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                         NUCLEAR POLICY
 
1 [NYTr] IAEA Says Iran Testing New Enrichment Device
2 Guardian Unlimited: West Wants Iran Technology Sales Banned
3 Haaretz: Peres: Israel has no intention of attacking Iran - 
4 washingtonpost.com: IAEA Head: Iran Close To Enriching Uranium - 
5 AFP: "Tortuous road" to settlement of Iran nuclear issue, says Ban -
6 UPI: Israel steps up calls to stop Iran
7 Guardian Unlimited: More N. Korea Nuclear Tests Worry Japan
8 Guardian Unlimited: Prescott heads to North Korea talks
9 Guardian Unlimited: China Denies Reports of N. Korea Apology
10 Guardian Unlimited: China Says N. Korea Not Planning Test 
11 Korea Times: Seoul Develops 1,000-KM Cruise Missile 
12 Korea Times: Alliance in Disarray 
13 AFP: NKorea has no plans for second nuke test, but no apology for fi
14 AFP: SKorea successfully tests longer-range cruise missile - report 
15 UPI: S. Korean official doubts NK nuke pledge
16 UPI: ElBaradei: Sanctions no answer to N. Korea
17 UPI: IAEA: North Korea feels threatened
18 Guardian Unlimited: Test Sparks N. Korea Backlash in Japan 
19 IAEA: IAEA Director General Official Visit to United States
20 Guardian Unlimited: Spain Says Mideast 'Road Map' Stalled 
21 BBC: Nuclear bunker goes under hammer
 
                         NUCLEAR REACTORS
 
22 IPS-English ARGENTINA: Nuclear Power Loaded with Question Marks
23 US: NRC: NRC Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards to Meet Novemb
24 Sydney Morning Herald: Nuclear power plant 'a matter of time' - 
25 MDN: Worker exposed to radiation at nuclear power plant, no effect o
26 US: NRC: Notice of Meetings; Sunshine Act
27 FT.com: UK - Ministers to break up nuclear group sale
28 MercoPress Brazil plans to build seven nuclear reactors
29 US: The Day: Dominion Offers Positions to Whistleblower  
30 US: NRC: In the Matter of Certain Licensees Authorized To Possess an
31 US: NRC: Demonstrating the Feasibility and Reliability of Operator M
32 Scotsman.com:  British Nuclear Group to split
33 IPS: ARGENTINA: Nuclear Power Loaded with Question Marks
34 US: Hampton Union: Nuke plant study must be taken seriously
35 NewsRoom Finland: Commission to probe French state aid to Finland's 
 
                          NUCLEAR SECURITY
 
36 Another Disastrous Coverup: Forward Base Falcon Disaster
37 IHT: European Commission recommends closer nuclear cooperation with 
38 US: Analysis: The politics of terror
 
                          NUCLEAR SAFETY
 
 
                         NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE
 
39 US: Bradenton Herald: Tallevast residents ask for time to check data
40 US: AU ABC: Drilling reveals promising uranium find
41 Bayshore Broadcasting Corporation: Speaking out on nuclear waste
42 US: Palladium-Item: Rail company sets up shop in Union Co.
43 US: NRC: Request for a License To Import Radioactive Waste
44 US: NRC: Request for a License To Export Radioactive Waste
45 NRC: In the Matter of USEC Inc. (Lead Cascade Facility) and All Othe
46 FT.com Wanted: willing hosts for nuclear dump
47 Hemscott: UK Government splits Sellafield sale from other parts of B
48 CanWest: Ont. nuke waste plan poses Great Lakes risk, U.S. Democrat 
49 US: canada.com: Cameco allows mine to flood
50 The Australian: Costello sees future for nuke power
 
                           PEACE
 
 
                        US DEPT. OF ENERGY
 
51 [NukeNet] New IG Report
52 DOE: DOEs Rocky Flats Cleanup Site Named 2006 Project of the Year 
53 DOE: Secretary of Energy Announces Nearly $24 Million in Grants 
54 Tri-City Herald: Audit: Cleanup cost may double 
55 DOE: Environmental Management Site-Specific Advisory Board, Savannah
56 DOE: DOE/Advanced Scientific Computing Advisory Committee
57 Knox News: Y-12 object of third bad report Former DOE adviser 
58 KnoxNews: Lab's existing Jaguar won't meet other half immediately
59 AFP: Hong Kong detains NKorean cargo ship as UN sanctions bite - rep
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                         FULL NEWS STORIES
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 1 [NYTr] IAEA Says Iran Testing New Enrichment Device
 
Date: Tue, 24 Oct 2006 19:36:50 -0500 (CDT)

X-Sender-Host-Name: chumbly.math.missouri.edu
X-Spam-Class: HAM

Via NY Transfer News Collective  *  All the News that Doesn't Fit
 
The New York Times - Oct 24, 2006
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/24/world/middleeast/24iran.html

U.N. Official Says Iran Is Testing New Enrichment Device

By DAVID E. SANGER

WASHINGTON, Oct. 23 -- The head of the International Atomic Energy Agency
said Monday that Iran had begun testing new uranium enrichment equipment
that could double the capacity of its small research-and-development
facilities.

The action appears to be a signal to the United Nations Security Council
that Iran would respond to sanctions by speeding ahead with its nuclear
program.

Since February, when Iran publicly celebrated its first production of
enriched uranium, progress at its main nuclear complex at Natanz has
reportedly been slow. Iran has sporadically operated a single "cascade" of
164 centrifuges, the devices that spin at high speed and turn ordinary
uranium into a fuel usable for nuclear power plants -- or, at higher
enrichment levels, nuclear weapons.

Those reports had prompted speculation that Iranian engineers had run into
considerable technical difficulties.

But in an interview on Monday, Mohamed ElBaradei, the director general of
the I.A.E.A., said that "based on our most recent inspections, the second
centrifuge cascade is in place and ready to go." He said that no uranium
had yet been entered into the new system, but could be as early as next
week.

Even with two cascades running, it would take Iran years to enrich enough
uranium to produce a single nuclear weapon.

The United States director of national intelligence, John D. Negroponte,
has said repeatedly that he believes Tehran is 4 to 10 years away from
developing a weapon, even though its technology base is far more advanced
than that of North Korea, which conducted a nuclear test 15 days ago.

Unlike North Korea, Iran has insisted that it does not intend to build a
weapon. Nonetheless, Iran ignored an Aug. 31 deadline, set by the Security
Council, to stop enriching uranium.

Since then, European nations, China, Russia and the United States have been
debating what sanctions, if any, should be imposed. China and Russia have
resisted, and in a speech on Monday at Georgetown University's School of
Foreign Service, Dr. ElBaradei made clear that he believes sanctions are
unlikely to work.

"Penalizing them is not a solution," he said. "At the end of the day, we
have to bite the bullet and talk to North Korea and Iran."

Unlike American officials, he says that he remains unpersuaded that Iran's
ultimate goal is to build a weapon, though I.A.E.A. officials say they
believe that Iran wants to have all of the major components of a weapon in
hand so that it is clear that it could build one in weeks or months.

"The jury is still out on whether they are developing a nuclear weapon,"
Dr. ElBaradei said at Georgetown, after meeting earlier in the day with
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice.

After the meeting, Sean McCormack, the State Department spokesman, said
there was now "widespread agreement, although not total agreement," on
elements of an initial sanctions package. He did not speculate about when
the sanctions might come to a vote; at the end of the summer,
administration officials insisted that the Security Council would act in
September.

Mr. McCormack said the Iranians seemed to be moving ahead "inexorably at
this point," so that at some point "you will have industrial-scale
production."

"You don't want that," he said.

Some European diplomats have expressed concern that, should the Security
Council act, the moderates in the Iranian government who have been involved
in negotiations over the nuclear program could be shoved aside, and that
some combination of military leaders and hard-line mullahs would push the
country to speed its nuclear production.

Copyright 2006 The New York Times Company
       
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*****************************************************************
 2 Guardian Unlimited: West Wants Iran Technology Sales Banned

From the Associated Press        

[UP] 

Tuesday October 24, 2006 9:16 PM
 	
AP Photo MOSB103 
By GEORGE JAHN Associated Press Writer 

VIENNA, Austria (AP) - The U.S. and its allies want the U.N.
Security Council to ban the sale of missile and atomic
technology to Iran and end most U.N. help for its nuclear
programs - moves diplomats said Tuesday are narrowly focused in
hopes of winning Russian and Chinese backing for sanctions. 

The diplomats, who spoke with The Associated Press on condition
of anonymity because the draft resolution was not yet public,
said the proposal also would commit U.N. member nations to
denying entry to Iranian officials involved in developing
missiles or nuclear systems. 

A Security Council resolution passed last week imposed similar
sanctions on the sale or transfer of technology that could
contribute to North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile
programs after that nation's test explosion of a nuclear bomb. 

One of the diplomats described all three measures aimed at Iran
as moderate in impact, saying that was an attempt to win Russian
and Chinese support. Moscow and Beijing could be formally
presented with the draft later this week, the diplomat said. 

Both Russia and China have agreed in principle to imposing
sanctions over Iran's defiance of a council ultimatum to freeze
uranium enrichment and sharply improve cooperation with the U.N.
probe of suspect Iranian atomic activities. 

But both continue to publicly push for dialogue instead of U.N.
punishment, despite the collapse last month of a European Union
attempt to entice Iran into talks. The EU proposed Iran at least
temporarily freeze enrichment as a condition for multilateral
talks meant to erase suspicions it may be trying to build
nuclear arms in violation of its treaty commitments. 

As permanent members of the council, Russia and China hold the
power to veto its actions, as do the United States, France and
Britain, which drew up the sanctions resolution. 

Iran insists it won't halt uranium enrichment, which it says is
intended solely to produce fuel for nuclear reactors that will
generate electricity. But enrichment also can produce material
for nuclear warheads, and the U.S. and others are suspicious of
Iran's intentions. 

Canceling technical assistance to Iran from the U.N. nuclear
watchdog, the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency,
would do little to ease such fears. But as the first such
withdrawal of IAEA help, it would send a strong signal of
international displeasure with Tehran. 

IAEA technical programs, which are freely available to all
member countries, are restricted to medical or agricultural
help, nuclear safety expertise and other peaceful applications
that cannot be diverted for weapons purposes. 

Typical projects, as listed in a confidential IAEA document seen
by AP, involve the disposal of radioactive waste produced by
nuclear reactors and the use of narrowly targeted radiotherapy
for tumors. 

In a bow to Russia, the draft resolution exempts IAEA technical
cooperation on operational safety and legal advice at Iran's
Bushehr nuclear facility being built by the Russians. 

The facility would be Iran's first atomic power plant and the
Tehran government recently allocated about $245 million to
finish it. The facility is now projected to go on line in late
2007, nearly a year later than originally envisaged. 

It was unclear how any eventual sanctions might impact Russia's
planned sale of 29 Tor-M1 air defense missile systems to Iran.

Analysts in Russia have said Moscow might scuttle the deal as
part of a give-and-take with Washington over sanctions. 

One of the diplomats who spoke with AP said Washington had
wanted to include Bushehr and ban all IAEA technical cooperation
but reluctantly agreed with Britain and France that Russia would
not go along. 

A U.N. official said Tehran would probably depict any sanctions
as a U.S.-inspired blow against Iranian programs that aid the
poor by using nuclear technology to treat the sick and to
increase agricultural yields by reducing crop pests. 

Additionally, he said, Iran will argue that no evidence has been
found proving it seeks to make nuclear weapons despite more than
three years of IAEA probes. As such, Tehran will say it has a
continued right to IAEA technical aid as an agency member in
good standing, he said. 

Iran has shrugged off the threat of sanctions. Diplomats told AP
on Monday that experts had begun testing a second enrichment
facility at Natanz, in central Iraq, over the past few weeks in
defiance of the council's ban on such activities. 

Iran produced a small batch of low-enriched uranium - suitable
for reactor fuel but not weapons - in February, using its
initial cascade of 164 centrifuges at its pilot plant at Natanz. 

Iran has said it plans to install 3,000 centrifuges at Natanz by
the end of this year, but experts have said industrial-scale
production of enriched uranium would require 54,000 centrifuges.

Guardian Unlimited © Guardian News and Media Limited 2006
*****************************************************************
 3 Haaretz: Peres: Israel has no intention of attacking Iran - 

Cheshvan 1, 5767

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (center)
praying in Tehran on Friday. (AP)
 			 			 		   	 	
Last update - 06:01 22/10/2006                                 

By Yossi Melman, Haaretz Correspondent, Reuters and Haaretz
Service   
  
Deputy Prime Minister Shimon Peres said Saturday that Israel has
no aggressive intentions towards Iran, and cautioned against any
pre-emptive strike on the Islamic Republic.

Peres also said Israel should regard Iranian President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad as it would Hitler, and urged the formation of a
global coalition against Iran.

"We must never consider such a thing," Peres told Channel Two
television when asked if he would support an independent Israeli
military strike against Iran if other nations failed to curb its
uranium enrichment program.

"Israel has never shown aggressive intentions (towards Iran) -
it has none. I don't think we have to, or can, deal with this
issue," he said, cautioning that Israel could face international
isolation if it attacked Iran.

Israel has said repeatedly it wants the United States and other
countries to take the lead in dealing with Iran over a nuclear
program that has raised international concern that it could
build atomic weapons.

Iran this month rejected demands that it suspend uranium
enrichment, prompting United Nations Security Council to
consider sanctions. It says it wants nuclear power only to
generate electricity.

The issue was high on the agenda of talks Prime Minister Ehud
Olmert held this week in Moscow with Russian President Vladimir
Putin, whose country, a UN Security Council member with veto
power, has been reluctant to support sanctions.

"The Iranians should be afraid - they must understand if they
object to every compromise there will be a price to pay,"
Olmert, who has said a nuclear Iran would pose a threat to
Israel's existence, told reporters on Thursday.

He did not elaborate. But his comments were described in the
Israeli media as the strongest warning yet by an Israeli leader
to Iran that Israel might consider a pre-emptive strike to try
to ensure Tehran cannot build an atomic bomb.

Israel bombed Iraq's nuclear reactor in 1981, an attack that
Peres, then leader of the opposition Labour Party, opposed as
diplomatically damaging. 

Peres also condemned what he called the world's silence in the
face of Ahmadinejad's threats against Israel.

"(Ahmadinejad) is the only (leader) calling for genocide: a
member of the United Nations threatening to destroy another
member of the United Nations. And ... a large part of the world
is silent," Peres said.

Ahmadinejad on Friday called Israel's leaders a "group of
terrorists" and threatened any country that supports Israel.

"You imposed a group of terrorists ... on the region," he said,
addressing the U.S. and its allies. "It is in your own interest
to distance yourself from these criminals ... This is an
ultimatum. Don't complain tomorrow."

Ahmadinejad warned Europe it was stirring up hatred in the
Middle East by supporting Israel and said it "may get hurt" if
anger in the region boils over. 

"You should believe that this regime [Israel] cannot last and
has no more benefit to you. What benefit have you got in
supporting this regime, except the hatred of the nations?" he
said in a speech to mark Al-Quds Day, or Jerusalem Day, when
Iranians are officially encouraged to demonstrate in support of
Muslim rule of the city. 

"We have advised the Europeans that the Americans are far away,
but you are the neighbors of the nations in this region. We
inform you that the nations are like an ocean that is welling
up, and if a storm begins, the dimensions will not stay limited
to Palestine, and you may get hurt," he said. The remarks were
broadcast on state radio.

The United Kingdom and France condemned Ahmadinejad's remarks
Friday. 

"Unfortunately these remarks do not come as a surprise," said a
spokesman for British Prime Minister Tony Blair. "They are
consistent with what Mr. Ahmadinejad has said for some time..."
 
"It's why we take the issue of Iran in general so seriously and
the possibility of it acquiring nuclear weaponry so seriously
and why the prime minister believes the world must be as united
in its message to Iran as it has been in its message to North
Korea," he added. "That is why we will continue to push for and
work towards a UN resolution [on sanctions against Iran]."

"I condemn the unacceptable comments made today by the Iranian
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in which he again calls into
question the existence of the state of Israel," French Foreign
Minister Philippe Douste-Blazy said in a statement.

Ahmadinejad caused outrage in the West last year by calling for
Israel to be "wiped off the map," echoing comments by the
Islamic Republic's late founder, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. 

He has not since repeated that phrase, but regularly launches
verbal attacks on Israel, whose right to exist Iran has not
recognized since the 1979 Islamic revolution. 

"Today, with the grace of God, the efforts to establish this
fake regime have failed totally," Ahmadinejad said.

Although Ahmadinejad has called for Israel's destruction, he
said in August Iran was not a threat to any country "not even to
the Zionist regime" - a term Iranian officials use for Israel. 

State television showed crowds in Iranian towns and cities on
Friday waving banners with pictures of Khomeini, and Hassan
Nasrallah, leader of the Iranian-backed Lebanese militant group
Hezbollah. 

Iran described Israel's war with Lebanon in the summer as a
victory for Hezbollah. 

"The false myth [of Israel being invincible] has fallen by the
will of the Palestinian youth and the faithful warriors of
Hezbollah," Ahmadinejad said. 

Prime Minister Ehud Olmert said in May that Iran's leaders had
turned Israel "into a target for annihilation." 
	   
  © Copyright  Haaretz. All rights reserved   
*****************************************************************
 4 washingtonpost.com: IAEA Head: Iran Close To Enriching Uranium - 

By Dafna LinzerWashington Post Staff Writer

Tuesday, October 24, 2006; Page A04
 
Iranhas taken another step in its ability to enrich uranium, the 
head of the U.N. atomic energy agency confirmed yesterday, as the 
Bush administration and European allies failed to reach agreement 
on sanctions against Tehran's expanding nuclear program.

Mohamed ElBaradei, the director of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency, said that Iranian technicians had pieced together 
a second line, or cascade, of 164 centrifuges and are days away 
from using the cascade to enrich uranium.

"It's in place and ready to go," ElBaradei said in a brief
interview yesterday.

European officials suggested that the new cascade is a political
move by Iranian officials who are hoping to send a defiant
message to the U.N. Security Council as it weighs possible
sanctions.

It would take many years for the Iranians to produce bomb-grade
uranium using the other 164-centrifuge cascade it is currently
operating, and U.S. intelligence officials think that Tehran is
at least four years away from gaining the technical capability
to produce enough nuclear material for a single weapon. Since
February, Iran has produced minuscule amounts of low-enriched
uranium suitable for the energy program that the government says
it wants, and not for bombs. The same cascades, if run longer
and more efficiently, can produce bomb-grade uranium.

The Bush administration has dismissed the energy claims and
thinks Iran intends to use the program to secretly build nuclear
weapons. ElBaradei's inspectors, on their fourth year
investigating in Iran, reported earlier this year that they were
unable to determine whether the Iranian program is peaceful.

The United States backed a package of European incentives
designed to coax Iran into negotiations if it suspended the
nuclear program during talks. When Tehran did not respond to the
offer, the Security Council stepped in and passed a resolution
in August obligating Iran to halt the program and negotiate. The
council threatened to impose sanctions if Iran balked.

Iran has since said it wants talks with China, Europe, Russiaand
the United States but will not suspend its nuclear work in
advance, arguing instead that it is exercising its right to
peaceful nuclear technology. Iran signed on to the nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty in the 1960s, forswearing nuclear
weapons for sensitive technology that could be used for an
energy program.

Yesterday, U.S. diplomats met with British and French
negotiators to try to complete a draft resolution on sanctions
that the rest of the council members, including China and
Russia, would approve. The Bush administration had hoped to
reach an agreement last Friday, but European officials said they
were not comfortable with some of the tougher measures that the
United States sought to impose.

State Department spokesman Sean McCormack said there was
"widespread agreement, although not total agreement," among
Britain, Franceand the United States on sanctions. European
officials said privately that the resolution is likely to be
limited to a ban on any nuclear or missile trade with Iran,
while carving out an exception for a preexisting Iranian-Russian
nuclear deal.

Some U.S. officials have been pushing for broader action,
including travel bans and financial restrictions on people
connected to the nuclear program.

Iran began its program in secret in 1987, with equipment and
know-how from Pakistan'stop nuclear scientist. The existence of
the program, which includes a large facility in the town of
Natanz built to house thousands of centrifuges, was made public
in 2002 by Iranian exiles who hope to overthrow the country's
clerical regime. The Pakistani scientist, Abdul Qadeer Khan,
remains under house arrest in Pakistan, but the Pakistani
government has refused to let U.S. officials directly question
him about Iran's program or other programs he supplied in North
Koreaand Libya.

A senior Pakistani military official said yesterday that Khan
responds to written U.S. requests for information as best he
can. The Pakistani official, in Washington to lobby against a
U.S. nuclear deal with rival India, said his country had put
Khan and his black market network in the past and suggested it
is time for the United States to also move beyond the episode.

Staff writer Colum Lynch at the United Nations contributed to
this report.

 Copyright 1996- The Washington Post Company | User
*****************************************************************
 5 AFP: "Tortuous road" to settlement of Iran nuclear issue, says Ban -
    
 Tue Oct 24, 3:56 AM ET 
		 	 
SEOUL (AFP) - The incoming United Nations United 
Nationssecretary-general played down hopes of an early end to the 
crisis over Iran Iran's nuclear programme. <img 
src="http://us.a2.yimg.com/us.yimg.com/a/ci/citi/102406_cbol_esav 
ings_y_300x250_reflect_500.gif" width=300 height=250 border=0>[ 
src=] South Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki-Moon, who takes over 
on January 1, described the issue as another threat to the global 
non-proliferation regime along with North Korea North Korea's 
October 9 nuclear weapons test.
 
"Tehran has not so far responded to the Security Council demand
that it suspend all enrichment-related activities, and the road
to a peaceful resolution on this issue seems tortuous," he said
in a speech marking the 61st anniversary of the UN.
 
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad vowed Monday his country
will not retreat even "an inch" over its nuclear programme
despite the mounting threat of UN sanctions.
 
His comments came as Britain, France and Germany draw up a draft
sanctions resolution to put to the Security Council after Iran
refused to obey repeated deadlines to suspend uranium enrichment.
 
Western countries fear it is secretly trying to build nuclear
weapons, but the Islamic republic insists its programme is
solely for generating energy.
 
Ban described the situation on global peace and security -- one
of the UN's three pillars along with development and human
rights -- as "precarious indeed."
 
Efforts for a comprehensive treaty to fight terrorism had so far
failed. The security and humanitarian crisis in the Sudanese
region of Darfur, the flare-ups in the Middle East and conflicts
in Africa also called for concerted responses, Ban said.
 
As secretary-general, he said, he intends to seek an active role
in finding a peaceful settlement of the North Korean nuclear
issue.
 
Copyright © 2006 Agence France Presse. All rights reserved. The
*****************************************************************
 6 UPI: Israel steps up calls to stop Iran
     
 United Press International - Intl. Intelligence - 

10/23/2006 6:45:00 PM -0400

TEL AVIV, Israel, Oct. 23 (UPI) -- Prime Minister Ehud Olmert
said Monday Israel would use all it has to get the world to take
"active" steps to stop Iran from developing a nuclear bomb. 

In an address to the Israel Management Center in Tel Aviv,
Olmert noted that Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is the
first head of state since World War II who openly calls for the
destruction of a United Nations' member state. 

"There cannot be a situation in which the leader of a state ...
is accepted as a legitimate leader ... when he calls for the
elimination of a U.N. member state," Olmert stressed. 

In a clear allusion to the Holocaust he declared: "Never again
shall we repeat the mistakes made 60 years ago of
absentmindedness, light headedness, ignoring what was heard
(then) when it was still possible to save (people)." 

Last week Olmert focused on the Iranian threat when he met
Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow. After that meeting
Olmert said Iran should be afraid. 

He did not elaborate there but Monday, in Tel Aviv, he said
Putin had told him Russia would do "everything" to prevent Iran
from obtaining a nuclear weapon. 

Putin shares the fear that a nuclear weapon in Iranian hands is
a danger to the world's existence, Olmert said. 

We will use "all our might -- political, international,
diplomatic, moral, to mobilize all the countries to take active
steps to stop Iran from obtaining a non-conventional
capability," Olmert declared.

© Copyright 2006 United Press International, Inc. All Rights
Reserved
*****************************************************************
 7 Guardian Unlimited: More N. Korea Nuclear Tests Worry Japan
 
[UP] 

 	
AP Photo TOK115 
By MARI YAMAGUCHI Associated Press Writer 

TOKYO (AP) - Japan's foreign minister warned Tuesday there was a
possibility of more nuclear tests by North Korea and expressed
pessimism that the North would return to disarmament talks soon. 

A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman said Tuesday that North
Korean leader Kim Jong Il did not apologize for his regime's
nuclear test when a special envoy from China's president visited
Pyongyang last week. 

South Korean news reports said last week that Kim had expressed
regret for the Oct. 9 test during a visit by State Councilor
Tang Jiaxuan, who delivered a personal message and a gift from
Chinese President Hu Jintao. 

``These reports are certainly not accurate,'' ministry spokesman
Liu Jianchao said at a regular press briefing. ``We haven't
heard any information that Kim Jong Il apologized for the
test.'' 

Liu also said that the North Koreans told Tang's delegation that
``it did not have the will to carry out a second test.'' 
``But if it faces pressure, North Korea reserves the right to
take further actions,'' Liu said, citing Tang. 

Meanwhile, Taro Aso praised China for sending top diplomats to
Pyongyang last week for talks with North Korean leader Kim Jong
Il, but added ``that does not mean we can be optimistic about
North Korea's nuclear abandonment or a return to the six-party
talks.'' 

Aso, speaking to a parliamentary defense and foreign affairs
committee, said Japan had to be prepared for the possibility of
``second and third nuclear tests'' by North Korea, which carried
out its first nuclear test on Oct. 9. 

``As long as I remember, no country has halted nuclear tests
after the first one,'' Aso said. ``It's only common sense to
assume there would be a second and a third.'' 

Beijing has not released details on a trip by Chinese diplomats
to Pyongyang, and there have been conflicting reports about the
outcome of those talks. 

South Korean media reported last week that Kim expressed regret
for carrying out the nuclear test, ruling out the possibility
for further tests and hinting at an intention to return to arms
talks. 

Other reports have said that China was not optimistic that North
Korea will end its nuclear program or rejoin disarmament talks
soon. 

North Korea has shown no public signs of backing down since its
test, even after the U.N. Security Council imposed sanctions
against Pyongyang. 

Aso said the six-nation talks on North Korea's nuclear program
among the two Koreas, China, Japan, the United States and Russia
remain the best framework for resolving the standoff, and called
on North Korea to return ``unconditionally.'' 

The U.S. has sought to cut off the North's access to
international banking as punishment for alleged currency
counterfeiting and other illicit activity. 

Pyongyang denies the charges and has boycotted the six-nation
talks until the U.S. ends the crackdown.	 
		 	 	   
Guardian Unlimited © Guardian News and Media Limited 2006
*****************************************************************
 8 Guardian Unlimited: Prescott heads to North Korea talks
 
[UP] 

Press Association 

Tuesday October 24, 2006 11:08 AM
 	
John Prescott is travelling to Seoul for talks covering the
North Korea crisis.
 
The Deputy Prime Minister is due to meet senior South Korean
ministers amid heightened tensions in the region since its
northern neighbour's nuclear weapons test this month.
 
Mr Prescott is in Japan where he met new prime minister Shinzo
Abe, after which he was scheduled to fly to the South Korean
capital.
 
The deputy premier is on a tour of the Far East which will also
take in Malaysia and China.
 
The series of talks is expected to cover moves to curb climate
change and Muslim extremism, as well as the perceived new threat
from North Korea.
 
There is speculation that the communist state is planning a
second nuclear test, despite worldwide condemnation of its first
on October 9.
 
North Korea has described the UN's retaliatory sanctions as a
declaration of war while Russia has warned that Washington's
refusal to engage in talks with Pyongyang has encouraged the
latter's nuclear ambitions.
 
Mr Prescott is due to meet South Korea's foreign minister Ban Ki
Moon, the secretary general-designate of the UN.
 
Mr Prescott arrived in Japan on Monday, where he met senior
ministers in the Tokyo administration, discussing issues linked
to his Cabinet committees' work.
 
After a number of days in Seoul, Mr Prescott will travel to
Kuala Lumpur to meet his Malaysian counterpart for discussions
about interfaith community issues. His last stop will be a brief
visit to China.
 
© Copyright Press Association Ltd 2006, All Rights Reserved.
 
Guardian Unlimited © Guardian News and Media Limited 2006
*****************************************************************
 9 Guardian Unlimited: China Denies Reports of N. Korea Apology
 
From the Associated Press        
	 
[UP] 

Tuesday October 24, 2006 11:46 AM
 	
AP Photo TOK115 
By ALEXA OLESEN Associated Press Writer 

BEIJING (AP) - North Korea is not planning a second nuclear test
and is willing to return to six-party talks under certain
conditions but warned that it would take action if it feels
pressured, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman said Tuesday. 

Chinese State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan was told during meetings
with North Korean leader Kim Jong Il and other officials in
Pyongyang last week that the North has no plans currently to
carry out a second nuclear test, said Liu Jianchao. 

``But if it faces pressure, North Korea reserves the right to
take further actions,'' Liu said, citing Tang. 

Despite the apparently conciliatory tone of the meeting, Liu
said that Kim did not apologize for his regime's nuclear test,
as some South Korean media had reported. 

``These reports are certainly not accurate,'' Liu said. ``We
haven't heard any information that Kim Jong Il apologized for
the test.'' 

Earlier this month, U.S. media reported that Pyongyang may be
preparing for another, citing suspicious activity at a suspected
test site in the North's northeast. 

But on Tuesday, South Korea's Yonhap news agency reported that
the U.S. military have detected no signs of preparations for a
second atomic test. 

U.S. military officials gave that intelligence assessment to
their South Korean counterparts during annual defense talks in
Washington last week, Yonhap said, citing unidentified defense
officials. 

Officials at the Defense Ministry were not immediately available
for comment. 

Also Tuesday, Ban Ki-moon, the next United Nations
secretary-general and South Korea's foreign minister, said Seoul
fully backs the U.N. sanctions imposed on North Korea as
punishment for the nuclear test. 

Ban said he plans to use his new position as U.N. chief, which
he assumes starting next year, to seek a peaceful resolution of
nuclear standoff. 

South Korea has yet to outline any specific action it plans to
take to enforce the sanctions. The U.S. has urged the South to
join an anti-proliferation initiative, and to take steps for
more accountability in joint economic projects with the North. 

Ban, who was headed to Beijing for talks with Tang and other
Chinese officials on Friday, said Seoul was still reviewing its
policies ``to bring them closer in line'' with the U.N.
measures. 

--- 
Associated Press writers Jae-soon Chang in Seoul and Kozo
Mizoguchi in Tokyo contributed to this report.	 
		 	 	   
Guardian Unlimited © Guardian News and Media Limited 2006
*****************************************************************
 10 Guardian Unlimited: China Says N. Korea Not Planning Test 

From the Associated Press        

[UP] 

	Tuesday October 24, 2006 8:16 PM
 	
AP Photo HK105 
By ALEXA OLESEN Associated Press Writer 

BEIJING (AP) - China gave its first full public account Tuesday
of its mission to North Korea, saying it got no apology from top
leader Kim Jong Il for the atomic explosion but did receive
assurances there were no plans for a second nuclear test. 

The North's reclusive leader also expressed a willingness to
return to six-nation talks over its nuclear program if financial
restrictions levied by the U.S. are first resolved, said Chinese
Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao. 

Chinese State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan met with Kim last week
during a trip to Pyongyang with Beijing's top nuclear envoy and
vice foreign minister that analysts and diplomats had called a
critical opportunity to assess the North's intentions. 

The meeting resulted in no breakthroughs, but China cast the
discussions in a positive light. 

Tang was told during meetings with Kim and other North Korean
officials that the regime has no plans currently to carry out a
second nuclear test, Liu said. ``But if it faces pressure, North
Korea reserves the right to take further actions,'' he added,
citing Tang. 

A second nuclear test has been widely believed to be a
possibility. Earlier this month, U.S. media reported that
Pyongyang may be preparing for another blast, citing suspicious
activity at a suspected test site in the country's northeast. 

But on Tuesday, South Korea's Yonhap news agency reported the
U.S. military had not detected signs of preparations for a
second atomic test. 

Despite the apparently conciliatory tone of the Pyongyang
meeting, Liu said Kim did not apologize for his regime's nuclear
test, as some South Korean media had reported. 

``These reports are certainly not accurate,'' Liu said. ``We
haven't heard any information that Kim Jong Il apologized for
the test.'' 

North Korean officials told the Chinese envoy Pyongyang was
willing to return to international negotiations on its nuclear
program but wants ``certain questions, including the matter of
U.S. financial sanctions against it, resolved first,'' Liu said
at a regular press briefing. 

The U.S. has sought to cut off the North's access to
international banking as punishment for alleged counterfeiting
of U.S. dollars and other illicit activity. Pyongyang has denied
the charges and boycotted six-nation talks on its nuclear
program until the U.S. ends the crackdown. 

``All countries involved in the six-party talks believe the
talks should be resumed but of course the parties do not all
agree on how,'' Liu said, referring to the talks Beijing has
hosted since 2003. They include China, the two Koreas, the
United States, Russia and Japan. 

``Consultations are required to find a way acceptable to all,''
he said. 

The North Koreans also said countries should not ``willfully
interpret or expand the sanctions'' imposed by the United
Nations because of the test, according to Liu. 

The United States and Japan are among countries that have
imposed additional sanctions on the North. Liu said he had no
information to indicate that China had already, or was
considering, cutting its food and energy assistance to North
Korea. 

Beijing, as the North's main ally and source of aid, has the
greatest leverage over the regime. However, China has been
reluctant to pressure the North, in part out of fear that a
collapse of social order there would result in a flood of
refugees over their shared border. 

Instead, it has been involved in a flurry of diplomatic activity
aimed at lessening tensions and preventing the crisis from
escalating since Pyongyang announced its Oct. 9 nuclear test. 

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice visited Beijing last week
and Ban Ki-moon, the next U.N. secretary-general and South
Korea's foreign minister, was scheduled to arrive in Beijing on
Friday to discuss the standoff with top Chinese leaders. 

Ban said he plans to use his new position as U.N. chief, which
he'll assume at the beginning of next year, to seek a peaceful
resolution of the nuclear issue. He also said Seoul fully backs
the U.N. sanctions imposed on the North as punishment for the
nuclear test. 

South Korea has yet to outline any specific action it plans to
take to enforce the sanctions. The U.S. has urged the South to
join an anti-proliferation initiative, and to take steps for
more accountability in joint economic projects with the North. 

Ban said Seoul was still reviewing its policies ``to bring them
closer in line'' with the U.N. measures. 

--- 
Associated Press writers Jae-soon Chang and Burt Herman in
Seoul, South Korea, and Kozo Mizoguchi in Tokyo contributed to
this report. 	 
		 	 	   
Guardian Unlimited © Guardian News and Media Limited 2006
*****************************************************************
 11 Korea Times: Seoul Develops 1,000-KM Cruise Missile 

Hankooki.com > The Korea Times   

By Jung Sung-ki Staff Reporter

South Korea has developed a cruise missile with a range of 1,000
kilometers to counter North Korea's short- and medium-range
missiles, a government source said yesterday. 

The 1,000-kilometer range means the missile is able to hit
strategic targets, including missile bases and nuclear weapons
facilities entrenched deep in mountainous areas in the communist
country. It is also capable of reaching as far as Beijing and
Tokyo. 

``The military has conducted a successful test of the missile
recently,'' the source said on condition of anonymity. 

He said the missile, aided by the Terrain Contour Matching
(TERCOM) system, hit targets with a margin of error of plus or
minus five meters during tests. 

The missile will be part of the arsenal of the Navy's advanced
vessels, including the 7,000-ton KDX-III Aegis destroyers that
will be built from 2008, the source said, adding the Defense
Ministry and the state-run Agency for Defense Development are
now developing cruise missiles with a range of 1,500 kilometers. 

Right after North Korea test-launched several missiles,
including the long-range Taepodong-2 capable of hitting Alaska,
into the East Sea last July, Defense Minister Yoon Kwang-ung
pledged to develop sophisticated cruise missiles to deter North
Korea's missile threat. 

Yoon said developing long-range cruise missiles does not violate
the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) agreed upon between
Seoul and Washington in 2001. 

The MTCR is an informal and voluntary association of countries
which share the goal of non-proliferation of unmanned
deliverance systems of weapons of mass destruction, and which
seeks to coordinate national export licensing efforts to prevent
their proliferation. 

Under the pact, South Korea can build ballistic missiles with a
range of up to 300 kilometers and a 500 kilogram maximum
payload. But the MTCR only applies to high-velocity, free flight
ballistic missiles, excluding the slower, surface-skimming
cruise weapons. 

The ministry neither confirmed nor denied the report. Informed
sources said the military is worried the announcement of the
cruise missile development would provoke its neighbors,
including China, Japan and Russia. 

The South Korean military has a cruise missile with a range of
500 kilometers, named ``Chonryong,'' which are being deployed to
the guided missile headquarters in the central part of the
country. 

The cruise missile, dubbed a ``flying bomb,'' is a guided
missile which uses a lifting wing and most often a jet
propulsion system to allow sustained flight. The self-navigating
cruise missile travels at supersonic or high subsonic speeds. It
flies in a non-ballistic very low altitude trajectory to avoid
radar detection. 

Currently, a few nations such as the United States, the United
Kingdom, France, Russia, China and Israel, possess long-range
cruise missiles with a range of more than 500 kilometers. 

Pyongyang is believed to have more than 600 Scud and Rodong
missiles that can cover South Korea and Japan. The Scuds, or
Russian R-11 series missiles, have a range of 130-700
kilometers. The latest version of the Rodong missile, a further
development of the Scud, has an estimated 2,000-kilometer range. 

gallantjung@koreatimes.co.kr 10-24-2006 17:01         

*****************************************************************
 12 Korea Times: Alliance in Disarray 

Hankooki.com > The Korea Times > Opinion   

 Korea Needs to Mend Relationship With US   
      
The confusion shown in the course of the just-ended Korea-U.S.
Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) was enough to make people
wonder if the military alliance of the two allied nations is
well. The annual meeting, held since 1968, used to be a festive
gathering to reconfirm the already firm security alliance.

 However, the chilly mood of the just-ended meeting was far
different from previous ones despite the fact that it was the
first SCM held under a new security environment on this
peninsula caused by North Korea¡¯s test of a nuclear weapon.

 Discords arose in the discussion of key issues, such as the
nuclear umbrella for South Korea. After the Military Committee
Meeting (MCM), held a day earlier than the SCM, Korean officials
told reporters that ¡°the U.S. government has given the
Commander of the Korea-U.S. Combined Forces (CFC) strategic
guidelines to better prepare for the nuclear threat from the
North.¡± But, the U.S. denied it, saying that there was no such
a thing.

 Another shameful scene came during the joint press conference
by Defense Minister Yoon Kwangung and his U.S. counterpart
Donald Rumsfeld. Yoon¡¯s remarks that extended deterrence was
affirmed by the U.S. to better protect the South from the
North¡¯s nuclear threat, was refuted on the spot by Rumsfeld,
who said that the affirmation would not go beyond that of
previous years. Those were the circumstances that arose from our
officials intentionally exaggerating what was talked about in
the meeting. We have no choice but to fear that it might be a
show of distrust between the two nations.

 In the meeting, Yoon agreed to take over wartime operational
control by March 2012 at latest. At the same time, Yoon also
sought an enhanced U.S. affirmation of nuclear deterrence. It
was a contradiction for him to seek an enhanced nuclear umbrella
while agreeing to take back wartime control, which will require
the disbandment of the CFC ? the central pillar in the defense
of South Korea.

 Our country is facing a security threat like none we have ever
experienced as a result of Pyongyang¡¯s nuclear blast. The only
means to counter the North¡¯s nuclear provocation is to
strengthen the security alliances with the U.S. However, the
Korea-U.S. relationship, long called a ¡°blood alliance,¡±
appeared to be markedly weakening at the SMC. Something must be
done to restore the crumbling security relationship with the U.S.

 Unfortunately, our relationship is expected to worsen in the
days to come over our participation in the Proliferation
Security Initiative (PSI) to interdict North Korean ships
suspected of carrying war materials. It may be a time for
President Roh Moo-hyun to consider changing the lineup in charge
of national security and diplomacy to normalize the fractured
relationship with the U.S. 

10-24-2006 19:23         
*****************************************************************
 13 AFP: NKorea has no plans for second nuke test, but no apology for first - China - 

 by Karl Malakunas Tue Oct 24, 7:48 AM ET 
		 	 
BEIJING (AFP) - North Korea

" /> has told China it had no plans for a second nuclear test but 
did not apologise for its first blast, Chinese officials said, as 
the UN warned of a critical food shortage in the impoverished 
nation. [ src=] In his first meeting with a foreign official 
since Pyongyang stunned the world with its atomic bomb test, 
North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il held talks with Chinese President 
Hu Jintao " /> 's envoy in Pyongyang on Thursday last week.
 
China's foreign ministry, giving the most expansive briefing yet 
of the meeting, said Tuesday that Kim had told envoy Tang Jiaxuan 
that North Korea was not planning a second blast.
 
However Kim also reportedly warned that further, but unspecified 
action, might follow if the international community continued to 
heap pressure on North Korea in reaction to the first blast.
 
"He (Kim) expressed that North Korea does not have a plan for a 
second nuclear test," foreign ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao 
told reporters.
 
"But if others put further pressure or unfair pressure (on the 
country), then North Korea may possibly take further measures."
 
The October 9 blast triggered global outrage and led to sweeping
UN Security Council sanctions against North Korea.
 
Some press reports from South Korea
" /> said Kim had expressed some form of regret for his nation's
actions, but Liu dismissed the speculation. "I have not heard of
Kim Jong-Il apologising," he said.
 
Liu also said Kim had reiterated his stance that Pyongyang would
not return to talks on its nuclear ambitions until the United
States lifted financial sanctions imposed last year for alleged
money-laundering and counterfeiting.
 
"They expressed to us their willingness to return to the
six-party talks but there are certain conditions," spokesman Liu
Jianchao said.
 
"They are willing to return, but these questions, including
financial sanctions, need to be solved."
 
Returning to the talks -- which have been stalled since North
Korea walked out in November last year -- is a key plank of the
UN resolution imposed on the nation for conducting its nuclear
test.
 
Japan and Russia, both parties to the six-nation talks, called
separately on Tuesday for North Korea to rejoin the diplomatic
forum.
 
"We firmly called on the North Korean side to maintain maximum
restraint and return to the negotiating table," Russian Foreign
Minister Sergei Lavrov said in Saint Petersburg.
 
Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Aso rejected North Korea's demand
that Washington lift the financial sanctions in return for
returning to the talks, which China hosts and also includes the
United States and South Korea.
 
"The US financial sanctions are a totally different thing from
the six-party talks," Aso told reporters.
 
"The US sanctions are based on its domestic laws which have
nothing to do with the six-way talks."
 
All six sides agreed a deal in September last year on ending the
North's nuclear program in return for Pyongang receiving
economic benefits and security guarantees. 

But the deal fell apart when North Korea walked out in protest
at the financial sanctions. 

Meanwhile, Vitit Muntarbhorn, the UN special rapporteur on human
rights in North Korea, warned that the critical food situation
in the impoverished country would likely worsen because of the
nuclear crisis. 

"There is a critical food shortage also compounded by disastrous
floods in July and August," Muntarbhorn told a news conference
at the United Nations
" /> headquarters in New York. 

He said the food crisis was further complicated by the North
Korean missile tests in July and this month's nuclear blast,
both of which he described as "a serious waste" of resources. 

"The resources spent on arms would have been better spent
satisfying the food security (of North Koreans)," said
Muntarbhorn, a Thai law professor. 

Chinese spokesman Liu said Tuesday that China, the North's
closest ally and by far its biggest aid donor, had no intention
of scaling back its humanitarian program to its neighbour. 

"Supplying the North Korean people with aid to help them
overcome some difficulties has all along been the policy of the
Chinese government," Liu said. 

"We believe this is beneficial to the stability of the
peninsula... at present I have not heard anything about stopping
this kind of aid to North Korea." 

Also Tuesday, South Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki-Moon said he
would play an active part in finding a peaceful settlement to
the nuclear crisis when he takes over as the next UN secretary
general in the new year.
 	 		 			
Copyright © 2006 Agence France Presse. All rights reserved. The
*****************************************************************
 14 AFP: SKorea successfully tests longer-range cruise missile - report -

 Tue Oct 24, 4:20 AM ET 
		 	 
SEOUL (AFP) - South Korea South Koreahas successfully tested a 
new longer-range cruise missile which has not only North Korea 
North Koreabut also parts of China and Japan within range, a news 
report has said. The Munhwa Ilbo newspaper, quoting unnamed 
senior government officials, said the country had succeeded in 
test-firing a cruise missile with a 1,000 kilometer (620-mile) 
range.
 
"The missile precisely hit the targeted zone, five meters in
diameter, during the test launch," an unnamed official was
quoted as saying.
 
The missile had to shuttle 25 times between a launch site and a
target around 40 kilometers away before hitting it to replicate
the long distance range, another official told the paper.
 
Defense ministry officials refused to confirm the report.
 
South Korea has vowed to step up efforts to develop missiles
that can launch surgical attacks on missile launching sites deep
inside North Korea since its declared nuclear test on October 9.
 
The new missile can reach all of North Korea as well as Beijing
and Tokyo. The unnamed official said Seoul was also developing
cruise missile with a range of 1,500 kilometers.
 
South Korea's media reported last month the country had
successfully developed its first cruise missile with a
500-kilometer range. Seoul's defense officials declined to
confirm the reports.
 
The new missile, tentatively named "Cheon Ryong" or Sky Dragon
and similar to the US-made Tomahawk, will be deployed for
operations by the end of the year, Yonhap news agency said
Tuesday.
 
A US-South Korean defence accord imposes a maximum range of 300
kilometers for Seoul's missiles, in compliance with
international arms control efforts.
 
But South Korean officials believe the agreement applies only to
ballistic and not cruise missiles, according to media reports.
 
The North deploys Scuds and Rodongs with a range of 1,300
kilometres, capable of hitting anywhere in the South, and is
developing a Taepodong missile with an expected final range of
up to 6,000 kilometres.
 

Copyright © 2006 Agence France Presse. All rights reserved.
*****************************************************************
 15 UPI: S. Korean official doubts NK nuke pledge
     
United Press International - Security &Terrorism - 

10/24/2006 12:40:00 PM -0400                                                                                                                     

WASHINGTON, Oct. 24 (UPI) -- A top South Korean official said
Friday he doubted whether North Korea's reported promise not to
detonate another nuclear weapon was sincere. 

At a Pentagon press briefing after meeting with U.S. Defense
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, South Korean Defense Minister Yoon
Kwang-ung smiled when asked whether he believed the promise
North Korea's leader Kim Jong Il apparently made in meetings
with Chinese officials, as reported by a South Korean news
agency. 

"To my understanding, a recent report has come in that Kim Jong
Il has announced that he does not intend to carry out a second
nuclear test," Yoon said. "I think the answer lies in looking
into the past." 

North Korea last week tested a nuclear warhead for the first
time. This week, Kim Jong Il said North Korea would detonate
another. He apparently backed off that claim, and even
apologized for the first test, according to the Yonhap News
Agency. 

Yonhap quoted an anonymous diplomatic source in Seoul as saying
Kim said there would be no second nuclear test. 

Minister Yoon said the United States and South Korea are
continuing to share intelligence as to preparations for a
possible second test. 

The U.S. director of national intelligence confirmed North
Korea's Oct. 9 nuclear test on Oct. 15, characterizing it as
small, less than a kiloton in yield.

© Copyright 2006 United Press International, Inc. All Rights
Reserved
*****************************************************************
 16 UPI: ElBaradei: Sanctions no answer to N. Korea
     
United Press International - Security &Terrorism - 

10/24/2006 3:50:00 PM -0400

WASHINGTON, Oct. 24 (UPI) -- Sanctions and other efforts to
isolate North Korea are not the most effective way to deal with
the nuclear threat it poses, a top U.N. official says. 

"Without a dialogue we are not moving forward," said
International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Mohammed
ElBaradei. 

ElBaradei said that the North Korean nuclear test, which took
place on Oct. 9, was a cry for help. 

"They feel, rightly or wrongly, that they are isolated," he
said. "For them the test is to say, 'We could do more harm if
you don't talk to us.'" 

El-Baradei spoke Monday at Georgetown University, Washington,
D.C., at an award ceremony honoring his diplomatic
accomplishments. 

On Oct. 14, the United Nations Security Council condemned the
North Korean nuclear test and imposed various sanctions,
including a ban on the flow of possible weapon materials and a
clause that allows all countries to inspect for weapons all
goods coming in and out of the reclusive communist country. 

The Security Council resolution, which was unanimously adopted,
also freezes the overseas assets of certain individuals that
could be associated with the North Korean weapons program and
bans them from traveling. 

U.S. ambassador to the U.N. John Bolton praised the vote, saying
that the resolution sends a clear signal to North Korea and any
other country considering the development of nuclear weapons
that such activity is not acceptable. 

According to ElBaradei, the United States needs to develop
"constructive engagement" policies as opposed to punishments.
Sanctions should be used to induce a change of behavior, he
said. 

"Isolating them further might hurt them for a while, but it's
not a solution." 

The International Atomic Energy Agency is an independent
international governmental body associated with the U.N., which
monitors the development of nuclear weapons and that oversees
the implementation of laws and treaties designed to stop
proliferation.

© Copyright 2006 United Press International, Inc. All Rights
Reserved
*****************************************************************
 17 UPI: IAEA: North Korea feels threatened
     
 United Press International - Security &Terrorism - 

10/24/2006 12:44:00 PM -0400

WASHINGTON, Oct. 24 (UPI) -- North Korea's Oct. 9 nuclear test
was a cry for help from a frightened regime, said the head of
the International Atomic Energy Agency. 

"It's a cry for help, in my view," Mohammed El Baradei said
Monday in a speech at Georgetown University. "I think from the
North Korean perspective it's a cry for help. It is the only
trump card they have, which is the nuclear issue. The feel,
rightly or wrongly, that they are isolated. They feel that they
are not getting the security assurance they would like to see.
They see that from their perspective it is a question of regime
survival, and for them the test is to say, 'We could be -- we
could do more harm, you know, if you don't come and talk to
us.'" 

"North Korea is saying, 'We have neighbors who are either
nuclear weapon states or either -- sitting under a nuclear
umbrella, and why can't we do the same? Maybe that would be our
way to protect ourselves, to provide ourselves with a shield,'
and then to start negotiating from a position of (strength)," he
said. "We might think that their perception of their security or
insecurity is misplaced, but it's ...either a question of
security or it's a question of trying to influence or project
influence. In the case of Korea, it's a question of security." 

El Baradei said nuclear non-proliferation in Asia can hold
unless it is diplomatically bungled, but warned that a second
North Korean nuclear test could compel Japan and South Korea to
develop their own nuclear weapons rather than rely on American
assurances for deterrence. They now face a nuclear China and
North Korea, as well as Pakistan and India.

© Copyright 2006 United Press International, Inc. All Rights
Reserved
*****************************************************************
 18 Guardian Unlimited: Test Sparks N. Korea Backlash in Japan 

From the Associated Press        

[UP] 

Tuesday October 24, 2006 10:01 PM
 	
AP Photo TOK105 
By HANS GREIMEL Associated Press Writer 

TOKYO (AP) - When a bamboo grove mysteriously erupted in flames
and nearly engulfed an office compound of Japan's biggest
pro-North Korean organization, So Chung-on was hardly surprised. 

Harassment of Japan's insular North Korean community, the
biggest outside the homeland or China, dates back decades. But
animosity has flared to new levels since North Korea stunned the
world with its nuclear test. 

``The atmosphere in Japan is now the worst,'' said So, director
of international affairs at Chongryon, an umbrella group acting
as de facto embassy for tens of thousands of ethnic Koreans who
live in Asia's richest capitalist society yet see North Korea as
home. 

No one was hurt in the Oct. 17 arson attack, and the blaze was
put out before it could torch local Chongryon offices. But it
was one of several outbursts putting people on edge - including
angry protests outside Chongryon facilities, threatening phone
calls to North Korea-backed private schools and a severed pinkie
finger mailed to the group's headquarters with a note promising
``punishment from heaven.'' 

North Koreans in Japan have long been vilified as a communist
fifth column, but with Tokyo leading a worldwide campaign to
sanction Pyongyang for its nuclear test, they now stand in an
unwanted spotlight. 

Japan, lying within easy range of North Korean missiles, is
especially jittery about its neighbor's atomic arsenal. After
the Oct. 9 test, Tokyo banned North Korean imports, barred port
entry of North Korean ships and prohibited most North Korean
nationals from entering the country. 

Chongryon has not commented on the nuclear test, but was quick
to condemn the backlash. 

The measures will likely strangle North Korean businesses in
Japan and divide families with roots in both countries. It could
also finally kill off reconciliation between rival camps of
North and South Koreans in Japan. 

``Koreans who have nothing to do with the nuclear test have
become the victim,'' Chongryon said in a statement. ``The
ratcheting up of sanctions severely threatens the rights and
lifestyle of Koreans in Japan.'' 

There are some 600,000 ethnic Koreans among 127 million
Japanese, most of them descendants of people who moved here
voluntarily or by force during Japan's 1910-1945 colonial rule
of the Korean peninsula. About 200,000 are affiliated with
Pyongyang. 

All Koreans in Japan face discrimination in Japan. All Koreans
were stripped of their Japanese citizenship after World War II
and those in Japan found themselves in a society that often
looked down on them as former colonial subjects. 

Yet given the long-standing animosity between Tokyo and
Pyongyang, North Koreans face especially limited economic
opportunities, confined to tight-knit community-run businesses.

Students who attend North Korean schools find it all but
impossible to enter public universities. 

Chongryon functions like an embassy because Japan and North
Korea have no diplomatic ties. Its walled headquarters in Tokyo
is guarded by police. Inside, visitors are greeted by a giant
mural of North Korea's founding father Kim Il Sung and his son,
current leader Kim Jong Il. 

The current backlash began in July, after North Korea conducted
internationally condemned missile tests. 

Since then, there have been 130 cases of harassment and
intimidation against North Korean students, Chongryon said. The
pace quickened after the nuclear test, with two arson attacks
against Chongryon facilities, including the bamboo incident in
the city of Mito. 

Tokyo's sanctions are meant to squeeze North Korea's economy and
pressure Pyongyang into giving up its nuclear ambitions. But in
reality, North Korean trade with Japan tumbled 85 percent from
2001, to a paltry $195 million last year. Analysts say any
additional crackdown will have limited impact overseas. 

But in Japan, it will dig deep into North Korean businesses that
rely on importing manufactured goods like cheap men's suits,
marine and agriculture products, like clams and mushrooms, and
raw materials such as coal. 

Meanwhile, banning North Korean ships will shut the doors on the
most popular way for North Koreans to visit relatives back home,
and the new immigration restrictions will further limit travel. 

Chongryon's future is anything but bright, said David C. Kang, a
North Korea expert at Dartmouth University. 

Loyalty toward Chongryon started fading in the 1990s when North
Korea's economy flat-lined and famines killed an estimated 2
million people. Then, in 2002, Kim Jong Il shocked the world by
admitting North Korean agents had been kidnapping Japanese
citizens to train communist spies. 

Today, many North Koreans simply opt for South Korean or
Japanese citizenship to escape the stigma. 

Chongryon tried to bolster its support by striking a landmark
reconciliation accord with the South Korean association in Japan
earlier this year. But the nuclear crisis scuttled that too. 

``The North Korean community is dwindling, for both assimilation
in Japan and also because it's such a sinking ship,'' Kang said.

    Guardian Unlimited © Guardian News and Media Limited 2006
*****************************************************************
 19 IAEA: IAEA Director General Official Visit to United States
 
+ [IAEA.ORG :: Atoms for Peace] 

Dr. ElBaradei Addresses the UN General Assembly 30 October 2006
 
Staff Report

 23 October 2006 [Mohamed ElBaradei and Condoleeza Rice] 
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice meets with IAEA chief
Mohamed ElBaradei at the State Department in Washington. (Photo
credit: AP Photo/Charles Dharapak) 

  + Story Resources 
  + US Department of State Briefing
  + Georgetown University Award
  + Sadat Chair, University of Maryland
  + Interfaith Center, New York
  + Muslim Public Affairs Council
  + IAEA Director General Awards 
  + Nobel Peace Prize 2005 
  + Rice-ElBaradei Meeting, May 2006 
During a visit to the United States, IAEA Director General
Mohamed ElBaradei met with US Secretary of State Condoleezza
Rice in Washington, DC, on matters related to nuclear
non-proliferation and security, including the verification of
nuclear programmes in Iran and the Democratic People´s Republic
of Korea (DPRK). 

On Monday, 30 October, Dr. ElBaradei is scheduled to address the
General Assembly of the United Nations. His statement focuses on
the IAEA´s work in fields of nuclear safeguards and
verification, safety and security, and science and technology.
 
In Washington, DC, Dr. ElBaradei attended events at Georgetown
University and the University of Maryland, both of which
honoured him for his distinguished international service at the
IAEA.
 
  + At Georgetown University, the Institute for the Study of
Diplomacy presented Dr. ElBaradei with the 26th Annual Raymond
"Jit" Trainor Award for Distinction in the Conduct of Diplomacy.
At the School of Foreign Service, Dr. ElBaradei also met with
Dean Robert Galluci, who moderated a question and answer session
with the Director General on nuclear issues. 


  + At the University of Maryland, Dr. ElBaradei received the
Honorary Doctorate in Public Service from University Dean Edward
Montgomery. Dr. ElBaradei is to present the invited Sadat Peace
Lecture at the Center for International Development and Conflict
Management. The Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development was
established at the University in 1997 in memory of the late
Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. The Chair was made possible by
the commitment of Anwar Sadat´s widow, Dr. Jehan Sadat, to her
husband´s legacy of leadership for peace. With support from all
levels of the University, Dr. Sadat created an endowment for the
Chair from the generous support of many individual contributors
from around the world. 
In New York City, Dr. ElBaradei is being honoured by the
Interfaith Center of New York (ICNY) and the Muslim Public
Affairs Council (MPAC).
 
  + ICNY honoured Dr. ElBaradei with the 2006 James Parks Morton
Interfaith. The award cites the Director General´s
"extraordinary work" at the IAEA, as a diplomat, academic, and
Nobel Peace Prize Laureate and the lasting impact of the IAEA
and his leadership on global efforts for safety, security, and
human development. ICNY promotes peace and understanding through
a range of secular educational activities that build bridges
between communities. 

  + MPAC is presenting Dr. ElBaradei with its Human Security
Award. The MPAC Foundation Human Security Award was created to
honor the contributions of extraordinary individuals who protect
and empower the world´s most vulnerable populations. The
Foundation recognizes Dr. ElBaradei´s contribution as an
advocate for disarmament and for his reliance on diplomacy to
rid the world of nuclear threats, and acknowledges Dr.
ElBaradei´s and the International Atomic Energy Agency´s
significant role in coordinating nuclear safety and security
around the world. 
At the United Nations 30 October, Dr. ElBaradei will address the
General Assembly on the work of the IAEA and global nuclear
developments. The full text of his statement will be on the
IAEA.org website after delivery.
 Copyright ©, International Atomic Energy Agency, P.O. Box 100,
Wagramer Strasse 5, A-1400 Vienna, Austria 
Telephone (+431) 2600-0; Facsimilie (+431) 2600-7; E-mail:
Official.Mail@iaea.org
*****************************************************************
 20 Guardian Unlimited: Spain Says Mideast 'Road Map' Stalled 

From the Associated Press        

[UP] 

Tuesday October 24, 2006 8:16 PM
 	
By PAUL HAVEN Associated Press Writer 

MADRID, Spain (AP) - A leading European voice on the Middle East
said Tuesday that the ``road map'' for peace in the
long-suffering region had fatally stalled, but Israeli and
Palestinian officials were quick to brand his comments as overly
pessimistic. 

Spanish Foreign Minister Miguel Angel Moratinos told a
parliamentary panel in Madrid that Europe has a historic
opportunity to take the lead in pushing for a fresh approach to
the conflict, and that negotiations should include Syria and
take into account the Iranian nuclear dispute. 

Moratinos said Europe must lead the effort to push both sides
back to the table, working in conjunction with the United
States. 

``It is necessary that this diplomatic initiative be led by the
European Union, not with small, gradual steps, but with a major
initiative that has great scope,'' said Moratinos. ``Everyone
agrees that sooner or later there will be a peace conference.'' 

He hinted it was too late to revive the U.S.-backed blueprint
for peace known as the ``road map.'' 

``I don't think the road map is the best path to get out of the
stagnation. I don't think it is in condition now to resurrect
the Middle East peace process, nor do I think small
confidence-building measures can work,'' said Moratinos, a
one-time EU envoy to the Middle East with wide connections in
the region. 

Those comments succeeded in bringing Israeli and Palestinian
officials together on at least one thing: Both sides rejected
his take on the conflict and leapt to the defense of the
Washington-backed peace blueprint, saying it still offered the
best way forward. 

``I don't think we can term anything dead or alive. The road map
is there, but if Miguel Moratinos will call for a mechanism to
implement it, we will appreciate this,'' Palestinian negotiator
Saeb Erekat, a confidant of moderate Palestinian President
Mahmoud Abbas, told The Associated Press. ``We don't need to
reinvent the wheel, we just need there to be a mechanism to
implement it. There will not be a solution without the road
map.'' 

Israeli Foreign Ministry spokesman Mark Regev agreed. 

``The way forward is through the road map which is the
international community's consensus document on how to move
forward in the Middle East peace process,'' he said, blaming the
Palestinian side for not embracing the plan. 

In Washington, the State Department spokesman Sean McCormack
said the idea has been ``bouncing around.'' The U.S. focus right
now, he said, is working with Abbas to build up security forces
and with the Israeli government to keep open more crossings. 

``It would also help reassure the Israeli government regarding
attacks on its territory emanating from Gaza,'' McCormack said. 

But most important, he said, is the Palestinian government must
overcome its failure to meet the criteria for peacemaking set by
the United States, the European Union, the United Nations and
Russia. 

He referred to demands Hamas renounce violence and accept
Israel's right to exist. ``That's a condition for any sort of
engagement with the international community,'' the U.S. official
said. 

Britain's Foreign Office said London still believes ``the road
map is the best way forward.'' 

The road map, launched in 2003, envisioned a Palestinian state
alongside Israel but stalled almost from the outset because
neither side met the initial commitments. Relations between the
Israelis and Palestinians soured further following the election
of a Hamas-led Palestinian government earlier this year. Hamas
has refused to rescind its call for Israel's destruction. 

Moratinos has long offered to have Spain play a role in
resolving the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, but has had little
response from either side in recent years. 

Spain hosted a landmark Middle East peace conference in 1991,
bringing together Israel and many of its Arab enemies for the
first time. Those talks helped lay the foundation for the Oslo
peace process, which resulted in the establishment of the
Palestinian Authority. 

The Spanish diplomat said that any talks should also involve
Syria - a longtime foe of Washington - and that Iran's nuclear
program would also need to be addressed at such a conference. 

The presence of Iran means new talks would have to be ``much
more sophisticated'' than in the past, Moratinos said. He did
not specify whether he felt Iran should be directly involved in
the talks. 

Moratinos has long offered to have Spain play a role in
resolving the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, but has had little
response from either side in recent years. 

Spain hosted a landmark Middle East peace conference in 1991,
bringing together Israel and many of its Arab enemies for the
first time. Those talks helped lay the foundation for the Oslo
peace process, which resulted in the establishment of the
Palestinian Authority. 

Moratinos said Middle East peace will top the agenda at a
meeting Friday and Saturday in the Spanish resort city of
Alicante that will bring together foreign ministers from
southern European and African countries bordering the
Mediterranean. 

EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana will visit Israel, Jordan,
Egypt and Lebanon, and meet with Palestinian President Mahmoud
Abbas next week. Solana is to assess efforts in trying to revive
the peace process. 

Guardian Unlimited © Guardian News and Media Limited 2006
*****************************************************************
 21 BBC: Nuclear bunker goes under hammer
 
Last Updated: Tuesday, 24 October 2006
 
[Mistley bunker]                                

The lower floor of the Mistley bunker is underground                                                           

A nuclear bunker built at the height of the Cold War is to be 
sold at auction at a guide price of £400,000. 

The Mistley Secret Bunker on the Essex-Suffolk border and owned 
by Essex County Council was used as a visitors' centre after 
decommissioning. 

London-based auctioneers Allsop said that the two-storey building 
near Manningtree, built in 1951, could be transformed into a 
unique home. 

It will be auctioned in central London on 31 October. 



*****************************************************************
 22 IPS-English ARGENTINA: Nuclear Power Loaded with Question Marks
 
Date: Tue, 24 Oct 2006 14:57:47 -0700

X-Nohoney: yes white-hard - relay H=adsl-63-203-231-61.dsl.snfc21.pacbell.net (borg.energy-net.org) [63.203.231.61]
X-Sender-Host-Address: 63.203.231.61
X-Sender-Host-Name: adsl-63-203-231-61.dsl.snfc21.pacbell.net
X-Spam-Class: HAM-VERY-WHITELIST

<x-flowed>
ROMAIPS LA DV EN IF IP MD SU=20
ARGENTINA: Nuclear Power Loaded with Question Marks
Marcela Valente

BUENOS AIRES, Oct 24 (IPS) - Argentina has begun hiring engineers, chemis=
ts, physicists, technicians and communications and environmental experts =
in its nuclear industry, which has been paralysed since the 1990s. But in=
  the face of this enthusiasm, activists are wondering if there will be mo=
re safety and transparency this time around.

Although one of the arguments for resurrecting nuclear power in the count=
ry is the need to curb climate change, caused by burning fossil fuels, mo=
st environmentalists say nuclear energy is potentially hazardous, and cre=
ates a long-term latent threat in the form of radioactive waste.=20

But nuclear experts are convinced that atomic energy is the cleanest and =
safest source of energy in the world. And the N=E9stor Kirchner administr=
ation has chosen to listen to their view, announcing in August a plan to =
reactivate nuclear power stations and the start of production of its inpu=
ts: heavy water and enriched uranium.

Argentina was a pioneer in nuclear energy production in Latin America. In=
  the mid-20th century, the state began to invest in research and developm=
ent, and in 1974 the region's first atomic power station, Atucha I, was b=
rought on-line. It produces 357 megawatts, and is located in the eastern =
province of Buenos Aires.

In 1984 a second power station, Embalse, began to operate in the central =
province of C=F3rdoba, generating 648 megawatts.

Construction of Atucha II, on the same site as Atucha I, began in 1981, b=
ut it was abandoned in 1994 because of lack of funds and political will o=
n the part of the rightwing government of Carlos Menem (1989-1999).

Argentina had originally planned to build a total of six nuclear reactors=
, but the plan was not completed. During the 1980s, interest fell off bec=
ause of the country's abundant supply of natural gas, and in the 1990s th=
e state decided not to proceed with an activity requiring such large inve=
stments.

In 1994, Menem removed the nuclear power stations from the aegis of their=
  parent organisation, the National Atomic Energy Commission (CNEA), in or=
der to put them up for public tender. The sale failed, and the power plan=
ts were left to the management of the Nucleoel=E9ctrica company, financed=
  by the state.

The paralysis of the industry had an impact on energy output. The share o=
f electricity generated by nuclear energy in Argentina fell from 15 perce=
nt in the 1980s to eight percent today.

Now the centre-left Kirchner administration plans to finish building Atuc=
ha II, which will generate 745 megawatts, by 2010, and to prolong the use=
ful lives of Atucha I and Embalse. It is also planning feasibility studie=
s for a fourth nuclear power station, and has announced the re-launch of =
heavy water production and uranium enrichment.

In an interview with IPS, engineer Dar=EDo Jinchuk, spokesman for the CNE=
A, recognised that the plan is a great boost to the industry. =94CNEA sto=
pped hiring in the 1990s, and the average age of our staff is now 54. At =
the peak of our activities there were 5,000 people working here; now ther=
e are only 1,900,=94 he said.

Many of the people trained at CNEA on state scholarships went abroad or c=
hanged careers.

The 60 vacancies and 68 scholarships on offer have created a buzz in the =
sector. Nuclear engineers are wanted, but so are specialists in civil, ch=
emical, industrial, environmental, electronic and mechanical engineering.

CNEA is also recruiting physics and chemistry graduates, accountants, exp=
erts in environmental safety, technicians to operate the power plants, ad=
vanced students in those areas, and lawyers specialised in the field, as =
well as public relations staff.=20

According to Jinchuk, restarting the nuclear power industry is consistent=
  with the current international scenario and with local needs. Globally, =
he said, hydrocarbon reserves are beginning to run out, fossil fuel price=
s are rising steeply, and the regions where they are produced are unstabl=
e. He also mentioned their environmental effects in terms of global warmi=
ng.

Within Argentina there are other factors which also make it good sense to=
  revive nuclear power. =94The economy is growing at eight percent a year,=
  and energy demand is increasing at four or five percent a year,=94 the C=
NEA spokesman explained. =94Private investment is very limited, so the st=
ate has decided to take it upon itself to do this.=94=20

And not only by means of traditional nuclear power stations. Jinchuk hope=
d that at last there would be funding for a prototype of a small reactor =
that generates electricity.

Argentina manufactures and exports reactors to make radio-isotopes, but t=
he CNEA is designing one for electricity generation that is still at the =
blueprint stage.

With regard to safety, he said that =94technology has improved a great de=
al=94 since the 1980s.

=94There are multiple independent safety systems, and several containment=
  barriers. There are automatic systems that don't need to be activated by=
  operators,=94 he said.

Referring to the fears of activists who are critical of the government fo=
r not performing environmental impact studies before extending the life o=
f the nuclear power stations that are ready to come off-line, Jinchuk sai=
d that this was normal practice.

=94In the United States there are 102 nuclear power stations, and half of=
  them will have their useful life extended,=94 he said.

But there are other questions which have still not been answered. Nuclear=
  power stations appear to have a built-in dislike of public scrutiny, a c=
haracteristic that makes them considerably more frightening. IPS tried to=
  talk to a member of the board of Nucleoel=E9ctrica for a week, but was u=
nable to get past the public relations officer.

The company's website is =94undergoing construction,=94 and gives no in-d=
epth information. =94For 12 years, Nucleoel=E9ctrica has been generating =
clean, safe energy,=94 the welcome page reads, while playing soothing bac=
kground music.=20

Jinchuk said the big bogey that plagues the industry is the 1986 accident=
  at the Chernobyl nuclear plant in Ukraine, when it was still under the d=
ominion of the now dismantled Soviet Union.

=94Since then there hasn't been any accident that serious, with leakage o=
f radiation, and that reactor didn't have proper safety measures,=94 he n=
oted

Proof of the soundness of the industry, he said, was that there are 443 n=
uclear power stations worldwide, and another 33 under construction, witho=
ut a single accident. =94All human activity has an impact on the environm=
ent; that impact will be greater or less depending on how well the state =
oversees and controls it,=94 he acknowledged.

=94The state must ensure that the industry operates within appropriate sa=
fety standards,=94 he remarked. In Argentina, the body responsible for su=
pervising nuclear activity is the Nuclear Regulatory Authority, created i=
n 1996.

Once Atucha II is completed, the proportion of energy generated by nuclea=
r power could rise from eight to 12 percent, assuming energy from other s=
ources remains the same -- an unlikely event as the government has called=
  on private companies to build new thermal generating stations and is inv=
esting in hydropower plants.

=94Those of us who work in the nuclear industry would like to see our sha=
re reach 17 percent, which is the world average for nuclear power, and id=
eally 35 percent, which is the European average,=94 Jinchuk said. In Fran=
ce, nearly 80 percent of electricity is produced by atomic power stations=
=2E
*****
+ LATIN AMERICA: Nuclear Energy Reborn
(http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=3D34975)
+ POLITICS: Role of U.N. Nuke Agency Called =94Schizophrenic=94
(http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=3D32942)
+ ENVIRONMENT-FRANCE: Dangerous Summer for Nuclear Power Plants - July 20=
05 (http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=3D29441)
+ Nuclear Regulatory Authority (http://200.0.198.11/Rese%F1a%20de%20Activ=
idades/ingles02/0001.htm)
+ Comisi=F3n Nacional de Energ=EDa At=F3mica - in Spanish (http://www.cne=
a.gov.ar)
+ Nucleoel=E9ctrica S.A. - in Spanish (http://www.na-sa.com.ar)
(END/IPS/LA EN IP IF DV SU MD/TRASP-VD-SW/MV/DM/06)



=20
=3D 10242212 ORP010
NNNN

</x-flowed>
*****************************************************************
 23 NRC: NRC Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards to Meet November 1-3 in Rockville, Maryland 

News Release - 2006-13 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Office 
of Public Affairs     Telephone: 301/415-8200 Washington, DC 
20555-0001     E-mail: opa@nrc.gov No. 06-133     October 23, 
2006   
  
The Nuclear Regulatory Commissions Advisory Committee on Reactor
Safeguards (ACRS) will hold a public meeting Nov. 1-3 in
Rockville, Md., to discuss, among other items, the final review
of the license renewal application for the Palisades Nuclear
Power Plant, located near South Haven, Mich. The committee will
also discuss proposed revisions to a regulatory guide related to
fire protection at nuclear power plants and a draft final rule
related to emergency core cooling systems.
 
The meeting will be held in Room T-2B3 of the agencys Two White
Flint North building, at 11545 Rockville Pike. It will begin at
8:30 a.m. each day and end at 7 p.m. on Wednesday, 6:30 p.m. on
Thursday, and 1 p.m. on Friday. A complete agenda will be
available on the NRCs Web site at:
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/acrs/agenda/2006/. 

Anyone with questions or those wishing to make public statements
during the meeting should contact Sam Duraiswamy at
301-415-7364. To pursue videoconferencing services, contact
Theron Brown, at 301-415-8066.
 
The ACRS advises the Commission on licensing and operation of
nuclear power plants and related safety issues.
   
  
-----------------------------------------------------------------

NRC news releases are available through a free list serve
subscription at the following Web address:
http://www.nrc.gov/public-involve/listserver.html. The NRC
homepage at www.nrc.gov also offers a SUBSCRIBE link. E-mail
notifications are sent to subscribers when news releases are
posted to NRC's Web site.
   



  


 	Last revised Tuesday, October 24, 2006 	
*****************************************************************
 24 Sydney Morning Herald: Nuclear power plant 'a matter of time' - 

www.smh.com.au

October 24, 2006 - 3:36PM
 	 	
A nuclear power plant will be built in Australia as soon as it
becomes commercially viable, federal Treasurer Peter Costello
says.
 
Mr Costello said nuclear energy was not currently economically
viable in Australia, but it would be feasible at some point in
the future.
 
"I can't tell you what that time frame will be - I don't think
it'll be next year ... I don't think it'll be three years," he
told reporters.
 
"Then you'll say to me 'Will it be 10 years?' Maybe, possibly
not.
 
"But in my view, yes, it will become commercial and when it
becomes commercial, someone will build it."
 
The government should not legislate to prevent companies from
investing in nuclear energy, Mr Costello said.
 
"I think we should legislatively say, provided you meet all of
the requirements in relation to safety and export controls
and... environmental considerations, that there is no
legislative bar. And then I'd let the market work," he said.
 
"The day it becomes commercial, someone will build it."
 
The government has commissioned former Telstra boss Ziggy
Switkowski to head a task force investigating whether a nuclear
energy industry would be viable in Australia.
 
Labor opposes a nuclear power industry and has called on the
government to nominate possible sites for a plant.
 	
© 2006 	AAP
 
*****************************************************************
 25 MDN: Worker exposed to radiation at nuclear power plant, no effect on health - 

MSN-Mainichi Daily News

October 25, 2006                                                                                                                                                        National                        
 		
A new worker was exposed to a small amount of radiation at a
nuclear power plant in northern Japan, but there was no effect
on his health, the plant operator said Tuesday.

The 19-year-old man took in a small amount of radioactive
material by mistakenly wiping sweat from his face with one of
his contaminated gloves at the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power
plant Monday, said Tokyo Electric Power Co. spokesman Jun Oshima.

The man had been on the job for one month, Oshima said. The dose
was less than a one-time X-ray examination.

By Tuesday, the amount of radiation in the man's body had
dropped, the spokesman said. (AP)

  
      	Copyright 2005-2006 THE MAINICHI NEWSPAPERS. All rights
reserved.
*****************************************************************
 26 NRC: Notice of Meetings; Sunshine Act
 
                         FR Doc 06-8867 
[Federal Register: October 24, 2006 (Volume 71, Number 205)] 
[Notices] [Page 62305] From the Federal Register Online via GPO 
Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr24oc06-90]                         
 
Agency Holding the Meetings: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
 
Dates: Weeks of October 23, 30, November 6, 13, 20, 27, 2006.
 
Place: Commissioners' Conference Room, 11555 Rockville Pike, 
Rockville, Maryland.
 
Status: Public and Closed.
 
Matters to be Considered: Week of October 23, 2006 Tuesday, 
October 24, 2006 9:30 a.m.--Briefing on Transshipment and 
Domestic Shipment Security of Radioactive Material Quantities of 
Concern (RAMQC) (Closed--Ex.
 
3) (morning session).
 
1:30 p.m.--Briefing on Transshipment and Domestic Shipment 
Security of Radioactive Material Quantities of Concern (RAMQC) 
(Closed--Ex.
 
3 and 9) (afternoon session).
 
Wednesday, October 25, 2006 9:30 a.m.--Briefing on 
Institutionalization and Integration of Agency Lessons Learned 
(Public Meeting) (Contact: John Lamb, 301-415-1727).
 
This meeting will be webcast live at the Web 
address--http://www.nrc.gov .
 
1:25 p.m.--Affirmation Session (Public Meeting) (Tentative) a. 
Final Rule: National Source Tracking of Sealed Sources (RIN 
3150-AH48) (tentative) 1:30 p.m.--Briefing on Resolution of 
GSI-191, Assessment of Debris Accumulation on PWR Sump 
Performance (Public Meeting) (Contact: Michael L. Scott, 
301-415-0565) This meeting will be webcast live at the Web 
address--http://www.nrc.gov .
 
Week of October 30, 2006--Tentative There are no meetings 
scheduled for the Week of October 30, 2006.
 
Week of November 6, 2006--Tentative Wednesday, November 8, 2006 
9:30 a.m.--Briefing on Digital Instrumentation and Control 
(Public Meeting) (Contact: Paul Rebstock, 301-415-3295).
 
This meeting will be webcast live at the Web 
address--http://www.nrc.gov .
 
Thursday, November 9, 2006 9:30 a.m.--Briefing on Draft Final 
Rule--Part 52 (Early Site permits/ Standard Design 
Certification/Combined Licenses) (Public Meeting) (Contact: Dave 
Matthews, 301-415-1199).
 
This meeting will be webcast live at the Web 
address--http://www.nrc.gov .
 
Week of November 13, 2006--Tentative There are no meetings 
scheduled for the Week of November 13, 2006.
 
Week of November 20, 2006--Tentative There are no meetings 
scheduled for the Week of November 20, 2006.
 
Week of November 27, 2006--Tentative There are no meetings 
scheduled for the Week of November 27, 2006.
 
* * * * * * The schedule for Commission meetings is subject to 
change on short notice. To verify the status of meetings call 
(recording)--(301) 415-1292. Contact person for more information: 
Michelle Schroll, (301) 415-1662.
 
* * * * * The NRC Commission Meeting Schedule can be found on the 
Internet at: 
http://www.nrc.gov/what-we-do/policy-making/schedule.html. * * * 
* * The NRC provides reasonable accommodation to individuals with 
disabilities where appropriate. If you need a reasonable 
accommodation to participate in these public meetings, or need 
this meeting notice or the transcript or other information from 
the public meetings in another format (e.g., braille, large 
print), please notifiy the NRC's Disability Program Coordinator, 
Deborah Chan, at 301-415-7041, TDD: 301-415-2100, or by e-mail at 
DLC@nrc.gov. Determinations on requests for reasonable 
accommodation will be made on a case-by-case basis.
 
* * * * * This notice is distributed by mail to several hundred 
subscribers; if you no longer wish to receive it, or would like 
to be added to the distribution, please contact the Office of the 
Secretary, Washington, DC 20555 (301-415-1969). In addition, 
distribution of this meeting notice over the Internet system is 
available. If you are interested in receiving this Commission 
meeting schedule electronically, please send an electronic 
message to dkw@nrc.gov. Dated: October 19, 2006.
 
R. Michelle Schroll, Office of the Secretary.
 
[FR Doc. 06-8867 Filed 10-20-06; 10:52 am] BILLING CODE 7590-01-M

 
*****************************************************************
 27 FT.com: UK - Ministers to break up nuclear group sale

Wanted: willing hosts for nuclear dump

By Christopher Adams, Political Correspondent

Published: October 24 2006 12:51 | Last updated: October 24 2006
12:51

Ministers are to break up the planned sale of British Nuclear
Group, the clean-up operation which manages Britainâ€™s biggest
nuclear complex at Sellafield, in a move that could raise
billions of pounds for the taxpayer.

Alistair Darling, trade and industry secretary, said in a
statement on Monday that he had decided on â€œa full
competitionâ€ for the contract to operate Sellafield, a process
that would be handled by the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority.
[Advertisement] 
Other parts of BNG, including the management of old Magnox
reactor sites and a one-third stake in AWE, which manages the
Aldermaston weapons complex on behalf of the Ministry of
Defence, will be sold separately.

The expectation in Whitehall is that more money will be raised
by conducting the sale this way, rather than selling BNG as a
single entity as originally envisaged.

Mr Darlingâ€™s decision follows a dispute between the NDA and
British Nuclear Fuels, which owns BNG, over the handling of the
sale of the clean-up division and the terms of the Sellafield
contract.

State-owned BNFL had been trying to sell BNG as part of the
governmentâ€™s policy of selling off its nuclear assets.

But, according to Mr Darling, it has emerged that several of the
potential buyers were forming consortia, which wanted to split
up the group, selling off the non-Sellafield businesses â€œat a
premium to the loss of the taxpayerâ€.

One government insider said: â€œIf a likely scenario is a
windfall gain by someone who buys BNG and sells off part of it
at as profit, we may as well maximise value for the taxpayer.â€

The potentially lucrative five-year contract to manage the
Sellafield complex in Cumbria, the biggest and most contaminated
nuclear site, was thought to be worth about Â£1bn a year.

It was important in determining the value of BNG since, under
the governmentâ€™s previous plans, the new owner of the group
would have automatically gained the Sellafield contract. With a
full competition, its value could prove greater.

The NDA, which is responsible for the UKâ€™s Â£70bn nuclear
clean-up programme, objected to the buyer of BNG winning the
management contract. 

There were concerns, too, that a lengthy formal procurement
process could damage prospects for Project Services, a
specialist contractor within the group that is developing
non-NDA work.

Serco of the UK, Areva of France and several engineering
companies from the US, such as Bechtel, Fluor and the Washington
Group, are all thought to be interested in BNG. In August, Fluor
made a Â£400m bid.

Mr Darling said that the board of BNFL became concerned that the
organisation best suited to succeed at Sellafield may be less
suited to helping the Magnox reactor sites and Project Services.
â€œThese businesses may be better served by a range of operators
with different skill sets rather than a single overall one.â€

He added: â€œThe BNFL boardâ€™s concerns were reinforced by
evidence in the market that instead of buyers for BNG, consortia
were being formed for the bid, suggesting that a future split of
BNG was likely with the risk that the non-Sellafield pieces
might be sold on at a premium to the loss of the taxpayer.â€

â€œI have concluded that there are real benefits to Project
Services and the Magnox business in separating them from the
process of choosing the right contractor for Sellafield.â€

â€œI also believe that the best way of securing the right
contractor for Sellafield is to proceed with a separate
competition with the full focus on what is best at that site.â€
The NDA was now expected to put in place a new contractor after
the middle of 2008 and BNFL would aim to complete individual
sales of its other businesses in 2007.

Mr Darling also announced plans for the establishment of a
National Nuclear Laboratory, to be based around the British
Technology Centre in Sellafield and nuclear research consultancy
Nexia Solutions.

 The Financial Times Limited 2006

of The Financial Times Ltd. 
*****************************************************************
 28 MercoPress Brazil plans to build seven nuclear reactors

Falklands-Malvinas & South Atlantic News
 
[MercoPress - www.mercopress.com]   

- Monday, 23 October

Chief cabinet coordinator Dilma Rouseff said the long term plan
to construct nuclear plants is geared to achieve “economic
efficiency” and will represent a doubling of Brazil’s current
nuclear energy contribution to the national grid from 2.5 to
5.6%. 

The plan is currently in Brazil’s executive and will begin to be
addressed once the presidential run off is over next October 29. 

Odair Dias Gonalves head of Brazil’s National Committee on
Nuclear Energy was more precise as to the number of nuclear
plants planned: “seven reactors by 2025”. 

Brazil has two nuclear plants, Angra 1 and Angra 2, and the
blueprints for Angra 3 which could be finished by 2010. 

Edson Kuramoto, president of the Brazilian Nuclear Energy
Association said that the construction of Angra 3 by 2010 should
held Brazil have its own uranium enrichment plant. 

Currently the enriched uranium consumed by Brazilian nuclear
plants is supplied by Holland. 

Fin del Texto - Mercosur - Monday, 23 October 
*****************************************************************
 29 The Day: Dominion Offers Positions to Whistleblower  

- theday.com
 	
 Tuesday, Oct 24, 2006        										 										 									

  By Patricia Daddona Day Staff Writer\, Millstone\/business 
trends E-mail: p.daddona@theday.com Phone No.: (860) 701 - 4324   
  
  Published on 10/23/2006 in Business » Business Local

Waterford â€” The owner of Millstone Power Station has created
three positions it considers equivalent to the one a
whistleblower lost there, but the former employee has not yet
accepted any. 

Dominion has created job openings for whistleblower Sham Mehta
that include shift technical advisor, a position with high
advancement potential that requires the passing of a test; a
temporary job in organizational effectiveness;  and a job as a
mechanical engineer, according to a letter from Dominion
attorney David Bogan. 

Mehta previously applied for the job of shift technical advisor
but failed the test. 

Dominion has offered to allow Mehta to study on the job if he
accepts the position until the course re-opens in December, and
then take the course. 

As a worker who looks into other Millstone employeesâ€™
concerns, Mehta had reported last year to Dominion that a
security fence alarm system was routinely disabled because of
repeated false alarms. Within a year, Mehta found his position
eliminated, and he was not rehired for other posts in the
company. 

Last last month, the state Department of Public Utility Control
ordered the company to reinstate Mehta in an equivalent position
to the job in the Employee Concerns department that he lost
during the departmentâ€™s restructuring. 

Mehta has alleged the company retaliated against him for
reporting his concerns. He has also complained to the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, which has not yet ruled on his case, and
the state division of the U.S. Department of Labor, which found
Dominion acted properly in eliminating his job. 

An appeal of the labor decision set for Tuesday has been
rescheduled to  Dec. 11. 

Mehta had been on paid leave while the case before the DPUC was
pending but had been denied access to the site and company
email, despite a recommendation from the DPUC's prosecutor
earlier this year that he be reinstated. 

The new post must have equivalent pay and benefits, the DPUC
ordered.
p.daddona@theday.com   
    
London, CT  |  Â© 1998-2006 The Day Publishing Co.               
[Beacon Locator] 
*****************************************************************
 30 NRC: In the Matter of Certain Licensees Authorized To Possess and 
 
                        FR Doc E6-17762 
[Federal Register: October 24, 2006 (Volume 71, Number 205)] 
[Notices] [Page 62302-62305] From the Federal Register Online via 
GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr24oc06-89]                         
 
Transfer Items Containing Radioactive Material Quantities of 
Concern; Order Imposing Fingerprinting and Criminal History 
Records Check Requirements for Unescorted Access to Certain 
Radioactive Materials and Modification of the Additional Security 
Measures (Effective Immediately) I The Licensees identified in 
Attachment 1 \1\ to this Order hold licenses issued in accordance 
with the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954, as amended, by the U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or Commission) or Agreement 
States, authorizing them to possess and transfer items containing 
radioactive materials in quantities of concern. On August 8, 
2005, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct) was enacted. Section 
652 of the EPAct amended section 149 of the AEA to require 
fingerprinting and a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
identification and criminal history records check of any person 
who is permitted unescorted access to radioactive materials 
subject to regulation by the Commission, and which the Commission 
determines to be of such significance to the public health and 
safety or the common defense and security as to warrant 
fingerprinting and background checks. NRC has decided to 
implement this requirement, in part, prior to the completion of 
the rulemaking to implement the provisions under the EPAct, which 
is underway, because a deliberate malevolent act by an individual 
with unescorted access to these radioactive materials has a 
potential to result in significant adverse impacts to the public 
health and safety or the common defense and security. Those 
exempted from fingerprinting requirements under 10 CFR 73.59 (71 
FR 33,989 (June 13, 2006)) for access to Safeguards Information 
\2\ (SGI) are also exempt from the fingerprinting requirements 
under this Order. In addition, individuals who have a 
favorably-decided U.S. Government criminal history record check 
within the last five (5) years, or individuals who have an active 
federal security clearance (provided in each case that they make 
available the appropriate documentation), have satisfied the 
EPAct fingerprinting requirement and need not be fingerprinted 
again. Individuals who have been fingerprinted and granted access 
to SGI by the reviewing official under EA-06-155 do not need to 
be fingerprinted again.
 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
---------- \1\ Attachment 1 contains sensitive information and 
will not be released to the public.
 
\2\ Safeguards Information is a form of sensitive, unclassified, 
security-related information that the Commission has the 
authority to designate and protect under section 147 of the AEA.
 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
---------- II Subsequent to the terrorist events of September 11, 
2001, the NRC issued a security Order requiring certain Licensees 
who may transport radioactive material quantities of concern to 
implement Additional Security Measures (ASMs) for radioactive 
materials. The requirements imposed by that Order (RAMQC Order), 
and certain measures licensees have developed to comply with that 
Order, were designated by the NRC as SGI and were not released to 
the public. One specific ASM imposed by the RAMQC Order required 
licensees to conduct local background checks to determine the 
trustworthiness and reliability of individuals needing unescorted 
access to radioactive materials. ``Access'' to these radioactive 
materials means that an individual could exercise some physical 
control over the material or device. At that time, the NRC did 
not
 
[[Page 62303]] have the authority, except in the case of power 
reactor licensees, to require licensees to submit fingerprints 
for an FBI criminal history records checks of individuals being 
considered for unescorted access to radioactive materials subject 
to NRC regulations. Therefore, in accordance with section 149 of 
the AEA, as amended by the EPAct, the Commission is imposing the 
FBI criminal history records check requirements, as set forth in 
this Order, including Attachment 2 to this Order, on all 
Licensees identified in Attachment 1 to this Order, which are 
currently authorized to possess or transfer items containing 
radioactive materials quantities of concern. These requirements 
will remain in effect until the Commission determines otherwise.
 
In addition, pursuant to 10 CFR 2.202, I find that in light of 
the common defense and security matters identified above, which 
warrant the issuance of this Order, the public health, safety, 
and interest require that this Order be effective immediately.
 
III Accordingly, pursuant to Sections 81, 149, 161b, 161i, 161o, 
182, and 186 of the AEA of 1954, as amended, and the Commission's 
regulations in 10 CFR 2.202, 10 CFR Parts 30 and 73, It Is Hereby 
Ordered, Effective Immediately, That All Licensees Identified in 
Attachment 1 to This Order Shall Comply With the Requirements Set 
Forth in This Order.
 
A. All licensees identified in Attachment 1 to this Order shall 
comply with the following requirements: 1. The Licensee shall, 
within twenty (20) days of the date of this Order, establish and 
maintain a fingerprinting program that meet the requirements of 
Attachment 2 to this Order, for unescorted access to radioactive 
materials that equal or exceed the quantities listed in Table 1 
of the RAMQC Order.
 
2. The Licensee shall, in writing, within twenty (20) days of the 
date of this Order, notify, the Commission (1) receipt and 
confirmation that compliance with the Order will be achieved or 
(2) if it is unable to comply with any of the requirements 
described in Attachment 2, or (3) if compliance with any of the 
requirements is unnecessary in its specific circumstances. The 
notification shall provide the Licensee's justification for 
seeking relief from or variation of any specific requirement.
 
B. In accordance with the NRC's ``Order Imposing Fingerprinting 
and Criminal History Check Requirements for Access to Safeguards 
Information'' (EA-06-155), issued on August 21, 2006, only the 
NRC- approved reviewing official shall review results from an FBI 
criminal history records check. The reviewing official shall 
determine whether an individual may have, or continue to have, 
unescorted access to radioactive materials that equal or exceed 
the quantities listed in the RAMQC Order. Fingerprinting and the 
FBI identification and criminal history records check are not 
required for individuals that are exempted from fingerprinting 
requirements under 10 CFR 73.59 (71 FR 33,989 (June 13, 2006)) 
for access to SGI. In addition, individuals who have a favorably 
decided U.S. Government criminal history records check within the 
last five (5) years, or have an active federal security clearance 
provided in each case that the appropriate documentation is made 
available to the Licensee's reviewing official, have satisfied 
the EPAct fingerprinting requirement and need not be 
fingerprinted again.
 
C. Fingerprints shall be submitted and reviewed in accordance 
with the procedures described in Attachment 2 to this Order.
 
Individuals who have been fingerprinted and granted access to SGI 
by the reviewing official under Order EA-06-155 do not need to be 
fingerprinted again.
 
D. The Licensee may allow any individual who currently has 
unescorted access to radioactive materials, in accordance with 
the RAMQC Order, to continue to have unescorted access without 
being fingerprinted, pending a decision by the reviewing official 
(based on fingerprinting, an FBI criminal history records check 
and a trustworthy and reliability determination) that the 
individual may continue to have unescorted access to radioactive 
materials that equal or exceed the quantities listed in the RAMQC 
Order. The licensee shall complete implementation of the 
requirements of Attachment 2 to this Order by January 15, 2007.
 
E. The ASMs of the RAMQC Order are modified as follows: 1. The 
requirement for a local criminal history check in ASM 2.d.(1) is 
superseded by the FBI criminal history records check. All other 
requirements in ASM 2.d.(1) are still applicable. Licensee 
responses to Condition A.2. shall be submitted to the Director, 
Office of Federal and State Materials and Environmental 
Management Programs, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555. In addition, Licensee responses shall be 
marked as ``Security- Related Information--Withhold Under 10 CFR 
2.390.'' The Director, Office of Federal and State Materials and 
Environmental Management Programs, may, in writing, relax or 
rescind any of the above conditions upon demonstration of good 
cause by the Licensee.
 
IV In accordance with 10 CFR 2.202, the Licensee must, and any 
other person adversely affected by this Order may, submit an 
answer to this Order, and may request a hearing on this Order, 
within twenty (20) days of the date of this Order. Where good 
cause is shown, consideration will be given to extending the time 
to request a hearing. A request for extension of time in which to 
submit an answer or request a hearing must be made in writing to 
the Director, Office of Federal and State Materials and 
Environmental Management Programs, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Washington, DC 20555, and include a statement of good 
cause for the extension. The answer may consent to this Order. 
Unless the answer consents to this Order, the answer shall, in 
writing and under oath or affirmation, specifically set forth the 
matters of fact and law on which the Licensee or other person 
adversely affected relies and the reasons as to why the Order 
should not have been issued. Any answer or request for a hearing 
shall be submitted to the Secretary, Office of the Secretary, 
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Rulemakings and 
Adjudications Staff, Washington, DC 20555.
 
Copies also shall be sent to the Director, Office of Federal and 
State Materials and Environmental Management Programs, U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, to the 
Assistant General Counsel for Material Litigation and Enforcement 
at the same address, and to the Licensee if the answer or hearing 
request is by a person other than the Licensee. Because of 
possible delays in delivery of mail to United States Government 
offices, it is requested that answers and requests for hearing be 
transmitted to the Secretary of the Commission either by means of 
facsimile transmission to (301) 415-1101 or by e- mail to  and 
also to the Office of the General Counsel either by means of 
facsimile transmission to (301) 415-3725 or by e-mail to . If a 
person other than the Licensee requests a hearing, that person 
shall set forth with particularity the manner in which his/her 
interest is adversely affected by this Order and shall address 
the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 2.309. If a hearing is requested 
by the Licensee or a person whose interest is
 
[[Page 62304]] adversely affected, the Commission will issue an 
Order designating the time and place of any hearing. If a hearing 
is held, the issue to be considered at such hearing shall be 
whether this Order should be sustained.
 
Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.202(c)(2)(i), the Licensee may, in addition 
to demanding a hearing, at the time the answer is filed or 
sooner, move the presiding officer to set aside the immediate 
effectiveness of the Order on the ground that the Order, 
including the need for immediate effectiveness, is not based on 
adequate evidence but on mere suspicion, unfounded allegations, 
or error. In the absence of any request for hearing, or written 
approval of an extension of time in which to request a hearing, 
the provisions as specified above in Section III shall be final 
twenty (20) days from the date of this Order without further 
Order or proceedings.
 
If an extension of time for requesting a hearing has been 
approved, the provisions as specified above in Section III shall 
be final when the extension expires, if a hearing request has not 
been received. An answer or a request for hearing shall not stay 
the immediate effectiveness of this order.
 
Dated this 17th day of October 2006.
 
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
 
Charles L. Miller, Director, Office of Federal and State 
Materials and Environmental Management Programs.
 
Attachment 1--List of Applicable Materials Licensees Redacted 
Attachment 2--Requirements for Fingerprinting and Criminal 
History Checks of Individuals When Licensee's Reviewing Official 
Is Determining Unescorted Access to Radioactive Materials Subject 
to EA-06-249 General Requirements Licensees shall comply with the 
following requirements of this attachment.
 
1. Each Licensee subject to the provisions of this attachment 
shall fingerprint each individual who is seeking or permitted 
unescorted access to RAMQC. The Licensee shall review and use the 
information received from the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) and ensure that the provisions contained in the subject 
Order and this attachment are satisfied.
 
2. The Licensee shall notify each affected individual that the 
fingerprints will be used to secure a review of his/her criminal 
history record and inform the individual of the procedures for 
revising the record or including an explanation in the record, as 
specified in the ``Right to Correct and Complete Information'' 
section of this attachment.
 
3. Fingerprints for unescorted access need not be taken if an 
employed individual (e.g., a Licensee employee, contractor, 
manufacturer, or supplier) is relieved from the fingerprinting 
requirement by 10 CFR 73.59 for access to Safeguards Information, 
has a favorably-decided U.S. Government criminal history check 
within the last five (5) years, or has an active federal security 
clearance. Written confirmation from the Agency/employer which 
granted the federal security clearance or reviewed the criminal 
history check must be provided for wither of the latter two 
cases. The Licensee must retain this documentation for a period 
of three (3) years from the date the individual no longer 
requires unescorted access to radioactive materials associated 
with the Licensee's activities.
 
4. All fingerprints obtained by the Licensee pursuant to this 
Order must be submitted to the Commission for transmission to the 
FBI.
 
5. The Licensee shall review the information received from the 
FBI and consider it, in conjunction with the trustworthy and 
reliability requirements of the RAMQC Order, in making a 
determination whether to grant, or continue to allow, unescorted 
access to radioactive materials.
 
6. The Licensee shall use any information obtained as part of a 
criminal history records check solely for the purpose of 
determining an individual's suitability for unescorted access to 
RAMQC.
 
7. The Licensee shall document the basis for its determination 
whether to grant, or continue to allow, unescorted access to 
RAMQC.
 
Prohibitions A Licensee shall not base a final determination to 
deny an individual access to radioactive materials solely on the 
basis of information received from the FBI involving: an arrest 
more than one (1) year old for which there is no information of 
the disposition of the case, or an arrest that resulted in 
dismissal of the charge or an acquittal.
 
A Licensee shall not use information received from a criminal 
history check obtained pursuant to this Order in a manner that 
would infringe upon the rights of any individual under the First 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, nor shall the 
Licensee use the information in any way which would discriminate 
among individuals on the basis of race, religion, national 
origin, sex, or age.
 
Procedures for Processing Fingerprint Checks For the purpose of 
complying with this Order, Licensees shall, using an appropriate 
method listed in 10 CFR 73.4, submit to the NRC's Division of 
Facilities and Security, Mail Stop T-6E46, one completed, legible 
standard fingerprint card (Form FD-258, ORIMDNRCOOOZ) or, where 
practicable, other fingerprint records for each individual 
seeking unescorted access to RAMQC, to the Director of the 
Division of Facilities and Security, marked for the attention of 
the Division's Criminal History Check Section. Copies of these 
forms may be obtained by writing the Office of Information 
Services, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 
20555-0001, by calling (301) 415-5877, or by e-mail to . 
Practicable alternative formats are set forth in 10 CFR 73.4. The 
Licensee shall establish procedures to ensure that the quality of 
the fingerprints taken results in minimizing the rejection rate 
of fingerprint cards due to illegible or incomplete cards.
 
The NRC will review submitted fingerprint cards for completeness. 
Any Form FD-258 fingerprint record containing omissions or 
evident errors will be returned to the Licensee for corrections. 
The fee for processing fingerprint checks includes one 
re-submission if the initial submission is returned by the FBI 
because the fingerprint impressions cannot be classified. The one 
free re-submission must have the FBI Transaction Control Number 
reflected on the re-submission. If additional submissions are 
necessary, they will be treated as initial submittals and will 
require a second payment of the processing fee.
 
Fees for processing fingerprint checks are due upon application. 
Licensees shall submit payment with the application for 
processing fingerprints by corporate check, certified check, 
cashier's check, money order, or electronic payment, made payable 
to ``U.S. NRC.'' [For guidance on making electronic payments, 
contact the Facilities Security Branch, Division of Facilities 
and Security, at (301) 415- 7404]. Combined payment for multiple 
applications is acceptable. The application fee (currently $27) 
is the sum of the user fee charged by the FBI for each 
fingerprint card or other fingerprint record submitted by the NRC 
on behalf of a Licensee, and an NRC processing fee, which covers 
administrative costs associated with NRC handling of Licensee 
fingerprint submissions. The Commission will directly notify 
Licensees who are subject to this regulation of any fee changes.
 
The Commission will forward to the submitting Licensee all data 
received from the FBI as a result of the Licensee's 
application(s) for criminal history checks, including the FBI 
fingerprint record.
 
Right To Correct and Complete Information Prior to any final 
adverse determination, the Licensee shall make available to the 
individual the contents of any criminal records obtained from the 
FBI for the purpose of assuring correct and complete information. 
Written confirmation by the individual of receipt of this 
notification must be maintained by the Licensee for a period of 
one (1) year from the date of the notification.
 
If, after reviewing the record, an individual believes that it is 
incorrect or incomplete in any respect and wishes to change, 
correct, or update the alleged deficiency, or to explain any 
matter in the record, the individual may initiate challenge 
procedures. These procedures include either direct application by 
the individual challenging the record to the agency (i.e., law 
enforcement agency) that contributed the questioned information, 
or direct challenge as to the accuracy or completeness of any 
entry on the criminal history record to the Assistant Director, 
Federal Bureau of Investigation Identification Division, 
Washington, DC 20537-9700 (as set forth in 28 CFR 16.30 through 
16.34). In the latter case, the FBI forwards the challenge to
 
[[Page 62305]] the agency that submitted the data and requests 
that agency to verify or correct the challenged entry. Upon 
receipt of an official communication directly from the agency 
that contributed the original information, the FBI Identification 
Division makes any changes necessary in accordance with the 
information supplied by that agency. The Licensee must provide at 
least ten (10) days for an individual to initiate an action 
challenging the results of an FBI criminal history records check 
after the record is made available for his/her review. The 
Licensee may make a final determination on unescorted access 
RAMQC based upon the criminal history record only upon receipt of 
the FBI's ultimate confirmation or correction of the record. Upon 
a final adverse determination on unescorted access to RAMQC, the 
Licensee shall provide the individual its documented basis for 
denial. Unescorted access to RAMQC shall not be granted to an 
individual during the review process.
 
Protection of Information 1. Each Licensee who obtains a criminal 
history record on an individual pursuant to this Order shall 
establish and maintain a system of files and procedures for 
protecting the record and the personal information from 
unauthorized disclosure.
 
2. The Licensee may not disclose the record or personal 
information collected and maintained to persons other than the 
subject individual, his/her representative, or to those who have 
a need to access the information in performing assigned duties in 
the process of determining unescorted access to RAMQC. No 
individual authorized to have access to the information may 
re-disseminate the information to any other individual who does 
not have a need-to- know.
 
3. The personal information obtained on an individual from a 
criminal history record check may be transferred to another 
Licensee if the Licensee holding the criminal history record 
receives the individual's written request to re-disseminate the 
information contained in his/her file, and the gaining Licensee 
verifies information such as the individual's name, date of 
birth, social security number, sex, and other applicable physical 
characteristics for identification purposes.
 
4. The Licensee shall make criminal history records, obtained 
under this section, available for examination by an authorized 
representative of the NRC to determine compliance with the 
regulations and laws.
 
5. The Licensee shall retain all fingerprint and criminal history 
records received from the FBI, or a copy if the individual's file 
has been transferred, for three (3) years after termination of 
employment or denial to unescorted access to the panoramic or 
underwater irradiator sealed sources. After the required three 
(3) year period, these documents shall be destroyed by a method 
that will prevent reconstruction of the information in whole or 
in part.
 
[FR Doc. E6-17762 Filed 10-23-06; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590-01-P

 
*****************************************************************
 31 NRC: Demonstrating the Feasibility and Reliability of Operator Manual 
 
                        FR Doc E6-17824 
[Federal Register: October 24, 2006 (Volume 71, Number 205)] 
[Notices] [Page 62323-62324] From the Federal Register Online via 
GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr24oc06-93]                         
 
Actions in Response to Fire, Draft Report for Comment AGENCY: 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
 
ACTION: Extension of comment period for NUREG 1852, 
``Demonstrating the Feasibility and Reliability of Operator 
Manual Actions in Response to Fire, Draft Report for Comment.'' 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
------
 
SUMMARY: On October 12, 2006 (71 FR 60200), the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued for public comment NUREG 1852, 
``Demonstrating the Feasibility and Reliability of Operator 
Manual Actions in Response to Fire, Draft Report for Comment.'' A 
request has been made to extend the public comment period such 
that the public will have a full 60 days to review this report. 
Currently, the Federal Register specifies that the public comment 
period ends on November 6, 2006, less than 30 days after the 
issuance of the Federal Register Notice.
 
 
[[Page 62324]]
 
DATES: The comment period has been extended and now expires on 
December 12, 2006. Comments received after this date will be 
considered if it is practical to do so, but the Commission is 
able to ensure consideration only for comments received before 
this date.
 
 
ADDRESSES: Members of the public are invited and encouraged to 
submit written comments to Michael Lesar, Chief, Rulemaking, 
Directives and Editing Branch, Office of Administration, Mail 
Stop T6-D59, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 
20555-0001.
 
Hand-deliver comments attention to Michael Lesar, 11545 Rockville 
Pike, Rockville, MD, between 7:30 a.m. and 4:15 p.m. on Federal 
workdays. Comments may also be sent electronically to 
NRCREP@nrc.gov. This document, NUREG-1852, is available at the 
Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Public 
Electronic Reading Room on the Internet at the NRC Web site at 
http://www.nrc.gov/[fxsp0]reading- rm/[fxsp0]adams.html under 
Accession No. ML0623502923; on the NRC Web site at 
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/[fxsp0]doc-collections/ 
[fxsp0]nuregs/docs4comment.html; and at the NRC Public Document 
Room, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD. The PDR's mailing 
address is USNRC PDR, Washington, DC 20555; telephone (301) 
415-4737 or (800) 397-4205; fax (301) 415-3548; e-mail 
PDR@NRC.GOV. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION, CONTACT: Erasmia Lois, 
Human Factors and Reliability Branch, Office of Nuclear 
Regulatory Research, telephone (301) 415-6560, e-mail 
exl1@nrc.gov. Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 16th day of 
October, 2006.
 
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
 
Jose Ibarra, Chief, Human Factors and Reliability Branch, 
Probabilistic Risk and Applications, Division of Risk Assessment 
and Special Projects, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research.
 
[FR Doc. E6-17824 Filed 10-23-06; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590-01-P

 
*****************************************************************
 32 Scotsman.com:  British Nuclear Group to split
 
Wednesday, 25th October 2006                    

>Tue 24 Oct 2006 [A

LONDON (Reuters) - The government said on Tuesday it planned to
split up state-owned nuclear clean-up firm British Nuclear Group
(BNG) for a four-part sell-off, reneging on its original plan to
sell the business complete. 

The move comes three months after U.S. engineering and
construction company Fluor Corp. wrote to BNG parent British
Nuclear Fuels Ltd. (BNFL) with an offer of up to 400 million
pounds for the unit, depending on contracts. 

EnergySolutions, a U.S. private equity-backed firm previously
called Envirocare, has since said it could afford to top Fluor's
offer but that it thinks the BNG business could be worth more if
broken up. 

Newspaper reports have suggested that support services firm
Serco Group was preparing a consortium to bid for BNG. 

Serco, which derives 90 percent of its business from the public
sector, declined to comment on a possible BNG bid, although it
said it was interested in competing for nuclear decommissioning
contracts. 

Industry experts have said the government could go for a
break-up of BNG rather than a single sale as a way to encourage
competition in the nuclear decommissioning sector, currently
dominated by BNG. 

"It has become increasingly clear that this approach was not the
best way of meeting the different needs of BNG's other
businesses," Alistair Darling, secretary of state for trade and
industry, said in a statement. 

BNG consists of four business areas -- the management of the
Sellafield contract, the management of the Magnox sites, a
project services division, and a 33 percent stake in AWE, which
manages the Aldermaston weapons complex on behalf of the
government. 

CONTROVERSIAL 

The government had planned to sell BNG, whose core business is
the clean-up of sites formerly occupied by nuclear power
stations and waste recycling facilities, as a single entity by
the end of next year. 

BNG is also involved in waste reprocessing and reactor
decommissioning, with the NDA being its principal customer. 

BNG was fined earlier this month for an incident in which around
83,000 tonnes of acid containing uranium and plutonium escaped
from a broken pipe into a sealed concrete holding site at the
controversial Sellafield site. 

"I have concluded that there are real benefits to Project
Services and the Magnox business in separating them from the
process of choosing the right contractor for Sellafield,"
Darling said. 

"I also believe that the best way of securing the right
contractor for Sellafield is to proceed with a separate
competition with the full focus on what is best at that site." 

The statement said the BNFL and NDA recommended that BNG should
continue to operate the Sellafield contract until the NDA can
put in place a new contractor and BNFL should conduct individual
sales of its other businesses to complete during 2007. 

"This was always going to be a highly complex challenge. British
Nuclear Group is comprised of different businesses, all of which
need their futures securing in very different ways," BNFL Chief
Executive Mike Parker said in a statement. 

The country's ageing network of nuclear power stations is set to
provide a bonanza to the clean-up industry. Twenty sites are due
for decommissioning in the coming five years, creating $2
billion (1.07 billion pounds) a year of business. 

BNFL last week completed the sale of its Westinghouse
reactor-building unit to Japan's second-biggest electronics
maker Toshiba Corp., which in February agreed to buy it for $5.4
billion to boost its stake in the nuclear business. 

After Westinghouse, Nexia Solutions -- a nuclear research and
consultancy firm -- and a 33 percent stake in uranium enrichment
firm Urenco could also be sold under government plans to sell
BNFL assets. 

(c) Reuters 2006. All rights reserved. Republication or
redistribution of Reuters content, including by caching, framing
or similar means, is expressly prohibited without the prior
written consent of Reuters. Reuters and the Reuters sphere logo
are registered trademarks and trademarks of the Reuters group of
companies around the world. 

Last updated: 24-Oct-06 21:55 BST 	 	 	
 
2006 Scotsman.com|
*****************************************************************
 33 IPS: ARGENTINA: Nuclear Power Loaded with Question Marks

Inter Press Service News Agency     

Wednesday, October 25, 2006   04:04 GMT       

Marcela Valente
 
BUENOS AIRES, Oct 24 (IPS) - Argentina has begun hiring
engineers, chemists, physicists, technicians and communications
and environmental experts in its nuclear industry, which has
been paralysed since the 1990s. But in the face of this
enthusiasm, activists are wondering if there will be more safety
and transparency this time around.

 Although one of the arguments for resurrecting nuclear power in
the country is the need to curb climate change, caused by
burning fossil fuels, most environmentalists say nuclear energy
is potentially hazardous, and creates a long-term latent threat
in the form of radioactive waste. 

But nuclear experts are convinced that atomic energy is the
cleanest and safest source of energy in the world. And the
Néstor Kirchner administration has chosen to listen to their
view, announcing in August a plan to reactivate nuclear power
stations and the start of production of its inputs: heavy water
and enriched uranium.

 Argentina was a pioneer in nuclear energy production in Latin
America. In the mid-20th century, the state began to invest in
research and development, and in 1974 the region's first atomic
power station, Atucha I, was brought on-line. It produces 357
megawatts, and is located in the eastern province of Buenos
Aires.

 In 1984 a second power station, Embalse, began to operate in
the central province of Córdoba, generating 648 megawatts.

 Construction of Atucha II, on the same site as Atucha I, began
in 1981, but it was abandoned in 1994 because of lack of funds
and political will on the part of the rightwing government of
Carlos Menem (1989-1999).

 Argentina had originally planned to build a total of six
nuclear reactors, but the plan was not completed. During the
1980s, interest fell off because of the country's abundant
supply of natural gas, and in the 1990s the state decided not to
proceed with an activity requiring such large investments.

 In 1994, Menem removed the nuclear power stations from the
aegis of their parent organisation, the National Atomic Energy
Commission (CNEA), in order to put them up for public tender.
The sale failed, and the power plants were left to the
management of the Nucleoeléctrica company, financed by the state.

 The paralysis of the industry had an impact on energy output.
The share of electricity generated by nuclear energy in
Argentina fell from 15 percent in the 1980s to eight percent
today.

 Now the centre-left Kirchner administration plans to finish
building Atucha II, which will generate 745 megawatts, by 2010,
and to prolong the useful lives of Atucha I and Embalse. It is
also planning feasibility studies for a fourth nuclear power
station, and has announced the re-launch of heavy water
production and uranium enrichment.

 In an interview with IPS, engineer Darío Jinchuk, spokesman for
the CNEA, recognised that the plan is a great boost to the
industry. "CNEA stopped hiring in the 1990s, and the average age
of our staff is now 54. At the peak of our activities there were
5,000 people working here; now there are only 1,900," he said.

 Many of the people trained at CNEA on state scholarships went
abroad or changed careers.

 The 60 vacancies and 68 scholarships on offer have created a
buzz in the sector. Nuclear engineers are wanted, but so are
specialists in civil, chemical, industrial, environmental,
electronic and mechanical engineering.

 CNEA is also recruiting physics and chemistry graduates,
accountants, experts in environmental safety, technicians to
operate the power plants, advanced students in those areas, and
lawyers specialised in the field, as well as public relations
staff. 

According to Jinchuk, restarting the nuclear power industry is
consistent with the current international scenario and with
local needs. Globally, he said, hydrocarbon reserves are
beginning to run out, fossil fuel prices are rising steeply, and
the regions where they are produced are unstable. He also
mentioned their environmental effects in terms of global warming.

 Within Argentina there are other factors which also make it
good sense to revive nuclear power. "The economy is growing at
eight percent a year, and energy demand is increasing at four or
five percent a year," the CNEA spokesman explained. "Private
investment is very limited, so the state has decided to take it
upon itself to do this." 

And not only by means of traditional nuclear power stations.
Jinchuk hoped that at last there would be funding for a
prototype of a small reactor that generates electricity.

 Argentina manufactures and exports reactors to make
radio-isotopes, but the CNEA is designing one for electricity
generation that is still at the blueprint stage.

 With regard to safety, he said that "technology has improved a
great deal" since the 1980s.

 "There are multiple independent safety systems, and several
containment barriers. There are automatic systems that don't
need to be activated by operators," he said.

 Referring to the fears of activists who are critical of the
government for not performing environmental impact studies
before extending the life of the nuclear power stations that are
ready to come off-line, Jinchuk said that this was normal
practice.

 "In the United States there are 102 nuclear power stations, and
half of them will have their useful life extended," he said.

 But there are other questions which have still not been
answered. Nuclear power stations appear to have a built-in
dislike of public scrutiny, a characteristic that makes them
considerably more frightening. IPS tried to talk to a member of
the board of Nucleoeléctrica for a week, but was unable to get
past the public relations officer.

 The company's website is "undergoing construction," and gives
no in-depth information. "For 12 years, Nucleoeléctrica has been
generating clean, safe energy," the welcome page reads, while
playing soothing background music. 

Jinchuk said the big bogey that plagues the industry is the 1986
accident at the Chernobyl nuclear plant in Ukraine, when it was
still under the dominion of the now dismantled Soviet Union.

 "Since then there hasn't been any accident that serious, with
leakage of radiation, and that reactor didn't have proper safety
measures," he noted

 Proof of the soundness of the industry, he said, was that there
are 443 nuclear power stations worldwide, and another 33 under
construction, without a single accident. "All human activity has
an impact on the environment; that impact will be greater or
less depending on how well the state oversees and controls it,"
he acknowledged.

 "The state must ensure that the industry operates within
appropriate safety standards," he remarked. In Argentina, the
body responsible for supervising nuclear activity is the Nuclear
Regulatory Authority, created in 1996.

 Once Atucha II is completed, the proportion of energy generated
by nuclear power could rise from eight to 12 percent, assuming
energy from other sources remains the same -- an unlikely event
as the government has called on private companies to build new
thermal generating stations and is investing in hydropower
plants.

 "Those of us who work in the nuclear industry would like to see
our share reach 17 percent, which is the world average for
nuclear power, and ideally 35 percent, which is the European
average," Jinchuk said. In France, nearly 80 percent of
electricity is produced by atomic power stations. (END/2006) 

  Copyright © 2006 IPS-Inter Press Service. All rights reserved.
*****************************************************************
 34 Hampton Union: Nuke plant study must be taken seriously

October 24, 2006

The decision by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to include
Seabrook Station in the first group of six nuclear power plants
to undergo what is being called the State of the Art Reactor
Consequence Analysis offers the residents of the New Hampshire
and northern Massachusetts seacoasts a unique opportunity.
 
The three-year project will bring together new and previously
completed research on how accidents can develop within
containment domes at nuclear plants, how those accidents can
escalate into a breach of those domes, how the plumes of
radioactivity could travel and affect surrounding communities,
and if and how current emergency preparedness procedures could
work to protect the residents of the towns and cities that
surround those plants.
 
That last piece is of interest to most people here on the
Seacoast. The question remains: "Can the current emergency
preparedness procedures really protect us in the event of a
radioactive release from Seabrook Station?"
 
Certainly, Seabrook Station officials and most of our emergency
responders -- police and fire -- would answer "yes" to that
question. That response is based on the simulated drills held
periodically to determine the level of preparedness.
 
But those drills are only simulations. A scenario is developed
by the testing agency -- FEMA or the NRC -- and emergency
responders tell those agencies what they would do if that
situation were to really happen.
 
Not a piece of equipment is moved, not a roadway barrier is put
out, not a person leaves the firehouse or police station.
 
Emergency planning has devolved into little more than a chess
game, despite the fact that experiencing a checkmate in
emergency planning could equate to massive health consequences
for thousands of people.
 
Any opportunity to revisit the emergency plan established almost
two decades ago when the plant first went online is a plus for
Seacoast residents, but only if the NRC analysts act as
investigators rather than advocates for the nuclear industry, if
every bit of information is looked at critically and not
accepted at face value, and, if testing emergency preparedness
is taken out of the emergency response centers and out into the
streets of our cities and towns.
 
--The Hampton Union
 
  Copyright © 2006 Seacoast Online. All rights reserved.
*****************************************************************
 35 NewsRoom Finland: Commission to probe French state aid to Finland's fifth nuke
 	
24.10.2006 at 15:06

The European commission is to probe the financing of Finland's 
fifth nuclear power station, which is being built by a consortium 
comprising French state-controlled Areva and Germany's Siemens 
for Finnish utility Teollisuuden Voima (TVO), the Finnish News 
Agency (STT) learned on Tuesday. 

The target of the investigation is a 570-million-euro guarantee 
granted by the French government. 

According to information obtained by STT, the commission is to 
announce later on Tuesday that it will look into the legality of 
state aid from which the project benefits. 

The commission was on Tuesday reported to have received at least 
two complaints regarding the financing of the project. 


/STT/ 	

© Copyright STT 2006 	
*****************************************************************
 36 Another Disastrous Coverup: Forward Base Falcon Disaster
 
Date: Tue, 24 Oct 2006 07:46:28 -0500 (CDT)

X-Sender-Host-Name: chumbly.math.missouri.edu
X-Spam-filter-host: mx.junkemailfilter.net - http://www.junkemailfilter.com
X-Spam-Class: HAM

Remember the newscast in Arabic with video of the Camp Falcon Ammo depot
ablaze with speculation about a tactical nuke having gone off? Well, it
appears that the media again has not been accurate in reporting American
casualties from that event nuke or not:

http://www.libertyforum.org/showflat.php?Cat=&Board=news_news&Number=29500265
1#Post295002651

http://www.tbrnews.org/Archives/a2547.htm

Over 300 American troops, including U.S. Army and Marines, CIA agents, U.S.
translators and contractors were killed or injured outright or died
immediately afterwards en route to hospital or in hospital and over 125
seriously injured, requiring major medical attention and 39 suffering lesser
injuries By accounts, charred and totally unrecognizable fragments of
personnel were scattered over an eight block area.

Another Disastrous Coverup
Forward Base Falcon Disaster

by Brian Harring

Late on the evening of October 10, 2006, Iraqi resistance groups lobbed mortar
and rocket rounds into the immense Forward Base Falcon, the largest American
military base in Iraq, located 13 km south of the Green Zone in Baghdad. In
addition to accurate mortar fire, Grad and Katyusha rockets were also used.

Falcon base was designed to house a large contingent of American troops,
mostly drawn from the 4th Infantry Division, stationed at Fr. Bliss, Texas. At
the time of the attack, there were approximately 3000 men inside the camp,
which also was filled with ammunition supplies, fuel, tanks and vehicles.

Iraqi contractors had assisted in the construction of the camp, which occupied
nearly a square mile and was surrounded with guard tower-studded high concrete
walls, and it is now apparent that the Resistance movement had been given
important targets from sources familiar with the layout of the base.

After the initial shelling, fuel and ammunition stores began to erupt with
massive explosions that could be heard, and seen, miles away inside the Green
Zone where U.S. military and diplomatic units were heavily guarded.

The explosions, all of them termed immense by BBC reporters, continued
throughout the night.

In response, US aircraft indiscriminately  rocketed and bombed various parts
of the city, BBC and AFP correspondents eported, trying to knock out the
launch sites of the rockets

The BBC's Andrew North, in Baghdad, said the explosions started at about 2300
(2100 BST) and were becoming "ever more frequent" as the huge fires spread
throughout the base, punctuated by tremendous explosions as more fuel and
ammunition dumps ignited.

Intelligence indicates that civilians aligned with a militia organization
were responsible for last nights mortar attack, said Lieutenant Colonel
Jonathan Withington, spokesman for the U.S. 4th Infantry Division.

An after action report, issued by the Department of Defense, stated that: On
October 10, 2006, at approximately 10:40 p.m., a 82mm mortar round, fired by
militia forces from a residential area in Abu T-Shir, caused a fire at an
Ammunition Supply Point (ASP) at FOB Falcon. The ASP, containing tank and
artillery rounds, in addition to smaller caliber ammunition, set off a series
of large explosions. About 100 troops from the 4th Infantry Division were
reported to be stationed at the base at the time, but no injuries were
reported.  (Emphasis added.) "The damage to the area will not degrade the
operational capability of MND-B (Multinational Division Baghdad),"

When the flames had been brought under control on the morning of the 11th of
October, primarily because the entire camp had been gutted, nine large
American military transports with prominent Red Cross markings were observed
by members of the foreign media taking off, laded with the dead and the
wounded.

Over 300 American troops, including U.S. Army and Marines, CIA agents and U.S.
translators were casualties and there also were 165 seriously injured
requiring major medical attention and 39 suffering lesser injuries  122
members of the Iraqi armed forces were killed and 90 seriously injured members
of same, were also evacuated to the U.S. military hospital at al-Habbaniyah
located some 70km west of Baghdad.

Satellite pictures and aerial photographs from neutral sources showed that
Camp Falcon suffered major structural damage and almost all the U.S.
militarys supply of small arms ammunition, artillery and rocket rounds, tons
of fuel, six Apache helicopters, an uncounted but large number of soft-skinned
vehicles such as Humvees and supply trucks were damaged or totally destroyed.
Foreign press observers noted an endless parade of military vehicle recovery
units dragging burnt-out heavy tanks and armored personnel carriers to another
base outside Baghdad.

Many of the walls and towers of the camp were damaged or leveled as were many
of  the barracks, maintenance depots, and there was considerable damage to the
huge mess halls that could hold 3000 soldiers, the huge recreation center with
its basketball courts and indoor swimming pools and all the administration
buildings

Although official U.S. DoD statements indicated that there were no deaths;
that only a hundred men were inside the base guarding billions of dollars of
vital military equipment and that there were only two minor injuries to
personnel, passes belief and certainly reality is more painful than
propaganda.

Not only has the U.S. military machine lost much of its armor and transport,
and its entire reserves of ammunition and special fuel, but the casualty list
for only the first day is over 300..

Here is a transcription of that list who were evacuated to other hospital
units:.

In re: Insurgent attacks on Forward Base Falcon on 10-11 October, 2006

Official Casualty List from U.S. military hospital at al-Habbaniyah located
some 70km west of Baghdad. U.S. medical personnel at al-Habbaniyah initially
stated that the US military hospital at the massive American-occupied air base
there had begun to receive dead and wounded personnel. The military hospital
in al-Habbaniyah,  the largest in occupied Iraq, was opened on 12 May this
year in response to sharply rising (and redacted)  US casualties.

List compiled and effective as of  11 Oct 06 at 2300.

   A -
Pfc James R. Adams, 7th Squadron, 10th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Brigade, 4th
Infantry Division
Captain Kenneth Adler, Army Reserve 346th Psychological Operations Company
Pfc Bobby Ray Albertson , Explosive Ordnance Disposal Mobile UnitTwo
1st Lt.Keith Allen, Army Reserve 346th Psychological Operations Company
Spc Cletus Anderson, 204th Support Battalion, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry
Division
Lance Cpl John Martin Ansley, Marine Forces Reserves 2nd Battalion, 25th
Marine Regiment
Spc Toby Anthony, National Guard's 149th Brigade Combat Team
Pfc Gustavo Armijo, 57th Military Police Company, 8th Military Police Brigade
Pfc Michael Armstrong, 1st Squadron, 17th Cavalry Regiment, 82nd Airborne
Division
Capt Steven Arnold, 67th Armor Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division
James Arthur  Ash II, Central Intelligence Agency
Cpl Edward Atkinson, 47th Combat Support Hospital, 62nd Medical Brigade

  B 
Pfc Roy Bailey, National Guard's 149th Brigade Combat Team
Spc John Baldwin, 47th Combat Support Hospital, 62nd Medical Brigade
Pfc Charles Barbe,  Army National Guards 1569th Transportation Company
Pfc Thomas Barnhart , 204th Support Battalion, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry
Division
Pfc James Barry, 67th Armor Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division
Capt Robert Bell, 3rd Battalion, 16th Field Artillery Regiment, 2nd Brigade
Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division
Spc William Bennett , Army Reserve 346th Psychological Operations Company
Pfc Saul Benson, 549th Military Police Company, 385th Military Police
Battalion
Pfc Joseph Berge, 542nd Maintenance Company, 44th Corps Support Battalion
Pfc Joseph Berkeley , 1st Squadron, 17th Cavalry Regiment, 82nd Airborne
Division
Capt Colmar Betts,  414th Civil Affairs
Zack Billings, Department of Defense
Edward Blair,, Civilian Contractor
1st Lt.Ronald Bort, Explosive Ordnance Disposal Mobile UnitTwo
Pfc Bowen, James, 1st Battalion, 37th Field Artillery Regiment, 25th Infantry
Division
Pfc Thomas R. Boyd, 1st Squadron, 17th Cavalry Regiment, 82nd Airborne
Division
Spc Mel Brewer, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry
Division
Master Sgt.Roger Brown , 204th Support Battalion, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry
Division
Pfc Francis Byrne,  Army Reserve 346th Psychological Operations Company

  C -
Pfc Arthur Cahill, 1st Squadron, 17th Cavalry Regiment, 82nd Airborne
Division
Pfc Fernando Calderon, 1st Squadron, 17th Cavalry Regiment, 82nd Airborne
Division
Alex Callaghan, Civilian Contractor
Pfc Peter Campbell,  Explosive Ordnance Disposal Mobile UnitTwo
Cpl Douglas Carmody,  118th Military Police Company, 519th Military Police
Battalion, 16th Military Police Brigade
Pfc Ashanti Carter, 67th Armor Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division
Pfc Henry Cartwright, Army National Guards 1569th Transportation Company
Pfc Ken Casey,  3rd Battalion, 16th Field Artillery Regiment, 2nd Brigade
Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division
Pfc Russell Cavanaugh, 57th Military Police Company, 8th Military Police
Brigade
Spc Raymond Chamberlain, 47th Combat Support Hospital, 62nd Medical Brigade
Pfc Einar Christiansen, 414th Civil Affairs
Spc Zack Christopher,  7th Squadron, 10th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Brigade, 4th
Infantry Division
Pfc Eric Clark, 549th Military Police Company, 385th Military Police
Battalion
Ronald Colby, Civilian Contractor
Pfc Marcus M. Cole, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th
Infantry Division
Pfc Paul Collins, 1st Battalion, 37th Field Artillery Regiment, 25th Infantry
Division
Pfc Rory Conner, Department of Defense
Pfc Roger Connolly, 1st Battalion, 37th Field Artillery Regiment, 25th
Infantry Division
Major Michael Connors,  414th Civil Affairs
Steven Cooke, Department of Defense
Spc Matthew Cooper,  Army National Guards 35th Special Troops Battalion
Edward C. Courtney, Central Intelligence Agency
Capt Jimmy Lee Craig,  Explosive Ordnance Disposal Mobile UnitTwo
Spc Samuel Cramer, Army National Guards 1569th Transportation Company
Pfc Micah Creighton,  Army Reserve 346th Psychological Operations Company
Spc Leonard Cunningham,  3rd Battalion, 16th Field Artillery Regiment, 2nd
Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division
Cpl Paul E. Curtis, Army National Guards 1569th Transportation Company

  D -
Pfc Sebastian Daly, 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry, 3rd Brigade, 25th Infantry
Division
1st Lt.Benjamin Davis, 57th Military Police Company, 8th Military Police
Brigade
Raymond Day, Civilian Contractor
Pfc Justin Delaney, 4th Support Battalion, 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division
Pfc Christopher Dixon , Marine Forces Reserves 2nd Battalion, 25th Marine
Regiment
Cpl Paul Doherty, 414th Civil Affairs
Pfc Nicholas Dolan, 67th Armor Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division
Pfc Lawrence Donahue, 1st Battalion, 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment, 2nd
Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division
Pfc Randall Douglas, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry Regiment, 4th Brigade, 4th
Infantry Division
Carl Dowd , Civilian Contractor
Master Sgt.Phillip Doyle, 542nd Maintenance Company, 44th Corps Support
Battalion
Pfc Edmund Drake, 1st Squadron, 17th Cavalry Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division
Spc Charles Duval, 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry, 3rd Brigade, 25th Infantry
Division

  E -
Spc Brandon East , Army National Guards 35th Special Troops Battalion
Pfc Jeremy Edwards, 1st Battalion, 22nd Infantry Regiment, 1st Brigade Combat
Team, 4th Infantry Division
Spc Shane Elkins, 549th Military Police Company, 385th Military Police
Battalion
Edgar Elliott , Central Intelligence Agency
Pfc Ronald Ellis, 4th Support Battalion, 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division
2nd Lt.Paul H. Etheridge, 4th Battalion, 42nd Field Artillery Regiment, 1st
Brigade, 4th Infantry Division
Sgt Kenny Evans, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th
Infantry Division

  F 
Cpl Thomas Fairchild, Army Reserve 346th Psychological Operations Company
Pfc Ben Farrell, 2nd Battalion, 8th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Brigade, 4th
Infantry Division
Pfc Robert Feeney,  1st Battalion, 12th Infantry Regiment, 4th Brigade, 4th
Infantry Division
Cpl Angus Ferguson, 3rd Battalion, 16th Field Artillery Regiment, 2nd Brigade
Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division
Lance Cpl Eetaban Fernandez, Marine Forces Reserves 2nd Battalion, 25th
Marine Regiment
Spc Bradford Fields , , Army National Guards 1569th Transportation Company
Pfc Raymond, Finlay, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th
Infantry Division
Major Eduard Fischer, 414th Civil Affairs
Pfc Kirk Fitzgerald, 2nd Battalion, 502nd Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade
Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault)
Arnold Flynn, Civilian Contractor
1st Lt.Gene Ford, Explosive Ordnance Disposal Mobile UnitTwo
Pfc Scott Fort, 3rd Battalion, 67th Armor Regiment, 4th Brigade, 4th Infantry
Division
Capt Shelby Foster, 1st Squadron, 17th Cavalry Regiment, 82nd Airborne
Division
Pfc Jon Franklin, Army National Guards 35th Special Troops Battalion
Spc Harold Frederickson, 47th Combat Support Hospital, 62nd Medical Brigade
Pfc Lawrence Frost, 204th Support Battalion, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry
Division

  G 
Pfc Michael Gaines, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th
Infantry Division
Spc Christopher Gallagher,  National Guard's 149th Brigade Combat Team
Pfc  Israel GarciaRogelio R. Garza, 1st Battalion, 37th Field Artillery
Regiment, 25th Infantry Division
Pfc Daniel Gardner, 4th Support Battalion, 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division
Pfc Brad Garrison , Explosive Ordnance Disposal Mobile UnitTwo
Lance Cpl Kirk Geary, 2nd Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, 2nd Marine
Division, II Marine Expeditionary Force
Pfc Randy Geohegan, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th
Infantry Division
Spc Adam Gibson, 1st Battalion, 67th Armored Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th
Infantry Division
Master Sgt.Richard M. Gilligan, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry Regiment, 2nd
Brigade, 4th Infantry Division
Pfc Paolo Giovinazzo,  4th Battalion, 42nd Field Artillery Regiment, 1st
Brigade, 4th Infantry Division
Pfc Jeffery Givens, 1st Battalion, 32nd Infantry Regiment, 3rd Brigade Combat
Team, 10th Mountain Division
Cpl Mario Gold, 542nd Maintenance Company, 44th Corps Support Battalion
2nd Lt.Pedro Gomez, 4th Support Battalion, 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division
Pfc Michael Gordon , 4th Battalion, 42nd Field Artillery Regiment, 1st
Brigade, 4th Infantry Division
Spc Gabriel Govia, 2nd Battalion, 8th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Brigade, 4th
Infantry Division
Thomas Grady,  Department of Defense
Pfc Kevin Graham, 1st Squadron, 17th Cavalry Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division
Pfc Paul Gray, 3rd Battalion, 16th Field Artillery Regiment, 2nd Brigade
Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division
Pfc Samuel Green, Marine Forces Reserves 2nd Battalion, 25th Marine Regiment
Pfc Lloyd Griffith, 1st Squadron, 17th Cavalry Regiment, 82nd Airborne
Division
Cpl Andrew Gustafson, Army Reserve 346th Psychological Operations Company

  H 
1st Lt. Seth Hall, , Marine Forces Reserves 2nd Battalion, 25th Marine
Regiment
Pfc Tobias Hancock,  1st Battalion, 12th Infantry Regiment, 4th Brigade, 4th
Infantry Division
Pfc James Hansen, 4th Battalion, 42nd Field Artillery Regiment, 1st Brigade,
4th Infantry Division
Sgt Stuart Harding , 3rd Battalion, 67th Armor Regiment, 4th Brigade, 4th
Infantry Division
Spc Randy Hardy, Army National Guards 35th Special Troops Battalion
Pfc Ronald Harris, 1st Battalion, 32nd Infantry Regiment, 3rd Brigade Combat
Team, 10th Mountain Division
Pfc Keith O. Harvey, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th
Infantry Division
1st Lt.Karl Hawkins, 414th Civil Affairs
Sgt. 1st Class Samuell Hayden, 67th Armor Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry
Division
Cpl Randi Hays, 1st Battalion, 22nd Infantry Regiment, 1st Brigade Combat
Team, 4th Infantry Division
Pfc Ben Henderson, 47th Combat Support Hospital, 62nd Medical Brigade
Pfc Kyle Henry, 1st Battalion, 37th Field Artillery Regiment, 25th Infantry
Division
Spc Danid D.Herron, 2nd Battalion, 502nd Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat
Team, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault)
Capt Kenneth Hilliard, 1st Battalion, 67th Armored Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th
Infantry Division
Pfc John Hodge, 3rd Battalion, 67th Armor Regiment, 4th Brigade, 4th Infantry
Division
2nd Lt.Lee Hoffman, 4th Support Battalion, 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division
Master Sgt.David Hoke, 1st Battalion, 37th Field Artillery Regiment, 25th
Infantry Division
Pfc Ted Holmes, 7th Squadron, 10th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry
Division
Kenny Howard, 1st Squadron, 17th Cavalry Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division

  I-
Keith Ingraham, 2nd Battalion, 502nd Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat
Team, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault)
Pfc Daniel Innis, 204th Support Battalion, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division
Cpl Shane Irving, 1st Squadron, 17th Cavalry Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division

  J 
Pfc Tarrnish Jackson, Army National Guards 1569th Transportation Company
Spc Lewellen Jacobs, 67th Armor Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division
Cpl Timothy Jasper, 67th Armor Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division
1st Lt.Larry Jenkins, 414th Civil Affairs
2nd Lt.Phiillip Johnson, Explosive Ordnance Disposal Mobile UnitTwo
Pfc Brian Johnstone, Army Reserve 346th Psychological Operations Company
Pfc Todd Jones, Army National Guards 1569th Transportation Company
Pfc Brendan Joscelyn, 1st Battalion, 67th Armored Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th
Infantry Division
2nd Lt.Cpl Allan Jose, 57th Military Police Company, 8th Military Police
Brigade
Pfc Thomas Joyce, 2nd Battalion, 502nd Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat
Team, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault)
Spc Benno Juarez, 3rd Battalion, 16th Field Artillery Regiment, 2nd Brigade
Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division

  K-
1st Lt.Eric Kaufman, 7th Squadron, 10th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Brigade, 4th
Infantry Division
Pfc Charles Kavanaugh , Explosive Ordnance Disposal Mobile UnitTwo
Cpl Jon Keats,  67th Armor Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division
Pfc Eric Keefe, 1st Battalion, 67th Armored Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th
Infantry Division
Spc Tony Keeler, 118th Military Police Company, 519th Military Police
Battalion, 16th Military Police Brigade
Pfc Chester Keenan, 542nd Maintenance Company, 44th Corps Support Battalion
Pfc Frank Kennedy, 3rd Battalion, 67th Armor Regiment, 4th Brigade, 4th
Infantry Division
Pfc Jon Kent, 4th Support Battalion, 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division
Sgt Jordan Kessler, 7th Squadron, 10th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Brigade, 4th
Infantry Division
Capt Mark King , 4th Battalion, 42nd Field Artillery Regiment, 1st Brigade,
4th Infantry Division
Pfc Neil Kirk, Army National Guards 35th Special Troops Battalion
Spc Jeff Klein, 1st Battalion, 67th Armored Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th
Infantry Division
Spc Alan Knoll, 57th Military Police Company, 8th Military Police Brigade
.Pfc Adam Koehler, 3rd Battalion, 16th Field Artillery Regiment, 2nd Brigade
Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division
Capt Osmond Kray, Army National Guards 1569th Transportation Company
2nd Lt.Gary Krueger, 1st Battalion, 37th Field Artillery Regiment, 25th
Infantry Division

  L 
Tracey LaFaver , Civilian Contractor
Lance Cpl Roger Lafferty,  Marine Forces Reserves 2nd Battalion, 25th Marine
Regiment
Pfc Junior Lambert, 1st Battalion, 67th Armored Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th
Infantry Division
Spc Shawn Lane, 1st Squadron, 17th Cavalry Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division
Cpl Charles T. Langholz, 4th Battalion, 42nd Field Artillery Regiment, 1st
Brigade, 4th Infantry Division
Pfc Jimmy Bob Larkin, National Guard's 149th Brigade Combat Team
Pfc Eric Larsen, 542nd Maintenance Company, 44th Corps Support Battalion
Sgt. 1st Class Robert Law, Army National Guards 35th Special Troops
Battalion
Spc Andrew Richard, 3rd Battalion, 16th Field Artillery Regiment, 2nd Brigade
Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division
Pfc Ricardo LeGallo, 4th Support Battalion, 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry
Division
2nd Lt.William S. Leonard,  2nd Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, 2nd
Marine Division, II Marine Expeditionary Force
Pfc Marshal Lindsley,  Explosive Ordnance Disposal Mobile UnitTwo
Master Sgt.Tommy Lee Lipton, 4th Support Battalion, 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry
Division
Pfc George Long, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry Regiment, 4th Brigade, 4th
Infantry Division
Pfc Jimmy Longtree, 542nd Maintenance Company, 44th Corps Support Battalion
1st Lt. Jasper Loomis, Army National Guards 35th Special Troops Battalion
Pfc Carstairs Lowe, 2nd Battalion, 8th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Brigade, 4th
Infantry Division
Spc Robert M. Lynch, Army Reserve 346th Psychological Operations Company

  M 
Pfc Paul McKinnon , 3rd Battalion, 16th Field Artillery Regiment, 2nd Brigade
Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division
Pfc Keith MacVane, 67th Armor Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division
Cpl Gunnar Magnusson, Army National Guards 35th Special Troops Battalion
Capt.Martin Mahoney, 67th Armor Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division
Pfc Enzo Marini, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th
Infantry Division
Rostan Markovic, Central Intelligence Agency
Spc John M. Marshall, Army National Guards 1569th Transportation Company
Pfc Michael Martin, 1st Battalion, 37th Field Artillery Regiment, 25th
Infantry Division
Pfc Scott Marvin, 2nd Battalion, 502nd Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat
Team, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault)
Pfc Leroy Mason, 1st Squadron, 17th Cavalry Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division
Spc Greg Mathews, 3rd Battalion, 67th Armor Regiment, 4th Brigade, 4th
Infantry Division
Pfc Duncan Maxwell, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th
Infantry Division
Pfc Brian Mayer, 47th Combat Support Hospital, 62nd Medical Brigade
Arthur Mazzocco, Department of Defense
1st Lt.Joseph McAllister, 3rd Battalion, 16th Field Artillery Regiment, 2nd
Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division
Master Sgt. Daniel McBride, . 2nd Battalion, 8th Infantry Regiment, 3rd
Brigade, 4th Infantry Division
Pfc William McClellan, 2nd Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, 2nd Marine
Division, II Marine Expeditionary Force
Spc Lou McConnell, Army National Guards 35th Special Troops Battalion
Sgt. 1st Class Albert McGinnis,. 3rd Battalion, 16th Field Artillery Regiment,
2nd Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division
Master Sgt.David McRae, 1st Battalion, 67th Armored Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th
Infantry Division
Matthew Medigovich, Central Intelligence Agency
Pfc Vincent Mendoza, 2nd Battalion, 502nd Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade
Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault)
Cpl Richard Milich, 1st Squadron, 17th Cavalry Regiment, 82nd Airborne
Division
Pfc Ben Miller, 47th Combat Support Hospital, 62nd Medical Brigade
Cpl Robert Mitchell, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th
Infantry Division
Pfc Terrence Mogen, 118th Military Police Company, 519th Military Police
Battalion, 16th Military Police Brigade
Pfc Ted Montague, 1st Battalion, 32nd Infantry Regiment, 3rd Brigade Combat
Team, 10th Mountain Division
Pfc Yates Montecino, 67th Armor Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division
Pfc Esteban Morales, 542nd Maintenance Company, 44th Corps Support Battalion
Pfc Darrell Morgan, Central Intelligence Agency
Jeffery Morrison, Civilian Contractor

  N 
1st Lt.Noble Natsios, 67th Armor Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division
Pfc Carlos Naverez, Army National Guards 1569th Transportation Company
Sgt. 1st Class Edward Nelson , 1st Battalion, 37th Field Artillery Regiment,
25th Infantry Division
Cpl Donald Newcomb, 67th Armor Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division
Roger Newell, Civilian Contractor
Pfc Dorin Nicholson, 3rd Battalion, 16th Field Artillery Regiment, 2nd Brigade
Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division
Pfc Bart Nolan, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry
Division
Pfc Nelson Norton, 3rd Battalion, 67th Armor Regiment, 4th Brigade, 4th
Infantry Division
Pfc Wally Novak, Army National Guards 35th Special Troops Battalion

  O 
1st Lt.Chris OBrien , 3rd Battalion, 16th Field Artillery Regiment, 2nd
Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division
Pfc Stephen OConnor, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th
Infantry Division
Raymond ORourke, Civilian Contractor

  P 
Spc James W. Page,  4th Support Battalion, 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division
Cpl Russell Palumbo, 1st Squadron, 17th Cavalry Regiment, 82nd Airborne
Division
Pfc Nicholas Pappas, 67th Armor Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division
Pfc Troy Parker, 3rd Battalion, 16th Field Artillery Regiment, 2nd Brigade
Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division
Pfc Mark Patten, 47th Combat Support Hospital, 62nd Medical Brigade
George Paul, Civilian Contractor
Lance Cpl Wallace Peabody,  2nd Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, 2nd
Marine Division, II Marine Expeditionary     Force
Pfc Dale Peake, 3rd Battalion, 67th Armor Regiment, 4th Brigade, 4th Infantry
Division
Spc Reed Perry, Army National Guards 1569th Transportation Company
Pfc Samuel Petersen, 67th Armor Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division
Pfc Roger Platt, 3rd Battalion, 16th Field Artillery Regiment, 2nd Brigade
Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division
1st Lt.Thomas Poole, 57th Military Police Company, 8th Military Police
Brigade
Pfc William Porter, 118th Military Police Company, 519th Military Police
Battalion, 16th Military Police Brigade
Sgt Daniel Powell, 1st Battalion, 67th Armored Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th
Infantry Division
Spc Todd Price, Army National Guards 35th Special Troops Battalion
Cpl Kevin Prisley, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th
Infantry Division
Pfc Peter Purvis, 3rd Battalion, 16th Field Artillery Regiment, 2nd Brigade
Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division

  Q 
2nd Lt.Quesada, Gonzalo, 542nd Maintenance Company, 44th Corps Support
Battalion
Pfc Liam Quinn, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry
Division

  R 
Pfc Chad Railey, 3rd Battalion, 16th Field Artillery Regiment, 2nd Brigade
Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division
Spc Ignacio Ramirez,  Army National Guards 35th Special Troops Battalion
Pfc Arthur Ramsen, Army Reserve 346th Psychological Operations Company
Benjamin Raymond, Civilian Contractor
Spc Todd Reckford, 204th Support Battalion, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry
Division
Pfc Aaron Reynolds, 57th Military Police Company, 8th Military Police Brigade
Pfc Timothy Richard, 1st Battalion, 32nd Infantry Regiment, 3rd Brigade Combat
Team, 10th Mountain Division
1st Lt. Paul Richardson, 1st Battalion, 67th Armored Regiment, 2nd Brigade,
4th Infantry Division
Pfc Robert Riley, 67th Armor Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division
Pfc Shawn Roberts, Army National Guards 35th Special Troops Battalion
Cpl Kirk Robinson, National Guard's 149th Brigade Combat Team
Sgt. 1st Class James P. Rodgers, 1st Squadron, 17th Cavalry Regiment, 82nd
Airborne Division
Master Sgt. Chad Romer, 1st Battalion, 22nd Infantry Regiment, 1st Brigade
Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division
Pfc Martin Ross, 118th Military Police Company, 519th Military Police
Battalion, 16th Military Police Brigade
Pfc Robert Rowan, 204th Support Battalion, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division
2nd Lt.Seth Ryan, 3rd Battalion, 16th Field Artillery Regiment, 2nd Brigade
Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division

  S 
Spc Ricardo Sagan, 118th Military Police Company, 519th Military Police
Battalion, 16th Military Police Brigade
Pfc Hector Salazar, 1st Battalion, 22nd Infantry Regiment, 1st Brigade Combat
Team, 4th Infantry Division
Cpl Ed Sampson, 3rd Battalion, 67th Armor Regiment, 4th Brigade, 4th Infantry
Division
1st Lt Walter San Fellipo, 1st Battalion, 67th Armored Regiment, 2nd Brigade,
4th Infantry Division
Bruce Sartiano,, 67th Armor Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division
Cpl Raymond Schmitz, Army National Guards 1569th Transportation Company
2nd Lt.Ernest Sherman , 57th Military Police Company, 8th Military Police
Brigade
Pfc Mario Sims, 7th Squadron, 10th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry
Division
Spc Joshua Smith, 4th Support Battalion, 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division
Pfc Andrew Snow, Explosive Ordnance Disposal Mobile UnitTwo
Gerald Sorenson, Department of Defense
Lincoln Stadermann, Translator
Master Sgt.Michael Stephenson, 7th Squadron, 10th Cavalry Regiment, 1st
Brigade, 4th Infantry Division
Pfc Carl Stone,, 542nd Maintenance Company, 44th Corps Support Battalion
Capt.Harold Sullivan, 3rd Battalion, 67th Armor Regiment, 4th Brigade, 4th
Infantry Division
1st Lt. Lawrence Swenson, 1st Battalion, 37th Field Artillery Regiment, 25th
Infantry Division

  T 
Cpl Augustus Tanner, 542nd Maintenance Company, 44th Corps Support Battalion
Pfc Reginald Tate, 67th Armor Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division
Spc Duane Taylor, 118th Military Police Company, 519th Military Police
Battalion, 16th Military Police Brigade
Sgt. 1st Class Curtis Thomas, 4th Battalion, 42nd Field Artillery Regiment,
1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division
Pfc Stuart Thompsen, 57th Military Police Company, 8th Military Police
Brigade
Spc Larry Thomson, 1st Battalion, 67th Armored Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th
Infantry Division
Capt David Towers, Army National Guards 35th Special Troops Battalion
Pfc Dean Townsend, 3rd Battalion, 16th Field Artillery Regiment, 2nd Brigade
Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division
2nd Lt.James Tracy, Army Reserve 346th Psychological Operations Company
Pfc Paul Tucker, 1st Battalion, 67th Armored Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th
Infantry Division
Spc Daniel Tyson, 3rd Battalion, 16th Field Artillery Regiment, 2nd Brigade
Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division

  U 
Pfc Romillo Ugarte, 1st Battalion, 32nd Infantry Regiment, 3rd Brigade Combat
Team, 10th Mountain Division
Cpl Austin Unger, 3rd Battalion, 16th Field Artillery Regiment, 2nd Brigade
Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division

  V 
Spc Ramon Valadez,  1st Battalion, 22nd Infantry Regiment, 1st Brigade Combat
Team, 4th Infantry Division
Cpl Hector Velazquez,  Army National Guards 35th Special Troops Battalion
Spc WalterVincent, 1st Squadron, 17th Cavalry Regiment, 82nd Airborne
Division
2nd Lt.ThomasVoelker, 204th Support Battalion, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry
Division

  W 
Spc Carl Wade, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry
Division
Sgt. 1st Class Kevin Walker, 1st Battalion, 67th Armored Regiment, 2nd
Brigade, 4th Infantry Division
Pfc Ronald Walsh,, 3rd Battalion, 67th Armor Regiment, 4th Brigade, 4th
Infantry Division
Cpl Jack Ward, 2nd Battalion, 502nd Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat
Team, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault)
Cpl Sean Weber, 1st Battalion, 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade
Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division
Pfc Steven Webster, Army National Guards 35th Special Troops Battalion
Spc Paul Welch, 3rd Battalion, 16th Field Artillery Regiment, 2nd Brigade
Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division
Capt.Gene Westin, 1st Battalion, 37th Field Artillery Regiment, 25th Infantry
Division
Master Sgt.Richard Wheeler, 542nd Maintenance Company, 44th Corps Support
Battalion
Pfc Lawrence White, 67th Armor Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division
Pfc Andrew Willams, 7th Squadron, 10th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Brigade, 4th
Infantry Division
Sgt. 1st Class Mario Williamson, Army National Guards 1569th Transportation
Company
Russell Wilson, Translator
Michael Wisniewski, Civilian Employee
Cpl Chris Womack, 67th Armor Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division
Spc Burton Wood, Explosive Ordnance Disposal Mobile UnitTwo

  Y -
Cpl Fernando Yates, 1st Battalion, 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment, 2nd
Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division
Istvan Yatsevitch, Civilian Contractor
Cpl John York,  4th Battalion, 42nd Field Artillery Regiment, 1st Brigade, 4th
Infantry Division
Pfc Peter Young, 1st Battalion, 67th Armored Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th
Infantry Division

  Z 
Pfc Mario Zammarella, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th
Infantry Division
Cpl Jose Zamora, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry Regiment, 4th Brigade, 4th
Infantry Division
Spc Reuben Zamora, 1st Battalion, 22nd Infantry Regiment, 1st Brigade Combat
Team, 4th Infantry Division
Pfc Arno Ziegler, 542nd Maintenance Company, 44th Corps Support Battalion
1st Lt.Charles L. Zimmerman, 1st Battalion, 32nd Infantry Regiment, 3rd
Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division

Courtesy of Novosti Press Agency

The Green Zone Follies

Baghdad, 12 Oct 06: On Tuesday, I was in my quarters, writing a letter to a
friend that I knew will be censored so I was being very unspecific about
conditions here.

About  2300 there was a huge explosion to the south of the Green Zone,
followed at intervals by other, very heavy, explosions that numbered about
thirty or forty and lasted all night. I went up onto the roof and saw a great
fountain of flames, billowing smoke and flaming debris shooting up into the
air like Fourth of July fireworks.

Personnel were running all over the building, wide-eyed with terror and
wondering if our compound was going to get it next.  Usually, we hear
distant explosions scattered throughout Baghdad on a daily basis as another
convoy is blasted by the insurgent bombs but this ongoing mess was louder, and
longer, than anything I have ever encountered.

It was impossible to sleep what with all the explosions and in the morning, I
shaved and went to my office. As a note here: I am lucky to have quarters with
no windows facing outwards towards Baghdad. The insurgents have sniper rifles,
usually U.S. .50 caliber, set up in buildings that have a distant overlook and
more than once, personnel shaving in front of a bathroom window have had their
brains splattered all over the tile walls as a sniper zeroes in on them. The
sound of the shot follows and never, not once, have our security people ever
found the snipers nest.

In the office I learned that Forward Operating Base Falcon, one of our
light-headed senior officers idea to set up  fortified positions in various
places, such as the capital of the Al Anbaar province as-Saqr  was hit by
enemy action, set on fire and suddenly exploded as tons of stored ammunition
cooked off.

Camp Falcon at Sukkaniya  is located in the southern Baghdad suburb of
ad-Durah.. Forward Operating Base Falcon was one of the newest and most
heavily armed fortified positions.

There now exists a very high threat of suicide bombers in Ramadi who might
attempt to ram Falcon with a vehicle packed with explosives, and so heavy
concrete barriers were placed around the base designed to prevent such
attacks. This did not deter the members of the Resistance movement who lobbed
the same type of mortar shells into Falcon as they have been lobbing into the
so-called super secure headquarters areas of the Green Zone. Falcon had also
become the largest US weapons arsenal depot in the American General
Headquarters in the south of Baghdad and a very tempting target. This time, we
heard later,  (and officially denied!) the Resistance used Grad and Katyusha
rockets instead of mortars and the results were immediate, prolonged and
completely devastating.

The installation itself is full of smoking rubble, and fires were still
burning the following day. Although it is still very early to be accurate,
reviews here of Falcons inventory indicates that losses will certainly exceed
$1 billion.

That addresses the loss of property. The loss of life is even worse

Over 300  American troops, including U.S. Army and Marines, CIA agents, U.S.
translators and contractors were killed or injured outright or died
immediately afterwards en route to hospital or in hospital and over 125
seriously injured, requiring major medical attention and 39 suffering lesser
injuries  By accounts, charred and totally unrecognizable fragments of
personnel were scattered over an eight block area.

122 members of the Iraqi armed forces were killed and 90 seriously injured
members of same, were also evacuated to the U.S. military hospital at
al-Habbaniyah located some 70km west of Baghdad. U.S. medical personnel at
al-Habbaniyah initially stated that the US military hospital at the massive
American-occupied air base there had begun to receive dead and wounded
personnel. The military hospital in al-Habbaniyah,  the largest in occupied
Iraq, was opened on 12 May this year in response to sharply rising (and
redacted)  US casualties.

Initially  three large military transport aircraft  with the red cross
displayed under the wings and on the fuselages, had flown into the base, and
casualties were being unloaded and sent into the hospital at the al-Habbaniyah
base, and officially, we predictably released a flood of official statements
that claimed there were only a few personnel wounded and no fatalities
whatsoever. Also predictably, our people overreacted by launching  a wild
series of bomb and rocket attacks on random parts of Baghdad, killing an
estimated 120 Iraqi civlinans and injuring an unknown number as well as
setting fires that were still burning the next morning. There were strong
ruimors that a container of artillery shells containing some kind of a nerve
gas (for use against Iraqi militant strongholdsshades of Hussein!) turned out
to be false. What was involved were a kind of tear gas, thank God, or we would
all be dead now!

By now, it should be clearly obvious that the reporting of fatal casualties in
both Iraq and Afghanistan are really under stated. For example, we had a young
officer in here about three days ago who was talking with several of us. He is
assigned to the air field from which the dead are shipped back to Dover, Md.
According to him, last month, he supervised the loading of over one hundred
and seventy military caskets but amazingly, the official DoD reportage had
only a fraction of that. Of course he has no names, only numbers, and perhaps
some high officer or Halliburton thief is shipping dope or underaged girls
back to the states inside the boxes but this man had no reason to lie. It will
be interesting to see if the DoD website shows the deaths over the Falcon
incident. Time may tell but they wont.

Insurgent mortar fire ignites U.S. ammunition dump

October 12, 2006
by Joseph Giordono,
Stars and Stripes Mideast edition

Insurgent mortar fire hit an American military ammunition dump late Tuesday
night, setting off huge explosions and rattling windows and nerves throughout
the Iraqi capital of Baghdad, military and civilian officials said Wednesday.

Tank rounds, artillery shells and small-arms ammunition at the Forward
Operating Base Falcon site were ignited by the explosion and subsequent fire,
casting an orange glow overnight and into Wednesday morning. No injuries were
reported by late Wednesday.(Emphasis added. Ed.)

According to military spokesmen, the first explosion happened around 10:40
p.m. Soldiers and base workers were evacuated from the area, and emergency
workers raced to control the blaze.

FOB Falcon is in the central Rasheed district of Baghdad. A mortar round fired
from southern Baghdad caused the blast, officials said.

Intelligence indicates that civilians aligned with a militia organization
were responsible for last nights mortar attack, 4th Infantry Division and
Multi-National Division-Baghdad spokesman Lt. Col. Jonathon Withington was
quoted by news agencies as saying.

As of Wednesday afternoon, the fire was still smoldering and more rounds were
occasionally cooking off and exploding.

Three battalions, including tank and infantry units, are stationed at the
base, but the loss of the ammunition will not degrade the operational
capability of [the division], a U.S. military news release read. The troops
at Falcon have been participating in Operation Together Forward, a massive
U.S.-Iraqi effort to clamp down on sectarian violence in Baghdad.

Soldiers as far away as Camp Liberty, near the Baghdad airport, reported
hearing the blast, which rattled windows on the base. Many rushed out of their
offices and bunks, thinking the explosions were an attack on Camp Liberty.

By Wednesday, the Islamic Army in Iraq  one of several insurgent groups in
Iraq  claimed responsibility for the attack.

With the help of God, the mortar and rocket squads of the Islamic Army have
shelled a U.S. Army base with two rockets and three mortar shells, a Web
statement read. The rockets and shells fell on ammunition dumps causing them
to explode.

There was no way to verify the groups claim of responsibility.

Other local Iraqi officials said Shiite militiamen were behind the attack.

FOB Falcon is in a largely industrial area of Baghdad, near the district of
Dora. Iraqi citizens in the area were notified of the attack and its suspected
cause but were not being evacuated.

Iraqs interior minister, Jawad al Bolani, took to the airwaves to give
details of the attack and reassure area residents that the incident was under
control.

There is an alert to security forces to provide any help to the residents of
the area, he said.

Stars and Stripes reporter Anita Powell contributed to this report.

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 37 IHT: European Commission recommends closer nuclear cooperation with Kazakhstan - 

- International Herald Tribune
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
The Associated Press

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 24, 2006

BRUSSELS, Belgium The European Commission on Tuesday sent a 
recommendation to EU governments urging them to back the 
conclusion of an agreement with Kazakhstan to facilitate supplies 
of uranium to Europe's nuclear industry.  "Given the foreseen 
development of the EU nuclear industry and Kazakhstan's ambition 
to become the world's top uranium producer by 2010, it is in the 
mutual interest of both parties to expand their relations in this 
field," the commission said in a statement.  The EU's executive 
body said the agreement should ease uranium trade, while setting 
out cooperation in nuclear safety, nonproliferation and research. 

The agreement should have an initial 10-year duration and an
estimated commercial value of around ¬500 million (US$630
million), the Commission said.  According to the EU, Kazakhstan
has one-fifth of the world's known reserves of uranium and
remains the third biggest producer of uranium in the world,
after Australia and Canada, but it represents only 3 percent of
uranium delivered to facilities in the 25 EU nations.  Growing
concerns about the cost and security of oil and gas supplies are
causing several EU nations to consider stepping up nuclear power
programs.  							  							 							 						 												 						
						 					   				 				
Herald Tribune All rights reserved   [IHT]    
	 					   				 			
*****************************************************************
 38 Analysis: The politics of terror

United Press International - Security &Terrorism - 

10/24/2006 6:11:00 PM -0400

 By MARTIN SIEFF UPI Senior News Analyst

WASHINGTON, Oct. 24 (UPI) -- The Republicans are betting on
their national security record in the congressional elections.
But their failures in Iraq look like wrecking the strategy. 

The irony is that -- apart from Iraq -- their record, though
flawed, is still substantial and serious. 

Not a single terrorist attack has taken place within the
territory of the United States since Sept. 11, 2001. Cooperation
between the FBI and the CIA has been hammered through to a
greater extent than critics believed possible. Electronic
surveillance has been massively expanded and FBI and U.S.
intelligence officials say it has proven invaluable in
monitoring extremists and nipping potential terror plots in the
bud. And U.S. inspectors at ports of entry can inspect
biometric, tamper-proof passports or visas -- and check them
against terrorist and other watch-lists -- for a growing
proportion of visitors to the country. 

Many serious problems in upgrading national security remain,
especially in the area of chemical industry security, upgrading
nuclear industry security and most of all, in the area of cargo
container security at ports around the nation. 

However, progress over the past five years has been
considerable. Congress has just approved a first appropriation
of $1.2 billion to build an ambitious high tech 700-mile-long
security fence along the U.S.-Mexican border to stem the flood
of illegal immigration across it. 

However, none of that -- except possibly for the fence in the
Southwest -- looks like being a significant political factor in
the upcoming elections. The unfolding catastrophe in Iraq, on
the contrary, plays center stage with voters, especially
independently affiliated ones, according to almost all polls.
And the currents of public opinion are flowing badly against the
GOP. 

The ironies in this are many and may look to some like a kind of
karmic payback for the Republicans. Even though the mega-terror
attacks of Sept. 11, 2001 happened eight months into President
George W. Bush's first term of office, the president was never
held to account in any significant way for them. In the midterm
elections of 2002 and the national elections of 2004, national
security issues were the ace card Bush and his party played to
trump every democratic election strategy. 

But now the Republicans have finally been trumped on national
security. And the Democrats had nothing to do with it. The GOP
trumped themselves -- with Iraq. 

Since the 2004 elections, events in Iraq have gotten steadily
worse. The deterioration, as we have monitored in our regular
UPI Eye on Iraq and Iraq Benchmarks columns, has only
intensified since the Iraqi general election late last year. The
poll produced a new constitutionally approved and popularly
elected parliament -- exactly as the Bush administration's
strategy had required. But since the new Iraqi parliament
assembled and its constituent parties finally agreed on a
coalition government, law and order in Iraq has collapsed rather
than being restored. 

Over the past month, that deleterious trend has deepened. A new
U.S.-driven strategy of using both U.S. forces and the new Iraqi
security forces to move against sectarian militias, including
Shiite ones in the capital Baghdad, has failed disastrously. 

Even senior U.S. generals have publicly acknowledged the failure
of the Baghdad operations so far and their comments have been
widely reported in the U.S. media. So have the soaring U.S.
casualties in Iraq -- threatening to make October the worst
month for American casualties since President Bush declared
"mission accomplished" on the deck of the USS Abraham Lincoln on
May 1, 2003. 

The irony is, as we noted above, there has been positive
progress -- and a lot of it -- in boosting U.S. homeland
security at a breakneck pace over the past five years. And while
the administration's track record is far from perfect and its
policies on respecting human rights and constitutional liberties
remain highly controversial, the achievements are real. But the
disasters in Iraq have buried all of that. 

Even the masterly skill the president and his top political
advisor Karl Rove have shown in their political tactics over the
past eight years have now come back to haunt them. They have
encouraged the American electorate to ignore detailed numbers
about federal budget or annual foreign trade deficits. So now
the public remain unimpressed by all the statistics the
administration and the Republican Party are throwing at them
about improvements in homeland security. 

The GOP has won elections repeatedly by hammering home visually
dramatic stories and striking images -- like the ads in Georgia
juxtaposing Democratic then-Sen. Max Cleland with Osama bin
Laden. But now the latest wave of images of escalating mayhem in
Iraq is swamping all the considered arguments the GOP is putting
out to try and defend their embattled candidates. 

Toppling Saddam Hussein and establishing a democratically
elected government in Iraq were supposed to be a centerpiece of
the Bush administration's policy to fight international terror
and increase the security of the United States. Instead, the
latest polling data suggests that the increasingly evident
failures of U.S. policies on the ground in Iraq eliminated the
strongest argument the Republicans had in their campaign to try
and retain control of both houses of Congress -- their tough,
determined and uncompromising record on boosting homeland
security. But the Democrats did not do it to them. They did it
to themselves.

© Copyright 2006 United Press International, Inc. All Rights
Reserved
*****************************************************************
 39 Bradenton Herald: Tallevast residents ask for time to check data

10/24/2006 | 

Posted on Tue, Oct. 24, 2006 email this print this 

 SYLVIA LIM Herald Staff Writer 

TALLEVAST - Tallevast residents have asked a state agency for
more time to decide whether the research on a 200-acre,
underground toxic plume in their community is complete, their
attorney said Monday. 

The extension will allow the residents and experts to review the
third report Lockheed Martin Corp. submitted to the Florida
Department of Environmental Protection, said Jeanne Zokovitch,
an attorney with the Wild Law firm in Tampa. 

On Sept. 25, DEP had approved the latest report from the defense
company as to how large the plume really is, The Herald
reported. If no one challenges the approval, Lockheed can begin
designing the final cleanup plan. 

The residents have until Oct. 26 to challenge the DEP's
decision, officials said. 

In a petition sent to DEP last Friday, residents want to extend
that deadline to Nov. 26 so they can have more time to go
through the report, Zokovitch said. A reply from DEP is expected
in a couple of weeks. 

"There's no reason to believe it won't be approved," Zokovitch
said. "The agency is usually good about granting additional
time." 

Residents, or those who think they may have been affected by the
toxic plume, have 21 days from when Lockheed published the state
agency's decision in The Herald on Oct. 5 to formally question
the findings, Zokovitch said. 

A community group called FOCUS, or Family Oriented Community
United Strong, said they thought Lockheed's report on the plume
was not complete. 

"We still feel that laterally the plume still hasn't been
identified completely," said Laura Ward, president of FOCUS,
referring to the depth of the plume. "It's a major concern." 

But the DEP appeared to be satisfied with the plume maps and
findings submitted by the defense giant. 

The toxic waste was traced back to the former Loral American
Beryllium Co. plant Lockheed once owned. Since Lockheed was the
owner when the contamination was discovered, that company is
held responsible for the cleanup. 

*****************************************************************
 40 AU ABC: Drilling reveals promising uranium find

ABC North and West SA
 
 Tuesday, 24 October 2006. 14:02 (AEDT)Tuesday, 24 October 2006.


 Drilling 60 kilometres north of the Honeymoon Mine, in South
Australia's north-east, has produced promising results for more
uranium in the area. 

The owners of the Honeymoon mine, near the far west New South
Wales city of Broken Hill, are ready to go ahead and Curnomona
Energy Limited has resumed drilling in the area. 

It has told the Australian Stock Exchange, another 14 holes
drilled at its Oban prospect have resulted in significant
uranium intersections. 

But it says assaying of core samples is needed to know the grade
of uranium. 



*****************************************************************
 41 Bayshore Broadcasting Corporation: Speaking out on nuclear waste

News for Tuesday, October 24th, 2006

Written by Ken Hashizume

The public had a chance to speak on nuclear waste in Bruce
County. 

The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission heard from proponents and
opponents of Ontario Power Generation's plan to bury its
radioactive waste underground.

CNSC held a public hearing of the environmental assessment at
the Davidson Centre in Kincardine.

The Deep Geologic Repository is for low and intermediate level
waste.

Kincardine Mayor Glen Sutton says he is happy with the report
presented by OPG and CNSC staff.

Both Kincardine and Saugeen Shores municipalities support the
assessment and are pushing to move the DGR forward.

However some in attendance had some concerns.

Chippewas of Nawash First Nations Chief Paul Nadjiwan says there
needs to be more indepth analysis on the environmental impact
before the project can begin.

Greenpeace Energy Coordinator Dave Martin says nuclear waste
should be kept at ground level so it can be monitored.

Even if the assessment is approved it will be years before OPG
can start digging.

    © 2006 Bayshore Broadcasting Corp. All Rights Reserved.
*****************************************************************
 42 Palladium-Item: Rail company sets up shop in Union Co.

www.pal-item.com - Richmond, Ind.
 
LIBERTY, Ind. — A new railroad company operating the former CSX
line between Richmond and Fernald, Ohio, is establishing its
corporate office in Cottage Grove in Union County.

The Eastern Indiana Railroad won a variance Monday for the
office in a former residence at 2551 U.S. 27 South.

The company began operating the rail line in August 2005,
operations manager Rob Cieri said. The company is working to
increase its industrial customers and needs a comfortable office
large enough to meet with clients, Cieri said.

In the past, the line that stretches through Boston, Cottage
Grove and Bath was mostly used to carry the hazardous
radioactive waste being removed from the closed Fernald uranium
processing plant. Traffic on the line was infrequent and the
crossings weren’t repaired. 

Originally published October 23, 2006

 Copyright ©2006 Palladium-Item.
*****************************************************************
 43 NRC: Request for a License To Import Radioactive Waste
 
                        FR Doc E6-17749 
[Federal Register: October 24, 2006 (Volume 71, Number 205)] 
[Notices] [Page 62301-62302] From the Federal Register Online via 
GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr24oc06-87]                         
 
Pursuant to 10 CFR 110.70 ``Public notice of receipt of an 
application,'' please take notice that the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission has received the following request for an import 
license. Copies of the request are available electronically 
through ADAMS and can be accessed through the Public Electronic 
Reading Room (PERR) link http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/ADAMS/index.html 
at the NRC Homepage. A request for a hearing or petition for 
leave to intervene may be filed within 30 days after publication 
of this notice in the Federal Register. Any request for hearing 
or petition for leave to intervene shall be served by the 
requestor or petitioner upon the applicant, the Office of the 
General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, 
DC 20555; the Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555; and the Executive Secretary, U.S. 
Department of State, Washington, DC 20520.
 
The information concerning this import license application 
follows.
 
NRC Import License Application 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
----------------------------------------------- Name of 
applicant, date of              Description of material 
application, date  received, 
------------------------------------------       End use Country 
of Application No., Docket No.       Material type        Total 
quantity                              origin 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
----------------------------------------------- UniTech Services 
Group, Inc.,     Class A radioactive  Up to 30,000 lbs.    
Imported materials   Canada. August 17, 2006, September 7,     
waste consisting     or 5,000 cubic       will be 2006, IW019, 
11005650.            of source, special   feet of various      
characterized and nuclear and contaminated         sorted by type 
and byproduct materials.           by levels of materials as 
radioactivity. All contaminants of materials imported various 
materials will be returned including paper, (see export 
cardboard, license plastic, metals, application XW011) cloth, 
rubber, to Canadian wood, etc. customers for

 
appropriate

 
disposition. No

 
materials imported

 
under this license

 
will remain or be

 
disposed of in the

 
U.S. 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
-----------------------------------------------
 
[[Page 62302]] Dated this 13th day of October 2006 at Rockville, 
Maryland.
 
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
 
Margaret M. Doane, Deputy Director, Office of International 
Programs.
 
[FR Doc. E6-17749 Filed 10-23-06; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590-01-P

 
*****************************************************************
 44 NRC: Request for a License To Export Radioactive Waste
 
                        FR Doc E6-17751 
[Federal Register: October 24, 2006 (Volume 71, Number 205)] 
[Notices] [Page 62302] From the Federal Register Online via GPO 
Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr24oc06-88]                         
 
Pursuant to 10 CFR 110.70 ``Public notice of receipt of an 
application,'' please take notice that the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission has received the following request for an export 
license. Copies of the request are available electronically 
through ADAMS and can be accessed through the Public Electronic 
Reading Room (PERR) link http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/ADAMS/index.html 
at the NRC Homepage. A request for a hearing or petition for 
leave to intervene may be filed within 30 days after publication 
of this notice in the Federal Register. Any request for hearing 
or petition for leave to intervene shall be served by the 
requestor or petitioner upon the applicant, the Office of the 
General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington 
DC 20555; the Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555; and the Executive Secretary, U.S. 
Department of State, Washington, DC 20520.
 
The information concerning this import license application 
follows.
 
NRC Export License Application 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
----------------------------------------------- Name of applicant 
date of              Description of material application, date 
received, ------------------------------------------       End 
use Country of Application No., Docket No.       Material type        
Total quantity                              origin 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
----------------------------------------------- UniTech Services 
Group, Inc.,     Class A radioactive  Up to 30,000 lbs.    All 
contaminated     Canada. August 17, 2006, September 7,     waste 
consisting     Or 5,000 cubic       materials imported 2006, 
XW011, 11005649.            of source, special   feet of from 
Canada under nuclear and contaminated         NRC License IW019 
byproduct materials.           will be returned materials to 
Canadian including paper, customers for cardboard, appropriate 
plastic, metals, disposition.
 
cloth, rubber, wood, etc.
 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
----------------------------------------------- Dated this 13 day 
of October 2006 at Rockville, Maryland.
 
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
 
Margaret M. Doane, Deputy Director, Office of International 
Programs.
 
[FR Doc. E6-17751 Filed 10-23-06; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590-01-P

 
*****************************************************************
 45 NRC: In the Matter of USEC Inc. (Lead Cascade Facility) and All Other 
 
                        FR Doc E6-17752 
[Federal Register: October 24, 2006 (Volume 71, Number 205)] 
[Notices] [Page 62318-62323] From the Federal Register Online via 
GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr24oc06-92]                         
 
Persons Who Seek or Obtain Access to Safeguards Information 
Described Herein; Order Imposing Requirements for the Protection 
of and Access to Safeguards Information (Effective Immediately) I 
USEC Inc. (USEC or the Licensee) holds a license, issued in 
accordance with the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954, by the U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or Commission) authorizing it 
to construct and operate a uranium enrichment test and 
demonstration facility in Piketon, Ohio. On July 15, 2003, NRC 
provided USEC, for its information, copies of Orders issued to 
Category III facilities on interim measures to enhance physical 
security at those facilities. Those Orders contained Safeguards 
Information.\1\ In addition, in the future, the Commission may 
issue the Licensee additional Orders that require compliance with 
specific additional security measures to enhance security at the 
facility. These Orders are also expected to contain Safeguards 
Information, which cannot be released to the public and must be 
protected from unauthorized disclosure. Therefore, the Commission 
is imposing the requirements, as set forth in Attachments A, B, 
and C of this Order, so that the Licensee can receive these 
documents. This Order also imposes requirements for the 
protection of Safeguards Information in the hands of any 
person,\2\ whether or not a Licensee of the Commission, who 
produces, receives, or acquires Safeguards Information.
 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
---------- \1\ Safeguards Information is a form of sensitive, 
unclassified, security-related information that the Commission 
has the authority to designate and protect under section 147 of 
the AEA.
 
\2\ Person means: (1) any individual, corporation, partnership, 
firm, association, trust, estate, public or private institution, 
group, government agency other than the Commission or the 
Department of Energy, except that the Department of Energy shall 
be considered a person with respect to those facilities of the 
Department specified in section 202 of the Energy Reorganization 
Act of 1974 (88 Stat. 1244), any State or any political 
subdivision of, or any political entity within a State, any 
foreign government or nation or any political subdivision of any 
such government or nation, or other entity; and (2) any legal 
successor, representative, agent, or agency of the foregoing.
 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
---------- On August 8, 2005, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 
(EPAct) was enacted. Section 652 of the EPAct amended Section 149 
of the AEA to require fingerprinting and a Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) identification and criminal history records 
check of any person who is to be permitted to have access to 
Safeguards Information. The NRC's implementation of this 
requirement cannot await the completion of the Safeguards 
Information rulemaking, which is underway, because the EPAct 
fingerprinting and criminal history check requirements for access 
to Safeguards Information were immediately effective upon 
enactment of the EPAct. Although the EPAct permits the Commission 
by rule to except certain categories of individuals from the 
fingerprinting requirement, which the Commission has done (see 10 
CFR 73.59, 71 FR 33,989 (June 13, 2006)), it is unlikely that 
many Licensee employees are excepted from the fingerprinting 
requirement by the ``fingerprinting relief'' rule. Individuals 
relieved from the fingerprinting and criminal history checks 
under the relief rule include Federal, State, and local officials 
and law enforcement personnel; Agreement State inspectors, who 
conduct security inspections on behalf of the NRC; members of 
Congress and certain employees of members of Congress or 
Congressional Committees; representatives of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency or certain foreign government organizations. 
In addition, individuals who have a favorably-decided U.S. 
Government criminal history check within the last five (5) years, 
and individuals who have active Federal security clearances 
(provided in either case that they make available the appropriate 
documentation), have satisfied the EPAct fingerprinting 
requirement and need not be fingerprinted again. Therefore, in 
accordance with section 149 of the AEA, as amended by the EPAct, 
the Commission is imposing additional requirements, as set forth 
by this Order, for access to Safeguards Information so that 
affected licensees can obtain and grant access to Safeguards 
Information. This Order also imposes requirements for access to 
Safeguards Information by any person, from any person, whether or 
not a Licensee, Applicant, or Certificate Holder of the 
Commission or Agreement States.
 
Subsequent to the terrorist events of September 11, 2001, the NRC 
issued Orders requiring certain entities to implement Additional 
Security Measures (ASM) or Compensatory Measures (CM) for certain 
radioactive materials. The requirements imposed by these Orders, 
and certain measures licensees have developed to comply
 
[[Page 62319]] with the Orders, were designated by the NRC as 
Safeguards Information. For some materials licensees, the storage 
and handling requirements for the Safeguards Information have 
been modified from the existing 10 CFR part 73 Safeguards 
Information requirements for reactors and fuel cycle facilities 
that require a higher level of protection; such Safeguards 
Information is designated as Safeguards Information--Modified 
Handling (SGI-M). However, the information subject to the SGI-M 
handling and protection requirements is Safeguards Information, 
and licensees and other persons who seek or obtain access to such 
Safeguards Information are subject to this Order.
 
II The Commission has broad statutory authority to protect 
Safeguards Information and prohibit its unauthorized disclosure. 
Section 147 of the AEA, as amended, grants the Commission 
explicit authority to ``* * * issue such orders, as necessary to 
prohibit the unauthorized disclosure of safeguards information * 
* *.'' Furthermore, section 652 of the EPAct amended section 149 
of the AEA to require fingerprinting and an FBI identification 
and a criminal history records check of each individual who seeks 
access to Safeguards Information. In addition, no person may have 
access to Safeguards Information unless the person has an 
established need-to-know and satisfies the trustworthy and 
reliability requirements of those Orders.
 
Licensees and all persons who produce, receive, or acquire 
Safeguards Information must ensure proper handling and protection 
of Safeguards Information, to avoid unauthorized disclosure, in 
accordance with the specific requirements for the protection of 
Safeguards Information contained in Attachments A, B, and C. The 
Commission hereby provides notice that it intends to treat 
violations of the requirements contained in Attachments A, B, and 
C, applicable to the handling and unauthorized disclosure of 
Safeguards Information, as serious breaches of adequate 
protection of the public health and safety and the common defense 
and security of the United States. Access to Safeguards 
Information is limited to those persons who have established a 
need-to- know the information, and are considered to be 
trustworthy and reliable, and who satisfy the fingerprinting and 
criminal history records check required by the EPAct and this 
Order. A ``need-to-know'' means a determination by a person 
having responsibility for protecting Safeguards Information that 
a proposed recipient's access to Safeguards Information is 
necessary in the performance of official, contractual, or 
Licensee duties of employment. The Licensee and all other persons 
who obtain Safeguards Information must ensure that they develop, 
maintain, and implement strict policies and procedures for the 
proper handling of Safeguards Information, to prevent 
unauthorized disclosure, in accordance with the requirements in 
Attachments A, B, and C.
 
The Licensee must ensure that all contractors whose employees may 
have access to Safeguards Information either adhere to the 
Licensee's policies and procedures on Safeguards Information or 
develop, maintain, and implement their own acceptable policies 
and procedures. The Licensee remains responsible for the conduct 
of its contractors.
 
The policies and procedures necessary to ensure compliance with 
applicable requirements contained in Attachments A, B, and C must 
address, at a minimum, the following: (1) The general performance 
requirement that each person who produces, receives, or acquires 
Safeguards Information shall ensure that Safeguards Information 
is protected against unauthorized disclosure; (2) protection of 
Safeguards Information at fixed sites, in use and in storage, and 
while in transit; (3) correspondence containing Safeguards 
Information; (4) access to Safeguards Information; (5) 
preparation, marking, reproduction, and destruction of documents; 
(6) external transmission of documents; (7) use of automatic data 
processing systems; and (8) removal of the Safeguards Information 
category.
 
To provide assurance that the Licensee is implementing 
appropriate measures to achieve a consistent level of protection 
to prohibit the unauthorized disclosure of Safeguards 
Information, the Licensee shall implement the requirements for 
access to Safeguards Information in this Order, including the 
requirements in Attachments A, B, and C of this Order. In 
addition, pursuant to 10 CFR Sec.  2.202, I find that in light of 
the common defense and security matters identified above, which 
warrant the issuance of this Order, the public health, safety, 
and interest require that this Order be effective immediately.
 
III Accordingly, pursuant to sections 53, 62, 63, 81, 147, 149, 
161b, 161i, 161o, 182, and 186 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 
as amended, and the Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 2.202, 10 
CFR part 30, 10 CFR part 40, and 10 CFR part 70, IT IS HEREBY 
ORDERED, EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY, THAT LICENSEE AND ALL OTHER 
PERSONS WHO PRODUCE, RECEIVE, OR ACQUIRE THE ADDITIONAL SECURITY 
MEASURES IDENTIFIED ABOVE (WHETHER DRAFT OR FINAL), OR WHO SEEK 
OR OBTAIN ACCESS TO SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION, SHALL COMPLY WITH THE 
REQUIREMENTS SET FORTH IN THIS ORDER, INCLUDING THE REQUIREMENTS 
IN ATTACHMENTS A, B, AND C.
 
A. 1. No person may have access to Safeguards Information unless 
that person has a need-to-know the Safeguards Information, has 
been fingerprinted or who has a favorably decided FBI 
identification and criminal history records check, and satisfies 
all other applicable requirements for access to Safeguards 
Information.
 
Fingerprinting and the FBI identification and criminal history 
records check are not required, however, for any person who is 
relieved from that requirement by 10 CFR 73.59 (71 FR 33,989 
(June 13, 2006)) or who has a favorably- decided U.S. Government 
criminal history check within the last five (5) years, or who has 
an active Federal security clearance, provided in each case that 
the appropriate documentation is made available to the Licensee's 
NRC-approved reviewing official.
 
2. No person may have access to any Safeguards Information if the 
NRC has determined, based on fingerprinting and an FBI 
identification and criminal history records check, that the 
person may not have access to Safeguards Information.
 
B. No person may provide Safeguards Information to any other 
person except in accordance with condition III.A above. Prior to 
providing Safeguards Information to any person, a copy of this 
Order shall be provided to that person.
 
C. The Licensee shall comply with the following requirements: 1. 
The Licensee shall, within twenty (20) days of the date of this 
Order, establish and maintain a fingerprinting program that meets 
the requirements of Attachment C to this Order.
 
2. The Licensee shall, within twenty (20) days of the date of 
this Order, submit the fingerprints of one (1) individual who 
needs access to Safeguards Information and who the Licensee 
nominates as the ``reviewing official'' for determining access to 
Safeguards Information by other individuals. The NRC will 
determine whether this individual (or any subsequent reviewing 
official) may have access to Safeguards Information and, 
therefore, will be permitted to serve as
 
[[Page 62320]] the Licensee's reviewing official.\3\ The Licensee 
may, at the same time or later, submit the fingerprints of other 
individuals to whom the Licensee seeks to grant access to 
Safeguards Information.
 
Fingerprints shall be submitted and reviewed in accordance with 
the procedures described in Attachment C of this Order.
 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
---------- \3\ The NRC's determination of this individual's 
access to Safeguards Information in accordance with the process 
described in Enclosure 3 to the transmittal letter of this Order 
is an administrative determination that is outside the scope of 
this Order.
 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
---------- 3. The Licensee shall, in writing, within twenty (20) 
days of the date of this Order, notify the Commission, (1) if it 
is unable to comply with any of the requirements described in the 
Order, including Attachments A, B, and C, or (2) if compliance 
with any of the requirements is unnecessary in its specific 
circumstances. The notification shall provide the Licensee's 
justification for seeking relief from or variation of any 
specific requirement.
 
Licensee responses to C.1., C.2., and C.3. above shall be 
submitted to the Director, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and 
Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 
20555. In addition, Licensee responses shall be marked as 
``Security-Related Information-- Withhold Under 10 CFR 2.390.'' 
The Director, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, 
may, in writing, relax or rescind any of the above conditions, on 
demonstration of good cause by the Licensee.
 
IV In accordance with 10 CFR 2.202, the Licensee must, and any 
other person adversely affected by this Order may, submit an 
answer to this Order, and may request a hearing on this Order, 
within twenty (20) days of the date of this Order. Where good 
cause is shown, consideration will be given to extending the time 
to request a hearing. A request for extension of time in which to 
submit an answer or request a hearing must be made in writing to 
the Director, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, 
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, and 
include a statement of good cause for the extension. The answer 
may consent to this Order. Unless the answer consents to this 
Order, the answer shall, in writing and under oath or 
affirmation, specifically set forth the matters of fact and law 
on which the Licensee or other person adversely affected relies, 
and the reasons as to why the Order should not have been issued. 
Any answer or request for a hearing shall be submitted to the 
Secretary, Office of the Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, ATTN: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff, 
Washington, DC 20555. Copies also shall be sent to the Director, 
Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555; to the Assistant 
General Counsel for Materials Litigation and Enforcement, at the 
same address; and to the Licensee, if the answer or hearing 
request is by a person other than the Licensee. Because of 
possible delays in delivery of mail to United States Government 
offices, it is requested that answers and requests for hearing be 
transmitted to the Secretary of the Commission, either by means 
of facsimile transmission, to 301-415-1101, or by e- mail, to ; 
and also to the Office of the General Counsel, either by means of 
facsimile transmission, to 301-415-3725, or by e-mail, to . If a 
person other than the Licensee requests a hearing, that person 
shall set forth with particularity the manner in which their 
interest is adversely affected by this Order and shall address 
the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 2.309. If a hearing is requested 
by the Licensee or a person whose interest is adversely affected, 
the Commission will issue an Order designating the time and place 
of any hearing. If a hearing is held, the issue to be considered 
at such hearing shall be whether this Order should be sustained.
 
Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.202(c)(2)(i), the Licensee may, in addition 
to demanding a hearing, at the time the answer is filed or 
sooner, move the presiding officer to set aside the immediate 
effectiveness of the Order on the grounds that the Order, 
including the need for immediate effectiveness, is not based on 
adequate evidence, but on mere suspicion, unfounded allegations, 
or error. In the absence of any request for hearing, or written 
approval of an extension of time in which to request a hearing, 
the provisions specified in Section III above shall be final 
twenty (20) days from the date of this Order, without further 
order or proceedings. If an extension of time for requesting a 
hearing has been approved, the provisions specified in Section 
III shall be final when the extension expires, if a hearing 
request has not been received. AN ANSWER OR A REQUEST FOR HEARING 
SHALL NOT STAY THE IMMEDIATE EFFECTIVENESS OF THIS ORDER.
 
Dated this 4th day of October 2006.
 
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
 
Jack R. Strosnider, Director, Office of Nuclear Material Safety 
and Safeguards.
 
Attachment A--Modified Handling Requirements for the Protection 
of Certain Safeguards Information (SGI-M) General Requirement 
Information and material that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC) determines are safeguards information must be 
protected from unauthorized disclosure. In order to distinguish 
information needing modified protection requirements from the 
safeguards information for reactors and fuel cycle facilities 
that require a higher level of protection, the term ``Safeguards 
Information--Modified Handling'' (SGI-M) is being used as the 
distinguishing marking for certain materials licensees. Each 
person who produces, receives, or acquires SGI-M shall ensure 
that it is protected against unauthorized disclosure. To meet 
this requirement, licensees and persons shall establish and 
maintain an information protection system that includes the 
measures specified below. Information protection procedures 
employed by state and local police forces are deemed to meet 
these requirements.
 
Persons Subject to These Requirements Any person, whether or not 
a licensee of the NRC, who produces, receives, or acquires SGI-M 
is subject to the requirements (and sanctions) of this document. 
Firms and their employees that supply services or equipment to 
materials licensees fall under this requirement if they possess 
SGI-M. A licensee must inform contractors and suppliers of the 
existence of these requirements and the need for proper 
protection. (See more under Conditions for Access).
 
State or local police units who have access to SGI-M are also 
subject to these requirements. However, these organizations are 
deemed to have adequate information protection systems. The 
conditions for transfer of information to a third party, i.e., 
need- to-know, would still apply to the police organization as 
would sanctions for unlawful disclosure. Again, it would be 
prudent for licensees who have arrangements with local police to 
advise them of the existence of SGI-M requirements.
 
Criminal and Civil Sanctions The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as 
amended, explicitly provides that any person, ``whether or not a 
licensee of the Commission, who violates any regulations adopted 
under this section shall be subject to the civil monetary 
penalties of section 234 of this Act.'' Furthermore, willful 
violation of any regulation or order governing safeguards 
information is a felony subject to criminal penalties in the form 
of fines or imprisonment, or both. See sections 147b. and 223 of 
the Act.
 
Conditions for Access Access to SGI-M beyond the initial 
recipients of the order will be governed by
 
[[Page 62321]] the background check requirements imposed by the 
order. Access to SGI-M by licensee employees, agents, or 
contractors must include both an appropriate need-to-know 
determination by the licensee, as well as a determination 
concerning the trustworthiness of individuals having access to 
the information. Employees of an organization affiliated with the 
licensee's company, e.g., a parent company, may be considered as 
employees of the licensee for access purposes.
 
Need-To-Know Need-to-know is defined as a determination by a 
person having responsibility for protecting SGI-M that a proposed 
recipient's access to SGI-M is necessary in the performance of 
official, contractual, or licensee duties of employment. The 
recipient must be made aware that the information is SGI-M and 
those having access to it are subject to these requirements as 
well as criminal and civil sanctions for mishandling the 
information.
 
Occupational Groups Dissemination of SGI-M is limited to 
individuals who have an established need-to-know and who are 
members of certain occupational groups. These occupational groups 
are: 1. An employee, agent, or contractor of an applicant, a 
licensee, the Commission, or the United States Government; 2. A 
member of a duly authorized committee of the Congress; 3. The 
Governor of a State or his designated representative; 4. A 
representative of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
engaged in activities associated with the U.S./IAEA Safeguards 
Agreement who has been certified by the NRC; 5. A member of a 
state or local law enforcement authority that is responsible for 
responding to requests for assistance during safeguards 
emergencies; 6. A person to whom disclosure is ordered pursuant 
to section 2.744(e) of part 2 of part 10 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations; or 7. State Radiation Control Program Directors (and 
State Homeland Security Directors) or their designees.
 
In a generic sense, the individuals described above in (A) 
through (G) are considered to be trustworthy by virtue of their 
employment status. For non-governmental individuals in group (A) 
above, a determination of reliability and trustworthiness is 
required. Discretion must be exercised in granting access to the 
individuals in group (A). If there is any indication that the 
recipient would be unwilling or unable to provide proper 
protection for the SGI-M, they are not authorized to receive 
SGI-M.
 
Information Considered for Safeguards Information Designation 
Information deemed SGI-M is information the disclosure of which 
could reasonably be expected to have a significant adverse effect 
on the health and safety of the public or the common defense and 
security by significantly increasing the likelihood of theft, 
diversion, or sabotage of materials or facilities subject to NRC 
jurisdiction.
 
SGI-M identifies safeguards information which is subject to these 
requirements. These requirements are necessary in order to 
protect quantities of nuclear material significant to the health 
and safety of the public or common defense and security.
 
The overall measure for consideration of SGI-M is the usefulness 
of the information (security or otherwise) to an adversary in 
planning or attempting a malevolent act. The specificity of the 
information increases the likelihood that it will be useful to an 
adversary.
 
Protection While in Use While in use, SGI-M shall be under the 
control of an authorized individual. This requirement is 
satisfied if the SGI-M is attended by an authorized individual 
even though the information is in fact not constantly being used. 
SGI-M, therefore, within alarm stations, continuously manned 
guard posts or ready rooms need not be locked in file drawers or 
storage containers.
 
Under certain conditions the general control exercised over 
security zones or areas would be considered to meet this 
requirement. The primary consideration is limiting access to 
those who have a need-to-know. Some examples would be: Alarm 
stations, guard posts and guard ready rooms; Engineering or 
drafting areas if visitors are escorted and information is not 
clearly visible; Plant maintenance areas if access is restricted 
and information is not clearly visible; Administrative offices 
(e.g., central records or purchasing) if visitors are escorted 
and information is not clearly visible; Protection While in 
Storage While unattended, SGI-M shall be stored in a locked file 
drawer or container. Knowledge of lock combinations or access to 
keys protecting SGI-M shall be limited to a minimum number of 
personnel for operating purposes who have a ``need-to-know'' and 
are otherwise authorized access to SGI-M in accordance with these 
requirements. Access to lock combinations or keys shall be 
strictly controlled so as to prevent disclosure to an 
unauthorized individual.
 
Transportation of Documents and Other Matter Documents containing 
SGI-M when transmitted outside an authorized place of use or 
storage shall be enclosed in two sealed envelopes or wrappers. 
The inner envelope or wrapper shall contain the name and address 
of the intended recipient, and be marked both sides, top and 
bottom with the words ``Safeguards Information-- Modified 
Handling.'' The outer envelope or wrapper must be addressed to 
the intended recipient, must contain the address of the sender, 
and must not bear any markings or indication that the document 
contains SGI-M.
 
SGI-M may be transported by any commercial delivery company that 
provides nation-wide overnight service with computer tracking 
features, U.S. first class, registered, express, or certified 
mail, or by any individual authorized access pursuant to these 
requirements.
 
Within a facility, SGI-M may be transmitted using a single opague 
envelope. It may also be transmitted within a facility without 
single or double wrapping, provided adequate measures are taken 
to protect the material against unauthorized disclosure. 
Individuals transporting SGI-M should retain the documents in 
their personal possession at all times or ensure that the 
information is appropriately wrapped and also secured to preclude 
compromise by an unauthorized individual.
 
Preparation and Marking of Documents While the NRC is the sole 
authority for determining what specific information may be 
designated as ``SGI-M,'' originators of documents are responsible 
for determining whether those documents contain such information. 
Each document or other matter that contains SGI-M shall be marked 
``Safeguards Information--Modified Handling'' in a conspicuous 
manner on the top and bottom of the first page to indicate the 
presence of protected information.
 
The first page of the document must also contain (i) the name, 
title, and organization of the individual authorized to make a 
SGI-M determination, and who has determined that the document 
contains SGI-M, (ii) the date the document was originated or the 
determination made, (iii) an indication that the document 
contains SGI-M, and (iv) an indication that unauthorized 
disclosure would be subject to civil and criminal sanctions. Each 
additional page shall be marked in a conspicuous fashion at the 
top and bottom with letters denoting ``Safeguards 
Information--Modified Handling.'' In additional to the 
``Safeguards Information--Modified Handling'' markings at the top 
and bottom of page, transmittal letters or memoranda which do not 
in themselves contain SGI-M shall be marked to indicate that 
attachments or enclosures contain SGI-M but that the transmittal 
does not (e.g., ``When separated from SGI-M enclosure(s), this 
document is decontrolled'').
 
In addition to the information required on the face of the 
document, each item of correspondence that contains SGI-M shall, 
by marking or other means, clearly indicate which portions (e.g., 
paragraphs, pages, or appendices) contain SGI-M and which do not. 
Portion marking is not required for physical security and 
safeguards contingency plans.
 
All documents or other matter containing SGI-M in use or storage 
shall be marked in accordance with these requirements. A specific 
exception is provided for documents in the possession of 
contractors and agents of licensees that were produced more than 
one year prior to the effective date of the order. Such documents 
need not be marked unless they are removed from file drawers or 
containers.
 
The same exception applies to old documents stored away from the 
facility in central files or corporation headquarters.
 
Since information protection procedures employed by state and 
local police forces are deemed to meet NRC requirements, 
documents in the possession of these
 
[[Page 62322]] agencies need not be marked as set forth in this 
document.
 
Removal From SGI-M Category Documents containing SGI-M shall be 
removed from the SGI-M category (decontrolled) only after the NRC 
determines that the information no longer meets the criteria of 
SGI-M. Licensees have the authority to make determinations that 
specific documents which they created no longer contain SGI-M 
information and may be decontrolled. Consideration must be 
exercised to ensure that any document decontrolled shall not 
disclose SGI-M in some other form or be combined with other 
unprotected information to disclose SGI-M.
 
The authority to determine that a document may be decontrolled 
may be exercised only by, or with the permission of, the 
individual (or office) who made the original determination. The 
document shall indicate the name and organization of the 
individual removing the document from the SGI-M category and the 
date of the removal.
 
Other persons who have the document in their possession should be 
notified of the decontrolling of the document.
 
Reproduction of Matter Containing SGI-M SGI-M may be reproduced 
to the minimum extent necessary consistent with need without 
permission of the originator. Newer digital copiers which scan 
and retain images of documents represent a potential security 
concern. If the copier is retaining any information in memory, 
the copier cannot be connected to a network. It should also be 
placed in a location that is cleared and controlled for the 
authorized processing of SGI-M information. Different copiers 
have different capabilities, including some which come with 
features that allow the memory to be erased. Each copier would 
have to be examined from a physical security perspective.
 
Use of Automatic Data Processing (ADP) Systems SGI-M may be 
processed or produced on an ADP system provided that the system 
is assigned to the licensee's or contractor's facility and 
requires the use of an entry code/password for access to stored 
information. Licensees must process this information in a 
computing environment that has adequate computer security 
controls in place to prevent unauthorized access to the 
information. An ADP system is defined here as a data processing 
system having the capability of long term storage of information. 
Word processors such as typewriters are not subject to the 
requirements as long as they do not transmit information 
off-site. (Note: If SGI-M is produced on a typewriter, the ribbon 
must be removed and stored in the same manner as other SGI-M 
information or media.) The basic objective of these restrictions 
is to prevent access and retrieval of stored SGI- M by 
unauthorized individuals, particularly from remote terminals. 
Specific files containing SGI-M will be password protected to 
preclude access by an unauthorized individual. SGI-M files may be 
transmitted over a network if the file is encrypted. In such 
cases, the licensee will select a commercially available 
encryption system that National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) has validated as conforming to Federal 
Information Processing Standards (FIPS). SGI-M files shall be 
properly labeled as ``Safeguards Information--Modified Handling'' 
and saved to removable media and stored in a locked file drawer 
or cabinet. The NIST maintains a listing of all validated 
encryption systems at .
 
Telecommunications SGI-M may not be transmitted by unprotected 
telecommunications circuits except under emergency or 
extraordinary conditions. For the purpose of this requirement, 
emergency or extraordinary conditions are defined as any 
circumstances that require immediate communications in order to 
report, summon assistance for, or respond to a security event (or 
an event that has potential security significance).
 
This restriction applies to telephone, telegraph, teletype, 
facsimile circuits, and to radio. Routine telephone or radio 
transmission between site security personnel, or between the site 
and local police, should be limited to message formats or codes 
that do not disclose facility security features or response 
procedures. Similarly, call-ins during transport should not 
disclose information useful to a potential adversary. Infrequent 
or non-repetitive telephone conversations regarding a physical 
security plan or program are permitted provided that the 
discussion is general in nature.
 
Individuals should use care when discussing SGI-M at meetings or 
in the presence of others to ensure that the conversation is not 
overheard by persons not authorized access. Transcripts, tapes or 
minutes of meetings or hearings that contain SGI-M shall be 
marked and protected in accordance with these requirements.
 
Destruction Documents containing SGI-M must be destroyed when no 
longer needed. They may be destroyed by tearing into small 
pieces, burning, shredding or any other method that precludes 
reconstruction by means available to the public at large. Piece 
sizes one half inch or smaller composed of several pages or 
documents and thoroughly mixed are considered completely 
destroyed.
 
Attachment B--Trustworthiness and Reliability Requirements for 
Individuals Handling Safeguards Information Licensees shall 
document the basis for concluding that there is reasonable 
assurance that individuals granted access to safeguards 
information are trustworthy and reliable, and do not constitute 
an unreasonable risk for malevolent use of the regulated 
material.
 
The trustworthiness, reliability, and verification of an 
individual's true identity shall be determined based on a 
background investigation. The background investigation shall 
address at least the past three (3) years, and, as a minimum, 
include a Federal Bureau of Investigation fingerprinting and 
criminal history check, verification of employment history, 
education, employment eligibility, credit check, and personal 
references. If an individual's employment has been less than the 
required three (3) year period, educational references may be 
used in lieu of employment history.
 
The licensee's background investigation requirements may be 
satisfied for an individual that has an active Federal security 
clearance.
 
Attachment C--Requirements for Fingerprinting and Criminal 
History Checks of Individuals When Licensee's Reviewing Official 
Is Determining Access to Safeguards Information General 
Requirements Licensees shall comply with the requirements of this 
attachment.
 
1. a. Each Licensee subject to the provisions of this attachment 
shall fingerprint each individual who is seeking or permitted 
access to Safeguards Information (SGI). The Licensee shall review 
and use the information received from the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) and ensure that the provisions contained in 
the subject Order and this attachment are satisfied.
 
b. The Licensee shall notify each affected individual that the 
fingerprints will be used to secure a review of his/her criminal 
history record and inform the individual of the procedures for 
revising the record or including an explanation in the record, as 
specified in the ``Right to Correct and Complete Information'' 
section of this attachment.
 
c. Fingerprints need not be taken if an employed individual 
(e.g., a Licensee employee, contractor, manufacturer, or 
supplier) is relieved from the fingerprinting requirement by 10 
CFR 73.59, has a favorably-decided U.S. Government criminal 
history check within the last five (5) years, or has an active 
Federal security clearance. Written confirmation from the 
Agency/employer which granted the Federal security clearance or 
reviewed the criminal history check must be provided. The 
Licensee must retain this documentation for a period of three (3) 
years from the date the individual no longer requires access to 
SGI associated with the Licensee's activities.
 
d. All fingerprints obtained by the Licensee pursuant to this 
Order must be submitted to the Commission for transmission to the 
FBI.
 
e. The Licensee shall review the information received from the 
FBI and consider it, in conjunction with the trustworthy and 
reliability requirements, in making a determination whether to 
grant access to Safeguards Information to individuals who have a 
need-to- know the SGI.
 
f. The Licensee shall use any information obtained as part of a 
criminal history records check solely for the purpose of 
determining an individual's suitability for access to Safeguards 
Information.
 
g. The Licensee shall document the basis for its determination 
whether to grant access to SGI.
 
2. The Licensee shall notify the NRC of any desired change in 
reviewing officials. The NRC will determine whether the 
individual
 
[[Page 62323]] nominated as the new reviewing official may have 
access to Safeguards Information based on a previously-obtained 
or new criminal history check and, therefore, will be permitted 
to serve as the Licensee's reviewing official.
 
Prohibitions A Licensee shall not base a final determination to 
deny an individual access to Safeguards Information solely on the 
basis of information received from the FBI involving: an arrest 
more than one (1) year old for which there is no information of 
the disposition of the case, or an arrest that resulted in 
dismissal of the charge or an acquittal.
 
A Licensee shall not use information received from a criminal 
history check obtained pursuant to this Order in a manner that 
would infringe upon the rights of any individual under the First 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, nor shall the 
Licensee use the information in any way which would discriminate 
among individuals on the basis of race, religion, national 
origin, sex, or age.
 
Procedures for Processing Fingerprint Checks For the purpose of 
complying with this Order, Licensees shall, using an appropriate 
method listed in 10 CFR 73.4, submit to the NRC's Division of 
Facilities and Security, Mail Stop T-6E46, one completed, legible 
standard fingerprint card (Form FD-258, ORIMDNRCOOOZ) or, where 
practicable, other fingerprint records for each individual 
seeking access to Safeguards Information, to the Director of the 
Division of Facilities and Security, marked for the attention of 
the Division's Criminal History Check Section.
 
Copies of these forms may be obtained by writing the Office of 
Information Services, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555- 0001, by calling (301) 415-5877, or by 
e-mail to . Practicable alternative formats are set forth in 10 
CFR 73.4. The Licensee shall establish procedures to ensure that 
the quality of the fingerprints taken results in minimizing the 
rejection rate of fingerprint cards due to illegible or 
incomplete cards.
 
The NRC will review submitted fingerprint cards for completeness. 
Any Form FD-258 fingerprint record containing omissions or 
evident errors will be returned to the Licensee for corrections. 
The fee for processing fingerprint checks includes one 
re-submission if the initial submission is returned by the FBI 
because the fingerprint impressions cannot be classified. The one 
free re-submission must have the FBI Transaction Control Number 
reflected on the re-submission. If additional submissions are 
necessary, they will be treated as initial submittals and will 
require a second payment of the processing fee.
 
Fees for processing fingerprint checks are due upon application. 
Licensees shall submit payment with the application for 
processing fingerprints by corporate check, certified check, 
cashier's check, money order, or electronic payment, made payable 
to ``U.S. NRC.'' [For guidance on making electronic payments, 
contact the Facilities Security Branch, Division of Facilities 
and Security, at (301) 415- 7739]. Combined payment for multiple 
applications is acceptable. The application fee (currently $27) 
is the sum of the user fee charged by the FBI for each 
fingerprint card or other fingerprint record submitted by the NRC 
on behalf of a Licensee, and an NRC processing fee, which covers 
administrative costs associated with NRC handling of Licensee 
fingerprint submissions. The Commission will directly notify 
Licensees who are subject to this regulation of any fee changes.
 
The Commission will forward to the submitting Licensee all data 
received from the FBI as a result of the Licensee's 
application(s) for criminal history checks, including the FBI 
fingerprint record.
 
Right To Correct and Complete Information Prior to any final 
adverse determination, the Licensee shall make available to the 
individual the contents of any criminal records obtained from the 
FBI for the purpose of assuring correct and complete information. 
Written confirmation by the individual of receipt of this 
notification must be maintained by the Licensee for a period of 
one (1) year from the date of the notification. If, after 
reviewing the record, an individual believes that it is incorrect 
or incomplete in any respect and wishes to change, correct, or 
update the alleged deficiency, or to explain any matter in the 
record, the individual may initiate challenge procedures. These 
procedures include either direct application by the individual 
challenging the record to the agency (i.e., law enforcement 
agency) that contributed the questioned information, or direct 
challenge as to the accuracy or completeness of any entry on the 
criminal history record to the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau 
of Investigation Identification Division, Washington, DC 
20537-9700 (as set forth in 28 CFR 16.30 through 16.34). In the 
latter case, the FBI forwards the challenge to the agency that 
submitted the data and requests that agency to verify or correct 
the challenged entry. Upon receipt of an official communication 
directly from the agency that contributed the original 
information, the FBI Identification Division makes any changes 
necessary in accordance with the information supplied by that 
agency. The Licensee must provide at least ten (10) days for an 
individual to initiate an action challenging the results of an 
FBI criminal history records check after the record is made 
available for his/her review. The Licensee may make a final SGI 
access determination based upon the criminal history record only 
upon receipt of the FBI's ultimate confirmation or correction of 
the record. Upon a final adverse determination on access to SGI, 
the Licensee shall provide the individual its documented basis 
for denial. Access to SGI shall not be granted to an individual 
during the review process.
 
Protection of Information 1. Each Licensee who obtains a criminal 
history record on an individual pursuant to this Order shall 
establish and maintain a system of files and procedures for 
protecting the record and the personal information from 
unauthorized disclosure.
 
2. The Licensee may not disclose the record or personal 
information collected and maintained to persons other than the 
subject individual, his/her representative, or to those who have 
a need to access the information in performing assigned duties in 
the process of determining access to Safeguards Information. No 
individual authorized to have access to the information may re- 
disseminate the information to any other individual who does not 
have a need-to-know.
 
3. The personal information obtained on an individual from a 
criminal history record check may be transferred to another 
Licensee if the Licensee holding the criminal history check 
record receives the individuals' written request to 
re-disseminate the information contained in his/her file, and the 
gaining Licensee verifies information such as the individual's 
name, date of birth, social security number, sex, and other 
applicable physical characteristics for identification purposes.
 
4. The Licensee shall make criminal history records, obtained 
under this section, available for examination by an authorized 
representative of the NRC to determine compliance with the 
regulations and laws.
 
5. The Licensee shall retain all fingerprint and criminal history 
records received from the FBI, or a copy if the individual's file 
has been transferred, for three (3) years after termination of 
employment or denial of access to SGI. After the required three 
(3) year period, these documents shall be destroyed by a method 
that will prevent reconstruction of the information in whole or 
in part.
 
[FR Doc. E6-17752 Filed 10-23-06; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590-01-P

 
*****************************************************************
 46 FT.com Wanted: willing hosts for nuclear dump

By Christopher Adams, Political Correspondent

Published: October 24 2006 22:37 | Last updated: October 24 2006
22:37

Towns, cities and villages are to be granted the dubious
privilege of volunteering to play host to a pile of nuclear
waste in a deep underground bunker, with the government expected
on Wednesday to back plans for disposal far underground.

In return, the lucky winner will be offered inducements
including investment in local transport infrastructure and their
social fabric.
[Advertisement] 
David Miliband, the environment secretary, will endorse
proposals by an independentÂ committee of experts to store and
then bury radioactive waste from the countryâ€™s ageing fleet of
civil nuclear plants in a bunker up to 1km below ground.

The repository, which could cost over Â£10bn, is also expected
to take waste from any reactors built by the private sector.

The issue of what to do with nuclear waste is the biggest
question arising from Tony Blairâ€™s energy review. 

Wednesdayâ€™s decision will herald the start of what, if
successful, looks likely to be the lengthiest and most expensive
construction project in modern UK history. Senior insiders are
predicting completion in 40 years. The bunker would house
470,000 cubic metres of waste produced by reactors, experiments
and military activities since the 1940s.

 The Nuclear Decommissioning Authority, charged with handling
the countryâ€™s Â£70bn nuclear clean-up programme, will begin a
long period of public consultation on the plans, which are
likely to be contentious. It will ask communities to volunteer
to accept the repository on their doorstep. 

In a separate development the government said it planned to
break up the sale of British Nuclear Group, the clean-up unit of
British Nuclear Fuels, a move that could enhance proceeds for
the exchequer. 

The Financial Times Limited 2006

  + Â© Copyright 2006. "FT" and "Financial Times" are trademarks
*****************************************************************
 47 Hemscott: UK Government splits Sellafield sale from other parts of British
Nuclear Group

LONDON (AFX) - The UK Secretary of State for Trade and Industry,
Alistair Darling, has confirmed that British Nuclear Group would
be sold off in separate parts rather than in one block.

Darling said today that after meeting with the companies, unions
and specialists affected, he had decided to separate its main
asset, the contract to manage the decommissioning of Sellafield
in Cumbria, from BNG's project services and its contracts to
operate the remaining, older Magnox nuclear power stations.

'I have given the sale of BNG careful consideration and I have
met with interested parties,' said Darling. 'I have concluded
that there are real benefits to the Project Services and the
Magnox businesses in separating them from the process of
choosing the right contractor for Sellafield.''I also believe
that the best way of securing the right contractor for
Sellafield is to proceed with a separate competition with the
full focus on what is best at that site,' Darling continued.
'That process will be run by the NDA, and the criteria it is
setting will include, first-rate health, safety, security and
environmental performance, and effectiveness as a contractor.'

The government will also establish a new National Nuclear
Laboratory, to be formed out of the British Technology Centre at
Sellafield and Nexia Solutions, the research company currently
owned by BNFL. george.hay@afxnews.com gh/rar

COPYRIGHT

Copyright AFX News Limited 2006. All rights reserved. The
copying, republication or redistribution of AFX News Content,
including by framing or similar means, is expressly prohibited
without the prior written consent of AFX News.

AFX News and AFX Financial News Logo are registered trademarks
of AFX News Limited Hemscott PLC - Serious Investment Research [
src=] Hemscott PLC - Serious Investment Research 
Tools:

Copyright 2006 Hemscott Group Limited.
Hemscott is the UK registered trademark of Hemscott Group
Limited.
*****************************************************************
 48 CanWest: Ont. nuke waste plan poses Great Lakes risk, U.S. Democrat claims

April Lindgren, CanWest News Service
                
Published: Tuesday, October 24, 2006                                                                    

TORONTO - An American congressman is challenging Ontario's
controversial plan to bury nuclear waste in 38 gigantic, deep
rock caverns on Lake Huron.
 
''Given the location of this proposed project, there is the
potential for significant risk to the environment of the Lake
Huron region,'' Michigan Democrat Bart Stupak said in a letter
sent last week to the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission.
 
The plan, by Ontario Power Generation, to build North America's
first deep rock nuclear waste storage facility at the Bruce
nuclear plant in picturesque Kincardine, Ont., includes digging
660 metres down into limestone and carving out 38 caverns, each
as long as a football field, up to eight metres wide and 6.6
metres high.
 
The commission will decide how extensive the environmental
assessment of the project, which would bury tonnes of low and
intermediate nuclear waste, will be following a day-long hearing
held Monday in Kincardine.
 
While commission staff have recommended that CNSC commissioners
oversee what's called a comprehensive review, environmental
groups attending Monday's hearing urged that it be bumped up
into a panel review where independent, outside commissioners are
appointed to hear both testimony and cross examinations.
 
''I'm hoping for the best but I expect the worst,'' Dave Martin,
energy co-ordinator for Greenpeace, said in an interview from
Kincardine. ''The CNSC has never supported a bump up. They've
been more of a lap dog than a watch dog for the nuclear
industry.''
 
Ontario Energy Minister Dwight Duncan rejected Stupak's
concerns, noting the Americans have their own nuclear plants on
the shores of the Great Lakes.
 
''The last time I sat out for a barbecue, I looked at Fermi 1
and Fermi 2 (across from Amherstburg, Ont.),'' he said. ''They
are nuclear reactors with everything that goes with them.''
 
Duncan also rejected NDP legislature member Peter Tabuns' call
for Ontario to hold its own environmental assessment of the
proposal.
 
''Our position is that this (the Bruce plan) is going through a
regulatory undertaking now by the federal government and that is
the appropriate place for it to be done.''
 
Stupak, the author of legislation that banned underwater oil and
gas drilling in the Great Lakes, said Duncan was muddying the
waters with his comments about American nuclear plants.
 
''We don't put our nuclear waste in repositories on the Great
Lakes,'' he retorted in an interview.
 
''If we are going to do one in this country it is in Nevada. You
can have nuclear power, you can build these plants and you can
be very responsible for the environment. I think a repository
less than a mile from the Great Lakes is not a responsible way
to take care of nuclear waste.''
 
Stupak said he also wrote to the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency and the International Joint Commission on the Great Lakes
on Monday asking if they were aware of Ontario's proposal and
what the two agencies plan to do about it.
 
In Ontario, each nuclear plant is responsible for storing its
own high-level nuclear waste, consisting mostly of used nuclear
fuel. But since 1974, low and intermediate level waste from all
of the province's reactors have been stored at the Bruce site.

Low-level waste, made up of minimally radioactive materials such 
as mop heads, protective clothing and floor sweepings, is placed 
in above ground concrete warehouse-type structures.

Intermediate-level waste, such as used reactor components, resins 
and filters, are stored mainly in steel-lined concrete containers 
that have been set into the ground.

OPG's planning for the repository calls for the launch of an 
environmental assessment by 2007 and completion of that process 
by 2010. The CNSC would then be asked to issue the necessary 
licences so that construction could begin by 2013. The goal is to 
begin storing waste in the caverns beginning in 2017.

Officials in Kincardine and four nearby communities say the polls 
show the majority of residents support OPG's plan for the new 
repository.

But critics point out the utility has committed to pay the 
municipalities $35.7 million over the next 30 years for the right 
to build the storage facility and describe the cash as ''hush 
money'' aimed at silencing opponents. The 20-page agreement 
between the municipalities and the provincially owned power 
generator states early on that payments to the communities can be 
halted if any or all of them ''have failed to exercise best 
efforts to support the construction of (the) deep geologic 
repository.''

William Fyfe, a retired University of Western Ontario professor 
who is Canada's foremost earth scientist and an international 
consultant on nuclear waste issue, is among those who has 
expressed concern about the project in the past.

''You do not put nuclear waste near things like the Great Lakes 
or the great rivers in case there's a leakage that you haven't 
expected,'' he told CanWest News Service 18 months ago.

''The earth changes ... and nuclear waste is dangerous for at 
least one million years.

''It wasn't that many thousands of years ago when we had ice on 
top of southern Ontario. That could happen again and when that 
happens, you get all sorts of new cracks and things formed.''

Fyfe, who has been a consultant to both Switzerland and Sweden on 
nuclear waste, said it should be buried in areas where naturally 
occurring materials that are easily corroded or soluble have 
survived unscathed for millions of years. This indicates the 
geology is stable.

''In Canada, we have a lot of these in old mining areas,'' he 
said, citing Sudbury as one example.

Fyfe said OPG should consult experts, including the Swedes who 
are burying their nuclear waste deep under the Baltic Sea, before 
pushing ahead with the Bruce project.

''They (the Swedes) are going underground more than a kilometre 
and if there ever was leakage, before the stuff gets into the 
sea, it has to go through a lot of clay sediments and things that 
accumulate from erosion on the ocean bottom that is very good at 
absorbing stuff. It is a perfect barrier.''
                                                

© 2006 CanWest Interactive, a division of CanWest
*****************************************************************
 49 canada.com: Cameco allows mine to flood

Cameco allows mine to flood

Mine abandoned Monday morning; all workers leave safely

Cigar Lake is the world's largest undeveloped uranium deposit.

Murray Lyons, The StarPhoenix

Published: Tuesday, October 24, 2006

The immediate future of a $12- billion uranium ore body in
northern Saskatchewan has been put in doubt, after efforts to
contain a fl ood at the Cigar Lake mine failed Monday morning.
 
Mine engineers from Cameco Corp. were unable to get one of the
mine's huge bulkhead doors to seal properly and stem the fl ow
of water that had been pouring in at a rate of 1,500 cubic
metres an hour since Sunday afternoon. On Monday, the decision
was made to do an orderly evacuation of the mine and let ll with
water.
 
All of the workers were able to safely leave the mine, which is
located more than 600 kilometres north of Saskatoon.
 
Early indications are that the company will continue to do some
construction work at the surface on the assumption the mine can
be remediated and put into operation. How employment will be
affected has not been determined.
 
There were 26 people directly employed in the mine's underground
works at the time of the fl ood, according to company offi -
cials.
 
On Sunday, the water began entering the mine when a section of
development tunnel gave way. The rock fall allowed water to pour
in under pressure from an adjacent sandstone formation about 450
metres below surface.
 
The tunnel work at Cigar Lake, located below the uranium ore
body, is built through generally stable "basement" granite.
However, the development tunnels at Cigar Lake are usually only
a short distance away from the water-logged sandstone that
exerts water pressure as great as ocean water at the same depth.
Cameco offi cials estimate the part of the tunnel that gave way
was only 11 metres away from the highly porous sandstone.
 
Cameco gave the order to abandon the mine at 11:30 a.m. on
Monday, less than 90 minutes after company executives talked
with analysts about their hopes that the bulkhead doors would
contain the water in the mine as they were designed to do.
 
Instead, the failure of the gasket within the giant doors, plus
the lack of pumping capacity to keep up with the inflow,
resulted in the decision to abandon the mine and let it fl ood.
 
In the past two years, Cameco and the mine's other three owners
have spent more than a half billion dollars developing Cigar
Lake, a high-grade deposit that was fi rst discovered in 1978.
 
Abandoning the mine for now means giving up any hope the mine
will start producing high-grade uranium ore by the most recent
projection of early 2008. The mine's operators had hoped to
increase production steadily in the following years as the
company learned to employ a method of production using
high-pressure water jets to extract the ore and pump it to the
surface in a slurry.
 
Pieces of expensive mining equipment that were to be used in the
process are now either under water or soon will be.
 
At one point on Monday morning, Cameco offi cials were talking
about only a year's delay when it appeared the fl ooding might
be contained by the bulkhead doors to just a single section of
the mine. Following the failure of the doors to seal, Cameco
president and CEO Jerry Grandey told analysts and media that no
timetable to repair the damage can be produced until the company
comes up with a plan on how to pump out the mine from surface
and get down to the area that failed and close up the leak.
                                       
"At this point of time, we have no estimate, not even an educated 
guess," he said.

A fi nancial analyst wondered if the fl ood puts into question 
the entire plan to mine a deposit that contains 230 million 
pounds of proven uranium which, at current market prices of $55 
US a pound, gives Cigar Lake a theoretical asset value of at 
least $12 billion.

"It's a question that will be looked at over the next little 
while," Grandey said. "We know the ore body is there and we 
understand it's extraordinarily high grade and we understand a 
good bit of the infrastructure is there and may require modifi 
cations in approach.

"I can't imagine an alternative does not exist to mine this 
thing. We've got some very creative people." As the failure of 
the fl ood containment plan became evident, Cameco asked that 
trading in its stock be suspended while it updated the investment 
community on the decision to abandon the mine. Even by that time, 
Cameco shares had already fallen more than nine per cent, or 
$3.93, on trading of 4.8 million shares. After trading resumed, 
the sell-off slowed down, with Cameco stock ending the day down 
$4 at $38.95, with total trading Monday involving just over 5.5 
million shares.

In the second of two conference calls on Monday, Grandey said 
there is virtually no insurance to cover what happened during the 
past two days at Cigar Lake.

As well, the company is not yet in a position where it has 
regulatory approval to pump the mine out once they get adequate 
pumping capacity in place at the surface. Pumps that were placed 
into the mine's underground workings, but are not yet hooked up, 
will be among the pieces of equipment going under water.

As well, the water treatment plant at the surface of Cigar Lake 
is just being completed. The company will have to receive 
environmental approvals to pump out and treat the volume of water 
entering the mine. Early indications are that the water coming in 
has not touched the high-grade uranium ore body and is not 
heavily contaminated, but Cameco will have to work out a 
contingency plan with both federal and provincial regulators on 
how much water can be pumped out and how it must be handled.

"Early indications we had were that the water was relatively 
clean," Grandey said. "Radium levels were low. Radon wouldn't be 
an issue.

It didn't appear to be in contact with the ore body." Cameco has 
experience with remediating a fl ooded mine, since a similar 
incident occurred at the McArthur River mine in early 2003. The 
mine was put back into production after about three months, but 
only part of the McArthur River works were fl ooded. Cameco offi 
cials say the infl ow at Cigar Lake is coming in at about twice 
the rate of the McArthur River fl ood.

It's not just Cameco Corp. that has expectations about Cigar 
Lake's production coming on stream later this decade. Cameco, the 
mine's operator, owns just over 50 per cent of the operation, 
while French nuclear giant Areva owns 37 per cent and two 
Japanese companies own eight and fi ve per cent respectively.

It's been almost 30 years since the Cigar Lake deposit was 
discovered. Regulatory approval for the mine's construction was 
given in December 2004, with original construction timelines 
predicting the fi rst production from the mine would have 
occurred 27 months later, or in the spring of 2007. However, a fl 
ood during construction of the mine's second ventilation shaft in 
April threw the construction schedule off by at least nine 
months.

mlyons@sp.canwest.com

Â© 2006 CanWest Interactive, a division of CanWest
*****************************************************************
 50 The Australian: Costello sees future for nuke power

This story is from our news.com.aunetwork Source: AAP 

 October 24, 2006 

A NUCLEAR power plant would be built in Australia as soon as it 
was commercially viable, federal Treasurer Peter Costello said 
today.
 
Mr Costello said nuclear energy was not viable yet but would be
at some point.
 
"I can't tell you what that time frame will be - I don't think
it'll be next year ... I don't think it'll be three years," he
said.
 
"Then you'll say to me `Will it be 10 years?' Maybe, possibly
not. 

"But in my view, yes, it will become commercial and when it
becomes commercial, someone will build it." 

The Government should not legislate to prevent companies from
investing in nuclear energy, Mr Costello said. 

"I think we should legislatively say, provided you meet all of
the requirements in relation to safety and export controls and
... environmental considerations, that there is no legislative
bar. And then I'd let the market work," he said. 

"The day it becomes commercial, someone will build it." 

The Government has commissioned former Telstra boss Ziggy
Switkowski to head a task force investigating whether a nuclear
energy industry would be viable in Australia. 

Labor opposes a nuclear power industry and has called on the
Government to nominate possible sites for a plant. 

© The Australian
*****************************************************************
 51 [NukeNet] New IG Report
 
Date: Tue, 24 Oct 2006 19:23:54 -0700

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NukeNet Anti-Nuclear Network (nukenet@energyjustice.net)

FYI


Remediation of the Waste Burial Grounds at the Hanford Site

DOE/IG-0743

Results

·       In the 1950's and 1960's, operations at the Department of Energy's 
Hanford, Washington Site generated large amounts of radioactive 
waste.  Hanford established waste burial grounds, designated as sites 
618-10 and 618-11, which received nuclear waste from fuel fabrication 
research and development activities during this period.

·       Based on historical information available about the origin of the 
waste, the burial grounds, which are approximately four miles from the 
Columbia River, may contain irradiated fuel fragments, contact and 
remote-handled transuranic waste, and low-level waste, including some 
hazardous mixed waste.  Radiation levels at the edge of the burial grounds 
have been found to have been 100 times the annual radiation dose limit per 
one hour of exposure.

·       In 2005, the Department awarded a "River Corridor" contract to, 
among other things, remediate the burial grounds at an estimated cost of 
$136 million; this goal was to be accomplished by 2012.  The objective of 
our audit was to determine if the Department had developed a comprehensive 
cleanup strategy for the remediation of the 618-10 and 618-11 burial 
grounds at the Hanford Site.

·       While the Department's intent is to fully remediate the 618-10 and 
the 618-11 burial grounds, the audit disclosed that its planned actions did 
not address all pertinent issues.  Specifically, we found that the 
Department's remediation strategy: 1) may produce a waste form or waste 
package that, in some cases, will not meet the Department's current 
acceptance criteria for interim storage or disposal; and, 2) did not 
reflect the cost to prepare the retrieved waste to meet waste acceptance 
criteria for storage or final disposal.

·       The audit showed that the Department had not fully addressed these 
issues in its planning process.  We found that it had not employed a 
"cradle to grave" approach to the remediation and disposal of waste in the 
618-10 and 618-11 burial grounds.  Specifically, the Department did not 
consider waste acceptance criteria for interim storage and final disposal 
in developing technologies to retrieve burial ground waste.  It also did 
not ensure that its retrieval strategy was based on accurate and complete 
waste characterization information.  Further, the Department did not ensure 
that it had an agreement with the River Corridor contractor that the scope 
of work for burial ground remediation included preparing the waste for 
interim storage or final disposal before entering into the contract.

·       As a result, the Department may incur up to $188 million more than 
planned to store, monitor and manage waste retrieved from the burial grounds.

Issues to Be Resolved

·       Management agreed with the recommendations and is proceeding with 
efforts to ensure that the solutions for remediating the burial grounds 
address the concerns presented in the report.  We consider management's 
comments to be responsive to our recommendations.

The report can be found on the web at: 
<http://www.ig.energy.gov/>http://www.ig.energy.gov

Judy Garland-Smith

Reports Manager

Department of Energy

Office of Inspector General




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 52 DOE: DOEs Rocky Flats Cleanup Site Named 2006 Project of the Year 
By Project Management Institute
 
  October 23, 2006
 
WASHINGTON, DC  The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) today
announced that the Project Management Institute (PMI) has
awarded its 2006 Project of the Year to DOEs Rocky Flats
Environmental Technology Site.  The award was presented to DOE
contractor Kaiser-Hill, LLC during the PMI Global Congress
Dinner 2006 on Saturday, October 21st, 2006 in Seattle,
Washington. 

It is a great honor for the Department of Energys Rocky Flats
safe cleanup and closure effort to be recognized with this
prestigious award, James Rispoli, Assistant Secretary of Energy
for Environmental Management.  As the largest DOE nuclear
weapons facility cleanup project completed to date, we are
applying what we learned at Rocky Flats to more than a dozen
other sites expected to safely close in the next three years. 

DOE and Kaiser-Hill successfully partnered in a 10-year effort
to complete the largest, most complex environmental cleanup
project in United States history and converted an environmental
liability into a community asset, completing the project nearly
fifty years and $30 billion below initial estimates.  The
majority of the 6,200-acre site will be transferred to the
Interior Department in the coming years and will become a
national wildlife refuge.  DOE has closed five sites including
Rocky Flats in Fiscal Year (FY) 2006 and is on track to safely
turnover an additional 12 between FY2007-FY2009. 

Kaiser-Hill performed a first-class job for the government, and
the public-private partnership between DOE and Kaiser-Hill paved
the way for our success, DOE Rocky Flats Project Office Manager
Frazer Lockhart said. We faced countless challenges on this
first-of-its-kind project and this award is a tribute our joint
efforts. 

A key element in the successful project was a unique,
incentive-driven contract between DOE and Kaiser-Hill that
rewarded schedule and cost savings while maintaining outstanding
safety and protection of human health and the environment. 

The Rocky Flats Closure Project was an enormous undertaking led
by DOE contractor Kaiser-Hill that included the following
accomplishments: 
  + Removed more than 21 tons of weapons-useable nuclear
materials 
  + Decontaminated and demolished 800 structures, comprising
more than 3 million square feet 
  + Drained 30,000 liters of plutonium solutions 
  + Dismantled and removed more than 1,450 contaminated
production glove boxes and 700 tanks 
  + Stabilized and packaged 100 tons of high-content plutonium
residue 
  + Performed environmental cleanup actions at 130 sites 
  + Dispositioned millions of classified items and excess
property 
  + Safely shipped more than 600,000 cubic meters of radioactive
waste  enough to fill a string of railcars 90 miles long 

The PMI Project of the Year is one of the worlds most
prestigious project management awards, which recognizes and
honors the accomplishments of the winning project team for
superior and exemplary project management.  With nearly 220,000
members in more than 150 countries, PMI is the leading
membership association for the project management profession. 
PMI is actively engaged in advocacy for the profession, setting
professional standards, conducting research and providing access
to a wealth of information and resources. 

Media contact(s): Megan Barnett, (202) 586-4940     [ ]   

  U.S. Department of Energy | 1000 Independence Ave., SW | 
Washington, DC 20585 1-800-dial-DOE | f/202-586-4403
   
*****************************************************************
 53 DOE: Secretary of Energy Announces Nearly $24 Million in Grants 
for Carbon Sequestration Research
 
  October 23, 2006
 
WASHINGTON, DC- Department of Energy (DOE) Secretary Samuel W.
Bodman today announced the selection of nine projects totaling
nearly $24 million aimed at developing novel and cost-effective
technologies to capture the carbon dioxide (CO2) produced in
coal-fired power plants so that it can be safely and permanently
sequestered.  Grant recipients will contribute nearly $8 million
in cost-sharing for the program. 

Carbon sequestration promises to significantly reduce Americas
greenhouse gas emissions even as our economy grows. This
combination helps protect the global climate, while promoting
job creation and a high standard of living, Secretary Bodman
said. The key to successful carbon sequestration is technology
development, including technologies to capture greenhouse gases
such as CO2 before they are released to the atmosphere. 

The projects support the Presidents Global Climate Change
Initiative, which calls for an 18 percent reduction in U.S.
greenhouse gas intensitythe ratio of greenhouse gas emissions
to economic outputby 18 percent by 2012. 

DOEs Energy Information Administration projects that fossil
fuels provide 85 percent of the worlds energy, a proportion the
will remain virtually unchanged over the next two and a half
decades as world energy consumption doubles. Even with advances
in energy efficiency and the switch to less carbon-intensive
fuels, the result is expected to be a significant increase in
greenhouse gas emissionsfrom 25,028 million metric tons in 2003
to 43,676 million metric tons in 2030 and the potential for
changes in the global climate. 

To reduce greenhouse gas emissions and control global climate
change, the Department of Energys Office of Fossil Energy has
established an aggressive Carbon Sequestration Program. One
aspect of the multifaceted program is the development of safe,
effective, low-cost carbon sequestration technologies, an effort
managed by the National Energy Technology Laboratory. 

Sequestration uses a variety of methods to remove greenhouse
gases from power plant emissions or the air itself, and securely
store those gases in geologic formations, soils and vegetation,
or in other environmentally safe forms. The newly selected
projects will focus on three pathways to CO2 capture: 
  + Pre-combustion, in which fuel is gasified to form a mixture
of hydrogen and CO2, called synthesis gas or syngas, and CO2
is captured from the syngas before it is combusted. 
  + Post-combustion, which involves capturing CO2 from flue gas
after fuel has been combusted in air. 
Oxycombustion, in which fuel is combusted in pure or nearly pure
oxygen rather than air, producing an exhaust mixture of CO2 and
water that can easily be processed to produce pure CO2. 

The projectswhich total more than $31 million, including nearly
$8 million in cost-sharing from the recipientsare described
below:  
  + Carbozyme, Inc. (Monmouth Junction, N.J.) will evolve a
second generation of their enzyme-based membrane design for
capturing CO2 from the flue gas of coal-fired power plants. The
technology has demonstrated high capture efficiency and low
energy cost.. (DOE share: $944,807; recipient share: $229,863;
duration: 36 months) 
  + Membrane Technology and Research, Inc. (Menlo Park, Calif.)
will develop a cost-effective, membrane-based process to
separate CO2 from the flue gas of coal-fired power plants. They
also intend to deliver condensed, high-pressure, supercritical
CO2 to a pipeline for sequestration. (DOE share: $788,266;
recipient share: $197,067; duration: 24 months) 
  + University of Akron (Akron, Ohio) will develop a highly
efficient, low-cost CO2 capture system.  Built on integration of
metal monoliths, material synthesis, and low-cost fabrication
techniques, the researchers anticipate a breakthrough technology
for the removalof CO2 from the flue gas of coal-fired power
plants. (DOE share: $764,995; recipient share: $156,702;
duration: 48 months) 
  + Carbozyme, Inc. (Monmouth Junction, N.J.) will design,
construct, test, and demonstrate a simple, efficient, and
readily scalable enzyme-based flue gas cleanup technology for
CO2 capture and will demonstrate a method for reasonable-cost
treatment of other pollutants to achieve near-zero emissions
from pulverized coal power plants. (DOE share: $4,799,175;
recipient share: $1,370,430; duration: 36 months) 
  + Praxair, Inc. (Tonawanda, N.Y.) will develop an
oxycombustion process using an oxygen transport membrane to
capture CO2 from coal-fired power plants. (DOE share:
$4,742,780; recipient share: $2,553,806; duration: 36 months). 
  + Research Triangle Institute (Research Triangle Park, N.C.)
will expand on the process they have developed to capture CO2
from power plant flue gas using an inexpensive, dry, regenerable
sorbent. (DOE share: $3,211,997; recipient share: $803,175;
duration: 36 months) 
  + SRI International (Menlo Park, Calif.) will fabricate a
technically and economically viable CO2-capture system based on
a promising membrane material for pre-combustion-based capture
of CO2 . (DOE share: $4,047,695; recipient share: $1,036,159;
duration: 36 months) 
  + University of Notre Dame (Notre Dame, Ind.) will focus on
the development of a new liquid absorbent for efficient
post-combustion capture of CO2 from coal-fired power plants.
(DOE share: $2,214,590; recipient share: $793,861; duration: 36
months) 
  + UOP LLC (Des Plaines, Ill.), a Honeywell Company, will
develop a process that uses novel microporous metal organic
frameworks having extremely high adsorption capacities for the
removal of CO2 from coal-fired power plant flue gas. (DOE share:
$2,238,171; recipient share: $559,543; duration: 36 months) 

Media contact(s): John Grasser, 202/586-6503 Craig Stevens, 
202/586-4940     [ ]   

  U.S. Department of Energy | 1000 Independence Ave., SW | 
Washington, DC 20585 1-800-dial-DOE | f/202-586-4403
*****************************************************************
 54 Tri-City Herald: Audit: Cleanup cost may double 

Published Tuesday, October 24th, 2006
 
By Annette Cary, Herald staff writer 

The estimated cost of dealing with waste in two infamous burial
grounds at the Hanford nuclear reservation could more than
double to $324 million, according to an audit by the Department
of Energy Office of Inspector General. 

During the 1950s and 1960s, some waste generated from research
just north of Richland in the 300 Area was so radioactive that
trucking it to central Hanford for disposal posed a risk for
drivers. Instead, it was buried closer to the 300 Area in the
618-10 and 618-11 burial grounds. 

The audit found that DOE's preliminary plans to clean up those
burial grounds did not address issues that could add to the
cleanup's cost. 

The $1.9 billion contract awarded to Washington Closure Hanford
in 2005 to clean up Hanford along the Columbia River corridor
included $136 million for work on the 618-10 and 618-11 burial
grounds. It's expected to be the most difficult technical
challenge in the contract.
 
The burial grounds include a mix of debris from testing nuclear
processes before they were used to produce plutonium for the
nation's nuclear weapons program. Irradiated fuel, hazardous
chemicals and waste contaminated with plutonium that's too hot
for workers to be near are believed to be in the burial grounds. 

The burial grounds include trenches, vertical pipes made from
welding 55 gallon drums end-to-end and underground steel
chambers connected to the ground with crooked and slanted pipes.
Much of the waste was dropped into the burial grounds in
containers ranging from the size of a juice can to a five-gallon
bucket. 

The audit questioned whether preliminary plans for the waste
would retrieve and package it in ways that would allow it to be
stored at Hanford under current regulations or would allow it to
be shipped to national radioactive waste repositories in New
Mexico or Nevada. 

"From the big picture perspective, it's really hard to say how
it will be handled," said Colleen French, spokeswoman for DOE at
Hanford. 

Washington Closure could propose removing the waste in one of
two ways that DOE earlier awarded research grants to test.
Neither research project covered whether the treated waste would
meet regulations for disposal. 

North Wind tested driving a casing into the ground around the
vertical pipes of waste, capping the bottom and top, then
lifting the casing out with the waste encapsulated in grout
inside. 

But the audit said that would produce a package 27 feet long to
be shipped to Hanford's Central Waste Complex for storage. Under
current regulations, waste containers up to 11 feet long are
accepted there. 

The complex also lacks the radioactive shielding to accept the
waste that's radioactively hot enough to be considered "remote
handled" rather than "contact handled." 

AMEC tested a process to insert electrodes into the soil around
the vertical pipes and melt them into a glassy, solid mass. AMEC
believes the glass with all the waste mixed together could be
considered low-level radioactive waste that could be disposed of
at Hanford. 

But the Office of the Inspector General questioned that. It said
the waste stream would include transuranic waste -- typically
waste contaminated with plutonium -- that would need to be sent
to a national repository for transuranic waste in New Mexico. 

However, the New Mexico repository would not accept waste that
also included pieces of irradiated fuel. That would have to be
sent to the Yucca Mountain, Nev., repository. 

There are treatment alternatives, such as taking the waste to T
Plant, which eventually is expected to be equipped for
remote-handled waste. 

But DOE's estimated cost of $136 million does not include the
cost for treating, repackaging and certifying the waste for
shipment to New Mexico or Nevada repositories, the audit said.
That estimate covered only storage at the Central Waste Complex
and burial of low-level waste at Hanford's Environmental
Restoration Disposal Facility. 

DOE and Washington Closure disagree on how much work was covered
under Washington Closure's contract proposal. Washington Closure
says it planned only to retrieve the waste and take it to the
Central Waste Complex. DOE believes the $136 million contract
amount covers additional work to package, ship, treat and store
or dispose of the waste. 

Treating, repackaging and certifying the waste so it can be
shipped off site could cost up to $188 million, the audit said. 

It's recommending that DOE take a "cradle-to-grave" look at how
to deal with the waste, starting with learning more about what's
in the waste sites. 

That work already is under way, according to DOE. 

Washington Closure has located 3,000 radiation survey records.
However, they provide information on radiation dose levels, but
not information on what was disposed of at the burial grounds. 

Washington Closure has until January to submit its plan to DOE
on how it proposes to deal with the 618-10 and 618-11 burial
grounds. DOE then is scheduled to take 90 days to study the plan.
 
© 2006 Tri-City Herald, Associated Press &Other Wire Services
*****************************************************************
 55 DOE: Environmental Management Site-Specific Advisory Board, Savannah 
 
                        FR Doc E6-17760 
[Federal Register: October 24, 2006 (Volume 71, Number 205)] 
[Notices] [Page 62253-62254] From the Federal Register Online via 
GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr24oc06-39]                         
 
River Site AGENCY: Department of Energy.
 
ACTION: Notice of open meeting.
 
SUMMARY: This notice announces a meeting of the Environmental 
Management Site-Specific Advisory Board (EM SSAB), Savannah River 
Site. The Federal Advisory Committee Act (Pub. L. 92-463, 86 
Stat. 770) requires that public notice of this meeting be 
announced in the Federal Register.
 
 
DATES: Monday, November 13, 2006, 1 p.m.-6:30 p.m., Tuesday, 
November 14, 2006, 8:30 a.m.-4 p.m.
 
ADDRESSES: Augusta Towers Hotel, 2651 Perimeter Parkway, Augusta, 
GA 30909.
 
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Gerri Flemming, Closure Project 
Office, Department of Energy Savannah River Operations Office, 
P.O. Box A, Aiken, SC 29802; Phone: (803) 952-7886.
 
 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Purpose of the Board: The purpose of 
the Board is to make recommendations to DOE in the areas of 
environmental restoration, waste management, and related 
activities.
 
 
[[Page 62254]] Tentative Agenda Monday, November 13, 2006 1 
p.m.--Combined Committee Session 5:15 p.m.--Adjourn 5:30 
p.m.--Executive Committee Meeting 6:30 p.m.--Adjourn Tuesday, 
November 14, 2006 8:30 a.m.--Approval of Minutes, Agency Updates 
9:15 a.m.--Public Comment Session 9:30 a.m.--Chair and 
Facilitator Update 10 a.m.--Strategic Legacy Management Committee 
Report 11 a.m.--Waste Management Committee Report 11:45 
p.m.--Public Comment Session 12 p.m.--Lunch Break 1 
p.m.--Administrative Committee Report 1:30 p.m.--Facility 
Disposition and Site Remediation Committee Report 2:30 
p.m.--Nuclear Materials Committee Report 3:30 p.m.--Public 
Comment Session 4 p.m.--Adjourn If needed, time will be allotted 
after public comments for items added to the agenda and 
administrative details. A final agenda will be available at the 
meeting Monday, November 13, 2006.
 
Public Participation: The meeting is open to the public.
 
Written statements may be filed with the Board either before or 
after the meeting. Individuals who wish to make oral statements 
pertaining to agenda items should contact Gerri Flemming's office 
at the address or telephone listed above. Requests must be 
received five days prior to the meeting and reasonable provision 
will be made to include the presentation in the agenda. The 
Deputy Designated Federal Officer is empowered to conduct the 
meeting in a fashion that will facilitate the orderly conduct of 
business. Individuals wishing to make public comment will be 
provided a maximum of five minutes to present their comments.
 
Minutes: The minutes of this meeting will be available for public 
review and copying at the U.S. Department of Energy's Freedom of 
Information Public Reading Room, 1E-190, Forrestal Building, 1000 
Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20585 between 9 a.m. and 
4 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. Minutes 
will also be available by writing to Gerri Flemming, Department 
of Energy Savannah River Operations Office, P.O. Box A, Aiken, SC 
29802, or by calling her at (803) 952-7886.
 
Issued at Washington, DC on October 18, 2006.
 
Rachel M. Samuel, Deputy Advisory Committee Management Officer.
 
[FR Doc. E6-17760 Filed 10-23-06; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 6450-01-P

 
*****************************************************************
 56 DOE: DOE/Advanced Scientific Computing Advisory Committee
 
                        FR Doc E6-17761 
[Federal Register: October 24, 2006 (Volume 71, Number 205)] 
[Notices] [Page 62254] From the Federal Register Online via GPO 
Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr24oc06-40]                         
 
AGENCY: Department of Energy.
 
ACTION: Notice of open meeting.
 
SUMMARY: This notice announces a meeting of the Advanced 
Scientific Computing Advisory Committee (ASCAC). Federal Advisory 
Committee Act (Pub. L. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770) requires that public 
notice of these meetings be announced in the Federal Register.
 
 
DATES: Wednesday, November 8, 2006, 9:45 a.m. to 12 p.m.
 
ADDRESSES: Marriott Washingtonian Center, 751 Washingtonian 
Blvd., Gaithersburg, MD 20878.
 
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Melea Baker, Office of Advanced 
Scientific Computing Research; SC-21/Germantown Building; U. S. 
Department of Energy; 1000 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, 
DC 20585-1290; Telephone (301)-903-7486, (E-mail:

 
Melea.Baker@science.doe.gov).
 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Purpose of the Meeting: The purpose of 
this meeting is to provide advice and guidance with respect to 
the advanced scientific computing research program.
 
Tentative Agenda: Agenda will include discussions of the 
following: Wednesday, November 8, 2006 Subpart of Charge 1--PART 
Rating for Genomes to Life Project Subpart of Charge 1--PART 
Rating for Multiscale Math Public Comment Public Participation: 
The meeting is open to the public. If you would like to file a 
written statement with the Committee, you may do so either before 
or after the meeting.
 
If you would like to make oral statements regarding any of the 
items on the agenda, you should contact Melea Baker via FAX at 
301-903- 4846 or via e-mail (Melea.Baker@science.doe.gov). You 
must make your request for an oral statement at least 5 business 
days prior to the meeting. Reasonable provision will be made to 
include the scheduled oral statements on the agenda. The 
Chairperson of the Committee will conduct the meeting to 
facilitate the orderly conduct of business. Public comment will 
follow the 10-minute rule.
 
Minutes: The minutes of this meeting will be available for public 
review and copying within 30 days at the Freedom of Information 
Public Reading Room; 1E-190, Forrestal Building; 1000 
Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20585; between 9 a.m. 
and 4 p.m., Monday through Friday, except holidays.
 
Issued in Washington, DC, on October 19, 2006.
 
Rachel M. Samuel, Deputy Advisory Committee, Management Officer.
 
[FR Doc. E6-17761 Filed 10-23-06; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 6450-01-P

 
*****************************************************************
 57 Knox News: Y-12 object of third bad report Former DOE adviser 
says uranium stored in unsafe conditions 

By FRANK MUNGER, munger@knews.com 

October 24, 2006 

OAK RIDGE - The Y-12 National Security Complex is the target of a 
third negative report in two weeks. This time the topic is 
nuclear safety. Robert Alvarez, a former policy adviser at the 
Department of Energy and investigator with the Senate Committee 
on Governmental Affairs, released a new study that says Y-12's 
backlog of highly enriched uranium is stored in unsafe conditions 
in deteriorated facilities at risk from fires and earthquakes. 
			 			
"A large fraction of HEU, which accumulated at the Y-12
site for more than 50 years, is still in insecure and unstable
forms - posing increased environmental, safety and health risk,"
Alvarez said in the report's summary. 

His paper reportedly has been accepted for publication in the
journal Science and Global Security. 

The Oak Ridge plant, which houses the nation's stockpile of
bomb-grade uranium and produces parts for every nuclear weapon
in the U.S. arsenal, was criticized for security-related
problems in recent reports by the Project On Government
Oversight, a watchdog group, and the Department of Energy's
Office of Inspector General. 

In his 46-page paper, Alvarez cites information from numerous
reports, many of them produced by DOE contractors. 

He recommends stronger federal oversight and safety enforcement.

He also suggests that low-level uranium products at Y-12 should
be disposed of as waste, rather than kept in unsafe storage. 

The condition of Y-12 facilities suffered because of lack of
funding and commitment to safety, and Alvarez said Y-12 workers
received abnormally high radiation exposures. 

"Between 1993 and 2005, more than 40 percent of the total
collective dose to workers from internal depositions of
radioactive materials in the DOE complex (nationwide) occurred
at the Y-12 site," he said. "A deep-rooted problem at Y-12 is
prevention of radiological exposures to workers from widespread
historical contamination." 

Alvarez, a senior scholar at the Institute for Policy Studies in
Washington, D.C., said there have been at least 23 fires and
explosions during the past 15 years, resulting in injuries to
workers and spreading contamination. 

DOE's National Nuclear Security Administration, which oversees
Y-12 and other nuclear weapons facilities, said many of the
allegations in the report are "based on old reports that are
woefully out of date" and do not reflect current conditions. 

"We agree with Mr. Alvarez that Y-12 had been allowed to
deteriorate during the 1990s, but he appears to ignore a major
campaign this administration undertook, beginning in 2001, to
invest hundreds of millions of dollars in upgrading the
facilities and clearing out old, dilapidated structures and to
improve security," the statement by NNSA's Anson Franklin said. 

Senior writer Frank Munger may be reached at 865-342-6329.
 					
© 2006 - Knoxville News Sentinel
*****************************************************************
 58 KnoxNews: Lab's existing Jaguar won't meet other half immediately

By FRANK MUNGER, munger@knews.com 

October 24, 2006

OAK RIDGE - Oak Ridge National Laboratory's Jaguar will become a 
two-headed beast - at least for a few weeks. The Cray 
supercomputer, already the fastest U.S. machine for open 
scientific uses at 54 trillion calculations per second, or 54 
teraflops, is being upgraded to 100 teraflops. 

Sixty-eight new cabinets for Jaguar are expected to arrive here 
within the next two to three weeks from Cray's manufacturing 
facility at Chippewa Falls, Wis. Before those are combined with 
the existing 54 cabinets, however, they will be tested and 
operated separately on the second floor of ORNL's National Center 
for Computational Sciences. 

The decision was made so that research efforts with the current
Jaguar configuration wouldn't be disrupted 
"It's all about the science," said Thomas Zacharia, ORNL's
associate lab director for computational sciences. 

The existing Jaguar will continue to run in the downstairs
computer room until late November or early December, when the
two units will be joined in the new second-floor home. 
The reason Jaguar is moving to the second floor is to make room
downstairs for the next-generation Cray machine, code-named
Baker during the development stage. 

Baker may become the world's first petaflop computer, capable of
1,000 trillion calculations per second. 

"We want to make sure we have sufficient space downstairs for
the big machine," Zacharia said. 

Earlier this year, ORNL signed a $180 million contract that
included delivery of Baker, a Cray XT5, which will have a
superscalar architecture similar to that of the Jaguar. 

Zacharia said lab officials knew that the computer center's
second-floor space, which had been used for a conference room
and other purposes, could support the weight of the Jaguar. 

The cabinets for the petaflop supercomputer will be heavier, for
sure, so that's why it's going downstairs, he said. 

The ORNL computer chief said it's possible to consolidate the
entire Jaguar system from "day one," but that would require
shutting down research operations for a few weeks so the units
could be properly tested. 

"That would have caused more disruption to our users," Zacharia
said. "We will transition all the users from the current machine
to the upstairs machine (once it begins operations) and then
move the remaining cabinets. That way, the users will not have
any discontinuity." 

Researchers have been getting fantastic results with the Jaguar,
Zacharia said, citing work with superconductivity, climate
change and other science issues. 

He said the Jaguar is a hardy machine that will continue to
operate at ORNL, even after the new petaflop machine comes
online. 

"With these upgrades, it is likely to continue to 2011 or so,"
he said. 

In its new home, the Jaguar will be next door to the lab's
computer visualization center called EVEREST (Exploratory
Visualization Environment for Research in Science and
Technology), a facility that includes a "power wall" backed by
27 projectors with an aggregate pixel count of 35 million
pixels. 

Senior writer Frank Munger may be reached at 865-342-6329.
 					
© 2006 - Knoxville News Sentinel
*****************************************************************
 59 AFP: Hong Kong detains NKorean cargo ship as UN sanctions bite - report - 

 Mon Oct 23, 11:38 PM ET 
		 	 
HONG KONG (AFP) - Hong Kong has detained a North Korean cargo 
vessel for possible safety violations under UN sanctions slapped 
on the regime after Pyongyang's nuclear weapons test, a media 
report has said. The rusting, 2,035-tonne general cargo vessel 
Kang Nam I was suspected of breaching 25 regulations after 
entering Hong Kong on Sunday, the South China Morning Post 
reported.
 
It said the vessel was not carrying any cargo when it arrived
and had come to load up with scrap metal.
 
The newspaper cited Hong Kong's marine chief Roger Tupper as
confirming the detention under the terms of the UN sanctions,
which require ports to stop and search any North Korean vessels.
 
The clampdown was put in place to prevent the hardline Stalinist
regime of Kim Jong-il from transferring or importing nuclear
technology and to end the trade in contraband, usch as drugs and
illicit cigarettes, that is believed to help fund the North's
nuclear programme.
 
The Hong Kong government's Customs Department was yet to confirm
the ship's detention.
 
Tupper was quoted as telling the Post that eight other North
Korean ships had been similarly stopped this year.
 
"Hong Kong is a major hub port and North Korean vessels do
sometimes visit," he said. "It is not unreasonable that they are
subject to routine Port State Control inspections."
 
The report said the ship had arrived from Shanghai and was due
to return home to Nampo, near Pyongyang, via Taiwan.
 
It said the captain, who would not give his name, had told
reporters he was unaware of Pyonygang's first ever atom bomb
test conducted October 9, nor of the subsequent UN sanctions.
 
The sanctions are part of a huge global diplomatic effort since
the test to persuade North Korea
" /> North Koreato abandon its nuclear weapons programme.
 
Copyright © 2006 Agence France Presse. All rights reserved.
    
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have expressed a prior interest in receiving this information for 
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<http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml> 
    
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