***************************************************************** 1/19/01 **** RADIATION BULLETIN(RADBULL) **** VOL 9.17 ***************************************************************** RADBULL IS PRODUCED BY THE ABALONE ALLIANCE CLEARINGHOUSE ***************************************************************** NUCLEAR POWER CONTENTS 1 Nevada will hold Bush to promises of keeping nuclear waste away 2 USEC head vows future in Paducah - 3 DEQ seeks help from EPA to clear away radioactive soil 4 Build more reactors, lab researcher says 5 REPORT SITES DANGERS AT MOTHBALLED NUCLEAR PLANTS. PRNLD 6 Energy designate to move on Yucca 7 Energy Northwest mulling Plant 1 revival 8 NRC: Consideration of Potassium Iodide in Emergency Plans 9 ANSTO won't release nuclear shipment details: Greenpeace 10 Lucas Heights plans head for court 11 UNLV could get funds for nuke research 12 GREENPEACE ACTIVISTS ARRESTED IN SEA-BASED PROTEST AGAINST 13 Another Pro-nuke editorial 14 Lab kicks off program to transform nuclear waste 15 TVA concerned about environment assessement NUCLEAR WEAPONS CONTENTS 1 DOE: Paducah plant radiation risk fell in 1999 - 2 Report says uranium-plant cleanup is safe 3 DOE to have say in nuclear lab discipline 4 Nuclear radiation a reality 5 Due Diligence: Exelon reaps benefits of nuclear fleet 6 White House Statement on Gulf War Health Consequences 7 Energy Department And University of California Extend Management 8 FBI Concludes Investigation of Hard Drive Incident at Los Alamos 9 Uranium Silence 10 IHT: Mad Cows, Funny Plants, Uranium Dust and Such 11 Stay on depleted uranium arms proposed 12 Plutonium Trace in Ammo Irrelevant, Says NATO 13 I see no evidence of harm 14 In another Bosnian town two small boys lie in their hospital 15 Scharping Defends Uranium Arms Action 16 Editorials: Depleted uranium and public health 17 'Non-existent' nuclear bombs may have left 18 Nuclear activists freed 19 Canister with radioactive material is located 20 Patten urges nuclear cleanup 21 Iraq asks U.N. for investigation into uranium effects - 22 Depleted uranium: Defence Minister critical of information flow 23 New inquiry into uranium scare 24 Nevada Nuclear Test Site to Host Huge Wind Farm 25 Meeting to focus on impact of DOE contractor layoffs 26 Hazardous exposure review to encompass seven counties 27 AMSE exhibits/ education manager leaves after 43 years ***************************************************************** ***************************************************************** NUCLEAR POWER ARTICLES ***************************************************************** 1 Nevada will hold Bush to promises of keeping nuclear waste away RGJ.com - By Jeff DeLong Reno Gazette-Journal Friday January 19th, 2001 The volatile debate over the proposed nuclear waste storage dump at Nevada’s Yucca Mountain will continue during George W. Bush’s term as president, and state officials mean to hold him to promises made during his successful campaign against Vice President Al Gore. During the campaign, Gov. Kenny Guinn received assurances from candidate Bush that he would support use of tough Environmental Protection Agency standards in gauging the safety of the Yucca Mountain site. Bush also said he would veto any legislation to store nuclear waste in Nevada on an interim basis until the safety of the site is determined, said Bob Loux, director of the Agency for Nuclear Projects. “My guess is we’re going to have to rely on those commitments a great deal,” Loux said. “They’re very critical.” Loux has little doubt the nuclear industry will continue to apply political pressure to have the Yucca Mountain site built. Despite continued opposition by Nevada’s federal and state representatives, the industry continues to push for the storage of some 77,000 tons of highly radioactive waste at the site, located 100 miles northwest of Las Vegas. During the Bush-Gore race, Democratic Sen. Richard Bryan said he was concerned a vote for Bush-Cheney would mean a dump in Nevada. In September, Sen. Pete Domenici, R-N.M., said within six to eight months after a Bush victory, the country would have an interim storage facility in business. Nevada officials were relieved last month when Bush decided not nominate former Sen. J. Bennett Johnston as his secretary of energy. The Louisiana Democrat was author of the so-called “Screw Nevada” bill that singled out the state as the only one for the controversial waste dump and his nomination was heavily lobbied against by Nevada officials. Still, Secretary of Energy nominee Spencer Abraham, a former Republican senator from Michigan, has a worrisome voting record on the subject of nuclear waste storage, Loux said. Last month, the state Commission on Nuclear Projects said the 2001 Legislature should pass a resolution urging the governor to veto any decision by the Department of Energy to recommend the Yucca Mountain site. Were Guinn to do so, it would take an act of Congress to overturn the state’s veto. It’s possible the nuclear storage debate will be sidelined, at least for a time, by other energy-related issues such as California’s worsening power crisis, Loux said. ©2001 RENO GAZETTE-JOURNAL ***************************************************************** 2 USEC head vows future in Paducah - By Joe Walker The Paducah Sun Friday, January 19, 2001 BARKLEY THIELEMAN/The Sun--Chamber reassured: William Timbers outlines some possibilities for the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant. This area's largest industrial employer is not headed for bankruptcy or forced sale as some predict, and has made the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant its center of operations, said USEC President and Chief Executive Officer William "Nick" Timbers. "Pundits have predicted our demise," he said. "That will not happen." Timbers gave his views Thursday in an interview and later as speaker at the Paducah Area Chamber of Commerce's annual dinner. He said the Paducah plant is foremost in the plans of the slumping company. "What's significant for us here tonight is that we've put down a stake in this community that we will consolidate our production here in Paducah. We have made substantial investments in upgrading the Paducah plant, and we see a productive future for it," he said. "The decision to choose Paducah was mostly based on economics, but be assured that this community's support did not escape our attention." Timbers denied critics' claims that USEC is headed for bankruptcy. Although the company is not seeking a buyer, the board is looking at many options to maximize the value of the firm, he said. "If that is the sale of the company to somebody else, I'm sure that the board will take that approach," he said. "If there is not sufficient value provided, I'm sure the board will take that into consideration." Although some advocate the government's buying USEC back only three years after it was privatized, Timbers said those chances are slim. "I can't predict what Congress or the administration will do at any point in time," he said. "However, I'd say that prospect is extremely unlikely." Planned for several months, his visit to Paducah came just a few days after the atomic workers union accused USEC of moving away from Paducah plant production and toward being solely a broker of Russian uranium for use in nuclear fuel. Leaders of the union, representing more than half the Paducah plant's 1,500 employees, said USEC is poised to buy even more Russian uranium, which will mean the demise of the plant as early as 2003. Timbers denied that. "We just went through a long, difficult, arduous evaluation about how we're going to produce enriched uranium, and our decision was to commit to this plant, to this community and to these employees that this is where we're going to produce this material," Timbers said. "The Russian material is not going to supplant our domestic production." He said the union warnings "have no basis" and are a disservice to employees and community. USEC's huge investment upgrading the Paducah plant should be evidence "of what our intent is," Timbers said. Under a nuclear disarmament agreement, USEC is buying about 60 percent of its marketable uranium needs from Russia, leaving the Paducah plant to produce the other 40 percent in a glutted market. World market prices have dropped 32 percent and demand 18 percent since USEC was privatized in 1998. USEC is paying more for the Russian uranium than it can sell it for, Timbers said, and is offering to buy more of it if Russia lowers prices. Last year, a proprietary Nuclear Regulatory Commission report said the Paducah plant could be in serious trouble by 2003. Another confidential report, newly prepared for the U.S. utilities industry that buys from USEC, says virtually the same thing, according to industry experts familiar with the report. The two reports accompany a drastic slide in USEC stock: from $14.25 per share in 1998 to about $5.50. Earnings per share dropped from $1.52 to 10 cents during the past fiscal year. Several shareholders have sued the firm, alleging it failed to adequately warn them about market declines and problems with the Russian deal. USEC denies the claims. During congressional hearings last year, some lawmakers blasted Timbers for earning too much money amid the company slide. He responds that his compensation package — nearly $2.5 million, including salary, bonus, stock and stock options — is about average for executives of like-sized companies and, except for the $600,000 base salary, is tied to company performance as determined by the USEC board. Although union leaders and federal lawmakers fear USEC's collapse, Timbers said the company is trying to overcome its problems by closing its other enrichment plant in Ohio and consolidating work at Paducah; signing a 10-year agreement with TVA to stabilize power prices, which make up more than half of production costs; reaching a pact with Russia to lower uranium prices starting in 2002; and sealing a deal with Enron giving utility customers the option of paying for enrichment services with deliveries of electricity. Timbers said he expects a decision this year on an advanced technology to replace outdated, expensive gaseous diffusion used at Paducah. USEC is involved in a yearlong project with DOE to develop gas centrifuge technology at the Ohio plant, which could eventually be used at Paducah, he said. USEC also is evaluating foreign centrifuges and Australian laser-based Silex technology, similar to AVLIS. Ditching AVLIS and focusing on centrifuge, a decades-old process, has drawn plenty of criticism from the union, industry experts and others who say USEC will be dead well before the five to 10 years it takes the company to deploy new technology. As USEC's older, higher- priced contracts expire, utilities are hesitant to sign new contracts because USEC has no advanced technology plan, critics say, and the firm's production costs are rapidly exceeding prices. Timbers said utilities have many reasons for stalling on contracts and it is hard to say if the technology issue is a key one. They may be worried that if USEC wins an unfair trade action against foreign competitors who are selling cheap uranium, it will force prices higher, he said. Last month, USEC and the atomic workers' union asked the Department of Commerce and the International Trade Commission to investigate the dumping of enriched uranium into the United States by USEC's European competitors, Eurodif and Urenco, and restore fair pricing. "This dumping hurts the domestic uranium enrichment industry and undermines long-term domestic energy security," Timbers said. "That means it hurts our employees and our shareholders. We are not going to let our competitors take these sales away from us unfairly." While strengthening core business, USEC is trying to diversify to generate more cash flow. Timbers said the company will bid on work to convert uranium enrichment waste at Paducah, as well as in Ohio and Tennessee. "We believe that we are the best suited to do this work," he said. Timbers highlighted the Paducah plant's successes of last year, including making improvements to be a stand-alone facility; completing changes to be more earthquake resistant; meeting aggressive maintenance schedules and equipment ramp-ups for the new power contract; and removing a huge pile of contaminated scrap called "drum mountain." Timbers also praised employees for their civic work. "We try to give back to the community in every way we can. Many of our employees hold leadership roles within local churches, schools, PTAs, government, civic clubs and charities," he said. "They coach and mentor young people. They fight fires. They raise money, and they find a thousand other ways to contribute their time and talent to this community." ***************************************************************** 3 DEQ seeks help from EPA to clear away radioactive soil BY CHRIS FRINK WESTSIDE BUREAU ST. GABRIEL--A state agency called on the federal government to spend up to $1 million to help clear away slightly radioactive soil near a defunct instrument service company site in St. Gabriel. The Department of Environmental Quality made the request of the federal Environmental Protection Agency, Michael Henry, a senior environmental scientist in DEQ's Radiation Protection Division, said Thursday. Cesium-137, a radioactive isotope used in industrial gauges, leaked into the ground near Coastal Radiation Services at 6745 Bayou Paul Road in the 1970s, Henry said. A meeting of the Iberville Parish emergency planning committee scheduled for 5 p.m. Thursday, Jan. 25, at East Iberville School in St. Gabriel will offer the public a chance to learn more about the situation. Coastal Radiation's services included removing radioactive pellets from gauges and shipping the pellets off for disposal. Several of those pellets spilled onto the ground and a rainstorm helped spread the radiation, Henry said. "We're not talking about an immediate health problem," Henry said. The property's owner and owners of neighboring contaminated property all understand the problem, he said. Depending on the EPA's response to the state's request for federal help, the cleanup could begin in March. The cleanup could remove from 100 to 1,000 cubic yards of soil, Henry said. A preliminary estimate of the work's cost is up to $1 million, Henry said. DEQ could not afford even to pay for even a $100,000 cleanup, so that's why the state agency called on EPA for help, he said. A routine DEQ inspection in 1979 found the contamination behind the Quonset hut-style metal building that housed the business in the rear of the owner's home, Henry said. The owner, who now lives in Madisonville, cleaned the contaminated soil from 1979 to 1981 and complied with regulations in place at the time, Henry said. Federal rules on radiation exposure recently were changed from allowing 500 millirems per year to 25 millirems per year. Extensive sampling and analysis at the site indicate exposure could be 90 millirems per year, he said. A millirem is equal to a thousandth of a rem, which is equivalent to one roentgen of X-ray, a unit of exposure used in measuring ionizing radiation. Copyright © 1995-2001, The Advocate, Capital City Press, All ***************************************************************** 4 Build more reactors, lab researcher says January 18, 2001 By Glenn Roberts Jr. STAFF WRITER PLEASANTON--The United States has entered a "nuclear renaissance, " and several nuclear power plants likely will be built or restarted in the next decade, a federal lab scientist said during a Wednesday presentation. Denis E. Beller, a researcher at Los Alamos Laboratory in New Mexico, spoke to members of the Northern California Section of the American Nuclear Society about an essay he co-authored, "The Need for Nuclear Power." "The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is now talking about building nuclear power plants," said Beller, and energy industry officials are also planning to bolster nuclear power production. "We can expect new construction--future reactors to be built." Although nuclear power produces only about 6.3 percent of the world's energy, some nations are heavily reliant on nuclear plants. Nuclear power supplies about 79 percent of the electricity in France, according to the essay produced by Beller and author Richard Rhodes for Foreign Affairs, an international policy journal. Nuclear power produces 20 percent of U.S. electricity. "Nuclear power is needed: for workers, the public and environment. It's needed to fight energy poverty," Beller said during the presentation at Faz Restaurant in Pleasanton. The world population passed the 6 billion mark in 1999, and about 2 billion people lack access to electricity. Beller said the world will need thousands of new power plants in the approaching decades to meet energy demand. "We're going to need 65 percent more energy in the next 20 years," he said. Nuclear power, he explained, may be the way to meet the demand, as new, emerging energy technologies could take too long to establish. "Nuclear power is safe. That's what we need to say when we talk to the public. I believe it is the safest major source of electricity, " Beller said. "(The industry) is not having accidents and the country once again needs electricity." The essay states that the nuclear power-production capacity at U.S. nuclear plants has increased substantially. The average capacity for 100 U.S. reactors in 1998 was 80 percent, compared with 66 percent in 1990 and 58 percent in 1980, the report states. Also, nuclear power produces a lower volume of waste than other types of power plants, although nuclear waste is more highly radioactive than waste from other plants. Even so, "a coal-fired power plant releases about 100 times as much radioactivity into the environment as a comparable nuclear plant," the essay states. There are proliferation risks in operating nuclear power plants, because the fission process can produce plutonium, though this plutonium is "beyond the capacity of terrorists to process," the essay concludes. Beller said that the reprocessing and recycling of spent nuclear fuel, now banned in the United States, could reduce the volume of nuclear waste and provide a new source for power plant fuel, while reducing proliferation risks. "We need to solve the spent-fuel dilemma," he said. Beller discounted the opposition to nuclear power by anti-nuclear activists and environmentalists. He said surveys have shown that most people accept nuclear power while assuming that they are a minority. "The public trusts us," he said. "One of the things we need to do is to get out and talk to the public. The public does accept nuclear power." ***************************************************************** 5 REPORT SITES DANGERS AT MOTHBALLED NUCLEAR PLANTS. PRNLD BY ASSOCIATED PRESS, 1/19/2001 03:00 EAST HADDAM, Conn. (AP) As part of its decommissioning, the Connecticut Yankee nuclear plant has been allowed to disconnect its emergency siren system, terminate its evacuation planning with state and local officials, and end all offsite accident planning. But a new federal report concludes that there is still a danger of a nuclear accident at plants such as Connecticut Yankee, because they continue to store their spent nuclear fuel on site. The analysis, compiled for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission by a 22-member federal panel, concludes that an accident involving stored nuclear waste would be comparable to a severe nuclear reactor accident. Three defunct nuclear plants in New England continue to keep nuclear waste in their storage pools: Connecticut Yankee; Maine Yankee in Wiscasset; and Yankee Rowe in Rowe, Mass. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has allowed such facilities to abandon emergency planning on the assumption that no accident severe enough to endanger the public was possible a year or two after the reactor was permanently shut down. At that point they were considered past the point when a ''zirconium fire'' could occur, a term that refers to the metal cladding that houses uranium in nuclear fuel rods. It is the zirconium that would ''melt down'' in a reactor accident. But the new report ''Technical Study of Spent Fuel Pool Accident Risk at Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants'' concludes that an accident in the spent fuel storage pool, leading to a large radiation release, cannot be ruled out ''even many years after shutdown.'' The analysts writing the report said that, however remote the possibility of such an accident, they were unable to calculate when the threat of a zirconium fire would fully pass. ''The impact of this new information on previously granted (emergency planning) exemptions is being evaluated by the staff,'' it states. Timothy E. Collins, who led the group that prepared the report, said the NRC may still conclude that emergency evacuation plans are not necessary at decommissioning nuclear plants. But no longer can that decision be based on the conclusion that a serious accident is not possible in the spent fuel pool, because the science does not support it, he said. Collins said the report emphasized that the chance of such an accident and fire involving the spent fuel is extremely remote. Major earthquakes or a multi-ton fuel storage cask crashing into the pool from a ceiling crane, were seen as the most likely events to cause an accident, he said. The NRC will hold a will hold a public meeting on the report Feb. 20 at its Rockville, Md. headquarters. ***************************************************************** 6 Energy designate to move on Yucca Friday, January 19, 2001 Copyright c Las Vegas Review-Journal DONREY WASHINGTON BUREAU WASHINGTON--Former Sen. Spencer Abraham, headed toward confirmation as federal energy secretary, said Thursday he was frustrated by the slow pace of progress on nuclear waste burial and vowed to move steadily on a plan to place the material in Nevada. At a confirmation hearing before the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee, Abraham pledged he will determine in a "timely way" whether Yucca Mountain is suitable for nuclear waste storage, and to develop it into a licensed repository if it is found acceptable. The decision on suitability could come as soon as this summer under a timetable being followed by the Department of Energy. "There is a process to follow and I expect to see that process move forward," Abraham said. "It has to move forward." Abraham, 48, repeated a pledge made during the fall campaign by President-elect George W. Bush that politics will not play a role in the decision. "My commitment is to make progress on the nuclear waste program while ensuring sound science governs decisions on site recommendations," Abraham said. A Republican, Abraham represented Michigan in the Senate for six years until he was defeated for re-election last November. He reminded senators he had voted for bills to speed nuclear waste burial in Nevada, and also voted to locate a temporary repository in the state. "I share the frustration of members of this committee with the lack of progress in this area," said Abraham, whose state is home to four nuclear power plants. During questioning, he said he favored a national strategy that includes nuclear power in the mix of energy sources. On nuclear waste, the nominee was urged to move quickly by committee chairman Sen. Frank Murkowski, R-Alaska, and Sen. Pete Domenici, R-N.M. "This has to be one of your highest priorities," Murkowski said. Murkowski reminded Abraham that Nevada officials will fight efforts to move ahead on Yucca Mountain. State leaders say evidence suggests the site is not safe to store tens of thousands of tons of highly radioactive waste for as long as 10,000 years. The Energy Department, which has been studying Yucca Mountain for more than a decade, has said it sees nothing that would disqualify the site. Abraham was greeted warmly and by his first name by many committee members and ran into few difficult questions during his confirmation hearing. Several hours later, the committee approved his nomination by voice vote and sent it to the Senate floor for final confirmation. Sen. John Ensign, R-Nev., said he planned to vote for Abraham. Sen. Harry Reid, D-Nev., said he was undecided but may vote against Abraham to protest the Yucca Mountain program. Both said they expect Abraham to be confirmed easily. "I think he's about as good as we can do ideologically," Ensign said of Abraham. Ensign met with Abraham earlier this week. "His first comments to me were that he knows that I know his record as a senator from the state of Michigan but that he is no longer a senator from the state of Michigan and he will carry out Bush's policies and he will make sure sound science and all that stuff applies, " Ensign said. During the campaign, Bush promised Nevada Gov. Kenny Guinn that his decisions on waste storage would be driven by science, not pressure from the nuclear industry. "I reminded him (Abraham) about the promises that Bush made during the campaign and he was willing to keep those promises," Ensign said. ***************************************************************** 7 Energy Northwest mulling Plant 1 revival This story was published 1/19/2001 BY CHRIS MULICK HERALD STAFF WRITER Energy Northwest said Thursday that it may yet revive plans to finish one of four nuclear power plants it started building in the 1970s but never finished. However, no one's ready to cut any ribbons or smash any champagne bottles. The obstacles standing in the way of finishing Plant No. 1 at north of Richland could prove to be enormous. "It has a huge up-front cost, and it has a huge political risk, " said Rod Webring, Energy Northwest's vice president for operations support. "The region may never be ready." But with electricity prices jumping like never before, the price of power out of a nuclear plant doesn't look so bad. "Maybe the dollar numbers that seemed so ridiculous are not that ridiculous," Webring said. Energy Northwest began building five nuclear plants in the 1970s to meet what was expected to be rapidly rising energy demands. That demand never materialized, perhaps until now, and rising costs forced four of the projects to be canceled. The consortium of public utilities, then known as the Washington Public Power Supply System, also defaulted on $2.25 billion in bonds sold to build the last two of those projects. Only Columbia Generating Station, formerly known simply as Plant No. 2, was ever finished. But with the price of power on spot markets at times tenfold and more what they are normally, the value of the power it has produced since July has topped $750 million. That's money Northwest ratepayers would have had to pay to buy as much energy as the plant produces. It is believed it would cost some $3 billion to $4 billion to finish Plant No. 1, which was two-thirds finished when work stopped in the early 1980s and was later canceled. Not much has changed since the mammoth 1,300-megawatt project was canceled. The monolith is the centerpiece of a nuclear ghost town of sorts, surrounded by a chain link fence and weathered roads. Energy Northwest has been exploring ways to redevelop the project for other industrial uses. It's not clear exactly how much power from Plant No. 1 would cost, but Webring figures it's worth finding out just in case anyone is interested. Energy Northwest has had a few nibbles in the past year from private utilities interested in finishing the project but no bites. "I would not be surprised if that interest is rekindled," he said. Energy Northwest doesn't have the ability to finish the project by itself because it has no money. The Bonneville Power Administration effectively buys all of Energy Northwest's power and pays all its bills, including millions annually on debt payments for Plant No. 1 on bonds the federal power marketer backed. For the project to materialize, another party would have to sign a contract to buy the plant's power or be willing to finish the project. "It would be almost like a new construction project," said Vic Parrish, Energy Northwest's chief operating officer. "If there's any interest in unit 1, we will do some irreversible damage to that facility in the next three to four years." That's because the agency plans to use the Plant No. 1 generator to help increase the output of the 1,150-megawatt Columbia Generating Station by another 175 megawatts. Rising power prices wouldn't be the only reason stimulating interest in finishing the project. While there are issues with finding places to store radioactive spent nuclear fuel, the plant wouldn't produce harmful air emissions like gas or coal plants or kill fish like hydroelectric dams. Also, nuclear plants now are being licensed to run for 60-year intervals, making them a guaranteed resource for a generation. All that still may not be enough to get the project going again. For now Energy Northwest is just preparing itself to answer questions about the possibility if they are asked, Webring said. "We're not going to build that plant unless the region wants it," he said. ***************************************************************** 8 NRC: Consideration of Potassium Iodide in Emergency Plans [Federal Register: January 19, 2001 (Volume 66, Number 13)] [Rules and Regulations] [Page 5427-5440] From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr19ja01-1] ======================================================================== Rules and Regulations Federal Register ________________________________________________________________________ This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER contains regulatory documents having general applicability and legal effect, most of which are keyed to and codified in the Code of Federal Regulations, which is published under 50 titles pursuant to 44 U.S.C. 1510. The Code of Federal Regulations is sold by the Superintendent of Documents. Prices of new books are listed in the first FEDERAL REGISTER issue of each week. ======================================================================== [[Page 5427]] NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 10 CFR Part 50 RIN 3150-AG11 AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission. ACTION: Final rule. SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is amending its emergency planning regulations governing the domestic licensing of production and utilization facilities. The final rule requires that consideration be given to including potassium iodide (KI) as a protective measure for the general public that would supplement sheltering and evacuation. KI would help prevent thyroid cancers in the unlikely event of a major release of radioactivity from a nuclear power plant. The final rule responds to petitions for rulemaking (PRM 50-63 and PRM 50-63A) submitted by Mr. Peter G. Crane concerning the use of KI in emergency plans. EFFECTIVE DATES: April 19, 2001. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Michael T. Jamgochian, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001. Telephone: (301) 415-3224. Internet: SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Section 50.47 of the Commission's regulations establishes requirements for emergency plans for nuclear power reactors to provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency. Section 50.47(b) contains 16 planning standards, and in particular, Sec. 50.47(b)(10) requires that emergency plans include ``a range of protective actions'' for the plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone (EPZ) for emergency workers and the public. This provision does not identify specific protective actions that must be included in these emergency plans. The Petitioner's Requested Amendment to the NRC Regulations On November 27, 1995 (60 FR 58256), the NRC published a document announcing the receipt of a petition for rulemaking (PRM 50-63) filed by Mr. Peter G. Crane on his own behalf and requested public comment on the suggested action. In the original petition (PRM 50-63), submitted on September 9, 1995, the petitioner requested that 10 CFR part 50 be amended to include language taken from FEMA's Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan of September 1994. The petitioner requested that the NRC amend its regulations concerning emergency planning to include a requirement that emergency planning protective actions include the prophylactic use of potassium iodide (KI), which the petitioner stated prevents thyroid cancer after nuclear accidents. The petitioner proposed that section 50.47(b)(10) be amended to read as follows: (10) A range of protective actions including sheltering, evacuation and prophylactic use of iodine have been developed for the plume exposure pathway EPZ [emergency planning zone] for emergency workers and the public. Guidelines for the choice of protective actions during an emergency, consistent with Federal guidelines, are developed and in place, and protective actions for the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ appropriate to the locale have been developed. In the September 9, 1995, petition (PRM 50-63), the petitioner stated that he believes that if his proposed rule change is adopted, the plan will become an accurate description of emergency preparedness for radiological emergencies; the recommendation of the Kemeny Commission to stockpile KI will at last be implemented; and the United States will be in compliance with the International Basic Safety Standards. On November 11, 1997, the petitioner submitted a revision to his original petition (PRM 50-63A). In the revised petition, the petitioner requested that 10 CFR 50.47(b) be amended to read: (10) ``A range of protective actions have been developed for the plume exposure EPZ for emergency workers and the public. In developing this range of actions, consideration has been given to evacuation, sheltering, and the prophylactic use of potassium iodide (KI), as appropriate. Guidelines for the choice of protective actions during an emergency, consistent with Federal guidelines, are developed and in place, and protective actions for the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ appropriate to the locale have been developed.'' The petitioner also provided a marked-up version of the NRC staff's proposed Federal Radiological Preparedness Coordinating Committee (FRPCC) Federal Register document concerning a revision to the Federal policy relating to the use of KI by the general public. The NRC published a document announcing the receipt of the amended petition on December 17, 1997, (62 FR 66038) and requested public comment on the amended petition. As part of the petitioner's comments on the proposed rule, the petitioner also stated that his original petition was incorporated by reference and resubmitted because the amended petition was based in part upon the June 30, 1997, Commission decision to fund State supplies for those States that request it. The petitioner also requested in PRM 50-63 that the NRC, either on its own or jointly with other agencies, issue a policy statement declaring that KI stockpiling is a sensible and prudent measure necessary to assure that the drug will be available in the event of a major accident. The petitioner believes that this statement would clarify that KI can be used in conjunction with evacuation and sheltering to maximize protection to the public. Commission Action Concerning the Petitions By staff requirements memorandum (SRM) dated June 26, 1998, to SECY 98-061, ``Staff Options for Resolving a Petition for Rulemaking (PRM 50-63 and 50-63A) Relating to Re-evaluation of the Policy Regarding the use of Potassium Iodide (KI) by the General Public after a Severe Accident at a Nuclear Power Plant,'' the Commission decided to grant the revised petition for rulemaking (PRM 50-63A). The Commission also directed that the [[Page 5428]] preamble for the proposed rule include a statement to the effect that State and local decision makers, provided with proper information, may find that the use of KI as a protective supplement is reasonable and prudent for specific local conditions. By SRM dated April 22, 1999, to SECY 98-264, ``Proposed Amendments to 10 CFR 50.47; Granting of Petitions for Rulemaking (PRM 50-63 and 50-63A) Relating to a Re-evaluation of Policy on the Use of Potassium Iodide (KI) After a Severe Accident at a Nuclear Power Plant,'' the Commission voted to approve publication in the Federal Register of a [7590-01-P] proposed rule that would grant in part both the original petition (PRM 50-63) and the revised petition for rulemaking (PRM 50- 63A). The proposed rule was published for public comment on June 14, 1999 (64 FR 31737). That notice provides greater detail concerning the basis for the petition and the NRC's rationale for the proposed rule language put forth for comment. Other Activities Related to the Rulemaking on KI In its decision on June 30, 1997, the Commission endorsed the Federal offer to fund the purchase of KI for States at their request. On June 26, 1998, in a decision on this rulemaking petition, the Commission again noted that the Federal government (most likely the NRC) is prepared to fund the purchase of a stockpile of KI for the States, upon request.\1\ However, in its April 22, 1999, SRM, the Commission decided: (1) Not to fund State stockpiles of KI; (2) to direct the NRC staff to work with FEMA to establish and maintain regional KI stockpiles; and (3) to support NRC funding of the purchase and resupply of the regional KI stockpiles to the extent that this cannot be covered by FEMA under its initiatives. The Commission determined that notwithstanding the June 30, 1997, and June 26, 1998, intention that ``most likely the NRC'' would fund the purchase of State stockpiles of KI, NRC was not prepared to fund State stockpiles of KI absent Congressional funding specifically for this purpose. \1\ This was in contrast to previous Commission statements, such as those made when the Commission amended its emergency planning regulations (45 FR 55402) on November 3, 1980, wherein the Commission stated that any direct funding of State or local governments solely for emergency preparedness purposes by the Federal government would come through the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The Federal Radiological Preparedness Coordinating Committee (FRPCC) is responsible to coordinate all Federal responsibilities for assisting state and local governments in emergency planning and preparedness for peacetime radiological emergencies. Federal agencies which participate in the FRPCC include (among others): the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), NRC, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). The 1985 Federal Policy recommends the stockpiling or distribution of KI during emergencies for emergency workers and institutionalized persons, but does not recommend requiring pre-distribution or stockpiling for the general public. In parallel with petitioning the NRC for rulemaking, Mr. Crane requested that the FRPCC policy be reconsidered. In early 1996, the FRPCC convened a subcommittee on Potassium Iodide. The subcommittee recommended the following to the FRPCC regarding the Federal KI policy: (1) Without changing the Federal policy that it is the State's prerogative to make its own decisions on whether to use KI, the Federal Government (NRC through FEMA), should fund the purchase of a stockpile for a State that, hereafter, decides to incorporate KI as a protective measure for the general public; (2) the language in the 1985 policy should be softened to be more flexible and balanced, as for instance, rewording it to state ``it [potassium iodide for use by the general public] is not required, but may be selected as a protective measure at the option of the State or, in some cases, local governments;'' and (3) local jurisdictions that wish to use KI should consult with the State to determine if the arrangements are appropriate. If local governments have the authority or secure the approval to incorporate KI as a protective measure for the general public, they would need to include such a measure in their emergency plans. On June 16, 1997, the NRC staff forwarded to the Commission a staff version of the FRPCC-proposed Policy Regarding Use of Potassium Iodide After a Severe Accident at a Nuclear Power Plant. In its SRM of June 30, 1997, the Commission endorsed the Federal offer to fund the purchase of KI for States. On June 26, 1998, the Commission directed that the FRPCC proposed Policy be modified to include a statement to the effect that State and local decision makers, provided with proper information, may find the use of KI as a protective supplement is reasonable and prudent for specific local conditions. As noted above, the Commission also reiterated its endorsement of the Federal offer to fund KI stockpiles for States. Subsequently, on April 22, 1999, the Commission directed the staff to amend the draft FRN on the Federal KI Policy to conform to the Commission decision on the petitions for rulemaking, and the decision not to fund State KI stockpiles. On April 29, 1999, the Director of FEMA, Mr. James Lee Witt, forwarded a letter to the Commission commenting on the issue of funding of stockpiles of KI for States. The letter objected to the Commission's ``unilateral'' decision on funding, and also noted ``FEMA has always opposed the notion that Federal regional stockpiles of KI would be effective [and believes that] regional stockpiles would complicate, not strengthen radiological emergency preparedness.'' FEMA believes that if a State opts to use KI as a supplemental protective measure, the NRC should provide the funds for such a purchase. The NRC responded to Mr. Witt's letter on June 15, 1999. This letter noted the Commission's decision not to fund state stockpiles of KI as well as the reasons underlying that decision. The letter also referred to the Commission's direction to ``the NRC staff to work with FEMA staff to establish and maintain regional KI stockpiles to be used in the event that local stockpiles prove to be insufficient, or when a state without a stockpile elects to use KI on an ad hoc basis in the case of a nuclear emergency.'' The letter expressed confidence that the staffs, working together would successfully resolve the KI supply issue. The status of the stockpile and funding issues are discussed later in this notice. NRC is working closely with the other Federal agencies to determine appropriate changes to the 1985 policy. A decision regarding policy changes will be reached after the conclusion of this rulemaking. In accordance with a Memorandum of Understanding between NRC and FEMA, NRC sent draft versions of this Federal Register notice to FEMA for its review and comment. FEMA responded by letter dated January 12, 2000. That letter reiterated their previous comments opposing regional stockpiles and instead favoring NRC funding of State stockpiles. The letter also noted that the development of regional stockpiles of KI had not progressed. As discussed in the public comment evaluation, the Commission, as part of its decision to grant in full the amended rulemaking petition, has withdrawn its support for the funding of regional KI stockpiles and has reinstated its offer to provide for NRC funding of State or, in some cases, local stockpiles. The Commission agrees to fund a State's [[Page 5429]] stockpile of KI, subject to various restrictions and limitations (see Staff Requirements Memorandum for the Affirmation Session on December 22, 2000). NRC intends to work closely with FEMA and the other Federal agencies in FRPCC to finalize the draft Federal Policy to replace the 1985 Federal Policy. A decision regarding changes to the draft policy will be reached after the conclusion of this rulemaking. The substance of the specific comments attached to the FEMA letter is addressed by the issues in the public comment evaluation. On September 30, 1998, the Commission also directed the staff to withdraw its guidance document, NUREG-1633 and substantially revise it, in a number of respects, including an improved discussion on how the practical problems in KI stockpiling, distribution and use are handled by States and other nations who use KI as a supplement. To accomplish this task, the NRC formed a KI Core Group, consisting of representatives from those States that have KI as a supplemental protective action, the Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors, the National Emergency Management Association, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), EPA and FEMA. The revised draft guidance document, NUREG-1633, ``Assessment of the Use of KI as a Supplemental Protective Action During Severe Reactor Accidents'', Rev. 2 is expected to be issued for comment following receipt of the FDA's draft revised position on exposure action levels and proper dosage of KI which was issued for public comment on January 4, 2001 (66 FR 801). In addition, the NRC plans to develop a public information brochure concerning the use of KI by the general public following completion of the final NUREG. Public Comment Evaluation On November 27, 1995 (60 FR 58256), the NRC announced the receipt of the original petition for rulemaking (PRM 50-63), and requested public comment on the suggested rule amendment. A total of 65 comment letters were received.\2\ Letters in favor of granting the petition came from 5 environmental groups, 22 members of the public (including 1 from the petitioner), and the American Thyroid Association. Letters opposed to the petition came from 20 utilities, 9 State governmental agencies, 2 utility interest organizations, a letter signed by 12 health physicists, 2 State university medical centers and 1 member of the public. \2\ Two letters that were received in response to the notice did not address the issues in the petition and are not discussed further. On December 17, 1997 (62 FR 66038), the Commission published a request for public comment on the amended petition (PRM 50-63A) in the Federal Register. In response to several requests, the comment period was extended until February 17, 1998, by a Federal Register notice published on January 21, 1998 (63 FR 3052). A total of 86 comment letters were received. The letters in favor of granting the petition came from 8 public interest groups, 48 members of the public (including 3 from the petitioner), 3 physicians, 2 U.S. Senators, one State Representative, FEMA, the American Thyroid Association, a KI manufacturer, and the US Pharmacopeia Convention. Fourteen utilities, 3 State government agencies, 1 utility interest association, and 2 members of the public opposed the petition for rulemaking. A detailed analysis of the issues raised by the public comments with the response to those issues was published in the June 14, 1999, proposed rule Federal Register notice. On June 14, 1999 (64 FR 31737), the Commission published a proposed rule in the Federal Register, based on the revised petition for rulemaking (PRM 50-63A) and requested public comment by September 14, 1999. A total of 77 comment letters were received.\3\ The letters in favor of the proposed rulemaking and the revised petition for rulemaking originated from a United States Senator; a member of the U.S. House of Representatives; 3 State agencies; 4 public interest groups; 10 members of the public (including two from the petitioner); and one letter with 529 signatures. Letters that opposed the proposed rulemaking came from 14 utilities; 13 State or local government agencies; 1 utility interest association; one letter from the Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors Standards committee representing 5 committee members; a letter from the National Emergency Management Association representing emergency management directors in 50 states; a law firm representing 15 utilities; and a former Assistant Secretary of Nuclear Energy at DOE. The FEMA letter of April 29, 1999, was submitted before the rule was published and discussed KI stockpiles. Another 24 letters requested the Commission to grant the original petition (PRM 50-63) by requiring the use of KI rather than the consideration of KI in emergency planning. These letters originated from members of the public as well as public interest groups. As part of the petitioner's comment letter dated August 17, 1999, on the proposed rule the petitioner stated that, in light of the Commission's decision not to fund state stockpiles of KI, the Commission should consider his original petition (PRM 50-63) to be incorporated by reference and resubmitted. He also requested the Commission to grant the petition as originally submitted. \3\ Three of the letters (those from FEMA, the senator and the congressional representative) were not submitted during the comment period in response to the notice, but are being treated as comment letters for purposes of this discussion. The following discussion addresses the significant comments and issues raised in the three public comment periods for the original and amended petitions for rulemaking and the proposed rule. Issue A: Should KI Be Considered as a Supplemental Protective Action to Evacuation and Sheltering Several commenters on the proposed rule state that the rulemaking would not add significant public health and safety benefit beyond the current emergency plans, because evacuation and sheltering are the best means to protect the public in the event of a radiological emergency. According to these commenters, evacuation and sheltering are more effective at dose reduction because they reduce dose to all organs, not just to the thyroid. Other comments express the view that the Chernobyl experience (including use of KI in Poland) shows that (1) thyroid cancer is a major result of reactor accidents, (2) the exposure can continue for days and thus the institution of KI blocking at any time is beneficial, (3) deployment of KI is safe, and (4) shelf life is extremely long. These commenters note that EPA Manual [Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents, EPA-400-R-92-001 (May 1992)] quotes the FDA as stating that potassium iodide ``will have substantial benefit even if it is taken 3 or 4 hours after acute exposure.'' Thus, these commenters believe that the advantage of having a supply of KI on hand outweighs moderate cost and that KI should be a supplemental protective action. Further, these commenters note that just because there may be other radionuclides to which people are exposed is not a reason to deny them the availability of KI. Commenters who favor the use of KI as a supplemental protective action conclude that evacuation and sheltering alone may not be sufficient safety actions in the event that evacuation is not feasible. They state that natural [[Page 5430]] disasters could occur that would make evacuation difficult and time consuming at best, as for instance, earthquakes, hurricanes, blizzards, and ice storms. According to these commenters, a point against strong reliance upon evacuation is the evacuation routes themselves. As an example, a commenter cites the area around the Seabrook Nuclear Plant, noting that during the summer tourist season especially, it can be predicted that evacuees will be forced to wait in traffic for great lengths of time. This commenter believes that if KI were predistributed, instances of cancer, hypothyroidism and other thyroid disorders might be avoided. Response. The Commission recognizes evacuation to be the most effective protective measure to be taken in the event of a radiological emergency because it protects the whole body (including the thyroid and other organs) from all radionuclides and all exposure pathways. The Commission recognizes that there may be situations when evacuation is not feasible or is delayed. In-place sheltering is an effective protective action in such a situation. However, it is important to note that the issue is not evacuation or sheltering versus KI. Rather, it is evacuation or sheltering with KI versus evacuation or sheltering without KI. The use of KI is intended to supplement, not to replace, other protective measures. This amendment represents no change in the NRC's view that the primary and most desirable protective action in a radiological emergency is evacuation of the population before any exposure to radiation occurs. Depending on the circumstances, KI may offer additional protection for one radiation-sensitive organ, the thyroid, if used in conjunction with evacuation and sheltering. In developing the range of public protective actions for severe accidents at commercial nuclear power plants, evacuation and in-place sheltering provide adequate protection for the general public but the use of KI can be a reasonable and prudent supplement. Therefore, it seems reasonable, while continuing to recognize the role of the State and local governments in matters of emergency planning, to require explicitly that emergency planners consider the use of KI. Issue B: Is There a Need for New Regulation Commenters in favor of the proposed rule note that a host of countries--France, Germany, Belarus, Russia, Switzerland, Austria, the Czech Republic, Japan, Great Britain, Sweden, Slovakia, and others-- protect themselves with stockpiles of KI. These commenters point to soaring rates of thyroid cancer appearing in children in the Soviet Union who were exposed to the Chernobyl nuclear accident and who received too little potassium iodide, and too late. Thus, these commenters support the view that there is new information that suggests the need for consideration by State and local governments. In addition, many of these commenters would go further than the proposed rule language and require the use of KI, not just its consideration. In contrast to the above, letters from some state and local governments, and from utilities, say that the State and local governments have already considered the use of KI. They believe that the petitioner has not provided any compelling reasons why additional Federal requirements are needed or how they would benefit the health and safety of the public. These State and local government commenters reject the view that the States have not had access to sufficient technical information regarding potassium iodide, and that without accurate and current information on KI--including the Chernobyl experience and the consensus of international experts--States cannot make an informed judgment. They conclude that this assertion is without merit, as there has been no shortage of information related to the use of potassium iodide available to State radiological emergency planners, and oppose the implication that State and local governments, absent Federal actions, are incapable of making informed decisions regarding the protection of their citizens during a radiological emergency. One commenter stated that by issuing this rule, the Commission is ignoring the views of States where KI has been stockpiled or pre-distributed, and where experience shows the system is ineffective. The commenters opposing the proposed rule on this basis also note that reliance on the Chernobyl experience discounts the vast technical, political, and socio-economic differences between the United States and Eastern European countries at the time of the Chernobyl accident. The efficacy of any protective measure will depend on a large number of factors, including but not limited to: the type of reactor involved; accident sequences and timing; source term; timeliness of notification; the manner in which protective action decisions are made and transmitted to the public; the mobility of the public; and the receptiveness of the general public to official instructions. These commenters believe that the above factors have already been considered by State and local governments in the development of existing emergency response plans. Response. The Commission did not intend to imply that States are not capable of making informed decisions regarding the protection of their citizens during a radiological emergency. In fact, the final rule calls on offsite authorities to make their own decision on this matter. Additionally, the Commission recognizes that most State and local governments have already considered the use of KI in the event of an emergency as part of their planning. Nevertheless, the Commission believes it appropriate to provide information that may be of aid to offsite authorities in their consideration of this matter. Offsite authorities may, of course, use this information as they see fit. Several States have welcomed the NRC's efforts in developing information relating to the benefits and risks associated with using KI as a supplemental protective measure for the general public. This information is intended to supplement and update information already available on this subject, including experience from State and foreign governments that have made KI available to the public. As noted earlier, this information will be in a revised NUREG-1633, which is scheduled for publication for comment after the FDA issues its draft guidance and in an information brochure. The Commission finds that KI is a reasonable, prudent, and inexpensive supplement to evacuation and sheltering for specific local conditions. Through its decision to require that the use of KI be ``considered'' (rather than being required), the Commission is acknowledging that the efficacy of any protective measure will depend upon a number of factors, including those noted by the commenter, that can vary not only between countries but in individual States. Thus, the Commission concluded that decisions on the use of KI need to be resolved on a State-by-State basis. As part of this consideration, State and local governments can weigh all relevant factors. Issue C: The Importance of Information in the Decisionmaking Process Concerning the Public Use of KI In the proposed rule, the Commission noted that NUREG-1633 was being revised to provide information about experience in the United States and abroad with distribution of KI, and that an information brochure was also being prepared. According to some commenters, distribution of information on the benefits and risks associated with [[Page 5431]] the use of KI should not be limited to people living within nuclear power plant emergency planning zones. Further, commenters note that a comprehensive public information program outlining the potential range of benefits and risks of using KI and how to employ it most effectively in the event of a radiological emergency would be necessary to allow personal decisionmaking. Making the information and the KI itself available directly to members of the public provides them with the ability to decide for themselves how best to take advantage of the benefits associated with the use of KI as supplementary protection. One vehicle currently used for disseminating regular preparedness information which could be used to provide information on KI is the public information brochures and calendars already required to be distributed annually within each emergency planning zone. In this commenter's view, making information and KI available provides the greatest level of protection for the greatest number of people. Some State government organizations were concerned that making provisions for KI might give the public a false sense of security that they are fully protected, and that the public might not evacuate. Thus, these organizations believe that there is a need for public information concerning the supplemental role that the use of KI could play. Several of the commenters stated that it is desirable that the NRC would work with other appropriate Federal agencies to develop and promulgate clear and necessary guidance on the subject, similar to the guidance on sheltering and evacuation. These commenters also believe that the final decision should lie at the discretion of the State and local governments. A few commenters expressed the view that the rule puts the burden of assessment on States who have fewer technical resources than the NRC, the EPA or the FDA. One commenter thought that the decisionmaking about stockpiling KI must include rigorous assessments to ensure sufficient quantities of KI will be available for distribution to members of the public, in both the plume exposure pathway and the ingestion exposure pathway. Response. The Commission recognizes that once a State decides to include KI as a protective measure for the general public, it would be up to the State to decide how and when to conduct an educational program on the benefits and risks associated with using KI and to supply KI for appropriate distribution to the general public. Additionally, the Commission agrees that more detailed guidance on the use of KI would be useful in assisting States to assess the merits of stockpiling KI for the general public, including logistics, amounts and public information needs. The Commission has formed a KI ``Core Group'' consisting of representatives of State, local, and Federal agencies whose responsibility is to develop clear guidance relating to the use of KI. This guidance (NUREG-1633, Rev. 2) should be published for comment after FDA issues its draft guidance, which was issued for public comment on January 4, 2001 (66 FR 801). The NRC is continuing to work with other Federal agencies through the FRPCC to coordinate government policies concerning radiation protection and emergency planning. Further, a public information brochure to be published later will assist States and individuals in making an informed decision on KI. Issue D: Making KI Available to the General Public A range of comments were submitted concerning ways by which KI could be made available to the general public in the event of a radiological emergency. Many commenters simply asked NRC to ``make KI available'' without further detail. In the proposed rule, the NRC discussed Federal stockpiles of KI as part of Federal response to terrorist acts. One commenter indicated that expanding this supply may be the best approach. Another commenter stated that the public is not interested in stockpiles, but instead wants information to make their own decisions. Of those comments related to specific methods of availability, these can be generally grouped into individual availability, State stockpiles in the vicinity of nuclear power plants, or regional stockpiles. Individual Availability One State submitted, as part of its comments, a report that discussed a plan they have developed that would allow citizens to gain access to KI in advance of an accident. The plan calls for the State to secure agreements with KI manufacturers to sell the medication directly to individuals or retail outlets, and to urge local pharmacies to stock KI as an over-the-counter drug. Information concerning KI availability and use would be included in the annual emergency information mailings prepared by nuclear power plant staffs and distributed to every property owner within the emergency planning zones. The State concluded that this method would allow individuals to make their own decisions about the use of KI. This State noted that one can envision this activity being conducted in conjunction with existing programs designed to remind and encourage family members to periodically check home first aid kits, smoke detectors, spare batteries for flashlights and radios, and other items that they might employ for their comfort and protection in the event of any emergency. In addition, one commenter noted that KI is now available via the Internet from at least two vendors at an affordable price. (See also comments above in issue C about decisionmaking.) State Stockpiles A number of commenters believe that KI should be stockpiled in schools, fire houses or reception centers near nuclear power plants. These commenters state that this is the advice of the experts, for instance the World Health Organization and Dr. Jean Temeck, from FDA. These commenters believe that the young are the most vulnerable; and, in the words of Dr. Temeck, ``in an emergency you want to get it to the children as quickly as possible and the teacher is right there on the spot. * * * You do not need to be medically trained to give KI. A permission slip to administer KI can be sent out by the school at the beginning of each year.'' Further, it makes sense to these commenters that this time-critical medicine be available nearby, such as in a local school, hospital, or fire-station. Thus, these commenters believe that State stockpiles are appropriate because regional stockpiles will not adequately protect the public since KI must be taken prior to exposure, or very shortly thereafter (within about six hours), to be an effective blocking agent. Regional Stockpiles A number of commenters, including emergency preparedness and response officials and FEMA, are concerned about the regional stockpiling and distribution process and its potential for reducing the effectiveness of measures which will provide much greater protection to the public. In their view, the complex logistics of storage and distribution of regional stockpiles far outweigh the usefulness of such a stockpile and that regional stockpiles of potassium iodide would complicate, not strengthen radiological emergency preparedness. These commenters believe regional stockpiling has disadvantages as compared to State stockpiling. The administration of KI is time-critical and regional stockpiling means critical time will be spent transporting the drug from a regional stockpile to the area where it is needed. For these reasons, they believe that [[Page 5432]] regional stockpiles should supplement, not substitute for State stockpiles. Response. If a State decides to use KI as a supplemental protective measure, the Commission agrees that the State should focus on the early administration of KI to children. A decision to make KI available to the general public will require some planning by the State for its own supplies of KI and methods of distribution. Such planning (for implementation of protective actions) is a normal part of a State's emergency planning activities. As noted earlier, the NRC plans to issue a guidance document (NUREG-1633) to assist the States. The Commission recognizes the logistical challenges associated with the distribution of KI to the general public. For this reason, the staff intends to include a discussion of experience with KI distribution in the United States and abroad in the guidance document NUREG-1633. There are different approaches that a State can use in incorporating KI as a supplemental protective measure for the general public. One approach is that mentioned by a commenter to distribute information about the over-the-counter availability of KI. Making KI available over the counter would provide members of the public with the opportunity to decide for themselves if they wanted to store and use KI. In fact, some KI manufacturers have indicated that they would make KI available to any person who requests it, at a fee. This approach would minimize the need for State stockpiles or predistribution and would put KI in the hands of the public before an accident occurs, rather than attempting to distribute the KI from stockpiles after an emergency is declared. The concerns about the effectiveness of regional stockpiles for rapid deployment of KI to the public are also acknowledged. FEMA has stated that in its view, regional stockpiles will not enhance local radiological emergency preparedness because of complex logistics. The Commission agrees. As part of its decision on this final rule, the Commission has decided to provide funding for a supply of KI for States that request such funding through FEMA and to discontinue support of regional stockpiles. The Commission believes that in light of logistic difficulties, it is doubtful that regional stockpiles of KI could be effectively employed in the unlikely event of a radiological emergency at a commercial nuclear power plant. Issue E: Requiring versus Considering Use of KI Several commenters thought that the proposed rule should be modified to require the use of KI, not just the consideration by State and local officials. These commenters believe, for instance, that the tragic comedy of errors surrounding attempts to distribute KI in the wake of the Three Mile Island partial core melt accident only serves to highlight the need for pre-distribution. The health of our children is too important to leave their protection to the consideration of states. These commenters ask that if the U.S. system is adequate, why do other industrialized nations believe that sheltering and evacuation alone are insufficient? Some of these commenters want all commercial reactor licensees to distribute KI to all individuals within the EPZ and to make KI available to anyone within a 50-mile radius of the reactor upon request. These commenters believe that the prophylactic use of KI for the general public should be a mandatory emergency planning requirement and should not be merely an optional consideration, because, if given the choice, many States may not adequately protect their citizens. Another reason cited for wanting NRC to require KI is that ``without a federal mandate for stockpiling KI, the nuclear industry will simply shift its fight against the policy to the State and local levels.'' Response. Because the Commission believes that current emergency planning and protective measures--evacuation and sheltering--are adequate and protective of public health and safety, the Commission will not require use of KI by the general public. Rather, the Commission recognizes the supplemental value of KI and the prerogative of the State to decide on the appropriateness of the use of KI by its citizens. The Commission believes the final rule together with the Commission's decision to provide funding for the purchase of a State's supply of KI strikes a proper balance between encouraging (but not requiring) the offsite authorities to take advantage of the benefits of KI and acknowledging the offsite authorities' role in such matters. The use of KI is intended to supplement, not to replace, other protective measures. This rule change thus represents no alteration in the NRC's view that the primary and most desirable protective action in a radiological emergency is evacuation of the population before any exposure to radiation occurs. The Commission recognizes that there may be situations when evacuation is not feasible or is delayed. In-place sheltering is an effective protective action in such a situation. Depending on the circumstances, KI may offer additional protection to one radiation-sensitive organ, the thyroid, if used in conjunction with evacuation and sheltering. In addition, the Commission notes that issues surrounding the prophylactic use of KI following such accidents do not lend themselves to across-the-board solutions. Therefore, the Commission has chosen to leave this decision to State and local emergency response planners, who may find that KI should be a supplementary protective measure, rather than to mandate its use. Additionally, the Commission's amendment to require explicitly that planners consider the use of KI, rather than require the use of KI, recognizes the important role of the States and local governments in matters of emergency planning and the use of medicinal protective measures by their citizens. Issue F: Funding Some commenters, including FEMA, state that the recent decision of the Commissioners not to fund the purchase of KI is an unfortunate reversal to the goal of providing supplementary protection for the general public. Thus, citing the Chernobyl accident, they urge the Commission to reconsider its position in light of the proven usefulness of KI in preventing childhood thyroid cancer. One State commenter was concerned that after two years of efforts made toward implementing this supplementary protection, the Commission's recent actions undermine that State's effort. While understanding the Commission's financial concerns leading to this decision, this commenter proposed that the Commission could approach Congress for a supplemental appropriation. Another commenter stated that the Commission's withdrawal of the offer to pay for State KI stockpiles sends a message that KI preparedness is not important, and that States who were considering plans to establish stockpiles have dropped such plans. Further, some commenters believe that the NRC reversal of position regarding funding of KI for States that elect to stockpile it adversely affects the implementation of the policy proposed by the Federal Radiological Preparedness Coordinating Committee (FRPCC). [That draft policy currently provides that if a State chooses to add KI as a supplement to its evacuation and sheltering protective [[Page 5433]] actions, the State will inform FEMA, which will forward the request to the NRC for payment.] Another commenter noted that the Kemeny Commission supported stockpiling KI, and that the Commission should fulfill an earlier NRC commitment to do so. Several States expressed the view that the requirement that use of KI be considered is an unfunded State mandate and is contrary to an Executive Order of 8/5/99. A number of commenters stated that they thought the utilities should pay for supplies of KI in the vicinity of the power plants. Some utilities expressed concern that the rulemaking might result in requests to the utilities from State and local organizations for such funding. Response. The Commission decision not to fund State stockpiles has been reversed as the result of public comment on this rulemaking. Promulgation of this final rule underscores the Commission's views on the importance of emergency preparedness, including consideration of the use of KI. The Commission has decided to fund State and, in some cases, local stockpiles of KI, subject to certain restrictions and limitations (see Staff Requirements Memorandum for the Affirmation Session on December 22, 2000). The Commission believes that in light of logistical difficulties, it is doubtful that regional stockpiles of KI could be effectively employed in the unlikely event of a radiological emergency at a commercial nuclear power plant. The Commission's offer to fund the purchase of a supply of KI for a State choosing to use KI prophylaxis as a supplemental protective measure retains the FRPCC's proposal that the State remain responsible for all other funding connected with the incorporation of KI, such as preparing guidelines for its stockpiling, maintenance, distribution and use, and for all other ancillary costs. The Commission agrees that, in the past, licensees may have found it in their own self interest to assist State and local governments by providing resources for emergency planning needs. The Commission expects that those States who decide to use KI for the general public will make suitable arrangements to fund costs other than the initial purchase of a supply of KI. After funding the initial purchases of KI, the Commission may consider extending the program to fund stockpile replenishment, but has made no commitments in this regard. As with other aspects of offsite emergency planning, the NRC will not require licensees to fund State activities, but the States can, of course, act in cooperation and coordination with licensees. As to the issues whether the rule constitutes an ``unfunded State mandate'' or is contrary to an Executive Order of August 5, 1999, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, as an independent regulatory agency, is not subject to the requirements of Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 or Executive Order 13132, ``Federalism,'' August 5, 1999. Issue G: Whether This Rulemaking Is a Backfit A commenter representing nuclear utilities raised a concern that if licensees would be required to expend significant resources in considering the use of KI in emergency plans, then the proposed rule is clearly a backfit and a backfitting analysis should be performed. Thus, the commenter requested that the NRC either limit the specific actions which would be required to be taken by licensees to demonstrate that the adequate consideration required by the proposed rule has been implemented, or the required backfitting analysis should be conducted and a suitably revised proposed rule should be published for comment. Response. This notice contains a ``Backfit Analysis'' section, which notes that the Commission concludes that the rule imposes no new requirements on licensees, nor does it alter procedures at nuclear facilities. Rather, it is directed to States or local governments, the entities with the responsibility to determine the appropriateness of the use of KI for their citizens, calling upon the governments to consider KI as one of the elements of their offsite emergency planning. The final rule imposes no binding requirement for State or local governments to alter emergency plans and procedures. Furthermore, the basic standard that emergency planning must include consideration of a range of protective actions is already set forth in the existing Sec. 50.47(b)(10). Once again, the rule does not impose new requirements on nuclear power plant licensees who are the intended beneficiaries of the Backfit Rule provisions. Therefore, no backfit is involved. Issue H: State Liabilities in Providing KI for the General Public State and local government organizations raised concerns about legal implications should a member of the general public be given KI at their directive or recommendation and the individual has an extreme allergic reaction. Commenters note that the Federal Register notice does not address legal issues for States who decide to adopt KI and for States who do not decide to adopt or administer KI to the public. Further, if the NRC decides to require stockpiling of KI for the general public, the commenters ask whether NRC has considered what liability may arise from any adverse health effects. Another concern was about who would assume liability if the KI was used prior to a Governor ordering its use. Response. These comments focus principally on concerns that State and local governments involved in distribution and administration of KI may be liable in tort if an individual receiving the KI has a significant adverse medical reaction to the KI. As stated in the proposed rule FR notice, the question of whether a State or locality might be liable for involvement with administration of KI to the general public can only be answered by reference to the laws and precedents of particular States. The NRC presumes that this would be part of the ``consideration'' that States and localities will undertake as a result of promulgation of this rule. To the extent that commenters are raising the potential for Federal government liability for the promulgation of this proposed rule, the proposed rule FRN notes NRC views that whether the Commission may be subject to tort liability through the implementation of a KI program depends upon a number of factors. However, it would appear that a Commission decision to require State and local emergency planning officials to consider stockpiling KI for public distribution should be subject to the ``discretionary function'' exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act. 28 USC 2671, et seq., which protects the Federal Government from liability. The Commission's offer to fund State stockpiles would similarly be subject to the ``discretionary function'' exception. The Commission has directed the staff to ensure that NRC funding for KI is accompanied by appropriate disclaimers to ensure that the NRC and any of its employees are not to be held responsible for any activity connected with transporting, storing, distributing, administering, using, or determining proper doses of KI for adults and children. Issue I: FDA Input on KI A few commenters thought that the dosage and intervention levels should be lowered from the values in the existing FDA guidance. For instance, they conclude that NRC should require using KI prophylaxis at one rem projected dose exposure not at the [[Page 5434]] current 25 rem. It was noted that Poland uses a 5 rem intervention level. The concern of these commenters is that continued use of the old guidance subjects children to greater risk than necessary. Response. The FDA is the Federal agency responsible for decisions about appropriate thresholds and dosages for use of KI. Existing FDA guidance related to the use of KI on dosage intervention levels is contained in a June 29, 1982 notice (47 FR 28158). As stated therein, ``FDA concludes in the final recommendations that risks from the short- term use of relatively low doses of potassium iodide for thyroid blocking in a radiation emergency are outweighed by the risks of radioiodine-induced thyroid nodules or cancer at a projected dose to the thyroid gland of 25 rem.'' That notice also provides recommended dosages for adults and children. New FDA guidance was published in the Federal Register for public comment on January 4, 2001 (66 FR 801). The Commission will incorporate it into its guidance documents. Issue J: Original Petition Versus Revised Petition A few commenters state that in the proposed rule, the Commission claims to have granted the alternative submitted in the amended petition, but did not actually do so. In their view, the amended petition contained the combination of three elements-- the requirement to consider KI stockpiling, the unequivocal recommendation that States establish stockpiles, and the offer of Federally-funded State stockpiles. Since the promise of funding removed a major impediment to States adopting a pro-KI policy, the commenters believe that the petitioner felt that amending his petition to require only ``consideration'' of the use of KI would likely result in State decisions favorable to using KI. In their view, the amended PRM was premised on the now-withdrawn NRC offer of Federally-funded State stockpiles of KI, and therefore it would be entirely appropriate for the petitioner to rescind his amendment to PRM 50-63 and to insist that the NRC adopt what was requested in his original petition. Response. The Commission agrees with this comment. Since the Commission has decided to reinstate its offer to fund a supply of KI for State or, in some cases, local governments that choose to incorporate KI prophylaxis in their emergency plans, the Commission believes that it is granting the amended petition (PRM-50-63A) in all respects. Issue K: Meaning of ``Consideration'' Several commenters stated that the proposed rule is vague in that it did not define ``consideration.'' They believe that the rule should clarify that the KI ``consideration'' within the context of radiological emergency planning and preparedness needs to be performed only once by the responsible State agency, which would provide written notice of the consideration to the Commission. Thereafter, no further ``consideration'' should be required unless the State determines there is reason to reconsider its position and that the ``consideration'' process is not subject to continuing oversight or recurring evaluation by the NRC, or any other federal agency. Another commenter questioned whether a State that considered the issue in the early 1980s, and rejected the use of KI, could now claim that the Commission's current proposal has already been fulfilled. Reliance upon the earlier consideration would violate the intent of the petitioner's proposal. Another commenter questioned whether the following scenario would be considered acceptable and in compliance with the rule: a State considered the use of KI, but found the licensee unwilling to pay for it, so the State decided that although use of KI might be a good idea, it couldn't afford it. Response. The Commission would expect that a State's ``consideration'' would involve at least an internal review of this notice and brief deliberation on the State's position on the use of KI by the general public. In NRC's experience, States periodically review their emergency plans and preparedness, typically on an exercise frequency basis, to ensure that plans are up to date and account for local changed circumstances. For those States that conduct such periodic reviews, the Commission would expect the States to undertake their ``consideration'' of the use of KI during the first periodic review conducted by the State of offsite emergency plans and preparedness following the effective date of this rule amendment and issuance of revised NUREG-1633 guidance. For those States that do not routinely conduct periodic reviews, the Commission would expect the States to undertake their ``consideration'' of the use of KI on the same frequency as periodic emergency preparedness exercises following the effective date of this rule amendment and issuance of guidance. The rule does not require States to provide written notice of their ``consideration.'' The Commission expects that States will inform FEMA and the NRC of the results of their consideration. Additionally, the Commission agrees that the ``consideration'' process is not subject to continuing oversight or recurring evaluation by the NRC or any other Federal agency. By issuing this rule, the Commission is stating its conclusion that consideration of the use of KI that might have been performed many years ago, needs to be reexamined in light of new information. Thus reliance upon such earlier evaluations would not be consistent with the rule requirement. Issue L: Federal Distribution of KI One commenter noted that the Commission's proposed rule would seem to support the same techniques used for forced KI distribution that were dictated by governments in Eastern Europe during the Chernobyl accident. The commenter urged the Commission to consider whether this posture would be endorsed by any government, be it Federal, State, or local. This commenter believes the NRC staff ignores the testimony of those States where KI is stockpiled or pre-distributed for the public and where experience shows the system is ineffective. Additionally, a commenter thought that the proposed rule is predicated on the false assumption that even if States decide not to stockpile KI for the general public, they will have access to Federal reserves of the drug. By the Commission's own admission, such reserves have yet to be established nor has the funding mechanism to support such reserves been identified. The proposal suggests that states ``consider'' the availability of resources that do not exist. Likewise, a commenter stated that the proposed rule implies that even when a State decides as a matter of public policy against distribution of KI for the general population, the Federal government will develop plans to override that decision. The purpose of such plans is unclear in the context of the proposed rule. Once a State has given due consideration to the use of KI stockpiling as a supplemental protective action and determined it to be unwarranted, the commenter seeks the basis on which the Commission proposes to develop a contingency plan. Response. The Commission has never endorsed ``forced KI distribution.'' Under this final rule the use of KI continues to be a State option. Moreover, revised NUREG-1633 will discuss the benefits and risks associated with using KI and the U.S. and foreign experience with public distribution. While the Commission has always [[Page 5435]] recognized that distribution at the time of an accident will present difficulties if there has been no advance planning, the Commission believes that the States will take the distribution matters into account when they consider the use of KI for the general public under this rule. The Commission has decided to withdraw its decision to provide funding for regional Federal KI stockpiles. However, it should be noted that Commission efforts in this regard were not intended to ``override'' a State decision not to use KI during an emergency; rather, they were intended to make KI available in the event that a particular State changed its views and decided to use KI in an actual emergency, and had nowhere else to go for KI. The Commission believes that in light of logistical difficulties, it is doubtful that regional stockpiles of KI could be effectively employed in the unlikely event of a radiological emergency at a commercial nuclear power plant. Issue M: Importance of Emergency Planning A few commenters feel that safe siting and Design-Engineered features alone do not optimize protection of the public-health and safety and that the Commission should not rely upon probabilistic risk assessments to obviate the need for stockpiling and predistribution of KI. Another commenter is concerned that the premature aging of reactor components, the economics of utility restructuring, and the long-term storage of high-level waste at reactor sites all contribute to the need for KI stockpiling. Response: The Commission agrees with the importance of emergency planning to complement site and design features and stated so in the August 19, 1980, Federal Register Notice (45 FR 55402) which codified the NRC's emergency planning regulations following the Three Mile Island accident: ``The Commission's final rules are based on the significance of adequate emergency planning and preparedness to ensure adequate protection of the public health and safety. It is clear * * * that onsite and offsite emergency preparedness as well as proper siting and engineered design features are needed to protect the health and safety of the public. As the Commission reacted to the accident at Three Mile Island, it became clear that the protection provided by siting and engineered design features must be bolstered by the ability to take protective measures during the course of an accident.'' The Commission did not rely upon probabilistic risk assessments in developing this final regulation on consideration of the use of KI. The Commission interprets the third comment to relate to factors that the commenter believes could increase the likelihood of an accident and which, in the commenter's view, heighten the importance of emergency planning. The Commission's regulations recognize the importance of emergency planning by requiring development of a range of protective actions, which include sheltering and evacuation and, by this rulemaking, consideration of the use of KI for the general public. Issue N: Cost of KI and Shelf-Life One commenter feels that the NRC has exaggerated the estimated cost of KI, ignoring comments that point to the availability of inexpensive and long-lasting KI. This commenter thinks that market forces are likely to bring down the cost of KI and that savings in the NRC budget could be effected without diminishing the safety of America's children. The U.S. Pharmacopeia wrote in its comment letter that the long- term viability of the drug was tested and it was found that 11 years after manufacture and eight years after the expiration date, the tablets were assayed at 99.1% of the labeled content of KI. The petitioner expressed the view that since the U.S. is currently engaged in a $15 million study of radiation-caused thyroid disease in the Ukraine, it was hard to understand why the government was not willing to spend a fraction of that amount to prevent radiation caused thyroid disease at home. Response. Cost estimates used in past documents were based upon information available at those times. NRC presently estimates the cost of KI to be about 18 to 20 cents per tablet if purchased in bulk, with a shelf life of 7 to 10 years. As a result, the Commission finds that KI is a reasonable, prudent and inexpensive supplement to evacuation and sheltering for the general public for specific local conditions. As noted earlier, the Commission has decided to offer to provide funding for a supply of KI for State or, in some cases, local governments that choose to incorporate KI prophylaxis in their emergency plans. Issue O: Safety of KI Commenters believe that there is new information available from Poland and Belarus regarding use of KI following a radioactive release. They state that there were no reported serious adverse reactions. Specifically, 18 million individuals received prophylactic KI with overall toxicity of 2.5% (mostly nausea) but with only a fraction of 1% having serious side-effects.\4\ Commenters state that this experience has been recognized by other countries who are stockpiling KI for use by the general public. This data has led some commenters to say that just because there are other lethal radionuclides to which people may be exposed, why deny them the availability of KI, which can counteract the deadly effects of radioactive iodine. Every drug has contraindications and the potential for allergic reactions. In an emergency as dire as a reactor accident where people risk illness and death, a possible adverse reaction to KI seems relatively minimal, and people absolutely should have the choice of making an informed decision and assuming possible risk. \4\ Comment letter from the Massachusetts Coalition To Stockpile KI dated September 10, 1999. Response. The Commission did consider the experience with mass distribution of KI during the Chernobyl radiological emergency (although the record on that distribution is not complete). That experience is still being investigated and evaluated by public health authorities worldwide. When the appropriate health agencies have established the applicability of the Polish experience to the United States, the findings will be followed in NRC guidance. The NRC acknowledges that KI is a reasonable, prudent, and inexpensive supplement to evacuation and sheltering for specific local conditions. The Commission guidance on emergency planning has long taken KI into consideration (see NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, ``Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants,'' Rev. 1, p. 63, items e and f). The FDA has approved KI as an over-the-counter medication and has found it effective and safe as discussed in the response to issue I. Commission Decision on the Petitions for Rulemaking Based on the foregoing, and as noted herein, the action by the Commission to approve this final rule grants in part and denies in part the original petition (PRM 50-63) and grants in all respects the amended petition (PRM 50-63A). The rule change, which requires ``consideration'' of the use of KI, is responsive to the amended petition. Further, including in this Federal Register notice for the final rule, a [[Page 5436]] statement that ``KI is a reasonable, prudent, inexpensive supplement to evacuation and sheltering for specific local conditions,'' is also responsive to both petitions. This statement does not use the petitioner's exact language but is responsive to the petitioner's request. The Commission's final position on funding of State stockpiles grants that part of the original and amended petition to include a statement of such support in the Statement of Considerations for the rule. However, the final rulemaking would deny that part of the original petition requesting that the Commission amend 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10) to require that the range of protective actions developed for the plume exposure pathway EPZ include sheltering, evacuation, and the prophylactic use of iodine. The Commission has found that ``[I]n developing the range of actions for severe accidents at nuclear power plants, evacuation and sheltering provide adequate protection for the general public.'' (Proposed Rule, 64 FR at 31745). In addition, the Commission notes that issues surrounding the prophylactic use of KI following such accidents do not lend themselves to across-the-board solutions. Therefore, the Commission has chosen to leave such decisions to State and local emergency response planners to determine whether their emergency plans should include the use of KI as a supplementary protective measure for the general public. The Commission's decision is implemented through this final rule that changes 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10). This final rule completes NRC action on PRM 50-63 and PRM 50-63A. Rationale for the Commission Decision The Commission has considered the KI policy question on numerous occasions since 1984. The history of the Commission deliberations shows that reaching consensus on this policy question has been an elusive goal. An important reason for this historical lack of consensus is that this policy question is not a clear-cut one. Individual Commissioners, past and present, have differed in their views with respect to the relative importance to be given to factors bearing on the KI issue. These honest differences have led to divided Commission views on how to resolve the policy question. The Commission agrees that its historical difficulty in reaching consensus on the KI policy question underscores the reality that this policy question is not a simple one, is not one that is easily resolved and, as a result, has been the subject of protracted deliberation. After considering all public comments received, the information available in the literature, 20 years of experience gained in evaluating licensee emergency preparedness plans, and the arguments presented by the petitioner, the Commission has decided to amend 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10), by adding a sentence similar to the one suggested in the revised petition. Specifically the following sentence is inserted in Sec. 50.47(b)(10), after the first sentence: ``In developing this range of actions, consideration has been given to evacuation, sheltering, and, as a supplement to these, the prophylactic use of potassium iodide (KI), as appropriate.'' The Commission finds that KI is a reasonable, prudent and inexpensive supplement to evacuation and sheltering for specific local conditions. The Commission's guidance on emergency planning has long taken KI into consideration (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, p. 63, items e and f). However, since the last revision of that guidance, there has been experience with the mass distribution of KI during an international radiological emergency, and though the record on that distribution is not complete, the indications thus far are that mass distribution is effective in preventing thyroid cancer and causes few threatening side effects. Moreover, many nations in Europe and elsewhere--nations as different in their circumstances, politics, and regulatory structures as France, Canada, and Japan--have stockpiled KI and planned for its use. So have some U.S. States. The World Health Organization and the International Atomic Energy Agency recommend its use. Therefore, in order to achieve greater assurance that KI will receive due attention by planners, it is reasonable to take a further small step and, continuing to recognize the important role of the States and local governments in matters of offsite emergency planning, explicitly require that planners consider the use of KI. The amendment should not be taken to imply that the NRC believes that the present generation of nuclear power plants is any less safe than previously thought. On the contrary, present indications are that nuclear power plant safety has significantly improved since the current emergency planning requirements were put in place after the Three Mile Island-2 accident in 1979. The use of KI is intended to supplement, not to replace, other protective measures. This amendment does not change the NRC's view that the primary and most desirable protective action in a radiological emergency is evacuation of the population before any exposure to radiation occurs. The Commission recognizes that there may be situations when evacuation is not feasible or is delayed. In-place sheltering is an effective protective action in such a situation. Depending on the circumstances, KI may offer additional protection to one radiation-sensitive organ, the thyroid, if used in conjunction with evacuation and sheltering. In developing the range of public protective actions for severe accidents at commercial nuclear power plants, evacuation and in-place sheltering provide adequate protection for the general public. In appropriate circumstances, KI can provide additional protection. In addition, the Commission notes that issues surrounding the prophylactic use of KI following such accidents do not lend themselves to across-the-board solutions. Therefore, the Commission has chosen to leave such decisions to State and local emergency response planners, who may find that KI should be a supplementary protective measure. The NRC recognizes that any decision to use KI as a supplemental protective measure for the general public presents issues of how best to position and distribute the medicine, to ensure: (1) That optimal distribution takes place in an emergency, with first priority given to protecting children; (2) that persons with known allergies to iodine not take it; and (3) that members of the public understand that KI is not a substitute for measures that protect the whole body. To date, these issues have been addressed in different ways in the numerous countries that currently use KI as a protective measure for their citizens. The NRC is working with States and other Federal agencies to develop guidance on these and other issues relating to the use of KI. The NRC believes that these implementation issues can be solved, given the level of expertise in the relevant Federal and State agencies, and the experience of numerous nations that have built KI into their emergency plans. Commission Decision on Funding of State Stockpiles or Supplies of KI The Federal Register notice for the proposed rule (64 FR 31737) stated the Commission's then-held position only to support funding of regional stockpiles or other supplies of KI as opposed to funding of State stockpiling of KI. As described above, in its deliberations on this final rule, the Commission has withdrawn its support for funding of regional KI stockpiles and has reinstated its offer to provide NRC funding of State or, in some cases, local stockpiles, [[Page 5437]] subject to various restrictions and limitations (see Staff Requirements Memorandum for the Affirmation Session on December 22, 2000). In doing this, the Commission has responded to comments from FEMA and other commenters. The Commission is supporting the 1996 FRPCC's Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Potassium Iodide recommendation that the Federal government (NRC through FEMA) should fund the purchase of State, or in some cases local, KI stockpiles. The Commission recognizes that this policy contradicts the Commission's historical policy that funding for State and local emergency planning is the responsibility of those governments often working with licensees. The Commission is making this exception to the long-standing policy on the basis of the FRPCC's recommendation and recent petitions received. The Commission has determined that for a State that has decided to stockpile KI, NRC funding for purchase of KI for use by that State during a radiological emergency would directly contribute to fulfilling NRC's regulatory mission. The Commission also recognizes that any State choosing to incorporate KI prophylaxis as a supplemental protective action in its emergency planning will face costs, other than the cost of the purchase of KI. Consistent with the long-standing policy, these ancillary costs will remain the responsibility of the State government. Depending on how the State incorporates KI prophylaxis in its emergency plans, the ancillary costs could significantly exceed the cost of the purchase of the KI supply. Metric Policy On October 7, 1992, the Commission published its final Policy Statement on Metrication. According to that policy, after January 7, 1993, all new regulations and major amendments to existing regulations were to be presented in dual units. The amendment to the regulations contains no units. National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act The National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-113, requires that Federal agencies use technical standards developed or adopted by voluntary consensus standards bodies unless the use of such a standard is inconsistent with applicable law or otherwise impractical. In this final rule, the NRC is amending its emergency planning regulations to require that consideration be given to including potassium iodide as a protective measure for the general public that would supplement sheltering and evacuation in the event of a severe reactor accident. This action does not constitute the establishment of a consensus standard that contains generally applicable requirements to which the provisions of the Act apply. Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact for Completing Action on the Petitions for Rulemaking Relating to the Use of Potassium Iodide (KI) for the General Public I. Introduction On September 9, 1995, a petition for rulemaking (PRM 50-63) was filed with the NRC by Mr. Peter Crane. The petitioner requested that the NRC amend its emergency planning regulations to require that emergency plans specify a range of protective actions to include sheltering, evacuation, and the prophylactic use of KI. In SECY-97-245, dated October 23, 1997, the NRC staff provided three options for the Commission's consideration in order to resolve PRM 50-63. On November 5, 1997, the Commission was briefed by the NRC staff, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and the petitioner regarding the options available for resolving the petition for rulemaking. During the meeting, the Commission invited the petitioner to submit a modification to his petition in order to address views he discussed during the meeting. On November 11, 1997, the petitioner submitted a revision to his petition PRM 50-63A, that requested two things: 1. A statement clearly recommending stockpiling of KI as a ``reasonable and prudent'' measure, and 2. A proposed rule change to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10) which would be accomplished by inserting the following sentence after the first sentence: ``In developing this range of actions, consideration has been given to evacuation, sheltering, and the prophylactic use of potassium iodide (KI), as appropriate.'' On June 26, 1998, the Commission disagreed with the NRC staff's recommendation in SECY-98-061 dated March 31, 1998, ``Staff Options for Resolving a Petition for Rulemaking (PRM 50-63 and 50-63A) Relating to a Re-evaluation of the Policy Regarding the use of Potassium Iodide (KI) by the General Public after a Severe Accident at a Nuclear Power Plant,'' to deny the revised petition for rulemaking (PRM 50-63A) and directed the NRC staff to grant the petition by revising 10 CFR 50.47 (b)(10). This final rule responds to this directive. Alternatives were essentially considered in previous documents. In SECY-97-124 (June 16, 1997), ``Proposed Federal Policy Regarding Use of Potassium Iodide after a Severe Accident at a Nuclear Power Plant,'' the NRC staff identified three options, one of which contained three sub-options, concerning a proposed change in the Federal policy regarding the use of potassium iodide (KI) as a protective measure for the general public during severe reactor accidents. On April 22, 1999, the Commission voted to approve publication in the Federal Register of a proposed rule that would grant the revised petition for rulemaking (PRM 50-63A). The proposed rule was published on June 14, 1999 (64 FR 31737). In the petitioner's comment letter on the proposed rule, he stated that in light of the Commission decision not to fund State stockpiles of KI, the Commission should consider his original petition (PRM 50-63) to be incorporated by reference and resubmitted in his comment letter. He also requested the Commission to grant the petition as originally submitted. The Commission, by undertaking this final rulemaking, is denying in part the original petition for rulemaking (PRM 50-63), which would require the use of KI for the general public. In so doing, the Commission has decided to continue to recognize the important role of the State by explicitly requiring that planners consider (PRM 50-63A) the use of KI for the general public. The Commission is granting in all respects the amended petition, including reinstating its support for funding State stockpiles of KI. II. Need for Action In SECY-97-245, the NRC staff proposed options for resolving the original petition for rulemaking. In an SRM on SECY-98-061, the Commission directed the NRC staff to proceed with the rulemaking. In so doing, the Commission found that KI is a reasonable, prudent, and inexpensive supplement to evacuation and sheltering for specific local conditions. The Commission's guidance on emergency planning has long taken KI into consideration (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, p. 63 items e and f). However, since the last revision of that guidance, there has been experience with the mass distribution of KI during an international radiological emergency. Although the record on that distribution is not complete, the indications thus far are that mass distribution is effective in [[Page 5438]] preventing thyroid cancer and causes few threatening side effects. Therefore, in order to achieve greater assurance that KI will receive due attention by planners, it seems reasonable, while continuing to recognize the important role of the States in matters of offsite emergency planning, to explicitly require that planners consider the use of KI. The rule is needed to ensure that the States are aware of and take into consideration the costs, risks, and benefits of KI in their decision making process in order to optimize emergency planning for the public health and safety. III. Environmental Impact of the Final Action The environmental impacts of the final action and its alternative (deny the petitions in their entirety and take no action) are considered negligible by the NRC staff, given that the final action would only add the sentence: ``In developing this range of actions, consideration has been given to evacuation, sheltering, and the prophylactic use of potassium iodide (KI), as appropriate.'' The NRC staff is not aware of any environmental impacts as a result of this final action. IV. Alternative to the Final Action The alternative to the final action at this time is to deny the petitions and take no action with respect to the use of KI by the public. Should this no-action alternative be pursued, the NRC staff is not aware of any resulting environmental impact. V. Agencies and Persons Consulted Cognizant personnel from the States, FEMA, and FDA were consulted, as was the petitioner, as part of this rulemaking activity. VI. Finding of No Significant Environmental Impact: Availability The Commission has determined under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, as amended, and the Commission's regulations in Subpart A of 10 CFR Part 51, that the amendment is not a major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of human environment and; therefore, an environmental impact statement is not required. This amendment will require that consideration be given to evacuation, sheltering, and as a supplement to these, the prophylactic use of KI. This action will not have a significant impact upon the environment. Paperwork Reduction Act Statement This final rule does not contain a new or amended information collection requirement subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C 3501 et seq.). Existing requirements were approved by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) approval numbers 3150-0009 and 3150-0011. Public Protection Notification If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection. Regulatory Analysis of the Final Rulemaking Completing Action on Petitions for Rulemaking (PRM 50-63) and (PRM 50-63A) Relating to the Use of Potassium Iodide (KI) On September 9, 1995, a petition for rulemaking (PRM 50-63) was filed with the NRC by Mr. Peter Crane. The petitioner requested that the NRC amend its emergency planning regulations to require that emergency plans specify a range of protective actions to include sheltering, evacuation, and the prophylactic use of KI. In SECY-97-245, dated October 23, 1997, the NRC staff provided three options for the Commission's consideration to resolve PRM 50-63. On November 5, 1997, the Commission was briefed by the NRC staff, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and the petitioner regarding the options available for resolving the petition for rulemaking. During the meeting, the Commission invited the petitioner to submit a modification to his petition in order to address views he discussed during the meeting. On November 11, 1997, the petitioner submitted a revision to his petition (PRM 50-63A), which requested two things: A statement clearly recommending stockpiling of KI as a ``reasonable and prudent'' measure; and A proposed rule change to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10) which would be accomplished by inserting the following sentence after the first sentence: ``In developing this range of actions, consideration has been given to evacuation, sheltering, and the prophylactic use of potassium iodide (KI), as appropriate.'' In the petitioner's comment letter on the proposed rule, he stated that in light of the Commission decision not to fund State stockpiles of KI, the Commission should consider his original petition (PRM 50-63) to be incorporated by reference and resubmitted in his comment letter. He also requested the Commission to grant the petition as originally submitted. The Commission, by undertaking this rulemaking, is granting the amended petition and is granting in part and denying in part the original petition. The Commission is denying that portion of the original petition for rulemaking (PRM 50-63), which would require the use of KI for the general public. In so doing, the Commission has decided to continue to recognize the important role of the State in matters of emergency planning by explicitly requiring that planners consider (PRM 50-63A) the use of KI for the general public. In SECY-97-245, the NRC staff proposed options for resolving the original petition for rulemaking. By SRM dated June 26, 1998, on SECY- 97-245, ``Staff Options for Resolving a Petition for Rulemaking (PRM 50-63) Relating to a Re-evaluation of the Policy Regarding use of Potassium Iodide (KI) after a Severe Accident at a Nuclear Power Plant,'' the Commission directed the NRC staff to revise 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10). This final rule responds to this directive. Alternatives were essentially considered in previous documents. In SECY-97-124 dated June 16, 1997, ``Proposed Federal Policy Regarding Use of Potassium Iodide after a Severe Accident at a Nuclear Power Plant,'' the NRC staff identified three options, one of which contained three sub-options, concerning a proposed change in the Federal policy regarding the use of potassium iodide (KI) as a protective measure for the general public during severe reactor accidents. Given that the Commission considered the options and directed the NRC staff to grant the amended petition, the only alternatives considered here are the Commission-approved option and the baseline, no-action alternative. The final rule does not ``require'' any action of licensees. States are to ``consider'' the use of KI along with evacuation and sheltering as protective actions. It is estimated that no more than 30 States will need to make this consideration. The rule does not impose any substantive requirements on States to actually stockpile or plan for the use of KI. Therefore, States would not accrue the costs associated with such actions. However, the Commission recognizes that consideration of using KI as a supplemental protective measure may result in some State expenditures. The NRC staff estimates that the labor needed by the States could range from a staff-week, to half of a staff-year. The latter would be the case if a State decided to hold hearings on the issue. [[Page 5439]] If one assumes an average hourly salary of $70 (this estimate includes benefits, prorated secretarial and managerial assistance, but not overhead), the range of estimates would be from $2800 to $63,000 per State. Using a base of 30 States, the range of impacts for the States to make the KI consideration is from $84,000 to $1.9 million. The Commission notes that when it amended its emergency planning regulations on November 3, 1980, the regulatory standards for emergency planning were a restatement of basic joint NRC-FEMA guidance to licensees and to State and local governments incorporated in NUREG- 0654; FEMA-REP-1, ``Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants for Interim Use and Comment.'' This guidance was cited in the regulation and addresses the use of radioprotective drugs by the general public, including quantities, storage, and means of distribution and State and local plans for decision making with respect to their use. The Commission removed the citations of the guidance from the regulation in 1987, but the guidance has continued in use for planning purposes by States and licensees and by the Federal agencies for evaluating emergency plans. As a result, it is believed that all of the 30 affected States have at some point considered the use of KI. A few of the 30 affected States have made the decision to stockpile KI. Thus, in practical terms, the projected costs will occur only in those States that have not previously elected to stockpile KI and choose stockpiling in light of the Chernobyl accident, recent international practice, and the NRC requirement to consider the use of KI. It is difficult to estimate the benefit of a State's consideration to use KI for the general public. However, we believe the benefit of such an action by the States is summed up by the petitioner who stated that the decision to use KI for the general public should turn on whether, given the consequences of being without KI in a major accident, the drug is a prudent measure; not on whether it will necessarily pay for itself over time. As the petitioner further noted, ``KI represents a kind of catastrophic-coverage insurance policy offering protection for events which, while they occur only rarely, can have such enormous consequences that it is sensible to take special precautions, especially where, as here, the cost of such additional precautions is relatively low.'' Nonetheless, the Commission notes that this rule will introduce another element in the context of emergency planning requirements for which licensees are ultimately responsible. Licensees have the obligation to confirm that offsite authorities have considered the use of KI as a supplemental protective action for the general public. While this ultimate responsibility could have practical implications, with some associated burdens, the extent is considered minimal when viewed in the overall licensee burden of complying with all of the existing emergency planning requirements. Additionally, the rule does not articulate any implementation date or inspection criteria. As stated above, this analysis focuses on the rule being codified as the result of petitions for rulemaking and on the Commission direction to grant the amended petition in all respects and to grant in part the original petition. This constitutes the regulatory analysis for this action. Regulatory Flexibility Certification In accordance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C. 605(b), the Commission hereby certifies that this rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. This final rule would affect only States and indirectly licensees of nuclear power plants. These States and licensees do not fall within the scope of the definition of ``small entities'' set forth in the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 601, or the size standards adopted by the NRC (10 CFR 2.810). Compatibility of Agreement State Regulations Under the ``Policy Statement on Adequacy and Compatibility of Agreement State Programs'' that was approved by the Commission on June 30, 1997, and published in the Federal Register on September 3, 1997 (62 FR 46517), Part 50 is classified as compatibility Category ``NRC.'' The NRC program elements in this category are those that relate directly to areas of regulation reserved to the NRC by the Atomic Energy Act or provisions of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations. Plain Language The President's Memorandum dated June 1, 1998, entitled ``Plain Language in Government Writing,'' directed that the government's writing be in plain language. This memorandum was published June 10, 1998 (63 FR 31883). In complying with this directive, editorial changes have been made in the final revisions to improve the organization and readability of the existing language of the paragraphs being revised. These types of changes are not discussed further in this notice. Backfit Analysis The definition of backfit, as set forth in 10 CFR 50.109(a)(1), is clearly directed at obligations imposed upon licensees (and applicants) and their facilities and procedures. Section 50.109(a)(1) defines a backfit as: * * * the modification of or addition to systems, structures, components, or design of a facility; or the design approval or manufacturing license for a facility; or the procedures or organization required to design, construct or operate a facility, any of which may result from a new or amended provision in the Commission rules or the imposition of a regulatory staff position interpreting the Commission rules that is either new or different from a previously applicable staff position * * * Section 50.109 is replete with references to ``facilities'' and ``licensees,'' which in their totality make clear that the rule is intended to apply to actions taken with respect to nuclear power plant licensees and the facilities they operate. See Sec. 50.109(a)(7), ``If there are two or more ways to achieve compliance with a license or the rules or orders of the Commission, or with written licensee commitments * * * then ordinarily the applicant or licensee is free to choose the way that best suits its purposes [emphasis added].'' This focus on licensees and their facilities is further confirmed by the Statement of Considerations accompanying the backfit rule (53 FR 20603; June 6, 1988), where the Commission stated that backfitting ``means measures which are intended to improve the safety of nuclear power reactors * * *.'' (53 FR at 20604). The nine factors to be considered under 10 CFR 50.109(c) further make clear that the rule is aimed at requirements applicable to licensees and facilities. These include: ``(2) General description of the activity that would be required by the licensee or applicant in order to complete the backfit; * * * (5) Installation and continuing costs associated with the backfit, including the cost of facility downtime or the cost of construction delay; [and] (6) The potential safety impact of changes in plant or operational complexity. * * * [emphasis added].'' The final rule imposes no new requirements on licensees, nor does it alter procedures at nuclear facilities. Rather, it is directed to State or local governments, the entities with the important role to determine the appropriateness of the use of KI for their citizens, calling on these governments to [[Page 5440]] ``consider'' KI as one of the elements of their offsite emergency planning. However, the rule imposes no binding requirement to alter plans and procedures on State or local governments. Furthermore, the basic standard that emergency planning must include consideration of a range of protective actions is already set forth in the existing wording of Sec. 50.47(b)(10). On this basis, the final rule does not impose new substantive requirements on anyone. After consideration of these factors, no backfit is involved and no backfit analysis as defined in Sec. 50.109 is required. Commission precedent also makes clear that the amendment does not constitute a backfit. The Commission's position was stated explicitly in 1987, when the last major change took place in emergency planning regulations (52 FR 42078; November 3, 1987). The Commission's final rule involving the ``Evaluation of the Adequacy of Off-Site Emergency Planning for Nuclear Power Plants at the Operating License Review Stage Where State and Local Governments Decline to Participate in Off-Site Emergency Planning'' stated that the emergency planning rule change in question ``does not impose any new requirements on production or utilization facilities; it only provides an alternative method to meet the Commission's emergency planning regulations. The amendment therefore is not a backfit under 10 CFR 50.109 and a backfit analysis is not required'' (52 FR 42084). Likewise, when the Commission altered its emergency planning requirements in 1987 to change the timing for full participation emergency exercises (a change that, as a practical matter, could be expected to result in licensees' modifying emergency preparedness-related procedures to accommodate exercise frequency changes), it stated: ``The final rule does not modify or add to systems, structures, components or design of a facility; the design approval or manufacturing license for a facility; or the procedures or organization required to design, construct, or operate a facility. Accordingly, no backfit analysis pursuant to 10 CFR 50.109 is required for this final rule'' (52 FR 16828; May 6, 1987). The final emergency planning rule change is of a similar nature and similarly does not involve a backfit. It has been argued by at least one commenter on the petition for rulemaking that, although licensees are not directly burdened by the final rule, they would be indirectly burdened because they would feel called upon to explain the new policy to their customers. By this logic, almost any Commission action that led an NRC licensee to issue a press release could be considered a backfit. Such a position is unsound law and policy. Here, the burden of public information on licensees or applicants, if any, appears de minimis. It plainly does not rise to the level of the type of concrete burden contemplated by the Commission when it enacted the backfit rule. It might also be argued that, if a State or local government were to decide to stockpile and use KI for the general public, it would undertake interactions with the affected licensee to coordinate offsite emergency planning. Although this could result in some voluntary action by the licensee to coordinate its planning, the final rule itself does not impose any requirement or burden on the licensee. Accordingly, the Commission concludes that the final rule would not impose any backfits as defined in 10 CFR 50.109. Nonetheless, the Commission notes that this rule will introduce another element in the context of the emergency planning requirements that licensees are ultimately responsible for, whereby licensees have the obligation to confirm that offsite authorities have considered the use of KI as a supplemental protective action for the general public. That ultimate responsibility could have practical implications, with some associated burdens, the extent of which is considered minimal when viewed in the overall licensee burden of complying with all of the existing emergency planning requirements. Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act In accordance with the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, the NRC has determined that this action is not a major rule and has verified this determination with the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs of OMB. List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 50 Antitrust, Classified information, Criminal penalties, Fire protection, Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear power plants and reactors, Radiation protection, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements. For the reasons set out in the preamble and under the authority of the Atomic Energy Act for 1954, as amended, the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, and 5 U.S.C. 552 and 553, the NRC is adopting the following amendment to 10 CFR part 50. PART 50--DOMESTIC LICENSING OF PRODUCTION AND UTILIZATION FACILITIES 1. The authority citation for 10 CFR part 50 continues to read as follows: Authority: Secs. 102, 103, 104, 105, 161, 182, 183, 186, 189, 68 Stat. 936, 938, 948, 953, 954, 955, 956, as amended, sec. 234, 83 Stat. 444, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2132, 2133, 2134, 2135, 2201, 2232, 2233, 2239, 2282); secs. 201, as amended, 202, 206, 88 Stat. 1242, as amended 1244, 1246, (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5842, 5846). Section 50.7 also issued under Pub. Law 95-601, sec. 10, 92 Stat. 2951, as amended by Pub. Law 102-486, sec. 2902, 106 Stat. 3123, (42 U.S.C. 5851). Sections 50.10 also issued under secs. 101, 185, 68 Stat. 936, 955, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2131, 2235); sec. 102, Pub. Law 91-190, 83 Stat. 853 (42 U.S.C. 4332). Section 50.13, 50.54(dd), and 50.103 also issued under sec. 108, 68 Stat. 939, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2138). Sections 50.23, 50.35, 50.55, and 50.56 also issued under sec. 185, 68 Stat. 955 (42 U.S.C. 2235). Sections 50.33a, 50.55a and Appendix Q also issued under sec. 102, Pub. Law 91-190, 83 Stat. 853 (42 U.S.C. 4332). Sections 50.34 and 50.54 also issued under Pub. Law 97-415, 96 Stat. 2073 (42 U.S.C. 2239). Section 50.78 also issued under sec. 122, 68 Stat. 939 (42 U.S.C. 2152). Sections 50.80, 50.81 also issued under sec. 184, 68 Stat. 954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2234). Appendix F also issued under sec. 187, 68 Stat. 955 (42 U.S.C. 2237). 2. In Sec. 50.47, paragraph (b)(10) is revised to read as follows: Sec. 50.47 Emergency plans. * * * * * (b) * * * (10) A range of protective actions has been developed for the plume exposure pathway EPZ for emergency workers and the public. In developing this range of actions, consideration has been given to evacuation, sheltering, and, as a supplement to these, the prophylactic use of potassium iodide (KI), as appropriate. Guidelines for the choice of protective actions during an emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, are developed and in place, and protective actions for the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ appropriate to the locale have been developed. * * * * * Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 9th day of January, 2001. For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Annette Vietti-Cook, Secretary of the Commission. [FR Doc. 01-1156 Filed 1-18-01; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590-01-P ***************************************************************** 9 ANSTO won't release nuclear shipment details: Greenpeace Age Breaking News Source: SMH|Published: Friday January 19, 5:15 PM Greenpeace today attacked the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO) for not revealing Sydney transportation details about a consignment of radioactive spent nuclear fuel rods. The cargo of 360 rods is scheduled to travel through the streets of Sydney - from the Lucas Heights nuclear reactor to Botany Bay via the Sutherland Shire - on Monday night. Greenpeace said the cargo then would be loaded onto a vessel heading to France, where the waste will be reprocessed and then returned to Australia. "ANSTO's total disregard of public concerns is disgraceful," Greenpeace nuclear campaigner Stephen Campbell said. Sutherland Shire Mayor Tracie Sonda said an ANSTO spokesman had been reported in the local paper just nine days ago as saying there would be no immediate fuel reprocessing plans. "In making its secretive and underhanded decision to transport the fuel rods on Monday night, ANSTO has once again failed to alert local residents of the route so they can be prepared in the event of an accident," Cr Sonda said. AAP Copyright © 2000 The Age Company Ltd. Any unauthorised use, ***************************************************************** 10 Lucas Heights plans head for court smh.com.au - Date: 17/01/2001 BY ANDREW CLENNELL IN CANBERRA Plans for Sydney's new nuclear reactor will be the subject of court action in Argentina after the country's national court stopped a British ship carrying nuclear waste through its waters. The Federal Court of Justice ruled that the Pacific Swan, carrying 80 tonnes of spent nuclear fuel to Japan, could not pass through Argentine waters. The Argentine environmental group FUNAM will use the decision to challenge plans by Argentine company INVAP to take spent fuel from the proposed nuclear reactor at Lucas Heights to Argentina for processing. A news agency report last Thursday confirmed that the court had banned the Pacific Swan from Argentina's exclusive economic zone. According to the head of FUNAM, Professor Raul Montenegro, the Ombudsman's argument in the Pacific Swan case used the same section of the Argentine Constitution that the professor himself had been quoting to argue that INVAP's plans were unconstitutional. The section dictates that "the entering to the national territory of waste, currently or potentially hazardous, and of those radioactive, is prohibited". INVAP's argument has been that its plan would not breach the constitution as they would not be taking the waste to Argentina to store. It would simply be processed to be returned to Australia. It has also argued that transporting spent fuel to Argentina was one option only and may never eventuate. INVAP has also presented the Herald with legal advice and advice from its nuclear regulatory authority that it can bring in the waste for processing. An Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation spokeswoman said yesterday that ANSTO did not see any relationship between ANSTO- INVAP contractual obligations and other nuclear shipments "which may be passing in the vicinity of Argentina". "It has been stated on several occasions ... that the shipment of spent fuel ... to Argentina is only an outside contingency," she said. "Notwithstanding this, the Argentine ambassador has recently confirmed to the Senate committee examining the contract between ANSTO and INVAP that the shipment of spent fuel ... would be permitted under Argentine law. "It may be noted that Argentina itself ships fuel from the operation of its own research reactors from Argentine ports." The Australian Conservation Foundation's anti-nuclear campaigner, Mr Dave Sweeney, said he believed the FUNAM court action would begin this week. Dr Montenegro said the Pacific Swan decision was an unexpected one for the Argentine Government. "The decision ... is an important judiciary precedent for future shipments but also against the entering of exhausted nuclear fuel from Australia," he said. This material is subject to copyright and any unauthorised use, copying or mirroring is prohibited. ***************************************************************** 11 UNLV could get funds for nuke research January 19, 2001 BY MARY MANNING LAS VEGAS SUN UNLV is poised to receive millions in research funds if it becomes a core institution in the search for a way to reduce deadly radioactive wastes, scientists said Thursday. Nuclear scientists estimate that an accelerator could be built in less than 10 years that would be able to reduce radioactive toxicity from thousands of years to 200 years or less, Thomas Ward, Department of Energy project manager from Washington, D.C., said on Thursday. Ward and 25 other scientists from universities and DOE national laboratories discussed research necessary for transforming nuclear wastes, called transmutation, Thursday at a daylong seminar at UNLV's Harry Reid Environmental Research Center. The United States is studying Yucca Mountain, 90 miles northwest of Las Vegas, for a possible repository for the tons of nuclear waste from commercial reactors and nuclear weapons activities that are accumulating across the country. The repository, if it is built, would hold up to 77,000 tons and could open by 2010. The technology would not replace the need for a repository, but an accelerator would cut the storage time down to 200 years or less and pay for itself by producing power, Ward said. Denis Beller is coordinating the advanced accelerator project from Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico with universities such as UNLV, Purdue and University of Michigan. "This entire project has been put on the fast track," Beller said. But the accelerator is competing for funds with the DOE's nuclear waste budget for studying and recommending Yucca Mountain, making it controversial. The research and development of accelerators that could be built regionally and used to handle reactor wastes is expected to take 10 years and cost $570 million. Last year scientists feared it would take 35 years and cost billions, Beller said. "We just didn't believe we could sustain congressional interest that long," he said. International research over the past year has resulted in advances that have reduced that time frame significantly, he said. Sens. Pete Domenici, R-New Mexico, and Harry Reid, D-Nev., secured $34 million for research this year. UNLV received $3 million of that money. "We have to focus very quickly, and that is where UNLV can help," Beller said. The funds will buy a lot of research opportunities for students and faculty, said principal accelerator investigator Anthony Hechanova, a nuclear engineer at the Harry Reid Center. Next year, if the program wins congressional support, UNLV could receive more than $4 million and begin purchasing equipment to study chemical and material reactions under intense heat, Hechanova said. A pilot accelerator could be built at the Nevada Test Site or one of the other DOE national labs, the scientists said. UNLV nuclear engineer Bill Culbreth and College of Science visiting professor Malcolm Nicol are on the university's team to coordinate accelerator research. If UNLV receives the extra money next year, more faculty would be hired to support accelerator research, Hechanova said. Los Alamos scientists have teamed up with researchers in France, Sweden and Russia--countries that also have accumulating nuclear waste--to experiment with accelerators. The major problem facing scientists is how to build an accelerator that will handle the heat of radioactive materials as they are bombarded by atomic particles, Los Alamos expert Stuart Maloy said. Radioactivity tends to corrode the metal of accelerators when temperatures reach three to five times the boiling point. ALL CONTENTS COPYRIGHT 2001 LAS VEGAS SUN, INC. ***************************************************************** 12 GREENPEACE ACTIVISTS ARRESTED IN SEA-BASED PROTEST AGAINST LOADING OF JAPANESE PLUTONIUM FUEL 19 January 2001 Cherbourg, France - Six Greenpeace France activists were arrested earlier today when they entered the heavily protected secure zone around the nuclear transport freighter Pacific Pintail, in the port Cherbourg on the Normandy coast. The British flagged ship which arrived at 06.00 (CET) is currently being loaded with deadly plutonium/MOX fuel, in readiness for a 30, 000km voyage to Japan later today. At around 9.30 am (CET), activists in Greenpeace inflatables and canoes carrying radiation symbols and a "Stop Plutonium" banner evaded armed security to protest alongside the vessel. Swimmers carrying radiation symbol flags jumped from the inflatables and approached the ship. The ship and plutonium cargo were being protected by around 30 French armed marine commandos in 5 boats inside the security zone. A further 50 marine commandos were on the dockside. The swimmers and canoeists were all arrested by the commandos after protesting for half an hour, but the inflatables evaded security, despite being chased by sea borne French forces. "The plutonium industry is out of control. Neither Japan nor France receive any benefit from this deadly trade, but both governments and the nuclear industry are threatening the environment and health of millions of people living in coastal communities along the entire 30,000km route by allowing this transport to go ahead. It’s time this madness was stopped." said Yannick Rousselet of Greenpeace in Cherbourg. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION PLEASE CONTACT: -Yannick Rousselet, Greenpeace France - Cherbourg +33 06 8580 6559 ~nuclear/transport/mox00/ Video and stills are available from: Footage +31 20 52 49 543 and stills +31 20 52 49 580. Notes to editors: The Pacific Pintail is being loaded with four nuclear casks containing 28 assemblies of plutonium/MOX fuel. The MOX fuel contains approximately 230kg of plutonium. The International Atomic Energy Agency classifies such plutonium/MOX as Category 1 nuclear material, as it can be used directly to make nuclear weapons. Sufficient plutonium for over 20 nuclear weapons is contained in this the second Japanese MOX shipment. ***************************************************************** 13 Another Pro-nuke editorial E4 : Engineering FORUM SLAMS OECD NUCLEAR REPORT ENVIRONMENTALISTS HAVE CRITICISED A RECOMMENDATION BY THE ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT THAT ADVOCATES THE USE OF NUCLEAR POWER AS A MEANS OF ACHIEVING SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT. A REPORT ISSUED LAST MONTH BY THE OECD CONCLUDED THAT NUCLEAR ENERGY HAD A PART TO PLAY IN ANY COUNTRY'S EFFORTS TO REDUCE ITS OUTPUT OF GREENHOUSE GASES. HOWEVER, RUPERT HOWES, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR THE SUSTAINABLE ECONOMY PROGRAMME AT THE FORUM FOR THE FUTURE, A UK CHARITY WORKING FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, SAID: 'ECONOMICALLY I DO NOT THINK NUCLEAR ENERGY STANDS UP. I DO NOT THINK THAT IT IS COMPETITIVE. IT DEPENDS ON WHAT COSTS YOU TAKE INTO ACCOUNT. 'DO CONSUMERS REALLY PAY BACK THE SUBSIDIES NUCLEAR ENERGY HAS RECEIVED FOR DECADES? SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT CERTAINLY DOES NOT MEAN LEAVING RADIOACTIVE LEGACIES FOR THE GENERATIONS TO COME,' HOWES ADDED. THE OECD REPORT, NUCLEAR ENERGY IN A SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVE, RECOMMENDS IT AS A COMPETITIVE TECHNOLOGY WITH AN AMPLE TECHNICAL RESOURCE BASE, SUFFICIENT RESERVES FOR DECADES OF ENERGY PRODUCTION, AND ZERO CARBON AND OTHER GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS. RADIOACTIVE WASTE IS ALSO CONSIDERED BY THE OECD TO BE NO BARRIER TO THE CONTINUED USE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY. 'RADIOACTIVE WASTE REPRESENTS SMALL VOLUMES THAT CAN BE ISOLATED FROM THE BIOSPHERE AT AN ACCEPTABLE COST,' THE REPORT SAYS. THE STUDY CONCLUDES: 'INCLUDING THE NUCLEAR ENERGY OPTION IN THE BASKET OF TOOLS AIMING AT ADDRESSING CLIMATE CHANGE ISSUES IS CONSISTENT WITH SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT.' GERMANY DECIDED LAST YEAR TO CLOSE DOWN ALL ITS NUCLEAR POWER STATIONS AND AT PRESENT THE UK HAS NO PLANS TO BUILD ANY MORE REACTORS. e4engineering.com e4data.com e4jobnet.com e4subcontracting.com ***************************************************************** 14 Lab kicks off program to transform nuclear waste Friday, January 19, 2001 Copyright c Las Vegas Review-Journal THE ASSOCIATED PRESS LOS ALAMOS, N.M.--The idea is to take highly radioactive spent nuclear fuel and bombard it with neutrons that eat up the worst of the problem and leave only a small amount of highly radioactive waste and a large pile of low-level waste that can be buried in landfills. Supporters of the concept, called transmutation, contend it might take care of radioactive waste created by the nuclear power industry and minimize the need for a proposed Nevada dump site. Critics argue the idea is a shell game that costs more and generates more new waste than it's worth. Nuclear power plants generate energy through controlled chain reactions. They change the reactor fuel into other radioactive elements, including plutonium, which has a half-life of 24,000 years. It stays radioactive for tens of thousands of years. The United States plans to bury such waste, most likely at Yucca Mountain. Under federal guidelines, the waste must be buried in a dump guaranteed for at least 10,000 years, said Pete Lyons, science adviser to Sen. Pete Domenici, R-N.M. "Talking about what's going to happen in the next 10,000 years is more theology than science, " Lyons said. Yucca Mountain, 100 miles northwest of Las Vegas, is the only site being studied to entomb 77,000 tons of the nation's highly radioactive wastes. While some University of Nevada, Las Vegas researchers applaud the concept of transmutation, Yucca Mountain Project officials have expressed skepticism. Some Energy Department officials contend licensing such reactors might be more difficult than persuading the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to license a repository for the waste. But Los Alamos National Laboratory, under a $34 million program, is researching transmutation technology. The lab christened the experimental Advanced Accelerator Applications program last week. The technology, if successful, would use up the waste's plutonium and leave material with a half-life of 300 years. Lyons said the program is experimental, and the process might prove too costly or environmentally questionable. Still, he and Domenici think it holds promise. "We've got to find a much better solution to the permanent disposal of nuclear waste," Domenici said. But Hisham Zerrissi, a consulting senior scientist for the Institute of Energy and Environmental Research, said the technology does not reduce nuclear waste because it still leaves radioactive uranium. Law defines only elements heavier than uranium as "high-level" waste that must be buried in special dumps. Uranium, no matter how radioactive, is considered low-level waste. "It's a loophole," Zerrissi said. The leftover uranium can be buried in less secure landfills though it is as radioactive as some of the material buried in the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant near Carlsbad, a federal dump for nuclear waste generated by weapons programs. Review-Journal Staff Writer Keith Rogers contributed to this report. ***************************************************************** 15 TVA concerned about environment assessement Oak Ridger Online --> Story last updated at 1:35 p.m. on Friday, January 19, 2001 BY R. CATHEY DANIELS for The Oak Ridger The Department of Energy has received a list of concerns from the Tennessee Valley Authority as to the environmental assessment of a strip of land considered for transfer to the public sector. The land, a 180-acre flood plain, would provide river access to a proposed development by the Oak Ridge Land Co., which is attempting to purchase from Boeing the adjoining 1,200-acre parcel across the Clinch River from the Oak Ridge K-25 site. The public comment period for the environmental assessment on the flood plain ended in December, and, according to Walter Perry, spokesman, DOE hopes to wind up the National Environmental Policy Act process in early March. DOE's proposed action is to convey the flood plain to the abutting landowner, which would be Oak Ridge Land Co. should the deal go through. The Tennessee Valley Authority, which requested but was refused participation in writing the environmental assessment, submitted its comments in a letter dated Nov. 30. "We thought it would be best for TVA to know what was going on in the process," Barbara Martocci, TVA spokeswoman, said in a phone interview of the agency's request to participate. "We felt it would be prudent for us to look at the EA as it went through, but presently we are not part of that process." TVA has jurisdiction over water-use management and flood control along the shoreline of the DOE flood plain. Among the TVA concerns are 69 acres of wetlands--about 39 percent of the total property. "It is unclear how a large marina in the middle of the largest wetland area (Roberts Creek) and removal of vegetation for view-shed and other activities would not jeopardize the quality and function of the wetland areas," wrote Eric Rauch, Mideast regional manager for TVA's resource stewardship program, in comments to Katy Kates, realty officer of Oak Ridge Operations. In addition, Rauch expressed concern that DOE had neglected to take into consideration the flood plain's designation as a "conservation- biodiversity preserved natural area." "The EA should indicate if there were any specific resources that led to this designation and, if so, the effects of the alternatives on these resources," wrote Rauch. According to a Nature Conservancy biodiversity report performed for DOE in 1995, the area was so designated due to its assemblage of rare state-listed plants, including the Appalachian bugbane, false foxglove and Pursh's wild petunia; rare wildlife; diverse mixed hardwood forest; wetlands and shoreline. [*][I] All Contents cCopyright The Oak Ridger ***************************************************************** ***************************************************************** NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARTICLES ***************************************************************** 1 DOE: Paducah plant radiation risk fell in 1999 - By Angie Kinsey The Paducah Sun Friday, January 19, 2001 The radiation risk for neighbors of the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant fell from 1998 to 1999, and tests on deer and rabbits found no signs of radioactive contamination, according to the U.S. Department of Energy's latest environmental report. The report for 1999 concludes that the most exposed plant neighbor would receive .69 millirem of the annual dose limit of 100 millirem set by DOE as a safe limit for human exposure. In 1998, maximum exposure rate was 2.27 millirems. DOE said the average person in the United States receives about 200 millirems annually. The .69 dose was calculated based on a hypothetical person who lives constantly at home just over a mile from the plant, gets 70 percent of his food from the immediate area and extensively uses the wildlife area surrounding the plant. "This is done as a conservative method," said Mitch Hicks, a health physicist for DOE. "They might kill deer on their property and use the food source as meat, and participate in recreational activities like swimming in Little Bayou Creek or picnic out on the grounds." The finding was one of several areas of reduced environmental contamination found during the 1999 study. "We took more than 800 samples of various media, including groundwater, soil and air," said Don Seaborg, DOE site manager in Paducah. "We also took biological samples from deer and rabbit. We're very pleased with it." The report found that metal and chemical levels in deer and rabbit samplings taken in and around the plant remained well below U.S. Food and Drug Administration limits for human consumption. The report said the levels were similar to those found in deer and rabbits far away from the plant. In addition, the report said the radioactive substance technetium- 99 has still not shown up in Ohio River samples. "The plumes indicate tech-99 is close to the river, but samples in the river do not show tech-99 contamination at this point," said Craig Jones, environmental engineer for Bechtel Jacobs. "Essentially there is no significant risk from what we've found in the past." DOE environmental engineer David Tidwell said residents with groundwater contaminated by technetium-99 have been supplied with city water. "We've taken away the risk to the public on groundwater contamination, " Tidwell said. "We spend $70,000 a year to provide city water to those residents." Although overall environmental contamination continued to decline, there were some instances where measured contaminants increased during 1999. DOE said the increases do not reflect a meaningful increased risk to the public. The report also said: --There were two Notices of Violation issued to DOE during 1999 by the Kentucky Division of Waste Management. One involved unapproved work in a landfill without state approval, and the other involved a failed toxicity test of water at one plant outfall. No fines were levied. --There were five instances in which DOE exceeded limits in its water discharge permit. Two related to the failed toxicity test, while the other three involved runoff of zinc from newly painted cylinders containing depleted uranium hexafluoride. The report also includes 50 pages of data gathered from soil and water samples taken as part of an investigation by the U.S. Department of Justice. The investigation is in regard to lawsuits claiming that previous plant operators filed false reports regarding pollution in and around the plant in an effort to earn millions of dollars in operating bonuses from DOE. However, there is no explanation regarding the meaning of the test results. DOE officials said details are not being released because of the pending lawsuits. The Department of Justice is continuing to investigate in an effort to determine if the federal government should join the suit as a plaintiff. The 1999 environmental report is available for reading at DOE's Environmental Information Center in the West Kentucky Technology Park in Kevil, and at the Paducah-McCracken County Library. Copies of the report can be obtained by calling 462-2550. Seaborg said the 2000 report should be out in September. Sun reporter Bill Bartleman contributed to this report. ***************************************************************** 2 Report says uranium-plant cleanup is safe courier-journal.com Ż The Courier-Journal Ż Louisville, KY Ż Local and Regional News Friday, January 19, 2001 By JAMES MALONE, The Courier-Journal PADUCAH, Ky.--Radiation exposure was minuscule and there was no public health risk from cleanup work at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant in 1999, the Energy Department said yesterday. In releasing the site's annual environmental report, the department said its cleanup operations produced less than one-hundredth of the permissible annual radiation dose. However, the account excludes plant facilities where uranium is enriched, prompting a critic to say the report doesn't offer the whole picture. "If it doesn't take into account every pathway for radiation to get into the body, the report is meaningless," said Mark Donham of Brookport, Ill., chairman of a federally funded community advisory board overseeing the cleanup. The findings did not show any "statistically significant" increase or decrease in contaminant levels compared with prior years, said Don Seaborg, the Energy Department site manager, although no uranium was detected in 1999 in sediment samples taken at three nearby creeks. From 1995 to 1998, some uranium had been found in samples from the creeks. Greg Cook, a spokesman for Bechtel Jacobs Co., an Energy Department contractor overseeing the cleanup, attributed the difference to a change in lab procedures. Another closely watched indicator for the spread of radiation-- whether highly radioactive plutonium or neptunium appeared in deer hunted at an adjoining wildlife area--was negative. Officials dismissed as "anomalies" two Little Bayou Creek samples of water-soluble technetium 99, a radioactive isotope, indicating 1999 levels up to 30 times higher than in 1998. Energy Department officials hope the report will convince people living near the plant that any health risk is minimal. But they acknowledge that the account does not include uranium-processing activities handled by United States Enrichment Corp., a private contractor that leases the plant's production facilities. In the past, USEC officials have said any releases of radiation from their operations pose no risk. According to the Energy Department report, environmental discharges of radioactive substances declined at three drainage points and increased slightly at the fourth. The report said levels were far below regulatory limits. The report said state water-permit limits for toxicity and metals were exceeded five times by cleanup work. The Energy Department maintains that the leading edge of an underground water plume tainted by trichlorethylene, a toxic solvent, and technetium 99, which leaked from the plant for several years, has not reached the Ohio River, about two miles from the plant. The plume is about 2,000 feet from the river, said Craig Jones, an environmental engineer who helped write the report. However, Jones acknowledged that the highest level of technetium 99 sampled in any waterways around the plant was in the Ohio River downstream from the plant. Most of the contaminants in the water and soil around the site escaped during the years when the plant enriched uranium for atomic weapons, conducted secret work for the U.S. government and dismantled atomic bombs. Subsequent investigations found large undetected leaks and lax dumping and disposal practices. Copyright 2000 The Courier-Journal. (updated April 2000). ***************************************************************** 3 DOE to have say in nuclear lab discipline FRIDAY JANUARY 19 08:15 AM EST By Peter Felsenfeld , TIMES STAFF WRITER SAN FRANCISCO--Federal officials will have a direct role in disciplining both individual workers and entire departments at the nation's nuclear labs under a new contract unanimously approved by the University of California Board of Regents on Thursday. Although the university retained managerial control, the Department of Energy can force the university to transfer a Los Alamos or Lawrence Livermore lab employee or contractor to a different assignment or remove an individual from the lab altogether. Previously, the university had final say over the status of lab workers -- who are classified as university employees--and the DOE could only offer suggestions. In addition, the DOE can fine a lab department for failing to comply with security or health requirements. The penalties would reduce money available in the lab's discretionary fund for research projects. ***************************************************************** 4 Nuclear radiation a reality Professor Lester C. Thurow's assessment of nuclear power is a grand example of why economics professors should let the general public decide energy policy (''Time for nuclear power,'' The Forum, Jan. 11). Thurow invalidates himself by overgeneralizing his wasteful energy habits to the entire U.S. population. He also makes a sad attempt to discredit solar power by calling it ugly and space consuming. If Thurow would care to look into case studies at Chernobyl, then he would find that nuclear radiation is not a ghost but a reality. His short-sighted attempt to re-energize nuclear power even fails economically, if Thurow would only look at the past cost overruns in nuclear-plant construction and in the storage of 10,000-year toxic waste. Environmentalists are not ''between a rock and a hard place,'' but rather are ready to look to the future with alternative energy policies rather than be mired in the failed policies of Big Oil and pro-nuclear constituents. Ran W. Foster, former coordinator Green Party of Shelby County Memphis, Tenn. NUCLEAR POWER: CLEAN AND SAFE The article by Lester C. Thurow makes a compelling case for the construction of more nuclear-power electricity-generating plants in the USA. Here are some other facts to support Thurow's case. * There are more than 425 nuclear power plants operating in the world today. Together, these power plants have approximately 6,000 successful operating years of experience. The only exceptions to this record are Chernobyl in Russia and Three Mile Island in the USA. The Chernobyl plant is not of American design. * More than 70% of the electricity generated in France originates from nuclear plants. Belgium, Germany, Great Britain, South Korea, and Sweden generate at least half of their electricity via nuclear power. In Japan, it's at least one-third. All of these plants utilize American technology. * More than 100 nuclear power plants are operating in the USA. These produce about 20% of our electricity. * Nuclear power plants built in the 21st century in the USA will feature passive fail-safe systems as opposed to the redundant systems designed into the plants that exist today. Construction costs for nuclear plants built in the future will be predictable because designs for these plants have already been prepared by the manufacturers and approved by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. America is missing out on a vital technology that will help ensure and sustain the economic engine of the country in the 21st century. It is tragic that we continue to deplete our finite supply of fossil fuels and to be a major source of global warming when clean, safe nuclear power is readily available. William D. Rezak, president Alfred State College Alfred, N.Y. ***************************************************************** 5 Due Diligence: Exelon reaps benefits of nuclear fleet Updated 1:53 AM ET January 18, 2001 CHICAGO (CBS.MW) - Exelon co-chief executive Corbin McNeill knows bargains. The power industry veteran picked up a string of nuclear power plants on the cheap when he headed Philadelphia-based Peco. The utility merged with Chicago-based Unicom, also a big nuclear plant operator, generator with 46,500 megawatts of capacity. Exelon owns 17 nuclear plants. That accounts for 37 percent of the utility's generating portfolio and also constitutes the nation's largest nuclear fleet. With natural gas prices soaring, that gives Exelon a big advantage over competitors that are more reliant on natural gas-fired plants. Bob Becker, portfolio manager for the Franklin Utilities Fund, noted that gas-fired plants are facing costs of $100 per megawatt hour for fuel alone. If Exelon meets its cost targets, it will be able to produce power for a total of $20 per megawatt hour, he said. That leaves room for bigger profits as gas prices drive overall power prices higher. Moreover, Exelon is able to sell the power generated at its nuclear plants and other facilities on the unregulated, wholesale power market, where prices have soared in response to the upward pressure on natural gas prices. "They have a low-cost position. In a commodity business, I'm willing to bet on the low-cost producer," said Becker. Exelon is the Franklin Utilities Fund's biggest holding, accounting for around 9 percent of the $1.5 billion fund's total value. Exelon isn't shy about trumpeting its nuclear cost advantages. The company has worked hard to increase the efficiency of its nuclear plants, achieving a capacity factor of 94 percent in 2000, said Exelon Chief Financial Officer Ruth Ann M. Gillis, in an interview. Capacity factor may fall off that pace somewhat in 2001, but could best the company's target of 92 percent over the long term as Exelon moves toward implementation of an 18-month cycle between refueling, Gillis said, noting that each one point gain in capacity factor adds around 6 cents a share to the bottom line. As part of those efforts, Exelon has reduced significantly the time its plants are down for refueling. The company has reduced its average refueling duration from 30 days to 20. Last fall, five refuelings were completed in 20 days or less. Each day shaved off of a refueling shutdown is worth $400,000, Gillis said. Meanwhile, the firm is looking to add to capacity at existing plants, increase overall production and trim expenses, with a goal of reducing nuclear production costs 14 percent by 2003. The company, which enjoys a strong presence in the Midwest, New England and the mid-Atlantic, is also looking to diversify its power generation portfolio through an aggressive acquisition strategy. Exelon wants to increase its footprint geographically and diversify its power- generation mix, Gillis said. The company recently took a 49.9 percent stake in Sithe's North American business for $682 million, which includes a call option to acquire the remaining stake in two to five years, with a collar price of $690 million to $960 million. James von Rieseman, an analyst at Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, believes the deal enhances Exelon's "healthy mix along the dispatch curve." Morgan has a "neutral" rating on Exelon. In addition to its unregulated power generation business, Exelon also delivers electricity to nearly 5 million customers in northern Illinois and the Philadelphia area. The company also has around 425, 000 natural gas customers in the Philadelphia region. Exelon, meanwhile, has promised big things to investors through aggressive acquisitions, post-merger cost-cutting and its power trading operations. The company has projected earnings of $4.50 a share for full-year 2001, followed by growth of 10 percent a year, which equates to $4.95 in 2002 and $5.40 in 2003. Analysts surveyed by First Call/Thomson Financial have forecast 2001 earnings of $4.53 a share. The company has pledged to achieve cost savings and synergies totaling $625 million by 2003. Of that, $100 million of cost-savings was to be accomplished in 2001 - a goal that the company remains on track to meet, Gillis said. McNeill is sharing CEO duties with his Unicom counterpart John W. Rowe, who is credited with helping turn around the company's troubled nuclear portfolio after taking the helm two years ago. Rowe will take over as sole CEO in 2003 under a power-sharing arrangement worked out under the merger. Overall, Exelon's management team has received high marks from investors. The company's executives have strong incentives to boost shareholder value, with 55 percent to 75 percent of compensation based on Exelon's share performance. "I always like it when the rewards for shareholders and for management are the same, and that's the case here," said Michael Mach, portfolio manager for Eaton Vance's $190 million Growth and Income Fund and its $135 million Tax-managed Value Fund. Exelon is among both funds' top 10 holdings. Mach believes Exelon has taken a conservative approach to its projections that could leave room to milk an additional 15 to 20 cents worth of profit through tax savings, increased nuclear efficiency, and higher energy prices. Becker also sees room to beat expectations, "based on conservative assumptions for power pricing as well as (merger-related) synergies ... and cost-cutting." UBS Warburg last week upped its rating on Exelon from "buy" to "strong buy." Analyst Barry Abramson based the upgrade on expectations Exelon's nuclear fleet would leave it room to earn more than expected amid high power prices. In a research note, Abramson put a price target of $78 on Exelon and said the stock's recent selloff represented a buying opportunity. Fueled by strength across the utility sector, as well as high hopes for the merger, Exelon soared 100 percent in 2000. The stock, like the rest of the sector, got zapped in the New Year, due partly to the fallout from California's energy crisis. After ending 2000 near 70, Exelon ended Tuesday at $58.55. But while California's woes have been bad news for some companies investors may be throwing the baby out with the bathwater in the cases of other battered down utility stocks, Mach said. California's problems appear to have fueled fears of a regulatory backlash. "While California has been an example of what not to do in terms of deregulating the utility industry, Illinois and PECO's (Pennsylvania) territory ... have two of the most constructive deregulatory frameworks, " Becker said. Gillis said a regulatory backlash is certainly possible in California, but she isn't terribly worried about any broader impact that could threaten Exelon's unregulated power generation business. "I think we all have to watch that closely, but I would suggest that initially any moves to re-regulate or retro-regulation would occur at the state level," she said. c2001 At Home Corporation. All rights reserved. Excite, @Home, ***************************************************************** 6 White House Statement on Gulf War Health Consequences U.S. Newswire 16 Jan 20:09 STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY ON WHITE HOUSE RELEASE OF ANALYSIS OF THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF THE GULF WAR To: National Desk Contact: White House Press Office, 202-456-2580 WASHINGTON, Jan. 16 /U.S. Newswire/--The following was released today by the White House: Today, the White House is releasing the report, Health Consequences of the Gulf War: An Ongoing Analysis. The report provides an overview of the background, clinical programs, research and investigations, compensation initiatives, outreach efforts and lessons learned from the last seven years of the Administration's efforts to better understand the causes of illnesses arising from the Gulf War. Both the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) have established registries and clinical evaluation programs for our veterans, as well as post-deployment health centers. DoD, the Department of Health and Human Services, and the VA have funded 192 peer-reviewed Gulf War research projects at a cost of over $155 million. These research projects have targeted the most likely causes of Gulf War Illness and have covered topics as diverse as Depleted Uranium, Pyridostigmine Bromide, Anthrax vaccinations, low-level chemical warfare agents, endemic infectious diseases and stress. Since 1994, when the VA was granted authority to compensate any Persian Gulf War veteran suffering from a chronic disability resulting from an undiagnosed illness, about 3,000 such claims have been granted. DoD and the VA have reached over 80,000 service members in their town hall outreach programs. Both Departments have established hotlines and websites to reach the veterans community. DoD has also published 24 case narratives and nine information papers to help veterans understand more about specific incidents and important issues. We have left no stone unturned in our efforts to understand the nature of the health problems that arose as a result of the Gulf War, President Clinton writes in the report. As we continue to pursue research leads, the United States remains committed to ensuring that our veterans and their families get the health care they need, and that disabled veterans receive the compensations they deserve. WHITE HOUSE -0- /U.S. Newswire 202-347-2770/ 01/16 20:09 ***************************************************************** 7 Energy Department And University of California Extend Management Contracts For Defense Labs energy.gov - Headquarters' Press Release The Department of Energy (DOE), the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and the University of California (UC) have agreed on new management and operations contracts for two of the Energy Department's defense labs, Lawrence Livermore and Los Alamos. The move expands and strengthens the contracts' requirements, and extends them for a three-year period. "This is a significant move forward for the department, the defense labs and for national security," said Secretary Richardson. "The work that these labs perform is vital to the nation and, with the provisions of these new contracts, the labs will receive the support and management assistance they need to succeed." John Gordon, Administrator of the NNSA, led the effort to renegotiate the contracts. "We restructured the contracts to enable UC to provide its unparalleled scientific reputation to ensure the scientific vitality of the laboratories and bring that same expertise to strengthen the management of security and facility operations, " Administrator Gordon said. "The contracts also provide the workforce with stability so that important national security programs, including Stockpile Stewardship, can move forward." Among other improvements, the new contracts strengthen management accountability, provide for enhanced security safeguards and management, and improve safety measures already in place at the labs. The department required new contractual provisions to bring about management improvements, including: ˙ Creation of a new UC management position of Vice ˙President for Lab Management; Requirement to obtain outside expertise in security˙and project management; ˙ Enhanced framework for assessing performance to provide ˙ clearer focus on DOE mission objectives and ˙ expectations; ˙ New contract performance expectations for operational ˙ priorities such as more rigorous nuclear facility ˙operations, integrated safeguards and security management, ˙recruitment and retention of a highly capable technical ˙work force; ˙ Inclusion of a contract clause under which the Administrator, ˙ NNSA, with approval of the Secretary of Energy ˙may direct the removal of the top lab manager for ˙performance failure; ˙ UC must satisfactorily meet DOE's expectations relative ˙to operational priorities as a pre-condition to ˙being paid all or a part of performance risk fee; ˙and ˙ In addition, if UC fails to meet DOE requirements ˙for environmental, safety & health or safeguards ˙and security, provisions have been added which would ˙allow DOE to deduct all or a part of UC's earned ˙fee, depending on the severity of the incident. ˙ The contract restructuring will require UC to implement urgently needed management improvements and bring about the changes needed to avoid the types of problems such as safety, security and project management lapses that have been encountered in the past. The additional contract extension of three years to September 30, 2005 is provided to stabilize the essential scientific and technical workforce and allow sufficient time to demonstrate successful implementation of these major improvements. The new contracts are valued at more than $2 billion. MEDIA CONTACT: Drew Malcomb, 202/586-5806 Release No. R-01-023 ***************************************************************** 8 FBI Concludes Investigation of Hard Drive Incident at Los Alamos energy.gov - Headquarters' Press Release No Evidence of Espionage The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has notified the Energy Department that its investigation of the missing hard drives at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) has been concluded and that the Bureau will be taking no further action at this time. The investigation, which began on June 5, 2000, focused on individuals with access to the information contained on the hard drives. "The FBI investigation found no evidence of outside involvement in the disappearance of the hard drives at Los Alamos," said Energy Secretary Bill Richardson. "With the closure of the FBI investigation, we are referring the matter to the department's Albuquerque Operations Office and the University of California for any appropriate personnel action." The University of California (UC), which holds the contract with the Department for the LANL is responsible for the review and possible personnel actions involving LANL staff. Secretary Richardson is asking UC to aggressively pursue the matter and ensure that appropriate personnel action is promptly taken. The FBI investigation was unable to determine responsibility for the disappearance of the hard drives. Furthermore, the FBI found no evidence that the classified information contained on the hard drives had been compromised. "Conclusion of the FBI investigation enables LANL to fully focus on its vitally important national security mission," said Under Secretary and Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration John Gordon. On June 5, 2000, computer hard drives belonging to the Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST) were reported to the FBI as missing. The missing hard drives were discovered 11 days later on June 16, 2000, behind a copy machine in the "X" division at LANL. MEDIA CONTACT: Stu Nagurka, 202/586-4940 Release No. R-01-021 ***************************************************************** 9 Uranium Silence Croatia must decide whether to brown-nose NATO or thwart ecological disaster. A TOL partner post. ZAGREB, Croatia--With the recent revival of mad cow disease hysteria in Europe, Croatia wasted no time in presenting itself as a country devoid of the problems plaguing the rest of the continent--a country that could turn an ecologically clean cheek to its neighbors and even offer up a non-contaminated slab of veal. As a part of the former Yugoslavia that has existed for decades somewhere between communism and capitalism, today's Croatia is proud of the fact that it has remained, in many respects, a kind of ecological oasis. That is party true, as the country evaded the worst type of socialist industrialization that ignored ecological standards and showed no respect for natural resources. Neither was Croatia ever a waste dump for industrial byproducts that were either forbidden from production in the West or were simply too expensive to dispose of. There's no doubt that the former Yugoslavia's orientation toward tourism also helped, since Croatia played the most important role in that respect. And it is exactly that role that the country intends to build on today. In fact, it is planning to base a significant amount of its future development on revenues from tourism. For that reason, ecological questions are paramount. But when it advertises its ecological advantages today, Croatia seems to have forgotten that it survived a war, and that for almost a decade it was either part of that war or at the edge of conflicts in the Balkans and Southeastern Europe. That ignorance came to the foreground only very recently when Europe was shaken by a new ecological scandal--"Balkan syndrome"--a little- researched threat involving depleted uranium, which has, it seems, been spread over the territory of the former Yugoslavia during NATO airstrikes. The problem is said to be most acute in Kosovo but is also present in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Although Croatian media have from the beginning extensively reported stories of NATO soldiers being taken ill by Balkan syndrome, it is almost flabbergasting that nearly no one has asked what that might mean for Croatia and its people. At the onset, it seemed that Balkan syndrome was as far away from Croatia as mad cow disease--perhaps even farther. OUT OF SIGHT, OUT OF MIND The number of affected European soldiers who have been serving in the region has begun to rapidly multiply. Among them are those who served in Croatia. As more and more scientific explanations appear, it seems that depleted uranium's effects are not only immediate, but can travel far and wide (allegedly as far as 300 kilometers). Scientists have also said that it could be a few years before all the negative consequences of this ecological war are fully revealed. For Croatia, it has posed many questions and fears that have until now been completely ignored. Interest in the subject first arose when NATO planes flew across the Adriatic Sea on the way back to their base in Aviano, Italy, several times dropping unused bombs into the sea in order to secure a safe landing. Although NATO denied that any of the bombs dropped in the Adriatic contained depleted uranium, many have cynically noted that when NATO soldiers started to show signs of cancer-related illnesses, the issue was suddenly not so easy to sweep under the rug. Furthermore, with the outbreak of Balkan syndrome, the public became aware that depleted uranium was just one of many long-term consequences of heavy bombardment, and that the systematic destruction of various industrial plants containing toxic chemicals also posed high risks. They understood, finally, that the ecological consequences of that destruction are still being felt, and that it's not over yet. It became clear that the most endangered people, potentially in the long term, won't necessarily be the soldiers, but rather the citizens of Croatia. Many unpleasant facts have finally come to light. For Croatia--in the middle of a region with a high concentration of military equipment and intense conflicts--it means that contamination could be enormous in some areas. It has also been revealed that Croatian soldiers are experiencing increased cases of leukemia and other cancerous diseases. In most of those cases, weapons and equipment of doubtful origins were used. In addition, the public has begun to direct some questions toward NATO. Why, people have asked, have NATO and American troops used Croatian military testing grounds for their exercises, and what could some of the potential consequences be? The government has been forced to initiate various types of research, such as measuring the level of soil contamination in areas where military exercises were held and forming special health committees to determine the extent of Balkan syndrome among Croatian soldiers and the local populace. But why Croatia ignored these topics from the beginning remains unanswered. Some favor the simplistic explanation: Croatia wants NATO membership, and politicians aren't willing to rock the boat by asking unpleasant questions. And then there's the little matter of the weak and flailing Croatian economy. The income derived from renting out its military grounds to Western countries is quite lucrative, and any future such deals would be difficult if ecological questions are raised too extensively with the public. In any case, Balkan syndrome has confirmed the existence of a dangerous tradition in Croatia: the reluctance of the government to face the consequences of war on its territory. The long-term effects of conflict and the socio-psychological, cultural, demographic, economic, ecological, and political issues that will impact the country's development have been completely ignored. Unfortunately, Balkan syndrome could serve as a final alarm bell for the government and Croatians to start addressing those topics. And perhaps facing the music could serve as a welcome education in the prevention of war for nations that are--as has been shown in the past decade--all too easily inclined to solve many of their problems on the battlefield without blinking an eye. [I] STOJAN OBRADOVIC is editor in chief for Croatia's independent news agency, Stina--a TOL partner. [I] A TOL partner post from Stina, an independent news agency based in Zagreb, Croatia. Copyright c 2001 Transitions Online. All rights ***************************************************************** 10 IHT: Mad Cows, Funny Plants, Uranium Dust and Such FLORA LEWIS Flora Lewis Friday, January 19, 2001 PARIS There is something that depleted uranium weapons, genetically manipulated plants and beef from countries exposed to mad cow disease have in common, and it is the reason for so much distress. They are all possible health dangers about which the public feels improperly informed, perhaps deliberately misled. This is a cumulative problem. It doesn't matter so much that these are specific questions with separate and unrelated causes, as that official explanations are no longer quite credible. There have been too many cases of failure to be candid, whether from ignorance or in order to cover up embarrassment, as in the French incidents of HIV-contaminated blood being used for transfusions because locally produced tests were not ready and the authorities did not want to admit the need to import foreign ones. The whole history of atomic weapons is dotted with cases of misinformation. Secrecy justified by security reasons has been used to hide risks to unwitting civilians, whether they were made to be guinea pigs or simply exposed to pollution. There is no way that the ordinary person can verify any of the assertions about precautions that have been taken or the harmlessness of new scientific measures. In food production, industrial techniques are used more and more with questionable results - cows and chickens and pigs raised in tiny spaces and fed with dubious manufactured meal and drugs (antibiotics and hormones) to alter normal growth and fattening. It makes food cheaper but less reliable. The reports on these various questions seem to trickle out, suddenly raising doubts about what had been assumed to be safe practices, and they are often contradictory. There is evidently a risk of conflict between significant economic interests and the basic interest of public health, and not adequate evidence that health is always put first. In the case of depleted uranium, civilians have not been involved ex- cept in battle areas where the arms have been exploded, but large num bers of troops from many countries have been exposed. There is convincing proof that the uranium metal in unexploded weapons presents no danger; the radiation level is low and the rays do not penetrate skin. But when it is pulverized into dust, it can be inhaled and accumulate to dangerous levels inside the body. NATO has cited independent scientists assuring that there is no connection between these weapons and the cases of leukemia reported particularly among Italian soldiers, but what of other cancers? NATO itself is obviously an interested party, and the general record of officialdom in all these cases is such that the public is naturally skeptical. There are so many complex new materials, inventions, techniques that the public uses in one way or another but cannot possibly know enough about to make rational judgments on the risk involved. José Bové, the French farm militant, rails against "la malbouffe" (bad chow), but the point is not whether we eat less well at less cost but whether we know what we are eating and its effects. One way or another, individual governments have lost automatic public confidence in their pronouncements on a whole variety of issues that only recognized scientific experts can settle. Politicians don't know any more about the details than other citizens. But there are no international organizations to which the questions can be referred. The World Health Organization does an impressive job fighting infectious and endemic diseases, a recognition of the principle that germs know no boundaries and neither should health. But it is not adapted to giving advice on new products, new drugs, new devices, advice which people need so as not to feel dependent on sources with interest involved. This is another aspect of the globalization development, a new requirement because of the new patterns of trade, communications and even defense. The feeling that you can't trust what you are told, and can't find out for yourself, is an important element of the unease and discontent afflicting affluent societies and provoking protests that which have no constructive proposals. There has to be a good deal more effort to supply the kind of information that people can rely on as they go about their lives if they are not to believe only in fantasies. With so many bewildering claims and counterclaims demanding attention, credibility is more important than ever. It is a basis for peace and stability. [*][I] Copyright © 2000 the International Herald Tribune All ***************************************************************** 11 Stay on depleted uranium arms proposed ireland.com - The Irish Times - IRELAND Thursday, January 18, 2001 BY TIM O'BRIEN, IN STRASBOURG THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT: The European Parliament has proposed a moratorium on the use of depleted uranium weapons such as those used in the Kosovo conflict. The weapons, while classified as conventional munitions, carry low-level radiation and have increased piercing power. During the Kosovo conflict more than 30,000 rounds of depleted uranium munitions were fired by NATO forces. Speaking at the European Parliament in Strasbourg yesterday, the Leinster MEP, Ms Nuala Ahern, said the irony was that NATO's action in Kosovo had been defined as a humanitarian initiative "but had resulted in the area being peppered with radiation". The Dublin Labour MEP, Mr Proinsias De Rossa, said the Government should quickly establish if the proposed European Rapid Reaction Force was to be equipped with depleted uranium weapons. If this was the case, he said Ireland should withdraw from the force. The Leinster MEP, Mr Jim Fitzsimons, said the evidence pointed to massive increases in cases of cancer where bombings took place during the Balkans War. Mr Fitzsimons also expressed concern that depleted uranium weapons were tested in the Irish Sea by British defence forces based at the Solway Firth. Yesterday's resolution, passed by the Parliament, called on member- states which are also NATO members to propose a moratorium on the use of such weapons as a precautionary principle. It is, however, not a binding resolution. In a statement, the UN Environment Programme said laboratory tests were being undertaken to determine lingering risks to human health. The results will be available in March. ***************************************************************** 12 Plutonium Trace in Ammo Irrelevant, Says NATO THURSDAY JANUARY 18 2:25 PM ET By Douglas Hamilton BRUSSELS (Reuters) - Faint traces of radioactive uranium 236 and plutonium could be present in some depleted uranium (DU) ammunition but the fact has been long established and presents no increased In a statement in response to reports highlighting the discovery of plutonium traces in spent DU rounds analyzed by independent laboratories, NATO spokesman Mark Laity said such traces were so small as to be meaningless in terms of health risk. Program (UNEP) and U.S. Energy and Defense department papers on the ``From a safety viewpoint, the presence of minute quantities of U- 236 in depleted uranium is irrelevant,'' the statement said. Tests showed that the presence of trace levels of plutonium (a few parts per billion) and other materials in depleted uranium ``added 0.8 percent to the radiation dose from DU.'' ``Thus, form a safety viewpoint, the presence of such small quantities of plutonium in depleted uranium is also irrelevant,'' Laity said. Politically, mere mention of plutonium meant a fresh headache for NATO, under fire for the past three weeks for using armor-piercing rounds DU in Bosnia and Kosovo. Some ailing soldiers and anti-nuclear campaigners say it causes cancer, although scientists say there is simply no evidence to support the claim. German Defense Minister Rudolf Scharping called in the U.S. charge d'affaires in Berlin on Wednesday to find out more about a German TV show's ``revelation'' that DU rounds might contain plutonium - - a word Scharping indicated had a particularly ominous resonance in many German ears. DU HAS TWO DIFFERENT ORIGINS The allies say there is no scientific evidence to back up DU fears and no evidence of symptoms among former peacekeepers that could describe a common ``Balkans syndrome'' suspected by some. ``It has long been established that there may be trace elements of U-236 and plutonium in depleted uranium, which is a by-product of the nuclear industry,'' the NATO spokesman said. ``According to independent experts, however, the levels found are so low as to present no cause for concern.'' One nuclear expert who did not wish to be quoted by name said that to describe DU simply as a ``by-product'' glosses over the fact it has two possible origins--from low-radioactive natural ore, or from highly-radioactive nuclear waste. Plutonium and U-236 can appear in low-radioactivity depleted uranium (U-238) created in the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel rods, but is not present in depleted uranium left over when U-236 is refined out of natural uranium ore to make fuel. The expert said that fact raised the theoretical possibility that not all DU in munitions was exactly the same, and that some batches might therefore display a different radioactive spectrum than others. Tests now under way would show that up, he said. One explanation for plutonium traces found in some DU was that, although it originated from natural ore, it was wrongly stored at some stage in production in containers used for nuclear waste, and had picked up faint contamination. The ammunition used by U.S. A-10 ground attack aircraft in Kosovo and Bosnia is manufactured by two American companies, Gencorp's Aerojet Ordnance Division and Honeywell. The United States has stockpiles of about 700,000 tons of depleted uranium created by 40 years of uranium enrichment. In November, the for proposals'' by February to prepare the DU inventory for disposal or potential use, and it said this could take 25 years. ``All this still doesn't change the bottom line--that no connection has shown up between serious illness and depleted uranium,'' a NATO diplomat said. Wherever it originated, it was depleted and not dangerous. The UNEP and Department of Energy reports both said the level of radioactivity in the DU with traces of other isotopes was only a tiny fraction higher than in DU without such traces, and was therefore not significantly different in health risk terms. Reuters ***************************************************************** 13 I see no evidence of harm Guardian Unlimited | The Guardian | The Ministry of Defence's chief scientific adviser attacks the press KEITH O'NIONS FRIDAY JANUARY 19, 2001 The reporting of the effects of depleted uranium (DU) has given rise to misunderstanding and unnecessary anxiety. The facts and evidence surrounding DU are widely available in the public domain and open to review by the scientific community. DU is less radioactive than natural uranium, but its high density and hardness make it ideal for attacking enemy tank armour. No comparably effective material is available. The Royal Navy uses DU ammunition, but the targets are not armoured, and we do not need the extra penetration provided by DU. In the future, therefore, shells will increasingly be made from tungsten. DU's relatively weak radioactivity could in theory and over a period of years increase incidence of cancer. DU is also a heavy metal and chemically toxic in the same way as uranium that occurs naturally. The risks are similar to those of lead. Ingested in large amounts, it could lead to kidney failure. In theory, soldiers might be exposed through handling or being close to DU rounds in a tank. But in practice these risks are very low, and can be guarded against. The very low levels of radioactivity involved are well determined and given the instructions issued by the MoD this risk is near negligible. The risk from toxicity is also very low. In the immediate vicinity of an armoured vehicle struck by a DU round, individuals might inhale or ingest DU oxide dust generated. So those approaching such vehicles are instructed to wear protective clothing. Because of this there is no evidence from those who served in the Gulf or the Balkans of either acute or chronic kidney damage attributable to DU intake. Some Gulf veterans do have kidney damage, but each case examined has been attributed to other specific diseases and not to their service. No published research links Gulf illnesses to heavy metal poisoning. In addition, there is a small theoretical radiological risk from insoluble DU lodging in the lungs. The MoD has published estimates of this risk for possible scenarios in the Gulf war. If a soldier spent two to three hours inside a DU contaminated tank on dust-raising activities, without protective measures he might receive a radiation dose which, according to the International Commission on Radiological Protection, could generate an increased lifetime risk of cancer of 12 in 100,000. Around 40% of people in the UK will contract cancer in their lifetime. Recent work published by the US office of the special adviser for Gulf war illnesses before Christmas estimates the potential exposure in this sort of scenario as much lower. In any case the measures the MoD insists personnel take should further reduce this risk to a negligible level. This is not just the MoD's view. Research published by the Rand Corporation, by the US agency for toxic substances and most recently by the US Institute of Medicine concludes that there is no evidence linking DU and lung cancer at low levels of exposure, or DU and clinically significant renal dysfunction. Nor was there any evidence to link DU to a range of other cancers, nervous system disease, respiratory disease and other health outcomes. US research also includes detailed examination of US veterans who have DU shrapnel embedded in their bodies and who still have no evidence of associated medical problems. This data is consistent with Gulf veteran mortality. Up to December 31 of over 53,000 Gulf veterans, 477 had died of all causes, compared to 466 in a similar control group who had not been in the Gulf. Of these 168 had died of disease compared to 208 in the control group. Of those, 69 Gulf veterans had died of cancers, (77 in the control group). In both groups the prevalence of cancer was substantially less than to be expected in comparable groups of the civil popu lation in England and Wales of the same age (100-120 deaths). It is untrue that Gulf veterans have evidence of excess mortality from cancer. There is no evidence to link DU with any illness suffered by any individual. We have always said that DU can represent a low level and well- understood risk. But we have also always made clear that the risks are very small, can be guarded against and are outweighed by the protection DU offers our troops in combat. Following some of the sensational reporting, to reassure members of the armed forces who remain concerned, it has been decided to put in place an additional appropriate voluntary screening programme, to be constructed with the advice of reputable independent scientific bodies, including the Royal Society. The tests will be carried out by external independent laboratories. Again I would stress that facts and evidence surrounding this issue are clearly established and in the public domain. Proper scientific and medical debate based on this and any further evidence is to be encouraged and the MoD will remain open-minded. But ill-founded comment, conjecture or assertions derived in an irresponsible manner will serve only to cause distress to serving personnel, veterans and their families. Guardian Unlimited c Guardian Newspapers Limited 2001 ***************************************************************** 14 In another Bosnian town two small boys lie in their hospital beds. Is this collateral damage? Independent By Robert Fisk in Duboj, Bosnia 19 January 2001 Within minutes of the first Nato depleted uranium air raids around the Bosnian Serb town of Doboj in 1995, Milan Simic, the municipality's civil defence commissioner, went to look at the wreckage. Some of the bombs were targeted on mountain-top Serbian military installations, others on a television transmitter and an ammunition depot in the town. "About 10 months later, our people started reporting strange things, " he said. "Animals were being born with deformities, particularly in cattle. We found calves born with large amounts of their skin missing but with enormous ears and huge paws. They did not live very long. "Then we found the vegetables and grass, after a few months, looked brown and burnt in the area of the bombings. The trouble is that no one at the time was able to document this - there was a war on." But Mr Simic can recollect his personal health problems with documentary clarity. "I didn't know anything about uranium or radiation. But in July last year, I suddenly found my throat had tightened. I couldn't speak. I lost 22 kilos in 18 days. If I hadn't been sent to the radiation specialists in Belgrade and been admitted to the military clinic, I would have died." Mr Simic is right about the lack of documents. Scientific inquiry has little scope in time of war. And there are unpleasant rumours circulating in northern Bosnia that evidence connecting depleted uranium (DU) munitions with ill-health has been suppressed on the orders of Biljana Plavsic, now before the war crimes tribunal in The Hague and anxious - perhaps - to offer Nato governments something in return for modest treatment at her trial. But detailed studies of the steady increase in cancers among Bosnian Serbs after Nato's 1995 raids, the so-called "epidemiological research" British and other governments demand before they will acknowledge that DU weapons cause cancers among civilians, may soon be available. The semi-autonomous Serb Republic is already reporting a fivefold increase in cancers over the past five years, with Banja Luka, heavily bombed in 1995, among the worst affected. The medical authorities there say cancer cases climbed from 816 in 1999 to 1,800 in 2000. In Doboj, which releases pre-war and post-war medical statistics on Monday, a tour of the regional hospital produces repeated assertions from doctors that the rate of tumours and respiratory infections now is two and a half times greater than before the war. Dr Branko Dabovic, the silver-haired head of the infection department, has never seen such a rise. "There was a significant increase in malignancies and skin infections after the bombings," he said. "In the one year after, we had more herpes zosta virus cases than in the 30 years I've worked here. We treated 200 cases here and 7,800 at their homes." Dr Dabovic chooses his words carefully. He is a medical man, not a politician. "We are aware there is a serious rise in patients suffering from immunity decrease. We have been wondering why people should suddenly suffer a decrease in immunity among all ages and both sexes. I tried to prove scientifically that it was bad food or stress. But it wasn't. We had one man come here who was under 20. He had felt fine the day before. We diagnosed acute leukaemia. Within four days, he was dead." Dr Zora Drobac, a senior dermatologist, said: "There are a larger number of tumours among children and a greater number of malignant tumours. The skin problems are almost always face, hands and neck - which are exposed." The urology department reports an increase in lung tumours, around 40 cases a year in 1999 and last year, just 20 a year before the war. For those who believe these claims are merely a variation of Serbian Bosnia's wartime propaganda, all seven doctors interviewed by The Independent at Doboj hospital insisted further studies would be necessary before scientific proof could connect the frightening rise in ill- health to DU munitions. But it is impossible not to be moved by Filip Andreato, pale and fearful, as he lies in the arms of a nurse in the paediatrics department, at eight years old, unable to comprehend why he cannot breathe fully. Or 11-month-old Ognjen Radonic, whose mother, Mirjana, was close to the Nato bomb explosions at Doboj's ammunition dump. "There were massive explosions and smoke like a small mushroom,"she said. Ognjen was born four years after the raids, but so were many of the other children now suffering from respiratory failure and unexplained leukaemias in the former war zones of southern Iraq. At the end of one bed, a small boy in blue sits, fiddling with a set of playing cards. Dusko Duric has a serious lung infection, the first any of his family have suffered. Are they victims of Nato? The doctors are putting their research data together for publication. In 1999, when research was published on regional cancer increases by six medical practitioners at the Doboj hospital, led by the head doctor, Obrad Filipovic, it was ignored in the West. Its evidence was too disturbing to be examined. It was compiled, said Dr Filipovic, because of "the enormous increase in the frequency of skin tumours of the face and neck at the end of the war." Their research showed that in the pre-war 1990-1991 period, Doboj, with a population of 450,000, treated 154 tumours, of which 130 were malign (86 baso-cellular and 44 plano-cellular). In 1996 and 1997, with a post-war population of only 140,000, the hospital operated on 144 tumours, of which 101 were malignant (75 baso-cellular and 25 plano-cellular). In other words, the doctors operated on almost the same number of tumour patients in the two years after the war as they did when the population was more than three times the size. Of the patients, 98 per cent were Serbs, whose areas were, of course, the target of Nato raids with DU shells. No one knows exactly how many DU rounds were used on Doboj - Nato admits DU was used. But a Serb news crew filmed the aftermath of one raid, and their videotape contains frames of a fragment of munitions at Usara carrying the Nato coding: "Wing Assembly 96214, ASSY 872128, Serial No: 80- 230893. Date: M (letter damaged)- G12." No doubt Nato in Brussels will know if that carried a DU warhead. * Nato said yesterday that its investigation had found no "significant" health hazard to S-for troops or to the present civilian population at the Sarajevo suburb of Hadzici from the DU ammunition rounds which have been discovered at the former military plant more than five years after it was bombed. ***************************************************************** 15 Scharping Defends Uranium Arms Action F.A.Z. - English Version F.A.Z. BERLIN. Defense Minister Rudolf Scharping, facing a group of faultfinding lawmakers on Thursday, stressed once again that the German military had not tried to play down the dangers of depleted uranium ammunition. Mr. Scharping pointed out to the parliament members that the government talked about the potential dangers during a news conference held on April 21, 1999, at a time when warplanes of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization were still bombing Yugoslavia. That effort continued about a month later, he said, when the Bundestag, or parliament, was told of the dangers. Finally, the minister said, German troops attended a course on the ammunition in June 1999, even though their leaders were uncertain at the time whether the ammunition had actually been fired during the war. The dispute was triggered by recent reports that NATO troops who served in Kosovo have fallen ill with leukemia. It gained new immediacy on Tuesday, when the UN Environment Program said ammunition tips found at sites targeted by NATO contained traces of enriched uranium from nuclear reprocessing plants. Swiss scientists who helped in the United Nations' investigation said the findings indicated that the ammunition probably contained traces of plutonium. In response to the reports, Mr. Scharping summoned the U.S. Embassy's chargé d'affaires, Terry Snell, on Wednesday to demand a full explanation. Mr. Scharping complained that "it can't be that not all NATO partners have access to the same information." On Thursday, members of the opposition accused Mr. Scharping of making contradictory arguments. Paul Breuer of the Christian Democratic Union said Mr. Scharping had in the past few weeks tried to create the impression that the ammunition was as harmless as "bath water." But now Mr. Scharping maintains he has constantly pointed to the potential dangers, Mr. Breuer said. Germany is also investigating the effects of 1988 fires that destroyed two U.S. tanks carrying depleted uranium ammunition, the news agency dpa reported. On Friday, a team will determine whether the fires caused increased radioactivity levels in a section of northern Bavaria, dpa said. Depleted uranium is a by-product of natural uranium and is created after the isotope U235 is removed to produce nuclear fuel. In the military, it is used to attack armored vehicles. Thanks to its high density and metallic properties, it can "self-sharpen" as it penetrates armor, according to the U.S. military. Other such munitions tend to mushroom and become blunt. Jan. 18, 2001 ;Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 2000 All rights reserved. ***************************************************************** 16 Editorials: Depleted uranium and public health bmj.com McDiarmid 322 (7279): 123 Fifty years' study of occupational exposure provides little evidence of cancer Depleted uranium, used in anti-tank weapons, provides a common thread that links concerns about leukaemia and other health effects in peacekeeping forces returned from the Balkans and worries about the environmental impact of debris from weapons in this war-weary segment of Europe. however, we know quite a lot about the health effects of depleted uranium. Depleted uranium is derived from natural uranium mined from the earth's crust. Uranium is composed of three radioactive isotopes, U238, U235, and U234, which decay to other radioactive elements and ultimately emit [I] particles during decay, which possess high energy but are poorly penetrating. Thus, uranium poses primarily an internal radiation hazard to tissue in close proximity. Uranium is not very radioactive, owing to its isotopes' relatively long half lives (105-109 years). These compare with radon, a prominent member of the daughter progeny of the uranium decay cascade, which bsp;days and a radiological activity 60% of the radioactivity of natural uranium, having been "depleted" of much of its most highly radioactive U234 and U235 isotopes. Depleted uranium is also a heavy metal, like lead or arsenic, with toxicity a function of route of exposure, particle solubility, contact properties, high density, and tensile strength, made depleted uranium an attractive material for use in weapons. p;what we know about depleted uranium's effects on human health did not begin there. A sizeable store of knowledge has been gathered over nbsp;years in studies of uranium miners, millers, and other processors worldwide. Two recent reviews of uranium exposure and cancer risk address overall cancer mortality and also lung, lymphoid, and bone cancer, those most likely to be related to internal uranium exposure. The first, by the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention/ Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, concluded that "no significant differences in cancer [of the lungs] was found between ;studies in uranium miners attributed an observed increase in lung cancer to radon and its progeny and not to uranium. "There is no unequivocal evidence that inhalation, oral exposures, often to more radioactive materials, were cited. Long term animal studies with both natural and enriched uranium had negative A second recent review of health effects of uranium authored by the US National Academy of Sciences Institutes of Medicine evaluated existing epidemiological studies more rigorously and gave relative weight to the studies' strengths and weaknesses in their assessments. Regarding the lung cancer risk, "the Committee concludes that there is limited/suggestive evidence of no association between exposure to uranium and lung cancer at cumulative internal dose levels lower the burden occurring from a full year's exposure to a dusty indoor For both lymphatic and bone cancer the committee concluded that there was inadequate or insufficient evidence to determine whether an association does or does not exist with uranium exposure. Most of the studies cited did not show an excess, but there was also inadequate evidence bsp; and now 60) US Gulf war veterans who were victims of friendly fire ;of these veterans possess retained metal fragments of depleted uranium in soft tissue and are excreting raised uranium concentrations in their urine. None of these veterans for uranium being the cause of leukaemia in peacekeeping forces is thin, notwithstanding the short latencies implied, even by the standards of haematological malignancies. The questions raised as to the connection between cancer and depleted uranium are understandable, however. Having lived through the cold war and beyond, we have all been sensitised to the fear of nuclear exchange, and justifiably so. In addition, many of us, including those in the medical community, have little familiarity with the dose-response curves of health effects caused by radiation exposure. Experts in risk communication tell us that lack of familiarity with pronouncements about background rates of disease observable in populations being statistically expected fail. Certainly, attribution of disease to "expected" or background levels should be a diagnosis of exclusion, and vigilance is warranted. However, the information we have on cancer risk is not simply a theoretical calculation, as some critics have suggested. Rather, there is both a context in which to evaluate the evidence and a hierarchy of relative weight to assign to types of evidence available for human risk assessment. Heading that list are epidemiological studies of human health effects, Regarding non-cancer health effects, and references made to Gulf war illness, there is still no single candidate hazard which serves as its unifying explanation, depleted uranium included. Indeed, Gulf war illnesses is a more appropriate title for the groupings of symptoms made by returning US veterans and recalled in the "Balkan syndrome" of affected peacekeepers. The report into Gulf war syndrome of the nbsp;stated that there was no Some final prevention points still must be made. Strident efforts at hazard communication training are in order for all serving in affected areas in any role[I]military or humanitarian. Similar efforts must be undertaken for the affected local populations. Low radiation risk issues aside, children should not be playing with depleted uranium penetrators and environmental monitoring (of drinking water, for example) is appropriate in highly affected areas[I]at the very least for assurance purposes. bsp;years of human epidemiological evidence in managing any of the environmental or occupational public health problems facing the global medical community today. We should use that evidence in informing the public about their potential health risk and, more positively, in guiding our prevention activities. bsp;West Baltimore sp;USA 1. nbsp;British safety claims wilt as uranium panic grips bsp;Jan. 2. Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry. Toxicological profile for uranium. Washington, DC: US Public Health Service, 1999. 3. Fulco CE, Liverman CT, Sox HC, eds. Gulf war and health. , Vol 1 Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 2000. 4. McDiarmid MA, Squibb KS. Uranium and thorium. In: Bingham E, Cohrssen B, Powell CH, eds. Patty's toxicology. New York: John Wiley, 2001: 381-422. 5. Eckerman KF. Limiting values of radionuclide intake and air concentration and dose conversion factors for inhalation submersion and ingestion. Washington, DC: Environmental Protection Agency, 1988. 6. 7. Kathren RL, McInroy JF, Moore RH, Dietert SE. Uranium in the tissues of an occupationally-exposed individual. Heath Phys 1989; 57: 17- 8. Donoghue JK, Dyson ED, Hislop JS, Leach AM, Spoor NL. Human exposure 9. McDiarmid MA, Keogh JP, Hooper FJ, Squibb KS, Kane R, et al. Health effects of depleted uranium on exposed Gulf war veterans. Environ 10. Covello VT. Risk comparisons and risk communication: issues and problems in comparing health and environmental risks. In: Kasperson RE, Stallen PJM, eds. Risks to the public. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1991:79-124. 11. Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses. Final report. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1996. [I][*]PDF OF THIS ARTICLE [I][*]SEND A RESPONSE TO THIS ARTICLE [I][*]Electronic responses to this article [I][*]Download to Citation Manager [I]Search Medline for articles by: [I] [*]McDiarmid, M. A [I]Alert me when: [I] [*]New articles cite this article Rapid Response responses to this article: DEPLETED URANIUM USE STILL SUGGEST RISKS ˙Gino Spinelli, Professor of Microbiology , UNIVERSITY OF BARI DEPLETED URANIUM AND RADIATION DOSE MEASUREMENT ˙Richard F Mould, MSc (Nuclear Physics) PhD (Cancer statistics) formerly ˙Director of Medical Physics, Westminster Hosp , RETIRED [HOME ˙ADDRESS] 41 EWHURST AVENUE, SOUTH CROYDON, SURREY CR2 0DH DU: A SHORT BIBLIOGRAPHY TO UNDERSTAND THE ISSUE ˙Marco Saba, Researcher , ETHICAL ENVIRONMENTAL OBSERVATORY HOGG WASH ˙terry walker, gulf war veteran , HOME IS IT MORALLY DEFENSIBLE? ˙Cory Mermer, Researcher/Writer EMBARRASSING STANDARD OF REPORTING IN UK MEDIA ˙Barry Marshall, Professor of Microbiology , UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN ˙AUSTRALIA RELATED WORKER STUDIES ON DU ˙Thurman B. Wenzl, Research Industrial Hygienist , NIOSH WHOSE PERSPECTIVE IS IMPORTANT IN THE DU DEBATE? ˙Nick Emmel, Teaching and research fellow , NUFFIELD INSTITUTE FOR ˙HEALTH, UNIVERSITY OF LEEDS ***************************************************************** 17 'Non-existent' nuclear bombs may have left U.S. WINDS DOWN ARAXOS PRESENCE THIS TRUCK WAS CONVEYING NUCLEAR WEAPONS WITHIN THE ARAXOS AIR BASE ON MONDAY, PRIOR TO THE BOMBS BEING TRANSPORTED OUT OF THE COUNTRY, ACCORDING TO THE ATHENS NEWS AGENCY. An unknown quantity of officially non-existent American nuclear weapons presumed to have been stored in the western Peloponnese may - or may not - have been removed from Greece, the government implied yesterday. "We have discussed this matter in the past, and will not make any further comment," government spokesman Dimitris Reppas said. "Within the framework of our cooperation with NATO, various decisions are made from time to time." He was responding to a question regarding press reports that at least 11 aging nuclear weapons have been withdrawn from the U.S. sector of the NATO air base at Araxos, south-west of Patras, where Greece's 116 Combat Wing is quartered.The U.S. is winding down its presence at the base. Defence Ministry sources said the weapons left Araxos on a U.S. transport plane on Monday night. The bombs are understood to have been taken to the NATO base at Aviano in Italy, under whose jurisdiction Araxos comes. "Nothing new has emerged regarding our position," Reppas said. "We stand by what we said in the past." This tended to vary. In 1999, Defence Minister Akis Tsochadzopoulos avoided the issue, saying that "the country's air force is not adapted for nuclear weapons." Later, he noted that there are "almost no nuclear weapons in Greece." Around the same time, Reppas stressed that "there is nothing to worry about." According to independent reports, ten B61 bombs were kept at Araxos, within the separate U.S. compound where 130 men and women from the 731 Munitions Support Squadron are stationed. First produced in 1966, the 11-foot weapons were initially meant to be loaded in case of nuclear war on Greek F-104 Starfighter jets, which were withdrawn in 1992. Although in theory they can be carried by 116 Combat Wing's A-7 bombers, Athens says the planes lack the necessary fittings. NATO officials in Brussels yesterday either denied any knowledge of U.S. nuclear weapons being transferred away from Greece, or refused to comment. Following revelations in 1999 that up to 200 nuclear weapons were stored outside the U.S., military and diplomatic sources in Brussels had indicated that Washington would be withdrawing its last remaining weapons of the sort from Europe. The Pentagon has conceded that the U.S. had "a very limited" stockpile of nuclear arms in "a very small number of countries." department. ©1999-2000 IHT-KATHIMERINI English Edition. All ***************************************************************** 18 Nuclear activists freed The Scotsman Online - Scotland's best selling quality national newspaper TWO anti-nuclear protesters who entered a dockyard planning to attack and disarm one of Britain’s Trident submarines were yesterday cleared by a jury. Sylvia Boyes, 57, and a fellow campaigner, River, 45, - formerly known as Keith Wright - had admitted at Manchester Crown Court that they plotted to damage HMS Vengeance at the Marconi Yard in Barrow, Cumbria, in November 1999. But they claimed their actions were justified because nuclear weapons were "immoral and illegal". Ms Boyes, of Eccles, Greater Manchester, and River of Whalley Range, Manchester, had pleaded not guilty to conspiracy to cause criminal damage. In October 1999, a sheriff in Greenock ordered not guilty verdicts on three women who caused thousands of pounds worth of damage to submarine equipment at a naval establishment on Loch Goil. ***************************************************************** 19 Canister with radioactive material is located ireland.com - The Irish Times - IRELAND Friday, January 19, 2001 BY COLMAN CASSIDY A missing canister containing radioactive material was found at the Ispat steel mill in Cork harbour yesterday, during a visit by an inspector from the Radiological Protection Institute of Ireland. The inspector carried out an independent check at the Irish Ispat plant in Cobh to allay public concern over the disappearance of the canister containing a small amount of radioactive material. The canister was one of four held in a storeroom at the Haulbowline plant, which went on fire last Monday. Details of where it had been found were unclear last night. "We wanted to make sure that everything is as we have been told," a spokeswoman for the RPII said. The missing canister was used as a "checking source" to monitor radioactive levels in other instruments, and the institute was assured the levels were too low to be a health hazard. The canister contained less radioactive material than that normally contained in a domestic smoke alarm, she said. Radioactive levels in the missing canister were too low to require licensing under the Radiological Protection Act 1991 (Ionising Radiation Order 2000), but the three that were recovered from the storeroom should have been licensed under new regulations introduced last May. These new regulations have reduced the acceptable limits of radiation by a factor of 10, said the RPII spokeswoman - from 100,000 to 10, 000 becquerels. Anything with a limit in excess of 10,000 becquerels must be licensed. The RPII prosecutes regularly for breaches of its regulations, the spokeswoman added - hospitals, dentists, universities and industrial users. She could not say, however, what action, if any, might be taken in the Ispat case. Ispat's chief executive, Mr Gerry Gorman, was adamant the missing canister had posed no health risk. Less than 50 per cent of the scrap metal used by the company was sourced in Ireland. "When you work with scrap metal, everything is not always above board. When you import scrap it is sometimes difficult to know where it has originated and everything must be carefully checked for radiation." But the monitoring of radiocative material was so precise at Haulbowline, he insisted, that "even if you put in a piece of granite with natural radiation in it", it would show up. The three canisters above the legal limits did require licensing, he conceded. In view of the "minute amounts" of radioactivity contained in the canisters, "Ispat understood that they were not licensable", according to an Ispat advertisement in the national press yesterday. Since the RPII had advised otherwise, however, "the company will address this immediately". ***************************************************************** 20 Patten urges nuclear cleanup Guardian Unlimited | The Guardian | Russia's 300 dumped reactors linked to Kursk aid IAN TRAYNOR IN MOSCOW FRIDAY JANUARY 19, 2001 Around 300 nuclear reactors and thousands of spent nuclear fuel rods dumped in the Russian Arctic are an immediate danger to Russians and Europeans alike, and require urgent action, Chris Patten, the European Union's external relations commissioner, warned yesterday. Speaking to Russian officials and diplomats in Moscow, Mr Patten called on the western European nuclear engineering industry to start cleaning up the world's biggest nuclear graveyard in Russia's far north. But he also feared that Brussels' bid to persuade Moscow to allow in outside remedial teams had run into opposition, not least because of Russian military secrecy. Russian admirals, in particular, are against external assistance with problems that involve military resources. The risk of wide-scale radioactive contamination from the reactors in dozens of abandoned submarines, formerly part of Russia's northern and Baltic fleets, were highlighted by Moscow's laboured response to the Kursk tragedy last summer. But Mr Patten, the EU's foreign policy supremo, pointed to a problem that could dwarf the Kursk disaster in its scale. "In the seas and the shores surrounding the Kola peninsula, there are some 300 nuclear reactors - about 20% of the world's total - and thousands of spent nuclear fuel elements," he said. "The lack of adequate storage or disposal facilities for spent fuel and radioactive waste from the reactors of nuclear vessels is a sword of Damocles hanging over all our futures." The fjords of the peninsula are littered with scores of inoperable nuclear submarines, abandoned like beached whales. Their hulks lie as testimony to the disastrous decline of the once mighty Soviet navy. The navy dockyards are crumbling, the sailors go hungry and unpaid. Mr Patten said the problem of nuclear safety in the far north was the most "dramatic" of all the issues on which Brussels and Moscow should seek enhanced cooperation during Sweden's term in the EU presidency. EU countries are being asked to make a hefty contribution towards the estimated ś47m needed to raise the stricken Kursk and its two nuclear reactors next summer. Mr Patten was expected to discuss the Kursk with Russian officials during his two-day trip. It appeared that Sweden, in particular, was pushing for more ambitious nuclear safety programmes and cleanup operations in the Arctic in return for agreeing to fund the Kursk salvage operation. Mr Patten's speech, Sweden's emphasis on nuclear safety in the Arctic, and the incoming Bush administration's declaration that American aid to Russia will be sharply cut back and focused on stabilising Russia's nuclear arsenal, all suggest that areas such as the Kola peninsula are moving up in priority on the international agenda. Guardian Unlimited c Guardian Newspapers Limited 2001 ***************************************************************** 21 Iraq asks U.N. for investigation into uranium effects - CNN.com - January 18, 2001 January 18, 2001 BAGHDAD, Iraq (AP)--Iraq demanded Thursday that the United Nations open an immediate investigation into the effects of depleted uranium on Iraq during the Gulf War. Iraq has insisted for years that there is a link between depleted uranium used in armor-piercing weapons and the increase in the number of Iraqis suffering from leukemia and other kinds of cancer. Recent international attention to the health risks of depleted uranium left over from NATO airstrikes in the Balkans in recent years prompted Iraq to raise the issue again. "Iraq urges you to order a prompt inquiry, to be conducted by reliable medical and scientific authorities in cooperation with the relevant Iraqi scientific bodies," Foreign Minister Mohammed Saeed al-Sahhaf said in a letter to U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan obtained by The Associated Press. The letter said a probe would confirm that hundreds of thousands of Iraqi civilians had been affected. Iraq's Health Ministry says the number of cancer cases nationwide rose from 6,555 in 1989 to 10,931 in 1997, particularly in areas heavily bombed by allied forces during the 1991 Gulf War. The ministry was unable to provide more recent figures. "Iraq reserves the right to demand fair compensation for the casualties and damages caused from the use of these weapons," the Foreign Ministry said in a statement last week. Depleted uranium, a heavy metal used in munitions to pierce armor, is a byproduct of natural uranium and about 40 percent as radioactive. U.S. and British tanks and warplanes first used ammunition containing depleted uranium in combat during the Gulf War, and more than 300 tons still litters battlefields in Iraq, according to U.N. officials. Numerous studies into the effects of depleted uranium have not revealed any connection between the metal and cancer. Still, children are feared to be at risk if they inhale uranium dust or put hands soiled with the toxic metal in their mouths. Meanwhile, a report published by the Health Ministry on Thursday reported an increase in mortality rates during the month of December 2000. The report said 11,421 people died in December from different illnesses "caused by sanctions imposed on Iraq." The ministry reported 10,132 deaths the month before. In December 1989, 850 deaths were reported. A Trade Ministry report on Sunday said Iraq has received only 41 percent of medicine and medical supplies ordered under the U.N.-approved rights reserved. c 2001 CABLE NEWS NETWORK. All Rights Reserved. ***************************************************************** 22 Depleted uranium: Defence Minister critical of information flow The Norway Post - Doorway to Norway 18. Januar 2001 Defence Minister Bjoern Tore Godal is critical of the flow of information between NATO and the member nations and the internal information flow in the Norwegian Defence Forces, with regard to the use of depleted uranium in shells and grenades. Godal says that the consequenses were that not all the personnel concerned received satisfactory instruction regarding the danger involved, when using this ammunition. However, he says he has no basis for believing that Norwegian personnel have been exposed to dangerous levels of radiation during their service in Kosovo, putting their health at risk. Neither does he see any need for any further action on this point. (NRK) Rolleiv Solholm ***************************************************************** 23 New inquiry into uranium scare BBC News | EUROPE | Friday, 19 January, 2001, 16:12 GMT [I] Concerns are growing over risk to civilians The World Health Organisation is sending a team of experts to Kosovo to investigate if there is a link between the use of depleted uranium (DU) weapons and cases of cancer. The visit, beginning on Monday, will focus on civilians who may have been in contact with debris from exploded DU shells. The mission was requested by the UN's ex-head in Kosovo, Bernard Kouchner, amid continuing concern about the effects of DU ammunition on the health of Balkans peacekeepers. The announcement came as Yugoslav President Vojislav Kostunica - speaking on his first official visit to Bosnia - insisted that the United Nations should treat Nato's use of DU weapons in the Balkans as a war crime. DU weapons were used by the US in Kosovo and Bosnia, and by American and British forces in the Gulf War. Many veterans of both conflicts believe that DU has damaged their health - a claim rejected by the US and UK Governments and by Nato. CIVILIAN FEARS Fears are being expressed that civilians may have suffered even greater exposure to radioactive materials. The four-strong WHO team will make an initial assessment of the situation and try to find ways of minimising any risks from continuing exposure, said a spokesman. There could be other factors in the environment that are producing health effects[I] WHO spokesman Mike Repacholi But the mission will also try to establish if there are other substances besides DU in the area that could be causing health problems. "We don't want to concentrate our efforts on DU when there could be other factors in the environment that are producing health effects, " said Mike Repacholi, WHO's co-ordinator for occupational and environmental health. The mission would also enable WHO to "start looking at further studies of populations that might have been exposed to depleted uranium," he said. [I] Some veterans claim their health has suffered Controversy over the weapons has deepened since reports emerged that some might have contained plutonium, which is even deadlier than uranium. Germany has demanded answers from Washington over the claims, and the US charge d'affaires in Berlin was summoned to the Foreign Ministry to give an explanation. Many governments across Europe are already conducting inquiries into whether soldiers were put at an increased risk of cancer by the DU shells. On Thursday, Italian Defence Minister Sergio Mattarella announced the death of an eighth Italian soldier who served with the NATO-led peacekeeping forces in the Balkans. 'HIGHER RADIATION RISK' Switzerland and Spain have added their voices to concern at the possible use of plutonium, and have instructed their teams already gathering evidence on the DU shells to check for plutonium. The UN said earlier this week that recycled uranium appeared to have been used in DU weapons in Kosovo. The radioactivity of recycled uranium is higher than that found in DU, and some experts say it would make it more likely that plutonium was also present. The Swiss Federal Institute of Technology said the separation of plutonium from uranium during the reprocessing of nuclear fuel would normally leave traces. ***************************************************************** 24 Nevada Nuclear Test Site to Host Huge Wind Farm Environment News Service: WASHINGTON, DC, January 18, 2001 (ENS) - Part of a former nuclear weapons testing site in Nevada is being transformed into the nation's second largest wind power facility. In his last week as Secretary of Energy, Bill Richardson signed an agreement with U.S. Senator Harry Reid of Nevada to build the enormous wind power facility on 664 acres of the Nevada Test Site (NTS), 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas. The agreement, paves the way for transforming the test site into a renewable energy facility that will help stabilize volatile utility supplies for both consumers and the government, particularly in California and Nevada. Energy Secretary Bill Richardson (Photo courtesy DOE) "This clean, renewable energy project will result in the second largest wind power farm in the United States," said Secretary Richardson. "The wind farm will be generating energy by the end of the year and will help increase energy supplies in California and other areas suffering from energy shortages. It also will benefit taxpayers by helping cut the Department of Energy's energy costs." The agreement, signed Wednesday at the U.S. Capitol by Reid and Richardson, links the MNS Wind Company and the Nevada Test Site Development Corporation (NTSDC) in a partnership created to produce energy from the wind at the Nevada Test Site. MNS Wind Company is a partnership being negotiated between M&N Wind Power of La Jolla, California and Siemens Energy & Automation, Inc. of Atlanta, Georgia. "The time is right to embrace new forms of clean energy and Nevada is the right location to build a pollution free wind farm that will serve as a source for that much needed power," said Senator Reid. Nevada Senator Harry Reid, a Democrat, was instrumental in getting the wind farm for the Nevada Test Site. (Photo courtesy Office of the Senator) "We should all learn from California's experience with electricity deregulation and begin work now to make these changes, before deregulation takes place. As demand for power continues to increase in California, Nevada and elsewhere, additional sources of electricity must be developed. This wind farm will aid in increasing those available power supplies, without endangering the health of the surrounding environment," Reid said. Reid played a key role in obtaining the easement on the property for the NTSDC, a nonprofit corporation that works with the Department of Energy to promote the growth of science and technology in Nevada. Larger than the state of Rhode Island, the Nevada Test Site covers 1,350-square-miles. Prior to the signing of the Limited Test Ban Treaty on August 5, 1963, which banned atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons, the Department's predecessor agencies conducted more than 1,100 above ground nuclear tests at the Nevada Test Site. Underground nuclear tests leave subsidence craters like these at the Nevada Test Site. 828 underground nuclear tests, including 24 with the UK, were conducted at the site between 1951 and 1992. (Photo courtesy The Brookings Institution) The Nevada Test Site ceased underground nuclear weapons testing in 1992. Since then, the Energy Department has performed subcritical experiments and disposes of low level radioactive waste from the site and from other Department of Energy installations. In addition, the site stores mixed transuranic waste, conducts spill testing, emergency response training, conventional weapons testing, and waste management and environmental technology studies. The test site has also partnered with the Nevada Test Site Development Corporation to produce energy from renewable sources. "There are many locations across the country where use of wind and solar power makes sense. The Nevada Test Site is just one of them, " said General John Gordon, administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). "As the owner-operator of the test site, we are glad to be able to cooperate in this project that is fully consistent with long term NNSA missions." The NTS wind turbine project furthers Secretary Richardson's commitment to have the energy department begin purchasing three percent of its electricity from green power facilities: sun, wind, biomass, and geothermal energy located throughout the United States. With the Nevada Test Site wind farm project in place, the department will meet its 2005 renewable energy goal of three percent two years early. The department has also committed to purchasing 7.5 percent of its electricity from non-hydro renewable energy sources by 2010. The first phase of the three phase project calls for at least 120 wind turbines to be operational by the end of 2001 and supply 85 megawatts of electricity. It is enough power to supply 85,000 people from some of the nation's fastest growing communities, including Nevada and California. The other two phases of the project will be developed 18 months after the first phase is completed. Windfarms like this one in Palm Springs, California, are increasingly providing power to the electric grid. (Photo by Warren Gretz courtesy National Renewable Energy Lab) Following those two installations, the wind farm will have 325 wind turbines producing 260 megawatts of electricity or enough to supply power for 260,000 people. The project also will create jobs for 150 to 200 construction workers and about 30 maintenance and operating jobs. The wind farm will contribute to the ability of the department's Nevada Operations Office to support the national security mission of the NTS. Prorated over the three phases of the project, the wind farm operators will provide DOE's Nevada Operations Office with free energy equivalent to ten percent of its NTS electrical consumption last year. Potential construction, operation, and maintenance work from the wind farm may also reduce infrastructure and site service costs to DOE programs and other users of the NTS. The Energy Department's green power purchase will stimulate the development of approximately 50 new megawatts of renewable energy sources in the United States. This purchase also will help encourage the development of renewable power generation by small and disadvantaged businesses, including some owned by Native Americans. ***************************************************************** 25 Meeting to focus on impact of DOE contractor layoffs Oak Ridger Online --> Story last updated at 2:16 p.m. on Friday, January 19, 2001 BY PAUL PARSON Oak Ridger staff Department of Energy contractor layoffs and their effects on employee pensions will be the focus of a public meeting Monday afternoon. The meeting is being hosted by the Economic Transition and Work Force Issues Committee of the Citizens' Advisory Panel of the Oak Ridge Reservation Local Oversight Committee. The LOC provides advice to local, state and federal officials regarding DOE-related issues. Susan Kaplan, who chairs the economic committee, recently made a written request to the Office of Worker and Community Transition at DOE headquarters in Washington, D.C., for data showing voluntary and involuntary layoffs by age and years of company service by year from 1988 to the present in Oak Ridge and other DOE sites nationwide. The economic committee is investigating the economic impacts of workforce decisions made by DOE and its contractors on Oak Ridge and the surrounding region. Layoff timing, age of targeted workers and the magnitude of lost benefits may have a significant economic impact on the area's retail and housing markets, LOC officials said. The economic committee is also trying to determine if layoffs of older workers would decrease the flow of pension money into the Oak Ridge community. In a study Kaplan published in May 2000, she pointed out that there are financial incentives to laying off older employees. Assuming that a worker's salary averaged $70,000 for the three-year period prior to retirement, Kaplan's study shows that a 57-year-old Oak Ridge National Laboratory employee with 85 points would make an annual pension of around $25,000 when he or she retired. But if that person had to take a voluntary departure from a DOE facility at age 50, then he or she would get an annual pension of around $10, 000, the study indicates. Officials with the economic committee hope to receive feedback on these issues from laid-off contractor employees. The Economic Transition and Work Force Issues Committee meeting, which is open to the public, is scheduled for 2 p.m. Monday in the Grand Conference Room of the Oak Ridge Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation office, 761 Emory Valley Road. For more information, contact Kaplan at 927-3784 or Susan Gawarecki, executive director of the LOC, at 483-1333. [*][I] All Contents cCopyright The Oak Ridger ***************************************************************** 26 Hazardous exposure review to encompass seven counties Oak Ridger Online --> Story last updated at 2:04 p.m. on Friday, January 19, 2001 Charles Washington, a member of the Oak Ridge Reservation Health Effects Subcommittee, discussed a health assessment planned for Anderson and six other counties. The Health Effects Subcommittee met Thursday at the Oak Ridge YWCA.--Photo by Brenda Mask Hazardous exposure review to encompass seven counties PANEL SPLIT ON HAVING A REPRESENTATIVE BY PAUL PARSON Oak Ridger staff Members of the Oak Ridge Reservation Health Effects Subcommittee on Thursday choose a seven-county area to be the focus of an upcoming examination on possible chemical and radioactive exposures. However, the health panel was split on whether to let the group being held accountable for these exposures--the Department of Energy -- have a representative on the subcommittee. The Health Effects Subcommittee consists of citizens primarily from the Oak Ridge area, including Knoxville and Roane County residents, who will work with community members and advocacy groups to offer advice and recommendations to several federal agencies regarding health concerns in Oak Ridge. Those concerns include exposure to contaminants from Oak Ridge's DOE facilities. Subcommittee members are nominated by the public and then appointed by the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry based on their backgrounds, technical expertise, ethnicity and diversity of opinion, officials said. ATSDR, located in Atlanta, Ga., is a federal public health agency within the Department of Health and Human Services and is involved in hazardous waste issues. At Thursday's meeting, the subcommittee decided that a health assessment, to be conducted early this year, will consist of interviews, focus groups and telephone surveys of residents in Anderson, Knox, Loudon, Meigs, Morgan, Rhea and Roane counties. Officials anticipate having at least eight focus groups. The subcommittee's Communications and Outreach work group has been charged with determining possible focus group topics. Also at Tuesday's meeting, the subcommittee discussed the possibility of having a non-voting, DOE liaison representative on the panel. The subcommittee currently has liaison representatives from the Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of Health's East Tennessee region office and the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation. A few subcommittee members voiced objection to having a DOE representative on the panel, saying the federal agency could intimidate subcommittee members' decisions. "Quite frankly I would like a chance to intimidate them," said Al Brooks, an Oak Ridge resident. Brooks is also a member of the Citizens' Advisory Panel of the Oak Ridge Reservation Local Oversight Committee and the Oak Ridge Environmental Justice Committee. The 18-member subcommittee eventually voted 11-7 in favor of having a DOE representative. However, subcommittee member Barbara Sonnenburg, a resident of Ten Mile, pointed out that, according to the group's bylaws, it would take a two-thirds majority for the motion to be accepted. But since the subcommittee's bylaws have not been passed, the group opted to table the discussion for now. The subcommittee did approve a motion requiring the non-voting liaison representatives to have different name plates than the voting subcommittee members so they can be easily identified by the public. [*][I] All Contents cCopyright The Oak Ridger ***************************************************************** 27 AMSE exhibits/ education manager leaves after 43 years Oak Ridger Online --> Story last updated at 2:16 p.m. on Friday, January 19, 2001 Phil Lamm BY AMY L. LEE Oak Ridger staff Ask Phillip Lamm a question about himself or his career and he modestly and politely answers. But ask him to explain a concept, theory or process pertaining to the world of science and he instantly becomes engaging. Lamm, the exhibits and education manager with the American Museum of Science and Energy, is ending his 43-year career as a teacher/ demonstrator and goodwill ambassador for the 51-year-old museum. It was called the American Museum of Atomic Energy when he first arrived. One of the highlights of Lamm's demonstrations has been the Van de Graaff generator, an AMSE icon. Adults still approach him and ask about "that ball you put your hand on and your hair stands up" that they remember from their childhood. During his tenure, Lamm has represented the museum throughout the country by providing science and energy education and public information. He toured 48 states with a walk-through van that had been converted into a traveling exhibit entitled "Atoms for Peace" that focused on the peaceful uses of atomic energy. "I wish the presentations had continued throughout the nation for a longer period of time because I think there is still a misconception about nuclear energy. The general public needs to know more than they do." Lamm has also served as the coordinator of the Energy Bowl, a contest for junior and senior high students. He developed questions, recruited teams and assembled judges for the 20-year-old program. Additionally, for 15 years Lamm has coordinated the Model Bridge Building contest with professional engineering societies to encourage junior and senior high students to apply the laws of physics and math and critical- thinking skills to building a model bridge following certain specifications and rules. Lamm grew up on a farm in Franklin County, N.C., before attending Atlantic Christian College and then East Carolina Teachers College, now known as East Carolina University. He came to Oak Ridge in 1957 after seeing an advertisement in a magazine where the Atomic Energy Commission (a Department of Energy predecessor agency) was requesting a traveling science teacher. At the time, he was teaching science at Bunn High School in Bunn, N.C. "I checked into it, and they told me the position had been filled the day before, but another similar position was available--except I would be traveling to school assemblies and then to science classes to give lectures. "I interviewed and accepted the job as a teacher/demonstrator to go around the nation presenting 'This Atomic World' to schools, science classes and civic groups." "Your Stake in the Atom," a geodesic dome structure with tractor- trailer, contained atomic energy exhibits and traveled to large county and regional fairs, shopping malls and museums. Additionally, Lamm managed a tractor-trailer with interactive exhibits, which circulated to museums around the country showcasing the museum's "Energy Lab" and "Life Sciences Lab." His presentations covered topics including nuclear fission, fusion, radiation biology, fossil fuels, energy conservation and understanding the uses of medical isotopes. Such concepts seem weighty for many people. However, Lamm said he strives to explain difficult concepts by using information his audience is already familiar with. For instance, when trying to teach elementary school children how small an atom is, he will ask if they know of anything smaller than an atom. "They say, 'Yeah, ants!' or 'germs' or 'bacteria,'" he said with a laugh. A love of teaching and a passion for science have been the perfect combination and driving force that kept Lamm in his position through four government contractors--the Oak Ridge Institute of Nuclear Studies, now known as Oak Ridge Associated Universities; Science Applications International Corp., Analysas and Enterprise Advisory Service Inc. "I enjoy working with people--adults all the way down. That is the main reason I stayed with this type of work. I get a great deal of satisfaction from teaching what I felt was a great achievement in atomic energy for many people." Lamm also spent 11 months at the Columbus Science and Industry Museum in Columbus, Ohio, presenting atomic energy merit badge workshops to Boy Scouts through a 12-hour, hands-on classroom program over two consecutive Saturdays. A reception in his honor will be held from 2 to 4 p.m. Sunday at the museum. [*][I] All Contents cCopyright The Oak Ridger ***************************************************************** NOTE: In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. section 107 this material is distributed without profit or payment to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving this information for non-profit research and educational purposes only. For more information go to: *****************************************************************