***************************************************************** 10/08/01 **** RADIATION BULLETIN(RADBULL) **** VOL 9.237 ***************************************************************** RADBULL IS PRODUCED BY THE ABALONE ALLIANCE CLEARINGHOUSE ***************************************************************** NUCLEAR POWER CONTENTS 1 [toeslist] Nuclear Industry Shouldn't Be Let Off the Hook for 2 Lost fuel rod search narrows 3 More than 100 join French Chernobyl cancer claim 4 Letter: The economics of Mox 5 Irish may seek inspectors at BNFL Sellafield plant 6 German nuclear power plant temporarily shut down due to safety 7 Total System Performance Assessment-Site Recommendation (TSPA-SR) 8 ACNW Comments on NRC Staff's Issue Resolution Process for 9 Daily Events Report 10 Former TVA engineer claims radiation records are missing 11 Authorities convene to discuss Millstone security 12 Science: Pining for a Breakthrough 13 Japan to dismantle first commercial reactor 14 Furious Ahern to tackle Blair on Sellafield terror 15 Greens launch legal case to stop UK nuke plant NUCLEAR WEAPONS CONTENTS 1 Remember the Kursk? They've Just Raised It 2 [southnews] Pakistan worries about nuclear installations 3 Case Against bin Laden Detailed by Blair; Unleasing the Nuclear 4 -- Are you a Japanese spy? 5 Kursk may arrive to Murmansk on October 10th 6 editorial: Refuge site moves ahead 7 Safety ignored in Oak Ridge salvage work, some claim 8 Dutch Group Lifts Russian Nuke Sub 9 Pantex to get new lab 10 Nagasaki mayor warns against using nuclear arms - ***************************************************************** ***************************************************************** NUCLEAR POWER ARTICLES ***************************************************************** 1 [toeslist] Nuclear Industry Shouldn't Be Let Off the Hook for Date: Sun, 7 Oct 2001 23:24:14 -0500 (CDT) Oct. 4, 2001 Nuclear Industry Shouldn't Be Let Off the Hook for Accident Costs Lawmakers Wrong to Force Taxpayers to Subsidize Nuclear Industry's Insurance Costs WASHINGTON, D.C. -- The House Subcommittee on Energy and Air Quality was wrong to vote today to reauthorize the Price-Anderson Act, which calls for the government - and therefore taxpayers - to foot most of the bill in the event of a nuclear power accident, Public Citizen said today. Not only is it a bad idea to reauthorize the act, but lawmakers should gather much more information about the security of nuclear power plants before even considering the legislation, particularly in light of the events of Sept. 11, Public Citizen said. The nuclear power industry has a dismal record of passing mock security drills, and recent published reports indicate that nuclear power plants could not withstand the attacks perpetrated on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. "This is absolutely the wrong time for the Congress to be considering the extension of this program," said Wenonah Hauter, director of Public Citizen's Critical Mass Energy and Environment Program. "The current law doesn't expire until next August, but the leadership in the House of Representatives has put this legislation on a fast track. It's foolhardy to consider this until a full and thorough discussion of nuclear safety is conducted." The Price-Anderson Act was passed in 1954 to help the nascent nuclear power industry get off the ground by providing government-backed indemnification in the event of any nuclear power accidents. Now, nuclear power plants must buy $200 million worth of insurance, and the industry's costs in the event of an accident would be capped at $9 billion. However, a nuclear accident would likely cost $500 billion, according to government estimates. The government would have to pay for what the nuclear industry doesn't cover. Under the pending legislation, the act would be reauthorized for 15 years. Public Citizen opposes the reauthorization, but says that if lawmakers do approve it, they should impose strict security requirements to protect against terrorism and assure the security of the reactors and surrounding communities. Of particular concern in light of the events of Sept. 11 is the subcommittee's approval of concessions to new reactors constructed according to the pebble bed modular reactor design, which cuts costs by eliminating the traditional containment that protects the reactor from explosions and intrusions. "This reckless move to promote dangerous new reactors is straight off the nuclear industry's wish-list," Hauter said. "There is no excuse for such blatant disregard of the safety risks that a new generation of nuclear plants would pose to the American public." Further, the bill continues to require the American taxpayer to pick up the tab for willful and negligent actions of private contractors at U.S. Department of Energy facilities. As Energy and Commerce Committee ranking member John Dingell (D-Mich.) pointed out, neither the Environmental Protection Agency nor the Defense Department provide this level of subsidized indemnification to their private contractors who perform unsatisfactorily. "What's the rush?" Hauter asked. "This is not the time to rush this legislation through the Congress. By doing so, we would expose our citizens to even more harm - financially and otherwise. Congress should put an end to corporate welfare for the nuclear industry." For more information about the Price-Anderson Act, visit http://www.citizen.org/cmep/energy_enviro_nuclear/nuclear_power_plants/nuclear_revival/articles.cfm?ID=4912 ### ------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor ---------------------~--> FREE COLLEGE MONEY CLICK HERE to search 600,000 scholarships! http://us.click.yahoo.com/Pv4pGD/4m7CAA/ySSFAA/NJYolB/TM ---------------------------------------------------------------------~-> To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to: toeslist-unsubscribe@egroups.com Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/ ***************************************************************** 2 Lost fuel rod search narrows This story was published Sat, Oct 6, 2001 By John Stang Herald staff writer For most of 2001, a New England utility speculated that two lost nuclear fuel rods were at one of four places, including US Ecology's Hanford site. Now after a 10-month investigation, that New England utility is sure those two lost fuel rods are at one of those four places, including US Ecology's Hanford site, the utility announced Friday. However, US Ecology's corporate parent, American Ecology, said "it is very unlikely" those rods ended up at Hanford. These two rods -- thin zirconium and aluminum alloy cylinders 13 feet long, 12 inch thick and filled with depleted uranium pellets -- are the only fuel rods to have been totally lost in American nuclear history. They were last confirmed seen in 1980 in a water-filled spent fuel basin next to Millstone Reactor No. 1 in Connecticut. They were discovered missing in December 2000 during an inventory of the fuel in that basin. In 1972, Northeast Utilities System operators bent the two rods during some repair work, making them unusable in the reactor's core, where the fuel has tight tolerances to function properly. The rods were put in a long cylinder, which was stored in the spent fuel basin. Then in December 2000, Northeast Utilities workers inventoried the basin's spent fuel in preparation to sell the three-reactor Millstone complex to Dominion Nuclear Connecticut for $1.3 billion in April 2001. They could not find the cylinder with these two fuel rods. For the past 10 months, Northeast Utilities interviewed about 200 people, searched vast numbers of documents and videotapes and inspected the fuel basin. The basin holds about 167,000 fuel rods. Investigators looked at about 75 scenarios on how the fuel could get lost. Northeast Utilities announced Friday that it sent a report to Dominion Nuclear, concluding the rods were not stolen and are at one of four sites. They include US Ecology's commercial low-level radioactive waste site in central Hanford, Chem-Nuclear's similar commercial waste site at Barnwell, S.C., a General Electric nuclear lab in Pleasanton, Calif., or still within the spent fuel basin at Millstone. In a July interview, Nuclear Regulatory Commission officials said health and safety concerns from the fuel inside the cylinder almost are nonexistent. In a written statement Friday, American Ecology said it believes the lost rods most likely are in the Millstone basin. "Dominion has a duty to eventually complete a full physical inventory of the Millstone pool to ascertain if they are present," American Ecology's statement said. American Ecology noted no records exist of the fuel rods leaving Millstone. And if the rods were mislabeled, American Ecology argued that Millstone sent "many more" shipments to Barnwell than to Hanford. US Ecology double-checked its paperwork pertaining to Millstone and found no indication of the lost fuel rods. US Ecology did a safety study that concluded: "No immediate or near-term threat to public health and safety would exist even if the rods were erroneously sent to Hanford." Copyright 2001 Tri-City Herald. All rights reserved. This ***************************************************************** 3 More than 100 join French Chernobyl cancer claim Planet Ark Environmental News: FRANCE: October 8, 2001 PARIS - More than 100 people filed lawsuits against the French government last week accusing it of failing to warn them of the risks following the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear disaster which they say caused cancer and other illnesses. The 125 plaintiffs joined an existing investigation into the effects in France of radioactive fallout from the world's worst nuclear disaster. The Paris prosecutor's office ordered an investigation in July after a group of 51 plaintiffs with thyroid ailments filed a suit against the government for involuntary physical injury and wilful disregard of duty to ensure public safety. They alleged French authorities failed to warn the public of the health risks after a radioactive cloud drifted west from Chernobyl in Ukraine when a reactor exploded in April 1986. Under French law, a probe is one step short of charges. A lawyer for the new plaintiffs said they were mostly from Paris, eastern France and Corsica, the regions worst affected. The plant in Ukraine shut down for good last December. Last year a 31-year-old Frenchman suffering from thyroid cancer, Yohann van Waeyenberghe, lost an attempt to have criminal proceedings launched against French officials for alleged bodily harm in connection with Chernobyl. Radioactivity from the explosion in Ukraine drifted across France between April 27 and May 5, 1986. REUTERS NEWS SERVICE ***************************************************************** 4 Letter: The economics of Mox The Independent - United Kingdom; Oct 8, 2001 BY SIR BERNARD INGHAM Sir: Your leading article says, "The case for nuclear power and its associated reprocessing facilities has never been very strong; after 11 September the Government's enthusiasm for all things nuclear is indefensible." I suspect that you might have written a different leader had you realised that, without nuclear power, Thursday's edition of The Independent might not have appeared. Nuclear generates about a quarter of our energy and the South-east gets about 50 per cent of its supplies from nuclear power stations. That strikes me as a very strong case for nuclear power generated, as it is, in very robustly designed stations. Without nuclear energy another 60 million tonnes a year of carbon dioxide, the main greenhouse gas, would be poured into the atmosphere. Not a very strong case? As for reprocessing, mixed oxide fuel produced in the plant just approved by the Government at Sellafield makes it much more, not less, difficult for terrorists to acquire plutonium. It also burns up the plutonium stockpile by generating electricity with it. Rather a good case for Mox, I would have thought. Sir BERNARD INGHAM Secretary Supporters of Nuclear Energy London SW1 ***************************************************************** 5 Irish may seek inspectors at BNFL Sellafield plant Sunday Business Post - Ireland; Oct 7, 2001 BY MAOL MUIRE TYNAN Dublin, Ireland, 7 October, 2001 The Taoiseach will press the British Prime Minister tomorrow to reverse the decision to extend nuclear reprocessing at Sellafield. The government is also considering requesting that Irish inspectors be allowed into the Cumbria plant to monitor developments. The government was given no advance warning that Britain would formally approve the opening of a GBP460 million mixed oxide (Mox) plant on the British Nuclear Fuels site. One government source said: "Greenpeace knew about it before we did. We are very disappointed." Another source described the action as a "slap in the face" to the Irish government. Attorney General Michael McDowell has given clearance for legal actions to go ahead over alleged breaches of two EU treaties. The British government is understood to believe that it is covered against any legal challenge by either the Irish government or environmentalists. The Irish government's earlier challenge to the Mox plant under the OSPAR convention -- an accord between North Atlantic states on curbing pollution -- is considered to have been overtaken by events, with last week's expansion announcement. Information and research assistance is to be provided to groups in Britain which intend to oppose the expansion of the plant, but there is considerable pessimism about the chance of the decision being reversed. ***************************************************************** 6 German nuclear power plant temporarily shut down due to safety problems BBC Monitoring Service - United Kingdom; Oct 7, 2001 Text of report by German news agency ddp Stuttgart/Berlin: The Philippsburg 2 nuclear power plant will be shut down for the time being. This decision was taken by Energie Baden-Wuerttemberg AG (EnBW), which operates the power plant, Baden-Wuerttemberg Environment Minister Ulrich Mueller, Christian Democratic Union (CDU), announced in Stuttgart on Sunday [7 October]. He also said that he had "serious doubts that the plant is operated in a sufficiently reliable way". After talks with Mueller on Saturday, German Environment Minister Juergen Trittin - Alliance 90/Greens - criticized that the Philippsburg plant was operating in August although important safety precautions had not been taken. On Sunday afternoon, EnBW representatives were scheduled to meet with Trittin's state secretary. According to the German Environment Ministry, staff at the plant noted on 25 August in Block 2 that one of the four flood container pairs did not show the compulsory boron acid concentration after 12 August. Two days later, the operators established the same fault in two more containers. Yet, only on 28 August was the compulsory concentration achieved again in all four containers. The flood containers are necessary for fill up the reactor's primary cooling circuit in the case of a leakage. This is a essential condition for the proper functioning of this safety mechanism, the Berlin ministry criticized. Mueller emphasized that based on current information, his ministry had to assume that the operators of the plant themselves "could not reliably say whether the plant's safety systems were fully functioning" for a period of at least one or two days. Nevertheless, operations continued although "for safety reasons, the plant would have had to be shut down immediately". The environment ministry in Stuttgart "largely agreed" with the federal Environment Ministry's "evaluation of the case and the necessary measures". The Philippsburg 2 plant itself is "OK and can be operated properly". Yet, the measures that had now to be taken must be aimed at creating the conditions for "restoring the reliability of the plant's responsible staff". Source: ddp news agency, Berlin, in German 1542 gmt 7 Oct 01 /BBC Monitoring/ © BBC. World Reporter All Material Subject to ***************************************************************** 7 Total System Performance Assessment-Site Recommendation (TSPA-SR) September 18, 2001 The Honorable Richard A. Meserve Chairman U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 Dear Chairman Meserve: SUBJECT: TOTAL SYSTEM PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT-SITE RECOMMENDATION (TSPA-SR) This letter documents the findings of the Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste's (ACNW's) vertical slice review of the TSPA-SR. The Department of Energy's (DOE's) Supplemental Science and Performance Analysis (SSPA) Report following the TSPA-SR, addressed a number of the issues that the Committee identified in its vertical slice review. Because our vertical slice review of the TSPA-SR preceded the SSPA, this letter addresses only some of the SSPA changes. It should be noted, however, that the Committee has not yet reviewed the SSPA report, although we do currently have access to it. In conducting its vertical slice review of the TSPA-SR, the Committee adopted an approach to: (1) determine the principal drivers of the assessed repository performance (including the supporting evidence) working from the final results, and (2) examine the extent to which the assessment achieves a risk-informed result. Review Findings In developing the TSPA-SR, DOE performed an extensive amount of modeling, and the results and supporting technical bases are reasonably well displayed in the context of the models employed. However, based on the Committee's vertical slice review, the principal findings are that the TSPA-SR does not lead to a realistic risk-informed result, and it does not inspire confidence in the TSPA-SR process. In particular, the TSPA-SR reflects the input and results of models and assumptions that are not founded on a realistic assessment of the evidence. The consequence is that the TSPA-SR does not provide a basis for estimating margins of safety. Discussion The Committee's principal concerns with the TSPA-SR are that: (1) modeling is guided by an inconsistent set of assumptions, including a mixture of conservative and nonconservative bounding assumptions, that do not represent realistic conditions; (2) the TSPA-SR relies on many assumption-based computations and analyses that do not support or link the assumptions with the available evidence; and (3) the TSPA-SR does not provide a sequence model of dominant dose contributors, therefore, it is not transparent or well-integrated. The following paragraphs summarize representative examples of the problems that the Committee's vertical slice review identified in the TSPA-SR, along with the Committee's recommendations. The TSPA-SR relies on modeling assumptions that mask a realistic assessment of risk. Among such assumptions are those having to do with such phenomena as radionuclide solubilities, in-package chemistry (including the formation of secondary mineral phases), cladding unzipping, decoupling of the drip shield model from the waste package model, and transport of radionuclides through the geosphere. Other assumptions that mask a realistic assessment and reasonableness have to do with mixing conservative and nonconservative bounding analyses and the general treatment of uncertainty. While the TSPA-SR analysts clearly recognize the masking problem and the modeling inconsistencies with respect to realistic assumptions, they fail to convey the expected risk, based on the available evidence. The Committee believes that the TSPA-SR is driven more by an attempt to demonstrate compliance with the standards than by the need to provide an assessment designed to answer the question: What is the risk? The result is that the assessment does not really risk-inform the safety of the repository even in the spirit of DOE's own words, "... the goal of performance assessment is to provide decisionmakers with a reasonable estimate of the realistic future performance of the disposal system and a clear display of the extent to which uncertainty in the present understanding of the system affects that estimate." (The italics are added.) The stated DOE practice is to choose parameter distributions that are "deliberately conservative" where uncertainty distributions "cannot be adequately justified based on available information." To suggest that the distributions are conservative implies some knowledge about the underlying processes, and how the results are affected by parameter values. While this approach may be suitable under some circumstances, when modeling involves linear systems and independent processes, the application of this approach to the high-level waste (HLW) repository at Yucca Mountain may be flawed. This is because the underlying processes in the near field of the repository, for example, are not entirely linear or independent. To the contrary, significant coupling is expected among nonlinear hydrological, chemical, and thermal processes. Determining what is conservative and what is not under these conditions is neither intuitive nor straightforward. The masking of realism in the TSPA-SR precludes providing a clear basis to estimate the margins of safety, or making an objective regulatory decision that is in the best public interest. We note that the SSPA report prepared following the TSPA-SR addresses both information and modeling uncertainties, describes how simplified and bounding models in the TSPA-SR, in some cases, were replaced in the SSPA with more detailed and representative models, and compares supplemental model results with those from the TSPA-SR. The Committee has not reviewed the SSPA and cannot comment on the quality of its results at this time. Nonetheless, there are some notable differences between the results of the SSPA and TSPA-SR models. In particular, the calculated doses for late times have significantly decreased in the SSPA models compared to the TSPA-SR models in the nominal case scenario, and increased for the disruptive case scenario. DOE claims that the differences between the supplemental SSPA model and TSPA-SR have essentially no impact on conclusions that might be drawn with respect to comparisons with the dose standard. Computations and analyses are assumption-based, not evidence-supported. The TSPA-SR seems to rely more on assumption-based computations and analyses than on the available evidence. This has resulted in limitations that concern the Committee, especially as they relate to: (1) coupled processes, (2) waste package failure, and in-package physical and chemical processes leading to mobilization of the waste, (3) uncertainty in amounts and rates of radionuclides released, and (4) uncertainty in the source term for radionuclide transport. A specific example of relying on assumptions without supporting evidence is an attempt in the TSPA-SR to compare "degraded" and "enhanced" scenarios to provide an indication of the impact on results of two different assumption sets. The idea is a good one and greatly facilitates the understanding of the impact of different assumptions. Nonetheless, the analysis lacks the linkage between the assumption sets and the supporting evidence. The real issue is what the evidence supports, not what are the possibilities? Working from 5th and 95th percentiles of bounding parameter uncertainties in the TSPA-SR does not have much to do with "pessimistic" and "optimistic" results. It would have been much more informative if the TSPA-SR provided sensitivity analyses with respect to parameter values that are probabilistic, but also realistic, reasonable, and supported by evidence. The idea is to move in the direction of "evidence-supported" analyses and away from "assumption-based" analyses. An alternative approach would be to select several performance scenarios for each of the nominal and disruptive cases, and emphasize the evidence supporting each individual scenario. The three peak-dose models (scenarios) considered in the TSPA-SR represent the beginning of such an approach, but fail to discriminate among the scenarios in terms of their likelihood and supporting evidence. Clearly defined scenarios can greatly facilitate the general question of what the evidence may or may not support. A dominant sequence model has not been developed. There is a need to abstract a simple model for the dominant dose contributors to the critical group that clearly illustrates how the major modules of the TSPA-SR are integrated and assembled from the detailed models that make up the TSPA-SR. The absence of a simple model for the dominant dose contributors greatly handicaps verification and confidence in the performance assessment results. This is particularly true with regard to evaluating the roles of the different components of the repository system. In the reactor risk assessment field, the industry has had considerable success in developing simplified risk models based on the dominant contributors to risk (sometimes referred to as a dominant sequence model). These models have contributed to better understanding of the real risk and the contributing factors. They lend themselves to repetitive calculations for checking results. They have also greatly facilitated the review process by allowing simple tradeoffs to be made in assumptions and design conditions while building confidence in the results. There does not appear to be a counterpart to these models in the performance assessment models employed in the TSPA-SR. The complexity of the TSPA-SR model compromises the ability to comprehend and develop confidence in the results. There are few radionuclides (Tc, I, Np, and Pu) that are driving the risk, suggesting a great opportunity to abstract a simple model. One interpretation of a simple model would be to simply trace the radionuclide Tc for early dose results (say up to 40,000 years) and Np dose calculations for late and peak doses (105 to 106 years). The adoption of "pinch points" by the DOE investigators is a move in the right direction to show continuity in the analysis and to modularize the models for greater transparency. The problem for the TSPA-SR is that the idea was implemented too selectively to facilitate putting all the pieces of the model together. Recommendations On the basis of its vertical-slice review of the TSPA-SR, the Committee recommends that the NRC staff take the necessary action to be assured that: + The performance assessment of the proposed Yucca Mountain repository is, in fact, risk-informed. + DOE has adopted an evidence-supported approach and realistic modeling assumptions for use in the TSPA-SR while reducing the dependence on parameter bounding and conservatism to overcome uncertainty and increase the reliance on such available evidence as site-specific field and laboratory data, natural analogs, and expert knowledge. + The NRC staff's review of the TSPA-SR adequately emphasized waste package failure and in-package processes to assure the staff that the waste package can perform as DOE claims and to inspire confidence in the characteristics of the source term for radionuclide transport. The Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste is prepared to discuss these issues with the NRC staff. Sincerely, /RA/ George M. Hornberger Chairman ***************************************************************** 8 ACNW Comments on NRC Staff's Issue Resolution Process for Risk-informing its Sufficiency Review of Doe's Technical Basis Documents for the Yucca Mountain Site Recommendation September 28, 2001 The Honorable Richard A. Meserve Chairman U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) requires the U. S. Department of Energy (DOE) to include in its site recommendation to the President preliminary comments from the NRC as to whether DOE's at-depth site characterization and waste form proposal for the proposed high-level waste (HLW) repository seem to be sufficient for inclusion in a possible license application. In this letter, we provide our observations and recommendations regarding the issue resolution process that the NRC staff used in its sufficiency review of DOE's technical basis documents pertaining to the site recommendation for the proposed Yucca Mountain, Nevada, HLW repository. In summer of 2000 the Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste (ACNW) initiated a vertical slice review of the NRC staff's issue resolution process and DOE's technical basis documents for the Yucca Mountain site recommendation. The purpose of our vertical slice review was to evaluate the NRC staff's tools, guidance, and technical capability for evaluating sufficiency and, if needed, an eventual license application. Primary objectives of our review were to evaluate: (1) whether the NRC's sufficiency review comments and issue resolution process are transparent, traceable, and defensible, and (2) whether the NRC's issue resolution agreements and information requested of DOE reflect a risk-informed and performance-based (RIPB) approach and are appropriate and realistic. In planning our vertical slice review, we selected four technical areas that correspond to one or more key technical issues (KTIs). The four areas were: (1) high-level waste chemistry, (2) saturated zone flow and transport, (3) thermal effects on flow, and (4) total system performance assessment and integration. Because we have not yet seen the staff's sufficiency comments, our observations are predicated solely on the issue-resolution process. The staff has informed the Committee that the information gleaned from technical exchange meetings and the agreements that stemmed from them formed the basis for the staff's sufficiency comments. On the basis of our selected reviews, we make several observations and recommendations: + The staff appears to be well equipped with analytical tools, technical capability, and guidance for conducting the sufficiency review and an eventual license application (LA) review, particularly in light of the staff's ongoing upgrades to the TPA code for analyzing the waste package and source term. It is not obvious, however, whether or how the staff used information and performance assessment tools to focus its sufficiency review on the most risk-significant issues, and whether or how it used its TPA code to develop risk insights to support the sufficiency review. + The NRC staff should continue to use its TPA code in conducting sensitivity analyses to explore important contributors to risk at the sub-issue level. We also encourage the staff to continue to enhance its use of the TPA code to allow for greater realism in its analyses and to conduct its own risk-informed assessments to quantify the uncertainties associated with the important risk contributors. We believe this will allow the staff to meet the Commission's intent of having a risk-informed analysis, refine its understanding of the potential risks associated with the proposed Yucca Mountain repository, focus its licensing review, and better justify its request for information and detailed analyses from the DOE. + Through its issue resolution process, the staff appears to be addressing the issues that are likely to be important for conducting an LA review for the proposed Yucca Mountain repository. + The technical exchange meetings have proven very valuable in resolving issues and establishing substantial and essential communication between NRC and DOE staffs. + The NRC staff used the ongoing issue resolution process efficiently and effectively to conduct its review in a timely fashion. + The staff seems to be doing an excellent job of tracking issue resolution as the emphasis shifts from KTIs to integrated sub-issues (ISIs). The ISI format appears to effectively capture and integrate material from the KTIs. + In the areas where the Committee focused its vertical slice review, the staff's issue resolution process is logical, defensible, and well documented in the issue resolution status reports (IRSRs). + DOE's inconsistent use of conservatism throughout the TSPA-SR models makes it difficult to identify issues that are important to risk, and precludes a risk-informed analyses of the proposed repository on the basis of the evidence. + The NRC staff should clarify and publish in its YMRP how it will tailor its licensing review of the abstractions (ISIs) on the basis of their importance to safety. We are concerned that the staff's technical exchange agreements may be challenged if the staff does not document how it is focusing on the most risk-significant issues. The Committee believes that the staff is on its way toward making the YMRP an RIPB guidance document, but still faces a significant challenge in making its issue resolution process and possible LA review RIPB and documenting how this was achieved. + The staff should clarify in the YMRP how to use "conservatism" appropriately to treat uncertainty, while providing a risk-informed analysis and understanding of the risks associated with the proposed repository. + According to the staff, the issue resolution agreements that emerged from the technical exchange meetings formed the basis for the staff's sufficiency comments. However, the existing IRSRs do not reflect the most current information supporting the recent agreements. This discrepancy will make it difficult to trace the bases and criteria that the staff used to develop its sufficiency comments. We understand that the staff intends to update the IRSRs to reflect the most recent information and acceptance criteria in the integrated IRSR, but this document is still under development and may not become publically available for some time. The traceability, clarity, and transparency of the sufficiency comments will not be complete without this integrated IRSR. Therefore, we recommend that the staff release this document to the public as soon as feasible. The ACNW developed a "template" containing a set of questions to guide its review toward achieving the desired objectives. Our answers to the template questions and additional background information for our review are provided in the attachment to this letter. Sincerely, /RA/ George E. Hornberger Chairman Attachment: Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste's Vertical Slice Review Approach Attachment Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste's Vertical Slice Review Approach In Summer 2000, the Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste (ACNW) initiated a vertical slice review of the NRC staff's sufficiency review of the technical basis documents prepared by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) for the site recommendation regarding the high-level waste (HLW) repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. The ACNW's approach for this review is one element of our larger strategy for evaluating the staff's overall licensing review capability. Other elements of the strategy include ongoing evaluation of the staff's key technical issue KTI resolution program, specific KTIs, the staff's performance assessment (PA) tools and capability, and the staff's overall regulatory framework for HLW. The Committee briefed the Commission on its overall strategy in March 2001. Background During its March 2000 meeting, the Committee heard a briefing from the NRC staff on its draft strategy to conduct the Yucca Mountain sufficiency review, and subsequently received a copy of the draft sufficiency review strategy in September 2000. In a letter to the Commission dated June 29, 2000, the Committee conveyed that the staff's approach appeared to be well thought out, logical, and consistent with the risk-informed and performance-based (RIPB) strategy outlined in the proposed draft 10 CFR Part 63. In July 2000, at the Commission's request, several Committee members informally provided feedback on the staff's draft proposed Yucca Mountain Review Plan (YMRP), which the staff developed for conducting an RIPB review of an eventual license application (LA). The staff also developed and provided to the ACNW a copy of the draft YMRP implementing guidance for conducting the sufficiency review. The Committee has not yet received a briefing on the draft YMRP or its implementing guidance and has not yet reviewed these documents in detail. During its August 2001 meeting, the Committee heard a briefing from the NRC staff on its sufficiency review and DOE's supplemental science and performance analysis (SSPA). However, we have not reviewed the SSPA and have not considered it in our evaluation of the staff's sufficiency review. Finally, the Committee members also gained insights into the staff's issue resolution process over the past year by participating in informal interactions with the NRC staff and by attending DOE-NRC technical exchange meetings for resolving technical issues. NRC Staff's Sufficiency Review The purpose of the NRC staff's sufficiency review was to evaluate whether the DOE has enough data and conceptual understanding of the Yucca Mountain HLW repository system to develop a safety case for a potential license application. Consequently, the scope of the sufficiency review was narrower than it would be for an LA review. For example, the staff will not make estimated dose comparisons relative to 10 CFR Part 63, and it will not make findings regarding the correctness of the site recommendation in relation to DOE's siting guidelines in 10 CFR Part 963. Rather, the staff will provide preliminary comments on where data and analyses appear to be sufficient or insufficient, what additional data and analyses are needed and within what time frame, whether conceptual models are supported by sufficient data, and the status of DOE's quality assurance (QA) efforts. The staff's sufficiency review will also document the status of the KTI issue resolution process, in addition to reporting on progress in the DOE's program. The staff informed us that the DOE-NRC KTI technical exchange meeting agreements formed the basis for its sufficiency review, and that it used the issue resolution process and IRSRs to risk-inform and document the basis for its sufficiency review. Similar to the way the ACNW conducted its review of the DOE's viability assessment in its letter dated April 8, 1999, each Committee member informally met with the NRC staff one or more times to exchange ideas and information related to their technical area. The Committee used the staff's IRSRs and agreements from the ongoing NRC-DOE technical exchange meetings to focus its review on relevant portions of DOE's technical basis documents. Other source material for the review included DOE's process model reports (PMRs), analysis model reports (AMRs), science and engineering report, TSPA-SR, DOE's repository safety strategy (RSS), and (to a very limited extent) SSPA. The Committee provided a separate report on its vertical slice review of HLW chemistry in its letter dated August 13, 2001 and the TSPA-SR in its letter dated September 18, 2001. The Template Questions 1. Are the NRC staff's tools, guidance, and capability sufficient to conduct a sufficiency review or LA review? In general, the NRC staff appears to be well equipped to conduct a sufficiency review and an LA review. The staff has its own analytical tools [e.g., total-system performance assessment (TPA) code and more detailed codes] to use in reaching conclusions about DOE's ability to meet regulatory requirements for licensing. The NRC staff and the staff of the Center for Nuclear Waste Regulatory Analyses (CNWRA) have impressive expertise in the areas that the ACNW evaluated, (i.e., repository chemistry, TSPA, saturated zone, and thermal effects on flow). The Committee also commented in its chemistry vertical slice review report that the NRC and CNWRA staff seem to be well positioned to deal with the impacts of evolutionary repository design changes. However, as noted in the chemistry report, we believe that deficiencies may exist in some engineering areas and that the staff lacks the computing capability to run DOE's Goldsim TSPA code in a Monte-Carlo mode. We also noted in the chemistry report that DOE's and NRC's treatment of coupled chemical processes is inadequate as a result of their complexity and difficulty in incorporating them in the modeling. In addition, the Committee noted that the staff needs to more fully address in-package chemistry issues as it develops an integrated chemistry model to be implemented in the NRC's TPA code, and that it is essential to develop an appropriate source term model for the TPA code. We are pleased to note that the NRC and CNWRA staffs are in the process of updating the TPA code to address the above deficiencies and to allow for more realistic assessments of the waste package, source term, and coupled processes. 2. Is there sufficient evidence to support the results of DOE's TSPA, process model, or model abstraction? On the basis of our collective reviews, more evidence may exist for treating the saturated zone in the TSPA model than for treating repository chemistry and thermal effects on flow. For the latter areas, we believe that DOE's understanding of system behavior may be derived more from modeling than from data. We also observed that neither the evidence supporting the TSPA-SR modeling assumptions, nor the importance of the assumptions to performance are made transparent. For example, DOE cites a variety of assumptions as "conservative." This is a concern because: (1) use of multiple "conservative" assumptions masks the risks posed by the repository and compromises the opportunity for a risk-informed analysis on the basis of the evidence, and (2) in many cases, assumptions are labeled as conservative without the supporting evidence. We also observed that verification and qualification of data and models are inconsistent and sometimes lacking. 3. Is the staff's approach adequate for using the TPA code to review the TSPA, process models, and/or model abstractions? Although the staff's TPA code lacks the detail and sophistication of DOE's Goldsim TSPA code, we believe that the staff is well positioned and equipped with its own, independent code to review information contained in a possible LA. A possible advantage of the simpler TPA code (compared to DOE's Goldsim code) is that it should be conducive to more realistic, scenario-based approaches that may be useful for verifying DOE's analysis. It is not obvious, however, whether or how the staff used information and performance assessment tools to focus its sufficiency review on the most risk-significant issues, and whether or how it used its TPA code to develop risk insights to support the sufficiency review. 4. Is the issue resolution process sufficient, given review of the integrated sub-issue (ISI)? Has integration between KTIs and ISIs been achieved? The staff's public technical exchange meetings were organized around KTIs and their sub-issues, while the staff's sufficiency review is structured around the ISIs. The Committee believes that the ISI format effectively captures and integrates material from the KTIs, and appears to have enabled the staff to integrate technical information across various KTIs in conducting its sufficiency review. Overall, the staff seems to be doing an excellent job of tracking issue resolution as the emphasis shifts from KTIs to ISIs. 5. Is the relative risk of the sub-issue (ISI) known or understood by the NRC? By DOE? Is it a principal factor? In the case of saturated zone flow, the staff recognizes the saturated zone as a geological barrier that is important to the safety case. The saturated zone flow regime itself is not a principal factor; however, because radionuclide transport relies on groundwater flow as input, the flow path ISI is seen to be important to both the NRC and DOE. In the areas of repository chemistry and thermal effects on flow, the NRC's understanding of the relative risk is less apparent and was not documented in the corresponding IRSR. We observed that DOE tends to use very "conservative" assumptions in some cases but not in others, and does not integrate the differing approaches in a consistent way. The inconsistent use of conservatism throughout the TSPA-SR models makes it difficult to identify issues that are important to risk and to ascertain if particular errors or problems are significant to overall performance. The complexity of the TSPA-SR model and code make it difficult to evaluate the individual contributors to risk. We discuss our review of the TSPA-SR in more detail in the September 18, 2001 letter. 6. Does NRC's YMRP/Guidance reflect an RIPB approach? Although the Committee has not yet reviewed the draft YMRP, several Committee members perused the draft document last year at the Commission's request and offered comments to the staff on how to better meet the Commission's expectations for making the document RIPB. Until we are briefed on the YMRP, we cannot assess how the staff might use the YMRP to conduct an RIPB review by taking advantage of such factors as risk insights derived from previous PAs, results of the TPA code, and sensitivity analyses. The Committee believes that the staff is on its way toward making the YMRP an RIPB guidance document, but still faces a significant challenge in making its issue resolution process and possible LA review RIPB and documenting how this was achieved. 7. Are the KTIs consistent with the issues that the PA identified as being important? As part of the issue resolution process, the original 10 KTIs have now been subsumed into the 14 ISIs. It would appear that the KTIs remain important issues for determining repository performance. In addition, the staff effectively uses the KTIs to highlight important issues in interactions with DOE, and the KTI-IRSR process has proven to be a flexible framework for identifying significant technical issues. 8. Are the staff's IRSRs and agreements logical, defensible, and focused on the most risk-significant issues? DOE and the NRC appear to have covered the important issues, but it is not obvious whether the NRC staff has made a concerted effort to focus on the most risk-significant issues. Although the staff appears to be in the process of identifying the most important issues, the discovery process is still underway. We are concerned that the defensibility of the staff's issue resolution process and technical exchange agreements may be challenged if the staff does not document how it is focusing on the most risk-significant issues. Although it was beyond the scope of our vertical slice review, a Committee member observed a technical exchange meeting on preclosure that caused him to question the defensibility of the NRC's agreements and request for information from the DOE. However, we believe that if the staff succeeds in making the YMRP an RIPB document and uses it to guide its LA review, the conclusions reached should be logical, defensible, and focused on the most risk-significant issues. 9. Are the staff's agreements well documented, transparent, and traceable? The Committee believes that the NRC staff's issue resolution process is well documented in the IRSRs. However, the existing IRSRs do not reflect the most current information supporting the recent agreements; this discrepancy will make it difficult to trace the bases and criteria that the staff used to develop its sufficiency comments. 10. How has uncertainty been evaluated? Are the issues treated with bounding assumptions, or are they realistically assessed? In the chemistry area, DOE handles uncertainty with differing degrees of realism, largely depending on what information is available. In the area of thermal effects on flow, it appears that DOE uses bounding assumptions together with probability distributions, but uses more bounding assumptions (taken to be "conservative") than "best estimates" by about 10:1. We believe that sensitivity analyses that are founded on bounding values for parameters (rather than on best estimates) are of questionable value and are more likely to be misleading than informative. A recurring theme in ACNW's review is that reliance on bounding analyses or "conservative" assumptions can obscure a true performance assessment. Although "sufficiency" relates only to the adequacy of the evidence (and not to performance per se), the staff must make a judgment about whether the philosophy behind the information-gathering process is adequate to support realistic performance for a license application. ACNW maintains that the use of conservatism upon conservatism makes a risk-informed approach impossible. ***************************************************************** 9 Daily Events Report U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Reports For 10/04/2001 10/05/2001 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** 38346 38347 38348 38349 38350 38351 38352 General Information or Other Event Number: 38346 REP ORG: NV DIV OF RAD HEALTH NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/04/2001 LICENSEE: LAS VALLEY WATER DISTRICT NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:11[EDT] CITY: LAS VEGAS REGION: 4 EVENT DATE: 10/04/2001 COUNTY: STATE: NV EVENT TIME: [PDT] LICENSE#: 00 11 0196 01 AGREEMENT: Y LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/04/2001 DOCKET: PERSON ORGANIZATION CLAUDE JOHNSON R4 FRED BROWN NMSS NRC NOTIFIED BY: STAN MARSHALL HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR SECTION: NAGR AGREEMENT STATE EVENT TEXT AGREEMENT STATE REPORT DAMAGED GAUGE 1. Event Report ID No.: NV 01 006 2. License No.: 00 11 0196 01 3. Licensee: Las Valley Water District 4. Event time, date, location: Las Vegas, NV, October 1, 2001 5. Event type (e.g. misadministration, lost source, overexposure, etc.): Slightly damaged portable gauge. Cause of the incident was lack of attention to detail. 6. Any notifications i.e. other agencies, patient, press release, FBI, etc.: N/A 7. Event description: release, isotope, activity, exposure(s), dose, contamination level, equipment malfunction model, serial No., etc.: A portable gauge fell off the bed of a slow moving transporting pickup and was slightly damaged. The gauge was not carried in it's shipping container at the time of the incident, The source was in the safe, shielded position at the time of the incident. The gauge has been surveyed and leak tested and has been shipped to the manufacturer for repair. The gauge was a Troxler Model 3440, s/n 22284 containing 10 mCi of Cs 137 and 40 mCi of Am 241 :Be. 8. Transport vehicle description, if known: Company pickup. Power Reactor Event Number: 38347 FACILITY: LIMERICK REGION: 1 NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/04/2001 UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: PA NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:23[EDT] RXTYPE: [1] GE 4,[2] GE 4 EVENT DATE: 10/03/2001 EVENT TIME: 23:28[EDT] NRC NOTIFIED BY: PETER ORPHANOS LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/04/2001 HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY PERSON ORGANIZATION EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY RICHARD CONTE R1 10 CFR SECTION: NONR OTHER UNSPEC REQMNT UNIT SCRAM CODERX CRITINIT PWR INIT RX MODE CURR PWR CURR RX MODE 2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation EVENT TEXT 24 HOUR REPORT IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPERATING LICENSE DUE TO POTENTIAL MAXIMUM POWER LEVEL VIOLATION "This report is being made in accordance with Limerick Generating Station Unit 2 Operating License Condition 2.E. as a potential violation of License Condition 2.C(1), Maximum Power Level "GE Report titled 'Impact of Steam Carryover Fraction on Process Computer Heat Balance Calculations', September 2001, documents a non conservative assumption for the moisture carryover fraction used in the calculation of core thermal power. The assumed carryover fraction of 0.1% was discovered to be potentially closer to zero and therefore non conservative in later model GE BWRs. "A review of Limerick Unit 2 moisture carryover data from an ASME PTC 6 test performed in October of 1999 found a moisture carryover value of 0.0277%, inducing an estimated bias of approximately 2.8 MWth. Similar testing on Limerick Unit 1 found a value of greater than 0.1%. Based on this data Limerick Unit 1 is not considered affected at this time. "Based on this potential non conservatism on Unit 2, indicated Maximum Power Level shift average is being administratively controlled 3 MWth below the licensed power level of 3458 MWth. "Exelon staff is continuing to evaluate the effect of the moisture carryover term in the heat balance calculation." The NRC resident has been notified. Power Reactor Event Number: 38348 FACILITY: CRYSTAL RIVER REGION: 2 NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/04/2001 UNIT: [3] [] [] STATE: FL NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:59[EDT] RXTYPE: [3] B L LP EVENT DATE: 10/04/2001 EVENT TIME: [EDT] NRC NOTIFIED BY: RICKY RAWLS LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/04/2001 HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES PERSON ORGANIZATION EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY CHARLES CASTO R2DO 10 CFR SECTION: ADEG 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) DEGRADED CONDITION UNIT SCRAM CODERX CRITINIT PWR INIT RX MODE CURR PWR CURR RX MODE 3 N N 0 Refueling 0 Refueling EVENT TEXT SMALL PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAK IDENTIFIED WHILE SHUTDOWN "At 0809 on October 4, 2001, Crystal River Unit 3 (CR 3) was in MODE 6 shutdown for refueling operation. CR 3 has identified a small defect in the reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure boundary. An RCS leak was suspected due to elevated radioactivity levels detected in the nuclear services closed cycle cooling water (SW) system since June 2001. Testing was conducted on line in MODE 1 and could not determine the source of the leakage. Additional testing in MODE 6 has identified the seal area heat exchanger on the 1B reactor coolant pump (RCP 1B) as the most likely source of the leakage. The defect allowed a small amount of leakage to occur from the RCS to the SW system during the previous operating cycle. A definitive leak location could not be identified due to the extremely small size of the leak. However, since all components in the RCP heat exchanger are included as part of the class 1 RCS pressure boundary, this defect is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). CR 3 was shutdown in MODE 6 at the time of the discovery. The RCP heat exchanger will be repaired prior to returning to power operation." The leak rate has been determined to be 0.02 gpm which exceeds the Technical Specification limit of 'No Pressure Boundary Leakage' and it appears to be a long term development. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Power Reactor Event Number: 38349 FACILITY: RIVER BEND REGION: 4 NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/04/2001 UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: LA NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:10[EDT] RXTYPE: [1] GE 6 EVENT DATE: 10/04/2001 EVENT TIME: 09:13[CDT] NRC NOTIFIED BY: DANNY WILLIAMSON LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/04/2001 HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES PERSON ORGANIZATION EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY CLAUDE JOHNSON R4 10 CFR SECTION: NONR OTHER UNSPEC REQMNT UNIT SCRAM CODERX CRITINIT PWR INIT RX MODE CURR PWR CURR RX MODE 1 N N 0 Refueling 0 Refueling EVENT TEXT OPERATING LICENSE CONDITION VIOLATION (POTENTIAL MAXIMUM POWER LEVEL VIOLATION) "This report is being made as required by River Bend Station license condition 2.E. River Bend is reporting a potential violation of the maximum power level as authorized in license condition 2.C.1. "This event is similar to event numbers 38337 and 38340 reported by two other BWR plants Based on the General Electric (GE) report titled, 'Impact of Steam Generator Carryover Fraction on Process Computer Heat Balance Calculations, September 2001.' It is possible that River Bend may have exceeded the maximum power level on some occasions in the past by approximately three megawatts thermal. "River Bend Station is currently in a refueling outage, so no immediate actions are necessary. This condition has been entered into the station's corrective action program to further evaluate the applicability of this condition and to develop an appropriate response before returning to power operations. "The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector." Hospital Event Number: 38350 REP ORG: RAPID CITY REGIONAL HOSPITAL NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/04/2001 LICENSEE: RAPID CITY REGIONAL HOSPITAL NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:58[EDT] CITY: RAPID CITY REGION: 4 EVENT DATE: 10/04/2001 COUNTY: STATE: SD EVENT TIME: [MDT] LICENSE#: AGREEMENT: N LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/04/2001 DOCKET: PERSON ORGANIZATION CLAUDE JOHNSON R4 PATRICIA HOLAHAN NMSS NRC NOTIFIED BY: ERIC HENDEE HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR SECTION: LADM 35.33(a) MED MISADMINISTRATION EVENT TEXT MEDICAL MISADMINISTRATION UNDERDOSE Today, 10/4/01, when the dose for a second treatment was being prepared, it was discovered that the first dose was not as large as prescribed. The first dose administered on 9/27/01 should have been 750 centigray and was only 400 to 500 centigray. The attending physician has been notified and the patient will be notified. A correcting dose, an additional fraction, will be given to correct the underdose. No adverse affects are expected by this misadministration. The dosage is administered with a high dose rate machine, Nucletron Microselectron. The Radiation Safety Officer contacted NRC Region 4 (Richard Leonardi). Other Nuclear Material Event Number: 38351 REP ORG: US AIR FORCE NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/04/2001 LICENSEE: US AIR FORCE NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:09[EDT] CITY: CANNON AFB REGION: 4 EVENT DATE: 10/04/2001 COUNTY: STATE: NM EVENT TIME: [MDT] LICENSE#: 42 23539 01AF AGREEMENT: Y LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/04/2001 DOCKET: PERSON ORGANIZATION CLAUDE JOHNSON R4 PATRICIA HOLAHAN NMSS NRC NOTIFIED BY: CRAIG REFOSCO HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR SECTION: BAB2 20.2201(a)(1)(ii) LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X EVENT TEXT REPORT OF 2 MISSING EXIT SIGNS CONTAINING TRITIUM AT CANNON AFB Two exit signs containing 20 curies of tritium each were discovered missing from building 1258 at Cannon Air Force Base, New Mexico. The signs were in place on 9/26/01 during a previous inspection. The signs are manufactured by SRB Technologies and the serial numbers are 192167 and 192168. There will be a formal investigation conducted. Power Reactor Event Number: 38352 FACILITY: BEAVER VALLEY REGION: 1 NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/05/2001 UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: PA NOTIFICATION TIME: 04:30[EDT] RXTYPE: [1] W 3 LP,[2] W 3 LP EVENT DATE: 10/05/2001 EVENT TIME: 00:26[EDT] NRC NOTIFIED BY: J. A. WITTER LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/05/2001 HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN PERSON ORGANIZATION EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY RICHARD CONTE R1 10 CFR SECTION: AINB 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) POT RHR INOP UNIT SCRAM CODERX CRITINIT PWR INIT RX MODE CURR PWR CURR RX MODE 2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation EVENT TEXT UNIT 2 ENTERED TECH SPEC 3.0.3 DUE TO TWO TRAINS OF SERVICE WATER DECLARED INOPERABLE "At 0026 hrs on October 5, 2001, Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2 experienced a trip of the 'A' Train Service Water (SWS) Pump. 2SWS P21 C was operating on the 'A' SWS header when the pump tripped on Motor Ground Over Current. Both A and B Train Emergency Service Water Pumps (SWE) auto started as designed and Service Water header pressure returned to normal values. Due to a piping class break, safety/non safety, between the SWS and SWE systems, the unit entered Technical Specification 3.0.3 due to two trains of Service Water being Inoperable. The unit entered and completed the Abnormal Operating Procedure for Loss of Service Water, and the Bravo Train of Service Water was restored Operable when 2SWE P21 B was secured and isolated from the 'B' SWS header. 25W5 P21 B continued to operate normally during this event. Technical Specification 3.0.3 was exited at 0037 hrs. The plant is currently stable and operating at 100% power. Technical Specification 3.7.4.1 for Service Water (72 hour action) is applicable, as the only operating pump on the 'A' SWS header is 2SWE P21A. The Alpha Service Water Pump, 2SWS P21 A is unavailable due to Intake Structure Bay cleaning. Currently efforts are under way to recover the Intake Bay and restore 2SWS P21A Operable. It is expected that both trains of Service Water will be Operable within 12 hours. The Non Safety Related Chiller units tripped due to the SWS low pressure conditions, and were recovered shortly there after. No additional failures or equipment challenges occurred as a result of this event." The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector. ***************************************************************** 10 Former TVA engineer claims radiation records are missing Oak Ridger Online --> Story last updated at 12:15 p.m. on Monday, October 8, 2001 By Duncan Mansfield Associated Press Writer KNOXVILLE-- A former Tennessee Valley Authority engineer claims radiation exposure records for thousands of TVA nuclear workers dating back to the 1970s could be missing or wrong. "The problem existed but everyone ran from it," said Ronald Grover, who discovered discrepancies and gaps in the data when he was assigned to co-manage a massive inventory of the personal dose records in 1999. According to Grover, the inventory of records scattered among paper files, microfilm and computer databases found: -- Conflicting dose records for as many as 11,320 TVA workers or contractors for the period 1970 to 1984. -- Missing documentation for as many as 2,088 workers known to have "exceeded dose limits." -- A pattern of missing records from critical times, including a 1975 fire at the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant in Decatur, Ala., and a major pipe break at the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant near Chattanooga in the early 1980s. The federal utility says all records are in order. "His allegations are either untrue or only tell part of the story because whenever a dose record (with a problem) was identified it was corrected," TVA spokesman Gil Francis said. But the Union of Concerned Scientists, a Washington watchdog group, on Monday formally asked the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to investigate, saying the allegations suggest "a very serious violation of federal regulations created to protect the health of nuclear workers." "It has entered our allegation process, so we will be reviewing it," said Ken Clark, a spokesman for the NRC's regional office in Atlanta. He wouldn't elaborate. Grover, 47, didn't ask for the inventory project. He contends it was a no-win assignment for supporting another TVA whistleblower. Grover has sued TVA for discrimination over his firing in April. TVA alleges he "misused TVA property (and) conducted personal business on TVA time" while on loan to the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations in Atlanta in 1996 and 1997. Grover claims this amounted to phone charges and business expenses he either repaid or fully reported, and an interest in some rental homes in Connecticut and Kansas City, where his mother lives, that he fully declared. The 1999 assignment to co-manage the records inventory project, which had been dragging on for three or four years at that point, was a setup to get rid of him, his discrimination complaint alleges. "TVA management wanted Mr. Grover to 'take the fall' for the project if he went along with the ongoing cover-up, or, alternatively, to appear as the person responsible for the failure to complete the program in a timely manner," the complaint said. Francis countered that "over the course of this project, we briefed the NRC and we conducted routine and special inspections on this thing. Contrary to (Grover's allegations), we allocated additional time to make sure it was done and done right." A U.S. Naval Academy graduate and veteran of the Navy nuclear program, Grover was chemistry manager in corporate engineering at the New York Power Authority before he arrived at TVA's power offices in Chattanooga in 1994 with high hopes of climbing TVA's nuclear ladder. But his future at TVA apparently began to fade two years later after Grover testified on behalf of whistleblower Gary Fiser, a subordinate who claimed he was passed over for promotion because he raised safety concerns. The NRC believed Fiser and levied a $110,000 fine against TVA in 2000. TVA is appealing. The radiation records inventory project began in the mid-1990s after NRC inspector Eldan Testa asked to see TVA's chart on his personal radiation doses. Testa found the numbers wrong and ordered the inventory. On June 8, 1999, Testa met with TVA officials for an update. Jim Flanigan, TVA's primary numbers-cruncher on the project, told Testa progress was being made in cleaning up the data. "As an example, he pulled up Mr. Testa's dose history to show him," according to Grover's notes of the meeting. "After reviewing the information presented on his dose record, Mr. Testa stated to Jim Flanigan that it was still incorrect." At that point, Testa questioned if there was '"willful misconduct' on the part of TVA in falsifying or not representing the dose records properly," Grover's notes said. Flanigan said none was found. Flanigan referred The Associated Press to Francis for comment. Testa did not a return a call to his Atlanta office. "I can't say there was willful misconduct," Grover said in an interview. "But there was a willful intent not to fully disclose to the NRC what you had." Grover said TVA's top nuclear managers -- Chief Nuclear Officer John Scalice, Senior Vice President Karl Singer and Vice President Jack Bailey -- were aware of the problems with the inventory project but wanted it closed, regardless, by the end of 1999. To do so, TVA had to make assumptions, Grover claims. Zeros were entered for radiation doses of some workers with missing records; others were given the dose numbers of co-workers, he said. On Jan. 11, 2000, TVA filed the results with the NRC. Previous reports "may not have been complete," TVA wrote. "Therefore, TVA is providing this updated occupational radiation exposure information to allow the NRC to update (its own records)." "My dictionary tells me there is a big difference between incomplete and being in error or missing or wrong," Grover said. "And that was my point to them. Just be honest and straightfoward to the NRC. "But nobody wanted to really address the root cause, to get into it and really fix it. They didn't want to. Why? (Because) some of these people (workers) are dead and gone," Grover said. "(Others) don't care about doses and they'll never ask." On the Net: Tennessee Valley Authority: http://www.tva.gov/ Nuclear Regulatory Commission:http://www.nrc.gov/ Union of Concerned Scientists: http://www.ucsusa.org/ All Contents ©Copyright The Oak Ridger ***************************************************************** 11 Authorities convene to discuss Millstone security TheDay.com: Nuclear complex increasing its 'security posture' By Paul Choiniere - More Articles Published on 10/08/2001 Waterford –– Within a couple of hours of Sunday's air strikes in Afghanistan, station managers, emergency preparedness officials and town leaders were meeting at the Millstone Nuclear Power Station to discuss additional security measures. Among those attending the session were John Wiltse, director of the Connecticut Office of Emergency Management, Waterford First Selectman Paul B. Eccard and Bill Matthews, vice president and senior nuclear executive at Millstone. “We are in the process of increasing our security posture,” Millstone spokesman Pete Hyde said. He declined to comment further, saying that too much information could aid potential attackers. A couple of incidents have caused anxiety in the vicinity of the nuclear plant. Police said that on Sept. 30 a van quickly drove away from a guarded checkpoint at Millstone after the woman driver was asked for identification. Police have been unable to substantiate reports of people taking photographs of the nuclear plant. Eccard said, however, that there has been no specific or credible threat that would suggest Millstone station, with its two operating reactors, is a terrorist target. Still, he said, the station must prepare as if it were a target. “We are all behaving like the whole world is under a credible threat right now,” Eccard said. U.S. Attorney General John D. Ashcroft warned last week of a “very serious threat” of additional terrorist attacks, “a threat that may escalate,” he said, after the U.S. responds. After the Sept. 11 attacks on New York City and Washington, D.C., barriers were set up at all access roads leading to Millstone. Guards at the nuclear plant are pulling extra shifts and are being assisted by local police patrols. Jeff Campbell, head of security, said more guards are being trained and should be ready for service over the next two months. Heated guard shacks are being prepared with the expectation that the heightened security will remain in place through at least the winter. “The goal at every level of government, and of the plant operating officials, is to make sure that we are doing everything that is possible to protect the public safety of the people we serve,” Eccard said. He said that residents have asked him what they would do if there were an attack on the nuclear plant. The decision whether to evacuate would be made by government officials, he said. Instructions on where to go and what to do are found just before the Yellow Pages in the telephone book. Nuclear plants could be vulnerable to the type of airborne attack that heavily damaged the Pentagon and destroyed the World Trade Center. While it would be difficult –– though not impossible –– for a suicide pilot to penetrate the containment dome protecting nuclear reactors, the nuclear waste stored at the plants is more vulnerable. Spent fuel rods produced by decades of nuclear operations are highly radioactive. They are stored in buildings not protected by the containment shell. Neil Sheehan, a Nuclear Regulatory Commission spokesman, said all security options are being discussed. The Washington-based Nuclear Control Institute has called for Natural Guard troops and anti-aircraft batteries to be deployed at nuclear plants. The institute works for nuclear non-proliferation and has been warning for years about the threat of a terrorist attack. The Federal Aviation Administration recently issued a directive to pilots of small aircraft to avoid the airspace above, or in proximity to, sites such as nuclear power plants, dams, refineries, industrial complexes, and similar facilities. Arlene Salac, a spokeswoman for the agency, said that in particular a pilot should not circle or otherwise loiter in the vicinity of such facilities. Sheehan noted that the military has been given the authority to shoot down aircraft that are off course and could pose a potential threat. Critics, however, question whether fighter planes could be scrambled quickly enough to respond to an air attack on a nuclear facility. In Maine, anti-nuclear activists have hired attorneys to seek better security through the courts for the nuclear waste that remains stored there following the closing of the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station in Wiscasset. The group Friends of the Coast –– Opposing Nuclear Pollution, said the decision to remove guard towers and vehicle barriers and to discontinue emergency response plans was a mistake given the terrorist threat. The Connecticut Yankee plant in Haddam also has dismantled its emergency response system since closing in 1996, though high-level nuclear waste remains stored there. © 1998-2001 The Day Publishing Co. ***************************************************************** 12 Science: Pining for a Breakthrough Despite years of ostracism, a small and dwindling army of cold-fusion faithful are ever hopeful By Gregory Beals NEWSWEEK Oct. 15 issue — Twelve years ago researchers at the University of Utah claimed to have found a cheap and easy way of producing energy from a nuclear-fusion reaction. This was one of the holy grails of physics. Scientists at the big energy laboratories had been trying to harness fusion for decades at staggering expense and had little to show for it. The cold-fusion scientists, by contrast, used a breathtakingly simple setup: a glass jar filled with water, wired like a battery with two electrodes. The result, they claimed, was a small but measurable output of energy—and the promise of unlimited energy at virtually no cost. IT WAS, of course, too good to be true. Other scientists tried and failed to reproduce the results. The giddy dreams evaporated. Stanley Pons and Martin Fleishman, the Utah scientists, were dismissed as charlatans and became the butt of jokes on late-night television and in physics classes everywhere. Nonetheless, a hard core of true believers has kept up the faith. Next month many of them will convene in Japan to exchange papers and discuss their progress. By most estimates a few hundred researchers (table) are still hoping that the scientific establishment was wrong, and that fusion energy can really be harnessed on a tabletop. The idea of cold fusion is so elegant and appealing that it’s difficult for many to resist. Fusion reactions occur when two hydrogen nuclei, or protons, fuse, thereby releasing energy. To get them close enough to fuse requires overcoming their strong electrical repulsion to one another. This is where cold fusionists part company with mainstream scientists. Physicists at the big labs believe that protons will fuse only if they collide at ferocious speeds, which is why they go to considerable expense to heat them to extreme temperatures. The cold-fusion approach is far more pastoral. Take a beaker of “heavy” water, which contains extra protons, nudge them gently with chemicals, and you’ve got fusion without the need for so much as a Bunsen burner. “Because of the potentially high payoff, there are certainly people who are willing to cling to their belief in cold fusion even though the evidence is to the contrary.” — AL TIECH American Association for the Advancement of Science To many researchers, the upside is so large—limitless, cheap energy—that it may be obscuring their objectivity. “Because of the potentially high payoff, there are certainly people who are willing to cling to their belief in cold fusion even though the evidence is to the contrary,” says Al Tiech of the American Association for the Advancement of Science. “Once you commit yourself to an idea, it’s hard to give it up.” Many researchers relish the role of outsider. “You can either work maintaining the edifice of scientific understanding or you can simply ask questions of the universe,” says physicist Eiichi Yamaguchi, a fellow at the 21st Century Public Policy Institute in Tokyo. “Researching cold fusion makes me feel a lot like Galileo.” And since cold fusionists have claimed only to have produced minute amounts of energy, they can rationalize their ambiguous results by reflecting that many valid experiments also ride on tiny measurements. Cold fusionists pay a price for this stubbornness. Akito Takahashi, a physicist at Osaka University, has spent more than a decade on cold fusion. Now he has trouble getting research money and attracting graduate students. “Other professors attack me from various sides,” he says. “Sometimes they call me directly and tell me to immediately stop my cold-fusion work.” Akito Yamaguchi has had funding requests turned down. Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry cut funding for cold fusion in 1998. Finding peers to review scientific papers is getting more and more like finding unbiased jurors for a highly publicized murder: few scientists keep an open mind. “The problem that we’re suffering from is not lack of criticism,” says physicist Mike McKubre of Stanford Research Institute in Palo Alto, California. “It’s a lack of informed criticism.” Attrition may ultimately succeed where ostracism has not. Attendance at the semi-annual conference peaked in 1992 at 320 and hit a low of 145 last year. “The number of participants is asymptotically dropping to zero because almost no young people participate,” says an enthusiast on the Infinite Energy Web site. “Most of the researchers are retired professors, 65 to 75 years old.” While cold fusionists fret, mainstream scientists are unconcerned. “While I think that cold fusion is certainly unlikely, I’m not prepared to make statements that the whole thing is complete rubbish,” says Peter Hodgson, former nuclear-physics supremo at Oxford University. In cold fusion, that’s as close as it gets to a ringing endorsement. © 2001 Newsweek, Inc. ***************************************************************** 13 Japan to dismantle first commercial reactor JAPAN: October 7, 2001 TOKYO - Japan Atomic Power Co will begin dismantling in December Japan's oldest commercial nuclear reactor, located northeast of Tokyo, a company spokesman said last week. The 166,000-kilowatt nuclear reactor, commissioned in 1966, will become the first commercial Japanese nuclear power plant to be dismantled. The cost of scrapping the plant and other related measures, which is expected to take until fiscal 2017/2018, is estimated at 93 billion yen ($772 million), the spokesman said. The spokesman said that about 18,100 tonnes of low-level radioactive waste is expected to be produced from the demolition of the plant. The reactor, located in Tokaimura on the Pacific Coast ended operations in 1998. It was the only plant in Japan that used graphite as its moderator and carbon dioxide gas as its coolant. Japan's 51 other commercial nuclear reactors use water as a moderator and coolant. About a third of Japan's electricity needs is covered by nuclear power. REUTERS NEWS SERVICE ***************************************************************** 14 Furious Ahern to tackle Blair on Sellafield terror Irish Independent Online - Date : Mon October 8th 01 TAOISEACH Bertie Ahern will phone British Prime Minister Tony Blair today to complain about Sellafield nuclear expansion plans. The direct contact will go ahead despite the outbreak of the war on terror, Government sources indicated last night. Mr Ahern is extremely annoyed that London announced the commissioning of the £467m mixed oxide (MOX) plant last week. He believed he had Mr Blair's assurance that no decision would be taken until a review had taken place by member countries of the Ospar Convention. No review of security measures to protect against terrorist attacks was carried out before the grant of a licence to the new nuclear reprocessing facility at Sellafield, it emerged yesterday. A newspaper reported that the Blair government carried out only a "cursory review" of protection plans for the new plant before giving it the go-ahead. The Government here has already ordered the preparation of a case against Britain on the issue, to be taken before the European Court of Justice. It has also been advised that British actions violate two articles of the UN charter. Junior Minister Joe Jacob has already said the Government will "exploit every legal avenue" to try to stop the new plant from starting up. Last night, a spokesman for the Department of Public Enterprise said the Government were furious about the revelation that no real assessment of the terrorist threat had been carried out. "If the story is true, it raises very serious issues, ones which we will be taking up with the British Government immediately. "If it transpires that the threat of a terrorist attack was not seriously considered before allowing the plant to go ahead, it will obviously strengthen our case in the European courts," he added. It was reported that the British government relied overwhelmingly on "informal" advice from civil servants from the branch of government which owns British Nuclear Fuels (BNFL), the company that runs the controversial Cumbrian nuclear complex. Officials from the British Department of Trade and Industry insisted the risk of a terrorist attack was "negligible" despite advice from a large number of independent experts that the plant poses potentially a major threat. * Leinster MEP Jim Fitzsimons has called for cross-party support for the Government in a forthcoming legal case in the European Court over the expansion of Sellafield. "I believe we must open up a battle with the British government on a number of fronts if we are to ultimately force the closure of Sellafield," he said. Senan Molony and Tom Felle ***************************************************************** 15 Greens launch legal case to stop UK nuke plant UK: October 8, 2001 LONDON - Environment groups Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace have started legal action to stop Britain from opening a controversial nuclear fuel manufacturing plant at Sellafield in northwest England. The groups said they were seeking judicial review of the government's decision last week to allow British Nuclear Fuels to begin operations at its mixed oxide (MOX) plant. "The government's decision to allow the MOX plant to open is dangerous, uneconomic and perverse," said Charles Secrett, director of Friends of the Earth in statement. "It makes the world an even more dangerous place." The decision prompted a storm of protest in Ireland where Irish Prime Minister Bertie Ahern promised last weekto raise the issue with his British counterpart Tony Blair and to take legal action to halt the plant. Ireland fears a nuclear accident at Sellafield, some 60 miles (96 km) from the Irish coast, and since the suicide attacks on the United States on September 11, the threat of a similar assault on the plant has been raised. Britain said it gave the go-ahead to the project because the economic case for opening it outweighed the social and environmental detriments. The plant takes plutonium from BNFL's neighbouring THORP reprocessing plant to make MOX fuel for nuclear power stations. The MOX plant was completed in 1996 but has lain idle ever since. There have been five reviews of its fate in the last four years. Green groups argue the economic costs of the project have been distorted as the government has disregarded construction costs. They say there is insufficient evidence that potential customers will materialise. REUTERS NEWS SERVICE ***************************************************************** ***************************************************************** NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARTICLES ***************************************************************** 1 Remember the Kursk? They've Just Raised It Date: Mon, 8 Oct 2001 22:33:02 -0500 (CDT) Remember the Kursk? They've Just Raised It Via NY Transfer News * All the News That Doesn't Fit REMEMBER THE KURSK? [The US doesn't want the Russians to grow too nervous about the Bush Crusade. Over the weekend, in an effort to strengthen the US's rush to blame a Ukranian missile for the Russian plane explosion, some of the more ignorant members of the US press were actually claiming, as fact, that the Russian sub Kursk had sunk because of "poor maintenance" in the Russian military. Sabotage, of course, was not mentioned -- massive explosions in nuclear subs just happen all by themselves, like infernos raging in TV towers, from poor Russian maintenance. Nor is "terrorism" being given credit for any recent mysterious disasters, from the Russian airplane to the anthrax panic in Florida. Strange, when at the same time the US Government is doing everything it can to make its citizens believe they are all in imminent danger. All this simultaneous Chicken-Little wing-flapping and soothing terrorism denial seems contradictory. But perhaps the idea is to make people fear terrorism that doesn't happen -- and deny terrorist authorship of what does happen, thereby salvaging their claim that their police state can Protect Amerikkka.] http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/europe/newsid_1584000/1584407.stm Monday, 8 October, 2001, 16:08 GMT 17:08 UK KURSK RAISED FROM SEA BED President Putin promised to recover the wreck The Russian nuclear submarine, the Kursk, has been lifted from the bed of the Barents Sea and is heading towards shore. The vessel, which sank last year killing all 118 people on board, docked safely with the giant salvage barge at about 1500 GMT, after a 15-hour lifting process. The barge pulled anchor at 0700 GMT, when the submarine was still below the surface, and began drifting slowly. It is now heading towards shore at a speed of three knots on a journey expected to take two days if the current good weather holds. The lifting, delayed by bad weather and mechanical problems, had originally been scheduled for mid-September and the approaching Arctic winter raised concerns that the operation might not be completed this year. Radiation 'normal' "The emotion was very great when we heard this news, because it means this enormous labour by divers, sailors and technical experts, has not been in vain," the head of Russia's Northern Fleet, Vice-Admiral Mikhail Motsak said. Divers have spent the past seven days attaching 26 massive cables from the Giant-4 barge to holes cut in the hull of the wreck. The Dutch salvage company Mammoet said the submarine had been less deeply embedded in the seabed than thought. "The vessel is completely loose now and free from mud. It came off quite easily, easier than we expected," Mammoet spokeswoman Larissa van Seumeren said. A force of 9,000 tonnes was required to raise the wreck, another Mammoet spokesman said. Final hurdle Divers have been inspecting the operation every hour - checking radiation levels and the angle between the barge and the submarine. There have been fears of a possible radiation leak but levels are still said to be normal. "The only thing we could fear is bad weather," said Northern Fleet spokesman Vladimir Navrotsky. To reduce the risk of a dangerous accident during the lifting process, the salvage team earlier cut off the badly damaged bow section, containing the torpedo bay. It had been feared that the section might otherwise fall off during the operation. Hunting for clues The Kursk will first be taken to a floating dock at Roslyakovo, outside Murmansk. After initial investigations and the removal of cruise missiles, the wreck will be towed to nearby Snezhnogorsk. Investigators will search for clues as to what caused the catastrophic explosions on 12 August last year. The Russian navy initially blamed the sinking on a collision with a Western vessel. A subsequent investigation suggested the cause was more likely to have been an accident in the torpedo bay. Russian President Vladimir Putin came in for severe criticism for his handling of the crisis, after failing to break off a holiday and return to Moscow. He later promised to ensure that the remains of the sailors' bodies were returned to their families at any cost. ================================================================= NY Transfer News Collective * A Service of Blythe Systems Since 1985 - Information for the Rest of Us 339 Lafayette St., New York, NY 10012 http://www.blythe.org e-mail: nyt@blythe.org ================================================================= ***************************************************************** 2 [southnews] Pakistan worries about nuclear installations Date: Mon, 17 Sep 2001 22:51:54 -0500 (CDT) FREE COLLEGE MONEY CLICK HERE to search 600,000 scholarships! http://us.click.yahoo.com/47cccB/4m7CAA/ySSFAA/7gSolB/TM ---------------------------------------------------------------------~-> ---------- Beg warns of threat to nuclear installations By Our Staff Reporter http://www.dawn.com/2001/09/16/top5.htm LAHORE, Sept 15: Pakistan cannot afford to allow the United States to use its facilities for attacks on Kabul, former army chief Gen Mirza Aslam Beg (retired) said here on Saturday. Talking to newsmen, he said if the government took such a decision, the nation would reject it and rise against it. He warned that there was a serious threat to Pakistan's nuclear installations. Gen Beg recalled that Pakistan had twice cooperated in the past with the United States. He said on both occasions it was a net loser. He said Pakistan had extended the fullest cooperation to the US against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. But the day the defunct USSR pulled out its troops, the USA turned its back both on Pakistan and Afghanistan. Then, he said, Pakistan stood on the side of the US during the Gulf War, but the result was no different. According to him the attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon had exposed the vulnerability of the security system of the United States and exploded the myth of the so-called super power. A country which could not challenge the aircraft hitting the WTC nor could take any other step to prevent the damage had implicated Afghanistan and Osama Bin Laden within 24 hours. He said the US had no evidence against Osama or Afghanistan, but the media had created an atmosphere against them. "This is a trick to achieve a particular objective". He said it was not fair on the part of the United States to treat Pakistan like a client state. CONDEMNED: Leaders of various Muslim and Christian organizations on Saturday condemned the plane attacks in America, urged the government to support all American steps against terrorists and asked the US administration to protect its Muslim citizens. Speaking at a news conference at the Lahore Press Club, they urged the government to support the American government at all levels in fighting the terrorists and stick to its resolve of extending cooperation in this connection. The religious leaders urged President Gen Pervez Musharraf to announce a day's mourning over the tragedy in America. They also urged the American government to ensure protection of its Muslim population and their religious places. The news conference was addressed by Pope John Paul's Advisor for Asia Father James Channan, Universal Peace and Harmony chairman Maulana Abdul Qadir Azad, Jamiat Ahle Sunnat Punjab president Maulana Husain Ahmad Awan, Tehrik Huqooq-i-Jafria chairman Maulana Mushtaq Jafri, Tehrik-i-Wahdat Islami amir Maulana Javed Akbar Saqi and Universal Peace and Harmony general secretary Bishop Azad Marshal. Meanwhile, leaders of a number of parties here have received invitations for an all-party conference to be held by the government in Islamabad on Sunday. ARD President Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan is among them. The invited leaders will first participate in the JI's APC conference at Mansoora and then proceed to the federal capital to take part in the government-sponsored conference. ---------- Pakistan's nuclear arms increase risks to region Rory McCarthy in Islamabad Monday September 17, 2001 The Guardian As well as an impending war, a refugee crisis and the threat of an Islamic revolution, Pakistan has one more element to throw into this combustible mix: the nuclear bomb. Since last Tuesday, it has stepped up security around its nuclear bases, including the key site at Sargodha, near Lahore, from which targets in India are well within range. Senior military officers are deeply concerned that US or Nato forces using Pakistani airspace for a military strike on Afghanistan will be able to glean information about the nuclear programme. Islamic clerics have condemned the Pakistani regime for offering its "unstinted cooperation" to the US for its impending strike at Osama bin Laden and Afghanistan's Taliban regime, Pakistan's long-time ally. Most analysts discount the chance of an Iranian-style Islamic revolution in the near future, but many senior army officers are deeply Islamic and much more rightwing than their urbane leader, General Pervez Musharraf. Some of the most senior Islamists include his deputy Lieutenant General Muzaffar Usmani and the Lahore corps commander, Lt Gen Mohammad Aziz. In April, Gen Musharraf replaced his Peshawar corps commander, Lt Gen Imtiaz Shaheen, after less than a year in the job. Gen Shaheen was a critic of support for the Taliban. A CIA report this year said Pakistan's nuclear programme was well developed and its ballistic missile development relied heavily on Chinese aid. Pakistan is putting the finishing touches to its Shaheen-II ballistic missile, able to hit targets 1,550 miles away. On May 28 1998, Pakistan announced it had successfully held five nuclear tests. Two days later another device was tested. It has not signed the comprehensive test ban treaty. Guardian Unlimited ) Guardian Newspapers Limited 2001 [Non-text portions of this message have been removed] To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to: southnews-unsubscribe@egroups.com Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/ ***************************************************************** 3 Case Against bin Laden Detailed by Blair; Unleasing the Nuclear Date: Sun, 7 Oct 2001 23:27:47 -0500 (CDT) IN THIS MESSAGE: Case Against bin Laden Detailed by Blair; Unleasing the Nuclear Dogs; Domestic Use of Armed Forces Case Against Bin Laden Cited in Detail by Blair Intelligence Data Leave 'No Doubt' Of Role in Attacks Britain's Prime Minister Tony Blair addresses an emergency session of the House of Commons on Thursday. (AP) By T.R. Reid Washington Post Foreign Service Friday, October 5, 2001; Page A01 LONDON, Oct. 4 -- Western intelligence agencies have proof that Osama bin Laden indicated shortly before Sept. 11 that he was preparing "a major attack on America," that he ordered close associates around the world to return to Afghanistan by Sept. 10, and that one of his top lieutenants admitted the bin Laden organization was responsible for the suicide attacks on New York and Washington, British Prime Minister Tony Blair said today. In a speech to Parliament, Blair laid out the most detailed public description to date of the case against bin Laden. After reviewing the "overwhelming evidence," Blair concluded: "We have absolutely no doubt that bin Laden and his network were responsible for the attacks." Of the 19 men suspected of seizing control of four airliners on Sept. 11, Blair said, "at least three of these hijackers have already been positively identified as known associates of bin Laden, with a track record in his camps and organization. . . . Of the three, one has also been identified as playing key roles in both the East African embassy attacks and the USS Cole attack." U.S. investigators have determined that a fourth hijacker also spent time in the camps. Also today, Pakistan's Foreign Ministry announced that evidence it had received from the United States was strong enough to bring an indictment in court. Building an evidentiary case against bin Laden and his Taliban defenders has become a crucial part of President Bush's effort to create a global coalition against terrorism in general and against bin Laden's al Qaeda network in particular. The U.S. government has released relatively few of its findings to the American public, but has been sending high-ranking officials and detailed classified diplomatic cables to foreign capitals to share the evidence with those governments. Blair attributed many of the findings he disclosed to unnamed intelligence sources and did not say how they had obtained the information. Much of what he laid out appears to come from U.S. reports; it was not clear if evidence shown to the British government was the same as that received by Pakistan. To back up Blair's speech, the British government subsequently issued an 18-page summary of the evidence released so far. The document can be found on the Internet at www.number-10.gov.uk. Blair said there is additional evidence "of an even more direct nature" about bin Laden's guilt that cannot be revealed because of intelligence considerations. In Islamabad today, Foreign Ministry spokesman Riaz Muhammad Khan said the evidence shown to Pakistan "provides sufficient basis for indictment" of bin Laden "in a court of law." Khan declined to provide any detail of the shared evidence but reiterated earlier statements by Pakistani officials that it should be made public. Pakistan has been under considerable domestic pressure to demand concrete evidence of bin Laden's involvement in terrorism, especially from small but influential Islamic groups that are close to Afghanistan's Taliban authorities. Earlier this week, NATO Secretary General George Robertson called the evidence provided by the United States "clear and compelling" and said "it is clear that all roads lead to al Qaeda." In his speech, Blair said the evidence available makes a compelling case as well that bin Laden and his al Qaeda organization "were able to commit these atrocities because of their close alliance with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, which allows them to operate with impunity in pursuing their terrorist activity." Britain has stood side-by-side with the United States since the day of the attacks, and Blair told Parliament today that Britain will join the United States on the battle line if military force is used against bin Laden and the Taliban. He said British military leaders have discussed "a range of military capabilities" to respond to the attacks on New York and Washington. Blair did not indicate when military action might begin, but said, "We are now approaching the difficult time when action is taken." Opinion polls show that the British people overall clearly back military action, but there have been some voices here -- including liberal members of Blair's Labor Party -- opposing the use of force and questioning bin Laden's guilt. Blair called today's one-day parliamentary debate at least in part to respond to dissenters in his party. Laying out intelligence findings, Blair summarized the case for Parliament: "Before 11 September, bin Laden told associates that he had a major operation against America under preparation; a range of people were warned to return to Afghanistan because of action on or around 11 September; and most importantly, one of bin Laden's closest lieutenants has said clearly that he helped with the planning of the 11 September attacks and has admitted the involvement of the al Qaeda organization." Blair made much of the modus operandi, or methodology, of the Sept. 11 attacks. The design and execution, he said, reflected "all the hallmarks of a bin Laden operation: meticulous long-term planning; a desire to inflict mass casualties; a total disregard for civilian lives (including Muslims); multiple simultaneous attacks; and the use of suicide attackers." He emphasized that there was no warning before the attacks, another bin Laden trademark. The written summary released in London today lays out evidence of bin Laden's involvement in earlier attacks on the United States, including the simultaneous bombing of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998 and the attack on the destroyer USS Cole by suicide bombers in Yemen in October 2000. Blair told Parliament that one of the hijackers in the Sept. 11 suicide attacks had taken part in the embassy attacks and the Cole bombing. Blair did not name the individual, but U.S. officials have said that Khalid Almihdhar, who was aboard the plane that crashed into the Pentagon, met in Malaysia with bin Laden operatives who were involved in the bombings. In other developments in the Sept. 11 investigation: Bush said U.S. and overseas authorities have rounded up 150 people believed to be part of al Qaeda. Fifty suspected terrorists not connected to the network have also been arrested, officials said. A Saudi pilot has been released on bond almost three weeks after being taken into custody at a New York airport in connection with the probe, a Saudi Embassy official told the Associated Press. Abdulaziz Alangari, who flies for Saudi Arabian Airlines, was arrested Sept. 13 at John F. Kennedy International Airport on a warrant that allows the arrest and questioning of someone considered crucial to an investigation. "Now I think the authorities feel relaxed that he's not involved," said Muddassir Siddiqui, a lawyer at the Saudi Embassy in Washington. Spokesmen at the FBI and Justice Department declined to comment. Alangari, who was released Wednesday, had aroused suspicion by showing a pilot's license in his brother's name, authorities said at the time. A federal grand jury in Pittsburgh today indicted 16 men of Middle Eastern descent on charges of fraudulently obtaining commercial driver's licenses, including licenses to haul hazardous materials, Reuters reported. The suspects were among 21 men arrested in seven states last week as authorities tightened their scrutiny of hazardous materials shipments. Four Iraqi men were indicted Wednesday. The case is not tied to the Sept. 11 attacks. Charges involve the unlawful purchase of federal commercial licenses through the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation. The FBI's Boston office issued an appeal for information from anyone with knowledge of the final hours of two hijackers, Mohamed Atta and Abdulaziz Alomari. The two men spent the night before the hijacking at a Quality Inn in South Portland, Maine; Atta is believed to have visited a Wal-Mart in Scarborough, Maine, that evening. Correspondent Pamela Constable in Islamabad, Pakistan, contributed to this report. 2001 The Washington Post Company ========================================== U.S. Pressed on Nuclear Response A Policy of Less Ambiguity, More Pointed Threat Is Urged By Dana Milbank Washington Post Staff Writer Friday, October 5, 2001; Page A16 The Sept. 11 terrorist attacks on Washington and New York have invigorated national security strategists inside and outside the government who favor using nuclear arms to deter and respond to chemical or biological attacks. Conservatives outside the administration have been calling on the administration to make an explicit threat to use nuclear weapons to respond to a biological or chemical attack. This would change a long-standing U.S. policy of refusing to rule in or rule out use of nuclear weapons in the event of such an attack. So far, at least, senior Bush administration officials have maintained this policy of deliberate ambiguity, though some administration figures appear to be sympathetic to a change that would entail a more specific threat. A report issued in January by the National Institute for Public Policy (NIPP) declared that "U.S. nuclear weapons may be necessary" to deter regional powers from using weapons of mass destruction or for "providing unique targeting capabilities" including buried or biological weapons targets. "Under certain circumstances, very severe nuclear threats may be needed to deter any of these potential adversaries," it said. Among the report's authors were Stephen Hadley, now President Bush's deputy national security adviser, Robert G. Joseph, the head of proliferation strategy at the National Security Council, and Stephen A. Cambone and William Schneider Jr., key Bush defense advisers. Proponents said last month's attacks on New York and Washington affirm their views. "September 11 really underscores the need to look at a full range of flexible options," said David Smith, a defense consultant who was an author of the NIPP report. "What we were trying to get at there is we don't believe the current arsenal of the United States is persuasively deterrent to all comers." Many Bush administration officials have endorsed the notion of switching to smaller nuclear arms that could be used for, among other things, hitting chemical and biological weapons sites and targeting figures, such as Osama bin Laden or Saddam Hussein, who hide in deep underground bunkers. A report in June 2000 by Stephen Younger, who has been named to head the Defense Department's Threat Reduction Agency, called for smaller nuclear weapons as part of a "fundamental rethinking of the role of nuclear weapons." Though a shift in the arsenal would take years to implement, an early sign will be the Nuclear Posture Review underway in the Pentagon and due to Congress by year's end. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Richard B. Myers, during his confirmation hearing Sept. 13, said deterrence against weapons of mass destruction "is a critical component" of the review. He also pointed out that the military already has "a number of low-yield weapons in the current stockpile." Another author of the NIPP study, Southwest Missouri State University's William R. Van Cleave, said the review will argue "that we need to regain some capability for some low-yield [nuclear] weapons and particularly earth-penetrating low-yield weapons." Van Cleave, whose colleague, J.D. Crouch, is now assistant undersecretary of defense for international security policy, said some Bush advisers "believe we have marginalized nuclear weapons too much. We have removed them from extended deterrence too much." Among his friends in the administration, Van Cleave said, "there's a sentiment for the view the way I expressed it." For the last decade or so, U.S. leaders have been deliberately ambiguous about using nuclear weapons to respond to a chemical and biological threat. Then-Defense Secretary Richard B. Cheney said in December 1990 that "were Saddam Hussein foolish enough to use weapons of mass destruction, the U.S. response would be absolutely overwhelming and it would be devastating." Administration officials later said Cheney wasn't implying a nuclear threat. Others defend the ambiguous nature of U.S. policy. "We've purposefully avoided drawing bright lines in the past about when we might use nuclear weapons," said a former senior Clinton administration official. "If we change that now, it would upset a lot of our core NATO allies, not to mention others in the coalition against terrorism we're trying to build." In 1978, President Jimmy Carter declared that "the United States will not use nuclear weapons against any nonnuclear weapon state" that is party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, unless the United States or its interests are attacked "by such a state allied to a nuclear weapon state." According to the State Department, this declaration has been reaffirmed by every successive administration. So far in the current crisis, top administration officials have continued the ambiguous wording of threats. Asked by Fox News on Sunday whether it would be reasonable for the United States to respond to a chemical or biological attack with nuclear weapons, White House Chief of Staff Andrew H. Card Jr. said: "I'm not going to talk about the operations that might be considered by the Defense Department and the president. But we're going to do everything we can to defend the United States." A week earlier, on CBS News's "Face the Nation," Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, asked if he had ruled out the use of nuclear weapons in the current conflict, replied that the country had never ruled out a first nuclear strike. "What we need to do, it seems to me, as a country, is to recognize how different this situation is, and then the traditional -- think of it, the deterrence that worked in the Cold War didn't work," he said. Some arms control experts believe the Bush administration's statements so far already go beyond past administrations' ambiguity. "That is an implied threat," said Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association. "They've crossed the line or they're at the line by implying the possible use." Opponents said nuclear threats will encourage nuclear proliferation and worry friendly governments. "It would create its own crisis, fracture the alliance and have no military purpose," said Joseph Cirincione of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Staff writer Bradley Graham contributed to this report. 2001 The Washington Post Company ==================================== Review of Military's Domestic Role Urged By Vernon Loeb Washington Post Staff Writer Friday, October 5, 2001; Page A26 Deputy Defense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz said yesterday that to enhance the nation's ability to counter terrorism, he strongly favors reviewing a legal doctrine that has kept the U.S. military from engaging in domestic law enforcement activities since 1878. Testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Wolfowitz said the Sept. 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon have made it possible for Americans to envision terrorist attacks particularly those involving chemical or biological weapons in which the military would have unique response capabilities. Wolfowitz's comment came in response to a question from Sen. John W. Warner (R-Va.), the committee's ranking Republican. Warner told Wolfowitz that he believes it is time to reexamine the legal doctrine of posse comitatus and asked the Pentagon's second-ranking official whether he agreed. "I agree very strongly," Wolfowitz said. He added that it would be much better to determine in advance how the military would function under civilian control in the event of terrorist incident. While much of the questioning involved the Pentagon's response to the Sept. 11 attacks and its new plans for homeland defense, Wolfowitz appeared before the committee to discuss the Quadrennial Defense Review, a congressionally mandated codification of military strategy, force requirements and organization. The 71-page document, completed Monday after months of preparation, makes homeland defense the Pentagon's highest priority and embraces "transformational" new technologies in information warfare, intelligence and space. In a critical revision, the document does away with the military's long-standing requirement to be able to win two major theater wars simultaneously. Under the new plan, the military is expected to win one major war decisively, meaning that it could occupy the enemy's capital, if necessary. At the same time, the military would be able to swiftly defeat a second adversary, engage in peacekeeping operations and invest in advanced defense technologies. Wolfowitz said the document represents a "paradigm shift" in planning the nation's future fighting force, defining six key priorities for military transformation. But the committee's chairman, Sen. Carl M. Levin (D-Mich.), criticized the document, calling it a "vision" statement that lacked specifics about how Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld will proceed beginning with next year's budget. While the document makes homeland defense the Pentagon's highest priority, Levin said, it lacks detail on "how the military will rearrange itself to prevent terrorist attacks on U.S. soil and support civilian authorities in managing their deadly consequences." One specific initiative favored by some transformation advocates inside the U.S. Air Force the purchase of more B-2 stealth bombers arose when Sen. Jean Carnahan (D-Mo.) asked whether the Pentagon is considering an expansion of the fleet. Previously, top Air Force officials have said the answer is no. But Air Force Lt. Gen. Bruce A. Carlson, a top planner on the Pentagon's Joint Staff who appeared with Wolfowitz, said expanding the B-2 fleet "will be one of the options that the Air Force considers." 2001 The Washington Post Company ___________________________________ FAIR USE NOTICE: This site contains copyrighted material the use of which has not always been specifically authorized by the copyright owner. We are making such material available in our efforts to advance understanding of environmental, political, human rights, economic, democracy, scientific, and social justice issues, etc. We believe this constitutes a 'fair use' of any such copyrighted material as provided for in section 107 of the US Copyright Law. In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. Section 107, the material on this site is distributed without profit to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving the included information for research and educational purposes. For more information go to: http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml If you wish to use copyrighted material from this site for purposes of your own that go beyond 'fair use', you must obtain permission from the copyright owner. ============================================================ Good, Better, BEST! What's better than a year's subscription to Ladies' Home Journal? Only a FREE year's subscription! Check out this great offer now! http://click.topica.com/caaac1Db1dc1Ab1fSOWf/TopOffers ============================================================ ______________________________________________ You can subscribe to Solidarity4Ever by sending a message to: Solidarity4Ever-subscribe@igc.topica.com and unsubscribe by sending an email to: Solidarity4Ever-unsubscribe@igc.topica.com. _________________________________________________ This is a read-only list, but if you have an item you want posted, send it to the list moderator at , who will determine whether it is appropriate for redistribution. You can temporarily suspend delivery by sending a request to the same address. Notify the moderator at the time you want delivery resumed. You can also manage this function yourself by going to the list at Monday, October 08, 2001 - Acongressional conference committee should approve plans to make the former Rocky Flats nuclear weapons plant a national wildlife refuge because it serves two important goals: closing a Cold War facility and preserving Colorado's open space. Ironically, the mothballed military site harbors some of the state's last undisturbed prairie ecosystems. For 50 years, the U.S. government closely guarded Rocky Flats' core 350 acres, where nuclear bomb triggers were made. The U.S. Department of Energy will retain permanent control of that contaminated core area. Most of the site's 6,000 acres weren't used for nuclear production and aren't contaminated. Security precautions kept all human intrusions far from the core 350 acres, so the surrounding 5,650 acres became a safe-haven for native plants and animals. Today, state officials and every city and county surrounding Rocky Flats recognize the importance of preserving open space and wildlife habitat, so support making the uncontaminated area a national wildlife refuge. The proposal is sponsored or supported by every member of Colorado's congressional delegation, led by a bipartisan team of U.S. Sen. Wayne Allard, a Republican, and U.S. Rep. Mark Udall, a Boulder Democrat. Normally, it's unwise to include previously stand-alone bills in broader legislation, because the amendments aren't related to the bigger bill, or because lawmakers use such "riders" to gain passage for ideas that wouldn't be approved on their own. In this case, though, Udall and Allard sought plenty of public comment before they introduced the legislation; the plan likely would pass on its own eventually. Rocky Flats' funding is already part of the Defense Department's budget, so it's legitimate to consider the site's future during debate on defense spending. It was acceptable for Allard to put the Rocky Flats refuge plan into the larger Defense Department authorization bill. Allard and Rep. Joel Hefley, a Colorado Springs Republican who co-sponsored the House bill, will serve on the conference committee, and Udall has asked to do so, too. All three will urge the panel to support making Rocky Flats a national wildlife refuge. Their colleagues should know they speak with strong Colorado support. Editorials alone express The Denver Post's opinion. The members of The Post editorial board are William Dean Singleton, chairman and publisher; Glenn Guzzo, editor; Sue O'Brien, editorial page editor; Bob Ewegen, deputy editorial page editor; Peter G. Chronis, Angela Cortez, Al Knight, Penelope Purdy and Billie Stanton, editorial writers; Mike Keefe, cartoonist; and Barbara Ellis and Peggy McKay, news editors. ***************************************************************** 7 Safety ignored in Oak Ridge salvage work, some claim KnoxNews: Local Subcontractors pay scant heed to rules By Frank Munger, News-Sentinel senior writer OAK RIDGE -- The revelation that unprotected workers were exposed to asbestos and other hazardous materials during Oak Ridge salvage operations has raised a troubling question: Is there a double standard on health and safety at the U.S. Department of Energy's K-25 plant? Some observers clearly think so. They suggest that rules and regulations strictly applied to work done by DOE and its prime contractors are loosely followed -- or ignored altogether -- at private operations taking place on the federal site. "When you're a subcontractor, all bets are off," said Paul Vance, who has seen both sides of the work taking place at K-25 (also known as East Tennessee Technology Park). Vance's full-time job is with Bechtel Jacobs Co., the Department of Energy's environmental manager in Oak Ridge. He's a member of the fire department at K-25, where he has worked for more than 20 years. He also moonlighted last year on a demolition crew with R Electric, a second-tier subcontractor that salvaged scrap metal from old equipment at the former uranium-enrichment plant. Vance said he was shocked at the differences. "When you work for DOE, you are under a lot of restrictions and a lot of other constraints. ... People certainly would be trained to start with. You would be in the right gear. You have to sign off on a work package. You would have 45 people get this plan together for two people to go and actually do the work. They would be dressed out in (protective) suits. ... But when you're a subcontractor ... you can go in there in shorts if you want to." R Electric conducted its salvage operations on space subleased from Southern Freight Logistics, a transportation company that's one of the tenant companies in DOE's Oak Ridge "reindustrialization" program. The program was begun in the mid-1990s to convert surplus federal facilities at K-25 to private industrial uses. It has been touted as a way to boost the local economy and to help offset the high cost of cleaning up the nuclear complex. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency battled with DOE a couple of years ago about safety oversight for the private operations. DOE refused to give EPA authority to approve work activities prior to startup, insisting that proper safety controls were in place. DOE said it would share information on the work plans with EPA. In the wake of recent allegations, DOE has refused to comment except for this one-sentence statement: "We are looking into health and safety concerns regarding this issue." The News-Sentinel was not allowed to visit the work site last week or take photographs. DOE said it could not grant authority because the facility is privately leased, and Southern Freight Logistics turned down the newspaper's request for access. John Owsley, the state's environmental oversight chief in Oak Ridge, said he was disappointed by the lack of response from DOE when alerted to worker concerns about six months ago. The state did its own sampling in August, verifying that materials _containing asbestos were still on the ground at the facility. Although Owsley would not offer an opinion on possible worker exposures, he said the presence of asbestos debris indicated that proper safety procedures must not have been followed. "We want reindustrialization to work," the state official said. "But it's not going to work if the proper safety precautions are not taken. Again, I don't want to conjecture or presuppose, but it's obvious that asbestos has been released on site. Whether or not the individuals that released the asbestos were properly trained and properly protected with personal protection equipment, we weren't there to observe. We have been told by the employees that they were not. "We do see that as a concern, not only for the employees, but for DOE's ability to lease additional property. If those sort of incidents are occurring, then the potential for other responsible employers to lease property may be reduced." Lawrence Young, the president of the Community Reuse Organization of East Tennessee, which leases the federal property to private businesses, said the necessary safety oversight is in place. If there was a problem in this instance, it was an anomaly, Young said. Mistakes happen all the time in all kinds of industries, he said. "This is an unfortunate circumstance," Young said, "but it's not the case of a much broader and deeper issue of health and safety oversight being relegated to a secondary status." Frank Munger can be reached at 865-482-9213 or twig1@knoxnews.infi.net. News-Sentinel Co. ***************************************************************** 8 Dutch Group Lifts Russian Nuke Sub Las Vegas SUN Today: October 08, 2001 at 5:30:21 PDT MURMANSK, Russia- Stopping every hour to monitor radiation levels, a Dutch consortium on Monday began raising the Kursk nuclear submarine from the bottom of the Barents Sea - an operation believed unprecedented in size and scope. The lifting began shortly before 4 a.m. local time, the Dutch Mammoet-Smit International Consortium said. The submarine was being lifted on steel cables lowered from the Giant 4 barge, and the barge began towing the vessel toward shore around 11 a.m. local time - even before the Kursk had been fully raise. The early departure is presumably due to the need to take advantage of good weather. Meteorologists have predicted deteriorating weather Monday evening, the ITAR-Tass news agency reported. The Kursk, one of Russia's most modern submarines, exploded and sank in August 2000, killing 118 seamen, during naval maneuvers, with dramatic rescue attempts in the ensuing days. Vice Adm. Mikhail Motsak, the Russian naval commander overseeing the recovery operation, said the Kursk should reach dry dock in the town of Roslyakovo, near Murmansk, in 1 1/2 days. "Depending on the wave resistance, we'll figure out the speed of towing, which will likely be 2.5-3 knots per hour," he said. Larissa van Seumeren, spokeswoman for Mammoet-Smit, said the lifting was proceeding more quickly than planned because the submarine was less deeply embedded in the seabed than expected. "We started to pull and there was almost no suction," she said in a telephone interview from Murmansk. "It was lifted up easily." Every hour, divers manually inspected the submarine, checking gauges monitoring radiation and the vessel's angle in relation to the barge, said Capt. Igor Babenko, spokesman for the Russian Northern Fleet. Visibility was hampered by a huge cloud of silt raised along with the submarine. "So far the lifting has gone without a hitch. The divers have inspected the submarine and found no flaws in the salvage equipment. The radiation level remains normal," Babenko said. According to his calculations, the submarine will have been raised to the surface by 5 p.m. local time. Once that happens, the barge can increase its speed from the current half-knot per hour to 2-3 knots per hour, he said. The lifting was originally set for Sept. 15, but delayed repeatedly because of storms and technical difficulties. The Dutch consortium previously severed the submarine's mangled forward section, which will be left on the seabed because of concern that it might have broken off and destabilized the lifting. Each of the 26 cables lowered from the barge and plugged into the holes cut in the Kursk's hull is a bundle of 54 super-strong steel ropes. A central computer was controlling every inch of lifting, distributing the required effort between lifting cables. No holes were cut in the Kursk's reactor compartment housing twin nuclear reactors. The Russian Navy and the salvage team say the reactors have been safely shut down and pose no threat to the lifting effort. "The radiation situation has remained normal," van Seumeren said. Other submarines have been lifted in the past, but none has been comparable in size to the giant, 18,000-ton Kursk. Five other nuclear submarines - two American and three Russian - that have sunk in the past remained buried at depths of up to 16,000 feet because raising them would have been enormously expensive. The Kursk sank just 356 feet below the surface. The salvage operation is costing the Russian government about $65 million. The government said the Kursk must be raised to avoid any potential danger to the environment from its nuclear reactors and to shipping because of its position in shallow waters. The navy also hopes to determine the cause of the Kursk's sinking and the deaths of 118 Russian seamen. Once it is put in dock, the navy will remove the remains of the crew and 22 Granit supersonic cruise missiles. All contents copyright 2001 Las Vegas SUN, Inc. ***************************************************************** 9 Pantex to get new lab Amarillo Globe-News: Local News: October 8, 2001 4:29 a.m. CT By Jim McBride jmcbride@amarillonet.com The National Nuclear Security Administration has started design work on a $22.2 million nuclear weapons evaluation test laboratory for the Pantex Plant. A major focus of the new lab will be to detect and predict the possible effects of aging on nuclear weapons' systems and components. The current Pantex lab houses about $90 million in equipment and is the only U.S. facility that conducts systems-level, non-nuclear tests on atomic weapons and parts, according to information from Sandia National Laboratories. Many of America's nuclear weapons are aging and some weapons systems now are being refurbished to extend their tour of duty. Each year, some nuclear warheads and bombs also are removed from the stockpile to test how components and weapons hold up over time. "I am very proud of it because it's a $22.2 million project here in Amarillo. Sandia is making a large investment in the NNSA here in Amarillo," said Ted Frederiksen, operations manager of the weapons evaluation test laboratory for Sandia National Laboratories. Frederiksen said 18 employees now work for Sandia at Pantex conducting weapons evaluation tests. "It's reliability and safety testing," he said. "We've been here since 1965 at this site, so we've been doing this for a lot of years." Construction of the new lab is expected to start next October and be finished in March 2004. The facility should be operational in October 2004, officials from Sandia National Laboratory said in a news release. The 30,000 square-foot lab will feature enhanced equipment to detect aging and other trends that could affect the reliability of nuclear weapons. "The new WETL represents a major improvement in capabilities that will allow our stockpile surveillance program to move from a defect-detection mode toward a lifetime prediction mode," Bill Norris, a top Sandia official, said in a statement. 2001 Amarillo Globe-News ***************************************************************** 10 Nagasaki mayor warns against using nuclear arms - Tuesday, October 9, 2001 Japan Today Japan News - News - NAGASAKI — Nagasaki Mayor Itcho Ito on Monday warned against the use of nuclear weapons in U.S.-led military action against Afghanistan. "It is unforgivable if a large-scale attack is launched that would involve innocent citizens. I will strictly keep watching the situation to verify that no nuclear weapons are being used," Ito said in a statement issued after the U.S.-British air strikes against Afghanistan. (Kyodo News) May I suggest BlackKnight (Oct 9 2001 - 09:57) Mayor Itcho you go camp out on one of those mountains near Kandahar and verify the non-use of nuclear weapons. Get a little closer to the action please, instead of being a media hound, and getting your name in the paper for rating sake. Instead of monitoring from your cushy office with your non-working geiger counter, would you please remember the same style of militants that caused your city to be turned to ash have their command center in that very city. Much like times before in Nagasaki, these present day imperilaists refuse to quit, or give up a internationally wanted terrorist, or any of his fine organization, even though those same leaders can not collect taxes - because the country is just too poor - so they fianance the countries economy on the growth and sale of opium products. Never mind that only one country recognizes them as 'a country,' and does so to provide at least one diplomatic link to the entire world. And never mind that even though their instrument of terror, fianancer of their army brags on TV, which none of the residents of Afghanistan can watch, requesting that god lift up their position, after these paid assasins by that terrorists organization sheltered by them killed about 6,000 innocents in this war on the non-believers. Pika, Pika to you too Mayor Itcho. ***************************************************************** NOTE: In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. section 107 this material is distributed without profit or payment to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving this information for non-profit research and educational purposes only. For more information go to: *****************************************************************