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                         NUCLEAR POLICY
 
1 IPS-English KOREAN PENINSULA: Norths nuke test likely to
2 [NYTr] S.Koreans Learn to Stop Worrying and Get Used to the Bomb
3 Dpr Korea: Security UN Vote On Reported Nuclear Test Set For Saturda
4 Korea Herald: N.K. seen developing small nukes   
5 Korea Herald: [David Ignatius] 'Principle of nuclear accountability'
6 INSIDE JoongAng Daily: [OUTLOOK] Sometimes we forgive too much
7 INSIDE JoongAng Daily: [EDITORIALS] Agreement is fragile
8 INSIDE JoongAng Daily: [VIEWPOINT]Can the North ever be tamed?
9 INSIDE JoongAng Daily: [EDITORIALS] Time for harmony with U.S.
10 SF Chron: The Nuclear Club Is Expanding / At loggerheads over North 
11 AFP: China says will back 'appropriate' NKorea sanctions - 
12 Korea Times: NKs Nuclear Threat - Now What? 
13 Korea Times: Nuclear Blackmail 
14 AFP: North Korea says ready to talk as Security Council readies reso
15 AFP: UN vote on NKorea sanctions in doubt after Russian, Chinese obj
16 AFP: Angry Japan slams door on NKorean imports 
17 AFP: US prepared to face threats of retaliatory action by NKorea - o
18 AFP: Security Council reaches tentative accord on NKorea sanctions -
19 AFP: Latest UN NKorea draft rules out use of force - report - 
20 AFP: Rice plans Asia trip to confer on North Korea test - US officia
21 AFP: White House has no definitive word on NKorea nuclear test -
22 Japan Times: Pyongyang warns Tokyo on sanctions
23 AFP: Non-aligned nations ask moderation on nuclear NKorea - 
24 Guardian Unlimited: Rush for deal as doubts grow over nuclear test
25 Guardian Unlimited: Price of a broken deal
26 US: [NYTr] Bush's Nuclear Apocalypse
27 US: Nuclear Crisis Made in USA
28 [NYTr] Shaking Off Hiroshima: Japan Faces Its Nuclear "Taboo"
29 [toeslist] Old French Nuke tests "represented a slight (health) risk
30 Guardian Unlimited: Nuclear tensions bring supporters flooding 
 
                         NUCLEAR REACTORS
 
31 IPS-English EGYPT: Nuclear Ambition Could Mean a Presidential
32 US: NE StatePaper.com: NRC Chairman Says Nuclear Power Will Be Neede
33 IHT: After France stops data, nuclear power firms step in -
34 US: NRC: In the Matter of All Licensees Identified in Attachment 1 t
35 US: NRC: Atomic Safety and Licensing Board; Before Administrative Ju
36 CNN: Russia building nuke barge to power Arctic 
37 AFP: US gives assurances on Indian nuclear deal - 
38 Japan Times: Ehime reactor gets go-ahead to go pluthermal
39 US: UPI: Analysis: Inquiry into N.Y. nuke plant
40 US: NRC: Live NRC Meeting Webcast
 
                          NUCLEAR SECURITY
 
41 Guardian Unlimited: Groups Question Nuke Plant Terror Risk
 
                          NUCLEAR SAFETY
 
42 IEER's Latest: North Korea; Fernald; Calculate CO2 from Coal
43 [NYTr] Old French Nuke tests "represented a slight (health) risk"
44 [NYTr] DPRK Nuclear test angers Hiroshima survivors
45 US: SVA: Study of contamination at rocket lab site reveals evidence 
46 US: Deseret News: Matheson acts on fallout study
47 US:                          FR Doc C6-7971 
48 US: Salt Lake Tribune: Study cites fallout, illness link
49 US: DesMoinesRegister.com: Carlson: Fallout shelters have fallen by 
50 US: courier-journal: Oppenheimer's flaws fascinate author 
51 US: NRC: In the Matter of All Licensees Who Possess Radioactive Mate
52 IPS: HEALTH: Cancer Fears Emerge as Fallout of French Nuclear Tests
53 US: ANWAG: Presidential Signing Statement May Have Thwarted Congress
54 US: UPI: Study finds thyroid damage from nuke tests
 
                         NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE
 
55 Platts: DOE eyes Yucca Mountain waste repository rail alternative
56 DOE: Amended Notice of Intent To Expand the Scope of the Yucca Mt
57 US: San Bernardino County Sun: Water quality panel may select perchl
58 DOE: Supplement to the Final Environmental Impact Statement for Yucc
59 US: EnergyBiz Magazine: Where to Store Spent Nuclear Fuel
60 US: Tonawanda News: Town cleanup site a joke
61 US: PE.com: Senators prod EPA over new findings
62 US: AP Wire: EPA to clean radioactive soil in Ottawa
 
                           PEACE
 
 
                        US DEPT. OF ENERGY
 
63 DenverPost.com: Judicial legacy includes Rocky Flats, Neil Bush
64 IHT: Report: Guns can't fit through nuclear weapons plant barriers -
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 1 IPS-English KOREAN PENINSULA: Norths nuke test likely to
 
Date: Fri, 13 Oct 2006 14:57:29 -0700

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<x-flowed>
KOREAN PENINSULA: North's nuke test likely to affect South Korean economy

Att.Editors: The following item is from the Emirates News Agency (WAM)

SEOUL, Oct. 13 (WAM) - Uncertainties over North Korea's claimed nuclear
test will last longer than expected, negatively affecting the South Korean
economy, the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP), a
state-run think tank, said on Friday.

North Korea conducted its first nuclear test on Oct. 9, causing concerns
that increased regional tension may dent consumer and corporate
sentiment.

    The atomic bomb test came at a time when the South Korean economy,
Asia's fourth largest, is expected to grow around 5 percent this year.

    But high oil prices and a firmer won versus the U.S. dollar are causing
concerns that economic growth may fall sharply in the second half of the
year.

    South Korea's economic growth cooled to 0.8 percent in the second
quarter, the slowest pace in more than a year, as the construction sector
remained slow and consumer spending slackened.

    Next year, economic growth is forecast to slow to around 4.6 percent on
a slowdown in the global economy, although some economic think tanks are
predicting that it could fall to around 4 percent.

    "The North's nuclear test will lead to a capital outflow, and a fall in
value of financial assets," the KIEP said. "If the incident lasts longer,
real economic activities will be negatively affected."

    The research institute said the degree of impact on the economy will
largely hinge on whether the North will conduct a second nuclear test, and
China's stance toward economic sanctions on Pyongyang. (WAM)
                     (WAM)

</x-flowed>
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 2 [NYTr] S.Koreans Learn to Stop Worrying and Get Used to the Bomb
 
Date: Fri, 13 Oct 2006 20:27:31 -0500 (CDT)

X-Sender-Host-Name: chumbly.math.missouri.edu
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Via NY Transfer News Collective  *  All the News that Doesn't Fit
 
sent by Simon McGuinness

The Independent - 13 October 2006 
http://news.independent.co.uk/world/asia/article1868082.ece

How South Koreans are learning to stop worrying and get used to the bomb

By Clifford Coonan in Busan 

Fireworks lit the night sky in Busan, South Korea's secondlargest city,
and an orchestra belted out a rousing anthem to launch this year's
international film festival. Schoolgirls screamed and cameras flashed as
the country's leading actors walked the red carpet, and traffic built up
on the waterfront as usual. People still filled the restaurants, eating
the national delicacy kanji and the shops were busy as they normally are
on a Thursday night. 

Not exactly a picture of a country quaking with fear at the prospect of
nuclear annihilation after the news that North Korea had tested a
nuclear weapon. But South Koreans are resilient.

For the people of Busan and the capital Seoul, the nuclear test is
merely the latest in a series of stunts by North Korea's leader, Kim
Jong Il, designed to prop up his regime, one that most Koreans consider
bankrupt. This is not a real threat for them.

Lee Chong Kuen, 55, who has a trading business, reckoned the test was
just the latest ploy by Kim Jong-il to keep his military afloat. "North
Korea's military needs to stay powerful so Kim can feel the country can
compete with the US," he said. "He needs to keep the population poor and
this is a great way to do it.

"Of course Kim does not want people to live well; he wants to stay
powerful. Kim should be condemned but I do feel genuinely sorry for the
North Korean people because they are under a communist regime; they have
no other choice."

Although the international focus has been on the six-nation talks
involving both Koreas, the US, Japan, China and Russia, Seoul has also
been trying to work out a lasting peace treaty with Pyongyang to replace
the armistice that ended the 1950-53 Korean war. Technically, the two
have been at war since.

The South Koreans have had to deal with a lot of sabre-rattling from
across the border, which helps explain why most people shrug when asked
about the test, and say they have seen it all before.

There were the long-range tests in 1998 when a missile flew across the
Sea of Japan, signalling that Pyongyang had intentions of nuclear might.
Then there were the announcements that the North Koreans were building
nuclear capability, that North Korea had left the nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty in 2003, the news they had the bomb, more
missile tests and finally this week's boast that they had tested a
nuclear device.

Kim Jong Il is said to crave international attention and has been irked
by the focus on Iran's nuclear programmes and the way the world is
fixated on Iraq, fellow members of the triumvirate that President George
Bush calls the "axis of evil".

Park Ji Yong, 23, a student of international politics at the elite
women's college Ewha University in Seoul, said: "It's been a while since
North Korea has been in the limelight. I don't think it's a big threat
because they always use something like an attack to win international
attention."

On the waterfront in Busan, one woman said: "This has been going on a
long time. He's always throwing around this nuclear issue, and hates
losing limelight because of Iraq. Everyone thinks he's insane, but
clever too. I don't really see it as a big threat.

"Korea is now the ninth nuclear power so we feel we should also have
nuclear weapons. Japan wants them too, so there's going to be a domino
effect."

Many South Koreans seem more worried about the cost of reunification.
Hong Min Yong, a student in Seoul, said: "They're not like us. I'm
worried reunification will bring down South Korea. Some students from
the North came to my college on an exchange programme and I didn't feel
a connection to them; they felt like foreigners. I can't forgive the
North for the nuclear tests, but the Americans should have treated them
better."

Others feel North Korea needs support so when reunification happens, the
economic and social costs will not be so high. The South Koreans have a
lot to protect. Their liberal democracy is the world's 10th-largest
economy and the streets are filled with sleek KIA sports utility
vehicles and top-of-the-range Hyundais. Half of the country's 48 million
people live in or around Seoul, said to be the world's second-largest
metropolitan area.

In North Korea, people are said to be so malnourished that they
sometimes resort to boiling grass to stay alive. For a long time, until
its workers were expelled from the country, the United Nations' World
Food Programme fed 6.5 million of North Korea's 23 million people. Aid
experts said Pyongyang did not like the warming of bilateral relations
between South and North.

Ms Park added: "We are all of the same blood. I am in support of aid of
all sorts because reunification is inevitable and it's better to have a
stronger North Korea to unite with than a weak one. Reunification right
now is not the best solution and the US can't wage a war, because if
North Korea is shattered, America will have to pick up the pieces."

But there is a belief in South Korea that Korea's problems need to be
solved by Koreans. Hong Seok Jun, 23, a business studies student, said:
"There are two schools of thought. One is that the South Koreans should
help North Korea but the other group thinks international help is
better. I think [South Korean President] Roh Moo Hyun is doing a bad job
because he is trying to bring down the South Korean economy by focusing
on solving the problem ourselves without international help." 
       
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 3 Dpr Korea: Security UN Vote On Reported Nuclear Test Set For Saturday Morning
 
Date: Fri, 13 Oct 2006 13:00:49 -0400

DPR KOREA: SECURITY COUNCIL VOTE ON REPORTED NUCLEAR TEST SET FOR SATURDAY MORNING
 
New York, Oct 13 2006  1:00PM
After further consultations today on what action to take against 
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) over its reported 
nuclear test, the United Nations Security Council is set to vote 
tomorrow on a United States resolution that includes the interdiction 
of the country’s ships on the high seas.

“This resolution certainly is going to permit that if this is adopted,” 
Council President for October Ambassador Kenzo Oshima of Japan 
told reporters when asked whether it would authorize states 
to interdict DPRK ships in international waters or if such action 
is prohibited under international law.

“The relevant provision is going to say measures will be taken in 
accordance with national legislation and measures consistent with 
international law,” he added, saying that the resolution would 
be put to the vote fairly early tomorrow morning.

Council members and experts have held intensive negotiations over 
the past few days on the resolution, which has been amended several 
times. The five permanent members who have veto power – China, 
France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the US – have been meeting 
together with Japan. 

Yesterday, Mr. Oshima said the UK, France, Slovakia and Japan would 
co-sponsoring the resolution and “several others indicated their 
support.” He noted then that the Chinese and Russian ambassadors 
“again explained their position.” 
Although all members strongly condemned the reported test in consultations 
on Monday, Mr. Oshima said on Tuesday that a major focus 
was whether to invoke Chapter VII of the UN Charter that allows 
for sanctions and the use of force in the case of a threat to or 
breach of peace. 
UN officials, led by Secretary-General Kofi Annan, have insisted 
on the urgent need for the DPRK to return to the Six-Party Talks 
that have been seeking to resolve the issue of its nuclear programme. 
The talks between China, DPRK, Japan, Republic of Korea, Russia 
and US have been going on sporadically in Beijing for several 
years.
 2006-10-13 00:00:00.000 


___________________

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To listen to news and in-depth programmes from UN Radio go to: http://radio.un.org/ 
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 4 Korea Herald: N.K. seen developing small nukes   
        
North Korea may be moving to develop nuclear weapons small
enough to place on missiles but needs "a few more years" before
it can produce them, South Korean Defense Minister Yoon
Kwang-ung said yesterday. 

"The South Korean government believes North Korea has been
developing low-grade nuclear bombs, and they may be moving to
develop (nuclear weapons) small enough to put on guided missiles
as the next stage," Yoon told a closed parliamentary hearing. 
The government has been analyzing "various information" on the
move, Yoon was quoted as saying. 

However, he echoed various experts' view that the North hasn't
yet obtained the technology and "will take a few more years to
deploy nuclear weapons for wartime use or miniaturize them to
fit them onto missiles." 

Yoon also said South Korea would not become a nuclear-armed
country even though North Korea's first nuclear test on Monday
breached a 1992 inter-Korean declaration on making the peninsula
nuclear-free. 

During the session, an opposition lawmaker claimed that North
Korea may attempt to send low-flying AN-2 infiltration aircraft
across the border for a nuclear attack against South Korea after
obtaining technical expertise. 

"North Korea currently deploys some 300 AN-2s. If North Korea
can minimize nuclear warheads into 1.5 tons, they can be put on
the planes," Song Young-sun, a lawmaker at the main opposition
Grand National Party, said during an inspection session at the
Defense Ministry. Analysts say it may take about 10 years for
North Korea to make nuclear weapons smaller and lighter. 

Saying that South Korea should be fully ready to counter any
possible nuclear attack from North Korea, she argued that an
AN-2 can land at one of the 106 golf courses in greater Seoul
because it can successfully land on a strip of less than 250
meters. 

2006.10.14
 
*****************************************************************
 5 Korea Herald: [David Ignatius] 'Principle of nuclear accountability'   
        
WASHINGTON - "Present at the Creation" was the title Dean
Acheson gave to his memoir about the founding of the post-World
War II order. Now, with North Korea claiming to have tested a
nuclear weapon in defiance of the international community and
Iran seemingly on the way, Harvard professor Graham Allison
argues that we are present at the unraveling. 

The North Korean bomb test is a seismic event for the world
community. It tells us that the structure created to maintain
global security is failing. The five permanent members of the
United Nations Security Council - the United States, Russia,
China, Britain and France - all warned North Korea against
taking this step. Yet the leaders in Pyongyang ignored these
signals, and in the process blew open the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty. 

The North Korean leadership, puny in everything but weapons
technology, has been marching toward this moment since the
1950s. It's unrealistic to think that, having brazened their way
to detonating what they say is a nuclear bomb, the North Koreans
will now give it up. The proliferation machine isn't going to
run in reverse. In that sense, the question isn't how to repair
the old architecture of nonproliferation - practically speaking,
it's a wreck - but how to build a new structure that can stop
the worst threats. 

What are the right cornerstones of this new security structure?
I put that question to Allison, who is a national resource when
it comes to questions of nuclear proliferation and deterrence.

He wrote the definitive book, "Essence of Decision," on the
Cuban missile crisis, the world's closest brush with all-out
nuclear war. In recent years, he has been studying the danger of
nuclear terrorism, and he edited a prescient discussion of the
implications of a North Korean breakout that appears in the
September issue of the Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science. 

Allison believes that the world community must now focus on what
he calls "the principle of nuclear accountability." The biggest
danger posed by North Korea isn't that it would launch a nuclear
missile, but that this desperately poor country would sell a
bomb to al-Qaida or another terrorist group. Accountability, in
Allison's terms, means that if a bomb explodes in Manhattan that
contains North Korean fissile material, the United States would
act as if the strike came from North Korea itself - and
retaliate accordingly, with devastating force. To make this
accountability principle work, the United States needs a crash
program to create the "nuclear forensics" that can identify the
signature of fissile material of every potential nuclear state.

Arms control expert Robert Gallucci describes this approach as
"expanded deterrence" in his article in the September Annals. 

President Bush seemed to be drawing this red line of
accountability when he warned Monday: "The transfer of nuclear
weapons or material by North Korea to states or nonstate
entities would be considered a grave threat to the United
States, and we would hold North Korea fully accountable for the
consequences of such action." 

Tough words, but are they credible? That's why the second
essential pillar of a new security regime is a restoration of
deterrence. The Bush administration warned North Korea over and
over that it would face severe consequences if it tested a
nuclear weapon. So did China and Russia, but Kim Jong-il went
ahead anyway. Iranian leaders are similarly unimpressed by
Bush's saber rattling, viewing America as a weakened nation
bogged down by an unwinnable war in Iraq. To restore deterrence,
the West needs to stop making threats it can't keep. And the
United States must salvage its strategic position in Iraq -
either by winning, or organizing the most stable plan for
withdrawal. 

After the Cuban missile crisis, President Kennedy got serious
about preventing nuclear war. He installed a "hotline" so the
White House and the Kremlin could talk when crises arose; he
negotiated the 1963 Test Ban Treaty; and he began the
discussions that led to the 1968 Nonproliferation Treaty. That
treaty worked adequately for almost four decades. Instead of the
20 nuclear states that Kennedy feared would exist by 1975, we
had just eight, until last weekend. But the North Korean test
threatens to begin what a 2004 U.N. commission warned would be
"a cascade of proliferation" that could spread to Japan, South
Korea, Iran, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. 

We are present at the unraveling. We must "think about the
unthinkable" with new urgency. The United States and its allies
must begin constructing a system that can succeed where the
Nonproliferation Treaty has failed. A terrorist nuclear bomb in
Manhattan or Washington isn't a thriller writer's fantasy; it's
a probability, unless America and its allies establish new rules
for nuclear accountability that are clear and credible. 


For an ongoing discussion of international issues, David Ignatius 
cohosts with Fareed Zakaria of Newsweek an online forum called 
PostGlobal, at www.washingtonpost.com. David Ignatius can be 
reached at davidignatius@washpost.com - Ed. 

(Washington Post Writers Group) 

2006.10.14
 
*****************************************************************
 6 INSIDE JoongAng Daily: [OUTLOOK] Sometimes we forgive too much

Octorber 14, 2006 KST 13:53 (GMT+9)                                                    
  		 	   	   		 	   	   		 	   	   		 	   	 	 
  South Korea's President Roh Moo-hyun is a fortunate man. Why?
Because his people are very forgiving. Observers might say it
makes no sense to call him fortunate. After all, Koreans are
facing hard times and now the North has claimed to have
conducted a nuclear test negotiating national security policy
has become like walking on thin ice. Let me explain.

 The U.S. President George W. Bush is the most powerful man in
the world. That is the reality whether he likes it or not. 
In a speech to the U.S. Congress on Jan. 28, 2003, Mr. Bush said
that Great Britain's intelligence agency had evidence Iraq was
making attempts to import uranium from Africa. That implied Iraq
was pursuing nuclear weapons. But when the United States
attacked Iraq, it found nothing to prove that.

 Ever since then, Mr. Bush has been criticized by the media. In
briefings at the White House, reporters continue to ask about
Saddam Hussein's lack of nuclear materials. They say, "The
president told the people a lie, We need explanations."
Journalists even confronted the president, asking "When did Iraq
import uranium?"

 As a correspondent from Korea, I find this hard to understand.
President Bush never said that Iraq possessed nuclear weapons.
All he did was quote Britain's intelligence agency. But the
media has persistently confronted the world's most powerful man
as if the faulty British intelligence was his direct
responsibility. 

"Isn't this too much?" I asked an American reporter I met at a
seminar in Washington, DC. He answered, "The president should
take responsibility for everything concerning national security."

 Now, maybe it's clear why President Roh is a fortunate man. For
every mistaken assessment by Mr. Bush, President Roh seems to
have made ten. In July of 2003, in an interview with ABC, he
said "There is no evidence that North Korea has reproduced 8,000
nuclear fuel rods." 

In November 2004, in Los Angeles, he said North Korea's
rationale [for its nuclear ambitions and missiles] was partly
reasonable. In July this year, when North Korea test-fired a
salvo of missiles into the East Sea, a presidential advisor said
"they were not aimed at South Korea." 

Immediately after North Korea conducted a nuclear test on
Monday, President Roh held a press conference at the Blue House.
I wanted Korean reporters to confront him, American-style, on
behalf of South Koreans, asking, "How would you explain to the
people your misjudgments on national security and your remarks
on the North's nuclear program?" But no one asked him to take
responsibility. 

President Roh accepted questions from only three reporters,
while occasionally smiling as if the situation posed no threats
to his composure; then he left the room.

 President Roh once said he found it hard to serve as a
president. However, I think our media, which is too tame, make
South Korea an easy country in which to be president.

 One more thing. President Roh has lost a golden opportunity.
After the nuclear test he could have seized the initiative. He
could have taken his approval rating out of the basement. He
could have shown his capacity to be a leader. But he failed to
do any of these things.

 Mr. Bush did not make this mistake after the Sept. 11 terrorist
attacks. Then Mr. Bush had a poor approval rating which had been
sinking since he took office. Many regarded him as incompetent.
However, in that national crisis, he was determined to been seen
as the president of the country, it's undisputed leader in times
of trouble. Standing center stage at the White House, he
declared he would never forgive or compromise with terrorist
attacks. Wearing a safety helmet, he went to the Ground Zero and
embraced fire fighters.

 It's easy to argue now that the U.S. invasion of Iraq was a
mistake. However, Mr. Bush took the tough decisions required of
a leader who wishes to unite his country when chaos threatens in
a time of a crisis. 

If only President Roh had visited the truce line immediatley
after the North conducted its test, to shake hands with our
soldiers there who have to risk their lives to protect the
people, I think we would have all felt a lot more relieved. 

If he had said, "Fellow citizens, please trust me. I will
protect your way of life no matter what," instead of making
vague speeches at a sterile press conference, then I might have
beem moved to tears instead of scorn.
 
* The writer is the city news editor of the JoongAng Ilbo.
 

by Kim Chong-hyuk   
	  
  2006.10.13       
        	
Copyright by Joins.com, Inc.
*****************************************************************
 7 INSIDE JoongAng Daily: [EDITORIALS] Agreement is fragile

Octorber 14, 2006 KST 13:53 (GMT+9)

  Yesterday's South Korea-China summit had the same importance
as the UN Security Council meeting on North Korea's nuclear
test. The two countries have borders with North Korea, and give
it the most economic support. In particular, China is North
Korea's closest ally, and the chair country of the six-party
talks. Thus the policies of China and South Korea are a key
variable in the UN's dealings with Pyongyang. 

The two countries confirmed that the nuclear test was
unacceptable and that North Korea must abide by its promise to
denuclearize. They also urged North Korea to avoid any action
that could aggravate the situation and return to the six-party
talks. This means that China and South Korea have established a
strong framework for working together; neither will acknowledge
North Korea as a nuclear power and each demanded North Korea
abandon its nuclear programs. This agreement was desirable; it
meant the two countries stayed in step with the UN and the
current position of the UN Security Council. 

Yet, the two countries left open the possibility of friction
with the UN in the future, if the UN intensifies its actions
against the North. Both South Korea and China attached the
condition that their support will only be given to "necessary
and proper" measures; which seems to imply that the two
countries will oppose military sanctions. It also appears that
two will carefully monitor financial sanctions. As a South
Korean official put it, "We will participate if the financial
sanctions are effective and if they are in concert with what the
two leaders confirmed to be necessary and proper." 

When the UN Security Council presents its first draft resolution
on financial sanctions, South Korea and China will submit it to
careful scrutiny to make sure it suits their own interests.

South Korea has the Kaesong Industrial Complex to protect. More
crucially, China supplies 90 percent of North Korea's oil and
they exchange thousands of truckloads of goods every month. 

Yesterday's summit meeting was only the start. Soon, when the UN
resolution is enforced, there is the risk of more conflict
between the nations involved. In that case, the UN Security
Council's sanctions are bound to lose their impact and North
Korea wil try to make use of that. If South Korea again takes an
ambiguous attitude toward North Korea, differences between South
Korea and the United States are bound to deepen. In that case,
how can we guarantee the protection of the nuclear umbrella?   
	  
  2006.10.13       

Copyright by Joins.com, Inc. Terms of Use |
*****************************************************************
 8 INSIDE JoongAng Daily: [VIEWPOINT]Can the North ever be tamed?

Octorber 14, 2006 KST 13:53 (GMT+9)    

  Former President Kim Young-sam mercilessly criticized former
President Kim Dae-jung and President Roh Moo-hyun for having
championed the engagement policy toward North Korea in the face
of the whole nation. At a luncheon meeting held at the Blue
House on Tuesday Mr. Kim said, "The situation we are in now is
brought to us because former President Kim Dae-jung started the
sunshine policy and President Roh Moo-hun, succeeding Mr. Kim's
sunshine policy unfolded the engagement policy." He also asked
the two to apologize to the people.

 It is regrettable to point out, but it was former President Kim
Young-sam himself who started the "wrong engagement policy"
toward North Korea. When he took power in 1993, he had the
ambition to be a national leader, surpassing the status of being
the first civilian president. In his inaugural address, Kim
Young-sam proposed a summit meeting with North Korean leader Kim
Il-sung. In the address, he mentioned a phrase that no previous
presidents remarked before: "No ally can be better than the same
nation." 

Does that remark mean that North Korea is better than the United
States or Japan? The conservatives opened their eyes wide. The
next day, Han Wan-sang, then deputy prime minister and minister
of national unification and current president of the Red Cross,
said at a press interview held upon his inauguration, "The
unification, reconciliation and happiness of the same nation is
more important than any thoughts or ideologies." It was another
theory which put priority to the same nation.

 Something finally happened two weeks later. Kim Young-sam
announced that he would send long-term prisoner Lee In-mo, 76,
who had refused to convert from communism, to North Korea
without conditions. Mr. Lee was the one North Korea asked to
repatriate to the North because he suffered from illness but had
no family members or relatives in the South who could take care
of him, although he was released from prison in October 1988,
after serving a prison term of 34 years. The Roh Tae-woo
administration had been playing a tug of war with North Korea on
the basis of reciprocity. The Roh administration asked North
Korea to agree on the family reunion plan which included the
establishment of a meeting place for separated family members
dispersed to the South and North and allowing mutual visits of
the family members to the other side in return for the
repatriation of Lee In-mo. But Kim Young-sam simply threw away
this important card.

 Two days later, a betraying return message arrived from North
Korea. It was North Korea's declaration that it would leave the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Kim Young-sam agonized
over the issue for some time. After a few days, he decided to
take the position of solving the nuclear problem through talks
and negotiations, and he sent Mr. Lee to the North as scheduled.
North Korea gave him and his family a lot of privileges. 

The North Korean regime showed its people that if anyone stands
by the communist belief, he would be rewarded with such
privileges. Lee In-mo, probably was an effective stimulant that
helped the North Korean people overcome a period of destitution
called, "The hardship march," during the mid-1990s. North Korea
was occupied with its nuclear development program and Kim
Young-sam started to realize that he made a wrong decision. In
his National Liberation Day address delivered on Aug. 15, 1993,
Mr. Kim proclaimed that "It is not possible to shake hands with
the one that holds nuclear weapons."

 Kim Jung-nam, who was in charge of the preparation of Kim
Young-sam's inaugural speech and who later became the senior
presidential secretary for education and culture, explained that
the phrase, "No ally is more important than the same nation,"
was addressed to North Korean leader Kim Il-sung, not the people
of South Korea. He said that it was a message, saying, "Your
trusted allies Russia and China established diplomatic relations
with us in the end. You should realize that the one you can
trust in the end is no one else but the same nation, South
Korea."

 Unfortunately, however, that statement contributed to the
growth of the nation priority theory that North Korea and
pro-North Korean forces in the South became so fond of.
 Kim Dae-jung and President Roh should have learned a lesson
from the costly mistake of Kim Young-sam. They should have
realized that reciprocity and alliance are important to tame
North Korea. But it did not have much educational effect on Kim
Dae-jung and President Roh.

 Kim Dae-jung in general succeeded in maintaining the Korea-U.S.
alliance. However, he failed to ask reciprocity in his deal with
the North. In order to materialize the historic South-North
summit meeting in 2000, he paid $450 million to North Korean
leader Kim Jong-il, but he failed to get back as much.

 President Roh has failed both in demanding reciprocity to North
Korea and in maintaining alliance with the United States
properly. He tried to abolish National Security Law, although
North Korea did not budge an inch to revise its cruel criminal
law. 

While North Korea was busy developing nuclear weapons, we clung
to the issue of transferring the wartime control of our troops
from Washington. 

Although it is belated, the president must change his way of
thinking since the North which he tried to embrace so much has
finally tested a nuclear device.

 After all, this is now a problem which our nation's fate may
hinge upon.
 
* The writer is an editorial writer of the JoongAng Ilbo.
 
by Kim Jin   
	  
  2006.10.13       

Copyright by Joins.com, Inc. Terms of Use |
*****************************************************************
 9 INSIDE JoongAng Daily: [EDITORIALS] Time for harmony with U.S.

Octorber 14, 2006 KST 13:53 (GMT+9) 

  The United Nations Security Council yesterday adopted a
resolution to sanction North Korea. The resolution is softer
than a U.S. draft resolution but still covers very stern
measures. The question is how the South Korean government will
respond to it. The government says it will abide by the
resolution. But by looking at the atmosphere surrounding the
governing party, one wonders whether the administration will
implement the resolution as required. Some politicians blame the
United States for the North's nuclear test and some make
attempts to lower the level of sanctions. 

Kim Keun-tae, Uri party chairman, opposes joining the
Proliferation Security Initiative. He also said he would visit
the Kaesong Industrial Complex over which Seoul and Washington
are debating whether to end or continue business cooperation
between South and North Korea. 

Another big problem is that the government and the ruling party
have revealed their intention to continue business cooperation
in the Kaesong Industrial Complex and Mount Kumgang tourism
project. Washington believes that cash which is funneled to the
North through these businesses is used by North Korea for
developing weapons of mass destruction. The South Korean
government should consult closely with Washington to make an
agreement on this, whether it halts or continues those projects.

 Measures which can overly intensify tension on the Korean
Peninsula should be avoided. South Korea should have dialogue
with North Korea, if needed. However, now is not the right time
because North Korea has passed the line by conducting a nuclear
test. The most urgent thing to do for now is to make North Korea
feel that tremendous punishment is being made against it in
return for its nuclear test. It is not too late to have dialogue
with Pyongyang after implementing stern sanctions. In this way,
the odds in having dialogue become higher.

 North Korea does not care about South Korea. The North's
statement regarding its nuclear test is for the United States.
It is clear which path South Korea should take. South Korea
should know that a resolution cannot view the North's nuclear
crisis as an issue between the two Koreas. The North's nuclear
crisis is an international matter that the United Nations
Security Council has intervened in. Thus, perfect cooperation
with Washington is needed more than anything else. The ruling
party should bear in mind that this is the most crucial time for
national security and should drop dangerous ideas.   
	  
  2006.10.13       

Copyright by Joins.com, Inc. Terms of Use 
*****************************************************************
 10 SF Chron: The Nuclear Club Is Expanding / At loggerheads over North Korea
 
[San Francisco Chronicle] 
				 
Gloria Duffy 
Friday, October 13, 2006

North Korea's announcement on Sunday that it had tested a
nuclear weapon was hardly a bombshell, to make a bad pun. From
removing plutonium from power reactors to firing off ballistic
missiles July 4 to this crude underground nuclear test, Kim Jong
Il has done everything he has threatened to do in his 12-year
march toward full membership in the nuclear weapons club.
Treaties, negotiations, threats and sanctions have done little
to sway him from his path. 

And yet, "Dear Leader" must leap higher hurdles before his
nuclear weapons can directly threaten other countries. Further
testing, redesigning, manufacturing the warheads, additional
testing and re-engineering of missiles and then emplacing the
warheads on missiles and successfully deploying them are a few
of the steps the North Koreans still need to take to be able to
directly threaten other countries with nuclear weapons. This
process will take from a number of months to a few years. 

We do have the military power to strike the North Korean test
sites now and to set back their nuclear program significantly.
The risk of this approach, however, is North Korean military
retaliation against South Korea, and possibly Japan, and that
must be weighed against the benefits of any such a strike by the
United States or its allies. 

To continue down their nuclear road, the North Koreans still
need funds, technology and components from outside the
Democratic People's Republic (DPRK). Thus, a viable approach for
the United States and its allies in dealing with this threat is
to adopt what I would call "defensive sanctions," designed to
prevent the North Koreans from obtaining full nuclear weapons
capability and to keep them from exporting WMD-related
technologies to other countries or terrorist groups. 

On Wednesday, the Bush administration prudently proposed to
inspect all cargo moving in and out of North Korea for
nuclear-related contraband. The necessary adjunct to this is
financial intervention to cut off the flow of money, much of it
from illegal activities such as drug trafficking and
counterfeiting, that Kim Jong Il uses to fund his military and
weapons programs. Cooperation from North Korea's neighbors,
especially trading partners South Korea, China, Japan and
Russia, will be necessary for these measures to work. 

Defensive sanctions are distinct from what might be called
"punitive sanctions," such as cutting off aid or trade more
broadly, which seem to have little effect on the DPRK's
behavior. Punitive sanctions also punish North Korean citizens,
which Kim Jong Il uses to demonize the United States, thus
strengthening the siege mentality among the North Korean people. 

While actively denying North Korea access to further weapons
technology, the longer-term solution to the anti-social behavior
of this rogue nation will be increasing penetration of
information, media, ideas, consumer goods and human contact from
more advanced societies. Ultimately, these are the forces that
brought down the Iron Curtain and the Berlin Wall, are causing
China to evolve from within, and will likely sweep Castroism
from Cuba when Fidel and his brother Raul pass from the scene.
South Korea's "sunshine policy" of the past few years is
designed to produce such a result in North Korea and should be
continued, balanced with the defensive sanctions described
above. 

Standing back from the crisis with North Korea, the worldwide
situation with regard to the spread of nuclear weapons is grim.
With Pakistan in 1998, North Korea today and perhaps Iran in the
future joining the nuclear club, the international
nonproliferation regime is tattered. 

I have always thought it a quaint notion that nuclear power for
generating energy could spread without leading to the spread of
nuclear weapons. Once a country has nuclear power reactors, it
has access to the basic material -- plutonium or enriched
uranium -- to make nuclear weapons. Once it obtains facilities
to reprocess plutonium or further enrich uranium, which are
available either on the black market or through controversial
sales such as Russia's offers of enrichment capabilities to
Iran, a country can manufacture a bomb relatively easily. 

Each of the countries that have obtained nuclear weapons over
the past three decades -- India, Pakistan and North Korea -- has
done it under the guise of generating civilian nuclear power.
Iran is following the same path. North Korea got its nuclear
reactors from the Soviet Union, Iran from Russia, India from
Canada and Pakistan from Canada, China and France. 

A framework of treaties and inspections was designed in the
1960s and 1970s to establish a firewall between commercial
nuclear power generation and nuclear weapons. But that structure
is not effective when countries choose to opt out of it, as
several countries are doing today. 

We should remember this as we contemplate reinvigorating the
nuclear power industry as a "clean energy" solution, in our
effort to avoid global warming. Continuing to spread nuclear
technology worldwide could be the dirtiest energy solution ever,
as it produces more nuclear weapons to threaten global peace and
stability. 

Gloria Duffy, president and CEO of the Commonwealth Club,
negotiated nuclear disarmament agreements for the United States
as a Pentagon official during the Clinton administration. 				
Page B - 11 			
The San Francisco Chronicle] 

*****************************************************************
 11 AFP: China says will back 'appropriate' NKorea sanctions - 

 Friday October 13, 09:48 AM 

  [South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun (L) with his Chinese 
counterpart Hu Jintao at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing]   
    
BEIJING (AFP) - China and South Korea have pledged to back
"appropriate" UN Security Council measures against North Korea
as world powers groped for a deal on how to punish the regime
for its declared nuclear test.

At talks in Beijing dominated by the crisis, President Hu Jintao
and South Korean counterpart Roh Moo-hyun condemned the test but
did not discuss details of a US-proposed draft resolution being
debated by diplomats.

The move came amid intense haggling at the United Nations
(Advertisement)
[ src=]  on the scale and nature of sanctions and ahead of a
high-level US diplomatic drive to reign in the Stalinist nation.

"The two leaders agreed to support appropriate and necessary
countermeasures by the UN Security Council against North Korea,"
Roh's chief security adviser Song Min-soon said.

Song said the leaders did not go into specifics of the draft,
adding only that "both parties will hold follow-up negotiations
on the effects of UN-led or individual sanctions."

 The United States earlier said that it had narrowed differences
with China and Russia on a resolution that would impose tough
sanctions, although it was unclear when a vote might take place.

China, North Korea's closest ally and biggest aid donor and
trade partner, is key to agreeing a unified response in the
nuclear crisis but has cautioned that "punishment is not the
goal" of sanctions.

South Korea, for its part, has long championed a policy of
engagement with Pyongyang, fearing it has most to lose from
instability that would result from the collapse of one of the
world's most impoverished and isolated states.

Speaking during a break in their talks, Roh said that he and Hu
agreed to work closer together on North Korea.

"I hope we will continue to strengthen our cooperation on this
issue," Roh said. "In the small group meeting we have also
reached consensus towards this end."

Meanwhile Japanese news agencies reported US Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice would visit China, South Korea and Japan next
week for high-level talks.

Citing unidentified sources in Washington, they said the trip,
along with the push for sanctions at the UN Security Council,
was meant to send a "strong message" to Pyongyang after Monday's
shock announcement that it had tested an atom bomb for the first
time.

According to the New York Times, Rice may be looking for
punitive measures "over and above" those being considered at the
United Nations.

The State Department in Washington was unable to confirm the
reports, which said Rice would be in Japan on Tuesday or
Wednesday before heading on to China and then South Korea.

Separately, Moscow announced Russian Prime Minister Mikhail
Fradkov would visit Seoul next Tuesday for talks with his South
Korean opposite number Han Myeong-Sook on the crisis.

The RIA Novosti news agency said Russian Deputy Foreign Minister
Alexander Alexeyev had flown Friday to North Korea for talks.

The diplomatic shuttle means senior officials from all sides
involved in six-nation talks on Pyongyang's nuclear programme
will be in the region next week.

The talks, which North Korea has boycotted since last November,
groups the two Koreas, China, Japan, Russia and the United
States.

Japan meanwhile approved its own bilateral sanctions, including
a complete ban on imports and all visits by North Korean ships.

"The additional sanctions are going to take effect at midnight
(1500 GMT)," Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuhisa Shiozaki told
reporters.

In New York, the United States said it hoped a UN Security
Council vote on sanctions could be held by the end of the week.

"I don't want to say we've reached agreement yet," US ambassador
to the UN John Bolton told reporters Thursday, "but many of the
significant differences have been closed, very much to our
satisfaction."

The US draft condemns the test, calls for inspection of all
seaborne cargo to and from North Korea and an array of financial
and military sanctions.

It also demands Pyongyang scrap all programmes involving nuclear
weapons, other weapons of mass destruction and ballistic
missiles.

However it dropped an earlier Japanese demand that all UN member
states bar North Korean ships and aircraft from their airports
and seaports.

In Seoul, an estimated 2,000 protesters angry at Roh's
"sunshine" policy torched North Korean flags and portraits of
its leader Kim Jong-Il. They also called on Roh to quit
dithering over how to punish Pyongyang.

"Overthrow Kim Jong-Il!" they chanted. "Kim Jong-Il is a
criminal who made atomic bombs!" 

AFP
*****************************************************************
 12 Korea Times: NKs Nuclear Threat - Now What? 

Hankooki.com > The Korea Times > Opinion   

Ralph A. Cossa
 President of Pacific Forum,
 Center for Strategic &Int¡¯l Studies

 North Korea's Nuclear Threat: Now What? HONOLULU, Hawaii -
North Korea announced on Tuesday that it ``will, in the future,
conduct a nuclear weapons test,¡¯¡¯ promising that it will be
done under conditions where ``safety is firmly guaranteed.¡¯¡¯
While Pyongyang did not say when this test would occur, it made
it clear that it felt compelled to take such action because of
``the U.S. extreme threat of a nuclear war and sanctions and
pressure.¡¯¡¯ 

Should we take this threat seriously? North Korea has threatened
such action before, although only in private. A public threat
such as this is difficult to ignore (although many will try to
do just that). Some will speculate that this is merely another
attention-getting device (Iran-envy?), and this may be at least
partially true. It may also be aimed at drawing attention from
an imminent South Korean success story _ the anticipated
selection of South Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki-Moon to be
Kofi Annan's successor as U.N. Secretary General. Examples of
previous attempts by North Korea to get attention and/or to
upstage the South are too numerous to recount here.

 Pyongyang may be bluffing, hoping that this will force
Washington to lift its financial restrictions against North
Korea's counterfeiting and money laundering operations or at
least accept bilateral negotiations on the nuclear issue _ to
date, Washington has said it would only meet the North
bilaterally within the context of the broader six-party talks
(also involving South Korea, China, Japan, and Russia).
Pyongyang may see this as a ``win-win¡¯¡¯ gambit: either
Washington gives in to its demands for direct negotiations
(which is unlikely) or renewed disputes about Washington's

``inflexibility¡¯¡¯ will drive deeper wedges between Washington
and its negotiating partners, especially in Seoul and Beijing,
while also playing into domestic U.S. election year politics.
North Korea's next step may be to do nothing at all, other than
to sit back and watch the rest of the world argue about what to
do next.

 It is also possible that Pyongyang really means what it says,
and that it will soon conduct a nuclear weapons test, hoping
that unlike its July 2006 missile tests _ which resulted in a
rare instance of international condemnation (including a
surprisingly tough U.N. Security Council resolution) _ this time
the international community will fail to speak with one voice
and institute even harsher measures. If we choose to wait and it
turns out that Pyongyang is not bluffing, we will be faced with
nothing but bad choices.

 The best way to deter Pyongyang from taking this next step is
to send clear signals in advance that there will be severe
consequences if such actions are taken. While Washington seems
prepared to lead this charge, unfortunately it has the least
leverage over the North (unless it plans to capitulate to
Pyongyang's demands). There is little that Washington (or Tokyo)
can do, politically or financially, that it has not already done
and military actions are simply not an option. If we are to
``preempt¡¯¡¯ a North Korean nuclear test, it must be done
politically, not militarily.

 The real leverage rests with Seoul and Beijing; no threatened
consequences are credible if not fully backed by these two
nations and, preferably, by Moscow as well. Seoul should
announce that a nuclear test will result in a halt to all
political and economic exchanges between the North and South
(other than humanitarian assistance, which would be funneled
exclusively through the U.N.). After all, Seoul has long stated
that it ``will not tolerate¡¯¡¯ a nuclear North Korea. While it
has chosen to dismiss the North's earlier claims to already be a
nuclear weapons state, the Roh Moo-Hyun administration's
international credibility (and perhaps even the fabric of the
U.S.-ROK alliance) will be severely tested if it fails to
respond to an actual nuclear test.

 China and Russia should issue similar statements, plainly
stating that the North Korean regime's threatening tactics must
change. Beijing should also set a date certain for the next
round of six-party talks to discuss the crisis, while making it
clear that a ``six-minus-one¡¯¡¯ session will occur if the North
refuses to come. Washington should encourage Seoul and Beijing
to take the lead on this issue and look for other sympathetic
Security Council members (the French come immediately to mind)
to help take the lead in building an international consensus
aimed at sending Pyongyang a strong message, in advance of a
nuclear test, as to just how severe the consequences of such an
action would be.

 There is another option. Beijing, Seoul, and the never-ending
(and growing) legions of Bush administration critics can
continue their internecine arguments and finger-pointing and
hope that Pyongyang is really bluffing. Of course, if they guess
wrong, we will then be faced with the near-impossible task of
trying to put the nuclear genie back in the bottle. At that
point, the only options will be to accept North Korea as a
nuclear weapons state or take the much more difficult (and
potentially dangerous) political, economic, and limited military
actions (short of an all-out war) required to bring about regime
change in North Korea. 
10-13-2006 18:49         
  
*****************************************************************
 13 Korea Times: Nuclear Blackmail 

Hankooki.com > The Korea Times > Opinion   

 Unprecedented Security Situation Requires Totally New Response 
 
North Korea¡¯s test of a nuclear weapon has ushered in a
security environment that has never been experienced on this
peninsula. Our military authorities need to work out new
strategic security countermeasures focused on defense against
nuclear bombs. Though the debate over whether or not the test
was successful continues nationwide, we have to push ahead with
relevant preparedness measures under the presumptions that
Pyongyang is equipped with nuclear weapons and that we are
already under siege.

 The Defense Ministry has already worked out a long-term
military buildup program to be conducted by 2020 in preparation
for the return of wartime operational control from the U.S. But
the buildup program with an emphasis of deterring conventional
war has become insignificant in the face of a weapon of mass
destruction.

 Defense Minister Yoon Kwang-ung rightly pointed out in
testimony to the National Assembly that our defense strategy
based on non-nuclear weaponry has to be revamped to meet the new
security environment.

 Military drills against nuclear attacks based on a new
strategic plan will have to be intensified. More importantly, we
have to seek ways to use the U.S. nuclear umbrella more
effectively. Some analysts are calling for Washington to supply
the U.S. forces in Korea with tactical nuclear weapons again.
But others oppose the idea on the grounds that it could ignite a
nuclear arms race on the peninsula.

 The idea should be considered if the situation worsens. The
important thing at this point is to maintain close military
cooperation with allied nations. However, South Korea is feared
to be separating from the U.S. on the intensity of the sanctions
to be imposed against the North. In particular, a leader of the
ruling Uri Party expressed his opposition to joining the
Americanled Proliferation Security Initiative aimed at
intercepting North Korean ships suspected of carrying weapons
materials for fear of provoking an armed clash between the South
and North.

 The U.N. Security Council is expected to shortly adopt a
stringent resolution calling for all member nations to slap
sanctions on Pyongyang. We need to be in step with the
international community, which positively wants to punish the
North. However, the lawmakers of the ruling camp are opposing
even stringent economic sanctions, calling for the continuation
of the engagement policy. They may be worrying that Pyongyang,
if driven into further economic hardship, could become more
dangerous.

 But at this crucial juncture, nothing is more dangerous than
being isolated from the international community. We shouldn¡¯t
treat the North as if nothing has happened. It is time to keep
pace with the U.S. and other allied nations. That is the best
way to deal with the crisis, both diplomatically and militarily. 
10-13-2006 18:48         
  
*****************************************************************
 14 AFP: North Korea says ready to talk as Security Council readies resolution - 

 Fri Oct 13, 12:56 PM ET 		 	 

MOSCOW (AFP) - North Korea" /> has said it was ready to talk as 
world powers reached a tentative deal on a package of sanctions 
to punish Pyongyang for its declared nuclear test four days 
earlier. 

 North Korean officials "in the near future... want to resolve 
problems connected to denuclearisation on the Korean peninsula 
through negotiations," Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander 
Alexeyev was quoted as saying in the North Korean capital on 
Friday. 

There is "a desire to find a way out of the existing crisis 
situation and to find a way to restart six-sided talks," 
ITAR-TASS news agency quoted Alexeyev as saying. 

Earlier Friday, Russia's foreign ministry press service quoted 
Alexeyev as saying: "We intend to do everything we can to prevent 
a worst-case, confrontational scenario." 

His visit to Pyongyang came as the UN Security Council edged 
closer to a package of sanctions, with the US ambassador to the 
United Nations" /> saying on Friday that the council had reached 
a tentative agreement on a compromise draft resolution. 

US Ambassador John Bolton told reporters on Friday that the vote
would take place "tomorrow morning", after the text is
finalised, with possible "additional changes". 

Japan's UN envoy Kenzo Oshima, the council's president for
October, confirmed that a vote was planned for Saturday morning. 

"All council members are asked to come back tomorrow," Oshima
said. 

The latest text, drafted by council experts late Thursday after
envoys of UN powers resolved some of the key outstanding issues,
invokes Article 41 of the UN Charter, which authorises sanctions
not involving the use of force, such as economic and diplomatic
sanctions. 

This was a key concession to veto-wielding China, North Korea's
closest ally and its biggest provider of aid, which insisted on
including Article 41. 

The White House, meanwhile, denied on Friday any ideological
split with China -- North Korea's closest ally but which led
condemnation over Monday's test -- over the content of the
resolution, and said the draft document was "very good". 

The draft, essentially based on US proposals, calls for
wide-ranging economic, military and financial sanctions,
particularly targeting North Korea's nuclear, ballistic missile
and other weapons of mass destruction programs. 

It drops a blanket arms embargo in an earlier draft and instead
calls for a ban targeting missiles, tanks, warships and combat
aircraft as well as inspection of all cargo to and from North
Korea. 

It also calls on Pyongyang to return immediately to six-party
nuclear disarmament talks "without precondition". 

Japan's new Prime Minister Shinzo Abe pledged Friday to do as
much as possible to implement the sanctions. 

"If the United Nations adopts a resolution (on sanctions), Japan
will do as much as possible about it as a matter of course," Abe
told reporters at his executive office. 

On Monday North Korea sparked worldwide condemnation with its
triumphant announcement that it had carried out its first atom
bomb test. 

One of the most isolated and impoverished nations in the world,
reliant on outside aid to feed its people, North Korea called
the blast a "historic event" that had been carried out safely
for the betterment of security and peace. 

China led world condemnation of the bomb test announced by
Pyongyang and initially called for punitive action, while South
Korea" /> said it may consider abandoning its "sunshine policy"
that has helped prop up the bankrupt communist state since 1998. 

North Korea has so far reacted defiantly, warning Wednesday that
it would regard harsh sanctions as a declaration of war and
threatened further atomic trials if the United States kept up
its pressure. 

There has still been no independent verification that Monday's
explosion was caused by a nuclear device, and air samples -- a
key piece of evidence to corroborate the North Korean claims --
collected by a US military aircraft showed "no evidence of
nuclear debris", a US defence official said Friday. 

"Sometime in the last 24 hours, the initial analysis came back
and there was no evidence of nuclear debris," said the official,
who spoke to AFP on condition of anonymity. 

"Based upon the analysis, we can't prove it was a nuclear
explosion, and we can't say it wasn't," said the official.
"We're sort of in a pickle." 

Also on Friday, the UN children's fund warned that any sanctions
must not affect children in North Korea. 

"UNICEF is concerned that whatever sanctions are imposed should
be designed and implemented in such a way as to avoid a negative
impact on children," a spokesman for the agency, Michael
Borciukiw, said. 	 		 			

Copyright © 2006 Agence France Presse. All rights reserved. The
*****************************************************************
 15 AFP: UN vote on NKorea sanctions in doubt after Russian, Chinese objections - 

 Fri Oct 13, 7:50 PM ET 		 	 

UNITED NATIONS (AFP) - Last-minute Russian and Chinese objections 
to a compromise draft resolution on mandatory sanctions against 
North Korea" /> North Koreaover its declared nuclear test cast 
doubt on prospects for a vote Saturday, diplomats said Friday. 

 US Ambassador John Bolton said that during private consultations 
among key UN powers Friday, the Russian delegations called for 
some changes after receiving instructions from Moscow. 

"I thought we had agreed to go to a vote tomorrow morning," the
US envoy said. 

He said envoys of the council's five veto-wielding members --
Britain, China, France, Russia and the United States -- plus
Japan would now meet Saturday morning prior to private
consultations by the full 15-member council to take stock ahead
of a decision on a vote. 

"The vast majority of members want to vote as soon as possible,"
Bolton told reporters, adding that the co-sponsors were now
awaiting to hear from their Russian and Chinese colleagues once
they get new instructions from their capitals overnight. 

Earlier, Bolton said the Council had reached a tentative
agreement on a draft resolution mandating wide-ranging and
legally binding sanctions on North Korea, but excluding the use
of force. 

US ambassador to the UN John Bolton told reporters that the vote
would take place on Saturday morning after the text was
finalized with only cosmetic changes. 

But asked if a vote would take place Saturday, China's UN envoy
Wang Guangya replied: "It all depends on the final text--
because we are not at the final text yet." 

In Moscow, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov cast doubt on
whether the UN Security Council would present a united front at
Saturday"s meeting. 

Speaking Friday after a meeting with a senior Chinese official
in Moscow, Lavrov said that the current draft resolution
"contains elements that should be discussed and clarified and on
which we will work," Russia's RIA-Novosti news agency reported. 

After Friday's meeting in Moscow with Tang Jiaxuan, a member of
China's state council, Lavrov said China and Russia agreed "on
the need to condemn this provocative challenge from Pyongyang." 

"On the other hand, we have a common position with China on the
necessity of pursuing a balanced approach, not to give in to
emotions, to some extreme sanctions," Interfax news agency
quoted Lavrov as saying. 

Copyright © 2006 Agence France Presse. All rights reserved. The
*****************************************************************
 16 AFP: Angry Japan slams door on NKorean imports 

 by Harumi Ozawa Fri Oct 13, 7:52 AM ET 		 	 

TOKYO (AFP) - Japan has banned all imports from North Korea" /> , 
hoping to inflict pain on the communist state's fragile economy 
in retaliation for its nuclear test. 

 Packing their boats with bicycles, appliances and whatever else 
they could find, North Koreans raced to meet a midnight (1500 
GMT) deadline for their 22 ships to leave Japanese ports on 
Friday. 

Japan's unilateral move cuts off a market for North Korean 
money-makers such as clams and crabs along with matsutake 
mushrooms -- which fetch hefty prices in Japan for their 
supposedly refined flavor. 

Japan hopes the ban will have repercussions on North Korea, Trade 
Minister Akira Amari said after a cabinet meeting approved the 
measures. 

Exports of marine products and matsutake mushrooms "have been a
source of financing for their military," Amari said. "I think
there will be a considerable impact." 

In Sakai port in western Tottori prefecture, where 11 North
Korean ships were docked, crew members bound a mountain of
second-hand bicycles onto their boat. 

"The crew members seem to be in a hurry loading lots of goods as
they have to leave today," said port official Yasutake Nakamura. 

In northern Otaru port, the four North Korean cargo ships that
had brought sea urchins to Japan were taking back everything
they could, said local official Makoto Chikazawa. 

"They left with loads of goods, from old bicycles to fridges to
desks," Chikazawa said. 

Japan's action comes as it lobbies at the UN Security Council
for international sanctions against North Korea. Japan is
particularly sensitive as Pyongyang fired a missile over its
main island in 1998. 

But Japan has already slapped most of the sanctions at its
disposal against North Korea, which conducts the bulk of its
limited trade with China and South Korea" /> . 

"I don't think the damage incurred by Japanese unilateral
sanctions is going to be significant," said Lee Yong-hwa, a
North Korea expert at Japan's Kansai University. "The amount of
trade with Japan is limited." 

Japan imported 17.6 billion yen (148 million dollars) worth of
goods -- largely seafood, mushrooms and tailored suits -- from
the North in 2004. 

Japan banned the main ship between the countries, visits by
diplomats and charter flights in response to Pyongyang's missile
tests in early July. 

On Wednesday, Japan said it would not allow visits by any North
Korean nationals, apart from the thousands of North Koreans who
were born in Japan in a legacy of Tokyo's brutal colonial rule
of the Korean peninsula. 

Details of the sanctions were announced Wednesday but needed the
final green light from Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's cabinet. 

Abe, who took office last month after a career built as a
hardliner on North Korea, has vowed to make the communist state
pay dearly for its nuclear test announced Monday. 

His government said the sanctions were part of Abe's pledge to
create a more assertive Japan that does not wait in defending
its interests. 

US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice" /> is reportedly due to
visit China, Japan and South Korea next week. 

But Yuriko Koike, the national security advisor to Abe, warned
that US attention could drift with US midterm elections coming
up and tension over Iran" /> and Iraq" /> . 

"What I'm interested in after visiting the United States is
watching how much concern and commitment we can attract from the
United States," Koike said. 

In an interview with Kyodo News in Pyongyang released Thursday,
Song Il-ho, the North Korean ambassador handling relations with
Japan, warned of "strong countermeasures" in response to the
sanctions. 

Japan's land ministry summoned about 30 officials to a meeting
to urge them to increase surveillance against possible attacks
by North Korean agents. 

"Make sure to have more thorough checks at every place, so
people will not worry," Yoshiaki Hirayama, the ministry's
official in charge of crisis management, told them. 

Japan's police chief Iwao Uruma also urged stations nationwide
to be on high alert. 	 		 			

Copyright © 2006 Agence France Presse. All rights reserved. The
*****************************************************************
 17 AFP: US prepared to face threats of retaliatory action by NKorea - official - 

 Fri Oct 13, 3:37 PM ET 		 	 

WASHINGTON (AFP) - The United States is prepared to face any 
threats of retaliatory action by North Korea North Koreaover 
new sanctions to be imposed on the hardline communist nation 
following its announced nuclear test, a senior State Department 
official said. 

 North Korea threatened Wednesday to take "physical
countermeasures" as the United States moved to secure tough
sanctions at the United Nations United NationsSecurity
Council. Pyongyang also warned of a possible "declaration of
war." 

"I can assure you we have a very strong alliance with Japan,
with South Korea South Korea, we have forces in the area,"
Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill said when asked to
respond to Pyongyang's retaliation threats. 

"I can assure you we can deal with these sorts of belligerent
threats. I would also point out, though, that just because the
North Koreans make these blood-curdling threats isn't a reason
to back down in the face of them. It's a reason to be prepared
to be clear-eyed and be ready, and we are," Hill said at a
Washington forum. 

He spoke as the UN Security Council reached a tentative accord
Friday on a compromise draft resolution mandating wide-ranging
sanctions against North Korea over its declared nuclear test. 

The council will vote on it Saturday. 

Hill said North Korea had a penchant for making threats using
its nuclear weapons as cover. 

"There are probably a million reasons they should not have
nuclear weapons, but one of those million reasons is they are
always threatening people with various things. 

"And, frankly, that has got to stop," he said. 

Hill also said that the expected economic, military and
financial UN sanctions -- particularly targeting North Korea's
nuclear, ballistic missile and other weapons of mass destruction
programs -- would make the hardline communist state "far more
isolated than ever before. 

"Now is the time to be calm but firm and make clear to North
Korea that no one is going to accept it as a nuclear weapons
state," he said. 

On North Korea's closest ally China's position on the sanctions,
Hill said Beijing had made very clear it wanted them "to be
painful to the North Korean regime." 

A draft UN resolution mandating the sanctions against North
Korea also demands that Pyongyang scrap all of its programs
involving nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) and ballistic missiles "in a complete, verifiable and
irreversible manner." 

It also calls on Pyongyang to return immediately to six-party
nuclear disarmament talks "without precondition" and provides
for a travel ban on senior North Korean officials involved in
the nuclear, ballistic missile and other WMD-related programs. 

Copyright © 2006 Agence France Presse. All rights reserved. The
*****************************************************************
 18 AFP: Security Council reaches tentative accord on NKorea sanctions - US envoy - 

 Fri Oct 13, 1:01 PM ET 		 	 

UNITED NATIONS (AFP) - The UN Security Council reached a 
tentative agreement on a compromise draft resolution mandating 
wide-ranging sanctions against North Korea" /> North Koreaover 
its declared nuclear test and will vote on it Saturday, the US 
ambassador has said. 

 US Ambassador John Bolton told reporters that the vote would
take place "tomorrow morning", after the text is finalized, with
possible "additional changes" later in the day. 

"The council has agreed basically that we'll put our text in
blue (meaning that it is ready for adoption) this afternoon and
vote tomorrow morning," the US envoy said. "We do have unanimous
agreement." 

Japan's UN envoy Kenzo Oshima, the council's president for
October, confirmed that a vote was planned for Saturday morning. 

"All council members are asked to come back tomorrow," Oshima
said. 

The latest text, drafted by council experts late Thursday after
envoys of UN powers resolved some of the key outstanding issues,
invokes Article 41 of the UN Charter, which authorizes sanctions
not involving the use of force, such as economic and diplomatic
sanctions. 

This was a key concession to veto-wielding China, North Korea's
closest ally and its biggest provider of aid, which insisted on
including Article 41. 

The text, a copy of which was obtained by AFP, "condemns" last
Monday's announced nuclear test in defiance of a Security
Council resolution, "acting under Chapter Seven of the Charter
of the United Nations" /> United Nations, and taking measures
under its Article 41". 

The draft, essentially based on US proposals, calls for
wide-ranging economic, military and financial sanctions,
particularly targeting North Korea's nuclear, ballistic missile
and other weapons of mass destruction programs. 

It drops a blanket arms embargo in an earlier draft and instead
calls for a ban targeting missiles, tanks, warships and combat
aircraft and calls for inspection of all cargo to and from North
Korea. 

It demands that Pyongyang scrap all of its programs involving
nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and
ballistic missiles "in a complete, verifiable and irreversible
manner." 

It also calls on Pyongyang to return immediately to six-party
nuclear disarmament talks "without precondition" and provides
for a travel ban on senior North Korean officials involved in
the nuclear, ballistic missile and other WMD-related programs. 

Copyright © 2006 Agence France Presse. All rights reserved. The
*****************************************************************
 19 AFP: Latest UN NKorea draft rules out use of force - report - 

 Fri Oct 13, 10:36 AM ET 		 	 

WASHINGTON (AFP) - The latest draft of a UN resolution responding 
to North Korea" /> 's nuclear test says that the measure does not 
pave the way for military action, according to reports. 

 "The preliminary deal was struck after the United States,
acting at the request of China, included assurances that the
resolution could not be used as a pretext for future military
action against North Korea," The Washington Post said Friday
without giving a source. 

The new version of the text was hammered out late Thursday by
envoys of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council
and Japan, after China's UN ambassador said Beijing still had
problems with the existing US draft. 

Wang Guangya suggested that Beijing would only accept sanctions
not involving the use of force, such as economic and diplomatic
sanctions. 

Any resolution "should be helpful for leading to a solution of
this issue by peaceful means, and it should also create
conditions for the parties to once again, in negotiations, to
settle this issue," the Chinese envoy added. 

In response to that concern, US Ambassador John Bolton stressed
that authorization of force requires a separate resolution. 

Bolton expressed satisfaction with the latest compromise draft,
saying few changes had been introduced to the text. 

"I don't want to say we've reached agreement yet, but many of
the significant differences have been closed, very much to our
satisfaction," Bolton told reporters after attending a private
meeting of envoys of six major UN powers at France's UN mission
in New York. 

Copyright © 2006 Agence France Presse. All rights reserved. The
*****************************************************************
 20 AFP: Rice plans Asia trip to confer on North Korea test - US official

 Fri Oct 13, 2:11 PM ET 		 	 

WASHINGTON (AFP) - US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice" /> 
Condoleezza Ricewill travel to Asia next week to discuss North 
Korea" /> North Korea's declared nuclear test with leaders in the 
region, State Department spokesman Sean McCormack said. 

 From October 17 to 22, Rice will head to Tokyo, Seoul and
Beijing to focus on the international response to North Korea's
nuclear test, announced earlier this week. 

Referring to a draft resolution now before the UN Security
Council that calls for imposing punitive sanctions on North
Korea, McCormack said: "She's going to be talking about how to
go about actually implementing that resolution." 

The trip also would provide the top US diplomat a chance "to
reaffirm and talk about the strength of our existing alliances
there," the spokesman said. 

Rice planned to hold "a wider conversation with others in the
region about the current situation, about the security
situation, and also to talk broadly about non-proliferation
efforts," he said. 

Copyright © 2006 Agence France Presse. All rights reserved. The
*****************************************************************
 21 AFP: White House has no definitive word on NKorea nuclear test -
     
 Fri Oct 13, 3:42 PM ET 		 	 

WASHINGTON (AFP) - The White House said it had no definitive word 
on whether North Korea" /> North Koreahad carried out a nuclear 
test as intelligence agencies were still conducting an analysis. 

 "We still do not have any definitive statement on it. We talked 
to DNI (the Director of National Intelligence's office) just a 
couple of minutes ago. They still think the analysis that they 
are doing may take take another day or two," White House 
spokesman Tony Snow said. 

"They don't have a deadline for this," he added. 

The White House spokesman's remarks came as a defense official 
said that air samples carried out by US military aircraft found 
no evidence of nuclear debris that would have confirmed a test 
took place. 

The North Koreans "have been trying to test the unity and the 
will of the parties. And if there is no test, our position 
remains the same: We don't want a nuclear Korean Peninsula; we 
want a non-nuclear" one, Snow said. 

"What's now happened is that the international community has 
said: No more carrots, no more rewards for bad behavior. There 
are going to be punishments. There are going to be consequences 
for bad behavior," he said. 

Air samples collected by a US military aircraft after North
Korea announced it had conducted a nuclear test showed "no
evidence of nuclear debris," a US defense official said Friday. 

The defense official said the samples were collected by a WC-135
aircraft on October 10, the day after the test announced by
North Korea. 

"Sometime in the last 24 hours, the initial analysis came back
and there was no evidence of nuclear debris," said the official,
who spoke to AFP on condition of anonymity. 

A final analysis was expected either later today or Saturday but
was not expected to differ much from the initial analysis, he
said. 

"Based upon the analysis, we can't prove it was a nuclear
explosion, and we can't say it wasn't," said the official.
"We're sort of in a pickle." 

Seismographs detected a blast in North Korea estimated at the
equivalent of 200 tons of TNT, unusually low for a first-time
nuclear explosion. Historically, they have ranged between four
and 12 kilotons. 

North Korea is reported to have tipped off China that it was
testing a four-kiloton nuclear weapon. It has said the test was
conducted underground under very safe conditions. 

US intelligence officials say a possible explanation for the low
yield is that the North Korea blast might have resulted from a
nuclear test that did not go as planned. 

But officials also have left open the possibility that a test
deep underground may have muffled the seismic shock, leading to
a distorted reading of the blast. 

For that reason, air samples were considered a key piece of
evidence to corroborate the North Korean claim of a successful
nuclear test. 

Copyright © 2006 Agence France Presse. All rights reserved. The
*****************************************************************
 22 Japan Times: Pyongyang warns Tokyo on sanctions
 
japantimes.co.jp               

Friday, Oct. 13, 2006

 Pyongyang warns Tokyo on sanctions Diplomat vows strong
retaliation 

PYONGYANG (Kyodo) North Korea will take strong measures against
Japan if it goes ahead with new sanctions in response to the
nuclear test Pyongyang said it carried out Monday, according to
a senior North Korean diplomat. 

Song Il Ho, in charge of diplomatic normalization talks with
Japan, said in an interview Wednesday that Pyongyang is still
trying to assess what new Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has in mind
for Tokyo's relations with Pyongyang. 

"We will take strong countermeasures," Song said when asked
about fresh sanctions by Japan. "The specific contents will
become clear if you keep watching. We never speak empty words." 

Later Wednesday, Japan decided on a package of additional
economic sanctions against North Korea, including a ban on all
imports from the country. The package also bans North Korean
ships from entering Japanese ports and bars North Korean
nationals from entering Japan. 

The steps are in addition to sanctions Tokyo imposed shortly
after North Korea's missile tests in July and include the
effective ban on remittances from Japan to 15 entities suspected
of links to North Korean weapons of mass destruction programs. 

While the international community is also considering imposing
sanctions on North Korea, Pyongyang would regard Japan's
measures as "more serious in nature" compared with others
because Tokyo has yet to adequately atone for its 1910-1945
colonial rule of the Korean Peninsula, according to Song. 

"We will be taking countermeasures by calculating that in," Song
said. 

Song said Pyongyang is still trying to figure out what Abe, who
took office last month and is known for his hawkish views on
North Korea, plans to do regarding Japan-North Korea relations. 

"We are watching his words and actions since becoming prime
minister, in a careful manner," Song said. 

Of particular interest for North Korea is believed to be Abe's
position on the abductions of Japanese nationals by North Korean
agents in the 1970s and 1980s. Japan and North Korea differ over
the number of victims and the fates of some of them. 

Abe, a staunch sympathizer of the abductees and their kin, has
created a ministerial post for the issue and named a special
adviser to look into the problem. 

"We are currently studying to see where his true intentions
lie," Song said, referring to the new posts. 

Song said North Korea believes that in particular, Abe should
inform North Korea about where Japan is keeping the cremated
remains that Pyongyang claims belong to Megumi Yokota, a
Japanese abducted to North Korea at age 13 in 1977. 

The ashes, which Japan says are of two people other than Yokota,
are a main point of contention between the two nations. 

Song repeated North Korea's demand that if Japan believes the
ashes, given to a Tokyo government mission in 2004, are not
those of Yokota's, they should be returned to North Korea in
original form. 

Japanese government sources have said that would not be
possible, as the ashes have been used for DNA tests and could no
longer be returned in the form received. 

On the bilateral talks for normalizing relations that have
stalled since February, Song said he considers it inappropriate
to hold negotiations when Japan's economic sanctions are in
place. 

"I wonder if we can hold talks under these kinds of
circumstances," he said. 

The Japan Times (C) All rights reserved 

*****************************************************************
 23 AFP: Non-aligned nations ask moderation on nuclear NKorea - 

[Delegates and representatives from the Non-Alligned Movement]
  
HAVANA (AFP) - Non aligned countries called for moderation in
resolving North Korea's nuclear crisis, as well as an end to
testing and nuclear materials transfers, in a declaration.

"The Non Aligned Movement urges all involved in the region: to
exercise moderation, which contributes to regional security; to
discontinue nuclear tests; and to suspend the transfer of
nuclear materials, equipment and technology related to nuclear
weapons," the text said.

The movement's 118 countries, including North Korea, is led by
Cuba since September's summit in Havana.

The statement expressed "concern, while understanding the
complexity of North Korea's nuclear test, which underscores the
need to work even more vigorously toward the movement's goals of
disarmament, including the elimination of nuclear weapons."

On Monday North Korea sparked worldwide condemnation with its
announcement that it had carried out its first atom bomb test.
By Friday however there had not been independent verification
that the explosion was caused by a nuclear device.

North Korea said on Friday it was ready to talk, as world powers
reached a tentative deal on a package of sanctions to punish
them for the declared test. 

AFP
*****************************************************************
 24 Guardian Unlimited: Rush for deal as doubts grow over nuclear test
 
Brian Whitaker
Saturday October 14, 2006
The Guardian 		 

The US last night refused to confirm that North Korea had joined 
the nuclear club, despite the discovery of a gas consistent with 
a nuclear blast in the atmosphere close to where Pyongyang 
claimed it had detonated a device on Monday.

"The betting is that this was an attempt at a nuclear test that 
failed," a Pentagon official said last night. "We don't think 
they were trying to fake a nuclear test, but it may have been a 
nuclear fizzle."

The official spoke on condition of anonymity because of the 
sensitive nature of the information. The test found a type of 
radioactive gas that would have been present after a nuclear 
detonation, the official said. It is one of several analyses 
conducted this week, which have not shown conclusive evidence of 
an atomic bomb.

Earlier tests had shown no sign of radiation. South Korea and
Russia have both said they believe Pyongyang detonated a nuclear
device, though France has been highly sceptical.

The doubts surfaced as the UN security council prepared for a
vote today that would impose sanctions on North Korea in an
effort to halt its nuclear activity.

At the UN headquarters yesterday, US ambassador John Bolton said
council members had unanimously agreed on the text of a
resolution. To win support from Russia and China, the revised
draft does not threaten imminent military action.

With the prospect of sanctions looming, there were new
indications from North Korea yesterday that it may be ready to
abandon its nuclear ambitions in exchange for aid and security
guarantees.

Following a meeting in Pyongyang, the Russian deputy foreign
minister, Alexander Alexeyev, said North Korea was looking for a
swift, negotiated resolution of the confrontation.

It "wants to resolve the issues linked with the
de-nuclearisation of the Korean peninsula in the near future
through negotiations", as well as implementation of a document
adopted after the third round of the six-nation talks in
September 2005, Mr Alexeyev said.

In Seoul yesterday, South Korea's nuclear envoy said he had been
on the point of agreeing a joint diplomatic initiative with
Washington when the North carried out its alleged nuclear test.

Chun Yung-woo told the Associated Press: "I tried to pre-empt
North Korea with a proposal for a peaceful resolution before
they went ahead with a test, but when I was about to finalise
it, when we were hours away from presenting such a proposal,
they went ahead with a test, or what they claim was a nuclear
test."

He said the offer had not been rendered invalid by the alleged
test, but it would have to be modified and he did not expect
immediate movement because of impending action by the security
council.

"Once the current situation has run its course, when the dust
and fallout of North Korea's test - whatever it was - settles
down, then I think that's the best time to revive diplomacy," he
said.
 
Useful sites
North Korea virtual library
CIA factbook: North Korea
UN security council
UN nuclear non-proliferation treaty
NK news - database of North Korean propaganda
North Korea Database
North Korea Zone

[UP] 

Guardian Unlimited © Guardian Newspapers Limited 2006
*****************************************************************
 25 Guardian Unlimited: Price of a broken deal
 
Simon Tisdall
Friday October 13, 2006
 		 
Twelve months ago it seemed the west's nuclear confrontation with 
North Korea had reached an unexpectedly happy ending. Then the US 
treasury department stuck its oar in. In a deal brokered by China 
on September 19 2005, Kim Jong-il's regime pledged to give up its 
atomic weapons, abandon existing nuclear programmes and rejoin 
the UN Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty that it had repudiated in 
2003.

In return the US agreed to recognise North Korea's territorial 
integrity and eschew all hostile actions. The Bush administration 
thereby effectively withdrew its earlier threats of forcible 
regime change levelled against a founder member of President 
George Bush's "axis of evil".

The US also promised to move towards normalised relations if 
Pyongyang kept its side of the bargain. It even revived the idea 
of helping North Korea build a light-water nuclear reactor for 
civilian power generation, a scheme promoted by the Clinton 
administration in the 1990s but later dropped by Mr Bush.

The September deal brought sighs of relief across Asia and in
Washington, where rightwing newspaper editorials hailed a
"triumph of US policy". It spawned talk of a new era of
strategic cooperation between the US and China, a denuclearised
Korean peninsula, and the peaceful reunification of North and
South Korea.

But the celebrations were premature. For reasons that remain
unclear, the US treasury department chose almost the exact
moment the deal was struck to move against a Macau-based bank
called Banco Delta Asia.

US officials announced the bank could face punitive action under
US banking rules and Patriot Act anti-terrorism laws over
suspicions that it was being used by North Korea for money
laundering and counterfeiting. They described the bank as a
"willing pawn" facilitating North Korea's "criminal activities".
The full implications of the treasury's allegations, publicised
on September 15 last year, took time to sink in. But the effects
were dramatic.

Worried that they too could become targets for US penalties and
be cut adrift from the international banking system, other
regional banks took fright. One by one they halted dealings with
North Korea.

Macau's government took control of Banco Delta Asia to conduct
its own investigation and shut down all North Korea-related
accounts. According to a Wall Street Journal investigation, led
by reporter Gordon Fairclough, accounts belonging to 20 North
Korean banks as well as those of 11 trading companies and nine
North Korean individuals were shut. Millions of dollars were
frozen. Within weeks much of North Korea's legitimate
international trade had ground to a halt and the country was
scrambling to secure foreign credit and loans, the newspaper
disclosed. US treasury investigators were meanwhile touring Asia
warning banks and financial institutions about the dangers of
being associated with North Korea's suspect activities.

Intentionally or not, the US had dealt the Pyongyang regime a
major blow that years of bilateral aid, trade and export
sanctions had failed to achieve. "We knew there was a lot going
on but we didn't expect to hit a major artery like we did," a US
official told Fairclough. Apparently facing financial
strangulation, Pyongyang's leadership resorted to the only
diplomatic weapon it had. The foreign ministry said North Korea
would boycott further talks on relinquishing its nuclear
activities until the threat of US financial sanctions was
lifted. North Korea has reiterated the same demand on numerous
occasions since and repeated it this week following its
underground weapons test. But it also said it was ready to
resume dialogue if Washington eased financial pressures.

There has been no response. US officials maintain that the steps
taken against Banco Delta Asia last autumn were unconnected to
the nuclear talks. On Wednesday Mr Bush accused North Korea of
"walking away" from the September 19 disarmament deal. Pyongyang
and Pyongyang alone was to blame for recreating the crisis, he
said.
 
[UP] 

Guardian Unlimited © Guardian Newspapers Limited 2006
*****************************************************************
 26 [NYTr] Bush's Nuclear Apocalypse
 
Date: Fri, 13 Oct 2006 19:59:41 -0400 (EDT)

X-Sender-Host-Name: olm.blythe-systems.com
X-Spam-Class: HAM-VERY-WHITELIST

Via NY Transfer News Collective  *  All the News that Doesn't Fit
 
TruthDig - Oct 9, 2006
http://www.truthdig.com/report/item/200601009_bushs_nuclear_apocalypse/

 The former Middle East Bureau Chief for The New York Times and author of
 the bestseller War Is a Force That Gives Us Meaning, reports on Bushs
 incalculably wrong-headed plans to attack Iran, and warns how a callous
 war, conceived by zealots, will lead to a disaster of biblical proportions.

Bush's Nuclear Apocalypse

by Chris Hedges

(Octber 9, 2006) The aircraft carrier Eisenhower, accompanied by the
guided-missile cruiser USS Anzio, guided-missile destroyer USS Ramage,
guided-missile destroyer USS Mason and the fast-attack submarine USS
Newport News, is, as I write, making its way to the Straits of Hormuz off
Iran. The ships will be in place to strike Iran by the end of the month. It
may be a bluff. It may be a feint. It may be a simple show of American
power. But I doubt it.

War with Iran a war that would unleash an apocalyptic scenario in the
Middle East is probable by the end of the Bush administration. It could
begin in as little as three weeks. This administration, claiming to be
anointed by a Christian God to reshape the world, and especially the Middle
East, defined three states at the start of its reign as the Axis of Evil.
They were Iraq, now occupied; North Korea, which, because it has nuclear
weapons, is untouchable; and Iran.

Those who do not take this apocalyptic rhetoric seriously have ignored the
twisted pathology of men like Elliott Abrams, who helped orchestrate the
disastrous and illegal contra war in Nicaragua, and who now handles the
Middle East for the National Security Council. He knew nothing about
Central America. He knows nothing about the Middle East. He sees the world
through the childish, binary lens of good and evil, us and them, the forces
of darkness and the forces of light. And it is this strange, twilight
mentality that now grips most of the civilian planners who are barreling us
towards a crisis of epic proportions.

These men advocate a doctrine of permanent war, a doctrine which, as
William R. Polk points out, is a slight corruption of Leon Trotskys
doctrine of permanent revolution. These two revolutionary doctrines serve
the same function, to intimidate and destroy all those classified as
foreign opponents, to create permanent instability and fear and to silence
domestic critics who challenge leaders in a time of national crisis. It
works.

The citizens of the United States, slowly being stripped of their civil
liberties, are being herded sheep-like, once again, over a cliff.
But this war will be different. It will be catastrophic. It will usher in
the apocalyptic nightmares spun out in the dark, fantastic visions of the
Christian right. And there are those around the president who see this
vision as preordained by God; indeed, the president himself may hold such a
vision.

The hypocrisy of this vaunted moral crusade is not lost on those in the
Middle East. Iran actually signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. It
has violated a codicil of that treaty written by European foreign
ministers, but this codicil was never ratified by the Iranian parliament. I
do not dispute Irans intentions to acquire nuclear weapons nor do I
minimize the danger should it acquire them in the estimated five to 10
years.

But contrast Iran with Pakistan, India and Israel. These three countries
refused to sign the treaty and developed nuclear weapons programs in
secret. Israel now has an estimated 400 to 600 nuclear weapons. The word
Dimona, the name of the city where the nuclear facilities are located in
Israel, is shorthand in the Muslim world for the deadly Israeli threat to
Muslims existence. What lessons did the Iranians learn from our Israeli,
Pakistani and Indian allies?

Given that we are actively engaged in an effort to destabilize the Iranian
regime by recruiting tribal groups and ethnic minorities inside Iran to
rebel, given that we use apocalyptic rhetoric to describe what must be done
to the Iranian regime, given that other countries in the Middle East such
as Egypt and Saudi Arabia are making noises about developing a nuclear
capacity, and given that, with the touch of a button Israel could
obliterate Iran, what do we expect from the Iranians? On top of this, the
Iranian regime grasps that the doctrine of permanent war entails making
preemptive and unprovoked strikes.

Those in Washington who advocate this war, knowing as little about the
limitations and chaos of war as they do about the Middle East, believe they
can hit about 1,000 sites inside Iran to wipe out nuclear production and
cripple the 850,000-man Iranian army. The disaster in southern Lebanon,
where the Israeli air campaign not only failed to break Hezbollah but
united most Lebanese behind the militant group, is dismissed. These
ideologues, after all, do not live in a reality-based universe.

The massive Israeli bombing of Lebanon failed to pacify 4 million Lebanese.
What will happen when we begin to pound a country of 70 million people? As
retired General Wesley K. Clark and others have pointed out, once you begin
an air campaign it is only a matter of time before you have to put troops
on the ground or accept defeat, as the Israelis had to do in Lebanon. And
if we begin dropping bunker busters, cruise missiles and iron fragmentation
bombs on Iran this is the choice that must be faced either sending American
forces into Iran to fight a protracted and futile guerrilla war or walking
away in humiliation.

As a people we are enormously forgetful, Dr. Polk, one of the countrys
leading scholars on the Middle East, told an Oct. 13 gathering of the
Foreign Policy Association in New York. We should have learned from history
that foreign powers cant win guerrilla wars. The British learned this from
our ancestors in the American Revolution and re-learned it in Ireland.
Napoleon learned it in Spain. The Germans learned it in Yugoslavia.

We should have learned it in Vietnam and the Russians learned it in
Afghanistan and are learning it all over again in Chechnya and we are
learning it, of course, in Iraq. Guerrilla wars are almost unwinnable. As a
people we are also very vain. Our way of life is the only way. We should
have learned that the rich and powerful cant always succeed against the
poor and less powerful.

An attack on Iran will ignite the Middle East. The loss of Iranian oil,
coupled with Silkworm missile attacks by Iran on oil tankers in the Persian
Gulf, could send oil soaring to well over $110 a barrel. The effect on the
domestic and world economy will be devastating, very possibly triggering a
huge, global depression. The 2 million Shiites in Saudi Arabia, the Shiite
majority in Iraq and the Shiite communities in Bahrain, Pakistan and Turkey
will turn in rage on us and our dwindling allies.

We will see a combination of increased terrorist attacks, including on
American soil, and the widespread sabotage of oil production in the Gulf.
Iraq, as bad as it looks now, will become a death pit for American troops
as Shiites and Sunnis, for the first time, unite against their foreign
occupiers.

The country, however, that will pay the biggest price will be Israel. And
the sad irony is that those planning this war think of themselves as allies
of the Jewish state. A conflagration of this magnitude could see Israel
drawn back in Lebanon and sucked into a regional war, one that would over
time spell the final chapter in the Zionist experiment in the Middle East.
The Israelis aptly call their nuclear program the Samson option. The
Biblical Samson ripped down the pillars of the temple and killed everyone
around him, along with himself.

If you are sure you will be raptured into heaven, your clothes left behind
with the nonbelievers, then this news should cheer you up. If you are
rational, however, these may be some of the last few weeks or months in
which to enjoy what is left of our beleaguered, dying republic and way of
life.
       
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 27 Nuclear Crisis Made in USA
 
Date: Fri, 13 Oct 2006 07:28:20 -0500 (CDT)

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Workers World
October 12, 2006

NUCLEAR CRISIS MADE IN USA

Bush threats forced North Korea to arm in self-defense

By Fred Goldstein

The Bush administration and the so-called great powers are hypocritically
trying to create panic over the announcement by the Democratic Peoples
Republic of Korea on Oct. 8 that it had successfully detonated a nuclear
weapon. U.S. officials have declared it a threat to international
 security.

In fact, it is the U.S. imperialist government and its ally, Japan, that
have created the crisis situation and are the main threats to peace in Asia.

The DPRK, in a statement from its Foreign Ministry on Oct. 3, had announced
publicly that it intended to carry out the test. It says it was forced into
nuclear testing because the Bush administration seriously threatened the
DPRKs sovereignty and right to existence. It condemned threatened
sanctions as an attempt to isolate and stifle it and bring down the
socialist system chosen by its people themselves.

The U.S. extreme threat of a nuclear war and pressure compel the DPRK to
conduct a nuclear test, an essential process for bolstering nuclear
deterrent, as a corresponding measure for defense, the statement continued.

To the Korean people, the U.S. threat is real. Washington divided their
country after World War II and has kept it divided until today through a
large U.S. military presence. For decades, Washington propped up one
dictatorial South Korean government after another.

The U.S. led a brutal war against the North from 1950 to 1953, dropping 800
tons of bombs a day in saturation raids. It used napalmjellied gasoline
that clings to skin and causes a horrible death. Every town, village and
city was left in rubble.

Four million Koreans died. Innumerable atrocities were carried out by U.S.
troops. And Washington used nuclear threats throughout the armistice
negotiations.

What can end the crisis

The crisis on the Korean peninsula and in the region could be ended if the
U.S. government would do three basic things: recognize the sovereignty of
the DPRK; establish normal diplomatic and economic relations between the two
countries; and guarantee the DPRKs security against a U.S. attack.

The North Korean government has been asking for this for over 50 years,
since the end of the Korean War.

In addition, the DPRK has made innumerable proposals for the
denuclearization of the peninsula and the surrounding region.

Above all, this kind of stability should be embodied in the signing of a
peace treaty formally ending the state of war between the U.S. and the DPRK.
Washington has resisted such demands for over 50 years.

The big business media and the government are treating the DPRK leaders as
if they are paranoid and irrational. But the facts show a different story.

Bush administration threats

In his State of the Union address in January 2002, President George W. Bush
branded the DPRK as part of an axis of evil, along with Iraq and Iran. In
that same period, Bush ordered the Pentagon to develop flexible plans for
the use of nuclear weapons as part of the Nuclear Posture Review. Sections
of it were leaked showing that the DPRK was on the Pentagons list of seven
targeted countries.

The National Security Strategy of September 2002 put forward the doctrine of
preemptive war and regime change, linking it to Bushs axis of evil
assertion. Six months later Washington launched a preemptive, unprovoked war
to bring about regime change in Iraq and overthrow the Saddam Hussein
government.

All these threats were being made by a superpower with 10,000 nuclear
warheads, a $10-trillion economy, a population of 300 million and highly
developed weapons systems spread throughout Asia, especially in the vicinity
of North Korea. In contrast, the DPRK has a population of 25 million, an
economy of $16 billion, and has been undermined economically by half a
century of U.S-imposed sanctions.

DPRK ringed by U.S. military

Furthermore, the DPRK is surrounded by U.S. nuclear bombers, nuclear-armed
submarines, cruise missiles, aircraft carriers and destroyer fleets. Some
30,000 U.S. troops are based in South Korea, as well as a U.S. military high
command that has final authority over several hundred thousand South Korean
troops. Their mission is war against the North.

As recently as June of this year, the U.S. Air Force held tests of its
Minuteman III missiles near the Korean peninsula. Three U.S. Navy carrier
battle groupsincluding 22,000 troops, dozens of fighter planes and several
heavy bomberswere assembled in the western Pacific off Guam in the largest
naval mobilization since the Vietnam War. The USS Curtis Wilbur and USS
Fitzgerald, both guided-missile destroyers, sit off the coast of North
Korea. The U.S. sent spy planes on 170 missions during this period.

U.S. hawks block normalization

Far from causing the present crisis, the DPRK has tried repeatedly to avoid
having to develop a nuclear deterrent. Each time the U.S. government or
militaristic factions within it have found ways to thwart any agreement.

A year ago, in September 2005, the North Korean government signed an
agreement at six-party talks with the U.S., China, Russia, Japan and South
Korea. In the agreement the DPRK pledged to abandon all nuclear weapons and
existing nuclear programs. In return the U.S. and North Korea agreed to
respect each others sovereignty, exist peacefully together and take steps
to normalize their relations.

Four days later, the U.S. Treasury Department imposed sweeping financial
sanctions against North Korea designed to cut off the countrys access to
the international banking system, branding it a criminal state for alleged
money laundering and so-called trafficking in weapons of mass destruction.
(Newsweek, Oct. 10)

In 2004, negotiators from the State Department had worked out an agreement
with the DPRK outlining steps to resolve the standoff over the countrys
nuclear weapons. But it lacked the tough language on disarmament that North
Korea had rejected and [Vice President Dick] Cheney knew Mr. Bush wanted.

With Colin L. Powell, then secretary of state, and his deputy, Richard L.
Armitage, at a black-tie dinner where they could not easily be reached on
secure telephones, Mr. Cheney declared this thing a loser, said a former
senior official.

Bush sent new instructions to the negotiatorsthrough the National Security
Council, rather than the State Departmentthat essentially killed the
 deal. (New York Times, Oct. 10)

Hostile to North-South dialog

In 1999 a new prime minister, Kim Dae-jung, was elected in South Korea. Kim
declared a sunshine policy of building friendly relations with the North.
In 2000, Kim Dae-jung had an historic summit meeting in Seoul with Kim Jong
Il, the North Korean leader. When Bush took office in 2001, he refused to
meet with Kim Dae-jung, signaling U.S. government opposition to any
relaxation of tensions on the peninsula and anything that could be favorable
to North Korea.

The Clinton administration had also tried to undermine the DPRK. In 1993,
after the collapse of the USSR, as part of the retargeting of U.S. nuclear
weapons, Clinton let North Korea know it was being targeted by some of them.
Clinton authorized Operation Team Spirit in March 1993, mobilizing bombers,
cruise missiles and naval vessels against the DPRK. He went to the
demilitarized zone separating North and South and threatened the DPRK with
war in early 1994.

When the government in Pyongyang, North Korea, threatened to pull out of the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Clinton prepared for war, including
the use of nuclear weapons. South Korean Prime Minister Kim Young-sam argued
with Clinton for half an hour over the phone to stop the war. Faced with the
prospect of a nuclear attack, Kim Il Sung, then president of the DPRK,
invited former President Jimmy Carter for talks. At their conclusion, Carter
announced an agreement, later called the Framework Agreement, negotiated in
Geneva.

Under this agreement, the DPRK, which was trying to develop nuclear energy
to supply electric power since it has no oil or gas, agreed to shut down its
nuclear reactor and stop development of two others in exchange for two
light-water reactors. The U.S. was supposed to organize the production of
these reactors by 2003 and supply fuel oil in the meantime.

It was also supposed to lift sanctions, recognize the sovereignty of the
DPRK, work towards normal political and economic relations, and guarantee
against nuclear attack. The U.S. immediately backtracked on everything but
supplies of fuel oil, and those deliveries came late.

Washington sought sanctions against the DPRK in the UN, put it on the
terrorist list, refused to guarantee against an attack and did not move an
inch to normalize relations. It delayed production of the light-water
reactors so they would be finished at the earliest by 2010.

The DPRK was in extraordinary economic difficulties following the collapse
of the USSR and was forced to delay its economic recovery under threat of
war.

Furthermore, in 1998, the U.S. military conducted exercises simulating an
attack on the North with 30 nuclear bombs. U.S. warplanes based at Seymour
Johnson Air Base in North Carolina, carrying concrete dummy bombs in place
of B61 nuclear bombs, dropped them at a base in Florida as part of
operational plans drawn up by the National Command Authority. (Gregory
Elich, Strange Liberators, Llumina Press, 2006)

Strategy of demonizing DPRK

The strategy of demonizing North Korea and constantly threatening it serves
a dual purpose. It keeps military tensions in the region at a fever pitch
and provides the basis for maintaining more and more military hardware in
Asia. Bush has promoted a high-tech, highly expensive and highly profitable
(to the military-industrial complex) missile defense system.

Administration denials notwithstanding, it is the policy and ambition of the
U.S. ruling class and its military to destroy the socialist government of
North Korea. It has been the policy ever since the Korean Revolution after
World War II, led by Kim Il Sung. The bosses and the landlords were thrown
out and the society was taken over and run for the workers and peasants.
That was the first crime of the DPRK.

The second crime was the outcome of the Korean War. In spite of enormous
casualties, the revolutionary armies of the North, with the assistance of
the Chinese Red Army, inflicted the first military defeat on U.S.
imperialism by stopping it from taking over all of Korea.

One of the long-standing goals of Washington has been to break up any
solidarity between the DPRK and the Peoples Republic of China (PRC). It is
difficult for progressives and revolutionaries to watch the PRC lending
itself to the anti-DPRK schemes of Washington and Tokyo. Hopefully, the
current narrow, unjust and self-defeating policy of supporting sanctions on
the DPRK will be reversed.

The implacable U.S. imperialist hostility towards the Korean revolution and
the socialist government of the DPRK comes from its ambitions to conquer
Asia and turn the Pacific Ocean into a U.S. lake. This policy has been a
stated goal for over a century.

Challenge to anti-war movement

The anti-war movement in the U.S. now recognizes that the Bush
administration is an aggressor in Iraq and is planning aggression against
Iran. It is beginning to recognize the reactionary role of the U.S.-client
state in Tel Aviv as the cats paw of the Pentagon in the Middle East. It
recognizes that Washington has designs to overthrow the Cuban government and
the Venezuelan government.

It is time to elevate the cause of the DPRK in the movement and fight
against Washingtons demonization, its sanctions and threats.

It is U.S. militarism that is the threat to peace, not the defensive
measures taken by the government of the DPRK. North Korea has done
everything possible to avoid having to resort to a nuclear deterrent. But it
has experienced a solid wall of hostility, threats, military maneuvers,
vilification, and attempts at isolation and economic sabotage.

It has seen preventive war against Iraq. It has witnessed the destruction
of the government of Yugoslavia after a massive U.S. bombing campaign. The
DPRK does not want more nuclear weapons in the area. On the contrary, it has
offered many proposals to get rid of them. It has called for signing a peace
treaty. It has called for a non-aggression pact. It wants peace, while
Washington wants war and counter-revolution in Korea and all of Asia.

Right now a dangerous bloc exists between Washington and Tokyo. Japan
annexed Korea in 1910 and ruled it as a colony until 1945. The Japanese
imperialist ruling class wants to use this crisis as a springboard to build
up its military. It is using the Bush administrations full court press for
sanctions and the strangulation of the DPRK as its cover.

The workers and oppressed in this country can only suffer from an increase
in militarism around the Korean peninsula. Either they will be dragged into
war or forced to pay the price of increased military spendingor both.

Those who are exploited by the bosses, whose wages are going down, whose
benefits are being cut, have nothing to gain by supporting the war drive of
the billionaires government in Washington, the military-industrial complex
and Big Oil, who are behind the present crisis.
*****************************************************************
 28 [NYTr] Shaking Off Hiroshima: Japan Faces Its Nuclear "Taboo"
 
Date: Fri, 13 Oct 2006 12:06:00 -0500 (CDT)

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Via NY Transfer News Collective  *  All the News that Doesn't Fit
 
sent by Simon McGuinness

[Just 5 years ago it was political suicide to propose nuclear weapons in
Japan, that was before US diplomacy [sic] laid into North Korea.  You
know that the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is dead in the water when
even the Japanese start talking about building a bomb.  Which is just
fine and dandy for all those nuclear share options that Don Rumsfeld
has.  And the more bombs there are around the more guidance, delivery
and maintenance technology Lockheed Martin can flog.  Who cares about
security when there's a fast buck to be made?  Killing the NPT is good
for US business and GW sure did a hekufajob of killing it. -SMcG]

The Independent - 12 October 2006 
http://news.independent.co.uk/world/politics/article1842545.ece

Japan faces its nuclear taboo amid calls to move on from Hiroshima 

By David McNeill in Japan 

Few people are angrier that North Korea has joined the nuclear club than
Sunao Tsuboi. As a 20-year-old student, he was burnt from head to toe
when the United States dropped the Fat Man atom bomb on Hiroshima in
August 1945. He still bears the scars all over his face and body. 

"We're furious about this test," he said of Japan's 270,000 atom bomb
survivors. "It means that more countries are sure to follow. Our
greatest worry is that Japan will now feel it has to have its own
nuclear weapon."

Japan's history means any talk of developing its own nuclear option has
long been taboo. But in the wake of Pyongyang's apparently successful
test, the limits of the debate are being tested. Yasuhiro Nakasone, a
former prime minister, is the latest politician to suggest that Japan
should "study the nuclear issue". While this week, Japan's largest
newspaper, The Daily Yomiuri, said the country should reconsider its
aversion to the bomb. Politics not technology hinders the development of
Japanese nuclear weapons. The world's second-largest economy also boasts
one of the largest nuclear industries. It has 55 reactors and the use of
a huge new reprocessing plant that will add to the 45 tons of plutonium
stored in the country.

In 2002 a senior opposition figure Ichiro Ozawa spelled out the
implications when he told China that it would be "a simple matter" for
Japan to build "3,000 to 4,000 nuclear warheads" if its neighbour got
"too inflated". Most experts believe a Japanese bomb could be built in
six months.

In public at least, the new Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, resists such
calls. In a parliamentary Q&A session this week he stood by Japan's
nuclear principles: that it will not "manufacture or possess nuclear
weapons or allow their introduction".

But the rhetoric has not always matched the reality. Nuclear-armed US
vessels have secretly docked in Japanese ports and in the 1970s a
nuclear feasibility plan was commissioned.

In the short term, most experts believe Pyongyang's bomb is likely to
push Tokyo closer to the US. Mr Abe has already pledged to speed up the
development of a joint missile defence shield and to boost defence ties,
a strategy that brings him into conflict with the "pacifist"
constitution.

Against a background of growing regional instability, few of the atom
bomb survivors are now prepared to bet that the nuclear freeze will last
forever. 
       
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 29 [toeslist] Old French Nuke tests "represented a slight (health) risk"
 
Date: Fri, 13 Oct 2006 13:02:18 -0500 (CDT)

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  Cancer Fears Emerge as Fallout of French Nuclear Tests
Julio Godoy

PARIS, Oct 12 (IPS) - New evidence is emerging of cancers caused by 
French nuclear testing in its South Pacific islands from the 1960s.

Between 1966 and 1996 France carried out 192 nuclear tests in French 
Polynesia, a group of islands in the south Pacific. These included 42 
atmospheric tests, in the face of opposition from local residents.

Now, 40 years after the tests began, the French government has finally 
started to admit that Polynesian inhabitants may have been right to fear 
the consequences of radioactivity.

Marcel Jurien de La Gravihre, representative of the French Commission on 
Nuclear Safety, announced in Papetee, capital of French Polynesia last 
week that a "coherent and continued medical examination" would be 
proposed for inhabitants most likely affected by the tests.

Such testing will be offered to some 2,000 persons, he said.

Jurien de la Gravihre admitted that six of the 192 tests had "affected 
in a significant manner some islands and atolls" in the region.

The French military carried out the six atmospheric nuclear tests 
between 1966 and 1974 on the islands Moruroa, Fangataufa, Magareva, 
Gambier, Tureia and Tahiti. These tests "represented a slight (health) 
risk", the ministry of defence now says.

Two of the Polynesian tests are particularly in question - the ones 
called Aldibaran (1966) and Phoebe (1971). According to new official 
figures these tests released far higher radiation than acknowledged so far.

Up to 150,000 people inhabited the islands in the region at the time. 
Some 20,000 other people worked at nuclear test sites during the 30 
years of testing.

The change in the French government's position comes after Florent de 
Vathaire, a researcher at the National Institute for Health and Medical 
Research (INSERM, after its French name) reported that the nuclear tests 
closely correlate with the appearance of thyroid cancer typically 
associated with radioactivity.

Florent de Vathaire, head of the epidemiological cancer unit at INSERM 
found "a statistically significant relation" between the nuclear tests 
and the incidence of thyroid cancer. De Vathaire studied some 240 cases 
of thyroid cancer reported in the islands.

On July 17 this year, de Vathaire presented his findings to the ministry 
of defence, and urged it to declassify military reports that he said 
confirm the findings.

"I would like to study the data contained in the classified documents, 
which would allow us to confirm in a more precise manner the nature of 
the health dangers represented by the tests," de Vathaire told IPS. 
Cancer victims and their relatives in the French Polynesia have made 
similar demands.

"So far, the French authorities have said that the nuclear bomb tests 
did not represent any danger," Patrice Bouveret, director of the 
Observatory of French Nuclear Weapons, an independent group, told IPS. 
"Now, the same authorities are saying that there was indeed a 'slight' 
risk."

But this admission too comes on the basis of reports by military 
officers, he said. "Nobody else has seen the original documents to 
verify such claims. If the victims would have these official reports, 
they could act legally and demand that justice be done."

The questions are not confined to the south Pacific islands. France 
carried out 17 tests in Reggane region in the Algerian Sahara in 1961 
and 1962, just before Algerian independence.

Health activists and affected people who have come together as the 
Association of Veterans of the French Nuclear Tests (AVEN) in French 
Polynesia and in the Algerian Sahara are fighting for declassification 
of the reports, and for recognition by the French authorities that the 
nuclear tests have caused a high number of cancers in these regions.

Jean-Paul Teissonihre, legal counsellor of AVEN and of the Polynesian 
association Mururoa e Tatou has been lodging complaints against the 
French authorities since 2003.

One aim is to obtain pensions from the French state for the victims and 
their relatives, he told IPS. "But in order to establish this causality 
link between the tests and the numerous illnesses we have to argue by 
presumption unless the authorities release the classified documents." 
(END/2006)
*****************************************************************
 30 Guardian Unlimited: Nuclear tensions bring supporters flooding 
back to waning campaign
 
Organisation rejuvenated as focus for opposition to new
generation Trident missiles 

Duncan Campbell
Saturday October 14, 2006
The Guardian 		 

In its heyday in the eighties, the Campaign for Nuclear 
Disarmament was able to mobilise 400,000 people for a rally in 
Hyde Park. The end of the cold war saw the organisation's 
influence wane and membership slump. But now, in the wake of the 
government's commitment to replace the Trident nuclear system and 
rising tension over North Korea and Iran, CND is claiming renewed 
support and a resurgence of interest.

Today in a university hall in Bradford, CND gathers for its 
annual conference, with new members signing up every week and new 
branches being launched.

"It has really galvanised people in an incredible way," said Kate 
Hudson, CND's chair, of the government's decision on Trident. "We 
feel that we are now articulating the majority view, perhaps for 
the first time in a long time. There is an incredible drive for 
peace and dialogue and debate at the moment and we feel we are 
part of that wave."

Since its foundation in 1958, the movement has experienced a
series of ups and downs with that heady peak in the 1980s
following the decision to site cruise and Pershing missiles in
the UK. In the 1990s, after the collapse of the eastern bloc,
the organisation no longer enjoyed such a profile and membership
dropped dramatically. Dr Hudson believes that the tide has now
turned, as evidenced by a recent increase in membership to over
32,000, and growing financial backing from supporters.

This weekend's event, which will be entertained tonight by the
comedian Attila the Stockbroker, will be a test of how far the
renewed organisation has come. "Our main current campaign is to
secure a debate on Trident," said Dr Hudson, who teaches
European politics and history at London South Bank University
and is the author of the recently published CND - Now More Than
Ever, which traces the organisation back to its cold war roots.
"We have been working with other organisations on this and 59%
of the population now oppose Trident replacement. We are a broad
church - we have support in the trade union movement and the
Christian element is very strong." While some members are
pacifists, others, like Dr Hudson, are not and believe that
there are occasions, such as the second world war, when war may
be justified.

She said CND is conscious of the need to broaden its support
base. One of the first motions on the conference agenda "notes
the predominantly white-British character of its membership"
which Dr Hudson accepts is a problem. "It's something CND has
been aware of but never been able to deal with." She said that
one of the beneficial side-effects of CND's involvement in the
anti-Iraq war movement had been that they had established much
closer links with the Muslim Association of Britain through
which they hoped to reach a more diverse membership.

The organisation's office in Holloway, north London, is named
after the Israeli nuclear whistleblower Mordecai Vanunu, who is
fighting for the right to leave Israel after serving 18 years in
jail. A call from Lewes CND to boycott Israel because of its
undeclared nuclear weapons programme which he exposed is the
subject of another motion, which is likely to be controversial.
Dr Hudson said some members might feel that a boycott call was
"not within our remit".

North Korea's test, which was strongly condemned by CND, will
also be discussed. She said that while criticising the test it
was important to remind people that the countries with nuclear
weapons were also in defiance of the non-proliferation treaty
and have to be challenged.

While some CND members have been with the organisation since it
started, there has recently been a growing number of student CND
groups formed. Ben Soffa, the youth and student campaigner, said
"about half a dozen new student groups have been set up already
this term". Opposition to the Iraq war on campuses had also
created interest, he said, particularly for students who had
grown up "when the cold war was no longer part of the
conversation".

On the party political front, CND has both Labour and Liberal
Democrat support in parliament and Jeremy Corbyn, the Labour MP,
will continue as one of their three vice-chairs. Since the
organisation started there has been an ongoing debate as to
whether changing Labour party policy from within was feasible.
Also to be debated is how far CND should commit itself to
opposing nuclear power, which some believe is a side issue.
 
	
Useful links
British Energy
Department of Trade and Industry
British Nuclear Fuels Ltd
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament
Greenpeace
Come Clean WMD awareness programme
UK atomic energy authority
National Radiological Protection Board
Friends of the Earth
World Nuclear Association
World Nuclear Transport Institute

[UP] 

      Guardian Unlimited © Guardian Newspapers Limited 2006
*****************************************************************
 31 IPS-English EGYPT: Nuclear Ambition Could Mean a Presidential
 
Date: Fri, 13 Oct 2006 14:57:39 -0700

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<x-flowed>
ROMAIPS MM PI IP NU=20
EGYPT: Nuclear Ambition Could Mean a Presidential Dream
By Adam Morrow

CAIRO, Oct 13 (IPS) - An announcement that the government intends to prod=
uce nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is provoking heated debate.

Gamal Mubarak, assistant secretary-general of the ruling National Democra=
tic Party (NDP) and son of President Hosni Mubarak surprised the audience=
  at the party conference Sep. 19 with the announcement that Egypt would r=
evive its long-stalled nuclear programme.

=94Many developing countries have proposed and started to execute the iss=
ue of alternative energy,=94 said Mubarak, who heads the NDP's influentia=
l policies committee. =94It's time for Egypt to put forth this proposal f=
or discussion about its future energy policies, the issue of alternative =
energy, including nuclear energy.=94

Mubarak and other government officials were quick to point out that nucle=
ar energy would be produced for peaceful purposes, as stipulated in the N=
uclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), of which Egypt is a signatory. Und=
er the treaty, countries are allowed to build nuclear power stations as l=
ong as they are placed under international supervision.

Mubarak's declaration was made amid a handful of mundane policy statement=
s. =94It was a fairly big surprise,=94 Joshua Stacher, lecturer in politi=
cal science at the British University in Egypt told IPS. =94There had bee=
n few hints beforehand that nuclear energy production was even on the gov=
ernment's agenda.=94

Nevertheless, added Stacher, =94Egypt is well within its rights as a memb=
er of the NPT to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.=94

There is little doubt that the government needs alternative power sources=
  to meet domestic energy demand. Cairo is currently spending some 7 billi=
on dollars a year to provide subsidised energy -- a situation that will o=
nly become more painful as international oil and gas prices continue to r=
ise. Domestic demand for electricity is rising 7 percent a year.

In the wake of the announcement, minister for electricity and energy Hass=
an Yunis revealed plans for a 1,000-megawatt nuclear power plant to be bu=
ilt at al-Dabaa on the Mediterranean coast about 150km west of Alexandria=
, at a cost of some 1.5 billion dollars.

Citing the country's need to lessen its traditional reliance on non-renew=
able hydrocarbons for electricity production, Yunis was quoted in the sta=
te press as saying that Egypt could have a nuclear power plant up and run=
ning -- with the help of foreign investment -- within ten years.

=94The Egyptian programme for the peaceful use of nuclear energy will be =
an ongoing one, involving several plants in different regions in order to=
  guarantee the flow of electricity needed for development activities,=94 =
Yunis was quoted as saying in government daily al-Ahram Oct. 9. The minis=
ter added that the number of power stations would =94depend on the manner=
  and sources of financing and qualified technical and human resources.=94

Yunis went on to explain that =94the nuclear fuel to be used in the Egypt=
ian plants would be enriched abroad=94 before being shipped to Egypt, alt=
hough he did not specify which country would supply the fuel.

In an indication of Cairo's seriousness, a government-appointed Council f=
or Nuclear Energy comprising representatives from several ministries, inc=
luding energy and defence, was convened shortly after the initial announc=
ement. The council is reported to have begun work on a preliminary feasib=
ility study to be handed over to the President for review.

This is not Egypt's first foray into the nuclear arena. A decision to bui=
ld a nuclear power station was made in 1963 by then president Gamal Abdel=
-Nasser, but the project was derailed by war with Israel four years later=
. A second attempt in 1986 was also aborted in the wake of the Chernobyl =
disaster in Ukraine, which prompted the opposition Wafd party to launch a=
  successful anti-nuclear campaign in parliament.

Now the fact that the nuclear bombshell was dropped by Gamal Mubarak, con=
sidered a major contender for presidential succession, has triggered furi=
ous speculation in the press.=20

An article in the Oct. 10 edition of independent weekly al-Karama, which =
is outspokenly critical of Gamal Mubarak and notions of presidential =94i=
nheritance=94, asked: =94Does the proposed (nuclear) programme represent.=
..the beginning of a new balance of power in the region, or is it merely =
propaganda...to elevate the younger Mubarak to the presidency?=94

Many political analysts see the move as primarily an attempt to bolster G=
amal Mubarak's popularity.

=94It was important that Gamal make the announcement. It was done for pra=
ctical reasons,=94 said Stacher. =94While the announcement was couched in=
  terms of national energy needs, the way it was delivered made it look li=
ke a public-relations stunt to score political points rather than a well =
thought-out national plan.=94

Stacher added: =94This in turn has fuelled speculation about the motives =
behind the declaration; fuelled speculation that Gamal Mubarak can be exp=
ected to succeed to the presidency -- at least that's how it has been int=
erpreted publicly.=94

NDP officials downplayed the relevance of the younger Mubarak's delivery =
of the announcement. =94These declarations have nothing to do with gainin=
g credibility, and came in the context of discussions relating to our ene=
rgy needs,=94 Mohamed Kamal, a close aide of Gamal Mubarak, was quoted as=
  saying in the state press.=20

Analysts, however, suggest that Mubarak -- a champion of economic liberal=
isation who, like his father, enjoys a close relationship with Washington=
  -- may also be using the nuclear issue to demonstrate his political inde=
pendence from the United States.

=94The government has presented its nuclear ambitions much like Iran did,=
  turning it into a nationalist issue,=94 said Stacher. =94This way, Gamal=
  Mubarak, who has also made a number of recent statements expressing disp=
leasure over U.S. policy, can establish his credentials in an 'Egypt Firs=
t' way.=94

=94Essentially, it's an effective ploy to tap into the national dignity q=
uestion; to give Egypt a concrete symbol that it's a sophisticated, moder=
n country,=94 added Stacher. =94Gamal Mubarak will become more popular fo=
r it.=94

Some Gamal Mubarak critics, however, suggest that Cairo had received a gr=
een light from the United States before making the contentious announceme=
nt. =94Gamal Mubarak received permission (to launch a nuclear programme) =
=66rom Tel Aviv and Washington before bringing it up at the party confere=
nce,=94 independent weekly al-Maydan wrote in its Sep. 27 issue.

Many Egyptians are elated over their country's possible elevation to the =
nuclear club, while expressing some reservations.

=94If Egypt actually implemented the programme, we would be very proud; i=
t would be great for the country, even if it's for only peaceful purposes=
,=94 said Ahmed Salah, a 25-year-old manager at a food and beverages comp=
any in Cairo. =94But I'm afraid it won't amount to much; the issue is jus=
t being used to give the people something to feel good about.=94 (END/IPS=
/MM/PI/IP/NU/AM/SS/06)




=20
=3D 10131004 ORP002
NNNN

</x-flowed>
*****************************************************************
 32 NE StatePaper.com: NRC Chairman Says Nuclear Power Will Be Needed 

To Meet Energy Demand
 
Friday, October 13, 2006 	 
 
Nuclear power is the coming thing according to the new head of 
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Proponents say that no matter how fossil fuels or alternative
fuels are viewed, they raise supply and environmental issues.
Critics say that the potential for environmental calamity is
more likely on the other foot, given the long-term toxicity of
nuclear material. 

NRC Chairman Dale Klein said Thursday that the need for nuclear
energy will grow as the nationâ€™s energy demands climb toward a
predicted 50 percent increase by 2055. 

Klein told a news conference in Omaha that â€œthe world will
build more (nuclear) plantsâ€ as energy demands increase.
â€œThereâ€™s no reason why we canâ€™t do it.â€ 

Nebraska is home to a pair of nuclear power plants. READ MORE.
Should we go nuclear for coming energy needs?
 
© 2006 Nebraska StatePaper.com |

*****************************************************************
 33 IHT: After France stops data, nuclear power firms step in -

International Herald Tribune
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
By Lars Paulsson and Tom Cahill Bloomberg News
 						
FRIDAY, OCTOBER 13, 2006

LONDON Électricité de France, Suez and other French utilities 
said Thursday that they would begin publishing data on their 
power generation next month, after France ceased publishing 
performance data on France's 58 individual nuclear reactors in 
September.  The companies will release aggregate daily production 
data by fuel source starting Nov. 15, Reseau de Transport 
d'Électricité, which operates the country's power grid, said. 

But some traders said the initiative did not go far enough.  
Capacity data are important for energy traders because they help 
them determine prices. France is the world's biggest producer of 
nuclear energy, which provides 84 percent of its power.  Traders 
prefer data for each power plant, but France will not comply. 

"Aggregated data by fuel source is not enough," said Paul Dawson, 
director of commodities regulation at Barclays Capital in London. 
"We need to see data for past production on a plant-by-plant 
basis to truly understand the drivers of prices."

 The decision to publicize the information is a turnaround from
the positions of UFE, the French electricity association, and
Électricité de France. 

The two said as recently as Wednesday that there were no plans to 
release data.  "Our mission is control and implementation, not 
production," said Evangelie Petit, a spokeswoman for ASN, the 
country's nuclear safety body.

"That's truly the domain of EDF."  Tom Cahill reported from
Paris.   							  							 							 						 												 						
						 					   				 				
Herald Tribune All rights reserved   [IHT]    
*****************************************************************
 34 NRC: In the Matter of All Licensees Identified in Attachment 1 to 
 
                        FR Doc E6-16996 
[Federal Register: October 13, 2006 (Volume 71, Number 198)] 
[Notices] [Page 60587-60590] From the Federal Register Online via 
GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr13oc06-111]                         
 
Order EA-06-241 and All Other Persons Who Seek or Obtain Access 
to Safeguards Information Described Herein; Order Imposing 
Fingerprinting and Criminal History Records Check Requirements 
for Access to Safeguards Information (Effective Immediately) I 
The Licensees identified in Attachment 1 \1\ to Order EA-06-241 
hold licenses issued in accordance with the Atomic Energy Act 
(AEA) of 1954, as amended, by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC or Commission) or Agreement States, authorizing 
them to engage in an activity subject to regulation by the 
Commission or Agreement States. On August 8, 2005, the Energy 
Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct) was enacted. Section 652 of the EPAct 
amended Section 149 of the AEA to require fingerprinting and a 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) identification and criminal 
history records check of any person who is to be permitted to 
have access to Safeguards Information (SGI).\2\ The NRC's 
implementation of this requirement cannot await the completion of 
the SGI rulemaking, which is underway, because the EPAct 
fingerprinting and criminal history records check requirements 
for access to SGI were immediately effective upon enactment of 
the EPAct. Although the EPAct permits the Commission by rule to 
except certain categories of individuals from the fingerprinting 
requirement, which the Commission has done (see 10 CFR Part 
73.59, 71 FR 33,989 (June 13, 2006)), it is unlikely that 
licensee employees or others are excepted from the fingerprinting 
requirement by the ``fingerprinting relief'' rule. Individuals 
relieved from fingerprinting and criminal history records checks 
under the relief rule include Federal, State, and local officials 
and law enforcement personnel; Agreement State inspectors who 
conduct security inspections on behalf of the NRC; members of 
Congress and certain employees of members of Congress or 
Congressional Committees, and representatives of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or certain foreign 
government organizations. In addition, individuals who have a 
favorably-decided U.S. Government criminal history records check 
within the last five (5) years, or individuals who have active 
Federal security clearances (provided in either case that they 
make available the appropriate documentation), have satisfied the 
EPAct fingerprinting requirement and need not be fingerprinted 
again. Therefore, in accordance with Section 149 of the AEA, as 
amended by the EPAct, the Commission is imposing additional 
requirements for access to SGI, as set forth by this Order, so 
that affected licensees can obtain and grant access to SGI. This 
Order also imposes requirements for access to SGI by any person, 
from any person,\3\ whether or not a Licensee, Applicant, or 
Certificate Holder of the Commission or Agreement States.
 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
---------- \1\ Attachment 1 to Order EA-06-241 contains sensitive 
information and will not be released to the public.
 
\2\ Safeguards Information is a form of sensitive, unclassified, 
security-related information that the Commission has the 
authority to designate and protect under section 147 of the AEA.
 
\3\ Person means (1) any individual, corporation, partnership, 
firm, association, trust, estate, public or private institution, 
group, government agency other than the Commission or the 
Department of Energy, except that the Department of Energy shall 
be considered a person with respect to those facilities of the 
Department of Energy specified in section 202 of the Energy 
Reorganization Act of 1974 (88 Stat. 1244), any State or any 
political subdivision of, or any political entity within a State, 
any foreign government or nation or any political subdivision of 
any such government or nation, or other entity; and (2) any legal 
successor, representative, agent, or agency of the foregoing.
 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
---------- II The Commission has broad statutory authority to 
protect and prohibit the unauthorized disclosure of SGI. Section 
147 of the AEA grants the Commission explicit authority to issue 
such Orders as necessary to prohibit the unauthorized disclosure 
of SGI.
 
Furthermore, Section 652 of the EPAct amended Section 149 of the 
AEA to require fingerprinting and an FBI identification and a 
criminal history records check of each individual who seeks 
access to SGI. In addition, no person may have access to SGI 
unless
 
[[Page 60588]] the person has an established need-to-know the 
information and satisfies the trustworthy and reliability 
requirements described in Attachment 3 to Order EA-06-241.
 
In order to provide assurance that the Licensees identified in 
Attachment 1 to Order EA-06-241 are implementing appropriate 
measures to comply with the fingerprinting and criminal history 
records check requirements for access to SGI, all Licensees 
identified in Attachment 1 to Order EA-06-241 shall implement the 
requirements of this Order. In addition, pursuant to 10 CFR 
2.202, I find that in light of the common defense and security 
matters identified above, which warrant the issuance of this 
Order, the public health, safety and interest require that this 
Order be effective immediately.
 
III Accordingly, pursuant to Sections 81, 147, 149, 161b, 161i, 
161o, 182 and 186 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, 
and the Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 2.202, 10 CFR Parts 30 
and 73, it is hereby ordered, effective immediately, that all 
licensees identified in attachment 1 to order EA-06-241 and all 
other Persons who seek or obtain access to safeguards 
information, as described above, shall comply with the 
requirements set forth in this order.
 
A. 1. No person may have access to SGI unless that person has a 
need-to-know the SGI, has been fingerprinted or who has a 
favorably- decided FBI identification and criminal history 
records check, and satisfies all other applicable requirements 
for access to SGI. Fingerprinting and the FBI identification and 
criminal history records check are not required, however, for any 
person who is relieved from that requirement by 10 CFR 73.59 (71 
FR 33989 (June 13, 2006)), or who has a favorably-decided U.S. 
Government criminal history records check within the last five 
(5) years, or who has an active Federal security clearance, 
provided in the latter two cases that the appropriate 
documentation is made available to the Licensee's NRC-approved 
reviewing official.
 
2. No person may have access to any SGI if the NRC has 
determined, based on fingerprinting and an FBI identification and 
criminal history records check, that the person may not have 
access to SGI.
 
B. No person may provide SGI to any other person except in 
accordance with Condition III.A. above. Prior to providing SGI to 
any person, a copy of this Order shall be provided to that 
person.
 
C. All Licensees identified in Attachment 1 to Order EA-06-241 
shall comply with the following requirements: 1. The Licensee 
shall, within twenty (20) days of the date of this Order, 
establish and maintain a fingerprinting program that meets the 
requirements of Attachment 1 to this Order.
 
2. The Licensee shall, within twenty (20) days of the date of 
this Order, submit the fingerprints of one (1) individual who (a) 
the Licensee nominates as the ``reviewing official'' for 
determining access to SGI by other individuals, and (b) has an 
established need-to-know the information and has been determined 
to be trustworthy and reliable in accordance with the 
requirements described in Attachment 3 to Order EA-06-241. The 
NRC will determine whether this individual (or any subsequent 
reviewing official) may have access to SGI and, therefore, will 
be permitted to serve as the Licensee's reviewing official.\4\ 
The Licensee may, at the same time or later, submit the 
fingerprints of other individuals to whom the Licensee seeks to 
grant access to SGI. Fingerprints shall be submitted and reviewed 
in accordance with the procedures described in Attachment 1 of 
this Order.
 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
---------- \4\ The NRC's determination of this individual's 
access to SGI in accordance with the process described in 
Enclosure 5 to the transmittal letter of this Order is an 
administrative determination that is outside the scope of this 
Order.
 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
---------- 3. The Licensee shall, in writing, within twenty (20) 
days of the date of this Order, notify the Commission, (1) if it 
is unable to comply with any of the requirements described in 
this Order, including Attachment 1 to this Order, or (2) if 
compliance with any of the requirements is unnecessary in its 
specific circumstances. The notification shall provide the 
Licensee's justification for seeking relief from or variation of 
any specific requirement.
 
Licensee responses to C.1., C.2., and C.3. above shall be 
submitted to the Director, Office of Federal and State Materials 
and Environmental Management Programs, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Washington, DC 20555. In addition, Licensee responses 
shall be marked as ``Security-Related Information--Withhold Under 
10 CFR 2.390.'' The Director, Office of Federal and State 
Materials and Environmental Management Programs, may, in writing, 
relax or rescind any of the above conditions upon demonstration 
of good cause by the Licensee.
 
IV In accordance with 10 CFR 2.202, the Licensee must, and any 
other person adversely affected by this Order may, submit an 
answer to this Order, and may request a hearing on this Order, 
within twenty (20) days of the date of this Order. Where good 
cause is shown, consideration will be given to extending the time 
to request a hearing. A request for extension of time in which to 
submit an answer or request a hearing must be made in writing to 
the Director, Office of Federal and State Materials and 
Environmental Management Programs, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Washington, DC 20555, and include a statement of good 
cause for the extension. The answer may consent to this Order. 
Unless the answer consents to this Order, the answer shall, in 
writing and under oath or affirmation, specifically set forth the 
matters of fact and law on which the Licensee or other person 
adversely affected relies and the reasons as to why the Order 
should not have been issued. Any answer or request for a hearing 
shall be submitted to the Secretary, Office of the Secretary, 
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Rulemakings and 
Adjudications Staff, Washington, DC 20555.
 
Copies also shall be sent to the Director, Office of Federal and 
State Materials and Environmental Management Programs, U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, and to the 
Assistant General Counsel for Materials Litigation and 
Enforcement at the same address, and to the Licensee if the 
answer or hearing request is by a person other than the Licensee. 
Because of possible delays in delivery of mail to United States 
Government offices, it is requested that answers and requests for 
hearing be transmitted to the Secretary of the Commission either 
by means of facsimile transmission to 301-415-1101 or by e-mail 
to  and also to the Office of the General Counsel either by means 
of facsimile transmission to 301-415- 3725 or by e-mail to . If a 
person other than the Licensee requests a hearing, that person 
shall set forth with particularity the manner in which his/her 
interest is adversely affected by this Order and shall address 
the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 2.309. If a hearing is requested 
by the Licensee or a person whose interest is adversely affected, 
the Commission will issue an Order designating the time and place 
of any hearing. If a hearing is held, the issue to be considered 
at such hearing shall be whether this Order should be sustained.
 
 
[[Page 60589]] Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.202(c)(2)(i), the Licensee 
may, in addition to demanding a hearing, at the time the answer 
is filed or sooner, move the presiding officer to set aside the 
immediate effectiveness of the Order on the ground that the 
Order, including the need for immediate effectiveness, is not 
based on adequate evidence but on mere suspicion, unfounded 
allegations, or error. In the absence of any request for hearing, 
or written approval of an extension of time in which to request a 
hearing, the provisions as specified above in Section III shall 
be final twenty (20) days from the date of this Order without 
further order or proceedings. If an extension of time for 
requesting a hearing has been approved, the provisions as 
specified above in Section III shall be final when the extension 
expires if a hearing request has not been received.
 
An answer or a request for hearing shall not stay the immediate 
effectiveness of this order.
 
Dated this 4th day of October 2006.
 
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
 
Charles L. Miller, Director, Office of Federal and State 
Materials and Environmental Management Programs.
 
Attachment 1--Requirements for Fingerprinting and Criminal 
History Records Checks of Individuals When Licensee's Reviewing 
Official is Determining Access to Safeguards Information General 
Requirements Licensees shall comply with the requirements of this 
attachment.
 
A. 1. Each Licensee subject to the provisions of this attachment 
shall fingerprint each individual who is seeking or permitted 
access to Safeguards Information (SGI). The Licensee shall review 
and use the information received from the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) and ensure that the provisions contained in 
the subject Order and this attachment are satisfied.
 
2. The Licensee shall notify each affected individual that the 
fingerprints will be used to secure a review of his/her criminal 
history record and inform the individual of the procedures for 
revising the record or including an explanation in the record, as 
specified in the ``Right to Correct and Complete Information'' 
section of this attachment.
 
3. Fingerprints need not be taken if an employed individual 
(e.g., a Licensee employee, contractor, manufacturer, or 
supplier) is relieved from the fingerprinting requirement by 10 
CFR Part 73.59, has a favorably-decided U.S. Government criminal 
history records check within the last five (5) years, or has an 
active Federal security clearance. Written confirmation from the 
Agency/ employer which granted the Federal security clearance or 
reviewed the criminal history records check must be provided. The 
Licensee must retain this documentation for a period of three (3) 
years from the date the individual no longer requires access to 
SGI associated with the Licensee's activities.
 
4. All fingerprints obtained by the Licensee pursuant to this 
Order must be submitted to the Commission for transmission to the 
FBI.
 
5. The Licensee shall review the information received from the 
FBI and consider it, in conjunction with the trustworthy and 
reliability requirements included in Attachment 3 to this Order, 
in making a determination whether to grant access to SGI to 
individuals who have a need-to-know the SGI.
 
6. The Licensee shall use any information obtained as part of a 
criminal history records check solely for the purpose of 
determining an individual's suitability for access to SGI.
 
7. The Licensee shall document the basis for its determination 
whether to grant access to SGI.
 
B. The Licensee shall notify the NRC of any desired change in 
reviewing officials. The NRC will determine whether the 
individual nominated as the new reviewing official may have 
access to SGI based on a previously-obtained or new criminal 
history check and, therefore, will be permitted to serve as the 
Licensee's reviewing official.
 
Prohibitions A Licensee shall not base a final determination to 
deny an individual access to SGI solely on the basis of 
information received from the FBI involving: An arrest more than 
one (1) year old for which there is no information of the 
disposition of the case, or an arrest that resulted in dismissal 
of the charge or an acquittal.
 
A Licensee shall not use information received from a criminal 
history check obtained pursuant to this Order in a manner that 
would infringe upon the rights of any individual under the First 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, nor shall the 
Licensee use the information in any way which would discriminate 
among individuals on the basis of race, religion, national 
origin, sex, or age.
 
Procedures for Processing Fingerprint Checks For the purpose of 
complying with this Order, Licensees shall, using an appropriate 
method listed in 10 CFR Part 73.4, submit to the NRC's Division 
of Facilities and Security, Mail Stop T-6E46, one completed, 
legible standard fingerprint card (Form FD-258, ORIMDNRCOOOZ) or, 
where practicable, other fingerprint records for each individual 
seeking access to Safeguards Information, to the Director of the 
Division of Facilities and Security, marked for the attention of 
the Division's Criminal History Check Section.
 
Copies of these forms may be obtained by writing the Office of 
Information Services, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555- 0001, by calling (301) 415-5877, or by 
e-mail to . Practicable alternative formats are set forth in 10 
CFR Part 73.4. The Licensee shall establish procedures to ensure 
that the quality of the fingerprints taken results in minimizing 
the rejection rate of fingerprint cards due to illegible or 
incomplete cards.
 
The NRC will review submitted fingerprint cards for completeness. 
Any Form FD-258 fingerprint record containing omissions or 
evident errors will be returned to the Licensee for corrections. 
The fee for processing fingerprint checks includes one 
re-submission if the initial submission is returned by the FBI 
because the fingerprint impressions cannot be classified. The one 
free re-submission must have the FBI Transaction Control Number 
reflected on the re-submission. If additional submissions are 
necessary, they will be treated as initial submittals and will 
require a second payment of the processing fee.
 
Fees for processing fingerprint checks are due upon application. 
Licensees shall submit payment with the application for 
processing fingerprints by corporate check, certified check, 
cashier's check, money order, or electronic payment, made payable 
to ``U.S. NRC.'' [For guidance on making electronic payments, 
contact the Facilities Security Branch, Division of Facilities 
and Security, at (301) 415- 7404]. Combined payment for multiple 
applications is acceptable. The application fee (currently $27) 
is the sum of the user fee charged by the FBI for each 
fingerprint card or other fingerprint record submitted by the NRC 
on behalf of a Licensee, and an NRC processing fee, which covers 
administrative costs associated with NRC handling of Licensee 
fingerprint submissions. The Commission will directly notify 
Licensees who are subject to this regulation of any fee changes.
 
The Commission will forward to the submitting Licensee all data 
received from the FBI as a result of the Licensee's 
application(s) for criminal history records checks, including the 
FBI fingerprint record.
 
Right to Correct and Complete Information Prior to any final 
adverse determination, the Licensee shall make available to the 
individual the contents of any criminal records obtained from the 
FBI for the purpose of assuring correct and complete information. 
Written confirmation by the individual of receipt of this 
notification must be maintained by the Licensee for a period of 
one (1) year from the date of the notification.
 
If, after reviewing the record, an individual believes that it is 
incorrect or incomplete in any respect and wishes to change, 
correct, or update the alleged deficiency, or to explain any 
matter in the record, the individual may initiate challenge 
procedures. These procedures include either direct application by 
the individual challenging the record to the agency (i.e., law 
enforcement agency) that contributed the questioned information, 
or direct challenge as to the accuracy or completeness of any 
entry on the criminal history record to the Assistant Director, 
Federal Bureau of Investigation Identification Division, 
Washington, DC 20537-9700 (as set forth in 28 CFR Part 16.30 
through 16.34). In the latter case, the FBI forwards the 
challenge to the agency that submitted the data and requests that 
agency to verify or correct the challenged entry.
 
Upon receipt of an official communication directly from the 
agency that contributed the original information, the FBI 
Identification Division makes any changes necessary in accordance 
with the information supplied by that agency. The Licensee must 
provide at least ten (10) days for an
 
[[Page 60590]] individual to initiate an action challenging the 
results of an FBI criminal history records check after the record 
is made available for his/her review. The Licensee may make a 
final SGI access determination based upon the criminal history 
record only upon receipt of the FBI's ultimate confirmation or 
correction of the record. Upon a final adverse determination on 
access to SGI, the Licensee shall provide the individual its 
documented basis for denial. Access to SGI shall not be granted 
to an individual during the review process.
 
Protection of Information 1. Each Licensee who obtains a criminal 
history record on an individual pursuant to this Order shall 
establish and maintain a system of files and procedures for 
protecting the record and the personal information from 
unauthorized disclosure.
 
2. The Licensee may not disclose the record or personal 
information collected and maintained to persons other than the 
subject individual, his/her representative, or to those who have 
a need to access the information in performing assigned duties in 
the process of determining access to Safeguards Information. No 
individual authorized to have access to the information may re- 
disseminate the information to any other individual who does not 
have a need-to-know.
 
3. The personal information obtained on an individual from a 
criminal history record check may be transferred to another 
Licensee if the Licensee holding the criminal history record 
check receives the individual's written request to re-disseminate 
the information contained in his/her file, and the gaining 
Licensee verifies information such as the individual's name, date 
of birth, social security number, sex, and other applicable 
physical characteristics for identification purposes.
 
4. The Licensee shall make criminal history records, obtained 
under this section, available for examination by an authorized 
representative of the NRC to determine compliance with the 
regulations and laws.
 
5. The Licensee shall retain all fingerprint and criminal history 
records received from the FBI, or a copy if the individual's file 
has been transferred, for three (3) years after termination of 
employment or determination of access to SGI (whether access was 
approved or denied). After the required three (3) year period, 
these documents shall be destroyed by a method that will prevent 
reconstruction of the information in whole or in part.
 
[FR Doc. E6-16996 Filed 10-12-06; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590-01-P

 
*****************************************************************
 35 NRC: Atomic Safety and Licensing Board; Before Administrative Judges: 
 
                        FR Doc E6-16997 
[Federal Register: October 13, 2006 (Volume 71, Number 198)] 
[Notices] [Page 60583] From the Federal Register Online via GPO 
Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr13oc06-109] [[Page 60583]]
 
Lawrence G. McDade, Chairman, Nicholas G. Trikouros, Dr. Richard 
E. Wardwell; In the Matter of System Energy Resources, Inc.; 
Early Site Permit for Grand Gulf Site; Notice of Hearing October 
6, 2006.
 
This Atomic Safety and Licensing Board hereby gives notice that 
it will convene an evidentiary session to receive testimony and 
exhibits in the ``mandatory hearing'' portion of this proceeding 
regarding the October 16, 2003, application of System Energy 
Resources, Inc.
 
(SERI) for a 10 CFR part 52 early site permit (ESP), seeking 
approval of the site of the existing Grand Gulf Nuclear Station 
(GGNS) near Port Gibson in Claiborne County, Mississippi, for the 
possible future construction of a new nuclear power generation 
facility.\1\ This mandatory hearing will concern safety and 
environmental matters relating to the proposed issuance of the 
requested ESP, as more fully described below.
 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
---------- \1\ See 69 FR 2636 (Jan. 16, 2004). 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
---------- A. Matters To Be Considered As set forth by the 
Commission in the January 2004 ``Notice of Hearing and 
Opportunity To Petition for Leave To Intervene Early Site Permit 
for the Grand Gulf ESP Site'' (69 FR at 2636) and the applicable 
regulations in 10 CFR 52.21, the matters at issue in this 
proceeding are whether the application and the record of this 
proceeding contain sufficient information, and the NRC Staff's 
review of the application has been adequate to support a finding 
that: (a) The issuance of this ESP will not be inimical to the 
common defense and security or to the health and safety of the 
public (Safety Issue 1); (b) taking into consideration the site 
criteria contained in 10 CFR part 100, a reactor or reactors 
having characteristics that fall within the parameters for the 
site, can be constructed and operated without undue risk to the 
public health and safety (Safety Issue 2); and (c) in accordance 
with the requirements of 10 CFR part 51, Subpart A, the ESP 
should be issued as proposed. Additionally, in accord with the 
Commission's January 2004 notice, also at issue in this 
proceeding are: (d) Whether the requirements of Sections 
102(2)(A), (C), and (E) of the National Environmental Policy Act 
of 1969 and 10 CFR part 51, Subpart A, have been complied with in 
this proceeding; (e) whether the final balance among conflicting 
factors contained in the record of this proceeding indicate that 
granting the ESP is the appropriate action to be taken; and (f) 
whether, after considering reasonable alternatives, the ESP 
should be issued, denied, or appropriately conditioned to protect 
environmental values.
 
B. Date, Time, and Location of Mandatory Hearing The Board will 
conduct this mandatory hearing at the specified location and 
time: 1. Date: Tuesday, November 14, 2006. Time: Beginning at 9 
a.m. EST. Location: ASLBP Hearing Room, Two White Flint North, 
Third Floor, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 
20852-2738.
 
The hearing on these issues will continue day-to-day thereafter 
until concluded.
 
Any members of the public who plan to attend the mandatory 
hearing are advised that security measures will be employed at 
the entrance to the hearing facility, including searches of 
hand-carried items such as briefcases or backpacks. The public is 
further advised that, in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, portions 
of the hearing sessions may be closed to the public because the 
matters at issue may involve the discussion of protected 
information.
 
C. Availability of Documentary Information Regarding the 
Proceeding Documents relating to this proceeding are available 
for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room 
(PDR), located at One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike 
(first floor), Rockville, Maryland, or electronically from the 
publicly available records component of NRC's document system 
(ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at 
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic 
Reading Room). Persons who do not have access to ADAMS or who 
encounter problems in accessing the documents located in ADAMS 
should contact the NRC PDR reference staff by telephone at (800) 
397-4209 or (301) 415-4737, or by e-mail to pdr@nrc.gov. D. 
Scheduling Information Updates Any updated/revised scheduling 
information regarding the evidentiary hearing can be found on the 
NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/ 
[fxsp0]public-involve/public-meetings/[fxsp0]index.cfm or by 
calling (800) 368-5642, extension 5036, or (301) 415-5036.
 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
---------- \2\ Copies of this Notice were sent this date by 
Internet e-mail transmission to: (1) Counsel for the NRC Staff 
and (2) Counsel for SERI.
 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
---------- It is so ordered.
 
Dated: October 6, 2006 at Rockville, Maryland.
 
For the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board.\2\ Lawrence G. McDade, 
Chairman, Administrative Judge.
 
[FR Doc. E6-16997 Filed 10-12-06; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590-01-P

 
*****************************************************************
 36 CNN: Russia building nuke barge to power Arctic 

- CNN.com

By Bjorn Carey

(PopSci.com[external link] ) -- While the U.S. hems and haws over 
reviving nuclear energy as a less expensive alternative to oil, 
Russia has dug back 30 years in our nuclear history to find a 
solution for some of its own energy woes: the floating nuclear 
power plant. 

The Russian nuclear-energy company Rosenergoatom is planning a 
mobile plant to deliver electricity to hard-to-reach northern 
territories near the White Sea, where harsh weather makes regular 
coal and oil fuel deliveries unreliable and expensive. 

The $200-million floating plant -- slated for construction next 
year -- could provide relatively inexpensive, reliable 
electricity to 200,000 people.

Although the concept of a water-borne nuke plant might sound 
outlandish, it isn't new, nor did it originate in Russia. 

Westinghouse Electric Company considered the idea in the 1970s 
and built an immense dry-dock facility in Jacksonville, Florida, 
where plants would be launched and floated north along the 
Eastern Seaboard, conveniently doling out power to towns in need. 

Engineers would be able to standardize construction for multiple 
plants in an offsite factory with increased quality control and 
reduced production costs before tugging a plant to its port of 
call. But ultimately, says retired Westinghouse consultant 
Richard Orr, energy conservation following the 1973 OPEC oil 
embargo killed the project.

The Russian plan is to mount two reactors on a 
football-field-size barge, float it to a port, connect power 
lines to the mainland, and turn on the reactors, providing 
communities with affordable electricity. 

The plant will store waste and spent fuel in an onboard facility 
that workers will empty every 10 to 12 years during regular 
maintenance overhauls. After 40 years, the normal life span for a 
nuclear plant, the decommissioned plant would be towed away and 
replaced with a new one. 

The reactor and spent fuel would go to a storage facility, but 
the barge could be recycled.

Yet because the safety of the Russian facility is still unknown, 
the prospect of resurrecting the Westinghouse idea in the White 
Sea has drawn protest from environmental groups such as 
Greenpeace and the Norwegian foundation Bellona. 

One concern is that a boat could ram the plant and spill waste 
into the water. 

An even bigger fear is that a nasty storm could cut the plant off 
from the land-based power supply required to run plant 
operations. Should emergency generators fail, says David 
Lochbaum, director of the Nuclear Safety Project at the Union of 
Concerned Scientists, a Chernobyl-like disaster could ensue. 

In a worst-case scenario, an overheated core could melt through 
the bottom of the barge and drop into the water, creating a 
radioactive steam explosion. Such a cloud could do far more 
damage than the plume of nuclear fallout kicked up by the 1986 
explosion of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in the former 
U.S.S.R., Lochbaum notes, because the human body absorbs 
radioactive water droplets more easily than it does radioactive 
ash. 

"Its worst day would be much worse than a land power plant's," he 
says.

Sergey Obozov, acting director for Rosenergoatom, says that 
reactors at sea have a proven safety record: The facility would 
be powered by two 60-megawatt KLT-40S reactors adapted from those 
already in use on three Russian nuclear-powered icebreakers. 

Yet Cristina Chuen, a Russian nuclear-energy specialist with the 
Monterey Institute for International Studies in California, 
cautions that subtle performance differences might arise when 
running the reactor for pure energy generation instead of 
propulsion, noting that the cooling system remains unproven. 

Although the technology exists to contain a burning core, 
Rosenergoatom won't say if the plant -- which was designed a 
decade ago -- will include the most modern safety measures.

With a building permit in hand, Rosenergoatom aims to have the 
facility afloat in the port city of Severodvinsk in the 
southeastern White Sea by late 2010. 

"The Russians have learned a lot about safety from the U.S. 
Department of Energy, Sweden and Norway -- who probably all wish 
[the Russians] would focus on things other than a floating 
nuclear power plant," says Chuen, who adds that she wishes the 
planning process were more transparent. 

"Maybe it will turn out great, but I just hope they did all the
research to make sure it's safe." 			 				

© 2006 Cable News Network LP, LLLP.
*****************************************************************
 37 AFP: US gives assurances on Indian nuclear deal - 

 Fri Oct 13, 12:52 AM ET 		 	 

NEW DELHI (AFP) - A top US official has given assurances that the 
United States wants to go ahead with a key civilian nuclear deal 
with India, easing fears for the agreement raised by North Korea" 
/> North Korea's atomic test. 

 US Under Secretary of State Nicholas Burns said in an interview 
broadcast Thursday that Washington was "determined" to implement 
the deal. 

"We are determined to fulfil the commitments we made to the
Indian government," Burns told NDTV. 

Burns said he had been in touch with Indian officials to "assure
that the US wants to go forward on all of the definite
initiatives that President (George) Bush and Prime Minister
(Manmohan) Singh talked in March." 

The accord -- reached during Bush's March visit -- aims to give
New Delhi access to previously forbidden nuclear technology to
generate electricity to fuel its rapid economic growth. 

Under the terms of the deal, India -- which conducted nuclear
tests in 1974 and 1998 and has not signed the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) -- will separate its civilian and
military plants and put the former under international
safeguards. 

Washington for its part agreed to amend its 1954 Atomic Energy
Act to allow nuclear commerce and trade in technology with a
non-NPT signatory. 

The US Congress gave its thumbs-up to the deal in July but a
vote has been delayed in the Republican-controlled Senate that
will shortly hold polls to elect new members. 

North Korea's announcement earlier this week that it had
conducted a nuclear test had however given rise to doubts about
whether US lawmakers opposed to the deal would allow it to go
through. 

Burns however said Congressmen and Senators were aware of the
"world of difference between India and North Korea." 

"India is a peaceful, democratic, law-abiding leader of the
international community. North Korea is the reverse of all
that," he told NDTV. 

"There is great trust that the commitments the Indian government
has made to us will be fulfilled and we are very confident that
the India deal will be approved by a substantial margin, at
least we hope it will. 

"We have been encouraged by the great number of senators,
Democrats and Republicans, who have come out to support the
agreement," Burns added. 

Copyright © 2006 Agence France Presse. All rights reserved. The
*****************************************************************
 38 Japan Times: Ehime reactor gets go-ahead to go pluthermal
 
Saturday, Oct. 14, 2006

 GOVERNOR GIVES '10 MOX NOD, SNUBS FOES Ehime reactor gets
go-ahead to go pluthermal 

MATSUYAMA, Ehime Pref. (Kyodo) Ehime Prefecture on Friday 
accepted Shikoku Electric Power Co.'s plan to start using 
plutonium extracted from spent nuclear fuel to generate power at 
a reactor in the town of Ikata by fiscal 2010. 

  [News photo]   
  The Ikata power plant's No. 3 reactor operated by Shikoku
Electric Power Co. faces the Seto Inland Sea in western Shikoku.

KYODO PHOTO   

The local endorsement of the so-called pluthermal plan at the
Ikata power plant's No. 3 reactor followed the central
government go-ahead in March, making it the second reactor in
Japan to have cleared both central and local government
scrutiny. 

Despite lingering opposition from citizen groups, Ehime Gov.
Moriyuki Kato handed a written agreement to Shikoku Electric
Power President Momoki Tokiwa at the prefectural office Friday
morning, after getting consent Thursday from Ikata Mayor
Kazuhiko Yamashita. 

By accepting the plan, the Ehime government will receive 6
billion yen in subsidies over 10 years. 

Pluthermal, or plutonium-thermal, power generation involves
burning plutonium-uranium mixed-oxide fuel, or MOX, made from
spent fuel at nuclear reactors. 

Amid a stalemate in Tokyo's efforts to develop a fast-breeder
reactor, pluthermal power generation has become the pillar of
Japan's plan. A spent nuclear fuel reprocessing plant in
Rokkasho, Aomori Prefecture, began a test run in March. 

Japan's power industry aims to realize pluthermal power
generation at 16 to 18 reactors by fiscal 2010. But the process,
which the government decided to promote in 1997, has stalled
with Tokyo Electric Power Co. and Kansai Electric Power Co.
suspending their plans due to scandals and an accident
alienating local governments. 

Prior local consent is a prerequisite for any reactor-related
changes under security agreements power companies have concluded
with the local governments that host their nuclear plants. 
Last March, Kyushu Electric Power Co. gained local support for
its pluthermal project at the Genkai nuclear plant in Saga
Prefecture, about six months after getting state approval. 
Shikoku Electric Power made requests in May 2004 for Ehime
Prefecture and Ikata to approve its project. 
Ehime Gov. Kato has voiced confidence in the local power
supplier's safety practices and said he believes the central
government's pluthermal policy is reasonable. 

The Japan Times (C) All rights reserved 

*****************************************************************
 39 UPI: Analysis: Inquiry into N.Y. nuke plant
     
United Press International - Energy - 

10/13/2006 5:38:00 PM -0400

 By BEN LANDO UPI Energy Correspondent

WASHINGTON, Oct. 13 (UPI) -- The top U.S. nuclear regulator has
called for an "independent assessment" of safety oversight at
the Indian Point plant, 45 miles north of New York City, in a
move criticized as both too mute and politically motivated. 

Community groups and elected officials have pressed the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission to act on safety concerns, though
the NRC has given Indian Point high marks. 

In response, NRC Chairman Dale Klein in a memo Wednesday gave
NRC Executive Director of Operations Luis Reyes 30 days "to
develop a Charter to conduct an independent assessment of the
implementation of the NRC's reactor oversight process at the
Indian Point facility." 

The Reactor Oversight Process, reconstituted five years ago, is
used to monitor plants "to verify that they are being operated
in accordance with NRC rules and regulations," according to the
just-released NRC Information Digest. 

"The Charter should be structured to not only assess the
efficacy of the NRC's implementation of the reactor oversight
program at Indian Point and possibly other facilities, but to
also identify areas within the program that may need refinement
as well as insights into licensee performance," Klein wrote. 

While praising recently instituted oversight guidelines -- a
sentiment somewhat shared with one of the country's top nuclear
safety watchdogs -- Klein wrote: "nevertheless, I believe that
additional review of our actions would be beneficial." 

Indian Point, located in Buchanan, N.Y., on the Hudson River,
can push 2,000 megawatts of power from its two reactors, which
went online in 1974 and 1976. If the NRC approves it, the
reactors could be granted a 20-year-renewal when their current
licenses expire in 2013 and 2015, respectively. 

"People around New York think that Indian Point is less safe
than it needs to be," said Dave Lochbaum, director of the
Nuclear Safety Project at the Union of Concerned Scientists. 

"I welcome NRC Chairman Klein's interest in reviewing oversight
at Indian Point, but I continue to believe that a full and
independent safety assessment is necessary to address public
concerns," Sen. Hillary Clinton, D-N.Y., wrote in an e-mail to
The Journal News this week. 

Clinton, and others, still want what's known as an Independent
Safety Assessment Team inspection, which was thorough enough to
shut down the Maine Yankee nuclear plant in 1996 (though
Lochbaum wrote March 15 an "engineering assessment inspection,"
or "ISAT-lite" as he dubbed it, "would likely have turned over
enough rocks to reveal the same performance problems that ISAT
revealed" at Maine Yankee). Both are methods within the Reactor
Oversight Process umbrella. 

But "the NRC has been reluctant" to move on the complaints
raised about Indian Point, Lochbaum said, though he says he
doesn't think there's anything wrong with the plant that isn't
being adequately addressed. Lochbaum says the Reactor Oversight
Process needs to upgraded, though. 

Lisa Rainwater, Indian Point campaign director for Riverkeeper,
which wants the plant shut down, called Klein's move just
"oversight of oversight. 

"It's great that he's taking a step to look at how it (NRC)
oversees safety at Indian Point," she said. She insists,
however, that "a checkered history" at the plant, including
radioactive leaks and a "gravely flawed" emergency evacuation
plan, warrants an ISAT. 

"It's basically bureaucracy churning its wheels continuously in
Washington, without assuring health and safety," she said.
"We're not an anti-nuclear group. We're watchdogs for the Hudson
River and New York City water supply." 

Rainwater is calling for action on bills stuck since spring in
Senate and House energy subcommittees, introduced by Clinton and
Rep. Maurice Hinchey, D-N.Y., which would mandate an ISAT
inspection at Indian Point. 

"It's apparent that the review the NRC is talking about doing is
brought about by political pressure," said Jim Steets, spokesman
for Entergy Nuclear Northeast, Indian Point's owner. 

Reps. Nita Lowey and Eliot Engel, both D-N.Y., as well as Reps.
Sue Kelly, R-N.Y., and Christopher Shays, R-Conn., all co-signed
Hinchey's bill. No Senator has signed onto Clinton's bill. 

"Around here I don't take the NRC at face value; I'm skeptical,"
Kelly told the Mid-Hudson News Network. 

"We're fully supportive of what NRC finally decides to do,"
Steets said, while touting "green" evaluation ratings -- the
highest -- from the NRC. Indian Point operates within the
regulatory guidelines the NRC sets out, he said, adding safety
issues Rainwater raises about the plant don't threaten the
wellbeing of residents or workers. 

In the letter, Klein, the NRC leader since July, alluded to
possibly bringing in the International Atomic Energy Agency to
conduct an in-depth look at the plant as part of the review, NRC
spokeswoman Beth Hayden said. 

An Operational Safety Review Team is a program where
"international teams of experts conduct three-week in-depth
reviews of operational safety performance at individual nuclear
power plants. These reviews are conducted at the request of the
government of the host country," according to the IAEA Web site. 

© Copyright 2006 United Press International, Inc. All Rights
Reserved
*****************************************************************
 40 NRC: Live NRC Meeting Webcast

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission broadcasts some
Commission meetings over the Internet as a means of improving
communications with the public. Upcoming webcasts are: 


                        Date     Subject   
  10/16/06     Briefing on Status of New Reactor Issues -
Combined Operating Licenses (COLS) - Morning session - 9:30 A.M.
 Briefing on Status of New Reactor Issues - Combined Operating
Licenses (COLS) - Afternoon session - 1:30 P.M. 
  + Slides   
  10/20/06     Meeting with the Advisory Committee on Reactor
Safeguards (ACRS) 
2:30 P.M.   
  10/25/06     Briefing on Institutionalization and Integration
of Agency Lessons Learned
 9:30 A.M.   
  10/25/06     Briefing on Resolution of GSI-191, Assessment of
Debris Accumulation on PWR Sump Performance
 1:30 P.M.   
  11/8/06     Briefing on Digital Instrumentation and Control
 9:30 A.M.   
  11/9/06     Briefing on Draft Final RulePart 52 (Early Site
Permits/Standard Design Certification/Combined Licenses)
 9:30 A.M.   

The following resources will assist you in participating: 
  + Public Meeting Schedule - provides a complete listing of
agency meetings. Live meetings shown as [webcast] 
  + Commission Meeting Schedule - lists all Commission meetings
for a six week period. Live meetings shown as [webcast] 
  + Slides - available in advance of the meeting 
  + Transcripts - available within 48 hours of the conclusion of
the live meeting 
  + Meeting SRM - documentation of any Commission's decisions
from the meeting 

To view a webcast you will need to download the RealOne plugin
[RealNetworks Media Streaming Player icon] . 

You may also view previous webcasts at our . 

Comments and Feedback 

To help us determine the value of continuing to provide this
service, the NRC would appreciate your assistance by providing
comments and feedback on the usefulness, performance, and
frequency with which you might use this service or any other
items related to this service. 
  + Contact Us About Webcasts 
  + Webcast Interest Survey 

Notes on Accessibility 

Section 508 of the Rehabilitation Act requires equal access to
the Federal government's electronic and information technology.
In compliance with this Act, NRC is including text equivalents
(captioning) as part of the video image being shown over the
Internet during the Commission meeting. Although every effort is
made to assure the accuracy and completeness of this text, users
should be aware that errors may nonetheless occur. Expressions
of opinion in this text do not necessarily reflect final
determination or beliefs. No pleadings or other paper may be
filed with the Commission in any proceeding as a result of any
statement or argument contained in the text-equivalent
(captioned) material.   

  
Last revised Wednesday, October 11, 2006           
*****************************************************************
 41 Guardian Unlimited: Groups Question Nuke Plant Terror Risk
 
From the Associated Press        

[UP] 

Friday October 13, 2006 3:16 PM

By HOLBROOK MOHR 

Associated Press Writer 

JACKSON, Miss. (AP) - Environmental groups opposed to expanding
a nuclear power plant accused federal regulators of failing to
publicly address whether the project would increase the risk of
terrorism. 

In a formal objection filed Thursday with the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, the Sierra Club and two Washington-based
environmental groups - Nuclear Information and Resource Service
and Public Citizen - urged the agency to hold public hearings. 

The plan for a second reactor at the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station
near Port Gibson, about 25 miles south of Vicksburg, is in the
permitting phase. 

``You don't have to be a CIA agent to know that nuclear power
plants are natural targets,'' said Rose Johnson, co-chairwoman
of the Sierra Club's Mississippi chapter. ``People have a right
to know the potential dangers they face in their own
neighborhoods.'' 

Commission spokesman Scott Burnell said Friday that regulators
are currently considering only whether the site can support a
new nuclear power plant and do not typically address security at
this stage. 

The existing reactor, which has been producing electricity since
1985, is one of 10 operated by Entergy Corp. The expansion
project is being pushed by NuStart Energy, a consortium of
nearly a dozen energy companies. 

Entergy officials have said it could take the consortium five
years to secure permits for a new reactor and another five years
to build it. No decisions have been made on whether to proceed. 

^--- 

On the Net: 

http://www.sierraclub.org/ms 

http://www.nrc.gov 

http://www.nustartenergy.com 
		 	 	   
Guardian Unlimited © Guardian Newspapers Limited 2006
*****************************************************************
 42 IEER's Latest: North Korea; Fernald; Calculate CO2 from Coal
 
Date: Fri, 13 Oct 2006 15:20:46 -0700

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<x-flowed>
Here two new items from IEER.  We hope they are useful to you.  Feedback 
is, as always, welcome.
aad

(1)  <http://www.ieer.org/sdafiles/14-3.pdf>Science for Democratic Action, 
Vol<http://www.ieer.org/sdafiles/14-3.pdf> 14, No 3 (November 2006) 
www.ieer.org/sdafiles/14-3.pdf  [PDF 760kB]
         Fernald Waste Management
         Environmental Transport of Radium and Plutonium
         Principles for Safeguarding Nuclear Waste at Reactors
         Atomic Puzzler: Calculate CO2 Emissions from a Coal Plant

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 43 [NYTr] Old French Nuke tests "represented a slight (health) risk"
 
Date: Fri, 13 Oct 2006 21:22:27 -0400 (EDT)

X-Sender-Host-Name: olm.blythe-systems.com
X-Spam-Class: HAM-VERY-WHITELIST

Via NY Transfer News Collective  *  All the News that Doesn't Fit
 
sent by Riaz K Tayob (activ-l) - Oct 13, 2006


InterPress Service -Oct 12, 2006

Cancer Fears Emerge as Fallout of French Nuclear Tests

by Julio Godoy

PARIS, Oct 12 (IPS) - New evidence is emerging of cancers caused by 
French nuclear testing in its South Pacific islands from the 1960s.

Between 1966 and 1996 France carried out 192 nuclear tests in French 
Polynesia, a group of islands in the south Pacific. These included 42 
atmospheric tests, in the face of opposition from local residents.

Now, 40 years after the tests began, the French government has finally 
started to admit that Polynesian inhabitants may have been right to fear 
the consequences of radioactivity.

Marcel Jurien de La Gravihre, representative of the French Commission on 
Nuclear Safety, announced in Papetee, capital of French Polynesia last 
week that a "coherent and continued medical examination" would be 
proposed for inhabitants most likely affected by the tests.

Such testing will be offered to some 2,000 persons, he said.

Jurien de la Gravihre admitted that six of the 192 tests had "affected 
in a significant manner some islands and atolls" in the region.

The French military carried out the six atmospheric nuclear tests 
between 1966 and 1974 on the islands Moruroa, Fangataufa, Magareva, 
Gambier, Tureia and Tahiti. These tests "represented a slight (health) 
risk", the ministry of defence now says.

Two of the Polynesian tests are particularly in question - the ones 
called Aldibaran (1966) and Phoebe (1971). According to new official 
figures these tests released far higher radiation than acknowledged so far.

Up to 150,000 people inhabited the islands in the region at the time. 
Some 20,000 other people worked at nuclear test sites during the 30 
years of testing.

The change in the French government's position comes after Florent de 
Vathaire, a researcher at the National Institute for Health and Medical 
Research (INSERM, after its French name) reported that the nuclear tests 
closely correlate with the appearance of thyroid cancer typically 
associated with radioactivity.

Florent de Vathaire, head of the epidemiological cancer unit at INSERM 
found "a statistically significant relation" between the nuclear tests 
and the incidence of thyroid cancer. De Vathaire studied some 240 cases 
of thyroid cancer reported in the islands.

On July 17 this year, de Vathaire presented his findings to the ministry 
of defence, and urged it to declassify military reports that he said 
confirm the findings.

"I would like to study the data contained in the classified documents, 
which would allow us to confirm in a more precise manner the nature of 
the health dangers represented by the tests," de Vathaire told IPS. 
Cancer victims and their relatives in the French Polynesia have made 
similar demands.

"So far, the French authorities have said that the nuclear bomb tests 
did not represent any danger," Patrice Bouveret, director of the 
Observatory of French Nuclear Weapons, an independent group, told IPS. 
"Now, the same authorities are saying that there was indeed a 'slight' 
risk."

But this admission too comes on the basis of reports by military 
officers, he said. "Nobody else has seen the original documents to 
verify such claims. If the victims would have these official reports, 
they could act legally and demand that justice be done."

The questions are not confined to the south Pacific islands. France 
carried out 17 tests in Reggane region in the Algerian Sahara in 1961 
and 1962, just before Algerian independence.

Health activists and affected people who have come together as the 
Association of Veterans of the French Nuclear Tests (AVEN) in French 
Polynesia and in the Algerian Sahara are fighting for declassification 
of the reports, and for recognition by the French authorities that the 
nuclear tests have caused a high number of cancers in these regions.

Jean-Paul Teissonihre, legal counsellor of AVEN and of the Polynesian 
association Mururoa e Tatou has been lodging complaints against the 
French authorities since 2003.

One aim is to obtain pensions from the French state for the victims and 
their relatives, he told IPS. "But in order to establish this causality 
link between the tests and the numerous illnesses we have to argue by 
presumption unless the authorities release the classified documents." 
(END/2006)
       
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 44 [NYTr] DPRK Nuclear test angers Hiroshima survivors
 
Date: Fri, 13 Oct 2006 11:46:08 -0500 (CDT)

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Via NY Transfer News Collective  *  All the News that Doesn't Fit
 
sent by Simon McGuinness

The Irish Times - Oct 12, 2006
http://www.ireland.com/newspaper/world/2006/1012/1160340240004.html

Nuclear test bomb angers Hiroshima survivors

by David McNeill in Japan

JAPAN: Few people are angrier that North Korea has joined the world's
nuclear club than Sunao Tsuboi. As a 20-year-old Hiroshima student, he
was burnt from head to toe when the US dropped the Fat Man A-bomb on
that city in August 1945. He still bears the scars all over his face and
body.

"We're furious about this test," he says of Japan's 270,000 A-bomb
survivors. "It means that more countries are sure to follow, and how can
the nuclear powers tell them not to develop their own bombs? Our
greatest worry is that Japan will now feel it has to have its own
nuclear weapon."

Japan's legacy as the world's only A-bomb victim means any talk of
developing its own nuclear option has long been taboo. But in the wake
of Pyongyang's apparently successful test, the limits of this taboo are
again being tested.

Former prime minister Yasuhiro Nakasone is just the latest politician to
suggest that Japan should "study the nuclear issue", voicing a sentiment
that has long stalked the conservative wing of Japanese politics.

This week Japan's largest newspaper, the Yomiuri, also said the country
should reconsider its aversion to the bomb, urging the government to not
let its "emotional nuclear allergy" stop it from "taking a realistic
response to such a major change".

Politics, not technology, hinders the development of Japanese nuclear
weapons. The world's second-largest economy also boasts one of its
largest nuclear industries with 55 reactors operating, 11 more planned,
and a huge new reprocessing plant which will add to the 45 tonnes of
plutonium already stored around the country.

In 2002 senior opposition figure Ichiro Ozawa spelled out the
implications of goading this sleeping giant when he told China that it
would be "a simple matter" for Japan to build "3,000 to 4,000 nuclear
warheads" if its neighbour got "too inflated". Most experts believe a
bomb could be built in six months.

In public at least, new prime minister Shinzo Abe resists such calls. In
a Diet question-and-answer session this week he reiterated Japan's three
nuclear principles: that it will not "manufacture or possess nuclear
weapons or allow their introduction into" the country.

"I would like to clearly state that there will be no change to [ these
principles]," he said.

But the reality of Japan's strict anti-nuclear stance has not always
matched the politicians' rhetoric. Nuclear-armed US vessels have
secretly docked in Japanese ports. In the 1970s prime minister Eisaku
Sato commissioned a nuclear feasibility plan which was so politically
explosive it stayed buried for 20 years.

In the near term, most experts believe Pyongyang's bomb is likely to
push Tokyo closer into the arms of the US, under whose nuclear umbrella
Japan has sheltered for half a century. Mr Abe has already pledged to
speed up the development of an as yet unproven joint missile defence
shield and to boost defence ties, a strategy that inevitably brings him
into conflict with Japan's "pacifist" constitution.

But against a background of growing regional instability and the
likelihood of further challenges from Japan's unpredictable neighbour,
few of the A-bomb survivors are prepared to bet that the nuclear freeze
will hold forever.

"There are no words to describe that happened to our city," says Mr
Kuboi, who has watched in despair as the world's nuclear club has grown
from one to eight in his lifetime.

"Our hopes have gone up and down since 1945, but I can't remember a time
as bad as this."

C The Irish Times 
       
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 45 SVA: Study of contamination at rocket lab site reveals evidence of cancer link 

[The SimiValley Acorn]     

October 13, 2006   

By Avi Rutschman avi@theacorn.com 

The Santa Susana Field Laboratory Panel, an independent team of
researchers and health experts, released a report last week
concluding that toxins and radiation released from the
Rocketdyne research facility near Simi Valley could be
responsible for hundreds of cancers in the surrounding areas. 

The Santa Susana Field Laboratory was built in 1948 by North
American Aviation and consists of 2,850 acres in eastern Ventura
County. Over the years, it has been used as a test site for
experiments involving nuclear reactors, high-powered lasers and
rockets. 

The report was completed by experts in the fields of reactor
accident analysis, atmospheric transport of contaminants,
hydrology and geology. The study took five years to complete and
was funded by the California Environmental Protection Agency. 

"We want to thank the many legislatures that have attended
meetings, provided funds and pressured public agencies into
action," said Marie Mason, a community activist and longtime
resident of the Santa Susana Knolls area in Simi Valley, who
helped to form the advisory panel. 

The panel originally formed 15 years ago after a 1959 nuclear
meltdown that occurred at the Santa Susana Field Laboratory was
made public. Concerned about the possibility of facing adverse
health affects due to the meltdown, area residents pressured
legislators into funding a panel to study the impact of the
incident. 

"We were fearful of what our families and communities may have
been exposed to," said Holly Huff, another community member who
pushed for the formation of the panel. 

The first study conducted by the panel was performed by UCLA
researchers and focused on the adverse health effects the
meltdown had on Rocketdyne employees. Completed in 1997, that
report indicated workers did indeed suffer a higher rate of
lymph system and lung cancers. 

Boeing, the current owner of the Santa Susana Field Laboratory,
has challenged the validity of the studies, calling into
question the scientific methods used by researchers. 

"We received a summary of the report Thursday, and we were not
given an advance copy to look through and prepare with," said
Blythe Jameson, a Boeing spokesperson. 

"Based on our preliminary assessment," Jameson said, "we found
that the report has significant flaws and that the claims are
baseless without scientific merit and a grave disservice to our
employees and the community." 

After the UCLA study concluding that laboratory workers had
faced adverse health effects because of the meltdown, the panel
was given federal and state funds to conduct another study of
potential impacts on neighboring communities and their
residents. 

According to the panel, Boeing was unwilling to disclose a large
amount of data concerning the accident and certain operations.
This forced the researchers to base some of their studies on
models of similar accidents. 

"One simply does not know with confidence what accidents and
releases have not been disclosed, nor what information about the
ones we do know of also has not been revealed," the panel stated
in its report. 

After five years of research, the panel concluded that between
260 and 1,800 cancer cases were caused by the field laboratory's
contamination of surrounding communitiesThe incident released
levels of cesium-137 and iodine-131, radio 

nucleotides that act as carcinogensthat surpass the amount of
contaminants released during the Three Mile Island incident. The
report also stated that othecontaminants have escaped, and still
could, from the Boeing-owned laboratory through groundwateand
surface runoff. 

Jameson said other scientific studies have contradicted those
findings. 

"There have been several reports done by federal and state
agencies, most notably a preliminary site evaluation from Agency
for Toxic Substance and Disease Registry in 1999, in which they
did not identify a public health hazard to surrounding
communities," Jameson said. 

David Lochbaum, a nuclear safety engineer for the Union of
Concerned Scientists, estimated in the field laboratory panel's
report that as much as 13,000 curies of iodine131 and 2,600
curies of cesium-137 escaped from the reactor during the 1959
meltdown. In comparison, only 17 curies of iodine131 and none of
cesium137 escaped during the Three Mile Island incident. 

The test reactor was contained in a partial pool of liquid
sodium and buffered from the surrounding environment by a layer
of helium. 

The reactor did not have a concrete containment shield, which
would explain the high levels of radioactive material that were
able to escape during the meltdown, according to Lochbaum. 

Dr. Jan Bayea, a physicist who specializes in modeling the
movement of radiation through the air, came to the conclusion
that between zero and 1,800 cancers, but most likely 260
cancers, were caused by the release of radioactive materials. 

"We faced three major difficulties in this study because it was
a complex site, not much information was released and we
couldn't obtain any meteorological data from Boeing," Bayea
said. 

According to the panel, Boeing wouldn't release meteorological
data from the time period of the 1959 incident, claiming that
information is a trade secret. 

Jameson insists that Boeing has not tried to hide anything. 

"We've shared the meteorological data with the Agency for Toxic
Substance and Disease Registry, that was then, in turn, turned
over to various groups," Jameson said. "It's been shared with
various other agencies, most recently at a Department of Energy
meeting in May of 2005 where it was shared with the public." 

Dr. William Bianchi, a soil physicist, discovered that Boeing's
decision to not use a synthetic cap on the burn pit areas has
led to additional contamination of groundwater at the site,
according to the panel's report. 

Boeing attempted to stop the recharge of groundwater with clay
soil and with native vegetation, but neither method proved to
make the area around the burn pits impermeable. 

"The supposed impermeable clay material is not impermeable at
all," the report states. 

Dr. Ali Tabidian, chair of the Department of Geological Sciences
at Cal State Northridge, discovered that perchlorate, a toxic
substance found in rocket fuel, did end up in groundwater wells
in Simi Valley as a result of surface water runoff. 

According to the report, Tabidian said that perchlorate migrated
off the laboratory site through surface water runoff, traveled
into the Arroyo Simi, then entered the groundwater and wells
near the Arroyo. 

The study says perchlorate has been discovered in a number of
wells surrounding the area. 

Boeing has challenged this claim, stating that the perchlorate
could have come from Chilean fertilizer, fireworks or road
flares. 

According to the report, Tabidian feels these are unjustifiable
claims because if they were true, perchlorate would be
detectable in wells throughout Simi Valley rather than only in
the areas surrounding the Arroyo. 

"Perchlorate is very soluble and travels almost as fast as
water. It's a warning, the leading edge of contaminate plume,"
said Dan Hirsch, co-chair of the panel and a lecturer on nuclear
policy at UC Santa Cruz. 

Despite their findings, the panel did not recommend an
epidemiological study of surrounding communities because of a
lack of data provided by Boeing and the high migration of
residents in the area throughout the years. 

"Doing a health study at this point would be a big gamble; it
would be wiser to search for a fingerprint of the contamination
release," Bayea said. 

"This has been 17 years of unwanted frustration, and in those
years our innocence has been lost," Mason said. 

The report commissioned by the Santa Susana Field Laboratory
Panel can be read online at www.ssflpanel.org. 

"There is no evidence of contamination as a result of our
current or past operations that has adversely impacted the
surrounding communities. We will continue to move forward with
the cleanup of the site in a safe and effective manner," Jameson
said. 
    
*****************************************************************
 46 Deseret News: Matheson acts on fallout study
 
[deseretnews.com] 

Friday, October 13, 2006                                 

Lawmaker calls for 'roadblocks in way of any new testing' 	 	 	
                                 
By Joe Bauman

Deseret Morning News                                          

The more scientists look into the effects of fallout from nuclear 
weapons tests, the more damage they discover, says Rep. Jim 
Matheson.

       The Utah Democrat was responding to a study by the
University of Utah researcher Dr. Joseph Lyon and colleagues,
which was reported in Wednesday's edition of the Deseret Morning
News. A re-evaluation study by 15 experts headed by Lyon, to be
published in the journal Epidemiology on Nov. 1, shows that more
than twice as many downwind residents as originally believed
suffered damage to the thyroid gland from fallout.

       "Dr. Joseph Lyon and his associates have spent 40 years
researching danger to those who were 'downwind' of nuclear
testing in Nevada," Matheson said in a press release. "The more
we look, the more damage we uncover from this era, even as the
federal government was telling us it was safe."

       Lyon's early studies helped convince Matheson's late
father, the former Utah Gov. Scott M. Matheson, that he should
demand the release of classified data about the nuclear tests,
says the release. "Gov. Matheson died from a radiation
exposure-related illness at age 61," it adds.

       The congressman is quoted as saying the data prove that
even underground nuclear tests are unsafe.

       "I have long opposed any effort to resume nuclear weapons
testing in Nevada," he added. "My legislation — Safety for
Americans from nuclear Weapons Testing — establishes significant
roadblocks in the way of any new testing."

       The legislation requires Congress to authorize any
nuclear weapons test and establishes the National Center for the
Study of Radiation and Human Health, he said.

       The center is a consortium of universities that will
study health effects of radiation exposure and illnesses that
are linked to radiation.

       Lyon's study is called "Thyroid Disease Associated With
Exposure to the Nevada nuclear Weapons Test Site Radiation: A
Re-evaluation Based on Corrected Dosimetry and Examination Data."

       The journal "Epidemiology" placed an abstract online. To
read it, go to the scientific journal's main Web site,
www.epidem.com/pt/re/epidemiology/paptoc.htmand then click on
the box labeled "Epi Fast-Track."

E-mail: bau@desnews.com			  		 		   

© 2006 Deseret News Publishing Company
*****************************************************************
 47                          FR Doc C6-7971 
[Federal Register: October 13, 2006 (Volume 71, Number 198)]
[CORRECTIONS]               
[Page 60609]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access
[wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr13oc06-128]                         
[[Page 60609]]
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
 
Final Effect of Designation of a Class of Employees for Addition 
to the Special Exposure Cohort
Correction
    In notice document 06-7971 appearing on page 55477 in the
issue of 
Friday, September 22, 2006, make the following correction:
    On page 55477, in the first column, in the last paragraph,
in the 
fourth line, ``1947'' should read ``1948''.
[FR Doc. C6-7971 Filed 10-12-06; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 1505-01-D
 
*****************************************************************
 48 Salt Lake Tribune: Study cites fallout, illness link

Study cites fallout, illness linkNuclear testingWork focuses on 
thyroid disorders among downwinders

By Greg Lavine 

The Salt Lake Tribune 

Article Last Updated:10/13/2006 02:04:15 AM MDT

A new study provides more evidence for a link between fallout 
from above ground nuclear weapons testing in the 1950s and 60s 
and a pair of thyroid diseases. 

   Several University of Utah researchers wrote the new report,
which will appear in the November issue of the journal
Epidemiology. The paper corrects problems with a 1993 study. 

   Earlier studies indicated that young children living downwind
from nuclear tests in parts of Utah and Nevada were thought to
be 3.4 times more likely to develop thyroid neoplasms, which are
precursors to thyroid cancer. The new study revised that
estimate to 7.5 times more likely, said Joseph Lyon, a U. family
and preventive medicine researcher and study author. 

   Children living in Utah and Nevada during above ground
weapons testing were exposed to radioactive iodine after fallout
landed on pastureland. Grazing dairy cattle ate the contaminated
grass, which put radioactive material in the resulting milk. 

   Children who drank this milk absorbed the radioactive
material in their thyroids. Such exposure can lead to thyroid
disease as well as cancer later in life. 

   "We went back and cleaned up a lot of the problems that were
inherent in the data," Lyon said. 

   Some of the problems were rooted in bugs in earlier computer 
programs. Once the programs were fixed, researchers felt they had 
more accurate estimates of radiation doses for children of that 
era, said Stephen Alder, another study author at the U. 

   "This paper is the improved dose estimation for individuals,"
he said. 

   Alder explained that these results are not meant to alarm
people who lived downwind of the test sites, but to encourage
such people to watch for certain potential health problems. 

   Lyon said the study suggests a relationship between fallout
and thyroiditis, a more common thyroid disease. Children who
grew up downwind appear 2.7 times more likely to develop
thyroiditis, up from 1.1 times as likely as determined in the
previous study. 

   The study looked at data collected on 2,497 people from in
1985 and 1986. The new study did not provide any estimates of
how many people may have developed thyroid neoplasms or
thyroiditis due to fallout exposure. Lyon said there is no
funding left to perform such an analysis. 

   Lyon had been working on an $8 million partnership with the
U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to study the
long-term health effects of fallout exposure. Researchers had
done follow-up testing on 1,700 people, but fell short of the
3,500 goal after funding was cut. 

   glavine@sltrib.com 
    
Â© Copyright 2006, The Salt Lake Tribune. 
*****************************************************************
 49 DesMoinesRegister.com: Carlson: Fallout shelters have fallen by the wayside
 	 	 	 	 
REGISTER COLUMNIST
 
October 13, 2006

You'd think things couldn't get much worse, what with the war in 
Iraq, the creepy Florida congressman hitting on kids and a 
9/11-style scare in New York.

Troubled times, indeed, and right in the middle of it all we have 
to deal with Kim Jong Il, the screwball North Korean dictator 
whose scientists exploded some sort of nuclear device a couple of 
days ago. He says he'll lob one our direction if we don't behave.

You're thinking nobody in his right mind would do such a thing.

True enough.

Except this little man with the spiked hair and platform shoes 
reportedly owns the world's largest collection of Daffy Duck 
cartoons. This is a problem because Daffy is precisely the kind 
of duck who would go berserk and start a war just for the heck of 
it.

At least we have public fallout shelters to protect us.

Right?

Nope.

"There is officially no fallout shelter program any longer,"
Kara Berg, a spokeswoman for Iowa Homeland Security and
Emergency Management, told me Thursday. "That ended in the
1990s."

Berg said some Iowa counties still have designated "safe rooms"
where Iowans supposedly can, well, be safe. But the food, cots,
water, blankets and medicine that were stockpiled in deep
basements since the world was on the brink of exploding in the
early 1960s are no more.

"The rooms still exist in some counties," Berg said. "They're
now basically tornado shelters."

So if you see the faded yellow "Fallout Shelter" signs in
buildings, they're up there only because people haven't gotten
around to taking them down.

Signs, that is. Not shelters. "We're really not thinking nuclear
anymore," said Deanna Bachman, emergency management coordinator
for Marshall County. "Some of the old buildings they were in no
longer exist. We still have some cots stored at a central
location, but that's in case of natural disasters. The barrels
of water and the medical kits are long gone."

Talk about a change. More than 800,000 American homeowners
rigged up fallout shelters in their basements back when Nikita
Khrushchev was pounding his shoe at the U.N. and stationing
missiles in Cuba.

Americans clearly were preparing for the big one. They installed
heavy steel doors and equipped their family shelters with food,
water and usually a gun of some sort. The weapon was there to
keep away pesky neighbors who were too lazy or cheap to put in
their own shelters, but probably would be interested in
surviving a nuclear holocaust.

Public fallout shelters were set up around the country and there
was room for 600,000 Iowans in them by the time the Cuban
missile crisis terrified everybody in 1962.

By the mid-1970s, kids were playing in the little basement rooms
and teenagers found them to be a fun place to take their dates.
Only a few of the tiny shelters survive, but the Internet is
loaded with information on how to build the things.

If the nightly news doesn't get you excited, there's always
Wednesday nights on CBS. That's when the network airs a new show
called "Jericho," which is about people who live in a small
Kansas town and deal with the aftermath of a nuclear attack on
Denver. Communications are cut off and the people of the town of
Jericho have to figure out what's going on around the world.

A bunch of other cities - Atlanta, Chicago, Philadelphia, Dallas
Los Angeles, New York - the list goes on - also supposedly have
been hit. And, according to a Web site created for people
obsessed with the show, a character named Emily screams
something about Des Moines being hit, providing the Iowa
connection we so desperately yearn for in these types of dramas.

None of this is likely to fire up people about fallout shelters
again. Still, anything's possible.

A terrorist with a nuke in a suitcase could wipe out part of a
city. Iran is building the bomb. The Middle East could explode.

Then there's the nut with the Daffy Duck fixation. Elmer Fudd
would tell us to buy lots of canned goods.

Copyright © 2006, The Des Moines Register.
*****************************************************************
 50 courier-journal: Oppenheimer's flaws fascinate author 

www.courier-journal.com

Friday, October 13, 2006    

By Chris Poynter
 cpoynter@courier-journal.com The Courier-Journal
 
J. Robert Oppenheimer was at his office at the Los Alamos 
National Laboratory when the news broke over the loudspeaker in 
1945: Hiroshima had been bombed. 

The laboratory -- where the atomic bomb had been secretly created 
under Oppenheimer's leadership -- erupted into cheers. 

Oppenheimer, however, soon realized the horror of the weapon he
had created -- and "the father of the atomic bomb," as he became
known, spent the rest of his life trying to contain nuclear
weapons. 

"American Prometheus" -- a book that profiles Oppenheimer's
triumphant but tragic life -- won the Pulitzer Prize in
Biography this year, and one of its authors, Martin J. Sherwin,
will speak in Louisville next week, brought to town by the
Filson Historical Society. 

Sherwin, a history and English professor at Tufts University,
co-wrote "American Prometheus" with Kai Bird, an author and
contributing editor to The Nation magazine. 

Sherwin began researching the book about 1979, but it took him
25 years to complete because of teaching commitments and other
interests. 

He pored over Oppenheimer's personal papers, searched through
his Federal Bureau of Investigation files and interviewed
family, friends and people who worked with him at Los Alamos and
elsewhere. 

Oppenheimer was a genius, Sherwin said, though at one point,
after graduating from college, he contemplated suicide. 

"He felt he was totally useless and should end it all because he
couldn't stand the embarrassment of failure," Sherwin said. "But
& he discovered a way not to be a failure. He discovered quantum
physics, and he was a genius at it." 

Though Oppenheimer was director of Los Alamos in New Mexico and
was a celebrated hero after World War II, he had a terrible
personal life. He was an absent father, Sherwin said, rarely
spending time with his children because work and research took
precedence. (Oppenheimer died in 1967. His daughter committed
suicide in the 1970s; his son is still living.) 

Sherwin said he admired Oppenheimer for realizing the danger of
nuclear weapons and working to control them. 

He spoke out against nuclear proliferation, "but doing that in
the context of American politics and the emerging Cold War was
very difficult," Sherwin said. 

Sherwin said he did not admire Oppenheimer for falling for
McCarthyism in the 1950s and turning against some of his former
students who were leftists. 

Oppenheimer "was kind of like iron. Once it starts cracking, it
falls apart, as opposed to steel, which has the ability to twist
and turn," Sherwin said. 

Oppenheimer was accused at a government hearing of being a
national security risk and was stripped of his federal security
clearance. 

Mark Wetherington, executive director of the Filson Historical
Society, said Sherwin's appearance is part of the Gertrude Polk
Brown lecture series. The series has brought numerous authors to
town, including many Pulitzer Prize winners. 

Sherwin said he believes the world is worse because of nuclear
weapons, but, he said, Oppenheimer's work and life are relevant
today. 

"The country and leadership of the country have learned very
little," Sherwin said. "We still think having nuclear weapons
helps our security. I don't think they help our security at
all." 

Reporter Chris Poynter can be reached at (502) 582-4475. 


  + enlarge   J. Robert Oppenheimer, who directed the Manhattan
Project that developed the first atom bomb, later regretted his
participation in the program. (Associated Press file photo,
1963) 

      IF YOU GO
 
What: "Examining the Creative Genius Behind Total Destruction"
When: 6:30 p.m. Tuesday
Where: Fine Arts Center, Ballard High School, 6000 Brownsboro
Road
Tickets: $10; free for Filson Historical Society members
Information: (502) 635-5083   

Copyright 2005 The Courier-Journal.
*****************************************************************
 51 NRC: In the Matter of All Licensees Who Possess Radioactive Material 
 
                        FR Doc E6-16995 
[Federal Register: October 13, 2006 (Volume 71, Number 198)] 
[Notices] [Page 60583-60587] From the Federal Register Online via 
GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr13oc06-110]                         
 
in Quantities of Concern and All Other Persons Who Obtain 
Safeguards Information Described Herein; Order Imposing 
Requirements for the Protection of Certain Safeguards Information 
(Effective Immediately) I The Licensees, identified in Attachment 
1 \1\ to this Order, hold licenses issued in accordance with the 
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC or Commission) or an Agreement State, authorizing 
them to possess and transfer items containing radioactive 
material quantities of concern. The NRC intends to issue security 
Orders to these licensees in the near future.
 
Orders will be issued to both NRC and Agreement State materials 
licensees who may transport radioactive material quantities of 
concern. The Orders will require compliance with specific 
Additional Security Measures to enhance the security for 
transport of certain radioactive material quantities of concern. 
The NRC will issue Orders to both NRC and Agreement State 
licensees under its authority to protect the common defense and 
security, which has not been relinquished to the Agreement 
States. The Commission has determined that these documents will 
contain Safeguards Information, will not be released to the 
public, and must be protected from unauthorized disclosure. 
Therefore, the Commission is imposing the requirements, as set 
forth in Attachments 2 and 3 to this Order and in Order 
EA-06-242, so that affected Licensees can receive these 
documents. This Order also imposes requirements for the 
protection of Safeguards
 
[[Page 60584]] Information in the hands of any person,\2\ whether 
or not a licensee of the Commission, who produces, receives, or 
acquires Safeguards Information.
 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
---------- \1\ Attachment 1 contains sensitive information and 
will not be released to the public.
 
\2\ Person means (1) any individual, corporation, partnership, 
firm, association, trust, estate, public or private institution, 
group, government agency other than the Commission or the 
Department, except that the Department shall be considered a 
person with respect to those facilities of the Department 
specified in section 202 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 
(88 Stat. 1244), any State or any political subdivision of, or 
any political entity within a State, any foreign government or 
nation or any political subdivision of any such government or 
nation, or other entity; and (2) any legal successor, 
representative, agent, or agency of the foregoing.
 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
---------- II The Commission has broad statutory authority to 
protect and prohibit the unauthorized disclosure of Safeguards 
Information.
 
Section 147 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, grants 
the Commission explicit authority to ``* * * issue such orders, 
as necessary to prohibit the unauthorized disclosure of 
safeguards information * * *'' This authority extends to 
information concerning transfer of special nuclear material, 
source material, and byproduct material.
 
Licensees and all persons who produce, receive, or acquire 
Safeguards Information must ensure proper handling and protection 
of Safeguards Information to avoid unauthorized disclosure in 
accordance with the specific requirements for the protection of 
Safeguards Information contained in Attachments 2 and 3 to this 
Order. The Commission hereby provides notice that it intends to 
treat violations of the requirements contained in Attachments 2 
and 3 to this Order applicable to the handling and unauthorized 
disclosure of Safeguards Information as serious breaches of 
adequate protection of the public health and safety and the 
common defense and security of the United States. Access to 
Safeguards Information is limited to those persons who have 
established the need-to-know the information, are considered to 
be trustworthy and reliable, and meet the requirements of Order 
EA-06-242. A need-to-know means a determination by a person 
having responsibility for protecting Safeguards Information that 
a proposed recipient's access to Safeguards Information is 
necessary in the performance of official, contractual, or 
licensee duties of employment. Licensees and all other persons 
who obtain Safeguards Information must ensure that they develop, 
maintain and implement strict policies and procedures for the 
proper handling of Safeguards Information to prevent unauthorized 
disclosure, in accordance with the requirements in Attachments 2 
and 3 to this Order. All licensees must ensure that all 
contractors whose employees may have access to Safeguards 
Information either adhere to the licensee's policies and 
procedures on Safeguards Information or develop, maintain and 
implement their own acceptable policies and procedures. The 
licensees remain responsible for the conduct of their 
contractors. The policies and procedures necessary to ensure 
compliance with applicable requirements contained in Attachments 
2 and 3 to this Order must address, at a minimum, the following: 
the general performance requirement that each person who 
produces, receives, or acquires Safeguards Information shall 
ensure that Safeguards Information is protected against 
unauthorized disclosure; protection of Safeguards Information at 
fixed sites, in use and in storage, and while in transit; 
correspondence containing Safeguards Information; access to 
Safeguards Information; preparation, marking, reproduction and 
destruction of documents; external transmission of documents; use 
of automatic data processing systems; removal of the Safeguards 
Information category; the need-to-know the information; and 
background checks to determine access to the information.
 
In order to provide assurance that the licensees are implementing 
prudent measures to achieve a consistent level of protection to 
prohibit the unauthorized disclosure of Safeguards Information, 
all licensees who hold licenses issued by the U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission or an Agreement State authorizing them to 
possess and who may transport items containing radioactive 
material quantities of concern shall implement the requirements 
identified in Attachments 2 and 3 to this Order. The Commission 
recognizes that licensees may have already initiated many of the 
measures set forth in Attachments 2 and 3 to this Order for 
handling of Safeguards Information in conjunction with current 
NRC license requirements or previous NRC Orders. Additional 
measures set forth in Attachments 2 and 3 to this Order should be 
incorporated into the licensee's current program for Safeguards 
Information. In addition, pursuant to 10 CFR Part 2.202, I find 
that in light of the common defense and security matters 
identified above, which warrant the issuance of this Order, the 
public health, safety and interest require that this Order be 
effective immediately.
 
III Accordingly, pursuant to Sections 81, 147, 161b, 161i, 161o, 
182 and 186 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the 
Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 2.202, 10 CFR Part 30, 10 CFR 
Part 32, 10 CFR Part 35, and 10 CFR Part 70, It is hereby 
ordered, effective immediately, that all licensees identified in 
Attachment 1 to this order and all other persons who produce, 
receive, or acquire the additional security measures identified 
above (whether draft or final) or any related safeguards 
information shall comply with the requirements of Attachments 2 
and 3 to this order.
 
The Director, Office of Federal and State Materials and 
Environmental Management Programs, may, in writing, relax or 
rescind any of the above conditions upon demonstration of good 
cause by the licensee.
 
IV In accordance with 10 CFR 2.202, the Licensee must, and any 
other person adversely affected by this Order may, submit an 
answer to this Order, and may request a hearing on this Order, 
within twenty (20) days of the date of this Order. Where good 
cause is shown, consideration will be given to extending the time 
to request a hearing. A request for extension of time in which to 
submit an answer or request a hearing must be made in writing to 
the Director, Office of Federal and State Materials and 
Environmental Management Programs, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Washington, DC 20555, and include a statement of good 
cause for the extension. The answer may consent to this Order. 
Unless the answer consents to this Order, the answer shall, in 
writing and under oath or affirmation, specifically set forth the 
matters of fact and law on which the Licensee or other person 
adversely affected relies and the reasons as to why the Order 
should not have been issued. Any answer or request for a hearing 
shall be submitted to the Secretary, Office of the Secretary of 
the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: 
Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff, Washington, DC 20555. Copies 
also shall be sent to the Director, Office of Nuclear Material 
Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555, to the Assistant General Counsel for 
Materials Litigation and Enforcement at the same address, and to 
the Licensee if the answer or hearing request is by a person 
other than the Licensee. Because of possible delays in delivery 
of mail to United States Government offices, it is requested that
 
[[Page 60585]] answers and requests for hearing be transmitted to 
the Secretary of the Commission either by means of facsimile 
transmission to 301-415-1101 or by e-mail to  and also to the 
Office of the General Counsel either by means of facsimile 
transmission to 301-415- 3725 or by e-mail to . If a person other 
than the Licensee requests a hearing, that person shall set forth 
with particularity the manner in which his interest is adversely 
affected by this Order and shall address the criteria set forth 
in 10 CFR 2.309. If a hearing is requested by the Licensee or a 
person whose interest is adversely affected, the Commission will 
issue an Order designating the time and place of any hearing. If 
a hearing is held, the issue to be considered at such hearing 
shall be whether this Order should be sustained.
 
Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.202(c)(2)(i), the Licensee may, in addition 
to demanding a hearing, at the time the answer is filed or 
sooner, move the presiding officer to set aside the immediate 
effectiveness of the Order on the ground that the Order, 
including the need for immediate effectiveness, is not based on 
adequate evidence but on mere suspicion, unfounded allegations, 
or error. In the absence of any request for hearing, or written 
approval of an extension of time in which to request a hearing, 
the provisions specified in Section III above shall be final 
twenty (20) days from the date of this Order without further 
order or proceedings. If an extension of time for requesting a 
hearing has been approved, the provisions specified in Section 
III shall be final when the extension expires if a hearing 
request has not been received.
 
An answer or a request for hearing shall not stay the immediate 
effectiveness of this order.
 
Dated this 4th day of October 2006.
 
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
 
Charles L. Miller, Director, Office of Federal and State 
Materials and Environmental Management Programs.
 
Attachment 1--List of Applicable Materials Licensees Redacted 
Attachment 2--Modified Handling Requirements for the Protection 
of Certain Safeguards Information (SGI-M) Modified Handling 
Requirements for the Protection of Certain Safeguards Information 
(SGI-M) General Requirement Information and material that the 
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) determines are 
safeguards information must be protected from unauthorized 
disclosure. In order to distinguish information needing modified 
protection requirements from the safeguards information for 
reactors and fuel cycle facilities that require a higher level of 
protection, the term ``Safeguards Information-Modified Handling'' 
(SGI-M) is being used as the distinguishing marking for certain 
materials licensees. Each person who produces, receives, or 
acquires SGI-M shall ensure that it is protected against 
unauthorized disclosure. To meet this requirement, licensees and 
persons shall establish and maintain an information protection 
system that includes the measures specified below. Information 
protection procedures employed by state and local police forces 
are deemed to meet these requirements.
 
Persons Subject to These Requirements Any person, whether or not 
a licensee of the NRC, who produces, receives, or acquires SGI-M 
is subject to the requirements (and sanctions) of this document. 
Firms and their employees that supply services or equipment to 
materials licensees would fall under this requirement if they 
possess facility SGI-M. A licensee must inform contractors and 
suppliers of the existence of these requirements and the need for 
proper protection. (See more under Conditions for Access) State 
or local police units who have access to SGI-M are also subject 
to these requirements. However, these organizations are deemed to 
have adequate information protection systems. The conditions for 
transfer of information to a third party, i.e., need- to-know, 
would still apply to the police organization as would sanctions 
for unlawful disclosure. Again, it would be prudent for licensees 
who have arrangements with local police to advise them of the 
existence of these requirements.
 
Criminal and Civil Sanctions The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as 
amended, explicitly provides that any person, ``whether or not a 
licensee of the Commission, who violates any regulations adopted 
under this section shall be subject to the civil monetary 
penalties of section 234 of this Act.'' Furthermore, willful 
violation of any regulation or order governing safeguards 
information is a felony subject to criminal penalties in the form 
of fines or imprisonment, or both. See sections 147b. and 223 of 
the Act.
 
Conditions for Access Access to SGI-M beyond the initial 
recipients of the order will be governed by the background check 
requirements imposed by the order. Access to SGI-M by licensee 
employees, agents, or contractors must include both an 
appropriate need-to-know determination by the licensee, as well 
as a determination concerning the trustworthiness of individuals 
having access to the information. Employees of an organization 
affiliated with the licensee's company, e.g., a parent company, 
may be considered as employees of the licensee for access 
purposes.
 
Need-To-Know Need-to-know is defined as a determination by a 
person having responsibility for protecting SGI-M that a proposed 
recipient's access to SGI-M is necessary in the performance of 
official, contractual, or licensee duties of employment. The 
recipient should be made aware that the information is SGI-M and 
those having access to it are subject to these requirements as 
well as criminal and civil sanctions for mishandling the 
information.
 
Occupational Groups Dissemination of SGI-M is limited to 
individuals who have an established need-to-know and who are 
members of certain occupational groups. These occupational groups 
are: A. An employee, agent, or contractor of an applicant, a 
licensee, the Commission, or the United States Government; B. 
member of a duly authorized committee of the Congress; C. The 
Governor of a State or his designated representative; D. A 
representative of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
engaged in activities associated with the U.S./IAEA Safeguards 
Agreement who has been certified by the NRC; E. A member of a 
state or local law enforcement authority that is responsible for 
responding to requests for assistance during safeguards 
emergencies; or F. A person to whom disclosure is ordered 
pursuant to Section 2.744(e) of Part 2 of part 10 of the Code of 
Federal Regulations. G. State Radiation Control Program Directors 
(and State Homeland Security Directors) or their designees.
 
In a generic sense, the individuals described above in (A) 
through (G) are considered to be trustworthy by virtue of their 
employment status. For non-governmental individuals in group (A) 
above, a determination of reliability and trustworthiness is 
required. Discretion must be exercised in granting access to 
these individuals. If there is any indication that the recipient 
would be unwilling or unable to provide proper protection for the 
SGI-M, they are not authorized to receive SGI-M.
 
Information Considered for Safeguards Information Designation 
Information deemed SGI-M is information the disclosure of which 
could reasonably be expected to have a significant adverse effect 
on the health and safety of the public or the common defense and 
security by significantly increasing the likelihood of theft, 
diversion, or sabotage of materials or facilities subject to NRC 
jurisdiction.
 
SGI-M identifies safeguards information which is subject to these 
requirements. These requirements are necessary in order to 
protect quantities of nuclear material significant to the health 
and safety of the public or common defense and security.
 
The overall measure for consideration of SGI-M is the usefulness 
of the information (security or otherwise) to an adversary in 
planning or attempting a malevolent act. The specificity of the 
information increases the likelihood that it will be useful to an 
adversary.
 
 
[[Page 60586]] Protection While in Use While in use, SGI-M shall 
be under the control of an authorized individual. This 
requirement is satisfied if the SGI-M is attended by an 
authorized individual even though the information is in fact not 
constantly being used. SGI-M, therefore, within alarm stations, 
continuously manned guard posts or ready rooms need not be locked 
in file drawers or storage containers.
 
Under certain conditions the general control exercised over 
security zones or areas would be considered to meet this 
requirement. The primary consideration is limiting access to 
those who have a need-to-know. Some examples would be: Alarm 
stations, guard posts and guard ready rooms; Engineering or 
drafting areas if visitors are escorted and information is not 
clearly visible; Plant maintenance areas if access is restricted 
and information is not clearly visible; Administrative offices 
(e.g., central records or purchasing) if visitors are escorted 
and information is not clearly visible; Protection While in 
Storage While unattended, SGI-M shall be stored in a locked file 
drawer or container. Knowledge of lock combinations or access to 
keys protecting SGI-M shall be limited to a minimum number of 
personnel for operating purposes who have a ``need-to-know'' and 
are otherwise authorized access to SGI-M in accordance with these 
requirements. Access to lock combinations or keys shall be 
strictly controlled so as to prevent disclosure to an 
unauthorized individual.
 
Transportation of Documents and Other Matter Documents containing 
SGI-M when transmitted outside an authorized place of use or 
storage shall be enclosed in two sealed envelopes or wrappers. 
The inner envelope or wrapper shall contain the name and address 
of the intended recipient, and be marked on both sides, top and 
bottom with the words ``Safeguards Information-- Modified 
Handling.'' The outer envelope or wrapper must be addressed to 
the intended recipient, must contain the address of the sender, 
and must not bear any markings or indication that the document 
contains SGI-M.
 
SGI-M may be transported by any commercial delivery company that 
provides nationwide overnight service with computer tracking 
features, U.S. first class, registered, express, or certified 
mail, or by any individual authorized access pursuant to these 
requirements.
 
Within a facility, SGI-M may be transmitted using a single opague 
envelope. It may also be transmitted within a facility without 
single or double wrapping, provided adequate measures are taken 
to protect the material against unauthorized disclosure. 
Individuals transporting SGI-M should retain the documents in 
their personal possession at all times or ensure that the 
information is appropriately wrapped and also secured to preclude 
compromise by an unauthorized individual.
 
Preparation and Marking of Documents While the NRC is the sole 
authority for determining what specific information may be 
designated as ``SGI-M,'' originators of documents are responsible 
for determining whether those documents contain such information. 
Each document or other matter that contains SGI-M shall be marked 
``Safeguards Information--Modified Handling'' in a conspicuous 
manner on the top and bottom of the first page to indicate the 
presence of protected information.
 
The first page of the document must also contain (i) the name, 
title, and organization of the individual authorized to make a 
SGI-M determination, and who has determined that the document 
contains SGI-M, (ii) the date the document was originated or the 
determination made, (iii) an indication that the document 
contains SGI-M, and (iv) an indication that unauthorized 
disclosure would be subject to civil and criminal sanctions. Each 
additional page shall be marked in a conspicuous fashion at the 
top and bottom with letters denoting ``Safeguards 
Information--Modified Handling.'' In additional to the 
``Safeguards Information--Modified Handling'' markings at the top 
and bottom of each page, transmittal letters or memoranda which 
do not in themselves contain SGI-M shall be marked to indicate 
that attachments or enclosures contain SGI-M but that the 
transmittal does not (e.g., ``When separated from SGI-M 
enclosure(s), this document is decontrolled'').
 
In addition to the information required on the face of the 
document, each item of correspondence that contains SGI-M shall, 
by marking or other means, clearly indicate which portions (e.g., 
paragraphs, pages, or appendices) contain SGI-M and which do not. 
Portion marking is not required for physical security and 
safeguards contingency plans.
 
All documents or other matter containing SGI-M in use or storage 
shall be marked in accordance with these requirements. A specific 
exception is provided for documents in the possession of 
contractors and agents of licensees that were produced more than 
one year prior to the effective date of the order. Such documents 
need not be marked unless they are removed from file drawers or 
containers.
 
The same exception applies to old documents stored away from the 
facility in central files or corporation headquarters.
 
Since information protection procedures employed by state and 
local police forces are deemed to meet NRC requirements, 
documents in the possession of these agencies need not be marked 
as set forth in this document.
 
Removal From SGI-M Category Documents containing SGI-M shall be 
removed from the SGI-M category (decontrolled) only after the NRC 
determines that the information no longer meets the criteria of 
SGI-M. Licensees have the authority to make determinations that 
specific documents which they created no longer contain SGI-M 
information and may be decontrolled. Consideration must be 
exercised to ensure that any document decontrolled shall not 
disclose SGI-M in some other form or be combined with other 
unprotected information to disclose SGI-M.
 
The authority to determine that a document may be decontrolled 
may be exercised only by, or with the permission of, the 
individual (or office) who made the original determination. The 
document shall indicate the name and organization of the 
individual removing the document from the SGI-M category and the 
date of the removal.
 
Other persons who have the document in their possession should be 
notified of the decontrolling of the document.
 
Reproduction of Matter Containing SGI-M SGI-M may be reproduced 
to the minimum extent necessary consistent with need without 
permission of the originator. Newer digital copiers which scan 
and retain images of documents represent a potential security 
concern. If the copier is retaining SGI-M information in memory, 
the copier cannot be connected to a network. It should also be 
placed in a location that is cleared and controlled for the 
authorized processing of SGI-M information. Different copiers 
have different capabilities, including some which come with 
features that allow the memory to be erased. Each copier would 
have to be examined from a physical security perspective.
 
Use of Automatic Data Processing (ADP) Systems SGI-M may be 
processed or produced on an ADP system provided that the system 
is assigned to the licensee's or contractor's facility and 
requires the use of an entry code/password for access to stored 
information. Licensees are encouraged to process this information 
in a computing environment that has adequate computer security 
controls in place to prevent unauthorized access to the 
information. An ADP system is defined here as a data processing 
system having the capability of long term storage of SGI-M. Word 
processors such as typewriters are not subject to the 
requirements as long as they do not transmit information 
off-site. (Note: If SGI- M is produced on a typewriter, the 
ribbon must be removed and stored in the same manner as other 
SGI-M information or media.) The basic objective of these 
restrictions is to prevent access and retrieval of stored SGI-M 
by unauthorized individuals, particularly from remote terminals. 
Specific files containing SGI-M will be password- protected to 
preclude access by an unauthorized individual. The National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) maintains a listing 
of all validated encryption systems at .
 
SGI-M files may be transmitted over a network if the file is 
encrypted. In such cases, the licensee will select a commercially 
available encryption system that NIST has validated as conforming 
to Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS). SGI-M files 
shall be properly labeled as ``Safeguards Information--Modified 
Handling'' and saved to removable media and stored in a locked 
file drawer or cabinet.
 
Telecommunications SGI-M may not be transmitted by unprotected 
telecommunications circuits
 
[[Page 60587]] except under emergency or extraordinary 
conditions. For the purpose of this requirement, emergency or 
extraordinary conditions are defined as any circumstances that 
require immediate communications in order to report, summon 
assistance for, or respond to a security event (or an event that 
has potential security significance).
 
This restriction applies to telephone, telegraph, teletype, 
facsimile circuits, and to radio. Routine telephone or radio 
transmission between site security personnel, or between the site 
and local police, should be limited to message formats or codes 
that do not disclose facility security features or response 
procedures. Similarly, call-ins during transport should not 
disclose information useful to a potential adversary. Infrequent 
or non-repetitive telephone conversations regarding a physical 
security plan or program are permitted provided that the 
discussion is general in nature.
 
Individuals should use care when discussing SGI-M at meetings or 
in the presence of others to ensure that the conversation is not 
overheard by persons not authorized access. Transcripts, tapes or 
minutes of meetings or hearings that contain SGI-M shall be 
marked and protected in accordance with these requirements.
 
Destruction Documents containing SGI-M should be destroyed when 
no longer needed. They may be destroyed by tearing into small 
pieces, burning, shredding or any other method that precludes 
reconstruction by means available to the public at large. Piece 
sizes one half inch or smaller composed of several pages or 
documents and thoroughly mixed would be considered completely 
destroyed.
 
Attachment 3--Trustworthiness and Reliability Requirements for 
Individuals Handling Safeguards Information Trustworthiness and 
Reliability Requirements for Individuals Handling Safeguards 
Information In order to ensure the safe handling, use, and 
control of information designated as Safeguards Information, each 
licensee shall control and limit access to the information to 
only those individuals who have established the need-to-know the 
information, and are considered to be trustworthy and reliable. 
Licensees shall document the basis for concluding that there is 
reasonable assurance that individuals granted access to 
Safeguards Information are trustworthy and reliable, and do not 
constitute an unreasonable risk for malevolent use of the 
information.
 
The Licensee shall comply with the requirements of this 
attachment: 1. The trustworthiness and reliability of an 
individual shall be determined based on a background 
investigation: (a) The background investigation shall address at 
least the past three (3) years, and, at a minimum, include 
verification of employment, education, and personal references. 
The licensee shall also, to the extent possible, obtain 
independent information to corroborate that provided by the 
employee (i.e., seeking references not supplied by the 
individual).
 
(b) If an individual's employment has been less than the required 
three (3) year period, educational references may be used in lieu 
of employment history.
 
The licensee's background investigation requirements may be 
satisfied for an individual that has an active Federal security 
clearance.
 
2. The licensee shall retain documentation regarding the 
trustworthiness and reliability of individual employees for three 
years after the individual's employment ends.
 
[FR Doc. E6-16995 Filed 10-12-06; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590-01-P

 
*****************************************************************
 52 IPS: HEALTH: Cancer Fears Emerge as Fallout of French Nuclear Tests

Inter Press Service News Agency     

Saturday, October 14, 2006   04:52 GMT       

Julio Godoy
 
PARIS, Oct 12 (IPS) - New evidence is emerging of cancers caused
by French nuclear testing in its South Pacific islands from the
1960s.

Between 1966 and 1996 France carried out 192 nuclear tests in
French Polynesia, a group of islands in the south Pacific. These
included 42 atmospheric tests, in the face of opposition from
local residents.

 Now, 40 years after the tests began, the French government has
finally started to admit that Polynesian inhabitants may have
been right to fear the consequences of radioactivity.

 Marcel Jurien de La Gravière, representative of the French
Commission on Nuclear Safety, announced in Papetee, capital of
French Polynesia last week that a "coherent and continued
medical examination" would be proposed for inhabitants most
likely affected by the tests.

 Such testing will be offered to some 2,000 persons, he said.

 Jurien de la Gravière admitted that six of the 192 tests had
"affected in a significant manner some islands and atolls" in
the region.

 The French military carried out the six atmospheric nuclear
tests between 1966 and 1974 on the islands Moruroa, Fangataufa,
Magareva, Gambier, Tureia and Tahiti. These tests "represented a
slight (health) risk", the ministry of defence now says.

 Two of the Polynesian tests are particularly in question - the
ones called Aldébaran (1966) and Phoebe (1971). According to new
official figures these tests released far higher radiation than
acknowledged so far.

 Up to 150,000 people inhabited the islands in the region at the
time. Some 20,000 other people worked at nuclear test sites
during the 30 years of testing.

 The change in the French government's position comes after
Florent de Vathaire, a researcher at the National Institute for
Health and Medical Research (INSERM, after its French name)
reported that the nuclear tests closely correlate with the
appearance of thyroid cancer typically associated with
radioactivity.

 Florent de Vathaire, head of the epidemiological cancer unit at
INSERM found "a statistically significant relation" between the
nuclear tests and the incidence of thyroid cancer. De Vathaire
studied some 240 cases of thyroid cancer reported in the islands.

 On July 17 this year, de Vathaire presented his findings to the
ministry of defence, and urged it to declassify military reports
that he said confirm the findings.

 "I would like to study the data contained in the classified
documents, which would allow us to confirm in a more precise
manner the nature of the health dangers represented by the
tests," de Vathaire told IPS. Cancer victims and their relatives
in the French Polynesia have made similar demands.

 "So far, the French authorities have said that the nuclear bomb
tests did not represent any danger," Patrice Bouveret, director
of the Observatory of French Nuclear Weapons, an independent
group, told IPS. "Now, the same authorities are saying that
there was indeed a 'slight' risk."

 But this admission too comes on the basis of reports by
military officers, he said. "Nobody else has seen the original
documents to verify such claims. If the victims would have these
official reports, they could act legally and demand that justice
be done."

 The questions are not confined to the south Pacific islands.
France carried out 17 tests in Reggane region in the Algerian
Sahara in 1961 and 1962, just before Algerian independence.

 Health activists and affected people who have come together as
the Association of Veterans of the French Nuclear Tests (AVEN)
in French Polynesia and in the Algerian Sahara are fighting for
declassification of the reports, and for recognition by the
French authorities that the nuclear tests have caused a high
number of cancers in these regions.

 Jean-Paul Teissonière, legal counsellor of AVEN and of the
Polynesian association Mururoa e Tatou has been lodging
complaints against the French authorities since 2003.

 One aim is to obtain pensions from the French state for the
victims and their relatives, he told IPS. "But in order to
establish this causality link between the tests and the numerous
illnesses we have to argue by presumption unless the authorities
release the classified documents." (END/2006) 

  Copyright © 2006 IPS-Inter Press Service. All rights reserved.
*****************************************************************
 53 ANWAG: Presidential Signing Statement May Have Thwarted Congressional Intent 
for EEOICPA Amendment
 
ANWAG PRESS RELEASE 

October 12, 2006 

For Immediate Release 

Contact: Coalition for a Healthy Environment, Knoxville, TN:

 Janet Michel 865-966-5918, Janine Anderson 865-984-0786
 Grassroots Organization of Sick Workers, Craig, CO:
 Terrie Barrie 970-824-2260 

Craig, CO - ANWAG has repeatedly noted the Department of Labors
(DOL) apparent disregard for Congressional intent in
implementing Part E of the Energy Employees Occupational Illness
Compensation Act of 2000 (EEOICPA). It now appears that DOL, as
an agency for the Executive Branch of the government, may have
overstepped its authority by choosing the President's
interpretation of the law instead of Congressional intent in
implementing Part E. 

On, October 28, 2004, President Bush signed a "Statement on the
Ronald Regan Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005",
which affirmed that the Administration considers Part E of
EEOICPA nothing more than a workers compensation program. The
document states, "The limited extension of Federal
responsibility here is unique because it is solely a replacement
for no fault worker's compensation payments not otherwise
available...."(emphasis added). What this means to the claimant,
is that this program is not claimant friendly as intended by
Congress. 

Under state workers' compensation programs the standard of
causation is greater than 50%. A preponderance of evidence is
needed to reach this standard. Congress intended the standard to
be less than 50%, as evidenced by their letter to Labor
Secretary Chao (August 1, 2005). However, DOL has confirmed that
they are using the same standard, i.e. greater than 50%, that is
used by the states systems. 

ANWAG has serious concerns about the role the signing statement
has played in implementing Part E of EEOICPA. This signing
statement, coupled with the OMB "passback memo" which contained
suggestions for controlling the growth in costs for special
exposure cohorts, leads us to believe that the true intent of
the Administration may be to limit liability and not compensate
the sick workers. 

It has been two years since this amendment as part of the
Defense Authorization Act was passed and the final rule for Part
E has still not been released by OMB. ANWAG calls upon Congress
not to wait until the final rule but to immediately hold
hearings to investigate if DOLs program is following the intent
of Congress and the spirit and letter of the law. 

"Congress acknowledged that '...state workers' compensation
programs do not provide a uniform means of ensuring adequate
compensation for the types of occupational illness...that
relate' to nuclear weapons workers," stated Terrie Barrie of
GOSW. "So why did DOL decide to model this compensation program
after a system proven not to work for these claimants? Is it
because of the Presidential signing statement? The signing
statement is not the law". 

"EEOICPA was passed so the workers would not need to face the
problems associated with individual states systems," says Janet
Michel of CHE. "DOL has ensured that the claimants' vision of a
timely, fair program will not be fulfilled." 

"Due to the classified nature of the work at the Department of
Energy sites, monitoring of radiation and toxic exposure was
found to be lacking. The records required to make a standard
workers' compensation claim do not exist," says Angleque Bryson
of GOSW. "Therefore, it is impossible for the former workers to
have the same due process afforded to other workers." 

"In March of 2001, DOE released the National Economic Council
report, which concluded that state workers' compensation system
would not be a fair and just means of compensation for the
deserving Cold War warriors," stated Janine Anderson of CHE.

"Mr. Peter Turcic, the director of this program, was a member of
that council. And now he's saying that this will work? The
latest statistics we have is that 444 wage loss claims and 121
impairment claims have been paid to living workers in two years.
I don't call that working." 
*****************************************************************
 54 UPI: Study finds thyroid damage from nuke tests
     
United Press International - NewsTrack - 


10/13/2006 1:59:00 AM -0400
 
SALT LAKE CITY, Oct. 13 (UPI) -- A new study of people living
downwind of the nuclear weapons test site in Nevada finds
thyroid damage was more extensive than previously believed. 

Dr. Joseph Lyon of the University of Utah and his colleagues
re-examined data from a 1993 study, the Deseret Morning News
reported. Lyon found that thyroid damage was more extensive than
the original study reported. 

The Centers for Disease Control canceled another Lyon study in
March 2005. 

Lyon said that he and his colleagues were more conservative in
their diagnostic criteria than the scientists who did the 1993
report. But they discovered an even stronger correlation between
thyroid abnormalities and exposure to radiation. 

© Copyright 2006 United Press International, Inc. All Rights
Reserved
		 		 			 				* 				Email: 			 			 		 		 			 				* 				Comments:

*****************************************************************
 55 Platts: DOE eyes Yucca Mountain waste repository rail alternative

Washington (Platts)--12Oct2006
 
The US Department of Energy plans to consider a second path for a 
rail line in Nevada to the proposed nuclear waste repository at 
Yucca Mountain, documents showed. 

     In a Federal Register notice scheduled for publication 
Friday, DOE said it would consider the environmental impact of a 
280-mile path, known as the Mina corridor, through the Walker 
River Paiute Tribe's land in western Nevada.

     The plan is an alternative to a 319-mile corridor from 
Caliente to Yucca Mountain that has been DOE's preference for 
rail transportation to the facility. 

     The tribe has given its blessing to the study. 

     "The Mina corridor appears to offer potential advantages to 
the extent it would cross fewer mountain ranges, utilize existing 
rail bed and also be a shorter distance," DOE said in a draft of 
the notice. "These potential advantages would simplify design and 
construction, and therefore would be less costly to construct." 

     DOE considered the Mina route in the 1990s, but dropped the 
idea when the Walker River Paiutes refused it access to their 
reservation. The tribe reconsidered earlier in 2006. 

     Separately, DOE is also scheduled to publish Friday a 
Federal Register notice announcing plans for a "supplemental" 
environmental impact statement on the Yucca Mountain repository 
site. 

     The department said it would carry out the additional review 
because of its 2005 decision to use one type of canister to ship, 
store and ultimately dispose of nuclear waste instead of multiple 
types. The change necessitated changes in the repository's 
design. The original EIS was completed in 2002.

Copyright © 2006 - Platts, All Rights Reserved [The McGraw-Hill 
Companies]       
*****************************************************************
 56 DOE: Amended Notice of Intent To Expand the Scope of the Yucca Mt
 
                         FR Doc 06-8675 
[Federal Register: October 13, 2006 (Volume 71, Number 198)] 
[Notices] [Page 60484-60490] From the Federal Register Online via 
GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr13oc06-40]                         
 
Environmental Impact Statement for the Alignment, Construction, 
and Operation of a Rail Line to a Geologic Repository at Yucca 
Mountain, Nye County, NV AGENCY: Department of Energy.
 
ACTION: Amended notice of intent.

SUMMARY: The Department of Energy (DOE or the Department) is 
providing this Amended Notice of Intent to expand the scope of 
the ongoing Environmental Impact Statement for the Alignment, 
Construction and Operation of a Rail Line to a Geologic 
Repository at Yucca Mountain, Nye County, Nevada (DOE/EIS-0369, 
Rail Alignment EIS, Notice of Intent, April 8, 2004, 69 FR 
18565). In the ongoing Rail Alignment EIS, DOE has undertaken an 
analysis of alternative rail alignments in which to construct and 
operate a rail line within what is referred to as the Caliente 
corridor. Based on new information, DOE now plans to expand the 
Rail Alignment EIS to incorporate analysis of a new rail corridor 
alternative. This additional analysis will supplement the 
corridor analyses in the ``Final Environmental Impact Statement 
for a Geologic Repository for the Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel 
and High-Level Radioactive Waste at Yucca Mountain, Nye County, 
Nevada'' (DOE/EIS- 0250F, Yucca Mountain Final EIS, February 
2002). The expanded analysis will consider the potential 
environmental impacts of a newly proposed Mina rail corridor at 
the same level of corridor analysis as is contained in the Yucca 
Mountain Final EIS, and will review the rail corridor analyses of 
that Final EIS, and update, as appropriate.
 
The expanded scope will then proceed to include a detailed 
analysis of alternative alignments within the Mina corridor at 
the same level of analysis of the ongoing alignment analysis for 
the Caliente corridor. The result will be to provide the public 
with information concerning both the potential corridor and 
alignment impacts of the Mina corridor at the same time DOE 
presents the potential impacts for the construction and operation 
of a rail line within the Caliente corridor. The expanded EIS 
will be entitled the Supplemental Yucca Mountain Rail Corridor 
and Rail Alignment EIS (DOE/EIS-0250F-S2 and DOE/EIS-0369).
 
On April 8, 2004 (69 FR 18557), the Department issued a
Record of Decision announcing its selection, both nationally and 
in the State of Nevada, of the mostly rail scenario analyzed in 
the Yucca Mountain Final EIS. This decision will ultimately 
require the construction of a rail line to connect the repository 
site at Yucca Mountain to an existing rail line in the State of 
Nevada for the shipment of spent nuclear fuel and high-level 
radioactive waste. To that end, the Department also selected the 
Caliente rail corridor in which to examine possible alignments 
for construction of that rail line. On April 8, 2004 (69 FR 
18565), DOE issued a Notice of Intent to prepare an EIS under the 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) for the alignment, 
construction, and operation of a rail line for shipments of spent 
nuclear fuel, high-level radioactive waste, and other materials 
from a site near Caliente, Nevada, to a geologic repository at 
Yucca Mountain, Nevada (the Rail Alignment EIS).
 
During subsequent public scoping, DOE received comments that 
offered preferences for various rail corridors analyzed in detail 
in the Yucca Mountain Final EIS, and identified other rail 
corridors for consideration. In particular, commenters 
recommended that DOE consider the Mina route, which would include 
use of an existing rail line from Hazen, Nevada, to the Thorne 
siding in Hawthorne, Nevada, and the construction of new rail 
line that would follow an abandoned rail line nearly to Yucca 
Mountain.
 
In the Yucca Mountain Final EIS, DOE considered, but eliminated 
from detailed study, several potential rail routes. One of those 
potential rail routes, the Mina route, could only connect to an 
existing rail line by crossing the Walker River Paiute Tribe 
Reservation northwest of Hawthorne, Nevada, and the Tribe had 
informed DOE that it would refuse to allow nuclear waste to be 
transported across its reservation (letter dated December 6, 
1991). For this reason, the Department considered the Mina route 
to pose an unavoidable land use conflict and thus to be 
unavailable for further consideration.
 
Following review of the scoping comments for the Rail Alignment 
EIS, DOE held discussions with the Walker River Paiute Tribe 
regarding the availability of the Mina route. Subsequently, in 
May 2006, the Walker River Paiute Tribe informed DOE that the 
Tribal Council had withdrawn its objection to the completion of 
an EIS studying the transportation of nuclear waste across its 
reservation. The Tribe stated that its Tribal Council had not 
decided to allow such shipments, but indicated that inclusion of 
the Mina route in an EIS would allow the Tribe
 
[[Page 60485]]
to make a more informed, final decision about the matter.
 
In view of the Tribal Council's decision, DOE initiated a study 
to determine the feasibility of the Mina route, and to identify a 
specific corridor (Mina corridor) and associated preliminary 
alternative alignments (described below under Mina Alternative 
Alignments).
 
Based on DOE's preliminary analysis, in comparison with other 
rail corridors, the Mina corridor appears to offer potential 
advantages to the extent it would cross fewer mountain ranges, 
utilize existing rail bed, and also be a shorter distance. These 
potential advantages would simplify design and construction of a 
rail line, and therefore would be less costly to construct. The 
Mina corridor also would appear to have fewer land use conflicts, 
and would involve less land disturbance, which tends to result in 
lower adverse environmental impacts overall.
 
For these reasons, DOE has concluded that the Mina corridor 
warrants further detailed study. Accordingly, DOE is announcing 
its intent to expand the scope of the Rail Alignment EIS to 
supplement the rail corridor analyses of the Yucca Mountain Final 
EIS, and analyze the Mina corridor. This Supplemental Yucca 
Mountain Rail Corridor and Rail Alignment EIS \1\ also will 
consider, in detail, alignments for the construction and 
operation of a rail line within the Caliente and Mina rail 
corridors.
 
----------
\1\ Coincident with this Amended Notice of Intent, DOE is 
publishing a Notice of Intent to prepare a Supplemental Yucca 
Mountain EIS (DOE/EIS-0250F-S1). That Supplement will consider 
the current repository design and plans for its construction and 
operation, and the transportation of spent nuclear fuel and high- 
level radioactive waste from sites around the United States to 
the repository at Yucca Mountain.
 
 
DATES: The Department invites comments on the scope of the 
Supplemental Yucca Mountain Rail Corridor and Rail Alignment EIS 
to ensure that all relevant environmental issues and reasonable 
alternatives are addressed. Public scoping meetings are discussed 
below in the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section. DOE will consider 
all comments received during the 45-day public scoping period, 
which starts with publication of this Amended Notice of Intent 
and ends November 27, 2006. Comments received after this date 
will be considered to the extent practicable.
 
 
ADDRESSES: Requests for additional information on the 
Supplemental Yucca Mountain Rail Corridor and Rail Alignment EIS 
or transportation planning in general should be directed to: Mr. 
M. Lee Bishop, EIS Document Manager, Office of Logistics 
Management, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, U.S. 
Department of Energy, 1551 Hillshire Drive, M/S 011, Las Vegas, 
NV 89134, Telephone 1-800-967-3477.
 
Written comments on the scope of the Supplemental Yucca Mountain 
Rail Corridor and Rail Alignment EIS may be submitted to Mr. M. 
Lee Bishop at this address, by facsimile to 1-800-967-0739, or 
via the Internet at under the caption, What's New.
 
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For general information 
regarding the DOE NEPA process contact: Ms. Carol M. Borgstrom, 
Director, Office of NEPA Policy and Compliance, U.S. Department 
of Energy, 1000 Independence Ave., SW., Washington, DC 20585, 
Telephone 202-586-4600, or leave a message at 1-800-472-2756.
 
 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Background On July 23, 2002, the 
President signed into law (Pub. L. 107-200) a joint resolution of 
the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate designating 
the Yucca Mountain site in Nye County, Nevada, for development as 
a geologic repository for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel and 
high-level radioactive waste. Subsequently, the Department issued 
a Record of Decision (April 8, 2004) to announce its selection, 
both nationally and in the State of Nevada, of the mostly rail 
scenario analyzed in the Yucca Mountain Final EIS as the mode of 
transportation for spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive 
waste to the repository. Under the mostly rail scenario, the 
Department would rely on a combination of rail, truck and 
possibly barge to transport to the repository site at Yucca 
Mountain up to 70,000 metric tons of heavy metal of spent nuclear 
fuel and high-level radioactive waste.
 
Most of the spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste, 
however, would be transported by rail.
 
The Department's decision to select the mostly rail scenario in 
Nevada ultimately will require the construction of a rail line 
\2\ to connect the repository site at Yucca Mountain to an 
existing rail line in the State of Nevada for the shipment of 
spent nuclear fuel and high- level radioactive waste in the event 
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission authorizes construction of the 
repository, and receipt and possession of these materials at 
Yucca Mountain. To that end, in the same Record of Decision, the 
Department also decided to select the Caliente rail corridor \3\ 
to study possible alignments for this proposed rail line. The 
Caliente rail corridor originates at an existing siding to the 
Union Pacific railroad near Caliente, Nevada, and extends in a 
westerly direction to the northwest corner of the Nevada Test and 
Training Range, before turning south-southeast to the repository 
at Yucca Mountain. The Caliente corridor ranges between 512 
kilometers (318 miles) and 553 kilometers (344 miles) in length, 
depending on the alternative alignments considered.
 
----------
\2\ Rail line means the railroad track and underlying earthworks.
 
\3\ A corridor is a strip of land 400 meters (0.25 mile) wide 
through which DOE would identify an alignment for the 
construction of a rail line.
 
----------
On April 8, 2004, DOE issued a Notice of Intent to prepare an EIS 
under NEPA for the alignment, construction, and operation of a 
rail line for shipments of spent nuclear fuel, high-level 
radioactive waste, and other materials \4\ from a site near 
Caliente, Nevada to a geologic repository at Yucca Mountain, 
Nevada. During subsequent public scoping, DOE received comments 
that offered preferences for various rail corridors analyzed in 
detail in the Yucca Mountain Final EIS, and identified other rail 
corridors for consideration. In particular, commenters 
recommended that DOE consider ``the Mina route,'' which would 
include use of an existing rail line from Hazen, Nevada, to the 
Thorne siding at Hawthorne, Nevada, and the construction of new 
rail line that would follow an abandoned rail line nearly to 
Yucca Mountain.
 
----------
\4\ Other materials are those related to the construction and 
operation of the repository.
 
----------
In the Yucca Mountain Final EIS, DOE considered, but eliminated 
from detailed study, the Mina route and several other potential 
rail routes (see Section 2.3.3.1). These other potential rail 
routes were identified in a series of three transportation 
studies--``Preliminary Rail Access Study'' (January, 1990), the 
``Nevada Potential Repository Preliminary Transportation 
Strategy, Study 1'' (February, 1995), and the ``Nevada Potential 
Repository Preliminary Transportation Strategy, Study 2'' 
(February, 1996). Based on the latter (1996) study and public 
scoping, five potential rail corridors were considered in detail 
in the Yucca Mountain Final EIS.
 
In the 1996 study, the Mina route was not recommended for further 
study, because a rail line within the Mina route could only 
connect to an existing rail line by crossing the Walker River 
Paiute
 
[[Page 60486]]
Tribe Reservation, and the Tribe had informed DOE that it would 
refuse to allow nuclear waste to be transported across its 
reservation (letter dated December 6, 1991). For this reason, the 
Department considered the Mina route to pose an unavoidable land 
use conflict and thus to be unavailable for further consideration 
(see Section 2.3.3.1 in the Yucca Mountain Final EIS).
 
Following review of the scoping comments for the Rail Alignment 
EIS, DOE held discussions with the Walker River Paiute Tribe 
regarding the availability of the Mina route. Subsequently, in 
May 2006, the Walker River Paiute Tribe informed DOE that the 
Tribal Council had withdrawn its objection to the completion of 
an EIS studying the transportation of nuclear waste across its 
reservation. The Tribe stated that its Tribal Council had not 
decided to allow such shipments, but indicated that inclusion of 
the Mina route in an EIS would allow the Tribe to make a more 
informed, final decision about the matter.
 
In view of the Tribal Council's decision, DOE initiated a study 
to determine the feasibility of the Mina route, and to identify a 
specific corridor (the Mina corridor) and associated preliminary 
alternative alignments. Based on DOE's preliminary analysis, in 
comparison with other rail corridors, the Mina corridor appears 
to offer potential advantages to the extent it would cross fewer 
mountain ranges, utilize existing rail bed, and also be a shorter 
distance. These potential advantages would simplify design and 
construction of the rail line, and therefore would be less costly 
to construct. The Mina corridor also would appear to have fewer 
land use conflicts, and would involve less land disturbance, 
which tends to result in lower adverse environmental impacts 
overall.
 
For these reasons, DOE has concluded that the Mina corridor 
warrants further detailed study. Accordingly, DOE is announcing 
its intent to expand the scope of the Rail Alignment EIS to 
prepare a Supplemental EIS that will supplement the rail corridor 
analyses of the Yucca Mountain Final EIS. In the Yucca Mountain 
Final EIS, DOE evaluated the construction and operation of a rail 
line within five corridors--Caliente, Caliente-Chalk Mountain, 
Carlin, Jean and Valley Modified. In the Supplemental Yucca 
Mountain Rail Corridor and Rail Alignment EIS, DOE will review 
the environmental information and analyses for these corridors, 
and update, as appropriate \5\; DOE also plans to consider the 
Mina corridor at a level of detail commensurate with that of the 
Yucca Mountain Final EIS. In addition, the Supplemental Yucca 
Mountain Rail Corridor and Rail Alignment EIS will consider, in 
detail, alignments for the construction and operation of a rail 
line within the Caliente and Mina corridors.
 
----------
\5\ In a letter to the U.S. Air Force (dated December 1, 2004), 
DOE eliminated from detailed study alignments that would 
intersect the Nevada Test and Training Range because of concerns 
regarding military readiness testing and training activities. 
This letter was in response to a May 28, 2004 letter from the 
U.S. Air Force. For the same reasons cited in these letters, DOE 
does not intend to consider further the Caliente-Chalk Mountain 
rail corridor.
 
----------
The Mina corridor originates at an existing rail line near 
Wabuska, Nevada, where it proceeds southeasterly through 
Hawthorne to Blair Junction, and then on to Lida Junction. At 
that point, it becomes coincident with the Caliente corridor 
trending southeasterly through Oasis Valley before turning 
north-northeast to Yucca Mountain.
 
The Mina corridor is about 450 kilometers (280 miles) in length; 
however, construction of new rail line would range between about 
386 kilometers (240 miles) and 409 kilometers (254 miles) because 
the corridor includes the existing Department of Defense rail 
line from Wabuska to the Hawthorne Army Depot in Hawthorne.
 
Previous Public Scoping Comments The Department received more 
than 4,100 comments during the public scoping period for the Rail 
Alignment EIS that ended June 1, 2004. In general, many of these 
comments offered preferences for various rail corridors or 
requested DOE to evaluate rail corridors other than Caliente, and 
suggested new alternative alignments or criteria (e.g., avoid 
wilderness study areas) that could be used to modify the 
preliminary alignments proposed by DOE or to create new 
alternative alignments. These comments helped inform DOE's 
decision to expand the scope of the Rail Alignment EIS as 
discussed under Background above, and to identify the range of 
reasonable alternative alignments as discussed under Caliente 
Alternative Alignments below.
 
Commenters also requested that DOE allow other commodities to be 
shipped on the rail line by private entities (referred to herein 
as shared use). As described under Proposed Action below, the 
Supplemental Yucca Mountain Rail Corridor and Rail Alignment EIS 
will evaluate shipments of commercial commodities, in addition to 
shipments of DOE materials.
 
DOE also received comments regarding analytical methods for 
various environmental resources such as cultural resources and 
water use, treatment of cumulative impacts and Native American 
concerns, the nature of the evaluation of potential accidents and 
sabotage, and the identification of mitigation measures. These 
comments and associated issues will be addressed in the 
Supplemental Yucca Mountain Rail Corridor and Rail Alignment EIS.
 
Proposed Action Under the Supplemental Yucca Mountain Rail 
Corridor and Rail Alignment EIS, the Proposed Action is to 
determine a rail alignment \6\ (within a rail corridor) in which 
to construct and operate a rail line for shipments of spent 
nuclear fuel, high-level radioactive waste, and other materials 
from an existing railroad in Nevada to a geologic repository at 
Yucca Mountain, Nye County, Nevada. DOE now plans to review the 
environmental information and analyses for four rail corridors, 
and update, as appropriate (Caliente, Carlin, Jean and Valley 
Modified), include and analyze the Mina corridor, and evaluate in 
detail two alternatives that would implement the Proposed 
Action-- the Mina Alternative and the Caliente Alternative. Under 
each implementing alternative, DOE will evaluate the potential 
environmental impacts from the construction and operation of a 
rail line along various alternative alignments \7\ and common 
segments.\8\ As part of rail line operations, DOE also will 
evaluate, as an option to the Mina and Caliente implementing 
alternatives, the shipment of commercial commodities by private 
entities (shared use).
 
----------
\6\ A strip of land less than 400 meters (0.25 mile) wide through 
which the location of a rail line would be identified.
 
\7\ A geographic region of the rail alignment for which multiple 
routes for the rail line have been identified.
 
\8\ A geographic region of the rail alignment for which a single 
route for the rail line has been identified.
 
----------
Preliminary Alternatives
As required by the Council on Environmental Quality and 
Departmental regulations that implement NEPA, the Supplemental 
Yucca Mountain Rail Corridor and Rail Alignment EIS will analyze 
and present the environmental impacts associated with the range 
of reasonable alternatives to meet DOE's purpose and need for a 
rail line, and a no- action alternative. The preliminary 
alternative alignments for the Caliente and Mina rail alignments 
comprise a series of common segments and alternatives (maps may 
be obtained as described above in
 
[[Page 60487]]
ADDRESSES). The Department is interested in identifying and 
subsequently evaluating any additional reasonable alternative 
alignments within the Caliente or Mina corridors that would 
reduce or avoid known or potential adverse environmental impacts, 
features having aesthetic values, and land-use conflicts, or 
alternatives that should be eliminated from detailed 
consideration. This could include identifying alternative 
alignments that could avoid environmentally sensitive areas or 
other land use conflicts.
 
Caliente Alternative Alignments
DOE's Notice of Intent (April 8, 2004) identified preliminary 
alternative alignments and common segments to be evaluated in the 
Rail Alignment EIS. The Notice of Intent also indicated that DOE 
would consider other potential alternatives if they would 
minimize, avoid or otherwise mitigate adverse environmental 
impacts.
 
Following scoping, DOE evaluated all public comments, as well as 
information from other sources, that could affect the preliminary 
alternative alignments and common segments identified in the 
Notice of Intent. Based on this information, DOE identified 
additional alternative alignments, and modified the preliminary 
alignments and common segments identified in the Notice of Intent 
to create a suite of potential alternatives. This suite was then 
evaluated using environmental features and engineering and design 
factors to determine, preliminarily, the range of reasonable 
alternative alignments.
 
As an example, commenters identified alternative alignments that 
would avoid Garden Valley by identifying routes through Coal 
Valley that cross the Golden Gate Range. However, DOE found these 
alignments are not reasonable alternatives because they would 
either exceed engineering and design factors or would be far more 
costly to construct than other alignments that pass through 
Garden Valley.
 
On this basis, DOE has identified, preliminarily, alternative 
alignments at the interface with the Union Pacific Railroad near 
Caliente, in Garden Valley, near the Reveille Range and the Town 
of Goldfield, north of Scottys Junction (referred to as Bonnie 
Claire), and in Oasis Valley. These alternative alignments, which 
are described below, will be considered in detail in the 
Supplemental Yucca Mountain Rail Corridor and Rail Alignment EIS.
 
Interface With Union Pacific Railroad
DOE has identified two alternative alignments, Caliente and 
Eccles, either of which alternative alignment would connect the 
proposed rail line to the existing Union Pacific Railroad in or 
near the City of Caliente. The Caliente alternative alignment 
would begin in Caliente, enter Meadow Valley Wash at Indian Cove, 
and extend generally north through Meadow Valley Wash and along 
U.S. 93. This alternative alignment would then cross U.S. 93 
about 5 kilometers (3 miles) southwest of Panaca and connect to 
Common Segment 1 about 1 kilometer (0.6 mile) northwest of U.S. 
93 and 18 kilometers (11 miles) south of Pioche. The Caliente 
alternative alignment would be approximately 18 kilometers (11 
miles) long.
 
The Eccles alternative alignment would begin along Clover Creek 
about 8 kilometers (5 miles) east of Caliente and trend generally 
north to enter Meadow Valley Wash from the southeast. This 
alternative alignment would then cross U.S. 93 about 5 kilometers 
(3 miles) southwest of Panaca and connect to Common Segment 1 
about 1 kilometer (0.6 mile) northwest of U.S. 93 and 18 
kilometers (11 miles) south of Pioche. The Eccles alternative 
alignment would be about 18 kilometers (11 miles) long.
 
Garden Valley DOE is considering four alternative alignments in 
the Garden Valley area, referred to as Garden Valley 1, 2, 3, and 
8. Garden Valley 1 would run due west through the Golden Gate 
Range for about 7 kilometers (4 miles), trend in a southwesterly 
direction through Garden Valley, cross the Lincoln and Nye County 
line, and connect to Common Segment 2 about 5 kilometers (3 
miles) north of the Worthington Mountains Wilderness Area, and 3 
kilometers (2 miles) east of the Humboldt Toiyabe National 
Forest. The Garden Valley 1 alternative alignment would be 
approximately 35 kilometers (22 miles) long.
 
Garden Valley 2 would run to the south of Garden Valley 1 and 
Garden Valley 3, crossing the Lincoln and Nye County line.
 
Garden Valley 2 would continue southwesterly through the Golden 
Gate Range at Water Gap, turn westward through Garden Valley, and 
continue southwesterly to connect to Common Segment 2 about 5 
kilometers (3 miles) north of the Worthington Mountains 
Wilderness Area and 3 kilometers (2 miles) east of the Humboldt 
Toiyabe National Forest. The Garden Valley 2 alternative 
alignment would be about 37 kilometers (23 miles) long.
 
Garden Valley 3 would run due west through the Golden Gate Range 
and then in a northwesterly direction until turning southwest to 
run along the southeast base of the Quinn Canyon Range. 
Continuing in a southwesterly direction, it would run through 
Garden Valley, cross the Lincoln and Nye County line, and connect 
to Common Segment 2 about 5 kilometers (3 miles) north of the 
Worthington Mountains Wilderness Area and 3 kilometers (2 miles) 
east of the Humboldt Toiyabe National Forest. The Garden Valley 3 
alternative alignment would be approximately 36 kilometers (22 
miles) long.
 
Garden Valley 8 would run to the south of Garden Valley 1 and 
Garden Valley 3, crossing the Lincoln and Nye County line. It 
would continue southwesterly through the Golden Gate Range at 
Water Gap, would turn westward through Garden Valley, and run in 
a southwesterly direction before turning sharply westward. Garden 
Valley 8 would proceed westward and connect to Common Segment 2 
about 5 kilometers (3 miles) north of the Worthington Mountains 
Wilderness Area and 3 kilometers (2 miles) east of the Humboldt 
Toiyabe National Forest. The Garden Valley 8 alternative 
alignment would be about 38 kilometers (23 miles) long, 8 
kilometers (5 miles) of which parallels Garden Valley Road.
 
South Reveille
South Reveille 2 and South Reveille 3 alternative alignments 
would begin 5 kilometers (3 miles) south of the South Reveille 
Wilderness Study Area. South Reveille 2 would trend to the 
northwest along the border of the South Reveille Wilderness Study 
Area. South Reveille 3 would trend northwest a few kilometers to 
the west and roughly parallel to South Reveille 2. South Reveille 
2 or South Reveille 3 would connect to Common Segment 3 in 
Reveille Valley about 14 kilometers (9 miles) west of State Route 
375. South Reveille 2 would be approximately 19 kilometers (12 
miles) long and South Reveille 3 would be approximately 20 
kilometers (12 miles) long.
 
Goldfield
DOE is considering three alternative alignments in the Goldfield 
area, referred to as Goldfield 1, 3, and 4. Goldfield 1 would 
extend south into the Goldfield Hills area, passing east of Black 
Butte. It would turn east near Espina Hill and head south to the 
east of Blackcap Mountain. It would wind around a series of hills 
and valleys to
 
[[Page 60488]]
maintain an acceptable grade. Goldfield 1 would run for 
approximately 11 kilometers (7 miles) along an abandoned rail 
line before joining Common Segment 4 about 1 kilometer (0.6 mile) 
northeast of Ralston. In total, the Goldfield 1 alternative 
alignment would be 47 kilometers (29 miles) long.
 
Goldfield 3 would extend south and farther to the east than the 
other Goldfield alternative alignments. Like Goldfield 1, 
Goldfield 3 would wind around a series of hills and valleys to 
maintain an acceptable grade. Also like Goldfield 1, Goldfield 3 
would run for approximately 11 kilometers (7 miles) along an 
abandoned rail line before joining common Segment 4 about 1 
kilometer (0.6 mile) northeast of Ralston. In total, the 
Goldfield 3 alternative alignment would be about 50 kilometers 
(31 miles) long.
 
The western Goldfield alternative alignment, Goldfield 4, would 
depart from Common Segment 3 to the north of Black Butte and 
trend southwest. It would then cross U.S. 95 and turn south 
toward Goldfield. After passing through the southwestern edge of 
Goldfield and crossing U.S. 95 again, Goldfield 4 would turn 
south to connect with Common Segment 4. Goldfield 4 would be 
about 53 kilometers (33 miles) long.
 
Bonnie Claire
DOE is considering two alternative alignments, Bonnie Claire 2 
and 3. Bonnie Claire 2 would depart Common Segment 4 about 8 
kilometers (5 miles) north of Stonewall Pass and would trend east 
toward the Nevada Test and Training Range for about 5 kilometers 
(3 miles) before turning south for an additional 17 kilometers 
(11 miles). Bonnie Claire 2 generally would follow the Nevada 
Test and Training Range boundary and would join Common Segment 5 
in Sarcobatus Flats to the north of Scottys Junction near the 
intersection of State Route 267 and U.S. 95. Bonnie Claire 2 
would be approximately 20 kilometers long.
 
Bonnie Claire 3 would depart Common Segment 4 about 8 kilometers 
(5 miles) north of Stonewall Pass. Bonnie Claire 3 would trend 
generally south, paralleling U.S. 95 to the east. After 
approximately 10 kilometers (6 miles), Bonnie Claire 3 would turn 
southeast and continue for an additional 10 kilometers (6 miles) 
through Sarcobatus Flats. It would then join Common Segment 5 
approximately 4 kilometers (2 miles) north of Scottys Junction 
near the intersection of State Route 267 and U.S. 95. Bonnie 
Claire 3 would be approximately 20 kilometers (12 miles) long.
 
Oasis Valley
DOE is considering two alternative alignments, referred to as 
Oasis Valley 1 and Oasis Valley 3. Oasis Valley 1 would depart 
Common Segment 5 about 3 kilometers (2 miles) north of Oasis 
Mountain and would run southeast and connect to Common Segment 6. 
Oasis Valley 1 would be approximately 10 kilometers (6 miles) 
long.
 
Oasis Valley 3 would also depart Common Segment 5 about 3 
kilometers (2 miles) north of Oasis Mountain and would run 
generally east and then south before crossing Oasis Valley 
farther to the east than Oasis Valley 1, and then connecting to 
Common Segment 6.
 
Oasis Valley 3 would be 14 kilometers (9 miles) long.
 
Mina Alternative Alignments
Following receipt of the letter regarding the Walker River Paiute 
Tribal Council decision (May, 2006), the Department initiated a 
study to consider the feasibility of the Mina route, and to 
identify a specific corridor (Mina corridor) and associated 
preliminary alternative alignments. The process used to identify 
the preliminary alternative alignments within the Mina corridor 
is consistent with that described under Caliente Alternative 
Alignments. Alternative alignments were identified near the Town 
of Schurz, around the Montezuma Range, north of Scottys Junction 
(referred to as Bonnie Claire), and in Oasis Valley. These are 
described below. Town of Schurz DOE has identified three 
alternative alignments that would bypass the Town of Schurz, 
Nevada. Schurz Bypass 1 would depart from the existing rail line 
about 30 kilometers (18 miles) northwest of the Town of Schurz 
passing along the eastern side of the valley (Sunshine Flat). 
From there, the alignment passes east of Weber Reservoir and 
crosses U.S. 95 about 8 kilometers (5 miles) north of the 
intersection of U.S. 95 and Alternate U.S. 95. Schurz Bypass 1 
then trends southeast remaining on the far side of the valley to 
where it rejoins the existing rail line about 13 kilometers (8 
miles) south of Schurz. Schurz Bypass 1 would be 51 kilometers 
(32 miles) long.
 
Schurz Bypass 2 also would depart the existing line at the same 
point of departure as Schurz Bypass 1 and would pass along the 
eastern side of Sunshine Flat. From there, the alignment passes 
east of Weber Reservoir and crosses U.S. 95 about 7 kilometers (4 
miles) north of the intersection of U.S. 95 and Alternate U.S. 
95. From there, the alignment trends to the southeast but staying 
to the east of Schurz and west of Schurz Bypass 1 until it 
rejoins the existing rail line about 13 kilometers (8 miles) 
south of Schurz. Schurz Bypass 2 would be 50 kilometers (31 
miles) long.
 
Schurz Bypass 3 would depart the existing rail line about 9 
kilometers (6 miles) northwest of the Town of Schurz where it 
would cross the Walker River. The alignment then crosses U.S. 95 
about 8 kilometers (5 miles) north of the intersection of U.S. 95 
and Alternate U.S. 95 at which point it continues southeasterly 
to a point where it rejoins the existing rail line about 13 
kilometers (8 miles) south of Schurz, on the east side of the 
valley.
 
Montezuma Range 

DOE identified two alternative alignments that depart near Blair 
Junction at the intersection of U.S. 95 and U.S. 6 to avoid the 
Montezuma Range; they rejoin at a point just east of Lida 
Junction. The first alignment, Montezuma Range 1, would depart 
Blair Junction paralleling State Route 265 to the Town of Silver 
Peak where it would proceed north to follow the western side of 
Clayton Ridge. The alignment would then turn south approximately 
16 kilometers (10 miles) before Railroad Pass at which point it 
would turn east between the southern end of the Goldfield Hills 
and the Cuprite Hills. The alignment would then cross U.S. 95 
about 7 kilometers (5 miles) north of Lida Junction and, 
paralleling U.S. 95, then head south to a point just east of Lida 
Junction. Montezuma Range 1 would be about 134 kilometers (83 
miles) long.
 
Montezuma Range 2, after departing from the intersection of U.S. 
95 and U.S. 6, would follow the abandoned Tonopah and Goldfield 
rail roadbed east to the north of Lone Mountain, at which point 
the alignment would head south following the abandoned roadbed. 
The alignment would traverse Montezuma Valley south to Klondike 
and would then parallel U.S. 95 as it approaches the Town of 
Goldfield. Montezuma Range 2 would stay west of Goldfield and 
then trend southeasterly to a point just east of Lida Junction 
where it would reconnect with Montezuma Range 1. Montezuma Range 
2 would be about 135 kilometers (84 miles) long.
 
Bonnie Claire and Oasis Valley
The Bonnie Claire and Oasis Valley alternative alignments are as 
described above under Caliente Alternative Alignments.
 
 
[[Page 60489]]
No Action Alternative
The Council on Environmental Quality and Departmental regulations 
that implement NEPA require consideration of the alternative of 
no action. Under the No Action Alternative, DOE would not select 
a rail alignment within the Caliente or Mina rail corridors for 
the construction and operation of a rail line. As such, the No 
Action Alternative provides a basis for comparison to the 
Proposed Action.
 
In the event that DOE were not to select a rail alignment in the 
Caliente or Mina corridors, the future course that it would 
pursue is uncertain. DOE recognizes that other possibilities 
could be pursued, including identifying and evaluating alignments 
in other corridors considered in the Yucca Mountain Final EIS.
 
Potential Environmental Issues and Resources To be Examined The 
Council on Environmental Quality regulations direct Federal 
agencies preparing an EIS to focus on significant environmental 
issues (40 CFR 1502.1) and discuss impacts in proportion to their 
significance (40 CFR 1502.2). Accordingly, the Supplemental Yucca 
Mountain Rail Corridor and Rail Alignment EIS will analyze issues 
and impacts with the amount of detail commensurate with their 
importance.
 
To facilitate the scoping process, DOE has identified a 
preliminary list of issues and environmental resources that it 
may consider in the Supplemental Yucca Mountain Rail Corridor and 
Rail Alignment EIS. The list is not intended to be all-inclusive 
or to predetermine the scope or alternatives of the Supplemental 
Yucca Mountain Rail Corridor and Rail Alignment EIS, but should 
be used as a starting point from which the public can help DOE 
define the scope of the EIS.
 
Potential impacts to the concept of multiple use as it applies to 
public land use planning and management specified by the Federal 
Land Policy and Management Act of 1976.
 
Potential impacts to land use and ownership.
 
Potential impacts to plants, animals and their habitats, 
including impacts to wetlands, and threatened and endangered and 
other sensitive species.
 
Potential impacts to cultural resources.
 
Potential impacts to American Indian resources.
 
Potential impacts to paleontological resources.
 
Potential impacts to the public from noise and vibration.
 
Potential impacts to the general public and workers from 
radiological exposures during incident-free operations of the 
railroad.
 
Potential impacts to the general public and workers from 
radiological exposures from potential accidents during operations 
of the railroad.
 
Potential impacts to water resources and floodplains.
 
Potential impacts to aesthetic values.
 
Potential disproportionately high and adverse impacts to 
low-income and minority populations (environmental justice).
 
Irretrievable and irreversible commitment of resources.
 
Compliance with applicable Federal, state and local requirements.
 
The Department specifically invites comments on the following 
relative to the Mina corridor and its alternative alignments: 1. 
Should additional alternative alignments be considered that might 
minimize, avoid or mitigate adverse environmental impacts (for 
example, looking beyond the 0.25 mile wide Mina corridor, 
avoiding environmentally sensitive areas)? 2. Should any of the 
preliminary alternatives be eliminated from detailed 
consideration? 3. Should additional environmental resources be 
considered? 4.What mitigation measures should be considered? In 
addition, the Department is interested in identifying any 
significant changes to, or new information relevant to, the rail 
corridors analyzed in the Yucca Mountain Final EIS.
 
Schedule
The DOE intends to issue the Draft Supplemental Yucca Mountain 
Rail Corridor and Rail Alignment EIS in 2007 at which time its 
availability will be announced in the Federal Register and local 
media. A public comment period will start upon publication of the 
Environmental Protection Agency's Notice of Availability in the 
Federal Register. The Department will consider and respond to 
comments received on the Draft in preparing the Final 
Supplemental Yucca Mountain Rail Corridor and Rail Alignment EIS.
 
Other Agency Involvement
Currently, the U.S. Bureau of Land Management, U.S. Air Force and 
the U.S. Surface Transportation Board are cooperating agencies in 
the preparation of the Supplemental Yucca Mountain Rail Corridor 
and Rail Alignment EIS. The Department also expects to invite the 
following to be cooperating agencies: Walker River Paiute Tribe, 
U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs, and the U.S. Army. The Tribe and 
these agencies have management and regulatory authority over 
lands traversed by alternative rail alignments within the Mina 
and Caliente rail corridors, or special expertise germane to the 
construction and operation of a rail line. DOE will consult with 
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Native American Tribal 
organizations, the State of Nevada, and Nye, Lincoln, Esmeralda, 
Mineral, Churchill and Lyon Counties regarding the environmental 
and regulatory issues germane to the Proposed Action. DOE invites 
comments on its identification of cooperating and consulting 
agencies and organizations.
 
Public Scoping Meetings
DOE will hold public scoping meetings on the Supplemental Yucca 
Mountain Rail Corridor and Rail Alignment EIS. The meetings will 
be held at the following locations and times: Amargosa Valley, 
Nevada. Longstreet Hotel Casino, Nevada State Highway 373, 
November 1, 2006 from 4-7 p.m.\9\

----------
\9\ DOE will hold a joint public scoping meeting on the 
Supplemental Yucca Mountain EIS (DOE/EIS-0250F-S1) and 
Supplemental Yucca Mountain Rail Corridor and Rail Alignment EIS 
(DOE/EIS-0250F- S2 and DOE/EIS-0369) in Amargosa Valley, 
Longstreet Hotel Casino, Nevada State Highway 373, November 1 
from 4-7 pm. Additional public scoping meetings on the 
Supplemental Yucca Mountain EIS will be held in Washington, DC, 
L'Enfant Plaza Hotel, 480 L'Enfant Plaza, SW, October 30 from 4-7 
pm; and Las Vegas, Cashman Center, 850 North Las Vegas Blvd., 
November 2 from 4-7 pm.

----------
Caliente, Nevada. Caliente Youth Center, U.S. 93 North, November 
8, 2006 from 6-8 p.m. Goldfield, Nevada. Goldfield School 
Gymnasium, Hall and Euclid, November 13, 2006 from 4-7 p.m. 
Hawthorne, Nevada. Hawthorne Convention Center, 932 E. Street, 
November 14, 2006 from 4-7 p.m. Fallon, Nevada. Fallon Convention 
Center, 100 Campus Way, November 15, 2006 from 4-7 p.m. The 
public scoping meetings will be an open meeting format without a 
formal presentation by DOE. Members of the public are invited to 
attend the meetings at their convenience any time during meeting 
hours and submit their comments in writing at the meeting, or in 
person to a court reporter who will be available throughout the 
meeting.
 
This open meeting format increases the opportunity for public 
comment and provides for one-on-one discussions with DOE 
representatives involved with
 
[[Page 60490]]
the Supplemental Yucca Mountain Rail Corridor and Rail Alignment 
EIS, and transportation planning in general.
 
The public scoping meetings will be held during the public 
scoping comment period. The comment period begins with 
publication of this Amended Notice of Intent in the Federal 
Register and closes November 27, 2006. Comments received after 
this date will be considered to the extent practicable. Written 
comments may be provided in writing, facsimile, or by the 
Internet to Mr. Lee Bishop, EIS Document Manager (see ADDRESSES 
above).
 
Public Reading Rooms
Documents referenced in this Amended Notice of Intent and related 
information are available at the following locations: Beatty 
Yucca Mountain Information Center, 100 North E. Avenue, Beatty, 
NV 89003, (775) 553-2130; Esmeralda County Yucca Mountain 
Oversight Office, 274 E. Crook Avenue, Goldfield, NV 89013, (775) 
485-3419; Las Vegas Yucca Mountain Information Center, 4101-B 
Meadows Lane, Las Vegas, NV 89107, (702) 295-1312; Lincoln County 
Nuclear Waste Project Office, 100 Depot Avenue, Caliente, NV 
89008, (775) 726-3511; Nye County Department of Natural Resources 
and Federal Facilities, 1210 E. Basin Road, Suite 6, Pahrump, NV 
89060 (775) 727-7727; Pahrump Yucca Mountain Information Center, 
2341 Postal Drive, Pahrump, NV 89048, (775) 571- 5817; University 
of Nevada, Reno, The University of Nevada Libraries, Business and 
Government Information Center, M/S 322, 1664 N.
 
Virginia 
Street, Reno, NV 89557, (775) 784-6500, Ext. 309; and the U.S. 
Department of Energy Headquarters Office Public Reading Room, 
1000 Independence Avenue SW., Room 1E-190 (ME-74) FORS, 
Washington, DC 20585, 202-586-3142.
 
Issued in Washington, DC, October 10, 2006.
 
David R. Hill, General Counsel.
 
[FR Doc. 06-8675 Filed 10-10-06; 4:15 pm] BILLING CODE 6450-01-P

 
*****************************************************************
 57 San Bernardino County Sun: Water quality panel may select perchlorate cleanup czar
 
Jason Pesick, Staff Writer 

Article Launched:10/13/2006 12:00:00 AM PDT

+ - Read about item 25 on the agenda for the San Bernardino
County Board of Supervisors regarding perchlorate cleanup in the
water supply --> 

+ - This state Web site has the all the orders and other
information from the Santa Ana Regional Water Quality Control
Board re: perchlorate in Rialto, Colton and Fontana
       

The Santa Ana Regional Water Quality Control Board today will
consider allowing a retired state water official to determine
whether to force three corporations to clean up perchlorate
contamination in Rialto. 

The action would represent another step in the process to clean
up the water contamination that was first discovered in 1997. 

"I think they have to take some strong action," said state Sen.
Nell Soto, D-Ontario, chairwoman of the Senate Select Committee
on Perchlorate Contamination. 

Perchlorate is a chemical used in the production of products
such as fireworks and rocket fuel and can interfere with the
functioning of the thyroid gland. 

The resolution up for consideration would delegate the water
board's authority to an independent hearing officer to issue
what are known as cleanup and abatement orders that force
polluters to clean up contamination they caused. 

The three corporations that would face cleanup orders are Black
& Decker Corp., Goodrich Corp. and the fireworks company Pyro
Spectacular. In 2003, the board issued a similar order against
San Bernardino County for perchlorate flowing from its property
on Rialto's north side. 

The hearing officer would be Walt Pettit, who was the executive 
director of the state Water Resources Control Board until 2000. 

The move to delegate authority to Pettit was the result of
allegations made by Emhart Industries, owned by Black & Decker,
that the regional board is biased, according to Kurt Berchtold,
the board's assistant executive officer. 

He said Emhart claimed that because the board's staff, which
investigates allegations against the corporations, has been
communicating with board members for years on the issue of
perchlorate contamination, the board members themselves are
compromised. 

"They're just using bogus tactics to hinder the process," Paul
Van Dyke, Soto's chief of staff, said about Emhart. 

Soto said the board has been too passive in its efforts to clean
up the contamination. She said she is not thrilled the board is
delegating its authority to Pettit, but also said, "I think
anything they do is better than what's going on now." 

      Updated: October 13, 2006 12:34:39 AM PDT  
  
Los Angeles Newspaper Group 
*****************************************************************
 58 DOE: Supplement to the Final Environmental Impact Statement for Yucca Mt
 
                         FR Doc 06-8676 
[Federal Register: October 13, 2006 (Volume 71, Number 198)] 
[Notices] [Page 60490-60494] From the Federal Register Online via 
GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr13oc06-41]                         
 
Geologic Repository for the Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and 
High- Level Radioactive Waste at Yucca Mountain, Nye County, NV 
AGENCY: U.S. Department of Energy. ACTION: Notice of intent.
 
SUMMARY: The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE or the Department) is 
announcing its intent to prepare a Supplement to the ``Final 
Environmental Impact Statement for a Geologic Repository for the 
Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste 
at Yucca Mountain, Nye County, Nevada'' (DOE/EIS-0250F, February 
2002) (Yucca Mountain Final EIS). The Proposed Action addressed 
in the Yucca Mountain Final EIS is to construct, operate and 
monitor, and eventually close a geologic repository at Yucca 
Mountain in southern Nevada for the disposal of spent nuclear 
fuel and high-level radioactive waste.
 
The Yucca Mountain Final EIS considered the potential 
environmental impacts of a repository design for surface and 
subsurface facilities, a range of canister packaging scenarios 
and repository thermal operating modes, and plans for the 
construction, operation and monitoring, and eventual closure of 
the repository. The Yucca Mountain Final EIS also considered the 
environmental impacts of the transportation of spent nuclear fuel 
and high-level radioactive waste from commercial and DOE sites to 
the repository by two principal modes--mostly truck and mostly 
rail. In the Yucca Mountain Final EIS DOE recognized that these 
repository design concepts and operational plans would continue 
to develop during the design and engineering process.
 
Since publication of the Yucca Mountain Final EIS, DOE has 
continued to develop the repository design and associated plans.
 
As now planned, the proposed surface and subsurface facilities 
would allow DOE to operate the repository following a primarily 
canistered approach in which most commercial spent nuclear fuel 
would be packaged at the commercial sites in multipurpose 
transport, aging and disposal canisters (TADs), and all DOE 
materials would be packaged in disposable canisters at the DOE 
sites. Waste packages would be arrayed in the repository 
underground to achieve what is referred to as a higher- thermal 
operating mode, and most spent nuclear fuel and high-level 
radioactive waste would arrive at the repository by rail.
 
To evaluate the potential environmental impacts of the current 
repository design and operational plans, DOE has decided to 
prepare a Supplement to the Yucca Mountain Final EIS \1\, 
consistent with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and 
the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, as amended (Pub. L. 97-425) (NWPA). 
This Supplemental Yucca Mountain EIS (DOE/EIS-0250-S1) is being 
prepared to assist the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) 
in satisfying its NEPA responsibilities pursuant to the NWPA 
(Section 114(f)(4)) \2\.
 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
---------- \1\ Coincident with this Notice of Intent, DOE is 
publishing an Amended Notice of Intent to prepare a Supplemental 
Yucca Mountain Rail Corridor and Rail Alignment EIS 
(DOE/EIS-0250F-S2 and DOE/EIS- 0369). That EIS will review the 
rail corridor analyses of the Yucca Mountain Final EIS, and 
update, as appropriate, and will analyze the proposed Mina 
corridor; it also will include detailed analyses of alternative 
alignments for the construction and operation of a rail line 
within the Mina corridor, as well as the Caliente corridor.
 
\2\ Section 114(f)(4) of the NWPA provides that any environmental 
impact statement ``prepared in connection with a repository * * * 
shall, to the extent practicable, be adopted by the Commission 
[NRC] in connection with the issuance by the Commission of a 
construction authorization and license for such repository.
 
To the extent such statement is adopted by the Commission, such 
adoption shall be deemed to also satisfy the responsibilities of 
the Commission under the National Environmental Policy Act of 
1969 * * *.''
 
DATES: The Department invites comments on the scope of the 
Supplemental Yucca Mountain EIS to ensure that all relevant 
environmental issues are addressed. Public scoping meetings are 
discussed below in the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section. DOE 
will consider all comments received during the 45-day public 
scoping period, which starts with publication of this Notice of 
Intent and ends November 27, 2006. Comments received after this 
date will be considered to the extent 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
---------- practicable.
 
 
ADDRESSES: Requests for additional information on the 
Supplemental Yucca Mountain EIS or on the repository program in 
general, should be directed to: Dr. Jane Summerson, EIS Document 
Manager, Regulatory Authority Office, Office of Civilian 
Radioactive Waste Management, U.S. Department of Energy, 1551 
Hillshire Drive, M/S 010, Las Vegas, NV 89134, Telephone 
1-800-967-3477. Written comments on the scope of the Supplemental 
Yucca Mountain EIS may be submitted to Dr. Jane Summerson at this 
address, or by facsimile to 1-800-967-0739, or via the Internet 
at http://www.ocrwm.doe.gov under the caption What's New. FOR 
FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For general information regarding 
the DOE NEPA process contact: Ms. Carol M. Borgstrom, Director, 
Office of NEPA Policy and Compliance, U.S. Department of Energy, 
1000 Independence Ave., SW., Washington, DC 20585, Telephone 
202-586-4600, or leave a message at 1-800-472-2756.
 
 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
 
[[Page 60491]] Background Section 111(a)(4) of the NWPA states 
that the Federal government has the: ``responsibility to provide 
for the permanent disposal of high-level radioactive waste and 
such spent nuclear fuel as may be disposed of in order to protect 
the public health and safety and the environment.'' The NWPA 
directs the Secretary of Energy, if the Secretary decides to 
recommend approval of the Yucca Mountain site for development of 
a repository, to submit a final environmental impact statement 
with any recommendation to the President. The Department prepared 
the Yucca Mountain Final EIS to fulfill that requirement.
 
On February 14, 2002, the Secretary, in accordance with the NWPA, 
transmitted his recommendation (including the Yucca Mountain 
Final EIS) to the President for approval of the Yucca Mountain 
site for development of a geologic repository. The President 
considered the site qualified for application to the NRC for a 
construction authorization and recommended the site to the U.S. 
Congress. Subsequently, on July 23, 2002, the President signed 
into law (Pub. L. 107-200) a joint resolution of the U.S. House 
of Representatives and the U.S. Senate designating the Yucca 
Mountain site for development as a geologic repository for the 
disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste. 
The Department is now preparing a license application for 
submittal to the NRC seeking authorization to construct the 
repository, as required by the NWPA (Section 114(b)).
 
In the Yucca Mountain Final EIS, DOE considered the potential 
environmental impacts of a repository design for surface and 
subsurface facilities, a range of canister packaging scenarios 
and repository thermal operating modes, and plans for the 
construction, operation and monitoring, and eventual closure of 
the repository. The Yucca Mountain Final EIS also described and 
evaluated the transportation of spent nuclear fuel and high-level 
radioactive waste from commercial and DOE sites to the repository 
by two principal modes--mostly truck and mostly rail. DOE 
recognized at that time that these repository design concepts and 
operational plans would continue to develop during the design and 
engineering process.
 
More specifically, the Yucca Mountain Final EIS included 
evaluations of separate canistered and uncanistered packaging 
scenarios for commercial spent nuclear fuel, and a repository 
design comprised of three primary surface operations areas (North 
Portal Operations Area, South Portal Development Area, 
Ventilation Shaft Operations Area) in which spent nuclear fuel 
and high-level radioactive waste would be handled in two 
principal facilities (Carrier Preparation Building, Waste 
Handling Building). The Yucca Mountain Final EIS also evaluated a 
range of underground thermal operating modes (referred to as 
lower- and higher-temperature modes) in which heat from the waste 
packages would raise the temperature of the adjacent rock to a 
range of temperatures from below the boiling point of water to 
above the boiling point. Two scenarios, mostly truck and mostly 
rail, were analyzed for the transportation of spent nuclear fuel 
and high-level radioactive waste from the commercial and DOE 
sites to the repository.
 
Since publication of the Yucca Mountain Final EIS, DOE has 
continued to develop the repository design and associated plans.
 
As now planned (and described in greater detail in the Proposed 
Action below), the proposed surface and subsurface facilities 
would allow DOE to operate the repository following a primarily 
canistered approach in which most commercial spent nuclear fuel 
would be packaged at the commercial sites in TADs, and all DOE 
materials would be packaged in disposable canisters at the DOE 
sites. These TADs and disposable canisters then would be 
transported mostly by rail \3\ to the repository where they would 
be placed on aging (or staging) \4\ pads prior to disposal, or 
inserted into waste packages and disposed of in the repository 
underground.
 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
---------- \3\ On April 8, 2004 (69 FR 18557), the Department 
issued a Record of Decision selecting, both nationally and in the 
State of Nevada, the mostly rail scenario analyzed in the Yucca 
Mountain Final EIS. This decision will ultimately require the 
construction of a rail line to connect the repository site at 
Yucca Mountain to an existing rail line in the State of Nevada.
 
\4\ The terminology refers to retaining commercial spent nuclear 
fuel on the surface at the repository to meet waste package 
thermal limits (aging), or to provide a surge capacity to 
maintain flexibility in waste handling operations (staging).
 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
---------- At the repository site, spent nuclear fuel and 
high-level radioactive waste would now be handled in up to six 
principal facilities located within three primary surface 
operations areas. A fourth operations area would be developed to 
support excavation of the underground repository. A 
higher-thermal (temperature) operating mode would be employed.
 
Based on the current planning, the Department does not believe 
that any of the developments to the repository design or 
operational plans would have a significant impact on the 
environmental effects considered in the Yucca Mountain Final EIS. 
Nevertheless, to assist NRC in satisfying its NEPA 
responsibilities pursuant to the NWPA (Section 114(f)(4)), DOE 
has decided to prepare this Supplemental EIS.
 
Proposed Action Under the Proposed Action, DOE would construct, 
operate and monitor, and eventually close a geologic repository 
at Yucca Mountain for the disposal of up to 70,000 metric tons of 
heavy metal (MTHM) of commercial and DOE-owned spent nuclear fuel 
and high-level radioactive waste.\5\ DOE would dispose of these 
materials in the repository using the inherent, natural geologic 
features of the mountain and engineered barriers to ensure 
long-term isolation of the spent nuclear fuel and high-level 
radioactive waste from the human environment. These materials 
would be emplaced underground at least 200 meters (660 feet) 
below the surface and at least 160 meters (530 feet) above the 
water table. The NRC, through its licensing process, would 
regulate repository construction, operation and monitoring, and 
closure.
 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
---------- \5\ The 70,000 MTHM includes 63,000 MTHM of commercial 
spent nuclear fuel, about 2,333 MTHM of DOE fuel (includes about 
65 MTHM of naval fuel), and about 4,667 MTHM of DOE high-level 
radioactive waste.
 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
---------- Under the Proposed Action, most spent nuclear fuel and 
high-level radioactive waste would be shipped from 72 commercial 
and 4 DOE sites \6\ to the repository in NRC-certified 
transportation casks placed on trains dedicated only to these 
shipments. Some shipments, however, would arrive at the 
repository by truck.
 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
---------- \6\ In 2002, fifty-four additional sites, primarily 
domestic research reactors, were expected to ship spent nuclear 
fuel to two DOE sites prior to disposal at the repository (see 
Records of Decision June 1, 1995 at 60 FR 28680, and March 8, 
1996 at 61 FR 9441). Also, the Yucca Mountain Final EIS analyzed 
fuel shipments from 5 DOE sites, including Fort St. Vrain, to the 
repository. Presently, it is anticipated that fuel from Fort St. 
Vrain will be shipped to Idaho National Laboratory prior to being 
shipped to the repository.
 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
---------- Under the Proposed Action, all DOE spent nuclear fuel 
and high- level radioactive waste would be placed in disposable 
canisters at the DOE sites, and as much as 90 percent of the 
commercial spent nuclear fuel would be placed in TADs at the 
commercial sites prior to shipment. Upon arrival at the 
repository, both types of canisters (DOE disposable and TADs) 
would be placed into corrosion-resistant overpacks
 
[[Page 60492]] (waste packages) prior to emplacement in the 
repository underground.
 
The remaining commercial spent nuclear fuel (about 10 percent) 
would be transported to the repository in dual-purpose canisters 
(canisters suitable for storage and transportation), or would be 
uncanistered. At the repository, uncanistered spent nuclear fuel 
would be placed directly into TADs and then waste packages for 
disposal. Commercial spent nuclear fuel arriving in dual-purpose 
canisters would first be removed from the canisters, placed into 
TADs and then into waste packages for disposal.
 
Handling of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste 
would take place in the geologic repository operations area, 
which includes the North Portal area, the South Portal 
development area, a North Construction Portal development area, 
and the surface shaft areas. The surface portion of the geologic 
repository operations area also would include the facilities 
necessary to receive, package, and support emplacement of spent 
nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste in the repository. 
Waste transfer operations would be conducted inside reinforced 
concrete and metal frame buildings designed and constructed to 
withstand earthquakes and other phenomena.
 
Workers and the public would be protected from radiation by 
shielded transfer equipment and walls, exhaust filtering systems, 
and the use of remotely controlled equipment to remove the waste 
forms from the transportation casks for insertion into waste 
packages.
 
The primary surface waste handling facilities include a wet 
handling facility, a receipt facility, and three separate 
canister receipt and closure facilities. DOE also is considering 
an initial handling facility. These facilities would allow the 
various types of materials received at the repository to be 
prepared for disposal.
 
The wet handling facility would receive commercial spent nuclear 
fuel as bare fuel assemblies (uncanistered) or in dual-purpose 
canisters, either in truck or rail transportation casks.
 
Commercial spent nuclear fuel would be transferred underwater 
from the transportation casks or dual-purpose canisters into 
TADs. The wet handling facility would include provisions for 
opening transportation casks and dual-purpose canisters, and for 
drying and closing the loaded TADs. Loaded TADs either would be 
placed into overpacks for placement on aging/staging pads, or 
would be transferred to the canister receipt and closure 
facilities for loading into waste packages for disposal.
 
The receipt facility would receive TADs and dual-purpose 
canisters in rail transportation casks. The TADs and dual-purpose 
canisters would be transferred (dry) from the transportation 
casks either to overpacks for placement on the aging/staging 
pads, or to shielded transfer casks for transfer to the canister 
receipt and closure facilities.
 
Shielded transfer casks also would transfer dual-purpose 
canisters to the wet handling facility, as necessary.
 
The canister receipt and closure facilities would receive DOE 
disposable canisters and TADs in rail transportation casks, 
shielded transfer casks and aging/staging overpacks. These 
facilities also could receive truck casks. There, TADs and DOE 
disposable canisters would be placed into waste packages for 
disposal.
 
If constructed, the initial handling facility would receive DOE 
high-level radioactive waste canisters and naval spent nuclear 
fuel canisters in truck and rail transportation casks. These 
canisters would be removed from the transportation casks and 
transferred to waste packages for disposal.
 
Waste packages containing TADs, naval nuclear spent fuel, or DOE 
disposable canisters would be placed on pallets and loaded onto 
shielded waste package transporters. The shielded waste package 
transporters would transfer the waste packages to the underground 
for emplacement in dedicated tunnels (drifts). In these drifts, 
waste packages would be aligned end-to-end. Emplacement drifts 
would be excavated in a series of panels, phased to match the 
anticipated throughput rate of the surface waste handling 
facilities.
 
The repository also would have other underground excavations. 
These would include, for example, main drifts to provide access 
to the surface and the emplacement drifts, and exhaust mains to 
exhaust ventilation air from the emplacement drifts.
 
Under the Proposed Action, thermal output of the waste packages 
would heat the adjacent rock in excess of the boiling temperature 
of water (i.e., higher-thermal operating mode). In this 
higher-thermal mode, the repository emplacement drifts would 
remain open and ventilated for a nominal period of 50 years after 
emplacement of the spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive 
waste; ventilation would remove much of the heat and humidity 
from the emplacement drifts during this period. The higher 
thermal operating mode would be achieved by a combination of 
closely spaced waste packages, a nominal ventilation period of 50 
years, and managing waste package thermal output by mixing lower 
heat output waste packages with higher heat output packages in 
the drifts (for example).
 
After the repository is closed and sealed, the rock around the 
emplacement drifts would dry, minimizing the amount of water that 
might contact the waste packages for hundreds of years. However, 
a substantial portion of the rock between the drifts would remain 
at temperatures below boiling, and this would promote drainage of 
water through the central portions of the rock, rather than into 
the emplacement drifts.
 
The surface and subsurface facilities and associated 
infrastructure,\7\ such as the on-site road and water 
distribution networks and emergency response facilities, would be 
constructed in phases to accommodate the expected receipt rates 
of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste. 
Emplacement (disposal) operations, which would last up to 50 
years, would be followed by a preclosure monitoring period of 50 
years. Towards the end of the preclosure monitoring period, 
titanium drip shields would be installed over the waste packages. 
The drip shields would divert moisture that might drip from the 
drift walls, as well as condensed water vapor around the waste 
packages, to the drift floor thereby increasing the life 
expectancy of the waste packages. Drip shields also would protect 
the waste packages from rock falls.
 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
---------- \7\ DOE published a ``Draft Environmental Assessment 
for the Proposed Infrastructure Improvements for the Yucca 
Mountain Project, Nevada'' on July 6, 2006 (71 FR 38391). DOE 
proposes to repair, replace, or improve certain infrastructure at 
the site to enhance safety and to safely continue operations, 
scientific testing, and maintenance until such time as NRC 
decides whether to authorize construction of a repository. To the 
extent that activities proposed by DOE in its environmental 
assessment, such as construction of a new access road or new 
power lines, may not be undertaken in the timeframe considered in 
the environmental assessment, they will be considered in this 
Supplemental Yucca Mountain EIS (DOE/EIS-0250F- S1).
 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
---------- Under the Proposed Action, emplaced waste packages 
could be retrieved at any time prior to 100 years after the start 
of emplacement. Following waste emplacement, surface facilities 
would be decommissioned and after the monitoring period the 
repository would be closed. Closure would involve sealing the 
shafts, ramps, exploratory boreholes and other repository 
openings. The main drifts would be filled with crushed rock and 
surface caps would be installed to discourage human intrusion. A 
network of monuments and markers would be erected around the site 
surface to warn
 
[[Page 60493]] future generations of the presence and nature of 
the buried radioactive waste.
 
No Action Alternative Under the No Action Alternative, DOE would 
terminate activities at Yucca Mountain and undertake site 
reclamation to mitigate any significant adverse environmental 
impacts. Commercial nuclear power utilities and DOE would 
continue to manage spent nuclear fuel and high- level radioactive 
waste at sites throughout the United States.
 
The No Action Alternative was analyzed in the Yucca Mountain 
Final EIS as a basis for comparison with the Proposed Action.
 
Since completion of the Yucca Mountain Final EIS, DOE has not 
identified any relevant changes in circumstances or information 
bearing on environmental concerns regarding the No Action 
Alternative.
 
For this reason, DOE anticipates that the Supplemental Yucca 
Mountain EIS will incorporate by reference the information 
describing and analyzing the No Action Alternative presented in 
the Yucca Mountain Final EIS (pursuant to Council on 
Environmental Quality (CEQ) regulations at 40 Code of Federal 
Regulations (CFR) 1502.21). Potential Environmental Issues and 
Resources To Be Examined The CEQ regulations direct Federal 
agencies preparing an EIS to focus on significant environmental 
issues (40 CFR 1502.1) and discuss impacts in proportion to their 
significance (40 CFR 1502.2). Accordingly, the Supplemental Yucca 
Mountain EIS will analyze issues and impacts with the amount of 
detail commensurate with their importance. Under these 
guidelines, aspects of the Proposed Action with clearly small 
environmental impacts usually would require less depth and 
breadth of analysis. To the degree that the Proposed Action would 
affect public health or safety, however, the potential impacts 
generally are a matter of public interest, regardless of their 
significance. Therefore, DOE plans to pay particular attention to 
worker and public health and safety associated with the handling 
and disposal, and transportation of spent nuclear fuel and 
high-level radioactive waste, even where such impacts would not 
be significant.
 
To facilitate the scoping process, DOE has identified a 
preliminary list of issues and environmental resources that it 
may consider in the Supplemental Yucca Mountain EIS. The list is 
not intended to be all- inclusive, but should be used as a 
starting point for public input on the scope of the Supplemental 
Yucca Mountain EIS.
 
Radiological releases. The potential impacts (i.e., latent cancer 
fatalities) to the public and workers from potential radiological 
releases during routine loading of canisters and transportation 
casks at the commercial sites, and from handling and disposal 
operations at the repository.
 
Worker safety and health. Potential health and safety impacts 
(i.e., injuries and fatalities) to workers during handling and 
disposal operations at the commercial and DOE sites and the 
repository.
 
Transportation. The potential radiological and non- radiological 
impacts (i.e., traffic injuries and fatalities) to the public and 
workers associated with the shipment of materials to the 
repository under the mostly rail scenario.
 
Accidents. The potential radiological impacts to workers and the 
public from reasonably foreseeable accidents during loading of 
canisters at the sites, transportation and repository operations, 
including any accidents with low probability but high potential 
consequences.
 
Sabotage. The potential radiological impacts to workers and the 
public from sabotage of transportation and repository operations.
 
Waste isolation. Potential radiological and non- radiological 
impacts (e.g., chemically toxic materials) associated with the 
long-term performance of the repository.
 
Socioeconomic conditions. Potential local regional socioeconomic 
impacts to the surrounding communities from construction, 
operation and closure of the repository.
 
Water and air resources. Potential impacts to air resources, and 
water quality and use.
 
Cultural resources. Potential impacts to archaeological and 
historic resources and American Indian issues of concern.
 
Biological resources. Potential impacts to plants, animals and 
their habitats, including impacts to endangered and threatened 
species.
 
Cumulative impacts from the Proposed Action and other past, 
present and reasonably foreseeable future actions.
 
Environmental justice. Potential for disproportionately high and 
adverse impacts on minority or low-income populations.
 
Schedule The DOE intends to issue the Draft Supplemental Yucca 
Mountain EIS in 2007, at which time its availability will be 
announced in the Federal Register and in media in Nevada. A 
public comment period will start upon publication of the 
Environmental Protection Agency's Notice of Availability in the 
Federal Register. DOE will hold public hearings during the 
comment period. The Department will consider and respond to 
comments received on the Draft Supplemental Yucca Mountain EIS in 
preparing the Final Supplemental Yucca Mountain EIS.
 
Other Agency Involvement The Department intends to consult with 
Federal agencies, such as the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, U.S. 
Bureau of Land Management, U.S. Air Force, and the U.S. 
Department of the Navy, and with state agencies, such as the 
Nevada Department of Transportation and the Nevada Division of 
Environmental Protection, during preparation of the Supplemental 
Yucca Mountain EIS.
 
Public Scoping Meetings DOE will hold public scoping meetings on 
the Supplemental Yucca Mountain EIS. The meetings will be held at 
the following locations and times: Washington, District of 
Columbia, L'Enfant Plaza Hotel, 480 L'Enfant Plaza, SW., October 
30 from 4-7 p.m. Amargosa Valley, Nevada. Longstreet Hotel 
Casino, Nevada State Highway 373, November 1 from 4-7 p.m.\8\ 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
---------- \8\ DOE will hold a joint public scoping meeting on 
the Supplemental Yucca Mountain Rail Corridor and Rail Alignment 
EIS (DOE/EIS-0250F-S2 and DOE/EIS-0369) and on the Supplemental 
Yucca Mountain EIS (DOE/EIS-0250F-S1) in Amargosa Valley, 
Longstreet Hotel Casino, Nevada State Highway 373, November 1 
from 4-7 pm.
 
Additional public scoping meetings on the Supplemental Yucca 
Mountain Rail Corridor and Rail Alignment EIS will be held in 
Caliente, Caliente Youth Center, U.S. 93 North, November 8 from 
6-8 pm; Goldfield, Goldfield School Gymnasium, Hall and Euclid, 
November 13 from 4-7 pm; Hawthorne, Hawthorne Convention Center, 
932 E. Street, November 14 from 4-7 pm; and Fallon, Fallon 
Convention Center, 100 Campus Way, November 15, from 4-7 pm.
 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
---------- Las Vegas, Nevada. Cashman Center, 850 North Las Vegas 
Blvd., November 2 from 4-7 p.m. The public scoping meetings will 
be an open meeting format without a formal presentation by DOE. 
Members of the public are invited to attend the meetings at their 
convenience any time during meeting hours and submit their 
comments in writing at the meeting, or in person to a court 
reporter who will be available throughout the meeting.
 
This open meeting format increases the opportunity for public 
comment and provides for one-on-one discussions with DOE 
representatives involved with
 
[[Page 60494]] the Supplemental Yucca Mountain EIS and the 
repository program.
 
The public scoping meetings will be held during the public 
scoping comment period. The comment period begins with 
publication of this Notice of Intent in the Federal Register and 
closes November 27, 2006. Comments received after this date will 
be considered to the extent practicable. Written comments may be 
provided in writing, by facsimile, or via the Internet to Dr. 
Jane Summerson, EIS Document Manager (see ADDRESSES above).
 
Public Reading Rooms Documents referenced in this Notice of 
Intent and related information are available at the following 
locations: Beatty Yucca Mountain Information Center, 100 North E. 
Avenue, Beatty, NV 89003, (775) 553-2130; Esmeralda County Yucca 
Mountain Oversight Office, 274 E. Crook Avenue, Goldfield, NV 
89013, (775) 485-3419; Las Vegas Yucca Mountain Information 
Center, 4101-B Meadows Lane, Las Vegas, NV 89107, (702) 295-1312; 
Lincoln County Nuclear Waste Project Office, 100 Depot Avenue, 
Caliente, NV 89008, (775) 726-3511; Nye County Department of 
Natural Resources and Federal Facilities, 1210 E. Basin Road, 
Suite 6, Pahrump, NV 89060 (775) 727-7727; Pahrump Yucca Mountain 
Information Center, 2341 Postal Drive, Pahrump, NV 89048, (775) 
571- 5817; University of Nevada, Reno, The University of Nevada 
Libraries, Business and Government Information Center, M/S 322, 
1664 N.
 
Virginia Street, Reno, NV 89557, (775) 784-6500, Ext. 309; and 
the U.S. Department of Energy Headquarters Office Public Reading 
Room, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW., Room 1E-190 (ME-74) FORS, 
Washington, DC, 20585, 202-586-3142.
 
Issued in Washington, DC, October 10, 2006.
 
David R. Hill, General Counsel.
 
[FR Doc. 06-8676 Filed 10-10-06; 4:15 pm] BILLING CODE 6450-01-P

 
*****************************************************************
 59 EnergyBiz Magazine: Where to Store Spent Nuclear Fuel

October 13, 2006

Ken Silverstein, EnergyBiz Insider Editor-in-Chief                                                                 
 								
Just when it seemed that a permanent nuclear waste storage site 
might be derailed, the possibility has come roaring back. A bill 
to speed up time frames and remove some procedural obstacles to 
implementation of such a repository is now before Congress. 

While Senate Energy Committee Chairman Pete Domenici's 
legislation wants the federal government to take control over 
nuclear waste, his bill's future is far from certain. The measure 
wants to open up Yucca Mountain, about 90 miles away from Las 
Vegas, by 2011 to defense-related nuclear waste and by 2017 to 
commercially-related spent fuel from utilities. All of it would 
eventually be stored underground there. 

Under the bill, defense waste can be shipped to Yucca after the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission approves an above-ground storage 
facility. That is estimated to occur by 2010, making it possible 
that the spent fuel could be stored within concrete walls about a 
year later. At the same time, the U.S. Secretary of Energy could 
decide what waste would qualify to be re-processed, or recycled 
-- all as a way to lessen the level of waste sent to the 
repository. The fuel that cannot be recycled would be stored at 
Yucca. 

"This bill will remove legal barriers that will allow the 
(Department of Energy) to meet its obligation to accept and store 
spent nuclear fuel as soon as possible," says Domenici, in a 
floor speech. The measure gives the Energy Department the 
authority to create 147,000 acres of land as a buffer zone around 
Yucca. It would also fund a rail system to transport waste from 
131 sites around the country. 

Current law enacted in 1982 permits 70,000 tons of spent fuel to 
be housed at Yucca. But, Domenici says that the threshold is too 
little and the limit would be quickly reached -- if the site 
becomes a permanent storage facility. For example, about 54,000 
tons of both commercial and defense-related waste now awaits 
permanent storage But, the Energy Department says those entities 
could generate 119,000 tons of spent fuel by 2035. 

The pending measure deviates from the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 
1982, allowing the Energy Department to circumvent the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission that must approve the Yucca Mountain 
application. If the bill would pass, the Energy Department could 
move the spent fuel to the site before the nuclear agency gives 
its permission -- something that has been repeatedly pushed back 
and is not expected now until 2008. 

Until Yucca Mountain would become workable, the bill would allow 
for the creation of interim storage facilities in several states 
-- something opposed by 10 state attorney generals. "The proposal 
does not contain even basic measures to address the major 
transportation-safety issues entailed in moving nuclear waste, 
such as emergency-response preparation, accident prevention, 
security and public education," says the coalition of attorneys 
general, in a letter to Chairman Domenici. 

On-Site Storage 

Critics of Domenici's latest efforts say that it is an attempt by 
federal officials to bypass the current set of requirements. If 
the measure were to become law, they have vowed to challenge it 
in the courts. Opponents have always maintained that Yucca poses 
serious environmental and safety concerns and argue that the best 
solution to storing nuclear waste is to keep it on site and in 
underground storage near the reactors that generate it. 

Public Citizen, the Union for Concerned Scientists and many 
others told a House subcommittee that highly reinforced dry casks 
is the appropriate place to put spent nuclear fuel. Moreover, 
Yucca Mountain is a poor solution and would not obviate the need 
for on site storage, they say. Some members of Congress want the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission to issue rules requiring permanent 
on-site, underground storage at each of the nation's 103 nuclear 
power plants. 

Yucca Mountain "is not a site that can be licensed given 
reasonable standards for health and public safety," said Michele 
Boyd, legislative counsel with Public Citizen. She says that the 
ongoing effort to create a permanent nuclear waste site there has 
cost $10 billion over the last 20 years. 

The issue of storing spent nuclear fuel is probably the most 
pressing one facing the nuclear power industry. While proponents 
have done a reasonably good job of letting the public know that 
nuclear energy is environmentally friendly, they have yet to 
persuade all parties that the generation and storage processes 
are totally safe. And, if federal incentives are successful and 
more nuclear power generation is built, then the federal 
government would likely need to create more permanent storage 
facilities beyond what Yucca Mountain has to offer. 

An MIT study says that existing nuclear storage sites should be 
expanded to enable the storage of spent fuel decades into the 
future. At some point, the technology to allow that fuel to be 
recycled will have advanced. Instead of burying it all, some of 
the spent fuel could then be used to power other nuclear 
generators. 

Other countries, meantime, are grappling with similar issues. 
France, for example, now reprocesses its waste and uses it in 
other reactors. The country also buries it underground in storage 
at two sites there and in ventilated wells to control the 
temperature. An underground research laboratory in eastern France 
is now researching more effective ways to bury such waste. 

In the United States, leading lawmakers are insistent that Yucca 
Mountain is the best long-term solution when it comes to storing 
spent fuel. They are working to remove the legal barriers to 
allow for such a permanent repository. Opponents are determined 
to prevent it. As such, the more immediate question may be 
whether underground, on-site storage is the most optimal answer 
to the problem. 

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reserved. 
2821 S. Parker Rd. Ste 1105 Aurora, CO 80014 Contact: Phone - 
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*****************************************************************
 60 Tonawanda News: Town cleanup site a joke
 
October 12, 2006 09:45 pm  

Reportedly on his way to the Ashland dedication cleanup ceremony 
on Sept. 15, Assemblyman Robin Schimminger saw several deer 
frolicking nearby Ashland Oils radioactive dump site repository.

Tonawandas lurid past history involving the atom bomb, or
Manhattan Project, is according to many expert epidemiologists
more than likely responsible for creating the cancer cluster
dilemma that has now become a stark reality for area residents.

The deer seemed perfectly healthy. They werent glowing, they
were very happy, said Schimminger to former Tonawanda News
reporter Jessica Gasper.

It should be painfully obvious to the residents of the
Tonawandas that Assemblyman Schimminger would rather talk to the
deer than face up to the fact that many families have legitimate
questions and fears. These families are the recipients of early
on cancer clusters and other more than proven environmental
medical maladies as evidenced by Albanys New York State Health
Department report of 2002.

Schimminger has for years steadfastly turned his back on facts
that would have enhanced the likelihood of an Albany sponsored
or federal sponsored human bio-monitoring program, utilizing
blood and urine analysis. His apparent corporate crony
favoritism stance over suffering residents is surely a slap in
the face to our community.

In all fairness to Schimminger, he is not alone. Most of our
bi-partisan Tonawanda officials, with a few exceptions, have
rallied to the side of economic development growth without
considering the implications and tragedy of human health
consequences due to corporate and governmental environmental
irresponsibility.

I would like to ask Tonawanda officials a few questions. Why
have you refused to acknowledge and make public the Department
of Defense and Corps of Engineers ongoing need to air monitor
and test for nuclear gamma radiation shown to be harmful to area
residents? Evidence shows that in 2002 there were 24 active
gamma dosimeters including three off site, which is on Town of
Tonawanda and public property.

It is my understanding that we are still presently being air
monitored for gamma radiation. Why?

Why in years past were the dangers of large amounts of Americium
241 (a man made isotope of Plutonium) dumped into Tonawandas
sewer system, partially incinerated and not fully made known to
the general public?

Where and to what degree do quantities of Radium 226, Thorium
230, Uranium 238 and Americium 241 still exist in our local
environment?

What is the present status of thyroid cancer for women, as
reported by the New York State Health Department in 2002, to be
81 percent above New York state average and 22 percent above
average for generalized cancers?

Are you aware that a final result accomplished in percentage of
cleanup value has many long term health implications considering
that Uranium 238 has a half-life of 4.5 billion years, Thorium
230 has a half-life of 32,500 years, Radium 226 has a half-life
of 1,600 years and Americium 241 has a half-life of 432 years?

I think it only fair and morally imperative that our local
leaders on a bi-partisan level should self-educate themselves
and become able to answer these questions to their constituency.

To date our newly elected democratic Town of Tonawanda Town
Board members have been surprisingly, with disappointment added,
unresponsive to the many environmental and health problems still
existing in our community. A major priority for board members to
address is the need for a human bio-monitoring program as first
endorsed by the Center for Disease Control and New York State
Department of Health in 2002.

This program should mirror the City of Buffalos school children
chelation lead testing program, adding heavy radionuclide
isotopes as additional known carcinogens.

Jessica Gaspars Ashland radioactive site article shows a
pristine garden utopia that somehow we all want to believe and
embrace.

The reality is that we will never realize peace of heart for our
families and children until government and corporate hidden
secret agendas become public domain, only accomplished by
bringing truth to the light of day.

Philip F. Sweet is a resident of Town of Tonawanda. 											

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 61 PE.com: Senators prod EPA over new findings

Inland Southern California
   
10:00 PM PDT on Thursday, October 12, 2006 

By DAVID DANELSKI The Press-Enterprise 

California's U.S. senators and an Inland environmental group are
calling for action to protect public health in the wake of a
federal study linking a common water contaminant with impaired
thyroid function in women. 

In addition, the California agency responsible for assessing
health risks from pollution will analyze the study and could
reconsider how much of the chemical, the rocket fuel
perchlorate, is safe to consume in drinking water. Perchlorate,
used in munitions, fireworks and flares as well as rockets, has
tainted numerous Inland water supplies as a result of industrial
spills and leaks. It also has been found in milk, lettuce and
other foods nationwide. 

Sens. Barbara Boxer and Dianne Feinstein, both California
Democrats, are demanding that the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency issue a health advisory to warn people about perchlorate.
The senators were not specific about how the public should be
warned about the contamination. 

"The EPA should also establish a drinking-water standard that
protects vulnerable pregnant women and children," the senators
said in a letter to EPA Administrator Stephen Johnson. 

Members of the Glen Avon-based Center for Community Action and
Environmental Justice gathered Thursday outside Rialto City Hall
to push for faster cleanup of perchlorate contamination that has
forced the city to shut down drinking-water wells. 

CDC Findings 

More than 2,000 people took part in the health study, published
last week by scientists at the U.S. Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention in Atlanta. It found that women with low iodide
levels had reduced thyroid function when exposed to perchlorate
at levels the EPA has deemed safe. 

Potentially, one-third of U.S. women have low iodide levels and
could be affected by the chemical, CDC researchers found.
Thyroid health is important because the gland makes hormones
that control metabolism and guide neurological development in
fetuses and infants. 

Speaking at a water conference Thursday in Ontario, Benjamin
Blount, lead author of the CDC study, cautioned that the
research does not necessarily prove that low amounts of
perchlorate are making people sick. However, it did show the
chemical having effect on more vulnerable women. 

The scientists found a correlation between perchlorate, in
concentrations as low as 2.9 parts per billion in urine, and
reduced output of thyroid hormones. Blount said ingested
perchlorate winds up in urine. 

He has also found that perchlorate in urine is more concentrated
than drinking-water levels because the chemical is widespread in
foods. 

The EPA, in developing guidelines for what's safe in drinking
water, relied heavily on a study of 37 people exposed to
perchlorate for two weeks. The agency decided that as much as
24.5 parts per billion is safe in drinking water. The authors of
that study, published in 2002, concluded that perchlorate had no
effect on the thyroid at 245 parts per billion. 

California's Department of Health Services has proposed limiting
perchlorate to 6 parts per billion in drinking water. A public
hearing on the proposal is set for Oct. 30 in Sacramento. 

'A Very Significant Study' 

State officials will take a close look at the CDC study and
independently analyze the data, said Allan Hirsh, a spokesman
for the California Environmental Protection Agency's Office of
Environmental Health Hazard Assessment. 

The agency sets health goals that are used by the Department of
Health Services to limit contaminants in drinking water. Health
goals aren't enforceable limits, but water agencies use them as
guidelines to determine what is safe for all consumers. 

"This is a very significant study," Hirsh said by telephone. "A
re-evaluation of the health goal is a potential outcome." 

Natalie Ravitz, a spokeswoman for Boxer, said the senator wants
to hold hearings on perchlorate. 

She said Boxer, the ranking Democrat on the Senate Environment
Committee, could have the power to call for hearings if
Democrats win control of the Senate in next month's election. 

EPA officials were unavailable Wednesday or Thursday to discuss
the CDC study or the senators' demands. The agency's media
office, however, issued a statement saying that the EPA will
respond "in detail" to Boxer and Feinstein. 

"EPA is interested in the CDC's findings, although the CDC
scientists recommend their study be confirmed with additional
research," the statement said. "EPA will review and analyze
these news studies in conjunction with the body of available
research that contributes to our understanding of perchlorate
toxicity and exposure." 

Perchlorate contamination is often found at military and
defense-contractor facilities. 

Shannon Cunniff, the Defense Department's special assistant for
emerging environmental contaminants, said the department will
not change its perchlorate cleanup policy without direction from
the EPA. 

The CDC study is just one of many studies, Cunniff said during a
brief interview at Thursday's water conference. 

Rialto Plume 

A few miles from the Ontario conference, community activists in
Rialto cited the study in pressing for faster action to rid the
city's water of perchlorate. For several years, the Santa Ana
Regional Water Quality Control Board has investigated a 160-acre
site in northern Rialto contaminated by perchlorate. The water
board has named several manufacturers it says is responsible for
the plume. 

Residents and representatives of the Center for Community Action
and Environmental Justice said they are concerned that state
water-quality officials may appoint an independent hearing
officer to oversee a cleanup on a 160-acre site in northern
Rialto, which they fear could slow the work. 

About a dozen group members stood in a loose semicircle on the
lawn. Some held signs saying, "Clean Water Now." They were
flanked by posters of contaminated areas in Rialto and Colton,
drawings of the thyroid gland and pictures of Rialto children. 

Marene Deischer, a Rialto resident since 1977, said two of her
children suffer from problems that she believes could be linked
to perchlorate. 

She said one of her sons has speech and hearing problems and
attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder, among other problems. 

"Now we're trying to link it and see if it is the cause," she
said. 

The CDC study shows "what we've feared for a long time now,"
said Jan Misquez, a member of the group. "There should be no
rocket fuel in our drinking water." 

Staff writer Adam Hartmann contributed to this report. More
headlines... 

Press-Enterprise
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 62 AP Wire: EPA to clean radioactive soil in Ottawa

10/13/2006 | 

 Associated Press 

OTTAWA, Ill. - Crews from the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency will return to Ottawa next month to continue cleaning
radioactive contamination. 

The EPA cleared away contaminated soil from 1994 to 1997 in 14
of 20 sites in this city located about 70 miles west of Chicago. 

The contamination was caused by the buried remains of
glow-in-the-dark watch parts made from 1918 to 1978. The watches
were made with paint containing radium. 

Most of the radiation sites are located on vacant land and
buried in the ground, so the EPA has not considered them an
urgent health risk. 

The EPA Superfund tried to work on the sites in 2002, but a lack
of funds stalled the cleanup, according to EPA Project Manager
Denise Boone. 

In the fall, the project received $2 million in federal money. 

The funds will be used to clean up four of six remaining sites,
including one near Marquette High School football field, an
Illinois Power building, and near residences. 

Weston Solutions, a Chicago-based environment and redevelopment
firm, will haul the contaminated soil to a radioactive waste
facility, Boone said. 

Once the sites have been cleaned, workers will backfill the
areas with fresh soil and seed them. 

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 63 DenverPost.com: Judicial legacy includes Rocky Flats, Neil Bush
 
By Claire Martin 

Denver Post Staff Writer

Article Last Updated:10/12/2006 11:06:02 PM MDT

Retired federal District Judge Sherman Finesilver, who died 
Thursday at age 79, remained circumspect in a career 
characterized by highly public cases where defendants ranged from 
a former president's son to characters bickering over the world's 
largest pearl. 

"Do not confuse notoriety and fame with greatness," he once told 
a friend. 

Born and schooled in Colorado, Finesilver began his judicial 
career as a Denver municipal judge in 1955. President Nixon 
nominated him to the federal bench in 1971. Finesilver became 
chief judge in 1982. 

In perhaps his most celebrated - and certainly most widely
documented - case, he presided over the special grand jury
investigating environmental violations at the Rocky Flats
nuclear weapons plant near Boulder. 

The grand jury wanted to indict U.S. Department of Energy and
Rockwell International Corp. officials, but prosecutors
declined. When the case was settled with a plea bargain and an
$85 million fine against Rockwell, some of the jurors united as
a runaway jury. 

They immediately wrote a report describing the defendants'
"ongoing criminal enterprise." Finesilver put the jurors under a
gag order and sealed the report, eventually releasing what he
termed a "heavily edited" version, further fueling a litigious
fire that still burns. 

That case dominated a 39-year judicial career full of
high-profile cases. Finesilver handled the dispute that resulted
in a $49.5 million settlement in the government's case against
Neil Bush and other directors of the failed Silverado Banking,
Savings &Loan. 

"He was known far and wide for his ability to achieve
settlements in the most contentious of cases," said federal
District Judge Rich ard P. Matsch. 

"I don't know how he did it, but he had an unusual ability to
get people to see common ground." 

In another case, Finesilver ordered psychiatric treatment along
with a prison sentence and fine for an Arvada legal secretary
caught carrying a loaded pistol as she stalked former President
Bush. 

He also resolved a lengthy federal court battle over the
ownership of the 14-pound "Pearl of Allah," a gem reputedly
grown under order from philosopher Lao-Tzu and connected to a
record-setting penalty in a wrongful-death lawsuit. 

"It was like 'Guys and Dolls' in his courtroom, with a lot of
people dressed like hoodlums," said his wife, Annette
Finesilver. 

Finesilver retired from the bench in 1994, saying he wanted to
spend more time with his family and refine his fly-fishing
technique. He particularly enjoyed the Blue River area, where a
property-owning friend named a pond "Lake Sherman" in his honor. 

Though his health faltered in later years, Finesilver enjoyed
accompanying son Steven Finesilver, who coaches George
Washington High School's football team. The players
affectionately nicknamed the judge "Big Coach." 

Services will be at 1:30 p.m. Sunday at Congregation Emanuel, 51
Grape St. 

Besides his wife and son Steven, survivors include daughter
Susan Finesilver of Boulder; son Jay Finesilver of Denver; and
11 grandchildren. 

Staff writer Claire Martin can be reached at 303-954-1477 or
cmartin@denverpost.comReturn to Top  	 	  

 All contents Copyright 2006 The Denver Post or other copyright
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 64 IHT: Report: Guns can't fit through nuclear weapons plant barriers -
   
International Herald Tribune
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Associated Press
 						
: October 13, 2006                                                                                                                                                                                                                
                  
KNOXVILLE, Tennessee The government discovered after completing 
90 concrete barriers around the high-security Y-12 nuclear 
weapons plant in Oak Ridge that special holes in the walls for 
guards to shoot through were too small for their guns.  The 
weapons ports were found to be about 2 inches (5 centimeters) too 
small and unable to "adequately accommodate the sight system on 
the protective force weapons," the Energy Department's inspector 
general said in a report Friday.  As a result, "the ability of 
security police officers to maneuver their weapons when firing" 
was severely limited, Inspector General Gregory Friedman wrote. 

Y-12, located about 20 miles (32 kilometers) west of Knoxville, 
makes parts for every nuclear warhead in the U.S. arsenal and is 
the nation's primary storehouse for weapons-grade uranium.  The 
problem was later corrected â€” at a cost of $300 (¬239) per 
hole, or about $27,000 (¬21,514).  But the National Nuclear 
Security Administration refused to bill the guard contractor, 
Wackenhut Services Inc., that provided the incorrect port 
dimensions. Instead, NNSA charged it to "contingency funds," NNSA 
Associate Administrator Michael Kane wrote.  NNSA, which oversees 
nuclear weapons programs for DOE, also refused to take back a 
$525,000 (¬418,326 performance bonus to Y-12's managing 
contractor, BWX Technologies, which completed the project in 
December 2005, some seven months past deadline.  "In our view, 
management's disagreement with the recommendations to recoup 
moneys from the contractor ignores the factual record and places 
the burden on the taxpayers to pay for the contractors' failure 
to provide due diligence in the design of the barriers and the 
timely completion of the West Fort project," Friedman wrote. 

Friedman said the probe began after his office received "an 
allegation that weapon port openings in newly constructed 
security barriers at Y-12 were designed without space required to 
accommodate the sight system of protective force weapons." The 
problem was discovered when the barriers were put to the test 
during a "protective force exercise" or mock assault on the Y-12 
complex, the report said. 

Wackenhut has been cited for cheating on these exercises in the 
past for getting advance briefings on what would occur.  The 
barriers were installed to meet security requirements ordered in 
2003 under the DOE's "design basis threat" risk analysis for Y-12 
to withstand a terrorist assault.  Although Wackenhut provided 
incorrect dimensions for the weapons ports, NNSA's Kane said that 
"at the time of the original design, the size of the weapons 
ports was correct." A later upgrade in weapons led to the ports 
being too small, he said.  

However, the inspector general said it found that Wackenhut first 
ordered the upgraded weapon sights in December 2003, almost a 
year before Wackenhut provided the outdated specifications to 
BWXT.  "We concluded, based on the timing of the available 
information, that Wackenhut had the opportunity to provide the 
correct sizing specifications to BWXT prior to construction, but 
that it failed to do," Friedman wrote.  Still, NNSA's Kane said 
there was "no basis for the contractor to reimburse the 
government since the government benefited from the changes made" 
once the weapons ports were widened.  ___  Y-12 Plant: 
http://www.y12.doe.gov  DOE Inspector General: 
http://www.ig.energy.gov                                                                                                                                                                       
						 												 						 						 					   				 				
Herald Tribune All rights reserved   [IHT]    
    
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