***************************************************************** 08/01/01 **** RADIATION BULLETIN(RADBULL) **** VOL 9.186 ***************************************************************** RADBULL IS PRODUCED BY THE ABALONE ALLIANCE CLEARINGHOUSE ***************************************************************** NUCLEAR POWER CONTENTS 1 NRC Approves Power Uprate for Hope Creek Nuclear Power Plant in 2 Uranium enrichment employees to vote on strike 3 Inspection of the Americium/Curium Solution Stabilization Project 4 Nuke Waste Shipment Leaves Germany 5 Tribe, environmentalists fear opening of uranium mine near Grand 6 No radioactivity found around leaky nuclear waste container 7 Crack in nuke waste container discovered 8 House rejects Yucca bill: Legislation would have given DOE more 9 Japan, U.S. Govts Eye Joint Research on Recycling Next-Generation N-fuels 10 Nuclear Waste Leaves Plant For Reprocessing in Britain 11 ADAMS: Items of Interest - Wednesday, August 01, 2001 12 Letter from Kenny C. Guinn, Governor to Spencer Abraham, 13 Energy Secretary Praises Senate Energy Committee's Action to Move 14 Oak Ridge National Laboratory Price-Anderson Amendments Act Program 15 Inquiry to study cancer clusters at power stations 16 Donald B. Allen Named NRC Senior Resident Inspector at Comanche 17 NRC Assigns New Resident Inspector to Calvert Cliffs Nuclear NUCLEAR WEAPONS CONTENTS 1 House OKs Extended Veterans Benefits 2 RFK Jr. Completes Vieques Sentence 3 DEQ denies federal request to delay cleanup at INEEL 4 Leaked compound nonradioactive 5 Ex-Flats worker sues over beryllium disease 6 Volunteers to join Fallon leukemia probe 7 SELLS Meeting Announcement 8 Event to honor Hiroshima victims 9 Y-12 to lay off 30, more to follow 10 Technology Visions Group Announces Expansion of Contract with Bechtel 11 Workers will get checks shortly 12 DOE HEALTH NEWS LETTER 13 DOE Announces Completion of 90-Day Fast Flux Test Facility 14 Plutonium Thief 'Sophisticated' 15 Spotlight finds Y-12 during times of change **************************************************************** ***************************************************************** NUCLEAR POWER ARTICLES ***************************************************************** 1 NRC Approves Power Uprate for Hope Creek Nuclear Power Plant in New Jersey Press Release - 2001 - 95 - U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Office of Public Affairs Telephone: 301/415-8200 Washington, DC 20555-001 E-mail: opa@nrc.gov Web Site: http://www.nrc.gov/OPA No. 01-095 July 31, 2001 The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has approved a request by Public Service Electric & Gas Company to increase the generating capacity of the Hope Creek nuclear power plant by 1.4 percent, or about 15 megawatts of electricity. The power uprate at Hope Creek, located in Hancocks Bridge, N.J., will increase the generating capacity of the plant to about 1133 megawatts of electricity. The facility intends to implement the power increase by the end of September. The application for the increase in power was submitted to the NRC in December. The NRC's safety evaluation of the requested power uprate for the plant focused on several areas, including nuclear steam supply systems, instrumentation and control systems, electrical systems, accident evaluations, radiological consequences, operations and technical specification changes. The NRC staff determined that the licensee could safely increase the power output of the reactor with minor modifications to plant equipment and because of technical refinements that permit more precise measurements of reactor operating conditions. ***************************************************************** 2 Uranium enrichment employees to vote on strike City &Region | Herald-Leader Online | Kentucky.com | Herald-Leader Published Wednesday, August 1, 2001, in the Herald-Leader Contract for workers at Paducah plant expired yesterday ASSOCIATED PRESS PADUCAH -- About half the workers at Paducah's U.S. Enrichment Corp. plant, the nation's only uranium production facility, will vote Thursday whether to go on strike. ``The union has received USEC's last, best and final offer for settlement for a new contract,'' David Fuller, president of Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemical and Energy Workers Union Local 5-550, said yesterday. ``It's not really acceptable in its present form.'' The union represents the plant's more than 700 hourly workers except for the guards, Fuller said. A total of 1,500 workers are employed at the plant. A five-year contract that union members had been working under expired at 7 a.m. CDT yesterday. The earliest the workers could go on strike is 7 a.m. Friday, Fuller said. ``In a situation like this, a strike is certainly in the picture,'' Fuller said. ``It's a possibility.'' Yesterday, USEC spokeswoman Elizabeth Stuckle, however, said she is confident there will be a resolution. ``We will continue to work with the union until we reach a contract satisfactory to both of us,'' she said. A key issue is whether USEC has the right to terminate a proposed five-year contract with workers within one year if it is not successful in meeting certain terms to buy uranium from Russia, Fuller said. Fuller said he considers the Russian bargaining issues to be ``a little bit of a slap in the face'' because the union, along with community and congressional leaders, worked hard to help resolve the issues before contract talks. But Stuckle, in a prepared statement, said the provision is a necessity. ``This is a five-year contract proposal, but will only be renewed after the first year if USEC remains sole executive agent and receives a market-based-pricing contract with Russia,'' she said. In June, production was stopped at USEC's uranium enrichment plant in Piketon, Ohio, because of a market glut for nuclear plant fuel. The company chose to keep the Paducah plant open and to buy uranium from Russia's decommissioned nuclear warheads. Other disputed issues in the proposed contract pertain to overtime compensation and medical benefits, Fuller said. But Stuckle said USEC is offering ``an attractive and very competitive economic package, including increases and enhancements to salary and pension, while maintaining a very attractive medical plan.'' During three separate meetings Thursday union leaders will tell workers whether they recommend accepting the contract offer, Fuller said. The results of the union vote are expected to be made public about 9 p.m. CDT Thursday, Fuller said. USEC, based in Bethesda, Md., was created in the early 1990s as a government corporation with the mission of restructuring the government's uranium enrichment operation and to prepare it for sale to the private sector. It was made private in 1998. Federal law creating USEC made it the agent for a 20-year, $8 billion deal to buy 500 metric tons of uranium taken from Russia's dismantled nuclear warheads and blended down into material for use by nuclear power plants. Although USEC is 40 percent ahead of schedule on the Russian deal, it is paying prices higher than it costs the Paducah plant to enrich uranium. All content © 1999, 2000, 2001 Kentucky Connect and the Lexington ***************************************************************** 3 Inspection of the Americium/Curium Solution Stabilization Project Pretreatment Process at the Savannah River Site July 2001 Prepared by Office of Environment, Safety and Health Oversight Environment, Safety and Health TABLE OF CONTENTS + Abbreviations Used in This Report + Executive Summary + 1.0 Purpose + 2.0 Background + 3.0 Inspection Activities + 4.0 Results + 4.1 Focus Area Results + 4.2 Positive Attributes + 4.3 Observations + Appendix A - Team Composition Abbreviations Used in This Report Am/Cm Americium/Curium Solution DOE U.S. Department of Energy EH-2 Office of Environment, Safety, and Health Oversight ISA 84.01 Application of Safety Instrumented Systems for the Process Industries Executive Summary This report documents the results of an onsite inspection performed by the Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Environment, Safety and Health Oversight (EH-2) at the Savannah River Site from March 26 to 30, 2001. The purpose of the inspection was to perform a focused technical review of the Americium/Curium (Am/Cm) Solution Stabilization Project pretreatment process, which is an initial step in preparing the Am/Cm solution for vitrification and long-term storage. A program conducted in the 1970s at the Savannah River Site produced isotopes of americium and curium. Approximately 11,000 liters of highly radioactive Am/Cm solution including impurities are stored in a tank in the Savannah River Site F-Canyon facility. DOE reports and a Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board recommendation have identified potential vulnerabilities associated with the current storage of this radioactive solution and have recommended that the solution be stabilized to further enhance the safety of workers and the public. The Am/Cm Solution Stabilization Project is intended to establish the production capability and operating systems necessary to stabilize the Am/Cm solution in a vitrified form for long-term storage. The pretreatment process design has used sound engineering practices for analyzing potential hazards and safety controls, including laboratory experiments using appropriate surrogate materials. In general, the Savannah River Site identified and analyzed potential hazards and prepared adequate backfit analysis to document the technical basis for upgrading the existing F-Canyon structures, systems, and components. The technical basis and procurement quality requirements for the safety-significant structures, systems, and components are generally adequate. The addition of a new passive design feature for the steam jet transfer system, a siphon breaker, is a positive attribute. This breaker is designed to prevent a potential reverse flow situation in which highly radioactive solution could flow to the "gang" valve room, resulting in potential exposures to workers. No Safety Issues were identified during this inspection. Although most aspects of the engineering design process are effective, the EH-2 Team made five observations related to the hazards identification and analysis portions of the engineering and design phase that should be considered by line management: + The similarity analysis, performed to support the evaporator tank structural integrity analysis, did not address all relevant design differences. + Potential hydrogen deflagration following the design basis earthquake has not been fully analyzed. + Instrumentation failure mode and effect analysis does not address some possible failure modes. + Different failure rates for various failure modes of the tank cooling coil are not considered. + The minimum airflow for the process vessel ventilation system has not been delineated in the basis for interim operations. Although some aspects of hazards analyses could be improved, the identified observations do not indicate systemic problems in engineering design practices at the Savannah River Site. In general, the pretreatment process design used sound engineering practices for incorporating safety into the design process. Because other safety systems are in place (e.g., safety-class confinement systems), the five EH-2 observations would not necessarily impact the overall risk of operations of the proposed system. However, additional analysis of potential hazards and controls would benefit the site and provide additional assurance that adequate safety margins are established. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- [blue1.jpg (1661 bytes)] Purpose The Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Environment, Safety and Health Oversight (EH-2) performed an inspection of the proposed Americium/Curium (Am/Cm) Solution Stabilization Project at the Savannah River Site. EH-2, within the Office of Environment, Safety and Health, performs ongoing evaluations of environment, safety, and health programs related to selected major DOE projects on a continuing basis. The EH-2 evaluations include site visits and are coordinated with site and project management. Early and continuing oversight evaluations provide assurance that potential environment, safety, and health deficiencies in engineering, design, and implementation are identified in a timely manner. The Am/Cm Solution Stabilization Project was selected for review because of its technical complexity and potentially significant hazards. The EH-2 Team evaluated the pretreatment process design, hazard identification, and controls. The pretreatment process is an essential first step in the proposed process for stabilizing the Am/Cm solutions. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- [blue2.jpg (1953 bytes)] Background The DOE Savannah River Operations Office is the DOE field element with primary responsibility for safety in the conduct of the Am/Cm Solution Stabilization Project. The Westinghouse Savannah River Company is the prime contractor for the Savannah River Site and is responsible for design, construction, and operation of the proposed project. In the 1970s, a Savannah River site program, the Transuranic Isotope Production Program, was established to produce transuranic elements (i.e., atomic weights heavier than those of uranium and plutonium). A major step in that program involved the irradiation of high-exposure plutonium targets in the Savannah River Site reactors to produce stable isotopes of americium (Am) and curium (Cm). The irradiated targets were then dissolved at the Savannah River Site F-Canyon. While it operated, the Transuranic Isotope Production Program produced about 11,000 liters of nitric acid solution containing approximately ten kilograms of americium (Am-243) and two kilograms of curium (Cm-244). The Am/Cm solution generates about seven kilowatts/hour of heat as a result of radioactive decay of the americium (~1800 curies) and curium (~210,000 curies). This Am/Cm solution has resided in Tank 17.1 of F-Canyon since 1972 and has no future mission. Several DOE and external reports have identified potential hazards associated with storing the highly radioactive solution and have recommended that the solution be stabilized to further decrease health and safety risks to workers and the public. For example, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, in Recommendation 94-1, Improved Schedule for Remediation, recommended that this material be converted into forms that are safer for storage. The Savannah River Site has proposed to stabilize the Am/Cm solution using a vitrification process, in which the hazardous materials are embedded in a highly stable glass matrix. The Am/Cm Solution Stabilization Project is intended to establish the production capability and operating systems necessary to stabilize the Am/Cm solution in a vitrified form for long-term storage. The proposed process requires two major stages: (1) solution pretreatment to render it suitable for vitrification, and (2) the vitrification process. Both stages will be performed in F-Canyon. The pretreatment processes will be performed primarily using existing tanks and systems. The vitrification processes will be performed at the F-Canyon Multi-Purpose Processing Facility. Once operational, the Am/Cm pretreatment and vitrification process is expected to take less than two years to complete. At present, the project has completed the research and development work for both pretreatment and vitrification processes. Fabrication of equipment to support these processes is under way. The Multi-Purpose Processing Facility is being modified, and the final design and independent design reviews of the pretreatment process design are nearing completion. The current schedule calls for completing the project by the third quarter of fiscal year 2005. The pretreatment process is needed to remove metal impurities, which adversely affect glass quality. The pretreatment process is expected to reduce the original solution volume by a factor of 15, the metals content by a factor of 10, and the nitric acid content by a factor of more than 4. After pretreatment, the product is expected to be suitable for interim storage and for eventual transfer to the melter feed preparation tank. The pretreatment process consists of the following steps: + Denitrating the Am/Cm solution with formic acid + Precipitating the Am/Cm, actinides, and lanthanides with oxalic acid to remove the uranium and metallic impurities, which are transferred to the tank farm, and then washing the precipitate with oxalic/nitric acid to remove residual supernate + Dissolving the resultant Am/Cm precipitate in concentrated nitric acid and dilute manganous nitrate solution + Denitrating the resultant solution with water and formic acid, concentrating it, and further denitrating it with formic acid. The following figure presents a simplified schematic flow diagram of the pretreatment process. Pretreatment Process: Denitration; Separation of Am/Cm, Actinides, and Lanthanides from Metal Impurities and Uranium; and Preparation of the Solution for Melter Feed [Pretreatment Process: Denitration; Separation of Am/Cm, Actinides, and Lanthanides from Metal Impurities and Uranium; and Preparation of the Solution for Melter Feed] ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- [blue3.jpg (1982 bytes)] Inspection Activities The EH-2 inspection included a review of project documents and two site visits. On January 17 and 18, 2001, the EH-2 Team conducted an initial (scoping) meeting at the Savannah River Site to understand the status of the project and the technology to be used to disposition the Am/Cm solution. During the scoping meeting, the EH-2 Team toured the facility, were briefed by the Am/Cm project staff, and assessed the status of the project progress. Following the scoping visit, the Team reviewed relevant project documents and identified five focus areas: + Pre-treatment process design + Hazard identification, characterization, and control + Safety classification and procurement quality requirement + Backfit analysis for existing F-Canyon facility structures, systems, and components + Appropriateness of the surrogate material used for prototype testing. The EH-2 Team conducted the onsite portion of the inspection from March 26 to 30, 2001. During this onsite review, the Team discussed each of the focus areas with DOE and contractor technical staff. Additionally, the Team discussed the implementation program for Instrument Society of America (ISA) 84.01, Application of Safety Instrumented Systems for the Process Industries, and the systems that are required to verify the initial condition for the process in the safety basis. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- [blue4.jpg (2014 bytes)] Results The results of the EH-2 Team’s review of the focus areas are presented in Section 4.1. No Safety Issues were identified during this EH-2 inspection. Therefore, a formal corrective action plan is not required (in accordance with DOE Order 414.1A, Quality Assurance). However, one positive attribute (Section 4.2) and five observations (Section 4.3) were identified. DOE and contractor management should evaluate all five observations as part of their continuous improvement efforts for safety. 4.1 Focus Area Results Pretreatment process design. The EH-2 Team reviewed the process design and flowsheets and evaluated the process chemistry for the preparation of feed materials for vitrification. The EH-2 review indicates that the Savannah River Site appropriately considered the proven technology and laboratory experiments in the design phase. The existing Am/Cm solution in Tank 17.1 contains nitric acid, lanthanides, and actinides along with metallic impurities, uranium, and thorium. Thus, it is not suitable for direct vitrification because of the high acid content and the quantity of metallic impurities and uranium. The formic acid reaction for reducing nitric acid is well known and controllable, and it has been used this way in several past operations. The oxalic acid precipitation technique is also well known and controllable, and it is used in nuclear chemical separation processes. Applying these two techniques to reduce nitric acid concentration and separate the metallic impurities, uranium, and thorium is a proven technology. Laboratory experiments with surrogates have provided parameters for controlling the formic acid reaction and oxalic acid precipitation to achieve the vitrification batch feed parameters. Technical reports and specific experiments, including experiments involving surrogates, were reviewed. Appropriate controls have been analyzed for the process chemicals and reactions, which center around the use of formic acid for denitration. Hazard identification, characterization, and control. The EH-2 Team reviewed the hazards and controls for the pretreatment process design. This review indicated that most hazards had been identified, characterized, and controlled. A Positive Attribute involving a new design specification that prevents reverse flow of radioactive solution is discussed in Section 4.2. However, additional attention is warranted to ensure that the design is conservative and adequately addresses all credible hazards. In this focus area, the EH-2 Team identified three observations in the areas of: (1) tank cooling coil failure rates, (2) process vessel ventilation system minimum purge airflows, and (3) a potential hydrogen deflagration event following a design basis earthquake. Section 4.3 provides additional details on these observations. Safety classification and procurement quality requirement. The Team reviewed the functional classification methodology that was used to select safety-class and safety-significant structures, systems, and components for the pretreatment process systems design. The technical basis for the classification is generally adequate. The existing safety-class F-Canyon structure and the canyon exhaust system are credited for protecting the public and onsite workers during a design basis accident. Several other structures, systems, and components are classified as safety-significant for worker protection and defense-in-depth. Many of the safety-significant structures, systems, and components were originally designed and installed as general-service class and warranted a technical basis for upgrading to safety-significant (see discussion under Backfit Analysis). The Team also reviewed the procurement process and controls for the safety-significant structures, systems, and components. Procurement quality requirements established for these systems are consistent with their design and safety functions. Backfit analysis for existing F-Canyon facility systems. The Team reviewed the backfit analyses for selected structures, systems, and components designated as performing safety-significant functions. Several accident scenarios are identified as having offsite and onsite consequences. Structures, systems, and components required to prevent onsite consequences are designated as safety-significant, while the canyon structure and canyon exhaust system are credited as being safety-class to mitigate offsite consequences. Because these structures, systems, and components are general-service class and are being upgraded to safety-significant class, the backfit analyses provided the technical bases for qualifying these structures, systems, and components as safety-significant. The backfit analyses addressed the functional and environmental qualification requirements of the structures, systems, and components that are credited for specific accident scenarios. The backfit analyses also addressed the ability to test and maintain the systems. In general, site contractors prepared adequate backfit analyses that document the technical basis for the upgrade of the structures, systems, and components. However, the EH-2 Team identified two observations in this focus area in (1) instrumentation failure modes and effects on safety functions, and (2) process tank integrity analyses. These observations are discussed in Section 4.3. Appropriateness of the surrogate material that is used for prototype testing. The EH-2 Team reviewed the use of chemical surrogates to simulate Am and Cm in laboratory process and equipment development tests for the pretreatment and vitrification processes. The surrogates selected for prototypes are appropriate. Europium and gadolinium were chosen as surrogates for the simulation of the oxalate precipitation process. These surrogates are lanthanide-series elements that correspond to the positions of Am and Cm in the actinide series of the periodic table of elements. Thus, the surrogates produced oxalate precipitates that closely resemble the oxalate precipitates of Am and Cm. Erbium, a lanthanide, was chosen as the surrogate element for vitrification studies because it has an oxide melting temperature close to a glass previously made (1980) with the Am/Cm solution. The recent vitrification tests included other lanthanide elements, as well as uranium and thorium. Tests with this broad spectrum of elements showed that no element significantly affected the production process or the properties of the lanthanide borosilicate based glasses produced. Therefore, it was concluded that the broad spectrum of surrogate glass studies adequately bounded the properties of the Am/Cm solution. 4.2 Positive Attributes + Measures to prevent reverse flow of radioactive materials. A steam jet will be used to transfer radioactive solutions from tank to tank during process operations. Immediately after a steam jet is shut off, a vacuum could be created in the transfer line that could cause the highly radioactive solution to flow back to the "gang" valve room and thereby pose a potential hazard to the workers. Currently, a series of valve operation sequences is used to prevent such reverse flow. A new siphon breaker design feature will be installed on the upstream side of the steam jet to further reduce this potential hazard. The siphon breaker will consist of an engineered vent tube tapped from the upstream side of the steam jet to the head space of the process vessels. When the steam jet is shut off, the vent tube will equalize the pressure between the tank and the transfer line and prevent the siphoning effect. Addition of the siphon breaker provides a passive feature that prevents the vacuum and reverse flow. This design makes the preventive system more robust and reliable. 4.3 Observations While various aspects of the design and engineering process are consistent with the safety basis, the EH-2 Team identified instances where the identification and analysis of hazards and controls could be strengthened. Because other systems (e.g., safety-class confinement systems) are in place, these observations do not necessarily affect the overall risk of operation of the proposed system. Also, the five observations are not indicative of a systematic weakness in the design and engineering process. However, the following five observations indicate that the site could benefit from additional attention to hazard identification and analysis of hazards and controls during the design phase. + The similarity analysis, performed to support the evaporator tank structural integrity analysis, did not address all relevant design differences. The backfit analysis for the tank structural integrity addressed the integrity of the evaporator tanks during a postulated hydrogen deflagration accident. The backfit analysis relied on the structural similarity of the evaporator tanks to other tanks in the canyon, and concluded that the evaporator tanks could withstand the maximum pressure from a hydrogen deflagration accident. However, the EH-2 Team identified a few differences between the evaporator tanks and other tanks in the canyon that should be evaluated to ensure that the similarity analysis is comprehensive and bounding: (1) certain welds (i.e., the hold-down-studs-to-tank-top welds for the agitator base plates) are the weak links on other tanks but not on the evaporator tank, and (2) the structural details of the bottom and top heads (including the respective attachments) of the evaporator tanks are different. In addition, the experimental results relevant to rupture of a vessel from the deflagration tests cited in the backfit analysis for the similarity analysis have different geometry (dished versus flat head) and attachments, and thus may need further evaluation. Further, the backfit analysis does not analyze the structural integrity of the other Am/Cm process tanks to be used in the pretreatment process. Thus, further evaluation of the structural integrity of the evaporator tanks and other Am/Cm process tanks is needed. + Potential hydrogen deflagration following the design basis earthquake has not been fully analyzed. The Am/Cm pretreatment accident analysis does not consider the accident scenario of a postulated hydrogen deflagration in the process tanks following an earthquake that could cause the purge air and the canyon ventilation to be inoperable. Such a scenario could cause the hydrogen from radiolysis to reach an explosive level in the tank headspace. The canyon ventilation and the tank purge system could be unavailable for up to 48 hours following a design basis earthquake, but hydrogen buildup in the tank could reach the lower flammable limit in only 20 minutes. This scenario could result in releases that are higher than the current design basis accident because the release from the tanks would be more energetic than the current assumption (which is based on spills from toppled tanks). Additionally, the current F-Canyon basis for interim operations does not address this accident scenario. Releases from hydrogen deflagration may be mitigated by the existing confinement systems, but such scenarios should be analyzed to ensure an adequate safety margin. + Instrumentation failure mode and effect analysis does not address some possible failure modes. A failure mode and effect analysis was performed to evaluate the existing instrumentation for tank level controls that are required to support the operation of the Am/Cm solution stabilization process. The failure mode and effect analysis addresses instrument failures due to loss of motive power (such as loss of electrical or pneumatic power), which could result in the devices "failing" in either high or low position and triggering an alarm. However, the analysis does not address failures of the device itself (as opposed to motive power failures). Such failures could produce erroneous indications, which could either trigger invalid actions by protective hardware or mislead the operator. Operator actions for preventing or mitigating process upsets or accident conditions rely on instrument readings and alarm functions. These functions are accomplished through procedural features or by operator actions upon observing parameters outside process limits, both of which almost exclusively depend on process instruments and control devices. Also, instrumentation and controls other than tank level devices, such as the low pressure switches for isolating the segregated cooling water system if the tank cooling coil fails, are not fully analyzed for failure modes and effects. The reliability, diversity, and redundancy of these devices should be fully analyzed for all failure modes. + Different failure rates for various failure modes of the tank cooling coil are not considered. The F-Canyon process hazard analysis for the process tank cooling coil does not consider the different failure rates for various failure modes. This analysis uses a failure rate (i.e., once per 1,142 years) that was based on failure rates for a catastrophic failure mode (i.e., a guillotine break). Such catastrophic failures are rare, so the event was determined to be in the "Unlikely" category. However, less severe but more likely failures (such as a pinhole leak that could contaminate the cooling water) are not analyzed. Consideration of less severe but more likely failure modes could raise the likelihood of a tank cooling coil failure to the "Anticipated" category. + The minimum airflow for the process vessel ventilation system has not been delineated in the basis for interim operations. The F-Canyon basis for interim operations establishes the process vessel ventilation system design requirements. One requirement is that each fan must be capable of maintaining a vacuum at the inlet to the filters of at least minus 3.0 inches of water. However, the basis for interim operations does not address the minimum airflow requirements through the vessels to prevent hydrogen buildup. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- APPENDIX A TEAM COMPOSITION Deputy Assistant Secretary for Environment, Safety and Health Oversight S. David Stadler, Ph.D. Associate Deputy Assistant Secretary for Environment, Safety and Health Oversight – Operations Raymond J. Hardwick, Jr. Office of Environment, Safety and Health Evaluations Edward B. Blackwood, Director William J. Eckroade, Deputy Director Team Leader Pranab Guha Team Members Rowland Felt Donald Harlow Donald Prevatte Subir Sen Quality Review Board S. David Stadler Raymond J. Hardwick, Jr. Thomas Staker ***************************************************************** 4 Nuke Waste Shipment Leaves Germany Las Vegas SUN July 31, 2001 BERLIN- Protesters briefly tried to block a shipment of nuclear waste that left a German power plant under heavy security early Tuesday, bound for a reprocessing plant in Britain. Police said about 35 protesters tried to stop the shipment as it was taken by road from the plant at Neckarwestheim, in the southern state of Baden-Wuerttemberg, to a nearby depot to be loaded onto a train. The demonstrators quickly cleared the road and the shipment continued, police said. About 700 officers were in place to guard the shipment - three containers carrying 21 spent fuel rods - and demonstrations along the route had been banned. The last shipment of German waste to Britain's Sellafield reprocessing plant, in April, was marked by a sit-down protest at Neckarwestheim. Thousands of police prevented demonstrators from blocking that transport, the first to the British plant in almost three years. Germany halted all nuclear shipments in 1998 after radiation leaks were found in some containers, but it resumed the shipments in March. It also suspended dealings with Sellafield last year after a scandal over fake records. Germany sends spent nuclear fuel from 19 power plants abroad for reprocessing under contracts that oblige the country to take back the resulting waste for storage. In June, leading energy companies signed an agreement to shut down Germany's nuclear power plants, and the pact limits plants to an average 32 years of operation. Anti-nuclear activists want the plants shut down faster and say waste shipments are unsafe. All contents copyright 2001 Las Vegas SUN, Inc. ***************************************************************** 5 Tribe, environmentalists fear opening of uranium mine near Grand Canyon Las Vegas SUN Today: August 01, 2001 at 6:40:47 PDT FLAGSTAFF, Ariz. (AP) - The Sierra Club claims land near the Grand Canyon that's sacred to the Havasupai Tribe is a target of the Bush administration's plan to expand energy production. The tribe itself is at least equally upset about the possibility, though the company owning the uranium site in question says it has no plan to open the mine. "That's our aboriginal homeland," said Matthew Putesoy, the tribe's vice chairman. "We claim that as our origination, where the very first Havasupai people were born ... from one of our great-great grandmothers. Grandmother Canyon, we call her. "We say were tied to the universe from that area," said Putesoy, whose tribe's lands border the sprawling Grand Canyon on the south. "They're drilling right in the abdomen of our Mother Earth." The Bush energy plan calls for 1,300 new power plants across the country by 2020 and for an expansion of nuclear power. In a statement dated Monday, the Sierra Club said part of that plan includes operating the Canyon Mine 15 miles from the Grand Canyon in the headwater drainage of Havasu Creek. The site is within the Kaibab National Forest. The mine was been built a few years ago but hasn't been operated. The Forest Service approved its construction after looking into its environmental impact, and the U.S. Supreme Court rejected tribal opposition in upholding the permit. Cathy Schmidlin, a public affairs officer for the Kaibab forest, said the company that built the mine is defunct and that Vancouver, B.C.-based International Uranium Corp., which operates three mines in Arizona, is the current owner. Its U.S. headquarters is Denver, and Ron Hochstein, president and CEO of International Uranium, said there's no immediate cause for alarm. "There is no plan to restart the Canyon Mine at this time," he said. "Uranium prices have to improve significantly before we could consider restarting that operation." Hochstein declined to comment on the tribe's cultural concerns. Nonetheless, Rob Smith of the Sierra Club said mine illustrates the potential for problems for Arizona under the Bush energy plan. "The emphasis on building lots of new power plants means Arizona will stand to be a big loser," Smith said. "Arizona could become an energy sacrifice zone if big power plants are the main thrust of a national energy policy. This means loss of natural and cultural areas, using up our water, polluting our air." Smith, the club's southwestern representative in Phoenix, said Arizona has another of the 21 natural areas nationwide about which the club has great concern. That other one is the recently designated Ironwood Forest National Monument near Tucson in southern Arizona. Asarco Inc., a giant producer of copper and other metals, wants to trade land in order to expand a mine into the monument. Environmentalists contend doing so would harm the habitat of an endangered species, the desert pronghorn antelope. Tucson-based Center for Biological Diversity claims the land that Asarco wants is critical to reproduction and survival of the last population of desert bighorn sheep. Additionally, there are plans for a power plant nearby and to run a transmission line through the monument, the Sierra Club pointed out. Mexico City-based Grupo Mexico acquired New York-based Asarco in 1999. The company's mining includes operations in Montana and Arizona. On the Net: International Uranium: http://www.intluranium.com All contents copyright 2001 Las Vegas SUN, Inc. ***************************************************************** 6 No radioactivity found around leaky nuclear waste container Las Vegas SUN Today: August 01, 2001 at 12:55:44 PDT LAS VEGAS (AP) - No radioactive material escaped a damaged shipping container on a truck hauling low-level nuclear waste from western New York to the Nevada Test Site, state and federal officials said. "The assessments by first responders and the Department of Energy confirmed no loss of radioactivity from the containers," Stan Marshall, radiological health manager for the Nevada State Health Division, said Wednesday. Crews spent Tuesday examining and removing the damaged container from a commercial truck stop off Interstate 80 in West Wendover, Nev. A driver for International Waste Removal Inc. reported late Monday that while washing down spilled diesel fuel he discovered foam around one of seven containers of contaminated pipes and valves from a dismantled nuclear-waste reprocessing project near Buffalo, N.Y. Marshall said a patch and plastic material stopped a trickle of packing material from the thick-walled metal box. The material foams when it gets wet. The patched container was sealed inside another packing container and taken on another truck to a storage facility near Clive, Utah, about an hour away. Marshall said it will be returned to New York. The six other containers in the shipment were trucked late Tuesday to the Test Site for burial. Nevada Gov. Kenny Guinn termed the incident "a near catastrophe" and said it illustrates problems with transporting nuclear waste by truck or train. The state is fighting the federal government's proposal to transport the nation's 77,000 tons of high-level nuclear waste and entomb it at Yucca Mountain in the Test Site, about 90 miles northwest of Las Vegas. "Low-level radiation doesn't necessarily mean low-level danger," said Kalynda Tilges, nuclear issues coordinator for Citizen Alert, a statewide environmental group. All contents copyright 2001 Las Vegas SUN, Inc. ***************************************************************** 7 Crack in nuke waste container discovered Today: August 01, 2001 at 10:59:21 PDT Radioactive shipments from N.Y. plant to Test Site on hold By Mary Manning LAS VEGAS SUN The Energy Department will delay the transportation of low-level nuclear waste to the Nevada Test Site from a New York reprocessing plant after investigators discovered a crack in a container in the first shipment, a spokesman said. Radiological inspectors found an inch-long crack in one of seven low-level nuclear waste containers after white foam was discovered on the bed of truck used to haul the shipment, DOE spokesman Joseph Davis said. An International Waste Removal Inc. truck was carrying the containers, packed with low-level nuclear waste from a defunct DOE West Valley, N.Y., reprocessing plant, to the Test Site, 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas. DOE and state inspectors discovered the crack after responding to an emergency call on Monday about a fuel spill at a truck stop near Wendover. "We will do a procedural review of shipping at the facility," Davis said, noting it normally takes 10 to 15 days to complete the process. Sen. Harry Reid, D-Nev., who has called for a national transportation review of hazardous cargoes, said the DOE's review may not go far enough. "Accidents can happen, accidents do happen and they happen a lot more than we know," Reid said today. The senator said he has his own plan that deals with transporting hazardous waste, although he did not provide details this morning. He said he will make an announcement on the plan later this week. State and local radiological experts said no radiation was detected on the cask or in the foam, which was formed by a grainy packing material called Waterworks, which leaked from the 6-by-4 container. None of the seven containers, the truck bed or the spot where the truck had been parked were contaminated with radiation, said Stan Marshall, director of the state's Radiological Health Division. Davis said the damaged container had been secured and shipped to a temporary storage site in Utah. The driver delivered the six intact containers to the Test Site Tuesday night. DOE experts wrapped the cracked container in a plastic seal then placed it in a Sea-van, a container with a door on each end used to transport cargo on ships. The truck driver will pick up the damaged container from the Utah site and return it to New York, Davis said. Gov. Kenny Guinn said the apparent leak further illustrates the dangers of transporting nuclear waste by truck or train. The DOE plans to ship high-level nuclear waste through 43 states to a proposed repository at Yucca Mountain, if the site is approved. "It's unfortunate that it takes a near catastrophe to make the point that we in Nevada have been trying to make for years, namely that the transportation of nuclear waste poses an unacceptable risk to every single community through which this material would be transported," Guinn said. "The Wendover shipment was low-level waste," the governor said. "What happens if it's high-level?" All contents copyright 2001 Las Vegas SUN, Inc. ***************************************************************** 8 House rejects Yucca bill: Legislation would have given DOE more authority Today: August 01, 2001 at 11:01:16 PDT By Benjamin Grove and Mary Manning LAS VEGAS SUN The House today scrapped -- for now -- legislation that would have taken Yucca Mountain project spending authority away from Congress. Rep. Jim Gibbons, R-Nev., and Shelley Berkley, D-Nev., for two or three weeks in private conversations and phone calls have been bending the ears of key lawmakers, arguing that it is a bad idea to eliminate congressional oversight of the Yucca budget. "No matter how each member of the House may feel about the Yucca Mountain project, not one of us should agree to cede our oversight of this incredibly dangerous project," Berkley said in a letter this week to House members. At issue is funding for the Yucca Mountain project, a plan to bury the nation's nuclear waste in an underground tomb at the desert site 90 miles northwest of Las Vegas. Congress each year sets funding for the Energy Department to spend on the project. It allocates money -- about $7 billion in the past two decades -- to the DOE from a national nuclear waste fund, mostly fed by special taxes paid by ratepayers nationwide whose electricity is generated by nuclear reactors. This year a group of congressional proponents of the Yucca plan, led by Reps. Joe Barton, R-Texas, and Billy Tauzin, R-La., sponsored a measure that would take Yucca budget-setting power away from Congress. Under the proposal, the DOE would have direct access to about $10 billion now in the waste fund to use however and whenever it sees fit, without congressional limits. They inserted the legislation into a sweeping energy bill being debated in the House this week, saying the measure would help speed the Yucca project toward completion by giving DOE more spending freedom. But Republican House leaders stripped the measure out of the energy package today, in part at Gibbons' request, in part to help win more votes for the underlying energy bill. Still, Barton and Tauzin on the House floor today promptly vowed to later this year revive their effort to take Yucca "off-budget." Nevada lawmakers were still pleased. They use the Yucca budget process to whittle away the project's money flow each year, effectively delaying the project. Gibbons on the House floor today argued that taking Yucca off-budget was irrational and fiscally irresponsible. In the Senate, Sen. Harry Reid, D-Nev., Senate Majority Whip, from his powerful perch on the Appropriations Committee, is pushing for a dramatically lower Yucca budget -- $275 million. The DOE requested $445 million for Yucca studies this year. Last year the agency got about $391 million. All contents copyright 2001 Las Vegas SUN, Inc. ***************************************************************** 9 Japan, U.S. Govts Eye Joint Research on Recycling Next-Generation N-fuels Welcome to The PMA OnLine Power Report Yomiuri Shimbun ( July 30, 2001 ) The Japanese and U.S. governments are considering joint research into recycling next-generation nuclear fuels, officials in Tokyo said Monday. Experts from the two countries will discuss using the currently closed fast-breeder reactor Monju for the envisioned project. As part of the joint effort, Atomic Energy Commission Chairman Yoichi Fujiie is scheduled to visit Washington this autumn to discuss the idea. The government hopes Japan's cooperation with the United States will help break the current deadlock in its own nuclear fuel recycling plan. In the United States, momentum has been growing for the resumption of research on fast-breeder reactors since May, when Washington changed its energy policy toward the construction of new nuclear power plants. Up until 1977, the United States led the world in the development of fast-breeder reactors. That year, however, President Jimmy Carter decided to call off the development plan in an effort to promote nuclear nonproliferation. Washington gave up on reprocessing the waste and started dumping it. Things changed in May, when the administration of U.S. President George W. Bush announced a plan to resume reprocessing spent nuclear fuel as part of a new U.S. energy policy. The announcement prompted policy planners in both countries to discuss joint research. The United States is planning to reopen a currently closed experimental fast-breeder reactor owned by the Energy Department. The reactor will be used in a federal institute for an experiment in which metallic fuel, a compound of plutonium and uranium, is burned. Fast-breeder reactors in Japan and other countries are currently using a mixed-oxide fuel (MOX), which is made by burning a mixture of powdered uranium and plutonium oxides. MOX can be reprocessed as fuel used for light-water reactors. Metallic fuels have drawn attention as a viable option since 1999 because they are more economical and safer than MOX fuels, and the heat conductivity is 10 times that of the latter. The two countries are expected to discuss the feasibility of using Monju for a joint experiment in which metallic fuel would be exposed to radiation to see how it reacts. They will also consider a plan to set up a database to explore new technologies. To see more of The Daily Yomiuri On-Line, go to http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/daily The Yomiuri Shimbun. All Rights Reserved. Copyright 2001 ***************************************************************** 10 Nuclear Waste Leaves Plant For Reprocessing in Britain F.A.Z. - English Version2. Aug. 2001 BERLIN. Three containers with nuclear waste left a power plant in southern Germany under heavy security early on Tuesday, bound for Britain's Sellafield reprocessing plant. Police said about 35 protesters tried to block the shipment as it headed by road from the plant at Neckarwestheim in Baden-Württemberg to a nearby depot to be loaded onto a train for the journey to Britain. But the demonstrators quickly cleared the road, police said. About 700 officers were in place to secure the transport of the 21 spent fuel rods. Demonstrations along the route had been banned. The last shipment of German waste from Neckarwestheim to Sellafield, in April, was also marked by protests. Thousands of police prevented demonstrators from blocking the transport, which was the first to the British plant in almost three years. Spent nuclear fuel from 19 German power plants is sent to Britain and France for reprocessing under contracts that oblige Germany to take back the resulting waste for storage. (AP ) Jul. 31, 2001 © Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 2000 All rights reserved. ***************************************************************** 11 ADAMS: Items of Interest - Wednesday, August 01, 2001 State of Nevada Agency for Nuclear Projects ADAMS - Items of Interest Recent Released Documents Added - Wednesday, August 01, 2001 These documents and others may be retrieved at the NRC PERR web site ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Item ID: 012120007 Accession Number: ML012080117 Date Added: 7/31/01 9:11:15 AM Title: 07/26/2001 - Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant: Implementation of 10 CFR 76.78. Author Affiliation: NRC/NMSS/FCSS/FSPB Document/Report Number: ML012080117 _________________________________________________________________ Item ID: 012120207 Accession Number: ML012120280 Date Added: 7/31/01 5:11:51 PM Title: 08/09/01 - Mtg w/ Columbiana Boiler Company (CBC) re results of compliance testing of the CBC Modified ANSI 14.1 30B UF6 cylinder for the UX-30 transportation package. Author Affiliation: NRC/NMSS/SFPO Document/Report Number: _________________________________________________________________ Item ID: 012120165 Accession Number: ML012120099 Date Added: 7/31/01 3:12:42 PM Title: 08/14/2001 meeting with Exelon Generation Company on license renewal for Peach Bottom Units 2 and 3 providing the NRC staff with an overview of the Peach Bottom License Renewal Application. The proposed agenda is in ML012060058. Author Affiliation: NRC/NRR/DRIP Document/Report Number: _________________________________________________________________ Item ID: 012120204 Accession Number: ML012110333 Date Added: 7/31/01 5:11:37 PM Title: 08/15/2001 Meeting With Nuclear Energy Institute and Operating Pressurized Water Reactor Licensee's to Discuss NRC Expectations Re PWR Licensee Responses to NRC's Bulletin on Circumferential Cracking of Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Penetration Nozzles. Author Affiliation: NRC/NRR/DLPM Document/Report Number: _________________________________________________________________ Item ID: 012120173 Accession Number: ML012120204 Date Added: 7/31/01 3:13:25 PM Title: 08/15/2001- 08/16/2001 Meeting Notice with Exelon and DOE on HTGC & PBMR (Project 713). Author Affiliation: NRC/RES/DSARE/REAHFB Document/Report Number: _________________________________________________________________ Item ID: 012120008 Accession Number: ML012040072 Date Added: 7/31/01 9:11:20 AM Title: 08/19/91 memorandum from L J Donnelly regarding Appointment of Additional Representatives to LSS Advisory Review Panel. Author Affiliation: NRC Document/Report Number: _________________________________________________________________ Item ID: 012120136 Accession Number: ML012110328 Date Added: 7/31/01 10:29:52 AM Title: 08/21/2001 Meeting with Boiling Water Reactors Vessel and Internals Project (BWRVIP) and Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) to Discuss Issues Related to BWRVIP Integrated Surveillance Program (ISP) and Fluence Issues. Author Affiliation: NRC/NRR/DE Document/Report Number: _________________________________________________________________ Item ID: 012120018 Accession Number: ML012040133 Date Added: 7/31/01 9:12:14 AM Title: Briefing for Commissioner Rogers on Water Chemistry Problems. Author Affiliation: NRC/OCM Document/Report Number: _________________________________________________________________ Item ID: 012120155 Accession Number: ML012060058 Date Added: 7/31/01 3:11:09 PM Title: ML012060058 - 08/14/2001 Agenda for Meeting with EXELON Generation Company on license renewal for Peach Bottom, Units 2 and 3. Author Affiliation: NRC/NRR Document/Report Number: _________________________________________________________________ Item ID: 012120075 Accession Number: ML012040409 Date Added: 7/31/01 10:17:43 AM Title: Part 1 - Non Proprietary version of Amendment No. 5 of NUHOMS Certificate of Compliance No. 1004 for Dry Spent Fuel Storage Casks. Author Affiliation: Transnuclear West Inc Document/Report Number: _________________________________________________________________ Item ID: 012120076 Accession Number: ML011990059 Date Added: 7/31/01 10:18:24 AM Title: Part 2 - Non Proprietary version of Amendment No. 5 of NUHOMS Certificate of Compliance No. 1004 for Dry Spent Fuel Storage Casks, Section M.5 Shielding Evaluation through Section M.6 Criticality Evaluation. Author Affiliation: Transnuclear West Inc Document/Report Number: _________________________________________________________________ Item ID: 012120077 Accession Number: ML011990151 Date Added: 7/31/01 10:19:29 AM Title: Part 3 - Non Proprietary version of Amendment No. 5 of NUHOMS Certificate of Compliance No. 1004 for Dry Spent Fuel Storage Casks, Section M.7 Confinement through Section 14 Decommissioning. Author Affiliation: Transnuclear West Inc Document/Report Number: _________________________________________________________________ Item ID: 012120078 Accession Number: ML011990131 Date Added: 7/31/01 10:19:47 AM Title: Part 4 - Non Proprietary version of Amendment No. 5 of NUHOMS Certificate of Compliance No. 1004 for Dry Spent Fuel Storage Casks, M.3 Structural Evaluation through end. Author Affiliation: Transnuclear West Inc Document/Report Number: _________________________________________________________________ Item ID: 012120125 Accession Number: ML012050324 Date Added: 7/31/01 10:27:47 AM Title: PFS - NRC Staff's Brief in Response to "State of Utah's Brief on the Question Certified in LBP-01-19: The Regulatory Standard for Aircraft Crash Hazards at the PFS Site - Contention Utah K (Credible Accidents)" Author Affiliation: NRC/OGC Document/Report Number: _________________________________________________________________ Item ID: 012120202 Accession Number: ML012050389 Date Added: 7/31/01 5:11:23 PM Title: PFS - NRC Staff's Response To "Motion By The Nuclear Energy Institute For Leave To File An Amicus Brief On The Regulatory Standard For Aircraft Crash Hazards At Spent Fuel Facilities" Author Affiliation: NRC/OGC Document/Report Number: _________________________________________________________________ Item ID: 012120131 Accession Number: ML012060191 Date Added: 7/31/01 10:28:30 AM Title: PRM-52-1 - Petition for Rulemaking submitted by Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) to Amend Part 52 relating to early site permit and combined license applications at existing reactor sites Author Affiliation: Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) Document/Report Number: _________________________________________________________________ Item ID: 012120081 Accession Number: ML012060198 Date Added: 7/31/01 10:21:15 AM Title: PRM-52-2 - Petition for Rulemaking submitted by Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) to Amend Part 52 and 2, 50 and 51 with respect to early site permit consideration, alternative sites and to address the role of the National Environmental Policy Act Author Affiliation: Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) Document/Report Number: _________________________________________________________________ Item ID: 012120082 Accession Number: ML012040099 Date Added: 7/31/01 10:21:23 AM Title: Proposed Rule on the Submission and Management of Records and Documents Related to the Licensing of a Geologic Repository for Disposal of High-Level Redioactive Waste. Author Affiliation: Edison Electric Institute Document/Report Number: _________________________________________________________________ Item ID: 012120144 Accession Number: ML012110231 Date Added: 7/31/01 10:35:29 AM Title: Transcript of 484th Advisory Committee On Reactor Safeguards Full Committee Meeting, July 11, 2001, Pages 1-195. Author Affiliation: NRC/ACRS Document/Report Number: ACRST-3165 _________________________________________________________________ Item ID: 012120145 Accession Number: ML012110237 Date Added: 7/31/01 10:36:07 AM Title: Transcript of 484th Advisory Committee On Reactor Safeguards Full Committee Meeting, July 11, 2001, Pages 196-307. Author Affiliation: NRC/ACRS Document/Report Number: ACRST-3165 _________________________________________________________________ Item ID: 012120139 Accession Number: ML012110273 Date Added: 7/31/01 10:30:09 AM Title: Transcript of ACRST-3166 Meeting, July 18, 2001 pages 1-236 Author Affiliation: NRC/ACRS Document/Report Number: ACRST-3166 _________________________________________________________________ Item ID: 012120142 Accession Number: ML012110270 Date Added: 7/31/01 10:34:54 AM Title: Transcript of Advisory Committee On Reactor Safeguards Thermal Hydraulic Phenomena Subcommittee Meeting, July 17, 2001, Pages 1-165. Author Affiliation: NRC/ACRS Document/Report Number: ACRST-3166 _________________________________________________________________ Item ID: 012120141 Accession Number: ML012110255 Date Added: 7/31/01 10:34:23 AM Title: Transcript of Advisory Committee On Reactor Safeguards Thermal Hydraulic Phenomena Subcommittee Meeting, July 17, 2001, Pages 166-322. Author Affiliation: NRC/ACRS Document/Report Number: ACRST-3166 ***************************************************************** 12 Letter from Kenny C. Guinn, Governor to Spencer Abraham, Secretary of Energy, re: DOE's retainment of Winston &Strawn OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR One Hundred One North Carson Street Carson City, Nevada 89701 KENNY C. GUINN Governor August 1, 2001 Spencer Abraham, Secretary of Energy 1000 Independence Ave. S.W. Washington, D.C Dear Secretary Abraham: I am writing to express my deep concerns regarding the retainment of Winston & Strawn by the Office Of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management to represent the Department of Energy (DOE) in the preparation of DOE's license application for the proposed Yucca Mountain site and requisite proceedings before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). As you know, Winston & Strawn has been legal counsel to the former Yucca Mountain prime contractor, TRW, and has been preparing and perfecting various scientific studies and analysis for the proposed site since 1992. It has now come to our attention that since 1992, Winston &: Strawn has been a registered lobbyist for the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), the major lobbying arm for the nuclear energy industry. We understand Winston & Strawn has been engaged by NEI as a lobbyist on major nuclear issues including the proposed interim storage initiatives introduced in Congress over the past several sessions, and the recently released Environmental Protection Agency's radiation standards for the proposed site which are currently being challenged by Nevada in the federal district court. The lead lobbyist for Winston & Strawn on these controversial issues, James Curtiss, is identified as the attorney for the Winston & Strawn multi-million dollar contract with DOE pertaining to the potential Yucca Mountain licensing proceeding before the NRC. This situation presents serious issues concerning conflict of interest and possible bias in the site evaluation process. These facts are very disturbing in light of the recent DOE Inspector General's Report of Inquiry (Report). Not only did the Inspector General conclude there was no bias on the part of DOE or its contractors which would compromise the integrity of the site evaluation process, it reached this conclusion while the relationship between Winston & Strawn and DOE was ongoing, and while Winston & Strawn was engaged by NEI in lobbying efforts related to the proposed site. In light of these circumstances, it is important to review the Inspector General's recommendations, which state: [A]s the Department moves forward with the evaluation process, including the preparation and issuance of any new documents, we believe that the Department's seniors managers should take the opportunity to: (1) re-affirm the commitment to a site suitability evaluation process which is objective, unbiased and based on the best possible science; and (2) review its internal and contractor processes to ensure that this objective is faithfully executed. Report of Inquiry, Yucca Mountain Project, April 23, 2001. You reiterated this recommendation in a press statement following the release, concluding "we must ensure that our work does not even raise the perception of possible bias." The nexus between DOE's law firm and the lobbying arm of the nuclear industry calls into serious question the objectivity of post 1992 studies, analysis and conclusions by DOE concerning the proposed site. It is fair to say these circumstances have resulted in the production of tainted data by DOE since at least 1992 regarding site evaluation and suitability. Moreover, Winston & Strawn, cannot be deemed "independent" under the NRC's licensing rules, hence are unqualified to represent the DOE in any proceeding pertaining to the proposed site. As I am sure you understand, this situation seriously compromises the integrity of the evaluation on the suitability of Yucca Mountain, and erodes public confidence in DOE's evaluation of Yucca Mountain as the Nation's high-level nuclear waste repository. Program. I believe this situation warrants an immediate halt to the site evaluation and suitability process pending a complete and independent investigation external to DOE of the entire program. It might be that such a review will conclude DOE's entire program has been so prejudiced that any further consideration of Yucca Mountain as a nuclear waste repository must come to an end. Given these grave circumstances, I believe this matter warrants your immediate attention, and I look forward to your judicious response. Sincerely: --s-- KENNY C. GUINN Governor ***************************************************************** 13 Energy Secretary Praises Senate Energy Committee's Action to Move Forward Balanced and Comprehensive Energy Policy energy.gov - Headquarters' Press Release RELEASE DATE: August 1, 2001 [Print Friendly Version] --> WASHINGTON--U.S. Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham today praised the Senate Energy Committee's decision to move forward with comprehensive solutions to America's energy challenges, saying: "Senator Bingaman and Senator Murkowski understand the importance in crafting a comprehensive and balanced energy legislation to meet America's energy challenges. They deserve credit for the productive and substantive ideas that the Energy Committee will begin considering today. The administration will continue working with them and other members of the committee to move productive energy legislation forward to full Senate consideration and passage." "America's energy challenges are long-term problems that can not be solved with quick fixes or overnight magic. We need a comprehensive, long-term energy strategy that meets America's future needs, reduces our dependency on foreign sources of oil, and enacts reasonable initiatives to conserve." Media Contact: Jeanne Lopatto or Joe Davis, 202/586-4940 Release No. R-01-128 ***************************************************************** 14 Oak Ridge National Laboratory Price-Anderson Amendments Act Program Review [DOE Seal] Department of Energy Washington, DC 20585 July 24, 2001 Dr. William J. Madia Director Oak Ridge National Laboratory P.O. Box 2008 Oak Ridge, TN 37831-6255 Dear Dr. Madia: During the period June 26-28, 2001, the Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Price-Anderson Enforcement (OE) conducted a review of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) Price-Anderson Amendments Act (PAAA) Program.  This review included an evaluation of the site processes to screen noncompliances for applicability under the PAAA, for reporting and tracking in the Noncompliance Tracking System (NTS) and internal reporting and tracking systems, and for correcting deficiencies in a timely manner. Our review found your PAAA Program to be established with varying degrees of maturity noted among the individual Program functions. Specifically we observed that (1) your PAAA Program is implemented through formal procedures, (2) the PAAA Program is appropriately staffed with knowledgeable and experienced personnel dedicated to task, (3) comprehensive training of personnel involved in the various aspects of the Program is provided, (4) a multidiscipline and independent review board for determining NTS reportability is utilized by ORNL, (5) corrective actions for NTS reportable noncompliances are evaluated for effectiveness before closure, (6) NTS corrective action completion target dates are rarely exceeded, and (7) the Program seems to be supported by ORNL senior management. This last observation is evidenced by the Program’s being managed by a Level 1 manager with direct report to you. Our review also identified areas for Program improvement. Of particular concern is the checklist used by ORNL line organization personnel in screening potential PAAA noncompliances. The strict adherence to the checklist by excluding potential noncompliances which may involve support services or activities would significantly limit the scope of the quality assurance (QA) rule and is contrary to guidance provided by my office. The continued use of this checklist in its present form undermines the credibility of your PAAA related self-identification and reporting processes. Other areas of concern include timeliness of evaluating NTS reportability of some potential noncompliances, and lack of maturity associated with the trending of non-NTS noncompliances for repetitive or programmatic deficiencies. As I stated earlier, your PAAA Program staff is knowledgeable and experienced. However, their effectiveness appears limited by the information they receive from the ORNL line organizations. We clearly agree that line organization involvement is critical to the success of your PAAA Program, but at the current level of maturity of your Price-Anderson Program Officer (PPO) concept and the apparent inconsistencies in screening potential noncompliances is hindering the effectiveness of your PAAA Program. We are encouraged that your PAAA Program staff is conducting independent assessments of the ORNL line organization PAAA screening and reporting process. This, combined with continued training, should aid in bringing your PAAA Program to a greater state of maturity. Failure to improve the areas identified in the enclosure could result in a reduction or loss of mitigation as described in the DOE Enforcement Policy (10 CFR 820 Appendix A) for any future enforcement action. In addition, OE is currently involved in the development of an Enforcement Guidance Supplement (EGS) to outline our enforcement position relative to implementation of the Independent and Management Assessment requirements of 10 CFR 830.122. Towards that end, our onsite visit also included a review of the implementation of your Independent and Management Assessment Programs. Information obtained during our review will prove valuable in our development of the EGS; a summary of our review in this area is enclosed. No reply to this letter is required. Should you have any questions concerning our review please contact Richard Day of my staff at (301) 903-8371. Sincerely, [Keith Christopher Signature] R. Keith Christopher Director Office of Price-Anderson Enforcement Enclosures: PAAA Program Review Report Independent and Management Assessment Summary S. Cary, EH-1 M. Zacchero, EH-1 R. Day, OE T. Weadock, OE D. Stadler, EH-2 F. Russo, EH-3 R. Jones, EH-5 J. Decker, SC-1 R. Schwartz, SC-83 L. Dever, ORO M. McBride, ORO B. Hawks, ORO D. Rosine, DOE-ORNL PAAA Coordinator M. Walls, ORNL PAAA Coordinator Docket Clerk, OE OAK RIDGE NATIONAL LABORATORY PRICE-ANDERSON AMENDMENTS ACT PROGRAM REVIEW 1. Introduction During June 26-28, 2001, the Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Price-Anderson Enforcement (OE) Team conducted an onsite review of the UT-Battelle, LLC Price-Anderson Amendments Act (PAAA) Program at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). The Laboratory encompasses 11 nuclear facilities and over 800 radiological areas/activities. UT-Battelle LLC took over from Lockheed Martin Energy Research on April 1, 2000, and has undertaken several efforts aimed at improving their PAAA Program. The Team evaluated the Laboratory’s basic PAAA functions related to (1) identification and screening of potential PAAA noncompliances, (2) evaluation of noncompliance reportability into the Noncompliance Tracking System (NTS), (3) cause determination for both NTS reportable and internally reportable noncompliances, and (4) noncompliance corrective action identification and closure. In addition, the Team evaluated aspects of the Laboratory’s implementation of the PAAA Program through procedures, training, staffing, and breadth of application, as well as the Laboratory’s Bioassay Program. In evaluating site processes, the Team held discussions with cognizant ORNL personnel and reviewed documentation pertinent to the review. 2. General Program Implementation ORNL has established a PAAA Program infrastructure that is formalized, in large part, by a procedure titled ORNL P-AAA Compliance Monitoring and Noncompliance Reporting. This procedure identifies the general responsibilities of organizational entities to identify, categorize, report, correct and trend noncompliances with DOE’s nuclear safety rules. The Team found that, for the most part, the ORNL PAAA Program to be well established and implemented by formal procedure. However, requirements and guidance with regard to trending and criteria for internally reportable noncompliances is lacking. Specifically, ORNL described a comprehensive structure for trending NTS and non-NTS noncompliances where line organizations, functional cross cutting organizations (i.e., radiation services and quality) and the PAAA organization all had responsibility for trending and identifying repetitive or programmatic noncompliances. Implementation of this structured approach to trending is at a very immature phase in development with much reliance on an expert based approach (mentally reviewing past data for trends) rather than a formalized approach to develop and trend useful performance metrics. Of concern is the apparent lack of progress in trending made by ORNL since this issue was originally identified in the February 2000 Independent Assessment of Price-Anderson Amendments Act Program Implementation at Oak Ridge National Laboratory. ORNL has recently initiated an effort titled Lab Level Roll-Up of Low-Level Deficiencies to address this concern. In addition, ORNL distinguishes between noncompliances, which require trending, and those, which are internally reportable. However, this distinction is not proceduralized and no criteria have been established to aid in this determination. Three full time personnel, who are experienced, knowledgeable and dedicated to task, staff the ORNL PAAA Program. ORNL senior management commitment to the Program is demonstrated by the fact that the Program has been assigned to a Level 1 manager with direct report to the Laboratory Director. At the current level of activity, the staffing dedicated to the ORNL PAAA Program is adequate.  However, it is apparent that when full implementation and compliance with the ORNL Price-Anderson Program Officer (PPO) concept is realized, the current staff will be quickly overwhelmed with the task of evaluating the influx of potential noncompliances from the PPOs. In addition, ORNL line management’s expectation with regard to PPO resources may not be in line with that needed to meet the ORNL PAAA Program expectations. This issue will need to be addressed by senior ORNL management. PAAA related training provided by ORNL PAAA Program staff is determined to be both complete and comprehensive and is noted as a significant strength. PPOs are provided a three-day introductory training session covering all major aspects of the PAAA Program and exercises in case studies utilizing historical noncompliances and enforcement actions from across the DOE complex. In addition, monthly PPO working group meetings are sponsored by the ORNL PAAA Program staff to facilitate lessons learned and to communicate emerging PAAA related issues. ORNL PAAA Review Board staff is also provided training specific to the evaluation of potential noncompliances forwarded from the PPOs. PAAA Awareness training is offered to line management on an as requested basis. Worthy of special mention is the ORNL PAAA Program staff training provided to support organizations such as Procurement and Human Resources. This training covers all general PAAA topics with a special emphasis on those aspects of the ORNL PAAA Program, which impact their activities. Currently the ORNL General Employee Training does not address PAAA as such. Consequently, line organization workers may be unaware of the relationship between nuclear safety requirements, as promulgated through ORNL policies and procedures, and the ORNL PAAA Program. The Team reviewed appropriate documentation to assure that the breadth of the ORNL PAAA Program extends to both subcontractors and vendors. Through discussions with ORNL personnel and review of pertinent documentation, the Team concluded that the ORNL Program captures subcontractor and vendor work subject to PAAA nuclear safety rules. 3. Identification and Screening of Potential Noncompliances ORNL has made progress over the past year to improve the processes by which they identify and screen potential noncompliances. ORNL makes use of a comprehensive set of source documents from which potential PAAA noncompliances are identified. At ORNL, line management is responsible and held accountable for the identification of potential PAAA noncompliances. This approach relies heavily on PPOs from ORNL nuclear and radiological divisions as well as key support divisions to assure that (1) a comprehensive set of documentation feeds into the PPOs for consideration, (2) these documents are appropriately reviewed, (3) potential noncompliances are identified and reported, (4) root cause and corrective actions are identified, and (5) identified issues are tracked and trended to determine repetitive or programmatic deficiencies. Although procedures are in place and training has been provided to assure that PPOs uniformly perform their intended function, actual performance varies considerably between line organizations and falls somewhat short of expectations. This observation was supported by a review of several PPO spreadsheets to examine the extent by which Radiological Event Reports (RERs) are being screened and reported as potential PAAA noncompliances. Numerous examples were noted that line PPO’s failed to review and/or report RER related potential noncompliances to the ORNL PAAA Program staff. Additionally, the level of detail and documentation observed for screening by the PPO varied significantly between the PPOs. A commonly used tool by the PPOs to screen and identify potential PAAA noncompliances is the ORNL Price Anderson Amendments Act Potential Noncompliance Evaluation Guide. The checklist, integral to this guide, directs the PPO through a series of questions. OE’s review of the checklist identified that, if strictly adhered to, ORNL PPOs could inappropriately screen out all potential noncompliances unless they involved nuclear or fissionable material or impacted the facility authorization basis. This narrowing of the scope of the QA rule is contrary to the intent of the rule and guidance provided by OE (see EGS 00-03). It is acknowledged that this limitation incorporated into the checklist is contrary to that found in ORNL procedures and that communicated through training. There is evidence that some potential noncompliances related to support services or activities are being captured at ORNL. However, there remains a concern that many such noncompliances may not be completely and consistently addressed across ORNL line organizations. 4. Evaluation of NTS Reportability At ORNL potential PAAA noncompliances are identified by the line organization’s PPOs and forwarded to the ORNL PAAA Program staff for reportability evaluation. The ORNL PAAA Program staff performs an initial screen and those issues determined to be reportable are forwarded to the ORNL PAAA Program Review Board. Those issues determined to be non-reportable are tracked and trended. The Review Board then uses the ORNL Price Anderson Amendments Act Potential Noncompliance Evaluation Guide checklist and/or guidance provided by OE to determine if the potential noncompliance is NTS reportable. Those determined not to be NTS reportable are considered internally reportable. The Review Board is staffed by a multidiscipline group of professionals who are trained and knowledgeable in their assigned duties and are empowered to act on behalf of the Laboratory Director. The Review Board meets frequently (typically every two weeks) and is flexible in its meeting schedule as increased activity may demand. The ORNL PAAA Program staff is also proactive in identifying and evaluating potential noncompliances through their review of Occurrence Reporting and Processing System (ORPS) reports and other sources of information. A review of the ORNL Price Anderson Amendments Act Potential Noncompliance Evaluation Guide checklist used by the Review Board to aid in determining NTS reportability identified that the checklist is not complete in capturing the criteria listed in Table 3-2 of the OE operational procedures Identifying, Reporting, and Tracking Nuclear Safety Noncompliances under Price-Anderson Amendments Act of 1988. Specifically, ORPS Unusual Occurrences related to fires/explosions, loss of control of radioactive material, equipment degradation, and safety system actuations are not addressed by the checklist. A review of NTS or internally reportable PAAA noncompliances over the past year suggests that some of these types of occurrences are being captured. However, there remains a concern that some of these occurrences are not being captured. A review of the ORNL P-AAA Compliance Monitoring and Noncompliance Reporting procedure does not provide for any criteria by which the ORNL PAAA Program Coordinator determines which potential noncompliances are forwarded to the Review Board for their consideration. Discussion with the PAAA Coordinator revealed that this decision is based on his expertise and experience and no specific criteria exist. This lack of criteria could adversely impact the ORNL PAAA Program in that reporting consistency would be compromised should the current coordinator leave the Program or is absent for an extended period of time. A review of the 129 potential PAAA noncompliances submitted by the PPOs over the past year and recorded in the Price-Anderson Issues Management System (PIMS) database indicated that approximately 40% of these noncompliances were open and required additional information for reportability determination. Some of these noncompliances have been open pending additional information for over a year. A sampling of these open noncompliances revealed that, in some cases, the information had been obtained and the noncompliance had been processed. However, the database had not been updated. In other instances, the information had not been obtained and the timeliness of reportability determination is being significantly affected. 5. Cause Determination The Team reviewed the ORNL PAAA Program implementation documents for requirements pertaining to causal analysis for both NTS and internally reportable noncompliances. It was found that root cause analysis is required for all reportable PAAA noncompliances. New training has been established for the conduct of formal critiques for the more significant events at ORNL that should aid in the ORNL causal analysis effort. 6. Corrective Action Identification and Closure ORNL has formalized procedures for identification and tracking of corrective actions to include those determined to be NTS or internally reportable PAAA noncompliances. Corrective actions are entered and tracked using the Laboratory Issues Database System (LIDS). Corrective action validation and verification is performed by the line organization(s) responsible for implementation of the corrective action(s). NTS reportable noncompliances are not closed until jointly agreed to DOE/ORNL closure criteria have been met and an evaluation of the effectiveness of the implemented corrective actions has been determined. Discussion with DOE and ORNL in conjunction with a sampling of NTS reports reveals that ORNL has been extremely diligent in meeting target completion dates for identified corrective actions. The Team observed through the course of its review, that corrective actions identified by a given line organization only address those corrective actions associated with its organization. This approach hinders ORNL’s ability to identify corrective actions that may be needed to address those causal factors that have sitewide implications. 7. Issues Management Systems The LIDS serves as the Laboratory’s central repository for issues management. Corrective actions associated with both NTS and internally reportable PAAA noncompliances are tracked in the LIDS. The ORNL PAAA Program staff recently developed a much needed database (PIMS) to capture all potential PAAA noncompliances reported by the ORNL line organization PPOs. Due to limitations of the LIDS, many line organizations have developed their own unique issues management systems. Most often these systems are designed without consideration to compatibility with other systems outside their organization. This fragmented approach has led to a great deal of difficulty in tracking an issue that may be common to several line organizations. An effort is currently underway at ORNL that will address this issue. The PIMS (spell out first time is an issues management system used by the ORNL PAAA Program staff to track potential PAAA noncompliances submitted from the line organizations. Although, an important recent developmental effort, the database is lacking in several areas. Specifically, the database is not kept current as new information is obtained and some inaccuracies in data entry were noted. A review of the “Detail Reports” provided by the database indicates that, in many cases, the ORNL PAAA program staff communicated extensively with the line organizations to resolve reportability issues. OE reviewed the various issues management systems used by the ORNL line organization to track line specific potential PAAA noncompliances. This review revealed significant diversity in the format and content of the spreadsheets. Some line organizations had a very comprehensive and complete system while others were very lacking in the information provided which often led to difficulty in tracking an issue from their system to the PIMS. 8. Bioassay Program As a follow-up to the 1998 “bioassay moratorium,” OE staff reviewed selected elements of the implementation of the ORNL Internal Dosimetry Program.  This included review of selected procedures, discussion with cognizant personnel, and evaluation of selected documents associated with program implementation (surveys, RERs, bioassay results). Strength was noted in the internal dosimetry program regarding a program developed to attempt to ensure ORNL employee compliance with bioassay monitoring requirements. This program has two notable features. The first includes automated notification of the Internal Dosimetrist when an individual logs onto a Radiological Work Permit (RWP) which has bioassay requirements. The program automatically checks the individual’s bioassay profile and if the RWP requires monitoring for radionuclides for which the individual is not already required to be monitored for, it adds those radionuclides to the individual’s required bioassay profile. The second strength in this program is the automatic notification of individual’s of their scheduled bioassay. The program generates a list of individuals whose bioassay is due and automatically informs them of the requirements and schedules them for an appointment. If the individual is a no-show for their appointment, that person is rescheduled automatically for another appointment and a no-show letter is sent to the supervisor. If the individual again does not show up for an appointment, that person is again rescheduled and a no-show letter is sent to the next level of management. If the individual fails to obtain that bioassay, that person is again rescheduled and a no-show letter is sent to the next level of management. This system appears to be very effective in ensuring bioassay program participation. A concern was also noted associated with the implementation of procedural requirements for special bioassay monitoring. The Internal Dosimetry Program Technical Basis Document and ORNL-RP-520, “ORNL Bioassay Program” require special bioassay monitoring, “Following any incident or occurrence in which an unexpected intake/uptake of radioactive materials is suspected…” ORNL-RP-520 further states, “… the DSS Internal Dosimetrist, in consultation with RSS personnel, shall determine on a case-by-case basis when special monitoring is required. RSS personnel shall initiate bioassay monitoring under the following conditions if the Internal Dosimetrist (or designee) is absent or otherwise unavailable for consultation:...." The procedure then cites several examples of personnel contamination that would trigger the special bioassay monitoring requirements. A review of RERs was conducted and four personnel contamination events were picked, which met the special bioassay monitoring thresholds, to verify that special bioassay monitoring was conducted in accordance with the procedural requirements. Of the four individuals reviewed, one individual received a special bioassay 17 days after the event, one individual received a special bioassay one-month after the event, and the other two did not receive special bioassay monitoring. The procedure allows special bioassay not to be conducted after consultation with the Internal Dosimetrist. However, there does not appear to be any documentation to verify that the Internal Dosimetrist was consulted regarding the two individuals who did not receive special bioassays. Further, the Internal Dosimetrist did not remember being consulted about the events. It appears that there may be an issue with procedural compliance in ensuring that the special bioassay monitoring requirements of the procedure are adequately implemented. 9. Conclusion The OE Team review of the ORNL PAAA Program found the Program to be established by procedure and staffed with experienced and dedicated personnel. OE views the independent assessment of the ORNL PAAA Program in February 2000 and the ORNL line organization PAAA independent assessments being performed by the ORNL PAAA Program staff as a strong asset to continuous improvement of the Program. However, OE has concern with (1) the checklist used by the PPOs to screen potential noncompliances that if strictly applied could limit the scope of the QA rule, (2) inconsistency in identifying and reporting potential PAAA noncompliances by the PPOs, and (3) the lack of progress made by ORNL in the area of trending nonreportable issues that may collectively indicate a programmatic or repetitive noncompliance. Overall the OE Team considers the Laboratory’s PAAA Program to be mature in some areas and failing to meet OE expectations in other areas. The areas in which improvements are needed seem to be understood by ORNL and, in some cases, corrective action is currently underway. OE encourages ORNL to continue its efforts to bring their PAAA Program to a greater state of maturity. OFFICE OF PRICE-ANDERSON ENFORCEMENT INDEPENDENT AND MANAGEMENT ASSESSMENT REVIEW OAK RIDGE NATIONAL LABORATORY 1. INTRODUCTION During the period June 26-28, the DOE Office of Price-Anderson Enforcement (OE) reviewed elements of the UT-Battelle Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) Independent and Management Assessment (IMA) Program. This pilot review was performed to collect information for an Enforcement Guidance Supplement (EGS) that is currently being developed by OE. Once completed, the EGS will outline the OE enforcement position relative to the IMA requirements of 10 CFR 830.122 and will serve as a guide for future OE formal reviews of contractor IMA programs. Despite the pilot nature of the review, OE did identify areas of positive performance that are described below. The OE review also identified several deficient areas that, subsequent to the formal promulgation of the EGS, may reflect potential noncompliance with 10 CFR 830.122 requirements. These are also summarized below. 2. OVERVIEW Independent Assessment activities are conducted largely through the activities of the ORNL Quality Services Division (QSD) and the Office of Independent Oversight (IO). The QSD provides matrix quality assurance (QA) staff support to the various laboratory line organizations, and performs various assessments (vendor inspections, etc.) in support of line programs. The IO organization reports directly to the Laboratory Director, and performs evaluations of the effectiveness of line program operational processes. Laboratory Management Assessment (termed self-assessment) activities are conducted by the various line organizations in accordance with ORNL procedure ORNL-QA-P03, Rev. 2, ORNL Self-Assessment Program and various division-specific operating procedures. Divisions identify annual assessment plans to self-evaluate performance in areas reflective of company, division and/or facility specific goals. 3. RESULTS 1. The OE review identified various observations (both positive and negative) that are considered highly relevant to the development of the EGS criteria. These observations are summarized below. The following program strengths and/or positive initiatives were noted during the subject review: 1. Although the responsibility for Independent Assessment activities is shared by both QSD and IO, the assessment activities of the QSD were noted to be largely driven in response to customer (line management) request. Consequently, the IO organization fulfills a needed function in providing a more independent focus/role. 2. Recent reviews by the IO organization have included an emphasis on line management PAAA program implementation and processes. The IO organization is also initiating a series of reviews with emphasis on line management Corrective Action Programs. 3. The QSD assessment process was described in approved procedures and included requirements for auditor qualification/certification and standard terminology for issues. 4. The Operational Awareness Program (OAP) was generally noted as a positive initiative. Implementation has resulted in significant benefits (i.e., generation of lessons-learned) and has provided opportunity for DOE and contractor partnering. 2. The following areas of deficient implementation were also noted during the current review. Subsequent to issuance of the EGS and more formal OE reviews of this area, several of the following deficiencies would be considered potential noncompliances of 10 CFR 830.122 requirements. 1. Formal documentation describing the ORNL assessment programs is not fully in place. The ORNL QA Plan did not describe ORNL’s current assessment strategy. Various implementing procedures were in draft form. 2. Several of the ORNL systems functioning to identify quality problems (IO assessments, OAP reports, Radiological Event Reports) left it to the discretion of the issue recipient/owner to evaluate the issue, determine whether it required formal tracking, and disposition the issue. No drivers were in place to ensure a response to or tracking of the issue independent of the owner. Discussion with various contractor participants to the process indicated inconsistencies in the consequent level of issue response across Divisions. ORNL has recognized deficiencies with the issue management system and is evaluating an improved process. 3. Reviewed ORNL assessment reports used a variety of undefined terms to designate a quality problem or issue (i.e., deficiency, potential vulnerability, etc.). Consequently, it was not obvious which issues were of greater or lesser significance, which represented problems deserving response, etc. 4. Implementation of the Radiological Support Services (RSS) self-assessment program was providing effective follow-up to previously identified issues. The focus of the assessments was noted to be limited to performance by the RSS organization, however, rather than line management implementation of the Radiation Safety program. Trending of identified issues was also focused on specific details of the issue, rather than more generalized concerns (i.e., a general trend of radiological procedural noncompliance was not recognized as such since each individual radiological procedure was only violated once or twice). 5. Review of a recent QSD waste certification audit and associated documentation identified that several identified corrective actions were overdue, with no specific follow-up. Discussion with QSD staff indicated that audit team leads were not routinely requesting a response to transmitted audits nor concurring in developed corrective actions as required by their internal QSD audit procedure. The above items are provided for appropriate consideration by UT-Battelle. No response to OE is required for this pilot review report. ***************************************************************** 15 Inquiry to study cancer clusters at power stations © 2001 Independent Digital (UK) Ltd 02 August 2001 07:19 GMT+1 Home > News > UK > Environment By Ben Russell, Political Correspondent 01 August 2001 A wide-ranging Government inquiry is to examine claims that radiation from nuclear power stations caused clusters of leukaemia and other cancers, Michael Meacher, the Environment Minister, announced yesterday. The six-month scientific review will examine possible effects of radioactive discharges from power stations and natural sources, Mr Meacher said. The review, which will also examine claims that cancer is linked to high-voltage power cables, will look at the effects of radioactive particles that are swallowed or breathed in. Members of the Government's independent Committee on Medical Aspects of Radiation in the Environment will carry out the review, which was immediately welcomed by environmentalists and families living near Sellafield in Cumbria and other power stations. Martyn Day, a solicitor who unsuccessfully pursued cases in the 1990s on behalf of leukaemia victims living near power stations and pylons, said he was delighted. He said: "These are two major issues from the early 1990s that have not been resolved. I am delighted that the Government has taken this initiative. The families I represented who lived near Sellafield and other power stations or next to electricity pylons, will be very pleased." Mark Johnston, a nuclear campaigner at Friends of the Earth, said: "We would want to welcome the initiative today. "But the concern is that if there is still doubt about radioactivity in the environment and in our food chain then we should not be continuing to discharge radioactive effluent into the environment. "This is particularly so at Sellafield, which, despite international criticism, continues to discharge into the Irish Sea." The Environment Minister said: "This new working group will reach across all parties in the debate on risks of radiation, to assess the impact and reach a consensus on whether the current risk models continue to be valid." * Protesters in Germany tried in vain last night to block a shipment of 21 spent nuclear fuel rods destined for Sellafield. The 40 anti-nuclear activists gathered as the consignment of nuclear waste was driven out of a plant at Neckarwestheim, in the southern state of Baden-Wuerttemberg, to a nearby depot to be loaded on to a train for the journey to Britain. But they were dispersed quickly and the convoy continued guarded by about 700 officers. Protesters along the route had been banned. A second shipment of atomic waste left a nuclear power plant at Brunsbuettel in northern Schleswig-Holstein last night, to be taken France. ***************************************************************** 16 Donald B. Allen Named NRC Senior Resident Inspector at Comanche Peak Region IV -- 2001- 41 - UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, REGION IV 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400, Arlington TX 76011 No. IV-01-041 July 31, 2001 CONTACT: Breck Henderson Phone: 817-860-8128 Cellular: 817-917-1227 e-mail: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has named Donald B. Allen senior resident inspector at Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, a nuclear power plant near Glen Rose, Texas. Mr. Allen joins resident inspector Scott Schwind. Mr. Allen graduated from Bradley University in Peoria, Illinois, with a Bachelor of Science degree in Physics. After service in the United States Air Force, Mr. Allen worked for Westinghouse as an instructor at a submarine reactor prototype in Idaho. Mr. Allen has over twenty years experience as a test engineer in commercial nuclear power plants. Mr. Allen joined the NRC in 1996 as a project engineer in Region IV offices, Arlington, Texas, in the Division of Reactor Projects. He has also served as resident inspector at Diablo Canyon near San Luis Obispo, California. Mr. Allen assumed his new position at Comanche Peak in early July. ***************************************************************** 17 NRC Assigns New Resident Inspector to Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Plant Press Release - Region I - 2001-049 - UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, REGION I 475 Allendale Road, King of Prussia, Pa. 19406 No. I-01-049 August 1, 2001 CONTACT: Diane Screnci (610)337-5330/ e-mail: dps@nrc.gov Neil A. Sheehan (610)337-5331/e-mail: nas@nrc.gov Nuclear Regulatory Commission officials in King of Prussia, Pa., have selected Leonard Cline as the agency's resident inspector at the Calvert Cliffs nuclear power plant. He joins Senior Resident Inspector David Beaulieu at the Lusby, Md., plant. Cline joined the NRC as a reactor engineer in the Region I office in September 1999. He was then assigned as a reactor inspector in the Performance Evaluation Branch in the Region's Division of Reactor Safety. Prior to joining the Agency, he was an officer in the United States Navy, where he completed the Navy's nuclear training program. Cline earned a bachelor's degree in civil engineering from Pennsylvania State University. Each U.S. commercial nuclear power plant has at least two NRC resident inspectors. They serve as the agency's eyes and ears at the facility, conducting regular inspections, monitoring significant work projects and talking with plant workers and the public. The Calvert Cliffs resident inspectors can be reached at 410/586-2626. ***************************************************************** ***************************************************************** NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARTICLES ***************************************************************** 1 House OKs Extended Veterans Benefits Las Vegas SUN July 31, 2001 WASHINGTON (AP) - The House voted Tuesday to expand the list of service-connected illnesses for Vietnam and Persian Gulf veterans and approve a cost-of-living increase for veterans' benefits. The legislation, passed 422-0, adds Type II diabetes to the list of diseases presumed to be service-connected in Vietnam veterans exposed to Agent Orange and other herbicides. It also, as of next April, adds chronic fatigue syndrome; fibromyalgia, a painful disease of the connective tissue; and chronic multi-symptom illness to the list of undiagnosed diseases that can qualify a veteran of the 1991 Gulf War for compensation. "There are thousands of veterans, who bravely served during the Gulf War, today suffering from undiagnosed illnesses deserving of compensation," said Rep. Christopher Smith, R-N.J., chairman of the Veterans' Affairs Committee. Smith, the sponsor, said the bill would also extend the period for providing compensation to Persian Gulf veterans to Dec. 31, 2003, so that newly eligible veterans have time to have their claims considered. The bill next goes to the Senate for consideration. Scientists have looked into nerve gas, anti-anthrax vaccines, depleted uranium and other possible factors, but have been unable to find a specific cause for some of the illnesses - including fatigue, skin rashes, cancers and muscle pain - afflicting tens of thousands of troops who served in the Gulf War. Congress passed legislation in 1994 granting the Veterans Affairs Department the authority to compensate those with difficult-to-diagnose and ill-defined illnesses, but veterans groups have complained that it is still difficult to gain compensation. "The VA has been too rigid and too restrictive on that," said Jim Fischl, director of veterans affairs and rehabilitation at the American Legion. He said his organization was pleased with the bill, but would prefer that Congress extend indefinitely the period during which a veteran can exhibit symptoms and apply for service-connected compensation. Thousands of veterans also returned home with ailments later linked to Agent Orange, a defoliant used to clear areas of jungle during the Vietnam War. Among the illnesses that have been linked to the herbicide are soft tissue cancer, Hodgkin's disease, non-Hodgkin's lymphoma and multiple myeloma. Some 21,000 service-connected claims have been granted. The measure passed Tuesday codifies steps already taken by the VA to add Type II diabetes to the list. The bill gives the nation's 2.3 million disabled veterans, or survivors of disabled veterans receiving compensation, a 2.7 percent cost-of-living adjustment, effective Dec. 1. Smith said these veterans would receive an additional $2.7 billion in benefits over five years. The measure also allows payment of National Service Life Insurance or U.S. Government Life Insurance policies to alternate beneficiaries when the first beneficiary can't be located within three years of the death of the insured. There are an estimated 4,000 cases in which life insurance policies have not been paid out because the beneficiary has not come forward or can't be found. --- The bill is H.R. 2540. All contents copyright 2001 Las Vegas SUN, Inc. ***************************************************************** 2 RFK Jr. Completes Vieques Sentence Las Vegas SUN Today: August 01, 2001 at 13:35:32 PDT VIEQUES, Puerto Rico- Environmental lawyer Robert F. Kennedy Jr. left prison Wednesday after completing a 30-day sentence for trespassing on U.S. Navy lands on Vieques. He immediately returned to the island to encourage protesters planning to invade the Navy bombing range here. Kennedy, who brought his 7-year-old son Connor to Vieques, was accompanied by New York labor leader Dennis Rivera, who also served a 30-day sentence for trespassing on Navy land in a bid to stop the last round of exercises in late April and early May. Earlier Wednesday, the two emerged from a federal detention center in a San Juan suburb, on the main island of Puerto Rico, flashing peace signs echoing the "Peace for Vieques" slogan. Kennedy had his arm around his son, who held a little red flag that read "Paz," or peace. The Navy plans to resume exercises on Vieques on Thursday, ignoring the results of a nonbinding referendum this weekend in which 68 percent of voters chose an immediate end to the bombing on the island of 9,400 people. "I'm disappointed that they decided to go ahead with the exercise when they should respect the will of the people of Vieques," Kennedy said shortly after his arrival. "It is an exercise in bullying." "We are going to continue putting on the pressure," promised Rivera, a Puerto Rican who heads New York City's 210,000-member health care union. "If the president doesn't order an end to the bombing, people will perceive him as a bully of a community that has helped so much in national defense." Thirty percent supported the Navy remaining indefinitely and resuming bombing with live munitions - a protest vote against the alleged anti-American policies of Gov. Sila Calderon, who called the referendum. Only 1.7 percent of Vieques voters in Sunday's referendum backed President Bush's plan for the Navy to withdraw in 2003 and continue exercises with dummy bombs until then. Years of resentment over the Navy's appropriation of two-thirds of the 18-mile-long Vieques island in 1940 and the following decades of exercises exploded in anger and protests when two 500-pound bombs dropped off target on the range and killed a civilian guard in 1999. Protesters occupied the range for a year before federal marshals forcibly removed them. The protesters have continued a campaign of breaking into Navy land to try to stop bombing runs. Hundreds have been arrested and convicted. The cause has drawn celebrities including New York civil rights leader the Rev. Al Sharpton, who is serving a 90-day sentence in New York City. Protesters say the bombing has fouled the environment and damaged the health of islanders, charges the Navy strongly denies. "Civil disobedience has been the only method that has been effective in detaining the bombing," Kennedy told reporters on Vieques' Esperanza beach, where he and Rivera boarded the same fishing boat that took them to the Navy's seaside bombing ground in April. This time, they only toured the bay. Kennedy said he and Rivera would return to San Juan later Wednesday and to New York on Thursday. Last week, Kennedy's wife Mary decided to name their newborn son Aidan Caohman Vieques Kennedy. He was born while his father was in prison. All contents copyright 2001 Las Vegas SUN, Inc. ***************************************************************** 3 DEQ denies federal request to delay cleanup at INEEL IdahoStatesman.com August 1, 2001 The Associated Press State environmental regulators have again rejected a federal bid to extend for up to 13 years the deadlines for cleaning up buried radioactive waste at the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory. Steve Allred, director of the Idaho Department of Environmental Quality, on Tuesday affirmed his March decision denying the U.S. Department of Energy's extension request for the troubled Pit 9 cleanup project. Allred said the proposed delays would jeopardize removal of the buried waste by 2018 as required under the state's landmark 1995 waste cleanup agreement with the federal government. Charles Findley, acting regional administrator of the federal Environmental Protection Agency, agreed with the decision, Allred said. The Energy Department has three weeks to ask Gov. Dirk Kempthorne, EPA Administrator Christine Whitman and Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham for a review. U.S. Sens. Michael Crapo and Larry Craig and U.S. Rep. Michael Simpson said they supported the state's position and called on the Energy Department to live up to its cleanup commitments. Pit 9 is one of several pits and trenches on the sprawling eastern Idaho reservation where the government buried plutonium-contaminated waste, mostly from its Rocky Flats weapons plant in Colorado, before 1970. The current cleanup deadlines were set in 1997, when the federal government paid nearly $1 million in fines for failing to meet deadlines outlined in a 1993 decision to embark on buried waste cleanup at INEEL. The Energy Department was to use Pit 9 as the prototype for cleaning up the other 87 acres of buried waste. In seeking a deadline extension, the Energy Department said the conceptual design of the Pit 9 plan underestimated safety issues. ***************************************************************** 4 Leaked compound nonradioactive [Las Vegas Review-Journal] Wednesday, August 01, 2001 Copyright © Las Vegas Review-Journal Governor, others say more care needs to be taken in transport By KEITH ROGERS REVIEW-JOURNAL A puncture in a shipping container allowed a foaming compound to trickle out of a metal box on a flatbed truck while low-level nuclear waste was being hauled from upstate New York to the Nevada Test Site, a state health official said Tuesday. He said the damaged container and its contents posed no public health concern. "One of the two metal boxes apparently had something in it that caused a hole. The team was able to put a patch of sorts over the crack and seal it with a plastic material," said Stan Marshall, radiological health manager of the Nevada State Health Division. He was describing the efforts of an Energy Department team that was dispatched Monday to West Wendover in Elko County in northeastern Nevada where local authorities secluded an International Waste Removal Inc. truck after the driver noticed foam on the truck's bed while washing down some spilled diesel fuel at a truck stop. He said the team verified first assessments by local emergency responders that "there was no loss of radioactivity from the container." Marshall said the sandlike material that leaked through the quarter-inch-thick steel box "is not considered a hazard. It is considered nonradioactive." The material known as "Waterworks" is packed with low-level radioactive waste shipments to keep the waste dry by absorbing condensation. It turns into a foam when it comes in contact with water. Gov. Kenny Guinn said the incident illustrates the problems with transporting nuclear waste by truck or train, especially high-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel that the Energy Department wants to haul across the nation to the proposed Yucca Mountain repository. "It's unfortunate that it takes a near catastrophe to make the point that we in Nevada have been trying to make for years -- that the transportation of nuclear waste poses an unacceptable risk to every single community through which this material would be transported," Guinn said in a statement Tuesday. Kalynda Tilges, nuclear issues coordinator for Citizen Alert, a statewide environmental group, said the West Wendover incident heightens awareness about the potential for a more dangerous accident involving high-level nuclear waste. "Low-level radiation doesn't necessarily mean low-level danger," she said, referring to the different grades of low-level radioactive waste. "How on Earth can we trust them with high-level waste in containers that haven't been built or tested fully?" An Energy Department spokesman at the agency's headquarters in Washington, D.C., said the metal box the team examined was transported on another truck to an Envirocare facility in Utah for short-term storage. "There was no radioactive readings on anything that was tested. There was no release of radioactivity," Energy Department spokesman Joe Davis said. Marshall said the truck that had been detained would deliver the remaining six containers Tuesday night for disposal at the test site, 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas. After that, it was to travel to Utah and pick up the repackaged container and return it to the West Valley Demonstration Project, 30 miles south of Buffalo, N.Y. The truck left West Valley, N.Y., on Friday with a contaminated cargo of pipes, valves and packing material from a dismantled, nuclear waste reprocessing project. This story is located at: http://www.lvrj.com/lvrj_home/2001/Aug-01-Wed-2001/news/16666759.html ***************************************************************** 5 Ex-Flats worker sues over beryllium disease Rocky Mountain News: Local Suit targets Ohio-based Brush Wellman Inc. By Karen Abbott, News Staff Writer A former Rocky Flats employee sued Ohio-based Brush Wellman Inc. in Denver Tuesday, claiming the company's products gave him chronic beryllium disease. Gary Coven, 52, sued in Colorado U.S. District Court, along with his wife, Connie. Brush Wellman officials couldn't be reached Tuesday. The lawsuit said Gary Coven worked at the Rocky Flats plant near Golden from 1970 to 1973 as a janitor, a machinist trainee and a radiation monitor. The now-defunct nuclear weapons plant used a variety of radioactive and other toxic materials, including beryllium. The lawsuit said Gary Coven was exposed to airborne beryllium particles, dust and powder while working at Rocky Flats. People with chronic beryllium disease have difficulty breathing, chest pain, coughing, fatigue and weight loss, the lawsuit said. "Chronic beryllium disease is incurable and typically progressive, and may lead to total disability, heart failure and death," the lawsuit said. Forty-seven other former Rocky Flats workers have lawsuits pending against Brush Wellman in state court in Jefferson County, alleging they developed beryllium disease from the company's products. An additional 75 such lawsuits, involving about 200 plaintiffs, are pending against the company nationwide. Last month Brush Wellman won a jury trial in a Jefferson County case involving four former Rocky Flats workers. The plaintiffs' lawyers, claiming the jury didn't understand the complex case, have said they will seek a new trial or appeal the verdict. August 1, 2001 2001 © The E.W. Scripps Co. ***************************************************************** 6 Volunteers to join Fallon leukemia probe Today: August 01, 2001 at 9:55:35 PDT By Mary Manning LAS VEGAS SUN Federal and state scientists this week will begin selecting families for biological and environmental tests in an attempt to determine what has caused a childhood leukemia cluster in Fallon. Fourteen cases of childhood leukemia have been identified in the community during the past three years. All of the cases have no apparent common link except that they occurred in children who live or had lived in Fallon, 60 miles east of Reno. Representatives from the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta will begin, on a random basis, calling families for their voluntary participation in a comprehensive health and environmental study, officials said on Friday. CDC scientists will collect blood, urine and possibly skin cell samples from families who were been affected by childhood cancer. Families in Fallon who have not been affected by leukemia will be tested, as well. For the next month or more disease investigators will interview and test up to 200 volunteers. Other investigators will sample air, soil and water in the family homes and other sites to be determined in Fallon. For each family that volunteers to provide blood, urine or environmental samples such as water, soil and dust, four other families without a history of childhood cancer will be selected, state epidemiologist Randall Todd said. The CDC has set up a medical wing in the Churchill Community Hospital in Fallon, Todd said. The scientific techniques for detecting such trace amounts of chemicals and toxins did not exist until recently, he said. "This technology never existed two or three years ago, and it is the first time it has been used on a cancer cluster," Todd said. Specimens will be packed in dry ice and sent to Atlanta for analysis, Todd said. People with questions about the Fallon sampling program can call state Health Department spokesman John Flamm at (775) 684-4221 or toll-free at (888) 608-4623. All contents copyright 2001 Las Vegas SUN, Inc. ***************************************************************** 7 SELLS Meeting Announcement DOE/SELLS Fall 2001 Meeting Tuesday through Thursday, October 23-25, 2001, American Museum of Science and Energy Oak Ridge, TN The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Society for Effective Lessons Learned Sharing (SELLS) Fall Workshop will be hosted by DOE Oak Ridge and the Oak Ridge Contractors October 23-25, 2001. All interested parties are welcome to attend. The theme for the workshop will be "Lessons Learned Integration." Workshop sessions will include discussions of ways to improve Lessons Learned Programs with a focus on integrating multiple programs at a Site and integrating DOE Lessons Learned Programs with commercial business programs. Interested contributors and/or participants are invited to submit additional topic ideas and/or abstracts by e-mail to one of the following individuals no later than September 15, 2001: + John Bickford at: John_C_Bickford@rl.gov + Mike Smith at: smithmc@oro.doe.gov + Bobbie Smith at: bsmith@legin.com The abstract should be long enough to convey the substance of your proposed paper or presentation. Please include estimated time needed for presentation to assist in agenda development and scheduling. PROPOSED TOPICS: New member orientation briefing and Q & A session Multi-contractor/DOE LL Program Assessments BNFL "Learning from Experience Colonial Pipeline LL Program Integrating with Industry (panel discussion) Yucca Mountain Project LL Program growth Near miss investigations Activity level feedback process and system The above topics are only suggestions. Additional related topics are welcome. REGISTRATION: Please register for the workshop by 9/30/2001 using the on-line form at http://tis.eh.doe.gov/ll/sells/sellsrgistr.cfm. If you have trouble with that form, please send an e-mail to John Bickford or FAX your name, address, e-mail, and telephone number to (509) 376-6112. Hotel reservations must be made separately (see below). HOTEL ARRANGEMENTS: A block of 50 rooms has been reserved at the at the government rate of $55.00 per night (does NOT include 13.5% tax). Reservations must be made before September 30, 2001. Please let the Inn know that you will be with the "DOE SELLS Conference." 433 South Rutgers Avenue Oak Ridge, TN 37830 (800) 553-7830 or (865) 481-8200 or register on-line through the Inns Web page. The Inn Web site has a map and directions. The Museum is 1/2 mile west of the Inn. WORKSHOP LOCATION: Early registration will be available in the Comfort Inn hospitality room starting at 3:00 p.m. on October 22, 2001. Registration for the workshop at the American Museum of Science and Energy will begin at 7:30 a.m., Tuesday, October 23, 2001. The workshop itself will begin at 8:00 a.m. An agenda will be posted to the SELLS Website (http://tis.eh.doe.gov/ll/sells/mtg200110/Agenda.htm) as it develops. OTHER INFORMATION SOURCES: Oak Ridge Convention and Visitors Bureau: http://www.visit-or.org Oak Ridge Chamber Of Commerce: http://orcc.org Anderson County Chamber of Commerce: Roane County Convention and Visitors Bureau: Roane County Chamber of Commerce: same as above ***************************************************************** 8 Event to honor Hiroshima victims Oak Ridger Online --> Story last updated at 1:02 p.m. on Wednesday, August 1, 2001 by Paul Parson and Beverly Majors Oak Ridger staff Hundreds of people are expected to gather Sunday afternoon at the Y-12 National Security Complex for an annual event that honors the victims of the bombing of Hiroshima and calls for an end to nuclear weapons production. Ralph Hutchison, coordinator for the Oak Ridge Environmental Peace Alliance, said he anticipates that 200 to 450 people will attend Sunday's event. Around 200 people attended last year, he added. As in the past, participants will gather at A.K. Bissell Park around 10 a.m. Sunday and begin marching to Y-12 at 10:30 a.m. A rally and demonstration will follow on the front lawn of Y-12. By mid-afternoon, according to Hutchison, some participants will risk arrest during a civil resistance action by attempting to cross a border and go into Y-12. Oak Ridge Police Capt. Bill Moehl said officers will handle the protesters the same way as in the past. "If someone violates the law we will charge them appropriately with the offense they commit," Moehl said. In past protests, police officers have charged protesters with criminal trespassing under a state statute. District Attorney James N. Ramsey in the past has refused to prosecute those charges and has dismissed them, stating that the cases should have been prosecuted under a city ordinance. In August 2000, Ramsey wrote a letter to Police Chief David H. Beams stating that his office would prosecute felonies and serious misdemeanors, such as assault, that arise from demonstrations. He wrote that he expected the city of Oak Ridge to use its city court and municipal ordinances to prosecute violations of minor infractions such as trespassing or disturbing the peace. Moehl said federal charges would not be placed against demonstrators who venture onto government property. "The U.S. attorney deemed it not important enough for them," Moehl said. The federal government created the Oak Ridge Reservation in 1943 to help develop the first atomic bomb. The uranium enriched at Y-12 ultimately fueled the "Little Boy" bomb, which was dropped on Hiroshima, Japan, near the end of World War II in 1945. Officially, the 56th anniversary of the Hiroshima bombing is on Monday. Hutchison said those involved in planning Sunday's events felt they should also do something on Monday. So, from 6 to 9 a.m., a group will gather on the front lawn of Y-12 to have a ceremony in which they read the names of victims from the Hiroshima bombing. "It's truly a remembrance ceremony," Hutchison said. All Contents ©Copyright The Oak Ridger ***************************************************************** 9 Y-12 to lay off 30, more to follow Oak Ridger Online --> Story last updated at 1:03 p.m. on Wednesday, August 1, 2001 by Paul Parson Oak Ridger staff The warning shots were fired earlier this year that layoffs were coming at the Y-12 National Security Complex. Now, it appears the first casualties will be notified very soon. BWXT Y-12, which manages the Department of Energy facility, plans to issue "reduction in force" notices to 30 of the 60 employees in the plant's Advanced Infrastructure Management Technologies group. "There's no specified date," replied Bill Wilburn, spokesman for BWXT Y-12, when asked when the notices would be served. "It's very soon." These reductions are part of the 200 positions that BWXT Y-12 announced in May that it would eliminate by mid-2002. Impacted employees will receive 30 days' notice plus an additional 30 days pay, for a total of 60 days' pay, along with severance benefits, displaced workers' medical benefits and outplacement services, according to Wilburn. Wilburn said the Advanced Infrastructure Management Technologies group is being reorganized and the 30 employees not laid off will be placed in other divisions within Advanced Technologies, the parent organization for the group. The reductions are based upon a decline in work for the group. The Advanced Infrastructure Management Technologies group provides a variety of environmental and infrastructure services to federal agencies, including technology integration, project management and risk assessment and software tools. An example is the Advanced Integrated Information Management System, which is an information integration tool used by Department of Defense installations. The majority of the overall position reductions at Y-12 are based on the need to adjust the company's "skills mix" and the need to reduce staffing in overhead and administrative areas not directly associated with the plant's national defense mission, according to Wilburn. BWXT Y-12 -- an alliance between Bechtel National Inc. and BWX Technologies Inc. -- officially took over full responsibility for Y-12 on Nov. 1. The organization was one of four entities that competed for the five-year, $2.5 billion contract to manage and operate Y-12. All Contents ©Copyright The Oak Ridger ***************************************************************** 10 Technology Visions Group Announces Expansion of Contract with Bechtel BWXT Wednesday August 1, 8:31 am Eastern Time Press Release SOURCE: Technology Visions Group, Inc. CARLSBAD, Calif., Aug. 1 /PRNewswire/ -- Technology Visions Group, Inc. (OTC Bulletin Board: TVGR- news) reported today that its previously announced contract with Bechtel BWXT Idaho's Environmental Restoration Department to perform a Bench Testing Grout Treatability Study has been significantly expanded. ``Bechtel was impressed with TVGI's technical service, support and management of this important environmental project. We are pleased and gratified that Bechtel has asked us to expand our existing contract to manage the testing of additional grout materials for the disposal of radioactive waste,'' said James B. Lahey, President of TVGI. ``We believe this represents a considerable step forward in the development of the Company as a leader in the hazardous waste management industry.'' TVGI's original contract with Bechtel BWXT was signed in July 2000. The treatability study was designed to determine the suitability of in-situ grout as a treatment option for the stabilization of transuranic (TRU) and mixed waste forms buried at the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL) Subsurface Disposal Area (SDA). Among the modifications added to the new contract, TVGI will examine the diffusion of the organics present in organic sludge through a matrix consisting of soil and certain grout candidates that are being evaluated for the containment of low-level radioactive mixed waste. Technology Visions Group, Inc., is an intellectual property holding company that identifies, develops and acquires new and innovative technologies and devises applications for commercialization through licensing or joint ventures. This press release contains statements that constitute forward-looking statements made pursuant to the ``safe harbor'' provisions of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Investors are cautioned that forward-looking statements involve risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results to differ materially from the statements. Factors that may cause or contribute to such differences include, amount other things, the Company's dependence on one customer, changes in business conditions and the economy in general, changes in governmental regulations, unforeseen litigation and other risk factors identified. The Company undertakes no obligation to update these forward-looking statements for revisions or changes after the date of this press release. SOURCE: Technology Visions Group, Inc. ***************************************************************** 11 Workers will get checks shortly The Paducah Sun Paducah, Kentucky Wednesday, August 01, 2001 By Bill Bartleman bbartleman@paducahsun.com--270.575.8650 The first $150,000 compensation checks for sick Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant workers and their surviving family members could be delivered as early as next week. Labor Secretary Elaine Chao hopes to visit two communities next week "regarding the energy workers program," according to Stuart Roy, spokesman for the U.S. Department of Labor. One of the first checks is expected to be issued to Clara Harding of Paducah, whose husband, Joe Harding, died of cancer more than 20 years ago after making public claims his illness was caused by his work at the plant. She has maintained a high profile because of taped comments her husband made about his illness. She also has testified before Congress and received a special award from former Energy Secretary Bill Richardson recognizing her for efforts to publicize conditions at the plant. Partly because of publicity she generated, Congress approved a compensation program for nuclear weapons workers who became ill because of work-related conditions. The program pays a $150,000 lump sum plus future medical costs. Department of Labor personnel began processing claims Tuesday. Roy said the easiest claims to process will be those filed by former workers at gaseous diffusion plants in Paducah, Oak Ridge, Tenn., and Portsmouth, Ohio. Those former workers or surviving family members have to prove only that they have certain types of cancer. Under the federal compensation legislation, it is assumed the cancer was caused by exposure to radiation and other chemicals at the plants. Cases from other Department of Energy facilities will take longer to process because workers must prove their illness was caused by exposure. Roy said officials hope that within two weeks, checks are being issued by the federal government on a regular basis. "We don't want to get people's hopes up ... and are careful not to raise expectations," Roy said. "But that's our goal." ***************************************************************** 12 DOE HEALTH NEWS LETTER /Office of Environment, Safety and Health · U.S. Department of Energy · Washington, DC 20585 The Office of Environment, Safety and Health (EH) publishes the Operating Experience Summary to promote safety throughout the Department of Energy (DOE) complex by encouraging the exchange of lessons-learned information among DOE facilities. To issue the Summary in a timely manner, EH relies on preliminary information such as daily operations reports, notification reports, and, time permitting, conversations with cognizant facility or DOE field office staff. If you have additional pertinent information or identify inaccurate statements in the Summary, please bring this to the attention of Frank Russo, 301-903-1845, or Internet address Frank.Russo@eh.doe.gov, so we may issue a correction. Operating Experience Summary 2001-02 TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. FORKLIFT OPERATION INJURES WORKER1 2. NEAR MISS OF EXOTHERMIC REACTION DUE TO LOSS OF AIR SUPPLY2 3. NEAR MISS FROM AMMONIUM NITRATE REACTION2 4. TUBE BUNDLE REACTION LEADS TO PRICE-ANDERSON ACTION4 5. INADEQUATE VERIFICATION OF VALVE CLOSURE CAUSES SAFETY CONCERNS5 6. INADEQUATE PRE-JOB BRIEFING CAUSES CRITICALITY CONCERNS7 EVENTS 1. Forklift Operation Injures Worker On March 15, 2001, a 900-pound steel frame fell from a forklift at the East Tennessee Technology Park Building K-31, causing a cut and contusion on a nearby worker’s head near the temple. This is one of an extensive series of injuries and near misses occurring during forklift operations across the DOE complex. (ORPS Report ORO--BNFL-K31-2001-0001) An experienced forklift operator was moving two large steel channel frames. He loaded each on a forklift tine, but tied down neither. The operator lifted the frames a short distance and backed out slowly, but stopped and reversed his direction to allow another forklift to pass. This latter motion caused one of the frames to topple and injure a nearby worker. The worker tried to avoid contact with the falling frame, but pallets blocked his movement. The onsite medical staff sutured, bandaged, and iced the worker’s cut and observed him for signs of concussion before releasing him to return to work. The contractor’s initial investigation identified several causes related to poor work planning: 1) unstable positioning of a hazardous load; 2) workers too close to the hazardous load; 3) forklift rights-of-way not established or understood; and 4) poor communication between the forklift operator and workers. As a corrective action, the contractor briefed all work crews on the contents of two Safety Notes related to forklift right-of-way and safety near a load. The contractor is also reviewing and revising Enhanced Work Plans to better address hazard controls for load stabilization and work area control. Six ORPS reports from the past two years noted forklift operations that resulted in personal injuries. Nine other reports noted heavy loads dropped from forklifts that were near misses. For example, there was a series of forklift-related occurrences at Rocky Flats, culminating on May 3, 2000, in which five Pipe Overpack Components (POCs) were dropped, each weighing over 200 pounds. Although no one was injured, the contractor immediately ordered a sitewide stand-down on forklift operations. Corrective actions included developing a method to secure the POCs to forklifts and ensuring that all forklift operations have a job hazard analysis. (ORPS Report RFO--KHLL-TRANSOPS-2000-0004) As another example, on August 8, 2000, a forklift operator at INEEL dropped a 600-pound load consisting of a wooden storage box containing a lead pig while attempting to move it from a storage rack nine feet high. The operator assumed the box was evenly loaded and lifted it at its center, but the load was off-center and the box fell. Corrective actions included labeling packages with off-center loads and training forklift operators to use caution in picking up unmarked objects. (ORPS Report ID--BBWI-SMC-2000-0007) Two Operating Experience Weekly Summary articles written in 1999 (Nos. 99-17 and 99-23) also addressed heavy loads dropped from forklifts, one concerning an occurrence at Oak Ridge that injured two workers. In October 1996, the DOE Office of Oversight issued a Special Study of Hoisting and Rigging Incidents within the Department of Energy that indicated forklifts caused one-third of all hoisting and rigging incidents and 38 percent of all accidents. Forklift operations continue to pose a significant risk to workers, particularly when heavy loads are not secured to the forklift before moving. Experience indicates that proper job hazard analysis and planning can reduce this risk. KEYWORDS: OSHA/industrial hygiene – injury; OSHA/industrial hygiene – near miss other ISM Core Functions: Analyze the Hazards, Develop and Implement Hazard Controls 2. NEAR MISS OF EXOTHERMIC REACTION DUE TO LOSS OF AIR SUPPLY On February 4, 2001, an electrical power outage at the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant shut down supplies for the plant and instrument air. This led to a sequence of events that threatened the safety of a hydriding reaction in Building 9204-2. The loss of air supplies was not fully anticipated in the facility’s design. Without a notification or alarm warning of the loss of air supplies, the facility operator was fortunate to promptly detect the loss and take the necessary actions to place the ongoing reaction into a safe condition. (ORPS Report ORO--BWXT-Y12SITE-2001-0007) A hydriding operation was underway in Building 9204-2 when the electric power and air supplies were lost. A reactor furnace was nearing its peak operational temperature, as melted lithium metal inside was being fed deuterium to form lithium deuteride. The loss of instrument air pressure caused the reactor’s deuterium supply valves to shut automatically. Subsequently, the molten lithium’s absorption of the remaining gas in the reactor created a partial vacuum in the reactor vessel. The O-ring used to seal the reactor vessel was not rated for reactor temperatures, and depended upon plant air for cooling. Loss of plant air during this event threatened to breach the O-ring’s integrity, and would have led to an inrush of room air into the vessel due to the partial vacuum. The molten lithium’s sudden exposure to air could have caused a violent exothermic reaction or explosion. In previous cases of failed plant and instrument air supplies, utilities personnel notified the Plant Shift Supervisor, who notified the Building 9204-2 shift supervisor. These notifications were necessary because the facility had no capability for monitoring the status of plant and instrument air pressures on a real-time basis. During this occurrence, utilities personnel were troubleshooting problems caused by the power outage and failed to provide a timely notification. The facility’s shift supervisor, however, fortunately recognized the loss of air pressure from other events in the facility, and quickly placed the reactor into a safe condition by opening valves that fed argon into the vessel. As a result of this occurrence, the contractor will install air flow meters and alarms for each reactor furnace. The contractor is now also considering the use of new high-temperature gaskets and a backup air supply. A search of the ORPS reports for the past two years found six cases where loss of air supply impacted the operation of safety-grade equipment, mostly ventilation system controls. None of these occurrences, however, involved a loss of dual-safety functions (e.g., valve control and cooling), and so the occurrence at Building 9204-2 appears unique. Nevertheless, this occurrence demonstrates the need for users of plant and instrument air systems to fully determine and address failure modes and consequences involving the loss of air supply. KEYWORDS: Mechanical/structural – mechanical equipment, electrical – power outage, conduct of operations – safety system actuation, OSHA/industrial hygiene – near miss other ISM CORE FUNCTIONS: Analyze the Hazards, Develop and Implement Hazards Controls 3. Near Miss from Ammonium Nitrate Reaction On June 19, 2001, an experiment to extract uranium metal from uranium slag using ammonium nitrate resulted in a violent reaction inside a glovebox at the Y-12 Plant’s Building 9202. The reaction caused a deposition of material on the glovebox window and breakage of the glass beaker in which uranium and ammonium nitrate had solidified overnight. The experimenter holding the beaker when the reaction occurred was unharmed; however, one of the glovebox gloves he was using had become imbedded with glass fragments, and the other received a small tear. (ORPS Report ORO--BWXT-Y12SITE-2001-0022) The purpose of the experiment was to explore new ways to extract uranium metal from uranium oxide. The experiment first combined an oxide of depleted uranium with calcium to form a slag. The slag was ground into powder, and calcium oxide was then leached from it using an ammonium nitrate solution. The job scope on the work authorization form for the experiment discussed the use of filters to remove the uranium powder from the leaching solution. This was described in general terms, and not as a step-by-step procedure. A hazard evaluation attached to the work authorization form noted that ammonium nitrate is explosive, but no explicit limits or controls were established. The experimenter failed to review the work authorization package before undertaking the experiment. Because the filtration process was very slow, the experimenter decided instead to extract the uranium by twice mixing slurries of slag and ammonium nitrate solution, and then decanting the solution and the dissolved calcium oxide. He omitted the water-rinsing steps mentioned on the work authorization form. The final product consisted of 35 grams of depleted uranium and less than 1 gram of ammonium nitrate. The experimenter stored the still-wet final product material overnight in a 250-ml glass beaker in the interlock of the glovebox. The next day, June 19, 2001, the experimenter transferred the beaker to a glovebox inerted with argon, and found the product had solidified and caked on the bottom of the beaker. Holding the beaker in his left hand, he attempted to loosen small amounts of the material with a stainless steel spatula. After a few minutes of scraping, the ammonium nitrate reacted violently with the uranium. The reaction produced a flash of light and a loud noise, and filled the glovebox with smoke. It deposited material on the glovebox window and broke the glass beaker held by the experimenter. The experimenter immediately pulled his hands free of the glovebox and was unharmed. Glass fragments were found in the left glove, and a one-inch slit was cut in the right glove. Surveys found no significant radiological contamination on the experimenter, the glovebox, or in the immediate area. The contractor suspended all hands-on laboratory work pending review and revision of job hazard analyses, work authorization forms, and safety documentation. The contractor will also review the work authorization process. A management critique of this occurrence noted the following probable causes: + A different technique was used to perform this experiment than had previously been described during the work authorization process. + The experimenter failed to recognize the introduction of a hazard that had been analyzed but not recognized to be present in this configuration. + The safety reviews identified the explosive hazard, but failed to control the hazard. + The experimenter was not familiar with the work authorization package and had not participated in its development. + Supervision failed to ensure that all personnel working to the documented scope of work were familiar with the hazards, and that controls were in place. A search for similar occurrences in the ORPS database found another event involving an ammonium nitrate reaction in a glovebox. On June 25, 1999, workers at the Los Alamos National Laboratory’s Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Facility were using hotplates in two gloveboxes to evaporate three trays of technetium-99 (Tc-99)-contaminated solutions. When they left for a lunch break, high levels of ammonium nitrate in the solutions reacted violently with trace amounts of metal. This reaction over-pressurized one of the gloveboxes, rupturing a glove and spreading Tc-99 contamination throughout the room. Since no one was in the room, there were no personnel injuries or exposures. The lessons learned from this occurrence included the need to perform work within an established review and approval process, and for senior management to review work authorizations. (ORPS Report ALO-LA-LANL-CMR-1999-0020) At this time, corrective actions and lessons learned have yet to be finalized in an updated or final ORPS report on the Y-12 Plant ammonium nitrate reaction. However, the occurrence obviously demonstrates the importance of identifying hazards and controls for one-of-a-kind experiments, and ensuring that all those performing such work are familiar with the job scope described in the job hazard analysis and work authorization documents. KEYWORDS: Conduct of operations – safety analysis/USQs, inadequate procedure, inadequate job planning other, OSHA/industrial hygiene – near miss other, other – glovebox ISM CORE FUNCTIONS: Develop and Implement Hazards Controls, Perform Work Within Controls 4. TUBE BUNDLE REACTION LEADS TO PRICE-ANDERSON ACTION On March 19, 2001, DOE issued a Preliminary Notice of Violation (PNOV) and a proposed civil penalty of $41,250 against BNFL, Inc., the contractor conducting decontamination and decommissioning activities at the East Tennessee Technology Park in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. The DOE action is a result of quality assurance deficiencies associated with an unanticipated chemical reaction that occurred in a T-4 converter tube bundle during disassembly activities on April 4, 2000 in Building K-33. (ORPS Report ORO--BNFL-K32-2000-0001) On April 4, 2000, an unanticipated chemical reaction developed in the tube bundle of a converter while workers were using a plasma torch to cut the converter tube sheets. The T-4 converters were modified in the 1980s, and the workers were unprepared for an internal configuration different from that encountered in previously used converters. Because of the different configuration, the tooling developed for the job was ineffective, and several attempted mechanical cutting techniques were unsuccessful. The Group Manager subsequently initiated a Field Change Notice (FCN) to the work plan, which allowed the use of a plasma arc cutter. The Fire Protection Engineer advised the Group Manager to have Class D fire extinguishing equipment available. Initial attempts to cut the tube sheet proceeded without incident. However, a subsequent cutting attempt resulted in the initiation of a chemical reaction near the center of the tube sheet. Workers had observed similar appearing reactions previously, and their experience was that the reaction was self-extinguishing. In this case, however, the reaction did not self-extinguish, and the workers used at least one Class D fire extinguisher with little effect. The fire department was summoned and, upon learning that a metal reaction was occurring, requested that metal fire extinguishing agents be brought to the scene from Y-12 and from the Oak Ridge National Laboratory. Two firefighting entries were made; the first to extinguish the bulk of the combustion materials, and the second to search for and extinguish embers in the debris. There were no worker exposures or releases of uranium to the environment. The hazards associated with this work were not properly identified. The Group Manager had the procedural authority to issue the FCN allowing the use of a plasma arc cutter, and to determine if any additional review by a subject matter expert (SME) was needed. The project’s procedural process required SME review only in the event of "intent" changes that are defined only for safety-significant systems. Because this work did not involve a safety-significant system, the Group Manager determined that the additional SME review was not required. BNFL has subsequently developed a procedural process requiring involvement of SMEs and including a broader definition of "intent" changes. Additionally, although the workers had received general fire watch training, primarily with Class A, B, and C extinguishers, the Class D training was peripheral in nature, and not hands-on. The discharge from a Class D extinguisher exhibits more of a squirting than a streaming effect. It is unclear whether, if the workers had been properly trained in the use of Class D extinguishers, the chemical reaction could have been quickly extinguished. DOE notified BNFL of the preliminary determination of violations and proposed civil penalty in a letter dated March 19, 2001. This letter enclosed the PNOV that described violations involving (1) failure to comprehensively identify the hazards associated with the T-4 converter decontamination and decommissioning, (2) failure to follow established procedures, and (3) failure to identify and mitigate known operational deficiencies despite several opportunities to do so. Additionally, DOE expressed concern that BNFL, Inc. had failed to adequately address hazards analysis and work control issues that were identified from several incidents (e.g., portable High Efficiency Particulate Air filter fire, respirator cartridge ignition) that occurred during the two years preceding the April 4, 2000 event. These violations were classified as Severity Level II and III violations (See Section VI of Appendix A, General Statement of Enforcement Policy, to 10 CFR Part 820 for a definition of Severity Levels). In determining the Severity Level of these violations, DOE considered the actual and potential safety significance associated with the event under consideration, the programmatic and recurring nature of the problems, and other factors. DOE determined that no mitigation was warranted for timely self-identification and reporting, because the chemical reaction was a self-disclosing event. DOE also evaluated the adequacy of corrective actions identified and implemented by BNFL and concluded that corrective actions taken through March 2001 appeared to address the issues that led directly to the chemical reaction, and that a 25% mitigation of the maximum Severity Level II civil penalty for violations of 10 CFR 830.122(c) was appropriate. All corrective actions associated with the Non-Compliance Tracking System are now closed, with the exception of verification (scheduled for August 2001) and validation (scheduled for December 2001). DOE remains concerned with the long-term effectiveness of the corrective actions aimed at enhancing worker awareness of nuclear safety-related issues, and will be closely evaluating corrective action effectiveness. BNFL was required to respond within 30 days to the PNOV to document specific actions taken or planned to prevent recurrence. BNFL paid the fine of $41,250 effective April 18, 2001, resulting in the conversion of the PNOV to a Final Notice of Violation (FNOV). The Price-Anderson Amendments Act of 1988 requires the Energy Department to undertake regulatory enforcement actions against contractors for violations of its nuclear safety requirements. The program is implemented by the Office of Enforcement and Investigations. This action was taken with the support and participation of the Department’s Oak Ridge Operations Office, which will ensure that the corrective actions are fully implemented. Additional details can be found on the Internet at http://tis.eh.doe.gov/ enforce. KEYWORDS: Work planning, enforcement, Price Anderson Amendments Act ISM CORE FUNCTIONS: Analyze the Hazards, Develop and Implement Hazard Controls, Provide Feedback and Continuous Improvement 5. INADEQUATE VERIFICATION OF VALVE CLOSURE CAUSES SAFETY CONCERNS On March 12, 2001, at Savannah River, a chain-operated manual valve, presumed closed by the operator, was left in a partially open position, resulting in the transfer of process water to an incorrect tank. Although the valve lineup was performed according to procedure and independently verified, the process water was transferred into tank 11.2, which was empty at the time, rather than the intended vessel, 13.1. The reason for the valve remaining partially open is surmised to be lack of lubrication. Although the valve lineup was performed in accordance with established procedures and independently verified, the inability of operators to positively verify that the valve was completely closed, as well as the lack of a formal preventive maintenance program, could have placed the facility in a potentially unsafe configuration. (ORPS Report SR--SRWC-FCAN-2001-0012) While adjusting the First Cycle Feed, Operations personnel determined that 25,000 pounds of process water (slightly acidified domestic water) needed to be transferred from vessel 11B to vessel 13.1. Since the capacity of vessel 11B is only 3,665 pounds, the transfer had to be accomplished with six full tank volumes and a part of a seventh. A pre-job briefing was held in the control room with a control room operator and the First Cycle Supervisor (FCS). Because the tank 11B outlet piping header is common to several vessels, the chain-operated inlet valve is required to be in closed position while transferring from tank 11B to tank 13.1. The Building Patrol Operator (BPO) performed the valve lineup in accordance with the approved procedure for valving tank 11B, and the valve lineup was independently verified by a second BPO. Verification of valve closure on a chain-operated valve is done by pulling on the chain to ensure that resistance is felt, and both the BPO and the independent verifier did this. The valve stem position, another indicator of the valve position, is partially hidden from the operator’s view. As the fourth tank volume of process water was in progress, the FCS noticed that the liquid level in tank 13.1 was not rising. He then observed that tank 11.2, previously empty, had a rising water level. The facility could have been placed in an unsafe condition if tank 11.2 had contained a critical mass and enough process water to dilute the acidity below minimum limits. The FCS realized that the water from the head tank was flowing into the wrong vessel, and immediately terminated the transfer by closing the automatic outlet valve on the head tank. After the discovery of process water in tank 11.2, the Building Supervisor went to check the valve lineup where tank 11B conveys liquid into a header that feeds several tanks, including tanks 11.2 and 13.1. This check indicated the valve alignment to be correct. The BPOs who performed the initial valve lineup and verification correctly verified the position of the inlet valve to tank 11.2 by manipulating the manual chain-operated valve in the closed direction. Feeling resistance in the closed direction, each operator assumed the valve to be closed. A further attempt to manipulate the valve in the closed direction by using additional force resulted in the valve being freed and traveling to the closed position. The direct and root causes of this transfer of process water to the wrong tank were an equipment or material problem with a defective or failed part. While the valve appeared closed to the BPO and the independent verifier, it was, in fact, stuck partially open. The contributing cause was personnel error, inattention to detail, as the BPOs were not able to positively verify that the valve was closed, and the operator was not closely monitoring the liquid level of the receiving tank. Several corrective actions have been taken. The first action taken was for Operations to develop and implement a schedule for preventive maintenance of chain-operated valves, including lubrication. Operations was also directed to issue a Facility Operating Experience Program (FOEP) Lessons Learned from the event to emphasize proper transfer protocol, including identifying potential and inadvertent routes, verifying the receipt of material, and monitoring liquid level increases in the receiving tank. The FOEP is to include a Standing Order for proper transfer protocol as an attachment. Operations is to follow up the transfer protocol oral assessment with training of all personnel in identified areas of weakness. Facility management will administer a remediation program to the individual involved. Management will also meet with the involved personnel and clearly reinforce expected roles and responsibilities. EH has identified a number of similar occurrences in which inadvertent transfers of material resulted from misaligned valves or valves presumed to be closed. The following is an example. On July 19, 1999, at the Savannah River Site, Operations personnel were attempting to transfer process water from the 16D head tank to the 16.3 vessel. Prior to the start of transfer operations, the BPO moved the valve to the closed position and pulled on the chain until it felt tight. Another BPO independently verified the valve position in the same manner. As the transfer began, the Control Room Supervisor noticed that the liquid level in vessel 17.5 was rising instead of in 16.3, and immediately halted the transfer. A further investigation of the event revealed that the valve had not been manipulated from its normally open position in several years, causing the chain operator to bind. (ORPS Report SR--WSRC-FCAN-1999-0017) These events illustrate the importance of operators being able to positively verify valve closure rather than relying upon supposition or experience. A properly managed, formal preventive maintenance program for safety-related chain-operated valves is essential to ensure safe operations. Management must evaluate any training deficiencies in personnel involved in material transfers, and follow up with training in areas of identified weaknesses. DOE-STD-1040-93, Change 1, Guide to Good Practices for Control of On-Shift Training, provides guidance on the use of hands-on training to develop a core of skilled personnel able to perform criticality-significant operations. DOE-STD-1052-93, Guideline to Good Practices for Types of Maintenance Activities at DOE Nuclear Facilities, contains information on developing an effective preventive maintenance program at DOE facilities. These standards are accessible on the Internet at http://tis.eh.doe.gov/techstds/standard/appframe.html. KEYWORDS: Preventive maintenance, inadvertent transfer, chain-operated valve ISM CORE FUNCTIONS: Define the Scope of Work, Analyze Hazards, Develop and Implement Hazard Controls 6. INADEQUATE PRE-JOB BRIEFING CAUSES CRITICALITY CONCERNS On March 14, 2001, at Savannah River, Solid Waste Rigging Personnel moved a metal container from transuranic (TRU) Pad 3 to TRU Pad 7. The next day, during an inspection tour of TRU Pad 7, the TRU Shift Manager noticed that the container was placed approximately 16 inches from one of the black metal FB-Line containers instead of the three feet minimum spacing required for nuclear criticality safety. This inadvertent violation of a nuclear criticality control and Technical Safety Requirement placed the facility in an unsafe configuration. (ORPS Report SR--WSRC-SLDHZD-2001-0004) TRU Pad 7 holds five black metal containers for storing TRU fissile waste, and the containers are separated from each other by a minimum 3’ spacing in accordance with Nuclear Criticality Safety Control (NCSC) requirements. On March 14, 2001, a crew comprised of one labeling person, one procedure person, and two Rigging and Heavy Equipment (R&HE) personnel began relocating containers from TRU Pad 3 to Pad 7. Shortly thereafter, one of the R&HE riggers left to support an incoming TRU shipment. This particular R&HE operator was the designated "spotter" to direct the other rigger in moving the TRU container and locating it at the proper separation distance from the other containers. After moving the box, the lone rigger went to TRU Pad 7 to ensure its proper placement, but overlooked the fact that the container was placed closer than three feet to one of the black metal containers. The pre-job briefing did not define the responsibilities of the spotter during the TRU waste movement. The importance of the spotter’s role at TRU Pad 7 during container placement operations was not properly emphasized, nor were the associated criticality issues addressed. The posting for the 3’ minimum spacing requirement was not prominently displayed on the containers. The rigger could not read the labels while adjusting the position of the moved container on TRU Pad 7. TRU Pad 7 was immediately placed into standby mode, and radiological control personnel checked the containers to ensure that no elevated neutron levels existed. In addition, a number of other corrective actions were undertaken. The procedure and related operator aids have been revised to incorporate Criticality Safety Limit (CSL) controls and to adequately define the roles and responsibilities of the personnel involved with respect to spotters and placement of containers. The facility’s other operations and procedures requiring NCSC controls were reviewed to ensure that appropriate CSL safeguards are implemented. Physical boundaries of three feet have been re-established around the black metal containers on TRU Pad 7, and the FB-Line black metal boxes have been relabeled on all four sides with larger, more visible letters. An engineering evaluation of criticality controls for TRU Pad 7 has been completed, and design controls (physical barriers) initiated for NCSC areas, as required. Facility management has examined the need for additional NCSC physical boundary measures at other waste storage or disposal areas. This event illustrates the importance of adequate procedures, procedure compliance, and attention to detail. Lessons learned from this event will be incorporated into the Solid Waste Management Facility criticality training program. Events similar to this have occurred, and the following is a pertinent example. On November 26, 1999, at Savannah River FB-Line, a Nuclear Safety Specialist identified two TRU waste pails that were not spaced 3’ apart, as required by the Nuclear Safety Control (NSC) for fissile items stored in temporary storage restraints. (ORPS Report SR--WSRC-FBLINE-1999-0036) The operator responsible for temporarily storing a TRU waste pail placed it within the boundaries of red "Fissile" tape left behind from a previously stored item, but failed to measure the spacing between the pail and other waste items to ensure compliance with NSC requirements. Because the NSC spacing requirement is more conservative than the Nuclear Criticality Safety Supplement limit of 24 inches, facility personnel confirmed that no CSLs were exceeded in this occurrence, and facility safety was not compromised. Such occurrences demonstrate the importance of strict adherence to nuclear criticality controls to ensure safe operations at DOE facilities. Both mass and space restrictions must be followed to prevent violation of a nuclear criticality control parameter, which could lead to an inadvertent nuclear criticality event. Occurrences such as these also strongly underscore the fact that physical controls such as mass and spacing requirements are far preferable to administrative controls in achieving criticality safety. DOE Order 420.1, Facility Safety, provides guidance on nuclear criticality safety program requirements for DOE facilities, and lists the American Nuclear Society’s ANSI/ANS standards that provide the basis for nuclear criticality safety programs. Specifically, ANSI/ANS-8.19, Administrative Practices for Nuclear Criticality Safety, provides the elements of an acceptable nuclear criticality safety program for operations outside of reactors. ANSI/ANS-8.20, Nuclear Criticality Safety Training, provides the criteria for administering a nuclear criticality safety training program for personnel who manage, work in or near facilities, or work outside of reactors, where the potential exists for nuclear criticality accidents. DOE Order 420.1 is available at http://tis.eh.doe.gov/techstds/standard/appframe.html. KEYWORDS: Transuranic, criticality safety limit ISM CORE FUNCTIONS: Develop and Implement Hazard Controls, Perform Work within Controls ***************************************************************** 13 DOE Announces Completion of 90-Day Fast Flux Test Facility Review; Begins Evaluation of Proposed Commercial Reuse of Hanford Facility Submittal for Proposed Medical Isotope Production to be Evaluated RELEASE DATE: August 1, 2001 [Print Friendly Version] The Secretary of Energy today accepted the final report of a 90-day review of options for restart or shutdown of the Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF) located at the Department's Hanford Reservation near Richland, Washington, and announced that the department will begin a 60-day review of one expression of interest in using the FFTF as a commercial production facility for medical isotopes in the treatment of cancer and research, as well as other industrial uses. The initial review and report on options for reactor restart or shutdown was commissioned by the Secretary in April, directing the Department of Energy (DOE) to thoroughly review all relevant factors affecting the January 2001 decision to permanently deactivate the FFTF. The final report was forwarded to the Office of the Secretary on July 27, by Mike Holland, director of the review team. Based on the review of all options and the submitted expressions of commercial interest, the review team concluded that only one submittal provides new information worthy of further consideration for the potential commercial use of the facility and several other surplus Hanford facilities. The submittal describes the potential use of these facilities for the production of medical and other industrial isotopes. A working group that includes DOE's real property and procurement specialists and legal counsel will be tasked to evaluate, by the end of September 2001, the viability of the submittal to use the facility for the commercial production of medical and other industrial isotopes, and options for disposition of the property. Based on that evaluation and considerations of the submittal under the National Environmental Policy Act, the Secretary will then decide whether to pursue disposition of the FFTF for commercial use or move ahead with facility deactivation. The final report forwarded to the Secretary also includes: + The cost and schedule estimates of the deactivation and restart of the FFTF, which were found to be reasonable but yet to be validated. + Potential new nuclear research programs that could be considered by DOE. + Extensive stakeholder comments received during the review on issues related to the restart or deactivation of the FFTF. A summary of 20 existing studies, reports, assessments of need and environmental reviews, which provides background information regarding medical and industrial isotope production, plutonium and tritium production, nonproliferation programs, research and development, the Hanford site cleanup, shutdown of the FFTF, and previous stakeholder input. The FFTF is a thermal, liquid-cooled reactor owned by the Department of Energy and located on the Hanford Reservation, near Richland, Washington. The reactor was shutdown in 1992 and its nuclear fuel subsequently removed. The reactor is currently maintained in a safe standby condition. Media Contact: Joe Davis, 202/586-4940 Hope Williams, 202/586-5806 Release No. R-01-12 ***************************************************************** 14 Plutonium Thief 'Sophisticated' F.A.Z. - English Version2. Aug. 2001 Aug. 2, 2001 By Alfred Behr STUTTGART. The Baden-Württemberg Environment Ministry issued a statement on Tuesday saying that the person who smuggled highly toxic nuclear material out of an inactive reprocessing plant in Karlsruhe had "specialized radiological knowledge and precise knowledge of the location and work routines." A 47-year-old locksmith has admitted stealing the material -- a flask of radioactive material containing plutonium and an irradiated cloth -- more than six months ago from a heavily contaminated room in the plant. Officials have expressed doubt about his claim that he did so to show that the facility's security controls could be easily foiled. Such controls are now to be increased in German facilities. The ministry statement was issued after a meeting of experts in Karlsruhe, and said all participants, including Federal Environment Ministry representatives, agreed the thief's methods were "particularly sophisticated." But that description is at odds with the opinion of Baden-Württemberg Environment Minister Ulrich Müller, who said when the theft was discovered that the culprit had harmed himself and acted in a manner "neither skilled nor intelligent." Officials said two weeks ago that the locksmith passed several exit locks and monitors carrying the radioactive material. He then placed the stolen objects next to the monitors, stepped through the security barrier without them, then turned and collected them. An interim report by the Baden-Württemberg Environment Ministry says: "The current safety measures do not take into consideration the possibility of the kind of incident corresponding to the Karlsruhe case (criminal theft of contaminated objects)." But a 1991 federal guideline does mention such a scenario, referring to an "individual with security access proceeding in secret...possibly with the cooperation of outside accomplices." While Mr. Müller said there has been no other case like the Karlsruhe incident, there have been thefts from plants that process nuclear material. In December 1990, a court in Bensheim sentenced two men, 20 and 23, to suspended prison sentences for stealing three tubes of uranium oxide pellets from a Siemens factory in Hanau that makes nuclear fuel rods. Such tubes are used as building blocks for nuclear fuel rods. The thieves, employed by a subcontractor as laborers at the plant, planned to smuggle out large amounts of fissionable material and sell it. But the potential customer they approached informed police. Another incident, which took place in the southern German city of Erlangen 20 years ago, has only recently been revealed. From 1971 to 1981, a laboratory technician stole weapons-grade uranium and assorted other chemicals from a Siemens research plant. Now 74 years old and suffering from bronchitis and eczema, he recently handed over the material to Bavaria's Environment Ministry for testing because he thinks the chemicals poisoned him. He said he wanted to draw attention to his case because a social welfare court refused to recognize his illnesses as work-related. Jul. 31, 2001 © Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 2000 ***************************************************************** 15 Spotlight finds Y-12 during times of change KnoxNews: Columnists Tuesday, Jul 31 In boosting the budget for nuclear weapons facilities earlier this summer, U.S. Sen. Harry Reid, D-Nev., said the huge increase' was needed in order to get weapons refurbishment back on track and to address the crumbling infrastructure' in the production complex. Reid, the Senate's assistant majority leader who chairs the Energy and Water appropriations subcommittee, said he had a frank talk with Gen. John Gordon, head of the National Nuclear Security Administration, about the expectations. "I am going to give him the resources he needs to do his job,'' Reid said. "However, I also told him that I am now holding him accountable for getting the job done over there.'' The nuclear weapons complex, of course, includes the Y-12 warhead factory in Oak Ridge, reportedly one of the most deteriorated of the production plants. A $4 billion modernization of storage and manufacturing capabilities is in the works at Y-12, and Gordon came to Oak Ridge last week to preside over dismantlement of a ramshackle guard house - a small project perhaps symbolic of the proposed transformation. The National Nuclear Security Administration was created in the wake of the spy scandal at Los Alamos National Laboratory. That was a political response to the perceived breakdown in nuclear security during the post-Cold War era. But it also was a response to other, long-standing concerns - such as the waste of taxpayer money in the name of national protection. That's an issue that won't go away. At the same time Congress is promising megabucks to revitalize the weapons-making capabilities in the United States, President Bush is talking with Russian President Putin about big-time cuts in their respective arsenals - perhaps bringing the warhead totals on each side down to 1,500 or even lower. The conflicting appearance of these events has not gone unheralded, particularly by peace activists. The Oak Ridge Environmental Peace Alliance last week called for the government to abort work on an environmental impact statement that supports modernization of Y-12, saying it is outdated, outrageous and makes no sense. "This document no longer speaks to the needs of the nation,'' Ralph Hutchison, the group's coordinator, said in a letter to U.S. Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham. "It is thought it has fallen out of time and hangs in space, separated from reality.'' The Y-12 report was supposed to be completed months ago, but it has yet to make an appearance. A spokesman said it should be released by late summer. Meanwhile, a series of events are planned this weekend to mark the anniversary of the Aug. 6, 1945 A-bombing of Hiroshima, Japan. Background: Y-12 extracted the U-235 used in the first atomic bomb dropped on a human population. Since then, the plant has manufactured parts for every nuclear weapon in the U.S. arsenal, and the Oak Ridge facility remains the nation's chief storehouse for bomb-grade uranium. The Oak Ridge Environmental Peace Alliance has been staging protests for years, but recent demonstrations have attracted new attention as Y-12 becomes a national target for peace activists. Organizers have predicted that participation in the "Stop the Bombs'' campaign will multiply - with a stated goal of having 7,000 demonstrators at Y-12 in August 2002. OREPA said hundreds are expected to take part this weekend, with a rally and demonstration at Y-12 scheduled for Sunday, Aug. 5. Other events are planned in Knoxville and Oak Ridge for Saturday and Monday. Pro-nuke hardliners, including some members of the Oak Ridge-based Citizens for National Security, are concerned that NNSA and the Y-12 contractor, BWXT, aren't taking the protests seriously enough. Is Oak Ridge ready for the type of aggressive demonstrations that have taken place at world economic gatherings, such as the recent G-8 Summit in Genoa, Italy? Some security analysts suggest that's a real possibility if the anti-weapons movement continues to gain momentum in the United States. Hutchison, OREPA's leader, earlier said, if there is violence at upcoming protests in Oak Ridge, it likely won't come from the anti-nuke protesters. Hutchison said demonstrators, especially those who plan to take part in acts of civil disobedience, will undergo nonviolence training in advance of the march on Y-12. Counter-protesters have been on hand in recent years, and that apparently won't change. Stacy Griffin, commander of the Citizens-Soldiers for the Atomic Bomb, recently announced her group would be back for a fourth year. "It is wrong for a handful of puny and unthankful anarchists who are by and large supported by government benefits and well-heeled benefactors to try to shame our brave veterans and make them feel guilty for winning World War II,'' the Rhea County woman said. The group last year published an indictment' that charged the Oak Ridge Environmental Peace Alliance with treason and concluded: "God Himself will execute the due penalties of banishment and death which you so richly deserve.'' This year the group plans to "play patriotic music'' and counter the protesters. Stay tuned. Senior Writer Frank Munger covers the Department of Energy for the News-Sentinel. He can be reached at 865-482-9213 or at twig1@knoxnews.infi.net. This column is also available on the Web at www.knoxnews.com/editorsview/munger/ [Get Copyright Clearance] Copyright 2001 The Knoxville News-Sentinel Co. ***************************************************************** NOTE: In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. section 107 this material is distributed without profit or payment to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving this information for non-profit research and educational purposes only. 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