***************************************************************** 03/17/01 **** RADIATION BULLETIN(RADBULL) **** VOL 9.69 ***************************************************************** RADBULL IS PRODUCED BY THE ABALONE ALLIANCE CLEARINGHOUSE ***************************************************************** NUCLEAR POWER CONTENTS 1 Piketon plant's shaky future casts pall over Pike County 2 Decision on plant in Paducah postponed 3 Legislators file nuclear waste bill 4 Big Rock rubble no worry, says nuclear expert 5 Safety Of Nuclear Accident Evacuation Plan Debated 6 Discover Dialogue: Arjun Makhijani The Nuke Slayer 7 Jim Riccio's Comments on The Voluntary Regulation of the Nuclear Industry 8 Yucca measures controversial 9 Electron Cafe by John Glenn: Irreparable harm 10 IEER-NCI Letter to NRC re: DCS MOX Fuel Fab. Facility 11 Plutonium End Game: Stop Reprocessing, Start Immobilizing 12 French Report Doubts Merits of Reprocessing and MOX 13 Could nuclear power answer some of our energy woes? 14 America Must Focus, and Focus Now, On Increasing Energy Supply 15 Nuclear waste in limbo after court ban 16 ALP demands halt to nuclear reactor 17 Failed land-sale lawsuit threatens nuclear plant 18 China plans new coastal nuclear power plants 19 KOREAN GOVERNMENT URGED TO BAN DANGEROUS JAPANESE PLUTONIUM 20 Finnish nuke plans could hit foreign trade - lobby 21 Judge has sharp words for uranium-plant privatization process 22 UPDATE - EU wants Lithuanian N-plant decision in 2002 23 Japan Invite for Dr Jack 24 An Active Exchange on Tom River Radiation 25 Editorial: Just what were they thinking? NUCLEAR WEAPONS CONTENTS 1 Dropping bombs on Los Alamos 2 SADDAM’S LAST LAUGH 3 A Global Truth Commission on Health and Environmental Damage from 4 US-Russian Plutonium Disposition Agreement 5 Engineer Quits, Blasts Livermore Lab / Recruiters misled him on 6 Exporter says charge is baseless 7 White House To Cut Aid to Russia 8 Bunker mentality 9 EU Offers to Help Russia Dispose of Nuclear Submarines 10 Congress works on funds for radiation victims 11 Safeguarding Rocky Flats cleanup 12 A warning on nuclear site cleanup funds 13 Checks still in the mail for Cold War uranium miners **************************************************************** ***************************************************************** NUCLEAR POWER ARTICLES ***************************************************************** 1 Piketon plant's shaky future casts pall over Pike County *Saturday, March 17, 2001* Bob Dreitzler *Dispatch Staff Reporter* Eric Albrecht / Dispatch Charles Noel, who runs a small grocery store in Waverly, says he knows most of his customers by name, which accounts for the friendly wave. He also knows that his future is tied to what happens at the Piketon uranium-enrichment plant just down the road. AVERLY, Ohio -- By modern supermarket standards, the flow of customers through Charles Noel's tiny neighborhood grocery store is a trickle. But as long as that trickle remains steady, Noel expects to keep his 40- year-old business afloat. Noel's livelihood is tied to traffic flow along Rt. 220, where his grocery is located a few miles north of the uranium-enrichment plant at Piketon. And that traffic is directly tied to the plant, which has marked time in Pike County for nearly 50 years, the work force and population respectively ebbing and flowing with the times. Noel estimated that he knows 90 percent of the his customers. Many of them work at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant. The plant's shaky existence these days has rattled Noel's nerves and has others worried. "If there are more cuts or they shut it down, that will hurt us,'' Noel said a few days after the U.S. secretary of energy announced on March 1 that $125.7 million in federal funding would stave off a June shutdown. Without the aid, the 1,700-employee plant would have faced closure at midyear. Even with the cash, about 525 workers still face layoffs this year. Its production peak occurred in 1981 when the plant was run by Goodyear Atomic Corp. Employment averaged 3,252 as Goodyear geared up to run a gas centrifuge enrichment process, which was later scrapped. The infusion of federal money assures the plant's future only through September 2002, the end of the next federal budget year. Like most in the community, located about 60 miles south of Columbus, the 78-year-old Noel hopes the plant will win a permanent reprieve. If the plant closes, its twin in Paducah, Ky., will be the nation's only domestic source of enriched uranium fuel for power plants. Residents, business owners and community leaders fear closing the plant might push people out of the area. Noel owned a small store at Wakefield in southern Pike County in 1952 when the federal government announced plans to build on a 4,000- acre site near Piketon a plant to process uranium for nuclear bombs. Government contractors poured men, money and materials into the area in a Cold War frenzy to finish the plant six months ahead of schedule. The boom overwhelmed the rural area, whose only industries until then had been farming and logging. During peak construction in 1954, the more than 22,000 workers called to build the plant nearly doubled the county's population of 14,000. They often lived in cars until they could rent sleeping space in the garages or attics of local homes. Small trailer parks sprang up in pastures. Overcrowded schools went into double sessions and streets were rerouted to handle the traffic. To fill the housing demand, builders got government-backed loans and threw together hundreds of modest homes. When the plant was completed in 1956, the construction workers left, but Waverly's population still had expanded to 8,000 from 1,750 at the beginning of the boom. When the start-up workers left, the population dropped. By 1960, Waverly's population was 3,300. When Noel began doing business in Waverly in the early 1960s, the enrichment plant was going strong with no hint that it would ever be shut down. "We felt like it was going to be there forever,'' Noel said. "I guess those were the good old days, as they say.'' He said the decline has not hurt his business much, although fewer customers these days are plant workers. The opening of the Mill's Pride cabinet manufacturing plant several years ago helped keep his business stable. The surplus of new homes in 1960 became an unexpected legacy. An entire subdivision of more than 300 houses went on the market in 1961 when the builder went bankrupt. "They built one tract too many,'' said Jay Early, executive director of the Bristol Village community. A Columbus-area minister recognized an opportunity. John R. Glenn, pastor of the Boulevard Presbyterian Church in Grandview Heights, put together a coalition with churches in Chillicothe, Portsmouth and Waverly to buy the subdivision and establish Bristol Village. The organization they founded is known today as National Church Residences and provides housing for about 14,000 people in 145 facilities across the nation. Bristol Village remains the organization's centerpiece, Early said. Since its creation, Bristol Village has added subsidized apartments for low-income residents, a recreation center and medical building, assisted-living units, a nursing home and a 12-bed unit for Alzheimer's patients. Other improvements are planned as part of a $4 million expansion. The village has held on to the quiet neighborhood ambience that was commonplace when the subdivision was built, Early said. "I grew up in the 1950s when it was safe to walk in the streets even at night,'' Early said. "People were friendly and helpful. That's what we try to foster here.'' Elsewhere, the county is trying to foster economic diversity as it prepares to wean itself from the enrichment plant as a primary job source. Joy Padgett, director of the Governor's Office of Appalachia, said the plant's uncertain future has the community walking an economic tightrope. "So much of Pike County is dependent on the Piketon plant,'' she said. "Their economy revolves around the plant, but it is not just because of the workers there. It is also the vendors and small businesses that are able to operate because of the plant.'' The county has taken several steps toward a future without the plant, including establishing a business-development program and creating an industrial park. About 24 percent of the plant's workers live in Pike County, said Blaine Beekman, director of the county's chamber of commerce. In the last 10 years the county has attracted several manufacturing plants. Mill's Pride has supplanted the enrichment plant as the county's top employer, with 2,700 workers. "Pike County has a lot of industry for its size, but outsiders tend not to see that because the focus is on the enrichment plant,'' Beekman said. The county has gained an average of 300 jobs a year for the past several years, Beekman said. He expects the trend to continue if the national economy doesn't slow too much. If the enrichment plant closes, communities will suffer more than the financial pain of losing hundreds of good jobs, Beekman said. If laid-off plant workers leave the area, their communities lose friends, neighbors and community leaders. "We will lose what they bring to the communities,'' Beekman said. bdreitzl@dispatch.com Charles Noel, who runs a small grocery store in Waverly, says he knows most of his customers by name, which accounts for the friendly wave. He also knows that his future is tied to what happens at the Piketon uranium- enrichment plant just down the road. Many Ohioans share a deep pride in where they live. Looking ahead to the state's bicentennial in 2003, The Dispatch presents the 46th in a series of periodic stories on Ohio's 88 counties. Copyright © 2001, The Columbus Dispatch ***************************************************************** 2 Decision on plant in Paducah postponed *Saturday, March 17, 2001* Jonathan Riskind *Dispatch Washington Bureau Chief* WASHINGTON -- A federal licensing decision that could be the death knell for southern Ohio's uranium-enrichment plant was postponed yesterday after two members of Congress raised objections. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission had been expected to announce yesterday that the uranium-enrichment plant in Paducah, Ky., was approved to produce commercial- grade material suitable for use as fuel by nuclear power plants. The Paducah plant is run by USEC, a privatized federal corporation that plans to close down the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant in Piketon in June. But USEC cannot close down Piketon until federal regulators sign off on efforts to upgrade the Paducah plant. Two members of the House Energy and Commerce Committee -- Reps. Ted Strickland, D-Lucasville, in whose district Piketon is located, and John D. Dingell of Michigan, the committee's top Democrat -- sent a letter Wednesday to the NRC asking for a postponement of the licensing decision. The lawmakers said they are concerned the Piketon plant will be closed before it is proven that Paducah can be successfully upgraded. Commission officials had planned to announce the licensing decision by yesterday. USEC officials, who predict the license will be granted, insist that the Kentucky plant will become a reliable producer of enriched uranium before the Piketon facility closes in June. A regulatory commission spokeswoman said she couldn't comment on whether the licensing delay was caused by the lawmakers' request. "We are considering their letter, and we will respond,'' said spokeswoman Sue Gagner. USEC spokeswoman Elizabeth Stuckle said regulatory commission officials have told the company that the commission wanted to hold up certification until the agency responded to Strickland and Dingell. Strickland said he's encouraged by the delay. "I hope they respond to our inquiry in a positive way that will protect our plant and, even more importantly, protect the nation's energy security,'' he said. For decades, the Paducah plant has enriched uranium halfway to the purity required to serve as fuel for nuclear plants. The Piketon plant was built to carry out higher-grade enrichment operations that used to include weapons-grade material and now entails raising uranium from Paducah to commercial-grade quality. Piketon was designed to perform both stages of enrichment, if necessary. USEC, which is struggling financially, cannot shut down operations at the Piketon plant until Paducah is certified capable of carrying out the entire enrichment process. USEC critics say it is dangerous to rely on an upgraded Paducah plant as the only domestic producer of enriched uranium for the nuclear plants that provide nearly a quarter of the nation's electricity. Strickland and Dingell want Piketon kept on "warm standby'' during a trial period at Paducah. That would require USEC to maintain the capability of enriching commercial-grade uranium at Piketon until the company has proven "that Paducah will be both reliable and economic,'' the letter to NRC Chairman Richard A. Meserve stated. jriskind@dispatch.com Copyright © 2001, The Columbus Dispatch ***************************************************************** 3 Legislators file nuclear waste bill OA Online News March 17, 2001 *By Melanie Maxcey Odessa American* AUSTIN — Two state lawmakers have filed legislation that would clear the way for a state-owned but privately managed nuclear waste dump. State Sen. Robert Duncan (R-Lubbock) said Friday that Texas cannot bury its proverbial head in the sand. Duncan wrote the Senate version of the bill, and State. Rep. Warren Chisum (R-Pampa) wrote the House version. "If we don’t fulfill our obligations in that compact, we’re exposing ourselves more," Duncan said, adding that the Department of Energy and Congress could force Texas to take all kinds of waste if legislators don’t take action soon. In 1992, Texas entered into a compact agreement with Vermont and Maine to dispose of nuclear waste from the three states. Since that time, the Texas Legislature has been unsuccessful in its efforts to open such a facility If passed, the bill makes the state of Texas the owner of the facility, the land and the waste. Licenses to manage the waste would be granted by the state to a private waste disposal company. Decommissioned power plants, research institutions and the oil and medical industries will generate waste included in the compact. The compact will be governed by the Texas Compact Commission. Department of Energy waste, such as nuclear weapons, is not part of the compact waste. Rick Jacobi, former vice president of the now-defunct waste disposal company Envirocare of Texas, said he was "pleasantly surprised" by the bill. "It gives management options for assured isolation and the license is volume specific, which limits the volume of the waste over the life of the facility," he said. Assured isolation is the storage of radioactive waste above ground. Burial is the other disposal method used in the industry. The bill also makes the management company provide financial assurance up front, in case of any contamination or accidents. Opponents to the bill disagree with Jacobi. "This bill is a radioactive nightmare," said Erin Rogers, grassroots outreach coordinator for the Lone Star Chapter of the Sierra Club. The bill states the Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission "shall consider whether sites appropriate for a permanent management facility are appropriate for low-level radioactive waste that is not managed under the compact. (TNRCC) shall report to the governor and the compact commission policy recommendations and recommendations for legislation regarding permanent management of that waste at or adjacent to a permanent management facility licensed under this chapter." Rogers said this provision is dangerous. "This bill will open the floodgates to dumping radioactive waste in Texas for the benefit of a handful of corporations. It is the worst-case scenario for resolving this question," she said. Duncan, however, disagrees. He said the provision allows the TNRCC, which is the state’s regulatory agency, to weigh in on the issue of whether to accept other waste. "(The management company) can’t do anything (on its own). Everything that they do will be limited pursuant to the license they get from TNRCC to operate this site," he said. Eric Peus, CEO of Waste Control Specialists, said there were parts of the bill he liked, others he didn’t. WCS owns and operates a waste processing and disposal site in Andrews County. He said he didn’t think handling compact waste alone would be profitable enough to sustain a private company. But, he added, he understood the concerns of legislators who want to limit the amount of waste coming in. "We’re in the business of trying to make money. But there are certain realities in this business, that’s life," he said. The bill also would allow for two types of waste management — assured isolation or below-ground burial. Duncan, who said he favors assured isolation, said he felt the bill had to have both components. "The problem with assured isolation is that it hasn’t necessarily been recognized by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission," he added. If the bill passes, private companies will submit proposals for the site. All things being equal, one provision in the bill allows the commission to favor assured isolation proposals. Duncan said the bill also includes a mandatory referendum. A majority of the host county’s residents must vote in favor of locating the site there. Neighboring counties are not included in the referendum. Peus said he felt Andrews County would welcome such a site. A second possible site is near Barstow in Ward County. Envirocare of Texas had chosen that site as a possible waste disposal site. Hearings have not been set for the bill. News Index Editorial Columns Home Sports Oil & Gas Classifieds Editorials Lifestyles Obituaries Advertising Reader Services The 20th Century Special Sections Copyright © 2000, 2001 Odessa American. All rights reserved. ***************************************************************** 4 Big Rock rubble no worry, says nuclear expert Traverse City Record-Eagle -- www.record-eagle.com March 16, 2001 - MSU physicist says nuclear plant debris that may be buried in Waters Landfill doesn't pose any danger By DAN SANDERSON Record-Eagle staff writer GRAYLING - A Michigan State University nuclear expert said Crawford County residents should not be wary of a plan to bury rubble from the Big Rock Point nuclear power plant at a local landfill. "I feel the plan (Consumers Energy is) submitting is very thorough and well thought out," said Paul Rossi, a health physicist from MSU's office of radiation, chemical and biological safety. "They've done a lot of advance work on it, they've looked at what other people have done and they've addressed every issue that I possibly could think of for decommissioning a nuclear power plant," Rossi said. "I don't think people should be worried at all." About 25 people attended a public meeting in Grayling Wednesday to hear details of the plan from Consumers, which owns Big Rock, located just north of Charlevoix. The company wants to haul about 42,000 tons of clean debris to the Waters Landfill. Deconstruction of the plant, which is already under way, is expected to be completed by 2004. Kurt Haas, site general manager at Big Rock, said the company may start hauling debris to the landfill next year. The cost of deconstruction and restoration of the property to a "green field" status, which comes from the Michigan Public Service Commission's decommissioning trust, will be $350 million. Bob Wills, a technical expert from Big Rock, said technicians would scan the debris inch by inch as demolition takes place. A bulk monitor will check trucks before the rubble heads for the Waters Landfill, which is owned by Waste Management Inc. Dave Minear, chief of the state Department of Environmental Quality's radiological division, said the scanning would be made by doing spot checks at Big Rock and the landfill. He said that although some radioactivity occurs naturally in the environment, technicians would be able to determine if radioactive material came from the plant. "It's in the food we eat, the air we breath and the soils we build our homes on," said Minear. He said advanced equipment and a ban on nuclear weapons testing in the atmosphere allows technicians to check for much lower levels of radioactivity than in the past. Still, some residents who live near the landfill fear that dumping the debris there will have a negative impact on their property values down the road. "I really believe they're going to do what they say they're going to do, but you really don't have any guarantees," said Mark Easterly, who peppered the panel with questions. "The thing that I'm really worried about is: Do you want to buy my place later on? I live right next door." Most of the questions Wednesday revolved around why the rubble could not be left on the site in Charlevoix. While Consumers has 560 acres there, Haas said, 80 percent is wetlands, 1½ miles is Lake Michigan frontage and stands of cedar and hardwoods cover much of the remaining area. Wills said while the federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission would allow debris to be kept on the site DEQ rules are more stringent and the company doesn't have that option. Pet Merrill, environmental monitor for Crawford County, said Waste Management can legally accept the waste because Charlevoix County is included in Crawford County's solid waste plan. But the plan may be a "moot point" if an Ingham County Circuit Court Judge rules in favor of Waste Management in its battle to expand the Cedar Ridge landfill in Charlevoix, said Charlevoix County commissioner Don Smith. The DEQ last year denied a request to expand the landfill, citing the proximity of the expansion to a nearby stream. Deb Johnston, division engineer for Waste Management, said the company is arguing that the stream in an intermittent stream that has not flowed 30 years and is not permanent. A hearing on the company's suit against the DEQ is scheduled for today. A ruling will be made later. Dan Sanderson is the reporter for Otsego, Crawford and Cheboygan counties. He can be reached at (517) 731-9684, or at dansand@freeway.net Traverse City Record-Eagle. All rights reserved. ***************************************************************** 5 Safety Of Nuclear Accident Evacuation Plan Debated 3/14/2001 Is any plan better than no plan at all? by Eric Thomason Last year the Putnam County Legislature unanimously voted to shut down the Indian Point 2 Nuclear Power Plant. On Wednesday, March 7th, the Legislature listened to a plan that could provide them the opportunity to achieve those desired results. The power plant at Indian Point has been a recurring theme for the Legislature. They have voted to shut it down, listened to proposed studies on the harmful nature of living near a radioactive plant and the subject will continues to be a hot topic. The latest discussion was held at last Wednesday’s Protective Services meeting. Mark Jacobs, of the Westchester Citizens Awareness Organization, started his presentation by informing the Legislature that calling for the closing of the plant "is not within your purview." He then presented a plan that would force the State’s hand in dealing with the Indian Point power plant. The Legislature then heard a presentation describing the evacuation route for the residents living within a ten mile radius of the plant - which includes Philipstown and Putnam Valley - in the event of a nuclear meltdown. Jacobs proposed a plan by which the Legislature would deem the evacuation plan unsafe and resolve to reject it, thus causing the State to either shut down the plant or take over the emergency evacuation plans. Jacobs and his group believe the evacuation plan is unsafe. "Traffic is a key issue when you look at population density," he said, "there are not main highways" in Putnam County. He said the roads during rush hours on normal days "don’t move that quickly. Imagine if it was an emergency." Jacobs also said, "8% of the population of the United States lives within a fifty mile radius of the plant." According to Jacobs the time it would take to evacuate would be "ten hours and fifty minutes." He said over that elapsed time there would have been a "complete meltdown" at the plant and those within the ten-mile radius would be in grave danger. He called this part of the plan "unacceptable." Jacobs said the plan calls for the use of police departments that no longer exist and the use of telephones for vital communication, which he says "will be the first to go down. If you believe, as I believe, that this plan will not work, I believe you should pass this resolution." He said two other counties have been successful in following this proposed course of action. After they deemed their evacuation plan unsafe, Suffolk County stopped further construction of a plant in their county. In Rockland County, Governor Cuomo was forced to take responsibility of their evacuation plan. Philipstown’s Vinny Tamagna, who brought the resolution to the Legislature for the closing of the plant, said "many times it is a matter of economics – do we really believe we could compromise public safety" for money? He believes the public safety cannot be sacrificed for tax breaks and jobs the plant provides to counties. Tamagna said by passing the resolution, "you will open a review process" that will find many holes in the plan and eventually improve it. The plan, as it is today, said Tamagna, is "a lot of phooey! For the sake of public safety and public health we have to look at this." Many of the other the legislators confirmed that they also think the plant is a danger to the public and the plan to evacuate the citizens on the western half of the county is undoable. However, when it came to condemning the evacuation plan that would shut down the plant, they balked. "It is more than economic hardship," said legislator Regina Morini, who had voted "yes" to shut down the plant last year. "What do you want instead of it (the plant)?" she asked. Morini, who said she has been watching the California power crisis closely, said, "we could be without power in New York" should the plant be closed. She stated that if it happened here, many people would freeze. She said to her fellow members of the Legislature, "I suggest we be very careful in what we are doing." Referring back to the California situation, she said there has been "a lot of environmentalists jumping off the fence. When you flip the switch and nothing happens – it is scary." Jacobs responded that Putnam County losing power and its residents freezing was an unlikely event. "There is no shortage of power in New York except July and August." According to Jacobs, the place most likely to be affected by a power shortage or brownouts is New York City, and its problem is "not quantity" it is "transmissions." He told the Legislature the equipment used to carry power into New York City is simply incapable at times of carrying the volume. Power shortages there have nothing to do with available sources of power. The Putnam County Legislature’s Deputy Chairman, Bobby McGuigan of Mahopac, said rather than seeing the Governor take control of the evacuation process he’d like to see the power stay within the County Executive’s office. He said, "I have tremendous confidence in the County Executive" to lead us through an emergency. Putnam County’s Department of Emergency Planning Commissioner Bob McMahon said he has taken "no position on nuclear power." He did stand behind the plan and said, "it is a plan and a lot of time and effort went into it." "I believe it’s a workable plan," said Commissioner McMahon adding that it is the "ability to adapt and work around" problems that makes it effective. County Executive Robert Bondi, who would be in charge of the evacuation in the event of a leak or accident at Indian Point, said "we have trained at least four times every year and Putnam County has always received high evaluations. We have built our confidence up." He said by rejecting the plan and passing the resolution the public will be negatively effected and it places them in "ultimate jeopardy." Bondi said the County has practiced and drilled the plan for many years. He said they involve "100’s of volunteers in the process." He was confident that the County has what it takes, as far as a plan and response unit, to lead its citizens to safety should an accident at the plant happen. Jacobs said part of the short sightedness of the plan is that it relies heavily on the Good Samaritans and volunteers of the County. He said the plan calls for schoolteachers and school bus drivers to risk their lives and not protect their families for the plan to work. According to Jacobs, teachers are required to stay with their students until are all safely moved out of the school and resist the urge to get their families to safety. In the plan, one third at a time of the district’s schoolchildren are to be evacuated and brought to a safe place. He said this requires a bus driver to drive into a danger zone three separate times and fight traffic to leave the zone three times before the evacuation is complete. And, "these are bus drivers who have not agreed to do this," stated Jacobs. "I know a tremendous amount of work has been put into this plan," said Legislator Tony Hay, "but it wouldn’t work." Hay said, one car accident on the highway, "one fender bender" and the "plan is history. If it blows similar to Chernobyl this is a doomsday scenario." Patterson Legislator Mike Semo said, "I, too, have been involved in planning all my professional life. Do I think [the plan] will work 100% — absolutely not. But without a plan, you want to talk about disaster, it will be absolute disaster." Jacobs informed Semo, and the other members of the Legislature, they could pass a resolution saying they believe the plan wouldn’t work. "It will have the same effect," he said, as pulling out of the plan. Legislative chairman Bob Pozzi stepped in and told Chairman Intrary and the other committee members, "I would strongly advise this committee not move forward" with this resolution. He said if an accident should happen, "I rely on the good nature of the people in this county" to help everybody get out safely. In a time of need, he said, "is the time you want to live in Putnam County. I’m excited about this county." One of the two cosponsors of the resolution calling to shut down the plant, along with Vinnie Tamagna was Putnam Valley representative Sam Oliverio, Jr. He said he has confidence in the people of the County, "but this is a much bigger issue. All the volunteers aren’t going to help – I can tell you deep down – we are not going to be okay. This lifeboat leaks." Committee chairman, Kent’s Terry Intrary, let everybody have his or her say on the issue before he weighed in with his comment. He spoke of the importance of having a plan in place, regardless of statistics and probabilities. He said, "You put a plan together for frame work. Will this plan work? I have no idea – but it is a plan. We will make adjustments. We’ve made the resolution to close the plant and that’s as far as I want to go." Indian Point continues as a topic for the Legislature of Putnam County. The Health, Educational, Social and Environmental Committee will hear arguments against a proposed study of the baby teeth of Putnam County residents next month. The organization doing the study claims it offers a glimpse of the radiation found in the body while those who oppose the study say small amounts of radiation have no harmful effects. ***************************************************************** 6 Discover Dialogue: Arjun Makhijani The Nuke Slayer DISCOVER Vol. 22 No. 4 (April 2001) News of science, medicine, and technology *This is an extended version, exclusive to the Discover website, of the article that appears in Discover Magazine.* Say the word nuclear, and scandal seems to follow, from Chernobyl to America's polluted nuclear-weapons production facilities. The latest controversy centers on the Balkans, where NATO forces fired more than 40,000 shells with dense, armor-piercing tips made of depleted uranium. At least 15 European soldiers who served there have developed or died of leukemia in the past five years. Outraged relatives blame the deaths on these munitions, a link the Pentagon hotly disputes. Arjun Makhijani, an engineer and president of the Maryland-based Institute for Energy and Environment Research, has analyzed past environmental abuses in his book *Nuclear Wastelands: A Global Guide to Nuclear Weapons Production and its Health and Environmental Effects* (MIT Press, 2000). He shares his thoughts with *Discover* associate editor Josie Glausiusz. What's your opinion of current controversy over depleted uranium missiles? It's a huge, huge scandal. These complaints deserve to be investigated seriously, but instead the American government is dismissing them without adequate study. This is very reminiscent to me of what the government did with the people who helped make nuclear weapons. It said, "No, you weren't hurt; we are sure the doses were low; really conditions were very safe; you didn't breathe very much radioactive material." Last year, of course, they made a blanket admission that half-a-million workers were put in harm's way, and we don't know how many of them got cancer as a result. How could these missiles harm human health? When they're fired, the metal burns at a very high temperature. And the fine particles that result are not the same as is seen typically, say, in a factory that makes depleted uranium metal. Some researchers have suggested that the uranium oxide dust created at very high temperatures will stay in the body for much, much longer than oxide which is generated at lower temperatures, because it is a kind of insoluble ceramic particle that dissolves a lot more slowly, and so may be eliminated from the body a lot more slowly. How might these particles cause cancer? Depleted uranium is primarily dangerous when it's inside your body, because it emits alpha radiation, which gravely damages the cells near where it is located, or even a single cell. So if you breathe it in, for instance, it can increase the risk of lung cancer, and it can migrate to the bones. Soldiers and civilians who handle depleted uranium shells could get cuts in the hands or arms, and so get oxide particles directly into the bloodstream. Do you believe that depleted uranium missiles caused cancer deaths among soldiers who served in the Balkans? I don't know. Cancer is a very common disease, there were a lot of soldiers there, and we must be careful in making scientific conclusions. I think four things are called for. One, the suspension of use of depleted uranium missiles. Two, conducting independent studies. Three, giving the benefit of the doubt to both the civilians and combatants so that they get the medical treatment they deserve. Fourthly, committing to cleanup. You cannot pretend that modern war is precise in its effects, and that just because no NATO troops died during the 1999 Yugoslavia-NATO war [in Kosovo] the long-term effects on the combatants and noncombatants are negligible or can be ignored. In the case of depleted uranium, there's a lot of it lying around. There should be some declaration of what was used, where it was used, how much, where it's expected to be found, and where it can be recovered. What in your opinion are the most pressing nuclear issues today? In the nuclear power field, it's the continued use of plutonium as a fuel for reactors, and the continued reprocessing and piling-up of commercial plutonium stocks in Russia, France, England and Japan. It's a waste of money, it's a proliferation risk and there are problems with significant discharges of radioactivity into the environment. Then there is the problem of about 4400 nuclear warheads on hair-trigger alert in the United States and Russia combined. The high alert state is getting more and more dangerous all the time, because Russia is losing its infrastructure. They don't have radar coverage of the sky. They don't have sufficient satellites up to provide them with 24-hour tracking of up-and-coming missiles. So they are more prone to make mistakes. I think it is extremely dangerous for the United States and Russia to persist in keeping warheads on tactical alert. Have nuclear weapons contributed in any way to peace? No. The most you can say about nuclear weapons is that they seem to have prevented white people from going at each other's throats. They have not directly fought each other in Europe for the last fifty years. But instead they have exported wars to the Third World. This idea that nuclear weapons have maintained the peace is a fantasy that has been created by the short-sightedness and self-absorption of the Europeans who have been writing history for the last couple of hundred years. Do you think the world will ever rid itself of nuclear weapons? Well, my mother sometimes wonders what I am doing in this business. She keeps telling me it's not going to change. My answer to her is, "I have to try. I can't look at myself in the face and say I'm not trying, knowing what I know." I do think that if the world doesn't rid itself of nuclear weapons, that we are inviting nuclear chaos. Look at the Middle Eastern question. There is also a commitment under the extension of the non-proliferation treaty to create a nuclear weapons-free zone in the Middle East. Now, if there is no resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian question, then how the nuclear situation in the Middle East evolves will be anybody's guess. Why do you do what you do? We want to democratize science. We don't think you can really be a democracy in the true sense unless you understand the important scientific issues of modern life, especially in the environmental and energy fields. Right now we're doing a study on the environmental effects of modern war. Our work on depleted uranium will be part of that. Do you think that nuclear materials should be allowed in space for peaceful purposes? I respect the idea of space exploration. I think we know a lot more about our planet because of what space explorers have done. But what many people don't realize is that the amount of plutonium in the Cassini mission to Saturn contains more radioactive plutonium than has been released in all the atmospheric weapons testing. I think there are other ways to do these missions, and we should carefully evaluate the priority for doing them. What is the hurry to get to Pluto or Saturn? We are doing a very bad job of husbanding this planet. Maybe we ought to leave the other planets alone for a little while until we learn to take care of the one we've got. *"Discover* Dialogue: Arjun Makhijani." For more information about the work of the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, see http://www.ieer.org/. For data on depleted uranium use in the Balkan s see http://www.antenna.nl/wise/uranium/dissbk.html © Copyright 2000 The Walt Disney Company. Back to Homepage. ***************************************************************** 7 Jim Riccio's Comments on The Voluntary Regulation of the Nuclear Industry [cmeeplogo.gif (4190 bytes)] The Voluntary Regulation of the Nuclear Industry Comments of James Riccio Senior Policy Analyst Public Citizen's Critical Mass Energy & Environment Program before The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Regulatory Information Conference March 14, 2001 Capital Hilton Hotel Washington, DC Good Morning, my name is James Riccio. I'm the senior analyst for Public Citizen's Critical Mass Energy & Environment Program. I appreciate the opportunity to present our views on Voluntary Industry Initiatives - in Lieu of Regulation. I hope the Commission does not mind my use of the original title of this initiative. I feel it is more forthright and accurate. At least originally, the NRC had the decency to admit what it was up to. The NRC must have realized that the inclusion of the phrase "in lieu of regulation" would further undermine public confidence in the agency and the industry. Thus, the phrase has mysteriously disappeared from NRC's lexicon, but the regulatory retreat it engenders has continued. I can understand why the NRC might wish to change the title of this program. The NRC has replaced regulation with voluntary initiatives that remove the public from the regulatory process and that have already failed to address significant safety issues. The NRC has refused to issue rules and regulations to address significant safety problems, instead relying on the voluntary initiatives that the industry has failed to implement. The nuclear safety issues that the agency and industry have subjected to this voluntary approach, the regulation of steam generators and the security of nuclear reactors, are not instances of prior regulatory rigor. These are instances where the NRC and the nuclear industry have been embarrassed by their inability or unwillingness to regulate. Voluntary Regulation of Steam Generators The basis of NRC's regulation of pressurized water reactors (PWRs) has been maintaining the primary pressure boundary to prevent the release of radioactive material into the environment and surrounding communities. Steam generators constitute more than 50% of the primary pressure boundary in PWRs, yet the NRC has abdicated its responsibility for regulating steam generators instead relying on the Nuclear Energy Institute's plan that still has not been implemented. When degraded steam generator tubes go undetected, they break, initiating a potentially disastrous sequence of events. The rupture of as few as ten tubes could result in the meltdown of the reactor fuel rods, potentially releasing catastrophic amounts of radiation into the environment. Unfortunately, the NRC staff continues to find that cracks in steam generator tubes may go undetected 40 to 60% of the time. In the early 1990's, the NRC staff developed both a generic letter and a proposed rule to regulate the integrity of steam generator tubes. The NRC staff was leaning toward rulemaking and the generic letter because reactor technical specifications were not adequate to ensure safety from new, more severe forms of steam generator tube degradation. However, the NRC never issued the generic letter or the proposed rule. Rather than regulate, the NRC instead deferred to the Nuclear Energy Institute's plan for voluntary self-regulation. Failing to issue the proposed rule and instead relying upon the Nuclear Energy Institute's steam generator plan has already resulted in limiting public participation. Rather than being afforded the opportunity for notice and comment rulemaking as contemplated by the Administrative Procedure Act, public input into the regulatory process has been short circuited. According to an ACRS letter to NRC's Executive Director of Operations, "in December 1997, the industry committed to implement, on a voluntary basis, NEI 97-06, "Steam Generator Program Guidelines." However, when the Indian Point 2 nuclear reactor burst a steam generator tube in February 2000, the NEI plan still had not been implemented. In my view, the failure of the NRC to promulgate regulations to govern steam generator tube integrity and the subsequent failure of the industry to implement its own initiative resulted in an accident 25 miles from New York City. The NRC has ignored the concerns of its own staff and has allowed a differing professional opinion to fester for nearly a decade. A recent NUREG report to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards determined that the NRC lacks a technically defensible basis for determining that degraded steam generators will not experience multiple tube ruptures during accident conditions. Voluntary Regulation of Nuclear Reactor Security Reactor Security has been another source of embarrassment for the nuclear industry and the NRC. The OSRE (Operational Safeguards Response Evaluation) Program has continually identified significant physical protection vulnerabilities at U.S. nuclear power plants. As of the summer 1998, mock adversaries were able to defeat security 40 times, demonstrating the potential for terrorists to cause "significant core damage" at nearly half the plants tested. Similar results have been recorded since that date and "significant vulnerabilities" continue to be identified. Many licensees failed their OSRE evaluations despite the fact that they had many months of advance warning and had increased the size of their security forces. Despite these past regulatory failures, reactor security regulations are slated for voluntary treatment by the agency and the industry. Does the NRC really need a terrorist attack on a nuclear reactor before it will take security seriously? U.S. nuclear reactors are supposed to be able to defend themselves against a band of armed terrorists yet they can't even stop mock terrorists when they tell them the day they are arriving! The Commissioner's Concerns When the NRC first floated this voluntary scheme, the staff was admonished by Commissioner Merrifield not to underestimate the importance of public confidence. He stated that: it must be clear to the public that substituting voluntary industry initiatives for NRC regulatory action can provide effective and efficient resolution of issues, will in no way compromise plant safety, and does not represent a reduction in NRC's commitment to safety and sound regulation. This process can only be successful if licensees effectively manage and implement their commitments associated with these voluntary initiatives and the NRC provides a credible and predictable regulatory response when licensees fail to satisfy these commitments. Failure of either the NRC or licensees to effectively carry out its responsibilities would undermine the regulatory process and serve to erode stakeholder confidence in the merits of using voluntary industry initiatives in this manner. Unfortunately, the accident at Indian Point 2 has made Commissioner Merrifield's comments seem almost prescient. I challenge the Commissioner and his colleagues to review their acceptance of voluntary industry initiatives in light of the accident at Indian Point. The accident has provided the NRC with a warning that these voluntary initiatives are no replacement for sound regulation. The NRC should consider itself lucky that it is merely being investigated by congress and the inspector general and not having to deal with the consequences of a meltdown 25 miles from New York City. ***************************************************************** 8 Yucca measures controversial March 16, 2001 By Cy Ryan SUN CAPITAL BUREAU CARSON CITY -- State legislators say their opposition to a proposed high-level nuclear waste dump at Yucca Mountain has not weakened despite introduction of resolutions urging Congress to find routes that avoid Las Vegas. There has been speculation these resolutions could indicate an implied consent that Nevada is willing to accept the radioactive materials from across the nation. Sen. Ray Shaffer, D-North Las Vegas, introduced Senate Joint Resolution 10 Thursday, urging Congress to make sure that any nuclear waste being shipped to Yucca Mountain must not come within 10 miles of any city or town. And the resolution said this "must not be construed in such a manner as to indicate that the Nevada Legislature or the state of Nevada explicitly or impliedly consents to the location of a repository ..." Sen. Jon Porter, R-Henderson, sponsored Senate Joint Resolution 11 that urges Congress to require a study on the environmental, economic and safety effects of transporting nuclear waste through Southern Nevada. "This is not implied consent," Porter said about his resolution. "I believe that by identifying the hazards and consequences specific to the transportation of those materials, we can finally force Washington, D.C., to consider alternative storage solutions to the nation's nuclear waste problem other than Yucca Mountain." Both these resolutions sparked immediate controversy. Under the standing rules, they were supposed to be referred to the Natural Resources Committee but instead were sent to the Transportation Committee headed by Sen. Bill O'Donnell, R-Las Vegas, because the resolutions deal with transportation, he said. But Sen. Mark James, R-Las Vegas, objected, saying these were environmental issues that should be sent to natural resources. After the session, James said any anti-nuclear waste legislation sent to O'Donnell's committee is buried. O'Donnell said, "I will have to talk to him (James) about that." O'Donnell was the main sponsor of a resolution on Feb. 21 that urges the Energy Department to locate an alternate train route to Yucca Mountain "in the event that the U.S. Congress declares Yucca Mountain to be a suitable site for a high-level radioactive waste repository." He said his opposition to the nuclear dump still stands. But he said the Congress has already designated Yucca Mountain as the only site to be studied. "We need a railroad to take this stuff out of the city. We can't afford it going through the Spaghetti Bowl. "It's either do this or nothing," O'Donnell said. Sen. Mike Schneider, D-Las Vegas, a co-sponsor of O'Donnell's resolution, Senate Joint Resolution 4, said, "We're not caving in." Schneider and others who co-sponsored SJR4 noted they signed a resolution that expresses Nevada's disapproval of the selection of Yucca Mountain. The resolution was a "What if?" situation, Schneider said, adding that "We should be looking at alternatives. We're playing defense as hard as we can, but we have to plan our next move." "We need to start looking at other things," he said, complaining that low-level nuclear waste has been trucked through Las Vegas in recent months. Schneider also said he wants to ban low-level shipments. Also signing the O'Donnell resolution was Assemblywoman Vonne Chowning, D-North Las Vegas. Asked if her resolve against nuclear waste has slipped, she replied, "Hell, no." Chowning, chairwoman of the Assembly Transportation Committee, said one shipment of low level waste came over Boulder Dam and others went through the Spaghetti Bowl. "I was so appalled," she said. Assemblyman Bob Beers, R-Las Vegas, who also signed O'Donnell's resolution, said, "If it is coming, if they put it there (Yucca Mountain), we don't want it coming through Las Vegas. "I envision a road from the corner of Interstate 15 and the Utah State line across the Test Site and as far from any populated areas as possible." I prefer it doesn't come, but the prospect of it coming and it coming through Las Vegas really frightens me." Assemblyman David Parks, D-Las Vegas, said, "I don't recall signing it," referring to O'Donnell's resolution. "Whatever was represented to me was not that we were giving into the federal government." Assemblyman Tom Collins, D-North Las Vegas, said, "I was told it was to not allow trucks to go through Las Vegas, and it is the resolution. It was my intent not to allow any shipment through Las Vegas. I see this as protecting the Las Vegas Valley." All contents copyright 2001 Las Vegas SUN, Inc. ***************************************************************** 9 Electron Cafe by John Glenn: Irreparable harm Power Online News for power industry professionals -->3/16/2001 Issues that make nuclear energy hard to promote as safe often result from the approach to safety standard development. I may be too simplistic but current standards are most often based upon the concept of “acceptable risk.” The term sounds nice but in practice “acceptable” is purely subjective. For example, living next to a nuclear power plant is many thousand times less likely to result in early death than commuting to work in an automobile. A proponent of nuclear power feels strongly that the relative safety of the nuclear power plant is *acceptable*. An opponent of nuclear power just as strongly feels that *any* chance of an early death from just living near a power plant is *unacceptable*. For the mechanical hazards we encounter on a daily basis, most of us have adopted a much different standard for requiring remediation or compensation. I suggest the standard we use is actually “irreparable harm.” An injury that will completely heal (small cut, light bruise, hairline fracture, sprain, etc.) is unlikely to result in a legal remedy. An injury that does not completely heal (death, chronic pain, scarring, loss of full use of a limb, partial blindness or deafness, etc.) will most likely result in a claim that will either be paid by insurance or resolved legally. There will be disputes about irreparable harm when the injury is severe but healing is likely (fractures, moderate burns, long recuperation times, etc.). But we are in agreement about the great majority of situations at either end of severity. A bruise that heals in a few days is not worthy of compensation. Someone who is confined to a wheelchair for life after an accident does deserve compensation. Can irreparable harm serve as a standard for exposure to environmental hazards with low risk but high consequence? If radiation from living near a nuclear power plant has a one-in-a-million chance of causing a fatal cancer, is that exposure to radiation irreparable harm? I believe that as we learn more about cancer causation and the body’s healing systems we may be able to develop a quantitative stand for reparable harm. Humans are subject to many trillions of environmental insults every day that have some chance of causing cancer. Natural ionizing radiation alone creates an enormous number of ion pairs within the human body every day. Theoretically any one of these ions could result in damage to DNA that results in cancer. Estimate of ion pairs per day: The average human being receives an absorbed dose of ionizing radiation from nature of about 0.001 rad per day. Each rad equals about 60 trillion electron volts of energy per gram of tissue. (This is a small amount of energy. A 100-Watt bulb requires 600 million trillion electron volts per second.) The average man has a mass of about 70,000 grams (154 pounds). The average man therefore absorbs about 4,200 trillion electron volts of energy from natural background each day. The average energy to create an ion pair is 33.5 electron volts. The average man is likely to have 125 trillion ion pairs created within his body each day. Why aren’t we all dead because of natural radiation? Many of the ion pairs are neutralized without causing any damage. But with so many chances to cause harm, many DNA strands are damaged and could cause cancer. So the main reason we are not all dead is the body’s ability to *repair* effectively the resulting damage. Thus irreparable harm would only result if the body is subjected to an additional hazard at least equal to the hazard every human must face for living on the planet earth. There are some twists and turns that would make the harm assessment difficult at radiation doses greater than background but less than radiation doses with documented and observable effects (greater than 10 to 25 rads). The damage to different types of cells varies. This means that the type of exposure as well as the gender, age, and health of the exposed individual will play some role in the effectiveness of the body’s repair mechanisms. However, a standard based upon the normal ability of the body to repair potentially cancer causing changes within cells could avoid illogical attempts to control very small radiation doses. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s proposed standard of 0.004 rad per year from ground water (equivalent to 4 days exposure to natural radiation) does not make sense. If the human body has evolved to survive three score and 10 plus years with natural radiation, then a 1% change in radiation dose per year can not represent irreparable harm or even an unacceptable risk. Copyright © 2000-2001, Vert Tech LLC. All rights reserved. ***************************************************************** 10 IEER-NCI Letter to NRC re: DCS MOX Fuel Fab. Facility Construction Application IEER NUCLEAR CONTROL INSTITUTE INSTITUTE FOR ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH Letter to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission re: Duke Cogema Stone & Webster application for authorization to construct a MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility March 9, 2001 Richard A. Meserve Chairman U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Dear Chairman Meserve: We are writing to you in reference to the application recently submitted by Duke Cogema Stone & Webster (DCS) for NRC authorization pursuant to 10 CFR § 70.23(b) to construct a facility at the Savannah River Site (SRS) for the fabrication of mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel containing excess U.S. weapon-grade plutonium (WG-Pu), as well as to the anticipated submittal in June 2002 of an application by DCS for an operating license for this facility pursuant to 10 CFR § 70.23(a)(8). We understand that it is the Commission's intention to conduct any hearings on these MOX plant applications using the informal procedures of 10 CFR Part 2 Subpart L, even though the Commission has the authority to initiate hearings using formal Subpart G procedures if it deems such hearings to be "required in the public interest" by issuing a Notice of Hearing pursuant to 10 CFR § 2.104. For the reasons stated below, we believe that the public interest would indeed be far better served if the Commission were to ensure that any MOX plant hearings would be conducted using the more rigorous procedures specified in 10 CFR Part 2 Subpart G. We therefore send this letter in support of the February 22, 2001 request by Georgians Against Nuclear Energy (GANE) and other interested parties that Subpart G proceedings be used for any MOX plant hearing. We are aware that the Commission has recently approved the issuance of a draft rulemaking (SECY-00-0017) that would revise the Rules of Practice stated in 10 CFR Part 2. One major consequence of the proposed rule would be to greatly restrict the range of proceedings that would require Subpart G procedures, reserving such formal procedures only for enforcement hearings, uranium enrichment plant licensing proceedings (as required by statute) and reactor licensing proceedings that involve "a large number of complex issues that would clearly benefit from the use of formal hearing procedures."1 A Commission decision to require formal procedures for MOX plant licensing hearings would appear at first glance to be in conflict with the preference for deformalizing most NRC hearing procedures that is reflected in SECY-00-0017. However, our reading of the Commission's voting record suggests a desire to move away from a *pro forma* adherence to set procedures, and toward a more pragmatic and flexible approach that tailors the rigor of the hearing procedures more carefully to the significance of the matter under consideration. For example, as you state in your comments on SECY-00-0017 (quite sensibly, in our view), material licensing actions "can raise very complex and difficult issues that would benefit from the focused scrutiny that formal procedures allow" and therefore "the proposed category of cases to which formal hearing procedures would apply is too narrow in other respects." You go on to suggest "categories of cases that would benefit from formal procedures..." which "might include "proceedings that present complex issues, that raise difficult disputed issues of material fact or of expert opinion, or perhaps ... that involve matters for which the preparation of an environmental impact statement was necessary." The MOX plant licensing clearly meets the last criterion, as it is the NRC's stated intention to carry out an EIS for this action. We maintain that a MOX licensing proceeding would fall within the other two categories as well. Some of the large number of complex issues that are likely to be raised in the MOX plant licensing proceedings and would benefit from formal resolution are as follows: + The MOX plant licensing will be the first NRC proceeding involving large-scale plutonium processing since the GESMO hearings were terminated in 1977, raising the possibility that the NRC's core competency in plutonium issues has eroded. + The MOX plant will be the first facility licensed under the revised 10 CFR Part 70, a highly complex rule that even at this preliminary stage has led to confusion on the part of the licensee concerning its requirements. + The highly aggressive MOX plant licensing schedule has been determined not by the needs of the NRC staff for adequate time for information-gathering, testing and analysis, but by commitments in international agreements, raising the concern that the NRC staff will be under political pressure to rush its review. + The MOX plant would be the first NRC-licensed fuel fabrication facility to process weapon-grade plutonium from dismantled nuclear warheads (some of which is, in its present form, alloyed with other materials), which will raise new security, safety and quality control issues. + The MOX program is fundamentally a bilateral U.S.-Russian program, and the NRC licensing process will serve as a model for the licensing of the MOX plant in Russia, with regard to safety, safeguards, physical protection and public involvement. A failure by the NRC to conduct the proceedings under Subpart G would undermine the U.S. policy of strengthening nuclear safety and regulation in Russia and send the wrong signal at a time when the independent Russian nuclear regulatory authority GAN is under threat. + The unusual importance of product quality control for ensuring public confidence in the safety of MOX fuel has been made apparent by the BNFL data falsification scandal and its consequences in Japan and elsewhere, implying that the licensee may have to make much more quality control data available to the public than is customary. + Safety issues regarding the facility's location on a highly contaminated, U.S.-Government weapons production site must be resolved. + Public confidence must be assured with regard to the potential abuse of proprietary agreements to conceal safety information from the public. + Public confidence must be assured with regard to the credibility of Framatome ANP and Cogema, the foreign parent companies of two of the members of the DCS consortium. For example, serious questions have arisen regarding the possible withholding of safety information by Framatome ANP from the NRC staff regarding the embrittlement tendencies of niobium-containing cladding similar to the M5 cladding proposed for use in MOX fuel assemblies. Also, there is an ongoing judicial investigation of Cogema, for possible violation of France's storage law relating to radioactive waste of foreign origin. + Serious unresolved issues exist regarding the licensee's plan for production and testing of MOX lead test assemblies, the availability of irradiated MOX fuel for independent testing by NRC staff, and the way in which the results of such testing will be fed back into MOX facility design and operations. This list of "complex and difficult issues" clearly indicates that the MOX plant licensing proceeding would "benefit from the focused scrutiny that formal proceedings allow." Therefore, using the standards that you have articulated, this proceeding would benefit from a formal, Subpart G hearing. Inversely, public confidence in the MOX plant licensing process will suffer if intervenors are denied the rights of discovery and cross-examination, and a thorough resolution of these issues is not reached to the satisfaction of all parties. Thank you for your consideration of our request. We look forward to a positive response. Sincerely, Edwin S. Lyman, Ph.D. Scientific Director Nuclear Control Institute2 Arjun Makhijani, Ph.D. President Institute for Energy and Environmental Research3 IEER Home Page Institute for Energy and Environmental Research Comments to Outreach Coordinator: ieer@ieer.org Takoma Park, Maryland, USA *July, 1999* Endnotes 1. Karen D. Cyr, NRC General Counsel, "Proposed Rule Revising 10 CFR Part 2 -- Rules of Practice," SECY-00-0017, January 21, 2000. 2. 1000 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 410, Washington, DC 20036 3. 6935 Laurel Avenue, Suite 204, Takoma Park, MD 20912 ***************************************************************** 11 Plutonium End Game: Stop Reprocessing, Start Immobilizing IEER: Science for Democratic Action vol. 9 no. 2 / Energy &Security No. 16: Plutonium End Game IEER | SDA V9N2 / E&S #16 by Arjun Makhijani *The problem of surplus military plutonium emerged quickly and with a high profile at the end of the Cold War because of widespread fears that black markets in such plutonium (and tactical nuclear warheads) might emerge from the collapse of the Soviet Union. But an equally important potential proliferation problem -- that of separated commercial plutonium -- has been quietly mounting in the past decade, without comparable attention. The hope of the nuclear industry had been that commercial plutonium would be a valuable fuel. But economic events in the real world have negated these hopes, just as the political events have rendered obsolete the idea that large military plutonium stocks were a security asset. Since essentially all isotopic combinations of separated plutonium, whether of commercial or military provenance, can be used to make nuclear weapons, plutonium is one of the most important links between the commercial and military nuclear industries. Management of separated plutonium, whatever its origin, is therefore crucial to sound non-proliferation policy. A great deal has been written about surplus military plutonium, including a considerable amount of literature produced by IEER, the US National Academy of Sciences, and others. In January 2001, IEER released a report on management of commercial plutonium, and how its disposition could and should be integrated with that of surplus military plutonium. This article summarizes that work. For references, please see the full report.*1 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Plutonium-239 is made by irradiating relatively abundant, naturally-occurring uranium-238 in a nuclear reactor. This can be done for military purposes, whereby plutonium is extracted from the fuel and targets rods that have been irradiated in a nuclear reactor (collectively called the irradiated reactor fuel, or spent fuel). Plutonium is also created in commercial nuclear reactors, since uranium-238 is present in large amounts in commercial nuclear reactor fuel. Since there are a large number of such reactors (more than 400 worldwide), the total quantity of plutonium that has been generated in the commercial nuclear power industry has been far greater than that produced in military nuclear weapons programs. By the end of 1999, the total plutonium created in commercial power reactors amounted to over 1,400 metric tons, compared to about 270 to 300 metric tons in military programs. Plutonium can also be used to fuel reactors. In order to be used as a nuclear fuel, plutonium must first be separated from residual uranium and fission products in the irradiated fuel rods. The chemical and electrochemical processes used to accomplish that separation go under the general rubric of "reprocessing." Of military plutonium, about 250 metric tons remains in government stocks. The rest was used up in nuclear tests, scattered about the world and in underground cavities, as the unused residue from tests, and stored or dumped as waste. Of the commercial plutonium, about 280 metric tons has been separated, while the rest remains in the spent fuel. Some of the separated commercial plutonium has been used as a mixed plutonium oxide-uranium oxide (MOX) fuel, while the rest is stored. Table 1 shows the current inventory of commercially separated plutonium in the world. Table 1: Estimated separated commercial plutonium stocks in country of storage, metric tons (see note) Country Separated Plutonium Date of stock Comments France ~80 End of 1999 Includes foreign plutonium stored in France Britain 78.5 31 March 2000 Includes foreign plutonium stored in Britain Russia 30 2000 Japan 5.3 End of 1999 USA 1.5 2000 Other 11 End of 1998 Germany, Belgium, India Total ~206 Total set to exceed 210 metric tons by the end of 2000. Note: Includes plutonium in the form of unirradiated MOX fuel. The stock of commercial plutonium is growing at roughly ten metric tons per year, since the amount of plutonium being used as MOX fuel is considerably lower than the amount separated. The military stock is growing at about one metric ton per year, mainly in Russia and the United States, both which claim that they are reprocessing for environmental, not military, reasons. At this rate, the stock of commercial separated plutonium is set to exceed the stock of military plutonium in the next few years. It is already so huge that it represents a serious proliferation problem. An Interagency Working Group of the US government on plutonium disposition has clearly stated that: "Virtually any combination of plutonium isotopes - the different forms of an element having different numbers of neutrons in their nuclei - can be used to make a nuclear weapon. Not all combinations, however, are equally convenient or efficient."2 One metric ton of weapon-grade plutonium could be used to make about 200 nuclear bombs - more, if sophisticated bomb designs are used. It takes roughly 40 percent more commercial-grade plutonium to make a similar bomb. Stored commercial plutonium is therefore sufficient to make at least 30,000 nuclear bombs of a size similar to the one that destroyed Nagasaki. Background to the commercial plutonium predicament For much of the period after World War II, plutonium was viewed not only as the currency of power in a nuclear weapons world, but also as a "magical" energy source. This was because a special type of reactor, called a breeder reactor, would convert uranium-238 into more plutonium-239 than was actually needed to run the reactor. Hence there would be more fuel (plutonium-239) at the end of the process than at the beginning, even though electricity had been generated.3 The high hopes of the 1950s that plutonium would provide such a "magical" energy source - one that might even be "too cheap to meter" - have run aground on the shoals of a host of practical problems that have steadily grown worse over the past 25 years: 1. Uranium turned out to be far more plentiful than anticipated, and the price of uranium declined rapidly (with an upward blip in the 1970s). It is currently at or near historic lows. 2. Sodium-cooled breeder reactors, the technology of choice for creating a plutonium economy, and the one in which the greatest efforts and money have been invested, have turned out to be a very difficult technology to master and make economical. Despite over $20 billion (1999 dollars) in construction expenditures over more than four decades for just the large completed plants, the technology continues to be plagued by technical problems and high costs. Table 2 shows the approximate worldwide capital expenditures on major sodium-cooled breeder reactors (in 1996 dollars), and the current status of the various reactors. 3. Separated commercial plutonium can be used to make nuclear weapons, so that the development of a plutonium economy incurs considerably increased proliferation risks compared to those posed by uranium-fueled nuclear power reactors. 4. Reprocessing proved to be a costly technology, thereby increasing costs of plutonium relative to uranium. 5. Reprocessing results in discharges of large amounts of liquid radioactive waste and also creates other radioactive wastes that pose environmental problems and create safety and health risks. Table 2: Capital Costs of Sodium-Cooled Breeder Reactors Larger than 100 megawatts-thermal (MWt) Reactor and country Capacity, MWt Operation dates a Capital cost, millions of US dollars (1996) Fermi 1, USA 300 1966-72 403 BN350, Kazakhstan 1,000 1972- 724 Phénix, France 560 1973- 395 Dounreay PFR, Britain 600 1974-94 ~395 Joyo, Japan 100 1977- 144 KNK-2, Germany ~100 1977-91 107 BN600, Russia 1,470 1980- 918 FFTF, USA 400 1980-1993 1,397 Superphénix, France 2,900 1985-98 6,028 Monju, Japan 714 1994-1995 5,134 SNR-300, Kalkar, Germany 762 Did not open 4,272 Total 8,906 - 19,917b Notes: a. Start of operation corresponds to achievement of criticality. b. The total does not include about $1.6 billion (current dollars) spent on the incomplete and abandoned Clinch River breeder reactor (about $3 billion in 1996 dollars) nor the costs of other incomplete reactors. These structural factors have been accompanied by recent events, all but one of which are highly unfavorable to continued commercial reprocessing and MOX fuel use: 1. After the election of the Social Democratic-Green coalition government in late 1998, Germany decided to phase out nuclear power. This phase-out schedule, as it stands at the present time, will be relatively slow, corresponding approximately to the lifetime of the existing power plants. But the phase-out necessarily includes a stoppage of reprocessing German spent fuel. This will make it even more difficult to rationalize continued operation of UP2 in France (a facility dedicated to foreign spent fuel reprocessing) and the reprocessing plant in Britain, called THORP, belonging to the government-owned company, British Nuclear Fuels (BNFL), also commissioned to serve foreign customers. 2. The German government's decision to phase-out nuclear power, and hence also reprocessing, is causing reverberations in France and elsewhere, where the topic of a phase-out of nuclear power is no longer as politically difficult as before. The subsidies to plutonium in France particularly stick out as a sore thumb. (See accompanying article on French doubts about reprocessing and MOX.) 3. The Science and Technology Committee of the British House of Lords concluded in 1999 that most British commercial plutonium should be declared a waste. This was a severe blow to the prospects for plutonium fuel subsidies in Britain. 4. The sodium-fire accident at the Monju demonstration breeder reactor in Japan in 1995 - only about a year-and-a-half after it went critical - and the September 1999 criticality accident at the Tokaimura plant (which killed two workers from high-level radiation exposure and injured many others) have increased opposition to Japan's MOX fuel use plans. The entire future of nuclear power in Japan is now far more open to question than seemed possible before the Tokaimura accident. 5. The revelation that some BNFL MOX fuel quality control data were fabricated, including data relating to some of the fuel shipped to Japan, has thrown the British MOX program as well as reprocessing into disarray. 6. Russia's Minatom, the nuclear energy agency with the strongest attachment to a plutonium economy, has been and continues to be strapped for funds and cannot pursue an ambitious breeder reactor program on its own. Russia also lacks a commercial-scale MOX fuel fabrication plant. 7. The sole recent factor favoring MOX fuel use comes from the military sector. The 1 September 2000 US-Russian agreement would fill the only gap in the Russian plutonium fuel cycle infrastructure, if it is fully funded by the West and proceeds as envisioned (see below). This agreement is aimed at putting military stocks of plutonium that have been declared surplus by the two countries into non-weapons usable form, mainly by using it as MOX fuel in light water reactors. Russia also wants the MOX fuel fabrication plant to be capable of making MOX fuel for breeder reactors. However, Russia and the United States have not been able to arrive at an agreement about who would bear the liability for the program, including in case of an accident. The agreement leaves that question open for further negotiations. (See accompanying article on the US-Russian plutonium disposition deal.) The net result of the historical and current trends and events is that there is now a large policy issue of what should be done with the huge but uneconomical stock of commercial plutonium that is growing rapidly. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that the plutonium stocks and facilities are run by institutions that have a declining command of public confidence and respect, not least because of the data fabrication, safety, and environmental scandals that afflict BNFL. These factors have compounded the underlying problems arising from poor economic decision-making by governments and plutonium-related corporations. Unsurprisingly, the plutonium industry continues to push for subsidies, upon which it should have no reasonable claim. A huge and unjustifiably large sum - on the order of $100 billion worldwide - has already been spent over the past five decades on attempts to create a plutonium economy. Much of this was on large breeder reactors, most of which are now shut. Most of the rest was on reprocessing and the use of the resulting uneconomical plutonium as a reactor fuel. These costs are summarized in Table 3. There is no end in sight to the subsidies and there is no reasonable way to resolve the many problems that are still outstanding in the foreseeable future. Table 3: Summary of the Approximate Net Worldwide Costs of Attempts to Develop Plutonium as a Fuel Cost category Cost (in 1999 US dollars) Comments Major breeder reactors ~20 billion Larger than 100 megawatts thermal; completed reactors only Incomplete breeder reactors, small breeders, net operating costs ~10 billion? Net operating costs are the costs of reactor operation in excess of revenues derived from electricity sales Reprocessing and MOX ~40 billion Net of value derived in substituting MOX as a fuel for uranium. Rough estimate. Rokkasho-mura reprocessing plant construction ~20 billion Incomplete plant, now officially scheduled for completion in 2005 Other past costs (R&D, infrastructure, past decommissioning, long-term commercial plutonium storage) Many billions Includes closed reprocessing plants, (e.g. West Valley in New York), past reprocessing and breeder decommissioning, breeder and reprocessing R&D Subtotal, costs to date ~100 billion Future continued reprocessing and MOX net costs ~2 billion per year Assuming $1,000 per ton of heavy metal and reprocessing at current rates Storage costs for old plutonium stock 0.4 billion per year Future decommissioning and commercial plutonium disposition costs Billions or tens of billions total By any rational economic and security criteria, the commercial plutonium fuel and breeder industries should have made a complete exit from the stage of energy choices at least a decade ago. Yet, commercial plutonium separation continues in several countries. Plans for breeder reactors also remain in place in some countries. Use of plutonium as a fuel (in the form of mixed uranium and plutonium oxide or MOX) in existing reactors grew considerably in the 1990s, creating a new set of subsidies for the plutonium industry. These subsidies and unrealistic plans persist because those who fervently hope and believe in the long-term future of plutonium as an energy source have had enough muscle in the political and economic arenas to keep the plutonium flame alive. Indeed, they have been able to vastly increase the amount of plutonium being separated and used as MOX fuel in light water reactors - the most common kind of commercial reactor - the vast majority of which were not designed for plutonium fuels. In France alone, the use of MOX fuel amounts to a subsidy of about $1 billion per year for the commercial plutonium industry. (See accompanying article on French doubts about reprocessing and MOX.) Military plutonium disposition The prospects for plutonium fuel have also received a boost from the end of the Cold War. The United States and Russia are proposing to use most of their declared surplus weapons plutonium as a fuel in commercial nuclear power plants. This would provide an immense new subsidy to the plutonium fuel industry, in the name of non-proliferation, and provide the nuclear establishments of both countries with the arguments they need to continue reprocessing and breeder reactor programs. In particular, Minatom, Russia's ministry of atomic energy, has explicit plans to use the infrastructure created with Western non-proliferation funds for its breeder reactor program. Minatom has explicitly stated that that US-Russian weapons plutonium disposition program "must be seen as the first step in developing a technology for a future closed nuclear fuel cycle..." This would involve "the use of mixed uranium-plutonium fuel of fast reactors" (another name for breeder reactors).4 The United States has agreed to such a system in Russia in the context of weapons plutonium, even though it was rejected in the United States in the 1970s as too proliferation prone. (See accompanying article on the US-Russian agreement.) Converting surplus military weapon-grade plutonium into a fuel and using it in commercial power reactors not only raises proliferation concerns but also concerns related to safety. The vast majority of commercial reactors were designed for uranium, not mixed oxide (MOX) fuel, in which plutonium isotopes provide the fissile material. Modifications to these reactors to accommodate more control elements may be needed. Weapon-grade plutonium has never been used as a commercial fuel in reactors, though plutonium derived from commercial spent fuel is now being used in commercial power reactors in France, Germany, Belgium, and Switzerland. The computer codes that would be used to evaluate the safety of MOX made from weapon-grade plutonium would be those developed for and tested for reactor-grade plutonium. How safety concerns arising from the different plutonium composition of weapon-grade plutonium and reactor-grade plutonium and the different patterns of loading MOX fuel will be resolved remains unclear. The consequences of an accident in a reactor with MOX fuel would be more severe than one with uranium fuel because MOX fuel contains a larger proportion of plutonium and transuranic radionuclides. The regulatory infrastructure in Russia is relatively weak, leading to questions as to how safety concerns would be brought up or resolved. Moreover, new proliferation risks will also be created, since fresh MOX fuel would be transported on highways and stored at commercial nuclear power plants that do not now have military levels of security. Immobilization Even if all plutonium separation in the commercial and military sectors were to stop immediately, there would still remain an immense problem of the management of separated commercial plutonium and surplus military stocks. It is therefore urgent both to stop commercial reprocessing and to create a plan to put separated commercial plutonium and surplus military plutonium into non-weapons-usable form as expeditiously as is consistent with safety, health, and environmental protection. IEER has shown in previous analyses that immobilization of plutonium in one of several ways would be a safer, faster, and cheaper way to put separated plutonium into non-weapons-usable form.5 The primary purpose of this immobilization should be to prevent theft of plutonium by non-nuclear weapons states or terrorist groups. The idea of immobilizing all separated commercial plutonium and all surplus military plutonium has not made progress because of two reasons: It is generally believed that Russia will not accept any other alternative than to use plutonium as a fuel. Hence the MOX fuel option for surplus military plutonium is seen as essential for putting Russian weapons plutonium into non-weapons-usable form (spent fuel in this case). The plutonium lobby in the West and Japan has been steadfast in their support of the creation of a MOX fuel infrastructure using non-proliferation funds. While it is true that Minatom wants western funds to create a MOX fuel infrastructure, this does not mean that a different proposal would be rejected by all parts of Russian society or government. For instance, no offer to purchase all Russian separated commercial plutonium and all surplus weapons plutonium for immobilization and storage in Russia under international safeguards has ever been officially presented to the Russian government. It would cost at most $2 billion for the purchase of 80 metric tons of plutonium, if is valued at its maximum possible theoretical price (that is if it were magically transformed into MOX fuel at zero cost).6 It would cost a comparable sum to immobilize the plutonium. Existing cooperative nuclear security arrangements indicate a Russian willingness to consider programs that it would not otherwise have undertaken. Yet no Western offer to purchase Russian surplus plutonium for immobilization has officially been made to the Russian government. Such an approach, coupled with a complete halt to reprocessing all over the world, deserves urgent consideration for non-proliferation, safety and environmental reasons. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Science for Democratic Action vol. 9 no. 2 Main MenuScience for Democratic Action Main Menu IEER Home Page Institute for Energy and Environmental Research Comments to Outreach Coordinator: ieer@ieer.org Takoma Park, Maryland, USA *February 2001* ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Endnotes: 1. Arjun Makhijani, Plutonium End Game: Managing Global Stocks of Separated Weapons-Usable Commercial and Surplus Nuclear Weapons Plutonium. Takoma Park, Maryland: Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, January 2001. 2. U.S. DOE, Nonproliferation and Arms Control Assessment of Weapons-Usable Fissile Material Storage and Excess Plutonium Disposition Alternatives, DOE/NN-007. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Energy, January 1997, p. 37. 3. The process is of course theoretically limited by the availability of uranium-238, which is abundant. 4. Source of quotes: Strategy for the Development of Power Engineering in Russia for the First Half of the 21st Century: Principal Provisions. Moscow: Ministry of Atomic Power Engineering of the Russian Federation, 2000, pp. 17-18. 5. IEER's technical analyses and commentary on weapons plutonium disposition are available on-line, at http://www.ieer.org/latest/pu-disp.html. 6. The actual economic value of plutonium as a fuel (whether of commercial or military origin) is negative since it is more costly than uranium fuel. ***************************************************************** 12 French Report Doubts Merits of Reprocessing and MOX IEER: Science for Democratic Action vol. 9 no. 2 / Energy &Security No. 16: Plutonium End Game by Annie Makhijani Nuclear proponents like to point to France as the success story of nuclear energy. Nuclear power plants generate 75 to 80 percent of France's electricity and this is often held up as a symbol of the presumed wide acceptance of nuclear energy among the French public.1 However, since the late 1980s, when the French government first tried to start local investigations for possible repository sites, one of the public's top concerns has been the management of nuclear waste. This concern has, in turn, fueled a debate regarding the phase-out of nuclear power. Within this context the more narrow, but crucial, debate of putting and end to reprocessing has for the first time received official consideration. A July 2000 report, entitled *Etude économique prospective de la filière électrique nucléaire* ("The Economic Prospects of the Nuclear Electricity Sector"), was commissioned by the French Prime Minister, Lionel Jospin, to provide the government2 with an economic analysis of nuclear power, including reprocessing and the use of MOX (mixed [plutonium and uranium] oxide) fuel.3 The report is known as the Charpin report, after its primary author, Jean-Michel Charpin, who is the head of the Commissariat du Plan.4 The other two co-authors are Benjamin Dessus, Director of the ECODEV (Ecodéveloppement) program at the Centre National de Recherche Scientifique,5 and René Pellat, Haut Commissaire à l'énergie atomique (Commissioner of the Atomic Energy Commission). Given the diverse constituencies represented by the authors, including the French nuclear establishment, the report must be viewed as something of an official technical consensus document. In the introduction of the report, the authors state that: "We did not try to define the most desirable outcomes, even less how to get there. Therefore, this study does not make any recommendation. [...] Our ambition was not to guide the choices of the authorities, or even to influence public opinion. It was to allow the necessary democratic debate to take place on the basis of verified information and explicit technical, economic and environmental reasoning." Although the report did not make any recommendations, its two main conclusions regarding reprocessing are clear. They are, moreover, based on data furnished by the nuclear industry itself. First, reprocessing and MOX fuel use are uneconomical and will remain so for the foreseeable future. Second, reprocessing and MOX fuel use will contribute little to the reduction of the inventory of the transuranic radionuclides in waste, including plutonium. The report is structured to show a comparative economic analysis of possible various modes of electricity generation. It also evaluates the long-term impact of those options on the environment, notably carbon dioxide emissions. What follows is a summary of Chapter I of the report, "Pour la France: l'héritage du passé" ("Regarding France: the legacy of the past"), in which the two conclusions regarding reprocessing are reached. In order to put the report in context, we first provide a quick overview of the electricity sector and MOX fuel use in France. Electricity production in France The overall electricity production in France in 1997 was 481 TWh (terawatt-hours)6, with 376 TWh (78 percent) coming from the nuclear sector. The civilian nuclear sector is comprised of 58 pressurized water reactors. Of these, 20 are currently using MOX, 8 can be modified to use MOX but are not presently using it, and the remaining 30 reactors use UO2 (uranium dioxide) fuel and cannot be modified to use MOX. The reactors that are loaded with MOX use a 30 percent MOX core. The rest of the fuel is low enriched uranium. The MOX load of these 20 reactors is comprised of almost all the plutonium that is separated from French spent fuel. Table 1 shows the total amount of spent fuel unloaded from French reactors and the amount of that which is reprocessed. Were MOX to be loaded into all twenty-eight reactors that can use it, all of the approximately 1,100 metric tons of UO2 spent fuel generated annually in France could be reprocessed. There is, however, a considerable backlog of unused separated plutonium that is stored in France, since the extensive use of MOX is far more recent than commercial reprocessing. Table 1: Types and Amount of Fuel Reprocessed in France Type of spent fuel Annual unloading, in metric tons Amount reprocessed, in metric tons UO2 ~ 1100 850 MOX ~ 100 0 Total 1200 850 Source: Commission Nationale d'Evaluation Relative aux recherches sur la gestion des déchets radioactifs, Instituée par la loi 91-1381 du 30 décembre 1991, Rapport d'Evaluation No4, October 1998. The scenarios The report did its analysis by constructing seven scenarios. Six of these postulate various future levels of reprocessing and MOX fuel use. These are basically divided into two sets of three scenarios each, which differ only in the assumed life for the reactors (41 versus 45 years). The seventh, called S7, is a fictitious scenario that estimates the price of electricity in France assuming that reprocessing had never been initiated. The difference in the assumed average lifetime is so small that we focus discussion here only on the second set, S4 through S6, which assume a reactor lifetime of 45 years. This is the assumption also made in the no-reprocessing scenario and therefore allows a comparison of the costs of various levels of reprocessing with no reprocessing. Scenarios S4 through S6 involve the following assumptions: + Scenario S4 assumes that reprocessing would stop in 2010. + S5 corresponds to the current situation in France, in which 70% of the spent fuel is reprocessed and the extracted plutonium is fabricated into MOX and irradiated in 20 reactors. + S6 corresponds to the situation where all newly generated spent fuel (but not the past stocks of the unreprocessed spent fuel) is reprocessed and the extracted plutonium is fabricated into MOX and irradiated in 28 reactors. Note that no scenario assumes an early halt to reprocessing. The report notes that before rejecting it, the authors had contemplated a scenario involving the termination of reprocessing in 2001, date for the renewing of Electricité de France's reprocessing contracts. The rational given for not considering an early halt to reprocessing is that a sudden stop would entail numerous technical (storage of irradiated fuel), social, and legal problems. Roland Lagarde, who is Environment Minister Dominique Voynet's point person on this, has recently broached the possibility of ending reprocessing in 2002. Economic analysis Table 2 summarizes the costs of scenarios S4 to S7, where the same 45-year lifetime per reactor is assumed. The costs shown include deferred decommissioning costs. (Immediate decommissioning is more expensive.) All cost figures are in constant 1999 French francs. Table 2: Electricity Cost and Generation Under Different Reprocessing Schemes in France Scenario S4 (end reprocessing in 2010) S5 (70 % reprocessing) S6 (full reprocessing) S7 (no reprocessing) Cumulative cost, billions of francs 2,888 2,910 2,927 2,762 Total cumulative electricity generation, billion kilowatt-hour (billion kWh) 20,238 20,238 20,238 20,238 Average cost of electricity, in centimes/kWh 14.27 14.38 14.46 13.65 Notes: The dollar-franc exchange rates fluctuate. An approximate conversion may be made by assuming one US dollar is approximately equal to one euro. The euro and franc have a fixed relationship at 1 euro = 6.55 francs. One centime = 0.15 cents. Several conclusions can be drawn from these results. It is clear that France would have been far better off economically without reprocessing. The cumulative cost difference between the nuclear establishment's desire for full reprocessing and no reprocessing amounts to 165 billion francs (about $25 billion, assuming 6.55 francs = one US dollar). This amounts to a difference of about 3.7 billion francs per year (about $560 million), averaged out over the entire assumed life (45 years) of all the reactors. However, MOX is used in only some reactors and for only a portion of the life of these reactors. Hence, the cost difference between the full reprocessing and no reprocessing scenarios per reactor using MOX per year of MOX use is roughly $50 million (including the related reprocessing costs). Stopping reprocessing in 2010 would save almost 40 billion francs cumulatively ($6 billion) whereas increasing the plutonium reuse from 70 to 100% of the UO2 spent fuel generated annually would cost an extra 17 billion francs ($2.6 billion). Unfortunately, the figures for stopping reprocessing in 2001 or 2002 are not given. But an extrapolation from the figures given indicates that the savings would be considerably higher. Material balance analysis Table 3 shows the projected stocks of plutonium and americium at the end of reactor operating lifetimes, assumed to be 45 years, in metric tons. Table 3: Quantities of Plutonium and Americium Contained in Unreprocessed Spent Fuel (UO2 and MOX) Generated Under Various Reprocessing Schemes in France Scenario S4 (End reprocessing in 2010) S5 (70% reprocessing) S6 (full reprocessing) S7 (no reprocessing) Final stock of plutonium and americium, in metric tons 602 555 514 667 Note: Americium contributes only a few percent to the quantities listed. Hence maximum reprocessing compared to no reprocessing reduces the plutonium stock by only 153 metric tons (S6 versus S7), or only about 23%. The difference in plutonium stock between phasing out reprocessing by 2010 and full reprocessing is even smaller (15%). The reasons that reprocessing has only small impacts on plutonium stocks are: + Spent MOX fuel still contains a large amount of residual plutonium. + France has a backlog of separated plutonium from the long period when it had no reactors or few reactors using MOX. 7 France does not have the reactor capacity to use this backlog. Moreover, aged plutonium contains americium-241, a strong gamma emitter resulting from the decay of plutonium-241. Its presence is a hazard to workers and would necessitate its removal from the plutonium prior to MOX fabrication. + France's plan to use large amounts of plutonium in breeder reactors has fallen apart because of the severe technical problems and the very high costs of the breeder reactor program. France has permanently shut down its star of this program, the Superphénix, by far the largest breeder reactor in the world, well ahead of the original schedule. + There is plutonium in the spent fuel that France does not plan to reprocess, because it could not use the plutonium without engaging in a transmutation program.8 IEER conclusions The Charpin report provides the public with first detailed look at the official data on reprocessing and MOX fuel use in France. Its conclusions clearly point the way towards an early end to reprocessing since no significant problem in the energy or waste management sectors can be addressed by it. A rapid phase-out of reprocessing and therefore MOX fuel use would appear to be in the economic interest of Electricité de France, which, like utilities elsewhere, is facing an era of deregulation and competition. The company that would be opposed to such a policy would be Cogéma, the primarily government owned company which operates all of France's reprocessing and MOX fuel fabrication plants. Institute for Energy and Environmental Research Comments to Outreach Coordinator: Takoma Park, Maryland, USA *February 2001* Endnotes: 1 See, for example, Frontline documentary, "Nuclear Reaction" aired on PBS on April 15, 1997. 2 The current French government is a coalition of five left-leaning parties, including the Socialist and Green Parties. The Environment Ministry is headed by a Green Party member, Dominique Voynet. 3 Jean-Michel Charpin , Benjamin Dessus and René Pellat, *Étude économique propective de la filière électrique nucléaire*, La Documentation française, July 2000. This report can be found on the web in French at . 4 The Commissariat du Plan reports to the Prime Minister. Its mission is to help guide public choices on economic and social issues by producing expert studies. 5 The CNRS is government-affiliated, and has branches in various regions of France. It conducts research in many fields, including physical and biological sciences, health, as well as economics and social sciences. 6 One terawatt is one trillion watts (1012 or 1,000,000,000,000 watts). 7 At the end of 1996, this backlog was approximately 35 tons. If foreign plutonium is included, the figure increases to about 65 tons. 8 IEER's analysis of transmutation as a waste management method -- including environmental, waste management, cost, and proliferation concerns -- is summarized in *Science for Democratic Action,* vol. 8 no. 3 (May 2000), on the web at: . ***************************************************************** 13 Could nuclear power answer some of our energy woes? News | KTVB.COM | Idaho MARCH 16, 2001, 01:15 PM Idaho Senator Larry Craig is co-sponsoring a bill aimed at renewed research and development of the next generation of nuclear power. Right now 20% of our nation's energy comes from nuclear reactors across the country. If Craig's legislation is passed, the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory would be at the center of nuclear development. Tim Leahy, INEEL lab director: "I think as residents and businesses experience more of these huge price increases, as demand continues for electricity while supply stays pretty constant - I think nuclear is going to look a lot better to people." Researchers at INEEL say the biggest challenge for nuclear power is public acceptance. ©MMI Idaho Interactive Group, P.O. Box 7, Boise, ID 83707 ***************************************************************** 14 America Must Focus, and Focus Now, On Increasing Energy Supply and the Use of Coal, Says National Mining Association Yahoo! Politics - 0314-147.html WASHINGTON, March 14 /U.S. Newswire/ -- The following was released today by the National Mining Association: "Demand for energy has outstripped supply. The United States must focus -- and focus now -- on an energy strategy that supports the expansion of our domestic energy supply," said a mining industry spokesman in testimony given today before the House Committee on Energy and Commerce's Subcommittee on Energy and Air Quality. Brett Harvey, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer for Pittsburgh-based CONSOL Energy, Inc., testified on behalf of the National Mining Association, and spoke in support of a balanced national energy policy that takes full advantage of all energy resources, including coal, natural gas, petroleum, uranium and renewable energy. In commending Subcommittee Chairman Joe Barton (R-TX) for his foresight in holding the hearings on the need for a National Energy Policy, Harvey said "reliable, affordable energy is a top priority for the country. Coal is domestic, plentiful, reliable, and coal and coal-generated electricity is affordable and increasingly clean." "Coal is our country's largest domestic fuel source whether measured in terms of reserves or production. We produce over 1.1 billion tons of coal per year and over 90 percent of that goes for the production of over half of our nation's electricity," Harvey testified and added, "between 90 and 95 percent of our fossil reserves are coal. The coal industry can certainly produce the coal needed to meet new demands, but to do so, will require a number of policy changes." Harvey said some of those policy changes must include opening up reserves now shut off to development, as well as changes in interpretation of environmental regulations related to mining and coal combustion, and changes in tax policies. "At the current time at least 15 separate regulatory actions dealing with SO2, NOx, and mercury are now either pending at the Environmental Protection Agency or are in litigation. These actions are based on the faulty premise that an increase in coal means an increase in emissions. This is simply not true," Harvey said. Harvey told the subcommittee that coal use for electricity generation is greater now than at any time in our nation's history, yet emissions have declined 30 percent since 1970. "The standards of the Clean Air Act as amended in 1990 are being met -- and then some," Harvey explained. "We have the technologies to increase coal use and continue to see a decline in emissions," Harvey said. "Legislative efforts are underway to make certain that these technologies are brought into the commercial marketplace." ------ Note: Brett Harvey, along with NMA President and CEO Jack Gerard, will be available for interviews. Contact 202-463-2664. More than half of America's electricity is generated from coal. Coal is our nation's most abundant energy resource, accounting for more than 90 percent of all fossil energy reserves and representing a secure supply for the next 250 years. On average, coal-fired power is less than one-half the cost of oil, and at current prices, coal power is about one-fifth the cost of natural gas. Modern technologies have made coal-fired generation increasingly clean. *Copyright © 2001 U.S. Newswire All Rights Reserved. ***************************************************************** 15 Nuclear waste in limbo after court ban news.com.au [ 17mar01 ] A SHIP carrying nuclear waste from Sydney's Lucas Heights reactor has been turned away by French authorities, threatening to create a nuclear ghost ship whose cargo cannot be removed. Australian authorities yesterday claimed the ship would not be allowed to return to Australia claiming the French Government had "already accepted" the shipment. But a local French court yesterday banned the unloading of the Australian nuclear waste -- which was sent to France to be reprocessed before returning to Australia for disposal or storage. The waste, 360 spent nuclear fuel rods from the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation's HIFAR reactor at Lucas Heights was contained within five 20-tonne casks. Greenpeace France successfully filed an action in a local court at Cherbourg blocking the unloading of the shipment on the basis that COGEMA had no licence to take the waste or reprocess it. Greenpeace claims the rejection by France places the Federal Government's plans for a new reactor at Lucas Heights in doubt. A spokesperson for ANSTO said the claim that the shipment may need to be returned to Australia "had no basis". "This is the fourth shipment of HIFAR spent fuel from ANSTO since 1996 and the second to the COGEMA facility, all of which have been handled in accordance with the applicable national and international safety requirements," said the spokesman. The shipment is the second of four deliveries COGEMA has contracted to take from ANSTO. Under the contract between France and Australia, the waste is to be reprocessed in La Hague before being sent back to Australia for safe disposal. But Greenpeace told the court that the fissile matter in the shipments, a form of 23 per cent enriched uranium, has never been dealt with at La Hague and that COGEMA does not have the technology to process it. Australian IT ***************************************************************** 16 ALP demands halt to nuclear reactor The federal opposition today demanded the government freeze plans to build a new nuclear reactor in Sydney after a French court blocked a shipment of Australian nuclear waste. Plans to build Australia's replacement reactor were riddled with uncertainties and the government must stop it from proceeding, Labor's environment spokesman Nick Bolkus said. "The French court's decision raises serious questions which must be addressed before any work proceeds on the new reactor," Senator Bolkus said in a statement. "The prime minister must step in to ensure that Australian taxpayers are not left open to significant liabilities if the waste produced by the new reactor cannot be reprocessed and adequately managed." Greenpeace today said the future of Australia's new nuclear reactor at Lucas Heights was in doubt after a court banned a ship from unloading its nuclear waste in France. After a complaint by Greenpeace, the French court banned COGEMA, a French firm specialising in re-processing nuclear material, from unloading the waste at Cherbourg and taking it to its nearby plant at La Hague. The shipment is the second of four deliveries COGEMA has contracted to take from the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO). The decision means the spent fuel, from Australia's proposed replacement reactor at the same Lucas Heights site in southern Sydney, will not be processed in France. Australia has no facility to accommodate the Lucas Heights waste and must send it overseas until a local strategy for it is in place. "The proposed plans are riddled with legal uncertainties and potential liabilities for the Australian taxpayer," Senator Bolkus said. "It would be irresponsible for Australian authorities to issue a licence after this decision by the French court." ©AAP 2001 ***************************************************************** 17 Failed land-sale lawsuit threatens nuclear plant [The Japan Times Online] Saturday, March 17, 2001 NIIGATA (Kyodo) -- A lawsuit filed by a group demanding the nullification of the sale of part of the proposed site of a nuclear plant in the town of Maki, Niigata Prefecture, was dismissed Friday by the Niigata District Court. The plaintiffs, who favor construction of the plant, had opposed the sale by the town to opponents of the plant. The suit was filed against the town mayor. The ruling will make it more difficult for Tohoku Electric Power Co. to build the plant after a municipal plebiscite in 1996 saw more than 60 percent of respondents oppose the construction. Presiding Judge Noriyoshi Katano ruled that the land sale by Mayor Takaaki Sasaguchi was conducted in a lawful manner. In August 1999, Sasaguchi, who opposes the plant, sold the town-owned 743-sq.-meter plot in the planned construction site to a group of 23 people opposed to the plan, according to the court. The plaintiffs, including town assembly members promoting the plan, argued that the mayor exercised excessive discretionary power in approving the sale, which was apparently aimed at halting the project. The plaintiffs claimed the sales contract was made secretly and illegally. Sasaguchi said the decision to sell the land came after the plebiscite and was legal. The construction of an 825,000-kw nuclear plant by the firm was announced in May 1971 and has been on hold since 1983 due to difficulties in acquiring the land. The plan hit another obstacle when Sasaguchi was elected mayor in January 1996. He paved the way for the plebiscite -- the first of its kind in Japan. The Japan Times: Mar. 17, 2001 ***************************************************************** 18 China plans new coastal nuclear power plants CHINA: March 14, 2001 BEIJING - China plans to build several new nuclear power stations in coastal provinces over the next five years, the China Daily reported yesterday. The southern province of Guangdong had proposed adding two new generating units with a combined installed capacity of 2,000 megawatts to the Daya Bay nuclear plant and building a new 6,000 megawatt plant in Yangjiang, the official newspaper said. The Daya Bay proposal would require investment of more than 20 billion yuan ($2.4 billion) and the Yangjiang plant was expected to cost up to 70 billion yuan, it quoted Zan Yunlong, chairman of the China Guangdong Nuclear Power Group, as saying. The northeastern province of Shandong wanted to build a $3.0 billion nuclear power plant with a capacity of 2,000 megawatts in Haiyang, it said. And the eastern province of Zhejiang was planning to build a 2,000 megawatt nuclear plant in Sanmen, it said. The operating Daya Bay plants and Qinshan plants produce around 14 million megawatt-hours annually, accounting for one percent of China's power output, the newspaper said. REUTERS NEWS SERVICE ***************************************************************** 19 KOREAN GOVERNMENT URGED TO BAN DANGEROUS JAPANESE PLUTONIUM SHIPMENT FROM COASTAL WATERS 14 March 2001 Seoul - The Republic of Korea government should take immediate action to prevent an armed British shipment of Japanese plutonium Mixed Oxide fuel (MOX) from violating its coastal waters, Greenpeace and KFEM (Korean Federation of Environmental Movements) warned today.(1) Two vessels, the Pacific Pintail and Pacific Teal, could be in the seas off the Korean Peninsular in a matter of days, posing a wholly unacceptable and unnecessary risk to the community, fisheries and environment of Korea. The ships are carrying a huge amount of weapons-usable plutonium and tons of uranium (2) to the nuclear power plant, Kashiwazaki-Kariwa, on the East Sea/Sea of Japan coast, near the city of Niigata. But it's likely the MOX may never be loaded into the reactor because of safety concerns. "Japan is wasting a vast amount of money on this highly dangerous trade", said Greenpeace International's Shaun Burnie in Tokyo. "They have already brought one such cargo from the UK and France, two years ago. Not one gram has been used because vital quality control data had been falsified by British Nuclear Fuels (BNFL). That is being returned to the UK at a cost to Britain of US$200 million (including compensation). The local Governor of the Fukushima prefecture has voiced his opposition to the loading of any MOX because of widespread safety concerns amongst the local community. All of this should send a clear message to the Japanese government that these global transports put lives and the environment at risk and must be stopped". Tens of countries along the route of the transport have opposed the shipment, forcing it to steer clear of coastal waters in the South Pacific. Greenpeace and the KFEM are urging the Republic of Korea to voice equally strong opposition. The two ships are due to arrive in Niigata as early as the 22nd of March, which would mean if they were to use the southern route they would pass through the East China Sea and into the East Sea/Sea of Japan this weekend. It would potentially bring the vessels to within 20-60 miles of the southern city of Pusan. Any accident involving the release of the plutonium would be catastrophic for the environment, fisheries, tourism and public health. In 1999, following public protests in South Korea and the intervention of the Seoul government, the MOX shipment entered the East Sea/Sea of Japan via the Tsugaru Straits in northern Japan. Greenpeace is not aware of any information of this shipment being provided to the South Korean government. "The government and the people have voiced their deep concerns in the past about these shipments, it is time for them to do so again. The environment of South Korea is being put at risk and the Government in Seoul should make it clear to Japan that they do not wish this ship to pass through the straits between the Korean Peninsula and mainland Japan," Sanghoon Lee of KFEM. For non-proliferation reasons, for over thirty years the Republic of Korea has been blocked by the United States government from using plutonium and MOX fuel in any of its nuclear reactors. As little as 5kg of the plutonium shipped to Japan over recent years would be sufficient for one nuclear weapon. "Japan's plans for using large amounts of this plutonium, which can easily be made into nuclear weapons, significantly increases the risk of a serious nuclear accident. Given the large number of reactors on Japan's western coastline, that means the entire Korean peninsula is being threatened with a nuclear program that makes no sense from an environmental, safety and non-proliferation perspective. The United States government would not permit this shipment to deliver MOX fuel to the South Korean nuclear program, and yet less than one days' sailing time from the Peninsula, Japan is acquiring thousands of kilograms of this weapons material. Given the fact that their MOX program is in a state of confusion, the Japanese government needs to consider more seriously the wider environment of North-east Asia and to abandon this program," said Burnie. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION PLEASE CONTACT: - Shaun Burnie - Greenpeace International in Tokyo +81 3 5351 5400 (or mobile +81 90 2253 7306) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- NOTES TO EDITORS: (1) Greenpeace is working with the Korean Federation of Environmental Movements, KFEM, as well as the Korean Anti-Nuclear Coalition to oppose Japan's plutonium program. (2) On board the Pacific Pintail are approximately 220kg of plutonium, together with 4-5 tons of uranium. A Japanese court is currently considering a case brought against plans to load the other batch of MOX fuel delivered in 1999 to the Fukushima power plant on the Pacific Coast. The Governor of the region (Prefecture) has recently opposed the loading of that fuel on the grounds that citizens are not convinced that it is safe. ***************************************************************** 20 Finnish nuke plans could hit foreign trade - lobby FINLAND: March 15, 2001 HELSINKI - Anti-nuclear lobbyists warned Finland yesterday it faced a possible trade boycott if it built a new nuclear reactor. The warning came a day after the Environment Ministry criticised as "vague" power group Teollisuuden Voima's (TVO) application to build the country's fifth reactor. It was also the latest move in a war of words between Finland's pro-and anti-nuclear lobbies. The government has still to decide whether to send TVO'S application to parliament for a vote. Last November TVO applied for a permit to build a new reactor to help satisfy increasing energy demand and ensure Finland fulfils its greenhouse gas emission obligations under the Kyoto Protocol. However, opponents of the plan say a new reactor would not encourage a change in the way energy is produced or the effectiveness in how it is consumed. The youth organisation of the Leftist Alliance party, part of a national anti-nuclear network, said yesterday that building a new reactor could lead to a foreign trade boycott on Finnish industry. Five of the eight European Union countries with nuclear power plants are against building more reactors. Finland is the only western country in the past decade to have proposed increasing its production capacity. "If Finland decides to go ahead with building additional nuclear power, the reaction from European consumers may come very fast," Paavo Arhinmaki from the Leftist Alliances' youth organisation told a news conference. The chairman of Finland's main industry lobby said last week that shelving plans to build more nuclear energy facilities would prove costly to households and lead to a slowing of economic growth due to the heavy investment needed to boost electricity production. REUTERS NEWS SERVICE ***************************************************************** 21 Judge has sharp words for uranium-plant privatization process EST Friday, March 16, 2001 BY KATHERINE RIZZO *Associated Press Writer * WASHINGTON (AP) -- A federal judge on Friday harshly described the process used by the government to decide to sell its uranium business. The criticism was delivered by U.S. District Judge Gladys Kessler in a written opinion ordering the Energy Department to pay labor union lawyers who used the Freedom of Information Act to successfully sue for documents showing how the uranium privatization decision was made. ``The transcripts of the closed board meetings ... reveal the ways in which bias, self-interest and self-dealing can influence the decision-making process, especially when that process is kept entirely secretive,'' Kessler wrote. The documents ``inform the public about what went wrong' with privatization in this case and what procedures and criteria should be used in the future when other federal entities consider privatization,'' the judge said. The opinion noted that the U.S. Enrichment Corp.'s outside lawyers made about $15 million, a financial advisor that was consulted stood to make $7.5 million if a board approved a public stock offering, and USEC chief executive, William ``Nick'' Timbers, got a $617,625 bonus on top of his salary and stock options. All urged approval of the stock deal, which produced $1.9 billion for the government. USEC spokeswoman Elizabeth Stuckle said the judge settling the lawyer-fee demand didn't have USEC's side of the story. ``The court did not have the benefit of any input from us on the fee proceeding. If they had, we feel the court would not have made these incorrect comments,'' she said. The privatization process has been the subject of criticism on Capitol Hill, and that criticism grew last year when USEC's finances began to falter and it announced plans to close its Piketon, Ohio plant. One of those critics, Rep. Ted Strickland, D-Ohio, called Kessler's criticisms ``a vindication of what some of us have been saying all along.'' ``Privatization was fundamentally flawed. It enriched a few and will hurt a lot of people,'' he said. ``Every feature of privatization was rotten to the core.'' Strickand's district includes Piketon. The suit seeking lawyer fees was filed on behalf of the union representing workers at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant in Kentucky and Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant in Ohio. The union, which at the time of privatization was called Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International but which now is part of the Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemical and Energy Workers International Union. On the Net: U.S. Enrichment Corp., http://www.usec.com Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemical and Energy Workers International Union, http://www.pace-union.org AP-CS-03-16-01 1855EST --> ***************************************************************** 22 UPDATE - EU wants Lithuanian N-plant decision in 2002 LITHUANIA: March 15, 2001 VILNIUS - European Union aspirant Lithuania must decide the fate of its Chernobyl-style nuclear plant next year if it hopes to keep to its plans for fast-track EU entry, a European Commission representative said on Tuesday. "What we're saying is that the whole situation in regard to the Ignalina nuclear power plant would have to be fully clarified in order to conclude the accession negotiations," Michael Graham, head of the European Commission delegation to Lithuania, told Reuters. Lithuania has said it wants to complete EU negotiations by the end of 2002 and enter the wealthy 15-member bloc by 2004. Under pressure from the EU, Lithuania has already pledged to shut down the first of Ignalina's two reactors in 2005, and plans to make a decision on the second reactor in 2004. "You cannot imagine those negotiations concluding without a binding commitment on the closure of both units (being made) in 2002," Graham said. The EU regards Ignalina as unsafe because it was built to the same design as Ukraine's disastrous Chernobyl plant, the scene of the world's worst civilian nuclear accident in 1986. Many in former Soviet Lithuania have been reluctant to shut Ignalina, which was built in the 1980s on Moscow's orders and makes Lithuania one of the most nuclear dependent countries in the world, supplying more than 70 percent of its electricity. Lithuania's current plans regarding the second reactor coincide with a scheduled review of energy strategy in 2004. "At the moment we have a national energy strategy and there we have a commitment to decide on the future of the second unit in 2004. But of course it depends on the (EU) negotiations," Deividas Matulionis, adviser to Prime Minister Rolandas Paksas, told Reuters. "We are very seriously thinking about this position from the EU," he added. Western donors pledged contributions of 208 million euro ($195 million) last year to help close unit one. Matulionis said the decision on the second reactor would depend largely on how smoothly the decommissioning of the first one goes. Graham said the EU may have set its sights on 2009 as a possible date for the closure of the second unit. "There is already a firm date for the closure of unit one, which is 2005. Based on the age difference of the reactors we would expect that 2009 would be the expected date for closure of unit two," he said. Story by Peter Mladineo REUTERS NEWS SERVICE ***************************************************************** 23 Japan Invite for Dr Jack The Whitehaven News Thursday, March 15, 2001 COPELAND MP Jack Cunningham is likely to go to Japan and help press Sellafield's case for more business from BNFL's biggest overseas customer. He said yesterday he had been invited to make the keynote speech at the Japanese atomic industry's international conference next month and, as the focus was on reprocessing, he was inclined to accept. "I will make a final decision in a day or two but I am under considerable pressure to accept and the Sellafield unions certainly want me to go," he said. Dr Cunningham said he would want to fix up meetings with Japanese nuclear power companies to help try and win more business for Sellafield following the MOX fuel scandal. "It would be a great opportunity to put the case for BNFL, Sellafield and West Cumbria," he said. The MP heads the Sort Out Sellafield group which will meet Prime Minister Tony Blair on March 20. Dr Cunningham said he had also arranged for the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate's top man Laurence Williams to meet the group at Westlakes 10 days later. "This is a good step forward because we will get his views first hand about how the NII now sees things at Sellafield and what the prospects are," said Dr Cunningham. ***************************************************************** 24 An Active Exchange on Tom River Radiation Friday, Mar. 16, 2001. Page 9 Letters To Our Readers *In response to "2 Siberian Rivers Full of Radioactivity," Nov. 3, 2000.* *Editor,* The information in your article was drawn from a report titled "Radioactive Pollution in the Tom River," dated Nov. 1, 2000, and distributed by the nongovernmental Government Accountability Project. The specialists of the Siberian Chemical Complex have analyzed this report and, as one might expect of information published in the periodical press, this report does not contain any information worthy of serious attention by experts in the field of environmental nuclear safety. Here are some of our reasons for reaching this conclusion: The measurements of the samples were carried out by the Novosibirsk State Laboratory and some American and Canadian laboratories that are not named in the report. Such anonymity means that we cannot judge their qualifications or the quality of the results presented in the report, which themselves raise doubts about the competence of these laboratories. For example, in regard to the measurements of phosphorus-32 and strontium-90 that are mentioned in your article, not one of the laboratories producing these results is identified in the report. The text merely reports that the American team handed the samples over to a laboratory (?) in Canada for mass-spectroscopic analysis for strontium-90 but that none was found. Such technical and methodological procedures in this main part of the report (the analysis of the samples) demonstrates the complete groundlessness of this research and the unwillingness of professional analytical laboratories to work with these organizations. Most likely it is in connection with this that the authors of the report use indirect methods to get their results concerning levels of strontium-90 in the Tom River. These methods involve using a lot of data that have no relation to the Tom River, since they were generated by a study of the Techa River in the Chelyabinsk region. As one would expect, the results achieved with this data exceeded all the authors' wildest expectations inasmuch as these incorrectly derived and manipulated figures indicated that strontium-90 levels in the Tom River exceed those previously established for the contamination of the Columbia, Techa and Danube rivers. There is also reason to suspect the sincerity of the representatives of the NGOs in their concern for our health and environment. Despite the "shocking" radiation levels that they discovered and the direct — in their assessment — threat presented to the environment and local residents, the results and conclusions of this study were published after a delay of three months and then not in Russia, but in the United States. As of now, this material has not been presented to any state organs in Russia or the Tomsk region or to the municipal administration of Seversk. It is perhaps not out of place to mention that these American philanthropists do not need to travel to distant Siberia to carry out such studies. Available data indicate the blue-green waters of the Columbia River, which flows past the Hanford nuclear facilities, contain phosphorus-32 levels of almost 2.6 million becquerels per kilogram that cannot be compared even to the made-up figures that the report's authors attribute to the Tom River: 110,000 becquerels per kilogram. The work of the Siberian Chemical Complex and its impact on the environment are constantly and diligently monitored by Russia's state monitoring and control agencies, which are charged with these responsibilities. Over the last 10 years, the complex has hosted no fewer than six commissions of various levels and statuses — from local to national — regarding matters of environmental regulation. The results of our observations over many years of the level of radioactivity in the Tom River have revealed no strontium-90 contamination, even though the methods and controls that we use would detect levels even much lower than those allowed under federal sanitary norms. Our tests have revealed the presence of sodium-24, phosphorus-32 and neptunium-239, but all are at levels below the sanitary norms set forth for the complex by the State Environmental Committee. The most likely culprit of any possible radioactive contamination of the local population is the consumption of fish caught in the river. According to state health statistics for 1999, the radioactive exposure of the local population based on the concentration of radiation detected in fish was not more than 12 percent of the maximum dose allowed under current norms. Preliminary results from 2000 also indicate that radiation levels are below accepted norms. The observation of all federal environmental legislation is the result of a strict technical policy adopted by the Siberian Chemical Complex, one of the priorities of which is ensuring the health and safety of the people living near our facility. *Press Service Siberian Chemical Complex Seversk* Activists' Answer *Editor,* Russian nongovernmental organizations invited the American public interest organization the Government Accountability Project to Russia last year for cooperative environmental studies around the perimeters of four nuclear facilities to further public understanding. GAP's Nuclear Weapons Oversight Program has experience conducting such studies of environments around American nuclear facilities. Last August, we found shocking levels of phosphorus-32 in the Tom River, downstream of SCC, at locations identified in our report. Our Russian-American study mostly relied on our laboratory spectrometer and on brilliant, confirming experiments by Russian co-author Sergei Pashenko of Siberian Scientists for Global Responsibility. The SCC points to the unwillingness of professional laboratories to analyze environmental samples like those we collected from the Tom River. This unwillingness is indeed a serious obstacle both in Russia and in the United States. Laboratories are operated by or under large contracts to nuclear facilities like SCC in Russia or the Energy Department in the United States, and this undermines their independence. Together with our Russian colleagues, we analyzed our samples and confirmed results for three months to be certain of the magnitude of pollution before publication. We suppose the SCC would have criticized us had we hurried to publish the results earlier without taking the proper precautions. The SCC spent four months reviewing our results, rather than collecting their own samples from the locations we specified on the Tom River next to the SCC. If there are more questions, let the SCC jointly sample and do replicate analyses with us. We have such agreements for joint sampling with officials of American nuclear facilities. The SCC's denial of radioactive problems on the Tom River mimics the response of the American nuclear agency when it has denied our test results identifying large radioactive pollution at the Hanford site along the Columbia River in Washington state. The SCC correctly writes that America has its own problems with massive radioactive contamination. But both countries need to end the denials, identify the problems of radioactive contamination and seek solutions. Public interest organizations are critically important in this process of conducting independent studies that make government agencies accountable to the public. The SCC claims its monitoring has revealed "no strontium-90 contamination" in the Tom River. Yet 1999 monitoring information at the Austrian web site www.iiasa.ac.at ("Releases of Radionuclides to Surface Waters at Krasnoyarsk-26 and Tomsk-7") shows strontium-90 appears in some tabulations, while it is strangely missing from others. Why does the SCC now deny the existence of strontium-90 in the Tom River? Why is strontium-90 radioactivity missing from most but not all SCC monitoring information? Finally, the SCC claims we failed to notify Russian authorities of our findings. The Russian-American team held a press conference with an SCC official present in August, the day after our sampling, announcing our preliminary findings. We also sent our report to Gosatomnadzor and the International Atomic Energy Agency. A copy of that letter and our report has been posted on GAP's web site (http://www.whistleblower.org" target="_blank">www.whistleblower.org) since November. The radioactive pollution in the Tom River from the SCC facility is greater than Russian authorities yet dare admit. This mindset of denial is a recipe for even worse nuclear disaster that is sure to come from the Nuclear Power Ministry proposal to import foreign radioactive waste to decrepit and contaminated Russian nuclear facilities. *Norm Buske Nuclear-Weapons-Free America Tom Carpenter Nuclear Weapons Oversight Program Government Accountability Project* ***************************************************************** 25 Editorial: Just what were they thinking? March 16, 2001 When it comes to Nevada's opposition to the federal government's bid to bury high-level nuclear waste at Yucca Mountain, state Sen. Bill O'Donnell's name for years has been associated with appeasement. The Las Vegas Republican has advocated negotiating with the federal government for benefits in return for the state agreeing to store man's deadliest waste. Now O'Donnell is sponsoring a resolution in the 2001 Legislature that continues this sorry legacy. Senate Joint Resolution 4 initially may seem harmless since it directs the governor to ask that any nuclear waste be sent by rail to Yucca Mountain -- rather than through the valley's crowded roads and highways -- if it is selected as a repository. This resolution is dangerous, though, since it assumes a nuclear waste repository will be built, implying that the state of Nevada has given up its fight against this nightmarish project. This is the worst message that could be sent at such a critical juncture in this battle. A dead giveaway to the intent of O'Donnell's resolution was that the two senators first in line to sign on were Joe Neal, D-North Las Vegas, and Lawrence Jacobsen, R-Minden, who long have been weak-kneed in opposing Yucca Mountain. While those two could be written off as lost causes, it is disturbing that so many Southern Nevada legislators, who have stood in opposition to Yucca Mountain, have been duped. Also co-sponsoring the bill are Sens. Ray Rawson, Terry Care, Maggie Carlton, Ann O'Connell, Mike Schneider, Ray Shaffer and Assembly members Bob Beers, Vonne Chowning, Morse Arberry, Tom Collins and David Parks. Those interviewed by Sun reporter Cy Ryan said they didn't intend to suggest they want a repository, but the fact is this is how the resolution will be viewed. The Legislature should kill this terrible resolution now before Washington gets the wr ong idea. All contents copyright 2001 Las Vegas SUN, Inc. ***************************************************************** ***************************************************************** NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARTICLES ***************************************************************** 1 Dropping bombs on Los Alamos Watchdog on the Web Albuquerque Tribune Online: News With billboards, studies and a new campaign to foil recruitment, tiny nonprofit takes aim at the national lab Chris Schneider/Tribune Greg Mello and Trish Williams-Neusch of the Los Alamos Study Group look over budget numbers for a project designed to discourage people from going into nuclear weapons work. The study group, an anti-nuclear weapons organization based in Santa Fe, has become one of the most vocal opponents of work done at Los Alamos National Laboratory. By Lawrence Spohn Tribune reporter SANTA FE -- The sign on Greg Mello's door mockingly shouts "Fallout Shelter." On his top shelf are "radioactive active plants" -- collected, he says, from polluted lands 35 miles to the west. There, in the picturesque Jemez Mountains, is the object of Mello's frustration: Los Alamos National Laboratory. It is the birthplace of nuclear weapons and still the world's premier nuclear weapons lab -- one of three administered by the Department of Energy. Some 60 miles to the south, along I-25 and Albuquerque's Gibson Boulevard, those frustrations are expressed for all to see. Along these roads are several giant billboards, put together by Mello, that display (at a cost of about $4,000 a month) the infamous atomic mushroom cloud and describe New Mexico as "America's nuclear weapons colony." "It's true," says Mello, executive director of the Los Alamos Study Group, which has been bird-dogging Los Alamos Lab since 1989. New Mexico, he points out, is easily the nation's top nuclear weapons state, with installations that include Los Alamos and Sandia national laboratories, the Department Of Energy's Albuquerque Operations Office and one of the nation's biggest nuclear weapons storage depots on Kirtland Air Force Base. While lab defenders and proponents point to the billions of federal dollars these facilities bring annually into the state, Mello and the Los Alamos Study Group counter that New Mexico fits the classic definition of a colony -- in which imperialist capital is invested to extract a local resource at the expense of the colony's overall health, economy and social well-being. He argues that it is no coincidence that New Mexico, even during the greatest economic expansion in U.S. history, continues to rank near the bottom in most economic and social measurements, including per capita income, education, child welfare, drunken driving and health care. The mild-mannered Mello says that long after the Cold War has waned, New Mexico's nuclear weapons culture continues "to hold hostage not just the Congress and the people of the United States, but the whole planet." The study group has been ardent -- and audible -- in its criticism of Department of Energy plans to consolidate the nation's far-flung nuclear weapons complex in a miniature, virtually self-sufficient version at Los Alamos. Citing DOE plans to use Los Alamos Lab to produce perhaps hundreds of plutonium pits -- the atomic triggers for thermonuclear bombs -- Mello says simply: "This is not nuclear disarmament." Mello said he believes nuclear weapons, in and of themselves, are as evil as the mass murder technology used by Nazi Germany, and should be opposed by all people on fundamental humanitarian and environmental grounds. Still, Mello is not a stereotypical rabid, anti-nuclear activist. Instead, he challenges Los Alamos with a growing portfolio of analyses and arguments that raise questions about what the lab is doing and where it is going. Long known on the hill as the thinking anti-nuke group, LASG, quite naturally, isn't embraced by the lab, which is frequently bashed in LASG news releases and besieged by the group's Freedom of Information Act requests. Officially, says Christina Armijo, Los Alamos Lab community relations director, "the study group has been an important element in advancing constructive dialogue." She said the group's scrutiny has stimulated "interest in the diverse opinions about the Laboratory's mission. "Our mutual interactions and dialogue, despite our differing stances on the work that we do, have proven to be appreciatively respectful and civil in nature over the years," Armijo adds. Mello's group was reserved during last year's Cerro Grande Fire, during which other environmental and anti-nuclear critics raised questions about radioactive contaminants in the smoke plume. Still, the study group has produced its share of heat on the hill. Mello's group won a battle with Los Alamos' Bradbury Science Museum, which chronicles the nuclear era at the lab. It got wall space to display an alternative picture: the human ravages and devastation endured by Japan's Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the only cities bombed with nuclear weapons. A Los Alamos veterans and lab retirees group countered with its own claim for museum space to present a view of a pre-war, barbaric Japan. They got half of the wall. Still, the confrontation, like others LASG has forged, forced the lab and its proponents to at least engage in the debate and defend their views. An engineer by training, Mello hasn't favored confrontation. He has taken an intense analytical approach to assessing the lab's programs, plans and budgets -- exposing what he believes is a mentality of "nukes forever" and "a colossal waste of resources." Indeed, much of the time, he sounds more like Don Quixote than an ideological nuke-buster. "We are interested in social justice, stewardship of the Earth, human dignity and economic sustainability," he says of the study group. These fundamental values, he says, cannot be squared with the development, threat or use of nuclear weapons. While he appreciates the need for the United States to safeguard and maintain its current nuclear weapons stockpile, he firmly believes it is a role, that along with the stockpile itself, ultimately can end. Equally opposed to the continuing nuclear engineering mission of nearby Sandia Labs in Albuquerque, Mello nevertheless says it shines in contrast to the entrenched Los Alamos. He offers praise -- albeit faint -- for Sandia, saying that unlike Los Alamos, it at least has made substantial strides in broadening its core mission to include energy and environment as key national security components. But in his David-and-Goliath struggle, Mello has no illusions about winning a public relations war with Los Alamos. The lab has some 6,800 employees working on a 43-square-mile federal reservation and a $1.2 billion annual budget. In contrast, Mello's nonprofit group has an annual budget of about $150,000, the bulk provided by grants from some 17 civic foundations and by "many small donors." Housed in a back-hallway, three-room office off Santa Fe's Marcy Street, the study group has just two full-time staff members, several part-time volunteers and four outside people who do "contract" writing or analysis work. "Not," he muses, "the stuff to launch a revolution." But just enough to follow the environmentalist's mantra of thinking globally while acting locally. The Los Alamos Study Group draws strength from its affiliation with the global Alliance for Nuclear Accountability. It also maintains strong ties to East and West Coast anti-nuclear organizations, including: + The Natural Resources Defense Council, in Washington, D.C., a broad environmental watchdog with expertise in nuclear issues that is considered the best independent source of nuclear weapons information; + Tri-Valley Cares, Inc., in Livermore, Calif., which monitors Los Alamos sibling Livermore National Laboratory; + Several other anti-nuclear organizations in Santa Fe and Albuquerque, which have primarily focused on opposing the DOE's Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, near Carlsbad, and on environmental issues at Sandia Labs; + Western States Legal Foundation, in Oakland, Calif., an independent watchdog, which like NRDC, tackles a broad range of nuclear weapons issues. In 1997, many groups, including the Los Alamos Study Group, collaborated in filing a lawsuit against the Department of Energy, charging that its nuclear stockpile stewardship program violates environmental law. The suit failed to stop construction of the controversial National Ignition Facility, a nuclear blast simulator at Livermore Lab. But it did force DOE to agree to several reforms, including providing $6.25 million for community and tribal monitoring of its environmental programs. Last month, several of the same groups collaborated again in issuing a public challenge to all scientists and engineers to renounce weapons of mass destruction, signing a pledge promising never to work on them. Mello, who helped coordinate this effort, says it is primarily aimed at young scientists, whom the weapons labs have already acknowledged difficulty in recruiting to replace retiring weaponeers. Like many of the group's efforts, "the pledge" aims to force Los Alamos to justify what it is doing. It also is an opportunity to publicize what Mello sees as the post-Cold-War nuclear contradiction: the almost exponential growth of nuclear weapons research and development to levels that he says now exceed nuclear weapons spending at the height of the Cold War. While many New Mexicans applaud the infusion of funds as a sign of healthy national labs, Mello says it is a ruse. Much of the money actually gets spent outside the state on unique materials, equipment and programs, he argues. And the trend has made it difficult, if not impossible, for the state to even consider economic alternatives, he says. Mello, who recently recruited Colorado College Economics Professor William Weida to the LASG board of directors, believes it is appropriate to challenge Los Alamos Lab on economic, as well as national security, military and philosophical grounds. Weida, a retired Air Force colonel and former Air Academy professor, couldn't agree more. In fact, Weida believes government-financed economic studies have misrepresented the true impact of the labs in New Mexico. The incoming federal dollars are "unevenly spread across the state, and unfortunately it doesn't trickle down," he says. Weida, who spent years in the non-nuclear contingent at the Pentagon, says many military leaders see nuclear weapons as an egregious waste because their is virtually no chance they will actually be used. They "are way beyond being moral weapons," he says. Weida said he likes the study group's eye-catching billboards because in a small but frontal way they are "raising consciousness in several quarters, not the least of which is among the physicists themselves." Mello acknowledges his group has had practically zero impact on ever-increasing nuclear weapons budgets and expansion at Los Alamos and other nuclear weapons facilities. "Maintaining the stewards," he observes, chuckling, "has become more important than the stockpile." "We don't know if we will be successful," he says. "But there are those with greater insight than me who are quite optimistic about the human spirit and the power of our good side to overcome our dark side." © The Albuquerque Tribune. ***************************************************************** 2 SADDAM’S LAST LAUGH TOMPAINE.com: The Dollar Could be Headed for Hard Times if OPEC Switches to the Euro *Arjun Makhijani is president of the Institute for Energy and Environmental Researchin Takoma Park, Maryland.* For a considerable time the United States has enjoyed a position of undisputed power among the world's countries. The superpower has been able, with some exceptions, to shape critical global policies to serve its own internal needs. Yet, its huge appetite for oil has left it dangerously vulnerable to the policies of Middle Eastern oil exporters and to the vicissitudes of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Historically, the fact that oil prices are denominated in U.S. dollars has accorded the United States a position of strength. This was bolstered by a strong military presence in the Middle East, which was welcomed until recently by at least some oil exporting states. But the global potential of the European Union's currency (the euro) and the rising anti-U.S. sentiment in the Middle East coupled with a series of other recent events, may lead OPEC to change oil pricing from the dollar to the euro -- a decision which could have a drastic effect on the U.S. economy and on global financial stability. Setting the Stage for Crisis U.S. domestic policy has generally been dominated by sentiment on two streets -- Wall Street and Main Street. But since the Israeli-Arab war in 1973 and the accompanying Arab oil embargo against the United States, the importance of a third "street" -- which might variously be called Oil Street or Middle East Street -- has grown steadily. Before the year is out, this last street may well dominate the scene. Oil is the energy and financial lifeline of the United States, Europe and Japan. It's a lifeline that runs through an area of intense conflict, where antagonism to U.S. and Israeli policies is as widespread as it is heated. In that context, rising tensions between the United States, the European Union, Russia and China could make for a dangerous and volatile crisis. Of the major powers, the United States is, in many ways, the most vulnerable. It certainly has the most to lose. Take the issue of oil imports. In 1973, the U.S. imported 34 percent of the oil it consumed. By 1989, that had grown to 41 percent. Today, the U.S. imports over half of the oil it consumes, and consumption is growing steadily. Western Europe imports about half the oil it consumes, but that is down from 80 percent two decades ago, and consumption has stabilized. China imports 30 percent of its oil. Russia is an oil exporter. Historically, the fact that oil prices have been denominated in dollars has benefited the U.S. economy enormously, as fluctuations in the value of the dollar had no direct effect on the price of oil for Americans. If the currencies of other countries decline against the dollar, the oil prices increase for those countries' citizens. For instance, last fall, oil prices increased faster for Europeans than for Americans, because the euro was plunging as petrol bills were soaring, triggering massive protests. At the Bretton Woods international economic conference in 1944, the U.S. dollar was assigned a fixed value of $35 to an ounce of gold, and so pricing in dollars essentially meant pricing in gold. That system unraveled between the mid-1960s and the early 70s because the "guns-and-butter policy" during the Vietnam War created high inflation. Foreign dollar holders began losing confidence and converted their depreciating dollars into gold in increasing amounts. By the early 1970s, U.S. gold supplies were running low. The U.S. devalued the dollar relative to gold in 1971 and, in 1973, unilaterally 'de-linked' it from gold. The U.S. dollar was no longer "as good as gold." Yet, oil exporters -- led by Iran, Venezuela and Saudi Arabia -- decided to continue denominating the price of oil in U.S. dollars, ostensibly a sign of confidence in the United States and in its money. But, in fact, these countries had little choice but to continue to use U.S. dollars -- there was simply no realistic global alternative at the time. With oil linked to the dollar, and a substantial U.S. military presence in the Middle East, the position of the dollar seemed to be strong. At that time, Iran was the closest U.S. ally in the Persian Gulf and welcomed U.S. military presence. Iran was also the most powerful military force and the most populous country in the region, as well as the world's second largest oil exporter. To date, the oil-dollar link has given the United States a huge advantage in international trade. Corporations and countries carry out trade in U.S. dollars, making the U.S. Treasury and the U.S. Federal Reserve Board the ultimate arbiters of global monetary policy. However, the stability of the U.S. dollar, and by extension the global monetary system, partially depends on the financial policies of Persian Gulf countries that control nearly two-thirds of the world's reserve of "black gold." That weakness became evident in 1979, when the Shah of Iran was overthrown by Ayatollah Khomeini's Islamic revolution, and the United States lost its main military ally in the global oil patch. The price of oil shot up to $40 a barrel (about three times today's level in real terms) and the value of the dollar plummeted relative to other currencies. The price of gold soared to $800 per ounce. The U.S. had to drastically increase interest rates -- to 15 to 20 percent, causing the most severe recession since World War II -- to encourage foreigners to hold onto their U.S. dollars rather than dump them for other currencies. Today in the Middle East We're now in the midst of the worst Israeli-Palestinian crisis in a generation and the situation is at least as unstable as the 1973-1979 period. U.S.-Iranian relations are hostile and tense. The U.S. has troops based in Saudi Arabia, but they are not welcome. In the early 1990s, several governments and many people in the Persian Gulf region tolerated and even welcomed the presence of U.S. troops out of fear of Iraq's dictator Saddam Hussein. Today, U.S. support to Israel in the face of the Palestinian struggle for statehood is not seen as that of an even-handed mediator. Rather, it has fueled more anti-U.S. sentiment. Ariel Sharon who, as Defense Minister, presided over a terrible massacre of Palestinians during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982-83, has just become Prime Minister of Israel. He has vowed that Israel will maintain sovereignty over an undivided Jerusalem, the holy city claimed by both Israelis and Palestinians. Saddam Hussein, the architect of brutal internal repression in Iraq, has proclaimed himself a military champion of the Palestinian cause. Many in the region welcome him in that role, now more than ever, as a counterweight to Mr. Sharon. The U.S. also has an uneven policy in the Middle East concerning nuclear proliferation, winking at Israel's development of a substantial nuclear arsenal, and even selling it military hardware. Israel has avoided signing on to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), to which Egypt and other Arab states belong. It is likely that Iraq, which has long sought nuclear weapons, still has nuclear ambitions. The United States has never promoted sanctions against Israel for its nuclear arsenal, but the U.S. supports sanctions against Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan. This contradiction has angered many countries in the region and may have stoked the ambitions of some of them for acquiring nuclear weapons. Israel has so far refused to participate in discussions regarding a Middle East nuclear-weapons-free zone. The specter of a black market in nuclear materials has increased with the economic woes of Russia, making nuclear proliferation in the Middle East a growing threat. U.S. Relations with Europe and Russia Increasingly, the U.S. is at loggerheads with other global powers. In the past two years, U.S. and Russia have clashed more and more over security issues such as national missile defenses and the expansion of NATO. Russia, China and France have regularly opposed the U.S. and Britain regarding UN Security Council sanctions against Iraq. Given the Bush administration's determination to build national missile defenses and President Bush's stated indifference to the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, U.S.-Russian tensions are likely to flare up even more. China has already warned that existing non-proliferation arrangements may not survive should the U.S. decide to violate the ABM treaty. U.S.- European relations are testy on a number of issues, ranging from trade to Europe's plan to create its own security force (the European Rapid Reaction Force), to the U.S. proposal to install a national missile defense system. In this context of global tension, the U.S. economic vulnerability to Oil Street is particularly poignant. In the last two years, the euro has risen as a possible alternative currency to the U.S. dollar. OPEC, unhappy with U.S. Middle East policies, could decide to create the financial equivalent of the 1973 oil embargo against the United States by changing oil pricing policy from dollars to euros. That would make the euro a major global competitor with the U.S. dollar. Linking Oil to the Euro Last autumn, as a protest against U.S. Middle Eastern policy, Iraq asked the United Nations for permission, which the UN granted, to be paid for its oil in euros. (It needed UN permission because Iraq is selling oil under a supervised United Nations sanctions regime. Other countries would not need permission.) Iran subsequently raised the possibility of doing the same. Both these moves hint at the potential for a change in OPEC oil-pricing policy. Pricing oil in euros rather than dollars could cause a tremendous flight from the dollar -- possibly far greater than the one that led to the collapse of the gold-dollar connection in 1973 or the one that caused the steep decline of the dollar in 1979-80. Like any other currency, the U.S. dollar is vulnerable to the fast, panicky currency trades made possible by the computerization of the financial world. Yet the dollar also has its own special vulnerability. Since it is the pre-eminent global currency, a large proportion of all the U.S. currency -- half or more -- is held abroad. The desire of foreigners to hold dollars provides the United States with a great deal of financial power. But it could also make for a far faster fall, should holders of dollars decide to dump them. Though the underlying value of U.S. companies and real estate could stem the dollar's decline as those assets become cheap enough for holders of other currencies to want to buy, there is no predicting whether chaos and uncertainty would take hold first. In any case, the U.S. economy would likely be deeply damaged. Russia has from time to time expressed an interest in tying itself closer to the euro. This would be more likely if the arms control dialog between the United States and Russia breaks down. If Persian Gulf oil exporters were to carry out an oil-pricing switch from dollars to euros in collaboration with Russia, a dangerous multi-sided confrontation could develop. In sum, a dangerous confluence of events has emerged very rapidly in the last two years: a Middle East political crisis, rising U.S.-European Union differences, the introduction of the euro, U.S.-Russian and U.S.-Chinese tensions, and the inauguration in the United States of an administration that has far more unilateralist proclivities than any since the end of the Cold War. U.S. Domestic Implications United States domestic actions -- such as attempts to open the Arctic National Wildlife Reserve (ANWR) to oil drilling -- will not solve the global conflict over oil, money and Israel-Palestine. Opening ANWR would not make a significant dent in U.S. oil imports for years to come, if at all. Nor would ANWR drilling ease the complex political-military-financial issues that have made the U.S. dollar vulnerable. Opening ANWR would, however, create internal U.S. political strife and divert attention from the crisis on the Middle Eastern Oil Street. Neither military power nor money will enable the United States to address global crises unilaterally, so the country has no choice but to abandon its overbearing unilateral policies and position itself as a better global citizen. For starters, it must foster cooperation with Europe and Russia, as well as create a just and even-handed Middle Eastern policy. For the world's sole super power to thumb its nose at the world is far more dangerous than most Americans realize. A cooperative approach would not only be more prudent; it would give the United States and the rest of the world the opportunity to consider new global monetary arrangements, which are needed in any case for a less vulnerable and more equitable global financial architecture. TAKE ON THE NEWS | HISTORY | OPINION FEATURES | OP AD | WHO WE ARE CONTACT | ARCHIVES © 1999-2001 The Florence Fund ***************************************************************** 3 A Global Truth Commission on Health and Environmental Damage from Nuclear Weapons Production IEER: Science for Democratic Action vol. 9 no. 2 / Energy &Security No. 16: Plutonium End Game IEER| SDA V9N2 / E&S #16 by Arjun Makhijani Extensive research in the last two decades has shown nuclear-weapon states have, first of all, harmed their own people without informed consent, in the name of national security.1 Nuclear weapons production workers have been on the front lines of this underside of the Cold War that nuclear-weapon states have waged on their own people. But the manner in which this slow attack on health and the environment was carried out is still largely unknown and little understood. In the last two decades, a substantial idea of the damage has begun to emerge from the fog of denial and propaganda in only one nuclear-weapon state - the United States. The US record that is public so far is not at all reassuring. It features deliberate emphasis on production compared to health protection, massive and routine violation of health and safety regulations, deliberately misleading workers so as not to arouse concerns or give hazardous duty pay when both were clearly warranted, and subversion of democratic process. Sloppy, incompetent science was a routine part of the dismal picture. The Department of Energy has admitted that, until 1989, no effort was made to calculate internal radiation doses to workers arising from the inhalation or ingestion of radioactive materials.2 IEER's work on data from the Fernald plant near Cincinnati, Ohio, where uranium for plutonium production reactors was processed, showed that in the 1950s and early 1960s, most workers were in fact overexposed due to uranium inhalation.3 Many probably also suffered kidney damage due to the toxicity of uranium as a heavy metal. Yet they were reassured that they were not being harmed. As such information has become public, calls for redress of injustice, and for public disclosure, health care, and compensation have risen. The United States recently passed legislation giving most radiation workers the right to apply for compensation and medical treatment in case they get certain diseases. No other government has yet made as broad an admission of potential harm from radiation as has the United States, though some modest programs are in effect for a limited number of people in some places. Raw data on worker doses and working conditions (with due respect for worker privacy) are, for the most part, still secret. While Russia has become more open since the mid-1980s, and some data on worker exposures are emerging, there are still practically no raw data available to independent Russian researchers. Secrecy also holds sway in the other relatively open countries - France, India, and Britain. The situation in China, Pakistan, and Israel is far worse. The pattern of keeping health and environmental abuses of their own people secret in the name of national security is anti-democratic to the core. It presumes that the people would not make sacrifices for the security of their countries. It presumes that top nuclear bureaucrats can make life or death decisions in defiance of established laws, norms, and regulations without the informed consent of the people. The harm has extended well beyond factory boundaries to workers' families, neighbors of the plants, and the general public. For example, an official study by the U.S. National Cancer Institute showed that during the 1950s, a large portion of the US milk supply was contaminated with iodine-131 due to fallout from atmospheric nuclear weapons testing at the Nevada Test Site.4 No other nuclear-weapon state has conducted a similar effort at being accountable to its own public. Moreover, the atmospheric testing of the weapon states contaminated milk supply well beyond their borders. It is interesting to note that maps of milk contamination and dose estimates published by the National Cancer Institute magically stop at the borders of Canada and Mexico. Uranium miners in non-nuclear-weapon states have been injured by nuclear-weapon states. Test sites have polluted former colonial areas, such as Algeria and Polynesia. Yet, no proper accounting has been forthcoming. But then, why would nuclear-weapon states be accountable to people beyond their borders when they have failed to be accountable to those within? The deliberate harm inflicted upon workers and the public at large in the course of nuclear weapons production and testing raises troubling questions about how national security policy has been formulated. If the nuclear weapons establishment can engage in deliberately harming the very people it claims to protect without informing them, how can one be sure that the security policies themselves are not largely motivated by bureaucratic self-preservation rather than by the security and health interests of the community at large? This is by no means a rhetorical or theoretical question. There is strong evidence, for instance, that the decision to bomb Hiroshima and Nagasaki was motivated in part by the desire to justify the huge expenditure on nuclear bombs during the Manhattan project. The nuclear establishment feared that if the bombs were not seen as highly useful in the war effort, there would be relentless investigations for waste of money after the war.5 Such investigations would, no doubt, also have dimmed the prospects for continued large nuclear weapons budgets after the war. A wide-ranging public discourse is needed within every nuclear-weapon state about the health and environmental harm that they have inflicted upon their own people. A global debate is needed about harm outside the borders of those states. Much of that harm was knowingly inflicted. For instance, an editorial in the Engineering alumni magazine of the University of California in 1960 noted that "nuclear testing has so far produced about an additional 6,000 babies born with major birth defects [worldwide]." Yet, it added that "you must weigh this acknowledged risk with the demonstrated need of the United States for a nuclear arsenal."6 The editorial did not explain why children in Nigeria or Costa Rica or Indonesia should have major birth defects so that the United States could have a nuclear arsenal. It is time for the United Nations General Assembly to establish an independent and open Truth Commission on the ravages that have been inflicted upon the world by nuclear weapons production and testing. That commission should not only examine the nature and extent of that harm, and whether and how deliberately it was inflicted; it should recommend ways in which the world's people can hold nuclear weapons establishments accountable. It should also examine whether and to what extent the security arguments that have been claimed for nuclear weapons have been constructed with the aim of keeping people ignorant and fearful so that the weapons bureaucracies might perpetuate themselves. Such an examination would be of some considerable relevance today, given that nuclear weapons establishments are still refusing to meet their nuclear disarmament commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and that people are still getting ill and dying from the harm that nuclear weapons establishments have inflicted upon them. Science for Democratic Action vol. 9 no. 2 Main MenuScience for Democratic Action Main Menu IEER Home Page Institute for Energy and Environmental Research Comments to Outreach Coordinator: ieer@ieer.org Takoma Park, Maryland, USA *February 2001* Endnotes: 1 Arjun Makhijani, Howard Hu, and Katherine Yih, eds. *Nuclear Wastelands: A Global Guide to Nuclear Weapons Production and Its Health and Environmental Effects*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1995. 2 See Arjun Makhijani and Bernd Franke, "Worker Radiation Dose Records Deeply Flawed," *Science for Democratic Action,* vol. 6 no. 2, November 1997. (On-line at http://www.ieer.org/sdafiles/vol_6/6-2/workers.html.) 3 See *Science for Democratic Action,* vol. 5 no. 3, October 1996. (On-line at http://www.ieer.org/sdafiles/vol_5/v5n3_1.html.) 4 Pat Ortmeyer, "Let Them Drink Milk," *Science for Democratic Action*, vol. 6, no. 2, November 1997. (On-line at http://www.ieer.org/sdafiles/vol_6/6-2/iodine.html.) 5 Leslie Groves, *Now it Can Be Told: The Story of the Manhattan Project*. New York: Harper and Row, 1962, Chapter 26. David Robertson*, Sly and Able: A Political Biography of James F. Byrnes*. New York: Norton, 1994, Chapter 15. See also Arjun Makhijani, "Japan: Always the Target?", *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, May-June 1995. 6 April 1960 editorial in the *California Engineer*, reprinted in the *California Engineer* in 1990. ***************************************************************** 4 US-Russian Plutonium Disposition Agreement IEER: Science for Democratic Action vol. 9 no. 2 / Energy &Security No. 16: Plutonium End Game IEER| SDA V9N2 / E&S by Michele Boyd On September 1, 2000, former US Vice President Al Gore and Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov signed the US-Russian agreement on plutonium disposition.1 The agreement requires that 68 metric tons of weapon-grade plutonium, 34 metric tons for each Party, be put into non-weapons usable form by either irradiating it as fuel in reactors (MOX fuel) or by immobilizing it in glass with high-level radioactive waste. The US has decided to use 25.57 metric tons of plutonium in MOX fuel and to immobilize the rest (8.43 metric tons), while Russia will use all 34 metric tons of its plutonium to make MOX fuel. Some characteristics of the surplus weapons plutonium stocks are summarized in the tables below. Quantities and Methods of Disposition * For the United States of America * Quantity (metric tons) Form Method of Disposition 25.00 Pits and Clean Metal Irradiation as MOX 0.57 Oxide Irradiation as MOX 2.70 Impure Metal Immobilization 5.73 Oxide Immobilization * For the Russian Federation * Quantity (metric tons) Form Method of Disposition 25.00 Pits and Clean Metal Irradiation as MOX 9.00 Oxide Irradiation as MOX Forms: Pits and Clean Metals: plutonium in or from weapon components or weapon parts, and plutonium metal prepared for fabrication into weapon parts. Plutonium in pits may be alloyed, notably with gallium. Impure Metals: plutonium alloyed with one or more other elements in the form of a homogenous metal, and unalloyed plutonium metal that is not clean metal. Oxide: plutonium in the form of plutonium dioxide. Source: *Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation Concerning the Management and Disposition of Plutonium Designated as No Longer Required for Defense Purposes and Related Cooperation, *Annex on Quantities, Forms, Locations, and Methods of Disposition, Sections I and II (September 1, 2000). According to the agreement (some excerptsare provided below), the immobilized plutonium can never be separated, but a country may reprocess its spent MOX fuel after all 34 metric tons of its plutonium are dispositioned. Russia's Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom) has clearly stated that it intends to reprocess the MOX fuel as part of the first step in developing a "closed" nuclear fuel cycle (see main article, Plutonium End Game). Given the timeline of the MOX program in the agreement, Russia will be allowed to re-extract residual plutonium from the spent MOX fuel by 2025, perhaps earlier. While the majority of the declared surplus plutonium is slated for use in light water reactors in the US and Russia, Russia also intends to use some of its MOX fuel in fast breeder reactors.2 MOX fuel for fast reactors contains a much higher percentage of plutonium than that for light water reactors. Two crucial issues in the agreement, financing of and liability for the Russian program, have been left to future negotiations, and until they are resolved, the MOX program in Russia cannot proceed. Furthermore, the deal stipulates that within one year, an agreement shall be reached on doubling the disposition rate, though how this is to be done is not entirely clear at the present time. These three issues are discussed in more detail below. * Financing * The financing plan for the Russian MOX program has been left to future negotiations, with a goal of concluding a multilateral agreement by September 1, 2001. If an agreement is not completed by March of the following year, the US and Russia can either agree to adjust the schedules of their programs or terminate the program altogether. The current estimate for the cost of the Russian MOX program is between $1.7 and 2.5 billion, while the US program is estimated to be approximately $4 billion.3 The United States has allocated $200 million for implementing the Russian program, and promised another $200 million, which has not yet been appropriated by Congress. The United States and Russia discussed multilateral financing of the Russian MOX program with the other leaders from the G-8 countries (Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, and Japan) at a meeting in Okinawa, Japan, last July. Britain has committed $100 million and France is contributing approximately $60 million. These contributions, together with those of the US, total roughly $560 million, out of the $900 million deemed necessary to begin design and construction of Russian MOX facilities.4 The G-8 agreed to work out an international financing plan for the Russian program before they meet again in Genoa, Italy, next July. A special task force within the G-8 Nonproliferation Experts Group has been established to develop a financing package and multilateral project structure, including issues such as how the project management would be structured and the oversight rights of donor countries. The European Bank for Reconstruction & Development has been approached about whether they would manage the implementation of the Russian MOX program.5 * Liability * The United States and Russia have not yet agreed on who would be held financially accountable for any claims relating to the Russian MOX program. In the United States, the Price-Anderson Act provides up to $10 billion dollars to nuclear power plant owners in case of an accident.6 Such a level of financial compensation on the Russian side, though insufficient for addressing a large nuclear accident, would be unlikely given Russia's economy. Moreover, there may be less regulatory oversight of the MOX program in Russia - a bill was recently introduced in the Duma that would, if passed, transfer the authority to license civilian-related nuclear activities from the federal regulatory agency, Gosatomnadzor (GAN), to Minatom. Although Minatom would prefer to use MOX in a "new generation" of fast reactors, which would take many years to build, it has agreed to the US plan to use MOX in existing light water reactors (LWRs). Given that the US is funding this plan, at least in part, an accident in a Russian LWR using MOX fuel could cause a serious political crisis over liability between the two countries, even if an agreement is reached. The deal stipulates that the US and Russia shall conclude an agreement on liability no later than the entry into force of a multilateral financing agreement, which is to be completed by September 1, 2001. Meanwhile, assistance to Russia is limited to pre-construction design work, which Russia is not permitted to use to build or operate a MOX plant until the question of liability is resolved. * Rate of disposition * The plutonium agreement sets December 31, 2007, as the target date to begin operating the plutonium disposition facilities with a minimum disposition goal of two metric tons per year in each country. Russia promoted a "western option," in which Russian-made MOX would be used in western European reactors. However, the French reprocessing company, Cogéma, which fabricates MOX fuel for western reactors, has been opposed to the plan because the Russian-made MOX could be sold at subsidized prices. Russia has since agreed to use the MOX fuel in its own reactors before selling any MOX fuel to other countries.7 As the US-Russian agreement on the disposition of highly enriched uranium8 illustrates, the commercial component of disposition programs can slow the disposition rate. According to a recent report by the General Accounting Office, the deliveries of Russian-made low enriched uranium (LEU) to the US have been delayed because Russia was dissatisfied with the level of revenue that it was receiving under the agreement. Moreover, USEC, Inc., the private US company that implements the commercial contract, considered resigning as the executive agent in 1999 because the decline in market prices for LEU had reduced their profits.9 The agreement also stipulates that the US and Russia develop a detailed action plan by September 1, 2001, to at least double this disposition rate. Several options for increasing this rate are listed, including: + Exporting MOX fuel for use in other countries: Minatom is particularly interested in this option. Sweden and Canada have expressed interest in using Russian MOX fuel in their reactors. Both Russia and the US have sent MOX samples to Canada for testing in a CANDU reactor, but the US has decided not to export its MOX fuel as part of its disposition program. + Increasing the number of reactors that use MOX within Russia: This option appears unlikely at this time, because the number of Russian reactors that can use MOX fuel is limited and Russia does not have the funds to complete the several reactors that have been under construction for years. US assistance under the agreement does not include funding for completing these reactors or for building new ones. However, the agreement does allow for US assistance for modifying existing Russian reactors to use MOX. + Using greater than 1/3 core MOX: New reactors can be designed to take 100% MOX cores, but all of Russia's existing reactors would require modifications for any MOX use. Even a partial MOX core in a LWR makes operation and control of the reactor more complicated. + Using "advanced nuclear reactors": Minatom has stated that it wants to build a "new generation" of breeder reactors. General Atomics and Framatome, with the US Department of Energy, Minatom and Fuji Electric, are researching a Gas Turbine Modular Helium Reactor, potentially for MOX fuel use after 2010.10 + Increasing the capacity of the conversion and MOX fuel fabrication facilities. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Quotes from the US-Russian Agreement on Plutonium Disposition "Neither Party shall separate plutonium contained in spent fuel until such time as that Party has fulfilled the obligation set forth in paragraph 1 of Article II of this Agreement [disposed of no less than thirty-four (34) metric tons of disposition plutonium]." -- Article VI, paragraph 2 "No Party shall separate disposition plutonium contained in immobilized forms." -- Article VI, paragraph 3 "Assistance provided by the Government of the United States of America [to the Russian Federation] shall be for such activities as the research, design, development, licensing, construction and/or modification of facilities (including modification of nuclear reactors), and technological processes, systems and associated infrastructure for such activities." -- Article IX, paragraph 1 "[T]he Parties shall cooperate with a view toward concluding within one (1) year after entry into force of this Agreement a multilateral agreement that documents the assistance arrangements necessary for [a disposition rate of two metric tons per year.]" -- Article IX, paragraph 8 "In the event the Government of the Russian Federation suspends any implementation activities..., the Government of the United States of America shall have the right to suspend proportionately its implementation activities under this Agreement." -- Article IX, paragraph 14 "No spent plutonium fuel shall be reprocessed by either Party after termination of this Agreement unless such reprocessing is subject to monitoring agreed by the Parties...." -- Article XIII, paragraph 7 "The Parties shall continue negotiations on liability provisions to apply to all claims that may arise from activities undertaken pursuant to the Agreement and shall seek to conclude an agreement ... at the earliest practicable date, and, in any event, not later than entry into force of the multilateral agreement...." -- Annex on Assistance, Section II, paragraph 1 "Until entry into force of the agreement containing liability provisions referred to in paragraph 1 of this Section: a) assistance activities under the Agreement shall be limited to appropriate pre-construction design work; b) neither Party shall be obligated under the Agreement to construct, modify, or operate disposition facilities, including reactors; and c) the Russian Federation shall not utilize in any way the pre-construction design work conducted under the Agreement including for the construction, modification, or operation of disposition facilities (including reactors)." -- Annex on Assistance, Section II, paragraph 2 Source: *Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation Concerning the Management and Disposition of Plutonium Designated as No Longer Required for Defense Purposes and Related Cooperation*, September 1, 2000. Science for Democratic Action vol. 9 no. 2 Main MenuScience for Democratic Action Main Menu IEER Home Page Institute for Energy and Environmental Research Comments to Outreach Coordinator: ieer@ieer.org Takoma Park, Maryland, USA *February 2001* Endnotes: 1 The full title is the *Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation Concerning the Management and Disposition of Plutonium Designated as No Longer Required for Defense Purposes and Related Cooperation*. It can be found on the internet at http://twilight.saic.com/md/bilatagreement1.htm(pudispagree.pdf). 2 The agreement specifically lists the BOR-60 reactor in Dmitrovgrad and BN-600 in Zarechnyy. Fast breeder reactors can be operated to yield a net increase or net decrease in plutonium, depending on how the reactor is operated and the configuration of its core and fuel blanket. 3 Russian cost estimate from *Preliminary Cost Assessment for the Disposition of Weapon-Grade Plutonium Withdrawn from Russia's Nuclear Military Programs*, Joint US-Russian Working Group on Cost Analysis and Economics in Plutonium Disposition, April 2000, p. iii. On the Internet at http://www.doe-md.com/(under "Work with Russia"). US cost estimate from Laura Holgate, Presentation to the Advisory Board to the Secretary of Energy on Plutonium Disposition in Russia, March 13, 2000. Transcript provided by Kevin Kamps, Nuclear Information and Resource Service, Washington, DC. 4 Hisane Masaki, "G-8 to tackle disposal of Russian plutonium," *Japan Times*, October 25, 2000; *Post-Soviet Nuclear & Defense Monitor*, Nov. 13, 2000, p.15. 5 *NuclearFuel*, Dec. 11, 2000, p.7. 6 As of August 20, 1998, the total maximum insurance incident was $9.43 billion. (Source: NUREG/CR-6617: *The Price-Anderson Act--Crossing the Bridge to the Next Century:A Report to Congress*, Prepared by ICF Incorporated for U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, August 1998.) The Price-Anderson Act was enacted in 1957 as an amendment to the Atomic Energy Act. The most recent amendment occurred in 1988 with the enactment of the Price-Anderson Amendments Act of 1988 (Public Law 100-408). 7 *NuclearFuel*, Dec. 11, 2000, p.9. 8 The full title is *The Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation Concerning the Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium Extracted From Nuclear Weapons* (February 18, 1993). 9* *General Accounting Office, *Implications of the US Purchase of Russian Highly Enriched Uranium*, GAO-01-148, December 2000 10 *NuclearFuel*, Dec. 11, 2000, p.9 ***************************************************************** 5 Engineer Quits, Blasts Livermore Lab / Recruiters misled him on weapons work, he says David Perlman, Chronicle Science Editor Friday, March 16, 2001 Livermore -- A young computer software engineer announced yesterday that he has quit his $85,000-a-year job at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory because, he said, he was ""deceived'' by recruiters, who did not tell him he would be working to improve the killing ability of nuclear weapons. Isaac Trotts, 25, conceded to reporters that he may have been more than a little naive when he took the job at the weapons lab in October thinking he would be helping make nuclear warheads safe. Instead, he found his work involved making them more effective. At a press conference yesterday organized by an anti-nuclear group, Trotts said he hoped his action would inspire his former Livermore co-workers to join him in refusing to "help maintain, enhance, design and build weapons of mass destruction." Trotts is a specialist in programming computers to visualize physical phenomena in three dimensions, a field he had pursued as a visiting aeronautics and astronautics researcher at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. His Livermore job was unclassified and involved researching and developing complex new methods for viewing simulated explosions of nuclear warheads, he said. His department is part of a national supercomputer facility in the Department of Energy's Stockpile Stewardship Program, designed to keep America's nuclear arsenal from deteriorating. During the press conference at the World Affairs Council in San Francisco yesterday, Trotts insisted that the Livermore recruiters who interviewed him led him to believe that his job would help to assure the "safety and reliability" of nuclear weapons but not to improve them. "I was a little uneasy about going to work there at first," he told reporters, "but I thought that making sure those weapons were safe, that they wouldn't explode accidentally and pollute the environment with radioactivity -- that way at least I'd be helping to make the world a better place. "I was assured no new weapons development was taking place, but it was a deception," he said. Trotts said he began to learn from government documents supplied by "activist" organizations that many of the nuclear warheads were in fact being modified to make them more effective -- armoring them to improve their earth- penetrating power, for example, or "suspicious things" like enabling them to explode at new and different heights. The Livermore laboratory stopped all weapons design and development work in 1992, a Livermore lab spokesman insisted yesterday, and designing new ones would require congressional approval. Modifying nuclear warheads to meet new military needs has been openly part of the Stockpile Stewardship Program since it was begun in 1993, the spokesman said, and does not involve new designs. Modifications do not alter a warhead's nuclear components and are not barred by treaty, he said. As for Trotts himself, the Livermore spokesman said that "all his colleagues agreed he was a really bright guy." Trotts said that after he grew more uneasy about his job at Livermore, much of what he learned about the implications of the work came from Department of Energy documents on warhead modifications obtained by Tri-Valley CAREs, an anti-nuclear group based in Livermore whose acronym stands for Communities Against a Radioactive Environment. *E-mail David Perlman at dperlman@sfchronicle.com.* ©2001 San Francisco Chronicle   Page A - 20 ***************************************************************** 6 Exporter says charge is baseless Miami Herald: Published Friday, March 16, 2001, in the Miami Herald * Miguel Barrios, 33, allegedly tried to ship a nuclear trigger to the Mideast. BY CAROL ROSENBERG crosenberg@herald.com A Hialeah exporter on Thursday accused federal authorities of blowing out of proportion a case against a former employee who allegedly tried to ship a potential nuclear trigger to the Persian Gulf. ``They make him sound like he's a terrorist; he's like a regular guy,'' said Ernesto Lopez, owner of Miami Export Purchasing Co., now a one-man operation in Hialeah Gardens. ``We didn't even know that that could be used to trigger a bomb or something. We applied for an export license, and we got it. We never would have done that,'' had anyone informed them the item was dangerous. Former employee Miguel ``Mike'' Barrios, 33, was charged in federal court Wednesday with conspiring to violate export laws. An affidavit said he tried to purchase a neutron generator and related systems -- meant to measure nuclear waste -- from the Activation Technology Corp. of Colorado for a client in Abu Dhabi, the United Arab Emirates. Barrios, who Lopez said left the exporter in January because business was slow, characterized the device -- an N-250 neutron generator -- as a logging tool for an oil well, something the federal authorities say it is not. Moreover, the complaint says it can be used as a trigger for a nuclear explosive device. If convicted, Barrios could be sent to prison for 10 years. He was arrested and charged Wednesday then released on his brothers-in-law's bond. Defense lawyer Ken Swartz, an assistant public defender, described Barrios as ``a young guy who apparently got caught up in something that is over his head.'' A 1970 immigrant from Cuba, he has only a high school diploma. Said Swartz: ``I think the evidence will show that he had no idea that this stuff had any nuclear capacity.'' Court papers say the Abu Dhabi firm was prepared to pay $776,200 for the order, then later scaled it back to one device and spare parts for $147,000. Lopez said that Barrios applied for a Department of Commerce export permit and provided Activation Technology with all the information it sought about their client -- but was never told that any of the activities were illegal. Lopez added that he established the Hialeah Gardens outfit in 1992 and a shipping relationship with Saadia Trading Co. in Abu Dhabi a year or two later after sending out solicitation letters around the world, including to the Middle East. He and Barrios had filled orders for Saadia ever since then and knew the firm to be a stable, reliable client. So the neutron generator order didn't seem unusual -- even though Saadia was using a subsidiary's name and Saadia's previous largest order was valued at about $17,000. Saadia, which placed the order using different corporate names, characterized the device as an oil well logging tool, Lopez said. He and Barrios had no reason to believe otherwise, he said. ``I don't know what [Saadia] was trying to do over there, but we sure as hell weren't trying to do anything sneaky over here,'' he said, describing Barrios as a friend, ``like a brother'' and ``a good worker.'' Barrios had to leave the firm in January, he said, because business was slow. He is now selling auto parts at a car lot. Lopez said the first he learned of the problem was Wednesday, when federal agents visited his office to pick up paperwork related to the Abu Dhabi deal. Barrios is next expected in court March 28. The complaint said sales of such devices are usually handled by Activation Technology, not middlemen. It describes as ``very unusual'' the idea that an Abu Dhabi business would ``use the services of small purchasing agent like MEP in Hialeah Gardens, Fla.'' Swartz said ``shock'' was the reaction to the charge by his client, who has no assets and lives in a rental apartment. ``I don't think the impact of it has really sunk in,'' he said. U.S. Attorney Guy Lewis' office was unable Thursday to comment on the significance of a possible breach of security, had such a delivery been made. The office also was unable to say when last others have faced similar charges, here or elsewhere in the country. Lopez said of his friend and former employee: ``He was only doing his job. Nobody told us that we weren't allowed to ship it nowhere. We were shipping it to the United Arab Emirates; there's no embargo on the United Arab Emirates. It's not like Iraq or anything like that. If the customer was going to re-export it, that's something else. To our intentions, the customer was not going to do that.'' Copyright 2001 Miami Herald ***************************************************************** 7 White House To Cut Aid to Russia March 15, 2001 WASHINGTON (AP) - The Bush administration plans deep cuts in programs aimed at helping Russia safeguard its nuclear materials even though a recent high-level commission called the program essential to national security. A proposed budget for fiscal 2002, now being put together by the administration, would cut spending for Russian nuclear nonproliferation activities from $872 million to $800 million, government and private sources said Thursday. The cuts were ordered by the White House despite several attempts by Energy Secretary Spence Abraham to obtain more money for a program widely supported by nonproliferation advocates, said these sources, who spoke on condition of anonymity. The Energy Department originally had hoped for a substantial increase in financial support for the program. A Clinton administration draft proposed more than $1.2 billion for the fiscal year starting Oct. 1, the sources said. In January, a bipartisan, private commission called the risk of theft of Russian nuclear materials "the most urgent unmet national security threat" facing the United States and urged sharp increases in spending. The Energy Department initiatives targeted by budget cutters include programs aimed at reinforcing security at Russian nuclear weapons facilities, providing help to economically strapped Russian nuclear scientists and helping Russia convert weapons-grade plutonium to less-threatening materials. While changes may still be made in the funding levels before President Bush sends Congress his detailed budget proposals for fiscal year 2002, several attempts by the department to get additional money already have been rebuffed by the Office of Management and Budget, the sources said. "This budget signals a retreat from a decade's worth of work with Russia to secure nuclear weapons expertise and materials," said William Hoehn of the Russian American Nuclear Security Advisory Council, a nonproliferation advocacy group. According to the latest DOE budget document, programs to increase security at Russian nuclear facilities would be cut by $31 million to about $170 million. The Energy Department sought an increase to $225 million. The government's Russia "nuclear cities" program, aimed at finding jobs and getting economic aid to Russian nuclear scientists, would be cut by $20 million to about $7 million, the sources said. Bush will ask for more money to dispose of Russia's excess plutonium stocks, but the amount falls far short of the proposed doubling of the $226 million program that the Clinton administration proposed, the sources said. Reports of the budget cuts brought a sharp response Thursday from Rep. Ellen Tauscher, D-Calif., a member of the House Armed Services Committee. "Dramatic cuts to these programs ... may cripple our efforts to secure nuclear material in Russia and ensure that Russia's nuclear physicists are gainfully employed in nondefense-related industries," Tauscher wrote Mitchell Daniels, director of the Office of Management and Budget. In January, a top-level, bipartisan commission issued a report recommending top priority and sharply increased on the Russian nonproliferation assistance programs. The panel said the risks of Russian nuclear materials being obtained by terrorists or unfriendly smaller states is significant and real. The report urged spending of $30 billion over 10 years to help Russia keep its nuclear materials and atomic scientists out of the hands of rogue states or terrorists. Such spending would be a prudent investment in world security, the commission concluded in a report sent to the Energy Department and White House. The panel was co-chaired by former GOP Senate Majority Leader Howard Baker of Tennessee and Lloyd Cutler, a White House counsel for former President Clinton. The commission also included former Democratic Sen. Sam Nunn of Georgia and former Rep. Lee Hamilton, D-Ind., both widely respected experts on nonproliferation and national security. --- On the Web: Office of Management and Budget: http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/index.html All contents copyright 2001 Las Vegas SUN, Inc. ***************************************************************** 8 Bunker mentality ISSUE 2122 Saturday 17 March 2001 Nuclear shelters are rarely comfortable and never pleasing to the eye. So why are these relics of the Cold War enjoying a peace-time boom? Chris Arnot reports The Cold War had thawed out by the time Mark Ormiston acquired his nuclear bunker. It was 1993 and it cost him "the price of a small, second-hand car". The Home Office threw in some radiation-monitoring equipment for nothing. "I went up to this big government store in Staffordshire," he recalls, "and they told me to help myself." Nuclear thaw: Mark Ormiston in his bunker in Kent Vandals have helped themselves to some of that equipment on three different occasions. He is unable to do much about it because he lives in Isleworth, Middlesex, and the shelter lies a good hour away - sometimes more, depending on the traffic on the M25. But he likes to go there at least once a month to cast a proprietorial eye over his own tenth of an acre of the North Downs, near Orpington, Kent (pictured above). He visits at weekends when he can get away from the 200-year-old wire and cable-making firm where he is managing director. He takes a strimmer to keep the grass down. "I might open a thermos flask or a beer and just enjoy the view," he says. "It's very pleasant with horses grazing in the foreground and Canary Wharf and the London Eye in the distance. This place was originally built so the Royal Observer Corps could monitor London being wiped off the map. Sometimes that's easy to forget." Mr Ormiston has never forgotten. Born in 1954, he was at an impressionable age during a period of considerable international tension. In 2001, the contents of his 12ft by 15ft bunker seem quaintly dated. We are invited to marvel at his wall-mounted bomb-power indicator (BPI), not to mention his hand-cranked siren, on a website put together by Subterranea Britannica, an organisation dedicated to the study of structures which are man-made and underground. "There were 1,563 nuclear bunkers in this country and 700 have already been filled in," says membership secretary Nick Catford, a courier from Swanley, Kent, who has visited many of the remainder on his motorbike. "The Cold War was an important part of history, so we need to record these places." English Heritage is going one better by calling for a bunker in Cambridge to be listed. In the event of a nuclear war, it would have been a Regional Seat of Government. One of only two purpose-built RSGs from the early 1960s, its appearance is enthusiastically described in a report by caseworkers as presenting "a definably brutalist appearance". Developers Kajima Cambridge Ltd wanted to demolish it. Not easy: structures designed to withstand a nuclear blast tend to be impervious to bulldozers. "We'd probably cap it off and landscape the site," says spokesman Bernard Stewart-Deane, whose company is seeking planning permission for between 350 and 380 homes. "If we have to keep the bunker as it is, we're going to lose 20 units," he continues. "Twenty five per cent would be social housing and the rest big, detached properties which would go on the market at up to £400,000." Elsewhere, some of the larger former nuclear bunkers are changing hands for six, even seven-figure sums. One, covering 30,000 sq ft on three floors, has just been sold at Skendleby in the Lincolnshire Wolds. "It's the size of an underground Tesco's," says James Cameron of the Lincoln agents Pygott and Crone. "Surprisingly airy and not at all eerie. The present owner has used it as his recreational toy." Whoever buys the Glass House in Chiselhurst, Kent, will have something even more exotic to play with. A mini-Pompidou Centre atrium soars above walls which are over five feet thick and built to withstand a nuclear blast. They were erected above ground in 1951, the height of the Cold War. Piedmont Homes bought the original structure from the Ministry of Defence for £70,000 in 1997 and set about creating a fantasy home with five bedrooms, a swimming pool and a stack of electronic gadgetry. It is difficult to imagine a starker contrast than that between the light and airy Glass House and Mr Ormiston's underground lair just a few miles away. Or, indeed, other former bomb-proof posts used for training purposes by the Royal Observer Corps until they were stood down in 1992. Mark Graves, 33, a computer systems manager from Hounslow, Middlesex, bought his in 1998 for £4,800. Included was the seat from a DC-10 aircraft. The previous owner, a radio ham from Birmingham, used to like to sit in it while communicating with fellow enthusiasts all over Europe. 'I just saw the bunker advertised on the internet," says Mr Graves, "and thought it would be interesting to own a piece of Cold War history." He cannot visit as often as he would like because the bunker is sited two-and-a-half hours' drive away from his home. All that is visible above ground is a raised hatchway and a radiation sensor which protrudes like the periscope of a submarine on the crest of a green wave of farmland near the Shropshire village of Stottesdon. The farmer, Peter Johnson, is a former Observer Corps volunteer and evidently feels rather miffed that he never had the chance to buy it himself. "In the early 1990s, they were advertised in newspapers all over the country," he recalls. "But by the time I heard about this one, it had already gone. Now it's been sold again. I've always had the feeling that this little bit of land on one of my fields isn't mine." Cecil Thomas was rather quicker off the mark when, in 1982, a bunker came up for sale on land which he farmed at the nearby village of Ditton Priors. The asking price was about £700, but he felt it to be a worthwhile investment. Mr Thomas had also been a member of the Observer Corps. He volunteered as a young man, just before the Ministry of Defence bought a quarter of an acre from his father in 1960, to build the shelter on. It was the year that Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev pledged support for "wars of national liberation" - an ominous warning in the light of the forthcoming confrontation with President Kennedy over Cuba, which took the world to the brink of nuclear war. Ground level: inside the Glass House The threat had receded by 1986, when Mr Thomas sold off some of his land to make way for a village recreation ground. But he held on to the bunker "just in case". It lies beyond the goalposts of a rather overgrown football pitch in a densely wooded copse which is thrown in with the sale price. Now, however, more than 40 years on from Khrushchev's bellicose rumblings, the Ditton Priors bunker is on the market. "I was probably a bit naive thinking that I could use it to save my family," says Mr Thomas. "I had three children then. Now I've acquired in-laws and grandchildren. Anyway, if you did survive a nuclear war, what would you come out to?" he adds with a grunt, shifting a large paving slab on top of the bunker's hatchway and inviting me to clamber down the iron ladder and take a look. There is, in truth, not much to see. A chemical lavatory occupies a small room off the main chamber, which is roughly 15ft by 12ft with whitewashed walls. There are two single beds, both covered with plastic mattresses, a cupboard and work surface. Oh yes, and a doormat. Mr Thomas has stayed at ground level. Now 67, he has developed claustrophobia, which is something of a deterrent to enjoying the peace and quiet of your own bunker. The asking price has dropped from five figures to four over the past few months, but the former farmer is reluctant to go much lower than £6,000. "If we decide to keep it, I'll do something with it," he says. And what would that be? "I'm not saying." Options for the use of former nuclear bunkers are limited. They have been used to grow mushrooms and to store wine. But building over one and using it as a cellar is not always straightforward, as a family from Lewes, Sussex, discovered. Ann Ffitch-Heyes owns 60 acres on the town's old racecourse, including a small, former underground outpost of the Observer Corps. She wanted to extend upwards by no more than 4ft 6in, allowing some light into what she planned as a one-bedroom starter home for her son Alexis, 26. But the local planning committee turned down the proposal. "It's been there for 40 years and nobody's seen it," says her husband, John. "Yet the minute you want to do something useful with it, they throw up their hands in horror. There is no reasonably priced housing for youngsters in Lewes. Our son has been living on the site in a caravan for the past nine years, and now they're telling him he's got to move it." Lewes Town Council justifies its stance on the grounds that the old racecourse is officially classified as an area of outstanding natural beauty. Thankfully, it survived the Cold War with its beauty intact. And its bunker was never required for the purpose intended. Perhaps we should be grateful that so many like it are now considered surplus to requirements - for the time being, at least. + The Glass House is for sale for £2.75 million through Knight Frank (0207 824 8171). The bunker at Ditton Priors is being sold by Chris Williams of Ludlow (01584 877676). Offers around £6,000. 26 November 2000: [UK News] For sale: one des res with atom shelter 15 October 1999: [International] Shrine fear as builders find Hitler's war bunker 6 January 1999: [UK News] Dr Strangelove bunker under Wiltshire quarry 27 November 1997: [UK News] RAF nuclear bunker goes up for sale © Copyrightof Telegraph Group Limited2001. Terms & Conditionsof reading. www.telegraph.co.uk. ***************************************************************** 9 EU Offers to Help Russia Dispose of Nuclear Submarines Russia Today - MURMANSK, Mar 16, 2001 -- (Agence France Presse) The European Union will help Russia to decommission its nuclear submarines, Swedish Foreign Minister Anna Lindh said Thursday at a regional conference in this northwestern Russian city. "The European Union has to be more active" in this field, Lindh told reporters after a meeting of the Barents Sea Euro-Arctic Council which groups Russia, Norway, Finland, Sweden, Denmark and Iceland. Sweden currently holds the six-month rotating presidency of the European Union. Moscow's and the EU's positions on the adoption of a joint nuclear and ecological program for Russia "are getting closer," said Russian Foreign Minster Igor Ivanov. The cash-strapped Russian government is unable to finance fully the decommissioning of some 100 nuclear-powered submarines taken out of service. The cost is estimated at 1.5 billion dollars. Russia, which has chaired the Euro-Artic Council since March 15, 2000, handed over the rotating presidency to Sweden. *((c) 2001 Agence France Presse)* *****************************************************************