***************************************************************** 08/17/01 **** RADIATION BULLETIN(RADBULL) **** VOL 9.198 ***************************************************************** RADBULL IS PRODUCED BY THE ABALONE ALLIANCE CLEARINGHOUSE ***************************************************************** NUCLEAR POWER CONTENTS 1 Feds OK increased shipments to WIPP 2 ADAMS: Items of Interest - Friday, August 17, 2001 3 Public may ask for hearing on Duke 4 S.C. girds itself for tough battle over plutonium 5 NRC Invites Public to Submit Nominations for the Advisory 6 Public Citizen Protetss DOE Plan to Recycle Radioactive Metals 7 Condon to file lawsuit 8 Radioactive Russian Waters Worry Chelyabinsk Governor 9 Boeing site in California accused of toxic releases 10 Editorial: Sellout isn't that surprising 11 TVA: Missing Unit 1 parts not a problem 12 Bush Urged Not to Scrap Recycle Ban 13 We need nuclear power, says the man who inspired the Greens 14 Do not license reactors 15 BNFL to unveil supercompactor NUCLEAR WEAPONS CONTENTS 1 Work of AMSE Transfer Exploration group begins 2 DOE Health Summary 200-03 3 Our Views: DOE and 'whisteblowers' 4 Editorial: Radiation as a weapon 5 Government should bear the burden of proof in compensation cases 6 Subject: Argonne Labs Preliminary Notice of Violation 7 Workers: Comp plan falls short 8 New chief:Omaha not out of the mix 9 DOE role in Roane probe rejected ***************************************************************** ***************************************************************** NUCLEAR POWER ARTICLES ***************************************************************** 1 Feds OK increased shipments to WIPP Roswell Daily Record News IDAHO FALLS, Idaho (AP) — Federal environmental regulators on Wednesday lifted their restrictions on nuclear waste processing in eastern Idaho, enabling the Energy Department to more than double the number of shipments its sends each week to an underground dump in New Mexico. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency notified the department, dump operators and the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory that it found new equipment used to certify the contents of the waste drums was properly functioning and waste processed through it could be moved to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant near Carlsbad. The equipment was taken out of service in late June when EPA auditors realized it had never been checked for accuracy. Regulators determined none of the waste drums inspected by the equipment posed any health or environmental threat. But it left the INEEL with an older, less efficient certification process that more than halved the amount of waste the facility could ship each week. The new equipment can process waste about three times faster. ‘‘We’re looking to go up to 10 shipments a week by the end of August,’’ INEEL spokeswoman Stacy Francis said. The facility has been averaging only three to four shipments a week for nearly two months. The processing disruption put the government further behind schedule in meeting the Dec. 31, 2002, deadline for shipping 15,000 drums of plutonium-contaminated nuclear waste out of INEEL. With less than 17 months left to meet the court-ordered deadline, the government has moved 22 percent of the required waste to the $2 billion facility near Carlsbad. Its original schedule called for 35 percent of the material to have been shipped by mid-August 2001. Failure to comply with the deadline set in the state’s 1995 nuclear waste cleanup agreement with the federal government would disrupt the Energy Department’s plans for handling and storing other nuclear waste. State oversight officials have already indicated the ability of the government to meet the deadline would determine whether the state would try to block shipments of high-level radioactive waste from western New York that were expected to be made to Idaho this summer. ***************************************************************** 2 ADAMS: Items of Interest - Friday, August 17, 2001 State of Nevada Agency for Nuclear Projects ADAMS - Items of Interest Recent Released Documents Added - Friday, August 17, 2001 These documents and others may be retrieved at the NRC PERR web site ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- --- Item ID: 012280313 Accession Number: ML011140409 Document Date: 5/3/01 Title: 05/03/01 - Results of Independent Assessment of ADAMS - Memo to Commission from Travers Author Affiliation: NRC/EDO Document/Report Number: _________________________________________________________________ Item ID: 012280308 Accession Number: ML012280288 Document Date: 6/7/01 Title: 06/27/2001 meeting with South Nuclear Operating Company regarding NRC annual performance assessment of Hatch Nuclear Plant. Author Affiliation: NRC/RGN-II Document/Report Number: _________________________________________________________________ Item ID: 012280101 Accession Number: ML012260444 Document Date: 8/8/01 Title: 08/08/01 - Ltr K Swenson, US Air Force, re extension of quality assurance program approval for radioactive material packages no. 0587. Author Affiliation: NRC/NMSS/SFPO Document/Report Number: _________________________________________________________________ Item ID: 012280102 Accession Number: ML012270318 Document Date: 8/15/01 Title: 08/28/2001 Forthcoming Meeting with South Carolina Electric & Gas Company (SCE&G) to Provide Overview & Discuss Technical Intricacies of Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station Technical Specification Amendment Request Re to Spent Fuel Pool Storage Expansion. Author Affiliation: NRC/NRR/DLPM Document/Report Number: _________________________________________________________________ Item ID: 012280310 Accession Number: ML010920214 Document Date: 3/30/01 Title: ADAMS Directional Assessment Study Report of Findings & Recommendations Author Affiliation: Harvard Computing Group Document/Report Number: _________________________________________________________________ Item ID: 012280064 Accession Number: ML012210398 Document Date: 8/8/01 Title: Comment (13) submitted by Jan Sinnott in Opposition to the NRC Proposed Rulemaking PR 1, 2, 50, 51, 52, 54, 60, 70, 73, 76 & 110, Changes to Adjudicatory Process Author Affiliation: - No Known Affiliation Document/Report Number: _________________________________________________________________ Item ID: 012280011 Accession Number: ML012070119 Document Date: 8/15/01 Title: E-Mail Correspondence Between NRC and Entergy From June 21 To July 3, 2001. Author Affiliation: NRC/RGN-I/DRS/SB Document/Report Number: _________________________________________________________________ Item ID: 012280144 Accession Number: ML012270430 Document Date: 8/15/01 Title: IR 05000286/2001006; on 05/14/2001-05/18/2001; Entergy Nuclear Northeast; Indian Point 3 Nuclear Power Plant; Event Followup.Special Inspection, loss of the backup spent fuel pool cooling system with the core fully offloaded into the spent fuel pool. Author Affiliation: NRC/RGN-I/DRS Document/Report Number: IR-01-006 _________________________________________________________________ Item ID: 012280215 Accession Number: ML012270284 Document Date: 8/14/01 Title: M010814 - Briefing on International Activities Author Affiliation: Court Reporter Document/Report Number: _________________________________________________________________ Item ID: 012280355 Accession Number: ML012280351 Document Date: 8/15/01 Title: M010815A - Briefing on EEO Programs. Author Affiliation: NRC/OCM Document/Report Number: _________________________________________________________________ Item ID: 012280354 Accession Number: ML012280382 Document Date: 8/15/01 Title: M010815C - Meeting with Organization of Agreement States (OAS) and CRCPD. Author Affiliation: NRC/OCM Document/Report Number: _________________________________________________________________ Item ID: 012280028 Accession Number: ML012200022 Document Date: 8/3/01 Title: Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant (PORTS) Summary of 10CFR95.57(b) Reports. Author Affiliation: United States Enrichment Corp Document/Report Number: _________________________________________________________________ Item ID: 012280229 Accession Number: ML012280032 Document Date: 8/8/01 Title: Press Release-01-098: NRC Seeks Public Comment On Proposed Rule Allowing Parts Of Reactor Sites To Be Released For Unrestricted Use Author Affiliation: NRC/OPA Document/Report Number: Press Release-01-098 _________________________________________________________________ Item ID: 012280230 Accession Number: ML012280037 Document Date: 8/9/01 Title: Press Release-01-099: NRC Comments On GAO Report On Indian Point 2 Emergency Preparedness Author Affiliation: NRC/OPA Document/Report Number: Press Release-01-099 _________________________________________________________________ Item ID: 012280231 Accession Number: ML012280048 Document Date: 8/10/01 Title: Press Release-01-100: NRC Introduces New Version Of ADAMS Based On Public Comment, Operational Experience Author Affiliation: NRC/OPA Document/Report Number: Press Release 01-100 _________________________________________________________________ Item ID: 012280232 Accession Number: ML012280051 Document Date: 8/10/01 Title: Press Release-01-101: NRC Advisory Committee On Nuclear Waste To Meet August 28 - 30 In Rockville, Maryland Author Affiliation: NRC/OPA Document/Report Number: Press Release-01-101 _________________________________________________________________ Item ID: 012280234 Accession Number: ML012280068 Document Date: 8/10/01 Title: Press Release-I-01-051: NRC To Hold Public Meeting On Inspection Programs For Steam Generators At Salem Nuclear Plant Author Affiliation: NRC/OPA Document/Report Number: press Release-I-01-051 _________________________________________________________________ Item ID: 012280219 Accession Number: ML012130089 Document Date: 7/2/01 Title: Press Release-II-01-023: NRC To Meet With Duke Energy Officials To Discuss Safety Performance At McGuire Nuclear Power Plant. Author Affiliation: NRC/OPA:RGN-II/FO Document/Report Number: Press Release-II-01-023 _________________________________________________________________ Item ID: 012280162 Accession Number: ML012050047 Document Date: 7/12/01 Title: Reactor Oversight Process Summary of Public Meeting Held on July 12, 2001. Author Affiliation: NRC/NRR/DIPM/IPB Document/Report Number: _________________________________________________________________ Item ID: 012280189 Accession Number: ML012270115 Document Date: 8/13/01 Title: Reactor Oversight Process Summary of Public Meeting Held on July 13, 2001 With NRC/Industry Working Group on Safety System Unavailability. Author Affiliation: NRC/NRR/DIPM/IPB Document/Report Number: _________________________________________________________________ Item ID: 012280156 Accession Number: ML012250004 Document Date: 8/9/01 Title: Scoping Summary Report - Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility Savannah River Site Author Affiliation: NRC Document/Report Number: _________________________________________________________________ Item ID: 012280226 Accession Number: ML012280021 Document Date: 8/6/01 Title: Speech-01-020: The Leadership Challenge Shaping Our Future Challenges Facing The NRC. Author Affiliation: NRC/Chairman, NRC/OPA Document/Report Number: Speech-01-020 _________________________________________________________________ Item ID: 012280015 Accession Number: ML012180296 Document Date: 8/3/01 Title: Summary of 07/31/2001 meeting with risk-informed technical specification task force (RITSTF). Author Affiliation: NRC/NRR/DRIP/RTSB Document/Report Number: ***************************************************************** 3 Public may ask for hearing on Duke [charlotte.com] Published Friday, August 17, 2001 REQUEST DEADLINE IS SEPT. 14 Public may ask for hearing on Duke Energy firm has filedfor operating extensionson 4 nuclear reactors By BRUCE HENDERSON Members of the public may now ask for a hearing on Duke Energy's application to extend the licenses for four nuclear reactors near Charlotte by 20 years, the federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission says. Duke submitted applications June 13 to renew licenses for reactors at the McGuire nuclear station on Lake Norman and Catawba station on Lake Wylie. The commission staff has decided the application was complete enough for a detailed review. If the renewals are granted, the reactors at McGuire and Catawba could operate until between 2041 and 2043. The current 40-year licenses expire between 2021 and 2026. Requests for a hearing on the application have to be filed by Sept. 14. Requests can come from anyone "whose interest might be affected by the license renewals" and who wishes to participate as a party to the proceeding. Send requests to Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington DC 20555-0001, Attention: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff. Copies of the request should be sent to the Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington DC 20555-0001 and to Michael S. Tuckman, executive vice president, nuclear generation, Duke Energy Corp., 526 S. Church St., P.O. Box 1006, Charlotte 28201-1006. Copies of Duke's application are at www.nrc.gov/NRC/REACTOR/LR/index.htmlor through the commission's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System by calling (301) 415-4737 or (800) 397-4209. Copies of the McGuire application are also at the J. Murrey Atkins Library at UNCCharlotte and the Catawba application at the Rock Hill (S.C.) Public Library. ***************************************************************** 4 S.C. girds itself for tough battle over plutonium [charlotte.com] Published Friday, August 17, 2001 ATTORNEY GENERAL To Sue U.S. S.C. girds itself for tough battle over plutonium Political rivals agreefederal stand is wrong,want to block waste By HENRY EICHEL Columbia Bureau COLUMBIA -- The federal government's plan to truck about 55 tons of radioactive plutonium into South Carolina has the governor threatening to lie down in the road and the state's attorney general announcing he will sue. "The governor is prepared to take the strongest measures possible," Cortney Owings, acting press secretary to Gov. Jim Hodges, said Thursday. She said the governor was serious when he said last week: "If it is necessary for me to lie down in front of the trucks, I'll do that." Hodges and Attorney General Charlie Condon, bitter political rivals, find themselves agreeing that the federal government has reneged on a deal to send part of the plutonium to Nevada. But as they jockey for the populist high ground, they're pursuing different strategies. Hodges has ordered troopers and transportation police to practice blocking roads and gates into the federal Savannah River Site, the former nuclear weapons complex near Aiken, about 150 miles southwest of Charlotte. He ordered training exercises near the site Aug. 29 and said he plans to be there to observe. Condon announced plans Thursday to sue the federal government to stop the plutonium shipments. "We will not allow South Carolina to be turned into a nuclear dumping ground," he said. The federal Energy Department says it plans sometime after Oct. 1 to send a tractor-trailer truck loaded with drums of plutonium scrap and powder to Aiken from the defunct Rocky Flats nuclear weapons plant in Colorado. Many more shipments are to follow over the next two years, primarily from Rocky Flats and weapons plants in Texas and Washington state. It is unclear whether any of the shipments will pass through North Carolina. "These are classified shipments; nobody will be notified when they're on the road or where," said Energy Department spokesman Jim Giusti. The government has been shipping plutonium to and from the Savannah River complex by truck and by rail, for the past 50 years. During the Cold War, the complex manufactured plutonium for the nation's nuclear warheads. Later, it became a repository for spent fuel rods from nuclear power plants. What's different about the proposed shipments is that Hodges accuses the Energy Department of reneging on a deal the state had with the Clinton administration. In the deal, the state would allow the Savannah River Site to become a facility to convert about 36 tons of surplus plutonium into fuel for power plants. Roughly 19 more tons, not pure enough for fuel, would be immobilized in glass containers and shipped to Nevada, where it would be buried inside a mountain. The plan emerged from a joint U.S.-Russian agreement to rid the world of excess bomb material. But the Bush administration in the spring said it was postponing the expensive process of encasing the plutonium in glass. Under the new plan, the fuel conversion project would continue, but the portion not pure enough for fuel would be stored at Savannah River while the issue is studied. Hodges immediately complained that South Carolina would be stuck forever with the radioactive waste because no other state would want it. South Carolina is used to taking other people's waste. Thirty years ago, in order to bring jobs to a poor corner of the state, it sought and got a low-level nuclear waste landfill at Barnwell. Another landfill in Sumter County takes in non-nuclear hazardous waste from much of the eastern United States. But more recently, South Carolinians have complained of their state becoming a dumping ground. Two of Democrat Hodges' chief rivals in next year's gubernatorial election, Republicans Condon and Lt. Gov. Bob Peeler, agreed with him this week that no more plutonium should come to Savannah River without a definite plan to dispose of it elsewhere. Opposition to federal authority has deep roots in S.C. history, ever since John C. Calhoun argued in 1828 that states had the right to ignore federal laws they disagreed with. Legal scholars predict that, like Calhoun's, both Hodges' and Condon's efforts will fail because the U.S. Constitution clearly makes federal laws superior to state laws. Both of Hodges' predecessors were unsuccessful in challenging the Energy Department. In 1997, a federal judge dismissed a lawsuit by then-Gov. David Beasley to stop shipment of 19 tons of spent nuclear fuel rods to Savannah River. And in 1994, then-Gov. Carroll Campbell unsuccessfully fought to stop a trainload of nuclear waste from reaching the site. If Hodges goes through with his threat to use police to block shipments, the federal government will be able to get a court injunction ordering him to stop, said University of South Carolina law professor Eldon Wedlock. "I don't think Hodges has any real thoughts that he can be successful in a judicial challenge," Wedlock said. "He's trying to make a political point that the people of South Carolina should not be burdened with this material. He's just trying to get press over the fact, and impress people with the gravity of the situation." ***************************************************************** 5 NRC Invites Public to Submit Nominations for the Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste Press Release - 2001 - 103 - U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Office of Public Affairs Telephone: 301/415-8200 Washington, DC 20555-001 E-mail: opa@nrc.gov Web Site: http://www.nrc.gov/OPA No. 01-104 August 17, 2001 The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is seeking qualified candidates for an appointment to its Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste (ACNW). Currently, there are four members and the Commission is seeking to fill an additional position on the Committee. The ACNW is a part-time advisory group established by the NRC in 1988 to provide independent technical review of and advice on the disposal of nuclear waste, including all aspects of nuclear waste disposal facilities, as directed by the NRC. This encompasses activities related to both high- and low-level radioactive waste disposal facilities, including the licensing, operation and closure of the facilities, rulemakings, and associated regulatory guides and technical positions developed to clarify the intent of NRC's regulations. As part of these activities, the ACNW reviews performance assessments of radioactive waste disposal facilities. The ACNW membership includes individuals who possess specific technical expertise along with a broad perspective in addressing safety concerns. Committee members are selected from a variety of engineering and scientific disciplines, such as risk assessment, chemistry, mechanical engineering, civil engineering, materials sciences, and earth sciences. The Commission is seeking an additional individual with technical expertise in health physics, dose assessment, and consequence modeling. Committee members serve a 4-year term, with the possibility of reappointment, for a total possible service of 8 years. Candidates typically have 15-20 years of experience, graduate level education, and significant experience in the area of health physics, including dose assessment and consequence modeling. Criteria used to evaluate candidates include education and experience, demonstrated skills in nuclear waste management matters, and the ability to solve complex technical problems. The Commission, in selecting its Committee members, considers the need for a specific expertise to accomplish the work expected to come before the ACNW. Consistent with the requirements of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, the Commission seeks candidates with diverse backgrounds so that the membership on the Committee will be fairly balanced in terms of the points of view represented and functions to be performed by the Committee. Candidates for ACNW appointments may be involved in or have financial interests related to NRC-regulated aspects of the nuclear industry. Because conflict-of-interest considerations may restrict the participation of ACNW members in Committee activities, the degree and nature of any such restriction on an individual's activities as a member will be considered in the selection process. Each qualified candidate's financial interests must be reconciled with applicable Federal and NRC rules and regulations prior to final appointment. This may require divestiture of securities or discontinuance of certain contracts or grants. Information regarding these restrictions will be provided upon request. Interested candidates should submit a resumé describing their educational and professional background, including special accomplishments and professional references, their current address, telephone number, and e-mail address. Appointment will be made without regard to such factors as race, color, religion, national origin, sex, age, or disabilities. Candidates must be citizens of the United States and be able to devote approximately 50-100 days per year to Committee business. Applications will be accepted until November 16. Copies of nominees resumés should be sent to the Office of Human Resources, ATTN: Sherry Meador, Mail Stop T2E-26, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001. ***************************************************************** 6 Public Citizen Protetss DOE Plan to Recycle Radioactive Metals Aug. 16, 2001 Flawed Hearing Process Indicates Nuclear Waste Recycling is a Foregone Conclusion ARLINGTON, Va. – The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is stacking the deck against the public in an effort to do the nuclear industry’s bidding and ultimately authorize the recycling of radioactive waste into consumer products, Public Citizen said at a hearing today. Even though there is virtually no public support for the recycling of radioactive waste, the agency has embarked on the process necessary to authorize it, Public Citizen said. As part of this process, the DOE is holding two public hearings today in Arlington. But the public was given just a month’s notice – not enough time to study what is a complex issue and prepare comments, particularly during a time when so many people are away. The DOE is required to take public comments into account in determining the scope of its Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS). The DOE – under heavy pressure from the nuclear industry – is developing a program to dump vast quantities of radioactive scrap metal into municipal landfills or to recycle it into everyday household products and industrial materials. Currently, some radioactive wastes and materials – except some metals – can be released from DOE nuclear weapons sites without restrictions. The DOE, in January and July 2000, banned the release of some radioactive metals, but the policy being discussed in the hearings would replace those bans. The DOE’s process to authorize the release of radioactive metals begins with the PEIS being discussed at today’s hearings. The PEIS process has not had a promising start. The DOE initially contracted with San Diego-based Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) to perform an environmental review of the recycling plan. But SAIC would profit from radioactive recycling at a nuclear waste site in Tennessee – a clear conflict of interest. In late July, Public Citizen and others pointed out the conflict to the DOE, and the agency revoked the contract. A similar conflict involving radioactive recycling led to the termination last year of an SAIC contract with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. "Today’s hearings should have been postponed until another contractor was chosen," said Wenonah Hauter, director of Public Citizen's Critical Mass Energy and Environment Program. "The agency should make all documents relevant to contractor selection available for review well in advance of any hearing. Evaluating the contractor is a crucial part of an open process." Another flaw in the process was revealed this week. For a similar Cincinnati public hearing on Tuesday, a telephone conference was quietly set up to allow "interested DOE/contractor staff and stakeholders at Paducah and Portsmouth to participate," according to a DOE employee’s e-mail. But members of the public who have expressed an interest in being kept up to date on issue and the PEIS process and who are on the PEIS distribution e-mail list were never notified or invited to participate by teleconference. "It has become clear that the DOE really wants to hear only from its own employees and contractors who support this ludicrous plan," said Public Citizen policy analyst David Ritter. "When special notification regarding this issue is sent out to DOE staff, but not to those on the PEIS distribution list, it indicates the degree to which DOE wants to stack the deck at these hearings." Yet another flaw in the process is evident in the DOE’s choice of hearing facilitator: Holmes Brown, a longtime employee of Afton Associates, Inc. Afton Associates is a paid advocate for the interests of radioactive waste producers and has received funding indirectly from the DOE to promote nuclear programs. Public interest groups are requesting information from the DOE about Brown and about the conflict of interest in the now-canceled SAIC contract. "The hiring of a nuclear industry lobbyist to facilitate these so-called public hearings is clear evidence that the DOE is trying to push this plan through no matter what," Hauter said. "The DOE wants to help the industry follow the polluter’s golden rule: The solution to pollution is dilution." The DOE also has failed to make available to the public records indicating what radioactive materials have been and are currently being dispersed without restrictions or recycled into everyday products. Public Citizen is urging the agency to stop dispersing radioactive materials and to strengthen and expand its current bans on recycling radioactive metal. The DOE hearings are to be held today from 2-5 p.m. and 8-11 p.m. at the Hilton Crystal City, 2399 Jefferson Davis Highway, in Arlington, Va. Public Citizen representatives will be available to consult with the public and the media at both sessions. Public Citizen ***************************************************************** 7 Condon to file lawsuit S.C. attorney general will try to stop shipments of plutonium to the Savannah River Site By MICHELLE R. DAVIS Staff Writer South Carolina Attorney General Charlie Condon said Thursday he would sue the U.S. Department of Energy to stop shipments of plutonium bound for the Savannah River Site. Condon and other state officials are worried that the Bush administration has plans to permanently store excess plutonium, a dangerous radioactive material, in South Carolina. Earlier this week, Gov. Jim Hodges threatened to call out state troopers to block plutonium shipments from coming into the state. "It's apparent that the federal government plans to store the plutonium permanently at the Savannah River Site," said Condon, who said he will file the lawsuit in federal court next week. "That's not going to be acceptable." The U.S. Department of Energy says Savannah River Site is only a temporary stop for the plutonium. DOE has said it plans to convert plutonium into fuel for commercial nuclear reactors or into safer glass logs for permanent storage in Nevada. But the glass conversion facility has been put on hold, and estimates for disposing of the plutonium have come in at 50 percent over budget. That makes state officials worry that the plutonium will come into SRS and never leave. Next week, officials from DOE, the governor's office and some South Carolina congressional offices will meet in Washington in hopes of resolving the situation. SRS, located near Aiken, is a former nuclear weapons facility. Hodges was concerned that shipments could come as soon as this month. But the Department of Energy said the shipment will likely take place in October. DOE spokesman Joe Davis said the delay is because the shipment of plutonium is not ready (--) not because of Hodges' recent comments. About 17 facilities around the country need to ship plutonium, according to U.S. Rep. John Spratt, D-S.C. Rocky Flats, Colo., would be the first to ship plutonium to SRS, according to plans. Spratt, a York Democrat, has introduced legislation that would block shipments after Feb. 1 if the government doesn't establish a schedule for processing and disposal elsewhere. Davis said "all of our actions regarding these shipments are well within all applicable laws and regulations," adding that DOE has pledged to eventually remove from the state any plutonium shipped to SRS. But Hodges' spokeswoman Courtney Owings said Thursday that until the governor showed a "stronger resolve," the Department of Energy was "not very forthcoming" and "evasive" in providing information on the plutonium shipments. "We believe the role the governor has taken has definitely made a difference," she said. The Bush administration is re-examining a plan set out by President Clinton in 1997 to dispose of about 50 metric tons of surplus plutonium by shipping it to SRS. That proposal included plans for two facilities at SRS: a mixed-oxide, or MOX, facility that would transform plutonium into fuel and an immobilization facility to make the plutonium into glass logs. But budget cuts and other concerns have made the future of those facilities questionable. Hodges has said he believes those cuts signal the Bush administration's intention to store plutonium at SRS for good. DOE spokesman Jim Giusti said Thursday that plans for the MOX program are still going forward, while the immobilization facility has been put on hold. Plutonium coming into the site would likely be stored in an idle reactor at SRS, Giusti said. But the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, an independent government agency that monitors safety issues at the nation's nuclear weapons sites, found the idle K reactor acceptable as a plutonium storage facility only on an "interim" basis. In a March 23, 2001, letter to Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham, the group said SRS "lags behind most of the other sites by four to six years" when it comes to packaging and stabilizing plutonium. Politics might be coming into play. Democrat Hodges, who is running for re-election, said Condon's method of seeking an injunction isn't strong enough. "Plutonium is too dangerous to leave to a legal roll of the dice," Hodges said through a spokesperson. Condon, who is running for the Republican gubernatorial nomination next year, called Hodges' plan "a recipe for civil damages and potential violence," since the plutonium shipments will be guarded by armed federal officers. Michelle R. Davis covers Washington issues from a South Carolina perspective. She can be reached by phone at (202) 383-6023 or by e-mail at mdavis@krwashington.com. Copyright 2001 The State-Record Company ***************************************************************** 8 Radioactive Russian Waters Worry Chelyabinsk Governor Environment News Service: MOSCOW, Russia, August 16, 2001 (ENS) - The governor of Russia's Chelyabinsk region, Petr Sumin, has warned that water in his district is contaminated with radioactivity from the Mayak nuclear reprocessing plant. The governor's warning, contained in a July 10 letter to Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov, was disclosed Wednesday by a Moscow based anti-nuclear environmental group. The international environmental group EcoDefense! obtained a copy of the letter and made it public out of concern for public health and safety. "It is no doubt that such letter must be disclosed because it contains information on serious threat to millions of Russian citizens," said Vladimir Slivyak, co-chairman of EcoDefense! Governor Sumin's letter says, "It becomes more and more dangerous to use the Techa River cascade, serving the Mayak facility of Minatom [Ministry of Atomic Energy]. Open water reservoirs contain about 400 million cubic meter of radioactively contaminated water. The level of these waters is about to become dangerous." [Chelyabinsk] Sofiya Khrolenko, who lived near Mayak during a 1957 nuclear accident, shows a videographer the contaminated Techa River. (Photo courtesy Log In Productions) The Chelyabinsk governor demanded immediate action to solve the problem of radioactive pollution in the water. Mayak, Russia's only nuclear reprocessing plant, has dumped its radioactive waste into Russian rivers over the past 40 years, Slivyak says. Governor Sumin suggests that constructing a new nuclear plant is the key to the Mayak problem. He writes, "building of the South-Ural nuclear power plant allows to solve this problem effectively." Slivyak calls that plan "disastrous" and "absurd." Instead of working to get rid of 400 million cubic meters of radioactive waste, Slivyak says, "Chelyabinsk authority proposes a plan that will increase the amount of nuclear waste in the region as a result of new nuclear plant operation." An estimated 14,000 tons of high-level radioactive waste, such as spent nuclear fuel, has accumulated at Russian nuclear plants. Slivyak says the amount of medium and low-level radioactive waste in Russia cannot be calculated across the country because the amount is large and not all of the locations where it is stored are known to the public. In May, the Russian government changed a law to open the border for foreign spent nuclear fuel to be stored or reprocessed in Russia. Established as an atomic weapons complex in the late 1940s, Mayak is now the only reprocessing facility operating in Russia. It can handle an estimated 400 tons a year, but Slivyak says that during the 1990s, the plant was reprocessing no more than 150 tons of spent nuclear fuel annually. According to a source at the plant, it needs modernization that would cost about US$600 million. [demonstration] Russian anti-nuclear protesters lie on a street in Chelyabinsk August 3, 2000 (Photos courtesy EcoDefense!) The Chelyabinsk district, called an oblast, is situated in the southern Urals bordering on Kazakhstan in the south and Bashkortostan in the west. A large amount of land near the Mayak facility is still contaminated as a result of a 1957 accident comparable to Chernobyl in its effects. On September 29, 1957, a Mayak tank containing radioactive waste exploded, releasing several millions of Ci of radioactivity into the atmosphere. Thousands of people were resettled, thousands of square kilometers were polluted. There is special federal program to rehabilitate this territory in Russian budget, but it is not clear what kind of programs are implemented within its framework. "Mayak must be shut down as soon as possible," Slivyak said. "The more it operates, the more plutonium will be generated out of spent fuel reprocessing. Russia doesn't need this plutonium, it already has more than enough, so it's unlikely that this material will ever be properly watched and protected," the anti-nuclear campaigner says. Environmental Press Releases © Environment News Service (ENS) 2001. All Rights Reserved. ***************************************************************** 9 Boeing site in California accused of toxic releases Friday, August 17, 2001 By BETH BARRETT LOS ANGELES DAILY NEWS SIMI VALLEY, Calif. -- State officials cited The Boeing Co. 38 times for high levels of mercury and other toxic materials that were found in samples of water draining from its former nuclear reactor test site in Ventura County's Simi hills, the Los Angeles Daily News has learned. The California Regional Water Quality Control Board issued the notice of violations June 27 after samples between January 2000 and March 2001 were provided by the company. One mercury reading was 191 times what the permit allowed, according to agency documents. Mercury in aquatic ecosystems can become concentrated in fish, posing a health hazard to human consumers. Of 2,000 companies reporting quarterly, Boeing is among about 240 cited, said Dennis Dickerson, the water quality board's executive officer. Many of the others were cited for a single violation each, he added. With thousands of dollars in potential fines at stake, the company responded July 26 that most of the citations reflect laboratory errors, reporting errors, improper permit conditions and possible permit misinterpretations by the board. In addition, Steve Lafflam, Boeing division director of safety, health and environmental affairs, said none of the citations involved radioactive materials. He said there is no evidence the mercury left the lab boundaries; the site contains settling ponds designed to collect the metal. Boeing officials plan to meet with state regulators next week and hope to have some of the citations dismissed, Lafflam said yesterday. Still, company officials estimate that 20 to 30 truckloads of mercury-contaminated dirt will need to be removed near the vacant site of an old experimental sodium reactor. "It is at a low level and not a risk to human health or the environment," said Art Lenox, the company's project manager who is overseeing chemical cleanup at the lab. Story last updated at 11:17 a.m. on Friday, August 17, 2001 by Paul Parson Oak Ridger staff BNFL Inc. is scheduled Tuesday to officially unveil the "largest compactor ever used in the nuclear industry," according to company officials. "We've been waiting for this moment," said BNFL spokesman Norman Hammitt, who added that U.S. Rep. Zach Wamp, R-3rd District, is expected to attend the unveiling. BNFL's supercompactor was designed to take metal that can't be recycled because of contamination or its shape and compress it to a recyclable size before it is sent off-site for disposal. Housed in a 28,000-square-foot facility, the supercompactor is powered by 2,200 tons of hydraulic force and can process up to 58 tons of metal per hour, according to officials. The machine can compact items up to 26 feet long, 14 feet wide and 6 feet high. The goal, according to BNFL officials, is to have the supercompactor process two million pounds of materials per week. DOE and BNFL signed a $238 million, six-year, fixed-price contract on Aug. 25, 1997, to decontaminate and decommission three buildings at K-25. Those buildings are K-33, which totals 2.8 million square feet; K-29, 586,880 square feet; and K-31, 1.4 million square feet. BNFL gets paid after it completes milestones on the project. All Contents ©Copyright The Oak Ridger ***************************************************************** ***************************************************************** NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARTICLES ***************************************************************** 1 Work of AMSE Transfer Exploration group begins Oak Ridger Online --> Story last updated at 12:28 p.m. on Friday, August 17, 2001 by Amy L. Lee Oak Ridger staff A tour of the American Museum of Science and Energy is the first order of business for the newly formed AMSE Transfer Exploration Committee, which met Wednesday with members of city staff, David Bean of AMSE and Department of Energy officials to begin gathering background information regarding the museum. The meeting was held at the Municipal Building. Committee members Tom Beehan, Willie Golden and David Mosby, all newly elected City Council members, met to discuss the committee's charge, which is to gather data about the potential transfer of the museum from DOE and the future operation of the facility, to determine the conditions under which DOE intends to transfer the facility to the city, recommend a community vision for AMSE's long-term status, and recommend a policy regarding the city's role in this vision. The committee will provide a written report to council by Dec. 10 of this year, and upon council's acceptance of the report, the committee will cease to exist. Mosby, who chairs the committee, suggested the group's formation following council's recent unwillingness to hire Amaze Design Inc. of Boston, Mass. City staff had discussed a $100,000 two-phase study with the firm to analyze operating costs, identify necessary capital expenditures, determine if AMSE could become self-sufficient and develop a management structure. "The council missed an excellent opportunity to provide leadership for the city by allowing the museum resolution to be defeated and not providing further guidance to staff," Mosby said. "Council must be aggressively proactive in planning a path forward on this very important issue for the city." Mosby said he believes the city should assume ownership of AMSE, if DOE offers the transfer, and that operation of the museum must not create an unnecessary burden to taxpayers. After eliminating funding last October, DOE requested that UT-Battelle provide a plan for the long-term stability of the museum, which falls under UT-Battelle's contract with DOE to manage Oak Ridge National Laboratory. The resulting plan included transferring ownership of the museum to the city. In December, City Manager Paul Boyer was authorized to enter discussions with DOE regarding the transfer. In March, council approved the concept of transferring the museum to the city, including the land surrounding the facility. However, council voted 4 to 3 May 21 against approving the contract to hire Amaze Design without further study or direction to city staff. The museum, which gets about 138,000 visitors annually, is one of the primary attractions promoted by the Oak Ridge Convention and Visitors Bureau. "We are very interested in the long-range stability of the museum. It's important to tourism," said Joe Valentino, executive director of the Convention and Visitors Bureau, which is located next door to AMSE. The Convention and Visitors Bureau building was built as an exhibit for the 1982 World's Fair. Each year 10,000 visitors pass through the CVB's doors. "We have a lot of cards involved in this game," Valentino said. Bean said the staff is "very interested in what goes on" and that their primary concern is that the transfer occurs and to maintain growth. All Contents ©Copyright The Oak Ridger ***************************************************************** 2 DOE Health Summary 200-03 The Office of Environment, Safety and Health (EH) publishes the Operating Experience Summary to promote safety throughout the Department of Energy (DOE) complex by encouraging the exchange of lessons-learned information among DOE facilities. To issue the Summary in a timely manner, EH relies on preliminary information such as daily operations reports, notification reports, and, time permitting, conversations with cognizant facility or DOE field office staff. If you have additional pertinent information or identify inaccurate statements in the Summary, please bring this to the attention of Frank Russo, 301-903-1845, or Internet address Frank.Russo@eh.doe.gov, so we may issue a correction. Operating Experience Summary 2001-03 TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. WORKER’S TOES CRUSHED BY TUBE BUNDLE FRAME 1 2. FALL FROM LOADING DOCK INJURES WORKER 2 3. HORSEPLAY LEADS TO NEAR MISS AT CONSTRUCTION SITE 3 4. IMPROVED COMMUNICATION HELPS MITIGATE WILDFIRE IMPACT 3 5. FIRE HAZARD FROM FOAM INSULATION 4 EVENTS 1. WORKER’S TOES CRUSHED BY TUBE BUNDLE FRAME On July 3, 2001, at the East Tennessee Technology Park (ETTP) Building K-33, a heavy tube bundle frame rolled onto a worker’s foot and crushed two of his toes. The worker was using a plasma torch to cut the frame, in compliance with a disassembly practice used many times before without incident. The possibility of unstable frame orientations and the hazards from pinch points had not been addressed in the design of the disassembly. (ORPS Report ORO--BNFL-K33-2001-0010) Tube bundle frames supported barrier tubes inside converters used for uranium enrichment at the K-25 Gaseous Diffusion Plant. During dismantlement, the tubes are removed before the frames are disassembled. A frame weighs over 11,000 pounds and consists of parallel support bars and several disk-shaped tube sheets (see Figure 1). The frames are lowered horizontally by crane onto a disassembly stand constructed of I-beams and then cut apart with cutting torches. In past practices, the frames rested on the stands during the cutting operation without another form of restraint, with a maximum of four inches between each tube sheet and the stand. In over 400 previous disassembly operations, the frame had never shifted during cutting. However, in this occurrence, the frame rolled as the worker cut partway through the center pipe in the frame. His left foot was positioned between an I-beam and a tube sheet (see Figure 2). The frame crushed his toes even though he was wearing boots with steel toecaps. The weight of the frame broke his first and second toes, rupturing blood vessels in the latter. The worker was hospitalized for four days, during which time a pin was surgically implanted in his big toe. Figure 1. Tube Sheet in Tube Bundle Frame Figure 2. Location of Worker’s Foot in Pinch Point A preliminary investigation team inspected the frame soon after the accident and found the tube sheets still in line and parallel, indicating the frame had rolled and not twisted or deformed. One of the key questions addressed in the contractor’s accident investigation was why the frame rolled in this occurrence and not in previous instances. By observing frame movement evolutions, the investigation team found that in most cases, a stabilizer bar or jack plate prevented the frame from moving on the disassembly stand. But in one unique set-down position, the frame was unstable and could roll. The accident investigation team found that the tube bundle frame disassembly design did not recognize the hazards from gaps and pinch points or the possibility of unstable frame orientations. Frame dimensions varied and there was no control on frame orientation, nor any requirement to secure the frame to the disassembly stand. Corrective actions taken by the contractor include revising the work procedure to require securing the frames during dismantling. The contractor will also revise its enhanced work planning process to better identify and address pinch point hazards. A search of ORPS reports for the past two years found five other occurrences in which pinch point hazards injured or nearly injured workers. On March 28, 2001, a machinist at the Y-12 Plant lost the tip of his finger between a forklift tine and the lathe it was supporting. (ORPS Report ORO--BWXT-Y12NUCLEAR-2001-0012). On April 12, 2001, a well driller at Pantex injured his finger between a loaded hopper and the forks of a skid loader. (ORPS Report ALO-AO-BWXP-PANTEX-2001-0024). These occurrences demonstrate the importance of addressing pinch point hazards in work planning. The injury at Building K-33 also shows that, although operations with heavy equipment can be repeated many times without mishap or indication of danger, a risk to workers may still exist unless all potentially hazardous situations are identified and addressed. KEYWORDS: Injury, heavy equipment, pinch point ISM CORE FUNCTIONS: Analyze the Hazards, Develop and Implement Hazard Controls 2. FALL FROM LOADING DOCK INJURES WORKER On July 3, 2001, a worker collecting soiled laundry at the loading dock at Y-12 Plant Building 9995 fell from the dock and injured his head and toe. He was treated at a nearby hospital trauma center and released the same day. This occurrence was a near miss of a more serious injury, and may have been prevented had fall hazards at the dock been better identified and controlled. (ORPS Report ORO--BWXT-Y12SITE-2001-0024) The loading dock is an elevator dock that can be raised from its lowest level, approximately two feet above the pavement, to its upper level, six and one-half feet above the pavement. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) set forth requirements in 29 CFR 1910.23.c that handrails or an equivalent must be in place to guard open-sided floors or platforms that are raised four feet or more above an adjacent floor. Although two removable safety chains were available to provide fall protection at the dock, there was no signage or formalized procedure that required the chains to be in place when the dock was raised above four feet. Instead, a sign posted at the dock stated that the dock should be returned to its upper level after use. When the worker arrived, the elevator dock was at its lowest level and the two safety chains were down. The worker found that pallets and other material on the dock blocked the path to the laundry and, instead of using the stairs, he stepped onto the dock. He then directed a truck driver he was working with to raise the dock to its upper level so that the materials could be removed. The safety chains were not installed. While clearing a path to the laundry, the worker snagged his glove on one of the pallets. This caused him to lose his balance, and he fell from the dock to the pavement below, injuring the back of his head and his toe. The driver checked the worker and radioed for an ambulance and assistance. The ambulance crew stabilized the worker and transported him to the nearest hospital trauma center where he was evaluated, treated, and released with instructions to go home for the rest of the day. The contractor initiated an investigation of the accident and reported it as a near miss, recognizing the potentially greater consequences that might have occurred. The contractor is still developing corrective actions and lessons learned from this occurrence; however, at this time, it appears that new signage will be installed calling for the use of safety chains, and replacement of the chains with handrails is under consideration. A search of ORPS reports from the past two years found no other occurrences involving injuries due to falls from loading docks. However, there were over 40 occurrences involving violations of fall protection requirements during this time, one of which involved a loading dock. On January 17, 2000, a custodial worker in Rocky Flats Building 111 was found on a second-story loading dock without fall protection, although postings stated that fall protection was required. (ORPS Report RFO--KHLL-FACOPS-2000-0001) KEYWORDS: OSHA/industrial hygiene –injury, OSHA/industrial hygiene – near miss other ISM CORE FUNCTIONS: Perform Work Within Controls 3. HORSEPLAY LEADS TO NEAR MISS AT CONSTRUCTION SITE On July 12, 2001, a heavy equipment operator nearly ran his earthmoving equipment over a worker at a construction project at the Y-12 Site. The operator had become upset over the escalation of horseplay with another heavy equipment operator, and rapidly backed his pan/scraper without fully checking the path behind him. In doing so, he almost hit a third operator who was exiting the passenger side of a pickup truck. The truck driver pulled the passenger back into his truck cab, narrowly avoiding serious injury. (ORPS Report ORO--BJC-Y12WASTE-2001-0006). The horseplay between the two experienced heavy equipment operators began during the morning of July 12, 2001, when the pan/scraper operator dropped his equipment’s pan, intentionally causing dirt and dust to fly into the face of a bulldozer operator. Later, after the lunch break, the bulldozer operator retaliated by throwing water into the face of the pan/scraper operator. This angered the pan/scraper operator, who recklessly backed up his equipment while a third operator was exiting a pickup truck directly into the path of the pan/scraper. The driver of the pickup truck saw the moving equipment and quickly pulled the passenger back into the truck, narrowly avoiding the passenger from being struck. Recognizing the significant risk of the event, the subcontractor terminated the two heavy equipment operators and initiated a workforce stand-down to discuss the seriousness of horseplay while operating heavy equipment on the job site. The contractor reported this event as a near miss, unusual occurrence. A search of ORPS reports from the past two years found no similar occurrences in which the escalation of horseplay resulted in injuries or near misses. There are, however, past occurrences that illustrate the serious consequences of mishandling heavy equipment. For example, at the Monticello Millsite a scraper operator unsafely rounded a limited-visibility corner in the wrong lane and collided with another scraper, injuring both operators (ORPS Report ALO--MCTC-GJPOTAR-1999-0003). On July 20, 1997, a worker at a Brookhaven National Laboratory construction site was killed when backed over by a front-end loader during a grading operation (Reference: Type A Accident Investigation Board Report on the June 20, 1997, Construction Fatality at the Brookhaven National Laboratory Upton, New York, July 1997). KEYWORDS: OSHA/Industrial hygiene – near miss other ISM CORE FUNCTION: Perform Work Within Controls 4. IMPROVED COMMUNICATION HELPS MITIGATE WILDFIRE IMPACT On July 8, 2001, a wildfire burned about 75 acres of land at the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL). The laboratory had recently taken steps to improve communications with the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), thus enabling a more rapid response by that agency and subsequently helping to minimize the spread of the fire. (ORPS Report ID--BBWI-CFA-2001-0011) Last year, DOE experienced major wildfires at Los Alamos, Hanford, and INEEL. The Los Alamos and Hanford fires caused facility damage and evacuations. INEEL experienced three wildfires that burned a total of approximately 62,000 acres. In response to these and other wildfires, the Secretary of Energy directed initiatives aimed at improving DOE’s capabilities to prevent and respond to wildland fires. (Reference: A Report to the Secretary of Energy – Initial Joint Review of Wildland Fire Safety at DOE Sites, December 2000). One of INEEL’s site-specific improvements resulting from DOE’s wildfire initiatives included the establishment of direct radio contact with the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) to speed communication and response. The INEEL wildfire on July 8, 2001 is presumed to have started by a lightning strike at the south side of the site’s middle butte, about ten miles from Argonne-West. Responding to an initial report of a wildfire at 2:27 p.m., the INEEL Fire Department contacted BLM units by radio and worked with them to locate the fire. The INEEL Fire Department sent four wildfire units, the BLM sent five, and the Blackfoot Fire Department sent one. The BLM also responded with two air tankers that dropped fire retardants on the fire. The two fire departments and BLM worked effectively under a unified command and had the fire contained by firebreaks before 10 a.m. The fire was stopped far from any INEEL buildings. Patrols ensured no further spread of fire. The INEEL Fire Department credits part of the rapid and successful containment of the July 8, 2001 wildfire to its improved communications with the Bureau of Land Management. This good practice should be considered by others developing wildfire management plans. KEYWORDS: Wildfire, wildland fire, radio ISM Core Functions: Feedback and Continuous Improvement 5. FIRE HAZARD FROM FOAM INSULATION On July 16, 2001, contractors for the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL) declared a positive Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ) regarding the fire hazard from polyurethane foam insulation. The insulation was sprayed on the exterior walls of 11 facilities at the Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center (INTEC) during the early 1980s. Safety analysis documents for the facilities did not fully address the potential consequences from the fire loading of the foam, and did not establish controls to prevent or mitigate insulation fires. (ORPS Report ID--BBWI-LANDLORD-2001-0013) The exteriors of 11 INTEC buildings were insulated with polyurethane foam insulation and coated with an acrylic rubber elastomer in 1985. These facilities house nuclear material laboratories, deactivated processing equipment, tank farm instrumentation, and offices. The original facility safety documents did not address any fire hazard from the insulation. Fire hazard analyses developed as part of safety document upgrades in the mid-1990s recognized potential fire issues and recommended testing and evaluation of the insulation. The testing and evaluation were never performed; however, recent information on similar insulation used in Building 3019 at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) further emphasized the need to address the fire hazard from polyurethane foam insulation (see discussion below). Currently, the acrylic rubber elastomer (Diathon) coating is peeling off of the INTEC facilities’ insulation in several places, further exposing the foam to possible ignition (see Figure 1). The USQ evaluation found that six of the eleven facilities (CPP-602, CPP-620, CPP-627, CPP-630, CPP-637, and CPP-640) have an increased risk of radioactive or chemical material release due to the large fire loading from the exterior wall insulation. The other five facilities are in separate buildings and house no hazardous materials, thus facility fires pose little risk from material release. For the facilities found to have increased risk, the contractor is implementing compensatory measures that include patching areas where the coating has peeled, removing combustible materials away from the walls, and prohibiting welding and grinding operations near the exterior of the facilities. A similar polyurethane foam insulation has covered the interior walls of the penthouse for ORNL Building 3019 since the early 1970s. The Atomic Energy Commission raised fire hazard concerns about the insulation in 1973, and the contractor installed additional sprinklers along the walls to protect them from fire. A fire hazards evaluation in 1985 confirmed this protection to be adequate. However, industrial fire experience from the past 20 years and recent burn testing have shown that polyurethane foam insulation is highly combustible, with much greater fire potential than previously thought. In 2000, ORNL took further compensatory measures to address the insulation’s fire hazard, and revised the facility’s fire hazard analysis, nuclear criticality safety analysis, and safety analysis report accordingly. (ORPS Reports ORO--ORNL-X10CHEMTEC-2000-0006, ORO--ORNL-X10CHEMTEC-2000-0009, and OE Summary 2000-07) The INEEL and ORNL occurrences demonstrate that underestimating fire hazards from polyurethane foam insulation is a multi-site, multi-facility issue. Other sites and facilities using such insulation should address the insulation’s fire hazard, particularly where wildfires pose a threat. KEYWORDS: Foam insulation, fire hazard ISM CORE FUNCTIONS: Analyze the Hazards, Develop and Implement Hazard Controls ***************************************************************** 3 Our Views: DOE and 'whisteblowers' Oak Ridger Online --> Story last updated at 11:48 a.m. on Friday, August 17, 2001 Certainly as a named party in a legal complaint, the Department of Energy has every right to weigh the legal evidence and carry the cases and necessary appeals forward consistent with the best interests of the agency and American taxpayers who foot the bill. But given the sometimes long and continuing history of some of these "whistleblower" cases, where DOE has been ordered to pay injured individuals, one is left to wonder whether federal bureaucracies hide behind procedure in the hope of wearing down critics. This week, DOE appealed a ruling recommending damages be paid to three Oak Ridge whistleblowers. These individuals had expressed concerns that questionable individuals were granted security clearances, including convicted felons, drug dealers and abusers, and persons with psychological problems. Now, we do not know the details of these cases. But we do know the whole idea behind whistleblower laws is to protect the nation's vital security interests against abuses or even missteps by bureaucrats. It would be disturbing to learn that DOE might be seeking to circumvent the spirit of these laws and, in the process, compromising national security and costing taxpayers unnecessarily in the process. We trust it has weighed carefully the consequences of its ongoing appeals and the message it sends to its own workforce. All Contents ©Copyright The Oak Ridger ***************************************************************** 4 Editorial: Radiation as a weapon (captimes.com) An editorial August 14, 2001 Most Americans remain unaware that, a decade ago, this country's military deployed one of the most horrific new weapons since atomic and hydrogen bombs were developed. That weapon was the depleted uranium (DU) projectile, a radioactive device designed to expose military personnel and civilians to toxic substances that could ultimately undermine their health or kill them. The DU projectiles were used during the Persian Gulf War, as a weapon against the Iraqis. But they have turned into a nightmare not just for the people of that country, but also for the American servicemen and women who handled these irresponsible weapons. A decade after the end of the war, according to groundbreaking reporting in the Japanese press, adverse health effects from DU exposure continue to crop up among military personnel and civilians in Iraq where the fighting took place, and among U.S. and British veterans and their families. "As I traveled through the U.S., UK and Iraq to cover this story, I was confronted at every turn by the sad and frightening specter of 'discounted casualties' - people exposed to depleted uranium and other toxic substances, and now tormented by leukemia and a whole array of chronic disorders," wrote Akira Tashiro, a Hiroshima-based senior staff writer for Chugoku Shimbun, one of Japan's most respected daily newspapers. Tashiro's research has been gathered into an important new book, "Discounted Casualties: The Human Cost of Depleted Uranium." And Steve Leeper - the son of former Wisconsin state legislator and Madison peace activist Midge Miller - has been working hard to bring the book and the issues it addresses to the attention of Americans. Leeper's interest in issues of nuclear weapons and radiation led him to work in Hiroshima on peace issues. He knows Tashiro and his research well. And he will discuss depleted uranium in an important dialogue at 7 tonight at the Friends Meeting House, 1704 Roberts Court. Leeper makes the case that the United States ought to take the lead in the international struggle to ban the use of depleted uranium in weapons - not merely for the sake of other countries, but for the sake of our own soldiers. Yet so far U.S. officials have spent much of their time attempting to obscure the reality of the threat posed by DU projectiles. In 1993, Congress passed a bill authored by U.S. Rep. Lane Evans, D-Ill., ordering the Pentagon to research the effects of inhaled, ingested, and embedded DU on Gulf War veterans' health. Yet, while the Pentagon belatedly admitted in 1998 that "thousands" of Gulf War veterans may have "unnecessarily" inhaled or ingested DU dust because no warnings or protective clothing had been issued, serious research has been delayed. The truth is that the research has been done. Akira Tashiro's comprehensive book, and the insights of activists such as Steve Leeper, tell us that the time has come to ban these horrific weapons. Published: 8:52 AM 8/14/01 Copyright 2001 The Capital Times ***************************************************************** 5 Government should bear the burden of proof in compensation cases Post-Dispatch: This story was published in Editorial on Thursday, August 16, 2001. By Arjun Makhijani, And Lisa Ledwidge NUCLEAR WORKERS Last year, after decades of denial, the U.S. government made a historic acknowledgment: It had put 600,000 people who worked in its nuclear weapons program in harm's way and, as a result, made many sick. Subsequent legislation gave some workers with certain diseases the right to apply for compensation or medical treatment. It was the most dramatic about-face in nuclear history. Then-Energy Secretary Bill Richardson's decision to become a champion for these workers makes him, and the United States, stand tall. No other nuclear weapons state has yet to come even close. Since 1942, atomic workers have labored in scores of facilities across the country, including 10 sites in Missouri. Some workers in some plants suffered radiation doses so huge that they were practical death sentences. Such workers probably suffered severe kidney damage well before they got cancer, and no dialysis was available then. There is clear evidence that the safety standards of the time were violated and the government and its contractors colluded to keep that knowledge from workers. Now, although it took courage to make the historic admission of wrongdoing, the U.S. government may squander the goodwill and trust that could accrue from the compensation program. The devil, as usual, is in the details. Apart from four facilities (the three uranium enrichment plants in Tennessee, Kentucky and Ohio, and the Amchitka test site in Alaska), workers will not be given the benefit of the doubt if they get one of the cancers listed in the law. Instead, they will have to prove that their radiation doses were more likely than not the cause of the listed cancers. For many or most workers, this is likely to an impossible task for no fault of their own. Worker dose records at many of these plants are incomplete and, in many cases, shockingly deficient. In some cases they may be fraudulent, being tainted by data fabrication. The dose estimates resulting from such records will have huge uncertainties and may remain scientifically indefensible. Sloppy and incompetent science on health and environmental issues was routine throughout most of the history of nuclear weapons production. For instance, the Department of Energy has admitted that, until 1989, no effort was made to calculate internal radiation doses to workers arising from the inhalation or ingestion of radioactive materials. At the Fernald plant near Cincinnati, Ohio, where uranium for plutonium production reactors was processed, most workers in the 1950s and early 1960s were overexposed due to uranium inhalation, with about 90 percent being overexposed in 1955. The pattern of keeping health and environmental abuses of their own people secret in the name of national security is fundamentally anti-democratic. It presumes that the people would not make sacrifices for the security of their country. It presumes that top nuclear bureaucrats can make life or death decisions in defiance of established laws, norms and regulations without the informed consent of the people. Nuclear weapons workers should be given the benefit of the doubt and compensated. Many are sick now and don't have time to wait for bureaucratic procedures to see if their radiation doses can be reconstructed. For large numbers of workers, the poor state of the records makes it unlikely that even a long, expensive process would result in accurate dose estimates. It is unfair and unjust to impose the burden of proof on workers now when the government did not do its job well then. The government should assume the burden of proof. This would help redress some of the harm and set a standard that other nuclear weapons states would do well to follow. The United States should not fritter away a historic opportunity for expanding justice and democracy by example. Arjun Makhijani and Lisa Ledwidge are, respectively, president and outreach coordinator of the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Tacoma Park, Md., www.ieer.org. Published in the Editorial section of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch on Thursday, August 16, 2001. Copyright (C)2001, St. Louis Post-Dispatch ***************************************************************** 6 Subject: Argonne Labs Preliminary Notice of Violation Department of Energy Washington, DC 20585 August 14, 2001 Hermann Grunder, Ph.D. Director Argonne National Laboratory 9700 South Cass Avenue Argonne, IL 60439 EA-2001-05 Dear Dr. Grunder: This letter refers to the Department of Energy’s (DOE) evaluation of the facts and circumstances concerning an uncontrolled release of radon due to Laboratory management failures affecting nuclear safety at the Department’s Argonne National Laboratory-East (ANL-E) site. The release occurred during decontamination and decommissioning work at Building 211, a former cyclotron facility, and resulted from the opening of two vials containing what was believed to be a total of 500 millicuries of radium. This release of radon resulted in measurable uptakes of radioactive material by seven workers. While the radiation doses are well within regulatory limits, the DOE is concerned about any nuclear activity that subjects a worker to an unexpected radiological exposure. Thus, the DOE Office of Price-Anderson Enforcement, in coordination with the DOE Argonne Area Office (AAO), conducted an onsite investigation of this event during May 8-9, 2001. The results of this investigation were provided to you on June 20, 2001; and an enforcement conference was held with members of your staff on July 16, 2001, to discuss these findings. The conference’s summary report is enclosed. Based on the DOE’s investigation and information your staff provided during the enforcement conference, DOE has concluded that violations of 10 CFR 830, "Nuclear Safety Management," and 10 CFR 835, "Occupational Radiation Protection," likely occurred. I am therefore issuing the enclosed Preliminary Notice of Violation (PNOV) that describes the violations in detail. Section I of the PNOV describes violations associated with the failure to properly identify the radiological hazards involved with opening vials containing radium solutions. Specifically, ANL-E management’s use of off-site radiation safety personnel who were inexperienced in working with radium; failure to adequately develop and maintain Building 211’s Authorization Basis; and not utilizing available information regarding a previous radon contamination event that could have prevented the worker contaminations. Section II describes violations associated with work controls for stabilizing radium solutions at Building 211. These include ANL-E management’s failure to maintain several workers’ respiratory protection qualifications, and failure to prepare an acceptable work plan for stabilizing radium solutions in accordance with site requirements. Section III of the PNOV describes violations in administrative controls to maintain radiation exposures as low as reasonably achievable. These are associated with Laboratory management failing to determine the limitations of off-site radiation safety personnel before they became involved in the planning of and carrying out the radium solution stabilization, and by allowing a deficient work plan to be used that contributed to the radon release. The DOE is concerned that the hazards that created the event were not previously identified and incorporated into the work plan despite multiple opportunities to do so. Moreover, the radiation doses were low due to fortuitous circumstances in that the actual amount of radium to be stabilized was actually about 100 times less than the quantity presumed. Therefore, the safety significance of each violation warranted a Severity Level II rating. No mitigation for self-identification or corrective actions was appropriate due to (1) the self-disclosing nature of the event, (2) the ineffectiveness of previous corrective actions resulting from the November 1999 enforcement action concerning work processes and quality improvement, (3) the University of Chicago’s (University) failure to resolve chronic communication and cooperation issues affecting health physics support for nuclear work, and (4) to ensure that required management assessments of its nuclear activities were performed with regard to Building 211 activities. Furthermore, were it not for the University’s statutory exemption from civil penalties, the DOE would have included a proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $165,000 ($55,000 for each Severity Level II violation) for this event. The Department, however, recognizes the efforts of the Laboratory’s Office of Environment, Safety and Health/Quality Assurance Oversight (EQO). This organization’s function is viewed as an important part of the University’s process to respond to or mitigate any future nuclear safety deficiencies. In this instance, the timeliness in developing corrective actions, and the thoroughness of the corrective actions addressing work planning processes, the reviewing of proposed work documents, and worker training and qualification issues, highlight the potential effectiveness of this organization. What was noticeably absent, though, was the same degree of attention to management oversight deficiencies within the line organizations directly responsible for the event. The Department also recognizes the Laboratory’s senior management support of this organization and encourages continued, long-term support at this level in order for the University to better develop an institutionalized program for addressing nuclear safety issues. During the enforcement conference, Laboratory senior staff described the implementation of a new Integrated Safety Management System assessment process. This was presented as a system of self-assessments performed by each Laboratory division and independent assessments of each division performed by the EQO group. In addition, a structured program of management assessments is being implemented and is to be completed by each Associate Laboratory Director by October 31, 2001. You are, therefore, further required to provide to the AAO a summary briefing on and copies of the EQO and management assessments of the Technology Development Division no later than November 30, 2001. You are required to respond to this letter and follow the instructions specified in the enclosed PNOV when preparing your response. Your response should document any additional specific actions taken to date. Corrective actions should also be tracked in the DOE Noncompliance Tracking System (NTS). You should enter into the NTS (1) any actions that have been or will be taken to prevent recurrence and (2) the target and completion dates of such actions. After reviewing your response to the PNOV, including any corrective actions entered into the NTS as well as the results of any other assessment or inspection, DOE will determine whether further enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with DOE nuclear safety requirements. Sincerely, [Keith Christopher Signature] R. Keith Christopher Director Office of Price-Anderson Enforcement CERTIFIED MAIL RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED Enclosures: Preliminary Notice of Violation Enforcement Conference Summary List of Attendees cc: S. Cary, EH-1 M. Zacchero, EH-1 R. Day, OE S. Zobel, OE D. Stadler, EH-2 F. Russo, EH-3 R. Jones, EH-5 J. Roberson, EM-1 H. Himpler, EM-5, DOE PAAA Coordinator J. Decker, SC-1 R. Schwartz, SC-83, DOE PAAA Coordinator M. Gunn, DOE-CH J. Drago, DOE-CH PAAA Coordinator R. Wunderlich, DOE-AAO C. Zook, AAO-DOE PAAA Coordinator A. Cohen, ANL-E PAAA Coordinator R. Azzaro, DNFSB Docket Clerk, OE ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- --- Preliminary Notice of Violation University of Chicago Argonne National Laboratory-East EA-2001-05 During a Department of Energy (DOE) investigation conducted on May 8-9, 2001, violations of DOE nuclear safety requirements were identified. In accordance with the "General Statement of Enforcement Policy," 10 CFR 820, Appendix A, DOE is issuing this Preliminary Notice of Violation. The particular violations are set forth below. 1. Hazard Identification 1. 10 CFR 830.120(c)(1)(ii) states, in part, that "[p]ersonnel shall be…qualified to ensure they are capable of performing their assigned work." Contrary to the above, personnel were not qualified to ensure they were capable of performing their assigned work in that, at the time of the October 26, 2000, event, assigned health physics (HP) personnel responsible for controlling worker radiation exposure did not know the well-documented hazards and characteristics associated with radium and, therefore, were unable to safely plan and conduct work, thus causing the event. 2. 10 CFR 830.120(c)(1)(iii) states, in part, that "[i]tem characteristics, process implementation, and other quality-related information shall be reviewed…to identify…services and processes needing improvement." Contrary to the above, item characteristics, process implementation, and other quality-related information were not reviewed to identify services and processes needing improvement in that, between February 1997 and October 2000, the radon hazard associated with radium was not identified as follows 1. The executive summary of the March 1998 "Building 211 Cyclotron Characterization Survey Report" states "[t]he Senior Cave contains a variety of radioactive sources which must be removed from the facility, most notably a shielded 0.5 Ci Ra-226 source." However, though the Characterization Report did not specifically identify a radon hazard, this quantity of radium did not cause Technology Development Division (TD) and affiliated personnel to assess any radium-related hazards. 2. The Auditable Safety Analysis (ASA) and the Health and Safety Plan (HASP) comprise Building 211’s Authorization Basis. 1. The ASA identifies the radium sources in the Senior Cave, identifies as Task 3 the removal of these sources, and specifically addresses the chemical hazard associated with stabilizing the radium solutions. However, radon hazards were not addressed and this document was not kept current to reflect new activities or unidentified and unanalyzed hazards. 2. The HASP lists 12 Task Descriptions to complete the Building 211 decontamination and decommissioning (D&D) effort and the associated hazards and control methodologies for each task. However, none of these tasks addressed the treatment, packaging, or removal of legacy waste contained in the Senior Cave, nor was this document kept current to reflect new activities or unidentified and unanalyzed hazards. 3. On two separate occasions prior to the October 26, 2000, 2R container repackaging, Laboratory HP personnel met with TD personnel to discuss the stabilization of the radium solutions and provided TD personnel with documentation describing a February 1997 Senior Cave contamination event. This documentation stated a worker’s contamination was due to radon decay products from that same 2R container. However, this information was not taken in account in planning the radium solution stabilization. Collectively, these violations constitute a Severity Level II problem. Civil Penalty - $55,000 (exempted) 2. Work Control 1. 10 CFR 830.120(c)(1)(ii) states, in part, that "[p]ersonnel shall be provided continuing training to ensure that job proficiency is maintained." Contrary to the above, personnel were not provided continuing training to ensure that job proficiency was maintained in that, on October 26, 2000, the TD project manager’s respiratory training for supervisors of respiratory protection users was expired, and the TD Project Specialist’s "Respiratory Protection – Air Purifying Respirators" training, annual medical certification to use a respirator, and annual respirator fit test were lapsed. However, these were required by the site Environment, Safety and Health (ES&H) Manual, section 12.2, "Respiratory Protection," to be current due to these individuals’ work activities. 2. 10 CFR 830.120(c)(1)(iv) states, in part, that "[d]ocuments shall be prepared, reviewed, [and] approved…to prescribe processes…." Contrary to the above, documents were not prepared, reviewed, and approved to prescribe processes in that 1. The October 26, 2000, job evolution used "Packaging Plan for 2-R Containers and Paint Can Located in 55 Gallon Drum." However, this packaging plan was not subjected to a formal review and approval process as required by AP-1.1, "Document Preparation and Control Procedure," dated December 1998, and did not meet the format and content requirements stated in AP-1.1, section 5.3.2, for first-time activities. 2. The radiological work permit (RWP) for the October 26, 2000, job evolution was prepared in accordance with a previously approved, alternate RWP procedure. However, the RWP’s preparation did not adhere to the requirements of the September 25, 2000, revision to section 5.24 of the ES&H Manual. Section 5.24.3 of the revision states "[t]his section is applicable to activities by ANL employees, non-ANL employees, facility users, subcontractors and/or service contractors." 3. 10 CFR 830.120(c)(2)(i) states, in part, that "[w]ork shall be performed to established technical standards and administrative controls using approved instructions, procedures, or other appropriate means." Contrary to the above, work was not performed to established technical standards and administrative controls using approved instructions, procedures, or other appropriate means in that 1. The Radiation Work Permit Request associated with the October 26, 2000, radium solution stabilization did not require an ALARA (as low as reasonably achievable) review. However, ES&H Manual section 5.21, "ALARA Program Description," subsection 5.21.7, "Division/Department ALARA Review Triggers," requires an ALARA review for "[a]ctivities with the potential for dose and/or contamination being performed for the first time in a radiological area by division/department." 2. The October 26, 2000, radium solution stabilization was performed in a basement alcove of Building 211 where a ventilated plastic containment was constructed. However, this containment design was not subjected to the requirements of ES&H Manual section 5.18, "Containment Requirements for Dispersible Radioactive Material," nor was section 5.18 used to determine the most reasonable containment approach for the work to be performed. Collectively, these violations constitute a Severity Level II problem. Civil Penalty - $55,000 (exempted) 3. Maintaining Exposures ALARA 10 CFR 835.1001(a) states, in part, that "[m]easures shall be taken to maintain radiation exposures in controlled areas ALARA through physical design features and administrative control." Contrary to the above, measures were not taken to maintain radiation exposures in controlled areas ALARA through physical design features and administrative control in that, between February 1997 and October 2000 1. Technology Development D&D management failed to assess the limitations of the assigned HP staff and thereby failed to administratively control worker exposures to radiation in accordance with ALARA practices. 2. The packaging plan and associated RWP, that directed the stabilization of the radium solutions, were not adequate to ensure radiation exposures would be ALARA as follows: 1. The air mover used to depressurize the alcove’s plastic containment, with the intention of minimizing the escape of contamination, transported radon from the containment to the area just outside the alcove. 2. The personal protective equipment specified on the October 25, 2000, RWP required the use of full-face respirators with activated carbon filter cartridges, yet assigned HP staff who prepared the RWP did not recognize the filters would not impede radon and its decay products. 3. The October 25, 2000, RWP did not require the use of extremity--finger--dosimeters despite both Technology Development D&D and assigned HP personnel knowing the radium vials would be handled without the use of tongs or other similar devices. 4. The RWP did not provide instructions regarding emergency response nor did assigned HP personnel to know how to respond to an emergency situation to maintain radiation exposures ALARA once the radium vials were opened. Collectively, these violations constitute a Severity Level II problem. Civil Penalty - $55,000 (exempted) Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 820.24, the University of Chicago (University) is hereby required within 30 days of the date of this Preliminary Notice of Violation to submit a written statement or explanation to the Director, Office of Price-Anderson Enforcement, Attention: Office of the Docketing Clerk, P.O. Box 2225, Germantown, MD 20875-2225. Copies should also be sent to the Manager, DOE Argonne Area Office, and to the Cognizant Secretarial Offices at Headquarters for the facility that is the subject of this Notice. This reply should be clearly marked as a "Reply to a Preliminary Notice of Violation" and should include the following for each violation: (1) admission or denial of the alleged violation, (2) any facts set forth that are not correct, and (3) the reasons for the violation if admitted, or the basis for denial if denied. Corrective actions that have been or will be taken to avoid any future violation should be delineated with target and completion dates in DOE’s Noncompliance Tracking System. In the event the violations set forth in the Preliminary Notice of Violation are admitted, this Notice will constitute a Final Notice of Violation in compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 820.25. Should the University fail to answer within the time specified, DOE will issue an Order imposing the violations. Sincerely, [Keith Christopher Signature] R. Keith Christopher Director Office of Price-Anderson Enforcement Dated at Washington, DC, this 14th day of August 2001 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- --- Enforcement Conference Summary The Department of Energy’s (DOE) Office of Price-Anderson Enforcement (OE) held an Enforcement Conference with University of Chicago (UC), personnel on July 16, 2001, in Germantown, Maryland, to discuss the circumstances of the event described in the OE Investigation Summary Report in addition to the UC’s proposed and implemented corrective actions pertaining to the event. Mr. Keith Christopher, OE Director, began the conference by explaining this meeting would be an opportunity for the UC to make its case for enforcement mitigation. Mr. Christopher further stated that material provided by the UC would be incorporated into the docket file. Mr. Samuel Golden, Associate General Counsel, University of Chicago, spoke briefly stating that the University’s Board of Governors had reviewed the investigation summary report and took the report’s findings seriously. Dr. Beverly Hartline, Deputy Laboratory Director, Argonne National Laboratory - East, began her presentation by acknowledging and agreeing with DOE’s findings in the summary report. This was followed by an overview of the event and the corrective actions that were developed to resolve the associated deficiencies. Dr. Hartline concluded the presentation by stating the radon exposures were fortuitously low due to a record keeping error that indicated the radium concentration was much greater than it actually was. Dr. Hartline and her staff then answered several questions concerning the corrective actions. Mr. Christopher stated that the UC’s presentation and other information would be taken into consideration for DOE’s enforcement deliberations. The conference was then adjourned. July 16, 2001 University of Chicago Building 211 Radon Release Enforcement Conference List of Attendees Office of Price-Anderson Enforcement Argonne National Laboratory R. Keith Christopher, Director Beverly Hartline, Deputy Lab. Director Richard Day, Enforcement Officer Adam Cohen, PAAA Coordinator Steven Zobel, Enforcement Officer Yoon Chang, Assoc. Lab. Director Office of Environmental Management University of Chicago Henry Himpler, PAAA Coordinator Samuel Golden, Assoc. Gen. Counsel Tom Evans, EM-5 Bob Fleming, EM-34 Argonne Area Office Shirley Frush, EM-34 Bob Wunderlich, Manager Office of Science A. Creig Zook, PAAA Coordinator Andrew Gabel, Environmental Projects Ray Schwartz, PAAA Coordinator Stan Staten, SC-10 Chicago Operations Office Van Nguyen, SC-83 Barry Parks, SC-83 Joe Drago, PAAA Coordinator ***************************************************************** 7 Workers: Comp plan falls short The Hawk Eye Newspaper August 17, 2001 By Dennis J. Carroll The Hawk Eye • Former IAAP workers say thousands of affected laborers left out of plan. Despite their exposure to hazardous materials, thousands of former workers and contractors at the Middletown munitions plant were wrongly left out of a federal compensation package for former nuclear weapons workers, former plant employees charged Thursday. "What about the construction workers and the maintenance workers?" former electrical contractor Stephan Weyer, 58, asked aides to Sen. Tom Harkin, D-Iowa, in a forum at the Des Moines County Courthouse. "The people who did maintenance had the worst exposure of all," Weyer said. "They were everywhere at all times." About 40 former workers or their survivors showed up for a forum held by Harkin aides Allison Hart and Lowell Ungar. Richard Baker, Yarmouth, a Line 3 munitions worker, said materials from the burning fields often floated over the plant, covering the ground and vehicles with ash. "We breathed it all night long," said Baker, whose left lung virtually was removed because of what his doctors said was exposure to poisonous materials. The Department of Energy is offering former nuclear weapons workers, or their survivors, who were made ill or died from exposure to radiation, beryllium or silica a $150,000 lump sum payment and coverage of some medical costs. But the payments are limited to DOE or Atomic Energy Workers. Army contract workers are not covered. Some at the forum complained that Army and plant officials have ignored or dismissed the complaints of workers. "They treated us like we were absolute idiots," said Shirley Wiley, who said she left the plant after the building she worked in blew up. Others charged that the medical records of their parents were inexplicably lost or even altered to cover up their illnesses and exposure to hazardous materials. Several questioned whether bodies would have to be exhumed to prove they had been exposed to the hazardous materials. Ungar and Hart said the workers' concerns would be conveyed to the senator and possibly could be used in the modification of compensation guidelines or the drafting of legislation. The Hawk Eye 800 S. Main St., Burlington Iowa 52601 319-754-8461 Front Desk · 319-754-6824 FAX · 1-800-397-1708 Toll Free ***************************************************************** 8 New chief:Omaha not out of the mix The Hawk Eye Newspaper August 17, 2001 Iowa Time: 11:59 PM By Dennis J. Carroll The Hawk Eye The Omaha office of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers will continue with much of the environmental cleanup at the Iowa Army Ammunition Plant, despite the transfer of overall cleanup management to the St. Louis district, the new commander of the plant said Thursday. "Let me assure you that the Omaha office is not out of the restoration business at the (IAAP)," Lt. Col. Yolanda Dennis-Lowman told citizen advisers to the Superfund cleanup "By adding St. Louis in the picture, we have merely added a system of checks and balances into our restoration management process," Dennis-Lowman said. "We have not changed the process or the players in the process." As one of his last acts as outgoing commander, Col. Bruce Elliott in June announced that responsibility for program and schedule cleanup management had been transferred from the Corps' Omaha district to the St. Louis district. "The St. Louis district is best qualified to manage the full range of programmatic and scheduling issues confronting the Iowa AAP Installation Restoration Program," Elliott said at the time. Two members of the plant's Restoration Advisory Board, Larry Orr and Mark Hagerla, complained to Dennis-Lowman that Elliott had not consulted with the RAB about the transfer. "When decisions are made (in the way) this was made, it offends me as a board member because there was no discussion (with the RAB) and that's basically what we are here for," said Hagerla. He said such decision-making threatens the trust the RAB and community have placed in the Army's cleanup process. Dennis-Lowman said she understood Hagerla's concern and that "in the future, I think you will see us work more as a team together." Orr charged that the Army was "fixing something that wasn't broken." Both Orr and Hagerla praised the work and openness of Omaha's IAAP project manager Kevin Howe. Some have suggested that the change perhaps was made at least in part because adding St. Louis to the mix may mean more money for the cleanup. The St. Louis district is home to a Corps program known awkwardly as the Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program, or FUSRAP. That program offers a stream of funding to clean up sites contaminated by operations of the Department of Energy or, in the past, the Atomic Energy Commission, which oversaw the development of the nation's nuclear weapons system. From the late 1940s to the mid-1970s, the Atomic Energy Commission assembled, test fired and, in later years, disassembled nuclear weapons components at IAAP. Howe now will be sharing the stage at IAAP with Sharon Cotner, FUSRAP's project manager for Middletown. Cotner was brought into the plant cleanup in recent months after shards and large chunks of depleted uranium were found at two firing sites used by the AEC. In addition, traces of depleted uranium were discovered in several former AEC buildings. Cotner is conducting a preliminary assessment of whether the plant should be given FUSRAP status, and whether further exploration of the plant, possibly with low-level radiation flyover, should be conducted. State officials -- including Gov. Tom Vilsack, Sens. Tom Harkin and Chuck Grassley, and state radiological regulators -- have urged the Army to order a flyover of the entire 19,000-acre facility with aircraft equipped with special radiation-detection gear. A FUSRAP recommendation on the matter will not come before Dec. 1, Cotner said. The decision ultimately may be decided by Congress. The Hawk Eye 800 S. Main St., Burlington Iowa 52601 319-754-8461 Front Desk · 319-754-6824 FAX · 1-800-397-1708 Toll Free ***************************************************************** 9 DOE role in Roane probe rejected Oak Ridger Online --> Story last updated at 11:15 a.m. on Friday, August 17, 2001 by Paul Parson Oak Ridger staff The Department of Energy should not lead an investigation into possible off-site contaminations of three Roane County communities that border the Oak Ridge K-25 site, two groups say. Members of the Coalition for a Healthy Environment and the Roane County chapter of Save Our Cumberland Mountains say they have no confidence in DOE's doing so. The coalition, which requested the investigation in June, serves as a support and research group pertaining to the illnesses of workers at Department of Energy facilities and the citizens of Oak Ridge and the surrounding areas. "We want EPA (the Environmental Protection Agency) to come in and do the study," said Janine Voner, outreach coordinator for the coalition. "We don't want DOE. We want something done with actual results. We have no confidence in DOE. EPA is who we requested. We don't want DOE involved." Voner, a Maryville resident, used to live in and near the three Roane County communities in question -- Sugar Grove Valley, Dickey Valley and Dyllis. "I have no doubt in my mind that there is a problem out there," she said. After the coalition voiced concern about the Roane County communities, EPA official Constance Jones sent a letter to DOE stating the agency should detail a plan to address the possible contaminations in the three communities. EPA contends that DOE has the lead responsibility for the investigation. That's unacceptable, says Harry Williams, president of the coalition. "People don't trust DOE," he said. Williams issued a letter to Jones on Thursday stating the investigation "clearly falls within EPA's jurisdiction" and not DOE's. "The DOE has demonstrated over the past 50 years their lack of concern for private property and the welfare of their workers and resident neighbors," Williams' letter states. Mike Knapp, community organizer for Save Our Cumberland Mountains, said it would be a "conflict of interest" for DOE to investigate possible contaminations if they were responsible for them. Knapp added that his organization agrees that EPA should do the investigation. Save Our Cumberland Mountains is a grassroots citizens' organization that works for environmental, social and economic justice. "We've always been told that nothing went over the fence," said Janice Stokes, a member of Save Our Cumberland Mountains, who added that she finds that hard to believe. "These communities are in such close proximity to K-25." The Oak Ridge K-25 site, which is a Superfund, or contaminated, site, occupies 4,689 acres (7.6 square miles) or 14 percent of the Oak Ridge Reservation and is located in the Roane County portion of Oak Ridge. At K-25, uranium-235 was separated from uranium-238 through a gaseous diffusion process. However, while concern is being voiced about DOE's involvement in the investigation, DOE has taken some initial steps in the matter. DOE officials met this week with EPA representatives about the possible off-site contaminations. "The meeting this week was our first opportunity to discuss this request," said DOE spokesman Steven Wyatt. "We will be holding additional discussions with EPA and the state of Tennessee over the next few weeks. No decisions have been made, and it is premature at this point to speculate on any future actions that may result from these discussions." 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