affluent, not preparations for war." His hard line will not bring 
a brighter future. (From the Mainichi Shimbun, Dec. 30)
 
© 2002 The Mainichi Newspapers Co. Under the 
*****************************************************************
 10 Baghdad: Why is North Korea’s case different? 

[The Daily Star on line] 

We (in Iraq) do not incite against North Korea. It’s not our 
business to cast doubt on North Korea’s motives or America’s 
pretexts,” leader writer Sami Mahdi declares in the Baghdad daily 
Al-Thawra. “We advocate dialogue and the peaceful resolution of 
world problems in compliance with the UN Charter, international 
law and the principles of justice and fairness. 

“Our intention then is not to incite against North Korea because 
this is not in our character. But no independent person can avoid 
drawing parallels between the case of Iraq and that of Korea and 
assessing the US administration’s approach towards each of the 
two cases.” 

Mahdi writes that North Korea has publicly announced it would 
reopen a reactor that can produce weapons-grade plutonium, 
restart its nuclear weapons development program, and ordered 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors to leave. 

Logically, Mehdi writes, this means North Korea is in a position 
“to develop other weapons of mass destruction if it didn’t 
already have them.” 

“In contrast, Iraq has done the opposite, agreeing to disarm as 
far back as 1991. In effect, it disarmed and its banned weapons 
were destroyed. Iraq is free of proscribed weapons and the arms 
inspectors are here to verify just that. Iraq did not remove the 
seals, cameras and monitoring devices that were put in place for 
inspection purposes; it was American and British warplanes that 
bombed those sites and put the monitoring devices out of action 
when America and Britain attacked Iraq in December 1998. Iraq did 
not expel the arms inspectors ­ it was America that ordered them 
out on the eve of the said aggression. 

“Iraq, despite being ceaselessly aggressed, harassed and accused, 
did not revoke its acceptance of UN Security Council Resolution 
687 or exploit the inspectors’ absence to build new (arms) 
programs ­ notwithstanding the Security Council’s failure to 
uphold its own commitments (to lift sanctions). 

“Isn’t Iraq’s case the opposite of the case of North Korea?” 
Mahdi asks. “But look at the way America addresses the two 
situations ­ how it threatens Iraq, which is free of weapons of 
mass destruction, with invasion and occupation; how, based on 
assumptions and probabilities of its own making, it tries to find 
something against Iraq that Iraq simply doesn’t have. 

“Contrast that approach with the US administration’s eagerness to 
solve the crisis with North Korea by diplomatic means, urging 
other nations to broker a solution, offering economic inducements 
(to Pyongyang) and prodding the IAEA to bring the case of North 
Korean violations before the UN Security Council. The most that 
Washington has threatened with is economic pressure and possibly 
stopping cash-strapped North Korea’s missile exports by 
intercepting them at sea. 

“When the Bush administration’s high fliers are asked about the 
reason for such bigotry in dealing with the two cases of Iraq and 
North Korea, they answer: ‘North Korea has not defied the 
international community.’ If so, whom did Pyongyang defy?” he 
wonders. “Isn’t it violating the so-called 1994 Agreed Framework 
signed in Geneva, in which it undertook to freeze its nuclear 
weapons program (in return for the US-led construction of two 
modern, light-water reactors and 500,000 tons of fuel a year 
until the reactors are completed)?” 

Mahdi asks, “what about Iraq? Did Baghdad defy the international 
community? If so, how? Did Iraq’s refusal to take back the 
inspectors ordered out by the US in 1998 (who turned out to be 
spying against Iraq’s national security and trying to drive a 
wedge between it and the Security Council as confirmed by former 
inspector Rolf Ekeus) constitute a challenge to the international 
community? 

“Moreover, Iraq has now taken back the inspectors and they are 
going about their job freely and with unfettered access to all 
Iraqi sites of their own choosing, including those designated by 
the American and British governments ­ but they have found 
nothing prohibited. 

“So where is the defiance? Why are America and Britain continuing 
to threaten Iraq? Is it because Iraq is an Arab country? Is it 
because Iraq is an oil-producing country? Or is it because the 
Zionist gang inside the US administration is determined to settle 
accounts with Iraq to Tel Aviv’s benefit?” 

Mahdi says that “in commenting on the two cases of Iraq and North 
Korea, Robert Jervis, the Adlai E. Stevenson professor of 
international politics at Columbia University, said it was 
ridiculous to claim that Baghdad poses a bigger threat than 
Pyongyang because it is certain that the latter has a nuclear 
program while no one is sure that Iraq has one. 

“Where we (Iraqis) are concerned, we can confidently declare: 
Iraq is free of weapons of mass destruction ­ whether nuclear, 
chemical or biological. And the so-called ‘Iraqi threat’ is a 
tall American-British tale. The search for proscribed weapons 
will prove this fact if the inspectors go about their job 
professionally, impartially and scrupulously, without allowing 
Washington to interfere in their work. 

“In that case, the Bush administration is up for a very big shock 
and the world will come to realize how much this cruel 
administration has hurt Iraq and harmed its people.” 

Kamal Hamad, writing for the Beirut daily Al-Mustaqbal, suspects 
US designs on Iraq, “including the scenario of partitioning the 
country among its Kurdish, Sunni and Shiite components, could 
prove to be the first step in breaking up the entire Arab region 
into confessional and feuding mini-states that would constantly 
seek outside help, with Israel remaining whole as the region’s 
most powerful and dominant Jewish overlord.” 

He says this, plus the expected infighting among the region’s 
confessional mini-states, will bury “such slogans as the 
liberation of Palestine and the recovery of occupied Arab lands” 
from Israel and allow the United States to effectively lay its 
hands on Arab oil riches and appoint long-term American military 
governors in various parts of the Arab region. 

The Saudi daily Okaz protests what it calls “American lies” in a 
reference to a report in The New York Times earlier this week 
claiming that Saudi Arabia has privately told American military 
officials that the kingdom would make its air space, air bases 
and a key operations center available to US forces in the event 
of war on Iraq. 

“The lies that found their way to The New York Times were not 
surprising … because the media game in America is not uncommon, 
nor is the use of the US media as a means of pressure at times, 
or as a test balloon at others or as a way of leaking information 
by one official or another,” Okaz writes in its main leader. 

The paper adds: “If The New York Times, whose inclinations and 
instigators are well-known, timed its report to muddle 
unequivocal (Saudi) positions by attributing statements to real 
or imaginary officials, the fact remains that the kingdom’s 
stances were unambiguous, firm and explicit, leaving no room for 
talk of private assurances, which have no place in reality except 
in the imagination of those who failed to lure the kingdom into 
taking positions that contradict its convictions and declared 
policies. 

“The kingdom is not two-faced and does not have private and 
declared policies vis-a-vis international issues. Prince Saud 
al-Faisal told his first regular press conference last week: ‘We 
will not participate, or allow the use of our territory, in the 
mugging of Iraq.’” 

Another Saudi daily, Al-Riyadh, repeats accusations that the Bush 
administration wants to turn its allies into “simple employees in 
the world supermarket it is running” and of following the British 
dictum that great nations have no permanent friends and no 
permanent enemies ­ only perpetual interests. 

That’s why the White House indicated through aides that any visit 
by Prince Charles to the United States at this time would be 
deemed “very unhelpful” due to the prince’s reported opposition 
to war on Iraq, for fear that such a conflict would lead to a 
dangerous rift between the West and the Muslim world. 

Al-Riyadh remarks that “in much of his positions,” the prince of 
Wales shows himself to be “sympathetic to the Muslim world.” 

The daily also points out that “it is not the first time” that 
the White House drops diplomatic niceties to give lessons around, 
recalling how President George W. Bush greeted with a studied 
chill the reelection 

of German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder for having declared his 
firm opposition to a US war on Iraq. 

Talal Salman, publisher of the Beirut daily Al-Safir, tells 
readers he has little, if any, comforting news for the New Year. 

“Tomorrow,” he writes, “we’ll bid farewell to another year full 
of heavy defeats on the general Arab level and welcome a New Year 
auguring heavier defeats.” 

In Lebanon, governance is “on holiday,” he writes, but “that’s 
tolerable compared to what is threatening the Arab motherland and 
its peoples, political entities and economic resources.” 

Palestine is “melting away ­ city after city, village after 
village, and refugee camp after refugee camp ­ to make space for 
new (Jewish) settlements, settlement bypass roads and (Israeli) 
security exigencies, while the American ‘road map’ for a 
Palestinian state winds its way between Washington and Tel Aviv 
in the hope that by time it is approved by the criminal Ariel 
Sharon, its announcement will be put off until after the 
destruction of Iraq. 

“This is not to mention that some people believe the road map is 
meant to point the way out for Palestinians from their land, 
perhaps to new entities that the American occupation will set up 
(in Iraq,) the land of 

Al-Rafidain (meaning the two rivers ­ the Tigris and Euphrates).” 

Salman says arms inspectors are meanwhile hollowing out Iraq from 
one end to another, violating its state, economic, business and 
learning institutions and cross-examining its scientists and 
experts on grounds that they are the breeders of terrorism. 

“The year dawning on us will be hard,” he writes, “for never was 
the pan-Arab nation under occupation as it is today ­ not under 
the Crusaders, not under the Ottomans and not under the old 
colonialist rule. It never happened that all its resources were 
either debilitated or embezzled or seized as they are today. Even 
the states with rich natural resources ­ Saudi Arabia, Algeria, 
Iraq, etc. ­ are overburdened with massive debts, pressure from 
the International Monetary Fund and exorbitant bills for tanks 
and warplanes that are of use only to their manufacturers. 

“Foreign occupation ­ both American and Israeli ­ envelops our 
(Arab) land, sea, air space and (rulers’) will. Consequently, 
(Arab) armies built at astronomical costs have been turned into 
formations for folkloric parades, or into forces to protect the 
rear of occupation troops, or into repression instruments.” 

The year 2003, continues Salman, will be harsh and “overflowing 
with fire, blood and extermination and partition plans.” 

“The resolutions of the Arab summit in Beirut failed to prevent 
the catastrophes of the year about to end despite the Arab 
(Peace) Initiative that offered the Americans and Israelis 

the peace of the weak. Hopefully, the next Arab summit to be held 
in Bahrain in three months time will find something to trade off 
in Iraq, Palestine and perhaps other Arab states. 

“It might well be that we will end up mourning and shedding tears 
over the closing year,” he concludes. 

DS: 31/12/02 

On line discussion| Lebanon Abroad | Cartoon | Chat 

or write to opinion@dailystar.com.lb 

Copyright© 2001 The Daily Star. All rights reserved. 
*****************************************************************
 11 Are we wary yet? Getting to the bottom of 2002

  The Miami Herald | 12/29/2002 | 

 Iraq flared up and the economy teetered, but DAVE BARRY just
wants to focus on his salad

 DAVE BARRY Year in Review
 
If you had to pick one word to describe our national mood in 
2002, that word would be ''wary.'' We went to sleep wary, and we 
woke up wary. We wallowed in wariness. We were wabbits.
 
This was partly because bad things kept happening. But it was 
also because government officials kept issuing alarming, yet 
vague, warnings. ''We have received reliable information,'' an 
official would say, 'that something bad might happen. We don't 
know what, or when, or where. But it is very, very bad. Also we 
are seeing the letter 'E.' So we urge all citizens to continue 
leading normal lives, while remaining in a state of stark, 
buttpuckering terror. Tune in tomorrow and we'll see if we can't 
ratchet this thing up a notch or two.''
 
We were also wary of the stock market. One day it was up; the 
next day it was down; the next day it was way down. And as we 
watched our 401K plans decline from a retirement villa in France 
to a refrigerator carton in an alley, we heard the unceasing 
babble of the financial ''experts,'' the ones who have never yet 
failed to be wrong, speculating endlessly on whether the market 
had bottomed out:
 
FIRST EXPERT: Bill, I think we may be seeing the bottom here, 
unless the market goes lower.
 
SECOND EXPERT: I agree, Bob. If the market does not go any lower, 
then this is the bottom. But by the same token, if the market 
DOES go lower, then this is not the bottom. We can say whatever 
we want and people will take us seriously, because we're on TV, 
and we're wearing suits.
 
FIRST EXPERT: I like to say ''bottom,'' Bill. Bottom bottom 
bottom.
 
SECOND EXPERT: Ha ha! But seriously, Bob, if the market goes 
higher from here, then we can say this is . . .
 
And so on, day after wary day. We became even warier when we 
found out that some large corporations had essentially the same 
business ethics as Bonnie and Clyde. It got so bad that we even 
became wary of Martha Stewart, who hit her own personal bottom 
(we are speaking figuratively) during a June appearance on the 
CBS early-morning show. Martha was trying to chop some cabbage 
for a salad, and the show's host, Jane Clayson, kept pestering 
her about her alleged insider trading, and finally Martha emitted 
what was probably the most poignant quote from all of 2002: ''I 
want to focus on my salad.''
 
In a way, Martha was speaking for the entire nation. We all 
wanted very much to focus on our salad in 2002. But it was 
impossible, with so many things making us wary. In addition to 
being wary of terrorism and economic uncertainty, we were wary 
that our children would be abducted, that a sniper would shoot 
us, that Saddam Hussein would attack us, or that we would attack 
him. We were wary of asteroids, wary of wildfires, wary of 
floods, wary that American Idol was fixed, wary of fast food, 
wary of global warming, wary of Florida elections, wary of 
professional baseball, wary of the West Nile virus, wary that at 
any moment, some evil, vicious, sick, twisted mind with no regard 
for the norms of human decency would decide to make a sequel to 
Scooby-Doo.
 
But, somehow, one wary day at a time, we got through 2002. Now we 
are poised to enter a new year, which, according to Wall Street 
analysts, will be 2003, so we would not bet on it. But before we 
move ahead to wherever we're going, let us take one last, wary 
look back at the year just completed, starting with .

  About Herald.com 
*****************************************************************
 12 North Korea situation can be resolved diplomatically: Bush

ABC News - 01/01/03 : 

A nuclear reactor under construction in North Korea (August 2002)

US President George W Bush says the crisis provoked by North 
Korea's move to relaunch its nuclear weapons program can be 
resolved without military action. 

"The North Korean situation is one that can be resolved 
peacefully through diplomacy," Mr Bush said. 

Mr Bush says "this is not a military showdown" but a "diplomatic" 
one. 

He says he had spoken by telephone with Chinese President Jiang 
Zemin to discuss a "nuclear weapons-free Peninsula," and had also 
had a "very good visit" by phone with South Korea's 
President-elect Roh Moo-Hyun. 

Speaking to reporters at his Texas ranch, President Bush says 
"all options are on the table".
 
Meanwhile, more than 20,000 South Koreans have staged a huge 
anti-American protest in Seoul on the eve of the nation's New 
Year celebrations.
 
The demonstrators have called on Washington to stop pressuring 
North Korea over its ongoing nuclear crisis. 

The US has warned Pyongyang it will continue to pay a serious 
price in withheld international aid until it dismantles its 
nuclear program. 

However, the South Korean Government says it is committed to a 
policy of engagement with the North.

© 2002 Australian Broadcasting Corporation
*****************************************************************
 13 Kim, Roh Pledge to Bring Peace on Peninsula 
 
KoreaTimes : 

Hankooki.com > Korea Times > Nation   

By Oh Young-jin Staff Reporter

 President Kim Dae-jung and President-elect Roh Moo-hyun in their 
New Year messages yesterday vowed to ensure 2003 will be a 
turning point in improving inter-Korean relations and bringing 
lasting peace to the Korean Peninsula.

 In his New Year message, distributed in advance to media 
outlets, Kim said, ``We should rally behind the incoming 
administration¡¦ to resolve the North Korean nuclear problem and 
help peace take root on the Korean Peninsula.¡¯¡¯

 Roh, in a separate message, said the past year was a year of ``a 
great victory for Korean people.¡¯¡¯ 

 ``Responding to the aspirations people showed in the Dec. 19 
election, I will devote myself to abolishing authoritarianism, 
regionalism and the culture of corruption prevalent in the 
political community, and lead the way toward national 
reconciliation and a brighter future,¡¯¡¯ Roh said.

 The president-elect promised to bring more transparency to the 
economy, help create a better environment for businesses and 
provide more jobs to achieve a vibrant economy where the fear of 
joblessness no longer exists. 

 ``I will seek settlement over the North¡¯s efforts to develop 
nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction through peaceful 
dialogue,¡¯¡¯ he said. Roh was elected on the ticket of the 
Millennium Democratic Party (MDP), which Kim founded but has 
since severed ties with. The two will have dinner on Jan. 3 
together with their wives. Roh takes office from Feb. 25. 


oh@koreatimes.co.kr 12-31-2002 18:39         
        
*****************************************************************
 14 IAEA Set to Complete Report on NK Nuclear Program 
 
KoreaTimes : 

Hankooki.com > Korea Times > Nation   

BERLIN (Yonhap) - The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
has almost completed a report on North Korea's nuclear activities 
that will reveal Pyongyang has violated the 1994 Geneva 
agreement, an IAEA official said Monday. 

 The report will be presented to a meeting of the IAEA's 
executive council Jan. 6 to allow council members to respond to 
North Korea's breach, the official said. 

 IAEA Director General Mohamed Albaradei will ask the executive 
council to urge Pyongyang to allow the international nuclear 
watchdog to resume inspections of North Korea's Yongbyon complex, 
according to the official. 

 Elbaradei recently said during press interviews that the IAEA is 
obligated to report the issue to the United Nations Security 
Council if the North continues to prevent the agency from 
conducting inspections. 

 The IAEA chief, however, has made it clear that he hoped the 
issue could be resolved in a peaceful manner before Pyongyang 
restarts its nuclear facilities. 

 The organization has said that North Korea is pursuing 
reactivation of its 5-megawatt nuclear plant within one or two 
months and also fears it intends to separate weapons-grade 
plutonium from spent fuel rods. 

 According to IAEA deputy spokeswoman Melissa Fleming, two of its 
inspectors have already arrived in Pyongyang from Yongbyon to 
wait for a flight to Beijing. 

 One of them, a Chinese national, will remain in Beijing for a 
certain amount of time, while the other will come directly to 
IAEA headquarters in Vienna on Jan. 1, Fleming said. 

12-31-2002 18:47 	 
        
*****************************************************************
 15 U.S. and the Republic of Korea Agree on Joint Nuclear Energy 
Research Projects

Office of Technology and International Cooperation
 
OFFICE OF ADVANCED NUCLEAR RESEARCH   
       
The United States Department of Energy (DOE) and the Republic of 
Korea Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST), in collaboration 
under the International Nuclear Energy Research Initiative 
(I-NERI), have announced five new totaling approximately $4 
million to five joint teams of U.S./Korean researchers for 
research in the development of advanced nuclear reactor 
technology. The selection was made by the DOE/MOST Bilateral 
I-NERI Committee (BINERIC) at a meeting held in Washington, DC on 
November 13, 2002. The new awards increase the total number of 
projects currently funded by DOE and MOST under I-NERI 
collaboration to eleven. 

The successful projects were selected from twenty-two proposals 
submitted in response to a competitive solicitation issued 
jointly by DOE and MOST for R in three general areas:   

  + Next generation reactor and fuel cycle technology   
  + Innovative nuclear plant design 	
  + Advanced nuclear fuels and materials 

The I-NERI program was initiated in 2001 by DOE's Office of 
Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology (NE) to foster 
international collaborative research and development (R) on 
nuclear technology focused on the development of advanced 
technologies, such as next-generation nuclear energy systems, 
which represent improvements in nuclear technology in terms of 
economic performance, proliferation resistance, waste management 
and enhanced safety. 

Currently, there are 12 collaborative research projects in 
progress under the three established I-NERI collaborative 
agreements; the first with the Commisariat a l #201nergie 
Atomique (CEA) of France, the second with the Republic of Korea 
(ROK) Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) and the third 
with the Organization for the Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD). DOE is in the process of developing bilateral 
agreements with other countries. 

Further information regarding the I-NERI awards and other
research can be found on the web site which can be reached via . 
Posted: December 13, 2002   
*****************************************************************
 16 *North Korean radio denounces USA as "nuclear war fanatic"* /

*Quotation*
 
“ There are people who control spacious territories teeming with 
manifest and hidden resources. They dominate the intersections of 
world routes. Their lands were the cradles of human civilizations 
and religions. These people have one faith, one language, one 
history and the same aspirations. No natural barriers can isolate 
these people from one another ... if, per chance, this nation 
were to be unified into one state, it would then take the fate of 
the world into its hands and would separate Europe from the rest 
of the world. Taking these considerations seriously, a foreign 
body should be planted in the heart of this nation to prevent the 
convergence of its wings in such a way that it could exhaust its 
powers in never-ending wars. It could also serve as a springboard 
for the West to gain its coveted objects.” - 1902 - Sir Campbell 
Bannerman, Prime Minister of Britain [1905-08]  

uploaded 30 Dec 2002

North Korean radio has broadcast a commentary focusing on what it 
said was US hypocrisy in calling for Pyongyang to abandon its 
nuclear programme while maintaining the world's largest stockpile 
of nuclear warheads itself. It went on to denounce the USA as a 
"nuclear villain" and "nuclear fanatic". The following is the 
text of a report by North Korean radio on 28 December

It is one of the United States' stereotyped methods to put a 
nuclear hat on other countries and create a commotion all the 
time.

Nowadays, the United States is carrying out a nuclear pressure 
commotion by putting a nuclear hat on our country, Iran, and 
Iraq. Due to the acts of the United States, which creates a 
commotion by acting as a nuclear judge although no one ordered it 
to, peace and stability was destroyed in various regions of the 
world, and troubles are arising on the word stage. The great 
leader Korean: suryong , Comrade Kim Il-sung, indicated the 
following:

A nuclear power, which becomes a practical threat to mankind's 
survival, is on the front-line and putting unjust pressure on us, 
a non-nuclear country. This could be called an expression of 
arrogance by those accustomed to disregarding the principle of 
justice and equality and demanding their unilateral intentions in 
international relations.

The United States is the country that manufactured nuclear 
weapons for the first time in the world, and it is the only 
country that imposed a nuclear disaster on mankind by actually 
using nuclear weapons. When the World War II was coming to an 
end, the United States dropped nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki, Japan although this was not militarily necessary with 
the visible demise of Japan; and the United States took hundreds 
of thousands of people's lives in an instant.

Furthermore, the United States greatly damaged people by using 
depleted uranium shells, which is a type of nuclear weapon, 
during the Persian Gulf war and Yugoslavian war. The United 
States is the world's greatest country possessing nuclear weapons 
that gravely threatens mankind's survival.

In 1945, when atomic weapons were developed, the United States 
had three nuclear weapons. In 1967, after 22 years, the number of 
nuclear weapons increased to 32,500. This was the greatest 
quantity in the world. Even now, the United States holds the 
world championship for possessing nuclear weapons.

There are around 20,000 nuclear weapons in the United States' 
nuclear weapons arsenal. Stored here are all types of nuclear 
weapons, including micro-size nuclear weapons, also known as 
nuclear (?sacks), nuclear mines, and neutron bombs which are 
weapons of the devil. The quantity of nuclear weapons possessed 
by the United States can push mankind into nuclear a disaster 
scores of times. The United States is creating a commotion by 
saying that someone could have developed one or two nuclear 
weapons. This is truly an absurd act.

Although the United States advocates nuclear arms reduction from 
outside, actually it does not intend reducing the vast scale of 
nuclear weapons it possesses. Using all kinds of deceptive 
methods, the United States is exerting unlimited efforts not only 
to preserve and maintain the vast nuclear weapons it already 
possesses but also to develop and produce new types of nuclear 
weapons.

As has been revealed, Russia and the United States promised to 
reduce two-thirds the strategic weapons in their country within 
10 years. However, rather than completely destroying the majority 
of nuclear warheads that will be reduced, the United States is 
trying to preserve them at a warehouse so that they can be used 
again in emergency.

This is not a stand on sincerely reducing nuclear weapons, but 
comes out of its intention to realize its nuclear monopoly while 
deceiving the world's people.

With regard to this, a Japanese newspaper commented that such 
news echoing from Washington constitutes the third blow 
challenging mankind's aspiration for building a denuclearized 
world.

The United States likes to find fault with other countries' 
nuclear issues and is making a nuclear commotion. They chodurun 
are heated up in developing and modernizing nuclear weapons.

Recently, the Bush administration also gave orders to develop 
nuclear warheads to penetrate underground, capable of destroying 
underground targets. In accordance with this, nuclear development 
organizations have been re-organized; an enormous amount of money 
is being disbursed for this sector; munitions monopolies are 
competitively engaged in developing nuclear weapons.

Since it conducted its first sub-critical nuclear test in 1997, 
the United States, which continues to press ahead with nuclear 
tests while fooling international social circles, has conducted 
scores of these tests up to the present.

Needless to say, this is a challenge against mankind's demand to 
conclude the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and 
international pledges.

Not satisfied with recent sub-critical nuclear tests, the United 
States is openly engaged in manoeuvres to resume even underground 
nuclear tests accompanying nuclear explosions.

It is none other than the United States that makes use of nuclear 
weapons its policy and (?takes the lead) in nuclear pre-emptive 
strikes.

As has been known, at the beginning of 2002 in the so-called 
Nuclear Posture Review, the United States designated seven 
countries, including our country, as nuclear attack targets and 
fashioned a pre-emptive strike strategy with nuclear attacks as 
its basis in September 2002.

There is no limit when we list US acts as the nuclear villain and 
the nuclear fanatic.

The logic and dogmatism of US-styled superpowerism - that only 
the United States has a moral standard with which it can judge 
right from wrong; only the United States can do everything; and 
other countries must unconditionally obey the United States' 
opinions - can never work in today's world.

The United States must correctly know this; deeply reflect on its 
nuclear crimes before giving instructions to other countries 
using the nuclear issue and making a commotion of pressure; and 
renounce its reckless nuclear policy.

*Source:  *BBC khilafah.com 

*****************************************************************
 17 WPost: Putting a Lid on Chernobyl
 
Date: Tue, 31 Dec 2002 01:31:27 -0600 (CST)

 
Putting a Lid on Chernobyl
200 Tons of Uranium Lie in Ruins of Derelict Reactor

By Guy Gugliotta
Washington Post Staff Writer
Sunday, December 29, 2002; Page A01

Engineers are completing plans for what may be the largest movable structure
ever built -- a 20,000-ton steel shell to enclose Chernobyl Reactor 4, site
of an apocalyptic nuclear accident whose consequences are still being felt
more than 16 years later.

By next summer an international consortium led by Bechtel International
Systems Corp., of San Francisco, will finish the conceptual design for a
hangar-shaped arch nearly 370 feet high -- the height of a 35-story building
-- that would be slid into place along greased steel plates to cover the
ruined remains in a snug, weather-tight shelter.

Inside, robotic cranes and, where possible, live workers will then begin
prying apart the wreckage, removing radioactive dust from twisted girders,
storing pieces of radioactive core in shielded canisters and cutting old
steel into manageable lengths.

The whole job -- design, construction and "stabilization" of the derelict
reactor 80 miles north of Kiev -- is part of a fully funded 10-year plan set
in motion by the Group of 7 industrialized nations in 1997. The $768 million
project, including the shell, is scheduled for completion in 2007, according
to officials involved with the project.

And then the world will wait.

The shelter is designed to keep water out and dust in for 100 years, or for
as long as it takes the Ukrainian government to designate a permanent
storage facility and dispose of more than 200 tons of uranium and nearly a
ton of lethally radioactive plutonium that remain inside the ruins.

Most of the fuel-containing material lies as a solid "lava" formed by the
fusion of molten fuel, concrete, 30 tons of fuel dust and 2,000 tons of
combustibles.

In the basement, rainwater and fuel dust have mixed together in a dangerous
radioactive "soup." Lethal chunks of the reactor core lie unseen in the
rubble and in the earth alongside the building. More pieces of core were
boxed and buried in a "cascade wall" built and bulldozed into place by
Soviet workers in the immediate aftermath of the explosion.

"We will need a lot of shielding," said Vincent Novak, director of the
Nuclear Safety Department for the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, overseers of the project. "If it weren't for the radioactivity,
I could almost call the job 'a piece of cake,' but the radiation makes it
hugely complex and extremely difficult."

The Chernobyl explosion occurred April 26, 1986, when an out-of-control
nuclear reaction blew off the roof of the steel building and spewed tons of
radioactive material into the air, releasing 30 to 40 times as much
radioactivity as the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombs combined in 1945.

It was the worst nuclear accident in history. Thirty workers died
immediately at the facility, and 135,000 people were evacuated from the
surrounding "Exclusion Zone." As recently as 2000, the Ukrainian government
was spending 5 percent of its gross domestic product to mitigate
consequences of the disaster.

In the six months immediately following the explosion, the Soviets erected
an improvised shelter known as the "sarcophagus," but within 10 years
scientists became alarmed because of leaks and the building's threatened
collapse. The walls were weakening, Novak said, and there was tremendous
uncertainty because "it was almost impossible to determine" the real
dangers.

In 1997, the Group of 7, plus Russia, the European Union and Ukraine, set up
the Chernobyl Shelter Fund with the European reconstruction bank in charge.
The bank established a shelter implementation plan, estimated the project
cost at $768 million, and funded it with donations from 28 nations, ranging
from $170 million from the United States to Iceland's $10,000.

In the first phase, completed in 1999, the sarcophagus's roof and structural
pillars were strengthened, and the reactor's rickety ventilation stack,
jutting more than 150 feet above the sarcophagus, was stabilized. The stack
was an added concern, because it was shared by the contiguous Reactor No. 3,
which was still operating.

But these were emergency measures. "Safety analyses show there are still
about 1,000 square meters [1,200 square yards] of holes in the roof and
sides," said Eric Schmieman, chief engineer for environmental technology at
Battelle Memorial Institute's Pacific Northwest National Laboratory in
Richland, Wash. "A significant amount of water can go in, and dust can go
out, and birds and squirrels and birds come and go all the time."

The Bechtel-led consortium designing the $250 million structure to cover the
sarcophagus had to make several decisions early. None of the three design
contractors, including Battelle and the French state utility Electricite de
France, will be allowed to bid on the actual work.

Doubts arose as to whether a steel structure could last a century. With
lethal levels of radiation inside the shell, opportunities for repair and
maintenance could be limited.

"It's doable," said Bechtel's Matthew Wrona, project manager. "There are
paints that last a long time and maintenance techniques for harsh
environments." The Eiffel Tower is perhaps the best-known large, century-old
steel structure fully exposed to the elements, but Wrona noted that several
large suspension bridges are aging elegantly.

The team also avoided experimental technologies in favor of the tried and
true.

"We're trying to build it for 100 years, and using brand-new technologies
increases the risks," Schmieman said. "If a human being has to intervene,
there's a consequence. We need to minimize the danger."

The team settled on a steel arch 40 feet thick. The inside dimensions would
be 803 feet -- almost three football fields -- across and 330 feet high. Up
to that point, planning was relatively simple, because "it had all been done
before," said Philippe Convert, technical manager for Electricite de France,
but the next steps were a different story: Lethal gamma rays escaping from
the reactor's damaged core would make the center of the arch too hot for
humans to work. Building the arch in place was impossible.

Instead, the team decided to construct the arch in four 120-foot sections,
then link the sections together and slide the entire structure along a track
made of steel plates built on each side of Reactor No. 4. When completed,
the project managers believe the new shelter will be the largest movable
structure ever built.

One end will be fully enclosed, while the other will be a "cutout" that fits
snugly over Reactor No. 3's building, which connects to the ruins. Current
plans call for the stack to be taken down, and the junction between the arch
wall and Reactor No. 3 to be sealed.

The new shelter will not "contain" the core's radioactivity but will be
weatherproof.

The tracks will be made by driving piles into the ground at relatively close
intervals, then filling the gaps with concrete. The planners want to avoid
seating the concrete in a deep trench, for fear of unearthing radioactive
material during excavation.

The concrete will then be covered with stainless steel plates and coated
with a lubricant, while the bottom of the new steel shell will have Teflon
pads for easier sliding. Convert said the sliding technique is used
extensively to move heavy machinery.

While workers will be able to enter some parts of Reactor No. 4 and work on
the wreckage in relative safety, the most routine tasks can suddenly turn
deadly.

"Surprises are inevitable," Novak said. During the initial roof and
structural repair, "we found a large piece of core embedded in the wall.
Everything stopped until we could build a device and get the shielding to
handle it. Each case is different."

To help deconstruct parts of the reactor building and the sarcophagus, the
new shell will have four ceiling cranes designed to pluck heavy steel beams
from the old reactor and to wrestle pieces of twisted metal from the ruins.
They will also be equipped with hydraulic cutters to chop wreckage into
manageable chunks.

One unusual problem is the need to manage the new shell's microclimate.
"It's so big, it could even rain inside, so we have to keep the moisture
down," Wrona said. Air conditioning would be prohibitively expensive, so
"we'll try to use natural air currents. It's like the inside of an
automobile on a cold morning."

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A49461-2002Dec28.html
*****************************************************************
 18 UK LIB DEMS: NO MORE NUCLEAR REACTORS

thisisGloucestershire

11:00 - 30 December 2002

The Liberal Democrats have opposed nuclear power for more than a 
decade on four grounds - cost, safety, risk of proliferation of 
nuclear materials and the problem of waste disposal.

The party says investing in renewable sources and energy 
conservation are more cost-effective and environmentally-friendly 
methods of meeting energy needs must be found.

It also says no further nuclear power stations should be built, 
existing plants should be withdrawn from use at the end of their 
operating life and British Nuclear Fuels Limited should remain 
publicly owned.

The party also argues that the demand for energy in the UK needs 
to be reined in, pointing out that half the energy currently used 
in the UK is wasted.

Lib Dems also believe an international Centre of Excellence at 
Dounreay should be established to encourage decommissioning.

<http://www.thisisgloucestershire.co.uk
*****************************************************************
 19 UK: People power fails to split atom security

<http://icberkshire.icnetwork.co.uk>

Newbury & Thatcham*

Dec 31 2002

ALDERMASTON atom base has stopped anti-nuclear activists carrying 
out a so-called citizens' inspection of the site.

The team of weapons inspectors marched on the base on December 21 
led by Berkshire Green MEP Dr Caroline Lucas and TV satirist Mark 
Thomas.

But Ministry of Defence Police refused to let them out of the car 
park.

Dr Lucas said: "We were refused entry despite having a clear 
mandate from constituents to ensure the facility was not being 
used to amass weapons of mass destruction.

"We sought assurance that the base will not be used to develop a 
new generation of nuclear weapons. Any such development would 
constitute a breach of the UN Non-Proliferation Treaty."

© owned by or licensed to Trinity Mirror Plc 2003
icBerkshire^TM is a trade mark of Trinity Mirror Plc.
*****************************************************************
 20 NRC Draft review standard available 

FR Doc 02-32999 

[Federal Register: December 31, 2002 (Volume 67, Number 251)] 
[Notices] [Page 79950] From the Federal Register Online via GPO 
Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr31de02-83] 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 

Review Standard for Extended Power Uprates; Availability of 
Review Standard AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). 
ACTION: Notice of issuance of draft review standard. 

SUMMARY: The NRC is announcing the availability of draft Office 
of 
Nuclear Reactor Regulation Review Standard (RS)-001, ``Review 
Standard 
for Extended Power Uprates,'' dated December 2002, for interim 
use and 
public comment. 
DATES: Submit comments by March 31, 2003. Comments received 
after this 
date will be considered if it is practical to do so, but the 
Commission 
is able to ensure consideration only for comments received on or 
before 
this date. 
ADDRESSES: Submit comments to Mohammed A. Shuaibi, Senior 
Project 
Manager, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Mailstop O-8H4a, 
Washington, DC 20555-0001. Comments may be delivered to 11555 
Rockville 
Pike, Rockville, Maryland, between 7:30 a.m. and 4:15 p.m. on 
Federal 
workdays. 

This document is available for public inspection at the 
NRC's 
Public Document Room (PDR), located at One White Flint North, 
Public 
File Area O1 F21, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland, and 
from 
the Agencywide Documents Access and Management System's (ADAMS) 
Public 
Electronic Reading Room on the Internet at the NRC Website, 
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html 
, using the Accession No. ML023540562, 
and at the NRC's Website, 
http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/licensing/power-uprates.htm
l. 

Persons who do not have access to ADAMS 
or who encounter problems accessing the document in ADAMS should 
contact the NRC PDR Reference staff by telephone at 
1-800-397-4209, 
301-415-4737, or by e-mail to pdr@nrc.gov. 
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mohammed A. Shuaibi, Senior 
Project 
Manager, Section 1, Project Directorate III, Division of 
Licensing 
Project Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, by 
telephone 
at 301-415-2859 or e-mail at mas4@nrc.gov. 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The process of increasing the 
licensed power 
level at a commercial nuclear power plant is called a ``power 
uprate.'' 
Power uprates can be classified into three categories based on 
the 
magnitude of the power increase and the methods used to achieve 
the 
increase. Measurement uncertainty recapture power uprates result 
in 
power level increases that are less than 2 percent and are 
achieved by 
implementing enhanced techniques for calculating reactor power. 
Stretch 
power uprates typically result in power level increases that are 
up to 
7 percent and do not generally involve major plant 
modifications. 
Extended power uprates (EPUs) result in power level increases 
that are 
greater than stretch power uprates, have been approved for 
increases as 
high as 20 percent, and usually require significant 
modifications to 
major plant equipment. Draft RS-001 is applicable to EPUs. 

Draft RS-001 establishes standardized review guidance for 
the 
staff's reviews of EPU applications to enhance the consistency, 
quality, and completeness of the reviews. It serves as a tool 
for the 
staff's use when processing EPU applications in that it provides 
detailed references to various NRC documents containing specific 
information related to the areas of review. 

Draft RS-001 also makes available to licensees the guidance 
used by 
the staff for reviewing EPU applications. Making this 
information 
available should help licensees prepare complete EPU 
applications that 
address the topics required for the staff's review. By 
addressing the 
areas in the review standard, a licensee could minimize the 
staff's 
need for requests for additional information and thereby improve 
the 
efficiency of the staff's review. 

Dated in Rockville, Maryland, this 24th day of December, 
2002. 

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 
Ledyard B. Marsh, 
Deputy Director, Division of Licensing Project Management, 
Office of 
Nuclear Reactor Regulation. 
[FR Doc. 02-32999 Filed 12-30-02; 8:45 am] 
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P 
*****************************************************************
 21 NRC SRP review available (Power update testing) 

FR Doc 02-33000 

[Federal Register: December 31, 2002 (Volume 67, Number 251)] 
[Notices] [Page 79948] From the Federal Register Online via GPO 
Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr31de02-81] 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 

Standard Review Plan, Availability of Draft Standard Review Plan 
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). ACTION: Notice of 
issuance of Draft Standard Review Plan. 

SUMMARY: The NRC is announcing the availability of draft 
Standard 
Review Plan (SRP) Section 14.2.1, ``Generic Guidelines for 
Extended 
Power Uprate Testing Programs,'' dated December 2002, for 
interim use 
and public comment. 
DATES: Submit comments by March 31, 2003. Comments received 
after this 
date will be considered if it is practical to do so, but the 
Commission 
is able to ensure consideration only for comments received on or 
before 
this date. 
ADDRESSES: Submit comments to Kevin A. Coyne, Operations 
Engineer, U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Mailstop O-6F2, Washington, DC 
20555- 
0001. Comments may be delivered to 11555 Rockville Pike, 
Rockville, 
Maryland, between 7:30 a.m. and 4:15 p.m. on Federal workdays. 

This document is available for public inspection (1) at the 
NRC's 
Public Document Room (PDR), located at One White Flint North, 
Public 
File Area 01 F21, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland, (2) 
from 
the Agencywide Documents Access and Management System's (ADAMS) 
Public 
Electronic Reading Room on the Internet at the NRC Web site, 
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html 
, using the Accession No. ML023530407, 
and (3) at the NRC's Web site, 
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/#comments. 

Persons who do not have access to ADAMS 
or who encounter problems accessing the document in ADAMS should 
contact the NRC PDR Reference staff by telephone at 
1-800-397-4209, 
301-415-4737, or by e-mail to pdr@nrc.gov. 
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Kevin A. Coyne, Operations 
Engineer, 
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, by telephone at 
301-415-1399 or 
e-mail at kxc@nrc.gov. 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Draft SRP Section 14.2.1 provides 
guidance 
for the NRC staff to use when evaluating testing programs 
proposed by 
licensee's in relation to extended power uprate amendment 
requests. The 
purpose of NRC staff's review related to Draft SRP Section 
14.2.1 is to 
ensure that proposed extended power uprate testing programs (1) 
adequately control initial power ascension to the requested 
power 
level, (2) include sufficient testing to demonstrate that 
extended 
power uprate related plant modifications have been adequately 
implemented, and (3) include sufficient testing to demonstrate 
that 
structures, systems, and components will perform satisfactorily 
at the 
requested power level. 

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 19th day of December 2002.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 
Kathy Halvey Gibson, 
Acting Chief, Equipment and Human Performance Branch, Division 
of 
Inspection Program Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor 
Regulation. 
[FR Doc. 02-33000 Filed 12-30-02; 8:45 am] 
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P 
*****************************************************************
 22  Browns Ferry restart TVA's biggest move of 2002

By REBECCA FERRAR, ferrarr@knews.com
December 29, 2002

TVA made its most significant move of 2002 when it authorized in 
May the $1.7 billion restart of the Unit 1 reactor at Browns 
Ferry Nuclear Plant near Athens, Ala. 

"It will add generation, so the average cost of power will be 
lowered," said TVA spokesman John Moulton. "We can produce power 
at Browns Ferry so economically." 

Critics, including environmentalists, said the power may not be 
needed and the plant is old and outdated. 

Last summer the U.S. Office of Management and Budget questioned 
whether the Browns Ferry restart costs would actually be two to 
three times more than the amount estimated by TVA. 

TVA officials countered that OMB's doubts were based on costs 
associated with new plants going on line rather than on a plant 
already built that needs major refitting. 

TVA officials hired Charles River Associates to identify 
companies interested in providing private financing for the 
restart, and the Boston firm is expected to present 
recommendations in January. 

The board in September allocated $353 million for the restart in 
2003, during which "significant modifications" will begin. The 
restart is scheduled to be completed in 2007. Browns Ferry's 
three units were shut down for safety reasons in 1985, but Units 
2 and 3 have been restored to operation. 

TVA approved $528 million in its 2003 budget to add pollution 
control equipment at the agency's 11 coal-fired plants, a $95 
million increase. Most of that equipment would be to reduce 
nitrogen oxide emissions that contribute to ozone pollution. The 
board also approved an eight-year, $1.5 billion contract to 
reduce pollution emissions at TVA's Paradise plant in Kentucky, 
at the Kingston and Bull Run plants in Tennessee, and at Colbert 
in Alabama. 

The $1.5 billion contract with Advatech LLC to install 
"scrubbers" would reduce sulfur dioxide emissions that contribute 
to air-pollution problems in the Great Smoky Mountains National 
Park. 

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission gave approval in 2002 for TVA 
to produce tritium at the Watts Bar and the Sequoyah nuclear 
plants. 

Tritium, an isotope of hydrogen, is used in making nuclear 
weapons. The United States has not produced tritium since 1988 
when the last tritium production reactor was shut down at the 
Department of Energy's Savannah River site in South Carolina. 

The tritium would be produced under contract with the DOE.

Critics say nuclear production for commercial and defense 
purposes has never been mixed, and they contend the TVA decision 
sets a dangerous precedent, based on several factors, including 
transportation and security risks. 

TVA, however, contends it has a defense mission and has supported 
national security in the past by making munitions at its Muscle 
Shoals, Ala., facility and building dams to supply power for 
aluminum factories and the Manhattan project during World War II. 

The tritium production is scheduled to begin at the Watts Bar 
Unit I reactor 50 miles south of Knoxville in the fall of 2003 
and at Sequoyah Unit 2 reactor near Chattanooga in the fall of 
2004. 

TVA approved a $7.1 billion budget for 2003 that included a rate 
freeze for the fifth year in a row. The agency paid off $120 
million of its $25 billion debt in 2002 and budgeted $75 million 
in payments on the debt next year. At a rate of $120 million a 
year, it would take more than 200 years to pay off the debt. But 
TVA officials said they plan to pay off more than the $75 million 
budgeted next year and in future years. TVA spokesman John 
Moulton said the agency has reduced the debt by $2.5 billion 
since 1997. 

During 2002 Tellico Lake residents won a partial victory over a 
development issue on the TVA reservoir. TVA will conduct an 
Environmental Impact Statement, the highest level of 
environmental review, on 120 acres proposed for high-end 
residential development on Tellico Lake. The decision followed a 
public outcry by Tellico Lake residents, environmentalists and 
others who said TVA had set aside the acreage for camping, 
hiking, picnicking and other public activities. 

Developer Mike Ross wants to add it to his Rarity Pointe 
development, which is already under way. Ross owns another 540 
acres on the lake. Rarity Pointe will be a gated community with a 
golf course, lodge, marina, shops and million-dollar homes. 

Another homeowner victory involved Keller Bluff, a rugged, 
300-foot high cliff overlooking Fort Loudoun Lake, which is one 
of three tracts in a 37-acre piece of property deeded to Knox 
County by TVA in 1952. 

TVA deeded the land with the restriction that it be used for 
public recreation. The county asked TVA to lift that restriction 
so it could be designated for residential use and sold for 
development. 

Members of the Keller Bend Homeowners Association who hike on the 
bluff and lake users who enjoy the view objected to losing access 
to the densely forested tract. 

Bill Schriver, one of the homeowners association members, has 
offered to lease the county some of his land for parking at $1 a 
year. He and others are encouraging the county to turn the land 
into a day park, and county officials now say they will consider 
that option. 

Rebecca Ferrar may be reached at 865-342-6357.                          
 				

The Knoxville News-Sentinel Co. All Rights Reserved. 
*****************************************************************
 23 AU: Joh's secret '70s dream: a nuke plant - 

smh.com.au
 
January 1 2003
 
The Bjelke-Petersen government considered sites in central 
Queensland and north of Brisbane for a $1billion nuclear plant, 
formerly secret Queensland cabinet documents reveal. 

Documents released under the 30-year rule show the state's 
coalition government in 1972 proposed to build a uranium 
enrichment plant. 

The plant, which would have been the largest industrial project 
in the state's history, was to provide enriched uranium fuel for 
nuclear power plants in the United States and France. 

The cabinet agreed on Broadmount, near Rockhampton, as the best 
site, due to the proximity of coal deposits and sparse 
population. Toorbul Point, near Brisbane, was felt to be too 
close to heavily populated areas and Bribie Island, a tourist 
spot. 

The documents said the project would employ about 10,000 workers 
over six years. Its benefits would include export dollars, extra 
tax and royalty receipts, jobs and a lower electricity supply 
cost, with a total economic spin-off of $2billion. 

The potential environmental or health aspects of the plant, apart 
from a brief mention of air pollution, were not considered. 

Both the then premier, Joh Bjelke-Petersen, and the prime 
minister, William McMahon, urged their ministers to keep the 
project secret. "The Prime Minister stated it is not intended to 
give any publicity to the proposed studies," the premier wrote in 
a cabinet minute. The papers do not reveal what happened to the 
proposal but Whitlam's election is likely to have put an end to 
it. 

AAP
 
Copyright  © 2003. The Sydney Morning Herald.     | contact us 
*****************************************************************
 24 Bulgaria starts closing nuclear reactors

BBC NEWS | Europe | 

Tuesday, 31 December, 2002

[The Kozloduy nuclear power plant]                                      

The Kozloduy plant provides 50% of Bulgaria's electricity

Bulgaria has begun decommissioning part of its only nuclear power 
plant - a process which will take up to 50 years to complete. 

 The European Union has been pressing Bulgaria to close four of 
the six reactors at the Kozloduy plant for safety reasons. 

 But there is widespread resistance to the plan within Bulgaria, 
which already faces energy price rises this winter. 

 Bulgaria has to decommission the reactors if it is to realise 
one of its dearest ambitions - membership of the European Union 
in five years' time. 

 It is also one of the conditions for receiving a European loan 
to modernise the two remaining reactors. 

 Upgraded 

 The plant, which lies 200 kilometres (125 miles) north of the 
capital, Sofia, currently supplies about half of Bulgaria's 
electricity. 

[Control room]                                          

In the last 10 years, many safety improvements have been made                                               

It has been described by the American Department of Energy as 
"one of the world's most dangerous nuclear installations" but the 
Bulgarian Government says the Soviet-designed reactors could run 
for another decade. 

 The first reactor was closed in the early hours of Tuesday, 24 
years into its 30-year lifespan. 

 The second reactor, which is one year younger, is to be closed 
by the end of the day. 

 The next two reactors will go by 2006. 

 All are 440-megawatt pressurized water reactors without safety 
containment facilities, built between 1974-1982. 

 That will leave just two reactors at the plant, 
both1,000-megawatt reactors with a safety shell, which were 
installed in 1987 and 1989. 

 Protests 

 The plan is for the two reactors being shut down on Tuesday to 
be prepared gradually for final decommissioning and dismantling. 

 However, the power plant's management has asked the Bulgarian 
authorities for a licence to mothball the reactors for five 
years, in case a decision is taken to re-start them. 

 The closure is a controversial decision: many Bulgarians see it 
as an attack on their sovereignty. 

 The government survived two no-confidence motions in parliament 
last month - but there may be more difficulties to come.

 Correspondents say electricity prices are likely to rise - and 
some analysts are predicting energy shortages by 2010. 

 However, Bulgarian Energy Minister Milko Kovachev said he did 
not expect "negative consequences" of either kind. 

 Time scale 

 Even Bulgaria's president has protested over the second phase of 
decommissioning. 

 But it is likely to go ahead nonetheless - part of the painful 
price of Bulgaria's admission to the European club. 

 Bulgarian media say the cost of decommissioning the first two 
reactors is estimated at $400m, of which the European Union is 
supplying $65m. 

 The spent fuel from the reactors is expected to be deposited in 
a new dry fuel storage facility by the year 2010. 

 It will take much longer to fully dismantle the reactor site and 
make it environmentally safe.       [ ]        

© MMII | News Sources | Privacy 
*****************************************************************
 25  Robinson Nuclear Plant focuses on tighter security, relicensing

- Morning News Online - Florence, Myrtle Beach
 	 	 
Dec 31, 2002
 
By JIM NEWMAN Morning News

HARTSVILLE -- This year was a big year for the H.B. Robinson 
nuclear power facility near Hartsville as it tightened already 
strict security procedures in the wake of the Sept. 11, 2001, 
terrorist attacks.

The biggest change was the expansion of the plant's "footprint," 
which established a broader coverage zone around the plant for a 
more effective means of defense.

The facility also boasts a larger security force than before. 
David McNeill, communications supervisor at H.B. Robinson, said 
the plant will continue to be "focused on safe, reliable and 
efficient operation."

Part of that process involves relicensing.

Carolina Power &Light filed for license renewal at Robinson on 
June 14, having spent the previous two-and-a-half years 
performing a safety review. If granted, the plant would continue 
to operate until 2030.

McNeill said the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is conducting a 
review of H.B. Robinson, and the relicensing process should be 
completed by 2004.

"We also will be collaborating with our other nuclear generating 
stations at Progress Energy to help them in their refueling 
efforts," he said.

A major focus in the coming year, McNeill said, will be to 
continue Robinson's close coordination with local, state and 
federal officials in terms of nuclear security.

H.B. Robinson has two units — one coal powered the other nuclear. 
The first fired up in 1960, producing 174 megawatts of 
electricity. Eleven years later, the nuclear unit went online, 
pumping 700 megawatts of power.
 
© 2002, Media General Inc.   
*****************************************************************
 26 Law makes nuke plant trespassing a felony 
 	 		 		
   Pantagraph.com - News - 
 By Kurt Ericskon Statehouse bureau chief 

12/31/02
 		 		 		 	 	 	 		 		
 SPRINGFIELD -- In the 15 years that the Clinton nuclear power 
plant has been operating, DeWitt County Sheriff Roger Massey can 
recall no events in which he had to arrest someone for 
trespassing at the facility.

 But, in yet another reaction to the terrorist attacks of 2001, 
Illinois lawmakers approved a new law this year that attempts to 
improve security at Illinois' nuclear power plants.

 Beginning Wednesday, the new law makes it a felony to enter a 
nuclear facility without permission or to remain on the grounds 
after being asked to leave.

 The penalty range for a conviction ranges from one to three 
years in prison and a fine of up to $10,000.

 "If someone did enter there, it would allow us to charge them 
with more than a misdemeanor," Massey said.

 In the wake of the Sept. 11 attacks, Gov. George Ryan posted 
National Guardsman at the facility for several weeks. After that, 
at least one Illinois State Police trooper was assigned to guard 
the heavily fenced complex northeast of Clinton.

 Now, security at the facility is more in line with what it was 
before the terrorist attacks, Massey said.

 The measure, approved last spring, was co-sponsored by state 
Rep. Bill Mitchell, R-Forsyth, whose new district encompasses the 
Clinton plant.

 Other co-sponsors include the late state Rep. Tim Osmond, whose 
Lake County district borders the now-shuttered Zion nuclear plant 
on Lake Michigan.

Copyright © 2002, Pantagraph Publishing Co. All rights
*****************************************************************
 27 New Seabrook owners to cut 190 jobs 

[Boston Globe Online:

 By Associated Press, 12/31/2002 08:32 

 SEABROOK, N.H. (AP) The new owners of the Seabrook nuclear power 
plant will cut the workforce there by nearly 25 percent, 
according to a company spokesman. 

 FPL Energy Seabrook Station, a subsidiary of Florida Power 
&Light, will cut 190 jobs, trimming the workforce from 790 to 600 
people by next November, said Alan Griffith. 

 Griffith said the cuts would not compromise safe operation of 
the plant or plant security. Security guards are provided by an 
independent contractor and are not Seabrook Station employees, 
according to the federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

 The company already has offered early retirement packages to 100 
eligible employees and hopes to achieve the rest of the planned 
cuts through attrition and ''synergy'' with the parent company, 
Griffith said. 

 However, layoffs are possible if the staff has not been trimmed 
by November 2003, he said. 

 FPL Energy has ''known for some time we are overstaffed,'' he 
said. But, ''we'll go about this in a very carefully measured 
way.'' 

 Glenn Dentel, senior inspector at the plant for the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, decline to comment specifically on how the 
cuts might affect safety, but said, ''We recognize a change can 
affect performance.'' 

 ''It depends on how it's handled. We'll keep an eye on it,'' 
Dentel said. 

 Griffith said job cuts would primarily involve ''support 
staff.'' Those most vulnerable apparently are workers who do jobs 
that could be done by other employees of the parent company, 
which also owns nuclear plants in Florida. 

 Some top managers already have been replaced, including former 
plant chief Ted Feigenbaum, who is now in the top job at Maine 
Yankee in Wiscasset, Maine. Last month, FPL Energy also brought 
in three new senior managers. 

 Florida Power &Light bought 88.2 percent of the plant last month 
for $798 million from Northeast Utilities, of Berlin, Conn., and 
several smaller shareholders. 

*****************************************************************
 28 Seabrook nuclear plant is facing job cuts /*

<http://www.theunionleader.com>

*News - December 31, 2002*

*By JERRY MILLER* Union Leader Correspondent

*SEABROOK* ? Seabrook Station will see a 25 percent reduction in 
personnel within the next year, according to a spokesman for FPL 
Energy Seabrook Station.

The reduction will see the workforce shrink from 790 employees to 
600, according to Alan Griffith, the spokesman. The process has 
already begun, with last month?s offer of early retirement to an 
estimated 100 eligible workers.

Florida Power & Light, an energy conglomerate, acquired 88.2 
percent of Seabrook Station, New Hampshire?s only nuclear power 
plant, early last month, for $798 million. The purchase was made 
from Northeast Utilities, a Connecticut-based company and several 
smaller co-owners. The Florida company was named the new owner in 
April, following an auction process. Since then, a host of 
federal and state regulatory agencies have signed off on the 
acquisition.

RELATED

12-25-02 *Benson criticizes PSNH deal: 'We could have done 
better'* 
<http://www.theunionleader.com/Articles_show.html?article=16789&archive=1>
12-12-02 *Seabrook, states release revised evacuation plan* 
<http://www.theunionleader.com/Articles_show.html?article=16502&archive=1>
12-08-02 *F&G official critical of Seacoast enforcement* 
<http://www.theunionleader.com/Articles_show.html?article=16406&archive=1>
12-06-02 *Connecticut Valley Electric will be purchased by PSNH* 
<http://www.theunionleader.com/Articles_show.html?article=16336&archive=1>

Griffith said the employees who were offered early retirement 
have until today to decide whether to accept or reject the 
offers. The spokesman declined to identify the departments 
involved or the nature of the positions.

Griffith said layoffs are not part of the current plan to reduce 
the workforce, but said that is ?not something that can be ruled 
out. The hope is that our staff reductions will occur naturally? 
via early retirements, attrition and what he called ?synergy? 
with the parent company.

In announcing its purchase of Seabrook Station, Florida Power 
officials said all employees would be guaranteed employment until 
November 2003, a year to the date of the formal acquisition. The 
guarantee included the same wages and benefits earned under 
Northeast Utilities.

Asked what will happen after November 2003, Griffith responded, 
?I don?t have an answer.?

Asked if forced layoffs would be possible at that time, Griffith 
said, ?Yes, it?s possible.?

Griffith declined to characterize the staff reduction as ?a house 
cleaning,? as charged by some workers.

?It?s in keeping with the industry,? Griffith said. ?It?s a new 
business paradigm? under deregulation, where profits are no 
longer guaranteed by regulators and legislators, but must be 
determined by the marketplace.

?We?ll go about this in a very carefully measured way,? he said.

Griffith said reductions in workers would be ?across the board? 
and would involve what he called ?support staff.? The most 
vulnerable workers seem to be those who carry out a function that 
can be shared or is already being done by someone with the parent 
company, which owns two nuclear plants in Florida.

Griffith said cuts would not compromise the safe operation of the 
plant or reduce security personnel. A spokesman for the federal 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission said plant security is done by 
contract, rather than by security guards employed by Seabrook 
Station.

Griffith said FPL has ?known for some time we are over-staffed.?

Some members of the top Seabrook Station leadership have already 
been replaced, including Ted Feigenbaum, the one-time plant 
chief, who is now filling the top slot at Maine Yankee. 
Feigenbaum was replaced by Mark Warner, the new site vice 
president.

In November, FPL also brought on three other new senior staff 
members.

Senior NRC Resident Inspector Glenn Dentel, one of two NRC staff 
inspectors stationed full time at Seabrook, declined to comment 
specifically on the planned staff reductions and on the expected 
loss of 190 positions.

Insisting the NRC?s primary concern is the safe operation of a 
nuclear power plant, Dentel said, ?We recognize a change (in the 
number of personnel) can affect (plant) performance.?

Dentel said plant performance could be impacted by additions or 
reductions in staff, but ?It depends on how it?s handled. We?ll 
keep an eye on it.?

HOME <http://www.theunionleader.com> Copyright © 2002
*****************************************************************
 29 [radiation-survivors] Lawyers give up on TMI cases
 
Date: Tue, 31 Dec 2002 01:20:26 -0600 (CST)

 
http://pennlive.com/news/patriotnews/index.ssf?/xml/story.ssf/html_standard.
xsl?/base/news/1040985027190890.xml

Lawyers give up on health cases

Friday, December 27, 2002

BY DAVID DeKOK
Of The Patriot-News

Nearly 24 years after the Three Mile Island nuclear accident, lawyers for
1,990 plaintiffs who alleged they suffered health damage from radiation
released during the reactor meltdown have thrown in the towel, closing a
chapter in the long-running story.

The lawsuits against former TMI owner General Public Utilities Corp. and
related defendants were dealt a final blow earlier this month when the U.S.
Third Circuit Court of Appeals refused to hear an appeal of a decision by
U.S. District Judge Sylvia Rambo granting summary dismissal of the claims.
No other major litigation remains from the 1979 accident.

"There's nothing more that can be done to proceed with them, essentially,"
said Lee C. Swartz, a Harrisburg lawyer who was co-counsel for the
plaintiffs from the beginning. "We doubt the U.S. Supreme Court would agree
to hear the case."

GPU and Nuclear Regulatory Commission officials have maintained that not
enough radiation was released from the TMI-2 plant during the March 28-April
1, 1979, accident to cause adverse health effects for anyone. But
anti-nuclear activists and some doctors argued the picture was far less
clear.

Radiation escaped from the crippled plant for days before the reactor was
brought back under control. An estimated 100,000 people fled the midstate
during the disaster.

"It just seemed to me there was scant, if not zero, evidence of a true
corollary between the radiation and the illnesses," said Herman M. Dieckamp,
who was president and chief operating officer of GPU at the time of the
accident, and spoke yesterday on being informed of the lawyers' decision.
"So it was probably the right thing for them to do."

A 1990 Columbia University study concluded that increased lung cancer and
leukemia cases near the plant could not have been caused by the accident
because reported exposures were too low.

But a later study by Dr. Stephen Wing and three colleagues at the University
of North Carolina-Chapel Hill School of Public Health re-analyzed the same
data used by the Columbia study and concluded that "downwind" areas during
the 1979 accident had increased cancer rates.

Wing conceded that his study did not prove that radiation releases were more
potent than reported, but argued that if they were not, there was little to
explain the higher cancer rates.

Eric Epstein, spokesman for TMI Alert, said yesterday his group "will
continue to pursue and track radiogenic cancers. While this is a setback, I
believe we'll endure and prevail, probably when I'm a very old man."

Among the 1,990 plaintiffs was Terry L. Koller of Dover Twp., York County.
His daughter, Abigayle, was born with deformed feet on Aug. 12, 1979. Her
mother, Joanne, was pregnant when the TMI radiation plume drifted across the
Susquehanna River into York County. The parents filed suit in 1986.

Koller said yesterday it became clear to him and his wife several months ago
that the case was "dead in the water" and unlikely to produce a financial
settlement. His daughter underwent two operations as a child and played
basketball in high school and college. She now does mission work.

"We have moved on with our life," he said. "She has moved on with hers.
We're not thinking about the past. The Lord gave her abilities in other
ways. Her injured feet were a byproduct of life. They did not curtail
[God's] plans for her."

The TMI lawsuits were the second round of post-accident lawsuits. The first
round was settled by GPU and its insurers in 1985 for $25 million at a time
when the company was seeking permission from the NRC and the courts to
restart the undamaged TMI Unit 1 reactor.

Swartz, who was not involved in the first round of litigation, said one of
the key factors that kept the case going so long was the U.S. Supreme
Court's 1993 decision in Daubert vs. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, which
placed new limits on what sort of expert witness testimony would be admitted
in civil litigation. Much of the TMI litigation after 1993 centered around
the admissibility of certain expert testimony.

Judge Rambo initially heard 10 test cases picked from among 2,000, and ruled
in 1996 that the plaintiff's expert testimony, including the Wing study, did
not meet the Daubert standard. She dismissed all 2,000 lawsuits, but the
1,990 cases not part of the test litigation were later restored to life on
appeal, albeit temporarily. DAVID DeKOK: 255-8173 or ddekok@patriot-news.com

To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to:
radiation-survivors-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com
-----
Are you looking for a good computer help list?

http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ComputersForSeniors/

 

Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/ 

[demime 0.98e removed an attachment of type application/octet-stream which had a name of @StoryAd?x]
*****************************************************************
 30 [radiation-survivors] Depleted uranium br a killer disaster
 
Date: Tue, 31 Dec 2002 01:21:25 -0600 (CST)

 
http://www.disasternews.net/news/news.php?articleid=1687

BALTIMORE (December 28, 2002) - Dr. Doug Rokke has a disturbing
habit of laughing when he should probably be crying.

He laughs when he talks about battlefields contaminated with
radioactive waste. He can't stop laughing when he talks about what
he claims is a massive government cover-up. And he keeps laughing
when he talks about his health problems, which he attributes to
deliberate Army negligence, and which will likely kill him.

Talking to Rokke on the telephone is disturbing enough without him
laughing about such horrors. A strange echo accompanies every
utterance. When this bizarre sound is pointed out to him, Rokke
says he isn't surprised: he claims his phone has been tapped for
years.

It may be tempting to dismiss Rokke as a crank or a conspiracy
theorist, but Rokke is 35-year-veteran of the U.S. Army, and he
isn't just a disgruntled grunt. Rokke ran the U.S. Army's depleted
uranium project in the mid-90s, and he was in charge of the Army's
effort to clean up depleted uranium after the Persian Gulf War. And
he directed the Edwin R. Bradley Radiological Laboratories at Fort
McClellan, Ala.

Yet if you type Rokke's name into a search engine on any military
website, you will draw a blank, as if he doesn't exist.

If you read through hundreds of pages of government documents and
transcriptions of countless government hearings regarding the
military use of depleted uranium, not once will you come across his
name.

That is more than a little unusual, since Rokke and his team were
at the forefront of trying to understand the potential health and
environmental hazards posed by the use of depleted uranium, or DU,
on the battlefield.

"We were the best they ever had," Rokke claims. He's not bragging.
He's laughing again.

The use of DU in combat is a fairly new innovation. It was used for
the first time in the Persian Gulf War as the crucial component of
armor-piercing, tank-busting munitions.

These munitions are tipped with DU darts that ignite after being
fired. The shells are so heavy and hot that they easily rip through
steel.

"It's like taking a pencil and pushing it through paper," Rokke
said.

This uranium "pencil" then explodes inside its target, creating a
deadly "firestorm."

As an anti-tank weapon, "these things are great," Rokke said. They
enable U.S. troops to quickly take out enemy tanks at long-range.

According to the Web site of the Deployment Health Support Directorate,
DU is "a by-product of the process by which uranium is enriched to
produce reactor fuel and nuclear weapons components."

In other words, DU is low-level nuclear waste. According to the
same Web site, DU can also contain trace amounts of "neptunium,
plutonium, americium, technitium-99 and uranium-236."

A total of 320 tons of DU munitions were fired during the Gulf War.
Rokke's job was to figure out how to clean up U.S. tanks, the
unfortunate victims of "friendly fire," which had been blown apart
by DU rounds.

After years of this kind of this work-in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia,
and on practice ranges in the U.S.-Rokke reached a conclusion in
1996.

He told the Army brass that DU was so dangerous that it had to be
banned from combat immediately.

That conclusion, Rokke said, cost him his career.

'Contamination was all over'

Burning tanks, burning oil fields, charred bodies.

This was Kuwait after the Gulf War. Rokke had a mission-clean up
U.S. tanks contaminated with DU.

What Rokke found terrified him.

"Oh my God is the only way to describe it," Rokke said. "Contamination
was all over."

Rokke and his crew were measuring significant levels of radiation
up to 50 meters away from affected tanks: up to 300 millirems an
hour in beta and gamma radiation, and alpha radiation from the
thousands to the millions in counts per minute (CPM) on a Geiger
counter.

"That whole area is still trashed," he said. "It's hotter than heck
over there still. This stuff doesn't go away."

His team took three months to clean up 24 tanks for transport back
to the U.S.

The Army, Rokke said, took another three years to fully decontaminate
the same 24 tanks.

But the contaminated tanks weren't the only problem.

Within 72 hours of their inspections, Rokke and his crew started
getting sick.

But they continued with their work. They went back to the U.S. to
perform tests on Army bases. They deliberately blew up tanks with
DU rounds, then ran over and jumped on the tanks while they were
still burning. They videotaped the uranium-oxide clouds pouring
out, and they measured the radiation being thrown off.

In the past decade, Rokke said 30 men out of 100 who were closely
involved in these operations dropped dead.

Rokke's lungs and kidneys are damaged. He believes that uranium
oxide dust is permanently trapped inside his lungs. He has lesions
on his brain, pustules on his skin. He suffers from chronic fatigue
syndrome. He has reactive airway disease, which means he can't stop
wheezing and coughing, and experiences a loss of breath when he
exercises. He also has fibromyalgia, a condition that causes chronic
pain in his muscles, ligaments and tendons.

The VA tested Rokke for uranium levels in his body in 1994. He got
the results back two and a half years later. His urine had 5000
times the amount of permissible uranium.

After years of fighting with the VA, Rokke said he managed to get
a 40 percent disability, but there is no official acknowledgement
that his illnesses were caused by his work with DU.

The Army and the Pentagon continue to insist that DU is safe. Rokke
says they know better, because he gave them the proof. He said they
can't find evidence of DU's dangers because "they're looking for
the wrong stuff, and they're using the wrong procedures."

The problem with DU, he said, is the stuff that's given off when a
round is fired. The projectile begins burning immediately, and up
to 70 percent of it oxidizes. This aerosolized power-uranium oxide-is
the really dangerous stuff, Rokke said, particularly when it is
inhaled.

Rokke insists that he and his men were wearing protective equipment-or
equipment they thought would protect them. But their face masks
were capable of straining out particles of 10 microns or larger.
That's as big as the DU particles get, according to the Army and
the Pentagon.

Rokke, however, insists that he has measured particles as small as
.3 microns, and that scientists at the Livermore laboratories have
measured them as small as .1 micron.

Thus these safety precautions, which are still in place now, are
utterly useless, he said.

'I'm a warrior and a patriot'

About one quarter of the 700,000 troops sent to the Persian Gulf
War have reported some sort of Gulf War-related illness, and Rokke
is convinced that DU has something to do with it, along with the
host of other chemicals to which troops were exposed, including low
levels of sarin gas, smoke from oil fires, countless pesticides as
well as anti-nerve gas tablets which troops were required to ingest.

If Rokke is right about the dangers of DU, why does the Department
of Defense continue to use it and insist that it is safe?

"When you go to war, your purpose is to kill," Rokke said, "and DU
is the best killing thing we got."

Rokke believes that the U.S. military is putting more emphasis on
firepower than on the health and safety of its own troops.

He received a memo in the early 90s he says proves his theory.

Dated March 1, 1991, the memo was written by Lt. Col. M.V. Ziehmn
at the Los Alamos Laboratories in New Mexico.

"There has been and continues to be a concern regarding the impact
of dU [sic] on the environment. Therefore, if no one makes a case
for the effectiveness of dU on the battlefield, dU rounds may become
politically unacceptable and thus, be deleted from the arsenal,"
the memo reads. "If dU penetrators proved their worth during our
recent combat activities, then we should assure their future existence
(until something better is developed) through Service/DoD proponency.
If proponency is not garnered, it is possible that we stand to lose
a valuable combat capability. I believe we should keep this sensitive
issue at mind when after action reports [sic] are written."

The meaning of this memo is quite clear, Rokke said. Since DU
munitions are so effective, they must continue to be used in combat,
regardless of the environmental or health consequences.

The other issue is financial, he said. If the true effects of DU
were known, cleanup costs would be absolutely staggering.

DU contaminated areas extend much farther than the Persian Gulf
battlefields. Rokke said DU is regularly used in practice maneuvers
in the U.S., namely in Indiana, Florida, New Mexico, Massachusetts,
Maryland and Puerto Rico. Then there's Kosovo, where DU rounds were
used to take out Serbian tanks.

As the U.S. stands on the brink of another war with Iraq, Rokke
said he wants to make sure the American public fully understands
that this war will be far worse that the last one, and that numbers
of troops sickened by DU is likely to be much higher.

Rokke insists he is no pacifist.

"I'm a warrior and a patriot," he said. Given a verifiable threat
against the U.S., "I would go to war in a heartbeat."

But he said that he is speaking out for the good of American troops,
and for anyone, including Iraqi troops and civilians, who could be
exposed to DU.

"Am I pushing for peace today? Yes, I am," he said.

Before a war with Iraq can even be contemplated, Rokke said, DU has
to be removed from every arsenal in the world.

In order for that to happen, however, the Pentagon would have to
admit that Doug Rokke is right, and that would come at a price that
no one has even imagined. But money can't restore the lives of those
that Rokke says have died from DU, and money isn't going to get the
uranium oxide out of his lungs. There are people at the Pentagon
who understand all this, Rokke claims, and that he deems unconscionable.

"I hope God slam-dunks their butts, because this is absolutely
criminal," he said.

Posted December 28, 2002 11:47 AM

To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to:

radiation-survivors-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com ----- Are you looking
for a good computer help list?

http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ComputersForSeniors/

Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
*****************************************************************
 31 Studies track Gulf War illness*

* TRAVIS DUNN*

*/BALTIMORE (December 30, 2002)/* ?

*Recent studies investigating the effects of low levels of sarin 
nerve gas on animals appear to confirm the theory that some forms 
of Gulf War illness may have been caused by the exposure of U.S. 
troops to nerve gas.*

ERD
<http://www.disasternews.net

/?Dr. Robert Haley/

Preliminary findings from one of these studies, conducted by the 
U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense in 
Aberdeen, Md., indicate exposure to low levels of sarin may cause 
brain damage in guinea pigs.

"The results suggest that depression of [cholinesterase] activity 
following low-dose sarin exposure may lead to persistent 
neurochemical or pathological changes that influence behavior," 
according to an abstract of the study presented at the November 
meeting of the Society for Neuroscience.

This study and others corroborate the work of Dr. Robert Haley, 
an epidemiologist at University of Texas Southwestern Medical 
School in Dallas, who has been studying the effects of low-dose 
sarin on human beings for almost a decade.

Haley has published several studies showing a direct correlation 
between low-level sarin exposure and permanent brain stem damage 
in some Gulf War veterans.

Haley cites another study, conducted by researchers at the 
Lovelace Respiratory Research Institute at the University of New 
Mexico, which also finds that rats, exposed to low levels of 
sarin, suffer brain damage, particularly when these rats are also 
been exposed to a hot environment, similar to what troops would 
have encountered in the Persian Gulf.

"They're both showing the same thing," Haley said. "This is sort 
of the final link in the chain of evidence that connects brain 
damage in Gulf War veterans with sarin nerve gas. None of these 
pieces of evidence is conclusive in itself. But when you add them 
up, there's strong evidence."

Haley, however, said he does not mean to imply that all the 
symptoms reported by sick Gulf War veterans are caused by sarin.

Haley also lends credence to the so-called "cocktail theory," 
which holds that a variety of substances -- pesticides, depleted 
uranium, anthrax vaccines, and petrochemical fumes -- may be 
responsible for the ill-health effects noted by almost a quarter 
of the 700,000 U.S. troops who were stationed in the Persian Gulf 
during Desert Storm.

Another Army study is looking into the combined effects of both 
low-level sarin and pyridostigmine bromide (PB) exposure in rats. 
PB is an anti-nerve gas pill that was given to troops during the 
war, and which some suspect may have impaired their health.

* The power of PON *

Scientific studies of Gulf War illnesses have been expanding 
considerably in the last few years, and received a big boost Oct. 
28 when the Department of Veterans Affairs announced it would 
spend $40 million in FY 2004 on further research, particularly on 
the neurological basis of some of these illnesses.

Haley, for one, is impressed by the change, since he began his 
research without any support from the DoD or the VA. His original 
studies were funded by H. Ross Perot.

At that time, he said, almost all government research into Gulf 
War illnesses was concentrated on "combat stress," a focus that 
Haley thought absurd.

But the Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses 
(OSAGWI) -- now the Deployment Health Support Directorate (DHSD) 
-- sharply criticized the validity of Haley's research for years.

"For years they called Haley a witch doctor. I know because I was 
there. I've got it on videotape," said Kirt Love, director of the 
Desert Storm Battle Registry. "They had it in for Haley. They've 
done everything they can to blackball this guy."

"Dr. Haley was publicly ridiculed on Capitol Hill, "added Steve 
Robinson, director of the National Gulf War Resource Center. "Now 
he has survived, and his science has been proven to be true, and 
his science is going to get funded."

Bernard Rostker, former undersecretary of the Army and head of 
OSAGWI, at a public hearing on Tuesday, July 13, 1999, called 
into question the basic logic of Haley's work.

"On various occasions Dr. Haley has also cited that since he's 
found [brain] damage there must have been sarin on the 
battlefield and therefore there was sarin on the battlefield," 
Rostker said. "That circular logic escapes me."

But to Haley the explanation is simple, and there's no circular 
logic involved.

It all has to do with a substance called paraoxonase Q, or PON Q, 
a chemical in the human bloodstream that serves only one function 
-- the elimination of sarin nerve gas.

Haley has no idea why such a chemical exists naturally; he 
speculates that it may have served some vestigial function in the 
annals of evolution. But that is beside the point, he said. The 
fact is, PON Q exists, and by studying blood levels of this 
chemical, a scientist can learn important information.

Haley's studies indicate that troops who have naturally high 
levels of PON Q in their bloodstream had relatively normal 
brains. The sick Gulf vets, however, all had naturally low levels 
of PON Q. These are soldiers who served in the same units, and 
would have been exposed to the same environmental and chemical 
conditions.

According to Haley, there is only one scientific conclusion: the 
troops he studied were exposed to sarin. No other theory could 
explain why the vets with high PON Q levels did not get sick.

So where did the sarin come from?

Robinson, who used to work for Rostker and OSAGWI, said the 
official word from the Pentagon, until 1997, was that no chemical 
or biological weapons were present in the Persian Gulf theatre. 
Robinson said he knew better -- the very organization he worked 
for was deliberately lying to the public.

"Science is proving them wrong," he said.

The DoD has since come to recognize possible low level sarin 
release from an Iraqi bunker at Khamisiyah. But neither Haley, 
nor Robinson, nor Love, think that this one site can explain all 
the sick vets.

At the abovementioned 1999 hearing, Rostker said, "So I don't 
know the source of the contamination that Dr. Haley relates 
to...that is another troublesome aspect of Dr. Haley's work. We 
just can't find with any degree of certainty the source of the 
contamination that he cites as being present."

Haley, however, has a very definite idea of where the sarin could 
have come from, and he thinks that if Rostker listened to Czech 
and French intelligence reports, he might find "the source of the 
contamination."

On both Jan. 20 and 24 of 1991, Czech units detected low levels 
of sarin drifting from a storage facilty in Iraq. French units 
independently confirmed ambient sarin on Jan. 24.

"[The DoD] would prefer that this not be discussed," Haley said.

* 'A new paradigm of warfare' *

Both Robinson and Love are happy with the turn that recent 
research is taking, but both are concerned that a focus on the 
effects of sarin might prevent research into other possible 
causes.

"The studies demonstrate that if good science is applied and 
researchers are allowed to look at the potential problems, then 
researchers will find an answer," Robinson said. "That doesn't 
mean that the other exposures are any less important."

Future research must not lose sight of other possible culprits, 
he said, such as depleted uranium, the PB pill, experimental 
drugs, anthrax vaccines, pesticides and the petrochemicals given 
off by burning oil wells.

"Exposures are part of the reason and causal factors of why [Gulf 
veterans] are sick," he said. "That's something we've been trying 
to make people to understand for the last 11 years."

Love, who himself suffers from an undiagnosed Gulf War illness, 
is heartened by the new studies because they are "going to be 
harder for DoD to dispute."

And that's a pattern that Love says he has seen in his activism 
for sick Gulf vets: a pattern of deception and stonewalling on 
the part of both the DoD and VA to prevent any comprehensive 
research into Gulf War illnesses.

"That's their job," Love said, "just to stiff arm us and just 
keep us at bay."

And both men are particularly concerned that researchers are just 
beginning to understand what happened a decade ago, as U.S. 
troops are once again deploying for the Persian Gulf.

"It's very interesting that it's kind of all coming together 
right on the precipice of another Gulf War," Robinson said.

One thing that most Americans don't realize, he said, is that the 
age of conventional warfare died during the last Gulf War, and 
that today's conflicts will entail the exposure of our troops to 
dangerous substances, the effects of which have not been 
completely studied.

"We're in a new paradigm of warfare," he said. "And we're not 
talking about it. [Chemical exposure] is just as dangerous as 
bullets and bombs, but it's just harder to see. And you don't 
have to die from it to feel the effects."

Love is concerned today's soldiers will not be adequately 
protected against what they may soon face in "this industrial 
wasteland they call Iraq."

He claims that some of the protective suits to be provided to the 
rank and file aren't really much better than the ones in the 
first Gulf War, and he cites a General Accounting Office report 
from Oct. 10 that concluded up to 70 percent of these suits were 
defective.

"I think we're going to have a lot of unnecessary deaths. What 
I'm fighting for right now is the medical and civil rights of 
veterans," he said. "I don't think it's right that they're 
sending these troops out and putting such a low dollar value on 
them."

/Posted December 31, 2002 4:17 PM/
 
Disaster News Network, 7855 Rappahannock Ave., Suite 200, Jessup, 
MD 20794 . Phone (443) 755-9999 . Email: info@disasternews.net 
<mailto:info@disasternews.net> Copyright </about/copyright.php> © 
2001-02 Disaster News Network Inc. All Rights Reserved

*****************************************************************
 32 Fallon father's survey confirms cancer fears

Tuesday, December 31, 2002
 Copyright © Las Vegas Review-Journal 

But state health officials doubt data from parent whose daughter
died of leukemia

 By RICHARD LAKE REVIEW-JOURNAL 

Stephanie Sands, who died last year at age 21, was one of three 
young people with ties to Fallon to die of leukemia in recent 
years.

Floyd Sands and others asked Fallon residents about cancers that 
affected their families in the past decade. Photo by Christine H. 
Wetzel. 

A door-to-door survey in Fallon has confirmed what some of the 
Northern Nevada city's residents have suspected all along, said 
the man who conducted the survey: There's too much cancer there. 

"Do the math and you're going to be startled," said Floyd Sands, 
whose daughter Stephanie was one of three young people with ties 
to Fallon to die of leukemia in recent years. 

But after a cursory examination of Sands' results, state public 
health experts said the data does not appear to back the claim. 

"There isn't enough information," said Randall Todd, an 
epidemiologist with the Nevada State Health Division. "It's 
forcing us to make too many assumptions." 

Since 1997, 16 children under age 19 who live or used to live in 
Fallon have been diagnosed with leukemia. An investigation was 
launched when the cluster of blood cancer was discovered in 2000. 
A cause has not been determined. 

Sands has complained about the investigation's lack of progress 
and has been harshly critical of state experts, especially Todd. 
So Sands launched his own investigation in October. 

He and a group of volunteers canvassed the town of 7,500 people 
and asked residents about the history of various types of cancer 
that they and their family members had experienced in the past 
decade. Sands said he also collected data through email and 
telephone calls from residents of Churchill County, which has a 
population of 25,000, after his survey received media exposure in 
the area. 

After almost three months of crunching the numbers, Sands 
released the results late Monday afternoon. 

He said the survey uncovered 27 cases of leukemia that are not 
included in the official investigation, as well as an assortment 
of other cancers, including 13 lung cancers, 17 cases of 
melanoma, 16 cases of breast cancer and 15 cases of brain cancer. 

"I think the survey confirms long-standing rumors in Fallon," 
Sands said. "I know it does." 

In discussing why the data was difficult to decipher, Todd 
pointed in particular to a lack of information on when the 
diagnoses were made, leading him to believe that Sands may have 
improperly compared his findings to what scientists would expect 
to see in one year as opposed to over an entire decade. 

Todd also pointed out that, if he were to include adult and 
childhood cases of leukemia over a 10-year period, he would 
expect to see about 36 cases in Churchill County, which includes 
Fallon. Sands' 43 cases, which include several people who no 
longer live in the area, would not be too far from the norm, Todd 
said. 

There are similar comparative results when the known rate of 
brain cancer, which is about 7.5 cases per 100,000 people, 
according to the National Cancer Institute, is compared to what 
Sands found in Fallon. 

Sands' data says he found 15 cases of brain cancer in the town, 
including several in unincorporated parts of the county. Todd 
said the state cancer registry shows 17 cases of brain cancer in 
the county since 1990. 

If Churchill County were in the normal range, experts would 
expect to see about 18 cases in a decade. 

Sands acknowledged that he doesn't know the date of diagnosis for 
most of the cases he found, but his survey asked for cancer 
histories dating to 1992. 

Sands said the number of auto-immune diseases, lupus cases and 
lymphoma cases concerned him most because they are often linked 
to leukemia. 

"The Hodgkin's lymphomas are frightful," he said. "The lymphomas 
overall are frightful." 

Sands said although he does not plan to share his data with the 
state Health Division, he would share it with other credible 
scientists who want to study the Fallon leukemia cluster. 

"Hopefully, this will mean something to someone in a position of 
authority, and maybe we can have a real epidemiological study of 
Churchill County," he said.
 
Copyright © Las Vegas Review-Journal, 1997 - 2002
*****************************************************************
 33 Vitrification plant boss garners passing grade
 
Published Dec. 27, 2002
 
Roy Schepens' performance for the first six months of his 
administration of the Office of River Protection has not been 
brag-worthy, but deserves a passing grade.
 
Schepens, who took overJuly 1, has yet to find his footing in the 
highly visible and political realm that is Hanford. 

He brought the expertise needed for his key job, building and 
operating a nuclear waste vitrification plant, but has yet to 
adjust his style to the unique culture that separates this 
cleanup site from others in the Department of Energy complex.
 
Schepens also has not made as much progress in solidifying his 
office's mission as successfully as he and the Energy Department 
had hoped.
 
His boss, cleanup czar Jessie Roberson, said in June that she had 
four goals for Schepens' first six months in office. Schepens has 
met at least one of them, perhaps two, but not all.
 
Roberson expected construction on the vitrification plant to be 
started and well under way. Construction has experienced some 
delays, but now is clipping along. 

Two other Roberson expectations hinged on the renegotiation of 
Bechtel's contract to build and operate the vit plant. Roberson 
said she wanted increased confidence for completion dates within 
the costs agreed upon and for Bechtel to have a clear definition 
of the scope of its work and measurements.
 
That has yet to happen. Schepens' office now expects to have its 
contract with Bechtel renegotiated next month. 

It does appear that among the changes will be more assurances 
from Bechtel that it can meet time targets, a commitment that 
also could result in more profit for the company. But how Bechtel 
will build a vitrification plant that can handle waste fast 
enough to satisfy the state and for a price the Energy Department 
can afford is still unknown.
 
Finally, Roberson wanted all the Office of River Protection's 
partners to be "checked in" and to "fully understand the 
priorities."
 
We're not sure how complete Roberson would be in listing the 
Office of River Protection's partners. Certainly, vit plant 
builder Bechtel and CH2M Hill, which is closing the underground 
tanks where the waste now is stored, would be on the list. 

Bechtel, for its part, is awaiting direction on the priorities 
that will emerge from the contract renegotiation, but is 
certainly working closely with Schepens' office. And CH2M Hill 
knows and is on board with what the Department of Energy wants - 
an accelerated closure of the tanks.
 
We, and we hope Roberson, also would extend the "partner" 
designation to state regulators, the Hanford Advisory Board and 
the surrounding community. There, Schepens has not fared as well. 

He has not shown, at least publicly, the appropriate deference to 
the Tri-Party Agreement and the battle that went into creating 
it. The TPA remains this community's and state's best assurance 
of a job well done at Hanford. 

Schepens' office also has not developed the relationships 
necessary to keep state regulators, community leaders and Hanford 
watchdogs abreast of changes as they happen. There are signs that 
Schepens is beginning to understand the reality of operating in 
Hanford's fish bowl, and so we are hesitant to give him a failing 
grade here. We hope he continues to improve that communication.
 
Schepens can be an asset to the construction and operation of 
Hanford's vitrification plant, but the full benefit of his 
potential won't be reached unless he recognizes the value that 
regulators and the public bring to the process. What's your 
opinon? 

Copyright 2002 Tri-City Herald. All rights reserved. This 
*****************************************************************
 34 Pakistan: N-programme in safe hands: FO 

*ISLAMABAD:* Pakistan on Monday reassured that the country's 
nuclear programme and its command and control structure was 
completely in safe hands.

"Pakistan's record as far as safety of our nuclear programme and 
transfer of technology is concerned is totally impeccable," 
Foreign Office spokesman Aziz Ahmed Khan said at a weekly news 
briefing here.

He was responding to a question about a news report in Japanese 
media alleging that Pakistan transferred nuclear material in a 
coffin. "This is a baseless, tendentious and ridiculous report. 
It is as ridiculous as it can get," he said of reports, which 
suggested that "centrifuges" were smuggled in a coffin along with 
a body of a wife of an official.

"A coffin, which has a dead body hardly, has any room to 
accommodate anything else in it," he said, adding, "It is totally 
baseless report and we outrightly reject it". He reiterated that 
Pakistan's nuclear programme was completely in safe hands and all 
the countries accepted this fact.

Referring to similar news items about Pakistan's nuclear 
programme, the spokesman said these were motivated reports, 
adding he would not like to make any speculative statement or 
guess work about their origin.

He responded in negative when asked about any pressure on 
Pakistan to abandon its nuclear programme. "As far as our 
relations with states are concerned, there is no such pressure, 
they understand our position and they are in complete agreement 
with the safety standards of our nuclear programme," he added.

Responding to a question about suggestions of having security 
equipment for the country's nuclear assets from other countries, 
the spokesman said that Pakistan's safety standards were totally 
adequate. "If there is any need in future we will look at it when 
it comes to that," he added.

He said there was nothing to be worried about the country's 
nuclear programme. The spokesman also rejected reports of 
Japanese foreign minister cancelling her visit to Pakistan. "For 
certain reasons she had to shorten her visit but the Japanese 
foreign minister had recently visited Pakistan and there have 
been several high-level visits from Japan to Pakistan and this 
(foreign minister) visit can be rescheduled at a later time," 
said the spokesman.

He also set aside suggestions that the visit of the Japanese 
foreign minister was linked to, in any way, with the reports of 
Pakistan's alleged cooperation with North Korea in its nuclear 
programme.

"It is nothing to do with that." About Prime Minister Mir 
Zafarullah Khan Jamali's visit to Saudi Arabia, the spokesman 
said Pakistan has close and fraternal relations with the Kingdom, 
which is marked by frequent exchange of high-level visits. Prime 
Minister Jamali, during his 5-day visit, will call on King Fahd 
and will also meet Crown Prince Abdullah and discuss bilateral 
matters and issues of regional and international concerns, he 
added.

Responding to a question about reports of India putting more 
restrictions on visits by Pakistanis, the spokesman termed them 
unfortunate, saying these measures would not help improve the 
situation, but will create problems for ordinary people visiting 
their relatives there. Pakistan, he said, would not reciprocate 
these new measures.

Copyright 1996-2002 . Hi Pakistan. All rights reserved.
*****************************************************************
 35 Inconsistencies lead to war

StatesmanJournal.com <http://www.statesmanjournal.com/>

December 31, 2002

The Bush administration?s drive for war with Iraq ignores major
inconsistencies on its part. It:

?Seeks to override U.N. inspection team investigations that could 
lead to peace.

?Forgets that its and Britain?s repeated bombings of no-fly zones 
in Iraq have killed thousands of innocent Iraqis, many of them 
children.

?Disregards Turkish oppression of the Kurds while blaming Iraq 
for the same.

?Overlooks Israel?s estimated 200 nuclear bombs as it predicts 
Iraq may have just one within a year.

?Postpones any Palestinian state for two years as Israel 
establishes more ?facts on the land? settlements.

Such unjust inconsistencies are a certain recipe that can only 
lead to war and more hatred.

?Hal Fisher

Salem

<http://news.statesmanjournal.com
*****************************************************************
 36 Russia Warns NK on NPT Withdrawal   
 
Digital Chosunilbo (English Edition) : Daily News in English

Updated Dec.31,2002 17:32 KST      
      
  by Jeong Byeong-seon (bschung@chosun.com)

MOSCOW - The Russian Foreign Ministry said Monday that North 
Korea's withdrawal from the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty would 
bring very serious consequences, in its first comments to 
domestic and international reporters after Pyongyang deported 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors. It also 
pointed out the Pyongyang's decision would not benefit the 
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula at all, while calling 
for resolution of the state of a tension through dialogue between 
the US and North Korea. 

Mikhail Lysenko, head of the Weapons Reduction Department said 
the North's withdrawal from the NPT would raise serious 
international concerns, and diplomatic efforts from surrounding 
nations such as Russia would be concentrated upon blocking this 
action. 

Evgeni Afanasyev, the former Russian Ambassador to Korea and 
current head of the Asian Regional Department, said it would be 
advisable to resolve the nuclear issue through the IAEA before 
the United Nations Security Council dealt with the issue. He 
added he did do not want a repeat of the 1994 crisis and 
dialogues between the North-and US, and North and South should 
resolve the nuclear issue. 

Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov said Russia regretted North Korea's 
decision to deport IAEA inspectors and remove surveillance 
devices attached to the Yangbyon nuclear reactor, while calling 
for it to observe its international obligations. 

*****************************************************************
 37 Historic bomb shelter found

Charlotte Observer | 12/31/2002 | 

Curiosity from '60s turns up beneath site of Woolworth sit-ins
 Associated Press
 
GREENSBORO - The demolition of an old Woolworth's where the civil 
rights sit-in movement was born has uncovered another piece of 
mid-20th century history.
 
The remnants of a long-forgotten bomb shelter, large enough to 
hold 100 people, were discovered recently in the basement of the 
downtown Greensboro store.
 
The shelter, designed to protect residents from a potential Cold 
War-era nuclear attack, includes aspirin bottles dated from 1962 
and biscuits in tin cans to feed people in the crowded room.
 
A heavy steel door with latches bolted to the wall was designed 
to protect those inside from radiation.
 
Some of the supplies will be part of a planned exhibit at the 
International Civil Rights Museum, set to open on the Woolworth's 
site in 2004. The store closed in 1994.
 
Life might have been short inside the shelter: an air vent within 
the 26-inch-thick cement protecting the shelter apparently was 
unfiltered.
 
"They would have survived, but I don't know how long," said Lois 
Boyd, who uncovered the shelter while surveying an isolated area 
of the basement. Boyd works with Sit-In Movement, which is 
working to build the museum.
 
It was at the Woolworth's in 1960 that four black students from 
N.C. A&T refused to leave their seats at the lunch counter after 
being denied service. The acts helped spread the sit-in movement 
across the South.
 
About the same time as the sit-ins, Americans fearing nuclear 
annihilation by the Soviet Union tried to find protection from 
radiation.
 
Rows of boxes stamped "Office of Civil Defense" line one wall of 
the shelter.
 
Six toilets, round cardboard cylinders with lids, are filled with 
toilet tissue and other supplies.
 
There was also a stainless-steel can opener that would be used to 
open the biscuit cans.
   
*****************************************************************
 38 50 Facts About U.S. Nuclear Weapons
 
Tuesday, December 31, 2002                                       
   	 	 	 		 		     		
This project was completed in August 1998 and resulted in the 
book Atomic Audit: The Costs and Consequences of U.S. Nuclear 
Weapons Since 1940 edited by Stephen I. Schwartz. These project 
pages are only occassionally updated and should be considered 
historical.--> U.S. Nuclear Weapons Cost Study Project 

This project was completed in August 1998 and resulted in the 
book Atomic Audit: The Costs and Consequences of U.S. Nuclear 
Weapons Since 1940 edited by Stephen I. Schwartz. These project 
pages are only occassionally updated and should be considered 
historical.

U.S. Nuclear Weapons Cost Study Project 

This project was completed in August 1998 and resulted in the 
book Atomic Audit: The Costs and Consequences of U.S. Nuclear 
Weapons Since 1940 edited by Stephen I. Schwartz. These project 
pages are only occassionally updated and should be considered 
historical.--> 

  
               50 Facts About U.S. Nuclear Weapons
 
 - Except where noted all figures are in constant 1996 dollars -

 1. Cost of the Manhattan Project (through August 1945): 
$20,000,000,000 

 SOURCES: Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson, Jr., The New 
World: A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, 
Volume 1, 1939/1946 (Oak Ridge, Tennessee: U.S. AEC Technical 
Information Center, 1972), pp. 723-724; Condensed AEC Annual 
Financial Report, FY 1953 (in Fifteenth Semiannual Report of the 
Atomic Energy Commission, January 1954, p. 73) 

 2. Total number of nuclear missiles built, 1951-present: 67,500 

 U.S. Nuclear Weapons Cost Study Project 

 3. Estimated construction costs for more than 1,000 ICBM launch 
pads and silos, and support facilities, from 1957-1964: nearly 
$14,000,000,000 

 Maj. C.D. Hargreaves, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Ballistic 
Missile Construction Office (CEBMCO), "Introduction to the CEBMCO 
Historical Report and History of the Command Section, Pre-CEBMCO 
Thru December 1962," p. 8; U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Ballistic 
Missile Construction Office, "U.S. Air Force ICBM Construction 
Program," undated chart (circa 1965) 

 4. Total number of nuclear bombers built, 1945-present: 4,680 

 U.S. Nuclear Weapons Cost Study Project 

 5. Peak number of nuclear warheads and bombs in the 
stockpile/year: 32,193/1966 

 Natural Resources Defense Council, Nuclear Weapons Databook 
Project 

 6. Total number and types of nuclear warheads and bombs built, 
1945-1990: more than 70,000/65 types 

 U.S. Department of Energy; Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Nuclear Weapons Databook Project 

 7. Number currently in the stockpile(2002): 10,600 (7,982 
deployed, 2,700 hedge/contingency stockpile) 

 Natural Resources Defense Council, Nuclear Weapons Databook 
Project 

 8. Number of nuclear warheads requested by the Army in 1956 and 
1957: 151,000 

 History of the Custody and Deployment of Nuclear Weapons, July 
1945 Through September 1977, Prepared by the Office of the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy), February 1978, p. 
50 (formerly Top Secret) 

 9. Projected operational U.S. strategic nuclear warheads and 
bombs after full enactment of the Strategic Offensive Reductions 
Treaty in 2012: 1,700-2,200 

 U.S. Department of Defense; Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Nuclear Weapons Databook Project 

 10. Additional strategic and non-strategic warheads not limited 
by the treaty that the U.S. military wants to retain as a "hedge" 
against unforeseen future threats: 4,900 

 U..S. Department of Defense; Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Nuclear Weapons Databook Project 

 11. Largest and smallest nuclear bombs ever deployed: 
B17/B24(~42,000 lbs., 10-15 megatons); W54 (51 lbs., .01 
kilotons, .02 kilotons-1 kiloton) 

 Natural Resources Defense Council, Nuclear Weapons Databook 
Project 

 12. Peak number of operating domestic uranium mines (1955): 925 

 Nineteenth Semiannual Report of the Atomic Energy Commission, 
January 1956, p. 31 

 13. Fissile material produced: 104 metric tons 
of<br>plutoniumand 994 metric tons of highly-enriched<br>uranium

 U.S. Department of Energy 

 14. Amount of plutonium still in weapons: 43 metric tons 

 Natural Resources Defense Council, Nuclear Weapons Databook 
Project 

 15. Number of thermometers which could be filled with mercury 
used to produce lithium-6 at the Oak Ridge Reservation: 11 
billion 

 U.S. Department of Energy 

 16. Number of dismantled plutonium "pits" stored at the Pantex 
Plantin Amarillo, Texas: 12,067 (as of May 6, 1999) 

 U.S. Department of Energy 

 17. States with the largest number of nuclear weapons (in 1999): 
New Mexico (2,450), Georgia(2,000), Washington (1,685), Nevada 
(1,350), and North Dakota (1,140) 

 William M. Arkin, Robert S. Norris, and Joshua Handler, Taking 
Stock: Worldwide Nuclear Deployments 1998 (Washington, D.C.: 
Natural Resources Defense Council, March 1998) 

 18. Total known land area occupied by U.S. nuclear weapons bases 
and facilities: 15,654 square miles 

 U.S. Nuclear Weapons Cost Study Project 

 19. Total land area of the District of Columbia, Massachusetts, 
and New Jersey: 15,357 square miles 

 Rand McNally Road Atlas and Travel Guide, 1992 

 20. Legal fees paid by the Department of Energy to fight 
lawsuits from workers and private citizens concerning nuclear 
weapons production and testing activities, from October 1990 
through March 1995: $97,000,000 

 U.S. Department of Energy 

 21. Money paid by the State Department to Japan following 
falloutfrom the 1954 "Bravo" test: $15,300,000 

 Barton C. Hacker, Elements of Controversy: The Atomic Energy 
Commission and Radiation Safety in Nuclear Weapons Testing, 1947 
-1974, University of California Press, 1994, p. 158 

 22. Money and non-monetary compensation paid by the the United 
States to Marshallese Islanders since 1956 to redress damages 
from nuclear testing: at least $759,000,000 

 U.S. Nuclear Weapons Cost Study Project 

 23. Money paid to U.S. citizens under the Radiation Exposure and 
Compensation Act of 1990, as of January 13, 1998: approximately 
$225,000,000 (6,336 claims approved; 3,156 denied) 

 U.S. Department of Justice, Torts Branch, Civil Division 

 24. Total cost of the Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion (ANP) program, 
1946-1961: $7,000,000,000 

 "Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion Program," Report of the Joint 
Committee on Atomic Energy, September 1959, pp. 11-12 

 25. Total number of nuclear-powered aircraft and airplane 
hangars built: 0 and 1 

 Ibid; "American Portrait: ANP," WFAA-TV (Dallas), 1993. Between 
July 1955 and March 1957, a specially modified B-36 bomber made 
47 flights with a three megawatt air-cooled operational test 
reactor (the reactor, however, did not power the plane). 

 26. Number of secret Presidential Emergency Facilities built for 
use during and after a nuclear war: more than 75 

 Bill Gulley with Mary Ellen Reese, Breaking Cover, Simon and 
Schuster, 1980, pp. 34- 36 

 27. Currency stored until 1988 by the Federal Reserve at its 
Mount Pony facility for use after a nuclear war: more than 
$2,000,000,000 

 Edward Zuckerman, The Day After World War III, The Viking Press, 
1984, pp. 287-88 

 28. Amount of silver in tons once used at the Oak Ridge, TN, 
Y-12 Plantfor electrical magnet coils: 14,700 

 Vincent C. Jones, Manhattan: The Army and the Bomb, U.S. Army 
Center for Military History, 1985, pp. 66-7 

 29. Total number of U.S. nuclear weapons tests, 1945-1992: 1,030 
(1,125 nuclear devices detonated; 24 additional joint tests with 
Great Britain) 

 U.S. Department of Energy 

 30. First and last test: July 16, 1945 ("Trinity") and September 
23, 1992 ("Divider") 

 U.S. Department of Energy

 31. Estimated amount spent between October 1, 1992 and October 
1, 1995 on nuclear testing activities: $1,200,000,000 (0 tests) 

 U.S. Nuclear Weapons Cost Study Project 

 32. Cost of 1946 Operation Crossroadsweapons tests ("Able" and 
"Baker") at Bikini Atoll: $1,300,000,000 

 Weisgall, Operation Crossroads, pp. 294, 371 

 33. Largest U.S. explosion/date: 15 Megatons/March 1, 1954 
("Bravo") 

 U.S. Department of Energy 

 34. Number of islands in Enewetak atoll vaporized by the 
November 1, 1952 "Mike" H-bomb test: 1 

 Chuck Hansen, U.S. Nuclear Weapons: The Secret History, Orion 
Books, 1988, pp. 58-59, 95 

 35. Number of nuclear tests in the Pacific: 106 

 Natural Resources Defense Council, Nuclear Weapons Databook 
Project 

 36. Number of U.S. nuclear tests in Nevada: 911 

 Natural Resources Defense Council, Nuclear Weapons Databook 
Project 

 37. Number of nuclear weapons tests in Alaska [1, 2, and 3], 
Colorado [1 and 2], Mississippiand New Mexico [1, 2and 3]: 10 

 Natural Resources Defense Council, Nuclear Weapons Databook 
Project 

 38. Operational naval nuclear propulsion reactors vs. 
operational commercial power reactors (in 1999): 129 vs. 108 

 Adm. Bruce DeMars, Deputy Assistant Director for Naval Reactors, 
U.S. Navy; Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

 39. Number of attack (SSN)and ballistic missile (SSBN)submarines 
(2002): 53 SSNs and 18 SSBNs 

 Adm. Bruce DeMars, Deputy Assistant Director for Naval Reactors, 
U.S. Navy 

 40. Number of high level radioactive waste tanks in Washington, 
Idahoand South Carolina: 239 

 U.S. Department of Energy 

 41. Volume in cubic meters of radioactive waste resulting from 
weapons activities: 104,000,000 

 U.S. Department of Energy; Institute for Energy and 
Environmental Research 

 42. Number of designated targets for U.S. weapons in the Single 
Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) in 1976, 1986, and 1995: 
25,000 (1976), 16,000 (1986) and 2,500 (1995) 

 Bruce Blair, Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution 

 43. Cost of January 17, 1966 nuclear weapons accident over 
Palomares, Spain (including two lost planes, an extended search 
and recovery effort, waste disposal in the U.S. and settlement 
claims): $182,000,000 

 Joint Committee on Atomic Energy Interoffice Memorandum, 
February 15, 1968; Center for Defense Information 

 44. Number of U.S. nuclear bombs lost in accidents and never 
recovered: 11 

 U.S. Department of Defense; Center for Defense Information; 
Greenpeace; "Lost Bombs," Atwood-Keeney Productions, Inc., 1997 

 45. Number of Department of Energy federal employees (in 1996): 
18,608 

 U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Worker and Community 
Transition 

 46. Number of Department of Energy contractor employees (in 
1996): 109,242 

 U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Worker and Community 
Transition 

 47. Minimum number of classified pages estimated to be in the 
Department of Energy's possession (1995): 280 million 

 A Review of the Department of Energy Classification Policy and 
Practice, Committee on Declassification of Information for the 
Department of Energy Environmental Remediation and Related 
Programs, National Research Council, 1995, pp. 7-8, 68. 

 48. Ballistic missile defense spending in 1965 vs. 1995: 
$2,200,000,000 vs. $2,600,000,000 

 U.S. Nuclear Weapons Cost Study Project 

 49. Average cost per warhead to the U.S. to help Kazakhstan 
dismantle 104 SS-18 ICBMs carrying more than 1,000 warheads: 
$70,000 

 U.S. Nuclear Weapons Cost Study Project; Arms Control 
Association 

 50. Estimated 1998 spending on all U.S. nuclear weapons and 
weapons-related programs: $35,100,000,000 

 U.S. Nuclear Weapons Cost Study Project 

Copyright © 1998 The Brookings Institution
*****************************************************************
 39 George Orwell: You and the Atom Bomb
 
    From the archives of The Memory Hole    

Anti-war Propaganda: Civilizing Weapons

 This piece by George Orwell was originally published by the 
Tribune 19 October 1945 within months after atomic bombs were 
dropped over Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan by the only country 
ever to have used them to kill people and destroy cities, viz., 
the U.S.A. Orwell had written enough about the latter that had 
been remarkably stupid, but this particular piece was exceptional 
for the insights it shared about the world dispensation that lay 
ahead in the age of atomic weaponry. In addition, it was clear 
that the groundwork for his novel, Nineteen Eighty-four had been 
completed by this writing.

You and the Atomic Bomb
 
by George Orwell 

Considering how likely we all are to be blown to pieces by it 
within the next five years, the atomic bomb has not roused so 
much discussion as might have been expected. The newspapers have 
published numerous diagrams, not very helpful to the average man, 
of protons and neutrons doing their stuff, and there has been 
much reiteration of the useless statement that the bomb "ought to 
be put under international control." But curiously little has 
been said, at any rate in print, about the question that is of 
most urgent interest to all of us, namely: "How difficult are 
these things to manufacture?" 

Such information as we--that is, the big public--possess on this 
subject has come to us in a rather indirect way, apropos of 
President Truman's decision not to hand over certain secrets to 
the USSR. Some months ago, when the bomb was still only a rumour, 
there was a widespread belief that splitting the atom was merely 
a problem for the physicists, and that when they had solved it a 
new and devastating weapon would be within reach of almost 
everybody. (At any moment, so the rumour went, some lonely 
lunatic in a laboratory might blow civilisation to smithereens, 
as easily as touching off a firework.) 

Had that been true, the whole trend of history would have been 
abruptly altered. The distinction between great states and small 
states would have been wiped out, and the power of the State over 
the individual would have been greatly weakened. However, it 
appears from President Truman's remarks, and various comments 
that have been made on them, that the bomb is fantastically 
expensive and that its manufacture demands an enormous industrial 
effort, such as only three or four countries in the world are 
capable of making. This point is of cardinal importance, because 
it may mean that the discovery of the atomic bomb, so far from 
reversing history, will simply intensify the trends which have 
been apparent for a dozen years past. 

It is a commonplace that the history of civilisation is largely 
the history of weapons. In particular, the connection between the 
discovery of gunpowder and the overthrow of feudalism by the 
bourgeoisie has been pointed out over and over again. And though 
I have no doubt exceptions can be brought forward, I think the 
following rule would be found generally true: that ages in which 
the dominant weapon is expensive or difficult to make will tend 
to be ages of despotism, whereas when the dominant weapon is 
cheap and simple, the common people have a chance. Thus, for 
example, thanks, battleships and bombing planes are inherently 
tyrannical weapons, while rifles, muskets, long-bows and 
hand-grenades are inherently democratic weapons. A complex weapon 
makes the strong stronger, while a simple weapon--so long as 
there is no answer to it--gives claws to the weak. 

The great age of democracy and of national self-determination was 
the age of the musket and the rifle. After the invention of the 
flintlock, and before the invention of the percussion cap, the 
musket was a fairly efficient weapon, and at the same time so 
simple that it could be produced almost anywhere. Its combination 
of qualities made possible the success of the American and French 
revolutions, and made a popular insurrection a more serious 
business than it could be in our own day. After the musket came 
the breech-loading rifle. This was a comparatively complex thing, 
but it could still be produced in scores of countries, and it was 
cheap, easily smuggled and economical of ammunition. Even the 
most backward nation could always get hold of rifles from one 
source or another, so that Boers, Bulgars, Abyssinians, 
Moroccans--even Tibetans--could put up a fight for their 
independence, sometimes with success. But thereafter every 
development in military technique has favoured the State as 
against the individual, and the industrialised country as against 
the backward one. There are fewer and fewer foci of power. 
Already, in 1939, there were only five states capable of waging 
war on the grand scale, and now there are only three--ultimately, 
perhaps, only two. This trend has been obvious for years, and was 
pointed out by a few observers even before 1914. The one thing 
that might reverse it is the discovery of a weapon--or, to put it 
more broadly, of a method of fighting--not dependent on huge 
concentrations of industrial plant. 

From various symptoms one can infer that the Russians do not yet 
possess the secret of making the atomic bomb; on the other hand, 
the consensus of opinion seems to be that they will possess it 
within a few years. So we have before us the prospect of two or 
three monstrous super-states, each possessed of a weapon by which 
millions of people can be wiped out in a few seconds, dividing 
the world between them. It has been rather hastily assumed that 
this means bigger and bloodier wars, and perhaps an actual end to 
the machine civilisation. But suppose--and really this the 
likeliest development--that the surviving great nations make a 
tacit agreement never to use the atomic bomb against one another? 
Suppose they only use it, or the threat of it, against people who 
are unable to retaliate? In that case we are back where we were 
before, the only difference being that power is concentrated in 
still fewer hands and that the outlook for subject peoples and 
oppressed classes is still more hopeless. 

When James Burnham wrote The Managerial Revolution it seemed 
probable to many Americans that the Germans would win the 
European end of the war, and it was therefore natural to assume 
that Germany and not Russia would dominate the Eurasian land 
mass, while Japan would remain master of East Asia. This was a 
miscalculation, but it does not affect the main argument. For 
Burnham's geographical picture of the new world has turned out to 
be correct. More and more obviously the surface of the earth is 
being parceled off into three great empires, each self-contained 
and cut off from contact with the outer world, and each ruled, 
under one disguise or another, by a self-elected oligarchy. The 
haggling as to where the frontiers are to be drawn is still going 
on, and will continue for some years, and the third of the three 
super-states--East Asia, dominated by China--is still potential 
rather than actual. But the general drift is unmistakable, and 
every scientific discovery of recent years has accelerated it. 

We were once told that the aeroplane had "abolished frontiers"; 
actually it is only since the aeroplane became a serious weapon 
that frontiers have become definitely impassable. The radio was 
once expected to promote international understanding and 
co-operation; it has turned out to be a means of insulating one 
nation from another. The atomic bomb may complete the process by 
robbing the exploited classes and peoples of all power to revolt, 
and at the same time putting the possessors of the bomb on a 
basis of military equality. Unable to conquer one another, they 
are likely to continue ruling the world between them, and it is 
difficult to see how the balance can be upset except by slow and 
unpredictable demographic changes. 

For forty or fifty years past, Mr. H.G. Wells and others have 
been warning us that man is in danger of destroying himself with 
his own weapons, leaving the ants or some other gregarious 
species to take over. Anyone who has seen the ruined cities of 
Germany will find this notion at least thinkable. Nevertheless, 
looking at the world as a whole, the drift for many decades has 
been not towards anarchy but towards the reimposition of slavery. 
We may be heading not for general breakdown but for an epoch as 
horribly stable as the slave empires of antiquity.

James Burnham's theory has been much discussed, but few people 
have yet considered its ideological implications--that is, the 
kind of world-view, the kind of beliefs, and the social structure 
that would probably prevail in a state which was at once 
unconquerable and in a permanent state of "cold war" with its 
neighbors. 

Had the atomic bomb turned out to be something as cheap and 
easily manufactured as a bicycle or an alarm clock, it might well 
have plunged us back into barbarism, but it might, on the other 
hand, have meant the end of national sovereignty and of the 
highly-centralised police state. If, as seems to be the case, it 
is a rare and costly object as difficult to produce as a 
battleship, it is likelier to put an end to large-scale wars at 
the cost of prolonging indefinitely a "peace that is no peace." 
*****************************************************************
 40 Defusing a lethal legacy (Project Saphire)

NewsAdvance.com - 

By Chris Flores Dec 28, 2002
 
  In the summer of 1993 Andy Webber's vehicle needed work.	 

Webber, a Department of Defense employee, was attached to the 
U.S. embassy in the newly formed republic of Kazakhstan. 

But he and his mechanic talked about more than cars when he 
visited an auto-repair shop in the city of Almaty. The mechanic 
told Webber about something he'd heard, rumors really, about the 
once-secret nuclear city in the northern corner of the country. 
At Ulba, there was a stockpile of nuclear material. Webber passed 
the rumor on to U.S. Ambassador William Courtney. 

It would prove a crucial slice of a puzzle that, when pieced 
together, became the genesis of Project Sapphire, a secret 
mission that spirited more than half a ton of nuclear material 
from Kazakhstan to the United States and eventually to the BWXT 
plant near Lynchburg. 

This was highly enriched uranium, weapons grade. Enough for two 
dozen or more Hiroshima-type atomic bombs. 

The United States had known for years about Ulba. The Ulba 
Metallurgy Plant produced uranium fuel pellets used in half of 
the fuel fabricated for Soviet-designed reactors. It also 
produced highly enriched uranium - fuel for the Soviet's secret 
Alfa submarine program and for nuclear-powered satellites. 

Until 1967, Ulba was known as Mailbox 10. It didn't show up on 
any maps of the Soviet Union. It was created in 1949 as one of 
the regime's secret nuclear cities. 

More than 40 years later, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
the material that was left behind was drawing the clandestine 
attention of rogue nations like Iran and Iraq. 

Time was short. 

Within weeks of his chance meeting with the mechanic, Webber was 
making the 550-mile journey from Almaty to Ulba. 

By year's end, Project Sapphire was under way and over the next 
10 years it would have a continuing impact on Central Virginia. 

As America is once more assessing the possible threat of weapons 
of mass destruction from Iran and Iraq, no one knows for sure if 
any of the Sapphire stockpile ended up in the hands of those 
rogue nations. 

 
BWX Technologies, located on the James River in the Mt. Athos 
section of Campbell County, would eventually receive more than $8 
million from the federal government to downblend the Sapphire 
material into nuclear fuel for commercial reactors, turning a 
potential weapon into electricity. 

That process, to begin in 1995, was supposed to be completed in 
nine months. 

It took a tumultuous five years. 

The first delays came in getting the materials from Kazakhstan to 
the U.S. atomic energy facilities in Oak Ridge, Tenn. 

Then a Tennessee environmental group caught wind of the secret 
mission. It sued the U.S. government, accusing it of using a veil 
of secrecy to short-circuit a mandated environmental process. 

Because the work was classified, most Central Virginians remained 
in the dark for years about BWXT's exact role in Sapphire and its 
programs for diluting America's weapons. 

When the material made it to Mt. Athos, so did the delays. BWXT 
had problems with malfunctioning equipment that led to spills and 
ventilation failures. When some of the material started a fire, 
the company had to develop new procedures. 

And compounding it all were the unanticipated high amounts of the 
deadly element beryllium in the Sapphire material. 

But the most controversial and lingering problem was the loss of 
enough highly enriched uranium to arm two nuclear weapons. 
Whether this was an accounting problem or theft probably will 
never be known. 

But that's getting ahead of the story. 

In 1992, the world's political landscape was changing. 

On the surface, the United States was ecstatic about the demise 
of the Soviet Union. Communism had collapsed and democracy had 
prevailed. The good guys won. 

Behind the scenes it was a different story. 

As 1992 unfolded, the Soviet Union was dissolving into a score of 
new republics with stockpiles of poorly guarded nuclear materials 
- a "nightmare nuclear scenario." 

Jeffery Starr was working to create personal connections with the 
bureaucrats who had inherited the nuclear stockpiles of the 
former Soviet Union. Starr was based in the Pentagon and carried 
the elongated title of U.S. Principle Director for Threat 
Reduction Policy in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense/International Security Policy. 

Half a world away, Vladimir Shkolnik was the director of 
Kazakhstan's new Kazakh Atomic Energy Agency. With its 
independence, Kazakhstan inherited the fourth-largest nuclear 
stockpile in the world. 

On Shkolnik's first inspection of what was left behind by the 
Soviets, he found the unexpected - a cache of weapons-grade 
highly enriched uranium (HEU) at the Ulba Metallurgy Plant. 

Assessments of the region indicated the Soviet Union had 
apparently forgotten about the HEU at the Ulba plant. The reports 
said the HEU had been there since 1976 and was intended for a 
research reactor that would create fuel for the failed 
experimental "Alfa" Soviet submarine program. 

CIA assessments also had information that was more troubling - 
Iranian agents visited the plant in the early 1990s, and Iraq was 
thought to have made a multimillion dollar offer for some of the 
material in either 1991 or 1992. 

Iran and Iraq were among the "rogue states" that aspired to 
possess nuclear weapons and had scouts looking for nuclear 
material across the southern areas of the former Soviet Union. 
How much they knew about Ulba wasn't clear, said Starr. 

Because the facility was targeted by rogue agents, the Pentagon's 
approach was to treat Ulba as a major target, he said. 

America's concern would prove to be prophetic. In the fall of 
1992, 1.5 kilograms of 90-percent-enriched weapons-grade uranium 
were stolen from Russia's Luch production facility. 

Ten years later, a report by the Russian American Nuclear Safety 
Advisory Council, a non-profit organization that advises both the 
U.S. and Russian governments on nuclear security, said that 
weapons-grade and weapons-usable nuclear materials had been 
stolen or lost at Russian plants as well as in former Soviet 
states. 

"We assess that undetected smuggling has occurred, although we do 
not know the extent or magnitude of such thefts. Nevertheless, we 
are concerned about the total amount of material that could have 
been diverted over the last 10 years," the report said. 

In a telephone interview earlier this year, Starr indicated the 
U.S. government knew in the early 1990s where most of the Soviet 
Union stockpiles were, but didn't know how much was in them or 
how well they were secured. 

Kazakhstan's government recognized the bargaining chip it had in 
the HEU stockpile. The country wanted to further the ties it had 
established with Washington in the early 1990s during the early 
days of the Clinton presidency. 

Its location - bordering China, Russia and several of the 
breakaway Soviet states with large Islamic populations - made it 
strategically important to the U.S. 

The U.S. was offering aid to countries like Kazakhstan. Clinton 
administration officials also made it a priority for Defense 
Department operatives like Starr and Laura Holgate to establish 
relationships with top officials in former Soviet republics 
without going through Moscow. 

Personal relationships were a large part of it, said Holgate, one 
of the first staffers hired under the Nunn-Lugar program, a 
Department of Defense project to disarm and secure Soviet nuclear 
weapons. Meanwhile, intelligence about Ulba bubbled to the 
diplomatic surface. 

"It came in through the embassy, but not at the ambassadorial 
level," said Holgate, referring to the tip that Webber received 
at the garage. 

The tip confirmed what the CIA suspected. 

"There were stories that had been around (about Ulba) well prior 
to the Kazakhstan government telling us about the material," said 
Starr. 

Neither Webber nor Starr saw themselves as on-site operatives, 
but in 1993 they took on that role and started the process that 
would bring the highly enriched uranium - the Sapphire material - 
half a world away to Campbell County. 

The team arrives 

The town of Ulba is a suburb of Ust-Kamenogorsk, a city of more 
than 350,000 in eastern Kazakhstan. It is a suburb of factories, 
many that have seen better days. 

Ust-Kamenogorsk lies in the foothills of the Rudnyy Altai 
Mountains and at the junction of the Ulba and Irtysh rivers. 

Ust-Kamenogorsk was founded as a Russian fort in 1720, and became 
a center of trade with Mongolia and China and the gateway to the 
mineral wealth of the Rudnyy Altai, which included lead, zinc, 
titanium, magnesium and uranium. 

Ulba was where many of those minerals were processed. Under the 
Soviet system, it was a closed city with security perimeters and 
restricted travel in and out. 

Andy Webber was with the first Americans to see the "vault" area 
of the Ulba plant where the Sapphire material was stored. 

The vault was a brick warehouse with dirt floors in a fairly 
segregated part of the Ulba complex. The six doors to the 
warehouse were wooden and only secured by padlocks. 

"Chills went up and down our spines when we heard it was 
protected by a padlock in what some called a 'vault,' " said 
Starr. 

The guard manning the entrance in the fence when the Americans 
went to the warehouse for the first time was an older woman, a 
"babushka." 

"Babushka" is Russian for grandmother. It wasn't clear if she was 
armed. 

Courtney, the U.S. ambassador, later found out the alarms on the 
Ulba fences didn't work. 

Nuclear nonproliferation expert Jon Wolfsthal said what American 
officials found at Ulba wasn't rare. "We've gone into facilities 
in Russia that don't have any armed guards and no response 
capabilities," he said. 

Courtney set up an immediate series of meetings after the visit 
to Ulba. 

"We met with the factory director (former Deputy Prime Minister 
Vitalii Mette) and learned more," said Courtney, "and then had 
several discussions with President (Nursultan) Nazarbayev about 
it." 

Courtney's negotiations would eventually involve several U.S. 
agencies, including the Department of Defense and the Department 
of Energy. 

Plant security was only part of the problem. 

The Pentagon and State Department were concerned that government 
officials - particularly on the local level - would be 
susceptible to bribes from anyone seeking nuclear material. 

One CIA assessment obtained by The News &Advance through the 
Freedom of Information Act concluded that Kazakhstan's "law 
enforcement agencies are ill-trained and riddled with corruption 
like many similar organizations in the former Soviet Union and 
border guards focus more on what's coming in to the country than 
what's leaving." 

"Numerous reports document widespread bribe-taking among 
Kazakhstani customs officials," said the assessment. 

 

Rogue states interested 

Starr said Iran and Iraq both sought the nuclear materials from 
Kazakhstan. 

Starr said the U.S. government had information that Iraq, in the 
year after it was defeated in the Persian Gulf War, may have made 
an offer to pay about $16,000 per kilogram for the Sapphire 
material - somewhere between $18 million and $30 million for the 
entire cache. 

Starr's assumption is the Iraqi offer came just after 
Kazakhstan's independence when he said "the security structure in 
the region began a precipitous decline." 

"Getting highly enriched uranium on the open market is a real 
coup," said Starr. 

Iran was also seeking nuclear materials. 

During an inspection of Ulba leading up to the Sapphire mission, 
Americans saw crates labeled for shipment to Tehran, Iran, in the 
room next to the Sapphire material. That worried the United 
States and underscored the importance of removing the material. 

About the same time, an Iranian film crew showed up at the BN-350 
plutonium breeder nuclear reactor in Aktau on the coast of the 
Caspian Sea in southern Kazakhstan with an interest in three tons 
of plutonium and spent fuel rods the Soviets left at the Aktau 
plant. 

"We've been aware for some time that there are Iranian agents 
that are tasked, generally, with getting their hands on nuclear 
material," said Wolfsthal, the nonproliferation expert. He said 
Iranian agents have turned up in sting operations, black market 
deals or visiting plants with nuclear material. 

A CIA assessment at the time said, "Iran has already tried to 
recruit Kazakhstan scientists with nuclear technology and 
chemical and biological warfare knowledge." 

The report said Iran was trying to get Kazakhstanis to illegally 
export "dual use" materials, which have a nuclear and non-nuclear 
use. 

Wolfsthal said the U.S. Department of Energy got serious about 
working with Kazakhstan after the Iranians began turning up near 
the country's nuclear sites. 

Kazakhstan officials told U.S. Ambassador Courtney in late 1993 
that the Kazakh Atomic Energy Agency was concerned it could not 
afford the costs of keeping the Sapphire material secure. 

"They made a very bold decision to stay on the right side of the 
fence," said Starr. 

The Kazakhs formally asked the United States for help in January 
1994. 

Within weeks, representatives of the Department of Defense, 
Department of State and National Security Council were discussing 
the situation at the White House. 

Assistant Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter was told to 
determine how to secure the material, and he gave operational 
control to Starr. 

"He said, 'This is your job,'" recalled Starr. " 'Do what you can 
to get it out and keep it closely held.'" 

 This story is day one of a seven-part series to be published in 
the Lynchburg News &Advance. On day two: The Pentagon-based 
"Tiger Team" determines that Iraq and Iran are showing too much 
interest in 600 kilograms of weapons-grade uranium and creates a 
mission to spirit the materials out of Kazakhstan before the 
winter blizzards. 

*****************************************************************
 41 Project Sapphire series: Day 2 Getting ready to go in

NewsAdvance.com - 

By Chris Flores 
Dec 28, 2002
 
  The Department of Defense's Jeffrey Starr was heading up a 
classified operation. He established his "tiger team" by the end 
of January 1994 - two members each from the Central Intelligence 
Agency, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, departments of state, energy and defense and the 
now-defunct Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. 

Their initial goal was to assess the threat and collect all the 
information various agencies had gathered. All the information 
was classified and the team would be the first to put together a 
complete assessment of the situation at the Ulba uranium plant in 
Kazakhstan. 

Starr's team ruled out the "cheap option" of beefing up security 
at the Ulba vault because of the country's politically uncertain 
future. 

"The tiger team's role was to figure out what our policy would 
be," said Starr, "but it went far beyond policy. We had to set 
objectives, run negotiations, oversee an operational plan and 
fuse all the intelligence." 

The team subcontracted out some work to experts in government 
agencies, but never told them what the mission was. Starr 
described it as having people solve fragments of a puzzle. 

Elwood Gift worked on the piece involving the Sapphire material. 
The nuclear physicist from Oak Ridge, Tenn., traveled to 
Kazakhstan in a "very unobtrusive way" in February 1994. He 
returned to Oak Ridge in April with 11 samples of the Ulba 
uranium in small glass vials. 

While Gift and Andy Webber, who was based in Almaty at the U.S. 
Embassy, were in Ulba, they found more crates labeled for 
shipment to Iran. U.S. Ambassador to Kazakhstan William Courtney 
said Ulba workers claimed the crates did not contain 
weapons-grade uranium, but the contents were never confirmed. 

When questions about the paperwork arose, the shipper - it is 
unclear if it was a Kazakhstani or Iranian - disappeared, said 
Starr. 

The uranium samples were analyzed by DOE contractor Martin 
Marietta to determine if the material could be stored at Oak 
Ridge. The company's report in July listed high levels of 
beryllium as a "significant health hazard" and plutonium as a 
lesser risk. 

Six months after the tiger team was formed, it had confirmation 
the Sapphire material amounted to 2,000 kilograms of heavy 
uranium, about 600 kilograms of which was weapons-grade uranium. 

"About 200 kilograms was almost pure (weapons-grade uranium 
metal)," said Starr, "which was particularly dangerous from our 
perspective, because with almost no processing it could have been 
made into a nuclear weapon." 

The report prompted a brisk message from the Starr team through 
the U.S. embassy to the Kazakhstani government - we will move on 
this, but you need to wait. 

While Courtney quietly negotiated the details in Almaty, Starr's 
team spent March and April getting money and approval from the 
Clinton administration for the mission to remove the uranium from 
Ulba. 

Preparations 

Alex Riedy was brought in to figure out how to repackage the 
Sapphire material to meet U.S. and international shipping safety 
standards. 

Riedy was director of the National Security Program office at Oak 
Ridge's Y-12 plant. He had also worked on UN weapons inspection 
teams that investigated Iraq's nuclear program just after the 
Gulf War. 

Riedy's working group estimated the removal would take six weeks 
and require a 31-member team of specialists. Twenty-five of them 
were from Riedy's Oak Ridge team. 

Each member had a different specialty, including processing and 
analyzing nuclear materials, health physics, safety, hygiene and 
maintenance. A medical doctor, a communications specialist and 
three interpreters and an embassy liaison from the Pentagon's 
On-Site Inspection Agency joined the Oak Ridge members. 

All went to Kazakhstan knowing that packing the uranium would be 
a major problem. Riedy's work at Oak Ridge had revealed that the 
beryllium in the Sapphire material could set off a nuclear chain 
reaction if the packaged uranium contained too much of it. 

Extensive calculations were done to determine the exact amount of 
beryllium that could be included safely, but there was a wild 
card - the beryllium content in the Sapphire material wasn't 
uniform. 

Riedy's team created a mockup of the Ulba warehouse, a portable 
lab and a packaging, staging area, at Oak Ridge. The lab, which 
would be replicated in Ulba, allowed the team to sample and 
package the material, weigh it, and analyze its radioactivity. 

Most crucial was the "glovebox." It was a transparent, sealed 
desk-sized box with gloves attached to the interior wall so 
workers could put their hands in from the outside, allowing them 
to handle the material without exposure to 
radioactivity.Meanwhile, Starr's team was trying to outmaneuver 
National Environmental Policy Act guidelines because of worries 
about secrecy. 

Bringing a large amount of nuclear material to an American 
facility required an environmental assessment, which outlines the 
proposed action and potential effects on the public. 

Worried about putting too much information in the document, 
Starr's group withheld the amount and chemistry of the material 
to maintain the project's secrecy. 

"It wasn't like this was the tightest secret in the U.S. 
government," said nonproliferation expert Jon Wolfsthal, "but 
still, it was very closely held." 

But not closely enough for Starr. 

"The (environmental assessment) by law would be made public, and 
we didn't want to short-circuit that process," said Starr. His 
team feared bureaucrats preparing the environmental documents 
would increase the risk that information could be leaked. 

The fears were two-fold - that terrorists and rogue nations might 
try to make a move on the Ulba materials, or that a worker in 
Ulba might steal it and look for a buyer on the growing nuclear 
black market. 

"If the bad guys knew we were going to try to get it, they might 
try to get there first," said Starr. "The circle of people who 
knew about the project grew uncomfortably large by the end of the 
summer." 

In August 1994, an advance Pentagon team went to Kazakhstan to 
figure out the logistics of the operation, including 
transportation routes to the Ulba plant and most importantly, 
where a C-5 Galaxy transporter plane could land. 

It's hard to hide the largest airplane in the U.S. Air Force 
fleet. 

Diplomacy 

While it was clear the Sapphire material wasn't moving, neither 
were the wheels of government bureaucracy. 

U.S. agencies argued over how to pay for the operation. Diplomats 
argued about seeking Russian approval of the transfer. Kazakhstan 
argued about getting just compensation. 

"The bureaucracy on the U. S. side was appalling," said former 
Defense Department employee Laura Holgate. "The Nunn-Lugar 
program was not set up to do this." 

Assistant Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter had helped convince 
Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar to create the legislation 
that bore their names. Authorized by Congress in 1991, it sought 
to help Russia and the former Soviet republics pay for protecting 
and destroying nuclear and chemical weapons. 

But the law didn't specifically authorize paying for nuclear 
material and bringing it back to the United States. If the 
Pentagon needed money for the Sapphire program, it required long 
consultations with lawyers in the Department of Defense. 

Carter, who left Harvard in 1993 to take the Assistant Secretary 
of Defense post, saw Sapphire as the most urgent project 
Nunn-Lugar had ever faced. He was frustrated it couldn't move 
faster. 

"At every stage, you ran into the stodginess of government 
bureaucracy, which is understandable," said Carter. "You're 
talking about the public's money and the public's trust." 

Nunn-Lugar allowed the United States to pay Kazakhstan for the 
market value of the uranium, said Starr. At the request of 
Kazakhstan, that amount has never been disclosed. 

What was eventually disclosed was that Kazakhstan wanted more 
than market value for the material. 

"I remember one of the Kazakhstani officials telling me, 'You're 
giving me what I already have,' " said Starr. 

So the U.S. created a $20 million aid package. 

"There was a handful of other program activities under way … with 
Kazakhstan that were essentially beefed up," said Holgate. 

Among them were nuclear material protection, export control 
assistance, boats to patrol the Caspian Sea coast and aid for a 
program to find jobs for Kazakhstani nuclear workers. Also 
included was a $2 million shipment of supplies from 
pharmaceutical companies and hospitals. 

The negotiations that resulted in the aid package didn't really 
start in earnest until after the uranium was back in the United 
States, said Starr. He called that "a clear statement of 
(Kazakhstan's) trust." 

The team was divided on the Russia question. 

Bringing Russia into the negotiations would add a third country 
that had to be satisfied. Russia was also expected to be very 
sensitive about the United States getting a chance to analyze the 
material and discover any of Russia's nuclear secrets. 

Adding Russia could also insult Kazakhstan, now a sovereign 
nation, by implying that it couldn't make a decision without 
conferring with Moscow. 

"Kazakhstan came to us and wanted it to be a bilateral deal 
between them and us," said Starr. 

State Department officials saw Sapphire as tied to the United 
States' efforts to build a closer relationship with Russia, but 
it wouldn't even acknowledge at first that the material was at 
Ulba. 

The diplomatic solution, which Starr said involved Vice President 
Al Gore and Russian Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin, was to 
"notify" Russia in June. 

Final details 

Down home politics in Tennessee nearly got in the way. 

Tennessee was going through political upheaval in 1994, with the 
governor's seat, both Senate seats and nine congressional seats 
up for grabs in November. 

Nuclear material is a sensitive Tennessee political issue. 

The Department of Energy was worried how Tennessee politicians, 
the public and environmentalists would react to bringing a 
shipment of weapons-grade uranium to Oak Ridge from another 
country without being notified or asked if they agreed with the 
plan. 

The DOE and Starr's team debated about what to tell to whom. 
There was rising fear that someone in apolitical race would raise 
the issue in a campaign. 

In August, Department of Energy Secretary Hazel O'Leary briefed 
political candidates and state and local Tennessee officials. No 
one leaked the information. 

About a year had passed since Andy Webber's mechanic told him 
about Ulba. 

"I was anxiety-ridden in August and September because we had 
hundreds of things we had to pull together," said Starr. 

The mission to retrieve the uranium was originally supposed to be 
launched by the end of the summer. 

Tempers were beginning to flare. "At least once a week, my boss 
would blow up at somebody for dragging their feet," said Holgate, 
referring to Ashton Carter's frustration over the delays. 

Ambassador Courtney said the slow response wasn't anyone's fault 
in particular. 

"The whole process should have been faster," said Courtney, "but 
it was the first time the U.S. had done anything like this." 

Holgate was less diplomatic. 

"The U.S. government ought to be ashamed of itself," she said. 

The National Security Council is supposed to coordinate agencies 
and do what the president asks, and it was not aggressive enough, 
said Holgate. 

"The president's guidance in this context was crystal clear," 
said Holgate. "Get that stuff the heck out of there." 

President Clinton authorized the mission on Oct. 7, 1994. Three 
hours later Riedy's team, along with 130 tons of equipment, took 
off from Knoxville, Tenn. on three Air Force C-5 transport 
planes. They touched down in Ust Kamenogorsk, Kazakhstan the next 
day. 

WHAT'S NEXT: The 31-member Sapphire team, working 12 to 16 hours 
a day, six days a week, repackages the highly enriched uranium in 
25 days. By Nov. 19, the equipment was taken down, inspected and 
sealed for transport to the airport in Ust-Kamenogorsk. Over the 
final 48 hours, two things now worried the team: terrorists and 
winter. 
*****************************************************************
 42 Project Sapphire: The Mission

NewsAdvance.com - 

By Chris Flores 

Dec 30, 2002
 
  Ust-Kamenogorsk has one hotel that caters to western 
businessmen - the Hotel Irtysh. Today, it has a casino, a good 
restaurant, air-conditioning and concierge services. 

When Riedy's team was there for 40 nights, it had none of those 
amenities. 

U.S. Ambassador to Kazakhstan William Courtney, who was there 
during the mission only briefly to give the team a pep talk, 
described the Hotel Irtysh as "livable, but not up to Western 
standards." 

Keeping the American presence low-key was important, so no other 
guests were allowed to stay at the hotel. "The fact that 
Americans were at the hotel - you couldn't hide it," said 
Courtney. "But the Americans weren't going to town very much." 

And the town wasn't coming to visit. The hotel was guarded by 
Kazakh security forces during the Americans' stay. 

Michael Dosier, a chief petty officer in the Navy, was part of 
the team. He recalled the hush-hush nature of the assignmentgiven 
to him by a Navy commander. "He couldn't tell me where it was or 
how long we'd be gone, but he said it would be dangerous," said 
Dosier, who was lead interpreter for the mission. 

Most civilian team members were from Lockheed Martin. Many hadn't 
served in the military or ever traveled far from the Oak Ridge 
area - but their nuclear expertise was essential. They received 
their security clearances when they were briefed just before 
leaving Oak Ridge. None were allowed to tell their spouses 
anything. 

Once in Kazakhstan, team members could call their spouses for 30 
seconds and couldn't say where they were or when they would come 
back. Usually it was just time to say, "I'm fine and miss you." 

The calls ended abruptly midway through the mission after 
information was leaked to a Florida newspaper about a secret 
project in a former Soviet republic. 

In Kazakhstan, the cover story was that the team was composed of 
International Atomic Energy Agency officials doing an inventory 
for the Kazakh government. When a group of foreign reporters in 
Kazakhstan saw them and asked why they were there, the team stuck 
to the story, and the reporters bought it. 

The team's equipment was trucked into Ulba under cover of 
darkness in vehicles used regularly by the plant. Security forces 
guarded the trucks and blocked intersections along the route. 

Ulba is a huge metallurgical facility that produced fuel pellets 
for nuclear reactors and is the world's largest producer of 
beryllium. It was also in terrible shape. 

"That was a run-down plant," said Dosier. "There were actually 
parts of the plant that looked like they had been bombed out." 
One CIA report said economic conditions at the plant were 
"deplorable, with employees regularly going months without 
getting paid." 

By the end of the mission the American interpreters likely 
appreciated the Ulba workers' conditions. 

The interpreters often worked 16 to 18 hours, said Dosier. 
Because they weren't involved in the specialized work, they were 
given all the mission's "gopher" duties. The interpreters took 
care of the team members' laundry, exchanged their money and had 
to be around for anything requiring an interpreter. 

"We even had to take the guys to get haircuts," said Dosier. 

They also arranged for the team's Russian food for breakfast and 
dinner and military ready-to-eat meals for lunch. 

"Every one of us probably lost about 30 pounds while we were 
there," said Dosier. 

In the first week at Ulba, the team unloaded equipment, and set 
up tents, a communications center and an electrical grid powered 
by diesel generators. The mission's director, Jeffrey Starr, 
stayed in daily contact with the group from his office in the 
Pentagon via an encrypted satellite phone. 

While the mission was veiled in secrecy, it never had a James 
Bond feel to it in Ulba. The real danger was never about spies, 
it was about handling radioactive materials. 

 

The glovebox lines and stations were set up at Ulba, along with a 
ventilation system and health monitoring equipment. The team set 
up evacuation routes and did emergency drills - standard 
procedures when handling highly enriched uranium. The room where 
the team did the repackaging was about the size of a typical 
elementary school gym. 

Operating carefully using three gloveboxes, the team opened the 
Kazakh containers and transferred the material into American 
containers that looked like small paint cans, which were secured 
by a machine that crimped the lids on. 

The containers were decontaminated, removed from the gloveboxes, 
weighed and analyzed for radiation levels. Some of the material 
was in big clumps and had to be smashed into smaller pieces with 
a hammer inside a glovebox. 

Three or four of the smaller containers were placed inside the 
barrel-size transportation containers. Once eight transportation 
containers were filled, they were put into cargo restraint 
transporters and stored. 

Hydrogen levels in the beryllium-tainted uranium became a 
problem. 

Hydrogen helps sustain a nuclear reaction. If there's too much 
hydrogen packaged with too little uranium, a dangerous release of 
heat and radioactivity is possible. 

There was too much hydrogen or too little uranium in much of the 
Sapphire material, making the mixtures unsafe. 

To remove the hydrogen, team members had to bake, or oxidize, the 
material. Extreme care was required because the dust and gas was 
toxic and overheating could ignite the uranium. 

"It was already supposed to have been oxidized, but it wasn't," 
said Dosier. 

A furnace manned by Kazakhs had to be used and their methods 
worried the Americans. Tempers flared and work stopped for two 
days. The concern, said Dosier, was whether the material could be 
baked at the temperatures the Kazakhs were using without igniting 
it. 

Part of the reason for the dispute, Dosier added, was that a 
Kazakh manager was still in a Cold War state of mind. He didn't 
like the Americans or that they were removing the material. 

Starr found himself refereeing from afar. The Pentagon was racing 
against time, but was sticking to its philosophy that "you 
support the troops at the front." 

The stalemate ended when the Kazakhs agreed to change how they 
baked the material. 

A few years later at Mt. Athos, BWXT would discover firsthand the 
problems and dangers of baking the material. 

 

Soviet nuclear accounting was notoriously bad and it was never 
clear if all the Sapphire material was at Ulba when the Americans 
arrived. Then it appeared there was more than originally 
estimated. 

The Americans' first inventory turned up 4 percent more uranium 
at Ulba than the Soviet bookkeeping listed. 

Part of the accounting problem was the Soviet system of keeping 
two sets of books, said nonproliferation expert Jon Wolfsthal. 

"Every facility had a quota to meet," said Wolfsthal. "Some 
years, you're better than quota and some years you're worse than 
quota. So what they would do is, if you had a good year, you 
would have one set of books that were the official books and said 
we met quota. And you take the other 10 pounds and hold it over 
for the next year, so if you had a shortfall, you could make it 
up." 

A trade journal paper written by Lockheed employees said the 
total amount of Sapphire material was 2,369 kg of uranium-bearing 
material in 1,200 Kazakhstani containers. It was repacked into 
1,304 American stainless steel cans and put into 447 shipping 
barrels. 

Russian nuclear officials told the Russian media only about 
one-third of that amount was taken from Ulba. 

On site, Dosier said the team's worries were more practical - 
would they get more material than they had planned for. 

"They really wanted us to help them clean the place out," said 
Dosier. "I had nightmares that they were going to come up with 
more stuff on the last day." 

The repackaging process took 25 days - 12 hours a day and six 
days a week. 

After repackaging was completed, the equipment was taken down, 
inspected and sealed for transport to the airport in 
Ust-Kamenogorsk. 

Two things now worried the team - terrorists and winter. 

 

 Once the material was sealed for transport, it was also at its 
most vulnerable because terrorists could steal it without risking 
lethal exposures to themselves. 

"The Kazakhstanis provided a special militia team, a SWAT-type 
team," said Courtney, "to help provide security on the way to the 
airport." 

With a helicopter hovering above, the armed convoy left Ulba just 
after nightfall on Sunday, Nov. 20, with the intention of getting 
the material out of the country before first light. 

"By that time, there was six inches of ice on the roads," said 
Dosier. "There were times when the trucks were sliding sideways 
down the roads." 

The Kazakh drivers were undaunted. They knew the real winter 
weather wouldn't hit for weeks yet. Still, the snow and ice 
initially prevented the three C-5 transport planes from landing. 

"The problem was that the planes they staged at an Air Force base 
in Europe came in and there was a number of false starts because 
of bad weather," said Starr. One of the planes turned back 
because of mechanical problems. 

The remaining two planes landed through the snow and ice sometime 
between 3 and 4 a.m. On board were 100 American servicemen to 
provide additional security, but more importantly, labor to help 
load the nuclear cargo. 

Dosier and a second interpreter scrambled to coordinate the 
efforts between the Kazakhstanis and Americans as they 
frantically loaded the 450 transport containers. In the east, the 
dark winter sky was beginning to lighten and ice was coating the 
runway. 

The C-5s - now loaded with 150 tons of men, materials and 
equipment - waited as the Kazakhs prepared an unusual form of ice 
removal - an engine from a Soviet MIG jet mounted on the back of 
a truck. To the Americans' surprise, it melted the ice. 

About 10 a.m. the two planes lifted off on a route that carried 
them over the Persian Gulf, the Mediterranean and the Atlantic. 
It took 20 hours for the planes, twice refueled in mid-air from a 
KC-10 tanker aircraft, to reach Dover Air Force Base in Delaware. 

Once airborne, a message was sent to Washington. Assistant 
Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter, who was at a White House 
dinner, informed both Lugar and Nunn that the mission was coming 
to a successful conclusion. 

In a book Carter would co-write in 1998, he said "the operation 
was completed just in time. The CIA believed Iranian agents were 
on the trail of the uranium … that had just been spirited out." 

At the sprawling Dover Air force Base, the containers were 
immediately put in secure armored trailers used for moving 
weapons-grade uranium. The vehicles are disguised to look like 
typical tractor-trailer rigs, but carry armaments and have a 
radio beacon that provides the trailer's location at all times. 
The convoy also included support vehicles, mostly SUV types, that 
carried an armed security team. 

Through the night the convoy rolled south through Maryland and 
Virginia, and into Tennessee. About 40 hours after the Sapphire 
material left Kazakhstan, it was unloaded at Oak Ridge. Two hours 
later a press conference was held in Washington. 

The completion of the operation was a turning point in U.S. 
relations with Kazakhstan. It never could have happened without 
the help of the Kazakhstani political leaders, said Starr. 

"This was a quantum leap in trust between the United States and 
the Kazakhstanis," said Starr. 

But Kazakhstan was keeping other channels open. A CIA assessment 
said the country sold 720 kilograms of natural uranium and four 
to five grams of low enriched (fuel grade) uranium to Iran for 
$35 million in 1995. 

The Sapphire material would remain in Tennessee for nearly a year 
before it was shipped, over several months, in similar secure 
armored trailers to Mt. Athos. 

But when all the material was finally unloaded in 1996 for 
processing at BWXT, it appeared something was amiss. 

The final accounting of the materials showed a significant amount 
of the uranium - enough to make two atomic bombs - couldn't be 
accounted for. 

  © 2002 Media General
*****************************************************************
 43 Nuclear taboo losing its potency

[A part of canada.com] <http://www.canada.com>

December 30 » 2002

Leaders quicker to invoke annihilation as a bargaining chip
 
Jan Cienski National Post

WASHINGTON - For more than five decades following the devastation 
of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it was considered unthinkable to 
threaten nuclear war outside the context of a superpower 
Armageddon. But what was once taboo is now being openly discussed 
by world leaders.

Pakistan's self-appointed military ruler, General Pervez 
Musharraf, yesterday told a group of air force officers that 
during this year's crisis with India, he threatened that 
country's Prime Minister "that the moment Indian forces cross the 
Line of Control [in Kashmir] and the international border, then 
they should not expect a conventional war from Pakistan."

News of Gen. Musharraf's warning came on the heels of North 
Korea's decision to expel inspectors from the International 
Atomic Energy Agency and to restart a mothballed nuclear reactor, 
leading to fears the Pyongyang regime will be able to build as 
many as six nuclear bombs in the coming year.

Although Israel continues to officially deny that it has nuclear 
weapons, it is believed to have them. The United States has also 
warned that any attack on it using weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD) will result in a massive and potentially nuclear response.

"The United States will continue to make clear that it reserves 
the right to respond with overwhelming force -- including through 
resort to all of our options -- to use of WMD against the United 
States, our forces abroad, and friends and allies," said a 
six-page presidential memo released this month titled "National 
Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction."

These threats, and especially the U.S. memo, mark a startling 
shift in nuclear doctrine from the days of the Cold War when 
nuclear weapons were reserved as measures of last resort.

During the long standoff with the Soviet Union, the United States 
was careful never to rule out first use of nuclear weapons in the 
event of a Soviet attack on Western Europe, the only way of 
deterring the USSR's advantage in tanks and artillery. But even 
then nuclear weapons would be used only against a foe equipped 
with similar weapons.

After the horror of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it became an unspoken 
rule that nuclear weapons could never be used against an enemy 
armed only with conventional weapons.

General Douglas MacArthur wanted permission to use the A-bomb to 
stop Chinese forces that were crushing the United States and its 
allies in Korea in 1950 but was turned down.

Similar plans to use nuclear weapons in Vietnam, first to help 
beleaguered French troops at Dien Bien Phu and later to stop 
Communist troops swarming down from North Vietnam, were also 
scotched.

The Soviets also refrained from using nuclear weapons in 
Afghanistan, although thousands of their troops were being killed 
by mujahedeen guerrillas.

Similarly, today's threats against the United States, while dire, 
are not existential. Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda terrorist 
organization is thought to be trying to develop a "dirty" 
radiological bomb, which can scatter radioactive material but is 
not much more lethal than a conventional bomb. At least two of 
George W. Bush's three-member "axis of evil," Iran and Iraq, have 
no nuclear capability, though they may be seeking it. North Korea 
may have one or two working bombs, but has no missiles capable of 
striking the United States.

Despite the imbalance in weaponry, the United States appears to 
be moving in the direction of making some limited form of nuclear 
war thinkable, even against an inferior foe.

In the latest U.S. defence budget, the Pentagon has won approval 
for a US$15-million program to study a new nuclear warhead, 
called the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP), or "bunker 
buster," intended to destroy deeply buried stocks of chemical or 
biological weapons, either in the hands of states like Iraq or 
terrorist groups like al-Qaeda.

In 1994, Congress forbade the creation of such low-yield nuclear 
weapons -- those less than five kilotons in size -- worrying that 
they could "blur the distinction between nuclear and conventional 
war."

In 1997, the United States introduced an earth-penetrating 
nuclear weapon, the B61-11, by modifying an existing bomb and 
placing it in a hardened steel casing. The bomb, which has not 
been tested, is designed to bury itself about seven metres in the 
earth before detonating, smashing underground bunkers with its 
shock wave.

Recently, Paul Robinson, director of the Sandia nuclear weapons 
laboratory, warned that the United States will need to build new, 
smaller nuclear weapons because the current ones are too large to 
be sensibly used.

"It is realized that the yields of the weapons left over from the 
Cold War are too high for addressing the deterrence requirements 
of a multi-polar, widely proliferated world," he said in a 
speech. "Without rectifying that situation, we would end up being 
self-deterred."

The current warnings from the United States are remarkably 
similar to those used during the 1991 Gulf War.

On Aug. 14, 1991, Dick Cheney, then the defence secretary and now 
the U.S. Vice-President, stated that it "should be clear to 
Saddam Hussein that we have a wide range of military capabilities 
that will let us respond with overwhelming force and extract a 
very high price should he be foolish enough to use chemical 
weapons on United States forces."

The U.S. government reportedly privately warned that in the event 
of an attack from weapons of mass destruction, the United States 
reserved the right to use any form of retaliation against Iraq, 
presumably including nuclear weapons.

Also during the Gulf War, General Avihu Ben-Nun, commander of the 
Israeli Air Force, was asked in an interview whether Israel would 
respond with nuclear weapons in the event of a chemical attack by 
Iraq.

"Maybe," was his one-word answer.

The threats worked and Saddam never used chemical or biological 
weapons to prevent his army's destruction.

The fear now is that this time Saddam has been backed into a 
corner and could use what limited weapons of mass destruction he 
still possesses, unleashing a horrific response.

An additional worry is that steps by the United States to make 
itself safer could make other nuclear powers, like Pakistan, 
bolder about using their own weapons.

jcienski@nationalpost.com

© Copyright  2002 National Post 
*****************************************************************
 44 Lockheed Martin: High Levels of Toxic Rocket Fuel Found in
 
Date: Tue, 31 Dec 2002 18:29:35 -0600 (CST)

 
http://www.ewg.org/reports/rocketlettuce/

High Levels of Toxic Rocket Fuel Found in Lettuce
Summary

Eating lettuce or other vegetables grown in fields irrigated by the Colorado 
River may expose consumers to a larger dose of toxic rocket fuel than is 
considered safe by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, according to 
test data and documents obtained by Environmental Working Group (EWG).

Test results never before made public show that leafy vegetables grown with 
contaminated irrigation water take up, store and concentrate potentially 
harmful levels of perchlorate, a thyroid toxin that is the explosive main 
ingredient of rocket and missile fuel.

Sworn depositions and other courtroom documents show that the giant 
aerospace and defense contractor Lockheed Martin  a major user of 
perchlorate responsible for widespread contamination of Southern California 
water supplies  knew as early as 1997 that vegetables stored high 
concentrations of the chemical, but said nothing to the EPA or state health 
officials. [PDF documents: Lockheed letter | Test results] Since most 
perchlorate-related work by defense contractors is done for the U.S. 
military, the Department of Defense may also have known, but said nothing to 
warn other agencies, consumers  or farmers whose crops, through no fault of 
their own, may be tainted by contaminated irrigation water.

If the perchlorate levels reported here are confirmed by further testing, 
immediate government action will be needed to reduce perchlorate in lettuce 
and other vegetables. In the interim, we strongly recommend that the Food 
and Drug Administration immediately begin testing lettuce and selected other 
vegetables grown with Colorado River water for perchlorate, and that the 
results of this testing be made public as soon as they are confirmed.

In addition, any grower who is adversely affected by perchlorate 
contamination of their crops should be fully compensated for any and all 
economic losses to their farming operations and property values.

Perchlorate in food could threaten human health

In a front-page story on Dec. 16, 2002, The Wall Street Journal reported 
that tests on several vegetable samples from a perchlorate-contaminated 
farm in Redlands found the plants concentrated perchlorate from local 
irrigation water by an average factor of 65, according to calculations by 
Renee Sharp of the Environmental Working Group in Oakland, Calif., one of 
the few nonprofit groups focused on perchlorate contamination. That means 
the perchlorate dose in the vegetables was 65 times the amount in the 
water. Sharp told the Journal: If people are eating it, on top of drinking 
it, the EPA will have to lower its proposed drinking-water standard 
substantially. [Read the story]

Perchlorate, which impairs the thyroids ability to take up iodide and 
produce hormones critical to proper fetal and infant brain development, has 
contaminated almost 300 drinking water sources and farm wells in California 
and an unknown number of sources in at least fifteen other states. Sources 
known to be contaminated include the Colorado River from near Las Vegas to 
the Mexican border  the primary or sole source of irrigation water for 
farms in California, Arizona and Nevada that grow the great majority of the 
lettuce sold in the U.S. during winter months.

If the perchlorate concentrations shown in the test results obtained by EWG 
and cited by the Journal affect the entire Colorado River winter vegetable 
crop, it would have huge implications for current efforts to set safety 
standards for exposure to perchlorate. It would signal that decades of 
negligence by chemical manufacturers, the aerospace industry and the U.S. 
military have contaminated not only the drinking water of millions of 
Americans, but their food supplies as well.

Both the EPA and the state of California are working toward establishing 
standards for perchlorate in drinking water. Under state law, California is 
supposed to set a standard by January 2004, although progress has been 
delayed by a lawsuit filed by St. Louis-based Lockheed Martin and Kerr-McGee 
Corp. of Oklahoma City, which until 1998 manufactured the chemical at a 
now-closed plant near Las Vegas that is a main source of contamination of 
the Colorado River. (The sole remaining U.S. producer of perchlorate is 
American Pacific Corp. of Las Vegas; until 1988 its plant, now in Cedar 
City, Utah, was near Kerr-McGees in Nevada.) EPA says it doesnt plan to 
adopt national standards for perchlorate in drinking water until at least 
2006, although both local and state elected officials in California  where 
more contaminated sources are discovered almost weekly  are calling for 
faster federal action.

But the newly revealed test data suggest that vegetables from the Imperial 
Valley region of California and Arizona, which produces most of the nations 
lettuce sold nationwide from November to March, may be a more significant 
source of perchlorate exposure than drinking water.

In a 1999 study, the EPAs National Environmental Research Lab grew lettuce 
seedlings in perchlorate-contaminated water and found that perchlorate was 
accumulated in the leaves to significant levels  by factors of 100 times 
or more. (Susarla et al. 1999.) The tests showed that lettuce was able to 
take up and store 95 percent of the perchlorate in the water. This 
extraordinarily high rate of bioaccumulation would mean that lettuce grown 
in water with even low levels of perchlorate could deliver large doses of 
the toxin to consumers  doses far higher than the EPAs provisional 
drinking water standard.

But EPA discounted the results of the 1999 tests because the water used was 
contaminated with concentrations of perchlorate much higher than are 
typically found in water supplies, and because the lettuce seedlings were 
grown in greenhouses and harvested before maturity. Another 1999 lab study 
found that a variety of native (non-crop) plants took up perchlorate from 
water, a potential biological aid to remediating s oil and water 
contaminated by the chemical. (Bacchus et al. 1999.) Despite the troubling 
results of these studies and the absence of data on perchlorate in U.S. or 
imported produce, the EPA concluded that Rthe available information ... 
suggests that foods do not contribute toS perchlorate accumulation in the 
human body. (EPA 2002.)

To close the data gaps, in April 1999 the EPA convened an eco-summit whose 
attendees included the Air Force; a coalition of perchlorate manufacturers 
and users, including Lockheed Martin, called the Perchlorate Study Group; 
and five Indian tribes who are major producers of winter vegetables 
irrigated by the Colorado River. The year before, at a perchlorate forum in 
Henderson, Nev., the environmental manager for the Yuma, Ariz., Quechan 
tribe stated:

Irrigation is a way of life for our people. We have 13,000 acres dedicated 
to the production of lettuce. We produce annually eight heads of lettuce for 
every man, woman and child [in the United States]. That food is produced 
from Colorado River water and 23 million people derive their water supply 
from the lower Colorado River in three states and two countries. Thats how 
big this problem is. (Rogers 1998.)

At the eco-summit, top priority was given to a real-world study that 
would test a variety of crops through the Department of Agriculture, and the 
Department of Defense provided $650,000 to fund it and other studies. EPA, 
USDA and the Food and Drug Administration developed an extensive protocol 
for the study  before deciding it was too expensive and postponing it 
indefinitely.

Instead, the Air Force decided it would pay for a second study of 
greenhouse-grown lettuce. The findings of this second study have never been 
made public. In 2000, responding to a Freedom of Information Act request by 
a California public-interest law firm for All materials related to any 
investigation or research conducted by, or for, any U.S. Government Agency, 
regarding the health effects of perchlorate on humans beings and the 
environment, the Air Force provided some material, but nothing on either of 
the lettuce studies. The Air Force stated that those and other records "are 
fully exempt from disclosure until the formally sponsored EPA peer review is 
complete. They contain information that is exempt under the deliberative 
process privilege. The EPA-sponsored peer review of proposed perchlorate 
standards is now complete, but the lettuce studies remain unreleased.

In October 2002, at a water industry-sponsored perchlorate conference in 
Ontario, Calif., Air Force spokesman Dave Mattie was asked about the second 
greenhouse lettuce study before a group that included regional EPA 
officials. Mattie replied that the study had been completed, but someone 
walked away with the data. When asked why the the real world study of 
vegetables grown with Colorado River water had been cancelled, Mattie again 
said it was for lack of funds.

But unknown to the EPA, there had in fact been a real world study of 
lettuce grown with perchlorate-contaminated water in 1997  two years before 
the "eco-summit" at which such a study had been made a priority. And 
Lockheed Martin, a key member of the Perchlorate Study Group, was intimately 
aware of its results. Since the Air Force has worked closely with Lockheed 
Martin and other members of the Perchlorate Study Group on a number of 
perchlorate research projects  including unethical tests on human subjects 
 the U.S. military may have known of these earlier lettuce tests as well.

Lockheed Martin is responsible for polluting dozens of water supplies in the 
Redlands area of San Bernardino County, Calif., with high levels of 
perchlorate and other chemicals. A class action lawsuit has been brought 
against the company by more than 800 residents of the area, who blame 
contaminated drinking water for a variety of health problems including 
cancer. Farms in the area are not irrigated by the Colorado River, but draw 
from wells that have been contaminated by perchlorate plumes from 
now-abandoned Lockheed facilities.

Lawyers at Engstrom, Lipscomb and Lack in Los Angeles, who represent the 
Redlands residents suing Lockheed Martin, learned that the company had 
earlier been in negotiation with Lucky Farms, a San Bernardino grower of 
lettuce and other vegetables, over contamination of the farms water supply. 
The lawyers subpoenaed all materials from the negotiations, and have 
discovered that Lockheed was sitting on startling evidence of vegetables 
uptake and concentration of perchlorate.

The subpoenaed documents, obtained by EWG from the lawyers, showed that in 
late 1997 and early 1998, Lucky Farms conducted a series of tests on its 
produce to see if they were contaminated with perchlorate. [PDF documents: 
Lockheed letter | Test results] These tests were conducted on four samples 
of leafy vegetables and four samples of some kind of vegetable matter 
which was not identified.

The results of the testing were dramatic: The four "leafy vegetable" samples 
averaged 4,490 micrograms of perchlorate per kilogram (ug/kg), with a 
maximum concentration of 6,900 ug/kg. Perchlorate levels in the vegetable 
matter were lower, averaging 213 ug/kg with a high of 420 ug/kg. Overall, 
the vegetables were found to have an average of more than 2,600 micrograms 
of perchlorate per kilogram  thousands of times higher than what the EPA 
considers to be a safe amount in a liter of water. Although there is 
currently no federal drinking water standard for perchlorate, the EPAs 
proposed reference dose, which is what the agency considers the level that 
is safe to consume each day, is just one microgram per liter of water or two 
micrograms per day for an adult.

Despite the startling results, Lucky Farms was somehow persuaded not to 
bring legal action against Lockheed Martin. However, there was one 
significant result. Since at least 1995, farm workers living and working on 
Lucky Farms property were required to sign a form stating that they had been 
warned of the dangers of drinking irrigation water. [View document] But 
after perchlorate was found in the water (and vegetables) in 1997, the forms 
were amended to include a more specific warning: "This water may cause 
cancer or birth defects.

According to EWGs analysis, if a pregnant woman were to eat a typical 
serving of vegetables with the contamination level found at Lucky Farms, she 
would get a dose of rocket fuel more than 100 times higher than the EPA 
considers safe in a liter of drinking water. (Figure 1.) One sample of 
leafy vegetables contained 386 micrograms of perchlorate per one-cup 
serving, and the average amount of perchlorate in the vegetable samples was 
146 micrograms per two-ounce serving.

According to other documents acquired by Engstrom, Lipscomb and Lack, the 
perchlorate concentration found in the five wells on Lucky Farms property 
ranged from 10 to 130 parts per billion (ppb) and averaged 40.1 ppb. Because 
it is not known which wells were used to irrigate which samples it is 
difficult to calculate exactly how much each of the tested vegetables 
concentrated perchlorate, but using average figures for the amount of 
perchlorate found in the wells and the vegetables, EWG analysis shows that 
the vegetables concentrated perchlorate by a factor of 65. This means that 
perchlorate levels in the vegetables were on average 65 times higher than 
the levels in the water.

Such results are consistent with the high concentrations of perchlorate that 
have been found in non-crop plants growing in contaminated areas. (EPA 
2002.) But the data has profound implications for future perchlorate 
drinking water standards  as well as for anyone who eats Imperial Valley 
lettuce.

The lower Colorado River is used to irrigate an estimated 1.46 million acres 
of farmland in California and Arizona. Water is distributed from the 
Colorado River to the nearby Imperial Valley of California and southwestern 
Arizona via extensive irrigation canals. It is used to grow a variety of 
crops including cotton, alfalfa, lettuce, wheat, citrus, barley, melons, 
dates, grapes, avocados, tomatoes, onions, carrots and cauliflower. (CRWUA 
2002.)

Of particular concern for perchlorate accumulation is a high water content 
crop like lettuce (which requires three acre-feet of water per acre). In 
Imperial County, CA, 20,000 acres of iceberg lettuce and 10,500 acres of 
leaf lettuce were harvested in 1999. (Imperial County 2002.) That year, 
45,000 acres of wintertime head lettuce, 5,300 acres of leaf lettuce and 
9,300 acres of Romaine lettuce were harvested in Yuma County, AZ. (UA 
Extension 2002.)

EPA and the state of California are in the process of developing drinking 
water standards for perchlorate, and both are required to consider sources 
of exposure other than drinking water. The preliminary research on vegetable 
uptake of perchlorate strongly suggests that food is likely to be an equal 
or greater source for perchlorate, but so far this hasnt been reflected in 
the proposed drinking water standards of either agency.

Californias latest draft public health goal (PHG) of 2 to 6 parts per 
billion (ppb) assumes that 80 percent of a persons exposure to perchlorate 
comes through drinking water. (OEHHA 2002.) EPA has calculated a drinking 
water equivalent level of 1 ppb for their most recent proposed reference 
dose (RfD), but has not yet considered the issue of relative source 
contribution in calculations of a proposed drinking water standard. (EPA 
2002.) If vegetables irrigated with Colorado River water are in fact 
concentrating perchlorate, the drinking water standards will have to be 
substantially lower to account for the considerable exposure coming from 
food.

If Lockheed-Martins perchlorate is indeed contaminating crops to unsafe 
levels, FDA will have to take emergency action to keep the food off the 
market. And the growers will have to be compensated for damage to their 
farming operations and property values.

Recommendations

If the perchlorate levels reported here are confirmed by further testing, 
immediate government action will be needed to reduce perchlorate in lettuce 
and other vegetables. In the interim, we recommend that the Food and Drug 
Administration begin immediately testing lettuce and selected other 
vegetables grown with Colorado River water for perchlorate, and that the 
results of this testing be made public as soon as they are confirmed.

In addition, any grower who is adversely effected by perchlorate 
contamination of their crops should be fully compensated for any and all 
economic losses to their farming operations and property values.

References

Bacchus et al. 1999.
CRWUA 2002. Colorado River Water Users Association. www.crwua.org.
EPA 2002.
Imperial County 2002. Agricultural Commissioners Report for 1999.
OEHHA 2002.
Rogers, Keith, 1998. Chemicals effect on crops worries tribes. Las Vegas 
Review-Journal. May 20, 1998.
Susarla et al. 1999.
UA Extension 2002. University of Arizona Cooperative Extension. 
http://ag.arizona.edu/crops/counties/yuma

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Meet America's New Big Brother http://www.hereinreality.com/bigbrother.html
The John Poindexter Awareness Office http://www.breakyourchains.org/jpao.htm

_________________________________________________________________
The new MSN 8 is here: Try it free* for 2 months 
http://join.msn.com/?page=dept/dialup
*****************************************************************
 45 DOE/NNSA Cites Los Alamos National Laboratory for Price
Anderson Violations

NNSA Implements Reorganization
 		 	 	 		 		 		
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
December 23, 2002                                                                                                                       Download
the Official Press Release
(Adobe Acrobat PDF)                                                                                     

WASHINGTON, D.C. – The Department of Energy’s (DOE) National 
Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has issued a Preliminary 
Notice of Violation to the University of California, the 
contractor for the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), for 
violations of nuclear safety rules and procedures involving the 
storage of nuclear waste materials.
 
The violations did not result in actual harm to workers or the 
public. DOE/NNSA took this action because, if not corrected, the 
violations could have led to the continued storage of transuranic 
(TRU) waste without analyzing all of the hazards, development of 
required safety controls to protect workers and the public, and 
proper authorization by the DOE/NNSA. TRU waste contains 
radioactive material in a form and quantity that, if not properly 
controlled, may cause harm to workers or the public.
 
The DOE/NNSA also took this action because the TRU waste storage 
conditions were in violation of nuclear safety rules for a period 
of several years and the contractor failed to promptly identify 
and correct the conditions. The DOE/NNSA considered this a 
significant failure of the Laboratory’s self-assessment and 
corrective action management processes.
 
LANL is exempt from civil penalty by statute and no civil penalty 
can be issued in association with the current PNOV. If not 
exempt, a civil penalty of $220,000 would have been assessed, 
based on the significance of the violations. 

The Price-Anderson Amendments Act of 1988 authorizes the Energy 
Department to undertake regulatory actions against contractors 
for violations of its nuclear safety requirements. The 
enforcement program is designed to have contractors correct 
procedural violations to prevent more serious events from 
occurring.
 
Additional details on this and other enforcement actions are 
available on the Internet at http://www.eh.doe.gov/enforce. 

Media Contacts: NNSA Public Affairs (202) 586-7371 Release No. 
NA-02-30                                                                    

 	 
*****************************************************************
 46 DOE: LANL ROD on Technical area 18 

FR Doc 02-32995 

[Federal Register: December 31, 2002 (Volume 67, Number 251)] 
[Notices] [Page 79906-79911] From the Federal Register Online via
GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr31de02-53] 

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 
National Nuclear Security Administration 

Record of Decision for the Final Environmental Impact Statement 
for the Relocation of Technical Area 18 Capabilities and 
Materials at the Los Alamos National Laboratory AGENCY: 
Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration. 
ACTION: Record of Decision. 

SUMMARY: The Department of Energy's (DOE) National Nuclear 
Security 
Administration (NNSA) is issuing this Record of Decision on the 
proposed relocation of Technical Area 18 (TA-18) capabilities 
and 
materials at the Los Alamos National Laboratory in the State of 
New 
Mexico. This Record of Decision is based on the information and 
analysis contained in the TA-18 Relocation Environmental Impact 
Statement (DOE/EIS-319), and other factors, such as programmatic 
and 
technical risk, construction requirements, and cost. NNSA has 
decided 
to implement the Preferred Alternative, which would relocate 
Security 
Category I/II missions and related materials to the Device 
Assembly 
Facility at the Nevada Test Site. This alternative includes 
facility 
modification and transportation of special nuclear materials and 
equipment required to support Security Category I/II missions. 
Regarding Security Category III/IV alternatives, NNSA has 
determined 
that additional studies are required and thus is not making a 
decision 
on this set of missions. 
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For further information on the 
TA-18 
Relocation EIS or Record of Decision, or to receive a copy of 
the TA-18 
Relocation EIS, contact: James J. Rose, Document Manager, 
National 
Nuclear Security Administration (NA-53), U.S. Department of 
Energy, 
1000 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20585, (202) 
586-5484. 
For information on the DOE National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA) 
process, contact: Carol M. Borgstrom, Director, Office of NEPA 
Policy 
and Compliance (EH-42), U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 
Independence 
Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20585, (205) 586-4600, or leave a 
message 
at (800) 472-2756. 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 
Background 

The DOE's NNSA prepared this Record of Decision pursuant to 
the 
regulations of the Council on Environmental Quality for 
implementing 
NEPA (40 CFR parts 1500-1508) and DOE's NEPA Implementing 
Procedures 
(10 CFR part 1021). This Record of Decision is based, in part, 
on DOE's 
TA-18 Relocation EIS (DOE/EIS-319). 

NNSA is responsible for providing the Nation with nuclear 
weapons, 
ensuring the safety and reliability of those nuclear weapons, 
and 
supporting programs that reduce global proliferation. These 
missions 
are accomplished with a core team of highly trained nuclear 
experts. 
One of the major training facilities for those personnel is 
located at 
Technical Area 18 (TA-18) within the Los Alamos National 
Laboratory 
(LANL), Los Alamos, New Mexico. The operations at TA-18 enable 
DOE and 
other government personnel to gain knowledge and expertise in 
advanced 
nuclear technologies that support the following: (1) Nuclear 
materials 
[[Page 79907]] 
management and criticality safety; (2) emergency response in 
support of 
counter-terrorism activities; (3) safeguards and arms control in 
support of domestic and international programs to control excess 
nuclear materials; and (4) criticality experiments in support of 
Stockpile Stewardship and other programs. Criticality 
experiments 
involve systems of fissile material(s), called critical 
assemblies, 
which are designed to reach a condition of nuclear criticality 
in a 
controlled manner. The capability to conduct criticality 
experiments 
also includes development of nuclear instruments, measurement 
and 
evaluation of integral cross sections, accident simulation, 
dosimetry, 
and the detection and characterization of nuclear material. A 
critical 
assembly is a machine used to manipulate a mass of fissile 
material in 
a specific geometry and composition. The critical assembly 
machines 
proposed for relocation are the Flattop, Planet, Comet, and 
Godiva, 
which are currently located in TA-18 facilities called CASAs 
(Critical 
Assembly Storage Areas). 

NNSA uses a cost-effective, graded approach to provide 
safeguards 
and security for special nuclear materials (SNM). Quantities of 
SNM 
stored at each site are categorized into Security Categories I, 
II, 
III, and IV with the greater quantities included under Security 
Categories I/II and lesser quantities included in descending 
order 
under Security Categories III/IV. Areas supporting Security 
Category I/ 
II activities are protected by a Perimeter Intrusion Detection 
and 
Assessment System (PIDAS) designed to detect, control, or deny 
access 
to these areas. Each CASA at TA-18 is surrounded by a PIDAS. 

TA-18 operations at LANL include Security Category I/II, as 
well as 
Security Category III/IV activities. Security Category I/II 
activities 
are associated primarily with the operation of the Flattop, 
Planet, 
Comet and Godiva critical assembly machines. Security Category 
III/IV 
activities are associated with various experiments and storage 
involving small quantities of SNM and the operation of the 
critical 
assembly machine. 

Though TA-18 is judged to be secure by DOE's independent 
inspection 
office, its buildings and infrastructure are from 30 to more 
than 50 
years old and are increasingly expensive to maintain and 
operate. 
Additionally, the TA-18 operations are located in a canyon which 
is 
difficult to secure, resulting in increasingly high costs to 
maintain a 
security infrastructure for the special nuclear materials (SNM) 
used 
and stored at the site. NNSA wishes to maintain the important 
capabilities currently provided at TA-18 in a manner that 
reduces the 
long-term costs for safeguards and security. NNSA proposes to 
accomplish this by relocating the TA-18 capabilities and 
materials to a 
new location. 
Alternatives Considered 

NNSA evaluated the environmental impacts associated with the 
proposed action of relocating TA-18 capabilities and materials 
associated with Security Category I/II activities to a new 
location. 
Location alternatives for Security Category I/II activities and 
materials include the following DOE sites: (1) A different site 
at LANL 
at Los Alamos, New Mexico; (2) Sandia National Laboratories at 
Albuquerque, New Mexico (SNL/NM); (3) Nevada Test Site (NTS) 
near Las 
Vegas, Nevada; and (4) Argonne National Laboratory-West (ANL-W) 
near 
Idaho Falls, Idaho. 

In conjunction with the relocation of Security Category I/II 
activities, NNSA also evaluated the environmental impacts 
associated 
with the relocation of TA-18 Security Category III/IV 
activities, 
including SHEBA, within LANL, and considered two alternatives 
not 
involving relocation: the No Action Alternative and the TA-18 
Upgrade 
Alternative. These alternatives are described in greater detail 
below. 
No Action Alternative 

This alternative would maintain the current missions at 
TA-18 as 
described for the Expanded Operations Alternative in the LANL 
Site-Wide 
Environmental Impact Statement (LANL SWEIS) and the associated 
Record 
of Decision (64 FR 50797). Under the No Action Alternative, the 
operations conducted at TA-18 would continue at the level 
described in 
the LANL SWEIS with no major construction, facility 
modifications, or 
changes to the infrastructure associated with buildings or 
safeguards 
and security. Current SNM inventories (all security categories), 
as 
well as the criticality experiments machines, would remain in 
place. 
The No Action Alternative may limit NNSA's ability to support 
future 
TA-18 mission requirements. 
TA-18 Upgrade Alternative 

This alternative would upgrade the buildings, infrastructure 
and 
security infrastructure of existing TA-18 facilities to continue 
housing these TA-18 operations at their present location at 
LANL. 
Current SNM inventories (all security categories), as well as 
the 
criticality experiments machines, would remain in place. 

Under the Upgrade Alternative, some construction activities 
would 
be necessary. New construction would consist of: (1) A new 
one-story 
office and laboratory building, (2) a new one-story control 
room, (3) a 
new one-story pre-engineered metal storage building, and (4) a 
new 
storage vault. In addition, some modifications to existing 
facilities 
would also be needed. The modifications include: installation of 
high- 
efficiency particulate air filters in conjunction with negative 
pressurization of the CASAs; paving and surfacing improvements; 
replacement of potable and fire-protection water systems; 
replacement 
of the sanitary sewage system; storm-water management 
improvements; 
site grading; additions or replacements of heating, ventilating, 
and 
air conditioning; power distribution and monitoring; lightning 
protection; grounding; surge suppression; PIDAS upgrades; and 
physical 
security enhancements. 
LANL New Facility Alternative 

This alternative would locate the TA-18 Security Category 
I/II 
activities in a new building to be constructed near the 
Plutonium 
Facility 4 (PF-4) at LANL's TA-55. The new Security Category 
I/II 
operations building would consist of above-grade structures that 
would 
house support operations and below-grade structures that would 
house 
criticality assembly areas and SNM vaults. A low-scatter bay 
would be 
located in a new pre-engineered-type building above ground. 
Access to 
the facility would be through a new Protected Area Access 
Control 
Building. The PF-4 PIDAS would be enlarged to encompass this new 
facility. 
SNL/NM Alternative 

This alternative would locate the TA-18 Security Category 
I/II 
operations within a new Security Category I/II facility to be 
constructed within TA-V at SNL/NM. The new Security Category 
I/II 
operations building would include nuclear material storage 
vaults, and 
critical assembly facilities. The alternative would also involve 
the 
modification and renovation of 10 existing aboveground buildings 
within 
SNL/NM's TA-V area. Structures that would be located in the 
aboveground 
renovations would include emergency response staging and 
maintenance, 
electronics and machine shops, instrumentation laboratory, 
critical 
assembly control rooms and warehouse, a low-scatter facility, 
waste 
management storage areas, and radioactive-source storage areas. 
[[Page 79908]] 
NTS Alternative 

This alternative would locate the TA-18 Security Category 
I/II 
operations in and around the existing the Device Assembly 
Facility 
(DAF). Currently, DAF is used for the assembly of subcritical 
experiments, as well as other miscellaneous national security 
missions. 
To accommodate the relocated TA-18 operations, modifications to 
the DAF 
would include: modifications to internal walls, floors, and 
ceilings; 
addition of bulk and penetration-shielding materials; demolition 
of 
fire-suppression and other water systems; and, raceway additions 
connecting the critical assemblies to their control rooms and 
power 
supplies. A new low-scatter building would also be constructed 
and 
placed outside the DAF, within its PIDAS. 
ANL-W Alternative 

This alternative would locate the TA-18 Security Category 
I/II 
operations in the existing Fuel Manufacturing Facility (FMF) and 
other 
existing buildings at ANL-W. New construction to expand the 
existing 
FMF would be required to accommodate the relocated TA-18 
operations. 
Security upgrades would also be necessary. The facilities 
proposed for 
the relocation of Security Category I/II activities are: FMF, 
with a 
proposed new addition; the Zero Power Physics Reactor (ZPPR) 
facility; 
the Experimental Breeder Reactor II (EBR-II) containment and 
power 
plant; the Transient Reactor Test (TREAT) facility; and a new 
General- 
Purpose Experimental Building (GPEB). Storage vault space 
requirements 
for Security Category III SNM would be provided in four 
different 
vaults within the protected area. Two of the vaults currently 
exist, 
while the other two would be constructed along with the new 
additions. 
Relocation of SHEBA and Other Security Category III/IV Activities

As discussed above, in conjunction with the relocation of 
TA-18 
Security Category I/II activities to either LANL's TA-55, 
SNL/NM, NTS, 
or ANL-W, a portion of the TA-18 Security Category III/IV 
activities 
(the SHEBA activities) would either be relocated to a new 
structure at 
LANL or remain at TA-18 and the rest of the Security Category 
III/IV 
activities would either be relocated to existing or new 
structures at 
LANL or remain at TA-18. 

The relocation of the SHEBA activities to a new location at 
LANL 
would involve either the construction of a new structure on top 
of an 
existing bunker or the construction of a new bunker and cover 
structure. The bunker, in both cases, would be used to house the 
SHEBA 
solution tanks and support equipment. A new control and 
training-room 
structure would be built in relatively close proximity to the 
construction of the new SHEBA bunker, but outside the SHEBA 
radiation 
zone. 

The relocation of the TA-18 Security Category III/IV 
activities, 
other than SHEBA, to LANL's TA-55 would involve the construction 
of a 
new laboratory and a new office building at TA-55 in the 
proximity, but 
outside the PIDAS, of the proposed new underground facility for 
Security Category I/II activities. If a decision is made that 
Security 
Category III/IV activities remain at TA-18, some internal 
modifications 
to TA-18 facilities would be required, but no new construction. 
Internal modifications would be limited to rearrangement of 
internal 
spaces. 
Preferred Alternative 

As stated in the TA-18 Relocation Final EIS, NNSA's 
Preferred 
Alternative is the NTS Alternative for Security Category I/II 
materials 
and activities. The preferred alternative is the alternative 
that the 
agency believes would fulfill its statutory mission, giving 
consideration to environmental, economic, technical, and other 
factors. 

As stated in the TA-18 Relocation Final EIS, the preferred 
alternative for Security Category III/IV activities is that 
those 
activities would remain at LANL. However, NNSA is currently 
pursuing 
additional studies and will issue a separate record of decision 
regarding these Security Category III/IV activities. 
Environmentally Preferable Alternative 

Ordinarily, the environmentally preferable alternative is 
the 
alternative that causes the least impact to the environment; it 
is also 
the alternative that best protects, preserves, and enhances 
historic, 
cultural, and natural resources. The analyses indicated that 
there 
would be very little difference in environmental impacts among 
the 
alternatives analyzed and also that the impacts would be small. 
After 
considering impacts to each resource area by alternative, NNSA 
has 
identified the ANL-W Alternative as having relatively the fewest 
impacts to the environment; it is also the alternative that best 
protects, preserves, and enhances historic, cultural, and 
natural 
resources. 
Environmental Impacts of Alternatives 

NNSA weighed environmental impacts as one factor in its 
decision- 
making, analyzing existing environmental impacts and the 
potential 
impacts that might occur for each reasonable alternative 
including the 
irreversible or irretrievable commitments of resources. 
Land Use 

Differences among alternatives are primarily associated with 
facility construction. The only alternative with no new 
construction is 
the No Action Alternative. Potential land disturbance would 
range from 
0.2 hectares (at TA-18; Upgrade Alternative) to 1.8 hectares 
(LANL New 
Facility and SNL/NM alternatives). In addition, 0.08 hectares of 
land 
could be disturbed at LANL's TA-39 for the relocation of SHEBA 
and 1.6 
hectares of land could be disturbed for the relocation of other 
Security Category III/IV activities at LANL's TA-55. No land use 
change 
would result from implementing any of the alternatives. 
Transportation 

Except for the No Action Alternative and the TA-18 Upgrade 
Alternative, all other site relocation alternatives would 
require the 
transportation of equipment and materials. Such transportation 
would 
involve the relocation of approximately 2.4 metric tons (2.6 
tons) of 
special nuclear material (SNM), and approximately 10 metric tons 
(11 
tons) of natural and depleted uranium and thorium, as well as 
support 
equipment, some of which would be radioactively contaminated. 
For each 
of the relocation alternatives, the environmental impacts and 
potential 
risks of such transportation would be small, less than one 
fatality per 
10,000 years under normal and accident conditions. The potential 
transportation risks would differ between the relocation 
alternatives 
primarily as a function of the transportation distance. Based on 
distance, the ANL-W Alternative would have the highest potential 
impact, the NTS Alternative the second-highest, the SNL/NM 
Alternative 
the third-highest, and the LANL New Facility Alternative the 
least risk 
(compared to the No Action and TA-18 Upgrade Alternatives). 
There is 
little variation in impacts between alternatives because effects 
are 
small, and any projected increased transport of radioactive 
materials 
is not enough to make a significant change. 
Socioeconomics 

Employment changes would also be very small (around 20 new 
hires) 
for the alternatives involving the relocation of TA-18 
activities to 
new sites (SNL/NM, NTS, or ANL-W), while the overall operations 
workforce at LANL would 
[[Page 79909]] 
remain the same regardless (TA-18, TA-55 or TA-39). Construction 
activities would involve temporary increases in the workforce 
with a 
maximum peak of 300 construction workers (LANL New Facility, 
SNL/NM 
alternatives) to 120 construction workers or less for the other 
alternatives. The peak number of construction workers for SHEBA 
and 
other Security Category III/IV activities relocation would be 
less than 
50. These workforce changes would have no noticeable impact on 
the 
socioeconomic conditions of the associated regions of influence. 
Geology and Soils 

No impacts to geology or geological conditions are expected 
in any 
of the alternatives. Proposed new facilities and renovated 
buildings 
would be evaluated, designed, and constructed in accordance with 
DOE 
Order 420.1 and sited to minimize the risk of geologic hazards. 
The 
potential exists for contaminated soils and possibly other media 
to be 
encountered during excavation and other site activities for all 
alternatives involving new construction. Prior to commencing 
ground 
disturbance, NNSA would survey potentially affected areas to 
determine 
the media extent and nature of any contamination and implement 
required 
remediation in accordance with the procedures established under 
each 
site's environmental restoration program. 
Water Resources 

Surface water would not be used to support new construction 
or 
modification of existing facilities at any of the sites 
considered for 
relocation. No impacts on surface water are expected from 
operations of 
TA-18 facilities and there would be no direct discharge of 
sanitary or 
industrial effluent to surface waters under all alternatives. 
Wastewater would be collected and conveyed to existing 
wastewater 
treatment facilities. Storm-water runoff from construction areas 
could 
potentially impact downstream surface water quality, although 
any 
effects on runoff quality would likely be localized around 
immediate 
points of disturbance or construction lay-down areas. 

Groundwater would be required during construction for such 
uses as 
dust control and soil compaction, washing and flushing 
activities, and 
to meet the potable and sanitary needs of construction 
employees. It is 
estimated that construction activities would require from 50 
thousand 
liters per year (ANL-W Alternative) to a maximum of 17 million 
liters 
per year (LANL New Facility, SNL/NM Alternatives) during 
construction. 
Facility operations would require approximately 6.9 million 
liters per 
year of groundwater under all alternatives. Groundwater required 
during 
the period of construction or operation should not impact 
regional 
groundwater levels or availability for any of the alternatives 
considered. No operational impacts on groundwater quality are 
expected 
for any of the alternatives. 
Biological Resources 

With the exception of the No Action Alternative and the 
ANL-W 
Alternative, construction of new facilities would impact 
terrestrial 
resources due to the loss of small amounts of native vegetation 
consisting of Ponderosa pine at LANL, grassland at SNL/NM, and 
creosote 
bush at NTS. Because of the small amount of land disturbance, 
the 
habitat loss would be small and potential disturbance of 
wildlife would 
be temporary. Construction activities would have no impact on 
existing 
wetlands at LANL. 

Potential impact on the federally threatened desert tortoise 
at NTS 
may occur under the NTS Alternative during construction. 
However, due 
to the low population density of the desert tortoise at NTS, it 
is 
doubtful that this impact would exceed allowable losses. 
Operational 
activities would not impact terrestrial resources at any of the 
alternative sites. 
Air Quality 

Non-radioactive hazardous air pollutants would not be 
expected to 
degrade air quality or affect human health under any of the 
alternatives. Small quantities of criteria and toxic air 
pollutants 
would be generated from the operation of emergency diesel 
generators 
during testing and other routine activities at all alternative 
relocation sites. The resulting concentrations would be well 
below 
ambient quality standards at all alternative relocation sites 
with the 
exception of LANL's TA-55 where the maximum ground-level 
concentration 
of nitrogen dioxide could exceed the 24-hour standard at the 
nearest 
public access road (Pajarito road). Short-term concentrations on 
public 
roads from testing of the emergency diesel generators at TA-55 
would be 
controlled by appropriate design of the generator stack or other 
appropriate engineering or management measures including 
limitations on 
testing the diesel generators to favorable meteorological 
conditions. 

Construction of new buildings and modifications of existing 
buildings at the alternative sites would result in a temporary 
increase 
in air quality impacts from construction equipment, trucks, and 
employee vehicles. Although emissions would vary with the 
magnitude of 
the construction activities at each alternative relocation site 
the 
maximum ground-level concentrations would be well below the 
ambient air 
quality standards at all alternative sites with the exception of 
LANL's 
TA-55 where the short-term concentrations of total suspended 
particles 
and particulate matter could exceed standards at public 
receptors 
adjacent to the site. Construction air quality impacts at the 
site 
would be mitigated by implementing standard dust-control 
practices as 
required by the state air quality control agency. 
Visual Resources 

Activities related to the construction of new buildings and 
building modifications at the alternative relocation sites would 
result 
in a temporary change to the visual appearance of the sites due 
to the 
presence of construction equipment and possible increased dust. 
The 
overall appearance of the existing landscape would not change 
under any 
of the alternatives. 
Noise 

Construction of new buildings and modifications of existing 
buildings would result in some temporary increase in noise 
levels near 
the area from construction equipment and activities. However, 
there 
would be no change in noise levels due to normal TA-18 
operations under 
all alternatives. 
Site Infrastructure 

The projected demands on key infrastructure resources 
associated 
with site construction and building modification are well within 
the 
infrastructure capabilities at each of the alternative sites. It 
is 
also projected that the existing infrastructure resources would 
be 
adequate to support the proposed TA-18 activities over 25 years 
for all 
alternative sites. 
Cultural Resources 

No impact to known prehistoric, historic, Native American, 
or 
paleontological resources is expected from construction or 
operational 
activities under all site alternatives. Because most of the 
proposed 
new construction would occur in previously disturbed land, it is 
unlikely that construction of new facilities at any of the sites 
could 
disturb previously unknown prehistoric, Native American or 
paleontological resources. 
[[Page 79910]] 
Consultation with the State Historic Preservation Officers and 
tribal 
representatives would be conducted in accordance with site 
cultural 
resource management plans. 
Waste Management 

Construction of new buildings and modifications of existing 
buildings at the alternative sites would mostly generate 
non-hazardous 
waste, and some hazardous (e.g., contaminated oil) and low-level 
radioactive waste. The projected one time non-hazardous 
construction 
waste generation volume under the action alternatives would vary 
depending on the size of renovation/modification needs and would 
contribute a very small fraction to the annual production of 
waste at 
each site. The impact of managing this waste at the alternative 
relocation sites would be minimal. 

The projected annual waste generation volume from operations 
associated with TA-18 activities would not change from the No 
Action 
Alternative volume. For all alternatives, the activities 
generate 
annually 145 cubic meters of solid low-level radioactive waste, 
1.5 
cubic meters of mixed low-level radioactive waste, and 4 cubic 
meters 
of solid hazardous waste. In addition, refurbishment and 
replacement of 
critical assembly machine parts prior to relocation would 
generate a 
one-time 1.5 cubic meters of mixed low-level and low-level 
radioactive 
solid waste at LANL. No liquid mixed low-level or low-level 
radioactive 
waste and/or hazardous waste would be generated during the 
operation. 
The impact of managing wastes at all relocation sites would be 
minimal. 
Worker and Public Health 

Public and occupational health and safety impacts were 
evaluated in 
terms of industrial, chemical and radiological consequences. 
Industrial 

During construction, yearly nonfatal occupational injuries/ 
illnesses could increase by an estimated maximum of 16 above the 
No 
Action Alternative. During the operation of all TA-18 activities 
(both 
Security Category I/II and III/IV activities), the estimated 
total 
number of yearly nonfatal occupational injuries/illnesses among 
the 
workforce would be 7 for all alternatives. No occupational 
fatalities 
are expected for the duration of the proposed action. 
Chemical 

No chemical has been identified that would be a risk to 
workers or 
the members of the public from construction activities at 
alternative 
sites. During operation, very small quantities of 
industrial-type 
chemicals, such as ethanol, isopropyl alcohol, phenyl phosphine, 
magnesium dioxide, and xylene would be used under all 
alternatives. The 
quantities of these chemicals that could be released to the 
atmosphere 
are minor and well below the regulatory screening levels that 
would 
require additional analysis. Workers would be protected from 
exposure 
to hazardous chemicals by adherence to Occupational Safety and 
Health 
Administration and Environmental Protection Agency standards. 
Radiological 

There would be no radiological impacts to the members of 
public 
from construction activities. Construction workers could receive 
very 
small doses above background radiation level from exposure to 
radiation 
from other past or present activities at alternative sites. 
These 
workers would be protected through appropriate training, 
monitoring, 
and management control limiting their exposure and ensuring that 
the 
doses are kept as low as reasonably achievable. 

Normal operations of critical experiments would generate 
small 
quantities of air-activation products (i.e., argon gas 
[argon-41]), 
about 110 curies per year that would be released to the 
environment. 
SHEBA operations, by the nature of its design and purpose, would 
generate the majority of argon-41 during operations (about 100 
curies). 
Under all alternatives, the radiological impacts to the members 
of 
public from these releases would be lower than that of the 
existing TA- 
18 operations. For all alternatives, the radiation exposure to 
the 
members of the public would be small, and well below the 
regulatory 
limit of 10 millirem per year. For all sites, the maximally 
exposed 
offsite individual would receive less than 0.067 millirem per 
year from 
operational radiological releases associated with TA-18 
activities. 
Statistically, this translates into a risk that one additional 
fatal 
cancer would occur approximately every 20 million years due to 
TA-18 
operations. The maximum collective dose to general public living 
within 
80 kilometers (50 miles) would be less than 0.1 person-rem per 
year (No 
Action Alternative, TA-18 Upgrade Alternative), which 
corresponds to 
approximately 5.0 x 10-5 estimated latent cancer fatalities, 
or one in every 20,000 years of operation. The collective dose 
to the 
population within 80 kilometers (50 miles) under other 
alternatives 
would be smaller, ranging from 0.020 person-rem (SNL/NM 
Alternative) to 
0.000070 person-rem (NTS Alternative). 

The direct dose (from gamma, and neutron radiation) to a 
member of 
the public from critical experiments under all alternatives, 
except for 
the current TA-18 and new SHEBA location, would be essentially 
zero. 
The maximum direct dose to a member of the public from 
activities at 
TA-18 location would be less than 4.75 millirem per year, with 
an 
estimated 2.4 x 10-6 latent cancer fatalities per year of 
operation. The maximum direct dose to a member of the public 
from SHEBA 
operations would be about 1 millirem per year with an estimated 
latent 
cancer fatality risk of 5 x 10-7 per year. Statistically 
speaking, the maximum risk of an individual member of public 
developing 
a latent cancer fatality from exposure to this direct radiation 
would 
be less than one in every 410,000 years of operation. 

The annual average dose to a worker involved in TA-18 
activities 
would be the same under all alternatives and is estimated to be 
100 
millirem per year with a corresponding risk of developing latent 
cancer 
fatality of 4 x 10-5 per year. There would be a one-time 
dose to the workers of 2.3 person-rem from SNM handling 
activities that 
would be transported from TA-18 to alternative relocation sites 
(i.e., 
LANL TA-55, SNL/NM, NTS, and ANL-W). SHEBA relocation would also 
incur 
a one-time dose to workers of 0.02 person-rem. 
Facility Accidents 

The accident analyses considered a wide spectrum of 
potential 
operational accident scenarios including uncontrolled reactivity 
insertion, inadvertent criticality, fire, explosion (i.e., 
hydrogen 
detonation), and earthquake, covering both the range of TA-18 
activities and the radioactive material at risk. The accident 
scenarios 
chosen for the evaluation bound the impacts of all reasonably 
foreseeable accidents that could occur at existing or relocated 
TA-18 
facilities. The accident risks were estimated in terms of both 
the 
frequency of the event and the consequences of such event. The 
risk of 
an accident is defined as the product of the accident frequency 
and the 
associated consequences to the population within 80 kilometers. 
The 
highest potential annual risk of excess latent fatalities among 
the 
population within 80 kilometers would be less than 5.1 x 
10-5 (i.e., about one chance in 19,000 per year of a latent 
cancer fatality), for the bounding accident analyzed. The No 
Action 
Alternative, and specifically SHEBA operations, 
[[Page 79911]] 
would produce the highest potential accident impact, primarily 
due to 
the design of SHEBA. The potential annual risk of excess latent 
cancer 
fatalities among the population at the alternative sites ranges 
from 
7.7 x 10-10 (NTS Alternative) to 2.2 x 10-7 (SNL/ 
NM Alternative). 

There would be no hazardous chemicals or explosives used or 
stored 
at existing and relocated TA-18 facilities, other than minor 
industrial 
quantities, that would impact workers or the public under 
accident 
conditions. 
Environmental Justice 

Based on the analysis of all resource areas and demographic 
information on low-income and minority populations, NNSA does 
not 
expect any environmental related issues (i.e., the projected 
impacts 
are not disproportionately high and adverse for minority or low 
income 
populations) from TA-18 activities under all alternatives. 
Comments on the Final EIS 

NNSA distributed approximately twelve hundred copies of the 
Final 
EIS for review and to date, has received only two comments on 
the EIS. 
Both individuals were concerned that the relocation of the TA-18 
missions would be a threat to national security through the loss 
of 
existing resources presently located at LANL. Both individuals 
indicated that these resources, especially experienced 
personnel, had 
been built up over a number of years and would not be present at 
another location. 
Other Decision Factors 

In assessing the alternatives for Security Category I/II 
missions, 
the NNSA considered other key factors such as programmatic 
impacts, 
construction risk, security concerns and overall cost. 
Programmatic Risk 

Due to the importance of the TA-18 missions in the Nation's 
overall 
security posture, the potential risk of programmatic impacts 
were 
assessed by reviewing the ability for each alternative to meet 
programmatic requirements and to determine the degree of synergy 
each 
option provided the mission set. While all alternatives met the 
basic 
program requirements, it was determined that the LANL New 
Facility and 
NTS Alternatives were more advantageous than SNL and ANL-W for 
minimizing programmatic risk to Security Category I/II 
activities. 
First, LANL New Facility and NTS offered improved security and 
operating flexibility that would allow for the accomplishment of 
programmatic work for the next few decades due to facility age 
and 
location. Additionally, LANL and NTS provided programmatic 
synergy as 
both sites have existing mission requirements that complement 
the TA-18 
mission set. SNL had increased programmatic risk because of the 
age of 
the facilities that would be modified under the alternative. 
ANL-W was 
determined to have the highest programmatic risk because it was 
no 
longer an NNSA site, had minimal programmatic synergy (namely 
through 
criticality research and training) and its remote location. The 
No 
Action and TA-18 Upgrade Alternatives were recognized to 
minimize 
programmatic risk initially, but would have increasing 
difficulty in 
meeting requirements, as the TA-18 facilities would reach the 
end of 
their useful life and operational/security requirements evolved. 
Construction Risk 

NNSA considered the risk from construction activities for 
the 
alternatives, taking into account the concepts proposed for each 
alternative. Factors that were examined included the age of the 
existing facility (if modifications would occur), the extent of 
modifications, and the complexity of designs. From this 
examination, it 
was determined that the NTS offered the least construction risk 
from 
the standpoint of facility age, design complexity, and extent of 
modifications. The NTS Alternative was based on a facility that 
was 
designed to modern safety standards as opposed to the TA-18 
Upgrade, 
SNL, and ANL-W Alternatives that were based on refurbishing 
multiple 
buildings that approached 30-40 years in age. As with modifying 
buildings of this age, NNSA has found from past experience that 
there 
is inherently more risk from discovering unknown design aspects 
of the 
buildings. Finally, the LANL New Facility Alternative, while 
providing 
the newest location for the TA-18 missions, offered moderate 
construction risk due to the nature of the underground design. 
Costs 

In reviewing the overall costs associated with relocation of 
the 
TA-18 Security Category I/II missions, it was determined that 
most 
options fell within a similar cost range when considering 
construction, 
transportation, and project management activities as well as 
lifecycle 
costs with a few exceptions. Preliminary relocation cost 
estimates 
indicated that the NTS Alternative was the lowest from a 
construction 
standpoint, but there was a potential for slightly higher 
lifecycle 
costs from operating activities due to the campaign structure 
proposed. 
Additionally, NTS as well as SNL and ANL-W had higher 
transportation 
costs associated with their alternative from off-site movement 
of 
materials than with the LANL options. The highest cost estimate 
was 
associated with the TA-18 Upgrade Alternative, driven by the 
current 
age of the TA-18 complex and uncertainties with future 
operational and 
security facility requirements. The remaining alternatives fell 
between 
these extremes, showing slight differences between them in terms 
of 
construction and lifecycle costs. 
Mitigation Measures 

Impacts were sufficiently small to negate the need for 
specific 
mitigative actions. This is not to say that the NNSA will not 
implement 
the normal storm water run-off control measures, waste 
minimization 
programs and other such normal activities so as to minimize 
adverse 
impacts to the environment, wherever possible. 
Conclusion 

NNSA has considered environmental impacts, stakeholders 
concerns, 
risks, costs, and national policy in its decisions regarding the 
relocation of TA-18 Security Category I/II missions and 
activities and 
has decided to implement the preferred alternative, transfer of 
missions to the Device Assembly Facility at the Nevada Test 
Site. At 
this time, the NNSA does not issue a decision regarding location 
of TA- 
18 Security Category III/IV missions and activities within LANL; 
however, additional studies will be performed and a separate 
record of 
decision will be issued sometime in 2003. 

Issued in Washington, DC, this 5th day of December, 2002. 
Linton Brooks, 
Acting Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration. 
[FR Doc. 02-32995 Filed 12-30-02; 8:45 am] 
BILLING CODE 6450-01-P 
*****************************************************************
 47 LANL Floodplain barrier 

FR Doc 02-32996 

[Federal Register: December 31, 2002 (Volume 67, Number 251)] 
[Notices] [Page 79911-79912] From the Federal Register Online via 
GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr31de02-54] 

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

National Nuclear Security Administration, Los Alamos Site Office 
Floodplain Statement of Findings for the Proposed Installation of 
a Multiple Permeable Reactive Barrier Within Mortandad Canyon at 
Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, NM AGENCY: National 
Nuclear Security Administration, Los Alamos Site Office, 
Department of Energy. [[Page 79912]] ACTION: Floodplain statement 
of findings. 

SUMMARY: This floodplain statement of findings is for the 
construction of a multiple permeable reactive barrier (PRB) at 
Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). The PRB will be placed 
across a floodplain area within Mortandad Canyon, located within 
the central eastern portion of LANL. In accordance with 10 CFR 
part 1022, the Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear 
Security Administration (NNSA) Los Alamos Site Office has 
prepared a floodplain/wetland assessment and will perform this 
proposed action in a manner so as to minimize potential harm to 
or within the affected floodplain. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION 
CONTACT: Elizabeth Withers, U.S. Department of Energy, National 
Nuclear Security Administration, Los Alamos Site Office, 528 35th 
Street, Los Alamos, NM 87544. Telephone (505) 667- 8690, 
facsimile (505) 667-9998; or electronic address: . For further 
information on general DOE floodplain environmental review 
requirements, contact: Carol M. Borgstrom, Director, Office of 
NEPA Policy and Compliance, EH-42, Department of Energy, 1000 
Independence Avenue, SW., Washington DC 20585-0119. Telephone 
(202) 586-4600 or (800) 472-2756, facsimile (202) 586-7031. 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: In accordance with DOE regulations for 
compliance with floodplain and wetlands environmental review 
requirements (10 CFR part 1022), NNSA prepared a 
floodplain/wetland assessment for this action. The NNSA published 
a notice of floodplain involvement (Volume 67, Number 236). This 
notice announced that the floodplain/wetland assessment document 
was available for a 15-day review period and that copies of the 
document could be obtained by contacting Ms. Withers at the above 
address, and that copies of the document were available for 
review at two public DOE reading rooms in Los Alamos and 
Albuquerque, New Mexico. No comments were received from the 
Federal Register notice on the proposed floodplain action. 

Project Description: In November 2002, NNSA considered a proposal 
for constructing a PRB system at a narrow constriction in 
Mortandad Canyon within LANL where contaminated groundwater is 
confined to a small cross-section of alluvial materials (see 
figure 1). The entire PRB structure would extend about 120 feet 
from side-wall to side-wall within the canyon bottom. The PRB 
would consist of a ``funnel and gate'' system to direct 
contaminated groundwater into a centrally- located gate area of 
reactive materials. The impermeable funnel would be constructed 
of sheet piling driven to a depth of approximately 27 feet on 
either side of the canyon. The permeable gate would contain 
multiple buried cells of selected media designed to react with 
and reduce the concentration of contaminants in groundwater 
passing through the gate. The PRB would be left in place for 
about 5 years and its function would be monitored through a 
system of shallow monitoring wells that would be installed at the 
same time the PRB was constructed. Construction of the PRB and 
associated monitoring wells will commence in 2003 and be 
completed in less than 6 months. 

Alternatives: Alternative locations for the PRB were considered 
but eliminated from future consideration. A combination of site 
factors was considered that lead to the identification of the 
proposed site as being the least disruptive to existing 
environmental resources in the area. 

Floodplain Impacts: The proposed action would have the potential 
for minimal impacts to the floodplain. Should a rain event occur 
during this activity, there may be some sediment movement down 
canyon because of the loosened condition of the soil from the 
clearing and construction activities. 

Floodplain Mitigation: Impacts to the floodplain would be 
minimized by following Best Management Practices at the 
construction area (such as the placement of silt fences, straw 
bales or wattles, or wooden or rock structures to slow down water 
runoff and run-on at cleared sites). Post-construction reseeding 
and re-vegetation along the sides of the stream channel will 
minimize soil disturbance and reduce or prevent the potential for 
soil erosion. No debris will be left at the work site. No vehicle 
maintenance or fueling would occur within 100 feet of the stream 
channel. Any sediment movement from the site would be short term 
and temporary. 

Issued in Los Alamos on December 20, 2002. Ralph E. Erickson, 
Manager, U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security 
Administration, Los Alamos Site Office. [FR Doc. 02-32996 Filed 
12-30-02; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 6450-01-P 
*****************************************************************
 48 Crisis in Korea: View from Pyongyang -- The Washington Times
 
December 30, 2002

By Martin Sieff UPI Senior News Analyst
 
WASHINGTON, Dec. 30 (UPI) -- Why did North Korea abandon the 
pretense it was abiding by its 1994 nuclear development agreement 
with the United States and why now? Because, seasoned East Asian 
Pyongyang watchers say, they appear to have believed that after 
the United States "takes out" President Saddam Hussein of Iraq, 
they would be next on the list. 

     The roots of the current crisis go back to President George 
W. Bush's State of the Union speech last January. To great 
applause, the president then included North Korea long with Iraq 
and Iran in an "axis of evil." 

     The comments were celebrated as a triumph by the powerful 
clique of neo-conservatives who run the Office of the Secretary 
of Defense under Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. And 
administration sources have told United Press International that 
they were included in the speech over the strong objections of 
Secretary of State Colin Powell. Certainly, close associates of 
Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz in the week after the 
speech openly boasted that the inclusion of the phrase was a 
humiliating defeat for Powell. 

     In the months that followed, it became increasingly clear 
that Bush was in earnest about confronting Iraq and Saddam and, 
at the very least, rooting out his weapons of mass destruction 
and programs to build them. Ponderously, slowly but inexorably, 
the United States continued to proceed along a path aimed at 
toppling Saddam and crushing his army militarily and installing a 
new government in Baghdad dependent on and favorable to 
Washington. 

     But according to East Asian intelligence sources, North 
Korea's reclusive, but smart and ruthless leader Kim Jong Il and 
his colleagues appear to have drawn the conclusion from U.S. 
policy that once Iraq was dealt with, they would be next on the 
list. Therefore, these sources said, the North Koreans have taken 
a page out of Israel's deterrence playbook. And like Israel, they 
did so because they were scared. 

     The North Korean capital Pyongyang is probably the most 
inaccessible capital city on earth. But certain things are known 
for a certainty, and very clear inferences can indeed be drawn 
from them. 

     First, senior South Korean intelligence officials and close 
advisers to President Kim Dae-jung have repeatedly told UPI 
Analysis that former North Korean leader Kim Il Sung and his 
innermost circle are truly ignorant of the nature of democratic 
societies in the wider world. Even worse, these top South Korean 
officials say, North Korea's Kim and his advisers are also still 
in a very much of a state of paranoid fear about everyone outside 
their own tightly policed borders. 

     That is why South Korea's Kim made his "Sunshine" policy of 
very cautious détente with North Korea the centerpiece of his 
nation's national security policies. And it is also why the South 
Korea's Kim and his own top officials were so appalled at what 
they considered the reckless actions and rhetoric of Bush when he 
visited the Demilitarized Zone border between South and North 
Korea last year. They feared Bush's tough talk could wreck the 
fragile foundations of their own détente. 

     North Korea has about the same population, a smaller area 
and a far, far smaller resource base than Iraq. Also, where Iraq 
can hope for uprisings of popular support among the Middle East's 
remaining 260 million Arabs outside its borders, or in the wider 
Muslim world, which numbers around 1 billion, the North Koreans 
are out on their own. 

     Pyongyang's only supporter is neighboring China, is 
determined to keep North Korea intact as a protective buffer 
against the contagion of the free speech, democratic societies of 
South Korea and Japan. But while China has been making long-term, 
serious and massive military investment to prepare for a possible 
air-sea war against the United States in the Taiwan Straits, it 
is no position to actively militarily intervene, on North Korea's 
side against the far superior U.S. high-tech military forces. 

     Besides North Korea's revered, although catastrophic, 
founding ideology of chu-chi, or independent self-reliance, 
teaches that national security and even survival can be entrusted 
to no other nation's hands. 

     The clear strategic inference to be drawn from such premises 
is that a nuclear deterrent would be necessary to maintain the 
cherished independence of North Korea against an outside world 
presumed to be entirely hostile against it. Similar motivations 
based on all too real recent history motivated democratic 
Israel's founding father David Ben-Gurion to launch an ambitious 
nuclear development program in the 1950s. 

     The North Korean admission makes clear that they never 
adhered to the 1994 Yongbyon agreement and that they did not 
break it out of anger at Bush's policies. On the contrary, North 
Korean admissions so far make clear that they were systematically 
breaking the 1994 agreement all along. 

     And as Anthony Cordesman of Washington's Center for 
Strategic and International Studies points out in a new paper, 
"even if the Yongbyon agreement of 1994 had been fully adhered 
to, it would not have prevented North Korea from having nuclear 
weapons or biological weapons of equal or greater lethality." 

     Will the North Koreans use them? The simple but accurate 
answer is, nobody knows. Cordesman believes, as he writes in his 
study, "North Korea has no incentive to risk an avoidable war. 
... By every traditional standard, North Korea should still be 
deterred, " 

     South Korean intelligence officials and national security 
analysts around both President Kim Dae-jung and his new 
successor, President-elect Roh Moo-hyun, agree with this 
assessment. But both they and Cordesman make important 
qualifications to it. 

     "In practice," Cordesman continued in his paper, "few wears 
are the result of rational calculations." And he adds, "North 
Korea's long history of brinkmanship and risk taking is not 
reassuring." 

     South Korean intelligence officials and senior diplomats 
feel exactly the same way. And that is precisely the reason why 
the South Korea's Kim pushed ahead with his "sunshine" policy of 
developing dialogue and cautious cooperation with North Korea. 
For Kim and his advisers believed the paranoia and 
unpredictability of Pyongyang's leaders was rooted in their 
extraordinary self-imposed isolation from the wider world that 
has earned their country the nickname, "The Hermit Kingdom." 

     Therefore, Kim and his advisers were appalled when Bush 
included North Korea in his "axis of evil." But their warnings to 
Washington to tread carefully with Pyongyang fell on deaf ears. 
Senior Bush administration officials made no secret of their 
contempt for Kim and his "Sunshine" policy, which won him the 
Nobel Peace Prize last year. 

     Now, the consequences that Kim and his colleagues most 
feared appear to be coming to pass. Even if war is successfully 
averted, Cordesman concludes, "The U.S. faces a future in which 
there is a nuclear North Korea and in which it can never be sure 
how many more (nuclear) weapons it will acquire, regardless of 
how many agreements it makes not to acquire them." 

     This grim situation obviously marks the failure of President 
Bill Clinton's much touted 1994 agreement with Pyongyang. But it 
also now underscores the failure of supposedly far tougher 
policies and rhetoric pursued by the current Bush administration 
over the past two years. 

     What can be concluded is that North Korea's leaders have now 
made the calculation that only the fear that they already possess 
nuclear weapons will deter Bush from taking major military action 
against them at some point soon. 

     Therefore, while Bush's policies and his "axis of evil" 
rhetoric and determination to take down Saddam did not motivate 
Pyongyang to push ahead with its nuclear program, it simply 
confirmed in the minds of Kim Jong Il and his colleagues the 
wisdom of sticking with it. They appear to have concluded that 
only the possession of a nuclear deterrent -- and the certain 
knowledge among their potential enemies that they already possess 
it -- would be sufficient to keep Bush off their backs. 

     Given the significant softening of U.S. policy on the 
dispute signaled by Secretary of State Powell Sunday, Kim Jong Il 
may well be reading the Bush administration better than Bush and 
his officials so far have read him. 

     (The first in a five-part series that looks at the dispute 
between the United States and North Korea over Pyongyang's 
nuclear program. Next: America's dilemma.)
 
    
*****************************************************************

NOTE: In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. section 107 this 
material is distributed without profit or payment to those who 
have expressed a prior interest in receiving this information for 
non-profit research and educational purposes only. For more 
information go to: 
<http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml> 
    
*****************************************************************