***************************************************************** 03/20/02 **** RADIATION BULLETIN(RADBULL) **** VOL 10.71 ***************************************************************** RADBULL IS PRODUCED BY THE ABALONE ALLIANCE CLEARINGHOUSE ***************************************************************** NUCLEAR POLICY 1 US: NRC: Meserve: Speech - 6 - Perspectives on the Past, Challenges 2 Canada running out of nuclear techs 3 Korea's KEPCO nuclear unit signs pact with Romania 4 ScottishPower to axe 500 Scots jobs 5 Norway to re-furbish nuclear aid to Russia 6 US: NRC: McGaffigan: Speech - 7 - Remarks 7 US: NRC: Merrifield: Speech - 8 - History's Lessons for Our Future C 8 US: Keeping Track of Atomic Matter 9 US: AABE Reaffirms Support for Nuclear Energy 10 Bush Won't OK N.Korean Nuclear Deal 11 CAN: Graham pushes nuclear cutbacks 12 US: NRC: Diaz: Speech - 4 - When... Large is Small and Small is Larg 13 US: NRC: Dicus: Speech - 5 - Set Yourself as the Standard NUCLEAR REACTORS 14 Y174 bil needed to scrap Monju reactor 15 Ukrainian reactor reconnected to grid after repairs 16 US: 68 nuclear plants get U.S. query 17 US: Ohio nuclear plant corrosion raises concerns, says NRC 18 US: Hole in Nuclear Reactor Vessel Prompts Inspections 19 UN says nuclear plants' vulnerability unclear NUCLEAR SAFETY 20 US: Beryllium tests urged for military workers NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE 21 US: Court Agrees to Hear Challenge to EPA Rule for Yucca Mountain Nu 22 US: Daschle Says He May Fail to Block Nuclear Dump 23 US: Panel reviews King bill on nuclear waste compact 24 US: NUCLEAR WASTE: Guinn: Yucca fight everywhere 25 US: Tom Daschle: Less optimistic about Yucca being "dead" 26 US: Feds: Ship nuclear waste down the Hudson 27 US: NJ: Canon Council opposes Cotter's waste contract 28 US: Editorial: Nuke barge idea takes on water 29 US: Yucca: Guinn: More money needed 30 US: Daschle not as confident on Yucca 31 Germany nuclear waste convoy leaves for Britain 32 US: AU: Senator critical of Kakadu uranium mine safety sandbags 33 Sydney may host nuclear reprocessing plant NUCLEAR WEAPONS 34 Pak: Nuclear alarmists 35 'Indo-Pak war could escalate to N-confrontation' 36 China's party paper comments on US nuclear posture review 37 UK: Shutting the stable door 38 Showdown at the Presidium 39 Russia needs more money to scrap old nuclear-powered submarines 40 Nuclear-free anniversary marked 41 US: THE RETURN OF NUCLEAR INSANITY 42 PAK: Nuclear alarmists 43 US: A fear of the nuclear 44 China hails own strategic nuclear force amid rising tensions with US 45 US: Barking Sands Worse Than the Bite 46 US: Wired 10.03: This Is Not a Test 47 A minority of one: Daniel Pipes 48 US: Quick and Dirty or Long and Dirty? US DEPT. OF ENERGY 49 Livermore, Berkeley labs develop detector 50 OR cleanup firm gets over $18 million 51 Missile official: Weapon need spotlights Oak Ridge plant's overhaul 52 Assessor gives DOE big bill for property tax 53 DOE: Dep. Sec. Francis Blake resigns 54 U.S. probing energy firm's links to Russians' company OTHER NUCLEAR 55 New Device Can Accurately Detect Distinct Radiation Types ***************************************************************** ***************************************************************** FULL NEWS STORIES ***************************************************************** ***************************************************************** 1 NRC: Meserve: Speech - 6 - Perspectives on the Past, Challenges for the Future OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS Office of Public Affairs Telephone: 301/415-8200 Washington, DC 20555-001 E-mail: opa@nrc.gov [opa@nrc.gov] Web Site: Public Affairs Web Site No. S-02-006 PDF Version (38 KB)[PDF Icon] PERSPECTIVES ON THE PAST, CHALLENGES FOR THE FUTURE Dr. Richard A. Meserve, Chairman U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Presented at the 14th Annual NRC Regulatory Information Conference March 5, 2002 Introduction Good afternoon. I join Bill Travers and Sam Collins in welcoming you to the NRC's annual Regulatory Information Conference. I want to commend Sam and his staff for arranging a series of sessions that cover the wide range of technical and policy issues that face the NRC today. I would also like to thank all those present for participating. It is through your efforts that this conference continues to be an important forum for information exchange. When I addressed this conference last year, I reflected on the past and provided a perspective on future challenges. I think it is safe to say that none of us had any inkling of the challenges that would arise during the year as a result of the events of September. The terrorist attacks and their aftermath have had, and will continue to have, a significant effect on both our licensees and the NRC. Nonetheless, our licensees' primary responsibility of ensuring the safe operation of their facilities, and the NRC's fundamental mission of protecting public health and safety, have not changed. Moreover, we have seen many developments bearing on civilian nuclear power. Although I will turn first to the issue I am sure is most on your minds - physical security -- I would also like to step back and review our activities and accomplishments over the past year. I will again offer my views on what the future may hold. Physical Security As you know, licensees of nuclear power plants have a capability to protect against terrorist attacks that far exceeds that of most other civilian infrastructure. Nonetheless, the attacks of September 11 required us to reassess our assumptions about the nature of the threats with which our licensees might have to cope. Our immediate response was to advise licensees to proceed to the highest level of security -- a level we have maintained in the intervening months. Many state and local government officials also took steps to augment plant security forces with law enforcement personnel or National Guard troops. And, for our part, the NRC has worked closely with the Office of Homeland Security, the FBI, and other government agencies to provide our licensees with timely information about potential security threats. With the full support of my colleagues on the Commission, I also directed the NRC staff to conduct a comprehensive review of our safeguards and security regulations and policies. Although this effort is not complete, it became clear that the persistence of the generalized high-threat environment required that enhanced security measures be formally maintained within our regulatory framework. Consequently, we have issued orders to our licensees with specific requirements for licensee actions to maintain heightened levels of security. I want to make clear that issuance of the orders does not imply any laxity on the part of our licensees in responding to the earlier advisories. The NRC continues to work closely with a variety of agencies, through the auspices of the Office of Homeland Security, in an effort to develop an integrated national strategy to deal with critical infrastructure. It is my view that the defense of nuclear facilities should not be viewed in isolation, but should be part of an overall national defensive scheme. This effort is in its early stages, but will become increasingly important. In many respects, the nuclear industry is the pathfinder because of the extensive capacities that it had in place before September 11. Industry Performance Although plant security has been in the forefront of our activities and those of our licensees, it has not totally dominated our attention. The Nation's nuclear power plants provide 20% of our supply of electricity. The safe and reliable operation of those plants is the primary responsibility of our licensees, and the NRC's obligation to protect public health and safety requires strong, safety-focused regulatory oversight. NRC data drawn from our performance indicators and inspection results and industry data on plant performance indicate a continuation of the trends that we have observed for the past decade: fewer safety-significant events, better plant reliability, and, as a result, increased capacity factors and cumulative power generation. The result is that the production cost for nuclear is less than that of natural gas and coal. I know that we are all pleased to see these advances. It is no surprise that strong safety performance and strong economic performance should move in parallel. A safe plant is a reliable plant, and a reliable plant promises cost-efficient operations. This does not mean, however, that we do not face challenges. We will continue to see new issues as the plants get older, such as reactor head nozzle cracking. We also recognize that, while overall industry performance continues to improve, there are still a few outliers that require more rigorous regulatory oversight. We must improve our ability to recognize the signals of declining performance and intervene appropriately to help reverse such trends. With this as background, let me now move on to discuss our progress and plans in the areas of risk-informed regulation and the Reactor Oversight Process. Risk-Informing NRC Regulations As most of you are aware, the NRC undertook the initiative to risk-inform our regulations and regulatory processes in recognition of the fact that improvements in the tools for quantitative assessment of risk, combined with the accumulated operating experience, provide a foundation for the critical examination of our regulations and processes. Where such examination reveals regulatory requirements that do not contribute to protection of public health and safety, we can modify or eliminate the requirements. Of course, we may also find areas in which requirements are insufficient to address the attendant risk, indicating a need to strengthen the regulatory framework. The consideration of risk provides a tool for continuing to refine and improve our regulatory system. The NRC's efforts to implement risk-informed regulations and regulatory processes has begun to bear significant fruit. We have formalized the processes for reviewing license amendments and for the conduct of inservice inspection and testing. We are moving forward with implementation of risk-informed technical specifications to be incorporated into the Standard Tech Specs. And we continue to work with standards development organizations to establish consensus standards for probabilistic risk assessments addressing full-power conditions, shutdown, fire-protection, and external events, such as earthquakes. We also continue to see progress in our efforts to risk-inform our so-called "special treatment" requirements and the technical bases that underlie the requirements in 10 CFR Part 50. The staff will forward to the Commission later this year its recommendations for a new rule - 10 CFR 50.69 - addressing special treatment requirements. This will refocus these requirements on the risk-significance of a system, structure, or component, rather than strictly on its safety classification. We also expect to see a proposed rule in the next month or so addressing risk-informed changes to the requirements for combustible gas control. The Commission recognizes that the pace for risk-informing our regulations is not as rapid as we had hoped. We do consider risk-informed regulation to be a high-priority effort, and we continue to encourage the staff to engage constructively with all of our stakeholders to reach mutually acceptable solutions to the issues that arise. We should see this activity as a long-term effort. Nonetheless, I also believe that the benefits for both the NRC and our stakeholders are potentially substantial, and I ask for both your patience and your help as we pursue these benefits. The Reactor Oversight Process Another area related to risk-informed regulation in which I believe we have made great progress is in our Reactor Oversight Process (or "ROP"). We are approaching two years since the new oversight process was implemented on an industry-wide basis. Overall, the oversight process has continued to meet its goals of providing more objective and understandable assessments of plant performance while focusing on aspects of operation that are most safety-significant. The feedback that we receive both from licensees and from members of the public is overwhelmingly positive. While the new oversight process has been remarkably successful, this does not mean it would not benefit from revision. We have received comments and recommendations on various elements from our licensees, other stakeholders, the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, and from the NRC staff. As a result, we recognize that improvements can be made in the way in which we assess performance indicators and in the indicators themselves. We also see a need for improvements in the risk-assessment tools and techniques that are employed in the significance determination process. We continue to seek feedback from all stakeholders in our efforts to build on our success to date. Nuclear Power for the Future So far, I have focused largely on the past and present. I would now like to turn to the subject of what the future may hold for nuclear power. The NRC's activities in this regard are concentrated in three major areas: power uprates for operating plants; license renewal; and preparation for the licensing and construction of new nuclear power plants, if and when new orders materialize. Let me first address uprates. Power Uprates Operating experience with the current generation of plants, along with more realistic techniques for analyzing plant performance during both normal and accident conditions have led licensees to conclude that it is possible to increase the power output of their plants while still maintaining adequate safety margins. The NRC has reviewed applications for modest uprates - up to around 5% - for several years and has approved a substantial number of these requests. Moreover, improvements in the measurement of flow rates, which reduce the uncertainty in power calculations that must be applied in certain accident analyses, have allowed licensees to increase power on the order of 1 to 1-1/2 %. The staff recently published guidelines for such flow-measurement based uprates, in order to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the staff's reviews. We are now beginning to receive applications for much larger power uprates - up to about 20% - as licensees seek to improve the economic performance of their plants. Feedback from the ACRS, which reviews the staff's evaluations of uprate applications, indicates that the staff's assessments are, overall, proceeding appropriately. In view of the large number of uprate applications that we expect to receive in the near future, the staff is looking at ways to improve the efficiency of the process, while maintaining the high technical quality of its reviews. Power uprates and associated capital improvements in operating plants are being undertaken, in part, in anticipation of the prospect of renewing the operating licenses of the plants for an additional 20 years. Let me touch briefly on progress to date and future plans for license renewal reviews. License Renewal As you know, the NRC established regulations governing the license renewal process (Part 54) in anticipation of receiving applications from licensees to renew operating licenses beyond the 40-year term authorized by the Atomic Energy Act. The Commission established an ambitious schedule for license renewal reviews, recognizing the need for efficiency, but also for the staff to perform technically sound, high-quality assessments. The results of the license renewal reviews have surpassed our expectations. The staff has met or bettered the target schedules for the four reviews completed to date, while maintaining the necessary technical rigor. Those reviews have aided - and have been aided by - the development of guidance documents, such as the Generic Aging Lessons Learned (or GALL) report. Those guidance documents will be modified and updated as new insights are gained in current and future reviews. In addition to the four plants, with a total of eight reactors, whose licenses have been renewed, renewal applications for eight plants, comprising fifteen units, are currently under review, and four more applications are expected before the end of the current fiscal year. Overall, about half of the operating plants have formally notified the NRC of their intent to seek renewal, and we still expect that virtually the entire operating fleet will ultimately apply. We recognize the challenges presented by the need to conduct a large number of simultaneous reviews. However, the staff's performance to date gives me confidence that the NRC can meet those challenges. New Plant Licensing and Construction License renewal extends the period during which currently operating nuclear plants can continue to contribute to the Nation's electric power supply. However, as our Nation's use of electricity increases, those plants will provide a decreasing percentage of demand and eventually, of course, the current fleet must be decommissioned. If society decides that nuclear power should continue to play a significant role in the portfolio of electric generation technologies, it will eventually be necessary to build new nuclear power plants. The NRC's responsibilities in this regard are not promotional, but we must be prepared to perform our regulatory duties without inappropriate impediments to the use of nuclear technology. The Commission has therefore sought to ensure that the NRC is ready to carry out its responsibilities, if and when applications for new plants are submitted. Regulations providing a more efficient licensing process for standard plant designs and for the consideration of early site permits are in place in Part 52. Three plant designs have been certified under its provisions, and an application for a fourth design, Westinghouse's AP1000, is expected within the next several weeks. The staff is also conducting preliminary reviews of two gas-cooled reactor designs, the pebble bed modular reactor and the gas turbine modular helium reactor. We are also prepared for a possible application for a combined construction permit and operating license (or "COL"). And we have been advised to expect applications for early site permits by one or more licensees, although the schedules are not certain at this juncture. The Commission is working to meet the needs that new construction will present. We have established groups within the Offices of Nuclear Reactor Regulation and Nuclear Regulatory Research dedicated to advanced reactor issues. We have requested and obtained resources in our budget to support the projected workload for early site permit, design certification, and possible COL reviews. We have also begun a dialogue with potential applicants and other stakeholders on how current regulations apply to new reactor designs, and are examining possible changes to our overall regulatory framework to make it more risk-informed and technology-neutral. We are also moving to strengthen our regulatory research program to support advanced plant reviews. And we have also taken specific steps to address our technical skill requirements. There will clearly be challenges that we must face in these areas, and there is still much uncertainty as to what we will need to review and when. Nonetheless, we will be ready to carry out our responsibilities when we are called upon to do so. Human Capital Initiatives An overarching issue is the need to maintain the NRC's technical skills at a time when a large number of NRC staff are approaching retirement. I mentioned last year that we had six times as many staff members over the age of 60 as under the age of 30. In the past year, we have sought to identify skill gaps, to hire new staff to fill those gaps, and to ensure that essential technical skills are maintained and strengthened. Initiatives in this area include hiring highly-qualified entry-level engineers and scientists and seeking to retain current staff members whose critical skills might otherwise be lost. Our efforts to hire new, young technical staff have been particularly successful: in the last 12 months, over 80 entry-level offers have been accepted and 35 of those people are currently on board. By the end of this fiscal year, we expect to have about 100 new staff. The ratio of 6 to 1 to which I referred previously has been reduced to 4 to 1, and is continuing to decline. I would also like to note that I have been hearing about increased interest in nuclear engineering and related technical areas among university students. Indeed, I understand that the University of South Carolina has recently decided to establish a nuclear engineering program in recognition of the resurgence of interest in nuclear power. This is clearly positive news for both us and the industry. We all draw from the same pool of academic talent, so this is a case of a rising tide that lifts all boats. Public Confidence The last topic I would like to address is one of great importance to the NRC: the need to conduct our business in a manner that instills public confidence in the agency. In my remarks at this conference last year, I emphasized the importance of public openness as a tool for building public confidence. Although my views have not changed, the events of September 11 have cast the issues of public openness and public confidence in a new light. I am committed to maintain open communications with all of our stakeholders and to ensure their involvement in our regulatory processes to the fullest possible extent. Only in this way can we hope to gain and retain the public's confidence in our ability to protect their health and safety. Because public concerns about nuclear may have grown since September 11, we have an increased obligation to address issues openly and forthrightly. Unless our decisions are made in as open a forum as possible, the result may be a decline in public confidence in both the industry and the NRC. However, we also recognize that certain information that our licensees provide or that the NRC develops could be of substantial use to terrorists. We must therefore walk a fine line between the public's right to know and the need to protect information from terrorists. This is the difficult issue, but I am hopeful that the guidance being developed will achieve the appropriate balance. Conclusion Let me conclude by saying that the past year has been one of extraordinary changes and challenges. My goal, and that of my colleagues on the Commission, has been to ensure that the NRC is able to respond to those changes and challenges in a manner that is direct, technically defensible, and responsive to the concerns of all of our stakeholders, while fulfilling our obligation to protect public health and safety. I hope that I have left you with the assurance that we can meet that goal. I appreciate the opportunity to address you and will be pleased to respond to questions. Thank you. ***************************************************************** 2 Canada running out of nuclear techs Last call for AECL subsidies: After 50 years of grants, Canada's nuclear industry still asks for more, seeming oblivious to the fact 'the world is abandoning nuclear power' Financial Post - Canada; Mar 20, 2002 Should Canada continue to bankroll that perennial money loser, Atomic Energy of Canada Limited's nuclear reactor sales program? Herb Dhaliwal, the new federal Minister of Natural Resources, will soon be putting that question before the federal Cabinet, along with two reviews designed to inform their opinion. Such reviews are not new. Mr. Dhaliwal's predecessors have been churning them out for 50 years, most recently in 1995 and 1998. One of the current crop of expert reviewers brought in to help the government decide, Nesbitt Burns, was an advisor back in 1995. The other reviewer, KPMG, employs Reid Morden, until three years ago AECL's chairman and CEO. What is new is skepticism from a prominent Cabinet member. Whether the government should continue the $100-million a year subsidy is "what the review's all about," Mr. Dhaliwal said hours after taking over his new portfolio earlier this year. "What is the future of our Candu reactor and atomic energy? Because if we're not making any sales and there's no potential, should we continue to invest in those areas or not?" Mr. Dhaliwal has good reason to ask hard questions. In 1995, and with help from Nesbitt Burns, AECL committed to sell 10 reactors in 10 years. Since then, only two were sold, both to China. The last hot prospect, Turkey, declined the nuclear option in July 2000. As Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit then observed: "The world is abandoning nuclear power." In the 1998 review, AECL committed to snag business in Southeast Asia by setting up offices in Thailand, Vietnam, and Indonesia. So far, no bites there, despite billions of dollars in bait that AECL has dangled before potential purchasers. The only pending "sale" is to complete a Candu in Romania called Cernavoda 2 that was actually sold in 1977 yet remains only 40% complete. The process of completing it has been complicated by a series of misadventures, including shoddy work by slave labourers and the execution of the project's sponsor, former dictator Nicolae Ceausescu. Like so many nuclear projects before it, the project awaits yet another subsidy from the Canadian government in the form of a Canada Account loan from Export Development Corporation, this time for $390-million. AECL's drive to find foreign customers gained new urgency in 1993, when Ontario Hydro decided it could no longer afford to buy Candu reactors. To stave off its own bankruptcy, Ontario Hydro began to phase out its existing nuclear plants by closing one reactor less than halfway through its planned service life and tearing up its plans to build, jointly with AECL, 10 more reactors. In 1997, Ontario Hydro pulled the plug on another seven operating reactors, admitting to an Ontario legislative committee that it would be unable to meet its financial obligations due to its nuclear problems. Once the nuclear industry promised electricity too cheap to meter. Now the industry cares little what its power costs to consumers, an attitude that goes some way to explain its failure. AECL scientist Jeremy Whitlock, the industry's unofficial voice through his on-line nuclear presence and comments in the press, minces no words in presenting his industry's perspective. When asked whether he and his nuclear colleagues thought nuclear-generated power was cheap, he replied: "I submit to you that this is an irrelevant question, and if you think that any of us suppose otherwise, you have simply not done your homework." Instead of cost, Mr. Whitlock prefers to measure value through complicated desk studies that attempt to value the "life cycle factors of the technology." AECL has lived off an uninterrupted stream of federal government subsidies for 50 years. In 1996, George Lermer, then dean of the faculty of management at the University of Lethbridge, reported that between 1947 and 1994, the federal government had invested $19-billion (in 2001 dollars) in AECL and its Candu program, over and above any offsetting gain to the federal government or federal taxpayers. Prior to Ontario Hydro's forced closure of one-third of its remaining reactor fleet in 1997, Mr. Lermer concluded: "The Candu project should have been declared a commercial failure and wound up at least two decades ago." Instead, the federal government has since provided the nuclear industry with billions more in financing. Always a wily follower of Ottawa fads, AECL adapts its message to suit. Sometimes it casts itself as a cure to regional disparity to pick up regional development dollars. That is how Cape Breton obtained an unneeded heavy water plant costing hundreds of millions. Sometimes it is a champion for the Third World poor -- all the better to tap the Canadian International Development Agency for foreign aid dollars. School children in Thailand received some of AECL's nuclear "education," paid out of funds earmarked for aid. In recent years, AECL has thrown a green cloak over its shoulders and tried to get paid for not emitting greenhouse gases. From its beginnings, AECL has excelled at tapping into government export credit subsidies. AECL has succeeded in gulling so many, in part, because AECL has been allowed to conceal itself from scrutiny. Despite a legislative obligation to report annually, its corporate plans have not been filed with Parliament since 1995. In 1998, AECL stopped reporting its overseas "agent fees," used indirectly in the past to bribe foreign officials. The public and the press have been kept in the dark along with government agencies and the federal Cabinet. Whether Canadians continue to be kept in the dark, and whether we continue to be forced to support what has become the longest-lived failure in industrial history, is now up to Mr. Dhaliwal. ***************************************************************** 3 Korea's KEPCO nuclear unit signs pact with Romania SOUTH KOREA: March 20, 2002 SEOUL - The nuclear unit of South Korea's state-run Korea Electric Power Corp (KEPCO) said yesterday it had signed a cooperation pact with Romania's state corporation on operating and building nuclear power plants. The power monopoly's unit, Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power Co, will provide Soocietatca Nitionala Nuclearoelectrica (SNN) with technical support to operate Romania's sole nuclear plant in Cernavoda, the company said. "We will send some operational and technology workforce to the plants, then it will take at least six months for them to transfer the technology," a company spokesman Kang Duk-koo told Reuters. Kang did not give the value of the pact, which also includes plans to build more nuclear power plants. The 750-megawatt plant in Romania accounts for 10 percent of the country's total power generation. A 700-megawatt nuclear power plant is under construction and Romania plans to build three more nuclear power plants later, it said. REUTERS NEWS SERVICE ***************************************************************** 4 ScottishPower to axe 500 Scots jobs The Scotsman - Wednesday, 20th March 2002 ANDREW TURPIN and IAIN DEY SCOTTISHPOWER is axing 500 more jobs across Scotland, about five per cent of its workforce north of the Border, as fierce competition in its electricity business continues to bite. The Glasgow-based group informed its staff yesterday of the move, which will be mainly carried out through voluntary redundancy schemes and natural wastage, but will involve some compulsory job cuts. The main brunt of the latest round of job cuts will fall on ScottishPower’s Glasgow operations, including its head office, with others going in Edinburgh and across other centres. It is understood that most of the cuts involve back office and support staff, including some senior managers, rather than engineers. The move will reduce ScottishPower’s workforce in Scotland to around 9,000. ScottishPower added it was also making cuts in its other businesses, with a few going in its Manweb electricity supply arm in the north west of England, but most were in Scotland. The decision follows a business review within the company. A spokesperson for ScottishPower said: "As part of the review we are looking at cutting costs so we can compete on a long-term basis." He added: "This is obviously to secure the future in the long-term prosperity of the company in order to compete in the very, very top markets." The move comes at a time when the group’s shares have come under heavy selling pressure after it announced earlier this month that it was slashing its dividend from the financial year beginning April 2003 onwards. Analysts are expecting a dividend cut of over 30 per cent. ScottishPower has been faced with falling profits at its UK division, down £37 million to £24 million in the nine months to December. At the same time it is currently fighting in a legal battle with British Energy to try and reduce the prices it has to pay for wholesale electricity, which are 10-15 per cent higher than those south of the Border. ScottishPower is obliged to buy 75 per cent of British Energy’s output north of the Border from its two nuclear electricity generating plants under the Nuclear Energy Agreement, not due to expire until 2005. This means Scottish electricity customers are paying around nine per cent more than those in England, according to industry regulatory body Ofgem. ScottishPower also announced earlier this month it is selling its for £2.05 billion its Southern Water arm to a finance group, including Scottish entrepreneur Tom Hunter, with the probable intention of selling it on to French utility giant Vivendi. Shares in ScottishPower were yesterday up 12.75p at 372p, having fallen from over 430p last month. ©2002 scotsman.com | contact ***************************************************************** 5 Norway to re-furbish nuclear aid to Russia Nor Nuclear Waste (Oslo:) The Norwegian Control and Constitutional Committee in the Parliament has evaluated the Norwegian Plan of Action for nuclear safety projects in Russia and made a list of requirements to be implemented in the future projects supported by Norway. Prior to the evaluation Bellona had submitted a list of changes. All Bellona's proposals were included into the final document released by the Committee. The Norwegian aid to build a train for transportation of naval spent nuclear fuel from Murmansk to Mayak was a mistake, says the Norwegian Parliament. Photo: Nils Bøhmer Thomas Nilsen, 2002-03-20 07:26 The result of the parliamentary discussion was based on a report from the Norwegian General Accounting Office regarding the Plan of Action for nuclear safety support from Norway to Russia. Bellona made a list of nine important proposals and suggestions to changes in the Norwegian nuclear safety aid package for projects to come. The parliamentary committee adopted all nine Bellona's points. From the early 1990s, Norway has spent some $65m in its program for improving nuclear safety in north-west Russia. For Norway it has been important to go in front internationally to assist Russia in securing its nuclear installations and improve radioactive waste treatment. The majority in the parliamentary committee underlines the importance of economical and political support to Russia's nuclear regulatory, Gosatomnadzor (GAN). Improved working conditions for GAN is a key-factor to reach the goal of improved nuclear safety in Russia. So far, many of the Norway supported projects have not been under supervision of GAN. From now on, all Norwegian funded projects must have a written provision, stipulating GANs participation during the planning and implementation stages of each project. The committee criticises the Ministry of Foreign Affairs way for implementing projects, saying that too many of the projects have not been passed an environmental evaluation before they were given a go-ahead. Future project must have an independent environmental evaluation before they are approved. Bellona has called for such evaluations during many years. Those calls concerned specifically the Norwegian support to ship submarine spent nuclear fuel from naval bases to the Mayak reprocessing plant in the southern Ural. The reprocessing in Mayak leads to radioactive contamination of Chelyabinsk area and reprocessed waste is much harder to deal with than with spent fuel in dry-storage. In autumn 1994, Bellona and Chelyabinsk based NGO Movement for Nuclear Safety arranged a hearing in the Norwegian Parliament, where it was said that the worst way of dealing with spent nuclear fuel from naval reactors was to ship it to the Mayak plant. Despite this, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs gave several million US dollars to build a train for such spent fuel transport from Kola to Mayak. Today, the parliamentary committee agrees with Bellona that the entire spent fuel train project was a failure, since it did not improve nuclear safety, instead it just moved the problems from the Murmansk area to Chelyabinsk region. The committee also says directly that in the future, Norway shall not be involved in any projects dealing with the Mayak-plant. The parliamentary committee supported the following nine points from Bellona: All Norwegian financed projects for improving nuclear safety in Russia must have an independent environmental evaluation before they are adopted. There must be a written provision in all future projects, involving Norwegian support, that GAN should have the right to approve the projects, before, under and after their implementation. There must be a written provision in all projects, involving Norwegian support, that Norwegian and/or international experts are allowed to inspect the implementation of the projects before, under and after they are developed to make sure that the installations are used in the terms of their initial plan and that they are used in accordance with Russian radiation protection norms. Norway shall not support any infrastructure projects which later on can be used as a part of the planned importation of spent nuclear fuel to Russia from other countries. Norway will only allocate financial support to nuclear power plants as long as there exists a written agreement that the money will be spent on closing down the power reactors and their coming decommissioning. Norway will increase its support to develop alternative energy resources in northwest Russia, including energy efficiency, bio energy, upgrade of hydropower plants and new energy development like hydrogen and windmills. Norwegian and Russian NGOs (such as Bellona) must have the opportunity to participate as observers in the joint Russian-Norwegian meetings on implementing nuclear safety projects. All relevant documents and information should be open to public as long as they do not contain information that can damage the national security of the countries. Norway shall not support any projects, which presume continuous reprocessing at the Mayak plant. Norway should improve the economical and political support to the Russian civilian nuclear watchdog agency Gosatomnadzor so that their internal position in Russia will be stronger. Publisher: Bellona Foundation, President: Frederic Hauge Information: info@bellona.no, Technical contact: webmaster@bellona.no Telephone: +47 23 23 46 00 Telefax: +47 22 38 38 62 * P.O.Box 2141 Grunerlokka, 0505 Oslo, Norway ***************************************************************** 6 NRC: McGaffigan: Speech - 7 - Remarks OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS Office of Public Affairs Telephone: 301/415-8200 Washington, DC 20555-001 E-mail: opa@nrc.gov [opa@nrc.gov] Web Site: Public Affairs Web Site No. S-02-007 PDF Version (34 KB)[PDF Icon] REMARKS by The Honorable Edward McGaffigan, Jr. Commissioner U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 14th Annual Regulatory Information Conference (RIC 2002) Capital Hilton Hotel Washington, D.C. March 6, 2002 I appreciate the opportunity to appear before this gathering for the sixth time. Indeed, this is the sixth regulatory information conference for three Commissioners, Commissioner Dicus, Commissioner Diaz and myself. I have not done the arithmetic, but I believe that you now have the most experienced Commission in NRC's history with three of us in our second terms. Most importantly, in recent years we have had full five-member Commissions. The White House personnel office in both the final years of the Clinton administration and the first year of the Bush administration has done a good job of making timely appointments or reappointments, and I look forward to similar positive action in the future. Obviously, the career staff of the agency does the every-day heavy lifting on the wide range of issues that confront us. And I want to commend them for the tremendous work they have done throughout this past year and particularly since September 11. But I also think that having a seasoned Commission has helped us stay on a steady course in recent years. In much of government there is so much turnover at senior levels, even in the absence of elections, that the senior people are barely around long enough to recognize the problems before they are gone. This Commission has been around long enough to recognize problems, to set in place policies to resolve those problems, and even to see the fruits of the success of those policies in a wide range of areas. A few years ago at this conference I commented on the six simultaneous miracles that an overworked staff was being challenged to perform. It is remarkable that they have largely succeeded in performing those miracles in the years since. The license renewal process is a resounding success. The revised oversight process, which involved a fundamental overhaul and integration of our inspection, assessment and enforcement processes, has been a tremendous success, although we still see areas for improvement and are committed to making those improvements. We have markedly improved the timeliness of our license amendment process and have not been an impediment to the remarkable consolidation taking place in the industry. I am convinced that this consolidation is bringing further improvements in safety to the industry. We have met the challenge posed by the tremendous growth in independent spent fuel storage facilities. We have certified a wide range of casks, including dual-purpose casks, and established a stable, timely and predictable process for certifications and amendments to certifications. Even in the area of risk-informed regulation, which Commissioner Diaz addressed yesterday, we have made modest progress. I appreciate Commissioner Diaz' impatience and his use of the bully pulpit, as Teddy Roosevelt called it, to urge faster action by the staff and greater investment in probabilistic risk assessment tools by the industry. But these are hard issues and I am afraid progress will continue to come in fits and starts. I do want to call to your attention a document that does a good job of summarizing these and other achievements of NRC's staff in recent years. It is the United States country report to Nuclear Safety Convention review conference, which will take place in April in Vienna. It is available on our web page. The reports of several other countries are available on their web pages as well and the IAEA web page provides links to those reports. I want to devote the remainder of my remarks to security issues. Much of what I will have to say is in reaction to Paul Leventhal's presentation yesterday afternoon in this room. Mr. Leventhal has made quite a media splash since September 11. He has been willing to share his expertise on law enforcement, intelligence and national security matters with any microphone or camera in his vicinity. Unfortunately, his expertise is quite thin and his biases are quite obvious. Anyone who disagrees with him is dismissed. Yesterday I was proud to see the Commission lumped in with the head of New York State's Office of Public Security, Mr. James Kallstrom, for Mr. Leventhal's criticism. Mr. Kallstrom, who spent most of his career in the FBI, was criticized for not sharing Mr. Leventhal's view that the Indian Point plants are "soft targets" and for making remarks to the effect that a terrorist attack on Indian Point would result in a lot of dead terrorists. I share Mr. Kallstrom's perspective and am happy to stand shoulder to shoulder by him. The Commission was criticized yesterday by Mr. Leventhal as a "captured agency: its financing, budgeting, decision-making and Commissioner nominations all controlled by industry." This is a heck of a conspiracy which Mr. Leventhal perceives. Mel Gibson and Julia Roberts might want to sign up for "Conspiracy Theory II" if Mr. Leventhal wants to write a screenplay. This one is a doozy because it must involve the highest officials of both political parties in this country for the past half dozen years or more. All five current Commissioners were first nominated by President Clinton. The White House personnel process in the Clinton administration for appointments to scientific agencies involved the President's Science Advisor and the Vice President's office because of Mr. Gore's deep interest in science and technology issues. Much of the Senate, which has confirmed all of us by voice vote, three of us twice, must be in on this conspiracy. Obviously the new administration must be as well. It is one heck of a conspiracy. It even extends to our intelligence, law enforcement and national security agencies who do not share Mr. Leventhal's overwrought and alarmist views and to every Governor and presumably the security advisors to those Governors who have failed to act on Mr. Leventhal's hysterical recommendations. There is an alternative theory that would describe all this data. And that is that Mr. Leventhal is flat wrong. I subscribe to this theory. Let me explain why. Mr. Leventhal loves to call our nuclear power plants "soft targets." No responsible person would make that claim. Long before September 11, the NRC had put in place at commercial nuclear power plants the most robust security regime for any commercial facilities in this country. And we alone in the critical infrastructure tested that security regime in force-on-force exercises. Now Mr. Leventhal loves to misuse the results of these Operational Safeguards Response Evaluations (OSREs). These were not pass-fail exams. As you all know, they were meant to identify weaknesses that needed to be corrected. The attacking force is credited with almost perfect knowledge of the plant's defenses and perfect knowledge of the plant's layout and the equipment they need to attack to try to bring about core damage. They are credited with very substantial capabilities to penetrate barriers in short periods of time. It is much like giving the St. Louis Rams Bill Belichek's defensive playbook before the Super Bowl, so that they know in advance how he plans to attack every St. Louis offensive formation and expecting the Patriots to still win the Super Bowl. In fact, under our rules Mr. Belichek would not even be able to make changes in his defensive sets once it became clear Kurt Warner had the Patriots' defensive playbook. But with all these advantages to the mock terrorists, in individual drills the attacking force reached its target sets only 15 percent of the time, in 9 of 59 drills, in 15 OSREs conducted between April 2000 and August 2001. And reaching target sets does not equate to core damage, for operators could well still recover the plant. And core damage does not equate to a radiological disaster, as Three Mile Island showed. As Chairman Meserve says, we make tough evaluations and then we insure that any weaknesses identified are promptly fixed. If our licensees were subjected to easier drills and we never found any weaknesses, Mr. Leventhal would undoubtedly be the first to criticize NRC. And in that case, his criticism would be warranted. Nuclear power plants are hard targets by any conceivable definition. If Mr. Leventhal wants to find soft targets, modest attacks on which could result in mass casualties with little danger to a terrorist, they are unfortunately available in abundance to a terrorist planner. We as a nation will need to do what we can to mitigate those vulnerabilities in our critical infrastructure in the years ahead. We will never eliminate them. But Mr. Leventhal wants us to devote enormous additional resources to the already most hardened element of our critical infrastructure. And he would do it in nonsensical ways. Since September 11, Mr. Leventhal has been calling for the deployment of "anti-aircraft guns" at commercial nuclear reactors. In mid-October I saw Mr. Leventhal on the margins of a Commission meeting and told him these guns don't exist in the United States Army. The last guns the Army or the Army National Guard deployed were the M-42 Dusters, which were still in the New Mexico National Guard when I first went to work for Senator Bingaman in the early 1980s, but have long since been retired. The Sergeant York Division Air Defense (DIVAD) gun was cancelled in the mid-1980s and the Army now uses an array of missile systems from shoulder-fired Stingers to long-range Patriots for air defense. I told him that he had essentially been demanding that a corporal with a Stinger and a telephone line to the White House be deployed at each of the 63 commercial nuclear power plant sites. The corporal would presumably have orders to take down any commercial airliner whose trajectory the corporal didn't like, if in those few seconds he had to react he could get permission to fire. Pretty amazing stuff. This was of course all news to our military expert, Mr. Leventhal, although I have noticed that he now calls for "radar-directed anti-aircraft batteries" when he speaks. And Raytheon, in typical defense contractor fashion, has pointed out that they could adapt the Navy's terminal ship defense gun, the Phalanx, for air defense of nuclear facilities. If Mr. Leventhal had ever seen a Phalanx fired, he would have severe doubts about the wisdom of his expert military advice. In a letter which Chairman Meserve sent Monday to Congressman Markey, we stated the following: "The NRC sees no need to deploy anti-aircraft weaponry at any commercial nuclear facilities in the United States. After consultation with the Department of Defense, the Office of Homeland Security and the Federal Aviation Administration, the Commission believes that there would be enormous command and control problems and a large potential for unintended consequences and collateral damage if such weaponry were deployed. The Commission believes that the proper way to deal with the potential hijacking of large commercial aircraft by suicidal terrorists is through the measures on airline security now well underway." Mr. Leventhal also advocates the deployment (presumably round the clock) of "30 to 40 specially trained infantry troops" at each site. Now if I take 35 and multiply by 63 sites (he may have more in mind) and then multiply by 5 to insure 24-7 coverage, I get 11,000 troops. Throw in a command, support, logistics and training infrastructure and we get pretty close to an Army division. Let's call it Leventhal's division. Now before we deploy this force, we would have a few minor technical issues to work out, such as the Posse Comitatus statute and the complete and total opposition of the Pentagon (I don't think I'd need to ask). It's not going to happen, although I would certainly not discourage Mr. Leventhal from working it into his screenplay for "Conspiracy Theory II." I could go on. But my bottom line is that I am a pretty conventional guy, and I would prefer my military advice come from the Pentagon, my law enforcement advice come from the FBI and the Justice Department, and my intelligence advice come from the intelligence community. I will continue to give the expert advice of Mr. Leventhal in all these areas the due consideration it deserves. The Commission has much to do in the months ahead on security matters. It is the single issue which has most dominated our time since September 11. We have a firm foundation on which to build and we will continue to insure that these facilities are the best defended and most physically hardened facilities in our critical infrastructure. We will do so responsibly, in full consultation with the Office of Homeland Security, the Justice Department, the Pentagon, the intelligence community and others. We hope that the Congress will pass the legislation which we have been requesting for many years that we believe would bolster the current security regime. The NRC is not an independent actor on homeland security matters. We need to be part of the integrated national effort which the President is seeking to put in place with the help of the Congress. A year from now I believe that we can have much of our enhanced security regime in place. I look forward to discussing these issues with you then. Thank you, and I'd be happy to answer any questions. ***************************************************************** 7 NRC: Merrifield: Speech - 8 - History's Lessons for Our Future Challenges OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS Office of Public Affairs Telephone: 301/415-8200 Washington, DC 20555-001 E-mail: opa@nrc.gov [opa@nrc.gov] Web Site: Public Affairs Web Site No. S-02-008 PDF Version (46 KB)[PDF Icon] HISTORY'S LESSONS FOR OUR FUTURE CHALLENGES by The Honorable Jeffrey S. Merrifield Commissioner U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 14th Annual Regulatory Information Conference (RIC) RIC 2002 Capital Hilton Hotel Washington, DC March 6. 2002 Introduction At this point in the Regulatory Information Conference, I am sure you have heard a dozen speakers tell you how this time last year no one could have imagined the events of September 11th. No rational person would have. While the Commission's response to the events of September 11th were immediate and substantial, we have not allowed ourselves to be swept up by irrational fears. In the short term, we shifted our focus from important ongoing initiatives, like preparing for the review of new plant applications, to ensuring that the existing fleet is secure. Not only did we issue a series of threat advisories, but recently we issued specific orders to reactor licensees to further enhance security. For the long term, it is obvious that we must remain focused on security issues. However, we must not lose momentum on initiatives that are critical to safety and regulatory effectiveness, such as those associated with enhancing the Reactor Oversight Program, our fire protection standards, and risk-informing our regulations. Before I address how we will meet this ambitious and challenging agenda, as security has been the Commission's principal concern over the last five months, I want to first share my own views of how we should proceed on security. Ernest Hemingway once said, "never mistake motion for action." There may be only a subtle difference between motion and action initially, but in the end, they produce different results. Though our motives have always been clear, to maintain public health, safety, and security, our regulatory efforts have not always been as successful as we hoped. I believe it is essential that our security review be conducted in a disciplined and informed manner learning from the lessons of our more significant regulatory hurdles, such as those learned from the Three Mile Island accident. History as Our Guide To appreciate how lessons learned from the TMI accident might be applicable to our current situation, let me remind you of some of its details. Occurring almost twenty-three years ago, on the morning of March 28, 1979, the accident quickly led to severe reactor core damage at TMI, Unit 2. Unfolding media coverage of the event over the next few days included reports of radiation releases, experts raising the possibility of a hydrogen explosion, and great uncertainties over emergency planning. As the event wore on, public alarm continued to escalate. Understandably, the American public focused not only on the safety of TMI, but on the safety of the entire fleet of nuclear reactors. Underlying that concern was one question, are these plants safe? In response, President Jimmy Carter and Congress acted swiftly and demanded full investigations into the accident. The President created a Commission chaired by then Dartmouth College President, John Kemeny to make recommendations about improving nuclear safety. The Kemeny Commission concluded that fundamental changes were necessary in the organization, procedures, practices "and above all -- in the attitudes" of the NRC and the nuclear industry. Congress held numerous hearings and drafted legislation aimed at holding the industry and NRC responsible for the accident and the events surrounding it. Not until September 11, 2001, would our nation again have that degree of focus and concern about the safety of nuclear power. As with the events of TMI, President George W. Bush and Congress have responded. The President created the Homeland Security Council to evaluate the vulnerabilities of the nation's infrastructure, including nuclear power plants, to determine the most effective use of federal assets to protect these potential targets. Congress for its part has responded by drafting numerous pieces of legislation, holding hearings and sending inquiries to the NRC regarding security. Obviously the accident at TMI and the events of September 11th, are vastly different. Yet, both events involved accident scenarios that were not considered likely, and consequently neither the federal government, nor the Commission had ready answers to the mounting questions. Just like the events of TMI, the events of September 11th and the continued high threat environment, have placed a tremendous burden on the NRC and industry to demonstrate that nuclear power plants are safe. Because of these similarities, I believe it would be useful to examine some of the lessons learned from the TMI experience. Lesson 1, Focus on the Big Picture - Safety In response to the events of September 11th, the NRC is undertaking a comprehensive review of our physical security and safeguards requirements. In conducting this task, we must remember two important lessons from TMI that demonstrate the need to ensure that regulatory requirements promote safety. The first lesson is to resist the temptation to rapidly address security issues with a new set of burdensome, prescriptive or ineffective requirements. As the Kemeny Commission so clearly stated, such requirements can detract from safety. In 1979, the Kemeny Commission stated that the NRC had a "preoccupation with regulations."(1) Although it noted that it is the responsibility of the NRC to issue regulations to assure safety, it found that "once regulations become as voluminous and complex as those regulations now in place, they can serve as a negative factor in nuclear safety."(2) Indeed, the Kemeny Report described the NRC regulations as "so complex that immense efforts are required by the utility, by its suppliers, and by the NRC to assure that regulations are complied with." The Report went on to conclude that "it is an absorbing concern with safety that will bring about safety -- not just the meeting of narrowly prescribed and complex regulations."(3) The second important lesson that we have learned from our post-TMI experience is that once a rule is promulgated, even if in hindsight we identify it as too prescriptive, it is an enormous regulatory undertaking to undo it. For example, in 1984 the staff initiated its "marginal-to-safety initiative" and identified a number of requirements that would benefit from a more performance-based, less prescriptive approach. As early as 1986, Appendix J to Part 50, which contains requirements for primary containment leakage testing for water-cooled power reactors, was identified as a potential candidate for change. Yet, the rule modification allowing licensees the option to use a less prescriptive approach, despite extraordinary staff efforts, was not finalized until 1995, nine years later.(4) Consistent with a more performance-based approach, the Commission, prior to September 11th, was reviewing its security program to determine if a less prescriptive set of requirements could enhance plant security. As part of this effort, the Commission agreed to pilot the Safeguards Performance Assessment, or SPA, program. That program contemplated more frequent force-on-force, exercises, but permitted less direct involvement by the NRC staff in conducting the more frequent exercises. Irrespective of whether the Commission eventually determines that the SPA program or another security oversight program is appropriate, the Commission cannot lose sight of the lessons learned from TMI. Regulations that are hastily issued can have profound and long-lasting consequences, and as shown in the case of TMI, do not necessarily lead to improvements in safety. Lesson 2, Communicate and be Understood Another important lesson that we can learn from TMI is the importance of effective communication. When looking at many of the communication lapses that took place during the TMI event, one of the more disturbing examples occurred on March 30, 1979, two days after the event first began. NRC senior officials, located in Bethesda, recommended that Governor Dick Thornburgh order an immediate evacuation of the area downwind from the TMI facility. They made this recommendation without calling the Commissioners whose offices were in Washington, D.C. This recommendation was based on unverified information that later turned out to be incorrect. The Pennsylvania State authorities with more up to date information decided to reject the staff's recommendation and did not order the evacuation at that time. When the Governor called the NRC's Chairman, Joseph Hendrie, to discuss the matter, the Chairman apologized for "the NRC staff error in recommending evacuation." However, by that time, civil defense authorities had announced over the radio that an evacuation might be called.(5) This was only one of a multitude of communication lapses that occurred during the TMI crisis. I chose this example to illustrate the importance of communication, because it involved several breaks in the communication chain, and it escalated an already extremely tense situation. It involved a breakdown in communication within the NRC, between the NRC and the State of Pennsylvania, and between the NRC and the TMI control room. Because it occurred two days after the initial event, the warning of a possible evacuation caused further questions to be raised about the safety of nearby communities. The Commission must never repeat these mistakes. I am confident that our present emergency response procedures have addressed the TMI communication failures that I have highlighted. However, security issues present different communication concerns because they involve intelligence information that for good reasons must be closely held. Consequently, strict procedures are in place to ensure that only individuals who hold an appropriate clearance, possess secure communications equipment, and who have a "need to know" are permitted to receive the information. Our efforts to respond to the events of September 11th were complicated because generally we have not granted security clearances to our licensees. To address this issue, the NRC is working with licensees to provide a limited number of clearances at each site to allow access to classified information. This is a major step that should help resolve previous problems in this area. To improve internal NRC communications, the NRC is providing secure telephones to our Resident Inspectors. Nevertheless, the importance of effective communication should not be understated. As was absolutely clear during the TMI accident, technical expertise is not enough in a crisis situation if the holders of essential information are not appropriately communicating with each other. In fact, as was illustrated, one mistake can cause significant confusion and unnecessary public panic. Therefore, we must continue to take steps to test and address our present communications systems to ensure that we can transmit vital information in this high threat environment. Lesson 3, Keep the Public Informed Similarly, effective communication between the NRC and the public is essential. The public's confidence in the security of nuclear facilities depends, in part, on how well the NRC communicates its regulatory actions. In 1979, during the TMI event, the lack of timely and accurate information caused the public to question whether the plant was safe, and whether the NRC and the industry could be trusted. Despite the extensive media coverage of the TMI accident, the Kemeny Commission found that "neither the utility nor the NRC nor the media were sufficiently prepared to serve the public well."(6) That conclusion was not based on reporters trying to come up with sensational headlines. Instead, the Kemeny Commission concluded that, "a combination of confusion and weakness in the sources of information and a lack of understanding on the part of the media resulted in the public being poorly served."(7) The NRC has learned from these lessons and has been seeking out ways to better communicate with the public and the media. In recent years we created massive databases of publicly-available information including our automated electronic document retrieval system, ADAMS, and the NRC Website. Though there have been some significant, inexcusable glitches identified with ADAMS, it is important to note that a principal goal of our information technology efforts has been to enhance the public's access to information. Despite recent advances in our ability to communicate with the public, concerns that information in our databases could be used for malicious purposes, caused us to take several steps. We took down our public Website, we refused to make certain documents publicly available and we changed our interactions with the public to ensure that sensitive information was not being disclosed. We have now brought our Website on-line again, although it does not contain the amount of information that it once did. Because information contained in our databases may be of interest to those with malicious intentions, it would be utterly irresponsible for us to ignore the unintended, but potentially significant harm that could result from inappropriate disclosure. Members of the public are concerned that our restrictions on disclosure are compromising their ability to interact in NRC public meetings and adjudications. These criticisms concern me. Our regulatory process benefits from the valuable insights offered by the public. As the TMI lessons demonstrate, timely and accurate information to the public is essential. Therefore, we must continually assess and improve our communication efforts. Although it is unfortunate that we will never be able to permit the breadth of public disclosure that we permitted prior to September 11th, we should remain committed to disclosing as much information as prudently possible. Lesson 4, Question the Adequacy of Safety The Kemeny Report identified a complacent attitude or "mindset" toward nuclear safety as a major contributor to the TMI accident. According to the Report, the widespread belief that plant equipment and operations were sufficiently safe led to numerous programmatic deficiencies.(8) The specific deficiencies included inadequate training, procedures lacking in clarity, and a failure of organizations to learn from previous incidents.(9) The report concluded that this attitude must be changed to one that "continually question[s] whether the safeguards already in place are sufficient to prevent major accidents."(10) I can say with confidence that the NRC and the industry have made substantial organizational changes to address lessons learned from TMI about the need for a questioning attitude. However, the continued threat environment teaches us that we need to ask many more questions before we complete our current security review. The federal government, the NRC and industry must resist the temptation to prematurely conclude that nuclear security is adequate. I want to emphasize that we and our licensees are not the sole participants in the effort to ensure the security of nuclear power plants. The September 11th attack was an attack on our nation, and consequently, efforts to prevent and respond to any similar attack will require a national response including state and local involvement. That is not to say that our licensees are not responsible for security at their facilities. To the contrary, they have demonstrated that they are committed to protecting their substantial plant assets and the communities surrounding their plants. But I am convinced that a terrorist act aimed at our nation, whether targeted at a nuclear plant or another facility, is going to require a comprehensive national response in order to prevent it, protect against it, or respond to it. While it would be easy to myopically focus solely on capabilities of the plants themselves, there are two issues we must keep in mind as we reassess the security requirements for the licensed facilities we regulate. First, security is a shared burden. It falls not simply on private companies, but must include a holistic approach that recognizes and utilizes the significant capabilities of our federal, state, and local governments. Second, nuclear power plants already possess robust safeguard and security programs that are far superior to other portions of the critical infrastructure. Common sense will be an important tool in our effort to find the right balance. Not Losing Sight of Ongoing Initiatives I would like to shift focus now from security to other important agency initiatives that were underway on September 11th, and that continue to require significant agency attention. It would be easy to immerse ourselves exclusively into security issues, but that would be a huge mistake. Security is but one element of safety. Day-to-day safe operations require a tremendous amount of attention from our licensees, and if our oversight is to be effective, it must be focused and rigorous. The NRC has made significant progress in numerous programmatic areas and we have a responsibility to continue to improve. Let me detail a few of the ongoing initiatives that I believe are extremely important and which I believe cannot be neglected. 1. It goes without saying that we must not lose focus on our efforts associated with license renewals and new plant licensing. We face significant challenges in these areas and thus, we must provide the resources necessary to keep these programs on track. In this respect, I will leave you with two cautions associated with these programs. First, license renewals must never become routine either for our licensees or for our staff. Licensees must never take shortcuts in their aging management programs, and our staff must never become complacent in their reviews. Second, licensees considering new plant construction must not allow these efforts to distract them from the safety of their existing plants. Constructing a new plant would be a significant endeavor for any licensee, but such an effort cannot interfere with effective and safe day-to-day operation of their current reactors. 2. Another critical area of importance is fire-protection. There is no more glaring example of complex, prescriptive and voluminous regulations than our fire protection regulations contained in Part 50, Appendix R. These regulations are so convoluted that licensees spend an inordinate effort trying to understand and comply with our regulations. The NRC spends an equally inordinate amount of time interpreting the regulations and ensuring consistent compliance and enforcement. I have no doubt that this is exactly the type of regulation that the Kemeny Report criticized. While the staff has been working on developing a risk-informed alternative standard: NFPA 805, the progress has been unacceptably slow. We must accelerate our efforts so that we can move beyond the unintended consequences associated with Appendix R and focus our efforts on developing sound and clear fire protection requirements. 3. Few would disagree that the new Reactor Oversight Program has dramatically improved our oversight of reactor safety and performance through the use of objective performance indicators and a risk-informed inspection process. It has enhanced regulatory effectiveness, transparency and predictability. In these ways it has served our agency, licensees and the American public very well. We cannot let progress in this area stagnate. We must continue to look at performance indicators that could produce unintended consequences and which may adversely effect safety. It would be absolutely irresponsible to ignore these matters and lose the potential opportunity to make safety enhancements. We also must improve our significance determination process (SDP). It is cumbersome and in many cases untimely. We must improve the tools we provide our inspectors and regions for assessing risk. Specifically, we must make it a top priority to provide more resources for validating our SDP notebooks and developing SPAR models. We must also resolve regional inconsistencies. Regional inconsistencies lead to regulatory instability and unpredictability, outcomes that I find unacceptable. My challenge to NRR is to make these improvements and continue to look for ways to further enhance our oversight program. 4. Another area we need to continue to enhance is our power uprate review process. The agency has been significantly challenged over the last few years with the increasing number of new uprate applications and with many licensees requesting larger power uprates. We must have confidence that our safety reviews are consistently thorough, efficient, and timely. I am pleased that NRR is now focusing on improving our review process for small uprates related to improved feedwater flow measurement techniques. I encourage NRR to seriously consider the merits of developing a Standard Review Plan for power uprates to ensure regulatory consistency, efficiency and scrutability. 5. The last important safety issue that I would like to address is a possible unintended consequence of our Part 50, Appendix B, quality assurance requirements for nuclear power plants. As many of you know, the number of suppliers with Appendix B quality assurance programs has been declining in the past several years as many of them are adopting the internationally accepted ISO-9000 programs and exiting the nuclear business. As I stated at the Water Reactor Safety Meeting two years ago, my concern is that our Appendix B requirements may be inappropriately discouraging high-quality component suppliers from participating in the U.S. nuclear market. If so, our requirements may unwittingly inhibit potential safety enhancements from taking place. As I have stated before, I believe our staff should take a fresh look at Appendix B and our regulatory framework surrounding quality assurance. The staff should assess options for adopting more widely accepted international quality standards like ISO-9000. The first time I raised this issue, it received a less than enthusiastic response from the staff and from NUPIC. More recently, some of these same people have begun to express an interest in exploring the potential safety and economic merits of my proposal. I intend to knock on the staff's and NUPIC's door one more time, and this time I expect the door to be opened. I need to be confident that the less than enthusiastic response I received the first time was not because people had become so comfortable with Appendix B that they were resistant to change. Comfort and stagnation are unacceptable in a vibrant regulatory agency and a vibrant industry. We cannot let a "we've always done it that way" mentality stifle regulatory innovations that can improve safety. Conclusion Last year we thought we had a lot on our regulatory plate. We had many of the same important ongoing initiatives and we were just coming to grips with the prospect of new plant licensing. This year our plate is overflowing, and security issues are the main course. Our staff has done a terrific job of opening up new lines of communication with our federal counterparts, working tirelessly to identify potential plant vulnerabilities, and keeping ever mindful of the need to communicate effectively with the public. At the same time, they have maintained their watchful eye on safe nuclear operations. For this, I thank them. While we will ask even more from our staff in the coming year, we must recognize that effectively protecting nuclear plants is a challenge for us all. I am confident that together we can work through this critical period of our nation's history. Thank you for joining me today. I have left a few minutes open for questions. 1. Report of the President's Commission On the Accident at Three Mile Island, The Need for Change: The Legacy of TMI, (October 30,1979)(referred to as the "Kemeny Report"), at 9. 2. Id. 3. Id. 4. Final Rule, "Primary Reactor Containment Leakage Testing for Water-Cooled Power Reactors," 60 Fed. Reg. 49,495 (September 26, 1995). 5. Kemeny Report at 118-19. 6. Id. at 19. 7. Id. 8. Id. at 8-9. 9. Id. at 11. 10. Id. at 9. ***************************************************************** 8 Keeping Track of Atomic Matter Louise Knapp"> By Louise Knapp [louiseb@wired.com 2:00 a.m. March 20, 2002 PST All that's needed for a do-it-yourself nuclear bomb is a little bit of know-how, an old cannon, and a few kilograms plutonium or enriched uranium. At least it sounds that easy, according to George Bunn, consulting professor at Stanford University's Institute for International Studies [http://iis.stanford.edu/] (IIS). "If you got hold of an old cannon and plugged each end with enriched uranium and then banged the two together, it'd go off in the same way the bomb at Hiroshima did," Bunn said. Obtaining the necessary ingredients may not be too difficult: There are stashes plutonium and enriched uranium scattered all over the world -- but a good deal of it is not accounted for. "Russia, for example, has over 6,000 tons of weapons-usable material, and only a third of it has been secured," said IIS researcher Lyudmila Zaitseva. Aware that it's probably a good idea to track such explosive material, the IIS team created a database that monitors its whereabouts. "The main goal of the database is to alert people to the problem, to raise awareness that this stuff is out there and unprotected," Bunn said. The database not only tracks incidents where weapons-usable material might be missing, it also records incidents involving the more common, everyday variety of radioactive material located in devices such as radiotherapy machines found in cancer clinics. "You can spread other types of radioactive material around via a bomb and make people sick and scare the bejeezers out of them," Bunn said. The IIS project is called the Database on Nuclear Smuggling, Theft and Orphan Radiation Sources (DSTO). "Orphaned" refers to material that has been "lost," intentionally or by mistake. Information gleaned from the database so far shows that about 40 kilograms of weapons-usable uranium and plutonium have been stolen from nuclear facilities in the former Soviet Union during the last decade. While most of that material was retrieved, 2 kilos of highly enriched uranium remains missing, Bunn said. Zaitseva believes this is only the tip of the iceberg. She estimates that the real amount of missing weapons-grade material could be 10 times higher. Bunn agrees. "A lot of our information typically comes from arrests made by border control. But if you take estimates from drug trafficking, then the U.S. catches less than 20 percent, and I suspect it's no better catching those who are trying to smuggle other kinds of material across the border." Information for the DSTO is gathered from two unclassified databases: the International Atomic Energy Agency [http://www.iaea.or.at/] 's Illicit Trafficking Database, and the Newly Independent States' Nuclear Trafficking Database at the Monterey Institute of International Studies [http://cns.miis.edu/index.htm] . The IAEA database draws from state-confirmed incidents, and the Monterey database is confined to incidents in the former Soviet Union. The IIS team also gathers information from newspapers, the Internet and transcripts of conferences. "Information in countries like Bangladesh or Pakistan has to be gathered with very little help from the government so you have to use open sources," Zaitseva said. "It makes the picture more complete." » Lycos Worldwide © Copyright ***************************************************************** 9 AABE Reaffirms Support for Nuclear Energy U.S. Newswire 19 Mar 18:47 American Association of Blacks in Energy Reaffirms Support for Nuclear Energy To: National Desk, Energy Reporter Contact: Robert Hill of the American Association of Blacks in Energy, 202-371-9530 WASHINGTON, March 19 /U.S. Newswire/ -- Reacting to ongoing controversy regarding the role of nuclear power in the U.S., the American Association of Blacks in Energy issued a statement reaffirming its position on the use of nuclear energy. In response to the Administration's call last fall for expansion of nuclear energy in the United States as a major component of our national energy policy, AABE issued the following position: AABE supports environmentally sound development and re-licensing of nuclear facilities. The organization particularly supports making a decision on a deep geologic repository for nuclear waste. There will always be uncertainties and, hence a need for carefully monitoring, but protection of public health can better be accomplished in one site instead of continuing the current practice of onsite storage. "Nuclear energy is the second largest source of U.S. electricity generation, supplying the needs of one of every five homes and businesses. It has proven over the past couple of decades to be safe, reliable, low in cost and environmentally friendly," said Robert Hill, AABE's executive director. "Our quality of life depends upon electricity that is reliable and affordable -- and nuclear is an important part of the mix." The American Association of Blacks in Energy is an organization of energy professionals dedicated to ensuring the input of African Americans and other minorities into the development of energy policy. It endorses nuclear energy as an essential policy consideration and one obvious solution to electricity supply and price problems. According to some recent surveys, the majority of Americans express support for the construction of new nuclear power plants, and two-thirds of the public believe nuclear energy should continue as a primary component of the nation's energy mix. AABE feels the loss of nuclear energy would mean enormous costs for the American public -- both economically and environmentally -- through loss of jobs and more expensive, polluting replacement sources. Given the prospect of rolling blackouts, price volatility and environmental repercussions associated with fossil fuels, nuclear energy is imperative to a rational U.S. energy policy for the twenty-first century. Copyright 2002, U.S. Newswire ***************************************************************** 10 Bush Won't OK N.Korean Nuclear Deal Las Vegas SUN Today: March 20, 2002 at 1:15:15 PST WASHINGTON- President Bush is planning to adopt a new policy position toward North Korea that, in effect, expresses doubts about that country's willingness to be a non-nuclear state. An administration official said Tuesday that Bush has decided to refuse to certify to Congress that North Korea is not hiding nuclear bomb-making materials. The official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said the decision will have no practical effect on U.S. nuclear cooperation with North Korea but amounts to a clear signal of U.S. unhappiness with Pyongyang. It comes less than two months after Bush moved closer to a confrontation with North Korea by listing that country as part of an "axis of evil" with Iran and Iraq. Bush's decision not to certify relates to a 1994 agreement with which North Korea pledged to freeze its suspected nuclear weapons program in exchange for two light-water nuclear reactors financed mostly by South Korea and Japan. North Korea has been allowing International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors to monitor the site where the nuclear program was frozen. The Bush administration questions whether North Korea has carried out a secret nuclear bomb project elsewhere. The key U.S. contribution to the 1994 agreement is to provide 500,000 tons of fuel to North Korea each year to help the country cover its energy needs during the period before the new reactors become operational. As a condition for the fuel deliveries to go ahead, however, Congress insisted the president examine North Korean compliance with all provisions of the 1994 agreement. The president can certify North Korean compliance, waive the requirement or not certify. Until now, North Korea has been certified every year, but Bush this year will exercise his waiver authority to show unhappiness with North Korea's refusal to disclose its nuclear history fully by permitting inspections by the IAEA, the official said. The waiver will not block future fuel deliveries. The issue has been attracting increasing administration attention because inspections must be completed before key components of the two new reactors are installed. Construction for the new reactors, which replace plutonium-producing models, is expected to begin in August, and managers of the project estimate that a significant portion will be completed by May 2005. Henry Sokolsky and Victor Galinsky, nonproliferation experts who are highly critical of North Korea, wrote last month that the three-year time lag may seem like a long time but insisted it's not. It will take the agency at least three to four years after Pyongyang grants full access to all nuclear sites "to determine if it is making or hiding nuclear weapons materials," Sokolsky and Galinsky said in an opinion piece in The Wall Street Journal. They said even with the low-end inspection estimate of three years, Pyongyang must open up to inspections by May for the process to be completed by the May 2005 target date. The U.S. official said the administration has clear evidence that North Korea has no intention of allowing the IAEA inspections to take place. On the Net: Library of Congress country study on North Korea: http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/kptoc.html [http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/kptoc.html] All contents copyright 2002 Las Vegas SUN, Inc. ***************************************************************** 11 CAN: Graham pushes nuclear cutbacks By JEFF SALLOT Wednesday, March 20, 2002 – Page A17 OTTAWA -- Foreign Affairs Minister Bill Graham chided the world's nuclear powers yesterday for the pace of their progress on treaty obligations to eliminate all nuclear weapons from their arsenals. In a speech to the United Nations Conference on Disarmament in Geneva yesterday, Mr. Graham resurrected much of the arms-control agenda of Lloyd Axworthy, one of his predecessors. Mr. Graham called for a global treaty banning nuclear testing and a protocol for enforcing a 30-year-old pact that outlaws biological weapons. He also said the current ban on nuclear weapons in space should be extended to include all weapons, a move that could put Ottawa at odds with Washington, its closest military ally. The Pentagon is financing research on space-based laser weapons that could be deployed by 2015. Mr. Graham said that if the UN conference is unable to make progress on the space issue, an ad hoc process could be established, much as Mr. Axworthy did to negotiate a treaty banning land mines. Although Mr. Graham avoided pointing to any one country in his speech, he warned that the world faces "a situation of grave concern," in which even existing arms-control agreements are being threatened by unilateralism. Later, he said Ottawa wants Washington to understand that its own long-term interests are best served by multilateral treaties. [http://www.globeandmail.com/newsletter/] ***************************************************************** 12 NRC: Diaz: Speech - 4 - When... Large is Small and Small is Large OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS Office of Public Affairs Telephone: 301/415-8200 Washington, DC 20555-001 E-mail: opa@nrc.gov [opa@nrc.gov] Web Site: Public Affairs Web Site No. S-02-004 WHEN... LARGE IS SMALL AND SMALL IS LARGE Remarks of Commissioner Nils J. Diaz United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Before the 2002 Regulatory Information Conference March 5, 2002 Good afternoon, I am pleased to be here and make good on my "I'll see you next year" parting remark. As usual, I will be presenting my individual views. This is my 6th opportunity to address the Regulatory Information Conference. Time flies when.... I have used this forum to present my philosophy of regulation and practical pointers for strengthening the NRC regulatory infrastructure and its relationship to public safety, to licensees and to stakeholders. I have tried to push the envelope with principles and practices, and I ain't changing now. Protection of public health and safety and the common defense and security is our business. For nuclear power plants, when the threat is terrorism and sabotage, security is a subset of safety. Today, security is very important; however, it should not overwhelm the safe operation and regulation of nuclear power plants. Security of nuclear power plants must be established in an integral manner with all the safety objectives and all their safety features, internal and external to the plant. Besides national security, energy security is also making headlines. I believe energy security is a key component of national security, and that the safe and reliable operation of nuclear power plants is vital to our energy security. With a feeling of deja vu, allow me to recall my first RIC appearance in 1997, where I outlined three common objectives for consideration by NRC and industry: 1. to develop the capability to differentiate routinely between issues of higher and lower safety significance; 2. to establish sensible priorities, so that resources are applied where they are needed most; and 3. to provide clarity and specificity in the way that we communicate. I stated that, by achieving those objectives, we could help assure that all of us contribute to the quality of life of the American people. These objectives were as practical then as they are now, and especially applicable to the physical security of nuclear power plants. Many of the improvements made during the last few years at the NRC have been along these lines. For example, the Commission first tackled and appeared to resolve the "compliance vs safety" standoff, and from that point, resolved many regulatory and process issues using real safety as the determinant. These solutions propagated into the practical resolution of licensing, regulation and enforcement issues, where it was necessary to differentiate between issues of higher and lower safety significance, using changes in regulation when needed, but often developing timely and suitable processes for decision-making without rule changes. Sensible priorities have been used to determine where resources would do the most good. Can we do any less for physical security in the aftermath of September 11? I think not. It is now vital to think, implement and measure security using similar principles, not just "doing something" but doing something good, and resisting doing the unnecessary for appearance's sake. Our national security begins and ends with the principles and practices of our democratic society, and with every component of our society that assures our freedom and the pursuit of happiness. Security does not depend on any one component, but on multiple layers of physical structures, systems and components, as well as other protective measures. For example, protection of public health and safety is not solely dependent on the survivability of the containment, but also on the survivability of the protective systems, including the emergency response infrastructure, that assure the American people that their well-being is protected. The health effects of the Chernobyl disaster were not only due to the failure of the reactor and the lack of a containment, but of the failure of a totalitarian society to protect its people. And in that sense, I can assure you that America will not fail: we will protect our people, with every available means, whatever happens. And now, maybe more than ever, we need to have clarity and specificity in our communications. I know we all have struggled with deciding what pieces of information could aid our enemies, and struggled with the balancing of restrictions that address the need to protect the public with the public's need to know. And it is in deciding this balance that there is no substitute for clarity in purpose and action. These are responsibilities that befall every American: do provide information that is helpful to America; do not provide unsubstantiated information to create fear; and do provide substantiated information to defeat the roots of fear, with deeds and words. "Deeds without words will not be understood, words without deeds will not be accepted." As we face the challenges of today and tomorrow, I will continue to publicly respond to counter unsubstantiated information and the unjustifiable fear that it can cause in our people, and the damage it could inflict to our common defense and security, our economy and our general well-being by the misdirection of resources that could result. September 11 is a harsh reality, a reality that demands good deeds and good words. It is also a reality that nuclear power plants are vital to the energy security of this country and, therefore, to the well-being of our people. Thus, it is our responsibility to bolster nuclear facilities' defenses within the envelope of reasonable protection of public health and safety and the common defense and security. Often you have heard me speak about the need for predictability in a regulator. It is imperative that both regulators and licensees respond to the security needs of this country in a predictable manner. That is why I believe that requiring prudent compensatory measures during a period of a high level threat was needed. Requiring common sense protective actions makes clear to the public, and predictable to both the public and the licensees, what is expected during a high level threat environment. The NRC needed to add clarity to physical security measures, with the information we had and with our knowledge of the facilities. It was the right thing to do. Let me conclude my remarks regarding security by stating that I strongly believe that America is providing prudent and necessary responses to protect public health and safety, and will continue to do so as needs arise and new assessments are completed. For the rest of my remarks, I will focus on improving the definition of the safety envelope required by the mandate to ensure reasonable assurance of public health and safety. It is this "reasonable envelope" that the NRC first prescribed in a very deterministic manner, and has been lately trying to further improve by using state-of-the-art technical know-how and methods, including probabilistic techniques. There is probably a perception out there that I kind of like PRAs and risk-informed regulation. What I really like is to resolve issues in the most lasting manner, using the best tools available, and with clear and timely decision-making. Frequently, risk-informed regulation provides a reasonable quantifiable and scrutable approach to regulatory decision-making and its day-to-day implementation. I do favor improved safety categorization, implementing prevention and mitigation strategies accordingly, as well as deploying resources where they are needed most. I do believe that explaining the "why" and the "how" should be done using a quantitative basis whenever possible. This might be risk-informed regulation. Perception is reality.... The Commission categorically decided, over 4 years ago, to systematically move to a risk-informed regime, supported by the proper allocation of resources and employing sound communications. Soon afterwards, we specifically decided to risk-inform Part 50. It should be obvious to all the informed that many of the key regulatory improvements of the last few years have a strong risk-informed backbone. The new 50.59, the revised maintenance rule, Reg. Guide 1.174, license renewal, the reactor oversight process (ROP), improved enforcement, in-service inspection, and many every day processes are guided and supported by risk-informed decision-making. These are sound and successful regulatory improvements; the majority were implemented by changing processes and fewer by rulemaking. These are improvements to be lauded. Now to one of the so called "challenges" that remain. Let me note that the risk-informing of Part 50 is taking a bit more time. In the famous SECY-98-300, submitted to the Commission in 1998, the staff estimated it would take 5-7 years to risk-inform Part 50. At that time, I expressed my dismay at such a protracted schedule. I wish we could have settled on a schedule, however protracted, then. Allow me to do some arithmetic on the schedule and the pace of changes for Part 50. After 3 years, we have completed... none. Considering there are approximately 1800 provisions in Part 50, and assuming 50.44, 50.46, and 50.69 will be done in another 2 years, it would take over 2000 years to do it all, give or take 1000 years.... Of course, this is not an accurate assessment. The selected short-term actions of Option 2, Special Treatment Requirements, could be completed in another 2 or 3 years. Other "longer-term" actions and Option 3, however, could take a little longer. It is my perception that the pace of risk informed regulation has slowed down. I am puzzled as to why. Every risk-informed change made has been fruitful in improving safety, effectiveness and efficiency. Some say that some in the NRC staff and the industry are not willing to let go of the "comfortable", of what has been working for them. Some say NRC staffers here and there are "uncomfortable" with abandoning conventional prescriptions or that some in the industry are not willing to make an investment for tomorrow. The more the pace slows down, the more valid the criticism becomes and the easier it becomes to oppose even a good thing. And it could be that the regulatory structure today is fine for today. But I believe it is not fine for tomorrow. Living in the past is not the way to ensure the future. One only needs to compare the regulatory regime, safety performance and plant operation ten years ago and today. This is the year 2002, almost 30 years after WASH-1400, and it is time that all licensees have a quality Level 2 PRA so they can effectively utilize our regulatory processes. Moreover, history has shown that one single event could require the quantitative placement of that event in a risk scale for the most appropriate regulatory response; yet, today we might not have the regulatory framework to do that. History has also shown us what happens when the appropriate regulatory framework is not available. So, what is the problem? Could it be that, by us selecting the easy thing to do or what industry believes will provide the most near-term benefits, we are actually making the whole thing more difficult? No doubt the present is bounded by existing rules, no matter how good or bad they are, but the future should be ruled by what is most useful to society. I believe that by tackling the difficult -- the cornerstones of what really needs to be deleted or improved -- the difficult can be accomplished in a reasonable time, with reasonable expenditures of resources, and with predictable results that will astonish one and all! For example, we are dancing around how to resolve the Large Break LOCA. It is in the books and so much of the design safety basis is dependent on it. Yet, the Large Break LOCA is obsolete now, a true anachronism in today's safety envelope. It needs to be abandoned in favor of what really affects safety and is risk-significant. The Large Break LOCA was good in 1970 but it is absurd now as a dominant safety LWR criterion. If risk and safety are determinants, large (LBLOCA) is small and small (SBLOCA) is large. The resolution of the Special Treatment Requirements has taken this long because of a lack of an overriding principle to resolve risk-informed regulation. Some would say that is has taken 3 years to even talk about soon resolving the Special Treatment Requirements and, therefore, it would take decades to get rid of the Large Break LOCA. To them I say that it will take that long, and more, to resolve anything if the principles are not well established for everyone to work from. Think about it.... Fundamental principles for risk-informing Part 50 were established years ago. At the time of the 1997 RIC, I was having some engaging discussions with Chairman Jackson on the design bases and compliance issues. I quoted in my 1997 speech one of her best statements, a sound regulatory standard for our times: "If regulations are not important to safety, they should be revised or eliminated." I say, amen and yes, in this regard I miss Mrs. Risk-Informed, Dr. Shirley Jackson! This axiom translates into a dominant principle that should be a deciding factor in how to risk-inform our regulations. Risk-informed regulation incorporates deterministic, experiential, and probabilistic components. In this context, the principle to use is: if it is not risk-significant, it is not important to safety. Again, amen. Have a great conference and many happy returns. ***************************************************************** 13 NRC: Dicus: Speech - 5 - Set Yourself as the Standard OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS Office of Public Affairs Telephone: 301/415-8200 Washington, DC 20555-001 E-mail: opa@nrc.gov [opa@nrc.gov] Web Site: Public Affairs Web Site No. S-02-005 Set Yourself as the Standard - Chinese Proverb by The Honorable Greta Joy Dicus Commissioner U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 14th Annual Regulatory Information Conference (RIC) RIC 002 Capital Hilton Hotel Washington, D.C. March 6, 2002 INTRODUCTION Good morning ladies and gentlemen. As several times in the past, I'm pleased to have the opportunity to be with you today to participate in NRC's 2002 Regulatory Information Conference. We have another great turnout, and the Commission and the staff appreciate your attendance and participation in the Conference. I am pleased to welcome our licensees, consultants, our foreign attendees, state and local government representatives, and members of the public. I hope you take the opportunity to visit our beautiful Nation's Capitol while you are here. We have had a mild winter in the Washington DC area this year. If Mother Nature would have cooperated, the cherry blossoms might have been in bloom by now. It is a spectacular site especially surrounding the monuments and it is a highlight of springtime in this area. With the anticipation of spring, comes the celebration of the Chinese New Year and the beginning of the year of the horse. This ancient culture has a lot to teach us especially since Chinese proverbs are still applicable today. With that, I offer you one of several Chinese proverbs with which I believe we can all relate - "Set yourself as the Standard." As you are quite aware, our world has changed a great deal since I last spoke at the Regulatory Information Conference 2001. Since the events of September 11th, the NRC and the nuclear industry have faced new challenges in the areas of physical security, radiation protection and public confidence, to name a few. I believe that both the NRC and the nuclear industry have met these challenges. Yet we have many challenges and opportunities ahead. Much has changed since last year, but much has stayed the same. We are still at a time when commercial nuclear power appears to be on the verge of a significant resurgence in the United States and other parts of the world. So much so, that the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation has created the New Reactor Licensing Project Office to support new reactor licensing activities. We are still at a time when aging of existing reactors, power uprates, and license renewal are important issues. We are also at a time when security of our nuclear reactors and material licensees, along with our country as a whole, has never been more important. Another Chinese proverb states that "a fall into a ditch makes you wiser." This statement is more applicable than one would think. The NRC has been working diligently with its licensees and the Office of Homeland Security to help ensure its licensees are adequately protected against security events. As Chairman Meserve mentioned in a recent speech, the physical protection at nuclear power plants is very strong. For decades, security against radiological sabotage has been an important part of the NRC's regulatory activities and our licensees' responsibilities. These plants are among the most formidable structures in existence and they are guarded by well trained and well armed security forces. The security at nuclear plants is and has always been far more substantial than that at other civilian facilities. And it has been augmented since September 11. However, representatives from Congress, the media and the public have questioned whether we all can do a better job to protect our national interests. Our reaction to these questions should not be made blindly or our decisions made hastily. The consequences of our decisions should be well understood. One should not fill in all ditches to ensure against a fall, but rather, one should watch where they step. So the question remains - what is normalcy? How do we refocus without losing focus? The NRC continues to work with its stakeholders to develop more risk-informed regulations, to provide guidance to assist State and local governments in making decisions on the role and use of potassium iodide in their site-specific emergency plans, and to increase public confidence. These important activities are enhanced by interactions with our stakeholders and members of the public in general. With these things in mind, I would like to take time with you today to discuss consensus standards. Consensus standards offer an avenue to address the new and existing challenges that the NRC and the nuclear industry face. These include standards which protect public health and safety, support the NRC strategic plan, and provide security for our nuclear reactors and material licensees. As the proverb goes, "if you don't stand for something, you will fall for something." WHAT IS A STANDARD? So what is a standard? Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines a standard as "something that is established by authority, custom, or general consent as a model or example to be followed." For our purposes, a consensus standard is the product of a standards development organization operating with openness, balance of interests, due process, an appeals process, and consensus, which represents general agreement but not necessarily unanimity. Examples of standards development organizations include such groups as the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME), Health Physics Society (HPS), and American Nuclear Society (ANS). The development of consensus standards is a significant effort for all the participants of standards development organizations. As the proverb goes, "only when all contribute their firewood can they build up a strong fire." The NRC has been an active participant in the development and use of consensus standards since the NRC's establishment in 1975. The Commission's Strategic Assessment and Rebaselining Initiative in 1996 further increased NRC's focus on the use of standards. For nuclear reactor and nuclear materials safety, the Commission's strategy is to increase the involvement of licensees and others in the NRC regulatory process consistent with OMB Circular A-119, "Federal Participation in the Development and Use of Voluntary Consensus Standards and In Conformity Assessment Activities" and with Public Law 104-113, "National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995." Public Law 104-113 requires an agency to use a standard developed by a consensus body unless such use is inconsistent with applicable law or is otherwise impractical. The NRC may use a consensus standard as a mandatory requirement or as a voluntary provision. Mandatory use occurs through incorporation of a consensus standard in a regulation, license condition, order, or technical specification for individual licensees or certificate holders. Regulatory guides, or in the materials area, NUREGs and regulatory guides, that identify an acceptable method for licensees to comply with NRC regulations, are the primary mechanisms for allowing voluntary use of consensus standards by licensees and certificate holders. In Fiscal Year 2001, the NRC adopted 64 voluntary standards; four ANS standards, three ASME standards, eight American Society for Testing and Materials standards, three Institute of Electronic and Electrical Engineers standards, and forty-six National Fire Protection Association consensus standards. The NRC's strategic plan incorporates activities that increase public confidence, improve our efficiency and effectiveness, and reduce regulatory burden. It is my opinion that the development of consensus standards is an ideal way of meeting these goals. I would like to discuss three different types of consensus standards that may affect all of us in the future. Standards on the Quality of PRAs We all know that it is "better to light a candle than curse the darkness" and the development of standards on the quality of probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs) will shed a light on our regulatory process. The Commission has continually noted the importance of high quality PRAs for success of risk-informed regulation. We believe that a PRA consensus standard is an integral part in providing the level of confidence that the risk insights derived from the PRA results are both technically sound and technically defensible. Further, the Commission has stated that development of a PRA standard can provide a level of confidence to the NRC staff regarding the technical quality of a PRA utilized by a licensee to support a risk-informed initiative. Such a standard can, therefore, result in a more focused technical review of the PRA by the NRC staff and thereby make more efficient use of both NRC and industry resources, while still ensuring the safety of the decisions being supported by PRA insights. The NRC has been actively participating in the consensus standards process to develop standards for PRA that support the implementation of risk-informed regulation in a manner that maintains safety. Currently, there are several PRA standards that are under development by standards development organizations for nuclear power plants. ASME has developed a PRA standard on internal events which includes transients, loss-of-coolant accidents, and floods. ANS is developing PRA standards for low-power and shutdown events, internal fires, and external hazards. These PRA standards and associated industry programs can be used to provide an understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of a PRA. It is the NRC's intention to endorse these PRA standards, when the final standards are issued, in a single regulatory guide that provides an approach for characterizing the quality of PRA results used in support of regulatory applications. The regulatory guide would provide guidance to licensees on how to use the standard to determine the level of confidence of the PRA insights/results being used. These risk insights can then be appropriately used by the licensee decision maker. The appendix of the regulatory guide would provide staff endorsement of the individual PRA standards. It should be noted that the endorsement of the PRA standards may take exception to or include additional specific criteria to address any identified weakness in the standards to ensure that PRAs used in regulatory decisionmaking will have an adequate technical basis and meet the regulations. Standards on the Radiation Protection Unlike the consensus standards developed using the standards development organization process where members of the NRC staff participate on the development committees, development of consensus standards for radiation protection has followed a different approach. Historically, the NRC's regulatory approach for radiation protection standards has considered new scientific information on radiation health effects and recommendations for systems of radiation protection. International bodies of experts evaluate the information on radiation health effects and provide the recommendations. After considering recommendations from these scientific bodies, if the Commission agrees that revisions to NRC's radiation protection regulatory framework are needed, then the changes are proposed through an open and inclusive rulemaking process that provides for public input. Finally, NRC is subject to statutory requirements to follow the generally applicable radiation protection standards issued by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. One important consensus standard with regard to radiation protection was developed by the International Committee on Radiation Protection (ICRP). Since 1978, the ICRP has made major revisions to its basic radiation protection recommendations. These were published in ICRP Publication 60 in 1990. This publication has recommendations which supercede those of the ICRP Publication 26. Because of timing and other considerations, NRC adopted only some of the ICRP recommendations into Part 20. As an example, NRC adopted the ICRP-60 recommendation to lower the dose limit for the general public from 5 mSv (500 mrem) per year to 1 mSv (100 mrem) per year. However, with respect to the occupational exposures, even though ICRP-60 recommended a new occupational dose limit of 100 mSv (10 rems) in 5 years with a 50 mSv (5 rem) maximum, NRC believed that a reduction in the annual dose limit was not required since the annual average radiation dose to most occupational workers in 1987 was already well below 20 mSv (2 rem). Furthermore, as a part of the revised regulations, NRC included the concept of maintaining radiation exposures as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA). Another applicable Chinese proverb states that "when you want to test the depth of a stream, don't use both feet." It is my view that some facts and figures based on recent information must be fully evaluated before considering a rulemaking change to reduce occupational exposure as recommended by ICRP-60. For example, in 1999, out of approximately 150,000 monitored individuals at commercial power reactors, only twenty-four individuals received doses exceeding 20 mSv (2 rems), and only 2 individuals received more than 30 mSv (3 rems). No individual exceeded 50 mSv (5 rems). When you consider the fact that even ICRP-60 allows a maximum of 50 mSv (5 rem) per year, as long as the average over five years is below 20 mSv (2 rems), even if NRC adopts ICRP-60, there would not be any savings of dose. Furthermore, there would be substantial cost for implementing the new regulation, with uncertainty for any added benefit. Security Standards Security standards and regulations are an island all to their own. In this world of uncertainty, a Chinese proverb would advise "to know the road ahead, ask those coming back." However, in the world of security standards and regulations, the future is not that clear cut. The nuclear industry is unique in that 10 CFR 73.55 requires the physical protection of nuclear power plants against radiological sabotage. Standards development organizations and international bodies of experts that develop security standards which protect against radiological sabotage do not exist. As you well know, due to the generalized high-level threat environment, the Commission has issued threat advisories to our licensees. It is extremely important to note that all of our licensees have voluntarily complied with the intent of the NRC's threat advisories. In addition to the security regulations and threat advisories, the Commission recently issued orders requiring all power reactor licensees to implement interim compensatory measures for the protection of their facilities. In this case, I believe the applicable Chinese proverb is "a dish of carrot hastily cooked may still have soil uncleaned off the vegetable." The security requirements imposed on our licensees continue to increase. While it is the NRC's responsibility to ensure public health and safety through our regulatory framework, licensees, many of whom are in this room, are of course ultimately responsible for the safety and security of their facility. But it is also the Commission's responsibility to ensure that our requirements are reasonable and technically defensible. So how does one determine how much security is enough? Unlike PRA and radiation protection standards, we do not have the benefit of standards development organizations or international bodies of experts. Therefore, I believe we must proceed deliberately, with caution, to ensure that the additional security requirements have a basis and are defensible. Additionally, we must understand the short-term and long-term consequences that imposing additional security requirements may have on our licensees. To paraphrase a statement made by Albert Einstein, "you cannot solve the problem with the same mind set that created it." So perhaps it is time to think outside the box regarding security standards and regulations. Should we be more creative in how security is provided rather than providing more security? In the not so distant past, the staff was considering risk-informed performance criteria which would provide flexibility in the design of security programs and response strategies. Such an approach could include the concept of identifying certain systems, structures, and components as vital components that need additional physical protection based on risk insights. I cannot help but think that a risked-informed performance based approach may provide powerful insights and result in improved security requirements. We also need to develop creative ways to provide rapid response to emergencies and better coordination with local authorities. In closing, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to discuss these issues with you today. Although we are struggling through this time of uncertainty, I remain confident that the health and safety of the public will continue to be protected and that the future for the nuclear industry will continue to be resplendent based on the quality and capabilities of the people entrusted to operate the nuclear reactors safely. ***************************************************************** 14 Y174 bil needed to scrap Monju reactor Japan Today Japan News - News - Wednesday, March 20, 2002 at 09:15 JST TOKYO The government-funded Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute (JNC) estimates that scrapping its Monju fast-breeder nuclear reactor will cost some 174 billion yen, including the disposal cost of nuclear waste, JNC sources said Tuesday. While the average cost to dismantle a reactor for commercial use with an output of 1.1 million kilowatts is estimated at around 50 billion yen, it will cost more than three times that for the Monju reactor, which has an output of 280,000 kilowatts. (Kyodo News) ***************************************************************** 15 Ukrainian reactor reconnected to grid after repairs BBC Monitoring Service - United Kingdom; Mar 20, 2002 Text of report by Ukrainian news agency UNIAN Kiev, 20 March: The No 2 power-generating set (VVER-1000-type reactor) at the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant was reconnected to the power grid on Tuesday [20 March] at 0305 [0105 gmt], having undergone scheduled maintenance. The unit is gradually increasing its power, UNIAN has learnt from the national nuclear power-generating company, Enerhoatom. Ukrainian nuclear power stations produced 235.84m kWh of electricity over the past 24 hours. Twelve out of 13 power-generating sets are currently in operation at the nuclear power stations. Repairs are under way at the No 6 unit at the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant. Radiation levels at and around the nuclear plants are within admissible limits. Source: UNIAN news agency, Kiev, in Ukrainian 0820 gmt 20 Mar 02 /BBC Monitoring/ © BBC. ***************************************************************** 16 68 nuclear plants get U.S. query Beacon Journal | 03/20/2002 | Regulators want quick assurance Davis-Besse's damage doesn't lurk in similar reactors elsewhere By Jim Mackinnon Beacon Journal business writer Keeping nuclear power plants safe following the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks remains the industry's No. 1 concern. The No. 2 concern: finding out how acid damaged FirstEnergy's Davis-Besse nuclear power plant. ``This is a very significant issue for the industry and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,'' said Jack Strosnider, director of the division of engineering in the NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. Because of Davis-Besse, the NRC sent out bulletins yesterday to the operators of the nation's 68 other pressurized-water reactors, asking them to show that their plants don't have similar problems. Typically, the NRC seeks responses from the industry in 30 to 45 days. This time, the federal agency gave 15. The NRC wants to know if other power plants have similar damage or are vulnerable to corrosion that could challenge safety systems. At the least, new discoveries could cost plant owners tens of millions of dollars to fix; FirstEnergy estimates it will have to pay as much as $10 million for repairs and $10 million to $15 million a month to buy extra energy until Davis-Besse is restarted. The plant was shut down on Feb. 16 for refueling and an NRC-mandated safety inspection, which led to the discovery of the damage. The NRC's bulletin was just one of the latest developments in the investigation into how boric acid, a byproduct of the nuclear reaction, unexpectedly chewed two cavities in Davis-Besse's steel reactor vessel head, a 150-ton safety device that's more than 6 inches thick and covers the radioactive fuel rods. One of the cavities is 6 inches deep, while the other is much smaller, about 1 ½ inches deep. A survey presented yesterday to the NRC by nuclear industry members reported that three other nuclear plants may be susceptible to the kind of damage found at Davis-Besse. The survey was conducted at the NRC's request. It didn't name the plants, but the NRC said it will get the names shortly. No other nuclear plants have reported similar damage, the NRC said. ``We'll see if we have to take further action,'' said Brian Sheron, associate director for project licensing and technical assessment with the NRC. ``The agency has the authority to shut down plants and order an inspection. We haven't had to do that yet.'' A second public meeting is scheduled from 1 to 5 p.m. today at NRC's headquarters in Rockville, Md. Also yesterday, the NRC reported for the first time that the reactor vessel head's thin inner lining of stainless steel -- between 3/16 and 3/8 of an inch thick -- bulged slightly but still prevented radioactive coolant from spewing out through the deepest cavity and into the power plant's massive containment chamber, officials said. The NRC said the bulge was about 1/8 of an inch. While the stainless steel lining is designed mainly for corrosion protection, it also helps contain the enormous pressure -- upwards of 2,500 pounds per square inch -- in addition to the much thicker carbon steel that encases it, officials said. Initial calculations show that the stainless steel lining could have withstood far greater pressures before breaking, the NRC and FirstEnergy said. Even if the lining had shattered and created what is called a ``loss of coolant'' accident -- something that's never happened in the United States -- safety devices would have shut the reactor down and prevented any radioactive materials from getting into the environment, officials have said. ``If everything works right, it's going to be an economic hit for the plant owner, not a safety hit,'' said David Lochbaum, a nuclear safety expert with the Union for Concerned Scientists. A nuclear plant with a coolant loss could be cleaned up and running in about a year, he estimated. FirstEnergy hopes to getDavis-Besse repaired and restarted before July, the company said again yesterday. Details of those repairs will not be known until after the cause of the damage is determined. Two months, however, would not be long enough to replace the entire vessel head, a lengthy process that could cost $20 million. The discovery of the second, smaller cavity will not delay repairs or add to the costs, Davis-Besse spokesman Richard Wilkins said. FirstEnergy first has to figure out how the damage was created. Preliminary indications are that hairline cracks in parts called control rod nozzles allowed water with boron in it to touch the carbon steel that makes up the outside of the reactor vessel head. Three of Davis-Besse's 69 nozzles were found to have hairline cracks that extended all the way through the device. Cracks have been found in nozzles at other nuclear power plants, but industry experts said their calculations never predicted the kind of damage found at Davis-Besse. Once a so-called root cause is found, FirstEnergy hopes the NRC will approve whatever repairs the utility comes up with. FirstEnergy has ordered a new reactor vessel head, but that will take as long as two years to make. The massive device needs to be made in Japan, then shipped to France to be finished. FirstEnergy said that no matter how long it takes to restart the 883-megawatt plant, its customers won't go without electricity. Davis-Besse represents about 14 percent of FirstEnergy's generating capacity. ``We'll handle it,'' spokesman Ralph DiNicola said. Jim Mackinnon can be reached at 330-996-3544 or jmackinnon@thebeaconjournal.com [jmackinnon@thebeaconjournal.com] ***************************************************************** 17 Ohio nuclear plant corrosion raises concerns, says NRC - 3/20/2002 - ENN.com Wednesday, March 20, 2002 By Reuters WASHINGTON — U.S. regulators Tuesday ordered 69 nuclear plants to submit reactor safety information after finding unexpected corrosion at an Ohio plant owned by FirstEnergy Corp. that raised broader concerns. FirstEnergy last month shut its Davis-Besse nuclear power plant in Oak Harbor, Ohio, due to corrosion inside the reactor chamber. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) wrote to 69 U.S. plants with pressurized water reactors similar to Davis-Besse's seeking information on their structural integrity. The agency said it did not believe the problems at the Ohio plant could release radiation into the atmosphere but that they could reduce its margin of safety. The other 34 reactors, which use boiling water reactors, were not required to take any action. There are 103 total operating U.S. nuclear power plants, which generate about 20 percent U.S. electricity supplies. Regulators gave the utilities two weeks to respond, a short turnaround that "reflects the seriousness with which we view this," an NRC spokesman said. While refueling the Ohio plant in February, FirstEnergy found an area on top of a high-pressure vessel which contains the nuclear reaction that showed unusual wear. Corrosion left less than one-quarter inch of stainless steel to protect the top of the reactor vessel, normally shielded by 6.5 inches of carbon steel, the NRC spokesman said. The NRC said it expects that a corrosive coolant leaking from the reactor core ate through the pressure vessel but has not announced definite findings. "The issue could have generic implications for other pressurized water reactors," the spokesman said. The NRC said it will use the new information to determine if its current inspection and maintenance practices are adequate. FirstEnergy's 925-megawatt plant supplies electricity to the Midwest electricity grid. NRC inspections now underway at Davis-Besse show boric acid in the cooling water was a contributing cause of corrosion. Boric acid is added to the water to control the speed of the nuclear reaction. Last year, the NRC identified 13 reactors that either developed or were believed highly susceptible to developing tiny cracks that could damage power plant equipment and cause lengthy shutdowns for repairs. Of the 13 units, cracks were found and repairs were made at three. Eight did not show cracks. Two plants — the Davis-Besse plant and American Electric Power's Cook 2 unit in Michigan — were to be inspected. Repairs were made at the 1,090-megawatt Cook 2 reactor earlier this year. Copyright 2002, Reuters ***************************************************************** 18 Hole in Nuclear Reactor Vessel Prompts Inspections Environment News Service: AmeriScan: March 19, 2002 WASHINGTON, DC, March 19, 2002 (ENS) - The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has ordered inspections at all operating pressurized water nuclear reactors to confirm that their reactor heads are intact. The NRC has sent a bulletin to companies that hold licenses for operating pressurized water reactors (PWRs) requiring information on the structural integrity of the reactor vessel head, and data indicating that the vessel head will continue to perform its function as a coolant pressure boundary. The bulletin was sent to the 69 PWRs because of a problem that discovered last month at the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station at Oak Harbor, Ohio. During routine maintenance, workers at Davis-Besse found a cavity in the top of the reactor vessel about six inches deep and four inches wide. The reactor vessel head, fabricated of carbon steel with a stainless steel liner, is about 6.5 inches thick. The remaining thickness of the vessel head beneath the cavity was reported as 3/8 inches of stainless steel. First Energy Corporation, the operator of the Davis Besse plant, also found three cracked and leaking tubes among the 69 tubes that allow the reactor control rods to penetrate the reactor vessel. The NRC issued a bulletin last August requiring the detailed inspections at Davis-Besse and other sites after cracking problems were found in control rod tubes at several other nuclear plants. The cavity in the Davis-Besse reactor vessel head is next to one of the cracked tubes. Repair teams believe the steel vessel may have been corroded by boric acid, an ingredient of the water in the reactor cooling system. The NRC is asking all facilities to check their reactor heads to determine whether current inspection and maintenance practices at reactor facilities provide "reasonable assurance that reactor coolant pressure boundary integrity is being maintained." More information is available at this NRC website. © Environment News Service (ENS) 2002. All Rights Reserved. ***************************************************************** 19 UN says nuclear plants' vulnerability unclear AUSTRIA: March 20, 2002 VIENNA - The United Nations' nuclear watchdog said this week that it was unclear how vulnerable nuclear facilities were to terrorist attacks of the scale that shocked the world on September 11. A report by the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) obtained by Reuters said nuclear facilities were generally very robust structures, but that their resistance to such attacks could not be easily determined. "There doesn't currently exist a widely accepted methodology for identifying, assessing and addressing such vulnerabilities," said the report, presented to the agency's board of governors by IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei this week. Many facilities are too old to have allowed for the effects of large modern passenger jets with a heavy fuel load slamming into them, as they did into the World Trade Center in September. "Most nuclear power plants took into consideration terrorist attacks when they were designed and built, but in the 1970s, when many of the plants were constructed and designed, airplanes were smaller and didn't carry as much fuel," IAEA spokeswoman Melissa Fleming said. According to IAEA figures, there are 651 research reactors, of which 284 are in operation, and 438 nuclear power reactors around the world. In order to address the security of nuclear facilities, the IAEA has asked member states to contribute around $12 million annually between them. It said it was seeking another $20 million per year to help countries lacking funds "to respond to urgent situations that require immediate upgrades". The agency also wants to track down and recover all "orphaned", or missing, highly radioactive sources that had vanished from regulatory control, the report said. Fleming said there was no way of estimating how much radioactive material had been orphaned, but added that none of it was weapons grade material. Much of the missing material is believed to have been stolen from laboratories and hospitals in former Soviet states. The recent find of highly radioactive objects in ex-Soviet Georgia increased fears that terrorists could add such material to conventional explosives to make "dirty bombs" - intended more to cause panic than physical harm. Story by Louis Charbonneau REUTERS NEWS SERVICE ***************************************************************** 20 Beryllium tests urged for military workers Chicago Tribune | By Sam Roe Tribune staff reporter Published March 19, 2002 Several members of Congress are calling for the Department of Defense to test thousands of military personnel who might have been exposed to the highly toxic metal beryllium. The lawmakers assailed the Pentagon for ignoring federal health guidelines that recommend blood tests for workers exposed to beryllium, a lightweight metal whose dust can cause an often fatal lung disease. Testing in other industries has revealed dozens of illnesses. "This is a national disgrace the way the Department of Defense has treated these workers," said Rep. Tom Udall, a Democrat from New Mexico. The Tribune reported this month that beryllium dust has been detected at 73 Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps facilities in 23 states, with some exposure levels twice the federal legal limit. The Defense Department estimates that 9,513 military and civilian personnel might have been exposed in the last 10 years. The agency said the decision to screen workers rests with doctors at each of its facilities, but military officials said they were unaware of any such testing. The Pentagon has used beryllium for decades in a variety of applications, including missiles, aircraft brakes and helicopter components. While the Defense Department reports that only one of its workers has developed the disease since the 1940s, studies have long shown that the illness is often misdiagnosed or goes undetected. Five congressmen contacted by the Tribune said they wanted the Defense Department to take action. They are Udall and Reps. Charlie Gonzalez (D-Texas), Paul Kanjorski (D-Penn.), Ted Strickland (D-Ohio) and Ciro Rodriguez (D-Texas). The lawmakers also said the Defense Department should compensate employees harmed by beryllium and other substances, similar to the way the Energy Department aids ailing workers who were employed at that agency's facilities. "This is just about doing the right thing," said Gonzalez, whose district includes former workers at the now-closed Kelly Air Force Base, where beryllium was used. Strickland said officials who say they support U.S. troops overseas should support the right to basic medical care. "I don't know how we can wave the flag and speak in glowing terms about fighting the war against terrorism" and not screen the military for a potentially fatal disease, he said. Other lawmakers said they were concerned about beryllium exposure but wanted to investigate further. The Energy Department, which has used beryllium in nuclear weapons, reported few disease cases until it started screening workers in the early 1990s. The agency has since tested 27,800 workers at 18 facilities, finding 729 people with beryllium disease or blood abnormalities linked to the illness. The screening is recommended by federal agencies, including the Occupational Safety and Health Administration. Early detection is important because it allows treatments that can attempt to limit lung damage. Beryllium disease has been found in virtually every industry in which workers have been screened. Studies show that about 3 percent of those exposed to beryllium dust develop the illness, sometimes decades after their last exposure. Kanjorski said it was important to notify all former workers who worked near beryllium. "There may be a lot of retired people who don't even know that they had the exposure," he said. Copyright © 2002, Chicago Tribune ***************************************************************** 21 Court Agrees to Hear Challenge to EPA Rule for Yucca Mountain Nuclear Dump March 18, 2002 Environmental, Public Interest Groups Contend Standard Is Too Lenient WASHINGTON, D.C. – A lawsuit challenging the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) controversial standards for a proposed nuclear waste dump in Nevada has survived a critical hurdle. In a March 12 order, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals agreed to hear the merits of three lawsuits challenging the standards. Last June, a coalition of national and Nevada-based environmental and public interest organizations filed a lawsuit charging that EPA’s rule was too lenient because it allows the U.S. Department of Energy to permit radioactive waste to leak from the dump rather than ensure it is contained. The case was later consolidated with lawsuits from the state of Nevada and the Nuclear Energy Institute. In November, the EPA asked that the case be dismissed on the grounds that approval had not yet been granted to construct the proposed repository at Yucca Mountain. The petitioners countered that the EPA rule sets the standard by which the project’s suitability is assessed and that officials were already relying on the rule to make decisions. In last week’s order, the court decided not to dismiss the case. Instead, it ruled that the question of dismissal should be taken up when the court considers the merits of the case. "This is a victory, although it’s only the first step," said Geoff Fettus, an attorney with the Natural Resources Defense Council. "We will ask the court to overturn the weakest aspects of EPA’s Yucca Mountain radiation protection standards in order to protect the environment and public health." Added said Lisa Gue, policy analyst with Public Citizen’s Critical Mass Energy and Environment Program, "The EPA’s inadequate standards provided a basis for Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham’s recommendation in favor of the proposed repository. This clear example of undercutting environmental regulations to allow a fundamentally flawed project to move forward sets an unacceptable precedent." It is unlikely that the case will be resolved before Congress votes on the Yucca Mountain proposal later this year. ### ***************************************************************** 22 Daschle Says He May Fail to Block Nuclear Dump March 20, 2002 By REUTERS WASHINGTON (Reuters) - Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle said on Wednesday he is no longer confident he can block a White House plan to bury nuclear waste at a Nevada site opposed by green groups and state officials. The proposed Yucca Mountain waste site, located about 90 miles northwest of Las Vegas, would permanently hold 70,000 tons of radioactive material generated by the nation's nuclear power plants. President Bush endorsed the Yucca Mountain project last month, over the objections of environmental groups worried about the risks of trucking radioactive material over long distances and the potential for nuclear waste to contaminate ground water. Daschle told reporters he recently learned of a provision in federal law regarding nuclear waste disposal that would permit approval of the plan with a simple majority vote in the Senate. Daschle's Democrats now control the Senate, but just barely. The chamber is divided among 50 Democrats, 49 Republicans and one independent, Sen. James Jeffords of Vermont. Daschle said he had erroneously figured he could stop the plan by requiring a 60-vote majority, which is typically required for most major legislation. ``When I said in Nevada many months ago that, as long as Democrats were in control, it was not going to be an issue that had much viability, I was not aware that this legislation -- when we drafted it decades ago -- is under an expedited procedure,'' Daschle said. That means any senator can call the measure for a vote, he said, and once on the floor ``it only takes a majority vote'' to pass it. The Senate leader said only two Senate Republicans oppose the Yucca Mountain dump site, John Ensign of Nevada and Ben Nighthorse Campbell of Colorado. Spent nuclear fuel, high-level radioactive waste and excess plutonium from U.S. nuclear power plants are now stored at more than 131 sites throughout the nation. Utilities contend they are running out of space to hold the waste material and say the U.S. government must live up to a 1982 federal law mandating that a national repository be built.Bush's Yucca Mountain decision to Congress. The state last month filed a federal lawsuit contending there is not enough scientific evidence to show the site is geologically safe. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission must also approve a license for the site, which the Energy Department hopes to activate by 2010. Copyright 2002 Reuters Ltd. | Privacy Information ***************************************************************** 23 Panel reviews King bill on nuclear waste compact Gov. Angus King's bill to remove Maine from a three-state, low-level radioactive waste disposal compact was reviewed Tuesday by the Legislature's Utilities and Energy Committee. --> Wednesday, March 20, 2002 Copyright © 2002 Blethen Maine Newspapers Inc. AUGUSTA — The administration says the compact to send waste to Texas was agreed upon when the Maine Yankee atomic plant, which was the state's largest generator of low-level nuclear waste, was in operation. It also says Maine has found other facilities in South Carolina and Utah where it can send its low-level waste. Vermont was also part of the compact. Maine Public Advocate Stephen Ward submitted testimony to the committee Tuesday that also noted the Texas environmental board unanimously rejected an application for a license to build the facility. There are currently no plans to build the Texas facility, Ward said. Copyright [http://www.mainetoday.com/copyright.shtml] © Blethen Maine Newspapers Inc. ***************************************************************** 24 NUCLEAR WASTE: Guinn: Yucca fight everywhere Wednesday, March 20, 2002 Copyright © Las Vegas Review-Journal Governor receives $70,000 in contributions By KEITH ROGERS REVIEW-JOURNAL With fresh donations for fighting plans to bury nuclear waste in Yucca Mountain, Gov. Kenny Guinn said Tuesday the battleground to sway opinion against the project is "every place where there's a United States senator." "That's where our fight is," Guinn said at a news briefing at the Sawyer Building, where he accepted a combined $70,000 from a Nevada commercial development firm and a Realtors association. That brings to more than $6 million the amount the state has to pay lobbyists, lawyers, consultants and a publicity firm. Guinn said the fund is small compared to the estimated $30 million the nuclear power industry has spent to lobby for a Yucca Mountain repository. He said Nevada's delegation used a stealthy approach to avoid interference from the nuclear industry to hire former Clinton administration Chief of Staff John Podesta and former Reagan administration Chief of Staff Kenneth Duberstein as lobbyists. "We have to work very closely when we hire somebody, because they're going to offer them twice as much," Guinn said. State Budget Director Perry Comeaux said the Nevada Resort Association is paying for Podesta's work and the American Gaming Association is paying Duberstein. Guinn's spokesman, Greg Bortolin, said contracts for Podesta and Duberstein haven't been finalized and figures on how much each will be paid were unavailable Tuesday. But Guinn said the addition of the pair completes the state's anti-repository team that includes Brown &Partners Advertising and Public Relations, hired for about $1 million in November to develop a nationwide public information campaign; and Egan &Associates, a Washington, D.C., law firm that signed on in September to handle legal matters for $2.5 million. In addition, $1 million is being spent by the Nuclear Projects Commission on other contracts to oppose the Yucca Mountain Project. Guinn obtained $4 million from the 2001 Legislature for the Nevada Protection Fund. The account has been augmented by donations from cities and counties, including $1 million from Clark County. The $50,000 donation Tuesday by Molasky Companies and $20,000 from the Nevada Association of Realtors are the first private funds to fight the Yucca Mountain Project to come from outside the gaming industry. "We have a lot of people saying this is being forced down our throats and we can do nothing about it. I disagree with that," said donor Steven Molasky, an eight-year member of the State Nuclear Projects Commission. Guinn said he intends to make a high-profile event out of casting his veto "sometime between April 1 and 15" against President Bush's decision last month to proceed toward construction of a repository for highly radioactive waste in the mountain, 100 miles northwest of Las Vegas. "It's the first time this has ever occurred, that a sitting governor can veto a president's decision," Guinn said. He has until April 16 to veto Bush's Yucca Mountain decision. After that, Congress would have 90 legislative days to override it. Guinn declined to say whether he would travel to Washington, D.C., to veto what Nevada's politicians refer to as "the dump." "Believe me, we have a plan developed," he said. Guinn said part of the opposition plan could include levying a steep tax against any attempt by the Energy Department to import water to construct a repository. "Fine, you can truck it in, but we're going to put a $1 million-per-gallon surcharge on it," Guinn said Tuesday. The Justice Department is challenging in court the state's denial of DOE applications to withdraw 140 million gallons of water a year from five wells in Nye County to build and operate the repository. Guinn said a key part of Nevada's opposition to the Energy Department's plans will be to emphasize the potential dangers involved with hauling nuclear waste across 43 states to reach Yucca Mountain by trains and trucks. Energy Department officials have said transportation aspects of the project will be covered when the Nuclear Regulatory Commission conducts a licensing review, if the department submits an application to build and operate a repository. Nevertheless, Guinn said he will take every opportunity through the state's lobbying effort keep Yucca Mountain in the national spotlight. "If they want us to go some place, we're going. If they want us to speak, we're going to speak," he said. Guinn said awareness about nuclear waste transportation is growing, particularly in Colorado. In Nevada, he said, "Now almost everybody here knows about Yucca Mountain, even the kids. But across America it's a different story." Copyright © Las Vegas Review-Journal, 1997 - 2002 ***************************************************************** 25 Tom Daschle: Less optimistic about Yucca being "dead" Wednesday, March 20, 2002 Copyright © Las Vegas Review-Journal Daschle Yucca stance changes Democratic leader less certain of success By STEVE TETREAULT and TONY BATT STEPHENS WASHINGTON BUREAU WASHINGTON -- Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle said Tuesday he plans to help Nevada fight Yucca Mountain in Congress but he was less certain of success than when he declared last year that the nuclear waste project was "dead" as long as Democrats controlled the Senate. Asked whether Yucca Mountain legislation could be killed in an upcoming Senate vote, Daschle, D-S.D., said "I have no idea." "All I'm going to do is continue to do what I said I was going to do, and that is work with Senator (Harry) Reid to ensure that his position is one that people understand and that as many of us as possible can support." Daschle's comments, made to reporters outside the Senate chamber, were toned down from those he made May 31 when he appeared with Reid at a $1,000-per-plate fund-raiser in Las Vegas. "I think the Yucca Mountain issue is dead," Daschle said at the time. "As long as we're in the majority, it's dead." Daschle's comments Tuesday came as a news organization reported a partial Senate head count on Yucca Mountain, the ridge 100 miles northwest of Las Vegas that President Bush has approved as a repository for nuclear waste disposal. The House and Senate need to vote on the repository to finalize the site selection. The CongressDaily newsletter said it surveyed senators over the past four weeks. Of 71 who responded, 36 intended to vote to send nuclear waste to Nevada while 14 were opposed and 21 undecided. Those in favor of Yucca Mountain included 29 Republicans and six Democrats. One Republican is siding with Nevada so far, Sen. Ben Nighthorse Campbell, R-Colo., the newsletter reported. Sen. John Ensign, R-Nev., said a second Republican, Lincoln Chafee of Rhode Island, also has committed to back Nevada. Apart from that, neither Ensign nor Reid commented on the report. But Ensign did say efforts to recruit Republican senators have not been encouraging. He said he has talked to six GOP senators whom he declined to name. "It's very uphill sledding," Ensign said. "You have all these senators. They either have (nuclear) waste in their state or they've staked out a position in years past. "You're starting with a lot of things against you," he said. "The only thing you have going for you basically is the relationship you formed with them and trying to convince them on the merits of the case." Nevada's senators are counting on Daschle to help attract votes and also manage the Senate calendar during the 90 days that Congress will consider the Yucca Mountain bill. The clock starts running the day after Gov. Kenny Guinn issues his veto of the project, expected early in April. If the 90 days expires without a vote, the Yucca Mountain resolution fails and Nevada prevails, officials have explained. Ensign said it will be up to Daschle to make sure the Senate does not vote. "We're hoping that Senator Daschle keeps his word and we're counting on him keeping his word," Ensign said. "Reid and I are rounding up votes in case he doesn't." Ensign said he will hold Daschle to the same measure that Reid held Bush, who told Nevadans during the 2000 campaign he would let "sound science" guide his decision on Yucca Mountain. Reid accused Bush of lying when the president ended up endorsing Nevada for nuclear waste burial. "Reid and myself are working very closely," Ensign said. "(Reid) was upset at what the president did and felt like the president violated his word and that kind of thing. Well, I'm going to hold Senator Daschle to his word." Reid said Daschle will "do everything he can," but the process makes it "extremely difficult" for the Senate to avoid having to vote at some point. "President Bush could have single-handedly stopped this," Reid said. "Daschle will do everything he can do. Daschle is not backing away from me." Robert Dove, a former Senate parliamentarian, has been hired by Nevada to scrutinize Senate procedures for ways to circumvent a special fast-track process that does not allow the Yucca Mountain resolution to be filibustered or delayed by other conventional means. Dove has told the congressional delegation that Daschle has several devices at his disposal to help Nevada. If the bill can be knocked off the fast track, Nevada might be able to attack it through Senate procedures that would require Reid and Ensign to gather only 40 votes, and not 50, officials say. One scenario has the majority leader employing a "blocking motion to proceed." He would bring up an unrelated bill, and just allow it to sit there, acting as a roadblock for anyone wanting to get to the Yucca Mountain legislation, according to one Dove memo. Ensign described the upcoming Senate action as the biggest challenge of his political career. He estimated about 80 percent of his workday is being consumed by Yucca Mountain. Aides say Reid has committed an equivalent amount of time. "The next three or four months are the most critical phase the state of Nevada has ever been in," Ensign said. Reid and Ensign met late Thursday to discuss strategy with lobbyists John Podesta and Ken Duberstein and Frank Fahrenkopf of the American Gaming Association. Guinn chief of staff Marybel Batjer and attorney Vicky Oldenburg participated via phone from Nevada. Copyright © Las Vegas Review-Journal, 1997 - 2002 ***************************************************************** 26 Feds: Ship nuclear waste down the Hudson [http://www.thejournalnews.com] --> Thursday March 21, 2002 01:43:32 AM By ROGER WITHERSPOON AND FAITH BREMNER THE JOURNAL NEWS (Original publication: March 19, 2002) Highly radioactive nuclear waste would be shipped over several years from the nuclear plants in Buchanan down the Hudson River through the Port of New York en route to Nevada, as part of the U.S. Department of Energy's national waste-storage plan. The shipments are detailed in a proposal to be considered in the spring when Congress votes on President Bush's plan to open a national repository for nuclear waste under Nevada's Yucca Mountain in 2010. The Energy Department's environmental impact report states that thousands of shipments of radioactive fuel would go through 15 commercial ports during a 38-year period. Included in the plan is spent fuel being stored at the defunct Indian Point 1 and the 1,000-megawatt reactors at Indian Point 2 and 3. The three Indian Point spent fuel pools hold more than 1,200 tons of radioactive material. The plan calls for loading the Indian Point fuel on 58 barges and floating it down the Hudson River to the container shipping center at Port Elizabeth in New Jersey, opposite the Statue of Liberty. But the proposal raised immediate concerns from environmentalists and elected officials. "I am very troubled by this," said Sen. Hillary Rodham Clinton, D-N.Y. "Any plan that involves the shipping of nuclear waste on a barge down the river past New York City raises enormous health, environmental and security concerns." "We should not be using our ports, which are in the most densely populated parts of the state, as rest stops for nuclear material," said Debra DeShong, spokeswoman for Sen. Robert Torricelli, D-N.J. New York City Councilman Jim Gennaro, D-Queens, said, "There is no way to keep the people of the city of New York and the metropolitan region safe from accidents or intentional mischief that comes with the shipment of nuclear fuel." Alex Matthiessen, director of the Garrison-based environmental group Riverkeeper, said, "We would definitely try to block it in court. It seems like such a pie-in-the-sky idea. "Moving spent fuel off-site from Indian Point is a foolish idea given the terrorist threat we face." The river shipments are needed to handle the waste from 17 plants that are located far from railroad lines. The ports are located on both coasts, Lake Michigan and on three major rivers. When waste shipments reach the ports, they would be placed on rail cars and sent to Nevada. The proposal for Indian Point and the other plants without rail access would bring 21,572 tons of nuclear waste — or 19 percent of all the commercial power plant waste destined for Yucca Mountain — into commercial ports. Jim Steets, spokesman for Entergy Nuclear, which owns Indian Point, said there already are docking facilities at Indian Point 2, though it may have to be expanded and strengthened to handle any spent fuel shipments. He said it was premature, however, to discuss possible future shipments. In all, there are more than 77,000 tons of nuclear waste in the storage pools of the nation's 103 nuclear reactors. The Energy Department has considered trucking the spent fuel to Yucca Mountain, but its preferred method is using rail cars because they carry six times more waste than trucks and are thought to be safer. Over 38 years, it would take 105,685 trucks to move the waste from 72 power plant sites to Yucca Mountain. In comparison, it would take 18,243 rail cars, supplemented by 3,122 trucks, to move the waste to Nevada. Supporters say the lead-lined, stainless steel shipping containers, called casks, are strong enough to withstand severe accidents and terrorist attacks. The casks are designed to withstand, among other things, a 30-foot fall onto a hard surface and 30 minutes' exposure to fire at 1,475 degrees. Since 1964, the industry has had more than 3,000 shipments of used nuclear fuel without a major accident. Environmental groups have long contended that the waste should not be moved at all. "What if there is an accident on the barge? What happens to Hudson River traffic then?" asked Marilyn Elie of the Citizens Awareness Network. "I have no confidence in moving nuclear waste. We used it here. We should be responsible for it." Send e-mail to [rwithers@thejournalnews.com] Copyright 2002 The Journal News, [http://www.gannett.com/] . Inc. newspaper ***************************************************************** 27 NJ: Canon Council opposes Cotter's waste contract The Pueblo Chieftain Online - Wednesday March 20th, 2002 By TRACY HARMON CANON CITY - City Council on Monday passed a resolution urging the delay of transport of 470,000 tons of radioactive material from the Maywood, N.J., Superfund site to Cotter Corp. Uranium Mill. According to City Attorney John Havens, the city has no direct regulatory power over Cotter Corp. or the transportation corridors between New Jersey and the Cotter mill. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers recently awarded a contract to clean up radioactive soil that was left by Maywood Chemical Co., which extracted thorium to make lantern mantles from 1916 to 1959, and contaminated soil was to be transported to Cotter Corp. for disposal. City council joins Fremont County commissioners and Gov. Bill Owens in requesting a delay of shipments while the Colorado Department of Health and Environment studies the legality of Cotter's proposal, Havens said. "The council wishes to send a clear message to Cotter that the transportation agreement to bring in and handle the disposal of waste material from other Superfund sites is not something it wishes to see occur on a regular basis." "The council is not against Cotter, but wants to stop the stigma that (being a repository for radioactive waste) is what Canon City is all about," City Manager Steve Rabe said. Sara Kitchen of Colorado Citizens Against Toxic Waste told council she has concerns about old abandoned mine shafts located in and around Cotter mill property. She said the shafts can and will cave in. Shirley Squier, also a member of CCAT, said Canon City residents are committed to economic development, "but we are very interested in responsible economic development. Dumping of toxic waste is not good economic development for our community." Also on Monday, Florence City Council passed a similar resolution and the Denver-based Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility urged the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency to accept public comment on the disposal plan. In other business Monday, council unanimously approved expenditure of $240,000 to purchase Department of Corrections property in the 100 block of Main Street as the site for a new city hall building. Council approved the purchase agreement pending an environmental review of the property. Rabe said the state has given initial approval to award a ©1996-2002 Chieftain.com The Star-Journal Publishing Corp. Pueblo, Colorado U.S.A. ***************************************************************** 28 Editorial: Nuke barge idea takes on water Las Vegas SUN Today: March 20, 2002 at 9:12:09 PST A Department of Energy report says that if Yucca Mountain is opened as a nuclear waste dump, about one-fourth of the nation's radioactive waste could pass through sea and river ports before it reaches its ultimate destination in Nevada. Gannett News Service reported Tuesday that if the plan eventually is put in place, over a 38-year-period 21,572 tons of nuclear waste would be shipped on barges through 15 commercial ports located on both coasts, three major rivers and Lake Michigan. Sending nuclear waste to Nevada by train and truck, over thousands of miles, is dangerous enough considering the prospect of accidents and terrorist attacks. But shipping man's deadliest waste over water on a barge? They might as well paint bull's-eyes on the lumbering vessels for terrorists. For years the Department of Energy has avoided providing details of what routes, and by what means, it would ship 77,000 tons of nuclear waste to Yucca Mountain. Keeping a lid on that information effectively has isolated Nevada in the debate over nuclear waste storage. Other states don't feel immediately affected if they're not told nuclear waste likely will travel through their cities and towns. If there is a silver lining to the revelation about the barges, it is that it could build opposition in Congress to the construction of a nuclear waste dump. Since Sept. 11 there has been considerable discussion about just how easy it is to penetrate our loosely guarded ports and how vulnerable they are to terrorist attacks. For the federal government to even contemplate sending nuclear waste by barges confirms yet again just how flawed the thinking has been of those who advocate turning Yucca Mountain into the nation's dumping ground for nuclear waste. All contents copyright 2002 Las Vegas SUN, Inc. ***************************************************************** 29 Yucca: Guinn: More money needed Las Vegas SUN Today: March 20, 2002 at 11:10:54 PST By Erin Neff With 26 days left to veto President Bush's Yucca Mountain decision, Gov. Kenny Guinn is worried the state doesn't have enough money to fight the proposed nuclear waste dump. On Tuesday, Guinn asked the private sector to "step up to the plate" to help fund the now-$6 million Nevada Protection Fund, which already has more than half of its donations spoken for. "Truthfully, $6 million is wonderful, but we could spend millions more," Guinn said. "The nuclear energy industry has earmarked $30 million to lobby" for the dump. Sometime between April 1 and 15 Guinn will become the first governor in U.S. history to veto a president's decision, triggering a 90-day window for Congress to vote to override him. Nevada's cost to fight the dump, which includes retaining lobbyists, PR firms and attorneys, is expected to skyrocket as the issue moves to Congress. Already $2.5 million of the Nevada Protection Fund has been earmarked for Nevada's outside attorneys to stage a legal fight against the proposed nuclear waste dump 90 miles outside of Las Vegas. Another $1 million was granted to Brown &Partners to conduct public relations campaigns in states where senators could be swayed about the hazards of transporting the waste through their districts. No one believes Nevada can sustain Guinn's veto in the Republican-controlled House of Representatives, but everyone is holding out hope Sen. Harry Reid, D-Nev., can get the 51 votes needed to block the dump. In addition to the $3.5 million already earmarked, the hiring of two prominent lobbyists will cost an estimated $600,000. John Podesta, chief of staff for former President Bill Clinton, will be paid $300,000 over the next six months to lobby Democrats. Ken Duberstein, chief of staff for former President Ronald Reagan, was hired at about the same amount to lobby Senate Republicans. "We're trying to make every penny we have count," Guinn said. On Tuesday, The Molasky Companies donated $50,000 and the Nevada Association of Realtors contributed $20,000 to the state's fight -- pushing the total over $6 million. "My motive is to really use it as a kickoff campaign to the business community," said Steven Molasky, who has served on the Nuclear Projects Commission for the past eight years. "While we have a long fight ahead of us, I think it's beatable. "I'll do what I can to reach out to the business community. Nobody wants to throw money away, but this isn't going to be throwing money away." Molasky said he is confident Nevada will be able to raise $10 million for the fight. Guinn said he is talking almost daily to Reid and Sen. John Ensign, R-Nev., to coordinate the state's lobbying efforts. "If they want us to go somewhere, we will," Guinn said. "We just can't cover every state because of the money. "If we had another $10 or $15 million, we could do more." All contents copyright 2002 Las Vegas SUN, Inc. ***************************************************************** 30 Daschle not as confident on Yucca Las Vegas SUN Today: March 20, 2002 at 11:13:38 PST By Benjamin Grove WASHINGTON -- Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle 10 months ago said the Yucca Mountain project was "dead" as long as he and Sen. Harry Reid, D-Nev., were in charge, but today Daschle said that may not be the case. Daschle said that specific federal laws on nuclear waste will not allow him to block a vote on the issue. "I was not aware that this legislation when we drafted it decades ago is under an expedited procedure," Daschle said. "Anybody can be majority leader when this comes to the floor. That is, anybody can call it to the floor after the requisite time that is required here for consideration of the recommendation made by the president." In May at a Las Vegas fund-raiser, Daschle declared Yucca Mountain dead. "As long as we're in the majority, it's dead," he said. He said he then believed he could keep the issue from the Senate floor for a vote, which the majority leader is traditionally allowed to do. Today he said the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, originally drafted in 1982, allows for any senator to call for a vote. The political fate of Yucca Mountain, 90 miles northwest of Las Vegas, is expected to be decided by Congress later this year. President Bush approved the site Feb. 15, leaving Gov. Kenny Guinn to officially veto the decision, which likely will happen next month. After that, Congress has 90 days to vote to override Guinn's objection, effectively giving the Yucca project a green light. Nevada Sens. Democrat Harry Reid and Republican John Ensign are scrambling to round up 49 other senators to vote against the Yucca project. Reid spokesman Nathan Naylor today said Reid is counting on Ensign -- and high-profile GOP lobbyist Ken Duberstein -- to round up at least 15 Republicans. So far, the only Republican who has agreed to vote with the Nevada lawmakers is Sen. Ben Nighthorse Campbell, R-Colo., Ensign said. Sen. Lincoln Chafee, R-R.I., also may vote with the Nevadans, Ensign said. Just as Reid is relying on Ensign, Ensign today continued to pressure Daschle to refuse to call for a vote on Guinn's objection. The Senate majority leader by Senate tradition calls for votes. "The majority leader is the only person who can bring an issue to the floor for an up-or-down vote," Ensign insisted. Daschle today said he wanted to set the record straight on the Yucca comments he made at the Las Vegas fund-raiser May 31. Daschle was also responding to comments made by Ensign Tuesday, he said. "I know that Sen. Ensign yesterday said I can stop (the vote)," Daschle told reporters. "Well, the expedited procedure precludes me from keeping it from coming to the floor." Ensign is pressuring Daschle much like Reid pressured Bush not to approve the Yucca site. Ensign today said he continues to work closely with Reid, and that no tension has developed between them despite the political crossfire. "I understand what he did, and he understands what I'm doing," Ensign said. "I wish President Bush had not made that decision, just like Sen. Reid hopes Sen. Daschle won't let this come to the floor." Daschle spokeswoman Ranit Schmelzer today said Daschle was "absolutely" committed to helping Reid round up votes against the Yucca project, even if he couldn't block it. She said Daschle would help Reid lobby their Senate colleagues up until the minute before the vote, if necessary. The vote count has been the subject of much speculation among Yucca project observers, many of whom still say it is difficult to predict where the votes will fall. Nuclear industry lobbyists, as well as environmental groups, are said to have their own predictions about where senators are lining up on the issue. "Those things aren't accurate because everybody fudges them to scare the other side," Ensign said. "It's impossible to say for certain this far out," where votes line up, he said. One Capitol Hill newsletter, CongressDaily, sought to count votes but got responses from only 71 of the 100 senators, with 36 who now intend to vote in favor of the project, 14 against and 21 undecided. Ensign said several of the Republicans listed by the publication as favoring Yucca had told him they were undecided. All contents copyright 2002 Las Vegas SUN, Inc. ***************************************************************** 31 Germany nuclear waste convoy leaves for Britain theage.com.au, Breaking News NECKERWESTHEIM, Germany, March 20 AFP|Published: Wednesday March 20, 10:02 PM A shipment of highly radioactive atomic waste left the nuclear power plant in the south-west German town of Neckerwestheim today bound for Britain's Sellafield treatment centre with little disruption from protesters, police said. The waste is to be transferred from three trucks to rail cars in the town of Walheim in the afternoon, where it will then continue its journey to Britain. A police spokesman said there had "for the most part" been no disturbances by demonstrators, who traditionally attempt to block the shipments they maintain are unsafe. Several hundred police officers were deployed to protect the convoy. Copyright © 2002 John Fairfax Holdings Ltd. All rights reserved. ***************************************************************** 32 AU: Senator critical of Kakadu uranium mine safety sandbags ABC Politics - 20/03/02 : The Northern Territory's Labor Senator is calling on the Federal Government to explain why sandbags are being used to stop uranium sediment from the Ranger Uranium Mine seeping into the environment. The mine is surrounded by the Kakadu National Park. Trish Crossin says it is evident this method, used by Energy Resources Australia, in retention pond number one is not working. She says it is the fourth wet season in a row where highly elevated uranium concentrates have been discharged into the Magela Creek. "If you have got uranium sediment in the water that you are trying to maintain and contain in a retention pond, then having sandbags as a wall to try and stop this flow is far from inadequate," Senator Crossin said. "In fact it is grossly negligent." © 2001 Australian Broadcasting Corporation ***************************************************************** 33 Sydney may host nuclear reprocessing plant ABC Sci-Tech - 21/03/02 : The Australian Democrats claim legal action in Argentina could lead to Sydney hosting a nuclear reprocessing plant, as well as a new reactor. A judge is yet to decide whether to pursue the case put by Argentinian prosecutors for a court investigation into the contract to replace the Lucas Heights reactor. The prosecutors' report says the nuclear cooperation agreement with Australia and the contract with Argentinian company INVAP might breach the constitution by importing radioactive waste. The Argentinian ambassador to Australia, Nestor Stancanelli, says international agreements say reactor spent fuel rods are not nuclear waste, so the government's accepted that Lucas heights spent rods could be conditioned in Argentina if necessary. Democrats energy spokeswoman Lynne Alison says the case could lead to a reprocessing plant and indefinite waste storage as well as a new reactor in Sydney's southern suburbs. © 2001 Australian Broadcasting Corporation ***************************************************************** 34 Nuclear alarmists The Frontier Post From Peshawar Pakistan Richard D Sokolsky and Eugene B Rumer Updated on 3/20/2002 10:07:49 AM Arms control advocates are sounding the alarm over recent press reports about the Bush administration’s new nuclear posture review, which calls for developing nuclear plans and capabilities to deter or defend against nuclear, biological or chemical weapons attacks not only by Russia and China but also by Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Syria and Libya. The critics of the nuclear review claim that increasing the number of instances in which the United States might consider using nuclear weapons could well make their use more likely and is liable to stimulate further proliferation of such weapons. These arguments do not stand up under scrutiny. In fact, the Bush administration deserves praise for its candour in dealing with the security dilemmas posed by the post-Cold War strategic environment. The United States is right to redefine the requirements of deterrence in order to meet new threats to its security, its forces abroad and its allies. Countries hostile to the United States are indeed developing nuclear, biological and chemical weapons that could do us grave harm. Their leaders may not be deterred by traditional threats of massive nuclear retaliation. And they are producing and storing these weapons in deeply buried and hardened sites that might be invulnerable to all but nuclear weapons. Posing a threat to targets that are highly valued by an adversary has been a staple of US deterrence doctrine since the beginning of the nuclear age. But leaders of rogue states may not take seriously US threats to launch massive nuclear strikes on leadership and weapons sites - nuclear, chemical and biological - that are inaccessible except to the most destructive nuclear weapons in our arsenal: the types left over from the Cold War. These US weapons, would, of course, cause a huge loss of innocent lives. Thus, having the capability to destroy such targets with smaller and less destructive weapons would strengthen rather than erode deterrence. It is preposterous to believe, as some scaremongers have suggested, that the Bush administration is preparing to carry out nuclear preemptive strikes around the world. But it is not hard to imagine circumstances under which a president might want to have the nuclear option available for preventing or responding to a rogue state’s use of highly destructive weapons. Suppose, for example, that the United States had just suffered the loss of 100,000 lives in a biological warfare attack, that it not only knew the identity of the rogue state attacker but also had reliable intelligence it was preparing additional attacks on US territory - and that these weapons could be destroyed only with nuclear weapons. Under these conditions, why shouldn’t the president have the option of limiting further American deaths? A key criticism of the nuclear posture review is that it envisions using nuclear weapons to deter or possibly respond to not only nuclear threats to the United States but also attacks with chemical and biological weapons (CBW). Critics point out that during the Cold War, nuclear weapons were an option of last resort, to be used only to deter a nuclear attack on the United States by the Soviet Union - in other words, only when national survival was at stake. This interpretation is a misreading of history. Throughout the Cold War, the United States reserved the right to use nuclear weapons to deter both conventional and nuclear attacks on its NATO allies and on Japan, Korea and Australia. The prime example of the United States’ “lowering the threshold” for the use of nuclear weapons was Europe, where official NATO doctrine called on the alliance to use nuclear weapons to deter or defeat a conventional attack by the Warsaw Pact that was also expected to include the use of chemical weapons. The credible threat to use nuclear weapons to offset the conventional superiority of the Warsaw Pact helped keep the peace in Europe throughout the Cold War. Similarly, holding open the option of using nuclear weapons against chemical or biological attacks may also help to keep the peace. The issue is not that, as some critics suggest, nuclear arms are strictly for deterrence rather than war fighting - this is a false choice. US plans for employing nuclear weapons over the past few decades have not specifically targeted population centres. These plans were based on the sound logic that threats work only if they are credible, and that it was simply incredible to threaten the Soviet Union with total destruction, and thus put the survival of the United States at risk, regardless of the nature of the Soviet nuclear attack. Critics of the nuclear posture review worry that it will increase nuclear proliferation because, in contemplating possible use of nuclear weapons in response to CBW attacks, the United States is abandoning a policy enunciated in 1978 forswearing US nuclear attacks on countries that do not possess nuclear weapons. In truth, however, over the past decade senior government officials have publicly stated that this country reserves the option of using nuclear weapons in response to CBW attacks - a flat contradiction of that 1978 policy. Advocates of nuclear disarmament assert that US backtracking from an outdated policy that effectively gives non-nuclear countries a “safe haven” for developing CBW will prompt further nuclear proliferation. They exaggerate the impact of US nuclear policy decisions on the calculus of other countries to acquire or increase their nuclear capabilities. There is little evidence to suggest that such decisions by Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Pakistan or India were driven by the US nuclear posture. Conversely, the United States could get rid of all its nuclear weapons tomorrow and these countries would not follow suit. On the contrary, the one sure way to stimulate further proliferation of weapons of mass destruction would be for the United States to level the playing field by slashing its nuclear arsenal to a few hundred weapons. The nuclear posture review represents an evolutionary change from the nuclear doctrine that has emerged since the Cold War ended. The reality is that nuclear weapons have a useful role to play in deterring or defeating the use of certain weapons of mass destruction. Instead of making overblown and misleading arguments, critics of the nuclear review should debate the implications for deterrence and stability of its one truly innovative feature - the decision to rely more heavily on conventional and missile defence capabilities in US strategic doctrine. Moreover, posing a credible threat to critical targets in rogue states (or, for that matter, Russia and China) does not require the thousands of nuclear warheads the administration plans to keep. Critics should continue to press the administration for a more convincing explanation of why the new nuclear strategy it has articulated will produce a strategic force posture and force levels almost identical to those planned by the Clinton administration under a Cold War nuclear doctrine the Bush team has correctly discarded. © Copyright 2001 The Frontier Post ***************************************************************** 35 'Indo-Pak war could escalate to N-confrontation' Indo-Pak Face Off Expressindia.com T.V. Parasuram/Press Trust of India Washington, March 20: In a grim assessment of the Indo-Pak situation, CIA director George Tenet has said that chances of a war between India and Pakistan are highest since 1971 and warned that a conventional war could escalate into a nuclear confrontation. "The chance of war between these two nuclear-armed states is higher than at any point since 1971," Tenet said on Tuesday while testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee with Defence Intelligence Agency Director Admiral Thomas Wilson. "If India were to conduct large-scale offensive operations into PoK (Pakistan-occupied Kashmir), Pakistan might retaliate with strikes of its own in the belief that its nuclear deterrent would limit the scope of an Indian counter-attack," he said. Tenet expressed concern that India and Pakistan may not have completed testing of their nuclear weapons and that they may deploy their most advanced systems without additional testing. The CIA Director said that the attack on Parliament in December last proved very destabilising for relations between India and Pakistan as it resulted in new calls for military action against Islamabad and subsequent mobilisation on both sides. "Both India and Pakistan are publicly downplaying the risks of nuclear conflict in the current crisis. We are deeply concerned, however, that a conventional war, once begun, could escalate into a nuclear confrontation," he said. The South Asian neighbours, Tenet said, are working on the doctrine and tactics for more advanced nuclear weapons, producing fissile material and increasing their nuclear stockpiles. Both countries also continue development of long-range nuclear-capable ballistic missiles, and plan to field cruise missiles with a land-attack capability, he added. Chinese firms, Tenet revealed, "Remain key suppliers of missile-related technologies to Pakistan, Iran and several other countries." The US is closely watching Beijing's compliance with its bilateral commitment in 1996 not to assist unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, Tenet said. © 2002: Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Ltd. All rights ***************************************************************** 36 China's party paper comments on US nuclear posture review BBC Monitoring Service - United Kingdom; Mar 20, 2002 China's Communist Party newspaper has identified three main dangers to human security in the Pentagon's recent Nuclear Posture Review report. 1) It expands the scope of the use of nuclear weapons, undermining the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. 2) It lowers the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons by advocating that the United States develop a new warhead that can destroy bunkers hidden deep underground. and 3) It undermines the efforts of all countries throughout the world to completely ban nuclear testing. Following is the text of an article by Mei Zhou in (International Forum) column: "The world does not need a nuclear overlord", by Chinese Communist Party newspaper Renmin Ribao web site on 19 March: The US Department of Defence recently submitted to Congress its Nuclear Posture Review report. It proposes that, in circumstances such as "an Iraqi attack on Israel or a neighbouring country, a North Korean attack on South Korea, or a military confrontation over the matter of Taiwan's status," the US President can threaten to use the means of nuclear retaliation. The report names seven countries, against which the US military must be well prepared for using nuclear weapons on emergency terms. The report calls on the United States to develop a new nuclear warhead that can destroy bunkers hidden deep underground. The disclosure of this report immediately triggered the serious attention of the international community. It shows that there are certainly some Americans who would play with fire with nuclear weapons. If it were to become US policy, it would pose new dangers to human security. Danger 1. It expands the scope of the use of nuclear weapons, sapping the validity of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. In this report, most of the countries that are clearly listed as possible targets of a nuclear attack are non-nuclear countries that are signatories to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. This treaty promises that, as long as the signatories continue to preserve their non-nuclear posture, and do not conduct joint operations with a nuclear country, they will not be attacked with nuclear weapons. But in line with the logic of the report, as long as the United States holds that any country which poses a threat to the security of another country, the United States can conduct a nuclear attack on it. And it can do so regardless of whether it is a nuclear or non-nuclear country, and regardless of whether it is a signatory to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. The effective role in curbing world nuclear weapons development, which has been played by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty for decades, is consequently undermined. Danger 2. It arbitrarily lowers the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons by advocating that the United States develop a new warhead that can destroy bunkers hidden deep underground. In line with the plan set forth in the report, when a problem cannot be solved by conventional force, nuclear weapons can be logically used to solve it. The US military can often use nuclear weapons as a deterrence in localized wars and armed conflicts by relying on nuclear blackmail to meet the goal of "subduing enemy forces." Due to the enormous destructive nature of nuclear weapons, since World War II statesmen and military experts of all countries, including the United States, have taken an extremely cautious stance on their strategic deterrence. To reduce and even eventually eliminate nuclear weapons altogether, all countries have been making unremitting efforts for decades. But, certain people in the Pentagon would allow those efforts to fall short of success for lack of a final push. Danger 3. It undermines the efforts of all countries throughout the world to completely ban nuclear testing. Even many NATO countries also admit that: "From the perspective of the human race and the environment, any use of nuclear weapons would be absolutely disastrous... ... [ellipses as published] The harm that it would do to the human race would likely do great political damage to a country that uses nuclear weapons, particularly to one that uses them first." As a New York Times editorial says, if another country plans to develop new nuclear weapons, and considers conducting a first strike on a non-nuclear country, Washington could list that country as a dangerous "rogue nation." But the Pentagon's nuclear review report proposes that the United States do exactly that. This report stresses the need to ensure the "absolute nuclear superiority" of the United States while pushing the entire human race towards the danger of nuclear war. Little do they know that, "in a great disaster, no one can escape unscathed." Even figures with foresight in the United States recognize this point clearly. The Boston Globe notes that Washington has again invited back the nuclear war maniacs. Source: Renmin Ribao web site, Beijing in Chinese 19 Mar 02 /BBC Monitoring/ © BBC. ***************************************************************** 37 UK: Shutting the stable door The Guardian - United Kingdom; Mar 20, 2002 BY NEIL LOWRIE *Allies have a habit of quickly turning to enemies. The Soviet Union shortly after the second world war is a prime example, so are Iran, Iraq and the Afghan mojahedin. Politicians conveniently ignore the small number of nuclear weapons in the hands of General Musharraf of Pakistan, but, more seriously, they turn a blind eye to the world's fifth largest nuclear arsenal, that of Israel. Iraq is a country beaten to its knees by a decade of sanctions and Anglo-American bombing. More is known about the military capability of Iraq than of any other country. It would be wiser to concentrate on those states that are perceived to be friendly to the west, as countries do not have friends, they only have allies of convenience. Neil Lowrie Loughborough, Leics N.J.Lowrie@lboro.ac.uk ***************************************************************** 38 Showdown at the Presidium The Pasko Case Gregory Pasko, an investigative journalist who worked for the Pacific Fleet's newspaper, was arrested on 20 November 1997 by the FSB and charged with high treason for his writing about the nuclear safety issues in the Russian Pacific Fleet. Russian Prosecutor General appeals nullification of unregistered and secret Ministry of Defence decree to Supreme Court Presidium. Jon Gauslaa, 2002-03-20 07:35 Just as everybody thought that decree 055:96 of the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD), which has been the legal basis for a number of bogus espionage cases, including the cases against Aleksandr Nikitin, Grigory Pasko and Igor Sutyagin, was cancelled once and for all, its validity will once more be tried in the Russian Supreme Court. Challenge from Prosecutor General The Prosecutor General has challenged the Supreme Court's Military Collegium's cancellation dated September 12, 2001 of ten provisions of decree 055:96. In this ruling, which came after an application filed by Aleksandr Nikitin, the Collegium cancelled the disputed provisions from the date of the enforcement of the decree (August 10, 1996),on the ground that the provisions had not been subject to state registration. The ruling was confirmed by the Supreme Court's Appeal Collegium on November 6, 2001. It has thus, reached legal force, but the Prosecutor General has appealed the decision to the Supreme Court Presidium, which will handle the appeal on March 27, 2002. At first sight the move of the Prosecutor General seems somewhat surprising. In both previous instances his representative supported Nikitin's application, saying that the decree indeed is a normative legal act subject to state registration as well as official publication, and that it should have no legal force. However, his recent move may turn out to be a cunning plan with the purpose to ensure that the legal force of the unregistered and unpublished decree is maintained ever from its enforcement in August 1996. Decree cancelled - but from when? Formally the Prosecutor General has not left the above-mentioned position, but he claims that the disputed provisions should be cancelled, not from August 1996 when they entered into force, but from the date the verdict cancelling the provisions was enforced (November 6, 2001). The decree was cancelled because it is not registered, but the Prosecutor General's position would mean that it still would have full legal effect throughout the whole period in which it was not registered. Thus, the lacking registration of the decree would have no legal consequences, and the cancellation of it would hardly have any effect, at least not for the ongoing criminal cases against Grigory Pasko, Igor Sutyagin and others. If the Supreme Court Presidium should approve the Prosecutor General's position, the consequences could be disturbing. It would mean that the unregistered and unpublished decree 055, which according to Russian legislation can not be used as a normative legal act because of its lack of registration and publication, nevertheless can be used as a normative legal act - from the day of its enforcement until this very day. From a legal point of view, it would be surprising if the Presidium would aprove the position of the Prosecutor General. However, some might say that bigger surprises have happened before… More cases waiting in line The case regarding the date of the cancellation of decree 055 is not the only case pending before the various bodies of the Russian Supreme Court these days. In fact the cases are queuing up in lines almost as tight as the queues to the Lenin Mausoleum in times past. Firstly, the Military Collegium's cancellation of the remaining provisions of decree 055 from February 12, 2002 will be subject to a hearing in the Appeal Collegium of the Supreme Court on April 2, 2002. The defence of Grigory Pasko, who launched the application regarding the validity of the provisions, will argue that also these have to be cancelled from their enforcement. Its opponents from the Ministry of Defence (MoD) will insist that the decree is not a normative legal act affecting the rights and duties of the citizens and thus, not the subject to state registration. Secondly, the Appeal Collegium will on April 2 also hear the MoD's appeal against the Military Collegium's decision of February 13, 2002 regarding the cancellation of article 70 of MoD decree 010, which was used as a part of the legal basis of the Pasko-conviction. Article 70 forbids Russian military personnel to have off-duty relations with foreign citizens and was cancelled because it violated the Constitution's provisions regarding the right to private life. The MoD claims that this is "wrong" and that the rights of military servicemen can be limited without having basis in any legal norms. Thirdly, also a case on the validity of the presidential decree No. 763:96 regarding state secrets will be heard on April 2. The Supreme Court has previously rejected an application on the issue saying that it did not have the competence to deal with the matter, but it has now accepted to evaluate the application filed by Nikitin's lawyer, Yury Schmidt. Pasko appeal case not scheduled While the above-mentioned cases, which in many ways can be considered as legal skirmishes of the Supreme Court's hearing of the cassation appeal against the Pasko-conviction, will be heard shortly, the date of the latter hearing has not been scheduled. According to the latest rumours, the hearing would probably take place in May. Publisher: Bellona Foundation, President: Frederic Hauge Information: info@bellona.no, Technical contact: webmaster@bellona.no Telephone: +47 23 23 46 00 Telefax: +47 22 38 38 62 * P.O.Box 2141 Grunerlokka, 0505 Oslo, Norway ***************************************************************** 39 Russia needs more money to scrap old nuclear-powered submarines BBC Monitoring Service - United Kingdom; Mar 19, 2002 Text of report in English by Russian news agency Interfax Moscow, 19 March: Russia needs R2.5bn annually to dispose of the engines of nuclear-powered submarines, Viktor Akhunov, head of the Atomic Energy Ministry's division in charge of ecology and decommissioning of nuclear-powered submarines told a roundtable discussion in the State Duma today. The entire programme of cutting up nuclear-powered submarines is estimated to require 2.5bn to 3bn US dollars, he said. Before 1 January 2002 a total of 190 such submarines had been decommissioned, with nuclear fuel removed from 97 of them, Akhunov said. As many as 122 submarines are awaiting cutting up for utilization, with nuclear fuel still remaining in 98 of them, he said. Source: Interfax news agency, Moscow, in English 1827 gmt 19 Mar 02 /BBC Monitoring/ © BBC. ***************************************************************** 40 Nuclear-free anniversary marked NZOOM - ONE News - Politics [http://nzoom.com] Opposition leader Bill English, says that New Zealand's anti-nuclear policy means that it has to work harder in maintaining a good relationship with the United States. English says the government should take a more open-minded view on the nuclear issue. He says that says that President George W Bush is taking a harder line on the issue, than his predecessor. However, Prime Minister, Helen Clark, says that the September 11 terrorist attacks reinforce the need for New Zealand to maintain its nuclear free policy as such vessels could be a target for terrorists. Clark says that the risk of nuclear vessels coming to New Zealand is greater now than when the anti-nuclear legislation was passed. But former Australian Minister of Defence, Peter Reith, told an Act Party conference at the weekend that New Zealand's anti nuclear stand was a mistake and should be scrapped. He says that there is no risk in nuclear armed or powered vessels coming to New Zealand. Published on Mar 18, 2002 ***************************************************************** 41 THE RETURN OF NUCLEAR INSANITY The American Reporter Vol. 8, No. 1806W - March 17, 2002 Happy St. Patrick's Day! On Native Ground by Randolph T. Holhut American Reporter Correspondent Dummerston, Vt. DUMMERSTON, Vt. -- Madness. Total, utter madness. What other reaction could a sane and rational human being have over the news that the Bush administration has ordered the Pentagon to prepare contingency plans for the use of nuclear weapons against not only the "axis of evil" nations of Iran, Iraq and North Korea, but also China, Russia, Syria and Libya? It gets worse. The Bush Administration directive known as the Nuclear Posture Review (details of which were recently leaked to the Los Angeles Times) tells the Pentagon to prepare for possibly using nuclear weapons in future crises such as an attack on Israel by Iraq, a Chinese attack on Taiwan or an invasion of South Korea by North Korea. Nuclear weapons may also be used in retaliation for a chemical or biological attack on the U.S., for attacking targets that can't be destroyed with conventional munitions and for "surprising military developments," such as terrorists getting hold of "weapons of mass destruction." The review also tells the Pentagon to start planning for the development of smaller "tactical" nuclear weapons and to again arm cruise missiles with nuclear warheads. Decades of efforts to reduce the proliferation of nuclear weapons are now in the process of being wiped out to serve the military needs of the ongoing "war on terrorism." Our long-standing policy of considering the use of nuclear weapons only as a last resort may now be over. The leaders of our nation now believe they have the right to use America's unquestioned military dominance to turn any nation it pleases into a smoking crater. Madness. Total, utter madness. Is threatening to wage a nuclear war against any nation we don't like avenge the dead of Sept. 11? I say that it is not. Lowering the threshold for the use of the most destructive weapon ever devised will do nothing to make this nation more secure. Since 1945, the unspoken policy was Mutually Assured Destruction -- any country who dared to launch a nuclear attack on the U.S. would likewise be destroyed. This was enough to deter the likelihood of a nuclear war. The policy now considered by the Bush administration makes the use of nuclear weapons a lot more likely. As for the years of effort to keep the nuclear monsters in the box, if the U.S. decides to resume testing and development of new nuclear devices, what's to keep India, Pakistan, Russia and China from starting testing again and touching off another arms race? Even dumber than that is targeting countries are now supposedly our allies in the "war on terrorism" -- Russia and China. How long are they going to stay on our side if our military policy pretends that the Cold War never ended and that Russia and China are still threats to our national security? Madness. Total, utter madness. Anyone who has ever seen the photos and films of the aftermath of the U.S. atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 knows the destructiveness of nuclear war. Now imagine the use of weapons more powerful and more sophisticated thanks to more than five decades of research and development. But maybe something good can come from this. Remember back in the 1980s, when the Reagan administration was talking about "winable" nuclear wars against the Soviet Union and wanted to deploy more tactical nuclear weapons in Europe? That was the last time we heard such loose talk about using nukes. One result of the Reagan years was the nuclear freeze movement that helped to transform the dialogue about foreign policy. The proposal to freeze the Soviet and U.S. nuclear stockpiles started in Europe as a reaction to their desire to not be incinerated in a shootout between the superpowers. It then quickly spread to the U.S. In 1981, about one in three Americans supported the worldwide elimination of nuclear weapons. By 1983, the figure was four out of five. From affirmative votes at town meetings in Vermont to nuclear-freeze referendums that passed in eight of nine states, American public sentiment against nuclear weapons was huge. As a result, the Reagan Administration quietly abandoned its talk about nuclear "superiority" and toned down the harsh rhetoric against the Soviets. Eventually, both nations reduced their nuclear stockpiles and the Cold War ended with the world no longer facing imminent destruction. I still consider it a miracle that we got through the 1980s without a nuclear war, and I think the nuclear freeze movement was a big part of that miracle. In spite of all the red-baiting and demonizing of the conservatives, most Americans realized that reducing the risk of nuclear war was just plain common sense. We need a similar movement today. We need to let our leaders know that there is no military contingency that requires the use of weapons of mass destruction. We need to let President Bush know that he doesn't have the right to wage unlimited and undeclared war against the evildoer du jour. We need to make it clear that the events of Sept. 11 do not justify the Bush administration to recklessly threaten other nations with nuclear attack and further fuel anti-American sentiment around the world. It's not going to be easy. We've seen how effectively dissent has been squelched by the pro-war folks. But the U.S. is squandering whatever moral high ground it had after the Sept. 11 attacks. The Bush administration seems to be committed to a military policy that makes us as much of a "rogue state" as any of the countries on President Bush's nuclear hit list. It is time to stop the madness. We need to speak up now and oppose the Bush doctrine of unlimited war and the possible use of nuclear weapons, before it's too late. Randolph T. Holhut has been a journalist in New England for more than 20 years. He edited "The George Seldes Reader" (Barricade Books). Copyright 2002 Joe Shea The American Reporter. All Rights Reserved. ***************************************************************** 42 PAK: Nuclear alarmists [http://www.paknews.com ©The Frontier Publications (Pvt) Ltd. Richard D Sokolsky and Eugene B Rumer Updated on 3/20/2002 10:07:49 AM Arms control advocates are sounding the alarm over recent press reports about the Bush administration’s new nuclear posture review, which calls for developing nuclear plans and capabilities to deter or defend against nuclear, biological or chemical weapons attacks not only by Russia and China but also by Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Syria and Libya. The critics of the nuclear review claim that increasing the number of instances in which the United States might consider using nuclear weapons could well make their use more likely and is liable to stimulate further proliferation of such weapons. These arguments do not stand up under scrutiny. In fact, the Bush administration deserves praise for its candour in dealing with the security dilemmas posed by the post-Cold War strategic environment. The United States is right to redefine the requirements of deterrence in order to meet new threats to its security, its forces abroad and its allies. Countries hostile to the United States are indeed developing nuclear, biological and chemical weapons that could do us grave harm. Their leaders may not be deterred by traditional threats of massive nuclear retaliation. And they are producing and storing these weapons in deeply buried and hardened sites that might be invulnerable to all but nuclear weapons. Posing a threat to targets that are highly valued by an adversary has been a staple of US deterrence doctrine since the beginning of the nuclear age. But leaders of rogue states may not take seriously US threats to launch massive nuclear strikes on leadership and weapons sites - nuclear, chemical and biological - that are inaccessible except to the most destructive nuclear weapons in our arsenal: the types left over from the Cold War. These US weapons, would, of course, cause a huge loss of innocent lives. Thus, having the capability to destroy such targets with smaller and less destructive weapons would strengthen rather than erode deterrence. It is preposterous to believe, as some scaremongers have suggested, that the Bush administration is preparing to carry out nuclear preemptive strikes around the world. But it is not hard to imagine circumstances under which a president might want to have the nuclear option available for preventing or responding to a rogue state’s use of highly destructive weapons. Suppose, for example, that the United States had just suffered the loss of 100,000 lives in a biological warfare attack, that it not only knew the identity of the rogue state attacker but also had reliable intelligence it was preparing additional attacks on US territory - and that these weapons could be destroyed only with nuclear weapons. Under these conditions, why shouldn’t the president have the option of limiting further American deaths? A key criticism of the nuclear posture review is that it envisions using nuclear weapons to deter or possibly respond to not only nuclear threats to the United States but also attacks with chemical and biological weapons (CBW). Critics point out that during the Cold War, nuclear weapons were an option of last resort, to be used only to deter a nuclear attack on the United States by the Soviet Union - in other words, only when national survival was at stake. This interpretation is a misreading of history. Throughout the Cold War, the United States reserved the right to use nuclear weapons to deter both conventional and nuclear attacks on its NATO allies and on Japan, Korea and Australia. The prime example of the United States’ “lowering the threshold” for the use of nuclear weapons was Europe, where official NATO doctrine called on the alliance to use nuclear weapons to deter or defeat a conventional attack by the Warsaw Pact that was also expected to include the use of chemical weapons. The credible threat to use nuclear weapons to offset the conventional superiority of the Warsaw Pact helped keep the peace in Europe throughout the Cold War. Similarly, holding open the option of using nuclear weapons against chemical or biological attacks may also help to keep the peace. The issue is not that, as some critics suggest, nuclear arms are strictly for deterrence rather than war fighting - this is a false choice. US plans for employing nuclear weapons over the past few decades have not specifically targeted population centres. These plans were based on the sound logic that threats work only if they are credible, and that it was simply incredible to threaten the Soviet Union with total destruction, and thus put the survival of the United States at risk, regardless of the nature of the Soviet nuclear attack. Critics of the nuclear posture review worry that it will increase nuclear proliferation because, in contemplating possible use of nuclear weapons in response to CBW attacks, the United States is abandoning a policy enunciated in 1978 forswearing US nuclear attacks on countries that do not possess nuclear weapons. In truth, however, over the past decade senior government officials have publicly stated that this country reserves the option of using nuclear weapons in response to CBW attacks - a flat contradiction of that 1978 policy. Advocates of nuclear disarmament assert that US backtracking from an outdated policy that effectively gives non-nuclear countries a “safe haven” for developing CBW will prompt further nuclear proliferation. They exaggerate the impact of US nuclear policy decisions on the calculus of other countries to acquire or increase their nuclear capabilities. There is little evidence to suggest that such decisions by Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Pakistan or India were driven by the US nuclear posture. Conversely, the United States could get rid of all its nuclear weapons tomorrow and these countries would not follow suit. On the contrary, the one sure way to stimulate further proliferation of weapons of mass destruction would be for the United States to level the playing field by slashing its nuclear arsenal to a few hundred weapons. The nuclear posture review represents an evolutionary change from the nuclear doctrine that has emerged since the Cold War ended. The reality is that nuclear weapons have a useful role to play in deterring or defeating the use of certain weapons of mass destruction. Instead of making overblown and misleading arguments, critics of the nuclear review should debate the implications for deterrence and stability of its one truly innovative feature - the decision to rely more heavily on conventional and missile defence capabilities in US strategic doctrine. Moreover, posing a credible threat to critical targets in rogue states (or, for that matter, Russia and China) does not require the thousands of nuclear warheads the administration plans to keep. Critics should continue to press the administration for a more convincing explanation of why the new nuclear strategy it has articulated will produce a strategic force posture and force levels almost identical to those planned by the Clinton administration under a Cold War nuclear doctrine the Bush team has correctly discarded. ***************************************************************** 43 A fear of the nuclear -- The Washington Times March 20, 2002 Tony Blankley I admit I am a little obsessive about the risk of nuclear blasts in America right at the moment. But as topics about which to obsess go, nuclear incineration of Americans is a pretty reasonable one. I continue to be amazed at the calmness, in fact indifference, with which most commentators as well as the public approach the fact that, since October, our government has designated avoidance of nuclear blasts in America as the single highest intelligence priority. Even catching al Qaeda terrorists only reaches that priority if they are suspected of being involved in nuclear activity. I suppose it should be comforting to see such calmness in the face of such danger. But I am more inclined to impute the lack of mental activity on the topic to the phenomenon of cognitive dissonance, which is a psychological malady in which facts are mentally rejected when they are incongruous with established attitudes. Most people cannot accept the possibility that we should fear a nuclear blast downtown this afternoon. Other than during the two weeks of the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, while Americans have had the possibility of nuclear war in the back of our minds, we have never had to contemplate its immediate application to our lives. Yet that is what our government has on its mind. Such sober and vastly experienced men as Vice President Dick Cheney and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld are thinking about it every day. Why aren't you? After all, it's not as if public attitudes don't matter. The president may have to ask Congress for permission to invade Iraq in furtherance of this objective. Should public support slip, he might not be given that permission. Admittedly, as far as public facts are concerned, it is not certain that Iraq has or will soon have nuclear weapons. Neither is it certain that al Qaeda has such weapons. But our government doesn't have the luxury of acting on only certainty. As former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger has written: "Statesmen always face the dilemma that, when their scope for action is greatest, they have a minimum of knowledge. By the time they have garnered sufficient knowledge, the scope for decisive action is likely to have vanished. In the 1930s, British leaders were too unsure about Hitler's objectives . . . to act on the basis of assessments which they could not prove. The tuition fee for learning about Hitler's true nature was tens of millions of graves stretching from one end of Europe to the other." President Bush is about in the same position as those British leaders in the 1930s. The semi-public case for Iraq's likely bomb relies substantially on the testimony of a few Iraqi defectors. Most prominent is Khidir Hamza, called "Saddam's bomb-maker." Those who find him credible believe he was the mastermind behind Saddam's nuclear project, whose insights justify the need for military action. But his detractors point out that he left Iraq in 1990 and that he claims first-hand knowledge of matters he probably got second-hand. But then, his detractors — such as former U.N. weapons inspector Scott Ritter, who used to be anti-Saddam and is now something of a Saddam apologist — are accused of getting too cozy with Saddam. Similar arguments of bias or second-hand knowledge are assigned to other intelligence sources such as Adnan Saeed al-Haideri (the Iraqi engineer who claims that Saddam is building secret chemical and biological weapons factories) and James Woolsey (the former Clinton CIA director, who advocates prompt action against Iraq). Iraq is a hard country for our intelligence to penetrate. Although Iraq has been a top intelligence target for us since 1989, 10 years later (1999) the CIA privately admitted that, regarding Iraq's Presidential Affairs Department (one of its eight intelligence organizations), "We don't know exactly what it is, but it's Saddam's secret unit." Unless Mr. Bush has conclusive secret information (and the reports out of European and Middle East embassies here in Washington are that their governments have not yet been presented with such conclusive evidence), he will have to make the Iraqi invasion decision only on the basis of suspicion. Moreover, Iraq is only one of the geographic areas from which the terrorists may get or be hiding nukes or biological weapons. Al Qaeda has bases in up to 60 countries. All those places may have to be searched (perhaps without permission of the host governments). And it may be that we will be chasing a chimera. Perhaps there is no imminent nuclear or biological threat? These are the terrible calculations that the president will have to make in the coming months: go to war and risk destabilizing much of the world (and possibly killing many young American soldiers) without knowing for certain whether it was all necessary; or, inaction resulting in the annihilation of a major American city, because he didn't have enough proof of danger until it was too late. Of course, one can always hope for the third possibility — inaction followed by . . . nothing. Tony Blankley is a columnist for The Washington Times. His column appears on Wednesdays. [http://asp.washtimes.com/mailarticle.asp?action=send&ArticleID=20020320-1059151 Updated at 1:30 a.m. All site contents copyright © 2002 News World Communications, Inc. ***************************************************************** 44 China hails own strategic nuclear force amid rising tensions with US Wednesday March 20, 4:39 PM Chinese state media hailed the country's nuclear force and second-strike capability, amid a row over US contingency plans listing China as a potential target for nuclear attack. The People's Liberation Army Daily, the People's Daily and other newspapers carried as their top story a eulogy of China's missile and nuclear forces, organized in the Second Artillery Corps. The article, titled "Forging a Shield of Peace for the Republic", described an exercise in which computers simulated a nuclear attack from an enemy power and the response of "Red Force", or China. "'Red Force' employs modern procedures to rapidly decide on a war plan, deploying new types of mobile launchers to remote mountains and forests," the article said. In techno-thriller prose, it described how the units employed new anti-jamming and anti-reconnaissance hardware and eventually unleashed their lethal nuclear might. "One by one, the missiles rise towards the sky, as the units successfully launch their counter-attack," it concluded triumphantly. The Second Artillery Corps is at the core of China's efforts to upgrade its 1950s-vintage military. The Corps, which is headquartered near Beijing, has a strength of about 100,000 troops and is believed to be equipped with more than 400 strategic and tactical missiles. Wednesday's article, which put emphasis on President Jiang Zemin's call for military modernization, was published at a time of renewed tensions with the United States. "The likelihood of this being coincidental is as remote as one can get," said Paul Harris, an expert on China-US relations at Hong Kong's Lingnan University. A Washington defense review listing China as a potential target of US nuclear strikes was recently leaked to US media. The report said one of the new contingencies in which US nuclear weapons might be used was a military confrontation between China and Taiwan. China reacted angrily to the report, condemning it as one in a series of recent US moves endangering bilateral ties, and Vice Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing Saturday summoned US Ambassador Clark T. Randt to protest. The nuclear planners' Taiwan scenario is particularly worrying for the Chinese, analysts said. It threatens to completely reverse the equation if US forces were to come to the rescue of the island during a Chinese attack. Against this backdrop, the newspaper feature on the Second Artillery Corps is aimed at a domestic audience to bolster its patriotism and self-assurance, they said. It could also boost the leverage of the top brass in charge of China's strategic nuclear forces and make it easier for them to get more resources. But this kind of article could also backfire abroad, and help convince powerful groups in the United States that China is the Soviet Union of the 21st century, Lingnan University's Harris warned. "It could fuel the view of people thinking we are entering a new Cold War, or a Second Cold War," he said. Copyright © 2002 AFP. All rights reserved ***************************************************************** 45 Barking Sands Worse Than the Bite (washingtonpost.com) By Al Kamen Wednesday, March 20, 2002; Page A31 As if living in Hawaii weren't spectacular enough, Navy Capt. Brian W. Moss, commander of the Pacific Missile Range Facility at Barking Sands, Kauai, decided his government-owned house needed some fixing up. So he decided to put up a couple of gazebos on the beach by the house that were originally to cost $15,000, and to spruce up the house interior. When it was all done, the gazebos alone cost $119,000 and the total bill for improvements came to $177,000, according to an inspector general's report obtained by local television station KHON. The report said Moss spent about $13,000 for carpeting, including about $2,700 to fly the carpet in from the mainland after he rejected locally available stuff, according to the Honolulu Star-Bulletin. The IG's report said the money he used was not authorized for that purpose. But Moss wasn't relieved of his command and the Navy would not say what disciplinary action was taken, except to call it "very appropriate and effective." Word at the Pentagon is the discipline didn't really amount to much. Moss was stripped of his authority over housing funds, but that was happening anyway to base commanders throughout the Navy under a streamlining effort. And Moss, who's retiring soon, apparently underwent "administrative counseling," a defense official said. The problem, it seems, is that after much head-scratching, the Pentagon brass, though not happy about all this, couldn't determine precisely what the violations were. We're told the old rules were so poorly written that it wasn't clear whether Moss directly violated anything. "We locked the barn door after this horse was built," a defense official reflected yesterday. In all fairness, these are some mighty fine gazebos, with showers, wet bar and fridge. Blake Vacates DOE for Home Depot Lobbyists and folks in the Energy Department were stunned by news Monday that Francis S. Blake, the highly regarded and much-liked deputy secretary, was leaving for what officials described as family reasons. Blake, in the job only about 10 months, becomes the highest-ranking Bush administration official to leave government. Blake, who had served as Environmental Protection Agency general counsel in Bush I, is moving to Atlanta to be No. 2 at mega-hardware store Home Depot. He'll be reporting to Home Depot CEO Robert L. Nardelli; it's a reunion of the two since Blake worked for Nardelli at GE Power Systems in Schenectady, N.Y. The White House has picked energy chief of staff Kyle McSlarrow, who had been chief of staff to Sen. Paul Coverdell (R-Ga.) and deputy chief to Senate Minority Leader Trent Lott (R-Miss.), to replace Blake. McSlarrow was vice president of political and government affairs for what then was Grassroots.com and is best known locally for having tried to oust veteran Rep. James P. MoranJr. (D-Va.) in 1992 and in 1994. Cheney Loses Energy Report Aide Speaking of top energy policy turnover . . . Andrew D. Lundquist, former staff director of the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources and more recently a top aide to Vice President Cheney and executive director of the National Energy Policy Development Group, whose records the General Accounting Office is seeking in court, is leaving shortly for private-sector consulting. Nuclear Waste on the Table Detente comes to the Potomac? White House counselor Karl Rove and Harry M. Reid (Nev.), No. 2 Senate Democrat and pal of the White House's version of the Devil Incarnate -- that would be Majority Leader Thomas A. Daschle (D-S.D.) -- were spotted with their spouses having dinner Friday night at Signatures, the hot, new and seriously expensive restaurant on Pennsylvania Avenue. Rove and Reid share some Nevada roots: Reid's from Searchlight and Rove's from Sparks, but there's speculation this chat had more to do with dumping nuclear waste in Yucca Mountain than in birthplaces. Neither Rove nor Reid seem to want to say what was said, so it must have been radioactive. A Book About the Books Save that date! This Friday, at the University of Mississippi's Oxford campus, don't miss the dedication of what the university says is described as "the world's most prestigious collection of printed accounting material." Lott and Rep. Roger Wicker (R-Miss.) will be there to celebrate the acquisition of the collection, said to be worth about $2 million. It includes a 1494 book, valued at $50,000, by Luca Pacioli, the Franciscan monk and mathematician who is regarded as the father of modern accounting. Talk about great timing. Now all the Andersen accounting records that haven't been shredded might find a high-class resting place. That's the Ticket Folks at the United Nations often seem to be shouting past each other, unable to comprehend their opponents' positions. Now we have a clue what the problem is: A Reuters wire the other day reported that a German crew providing interpreting services for a U.N. conference on development financing showed up in the wrong city. The crew went to Monterey, Calif., rather than the meeting site in Monterrey, Mexico, 1,500 miles away. An official with the German firm said they "planned their trip from Germany and their travel agency erroneously sent them to Monterey in California." Hmm . . . Monte is a small mountain and rey means king. Good thing they didn't show up at Kings Dominion. © 2002 The Washington Post Company ***************************************************************** 46 Wired 10.03: This Is Not a Test [W I R E D] Archive | 10.03 - Mar 2002 | Feature A decade after America's last nuclear test, the US arsenal is decaying and its designers are retiring. Now a new generation of scientists is trying to preserve bomb-building knowledge before it's too late. By Evan Ratliff This spring, as college students across the country convene study groups and hit the library in preparation for final exams, Charles Nakhleh will be hunkering down in a fenced-off building high on the New Mexico mesa, racing to finish his dissertation. He'll be tweaking the variables in his computational model and checking and rechecking his hypotheses. The thesis will never be published in a scientific journal or even bound with other dissertations and stored on some dusty shelf of a university library. Nakhleh will never be able to make a public presentation or even talk to his family about the details of his work: the W80 cruise missile-based nuclear warhead. To do so, in fact, would be a federal crime. But for Nakhleh, the project marks the final step in his three-year effort to earn the most exclusive diploma on the planet - a degree in thermonuclear weapons. Nakhleh is one of 11 students in the second graduating class of Titans: the Theoretical Institute for Thermonuclear and Nuclear Studies at Los Alamos National Laboratory. Getting admitted wasn't easy. The program's qualifications include a PhD in physics, chemistry, or engineering; a Q security clearance, which permits access to sensitive national security information; and employment in X Division, the elite Los Alamos nuclear weapons design department. Getting out isn't easy either. To graduate, students spend two years in the classroom studying the physics, hydrodynamics, particle transport, computational modeling, design, and history of nuclear weapons, and one final year in independent study. "The unusual thing about it is that everybody here already has their PhD," says the 35-year-old Nakhleh, who earned a doctorate in physics at Cornell. That's hardly the most unusual thing about Titans. Consider its mission: to prevent 50 years' worth of nuclear know-how from slipping away. The loss of knowledge is the result of a post-Cold War era that has changed the nuclear landscape. First came bans on weapons testing. Then the gradual retirement of key there-at-the-creation scientists. Meantime, aging weapons systems were not being replaced. Sure, today's X Division scientists understand the basic materials needed to build any given bomb. But building a nuke is more than following a recipe. They need to master, for instance, the technical tricks required to fit megatons of power into a warhead package. Traditionally, nuclear scientists learned their arcane craft by building and testing generation after generation of atomic devices. In this way, nuclear weapons design is the ultimate applied science. By 2014, our newest warhead will have reached the end of its intended life, and the US will not have a single designer with test experience. But what happens when the "applied" part is removed? Los Alamos hasn't set off a nuclear explosion since the US testing moratorium in 1992. Likewise, it's been more than a decade since the US designed or manufactured a new nuclear weapon. Full-scale underground testing has been replaced with massive supercomputer simulations and small-scale experiments, intended not to make new weapons but to "certify" that the weapons in the aging stockpile would still work if detonated and to predict potential failures. Simultaneously, the nuclear scientists with firsthand experience building and testing weapons - those who worked in the nuclear heyday of the '60s - are retiring, taking volumes of unrecorded knowledge with them. The Wen Ho Lee case and the "missing disks" scandal - which hurt lab morale and caused younger scientists to leave - accelerated the brain drain. And those remaining won't be there forever: Within the next five years, half of the designers at Los Alamos will have reached retirement age. By the time the newest US nuclear warhead reaches the end of its intended lifetime in 2014, it is entirely possible that the US will not have a single nuclear weapons designer with test experience. None of these developments have generated much attention. But suddenly world events are forcing the nuclear labs - and their problems - into the spotlight. The geopolitical landscape is more volatile than at any point since the end of the Cold War. India and Pakistan have raised the number of explicit nuclear powers to seven, with Iraq, Iran, and North Korea all racing to join. Terrorist groups may not be far behind. September 11 proved, quite dramatically, that our Cold War defense posture is out of step with today's security needs. The nuclear abolition movement, after gaining ground throughout the mid-'90s, has been increasingly drowned out by calls for new low-yield nuclear weapon designs to combat terrorist bunkers and provide "flexible deterrence" against the nuclear, biological, and chemical arsenals of the rogue states. The first US Nuclear Posture Review in six years, a classified analysis delivered by the Bush administration to Congress last January, called for both reductions in nuclear forces and, according to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, "a significant change in US offensive nuclear weapon approach." The review emphasized the need for a flexible arsenal combining nuclear weapons, conventional forces, and missile defense. It also required the labs to shorten the time they would need to return to testing. Weapons designers, meanwhile, complain that it is awfully difficult to maintain an effective nuclear arsenal in a no-testing world. "Imagine a world in which automobiles aren't being built anymore," says Stephen Lee, the bearded acting deputy division leader of Los Alamos' Computer and Computational Sciences Division. "Two or three people used to build starter motors and still know how they work. A couple of guys know about spark plug wires. But now they're retiring or dying, and the parts are getting older. If you find a cracked spark plug wire, you don't know if it matters. You have to figure out every component individually, and also how the parts all fit together and interact. But you're not allowed to drive the car! You have to maintain it for 40, 60, 80 years and still know how everything works, without ever starting the engine." Contributing editor Evan Ratliff ( [evan@wiredmag.com] ) wrote about Russian rockets in Wired 9.12. ***************************************************************** 47 A minority of one: Daniel Pipes The Jerusalem Post Newspaper : Online News From Israel - Opinion Article (March 20) - As US President George W. Bush gets closer to initiating hostilities against Saddam Hussein's foul regime in Iraq, the Middle East is sending out a howl of protest, arguing that (as The Washington Post sums up) "the risks of an attackÉ far outweigh any threat he may pose." This view is surprising, to put it mildly, ignoring as it does Saddam's record of brutality toward his subjects and aggression toward his neighbors, not to speak of his terrifying ambition to acquire nuclear weapons. The Middle Eastern outlook derives from several factors: * A sense of immunity. Most Middle Easterners "do not fear Iraq at all," observes Radwan Abdullah, former dean of political science at Jordan University. A 20-year-old vendor in Cairo has the strange idea that the problem is "between America and Iraq, and we [Egyptians] don't have anything to do with it." * A fear of the unknown. The prospect of Iraq splitting up or suffering total economic collapse worries its neighbors. Jordan's King Abdullah anticipates that "striking Iraq represents a catastrophe to Iraq and the region in general and threatens the security and stability of the region." Turkey's Prime Minister BŸlent Ecevit fears an attack on Iraq on the narrow grounds that this "will seriously affect" his country at a time when its economy rests "on very sensitive balances." * An alienation from the United States. Middle Easterners who want Saddam gone, distance themselves from Washington's policy lest they, as The Wall Street Journal puts it, appear to be "US lackeys." This applies even to Kuwaitis; in 1998, their foreign minister announced that his country is "not part" of Iraq's confrontation with the United Nations. * An admiration for Saddam. According to one political scientist, "Many Arab countries do not fear Iraq at all. On the contrary, they want Iraq stronger." They root for him defying the hated West. Middle Easterners are not unique in wanting to avoid confrontation with Baghdad. Much of the world, led by the French, Russian, and Chinese governments, concurs, leaving only the British, Israelis, and Iraq's opposition firmly supporting American threats to finish off Saddam. An anti-Saddam strategy, therefore, must accept that Washington may basically have to go it alone. This is less than ideal, but it is doable. And it prompts three observations. First, such isolation is not new, for Washington routinely goes it alone on a host of issues. It was the lone dissenter in a 118-1 vote at the United Nations General Assembly in 1981 favoring a code to restrict the promotion of infant-formula products. More recently, the Bush administration single-handedly scuttled the Kyoto climate treaty of 1997, which called for drastic reductions in carbon dioxide emissions. The war against the Taliban last fall was nearly a solo performance, too. As a White House spokesman rightly explained in 1996: "We may be in a minority of one, but we're going to stand by our position. Sometimes you're the only country taking a particular view on an issue but you stand by it because you have to stand by it." Second, defeating Iraq should be militarily easy. Kenneth Adelman, a former assistant to Donald Rumsfeld, predicts that a war against Iraqis will be a "cakewalk," and offers four reasons: "One. It was a cakewalk last time; two, they've become much weaker; three, we've become much stronger; and four, now we're playing for keeps." Assuming Adelman is right, US military forces acting solo can take control of Iraq without needing the UN seal of approval, European troops, Saudi money, or Turkish bases. The task would be easier with a little help from friends, but it is not necessary. Third, if Adelman is wrong and it's not an easy military victory, then US opinion becomes decisive. When a war goes badly, US public opinion can become fickle, affected by such factors as casualties, complacency, and a hostile world reaction. American disaffection hamstrung the near-solo American military efforts in Vietnam, Lebanon, and Somalia. In strategic terms, public opinion is the US center of gravity, its most vulnerable point. American planners must therefore keep a close eye on US opinion. Anything that exceeds its bounds risks failure. The fate of Iraq, whether it remains subject to Saddam's depredations or is liberated, may depend as much on the mood of ordinary Americans as it will on the capabilities of American troops. (Daniel Pipes is director of the Philadelphia-based Middle East Forum. ) © 1995-2002, The Jerusalem Post ***************************************************************** 48 Quick and Dirty or Long and Dirty? The Village Voice: Nation: Mondo Washington by James Ridgeway Week of March 20 - 26, 2002 Mondo Washington by James Ridgeway Quick and Dirty or Long and Dirty? Who Were the Cops Shooting At? Radioactive Bombs Rain Down on Asia Over Ma Bush's Knee More Fuelish War Talk The bottom line on Iraq is whether an attack against Saddam Hussein helps or hinders the Republican Party's chances in midterm elections next November. A quick air strike on Iraq with no U.S. casualties might make Bush look extra special tough. But any protracted campaign on Iraq involving a large number of casualties and large numbers of troops would raise serious questions, not the least of which would be the administration's casting aside of the War Powers Act, under which it is supposed to consult with Congress. As it now stands, the OPEC states in the Middle East are generally opposed to an invasion, and they have pegged the price of oil in such a way that fuel costs are likely to rise here whatever happens. If they get pissed and throw down an embargo, gas prices would go through the roof. That probably would be instant death to Republican congressional contenders, who, no matter what, will still be defending themselves for doing nothing during the recession. Meanwhile, Democrats are slowly beginning to frame their election-year challenge to the president on a range of different issues. Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle issued a mild criticism of Bush for not telling Congress he was setting into motion a secret shadow government that, for now, does not include either Congress or the judiciary. (Such shadow cabinets have hovered over D.C. for years.) Over the weekend, Daschle seemed almost stern in another threat to subpoena homeland security czar Tom Ridge to try to learn what he plans to do with all the money Bush wants to give him. And there are less publicized moves afoot in other areas. George Miller in the House is leading an effort to tackle the Enron mess by revising the 401(k) laws to mandate that workers sit with employers on boards that run these pension funds. The GOP doesn't want workers running anything. Miller's proposed legislation will allow the Dems to look like defenders of the little guy, even if they aren't. On defense, Rhode Island's Jack Reed, who heads the key House Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, is claiming that Bush's missile defense program could cost "a prodigious sum of money" (some say $150 billion), and all for a system that couldn't block attacks on the U.S. or its forces abroad. Last week, the conservatives sent guru William Bennett into the fray, setting up a new organization to target people they consider to be too critical of the war effort. The group, which operates out of Bennett's Empower America, is called Americans for Victory Over Terrorism (AVOT). It promises to "take to task those groups and individuals who fundamentally misunderstand the nature of the war we are facing." Likely targets are liberal members of Congress. And it poses the war against terror as a crusade against radical Islam, which it calls "an enemy no less dangerous and no less determined than the twin menaces of fascism and Communism we faced in the 20th century." Bennett told the Voice on Monday that he wanted to keep "enthusiasm" for the war going strong, adding, "This war can take longer than World War II, and we just want to make sure we all are together at the end." This looks like a rather feeble attempt by the neoconservatives, some of whom are ensconced at the American Enterprise Institute, to start up a blacklist. Bennett disagreed. "It's not a blacklist, it is a wrong-list," he said. "We just think that these people are wrongheaded, unhelpful, and misguided. We live in a free country, so we have the right to debate and go back and forth with them. I am sure I am not going to make president Jimmy Carter shut up if I say that I don't agree with him." And he promised the list would grow. "We don't add them," he said cheerfully. "They add themselves." Radioactive Bombs Rain Down on Asia Glowing Reports President Bush may have frightened most of America with big talk about nuclear war, but people in Afghanistan and Pakistan think they've already been nuked by depleted-uranium (DU) bombs. "The use of reprocessed nuclear waste in the U.S. air strikes against the Taliban poses a serious risk of radiation poisoning to the human lives in Afghanistan and Pakistan," said the Pakistan Weekly Independent last November. Added Dawn, Pakistan's big English-language paper, on November 12: "A leading military expert told Dawn that since October 7 the United States Air Force has been raining down depleted uranium shells at targets inside Afghanistan, especially against the Taliban front lines in the north. . . . 'There is widespread radiation in many areas that could adversely affect tens and thousands of people in the two countries for generations to come,' he said." The U.S. reportedly employed munitions containing depleted uranium during the Gulf War in 1991 and more recently during NATO's campaign in the Balkans and in Vieques, as part of military exercises. In Afghanistan, there have been reports of DU in bunker bombs and other munitions; some contain a "mystery" metal, either tungsten (most of which comes from China) or depleted uranium. A 1994 report to Congress by the secretary of the army said, "Like naturally occurring uranium, DU has toxicological and radiological health risks." The report goes on to say that "in combat, DU wound contamination and fragment implantation become more significant pathways of entry. Based on the lessons learned in Desert Storm, the army is developing procedures to better manage the internal exposure potential for DU during combat." Carl Conetta, co-director of the Project on Defense Alternatives in Washington, told the Voice that while experts argue, it seems possible that depleted uranium inhaled by a child could result in cancers later in life. He, too, suspected that hundreds of DU bombs are being used. He noted that chances are that depleted uranium is being used, if only because it's cheaper than tungsten. But who's using it? In January 2001, a French TV documentary reported that the DU in munitions may come from a contaminated reprocessing plant in Paducah, Kentucky. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld told a French publication in January that the U.S. had found radiation in Afghanistan—but that it was from DU warheads belonging to Al Qaeda. On Monday a spokesperson for the U.S. Central Command said that it has "not used depleted uranium in Afghanistan." Dai Williams, a DU researcher, has told reporters that if Al Qaeda is responsible, there may be even more of a risk: That could mean the DU might have come from Russia, and it could be even dirtier than that from Paducah. ***************************************************************** 49 Livermore, Berkeley labs develop detector Tri-Valley Herald Wednesday, March 20, 2002 - 4:09:29 AM MST By FROM STAFF REPORTS Wednesday, March 20, 2002 - -->Scientists at Lawrence Livermore and Lawrence Berkeley national labs have developed a mobile, hand-held detector that can identify radioactive materials, lab officials announced Tuesday. Dubbed Cryo3, the tool detects the X-ray and gamma-ray radiation signatures of materials that could be used to make nuclear weapons, and it also provides information on the quantity of materials. "The device would be able to determine the types of radioactive materials no matter where they might be located -- at a border crossing, in an airport or even on a person," researchers said in a press release. The device weighs about 10 pounds and can operate continuously for up to eight hours using two rechargeable lithium-ion batteries. With a constant power supply, the device can run continuously and unattended for "at least six months," officials said. At the core of the tool is a high-purity germanium crystal. X-rays and gamma rays interact with this crystal to create corresponding charges, and this charge is translated into information about the radioactive materials that produced the rays. Germanium radiation-detection crystals are typically super-cooled by liquid nitrogen to produce the best readings, but lab scientists sought out another cooling method for the hand-held device because liquid nitrogen can be cumbersome to work with in the field. They adapted a micro-cooler system that was originally developed for the aerospace industry. Researchers developed the hand-held radiation detector to assist in monitoring nuclear weapons stockpiles to ensure that nations are complying with treaty obligations, officials said. John Becker of Livermore lab and Christopher Cork, Lorenzo Fabris and Norman Madden of Berkeley are participants in the four-year development project for the Cryo3. Becker said the portable detector offers "results comparable to laboratory measurements" by larger equipment. ©1999-2001 by MediaNews Group, Inc. and ANG Newspapers ***************************************************************** 50 OR cleanup firm gets over $18 million Bechtel Jacobs penalized $1 million for safety problems By Frank Munger, News-Sentinel senior writer March 20, 2002 OAK RIDGE - Despite a $1 million penalty for safety-related problems, Bechtel Jacobs Co. received more than $18 million for managing the government's Oak Ridge cleanup effort last year. Bechtel Jacobs was notified of the performance results in a March 12 letter from Leah Dever, the U.S. Department of Energy's Oak Ridge manager. The letter was released to the news media Tuesday. DOE credited Bechtel Jacobs with making "significant progress" over the past year and cited a list of major _accomplishments, including the closure of a series of underground nuclear-waste tanks at Oak Ridge National Laboratory. After evaluating the environmental contractor's performance against a set of pre-established milestones, DOE awarded Bechtel Jacobs a total of $19,017,149 out of a total possible fee of $20,440,915. That's 93 percent of the fee pool. Dever said she reduced the contractor's fee by $1 million because of the safety problems and their impact on environmental programs. Bechtel Jacobs' integrated safety management came under fire last year, and DOE subsequently revoked its certification. Dever said that was "indicative of significant gaps in safety programs and performance." The Integrated Safety Management program is the safety bible currently in use at federal facilities, and the federally chartered Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board said last year that many of Oak Ridge's problems exist because DOE and Bechtel Jacobs had not complied with relevant safety directives. Without safety controls and supporting analyses in place at old nuclear facilities undergoing cleanup, it's impossible to determine whether the public, workers and the environment are being protected from hazards, safety board chief John Conway wrote in an Oct. 15 letter to DOE. DOE and Bechtel Jacobs pledged cooperation with independent assessments, but DOE said last fall it had already recognized most of the issues. Bechtel Jacobs said at the time that no imminent safety concerns were identified in three earlier reviews. With the payment released Tuesday, Bechtel Jacobs received about 88 percent of the total available fee, and it's possible more money may be forthcoming. Dever said more than $900,000 in potential fee was withheld because some projects were delayed "due to conditions beyond BJC control." A determination of the contractor's fee will be made after those tasks are completed, she said. Dennis Hill, a Bechtel Jacobs spokesman, said the company was "extremely pleased with this assessment." The DOE evaluation indicates the contractor team is meeting its cleanup commitments, he said. Hill said the company hopes to meet soon with DOE to clarify the reasons for the $1 million penalty and "to gain a better understanding of the rationale behind it." He added: "BJC continues to work on correcting those safety issues that have been raised in the past." Frank Munger can be reached at 865-482-9213 or twig1@knoxnews.infi.net. Copyright 2002 The Knoxville News-Sentinel Co. ***************************************************************** 51 Missile official: Weapon need spotlights Oak Ridge plant's overhaul By Frank Munger, News-Sentinel senior writer March 20, 2002 OAK RIDGE - Reports this week about the possibility of new weapon designs for the U.S. nuclear arsenal underscore the need to modernize the Y-12 warhead plant, a federal official said Tuesday. "Whatever this country needs in terms of uranium manufacturing, we need to be able to support that need because this is the only place that can be done," said Bill Brumley, who oversees Y-12 work for the National Nuclear Security Administration. Plans are under way for a major refurbishment of Y-12 facilities, which ultimately could cost about $4 billion. Groundbreaking is scheduled next week for a uranium-storage center, the first of several modernization projects. The Oak Ridge plant has produced parts for every U.S. nuclear weapon deployed since World War II, specializing in components made with highly enriched uranium. The Y-12 plant historically has collaborated with design labs - such as Lawrence Livermore and Los Alamos - on development of new weapons. Y-12 is not involved in research for a new bunker-busting weapon, which, according to published reports this week, will be evaluated by the design labs as a way to penetrate structures deep underground. Brumley said Y-12 is the "implementation end" of the nuclear complex: When design work reaches a certain point, Oak Ridge typically is asked to help determine "manufacturability." The latest reports from the Pentagon and the Department of Energy suggest the United States wants to upgrade its nuclear capabilities, turning to smaller weapons that could be turned against terrorists and their pocket strongholds. The United States already has one bunker-busting weapon in its nuclear arsenal, a modified B-61 bomb with a hardened nose cone. The Y-12 plant fabricated those nosepieces and is working on refurbishing W-87 warheads and planning rehab work on B-61 bombs, Brumley said. Meanwhile, participants in a "peace walk" from Seattle are expected to arrive at the plant this afternoon and stage a 4 p.m. vigil, praying for the elimination of nuclear weapons. Frank Munger: may be reached at 865-482-9213 or twig1@knoxnews.infi.net. Copyright 2002 The Knoxville News-Sentinel Co. ***************************************************************** 52 Assessor gives DOE big bill for property tax This story was published Tue, Mar 19, 2002 By Nathan Isaacs Herald staff writer Benton County Assessor Barbara Wagner has forwarded a $2.6 million bill to the Department of Energy for property the federal agency holds at Hanford. Wagner computed the bill based on the assessed value of DOE's holdings. She said the Hanford area within the county is valued at $226 million, or 12.5 percent higher than in 2001. The bill, or payment in lieu of taxes, is an attempt to replace the property taxes that could have been collected had the government not seized land at Hanford for its Manhattan Project. Only the Hanford property that was previously privately owned is figured into the PILT assessment, Wagner said. That accounts for about 47 percent of Hanford. She said the $2.6 million PILT bill comes from multiplying the levy rates of the various taxing districts that extend into Hanford. The county received $2.5 million in PILT in 2001. Wagner said Initiative 747, which restricts increases on property taxes, limited the amount the county can collect from the DOE -- just like other county property owners. Among those districts due a share of the 2002 PILT are: -- $869,077 for the Richland School District, down $22,088 from 2001. -- $771,327 for Benton County, up $57,415 from 2001. -- $120,296 for the Port of Benton, up $11,764 from 2001. -- $112,054 for the Mid-Columbia Library District, up $11,802 from 2001. -- $58,481 for the Prosser School District, up $1,105 from 2001. -- $13,221 for the Kiona-Benton School District, up $1,631 from 2001. -- $6,483 for the Prosser Hospital District, up $165 from 2001. -- And $684,927 will go into a fund for countywide school districts to dip into to pay off debts. That increased $33,812 from 2001. Wagner said Richland schools are getting less money to offset $83,000 in federal money already paid to the district for students with federal employee parents. She said the main reason the appraisal increased was the upsurge in value in prime riverfront property. She said Hanford has 30,672 lineal feet of riverfront property. The property was assessed at $1,356 per lineal foot, Wagner said. It was previously assessed at $500 per lineal foot. She said recent residential sales in north Richland caused the jump. The bulk of the Hanford site, 92,000 acres, is assessed for irrigation, or land that could have been orchards or vineyards. That property is assessed at $1,607 per acre. Copyright 2002 Tri-City Herald. All rights reserved. This ***************************************************************** 53 DOE: Dep. Sec. Francis Blake resigns Secretary Abraham Announces Resignation of Deputy Secretary Francis Blake; President Bush Announces Intention to Nominate Chief of Staff Kyle McSlarrow to Fill the Post energy.gov - Headquarters' Press Release RELEASE DATE: March 18, 2002 WASHINGTON, DC – U.S. Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham today announced that Deputy Secretary of Energy Francis Blake has decided to leave the Department of Energy (DOE) and return to the private sector. In announcing Blake’s decision, Abraham said that Kyle McSlarrow, currently chief of staff for the department, is set to be nominated by President Bush to serve as Deputy Secretary. “Frank Blake has provided tremendous leadership helping implement the energy and environmental policies of the Bush administration and providing critical management expertise in setting the agenda for the department, Secretary Abraham said. “Frank has left a positive imprint on the department during his tenure here and has served the Bush administration well. We will miss him.” “I would like to thank Secretary Abraham for the opportunity of working at DOE,” Blake said. “We have accomplished a tremendous amount in the time that I have been here, from moving forward with difficult decisions to launching necessary DOE program reforms. I enjoyed working at DOE and it is has been a pleasure to serve in the Bush administration.” In announcing the President’s intention to nominate Kyle McSlarrow to serve as Deputy Secretary, Abraham said, “From day one, Kyle McSlarrow has taken the lead role in managing key departmental programs. He is a critical and invaluable member of the policy and management team at the department and this administration.” “Confirming Kyle as Deputy Secretary will provide a seamless transition, further bringing his management and policy skills to bear on the array of energy, defense, science and environmental issues facing the department. Certainly, the department will benefit from Kyle’s legal and policy expertise, including his knowledge of and ability to work closely with members of Congress on key issues.” McSlarrow has held key positions on Capitol Hill including serving as deputy chief of staff and chief counsel to the Senate Majority Leader, and as chief of staff to former Senator Paul Coverdell. He is a former captain in the United States Army Corp of Engineers and served as assistant to the Army’s General Counsel. There, he was the Army’s lead attorney on environmental issues, as well as, research and development of major weapons systems. Prior to joining the department, Frank Blake served as Senior Vice President of Corporate Business Development at General Electric. He will be returning to the private sector, joining the corporate offices of Home Depot, the Atlanta-based construction and home improvement chain. Biographical information for Mr. Blake and Mr. McSlarrow, as well as photos, is available at www.energy.gov [http://www.energy.gov] . Media Contact: Jeanne Lopatto/Joe Davis, 202/586-4940 Release No. PR-02 ***************************************************************** 54 U.S. probing energy firm's links to Russians' company Chicago Tribune | By Stephen J. Hedges Washington Bureau Published March 20, 2002 WASHINGTON -- The Energy Department is investigating the relationship between the nation's leading nuclear fuel supplier and a Pittsburgh consulting business that was established by a top Russian nuclear official. Under an agreement with the U.S., Russia provides most of the uranium purchased by U.S. Enrichment Corp. of Bethesda, Md. The uranium, which supplies fuel to about 70 percent of the nation's nuclear power plants, is taken from dismantled Russian nuclear weapons, processed to be used in power plants and sent to the United States. Recent stories by the Tribune and the Los Angeles Times reported that USEC, which is the U.S. government's agent in the uranium trade with Russia, gave a Pittsburgh nuclear consultant a $90,000 contract that ran from January 2000 to March 2001. The consultant, Mark Kaushansky, was a business partner of Yvgeny Adamov, who was Russia's minister of atomic energy from 1998 to 2001. They had formed the Omeka Ltd. consultancy in 1994, but Adamov left the firm before he took his ministerial post. Adamov's wife, Olga, also was the Moscow business manager for the consulting firm. During the time that Kaushansky, a Russian who came to the U.S. in 1979, was a consultant for USEC, the company was trying to persuade Adamov to lower the price Russia was charging for its uranium, which was set by a contract with the U.S. In early 2000, the terms of the contract meant that USEC had to pay Russia more than the world market price for uranium. In May 2000 the company announced that Russia had agreed to a new pricing agreement, but the contract was never ratified by the U.S. and Russian governments. Senators hear the case During a U.S. Senate hearing last week, Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham said that his department was looking into Kaushansky's work for USEC and that it may affect the company's status as the U.S. government's agent in the Russian uranium trade. "There have been some allegations made very recently that place in question USEC's activities as the [U.S.] agent in recent years," Abraham told the Senate Armed Services Committee. "And so obviously our negotiations are continuing. I think before they are complete that we will seek to resolve any issues that are raised by these allegations." The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act prohibits U.S. companies from paying foreign officials for favorable treatment in business dealings. A spokesman for Abraham declined Tuesday to describe steps taken by Energy Department to examine the consulting arrangement. USEC spokesman Charles Yulish said: "If there were to be any inquiry, we would certainly cooperate on that. We are very open about the facts, and we feel very strongly about the facts." USEC told the Tribune last week that its contract with Kaushansky, a nuclear engineer, was legal and that it involved a project unrelated to the Russian uranium deal. "We got very full value for his services," Yulish said in a previous interview. "He has a pretty unique skill set. His reputation is very strong. He worked in exactly the areas he was needed." Yulish declined to describe the project that involved Kaushansky. He said Kaushansky's contract prohibits him from paying any foreign government officials. He also said that, at the time it hired Kaushansky, USEC did not know he had been a business partner with Adamov. Nonsense, critics say USEC's critics said the relationship between Adamov and Kaushansky was well-known in government and energy circles. "Adamov and Kaushansky said that anyone who wanted to deal with Adamov should deal with Kaushansky," said one attorney who represents U.S. energy companies but who asked to remain anonymous. "I advised my clients to stay away from that. But almost every place that Adamov went, there was Kaushansky." U.S. government officials also said Adamov was accompanied by Kaushansky at government meetings, though Kaushansky's role was not clear. "Mark Kaushansky was at at least a couple of meetings here in the States, and he was called a consultant," said former Energy Undersecretary Ernest Moniz. "Adamov's English was good enough, but occasionally he would ask Kaushansky to translate." Until 1998, USEC was part of the Energy Department and was responsible for managing the nation's uranium stocks. That year, the Clinton administration chose to make USEC a publicly traded company. USEC's portfolio included the Megatons-to-Megawatts program created by the U.S. and Russian governments in 1993. Under the program, the U.S. agreed to pay $12 billion over 20 years to import 500 tons of uranium. Why U.S. wants deal From the U.S. standpoint, the program encourages the destruction of Soviet-era nuclear weapons and reduces Russia's weapons-ready uranium stockpile. For Russia, the uranium trade provides much-needed cash. Once it brings the uranium to the U.S., USEC sells it to energy companies as fuel for nuclear power plants. USEC's purchases of Russian uranium make up 52 percent of its stock, and that is expected to grow to 60 percent this year. USEC's first, seven-year import contract with Russia expired in October. Since then, the company and Russia have struggled to reach new terms. On Feb. 26, USEC announced it had a deal, though it declined to disclose the terms. Both governments must still ratify the agreement. Competitors want in While USEC was negotiating, its competitors complained about the Russian uranium monopoly and pressed the Bush administration to open the trade to other companies. They said USEC's exclusive arrangement stifles competition, restricts supply and compromises national security. "We believe that it's not in the best interest of anybody except USEC for there to be one executive agent dealing with the Russians on material obtained from the dismantling of Russian nuclear weapons," said Jim Malone, vice president for nuclear fuels at the Chicago-based Exelon Corp. "Quite honestly, we believe that the way the current contract terms are stated, USEC is asking the Russian people to subsidize their operation." USEC's Yulish rejects such criticism. "They want to pick up a part of it," Yulish said. "A number of different entities have been doing everything they can to destabilize these negotiations and get the government to name a second entity. There's money involved here." Copyright © 2002, Chicago Tribune ***************************************************************** 55 New Device Can Accurately Detect Distinct Radiation Types The Daily Californian Courtesy/Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory This portable radiation detection device, known as Cryo3, is able to distinguish between harmful and benign forms of radiation. By TYLER HILLMAN Contributing Writer Wednesday, March 20, 2002 Ten years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the arms race has been reinvented as a competition between terrorism and vigilance, although the shadow cast by nuclear weapons remains unchanged. Radiation detection technology under development at Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory may make the surreptitious transport of nuclear material a much more daunting task, allowing governments to stay one step ahead of atomic terrorism. A team led by Berkeley lab engineer Lorenzo Fabris has constructed a 10-pound, portable radiation detection device called Cryo3 that uses semiconductor technology to image radioactivity with extraordinary alacrity. The power of the Cryo3 can distinguish between fissionable material, used to construct nuclear weapons, and harmless isotopes used in medicine. "The applications of this innovation are much broader now," said Fabris, "You can have lab quality equipment available in the field." At the heart of the device is a crystal composed of the semiconducting element germanium. The crystal is cooled to approximately 186 degrees Celsius, limiting its ability to carry charge or maintain a voltage. Incident X-ray and gamma ray emissions from nuclear material introduce so-called "charge carriers" to the crystal, inducing an easily measured voltage proportional to the radiation density. This information is read out by the detector as a series of peaks, each of which correspond to a radioactive isotope present in the vicinity. "The beauty of using germanium is that the uncertainty is very small so you can distinguish peaks that other materials could not," said Fabris, "(Through investigation) you can assign peaks to certain isotopes." Traditionally, a device known as a Geiger counter was used to detect radiation, but the new Berkeley lab technology offers many advantages over this approach. The new device can also gauge the amount of nuclear material present, which was not possible in the past. A major difficulty in moving this technology from the lab to the field was the traditional use of complex liquid nitrogen systems to achieve the low temperatures required. Berkeley lab scientists eliminated this roadblock by using a compact battery-powered cooling device typically employed to cool low-noise cellular phone antennae. "(To use the device,) you used to have to have with you liquid nitrogen, which is heavy and bulky," said Fabris, "The innovation is using a mechanical cooler instead." Increasing the efficiency of the detector by eliminating electronic noise was another major hurdle for researchers. This was accomplished through the use of a custom-built pre- amplifier that met portability requirements by only needing a small battery. Development of the detection system began as a way to aid international weapons inspectors in verifying treaty compliance, but the researchers predict the technology will cross over into counterterrorism. "The next step will be to make bigger and more efficient detectors," said Fabris, "(We will attempt to) make them more portable and with a longer operating life." (c) 2002 Berkeley, California Email: dailycal@dailycal.org ***************************************************************** NOTE: In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. section 107 this material is distributed without profit or payment to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving this information for non-profit research and educational purposes only. For more information go to: *****************************************************************