***************************************************************** 12/28/02 **** RADIATION BULLETIN(RADBULL) **** VOL 10.336 ***************************************************************** RADBULL IS PRODUCED BY THE ABALONE ALLIANCE CLEARINGHOUSE ***************************************************************** Send News Stories to news@energy-net.org with title on subject line and first line of body NUCLEAR POLICY 1 Seoul tries to curb nukes 2 Nuke Inspectors Prepare to Leave N. Korea 3 Russian Atomic Energy Minister: Iran Has No Technology to 4 Bush's Moonshine Policy 5 US to back IAEA's efforts to declare NKorea's treaty violation* 6 IAEA says U.N. inspectors will leave N.Korea on Tuesday 7 U.N.: N. Korea Violates 1953 Armistice 8 Report: Iraqi scientist provides U.N. with details on nuclear plans NUCLEAR REACTORS 9 Iraq's Thwarted Ambitions Litter an Old Nuclear Plant 10 Atomic Energy Ministry's plans for 2003 11 US: Yankee alert policy reviewed 12 US: Community wants Davis-Besse running 13 US: NRC: site selection criteria input proposal NUCLEAR SAFETY 14 US: Story regarding search for radioactive hazards at IAAP not NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE 15 Russia, Iran to sign nuclear waste accord in January 16 US: N-Waste Site Receives Little State Oversight 17 Yucca Mountain year's top story 18 YUCCA NWTRB meeting 19 US: American Ecology Set to Close a Plant NUCLEAR WEAPONS 20 US: these people need HELP~ 21 US: Potential hazards found at test site 22 Europarl member to visit Pasko 23 US: Nixon’s nuclear ploy | Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists US DEPT. OF ENERGY 24 High Levels of Toxic Rocket Fuel Found in Lettuce 25 Worker Comp Act of 2000 revisions 26 Sandia may simulate nuclear explosions OTHER NUCLEAR 27 NRC: Licensee bankruptcy of Permagrain Products Inc. 28 Fallout Case Lawyer Bushnell Dies at 79 ***************************************************************** ***************************************************************** FULL NEWS STORIES ***************************************************************** ***************************************************************** 1 Seoul tries to curb nukes - theage.com.au Saturday 28 December 2002, 17:30PM South Korea will send envoys to North Korea allies China and Russia to discuss ways of persuading Pyongyang to halt the reactivation of its long-shuttered nuclear program, a government official said. Officials from South Korea, Japan and the United States will also meet in the United States early next month to discuss measures to defuse the crisis, the foreign ministry official said. Meanwhile, a senior aide to president-elect Roh Moo-Hyun said US President George W Bush would send an envoy to Seoul around January 10 for talks with Roh about the issue. "Around the time of the visit by a US envoy, the three countries will hold a tripartite meeting," the foreign ministry official was quoted as saying by Yonhap news agency. "We are also in contact with China and Russia to send high-level delegates there at the earliest possible date," he said. The North announced it would, after eight years of monitoring, expel inspectors of the UN nuclear watchdog and reactivate a reprocessing plant to produce weapons-grade plutonium. After declaring it would restart its mothballed nuclear facilities in Yongbyon, some 100km north of the capital, it has been taking actions one after another over the past week, building up tensions. The United States called on Pyongyang to reverse its current course and eliminate its nuclear weapons program in a verifiable manner, while Germany and Italy summoned their North Korean ambassadors over the emerging nuclear crisis. "To date, restarting the reprocessing facility is the most serious aspect of the crisis ... We consider the situation very serious," the South Korean official said. "We consider all kinds of options but we will continue with diplomatic efforts to prevent the North from restarting the nuclear reprocessing plant," he said. ©2002 AFP Copyright © 2002 The Age Company Ltd advertise| contact us ***************************************************************** 2 Nuke Inspectors Prepare to Leave N. Korea Las Vegas SUN: Today: December 28, 2002 at 4:30:20 PST By WILLIAM J. KOLE ASSOCIATED PRESS VIENNA, Austria (AP) - U.N. nuclear inspectors will leave North Korea by Tuesday, the U.N. nuclear agency said, denouncing the communist state as "a country in defiance of its international obligations." Melissa Fleming, a spokeswoman for the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency, told The Associated Press the agency's three inspectors would comply with North Korea's demand that they leave. The inspectors have been monitoring a nuclear reactor at Yongbyon, north of the capital, Pyongyang. "IAEA inspectors in Yongbyon are making arrangements to leave the country. This is in response to DPRK officials confirming directly to the inspectors that they should leave the country immediately," Fleming said, using the acronym vfor the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. She said North Korea had not responded to a letter of protest by agency director Mohamed ElBaradei. In a statement issued from Sri Lanka, where he is vacationing, ElBaradei said: "This is a country in defiance of its international obligations. It sets a dangerous precedent for the integrity of the non-proliferation regime." ElBaradei said Friday that the North's demand would rob the agency of its last means to ensure its facilities are not being used to produce nuclear weapons. He said it worsens the crisis sparked by Pyongyang's decision to revive its frozen nuclear complex. The North removed the agency's monitoring seals and surveillance cameras from the complex earlier this week and began moving in fuel rods needed to restart a 5-kilowatt reactor. The agency confirmed Friday that it had received a letter from the North Koreans "requesting the immediate removal of IAEA inspectors." ElBaradei had sent a response to North Korea's atomic energy chief, Ri Je Son, urging the North to allow the inspectors to remain and to install new seals and cameras. The U.N. agency has been monitoring the complex since the North closed it in 1994 under an agreement that aimed to ensure that the communist state does not divert nuclear materials to make weapons. The agency normally has two inspectors in North Korea. Its international experts are based in Vienna and travel to North Korea for stints that last about two weeks. On Friday, three inspectors were in the country because of an overlap in a routine rotation, Fleming said. North Korea's official news agency, KCNA, reported that the country would reactivate a reprocessing laboratory at the facility where plutonium can be extracted from spent fuel rods. Plutonium can be used to make atomic bombs. North Korea already has 8,000 spent fuel rods. U.S. officials say they contain enough plutonium to make several atomic bombs. As of Friday, about 2,000 fresh fuel rods had been moved to a storage facility in the reactor, Fleming said. The reactor needs 8,000 rods to be restarted, the agency has said. All contents copyright 2002 Las Vegas SUN, Inc. ***************************************************************** 3 Russian Atomic Energy Minister: Iran Has No Technology to Produce A-Bomb Produce A-Bomb | RosbaltNews.COM Rosbalt, 28/12/2002, 13:12 MOSCOW, December 28. On February, an inspection of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) visited nuclear objects in Iran, Russia's Minister of Atomic Energy, Alexander Rumyantsev said at a briefing in Moscow. The inspection was initiated by the US that allegedly has photographs from the space that give grounds for such an inspection, he said. Iran is building two nuclear facilities on its territory, a research laboratory in Natanzana and a plant for producing heavy water in Araq, Rumyantsev pointed out. "They are being built without Russia's professionals and are meant to start production of own nuclear fuel for the nuclear power plant in Bushehr," he explained. The IAEA inspection will not find anything related to the production of weapon-grade uranium or nuclear weapons in Iran, the minister believes. "The production of an atomic bomb requires a complex of plants with high-tech equipment, while Iran has nothing of the kind," Rumyantsev said. ¿ RIA Novosti © 2000-2002 Rosbalt News Agency ***************************************************************** 4 Bush's Moonshine Policy (washingtonpost.com) By Mary McGrory Sunday, December 29, 2002; Page B07 George W. Bush ends the year with a genuine nuclear crisis on his hands. He has been assiduously trying to foment one with Iraq, dropping bombs on the country and expletives on its leader. But North Korea, which is not just suspected of working on the bomb but of having at least two, has muscled Saddam Hussein off the front pages and made our crusade against Baghdad seem crass: We're starting a war not just for oil or for Ariel Sharon but because we can win it. North Korea is a different story. It has a million men under arms. It has a built-in hostage situation at hand in the presence of 37,000 U.S. soldiers who guard South Korea. Kim Jong Il, the Communist leader of North Korea, almost makes Saddam Hussein look like Rotarian of the Year. While Hussein is welcoming U.N. arms inspectors, Kim is throwing them out. He has dismantled the international surveillance equipment installed by a treaty in 1994; he has announced he is going to make all the weapons-grade plutonium he wants. He is, in short, behaving like the radioactive lunatic he is. And what is George W. Bush, defender of the free world, scourge of terrorists, doing about all this? As of this moment, nothing. As far as we can see, he seems to feel that not speaking to the North Koreans is the solution. "Isolation" and "marginalization" will bring these rogues to heel? A leader who will starve his own people to feed his military machine, whose father invaded his neighbor, who shows no acquaintance with reality, will be cowed by a snub from Washington? The president has asked North Korea's neighbors to warn Kim Jong Il of the consequences of his horrendous behavior. Up to now, the Japanese have reported themselves as scared to death. Russia and China seem to have a million other things to do. The incoming chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Richard Lugar (R-Ind.), says we should "talk and talk and talk" to the outlaws. His is a lone voice. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld exhibited a reflex swagger response. The North Koreans better watch out. They mustn't think for a minute we couldn't wage war against them. Just in time for Christmas, he brought our war list up to three -- the one against al Qaeda, which we seem to have forgotten, the one brewing in Iraq -- and now Pyongyang? We should perhaps remember that President Bush has never liked talking to Koreans. His first overseas visitor was the estimable Kim Dae Jung, whom Bush snubbed. Bush, as he was eager to demonstrate, was not a fan. Kim's sin? He was instituting a sunshine policy with the North, ending a half-century of estrangement. Bush, who looked upon North Korea as the most potent argument for his obsession to build a national missile defense, saw Kim, a Nobel Peace Prize winner, as nothing but trouble. He sent him home humiliated and empty-handed. Kim's successor, Roh Moo Hyun, may be even worse. He is a passionate advocate of the sunshine policy, and he seeks "a more mature relationship" with the United States -- bad news for Bush. This ugly international set-to occurs just when the president has scored his most dazzling domestic political triumph. The hullabaloo over Trent Lott, the prospective leader of the Senate, was caused by Lott's letting the cat out of the bag on the subject of the Republicans' covert Southern strategy. Lott told a birthday party for Strom Thurmond what everyone has always known: The strategy was based on race. Republicans were mortified. Then Bush apprentice Karl Rove stepped in and saved the day. Bush and Rove engineered Lott's resignation and the substitution of glamorous Bill Frist of Tennessee, literally a medicine man, who spends his off-time flying his own plane to Africa to minister to AIDS patients. Bush issued a sharp criticism of Lott's remarks and nourished the Frist boomlet into a surge, all the while insisting through his spokesman that he did not think Lott should resign. Republicans are delighted. In an assembly largely given over to small minds and big egos, Frist's aura as a healer and his proclivity for rendering first aid on Capitol Hill make him a romantic figure. It's like getting Lord Byron on your condo board. The finesse of the operation was universally applauded. The qualities displayed -- the regard for the other guy's sensibilities, the willingness to forgo credit, are ones that can be successful in foreign policy negotiations. Bush could never send Jimmy Carter or Bill Clinton to represent him in the deadly and proliferating tension in North Korea -- he blames them for coddling Pyongyang. But he might send Karl Rove. He knows how the game is played. © 2002 The Washington Post Company ***************************************************************** 5 US to back IAEA's efforts to declare NKorea's treaty violation* New York,Saturday, December 28, 2002:* US administration is set to back efforts by International Atomic Energy Agency to have the UN Security Council declare that North Korea is violating the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and other agreements to keep nuclear weapons out of the Korean peninsula, senior officials were today quoted as saying. In turning to the UNSC, which may seek to impose penalties, the officials acknowledged that they were trying to counter North Korea's effort to increase pressure on the West. They were also trying to cast the issue as North Korea's international defiance, rather than a confrontation between Pyongyang and Washington, the New York Time said. "We want to make it clear that this is now an internationalised problem, not just a problem between the United States and North Korea," said a senior administration official involved in the discussions over how to react to the North's decision to evict nuclear inspectors and restart a reactor. "The North Koreans would like nothing better than a dust-up with the United States - that's the game they've played for years. We're not going to get into that," he told the Times. The officials, Times said, expect the IAEA to meet in early January and refer the issue to the Security Council within days. "This won't be an American action," the official said, while acknowledging that "the United States certainly won't oppose it". (PTI) 11:09 IST ***************************************************************** 6 IAEA says U.N. inspectors will leave N.Korea on Tuesday Reuters 28 December, 2002 21:24 GMT+08:00 By Judy Lee SEOUL (Reuters) - The U.N. nuclear agency said on Saturday its inspectors would leave North Korea early next week after the communist state said it would expel them and press on with its nuclear plans. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) described North Korea as a country "in defiance of international obligations". It said its inspectors would leave on Tuesday, while South Korea said it wanted to work with Russia and China, among others, to defuse the crisis over the North's atomic plans. South Korea, whose president and president-elect favour the so-called sunshine policy of aid and dialogue as a way of dealing with the North, said it would discuss strategy with the United States and Japan in January. A foreign ministry statement said South Korea would also "seek close cooperation with China, Russia and the European Union". In the capital Seoul, about 70 protesters rallied against their unpredictable communist neighbour and burnt a North Korean flag. "Stop sunshine policy. Stop assistance to North Korea," the group chanted. "The world must stop North Korea from producing nuclear weapons." The United States, keen to maintain its focus on Iraq, told North Korea it sought a peaceful end to the crisis on the world's last Cold War frontier, but insisted it would not negotiate under duress. As Washington and its allies cast around for a way to stop the country restarting a reactor capable of producing plutonium for nuclear weapons, North Korea's enigmatic leader, Kim Jong-il, relaxed at a concert where an army choir praised him in song. The Bush administration, banking on diplomacy to bring Kim back into line, said the impoverished country's relations with the outside world hinged on an end to its nuclear weapons programme. "The United States will not negotiate in response to threats or broken commitments," White House spokeswoman Claire Buchan said after China and Russia called for dialogue between Washington and Pyongyang to defuse the crisis. In Crawford, Texas, where President George W. Bush is spending the New Year at his ranch, White House spokesman Scott McClellan said the use of force was not under consideration. PEACEFUL RESOLUTION "We continue to seek a peaceful resolution of the situation," McClellan told reporters on Friday. "We will continue our consultations with friends and allies." Isolated since the end of the Cold War, North Korea has suffered economic collapse and food shortages that have killed two million people and left about a third of its 22 million population dependent on foreign food aid. The North's Korean Central News Agency accused Washington on Friday of seeking to overthrow its political system. On Saturday it carried a report on Kim's concert. "Kim Jong-il congratulated the artistes of the chorus...and highly appreciated the feats they have performed in encouraging the army and people in their sacred struggle to defend the socialist system of the country," it said. North Korea's neighbours and U.N. Security Council members China and Russia have responded coolly to U.S. calls for diplomatic pressure on North Korea. U.S. allies Japan and South Korea have also indicated they would rather not take a hard line with the reclusive communist state. North Korea, which wants direct talks with Washington, on Friday announced plans to restart a radiochemical laboratory capable of making plutonium for nuclear weapons. It told the IAEA that its inspectors must leave as a 1994 oil-for-compliance on non-proliferation agreement had broken down. The Vienna-based IAEA said the departure of its inspectors would practically end its ability to monitor the Yongbyon nuclear complex, 90 km (55 miles) north of Pyongyang. "This is a country in defiance of its international obligations," said IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei in a statement. "It sets a dangerous precedent for the integrity of the non-proliferation regime". The administration of President George W. Bush, which has labelled North Korea a member of an "axis of evil" with Iran and Iraq, said in October the North had admitted operating a secret weapons programme. The U.S.-led KEDO group of countries, set up under the 1994 deal, suspended oil shipments to Pyongyang in December. North Korea says it is reactivating the plant to make up for the lost supplies but U.N. and other experts say the research reactor is incapable of generating significant supplies of power. ***************************************************************** 7 U.N.: N. Korea Violates 1953 Armistice Las Vegas SUN: December 27, 2002 ASSOCIATED PRESS SEOUL, South Korea (AP) - North Korea recently violated the 1953 armistice that ended the Korean War by bringing machine guns into the buffer zone separating the two Koreas, the U.N. Command said Friday. The U.N. Command said an investigation confirmed reports by South Korean soldiers that North Korean troops brought 7.62mm machine guns into the Demilitarized Zone on six occasions from Dec. 13 to Dec. 20. The North Koreans set up the weapons 100 to 400 yards north of the border, or Military Demarcation Line, the U.S.-led command said in a statement. The two Koreas have been working on a cross-border railway in the area. "The weapons were apparently removed at the end of each day," said the command, which oversees terms of the armistice in the southern half of the Demilitarized Zone. The command requested a meeting with North Korean counterparts to discuss the issue on Dec. 26, but it said communist officials refused to accept the request. Under the 1953 armistice, only rifles and other small arms are allowed inside. North Korea routinely violates terms of the armistice that govern conduct inside the DMZ, according to U.S. military officials. North Korea occasionally accuses U.S. and South Korean soldiers of violations. The DMZ issue comes amid tension over North Korea's moves to restart its frozen nuclear facilities. On Friday, it said it would expel U.N. inspectors at the facilities and reopen a laboratory that could be used to extract weapons-grade plutonium. Divided in 1945, the Koreas share the world's most heavily armed border. All contents copyright 2002 Las Vegas SUN, Inc. ***************************************************************** 8 Report: Iraqi scientist provides U.N. with details on nuclear plans Al-Bawaba's 28-12-2002, 06:33 An Iraqi scientist interviewed by UN inspectors has given details of a military program suspected of being part of a secret effort to build a nuclear weapon, a UN spokesman disclosed, according to /The Guardian/. The spokesman, Hiro Ueki, said the scientist was a metallurgist from an important Iraqi state company. Ueki did not give details of the military program involved, nor did he said whether the scientist's testimony was evidence for or against the existence of a nuclear weapons project. However, the Iraqi foreign ministry issued a statement naming the scientist as Kathim Jamil, a specialist in the use of aluminium tubes in making short-range missiles. He appeared on Iraqi television to deny participation in any weapons program. The Iraqi statement on Friday implied that Jamil had corroborated Baghdad's version of the aluminium tube controversy. It pointed out that the interview had been carried out in al-Rasheed hotel in Baghdad, in the presence of a government official. On his part, Ueki said only that the metallurgist had provided "technical details of a military programme" that had "attracted considerable attention as a possible prelude to a clandestine nuclear programme". His testimony, Ueki said, "will be of great use in completing the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) assessment" of Iraq's nuclear program. (Albawaba.com) © * 2002 Al Bawaba (www.albawaba.com) * ***************************************************************** 9 Iraq's Thwarted Ambitions Litter an Old Nuclear Plant The New York Times December 27, 2002* *REPORTER'S NOTEBOOK* *By JOHN F. BURNS* TUWAITHA, Iraq ? Approaching from Baghdad across the flat moonscape of central Iraq, there is little to suggest what lies ahead. About 20 miles from the capital, an offramp from an expressway spirals away to the southeast, onto a narrow, winding traffic-clogged road. For half an hour, it meanders through a chain of ragged villages and towns, each with its kebab shops and tire-repair outfits and clothing bazaars with modish-looking jeans and jackets and shirts hanging outside, twisting in the winter winds. The first sign that something more ambitious lurks out here in the desert comes when the traders' stalls give way to a giant earthen berm. As tall as a three-story building, it is topped with watchtowers and coils of razor wire. After running unbroken for miles, it falls away to a concrete guardhouse flanked by a huge portrait of Saddam Hussein, unnervingly genial in a sky-blue suit. Beyond its sheer size, about equal to a medium-size American town, there is nothing, no sign at the gate, no signboards anywhere along the journey from Baghdad, no hint from frantically nervous villagers asked what lies behind the berm, to indicate that the giant earthwork forms the outer rampart of the nuclear installation called Tuwaitha. This was Mr. Hussein's Los Alamos, the site where he hoped to build Iraq's, and the Arab world's, first nuclear weapon. Behind the berm, deep in underground bunkers, the Iraqis have now admitted, scientists came close, in the months before the Persian Gulf war in 1991, to building at least one atomic bomb the size of the one used on Nagasaki in 1945. New teams of United Nations inspectors, returning here for the first time in four years in November, have already inspected Tuwaitha and more than 150 other formerly secret sites, of the 900 or so identified during the previous round of weapons inspections from 1991 to 1998. For a journalist following the inspectors, it has been a journey through a looking glass, into an astonishing terrain, full of intimidating sights. To have read over the past decade about Mr. Hussein's weapons projects is one thing; to walk into the sites where the work was done, to talk to some of the scientists and engineers who were at the center of it and to see the ruins at Tuwaitha and elsewhere, is to cross into another dimension. As a measure of its importance, Tuwaitha was one of the first Iraqi targets bombed by American aircraft in the gulf war of 1991. Here and at a score of other sites now being pored over by United Nations weapons inspectors lies a vast scrapyard of rusting missile casings, fermenters, pressure vessels, pipes, valves, fuel tanks and control panels. Altogether, billions of dollars of equipment was destroyed in American and British bombing raids, or blasted into futility by a previous generation of weapons inspectors. At these sites ? in their scale, in the impenetrable secrecy that enveloped them in the past, in their lethal sophistication ? there is a story of Shakespearean proportions, for what it reveals of the scope of Mr. Hussein's goals. It was in places like Tuwaitha that he aimed to rewrite the political map of the Middle East, by equipping Iraq with weapons available to no other Arab state; by confronting American power; and ultimately ? a goal avowed countless times in his 23-year rule ? by leading Arab armies to obliterate the state of Israel. Just as much, to the eye of a reporter walking through these sites, and viewing the wreckage, it is a story of hubris, of a vaulting ambition that seems to have been frustrated, as much as anything else, by Mr. Hussein's refusal to accept the limits of his power. The next weeks may tell whether the Iraqi leader still has secret weapons, but on the evidence already available, Mr. Hussein's place in history seems likely to be that of a man whose reach outstripped his grasp ? of a dictator with unlimited powers at home, convinced that no force in the world beyond, including the toughest weapons restrictions imposed on any nation since the crippling restrictions placed on Germany by the Versailles Treaty of 1919, could stop him. *Continued* 1 | 2 Copyright 2002 The New York Times Company ***************************************************************** 10 Atomic Energy Ministry's plans for 2003 Dec, 27 2002 --> [pravda.ru] --> To complete the construction of the power-generating block at the Kalinin nuclear power plant and to put it into operation will be the major tasks of the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry in 2003, said the ministry's head Alexander Rumyantsev at a briefing in Moscow. Another important issue will be preparation for the international conference on nuclear materials handling within the IAEA framework, the minister pointed out. "We are preparing an agreement on utilization of waste materials, meaning pollution of testing grounds by domestic waste, for example, medical and other equipment that contains radioactive substances," he explained. "2003 will be the year of 'global partnership' for industrialists. We will draw the necessary diplomatic, economic and judicial documents to help us to establish partnership relations with foreign nuclear facilities soon," Rumyantsev went on. "And, finally, we will work on the research program for developing nuclear physics and other scientific directions, as well as on projects of creating a nuclear power plant of a new generation, for example, one working on high-speed neutrons. Thus, we intend to construct a variant of this power-generating unit at the Beloyarskaya nuclear power plant," the minister concluded. © RIAN Copyright ©1999 by "". When reproducing our materials in whole ***************************************************************** 11 Yankee alert policy reviewed The Rutland Herald Online - December 27, 2002 By SUSAN SMALLHEER Southern Vermont Bureau BRATTLEBORO — Vermont will review its emergency alert policy for Vermont Yankee nuclear power plant, including whether the National Weather Service should continue to run that alert after a false alarm earlier this week rattled residents. Howard Rice, director of Vermont Emergency Management, said Friday that his office would meet with officials from the National Weather Service in Albany, N.Y., next week to discuss Thursday’s false alarm. Vermont Yankee is believed to be the only nuclear reactor in the country that uses the weather alert radios, and it is the only nuclear plant that uses the National Weather Service to send alarms. On Thursday, a forecaster for the National Weather Service mistakenly sent out a high-level alert to several thousand Windham County residents with the weather alert radios, notifying them that there was an emergency at Vermont Yankee and urging them to tune in to their local radio station for directions. It was a false alarm: A forecaster had clicked on the wrong icon on his computer screen. Rice said he was expecting a full report from the National Weather Service in Albany in the near future. He said a member of his staff would travel to Albany next week to review the changes the Weather Service has put in place after Thursday’s false alarm. “I want to make sure that it doesn’t have a chance of ever happening again,” Rice said with emphasis. “I want to be able to say, ‘We were there, we saw the fix.’” Rice, who has been emergency management director for only a few months, said he had talked with Gov. Howard Dean about the Yankee problem and that the governor was very concerned. Dean couldn’t be reached for comment Friday. Vermont Yankee has used a combination of the weather alert radios and public sirens to notify residents in the 10-mile emergency planning zone of any problem at the nuclear reactor since the Three Mile Island accident. Most people in downtown Brattleboro, for instance, don’t have the weather alert radios because they are within earshot of the siren system. Rice said that as far as he knew, Vermont Emergency Management followed the correct protocol in responding to the emergency about the false alarm. William Sherman, the state nuclear engineer with the Public Service Department, said he, too, was concerned about the false alarm. “It’s not good when false signals go out, obviously,” he said. “I want to understand how it happened.” Sherman said he was on vacation Thursday when Yankee contacted him and notified him of the problem. A spokesman for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission said Friday that false alarms are not an unusual thing for nuclear reactors. Neil A. Sheehan said the Three Mile Island nuclear plant in Pennsylvania had a false alarm of its emergency siren system two weeks ago. Sheehan also said that as far as he knew, Vermont Yankee was the only plant that had the weather alert radios as part of its emergency notification system. He said another nuclear reactor in Pennsylvania’s Beaver Valley uses personal home-alerting devices in addition to sirens. The plant got into trouble with the NRC earlier this year because the home alerting devices had not been adequately maintained and tested. Sheehan said the NRC determined the problem was of “white” or moderate safety significance, although at first it had been classified as “yellow,” the same finding Vermont Yankee received last year when it failed a mock terrorist drill. Sheehan said the NRC was concerned about Thursday’s false alarm, but noted that Vermont Yankee had notified the NRC of the problem. “We regulate the utility, not the National Weather Service,” he said. “We’ll keep on top of it.” Robert Williams, spokesman for Vermont Yankee, said the radios have been used for about 20 years, after the federal government reviewed emergency alert systems after the Three Mile Island nuclear accident. He said that Yankee had purchased 4,500 of the weather alert radios over the years. The radios are free to the public at either the town clerk’s office or the emergency planner. The current model purchased by Yankee is made by Radio Shack and costs about $30, Williams said. But nuclear power critics said the alert system showed that there was inadequate emergency planning for a real emergency. Ray Shadis of the New England Coalition said that Vermont Emergency Management was consistently downplaying the seriousness of potential problems at Yankee. “Every one seems to have a laid-back approach,” he said. He said the five-minute delay between the alert and the broadcast over local radio station WTSA, which is part of the emergency alert system, was a serious problem. “Five minutes can be precious,” he said. He called for testing of the radios, to determine whether they are effective for reaching people and telling them of a problem. Contact Susan Smallheer at susan.smallheer@rutlandherald.com. © 2002 Rutland Herald and Times Argus ***************************************************************** 12 Community wants Davis-Besse running The Associated Press [enquirer.com] Saturday, December 28, 2002 By John Seewer The Associated Press OAK HARBOR, Ohio - Bob Cook remembers watching the concrete cooling tower at the Davis-Besse nuclear plant rise above the farm fields. He remembers promises of cheap electricity. And he remembers that before Davis-Besse, the high school had to close one winter in the mid-1970s because it couldn't afford to pay for heat. Now there's a new school with a swimming pool and an auditorium with theater-style seats. All thanks to tax revenue generated by the nuclear plant. "It's been a great asset to the economy and the school," Mr. Cook said. Despite concern over the damage found inside the plant's reactor that has kept it closed much of the year, most folks living in the shadows of Davis-Besse want it to stay. "I haven't talked to anybody who wants it shut down," said Paula Mackey, who lives about two miles from the nuclear plant. "It's a little bit scary, but it's something you can't think about too much." Support for the plant also has come from public officials in recent weeks after FirstEnergy Corp. Chief Executive Officer Peter Burg suggested that one option for the plant includes closing it down. Davis-Besse won't become "a black hole for FirstEnergy," he said during a conference call with industry analysts. The Akron-based company already expects to spend more than $200 million to repair the plant. But further repairs already have pushed back the company's plans to open it this year. Now the hope is to open early in 2003. The plant near Toledo along Lake Erie has been shut down since February. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission began investigating after leaking acid nearly ate a hole through a 6-inch-thick steel cap covering the plant's reactor vessel. The leaks were discovered in March, during a maintenance shutdown. It was the most extensive corrosion ever at a U.S. nuclear reactor and led to a nationwide review of all 69 similar plants. "Most everybody is still in support of the plant, but they want the repairs done right," Mr. Cook said. "If they were to close, it would be devastating to the economy." Davis-Besse generates about $6 million a year in property tax and $3.5 in payroll tax. Most of its 870 employees are natives to the area. The plant also paid for emergency warning sirens that blanket the county and are used to warn of threatening weather. Those sirens helped warn neighboring towns of an approaching tornado that hit Port Clinton on Nov. 10. "Mistakes certainly were made, but a lot of good things have happened because of Davis-Besse," said Ottawa County Administrator Jere Witt. He said the plant should be permitted to reopen as soon as possible. "I would never suggest restart unless I thought safety was the first and only concern," Mr. Witt said. CINERGY FIELD IMPLOSION 1995-2003. , a newspaper. Use of this site signifies agreement to updated 12/19/2002. ***************************************************************** 13 NRC: site selection criteria input proposal FR Doc 02-32697 [Federal Register: December 27, 2002 (Volume 67, Number 249)] [Notices] [Page 79165-79166] From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr27de02-143] NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Criteria for the Review of Alternative Sites: Meeting AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission. ACTION: Notice of public meeting. SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is announcing a public meeting to obtain public input, which the agency will consider in deciding whether to undertake rulemaking to specifically define the criteria for review of candidate and alternative sites for commercial nuclear power plants. The NRC has environmental protection responsibilities under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) that lead to a review of alternative sites in connection with a decision to grant an early site permit, a construction permit, or a combined operating license. In addition to environmental protection considerations pertaining to alternative sites, the meeting will cover whether and how the NRC should consider emergency planning in reviewing alternative sites. DATES: January 28, 2003 from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. ADDRESSES: The public meeting will be held in the TWFN Auditorium in the NRC's headquarters at Two White Flint North, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Lee Banic, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington DC 20555- 0001, e-mail mjb@nrc.gov, telephone (301) 415-2771. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Purpose The purpose of the meeting is to obtain public input, which the agency will consider in deciding whether to undertake rulemaking to specifically define the criteria for review of candidate and alternative sites for commercial nuclear power plants. The NRC has environmental protection responsibilities under NEPA that lead to a review of alternative sites in connection with a decision to grant an early site permit, a construction permit, or a combined operating license. In addition to environmental protection considerations pertaining to alternative sites, the meeting will cover whether and how the NRC should consider emergency planning in reviewing alternative sites. Participation The meeting will be facilitated to ensure that all participants have the opportunity to share their views with the NRC staff. Members of the public who wish to speak should contact the cognizant NRC staff member listed above under the heading, For Further Information Contact to register before the meeting. Provide your name and a telephone number where you can be contacted, if necessary, before the meeting. Depending on the number of participants, NRC may need to limit the amount of time available for presentations. Members of the public will also be able to register to speak at the meeting on a first come basis to the extent that time is available. Background Under NEPA, Federal agencies must study the impacts of ``major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment'' and prepare detailed statements on the environmental impacts of a proposed action and alternatives to the proposed action. Granting an early site permit, a construction permit, or a combined operating license qualifies as a major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment. In addition, Appendix Q to 10 CFR part 50 provides a process whereby an applicant may request an early review of site suitability issues prior to submitting an application. An applicant might request an early review of alternative site issues under these provisions. Although NEPA and the NRC's regulations contain many elements that shape the NRC's environmental reviews, they do not specify in detail the nature and extent of alternative site reviews. On April 9, 1980, the NRC published in the Federal Register a proposed rule to address procedures and performance criteria for considering alternative sites (45 FR 24168). On May 28, 1981, the NRC published a final rule that addressed alternative site issues in operating license proceedings (48 FR 28630). Subsequently, the agency suspended work on other aspects of the proposed rule because of reduced interest in building new nuclear power plants. More recently, on March 31, 2000, the NRC published relevant guidance in NUREG-1555, [[Page 79166]] ``Environmental Standard Review Plan.'' This plan guides the NRC staff in reviewing an application for an early site permit, construction permit, or combined operating license. However, the guidance is general and not binding. On July 18, 2001, the Nuclear Energy Institute submitted two petitions for rulemaking (Docket Nos. PRM-52-1, PRM-52-2). Among other things, PRM-52-1 requested that the NRC treat as resolved certain information (including siting information) for a proposed nuclear power plant to be built on a site of an existing licensed plant. PRM-52-2 requested elimination of the requirement to consider alternative sites for nuclear power plants. The NRC published a notice of receipt and request for comment in the Federal Register on September 24, 2001 (66 FR 48828). A decision on this petition has not yet been issued by the NRC. Meeting Topics The discussions will include the topics discussed below. (1) Regulatory options: (a) Maintain the status quo. In this case, the suitability of the candidate site and whether an ``obviously superior'' alternative site exists would be reviewed on a case-by-case basis, using the current Standard Review Plan as a source of general and non-binding guidance. (b) Conduct rulemaking to specifically define the criteria for candidate and alternative site reviews. In this case, specific and binding criteria would be developed and implemented. (c) Issue revised guidance, such as a revised Standard Review Plan. In this case, specific criteria might be developed, but they would not be binding. (2) Criteria for candidate and alternative site reviews might take one of two broad forms. One type of criterion would focus on the sites selected by the applicant. The other type would focus on the applicant's site-selection process. (3) The region of interest is the area from which an applicant may select candidate and alternative sites. In the past, likely areas were the State in which the applicant would locate the proposed site or the applicant's service area. Now, deregulation of the electric utility industry might affect the region of interest. In a deregulated industry, the power purchase agreements of a merchant power producer could have considerable reach. It may not be reasonable, however, to expand the region of interest to include areas at great distance from the proposed site. (4) The review of alternative sites might be subject to a numerical limit. The 1980 proposed rule would have restricted the review to four sites (the proposed site and three alternative sites). (5) In the past, the NRC has employed an ``obviously superior'' standard. Some of the ideas that have been suggested for making a determination on whether an alternative site is obviously superior are the following: (a) If the proposed site is the site of an existing nuclear power plant, the search for reasonable alternatives may be restricted because it is unlikely that an alternative site would be obviously superior. (b) If the proposed site is the site of an existing nuclear power plant and no potentially disqualifying factors are identified, no review of alternative sites should be required. (c) The 1980 proposed rule would have indicated that the NRC would use a sequential two-part analytical test. The first part would give primary consideration to hydrology, water quality, aquatic biological resources, terrestrial resources, water and land use, socioeconomics, and population to determine whether any alternative sites are environmentally preferred to the proposed site. If such an environmentally preferred site exists, the second part would overlay consideration of project economics, technology, and institutional factors to determine whether such a site is in fact an obviously superior site. (6) Emergency preparedness is essentially a safety topic, rather than an environmental protection consideration. However, in some circumstances emergency preparedness considerations might have an effect on the determination of whether an alternative site is obviously superior to the proposed site. For example, there might be physical characteristics unique to an alternative site that could pose a significant impediment to the development of emergency plans. Accordingly, an applicant might be required to identify any physical characteristics unique to an alternative site, such as egress limitations from the area surrounding the site, that could pose a significant impediment to the development of emergency plans, i.e., similar to what is currently required for an early site permit under 10 CFR part 52. (7) Other topics may be introduced by the participants. The agenda schedule is as follows: 9-9:30 a.m.: Introductory Remarks 9-12 p.m.: Background and Discussion of Issues 12-1:30 p.m.: Break 1:30-5 p.m. Discussion Continued and Concluding Remarks* *The meeting may end earlier if a full day is not needed to discuss the issues. The Environmental Standard Review Plan, discussed above, is available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, located at One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland. It is also accessible from the Agencywide Documents Assess and Management Systems (ADAMS) Public Electronic Reading Room on the Internet at the NRC Web site, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html under the following ADAMS accession number: ML003702134. If you do not have access to ADAMS or if you have problems in accessing the document in Adams, contact the NRC Public Document Room (PDR) Reference Staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737 or by e-mail to pdr@nrc.gov. You may obtain single copies of the document from the contact listed above under the heading FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT. Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 20th day of December, 2002. For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Brian E. Thomas, Acting Program Director, Policy and Rulemaking Program, Division of Regulatory Improvement Programs, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. [FR Doc. 02-32697 Filed 12-26-02; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590-01-P ***************************************************************** 14 Story regarding search for radioactive hazards at IAAP not complete The Hawk Eye Newspaper Friday, December 27, 2002 By KILEY MILLER kmiller@thehawkeye.com MIDDLETOWN — In a year filled with big stories from the Iowa Army Ammunition Plant, the biggest is still in the opening chapter. Over five days in October, pilots with the Remote Sensing Laboratory in Las Vegas took to the skies in a specially equipped Bell 412 helicopter to search the plant compound for radioactive hazards. The public will know what was found when a draft report is released in March. The final report is due out in June. Rodger Allison, the plant's environmental projects manager, said last week the flyover could well be the biggest development in the plant clean–up this year. "It's probably the thing that has the most far–reaching impact and the most interest from the public," Allison said. State officials convinced the Army to conduct the $500,000 flyover to search for any residual radioactive hazards left behind by the Atomic Energy Commission, which built, disassembled and test–fired components of nuclear weapons at the plant from the late 1940s until the mid 1970s. The helicopter made passes over the entire 19,000–acre IAAP. The pilots expanded the flyover at the last minute to include about 3,000 acres that had formerly been part of the plant south of the present gates. The grounds of the Great River Medical Center in West Burlington also were scouted. The helicopter carried sensors to detect gamma rays coming from such sources as depleted uranium, plutonium, cesium, radium and cobalt. Department of Energy documents and worker accounts suggest that over the decades IAAP workers handled such materials. The flyover did detect what is believed to be depleted uranium at storage locations and at a firing site, areas where officials knew depleted uranium would be found. Allison and the Army earned accolades from Iowa Department of Public Health regulators for the way the flyover was conducted. The flyover came after several months of breakthroughs at IAAP. In September, Pentagon officials finally admitted nuclear weapons once were manufactured at the plant. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in St. Louis announced in July that the IAAP had been designated a radioactive cleanup site under the Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program. FUSRAP was created by Congress to assess and clean up contamination associated with the nation's early atomic weapons programs. It is a separate funding source from an Army Superfund appropriation, which is being used to clean up soil and groundwater contaminated by the manufacture of conventional weap–ons. Also in 2002, researchers from the University of Iowa continued their study of the health of former IAAP plant workers. Thus far, nearly $1 million in injury compensation has been given to seven former workers in the nuclear program, according to the figures released by the Department of Energy. A total of 1,257 claims representing 842 workers have been filed. The researchers have expanded their study to include the health risks faced by Department of Defense workers who assembled conventional weapons. The Hawk Eye 800 S. Main St., Burlington Iowa 52601 319-754-8461 Front Desk · 319-754-6824 FAX · 1-800-397-1708 Toll Free ***************************************************************** 15 Russia, Iran to sign nuclear waste accord in January Al-Bawaba's 28-12-2002, 06:40 Moscow and Tehran will next month ink an accord over the return of nuclear waste from a power plant that Russia is constructing in southern Iran, Russia's Atomic Energy Minister Alexander Rumyantsev said. Negotiators have completed drafting the agreement in which "Russia pledges to deliver and Iran pledges to return" the nuclear fuel and it should be ready for signing within a month, Rumyantsev said on his return from a visit to Iran. The final details are being worked out at the foreign ministry, Rumyantsev said. "There are no remaining obstacles to signing it," he said, according to /AFP/. The first delivery of nuclear fuel is to be made by the construction company Atomstroiexport, which is installing the nuclear reactor at Bushehr, and subesequent deliveries will be made by the TVEL company, he said. (Albawaba.com) * 2002 Al Bawaba (www.albawaba.com) * ***************************************************************** 16 N-Waste Site Receives Little State Oversight The Salt Lake Tribune -- December 28, 2002 BY JUDY FAHYS Budget constraints have left gaping holes in state oversight at Utah's sole radioactive-waste disposal site, say critics of the state's radiation control program. The Utah Legislative Watch (ULW), a government watchdog group, has begun meeting with legislators, urging them to step up scrutiny of the Tooele County disposal facility, Envirocare of Utah. ULW leader Claire Geddes said few Utahns -- lawmakers included -- know how little Utah monitors Envirocare compared with similar sites in two other states. "I want to know who's out there protecting the public and the water quality," said Geddes. Envirocare of Utah did not respond to requests for comment Thursday or Friday. In the past, the company has resisted more scrutiny by arguing that state and federal environmental regulators already watch its work carefully. State legislators allow the state Department of Environmental Quality to set regulatory fees just high enough to cover oversight. For 2002, Envirocare has said it expects state regulatory fees to total nearly $1 million. Dane Finerfrock of the state Division of Radiation Control said both state scrutiny and Envirocare's monitoring are "adequate." "We are doing a good job protecting the public health and safety," he said, noting there is always pressure to prioritize spending. But Geddes' group and other critics say the state should be doing more. As an example, they point to the state's reliance on twice-yearly groundwater tests Envirocare conducts on 60 wells scattered around its 640-acre site. Four times since 1991, the state spent the $10,000 to $20,000 needed to have a laboratory double check the results proffered by Envirocare's testing lab. Last year's "split sample" tests were scrapped because of tight budgets. In Washington state, the contractor operating the Hanford low-level waste facility conducts ground water tests four times a year. The state analyzes split samples annually. In Barnwell, S.C., the low-level radioactive waste facility contractor performs monthly groundwater tests, and split samples are taken four times a year. Envirocare receives about 97 percent of all the low-level radioactive waste disposed of in the United States. But the Utah waste is much lower in radioactivity than waste going to the facilities in the other two states. Geddes also criticized the absence of full-time, on-site inspectors at Envirocare. Facilities in Washington and South Carolina require such inspectors. She suggested that Envirocare, with reported revenues of $120 million -- and which spent more than $3 million this year to defeat a statewide ballot initiative that would have raised taxes on radioactive waste -- can afford to cover more of the state's oversight costs. Jason Groenewold of Healthy Environment Alliance-Utah, an environmental group, agreed Utah's oversight is lax. "It's like the fox watching the henhouse," he said. "There is no incentive for Envirocare to be forthright." Groenewold noted that Envirocare paid fines of more than $17,812 two years ago because of 1998 groundwater violations that regulators deemed "quite serious." More than 265 violations pertained to company tests that were incapable of detecting contamination within state guidelines. Another 450 violations had to do with the company's refusal to address contamination that was identified. One regulator noted in a memo the state had the authority to demand $536,250 for the lapses. Instead, the radiation division "bundled" the violations and assessed fines of $10,000 for these 715 violations. The memo notes, too, that the division issued the equivalent of warning letters after three subsequent reviews turned up the same violations. In contrast, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission "did not use the same discretion" when faced with the violations and issued violation notices. Groenewold also said there has been groundwater contamination at the nation's six radioactive waste disposal sites outside Utah and that four of them have shut down completely. fahys@sltrib.com © Copyright 2002, The Salt Lake Tribune. ***************************************************************** 17 Yucca Mountain year's top story Las Vegas SUN: December 27, 2002 LAS VEGAS SUN Las Vegas saw plenty of big news in 2002, from a presidential decision on Yucca Mountain to an election that included a new congressional seat. There were crises affecting Southern Nevadans, including the price of electricity, the state's budget deficit, doctors leaving Nevada because of rising medical malpractice insurance premiums, and the ongoing drought. The top stories on this list have one thing in common: They'll be back in 2003. Here, according to an informal survey of Sun editors, are the top 10 stories of 2002 in the Las Vegas Valley: 1. Yucca Mountain: President Bush and the Department of Energy decided to make Nevada's Yucca Mountain home to the nation's high-level nuclear waste. After Gov. Kenny Guinn filed his historic veto of a presidential decision, Congress voted to overrule Guinn and affirm Yucca Mountain as the site. The repository, 90 miles northwest of Las Vegas, is being designed to hold 77,000 tons of high-level nuclear waste. Nevada has filed several lawsuits trying to stop the dump, and the state's fight against the repository will continue into 2003. The DOE is preparing an application to build and operate the dump, to be submitted to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission by December 2004. The NRC will then decide whether the dump will be built. 2. Medical malpractice: The state saw its medical system turned upside-down by a medical malpractice insurance crisis. Doctors saw their insurance costs skyrocket after insurance companies pulled out of the state, citing the lack of any laws limiting judgments on medical malpractice lawsuits. Some doctors left the state despite a law passed in a special session of the state Legislature this summer designed to help rein in the costs of malpractice judgments. Lawmakers say they'll revisit the issue after the Legislature convenes in February. Republicans, supported by doctors, say tighter controls over jury verdicts are the answer. Trial attorneys and Democrats say the law is fine the way it is and just needs time to take effect. 3. Power crisis: Nevada Power Co., Southern Nevada's power provider, sought to raise rates to recoup more than $922 million the company says it lost during the power crisis in the West. Customers and political leaders blasted the move, which would have meant a 20 percent rate hike for the average power customer. The PUC granted only half of the utility's request, and its parent company, Sierra Pacific Resources, saw its stock price plummet as analysts worried about the company's stability. Meanwhile, the Southern Nevada Water Authority made two bids to take over the company. The utility, which brought in former Clark County manager and Las Vegas Chamber of Commerce president Pat Shalmy as chief executive, rebuffed the initial $3.2 billion offer and has yet to answer the second. The issue is far from over. Voters approved an advisory question in Nove mber supporting legislation that would allow a public utility. The Legislature, which outlawed hostile public takeovers of ! private enterprise in 2001, is expected to revisit the issue. 4. Taxes/state finances: The Governor's Task Force on Tax Policy in Nevada recommended a comprehensive package of taxes as a way to solve the state's budget crisis. But as the work began the state's budget woes deepened. Gov. Kenny Guinn in September ordered cuts in state spending that included layoffs of 44 workers. Guinn said state spending has been cut as far as it can be and that taxes will have to be raised. The task force plan includes raising so-called "sin" taxes on alcohol and cigarettes, which the governor has endorsed, and starting a 0.25 percent tax on a company's gross receipts over $350,000. The gross receipts tax is the key part of the task force plan, but the business community and many Republican lawmakers are against it. The governor is expected to unveil his plan before the Legislature convenes in February. 5. Republican sweep: Gov. Kenny Guinn ran against minor opposition and led the state Republican Party to a huge victory in November's elections. The Republicans swept all six statewide elections, won the newly created 3rd Congressional District seat and picked up seats in the Legislature. The Republican victories left the Democrats trying to figure out what happened. The state Democratic Party will see a change in leadership and party leaders have been holding a series of meetings to try to reorganize the party for elections in 2004. 6. Homeless: A major provider of homeless services, MASH Village, closed its doors this year. The shelter's services were picked up in many instances by other providers, but the closure pointed out the glaring needs of up to 10,000 homeless people in the valley. It wasn't a good news year for the homeless: Police made three major sweeps to roust homeless people, a ballot question calling for a trust fund to help homeless and low-income people failed in the November election, and the only regional body to deal with the issue came up with a plan but has yet to implement it. Homeless advocates vow to continue trying to change the system. Through Oct. 31, 47 homeless people died this year in the streets. The issue again came to the forefront when a homeless man was flushed to his death after being caught in a wash by winter rains. 7. High-profile accidents: In May two teenage girls were killed in a car crash as they rushed back to Las Vegas High School from lunch. Two other girls in the car were disabled by injuries incurred in the crash, which prompted Clark County School District officials to close campuses for lunch. Eight other teens were killed in car crashes, including a 16-year-old who died driving home from Centennial High School. In another high-profile crash, Las Vegas Sun executive Sandy Thompson was killed on the Las Vegas Beltway when a driver on marijuana ran into the back of her car at a stoplight. Police say the crashes are a reminder to Las Vegas residents of using care on the valley's roads and of the danger of drunken or intoxicated driving. Lawmakers are discussing tightening teen driver license laws in the 2003 Legislature, and Thompson's death has the Re gional Transportation Commission discussing adding safety measures to the beltway. 8. University regents: The 11-member board that oversees the state's universities and colleges was mired in public squabbling and name-calling. In December the regents made the rare move of issuing a blanket public apology, but the contrition didn't last long. Within a week, regents were squabbling again. One lawmaker plans to introduce a bill that will cut the number of regents and others were talking about starting a move to appoint regents. The regents are currently elected. 9. Test scores/No Child Left Behind: Clark County School District administrators said test scores on a national proficiency exam were disappointing but unfortunately not surprising. On the first year of a test required by federal law, Nevada students at the state and district level performed close to the national average on a standardized test in reading, language, mathematics and science. A sharp dip in achievement by Clark County students between the fifth and sixth grades had educators calling for an investigation of the cause. As part of the federal No Child Left Behind Act, signed into law last January, states are required to test students in grades three through 10 each year. Schools that do not demonstrate adequate yearly progress face penalties. School officials have pledged to improve the scores. 10. Land use: The Clark County Commission threw long-range master planning into disarray by approving projects throughout the Las Vegas Valley that were contrary to existing land-use guides. The approvals sparked angry opposition in many neighborhoods, especially as a spate of zoning changes came at the end of the year, before Commission Chairman Dario Herrera's and Commissioner Erin Kenny's terms end. Neighbors have been upset that changes were made to master plans that could affect housing values and neighborhood quality of life. County officials, including two commission newcomers, Rory Reid and Mark James, have promised to overhaul the planning process. All contents copyright 2002 Las Vegas SUN, Inc. ***************************************************************** 18 YUCCA NWTRB meeting FR Doc 02-32633 [Federal Register: December 27, 2002 (Volume 67, Number 249)] [Notices] [Page 79169-79170] From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr27de02-149] NUCLEAR WASTE TECHNICAL REVIEW BOARD Notice of Meeting Board Meeting: January 28, 2003--Las Vegas, Nevada: The Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board will hold a meeting to discuss DOE technical and scientific activities related to the proposed development of a repository for spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste disposal at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. Issues to be discussed include the Yucca Mountain science program, materials testing, and barrier analyses. Pursuant to its authority under section 5051 of Public Law 100-203, Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1987, on Tuesday, January 28, 2003, the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board (Board) will meet in Las Vegas, Nevada, to discuss U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) technical and scientific activities related to a proposed repository for spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. The meeting is open to the public, and opportunities for public comment will be provided. The Board is charged by Congress with reviewing the technical and scientific validity of DOE activities related to managing spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste. The Board meeting will be held at the Crowne Plaza Hotel; 4255 South Paradise Road; Las Vegas, Nevada 89109. The telephone number is (702) 369-4400; the fax number is (702) 369-4330. The meeting will start at 8 a.m. Following the call to order and introductory statements, a general overview of the DOE program and a briefing on the Yucca Mountain project will be presented. The DOE will then discuss its plans related to operating a waste management system, including waste acceptance, packaging, transportation, repackaging, and emplacement. This presentation will be followed by an update on the DOE's science and engineering activities. After lunch, a contractor for the State of Nevada will present a status report on state-sponsored corrosion studies, and the DOE will update the Board on its materials testing activities, followed by a presentation on waste package [[Page 79170]] manufacturing and closure welds. That presentation will be followed by discussions of barrier analyses. Two public comment periods have been scheduled: a short period just before lunch for those who are unable to attend the entire meeting and a second session at the end of the day. Those wanting to speak during the public comment periods are encouraged to sign the ``Public Comment Register'' at the check-in table. A time limit may have to be set on individual remarks, but written comments of any length may be submitted for the record. A detailed agenda will be available approximately one week before the meeting. Copies of the agenda can be requested by telephone or obtained from the Board's Web site at http://www.nwtrb.gov. Beginning on March 2, 2003, transcripts of the meeting will be available on the Board's Web site, via e-mail, on computer disk, and on a library-loan basis in paper format from Davonya Barnes of the Board staff. A block of rooms has been reserved at the Crowne Plaza. Reservations must be made by January 10, 2003, to obtain the meeting rate. When making a reservation, please state that you are attending the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board meeting. For more information, contact the NWTRB; Karyn Severson, External Affairs; 2300 Clarendon Boulevard, Suite 1300; Arlington, VA 22201-3367; telephone 703-235- 4473; fax 703-235-4495; or by ``contact form'' at http://www.nwtrb.gov. The Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board was created by Congress in the Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1987. The Board's purpose is to evaluate the technical and scientific validity of activities undertaken by the Secretary of Energy related to disposal of the nation's spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste. In the same legislation, Congress directed the DOE to characterize a site at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, to determine its suitability as the location of a potential repository for permanently disposing of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste. Dated: December 20, 2002. William D. Barnard, Executive Director, Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board. [FR Doc. 02-32633 Filed 12-26-02; 8:45 am] ***************************************************************** 19 American Ecology Set to Close a Plant The New York Times December 28, 2002* *By BLOOMBERG NEWS* BOISE, Idaho, Dec. 27 (Bloomberg News) ? The American Ecology Corporation which runs hazardous-waste plants, expects to lay off about 20 percent of its work force after closing a Tennessee plant that processes radioactive material. Sixty-three jobs will be eliminated at the Oak Ridge, Tenn., plant, which reduces levels of radioactivity in waste from nuclear plants, hospitals and research institutions. The waste is then shipped to a competitor's plant in Utah for disposal, an American Ecology spokesman, Chad Hyslop, said. The company employs about 300 people. American Ecology is trying to sell the Oak Ridge plant, after losing more than $45 million since buying it in 1994. Federal regulations will not allow the company to dispose of waste that is treated in Oak Ridge at its dump in Richland, Wash., Mr. Hyslop said. "We never could make it profitable," he said. By closing the operations, American Ecology, which is based in Boise, is seeking to attract buyers interested in running other types of businesses on the site. A few employees will continue to work at the plant to remove waste stored there, the company said. Copyright 2002 The New York Times Company ***************************************************************** 20 these people need HELP~ Date: Sat, 28 Dec 2002 18:08:59 -0600 (CST) ----- Original Message ----- From: sheila baker Date: Sat, 28 Dec 2002 13:27:09 -0800 (PST) To: globenet@yahoogroups.com Subject: [globenet] HELP ON ANY INFO RE: VAFB NMD DEPLOYMENT > I don't know the first thing on how to find info on > this upcoming announcement of Bush's intention to use > VAFB as an interceptor deployment base. Do I contact > Kadish and ask him if they will use existing silos or > build more? Since test launches use dummy decoys > supposedly that are deemed harmless, what will these > interceptors use? Will we get a hearings for this > project? We have had hearings for test bed expansion, > but not actual deployment silos. > > ANy info anyone has please enlighten. People in San > Luis Obispo County, just above Vandenberg AFB, are > nervous and talking about this issue (one of local > papers already did a feature article on the proximity > issue of Diablo Nuclear Power Plant and Vandenberg > AFB-less than 50 air miles from each other). > > Thanks for any info. > > -sheila > > __________________________________________________ > Do you Yahoo!? > New DSL Internet Access from SBC & Yahoo! > http://sbc.yahoo.com > > To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to: > globenet-unsubscribe@egroups.com > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Meet America's New Big Brother http://www.hereinreality.com/bigbrother.html The John Poindexter Awareness Office http://www.breakyourchains.org/jpao.htm ------------------------------------------------------------------------ MSN 8 with e-mail virus protection service: 3 months FREE*. ***************************************************************** 21 Potential hazards found at test site reviewjournal.com -- News: Saturday, December 28, 2002 XXXXXExplosives not stored, labeled properly By STEVE TETREAULT STEPHENS WASHINGTON BUREAU WASHINGTON -- Safety inspectors discovered high explosives at the Nevada Test Site improperly labeled and some stored near combustible material, posing potential dangers to workers, according to a government report released Friday. Energy Department inspectors found some explosives stored without proper shelf-life labeling that would give handlers information about the materials' age and stability. Kathy Carlson, the National Nuclear Security Administration's Nevada operations manager, said some corrective actions have been taken since the inspection occurred early this year, and others are planned. DOE's explosives safety manual recommends "storage review dates" be assigned to every bulk explosive in storage because their components can degrade during prolonged storage, "and the hazard of handling and using them may increase significantly." "However, during the inspection we identified explosives inventories that did not include shelf-life information, or posted shelf-life information as 'unknown,' " the auditors said in a 13-page report issued by DOE Inspector General Gregory Friedman. More than 15,000 pounds of explosives are stored at the test site, including C-4 plastic explosives and trinitrotoluene, or TNT. The material is used in experiments, according to a spokeswoman for the National Nuclear Security Administration, the DOE agency that manages the site. Inspectors also found explosives storage problems at the DOE facility in Oak Ridge, Tenn., which keeps about 90 pounds of demolition material, blasting caps and TNT. At the Nevada Test Site, auditors also found a potential hazard in that combustible packing material, wooden pallets and containers were being kept in the same storage magazines as high explosives and detonation cords. The material, including lumber used to stack incoming shipments in one facility, was kept inside to protect it from the elements, inspectors were told. "We are concerned that these materials provide additional combustion sources that create an additional and easily preventable hazard," the auditors said. Inspectors examined storage facilities operated by test site contractors Wackenhut Services Inc., Bechtel Nevada, the University of California and the Pentagon's Defense Threat Reduction Agency. The safety check also found that while the University of California and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency conducted periodic tests of lightning monitors and protection for their storage facilities, Bechtel Nevada and Wackenhut did not. Carlson said a management team is standardizing procedures for explosives handling and storage that should be completed by March. Copyright © Las Vegas Review-Journal, 1997 - 2002 ***************************************************************** 22 Europarl member to visit Pasko Gregory Pasko, an investigative journalist who worked for the Pacific Fleet's newspaper, was arrested on 20 November 1997 by the FSB and charged with high treason for his writing about the nuclear saf Bart Staes, member of the European Parliament and chairman of the Delegation to EU-Russia Parliamentary Co-operation Committee intends to visit the imprisoned journalist Grigory Pasko. Jon Gauslaa, 2002-12-27 20:18 Bart Staes, who represents the Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance in the European Parliament, has applied to the Russian Ministry of Justice to visit Grigory Pasko in the labour camp in Ussyriysk in the Russian Far East. The Belgian Europarl-member, who has been instrumental in the European Parliament's adoption of two resolutions denouncing the treason conviction of the journalist and environmentalist, told Bellona Web that there are a number of reasons why he has engaged himself in the case of Grigory Pasko. Nuclear heritage -- Freedom of press and freedom of speech are among the most important characteristics of democracy, said Mr. Staes, who sees clear parallels between the Pasko-case and the case of Aleksandr Nikitin who a couple of years ago was acquitted on similar charges as those Pasko was convicted of. Bart Staes added that the Nikitin-case made it clear that the nuclear heritage of the Soviet Union contains a possible environmental disaster, and only through co-operation the society can deal with this problem. -- Through the work of Nikitin and Bellona the international community has been able to raise money in order to clean up in the sins of the past, he said. -- The Pasko-case is for the Far East, the same as the Nikitin-case was for the Kola Peninsula. That is why I want to visit him, said Mr. Staes, stressing that the Russian Federation should constructively approach Pasko’s actions and initiate co-operation in order to solve the nuclear problems in the Far East. Parole hearing coming up Staes’ request was forwarded to the Russian Justice Ministry just before Christmas. If he gets positive response Mr. Staes hopes to be able to visit Grigory Pasko in January. If the Justice department bureaucrats do not get too involved in celebrating the Russian Christmas and New Year, but handles Mr. Staes’ request speedily, he may reach the town of Ussuryisk, 100 km Northwest of Vladivostok just in time to attend Pasko’s parole hearing. This hearing has been preliminary scheduled to January 13, 2003 at Ussuryisk’s municipal Court. Grigory Pasko who worked as an investigative reporter for the newspaper of the Russian Pacific Fleet was arrested on November 20, 1997 and charged with treason through espionage. He was acquitted of these charges by the Pacific Fleet Court in Vladivostok on July 20, 1999, but sentenced to a three-year imprisonment for 'abuse of his official position' although he was not charged with that crime, and released on a general amnesty. After both sides had appealed, the Supreme Court cancelled the verdict in November 2000 and sent the case back for a new trial at the Pacific Fleet Court. The re-trial started on July 11, 2001 and ended on December 25, with Pasko being convicted to four years. The verdict was again appealed by both sides. On June 25, 2002 the Military Supreme Court confirmed Pasko's four-year sentence. Pasko was transferred to a labour camp in the the Russian Far East on September 10, 2002. His released is scheduled for April 25, 2004. Publisher: Bellona Foundation, President: Frederic Hauge Information: info@bellona.no, Technical contact: webmaster@bellona.no Telephone: +47 23 23 46 00 Telefax: +47 22 38 38 62 * P.O.Box 2141 Grunerlokka, 0505 Oslo, Norway ***************************************************************** 23 Nixon’s nuclear ploy | Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Volume 59, No. 1, pp. 28-37, 72-73 By William Burr & Jeffrey Kimball Richard Nixon thought a secret, worldwide nuclear alert would remain unknown to the American public, and he was right. But his strategy—to threaten the Soviets into helping bring an end to the Vietnam war—was unsuccessful. They may not even have noticed. In 1969 President Richard Nixon ordered a worldwide nuclear alert—one of the largest secret military operations in U.S. history. Only Nixon, his special adviser for national security affairs Henry Kissinger, Kissinger’s National Security Council aide Col. Alexander Haig, and White House chief of staff H. R. “Bob” Haldeman, knew that the underlying purpose of the alert, known as the “Joint Chiefs of Staff Readiness Test,” was to convince the Soviets that helping to end the war in Vietnam was in their best interests. The alert began on October 13, 1969, when U.S. tactical and strategic air forces in the United States, Europe, and East Asia began a stand-down of training flights to raise operational readiness; Strategic Air Command (SAC) increased the numbers of bombers and tankers on ground alert; and the readiness posture of selected overseas units was heightened. On October 25, SAC took the additional step of increasing the readiness of nuclear bombers, and two days later SAC B-52s undertook a nuclear-armed “Show of Force” alert over Alaska, code-named “Giant Lance.” Three days later, U.S. intelligence detected Soviet awareness of the heightened nuclear alert and Defense Secretary Melvin Laird ordered commanders to terminate the test at the end of the month. The alert, along with Nixon’s orders to launch it, remained secret from much of the government as well as the public until 1983, when journalist Seymour Hersh reported on one of its phases and speculated about the reason behind it. Hersh suggested that it was a manifestation of Nixon’s strategy in Vietnam, related in some way to “Duck Hook”—a massive mining and bombing operation Nixon had threatened to unleash against North Vietnam if Hanoi did not yield to Washington’s terms at the Paris peace negotiations. Hersh’s report was an investigative coup, but his version of events was brief, fragmentary, and partially incorrect. Inexplicably, it was little noted, even at the time. The declassification of documents in the 1990s, however, confirmed that the readiness test had in fact occurred. At least one analyst speculated that the test was “an apparent effort to add credibility to the U.S. threat to intervene in a Sino-Soviet conflict.” But documents that have been released more recently, and statements by former senior Nixon-era officials who have become more willing to talk about Nixon-Kissinger policies, show convincingly that Nixon invoked the alert as part of an unsuccessful strategy for ending the Vietnam War. No direct evidence has turned up to support the theory of a connection between the alert and the Sino-Soviet border crisis. Nixon hoped that the nuclear alert would cause the Soviets and North Vietnamese to think it was a lead-up to Duck Hook, thus jarring them into making the diplomatic compromises demanded by the United States. Although a bluff, the alert also had a compensatory purpose. Because Moscow and Hanoi would discover after November 1 that he had not carried through with Duck Hook, the nuclear readiness measures, he thought, would at least serve to salvage his reputation for toughness and irrationality, and thus his credibility, by reminding the North Vietnamese, and especially the Soviets, that he was capable of taking dangerous and unpredictable escalatory steps. The war in Vietnam Nixon had campaigned on a secret plan to end the war in Vietnam, and he believed at his inauguration that he was well on the way to fashioning the outlines of a strategic plan that would enable him to extricate American troops from Vietnam, win a release of American prisoners of war, and preserve the non-communist government of South Vietnam’s President Nguyen Van Thieu. In contrast to skeptical anti-war critics, Nixon, Kissinger, and other policy-makers believed that achieving their goals in Indochina would have a critical bearing on the global influence of the United States. If they were perceived to have abandoned a client and ally, they felt, American credibility would be undermined on issues ranging from nuclear arms to Mideast politics. The plan included Vietnamization, de-Americanization, international diplomacy, and negotiations with the Vietnamese communists in Paris—all coupled with what Nixon referred to in one of his memoirs as “irresistible military pressure.” Nixon and Kissinger believed that by offering détente, they could persuade the Soviet Union to lever the North Vietnamese into being “reasonable” at the negotiating table. And by détente they meant more than a simple matter of relaxing tensions. As Raymond Garthoff put it, détente was a “strategy to contain and harness Soviet use of its increasing power” by enmeshing it in “a web of relationships with . . . the United States, a web that he [Nixon] would weave.” But the benefits of détente would not become available unless Moscow used its influence to help Washington reach a Vietnam settlement. “We should be hard and pragmatic in dealing with the Soviets,” Nixon told French President Charles de Gaulle in February 1969. He believed Soviet influence would be pivotal because “85 percent of [North Vietnam’s] weapons came from the Soviet Union.” Attempting to lever Hanoi by offering favors to or putting pressure on Moscow—and later on Beijing—was also known as “triangular diplomacy.” It was a game that Hanoi and Beijing engaged in as well, with Hanoi playing China and the Soviet Union against each other, and Beijing playing the American card against the Soviet Union. On the military front, Nixon continued to carry out the ground operations in South Vietnam begun by the last administration, including “pacification” and big-unit sweeps—and he envisioned adding more ground and air options. At the core of Nixon’s notions was a diplomacy-supporting stratagem he called the Madman Theory, or, as he and Bob Haldeman described it, “the principle of the threat of excessive force.” Nixon was convinced that his power would be enhanced if his opponents thought he might use excessive force, even nuclear force. That, coupled with his reputation for ruthlessness, he believed, would suggest that he was dangerously unpredictable. The Madman Theory undergirded not only his policy toward North Vietnam but also toward other adversaries, including the Soviet Union. Although Nixon favored this theory more than most, threatening excessive force was nothing new. In the 1950s President Dwight D. Eisenhower, his Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, and then–Vice President Nixon, had overtly practiced a version of the Madman Theory by means of the “uncertainty principle” and coercive nuclear “brinkmanship.” The Nixon Vietnam plan Nixon viewed the different elements of his evolving Vietnam plan as an interrelated whole. Expanded conventional military operations would not only have military consequences on the ground and bolster the morale and staying power of the Thieu regime, they would lend credibility to the Madman stratagem by signaling his willingness and ability to escalate the war. In turn, threats to use even greater force would bolster linkage and triangular diplomacy, and vice versa—or so he hoped. He decided on and implemented these elements in stages, however, as his hopes and fortunes waxed and waned in relation to the vicissitudes of the war in Vietnam and public opinion in the United States. Just seven days after his inauguration, Nixon met with Kissinger, Laird, and Gen. Earle Wheeler, chairman of the Joint Chiefs, to discuss “the possibility of working out a program of potential military actions which might jar the North Vietnamese into being more forthcoming at the Paris talks” and thereby “preclude prolonged stalling tactics.” Nixon described the link between a Vietnam settlement and other issues to Soviet Amb. Anatoly Dobrynin at a February 17 meeting. As Haldeman noted, the “President made clear that progress on political issues [is] bound to have real bearing on progress on arms control. . . . President hoped that Soviets would show constructive attitude in Middle East talks and do what they could to get Paris Vietnam talks off dead-center, since progress in these two areas bound to be helpful in reaching agreement on other issues.” On March 17 Nixon showed his inclination to send tough signals to adversaries when he launched “Operation Breakfast”—a massive B-52 bombing campaign against communist base areas in Cambodia. Kept secret from the public and most government officials, it was intended as a dramatic signal to “demonstrate to Hanoi that the Nixon administration is different and ‘tougher’ than the previous administration,” as one “well-placed” official put it. Meanwhile, Vietnamization, the publicly visible element in Nixon’s plan, was only slowly taking shape. On April 10 he ordered the preparation of timetables for incremental American troop withdrawals, and at Midway on June 8 he told President Thieu that 25,000 American troops would be withdrawn between July 1 and August 31. By the time the withdrawals actually began, however, Vietnam policy was at a critical juncture. North Vietnam had not been intimidated, and Kissinger’s efforts to persuade Moscow to help with Hanoi had not succeeded. The talks in Paris were deadlocked, and the anti-war opposition at home was becoming restive. Laird and Rogers wanted to accelerate troop withdrawals; Kissinger did not. “Going for broke” Nixon wrote in his post-war memoirs that he emerged from a July 7 meeting with Kissinger on the presidential yacht Sequoia intending to “‘go for broke’ in the sense that I would attempt to end the war one way or the other—either by negotiated agreement or by an increased use of force.” He could either escalate the war to force a favorable negotiated agreement or he could accelerate the withdrawal and do what was necessary to protect American forces while they were leaving. In either case, he said, “We’ll bomb the bastards.” In July and into August, Nixon was disappointed by the lack of success on the diplomatic front. With public patience waning, he decided to appease everyone with simultaneous Vietnamization and military escalation. Nixon and Kissinger set in motion the enhanced-threat phase in July and August. Kissinger met with Dobrynin on July 11, just four days after the Sequoia meeting, to warn him that Nixon might use “other alternatives” against North Vietnam unless Hanoi made concessions. Should this happen, Kissinger hinted, it would likely cause Soviet-American relations to fall to a “dangerous minimum.” Four days later Nixon continued his arm-twisting campaign by sending a letter to Ho Chi Minh via the North Vietnamese representatives in Paris. Nixon called on Ho “to move forward at the conference table toward an early resolution of this tragic war.” Nixon told Thieu in Saigon on July 30 that he would send “a warning to Hanoi . . . in an unorthodox way.” Kissinger flew to Paris, where he held his first secret meeting with the North Vietnamese, during which he reminded Xuan Thuy of the letter to Ho. At another meeting on the same day, he told French Foreign Ministry officials that “it was important that [the United States] not be confounded by a fifth-rate agricultural power.” By mid-August Nixon, Kissinger, and presidential advisers Haldeman, John Mitchell, and John Ehrlichman believed that for political reasons the administration had to bring the war to a favorable end “in six to nine months,” but that the “process will be difficult.” Soon after returning to Washington from an around-the-world trip, Nixon began to prepare himself for the heat he believed he would get should he resume the bombing of North Vietnam. Reviewing alternatives on August 18, Nixon felt the need to make a “total mental commitment.” Although they were unaware of contingency planning for the bombing of North Vietnam, Laird and Rogers opposed military escalation and continued to press for accelerated Vietnamization. Concerned about Nixon’s resolve, but supported by Haldeman, Mitchell, and Ehrlichman, Kissinger lobbied vigorously against Vietnamization while advocating the second phase of escalation. According to Haldeman’s notes, Nixon reviewed Kissinger’s “contingency plan for Vietnam” at the western White House on August 28. That plan was probably the emerging blueprint or “study” for a contemplated military operation against North Vietnam—code-named “Pruning Knife” by the military but known as Duck Hook at the White House and National Security Council. On August 30, Nixon received Ho Chi Minh’s reply to his July 15 letter. Ho rejected Nixon’s negotiating terms, put forward his own plan for a negotiated solution to the war, and brushed aside Nixon’s threats. His warnings having failed to intimidate either Hanoi or Moscow, Nixon knew that he would soon have to make a decision about which alternative to pursue—military escalation or accelerated Vietnamization. In late August or early September Kissinger formed a group of NSC staffers—sometimes called the “September Group”—which was charged with designing a scenario for what they hoped would be final negotiations, and drafting a presidential speech scheduled for November 3 in which Nixon would announce and defend renewed bombing. On September 9, Kissinger met with General Wheeler to “discuss military planning for the Duck Hook operation . . . and to convey to him the president’s personal mandate that planning be held strictly in military channels,” thereby precluding “discussion of the plan and the ongoing detailed planning with even the secretary of defense.” By September 16, if not before, the “concept of operations,” was complete. It called for the bombing of military and economic targets in and around Hanoi, the mining of Haiphong and other ports, air strikes against North Vietnam’s northeast line of communications as well as passes and bridges at the Chinese border, and air and ground attacks on other targets throughout Vietnam. The September Group continued to debate which parts of the operation to include or exclude. Threat-making accompanied operational planning. In a meeting with Republican senators on September 27, Nixon staged simultaneous ploys with the senators and Ambassador Dobrynin. With the senators he “planted a story,” as he put it, that he hoped would be leaked to the press and “attract some attention in Hanoi.” He told them he was considering a plan to blockade Haiphong harbor and invade North Vietnam. By prearrangement, Nixon phoned Kissinger, who was meeting with Dobrynin, and instructed him to tell the Soviet ambassador that Soviet cooperation on Vietnam was essential before a dangerously uncontrollable process unfolded. Having temporarily mollified Laird and public opinion by announcing the withdrawal of 40,000 troops and holding open the accelerated Vietnamization option, several days later Nixon concluded that “the long route can’t possibly work,” because “the doves and the public are making it impossible to happen.” He needed to go through with “the tough move”—Duck Hook. A change of plans But even as the Duck Hook plan moved forward, Nixon’s resolve melted. At home, Laird and Rogers opposed military escalation; there were reservations about Duck Hook’s potential effectiveness; public support for the war continued to decline; and there were signs of political slippage. Meanwhile, North Vietnamese negotiators remained steadfast; there was lowered enemy-initiated fighting in South Vietnam; and the Soviets were still not cooperating. Two major anti-war actions were scheduled for October and November: the Moratorium on October 15, and the Mobilization Against the War on November 13–15. Nixon was concerned that they would erode confidence in his leadership and blunt Duck Hook’s impact. In an October 3 Nixon-Kissinger-Haldeman meeting, Kissinger presented stark choices, arguing that the only two courses were a “bug out” (accelerated Vietnamization) or escalation (Duck Hook), without which, he said, the president would be lost. Nixon believed that he was “lost anyway if that fails, which it well may.” Kissinger countered that the only question is “whether P can hold the government and the people together for the six months it will take.” But that was precisely the rub for Nixon, since “it’s obvious from the press and dove buildup,” Haldeman noted, “that trouble is there whatever we do.” Nixon continued to “talk through alternatives” until October 11, but it was probably on October 6 that he decided against Duck Hook. His televised speech to the nation, scheduled for November 3 to announce the resumption of bombing, would have to be rewritten as an attack on his domestic and foreign opponents and as an appeal for the American public to support his Vietnam strategy. Even after canceling Duck Hook, Nixon could continue to show resolve to the North Vietnamese on the battlefield. But “the Soviets would need a special reminder,” he said in his memoir. That special reminder was the nuclear alert. On October 6, Nixon initiated the alert by telephoning Defense Secretary Melvin Laird. As Haig wrote to Kissinger, the president asked Laird to order U.S. military forces to take a “series of increased alert measures designed to convey to the Soviets an increasing readiness by U.S. strategic forces.” In recent interviews Laird has confirmed that when Nixon ordered the alert measures, he was recalling Eisenhower’s 1953 strategy for dealing with Korea by threatening China: “Nixon did it because of Soviet aid to North Vietnam—to alert them that he might do something. This was one of several examples of the Madman Theory. . . . He never used the term ‘madman,’ but he wanted adversaries to have the feeling that you could never put your finger on what he might do next. Nixon got this from Ike, who always felt that way.” Later in October, Kissinger reminded Nixon that in a forthcoming meeting with Dobrynin, “your basic purpose will be to keep the Soviets concerned about what we might do around November 1” and also to “make clear that . . . unless there is real progress in Vietnam, U.S.-Soviet relations will continue to be adversely affected.” If the Soviet ambassador raised the subject of “our current military measures,” Kissinger suggested that Nixon should, in oblique diplomatic language, coolly reply that they were “normal exercises relating to our military readiness.” In sum, Nixon and Kissinger were hoping that the “unusual” readiness test, or nuclear alert, would frighten the Soviets into helping force concessions out of the North Vietnamese. The alert The morning after Nixon’s phone call, Laird’s military aide, Col. Robert E. Pursley, called Kissinger aide Haig. Pursley told Haig he was sending a “plan for increased SAC alert.” But this first paper disappointed Haig, who told Kissinger it was “merely a résumé of an already approved East Coast air defense exercise, which was not responsive to the president’s instructions.” Haig asked Pursley for more impressive measures, telling him that the White House wanted military measures that the Soviets would consider “unusual and significant” but not “threatening.” The White House also wanted actions that were not expensive, did not require allied approval, would “not degrade essential missions,” and would have a “minimal chance of public exposure.” The next day, October 8, Pursley responded with a list of actions that were closer to Haig’s criteria. The new plan called for communications silence; a stand-down of combat aircraft (cessation of training flights); increased reconnaissance operations around the Soviet periphery; increased ground alert rates for SAC bombers and tankers; the dispersal of SAC aircraft with nuclear weapons to designated military bases around the country; and the alerting/sending to sea of ballistic-missile submarines. While the Joint Staff went to work on the details, Nixon took action. Kissinger passed Pursley’s first list to Nixon and recommended radio silence, aircraft stand-down, increased surveillance of Soviet shipping, higher alert rates for SAC aircraft, and dispersal of SAC bombers “phased appropriately through the week.” Kissinger did not approve increasing aerial reconnaissance operations near Soviet territory or raising alert levels of nuclear-armed submarines, thinking them too provocative or too hard to conceal (although measures involving submarines would come into play later). After Nixon signed off on these steps, Haig called Pursley and asked for a detailed plan and implementing instructions. Deep secrecy was needed to avoid public exposure. Haig may also have seen secrecy as useful for protecting Soviet prestige—if the measures became known, Soviet leaders might have found it necessary to take countermeasures. Given the emphasis on secrecy, only a small number of individuals in the U.S. government knew about the alert or why Nixon had ordered it. At the White House only Nixon, Kissinger, Haig, and Haldeman knew. Apparently, even NSC staff experts on Vietnam and Soviet affairs were not told about the decision. At the Pentagon, only Laird, Pursley, and General Wheeler may have had the full picture. Secretary of State Rogers and Undersecretary Richardson may not have learned about the readiness measures until October 13—if then—and by then the alert was already beginning. Although NSC–State Department relations were steadily deteriorating, Haig believed that Rogers and Richardson had to be told, although they “will most probably strongly object.” Unless they were informed, “feedback will most certainly come immediately through State channels.” In other words, some government, perhaps a NATO ally, was likely to notice heightened military activities and lodge a question with a U.S. ambassador. Haig further observed that “I do not believe Rogers or Richardson will forgive our failure to keep them informed,” and that the White House would face criticism if the press learned that State had been shut out. Whether Rogers or Richardson learned about the readiness test remains unknown. Laird quickly brought Wheeler into the planning, and on October 10, Wheeler notified the CINCs (the Commanders-in-Chief of the Strategic Air Command, European Command, Pacific Command, Atlantic Command, Southern Command, Strike Command, Alaska Command, and North American Air Defense Command) that “higher authority” —President Nixon—had directed the Pentagon to “institute a series of actions” from October 13 to 25 to “test our military readiness in selected areas world-wide to respond to possible confrontation by the Soviet Union.” According to Wheeler, “these actions should be discernible to the Soviets but not threatening in themselves.” Laird briefed Nixon and Kissinger on October 11. In the meantime, SAC began to prepare. At 8 a.m. on Monday, October 13, SAC canceled tactical training flights and put as many nuclear bombers and tankers on ground alert as possible, although forces assigned to Vietnam were excluded. Wheeler did not need to include intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) forces in the directive, because these were routinely on a high state of alert, ready for launch on warning. If Nixon wanted a “show of force” that Moscow would notice, SAC bombers were the best instruments for that purpose because their alert status could be visibly heightened. Standing orders called for SAC to maintain 40 percent of each squadron—six aircraft for each 15—on ground alert ready to strike Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) targets if early warning sensors detected a missile or bomber attack. But shortages of bomber crews—due mainly to Vietnam War commitments—had forced SAC to reduce the number of bomber and tanker “sorties” on alert. Actual ground alert bomber and tanker forces were substantially below SIOP requirements. Had it been a real emergency, SAC would have needed four to six hours to staff the degraded alert sorties. Given the personnel shortage, canceling flight training was essential to any effort to increase the numbers of aircraft on ground alert. SAC increased forces on ground alert to 144 B-52s, 32 B-58s, and 189 KC-135s—still below the 40 percent SIOP requirement, but close enough. Haig believed that an increase in the ground alert rate could be reached “without undo costs and risks,” but General Wheeler deflected White House pressure on SAC. To ensure that Moscow noticed the readiness test, though, SAC tried to bring more nuclear-armed aircraft into it. Other U.S.-based commands with nuclear-capable air forces expanded the scope of the test. On October 15, Strike Command ordered Tactical Air Command (TAC) to begin a stand-down. Pilots at TAC bases around the country stopped flying nuclear-capable aircraft—F-105 Thunderchiefs and F-4 Phantoms—as well as C-130s used for tactical airlift operations. During the stand-down, TAC cancelled 4,216 scheduled sorties, using the spare time to raise the combat-ready status of aircraft. The nuclear-capable air defense forces of the Alaskan and Continental Air Defense Commands also joined in the stand-down. By October 15, the U.S. European Command was participating in the readiness test. On order from Commander-in-Chief Gen. Andrew J. Goodpaster, U.S. air forces tightened security around European bases and stood down training flights. United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) alone had a formidable force of nuclear-armed and nuclear-capable tactical aircraft, including F-4 Phantoms. By October 19, those forces had obtained an average operational readiness rate of 94 percent. In addition, Goodpaster ordered the Sixth Fleet to enact controls over communications, but otherwise keep ship movements on schedule. Pacific Command received orders to instruct component forces to join the test. For example, on October 15, activities by South Korea-based units of the Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) were standing down training flights and increasing numbers of aircraft slated for “SIOP alert.” But why? The commanders who presided over the readiness test could only puzzle why the White House had requested the exercise. When SAC Commander-in-Chief Bruce Holloway called the Pentagon for more information, for example, he learned nothing. Correctly believing that Henry Kissinger was involved in the operation, senior officers at SAC headquarters speculated over a possible connection to the Vietnam negotiations in Paris and noted the return of U.S. negotiators to Washington for consultation as well as Nixon’s announcement that he would make a major address on Vietnam on November 3. Lack of knowledge about the alert’s purpose made it difficult for operational planners at SAC, among other commands, to respond to a Joint Chiefs Staff’s request for additional suggestions for action; they could only wonder whether their proposals were even relevant. To ensure the operational secrecy the White House wanted, the Pentagon imposed strict requirements on the services. Initially, and on the assumption that something would leak to the public, the guidance authorized public affairs specialists to respond to media queries with the flat statement that “we are merely testing current readiness posture.” But the assistant secretary of defense for public affairs weighed in with more rigorous guidance prohibiting any public announcement of the exercise and forbidding any response to questions unless specifically permitted. The Pentagon’s public affairs officers soon relaxed the latter restriction by allowing officials to answer queries with the statement: “We do not comment on readiness tests.” But no questions arose. Ordinarily, higher alert postures would be accompanied by messages indicating a change in Defense Readiness Condition or DEFCON status. But, consistent with secrecy, no increase was ordered. High Heels General Goodpaster, wearing two hats as Commander in Chief of European Command and Supreme Allied Commander Europe, believed he should inform NATO about the USAFE stand-down in progress, not least because under NATO procedures, ordering a stand-down unilaterally would raise questions from allies and pose “serious problems.” Haig believed the contrary—that telling NATO anything would risk leaks and jeopardize operational secrecy. Haig told Kissinger on October 14 that Laird was “reluctant” to proceed further. In addition to general concerns about the risks, Laird had another objection: The readiness test would interfere with an already scheduled secret nuclear command post exercise, “High Heels.” An annual exercise begun in the early 1960s, High Heels involved the Defense Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the CINCs, and the State Department, among other agencies, around the world. The “High Heels 69” scenario posited a series of aggressive Soviet moves leading to a preemptive nuclear strike against the United States and the “exercise” of U.S. nuclear war plans in retaliation. The Joint Staff and some of the CINCs believed that carrying out and supervising such a complex nuclear exercise while implementing readiness measures would overload communications and decision-making systems. Another concern was that the intelligence agencies would have difficulty differentiating between Soviet reactions to the alert measures and to High Heels. The proposal for increased surveillance of Soviet ships en route to North Vietnam was another area of contention. Wheeler wanted to hold that measure in abeyance because of its expense and its ramifications—the dangers of an incident and the likelihood of Soviet charges of interference with shipping. The U.S. Navy, among other military and intelligence agencies, routinely monitored Soviet shipping to Vietnam; Wheeler may have felt that was enough. Haig, however, suggested that Kissinger should “encourage” Laird to take action on surveillance. On High Heels and NATO consultations, among other areas of divergence, Haig told Kissinger that Laird’s objections were “not overriding.” Nevertheless, Laird was a powerful figure in the government, which made it necessary for Kissinger to get the president’s support. Kissinger met with Laird and Chairman Wheeler to adjust High Heels and the alert measures so as to ensure their implementation. Haig believed that “it was necessary to have the measures completed sufficiently before 3 November for the president to ascertain beyond a doubt whether or not the signals have been effective.” In other words, before Nixon finished work on his speech, he had to know whether the alert measures had had an impact on Moscow’s Vietnam policy. No record of the discussion with Laird and Wheeler is available, but Laird agreed to modify High Heels so that it would not complicate the readiness test. For the first time, the Pentagon limited High Heels to the “Washington area alone,” leaving the CINCs free to concentrate on the readiness test. As for the problem of NATO consultations, Haig recommended that Goodpaster tell any inquisitive allies that the stand-down was an “additional aspect of the High Heels operation.” Whether Goodpaster received such instructions or whether NATO officials asked about the USAFE stand-down remains unknown. At the meeting with Kissinger, Wheeler received instructions about the alert’s duration: On October 14 he notified the CINCs that the nuclear alert would last until the first minute of October 30. SAC forces would be on heightened ground alert for more than three weeks. Exactly how long the alert would last would depend on the timing of Soviet reactions. At some point on or after October 10, it had been decided—who made the decision is unknown—that the activities would “continue until our intelligence indicates that the Soviets have become aware of the increased readiness.” To make such a decision possible, Wheeler established a special intelligence watch to look for information suggesting that Moscow was aware of the U.S. alert. Searching for the Soviet reaction The Pentagon and the White House approved new air, ground, and sea-based readiness measures for implementation in Europe, the Near East, East Asia and the Pacific, and North America. Wheeler also allowed a temporary relaxation of the stand-down to meet air force concerns about flight training. Meanwhile, Kissinger hoped that Dobrynin’s request for a meeting meant that the alert was having an effect on Moscow, but the Soviets remained unresponsive to Nixon’s pressure. Since October 10, when the CINCs received the first message on the readiness posture, they had been sending Wheeler suggestions for additional military actions. Within a few days, the Joint Staff had sifted through and digested the advice, and on October 17 Wheeler forwarded new instructions to the CINCs designed to signal, with mounting intensity, increased U.S. readiness. Significant details of Wheeler’s instructions, especially those concerning nuclear weapons, remain classified. Nevertheless, their clear purpose was to intensify the readiness test, making it even more apparent to Soviet intelligence. Strike Command received orders for Middle East Force to deploy destroyers and destroyer escorts to the Gulf of Aden to conduct multiple ship exercises, while the Continental Air Defense Command was to keep its forces on alert and join the Alaskan Command in increasing air interceptor deployments. Wheeler instructed Atlantic Command to order the heavy cruiser U.S.S. Newport News, and a hunter-killer anti-submarine warfare group led by the carrier Yorktown, to rendezvous in the North Atlantic. Two other aircraft carriers, the Forrestal and the Franklin D. Roosevelt, were to leave ports in Virginia and Florida respectively and steam at high speed to points in the Western Atlantic. The Commander in Chief of the Atlantic Command would also stand down air patrol activities in the North Atlantic as well as flight training between October 25 and 30. U.S. Army Europe increased surveillance and intelligence gathering at the East–West German border. U.S. Army Europe also increased surveillance of the Soviet Military Liaison Mission, which monitored U.S. forces in West Germany. Adm. John McCain, the Commander in Chief, Pacific Command , revived the proposal for the surveillance of Soviet ships en route to North Vietnam. Following McCain’s suggestion, Wheeler directed that as of October 21 Pacific Command was to monitor those Soviet ships as well as any en route to the Bering Sea. In addition, Wheeler approved another McCain suggestion: to increase the number of Polaris missile submarines on patrol in the Pacific. On October 17, Wheeler gave SAC new instructions drawing on suggestions from General Holloway, and relaxed the stand-down to ease the burden it had imposed on flight training. When SAC resumed the stand-down on October 25, it was to place additional aircraft in the “highest state of maintenance readiness.” They would be “EWO [Emergency War Order] Configured”—that is, equipped with nuclear weapons but not on ground-alert status or assigned with crews with combat mission folders (target lists) on board. Maintenance readiness was a less demanding alternative to ground alert; it raised SAC’s readiness posture without further straining the crew-shortage problem, thus tacitly meeting White House interest in a larger-scale nuclear alert. Wheeler also approved Holloway’s recommendation for a “Show of Force” by SAC nuclear bombers, which involved an airborne-alert exercise of the Selective Employment of Air and Ground Alert (SEAGA) system. Wheeler ordered “Giant Lance,” a SEAGA “Show of Force” operation, to begin late in the day on October 26. SAC bombers and tankers would fly the “Eielson East orbit,” referring to Eielson air base in east-central Alaska (south of Fairbanks). The Pentagon rejected Kissinger’s proposal to send a carrier task force farther north into the Tonkin Gulf. On October 17, Dobyrnin requested a meeting with Nixon, which Kissinger interpreted as meaning that the test was already having an impact on Moscow. Yet the Nixon-Dobrynin meeting on October 20 was inconclusive. Ignoring Nixon’s threatening language, the Soviet ambassador offered nothing on Vietnam, but sought to defuse tensions through “reverse linkage”—by making a positive response to an earlier U.S. proposal to begin Strategic Arms Limitation or SALT Talks. The Pentagon eagerly scoured reports for Soviet reactions to the alert. Moscow noticed the stepped-up naval activities in the Gulf of Aden; Soviet ships in the area reversed course and headed toward the Gulf. The Pentagon decided to continue the Gulf activities but kept assessing Soviet naval actions. No doubt the Chinese and the North Koreans noticed U.S. naval operations in the Sea of Japan, but only the Soviets reacted to them. On October 21, several Soviet Badger medium bombers flew in the vicinity of the U.S.S. Constellation task group, which was monitoring Soviet shipping in the Sea of Japan. Probably on a reconnaissance mission, the Badgers flew within a mile of the Connie’s port bow right after U.S. fighter aircraft intercepted them. Overflights of U.S. naval activity were routine, so this was not necessarily a reaction to the readiness test as such, but Moscow may have wondered why the task force was lingering in the Sea of Japan. U.S. military intelligence could not tell, however, whether the Soviets saw the naval operations in the Sea of Japan and the Gulf of Aden, much less any of the readiness test, as part of a larger pattern. Giant Lance In keeping with his orders from General Wheeler, the Commander in Chief of Strategic Air Command ordered his commanders to generate additional bomber and tanker aircraft, over and above those on ground alert, to the “highest state of maintenance readiness.” The nuclear-armed aircraft would have “adequate supervision” and undergo daily inspection, with tires rotated and engines and other systems checked at regular intervals. This action was to begin no later than 8:00 a.m. local time on October 25 and would last “through the first week of November and possibly longer.” Also to increase the intensity of the readiness test, the SAC commander instructed the commanders of the 22nd and 92nd Strategic Wings to implement the “Show of Force” to begin on October 26. The bomber wing commanders were told that the airborne alert would not be accompanied by a declaration of DefCon 3, which was the usual procedure, and that it could continue into early November. The “maintenance generation” that began on October 25 assured that a large portion of SAC’s non-alert bomber and tanker force—about 65 percent—was loaded with four or more bombs and missiles. At about 8 a.m., on October 27, the 22nd and 92nd Wings began flying six nuclear-armed bomber aircraft continuously “over the frozen terrain of the Arctic.” It wouldn’t take long for Soviet early warning systems to detect this activity. While SAC was implementing Giant Lance and the other alert activities continued, U.S. military intelligence searched for signs of Soviet reactions. The Pentagon kept monitoring specific actions, such as stepped-up activities at the East–West German border or a stand-down of air patrol operations in the North Atlantic, but it found no evidence that Moscow had noticed. On October 28, Acting Joint Chiefs Chairman William Westmoreland told Laird there had been no specific Soviet reactions to measures in the European and Atlantic areas. He also reminded Laird that the test would end on October 30 as previously scheduled. The next day, Westmoreland instructed the CINCs to end test activities at the first minute of October 30 GMT. Thus, after 17 days of ground alert, stand-downs, surveillance, heightened naval activity, and airborne alert, the test ended on schedule. Years later, Defense Secretary Laird recalled that the readiness test ended when U.S. intelligence picked up Soviet communications expressing “concern” about the alert measures. That would have been consistent with White House instructions to end the test when the Soviets had reacted, but so far no documents confirm Laird’s account. Perhaps new intelligence became available after Westmoreland wrote to Laird. In any event, it appears that when Westmoreland decided to end the test, the elaborate alert measures had not elicited any discernible Soviet reaction. Post-mortems While military officers pondered the experience of the readiness test and the CINCs responded to requests for evaluation, Nixon and Kissinger may have puzzled over its impact. They had hoped that military pressures would jar the Soviets enough to facilitate a Vietnam “breakthrough,” but that proved illusory. Conversations that Dobrynin held with Ambassador-at-Large Llewellyn Thompson a few days after the test ended showed that Moscow was not about to take the kind of steps on Vietnam that Washington would regard as helpful. To Thompson, Dobrynin frankly emphasized Soviet antipathy toward such U.S. pressures as Nixon’s earlier visit to Romania, linkage on Vietnam, and statements of neutrality in the Sino-Soviet conflict. He did not bring up U.S. military moves: Either he did not know of them, was not free to mention them, or did not consider them significant compared to other pressures. In any event, Dobrynin insisted that pressure would not elicit Soviet assistance on Vietnam: “The reaction in the Kremlin to tactics of this kind would always be the opposite of what [Washington] desired.” Whether the nuclear alert even had an impact on Moscow’s Vietnam calculations is worth some speculation. As historian Roger Dingman has put it, “Nuclear weapons are slippery tools of statecraft.” Nixon and Kissinger could not be certain that the Soviets had read their message as intended—that is, if they had even seen the readiness test’s larger pattern, although they presumably did. The simultaneity of the readiness measures and Nixon’s October 20 “bad cop” message to Dobrynin might have appeared to Moscow as just a coincidence. If the Soviet leadership saw a connection, however, it very likely saw the readiness test as a bluff. As one Soviet official said many years later about an October 1973 alert, “Mr. Nixon used to exaggerate his intentions regularly. He used alerts and leaks to do this.” To the Soviets, Nixon’s October 1969 alert must have paled in comparison to the nuclear alert staged during the Cuban Missile Crisis, when SAC raised readiness levels to DEFCON 2—with 145 missiles and 1,436 bombers on high alert, all ready to strike targets in the Soviet bloc. Kennedy’s coercive nuclear diplomacy combined with a blockade of Cuba helped force a change in Soviet conduct. Although Nixon may have gotten Moscow’s attention in October 1969, his avoidance of strongly threatening measures possibly reduced the readiness test’s impact. How the Soviet high command interpreted the October 1969 alert may be unknowable until Russian documentation becomes available. That the alert was pitched at a level that Moscow would not regard as threatening reduced the possibility of an overreaction. And the alert was at a somewhat lower level of intensity than the White House may have preferred, owing to Wheeler’s opposition to bomber dispersal. Whether Nixon and Kissinger even saw that as a problem, however, is also imponderable. Nixon had no diplomatic coup to announce on November 3. All he could do was explain his past efforts for peace, attack anti-war opponents, criticize Hanoi’s obstructions, threaten “strong and effective measures,” and summon the “Silent Majority” to rally behind him. Two days after Nixon delivered his speech, Dobrynin expressed Moscow’s derision to Llewellyn Thompson, remarking that he did “not understand why there had been such a big build-up beforehand.” The failure to jar Moscow did not dampen Nixon’s interest in the Madman Theory. Nixon and his advisers continued to believe that threats of force, military signaling, and alerts intimating nuclear threats were valid and necessary tools of diplomacy. The deployment of naval strike forces in the eastern Mediterranean during the September 1970 crisis over Jordan, and into the Indian Ocean during the 1971 South Asian war, and the raising of alert levels of military forces during the October War in 1973, demonstrated Kissinger’s willingness to use threats of force to deter Soviet military intervention in regional conflicts (even if the Soviets had no plans to intervene). Despite the scale and scope of the readiness test, Nixon, Kissinger, and Haig made only indirect and cryptic references to it in their memoirs. Perhaps they thought it was too sensitive or wondered whether their hastily improvised effort would withstand public scrutiny. Perhaps Nixon and Kissinger did not care to revisit the desperate and wishful thinking that encouraged them to think that the pressure of nuclear alerts would induce Moscow to give greater assistance on the Vietnam problem. Nevertheless, the readiness test demonstrated their conviction that a show of force was essential to salvage U.S. Vietnam policy and the credibility of American power. William Burr is a senior analyst at the National Security Archive and director of the U.S. nuclear history documentation project. Jeffrey Kimball is a professor of history at Miami University and the author of Nixon’s Vietnam War (1998). A longer, fully documented version of this article appears in the January 2003 issue of Cold War History (). 2003 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists ***************************************************************** 24 High Levels of Toxic Rocket Fuel Found in Lettuce Date: Sat, 28 Dec 2002 13:29:55 -0600 (CST) Environmental Working Group || Rocket Fuel in Lettuce Grown in California's Imperial Valley http://www.ewg.org/reports/rocketlettuce/ Summary Eating lettuce or other vegetables grown in fields irrigated by the Colorado River may expose consumers to a larger dose of toxic rocket fuel than is considered safe by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, according to test data and documents obtained by Environmental Working Group (EWG). Test results never before made public show that leafy vegetables grown with contaminated irrigation water take up, store and concentrate potentially harmful levels of perchlorate, a thyroid toxin that is the explosive main ingredient of rocket and missile fuel. Sworn depositions and other courtroom documents show that the giant aerospace and defense contractor Lockheed Martin - a major user of perchlorate responsible for widespread contamination of Southern California water supplies - knew as early as 1997 that vegetables stored high concentrations of the chemical, but said nothing to the EPA or state health officials. [PDF documents: Lockheed letter | Test results] Since most perchlorate-related work by defense contractors is done for the U.S. military, the Department of Defense may also have known, but said nothing to warn other agencies, consumers - or farmers whose crops, through no fault of their own, may be tainted by contaminated irrigation water. If the perchlorate levels reported here are confirmed by further testing, immediate government action will be needed to reduce perchlorate in lettuce and other vegetables. In the interim, we strongly recommend that the Food and Drug Administration immediately begin testing lettuce and selected other vegetables grown with Colorado River water for perchlorate, and that the results of this testing be made public as soon as they are confirmed. In addition, any grower who is adversely affected by perchlorate contamination of their crops should be fully compensated for any and all economic losses to their farming operations and property values. Perchlorate in food could threaten human health In a front-page story on Dec. 16, 2002, The Wall Street Journal reported that "tests on several vegetable samples from a perchlorate-contaminated farm in Redlands found the plants concentrated perchlorate from local irrigation water by an average factor of 65, according to calculations by Renee Sharp of the Environmental Working Group in Oakland, Calif., one of the few nonprofit groups focused on perchlorate contamination. That means the perchlorate dose in the vegetables was 65 times the amount in the water." Sharp told the Journal: "If people are eating it, on top of drinking it, the EPA will have to lower its proposed drinking-water standard substantially." [Read the story] Perchlorate, which impairs the thyroid's ability to take up iodide and produce hormones critical to proper fetal and infant brain development, has contaminated almost 300 drinking water sources and farm wells in California and an unknown number of sources in at least fifteen other states. Sources known to be contaminated include the Colorado River from near Las Vegas to the Mexican border - the primary or sole source of irrigation water for farms in California, Arizona and Nevada that grow the great majority of the lettuce sold in the U.S. during winter months. If the perchlorate concentrations shown in the test results obtained by EWG and cited by the Journal affect the entire Colorado River winter vegetable crop, it would have huge implications for current efforts to set safety standards for exposure to perchlorate. It would signal that decades of negligence by chemical manufacturers, the aerospace industry and the U.S. military have contaminated not only the drinking water of millions of Americans, but their food supplies as well. Both the EPA and the state of California are working toward establishing standards for perchlorate in drinking water. Under state law, California is supposed to set a standard by January 2004, although progress has been delayed by a lawsuit filed by St. Louis-based Lockheed Martin and Kerr-McGee Corp. of Oklahoma City, which until 1998 manufactured the chemical at a now-closed plant near Las Vegas that is a main source of contamination of the Colorado River. (The sole remaining U.S. producer of perchlorate is American Pacific Corp. of Las Vegas; until 1988 its plant, now in Cedar City, Utah, was near Kerr-McGee's in Nevada.) EPA says it doesn't plan to adopt national standards for perchlorate in drinking water until at least 2006, although both local and state elected officials in California - where more contaminated sources are discovered almost weekly - are calling for faster federal action. But the newly revealed test data suggest that vegetables from the Imperial Valley region of California and Arizona, which produces most of the nation's lettuce sold nationwide from November to March, may be a more significant source of perchlorate exposure than drinking water. In a 1999 study, the EPA's National Environmental Research Lab grew lettuce seedlings in perchlorate-contaminated water and found that "perchlorate was accumulated in the leaves to significant levels" - by factors of 100 times or more. (Susarla et al. 1999.) The tests showed that lettuce was able to take up and store 95 percent of the perchlorate in the water. This extraordinarily high rate of bioaccumulation would mean that lettuce grown in water with even low levels of perchlorate could deliver large doses of the toxin to consumers - doses far higher than the EPA's provisional drinking water standard. But EPA discounted the results of the 1999 tests because the water used was contaminated with concentrations of perchlorate much higher than are typically found in water supplies, and because the lettuce seedlings were grown in greenhouses and harvested before maturity. Another 1999 lab study found that a variety of native (non-crop) plants took up perchlorate from water, a potential biological aid to remediating s oil and water contaminated by the chemical. (Bacchus et al. 1999.) Despite the troubling results of these studies and the absence of data on perchlorate in U.S. or imported produce, the EPA concluded that Rthe available information ... suggests that foods do not contribute toS perchlorate accumulation in the human body. (EPA 2002.) To close the data gaps, in April 1999 the EPA convened an "eco-summit" whose attendees included the Air Force; a coalition of perchlorate manufacturers and users, including Lockheed Martin, called the Perchlorate Study Group; and five Indian tribes who are major producers of winter vegetables irrigated by the Colorado River. The year before, at a perchlorate forum in Henderson, Nev., the environmental manager for the Yuma, Ariz., Quechan tribe stated: "Irrigation is a way of life for our people. We have 13,000 acres dedicated to the production of lettuce. We produce annually eight heads of lettuce for every man, woman and child [in the United States]. That food is produced from Colorado River water and 23 million people derive their water supply from the lower Colorado River in three states and two countries. That's how big this problem is." (Rogers 1998.) At the "eco-summit," top priority was given to a "real-world" study that would test a variety of crops through the Department of Agriculture, and the Department of Defense provided $650,000 to fund it and other studies. EPA, USDA and the Food and Drug Administration developed an extensive protocol for the study - before deciding it was too expensive and postponing it indefinitely. Instead, the Air Force decided it would pay for a second study of greenhouse-grown lettuce. The findings of this second study have never been made public. In 2000, responding to a Freedom of Information Act request by a California public-interest law firm for "All materials related to any investigation or research conducted by, or for, any U.S. Government Agency, regarding the health effects of perchlorate on humans beings and the environment," the Air Force provided some material, but nothing on either of the lettuce studies. The Air Force stated that those and other records "are fully exempt from disclosure until the formally sponsored EPA peer review is complete. They contain information that is exempt under the deliberative process privilege." The EPA-sponsored peer review of proposed perchlorate standards is now complete, but the lettuce studies remain unreleased. In October 2002, at a water industry-sponsored perchlorate conference in Ontario, Calif., Air Force spokesman Dave Mattie was asked about the second greenhouse lettuce study before a group that included regional EPA officials. Mattie replied that the study had been completed, but "someone walked away with the data." When asked why the the "real world" study of vegetables grown with Colorado River water had been cancelled, Mattie again said it was for lack of funds. But unknown to the EPA, there had in fact been a "real world" study of lettuce grown with perchlorate-contaminated water in 1997 - two years before the "eco-summit" at which such a study had been made a priority. And Lockheed Martin, a key member of the Perchlorate Study Group, was intimately aware of its results. Since the Air Force has worked closely with Lockheed Martin and other members of the Perchlorate Study Group on a number of perchlorate research projects - including unethical tests on human subjects - the U.S. military may have known of these earlier lettuce tests as well. Lockheed Martin is responsible for polluting dozens of water supplies in the Redlands area of San Bernardino County, Calif., with high levels of perchlorate and other chemicals. A class action lawsuit has been brought against the company by more than 800 residents of the area, who blame contaminated drinking water for a variety of health problems including cancer. Farms in the area are not irrigated by the Colorado River, but draw from wells that have been contaminated by perchlorate plumes from now-abandoned Lockheed facilities. Lawyers at Engstrom, Lipscomb and Lack in Los Angeles, who represent the Redlands residents suing Lockheed Martin, learned that the company had earlier been in negotiation with Lucky Farms, a San Bernardino grower of lettuce and other vegetables, over contamination of the farm's water supply. The lawyers subpoenaed all materials from the negotiations, and have discovered that Lockheed was sitting on startling evidence of vegetables' uptake and concentration of perchlorate. The subpoenaed documents, obtained by EWG from the lawyers, showed that in late 1997 and early 1998, Lucky Farms conducted a series of tests on its produce to see if they were contaminated with perchlorate. [PDF documents: Lockheed letter | Test results] These tests were conducted on four samples of "leafy vegetables" and four samples of some kind of "vegetable matter" which was not identified. The results of the testing were dramatic: The four "leafy vegetable" samples averaged 4,490 micrograms of perchlorate per kilogram (ug/kg), with a maximum concentration of 6,900 ug/kg. Perchlorate levels in the "vegetable matter" were lower, averaging 213 ug/kg with a high of 420 ug/kg. Overall, the vegetables were found to have an average of more than 2,600 micrograms of perchlorate per kilogram - thousands of times higher than what the EPA considers to be a safe amount in a liter of water. Although there is currently no federal drinking water standard for perchlorate, the EPA's proposed "reference dose," which is what the agency considers the level that is safe to consume each day, is just one microgram per liter of water or two micrograms per day for an adult. Despite the startling results, Lucky Farms was somehow persuaded not to bring legal action against Lockheed Martin. However, there was one significant result. Since at least 1995, farm workers living and working on Lucky Farms property were required to sign a form stating that they had been warned of the dangers of drinking irrigation water. [View document] But after perchlorate was found in the water (and vegetables) in 1997, the forms were amended to include a more specific warning: "This water may cause cancer or birth defects." According to EWG's analysis, if a pregnant woman were to eat a typical serving of vegetables with the contamination level found at Lucky Farms, she would get a dose of rocket fuel more than 100 times higher than the EPA considers safe in a liter of drinking water. (Figure 1.) One sample of "leafy vegetables" contained 386 micrograms of perchlorate per one-cup serving, and the average amount of perchlorate in the vegetable samples was 146 micrograms per two-ounce serving. According to other documents acquired by Engstrom, Lipscomb and Lack, the perchlorate concentration found in the five wells on Lucky Farms' property ranged from 10 to 130 parts per billion (ppb) and averaged 40.1 ppb. Because it is not known which wells were used to irrigate which samples it is difficult to calculate exactly how much each of the tested vegetables concentrated perchlorate, but using average figures for the amount of perchlorate found in the wells and the vegetables, EWG analysis shows that the vegetables concentrated perchlorate by a factor of 65. This means that perchlorate levels in the vegetables were on average 65 times higher than the levels in the water. Such results are consistent with the high concentrations of perchlorate that have been found in non-crop plants growing in contaminated areas. (EPA 2002.) But the data has profound implications for future perchlorate drinking water standards - as well as for anyone who eats Imperial Valley lettuce. The lower Colorado River is used to irrigate an estimated 1.46 million acres of farmland in California and Arizona. Water is distributed from the Colorado River to the nearby Imperial Valley of California and southwestern Arizona via extensive irrigation canals. It is used to grow a variety of crops including cotton, alfalfa, lettuce, wheat, citrus, barley, melons, dates, grapes, avocados, tomatoes, onions, carrots and cauliflower. (CRWUA 2002.) Of particular concern for perchlorate accumulation is a high water content crop like lettuce (which requires three acre-feet of water per acre). In Imperial County, CA, 20,000 acres of iceberg lettuce and 10,500 acres of leaf lettuce were harvested in 1999. (Imperial County 2002.) That year, 45,000 acres of wintertime head lettuce, 5,300 acres of leaf lettuce and 9,300 acres of Romaine lettuce were harvested in Yuma County, AZ. (UA Extension 2002.) EPA and the state of California are in the process of developing drinking water standards for perchlorate, and both are required to consider sources of exposure other than drinking water. The preliminary research on vegetable uptake of perchlorate strongly suggests that food is likely to be an equal or greater source for perchlorate, but so far this hasn't been reflected in the proposed drinking water standards of either agency. California's latest draft public health goal (PHG) of 2 to 6 parts per billion (ppb) assumes that 80 percent of a person's exposure to perchlorate comes through drinking water. (OEHHA 2002.) EPA has calculated a "drinking water equivalent level" of 1 ppb for their most recent proposed reference dose (RfD), but has not yet considered the issue of relative source contribution in calculations of a proposed drinking water standard. (EPA 2002.) If vegetables irrigated with Colorado River water are in fact concentrating perchlorate, the drinking water standards will have to be substantially lower to account for the considerable exposure coming from food. If Lockheed-Martin's perchlorate is indeed contaminating crops to unsafe levels, FDA will have to take emergency action to keep the food off the market. And the growers will have to be compensated for damage to their farming operations and property values. Recommendations If the perchlorate levels reported here are confirmed by further testing, immediate government action will be needed to reduce perchlorate in lettuce and other vegetables. In the interim, we recommend that the Food and Drug Administration begin immediately testing lettuce and selected other vegetables grown with Colorado River water for perchlorate, and that the results of this testing be made public as soon as they are confirmed. In addition, any grower who is adversely effected by perchlorate contamination of their crops should be fully compensated for any and all economic losses to their farming operations and property values. References Bacchus et al. 1999. CRWUA 2002. Colorado River Water Users Association. www.crwua.org. EPA 2002. Imperial County 2002. Agricultural Commissioners Report for 1999. OEHHA 2002. Rogers, Keith, 1998. Chemical's effect on crops worries tribes. Las Vegas Review-Journal. May 20, 1998. Susarla et al. 1999. UA Extension 2002. University of Arizona Cooperative Extension. http://ag.arizona.edu/crops/counties/yuma Copyright 2002, Environmental Working Group. All Rights Reserved. 1436 U Street N.W., Suite 100 | Washington, DC 20009 || info@ewg.org ***************************************************************** 25 Worker Comp Act of 2000 revisions FR Doc 02-32690 [Federal Register: December 27, 2002 (Volume 67, Number 249)] [Notices] [Page 79068-79074] From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr27de02-75] DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Act of 2000; Revision to List of Covered Facilities AGENCY: Department of Energy. ACTION: Notice of revision of listing of covered facilities. SUMMARY: On January 17, 2001, and again on June 11, 2001, the Department of Energy (``Department'' or ``DOE'') published a list of facilities covered under the Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Act of 2000 (``Act''), title 36 of Public Law 106-398. (66 FR 4003; 66 FR 31218). The Act establishes a program to provide compensation to individuals who developed illnesses as a result of their employment in nuclear weapons production-related activities and at certain federally-owned facilities in which radioactive materials were used. This notice revises the previous lists and provides additional information about the covered facilities, atomic weapons employers, and beryllium vendors. The original notice provides detailed background information about this matter. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Office of Worker Advocacy, 1-877-447- 9756. ADDRESSES: The Department welcomes comments on this list. Individuals who wish to suggest additional facilities for inclusion on the list or indicate why one or more facilities should be removed from the list should provide information to the Department. Comments should be addressed to: Office of Worker Advocacy (EH-8), U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20585. Email: . Tollfree: 1-877-447-9756. URL: . SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Purpose The Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Act of 2000 (``Act''), title 36 of Public Law 106-398, establishes a program to provide compensation to individuals who developed illnesses as a result of their employment in nuclear weapons production-related activities and at certain federally-owned facilities in which radioactive materials were used. On December 7, 2000, the President issued Executive Order 13179 (``Order'') directing the Department of Energy (``Department'' or ``DOE'') to list covered facilities in the Federal Register, which the Department did on January 17, 2001, and again on June 11, 2001. This notice revises the previous lists and provides additional information about the covered facilities, atomic weapons employers, and beryllium vendors. Section 2. c. iv of the Order instructs the Department to designate, pursuant to sections 3621(4)(B) and 3622 of the Act, atomic weapons employers and additions to the list of designated beryllium vendors. In addition, section 2. c. vii of the Order instructs the Department to list three types of facilities defined in the Act: (1) Atomic weapons employer facilities, as defined in section 3621(4); (2) Department of Energy facilities, as defined by section 3621(12); and (3) Beryllium vendors, as defined by section 3621(6). Compensation options and mechanisms are defined differently for each of these facility categories. The atomic weapons employer category includes atomic weapons employer facilities in which the primary work was not related to atomic weapons, and consequently these facilities are not commonly known as atomic weapons facilities. Their inclusion in this list is consistent with the Act, and is not intended as a classification for any other purpose. The list at the end of this notice represents the Departments best efforts to date to compile a list of facilities under these three categories. This listing includes 350 facilities in 42 jurisdictions. It designates 29 additional beryllium vendor facilities, two additional Atomic Weapons Employer facilities and clarifies the status as Department of Energy facility for 13 facilities. The designation of the 29 additional beryllium vendor facilities represents the Departments best efforts to meet its statutory deadline in Pub. L. 106-398 Sec. 3622 which sets a December 31, 2002, deadline for designating additional beryllium vendors. To assist the public in understanding changes made in this list, the Department has prepared a description of these changes and made it available at the website noted. A copy may also be obtained by request to the Office of Worker Advocacy. The Department is continuing its research efforts, and [[Page 79069]] continued revisions to this list should be expected. The public is invited to comment on the list and to provide additional information. In addition to continuing its research efforts, the Department has developed information dissemination mechanisms to make facility- specific data available to the public. Information about each listed facility, including the dates and type of work done there, is available by contacting the Office of Worker Advocacy. These descriptions are available in print form and also electronically (via the World Wide Web at ). The list that follows covers facilities under the three categories of employers defined by the Act: atomic weapons employers (``AWE''), Department of Energy facilities (``DOE''), and beryllium vendors (``BE''). Each of the categories has been defined in the original notice and include: 1. Atomic Weapons Employers and Atomic Weapons Employer Facilities The lines between research, atomic weapons production, and non- weapons production are often difficult to draw. For the purposes of this notice, and as directed by the Act, only those facilities whose work involved radioactive material that was connected to the atomic weapons production chain are included. This includes facilities that received radioactive material that had been used in the production of an atomic weapon, or the back end of the production cycle, such as waste handling or reprocessing operations. For the purposes of this listing, the Department considers commercial nuclear fuel fabrication facilities to be covered facilities for those periods when they either supplied radioactive materials to the Department or received radioactive materials that had been used in the Departments production reactors. Corporate information regarding many of the listed facilities is often not readily available. The Department welcomes comments or additional information regarding facilities that may have supported atomic weapons production that are not on this list, as well as information that clarifies the work done at facilities named below. 2. Department of Energy Facilities The listing of Department of Energy facilities is only intended for the context of implementing this Act and does not create or imply any new Departmental obligations or ownership at any of the facilities named on this list. 3. Beryllium Vendors and Beryllium Vendor Facilities Section 3621(6) of the Act defines beryllium vendor as the following: ``(A) Atomics International. (B) Brush Wellman, Incorporated, and its predecessor, Brush Beryllium Company. (C) General Atomics. (D) General Electric Company. (E) NGK Metals Corporation and its predecessors, Kawecki-Berylco, Cabot Corporation, BerylCo, and Beryllium Corporation of America. (F) Nuclear Materials and Equipment Corporation. (G) StarMet Corporation, and its predecessor, Nuclear Metals, Incorporated. (H) Wyman Gordan, Incorporated. (I) Any other vendor, processor, or producer of beryllium or related products designated as a beryllium vendor for purposes of this title under Section 3622.'' The list identifies facilities that processed, produced, or provided beryllium metal for the Department, as defined by the Act. Jurisdiction and facility name Location Facility type State AL--Southern Research Institute.... Birmingham.................................... AWE...................... Alabama. AL--Speedring, Inc................. Culman........................................ BE....................... Alabama. AL--Tennessee Valley Authority..... Muscle Shoals................................. AWE...................... Alabama. AK--Amchitka Nuclear Explosion Site Amchitka Island............................... DOE...................... Alaska. AK--Project Chariot Site Cape...... Cape Thompson................................. DOE...................... Alaska. CA--Arthur D. Little Co............ San Francisco................................. AWE...................... California. CA--Atomics International.......... Los Angeles County............................ BE DOE................... California. CA--California Research Corp....... Richmond...................................... AWE...................... California. CA--Ceradyne, Inc.................. Costa Mesa.................................... BE....................... California. CA--Ceradyne, Inc.................. Santa Ana..................................... BE....................... California. CA--City Tool & Die MFG............ Santa Clara................................... BE....................... California. CA--C.L. Hann Industries........... San Jose...................................... BE....................... California. CA--Dow Chemical Co................ Walnut Creek.................................. AWE...................... California. CA--EDM Exotics.................... Hayward....................................... BE....................... California. CA--Electro Circuits, Inc.......... Pasadena...................................... AWE...................... California. CA--Electrofusion.................. Fremont....................................... BE....................... California. CA--Energy Technology Engineering Santa Susana, Area IV......................... DOE...................... California. Center (ETEC). CA--General Atomics................ La Jolla...................................... AWE BE DOE............... California. CA--General Electric Vallecitos.... Pleasanton.................................... AWE DOE.................. California. CA--Hafer Tool..................... Oakland....................................... BE....................... California. CA--Hexcel Products................ Berkeley...................................... BE....................... California. CA--Hunter Douglas Aluminum Corp... Riverside..................................... AWE...................... California. CA--Jerry Carroll Machining........ San Carlos.................................... BE....................... California. CA--Lab. for Biomedical & Los Angeles................................... DOE...................... California. Environmental Sciences. CA--Lab. for Energy-Related Health Davis......................................... DOE...................... California. Research. CA--Lab. of Radiobiology and San Francisco................................. DOE...................... California. Environmental Health. CA--Lawrence Berkeley National Berkeley...................................... DOE...................... California. Laboratory. CA--Lawrence Livermore National Livermore..................................... DOE...................... California. Laboratory. CA--Lebow.......................... Goleta........................................ BE....................... California. CA--Philco-Ford.................... Newport Beach................................. BE....................... California. CA--Pleasanton Tool & Manufacturing Pleasanton.................................... BE....................... California. CA--Poltech Precision.............. Fremont....................................... BE....................... California. CA--Robin Materials................ Mountain View................................. BE....................... California. CA--Ron Witherspoon, Inc........... Campbell...................................... BE....................... California. CA--Sandia Laboratory, Salton Sea Imperial County............................... DOE...................... California. Base. CA--Sandia National Laboratories Livermore..................................... DOE...................... California. Livermore. CA--Stanford Linear Accelerator.... Palo Alto..................................... DOE...................... California. CA--Stauffer Metals, Inc........... Richmond...................................... AWE...................... California. [[Page 79070]] CA--Tapemation..................... Scotts Valley................................. BE....................... California. CA--University of California....... Berkeley...................................... AWE DOE.................. California. CO--Coors Porcelain................ Golden........................................ BE....................... Colorado. CO--Grand Junction Operations Grand Junction................................ DOE...................... Colorado. Office. CO--Project Rio Blanco Nuclear Rifle......................................... DOE...................... Colorado. Explosion Site. CO--Project Rulison Nuclear Grand Valley.................................. DOE...................... Colorado. Explosion Site. CO--Rocky Flats Plant.............. Golden........................................ DOE...................... Colorado. CO--Shattuck Chemical.............. Denver........................................ AWE...................... Colorado. CO--University of Denver Research Denver........................................ AWE BE................... Colorado. Institute. CT--American Chain and Cable Co.... Bridgeport.................................... AWE...................... Connecticut. CT--Anaconda Co.................... Waterbury..................................... AWE...................... Connecticut. CT--Bridgeport Brass Co., Havens Bridgeport.................................... AWE...................... Connecticut. Laboratory. CT--Combustion Engineering......... Windsor....................................... AWE DOE.................. Connecticut. CT--Connecticut Aircraft Nuclear Middletown.................................... BE DOE................... Connecticut. Engine Laboratory. CT--Dorr Corp...................... Stamford...................................... AWE...................... Connecticut. CT--Fenn Machinery................. Hartford...................................... AWE...................... Connecticut. CT--Machlett Laboratories.......... Springdale.................................... BE....................... Connecticut. CT--New England Lime Co............ Canaan........................................ AWE...................... Connecticut. CT--Seymour Specialty Wire......... Seymour....................................... AWE DOE.................. Connecticut. CT--Sperry Products, Inc........... Danbury....................................... AWE...................... Connecticut. CT--Torrington Co.................. Torrington.................................... AWE...................... Connecticut. DE--Allied Chemical and Dye Corp... North Claymont................................ AWE...................... Delaware. DC--National Bureau of Standards... Washington.................................... AWE...................... District of Columbia. DC--Naval Research Laboratory...... Washington.................................... AWE DOE.................. District of Columbia. FL--American Beryllium Co.......... Sarasota...................................... BE....................... Florida. FL-- Armour Fertilizer Works....... Bartow........................................ AWE...................... Florida. FL-- Gardinier, Inc................ Tampa......................................... AWE...................... Florida. FL-- International Minerals and Mulberry...................................... AWE...................... Florida. Chemical Corp. FL-- Pinellas Plant................ Clearwater.................................... DOE...................... Florida. FL-- University of Florida......... Gainesville................................... AWE...................... Florida. FL-- Virginia-Carolina Chemical Nichols....................................... AWE...................... Florida. Corp. FL--W.R. Grace Co., Agricultural Ridgewood..................................... AWE...................... Florida. Chemical Div.. HI--Kauai Test Facility............ Kauai......................................... DOE...................... Hawaii. ID--Argonne National Laboratory-- Scoville...................................... DOE...................... Idaho. West. ID--Idaho National Engineering Scoville...................................... DOE...................... Idaho. Laboratory. ID--Northwest Machining & Meridian...................................... BE....................... Idaho. Manufacturing. IL--Allied Chemical Corp Plant..... Metropolis.................................... AWE...................... Illinois. IL--American Machine and Metals, E. Moline..................................... AWE...................... Illinois. Inc. IL--Argonne National Laboratory-- Argonne....................................... DOE...................... Illinois. East. IL--Armour Research Foundation..... Chicago....................................... AWE...................... Illinois. IL--Blockson Chemical Co........... Joliet........................................ AWE...................... Illinois. IL--C-B Tool Products Co........... Chicago....................................... AWE...................... Illinois. IL--Crane Co....................... Chicago....................................... AWE...................... Illinois. IL--ERA Tool and Engineering Co.... Chicago....................................... AWE...................... Illinois. IL--Fansteel Metallurgical Corp.... North Chicago................................. BE....................... Illinois. IL--Fermi National Accelerator Batavia....................................... DOE...................... Illinois. Laboratory. IL--Granite City Steel............. Granite City.................................. AWE DOE.................. Illinois. IL--Great Lakes Carbon Corp........ Chicago....................................... AWE...................... Illinois. IL--GSA 39th Street Warehouse...... Chicago....................................... AWE...................... Illinois. IL--International Register......... Chicago....................................... AWE...................... Illinois. IL--Kaiser Aluminum Corp........... Dalton........................................ AWE...................... Illinois. IL--Lindsay Light and Chemical Co.. W. Chicago.................................... AWE...................... Illinois. IL--Madison Site (Spectrulite)..... Madison....................................... AWE DOE.................. Illinois. IL--Metallurgical Laboratory....... Chicago....................................... AWE BE DOE............... Illinois. IL--Midwest Manufacturing Co....... Galesburg..................................... AWE...................... Illinois. IL--Museum of Science and Industry. Chicago....................................... AWE...................... Illinois. IL--National Guard Armory.......... Chicago....................................... AWE DOE.................. Illinois. IL--Podbeliniac Corp............... Chicago....................................... AWE...................... Illinois. IL--Precision Extrusion Co......... Bensenville................................... AWE...................... Illinois. IL--Quality Hardware and Machine Co Chicago....................................... AWE...................... Illinois. IL--R. Krasburg and Sons Chicago....................................... AWE...................... Illinois. Manufacturing Co. IL--Sciaky Brothers, Inc........... Chicago....................................... AWE...................... Illinois. IL--Swenson Evaporator Co.......... Chicago....................................... AWE...................... Illinois. IL--W.E. Pratt Manufacturing Co.... Joliet........................................ AWE...................... Illinois. IL--Wyckoff Drawn Steel Co......... Chicago....................................... AWE...................... Illinois. IN--American Bearing Corp.......... Indianapolis.................................. AWE...................... Indiana. IN--Dana Heavy Water Plant......... Dana.......................................... DOE...................... Indiana. IN--General Electric Plant......... Shelbyville................................... AWE...................... Indiana. IN--Joslyn Manufacturing and Supply Ft. Wayne..................................... AWE...................... Indiana. Co. IN--Purdue University.............. Lafayette..................................... AWE...................... Indiana. IN--Wash-Rite...................... Indianapolis.................................. AWE...................... Indiana. IA--Ames Laboratory................ Ames.......................................... DOE...................... Iowa. IA--Bendix Aviation (Pioneer Davenport..................................... AWE...................... Iowa. Division). IA--Iowa Ordnance Plant............ Burlington.................................... DOE...................... Iowa. [[Page 79071]] IA--Titus Metals................... Waterloo...................................... AWE...................... Iowa. KS--Spencer Chemical Co., Jayhawk Pittburg...................................... AWE...................... Kansas. Works. KY--Paducah Gaseous Diffusion...... Paducah....................................... DOE...................... Kentucky. LA--Ethyl Corp..................... Baton Rouge................................... BE....................... Louisiana. MD--Armco-Rustless Iron & Steel.... Baltimore..................................... AWE...................... Maryland. MD--W.R. Grace and Company......... Curtis Bay.................................... AWE DOE.................. Maryland. MA--American Potash & Chemical..... West Hanover.................................. AWE...................... Massachusetts. MA--C.G. Sargent & Sons............ Graniteville.................................. AWE...................... Massachusetts. MA--Chapman Valve.................. Indian Orchard................................ AWE DOE.................. Massachusetts. MA--Edgerton Germeshausen & Grier, Boston........................................ AWE...................... Massachusetts. Inc. MA--Fenwal, Inc.................... Ashland....................................... AWE...................... Massachusetts. MA--Franklin Institute............. Boston........................................ BE....................... Massachusetts. MA--Heald Machine Co............... Worcester..................................... AWE...................... Massachusetts. MA--La Pointe Machine and Tool Co.. Hudson........................................ AWE...................... Massachusetts. MA--Massachusetts Institute of Cambridge..................................... AWE BE................... Massachusetts. Technology. MA--Metals and Controls Corp....... Attleboro..................................... AWE...................... Massachusetts. MA--National Research Corp......... Cambridge..................................... AWE...................... Massachusetts. MA--Norton Co...................... Worcester..................................... AWE BE................... Massachusetts. MA--Nuclear Metals, Inc............ Concord....................................... AWE BE................... Massachusetts. MA--Reed Rolled Thread Co.......... Worcester..................................... AWE...................... Massachusetts. MA--Shpack Landfill................ Norton........................................ AWE...................... Massachusetts. MA--Ventron Corporation............ Beverly....................................... AWE DOE.................. Massachusetts. MA--Watertown Arsenal.............. Watertown..................................... AWE...................... Massachusetts. MA--Winchester Engineering & Winchester.................................... DOE...................... Massachusetts. Analytical Center. MA--Woburn Landfill................ Woburn........................................ AWE...................... Massachusetts. MA--Wyman Gordon Inc............... Grayton, North Grafton........................ BE....................... Massachusetts. MI--AC Spark Plug.................. Flint......................................... AWE BE................... Michigan. MI--Baker-Perkins Co............... Saginaw....................................... AWE...................... Michigan. MI--Bridgeport Brass Co............ Adrian........................................ AWE DOE.................. Michigan. MI--Brush Beryllium Co............. Detroit....................................... AWE...................... Michigan. MI--Carboloy Co.................... Detroit....................................... AWE...................... Michigan. MI--Extruded Metals Co............. Grand Rapids.................................. AWE...................... Michigan. MI--Gerity-Michigan Corp........... Adrian........................................ BE....................... Michigan. MI--Mitts & Merrel Co.............. Saginaw....................................... AWE...................... Michigan. MI--Oliver Corp.................... Battle Creek.................................. AWE...................... Michigan. MI--Revere Copper and Brass........ Detroit....................................... AWE BE................... Michigan. MI--Speedring Systems, Inc......... Detroit....................................... BE....................... Michigan. MI--Star Cutter Corp............... Farmington.................................... AWE...................... Michigan. MI--University of Michigan......... Ann Arbor..................................... AWE...................... Michigan. MI--Wolverine Tube Division........ Detroit....................................... AWE BE................... Michigan. MN--Elk River Reactor.............. Elk River..................................... DOE...................... Minnesota. MS--Salmon Nuclear Explosion Site.. Hattiesburg................................... DOE...................... Mississippi. MO--Kansas City Plant.............. Kansas City................................... DOE...................... Missouri. MO--Latty Avenue Properties........ Hazelwood..................................... AWE DOE.................. Missouri. MO--Mallinckrodt Chemical Co., St. Louis..................................... DOE...................... Missouri. Destrehan St. Plant. MO--Medart Co...................... St. Louis..................................... AWE...................... Missouri. MO--Roger Iron Co.................. Joplin........................................ AWE...................... Missouri. MO--Spencer Chemical Co............ Kansas City................................... AWE...................... Missouri. MO--St. Louis Airport Storage Site St. Louis..................................... AWE DOE.................. Missouri. (SLAPS). MO--Tyson Valley Powder Farm....... St. Louis..................................... AWE...................... Missouri. MO--United Nuclear Corp............ Hematite...................................... AWE...................... Missouri. MO--Weldon Spring Plant............ Weldon Spring................................. DOE...................... Missouri. NE--Hallam Sodium Graphite Reactor. Hallam........................................ DOE...................... Nebraska NV--Nevada Test Site............... Mercury....................................... DOE...................... Nevada. NV--Project Faultless Nuclear Central Nevada Test Site...................... DOE...................... Nevada. Explosion Site. NV--Project Shoal Nuclear Explosion Fallon........................................ DOE...................... Nevada. Site. NV--Yucca Mountain Site Yucca Mountain................................ DOE...................... Nevada. Characterization Project. NJ--Alumium Co. of America (Alcoa). Garwood....................................... AWE...................... New Jersey. NJ--American Peddinghaus Corp...... Garwood....................................... AWE...................... New Jersey. NJ--Baker and Williams Co.......... Newark........................................ AWE...................... New Jersey. NJ--Bell Telephone Laboratories.... Murray Hill................................... AWE...................... New Jersey. NJ--Bloomfield Tool Co............. Bloomfield.................................... AWE...................... New Jersey. NJ--Bowen Laboratory............... North Branch.................................. AWE...................... New Jersey. NJ--Callite Tungsten Co............ Union City.................................... AWE...................... New Jersey. NJ--Chemical Construction Co....... Linden........................................ AWE...................... New Jersey. NJ--Du Pont Deepwater Works........ Deepwater..................................... AWE DOE.................. New Jersey. NJ--International Nickel Co., Bayonne....................................... AWE...................... New Jersey. Bayonne Laboratories. NJ--J.T. Baker Chemical Co......... Philipsburg................................... AWE...................... New Jersey. NJ--Kellex/Pierpont................ Jersey City................................... AWE DOE.................. New Jersey. NJ--Maywood Chemical Works......... Maywood....................................... AWE DOE.................. New Jersey. NJ--Middlesex Municipal Landfill... Middlesex..................................... AWE DOE.................. New Jersey. NJ--Middlesex Sampling Plant....... Middlesex..................................... DOE...................... New Jersey. NJ--National Beryllia.............. Haskell....................................... BE....................... New Jersey. NJ--New Brunswick Laboratory....... New Brunswick................................. DOE...................... New Jersey. [[Page 79072]] NJ--Picatinny Arsenal.............. Dover......................................... AWE...................... New Jersey. NJ--Princeton Plasma Physics Princeton..................................... DOE...................... New Jersey. Laboratory. NJ--Rare Earths/W.R. Grace......... Wayne......................................... AWE DOE.................. New Jersey. NJ--Standard Oil Development Co of Linden........................................ AWE...................... New Jersey. NJ. NJ--Stevens Institute of Technology Hoboken....................................... BE....................... New Jersey. NJ--Tube Reducing Co............... Wallington.................................... AWE...................... New Jersey. NJ--U.S. Pipe and Foundry.......... Burlington.................................... BE....................... New Jersey. NJ--United Lead Co................. Middlesex..................................... AWE BE................... New Jersey. NJ--Vitro Corp of America (New West Orange................................... AWE...................... New Jersey. Jersey). NJ--Westinghouse Electric Corp (New Bloomfield.................................... AWE...................... New Jersey. Jersey). NJ--Wykoff Steel Co................ Newark........................................ AWE...................... New Jersey. NM--Accurate Machine & Tool........ Albuquerque................................... BE....................... New Mexico. NM--Albuquerque Operations Office.. Albuquerque................................... DOE...................... New Mexico. NM--Chupadera Mesa................. Chupadera Mesa................................ DOE...................... New Mexico. NM--Los Alamos Medical Center...... Los Alamos.................................... DOE...................... New Mexico. NM--Los Alamos National Laboratory. Los Alamos.................................... DOE...................... New Mexico. NM--Lovelace Respiratory Research Albuquerque................................... DOE...................... New Mexico. Institute. NM--Project Gasbuggy Nuclear Farmington.................................... DOE...................... New Mexico. Explosion Site. NM--Project Gnome Nuclear Explosion Carlsbad...................................... DOE...................... New Mexico. Site. NM--Sandia National Laboratories... Albuquerque................................... DOE...................... New Mexico. NM--South Albuquerque Works........ Albuquerque................................... DOE...................... New Mexico. NM--Trinity Nuclear Explosion Site. White Sands Missile Range..................... DOE...................... New Mexico. NM--Waste Isolation Pilot Plant.... Carlsbad...................................... DOE...................... New Mexico. NY--Allegheny-Ludlum Steel......... Watervliet.................................... AWE...................... New York. NY--American Machine and Foundry... Brooklyn...................................... AWE...................... New York. NY--Ashland Oil.................... Tonawanda..................................... AWE DOE.................. New York. NY--Baker and Williams Warehouses.. New York...................................... AWE DOE.................. New York. NY--Bethlehem Steel................ Lackawanna.................................... AWE...................... New York. NY--Bliss & Laughlin Steel......... Buffalo....................................... AWE DOE.................. New York. NY--Brookhaven National Laboratory. Upton......................................... DOE...................... New York. NY--Burns & Roe, Inc............... Maspeth....................................... BE....................... New York. NY--Carborundum Company............ Niagara Falls................................. AWE...................... New York. NY--Colonie Site (National Lead)... Colonie (Albany).............................. AWE DOE.................. New York. NY--Crucible Steel Co.............. Syracuse...................................... AWE...................... New York. NY--Electro Metallurgical.......... Niagara Falls................................. AWE...................... New York. NY--Environmental Measurements New York...................................... DOE...................... New York. Laboratory. NY--Fairchild Hiller Corporation... Farmingdale................................... BE....................... New York. NY--General Astrometals............ Yonkers....................................... BE....................... New York. NY--Hooker Electrochemical......... Niagara Falls................................. AWE...................... New York. NY-- International Rare Metals Mt. Kisco..................................... AWE...................... New York. Refinery, Inc. NY--Ithaca Gun Co.................. Ithaca........................................ AWE...................... New York. NY--Lake Ontario Ordnance Works.... Niagara Falls................................. DOE...................... New York. NY--Ledoux and Co.................. New York...................................... AWE...................... New York. NY-- Linde Air Products............ Buffalo....................................... AWE...................... New York. NY--Linde Ceramics Plant........... Tonawanda..................................... AWE DOE.................. New York. NY--New York University............ New York...................................... AWE...................... New York. NY--Peek Street Facility \1\....... Schenectady................................... DOE...................... New York. NY--Radium Chemical Co............. New York...................................... AWE BE................... New York. NY--Rensselaer Polytechnic Troy.......................................... BE....................... New York. Institute. NY--Sacandaga Facility \1\......... Glenville..................................... DOE...................... New York. NY--SAM Laboratories, Columbia New York...................................... DOE...................... New York. Univeristy. NY--Seaway Industrial Park......... Tonawanda..................................... AWE DOE.................. New York. NY--Seneca Army Depot.............. Romulus....................................... AWE...................... New York. NY--Separations Process Research Schenectady................................... DOE...................... New York. Unit (at Knolls Lab.) \1\. NY--Simonds Saw and Steel Co....... Lockport...................................... AWE...................... New York. NY--Staten Island Warehouse........ New York...................................... AWE...................... New York. NY--Sylvania Corning Nuclear Corp.-- Bayside....................................... AWE BE................... New York. Bayside Lab. NY--Sylvania Corning Nuclear Corp.-- Hicksville.................................... AWE DOE.................. New York. Hicksville Plant. NY--Titanium Alloys Manufacturing.. Niagara Falls................................. AWE...................... New York. NY--Trudeau Foundation............. Saranac Lake.................................. BE....................... New York. NY--University of Rochester Atomic Rochester..................................... DOE...................... New York. Energy Project. NY--Utica St. Warehouse............ Buffalo....................................... AWE...................... New York. NY--West Valley Demonstration West Valley................................... AWE DOE.................. New York. Project. NY--Wolff-Alport Chemical Corp..... Brooklyn...................................... AWE...................... New York. NC--Beryllium Metals and Chemical Bessemer City................................. BE....................... North Carolina. Corp. NC--University of North Carolina... Chapel Hill................................... BE....................... North Carolina. OH--Ajax Magnethermic Corp......... Youngstown.................................... AWE...................... Ohio. OH--Alba Craft..................... Oxford........................................ AWE DOE.................. Ohio. OH--Associated Aircraft Tool and Fairfield..................................... AWE DOE.................. Ohio. Manufacturing Co. OH--B & T Metals................... Columbus...................................... AWE DOE.................. Ohio. OH--Baker Brothers................. Toledo........................................ AWE DOE.................. Ohio. OH--Battelle Laboratories--King Columbus...................................... AWE BE DOE............... Ohio. Avenue. OH--Battelle Laboratories--West Columbus...................................... AWE DOE.................. Ohio. Jefferson. [[Page 79073]] OH--Beryllium Production Plant Luckey........................................ BE DOE................... Ohio. (Brush Luckey Plant). OH--Brush Beryllium Co. (Cleveland) Cleveland..................................... AWE BE................... Ohio. OH--Brush Beryllium Co. (Elmore)... Elmore........................................ BE....................... Ohio. OH--Brush Beryllium Co. (Lorain)... Lorain........................................ BE....................... Ohio. OH--Cincinnati Milling Machine Co.. Cincinnati.................................... AWE...................... Ohio. OH--Clifton Products Co............ Painesville................................... BE....................... Ohio. OH--Copperweld Steel............... Warren........................................ AWE...................... Ohio. OH--Du Pont-Grasselli Research Cleveland..................................... AWE...................... Ohio. Laboratory. OH--Extrusion Plant (Reactive Ashtabula..................................... DOE...................... Ohio. Metals Inc.). OH--Feed Materials Production Fernald....................................... DOE...................... Ohio. Center (FMPC). OH--General Electric Company (Ohio) Cincinnati/Evendale........................... AWE BE DOE............... Ohio. OH--Gruen Watch.................... Norwood....................................... AWE...................... Ohio. OH--Harshaw Chemical Co............ Cleveland..................................... AWE...................... Ohio. OH--Herring-Hall Marvin Safe Co.... Hamilton...................................... AWE DOE.................. Ohio. OH--Horizons, Inc.................. Cleveland..................................... AWE...................... Ohio. OH--Kettering Laboratory, Cincinnati.................................... BE....................... Ohio. University of Cincinnati. OH--Magnus Brass Co................ Cincinnati.................................... AWE...................... Ohio. OH--McKinney Tool and Manufacturing Cleveland..................................... AWE...................... Ohio. Co. OH--Mitchell Steel Co.............. Cincinnati.................................... AWE...................... Ohio. OH--Monsanto Chemical Co........... Dayton........................................ AWE...................... Ohio. OH--Mound Plant.................... Miamisburg.................................... DOE...................... Ohio. OH--Painesville Site (Diamond Painesville................................... AWE DOE.................. Ohio. Magnesium Co.). OH--Piqua Organic Moderated Reactor Piqua......................................... DOE...................... Ohio. OH--Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Piketon....................................... DOE...................... Ohio. Plant. OH--R. W. Leblond Machine Tool Co.. Cincinnati.................................... AWE...................... Ohio. OH--Tech-Art, Inc.................. Milford....................................... AWE...................... Ohio. OH--Tocco Induction Heating Div.... Cleveland..................................... AWE...................... Ohio. OH--Vulcan Tool Co................. Dayton........................................ AWE...................... Ohio. OK--Eagle Picher................... Quapaw........................................ BE....................... Oklahoma. OK--Kerr-McGee..................... Guthrie....................................... AWE...................... Oklahoma. OR--Albany Research Center......... Albany........................................ AWE DOE.................. Oregon. OR--Wah Chang...................... Albany........................................ AWE...................... Oregon. PA--Aeroprojects, Inc.............. West Chester.................................. AWE BE................... Pennsylvania. PA--Aliquippa Forge................ Aliquippa..................................... AWE DOE.................. Pennsylvania. PA--Aluminum Co of America (Alcoa) New Kensington................................ AWE...................... Pennsylvania. (Pennsylvania). PA--Beryllium Corp. of America Hazleton...................................... BE....................... Pennsylvania. (Hazleton). PA--Beryllium Corp. of America Reading....................................... BE....................... Pennsylvania. (Reading). PA--Birdsboro Steel & Foundry...... Birdsboro..................................... AWE...................... Pennsylvania. PA--C.H. Schnoor................... Springdale.................................... AWE DOE.................. Pennsylvania. PA--Carnegie Institute of Pittsburgh.................................... AWE...................... Pennsylvania. Technology. PA--Carpenter Steel Co............. Reading....................................... AWE...................... Pennsylvania. PA--Chambersburg Engineering Co.... Chambersburg.................................. AWE...................... Pennsylvania. PA--Foote Mineral Co............... East Whiteland Twp............................ AWE...................... Pennsylvania. PA--Frankford Arsenal.............. Philadelphia.................................. AWE...................... Pennsylvania. PA--Heppenstall Co................. Pittsburgh.................................... AWE...................... Pennsylvania. PA--Jessop Steel Co................ Washington.................................... AWE...................... Pennsylvania. PA--Koppers Co., Inc............... Verona........................................ AWE...................... Pennsylvania. PA--Landis Machine Tool Co......... Waynesboro.................................... AWE...................... Pennsylvania. PA--McDanel Refractory Co.......... Beaver Falls.................................. BE....................... Pennsylvania. PA--Nuclear Materials and Equipment Apollo........................................ AWE BE................... Pennsylvania. Corp (NUMEC). PA--Nuclear Materials and Equipment Parks Township................................ AWE...................... Pennsylvania. Corp (NUMEC). PA--Penn Salt Co................... Philadelphia/Wyndmoor......................... AWE...................... Pennsylvania. PA--Philadelphia Naval Yard........ Philadelphia.................................. AWE...................... Pennsylvania. PA--Shippingport Atomic Power Plant Shippingport.................................. DOE...................... Pennsylvania. \1\. PA--Superior Steel Co.............. Carnegie...................................... AWE...................... Pennsylvania. PA--U.S. Steel Co., National Tube McKeesport.................................... AWE...................... Pennsylvania. Division. PA--Vitro Manufacturing Canonsburg.................................... AWE BE................... Pennsylvania. (Canonsburg). PA--Westinghouse Atomic Power Dev. East Pittsburgh............................... AWE...................... Pennsylvania. Plant. PA--Westinghouse Nuclear Fuels Cheswick...................................... AWE...................... Pennsylvania. Division. PR--BONUS Reactor Plant............ Punta Higuera................................. DOE...................... Puerto Rico. PR--Puerto Rico Nuclear Center..... Mayaguez...................................... DOE...................... Puerto Rico. RI--C.I. Hayes, Inc................ Cranston...................................... AWE...................... Rhode Island. SC--Savannah River Site............ Aiken......................................... DOE...................... South Carolina. TN--Clarksville Facility........... Clarksville................................... DOE...................... Tennessee. TN--Manufacturing Sciences Corp.... Oak Ridge..................................... BE....................... Tennessee. TN--Oak Ridge Gaseous Diffusion Oak Ridge..................................... DOE...................... Tennessee. Plant (K-25). TN--Oak Ridge Hospital............. Oak Ridge..................................... DOE...................... Tennessee. TN--Oak Ridge Institute for Science Oak Ridge..................................... DOE...................... Tennessee. Education. TN--Oak Ridge National Laboratory Oak Ridge..................................... DOE...................... Tennessee. (X-10). TN--S-50 Oak Ridge Thermal Oak Ridge..................................... DOE...................... Tennessee. Diffusion Plant. TN--Vitro Corporation of America Oak Ridge..................................... AWE BE................... Tennessee. (Tennessee). TN--W.R. Grace (Tennessee)......... Erwin......................................... AWE...................... Tennessee. TN--Y-12 Plant..................... Oak Ridge..................................... DOE...................... Tennessee. TX--AMCOT.......................... Ft. Worth..................................... AWE...................... Texas. [[Page 79074]] TX--Mathieson Chemical Co.......... Pasadena...................................... AWE...................... Texas. TX--Medina Facility................ San Antonio................................... DOE...................... Texas. TX--Pantex Plant................... Amarillo...................................... DOE...................... Texas. TX--Sutton, Steele and Steele Co... Dallas........................................ AWE...................... Texas. TX--Texas City Chemicals, Inc...... Texas City.................................... AWE...................... Texas. VA--BWXT........................... Lynchburg..................................... AWE BE................... Virgina. VA--Thomas Jefferson National Newport News.................................. DOE...................... Virgina. Accelerator Facility. VA--University of Virginia......... Charlottesville............................... AWE...................... Virgina. WA--Hanford........................ Richland...................................... DOE...................... Washington. WA--Pacific Northwest National Richland...................................... DOE...................... Washington. Laboratory. WV--Huntington Pilot Plant......... Huntington.................................... DOE...................... West Virginia. WI--Allis-Chalmers Co.............. West Allis, Milwaukee......................... AWE...................... Wisconsin. WI--A.O. Smith..................... Milwaukee..................................... BE....................... Wisconsin. WI--Besley-Wells................... South Beloit.................................. AWE...................... Wisconsin. WI--LaCrosse Boiling Water Reactor. LaCrosse...................................... DOE...................... Wisconsin. WI--Ladish Co...................... Cudahy........................................ BE....................... Wisconsin. MR--Pacific Proving Ground \2\..... Marshall Islands.............................. DOE...................... Marshall Islands. ----------------------------------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------------------------------- ---------------------- \1\ Consistent with the Act, coverage is limited to activities not performed under the responsibility of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion program. \2\ Pacific Proving Ground includes Bikini Atoll, Enewetak Atoll, Johnston (U.S. nuclear weapons testing activities only), and Christmas Island (U.S. nuclear weapons testing activities only). Issued in Washington, DC, December 20, 2002. Beverly A. Cook, Assistant Secretary, Office of Environment, Safety and Health. [FR Doc. 02-32690 Filed 12-26-02; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 6450-01-P ***************************************************************** 26 Sandia may simulate nuclear explosions Denver Post.com Saturday, December 28, 2002 - ALBUQUERQUE - Sandia National Laboratories may soon be in the business of simulating nuclear explosions using small amounts of electrically charged plutonium. The experiments, which could start in summer, would mark the first time the lab uses the radioactive lead-like metal in its massive nuclear fusion machines. Sandia's gymnasium-sized "Z" and Saturn machines are normally used to create tiny but intense bursts of radiation for fusion research. The Department of Energy wants to use the machines to fire a small piece of metal against a plutonium target. Instruments would then measure the plutonium's response. Jeff Quintenz, head of Sandia's Pulsed Power Center, said the experiments would simulate the intense pressures found in a detonating nuclear bomb. Inmate suspected in 2001 sex assault A man serving 25 years in prison for child abuse has been identified as a possible suspect in a 2001 sex assault case, Denver police said. The DNA of Roy Lee Brown, 26, matched DNA found at a southeast Denver apartment where a 38-year-old female was sexually assaulted in 2001. Brown was required by state law to submit a blood sample after being convicted of child abuse. His DNA was entered into a national database for comparison. This month, Denver police were notified that a match was found. On Thursday, police collected another blood sample from Brown to verify the match. All contents Copyright 2002 The Denver Post or other copyright ***************************************************************** 27 NRC: Licensee bankruptcy of Permagrain Products Inc. FR Doc 02-32696 [Federal Register: December 27, 2002 (Volume 67, Number 249)] [Notices] [Page 79162-79163] From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr27de02-141] NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION [Docket No. 030-13573] In the Matter of PermaGrain Products, Incorporated, 4789 West Chester Pike, Newtown Square, Pennsylvania, 19073; License Nos. 37- 17860-01, EA-02-260; Demand for Information I PermaGrain Products, Inc. (the Licensee) is the holder of Byproduct Material License No. 37-17860-01 issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or Commission) pursuant to 10 CFR part 30. The license authorizes the possession and use of 2,000,000 curies of cobalt 60 for the irradiation of materials other than explosives or corrosive materials. The license further authorizes an additional 5,000 curies of cobalt 60 for use in a NUMEC Model NRI-300A self-shielded irradiator for irradiation of materials. The license, originally issued on December 21, 1977, was last renewed on March 7, 1997, and is due to expire on March 31, 2007. The license permits use of material at the Licensee's facilities at Reactor Road, Karthaus, Pennsylvania. PermaGrain Products, Inc., leases the location from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the owner of the site. II On November 12, 2002, Dr. A. E. Witt, President of PermaGrain Products, Inc. informed the NRC that the Licensee was having financial difficulty and that it might declare bankruptcy. On November 13, 2002, Dr. Witt provided a letter to NRC Region I which made certain staffing and security commitments for the Karthaus facility that would continue until NRC was notified otherwise. Since that notification, PermaGrain was engaged in negotiations with a potential buyer which, if they had been successful, could have alleviated the Licensee's financial difficulties. On December 6, 2002, Jeffrey Kurtzman, counsel to PermaGrain Products, Inc. notified the NRC that the negotiations had not been successful. He also notified the NRC that the Licensee intended to file a voluntary petition pursuant to chapter 7 of title 11 of the United States Code (the ``Bankruptcy Code'') in the United States Bankruptcy Court of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. On December 16, 2002, Mr. Kurtzman notified NRC of the Licensee's intention to file for bankruptcy on or about December 17, 2002. The NRC is concerned that PermaGrain's financial situation will not allow continued funding of activities that are essential to ensure radiological safety and security of licensed material present at the site. Therefore, further information is needed to determine whether the Commission can have reasonable assurance that in the future the Licensee will maintain security of licensed material as well as continued maintenance of the required safety features, including the security alarm system, ventilation system, appropriate water level in the pool, the demineralizer system, the heating system, electric and water supply in the facility, all of which are essential to ensure radiological safety at the premises. III Accordingly, pursuant to sections 161c, 161o, 182 and 186 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 2.204 and 10 CFR part 30, in order for the Commission to determine whether your licenses should be modified, suspended or revoked, or other enforcement action taken to ensure compliance with NRC regulatory requirements, the Licensee is required to submit to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, within 48 hours of the date of this Demand for Information, in writing and under oath or affirmation: A. 1. A written description of its plan to continue to provide security over and control access to the Karthaus site, in accordance with 10 CFR parts 20 and 36; 2. A list of the essential services necessary to maintain radiation safety and security of the radioactive material on the site, and the Licensee's plan for continuation of these services. The list should include utilities, periodic maintenance and contract services, such [[Page 79163]] as a security alarm monitoring service. If the Licensee is unable to provide any of the essential services, the plan should include provisions for a third party to provide for the service(s), including providing the training necessary to adequately provide the service(s). B. In light of the findings set forth in section II of this demand for information, the Licensee shall provide to NRC a written plan for disposition of the cobalt 60 sources (including those in the self contained irradiator) in compliance with 10 CFR 30.36. The plan shall contain: 1. A description of how the sources will be removed, packaged, transported and disposed of; and, 2. A timetable for the transfer of all licensed material from the site to an authorized recipient. Copies also shall be sent to the Assistant General Counsel for Materials Litigation and Enforcement at the same address, and to the Regional Administrator, NRC Region I, 475 Allendale Road, King of Prussia, Pennsylvania, 19406-1415. After reviewing your response, the NRC will determine whether further action is necessary to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements. Dated this 17th day of December, 2002. For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Frank J. Congel, Director, Office of Enforcement. [FR Doc. 02-32696 Filed 12-26-02; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590-01-P ***************************************************************** 28 Fallout Case Lawyer Bushnell Dies at 79 The Salt Lake Tribune -- December 27, 2002 A lawyer best known for his 30-year legal battle with the U.S. government over the deaths of sheep he said were killed from nuclear fallout has died. Daniel Stott Bushnell, 79, died at his home of a heart attack on Monday. He was semi-retired but still trying cases for private clients. "He was living a very vigorous life," said his wife, Miriam. Bushnell represented the group of sheep ranchers in a seesaw lawsuit that ended with its defeat at the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals. He argued that 4,300 animals died after nuclear explosions at a Las Vegas test site in 1953. A World War II veteran, Bushnell was a pilot-instructor in the U.S. Air Corps before returning to Utah, where he began a term as a member of the Utah House of Representatives in 1951 at the age of 27. He was also president of the Salt Lake City Board of Education in 1977. Bushnell served as the Europe attorney for The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints from 1992 to 1998. He was proud of securing a tax deduction for tithing payments in Australia and Germany. Miriam Bushnell said she would miss most her husband's warmth, enthusiasm and generosity. Besides his wife, Bushnell is survived by five children, 18 grandchildren and seven great-grandchildren. Funeral services will take place at the Federal Heights Ward on Monday at noon. Viewing will be Sunday from 6 to 8 p.m. at Sunset Lawn, 2350 E. 1300 South. Copyright 2002, The Salt Lake Tribune. ***************************************************************** NOTE: In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. section 107 this material is distributed without profit or payment to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving this information for non-profit research and educational purposes only. For more information go to: *****************************************************************