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                         NUCLEAR POLICY
 
1 [progchat_action] Ahmadinejad: Production or use of nuclear weapons 
2 [NYTr] Second-Stage Planning for Iran Strike Underway?
3 AFP: Big power ministers to discuss Iran nuclear stalemate 
4 Guardian Unlimited: Iran Head Unwavering on Nuclear Position
5 IRIB PERSIAN NEWS: America worried about our progress 
6 IRIB PERSIAN NEWS: IRI worry of injustice in UN: FM 
7 Guardian Unlimited: Iran Farmers Fear Possible Sanctions
8 IRIB PERSIAN NEWS: German FM,Larijani talks constructive 
9 AFP: Bush willing to let the clock tick some more on Iran sanctions 
10 AFP: Iran rules out suspending nuclear activities 
11 AFP: Nuclear issue could stall Japan-Iran oil project 
12 AFP: No accord in Iran-EU nuclear talks; US warns of sanctions -
13 Asia Times Korea: Redesigning a historic alliance
14 Guardian Unlimited: China Back Plan for N. Korea Nuke Talks
15 AFP: Chinese, SKorean envoys meet in bid to restart NKorea nuclear t
16 INSIDE JoongAng Daily: Roh: North knew about ¡®approach' beforehand
17 US: Latest Keep Space for Peace Actions List
18 Reuters: U.S. Congress restricts Bush on Iraq spending              
19 AFP: Energy on agenda at Bush-Nazarbayev talks 
20 RIA Novosti: Missile defense: today and tomorrow
21 Comment is free: A movable nuclear feast
 
                         NUCLEAR REACTORS
 
22 US: [NukeNet] PG&E files appeal to 9th Circuit Court ruling
23 US: NRC: NRC Schedules Regulatory Conference to Discuss Harris Nucle
24 The Hindu: No secret agenda to cap India's strategic programme - Mul
25 The Hindu: "The goalposts haven't been shifted and they will not be 
26 Newslab.ru: Rosatom head: No worker will be left without a job after
27 Rueters: TEPCO to shut Fukushima nuclear unit for 1 month
28 US: newsobserver.com: Council worried by Harris plant
29 RIA Novosti: Kiriyenko to discuss nuclear power unit construction in
30 RIA Novosti: Russian specialists to bring Chinese reactor up to 75% 
31 reviewjournal.com: U.S.-India nuke treaty hits snags
32 US: NRC: Draft Report for Comment: Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulat
33 US: NRC: Notice of Determination That No Further Action Is Required 
34 US: NRC: Exelon Generation Company, LLC, Byron Station, Unit Nos. 1 
35 US: NRC: STP Nuclear Operating Company; Notice of Withdrawal of 
36 US: NRC: Review Methodology for Seismically Initiated Event Sequence
37 US: NRC: Notice of Availability of Draft Interim Staff Guidance Docu
38 Bellona: Rosatom to â€œdefinitelyâ€ build the Kursk NPP-2 
39 US: Los Angeles Times: Nuclear Energy: Still a Bad Idea - 
40 US: EasyBourse actualit: Exelon May Build New Nuclear Plant In Texas
41 UPI: Kazaks agree to downgrade uranium, reactor
 
                          NUCLEAR SECURITY
 
42 RIA Novosti: CIS holds joint anti-nuclear terrorism exercise
 
                          NUCLEAR SAFETY
 
43 US: NRC: Notice of License Amendment Request of BWX Technologies, In
44 US: NRC: In the Matter of Mr. Gary Abel; Confirmatory Order (Effecti
 
                         NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE
 
45 Daily Yomiuri: Intl community must agree on N-fuel plan
46 US: The Australian: Rann approves Honeymoon uranium mine 
47 RIA Novosti: Russia launches UK-funded nuclear fuel storage facility
48 US: CourierPostOnline: Plan to seal slag pile meets opposition 
49 US: EPA: EPA settles with United Nuclear to investigate contaminatio
50 US: Waste News: United Nuclear Corp agrees. to probe contaminated so
51 US: MPR: Minnesota regulators approve additional storage for nuclear
52 US: Morris Daily Herald: NRC: No fines expected over tritium release
53 US: Hawaii Reporter: Navy's Narrowly Focused Scoping Meetings Ignore
54 News & Star: MP slams nuclear group sale
55 US: St. Paul Pioneer Press: Quiet hearing OKs nuke storage
56 US: Bradenton Herald: Tallevast leaders call community-wide meeting 
57 US: AU ABC: Honeymoon uranium mine gets EPA approval
 
                           PEACE
 
58 [NYTr] New Japan PM Pledges to Ditch Pacifist Constitution
 
                        US DEPT. OF ENERGY
 
59 DOE: U.S. Department of Energy and NTI Announce Key Nonproliferation
60 Las Vegas SUN: Editorial: Domenici as Jekyll & Hyde 
61 DOE: Environmental Management Site-Specific Advisory Board, Hanford
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                         FULL NEWS STORIES
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 1 [progchat_action] Ahmadinejad: Production or use of nuclear weapons is immoral
 
Date: Fri, 29 Sep 2006 01:58:26 -0500 (CDT)

X-Sender-Host-Name: chumbly.math.missouri.edu
X-Spam-Class: HAM-VERY

Iran: Calls for Dialogue with the United States

by David Culp

"We believe the production or use of nuclear weapons is immoral." -- Iranian
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad

Hours after he spoke to the United Nations, the Iranian president made this
clear, unequivocal statement to a group of us during a private meeting in
New York.  The Mennonite Central Committee organized an extraordinary,
private session for about 50 people to dialogue with President Ahmadinejad
about the escalating crisis between the U.S. and Iran.

I left the hour-long meeting convinced, as did many, if not all, of my
colleagues, that the Iranian leader is a deeply religious person who
approaches the issue of nuclear weapons from a moral perspective.  The
Iranian leader expressed great interest in establishing a dialogue with the
religious community in the United States, and he explained that he views
Judaism, Christianity, and Islam as three co-equal religions.

Of course, I suspect that all of the people in this meeting had many areas
where we probably disagree with the policies of the Iranian government.  For
instance, FCNL is concerned about political prisoners in Iran, religious
tolerance, and Iran's position on Israel.  We also were aware that the
Iranian president met with us as part of his effort to defuse the looming
crisis between the Iranian government and the international community over
Iran's nuclear energy program.

But I've been a lobbyist working for the abolition of nuclear weapons for
more than a decade, and I've talked about these issues with a lot of people.
Ahmadinejad impressed me as someone who had thought about these issues a
lot.  He's a former engineer, who is thinking through the arguments from a
number of different perspectives.

AHMADINEJAD ON THE NUCLEAR BOMB "The bottom line is, we do not need a bomb,
unlike what others think.

Regretfully, some believe that the nuclear bomb can be effective in
international relations. They're wrong, because the time for nuclear bombs
has ended. We know that. These nuclear arsenals will not benefit anyone.

They have to spend so much money destroying them. If the nuclear bomb could
have saved anyone, it would have prevented the collapse of the Soviet Union.
If the nuclear bomb could have created security, it would have prevented,
perhaps, September 11th. If the nuclear bomb could have done anything, it
could have, perhaps, stopped the Palestinian intifada" ("President
Ahmadinejad's News Conference," CQ Transcripts Wire, Washington Post, 21
September 2006).

For instance, although he starts any discussion by saying that nuclear
weapons are immoral, Ahmadinejad also reminded us that the Soviet Union had
thousands of nuclear weapons, which didn't prevent their government from
collapsing.  He added that, during Iran's war with Iraq in the 1980s, Iraq's
alliance with a country with nuclear weapons (presumably he was referring to
the United States) didn't have any impact on the war.  He convinced me that
Iran is not interested in developing nuclear weapons.

Iran is interested in developing nuclear energy.  As a former engineer, he
believes that nuclear fuel is the cleanest fuel there is and he explained
that this energy source is critical for the future development of his
country.  And Ahmadinejad bristles at suggestions that the United States or
anyone else would try to dictate how his country pursued its energy needs.

But how do we get beyond the current impasse, we asked him?  Ahmadinejad
suggested that the UN's Committee on Disarmament, based in Geneva, might be
one forum where these discussions should take place.  He then offered a
proposal: Iran will open all of its nuclear facilities to inspections, if
the United States will also open its facilities to inspections.  Neither
Iran nor the U.S. have implemented the Additional Protocol to the nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty that includes additional inspections, although we
at FCNL believe both countries should do so.  He added that the United
States should refrain from building so-called second or third generation
nuclear weapons.

Now, I'm not endorsing Iran's proposals or even arguing this is the only
path to peace.  And, in our meeting in New York on Wednesday, the Iranian
president made other comments that I found deeply troubling.  In particular,
I was struck by his comments about the Holocaust.  He did not deny the
Holocaust, but he still conveyed a view that the matter is debatable.  In
these comments he sounded a lot like politicians in the U.S. Congress who
deny that global warming is a fact, even though there is a significant body
of evidence that cannot be denied.

But when he spoke about issues that I cover, the nuclear weapons issues,
what struck me is that the Iranian president was offering a reasonable basis
for real negotiations.  Since Ahmadinejad took office, Iran has been backing
away from permitting full inspections of its nuclear program.  But I think
this is a bargaining stance to start negotiations.  Iran wants to have full
rights for civilian nuclear energy, including nuclear enrichment.  Iranian
leaders also want some kind of assurance that the United States will not
bomb their country.

The day I left Washington to go to New York for this meeting, I attended a
hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.  The contrast was
striking.  Nicholas Burns, the number three official at the State
Department, spent most of that hearing lobbing what I can only describe as
rhetorical hand grenades at Iran.  In his first State of the Union address,
President Bush described Iran as part of the "axis of evil."  That's still
the approach of some in the U.S. government.

But what is even more striking is the pride U.S. officials take in insisting
they will not even talk to Iran.  Nicholas Burns, in his testimony this week
to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, made a point of saying he has
never met with an Iranian government official.  Now here is a man who has
been part of the U.S. foreign service for decades, and he made a point of
pride that he had never met with any Iranian official.  If the U.S.
continues to insist that no dialogue is possible with Iran, then war is the
likely alternative http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/culp230906.html

This email was cleaned by emailStripper, available for free from
http://www.papercut.biz/emailStripper.htm

 
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 2 [NYTr] Second-Stage Planning for Iran Strike Underway?
 
Date: Fri, 29 Sep 2006 14:54:12 -0400 (EDT)

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X-Spam-Class: HAM-VERY-WHITELIST

Via NY Transfer News Collective  *  All the News that Doesn't Fit
 
sent by smileycoyote @linuxmail.org (activ-l)

Raw Story via to-the-dome blog - Sep 21, 2006
http://to-the-dome.blogspot.com/2006/09/pentagon-moves-to-second-stage_28.html
Pentagon moves to second-stage planning for Iran strike option

by Larisa Alexandrovna

The Pentagon's top brass has moved into second-stage contingency planning
for a potential military strike on Iran, one senior intelligence official
familiar with the plans tells RAW STORY.

The official, who is close to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the highest ranking
officials of each branch of the US military, says the Chiefs have started
what is called "branches and sequels" contingency planning.

"The JCS has accepted the inevitable," the intelligence official said, "and
is engaged in serious contingency planning to deal with the worst case
scenarios that the intelligence community has been painting."

A second military official, although unfamiliar with these latest scenarios,
said there is a difference between contingency planning -- which he
described as "what if, then what" planning -- and "branches and sequels,"
which takes place after an initial plan has been decided upon.

Adding to the concern of both military and intelligence officials alike is
the nuclear option, the possibility of pre-emptive use of nuclear weapons
targeting alleged WMD facilities in Iran.

An April New Yorker report by Sy Hersh alleged that the nuclear option was
on the table, and that some officers of the Joint Chiefs had threatened
resignation.

"The attention given to the nuclear option has created serious misgivings
inside the offices of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he added, and some officers
have talked about resigning," Hersh wrote. "Late this winter, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff sought to remove the nuclear option from the evolving war
plans for Irano?=without success, the former intelligence official said."

The senior intelligence official who spoke to RAW STORY, along with several
military intelligence sources, confirmed that the nuclear option remains on
the table. In addition, the senior official added that the Joint Chiefs have
"come around on to the administration's thinking."

"The Joint Chiefs have no longer imposed roadblocks on a possible bombing
campaign against Iran's nuclear production facilities," the intelligence
official said. "In the past, only the Air Force had endorsed the
contingency, saying that it could carry out the mission of destroying, or at
least significantly delaying, Iran's ability to develop a nuclear weapon."

Preparation for such a strike would require contingency plans for securing
oil transport lines and dealing with possible riots, as well as assessment
of issues that arose during the Iran-Iraq war.

"Bahrain will be a battleground as it is majority Shi'a and has had Shi'a
riots stimulated by Iran in the past," the official said. "The US Fifth
Fleet is also based there. A system for [protection of] oil transport in the
Gulf will have to be devised by the US Navy to protect against attacks."

The Pentagon did not immediately respond to repeated emails requesting
comment.

Deployment orders

With allegations of a plan in place and contingency scenarios in play,
several military and intelligence experts see this as proof of a secret
White House order to proceed with military action.

Last week, a military intelligence official described to this reporter the
movement of Naval submarines and a deployment order sent out to Naval assets
of strategic import, such as minesweepers, that could indicate contingency
planning is already under way to secure oil transport routes and supplies.

On Sunday, Time Magazine confirmed much of what the military intelligence
source had described.

"The first message was routine enough: a 'Prepare to Deploy Order' sent
through Naval communications channels to a submarine, an Aegis-class
cruiser, two minesweepers and two mine hunters," Time's Michael Duffy wrote.
"The orders didn't actually command the ships out of port; they just said be
ready to move by October 1. A deployment of minesweepers to the east coast
of Iran would seem to suggest that a much discussed, but until now largely
theoretical, prospect has become real."

Retired Air Force Col. Sam Gardiner also expressed concern about the
deployment orders, but cautioned that these particular ships are slow-moving
and would take "a month or so" to arrive in position.

"Minecountermeasures, the four ships mentioned, are generally not
self-deploying," Gardiner said Wednesday. "When previously sent to the Gulf,
they were transported on the decks of heavy lift ships. The earliest they
would arrive would be around the first of November."

Although some claim the Defense Department has denied the deployment order,
no official denial has been made. The Pentagon does not comment on
operational plans, not even to issue a denial.

Lawmakers in the dark?

Attempts to contact members of the Senate Armed Services Committee provided
little help in confirming allegations of the deployment order made to this
reporter and Time. Senate offices that were available for comment would not
do so on the record.

>From all appearances, however, it would seem that at least some members of
>the Senate Armed Services Committee have not been briefed on deployment
>orders or on any strike plans, even contingency plans. The Senate
>Intelligence Committee is attempting to get a grasp on what is and has been
>going on.

A source close to the Committee, who asked to remain anonymous due to the
sensitivity of the information, explained that a series of briefings will be
going on this week and into next.

The Senate Intelligence Committee has "embarked on a much more aggressive
review of what the intelligence community knows and is doing regarding
Iran," the source said.

"In fact [the Committee has] a number of Iran related briefings this week
and next before the senators leave town," the source added. They "will cover
the full spectrum including various aspects of their nuclear program and all
U.S. collection efforts."

SOURCE: Raw Story

       
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 3 AFP: Big power ministers to discuss Iran nuclear stalemate 

  [Ali Larijani(R) is greeted by Javier Soriano]   

WASHINGTON (AFP) - Foreign ministers from the six powers trying
to negotiate a halt to Iran's nuclear program will confer over
the weekend about Iran's latest position in the standoff, State
Department spokesman Sean McCormack said.

With the threat of sanctions against Tehran hanging over the
process, EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana held a new round
of talks in Europe this week with Iran's chief nuclear
negotiator, Ali Larijani.

Solana, acting for the six powers, and Larijani both reported 
progress in the talks, but not a breakthrough concerning UN 
demands that Iran freeze its uranium enrichment program.

Washington and others say the enrichment is aimed at producing
nuclear weapons, while Iran insists it is only to make fuel for
nuclear power plants.

 McCormack said US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice would
have a conference call with Solana and her counterparts from
Britain, China, France, Germany and Russia over the weekend to
take stock of the state of negotiations.

"They'll talk about what it is that Mr Larijani said and what
the next steps would be," McCormack said of the conference call
involving the five permanent UN Security Council members and
Germany -- the so-called P5-plus-1 group.

The United States has been pressing for sanctions against Iran
since it ignored an August 31 UN Security Council deadline for
halting uranium enrichment.

But in the face of strong opposition from Russia and China and a
growing reluctance from France to take punitive steps against
Iran, Rice agreed last week to let the Solana-Larijani talks
proceed prior to imposing sanctions.

She did however get her five counterparts to agree on a new
deadline of early October for Iranian compliance, according to
diplomats at the meeting.

McCormack reiterated Friday that in the absence of a "positive,
clear, authoritative answer" from the Iranians to suspend
enrichment, "then we would expect the P5-plus-1 and the Security
Council would follow through and go down the pathway of
sanctions."

"I'm not going to specify the exact date, but time is running
quite short in that regard," he said.

Solana and Larijani are due to have more contacts next week,
although Iranian officials continue to send negative signals,
with Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki affirming Friday that
Tehran "does not see any reason to suspend nuclear activities."

Rice is due to discuss the Iranian nuclear issue and Iran's
support for radical Islamic militants in the region during a
tour of the Middle East next week, officials said.

She is scheduled to visit Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Israel and the
Palestinian territories.

In Cairo, she will also attend a meeting with the foreign
ministers of the six-nation Gulf Cooperation Council, Egypt and
Jordan, according to a diplomatic source in the Egyptian
capital. 

AFP
*****************************************************************
 4 Guardian Unlimited: Iran Head Unwavering on Nuclear Position
 
From the Associated Press        

[UP] 

Friday September 29, 2006 1:01 AM

AP Photo VAH112 

By ALI AKBAR DAREINI 

Associated Press Writer 

TEHRAN, Iran (AP) - Iran's hard-line president on Thursday again
rejected demands that Tehran suspend uranium enrichment, even as
top Iranian and European diplomats sounded somewhat optimistic
about making progress toward starting negotiations. 

Iranian and European envoys ended two days of talks in Berlin
with no agreement on the enrichment issue but insisted they had
``come to some positive conclusions'' on ways to open broader
talks on Iran's nuclear program. 

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad stood firm on his
insistence that Iran has a right to pursue its atomic program
and showed no sign of compromise over the U.N. Security
Council's demand that his government suspend enrichment. 

The statements from the negotiators and the Iranian president
continue a pattern of past months, in which Ahmadinejad publicly
states a hard-line position of no compromise, often in front of
large crowds, even as Iran's negotiators try to reach deals
behind the scenes. 

The Iranians appear to be gambling that even the hint of
progress will blunt any push for U.N. sanctions. 

Ahmadinejad said the United States and its European allies want
Iran to suspend enrichment as a first step toward forcing a
permanent halt in the nuclear program, because they are opposed
to Tehran's progress. 

The U.S. and others fear Iran's goal for developing enrichment
technology is to produce material for atomic bombs, while
oil-rich Iran says it needs enrichment to provide fuel for
nuclear reactors that will generate electricity for this
developing nation. 

Ahmadinejad said Iran would not give in. 

``They asked for a one-day halt. We said we won't do it,'' he
told thousands gathered in Karaj, west of Tehran. 

Iranian state TV quoted Ahmadinejad on Wednesday as saying
Western negotiators were trying to persuade Iran to halt
enrichment for just a day, to create a face-saving way for
opening negotiations. President Bush has refused to enter into
talks until Tehran halts enrichment. 

``Those who have filled their arsenal with nuclear weapons and
conduct new tests every day want, on political pretexts, to deny
the Iranian nation its full definite right of using nuclear
energy for peaceful purposes,'' Ahmadinejad said. ``The Iranian
nation won't give into one iota of coercion.'' 

The U.S. House sought to step up pressure Thursday by adopting
legislation that would impose U.S. sanctions on any entity found
to help Iran develop atomic weapons. The bill has yet to go
before the Senate, and critics questioned the need for such
action when the U.S. is pushing for a multinational approach. 

Iran ignored a U.N. Security Council deadline of Aug. 31 to halt
enrichment or face the possibility of economic sanctions. 

Despite that threat, Russia and China oppose any immediate move
to impose punitive measures, and as permanent council members
can veto its actions. Both nations, which have trade ties with
Iran, argue that diplomacy hasn't been exhausted. 

Six countries - the United States, China, Russia, France,
Britain and Germany - have offered a package of incentives in
return for Iran suspending enrichment and returning to
full-scale negotiations aimed at putting curbs on the nuclear
program that would ease suspicions. 

Ahmadinejad said the Europeans asked for a three-month
suspension of enrichment, which he said would mean ``a huge
loss'' for the Iranian program. 

``Who will pay for the losses?'' he asked. ``Then they reached a
point that they asked for a one-day halt. We said we won't do
it.'' 

In Berlin, Javier Solana, the European Union foreign policy
chief, refused to give details of the third session of talks but
said he would confer by telephone with the Iranians next week.
``We want to maintain the level of contact that we have had,''
Solana said. 

Iran's chief nuclear negotiator, Ali Larijani, said the two
sides discussed ways that full-scale talks could proceed, adding
that Tehran hoped ``to embark on the main negotiations as soon
as possible.'' 
		 	 	   
Guardian Unlimited © Guardian Newspapers Limited 2006
*****************************************************************
 5 IRIB PERSIAN NEWS: America worried about our progress 

  2006/09/28   

President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad on Thursday said that bullying
powers' objection towards IRI's peaceful nuclear activities is
only a political pretext.
 
Addressing people of Karaj west of Tehran Province, the
President underlined that nuclear energy is inalianable right of
the Iranian nation.
 
Noting that America uses nuclear energy issue as a pretext to
achieve its illegal goals, the President asked "what was
America's pretext for plotting and imposing war against the IRI
nation during last 27 years?"
 
Pointing to America's bid in equipping theZionist regime with
biggest nuke weapons arsons, President Ahmadinejad said that
America's concern is not IRI'S nuclear activities bus it is
worried about the Iranian nation's progress.
 
"Bullying powers planned to prevent Iranian nation from
scientific progress through vast propaganda," Ahmadinejad added.
  
  Copyright 2004, All Rights Reserved By Islamic Republic of Iran 
Broadcasting News Network Sponsored By IRIB News Computer Center. 
E-Mail: Info@IRIBNEWS.ir     
*****************************************************************
 6 IRIB PERSIAN NEWS: IRI worry of injustice in UN: FM 

  2006/09/29   
  
IRI is concerned with the lack of justice and spirituality in
the current international system, Foreign Minister Manouchehr
Mottaki said.
 
"Sixty years after the establishment of the United Nations, we
are still confronted with a great deal of injustice, with some
powers playing big brother," Mottaki said.
 
The reason is unilateralism, which is no longer acceptable by
most of the world community supporting multilateralism, he said
in an interview.
 
He said that the absence of spirituality has translated into
"power without responsibility, that is, every party trying to
acquire power without a sense of responsibility to the human
beings and members of the international community."
 
"This lack of justice and spiritual standards has translated
into various crises around the world," Foreign Minister said,
referring to the most recent example in Lebanon when some
countries supported the Zionist regime by preventing an
immediate ceasefire.
 
Mottaki said that IRI had recently offered to help with Iraq's
security problems.
 
"Iraq has two main problems. First, the lack of security and
terrorist activities; and second, the continuing presence of
foreign troops," Mottaki said.
 
He said the Iranian government believed the "best option is to
leave Iraq's security to Iraqi officials, and we favor a
timetable for the withdrawal of foreign forces."
 
M/D   

  Copyright 2004, All Rights Reserved By Islamic Republic of Iran 
Broadcasting News Network Sponsored By IRIB News Computer Center. 
E-Mail: Info@IRIBNEWS.ir     
*****************************************************************
 7 Guardian Unlimited: Iran Farmers Fear Possible Sanctions
 
From the Associated Press        

[UP] 

Friday September 29, 2006 11:16 AM

By ALI AKBAR DAREINI 

Associated Press Writer 

RAFSANJAN, Iran (AP) - As the annual pistachio harvest begins,
Ali Bajvand has more to worry about than backbreaking labor and
changes in crop prices. There is growing unease that possible
economic sanctions over the country's controversial nuclear
program could stifle the world's largest pistachio exporter. 

It was unclear what effect sanctions could have on the pistachio
business, but the prospect of losing lucrative markets in the
Middle East, Asia and Europe is unnerving for growers like
Bajvand. 

``I'm harvesting the fruit of my life. What you see here now is
the outcome of all the work and care that I've devoted to these
trees for the past couple of months,'' he said. ``But I'm told
our life will become hard if sanctions are imposed and
pistachios are not exported.'' 

There is similar nervousness and uncertainly among many
Iranians, who are unsure whether there will be sanctions, and
unclear on the possible effects, but worried about their
livelihoods nonetheless. 

The pistachio industry brings in an average of $500 million a
year and provides work for hundreds of thousands of people in a
nation where at least 11 percent of the population is
unemployed. 

Last year, Iran earned $824 million from a bumper pistachio crop
of 140,000 tons, mostly produced here in southeastern Iran. 

The United States is leading the charge for sanctions if Tehran
refuses to stop enriching uranium, a key step toward either
producing nuclear fuel or building nuclear weapons. 

The U.S. and others fear oil-rich Iran's goal in developing
enrichment technology is to produce material for atomic bomb.
Iran says it needs enrichment to provide fuel for nuclear
reactors that will generate electricity for the developing
nation. 

Iran ignored an Aug. 31 U.N. Security Council deadline to halt
enrichment or face the possibility of economic sanctions. 

Should sanctions be imposed, Iran's oil industry would most
likely suffer the most. Iran heavily relies on oil exports as a
major source of revenue and is the world's fourth-largest oil
producer. Other major exports include iron, steel, carpets and
saffron. 

Still, the U.S. faces an uphill battle in the U.N. Security
Council to persuade Russia, China and others to impose punitive
measures. And even if sanctions are imposed, they may not extend
to agricultural exports. 

``It's not clear if there will be any sanctions at all,'' said
Ali Asadi, manager of Aria Pistachio, a pistachio export
company. ``And even if the worst comes and sanctions are
imposed, it will initially be for the government-run factories,
oil et cetera, not pistachios exported by private firms.'' 

``However, it will be a very bad development if sanctions are
imposed because in the long-run it will harm our business,'' he
said. 
		 	 	   
Guardian Unlimited © Guardian Newspapers Limited 2006
*****************************************************************
 8 IRIB PERSIAN NEWS: German FM,Larijani talks constructive 

  2006/09/29   
  
German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier on Friday
described his talks with Iran's Chief nuclear negotiator Ali
Larijani as "constructive".
 
"My talks with Mr. Larijani were intense and constructive and I
hope we have made a step forward," Steinmeier said in an
interview with the Hamburg-based Die Welt newspaper.
 
Steinmeier held talks with Larijani in Berlin on Thursday
afternoon following a request by European Union Foreign Policy
Chief Javier Solana.
 
"I met late Wednesday night with Javier Solana after his first
round of talks (with Larijani). He asked me to have a bilateral
meeting with Mr. Larijani aimed at supporting his (Solana's)
efforts," the Minister added.
 
Steinmeier said Larijani and Solana are "likely to stay in
contact next week".
 
mk   

  Copyright 2004, All Rights Reserved By Islamic Republic of Iran 
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 9 AFP: Bush willing to let the clock tick some more on Iran sanctions -

 Fri Sep 29, 12:29 PM ET 		 	 

WASHINGTON (AFP) - President George W. Bush" /> President George 
W. Bush, in a published interview, said the Europeans should have 
time to see if they can convince Iran" /> Iran, "sooner rather 
than later", to suspend its uranium enrichment program. 

Asked by The Wall Street Journal how much time he wanted, Bush
said "sooner rather than later, to make sure that these
discussions are not (Iran's) attempt to stall their way into us
losing our interest in the subject." 

Pressed on whether a possible new deadline for Iranian
compliance might be set for the end of December, Bush said
Thursday: "I would certainly hope not." 

"I talked to the Secretary of State ( Condoleezza Rice" />
Condoleezza Rice) about this very subject this morning, who
agrees with me that we ought to give the Europeans time to see
whether or not the Iranians will make the proper choice about
verifiably suspending" their enrichment program, which
Washington suspects is being used to build nuclear weapons. 

"At the same time," he added, "she assures me that she's working
with them to make sure that this process cannot go on forever." 

Iran and the European Union" /> European Unionon Thursday failed
to reach agreement on Tehran's disputed nuclear programme, and
have programmed more discussions for next week. 

The negotiations were given a fresh chance after Washington,
under pressure from Europe and China, backed down on its demand
for immediate sanctions against Iran for failing to meet an
August 31 deadline imposed by the UN Security Council. 

A new deadline agreed last week among the permanent five UN
Security Council members -- Britain, China, France, Russia,
United States -- and Germany is apparently due to expire
sometime next week, according to European diplomats involved
with the talks. 

It was unclear whether Bush, in his interview with the
conservative Journal, was willing to give Iran and Europe more
negotiating time beyond next week's deadline, but US State
Department spokesman Sean McCormack on Thursday seemed
conclusive: 

"The timeline that was agreed in New York stays, and we are
getting short now in terms of that time," he said, referring to
the moment when the six nations would seek UN sanctions against
Tehran. 

McCormack insisted that negotiations involving the United States
could begin only after Iran freezes its enrichment program and
the suspension is verified by monitors from the UN nuclear
watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency" />
International Atomic Energy Agency. 

The EU-Iran talks were believed to be focussing on the
"sequencing" of a possible decision by Iran to temporarily
suspend enrichment and the subsequent start of full negotiations
on the incentives package. 

The talks focus on a list of economic and diplomatic incentives
put forward by the six powers in June as a reward if Iran
suspends its uranium enrichment. 

The incentives include support for an Iranian nuclear power
industry and the first direct contacts between the US and Iran
in nearly 30 years. 

Copyright © 2006 Agence France Presse. All rights reserved. The
*****************************************************************
 10 AFP: Iran rules out suspending nuclear activities 
 
 by Aresu Eqbali Fri Sep 29, 6:05 AM ET 		 	 

TEHRAN (AFP) - Iran" /> Iranhas said there was no reason to 
suspend its nuclear activities, maintaining a tough line despite 
talks with the European Union" /> European Unionaimed at 
persuading Tehran to halt uranium enrichment. 

 "Iran does not see any reason to suspend nuclear activities,"
state television quoted Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki as
saying Friday, a day after another key round of talks between
Iran and the European Union ended in Berlin. 

Mottaki's comments appeared to refer to uranium enrichment, a
sensitive nuclear process that the West wants Iran to suspend as
proof that it is not seeking nuclear weapons. 

A suspension at least of temporary nature is a key demand of the
European Union and United States. Enriched uranium can be used
both to make nuclear fuel and, in highly enriched form, the
explosive core of an atomic bomb. 

But Mottaki said Western countries "have found out that
threatening language and a referral to the United Nations" />
United NationsSecurity Council is not efficient and there is no
way for them now but to negotiate." 

Iran insists that its nuclear programme is solely for peaceful
energy needs, vehemently rejecting US allegations that it is
seeking to manufacture nuclear weapons. 

Washington is leading a push for UN sanctions against Iran if it
fails to halt uranium enrichment and agree a deal proposed by
the five permanent UN Security Council members plus Germany that
offers Tehran incentives and negotiations. 

Mottaki's comments represented Tehran's most explicit signal yet
since the talks between its top nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani
and EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana that it does not
intend to suspend enrichment. 

The talks that ended Thursday in Berlin failed to produce an
accord but both men said they were positive and constructive,
with Solana hailing what he described as progress. 

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad had vowed in a speech
Thursday that Iran "would not bend" over its nuclear programme
and also questioned the value of suspending uranium enrichment. 

There have been conflicting reports over whether Iran made any
offer in the EU talks to suspend enrichment for a limited time,
with some Iranian officials denying assertions by EU diplomats
that it had done so. 

The Washington Times reported Tuesday that Iran was close to
agreeing a secret deal that would have it suspend uranium
enrichment for 90 days in order for additional talks to take
place. 

"Why are they insisting that we stop it (enrichment) even for
one day? Why should we pretend to stop it even for one day?"
Ahmadinejad asked the cheering crowd in his speech. 

The United States, which has backed the EU talks while also
showing increasing impatience with Tehran, warned that time was
running out for Solana to convince Iran to suspend its uranium
enrichment activities. 

State Department spokesman Sean McCormack confirmed that a new
deadline for Iran to halt enrichment agreed last week among the
permanent five UN Security Council members and Germany was
looming and would not be changed. 

"The timeline that was agreed in New York stays, and we are
getting short now in terms of that time." The deadline has not
been officially revealed but European diplomats involved in the
negotiations said it was sometime next week. 

Iran defied a previous UN deadline of August 31 to halt uranium
enrichment but was given more time to see if the talks between
Larijani and Solana were successful. 

Meanwhile, Mottaki was also quoted as vowing that should the
standoff intensify "Iran will not use oil as a political weapon
and there is no need to do so either." 	 		 			

Copyright © 2006 Agence France Presse. All rights reserved.
*****************************************************************
 11 AFP: Nuclear issue could stall Japan-Iran oil project 

 Fri Sep 29, 11:26 AM ET                         

TOKYO (AFP) - Japan has decided to stop financial support for the 
development of Iran" /> Iran's largest onshore oil field if the 
Islamic republic continues uranium enrichment, a press report 
said. 

 The decision has been informally conveyed to the United States,
the Japanese news agency Jiji Press quoted US government sources
as saying in a report from Washington. 

The move means Japan's virtual withdrawal from its two
billion-dollar contract to develop the Azadegan field amid
mounting global concern over Iran's nuclear program, the report
said. 

"It will be a strong message to the international community
about intolerance of Iran's nuclear arms development," Jiji
quoted the sources as saying. 

Japan, which is almost entirely dependent on Middle Eastern oil,
has been under US pressure to give up the contract. It is the
world's second largest economy and imports about 15 percent of
its oil from Iran. 

The United Nations" /> United NationsSecurity Council adopted a
resolution in late July calling on Iran to stop uranium
enrichment, a process which could lead to the production of
weapons-grade plutonium. 

If the UN council applies sanctions against Iran, the Japanese
government will not extend official loans to the oil project or
guarantee repayment of debts, the report said. 

The contract was signed in 2004 by Inpex Corp., a Japanese oil
exploration company that is supported by the government but also
has private stakeholders. 

Work was meant to start by March 2005 but has been stalled, in
part due to the need to clear mines from the 1980-88 Iran- Iraq"
/> Iraqwar. 

Iran and Inpex had set a final deadline on September 15 but
failed to reach an agreement over profit-sharing, again
stretching negotiations until the end of this month. 

Earlier Friday, a Japanese cabinet minister said he saw no
obvious way to break the deadlock. 

"The Japanese government does not have a bright idea that would
lead to an immediate breakthrough" over the Azadegan field, the
newly appointed Trade and Industry Minister Akira Amari told a
news conference. 

"It is difficult to do anything other than carefully monitor the
situation." 

The trade minister had voiced doubts in remarks published
Thursday about Iran's latest threats to rip up Tokyo's contract
to develop the Islamic republic's largest onshore oil field. 

"The deadline has been extended many times before," Amari, who
took office Tuesday, said in an interview with the Yomiuri
Shimbun newspaper. 

"I think Iran is in a situation where it cannot throw out the
deal so easily," he said. 

Copyright © 2006 Agence France Presse. All rights reserved. The
*****************************************************************
 12 AFP: No accord in Iran-EU nuclear talks; US warns of sanctions -
                           
 by Fabien Novial Fri Sep 29, 4:38 AM ET 		 	 

BERLIN (AFP) - Iran" /> and the European Union" /> failed to
reach agreement in talks on Tehran's disputed nuclear programme,
prompting the United States to warn the Islamic republic the
clock was ticking on sanctions. 

Iran's top nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani and EU foreign policy
chief Javier Solana said that although an accord was elusive,
the negotiations had been positive and constructive. 

"It has been a long, constructive negotiation," Larijani told
reporters at the end of two days of meetings in the German
capital. 

"We have been able to arrive at some positive conclusions. 

"Today we have discussed modalities with the aim of coming back
to the main negotiations as soon as possible." 

Solana said in a news conference: "We have been progressing. We
will have a new contact in the middle of next week." 

Sources close to the talks said the contact could take place
over the phone and did not necessarily mean they would be
meeting face to face. 

In Washington, US State Department spokesman Sean McCormack
reaffirmed that a new deadline for Iranian compliance that was
agreed last week among the permanent five UN Security Council
members and Germany -- the so-called P-5-plus-1 nations -- was
looming and would not be changed. 

"The timeline that was agreed in New York stays, and we are
getting short now in terms of that time," he said, referring to
the moment when the six nations would seek UN sanctions against
Tehran. 

The deadline has not been officially revealed by the six
nations, which also include Britain, China, France, Russia and
the United States, but European diplomats involved in the
negotiations said it was sometime next week. 

"The ball is in their court," McCormack said Thursday of the
Iranians. 

"Nobody wants to go down the path of sanctions -- that is not
our first choice," he said. 

"But we are prepared, along with the P-5-plus-1, to go down that
path if that's the door that the Iranian regime wants to open,"
he said. 

On Friday Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki was quoted
by state television as saying Iran does not see any reason to
suspend its "nuclear activities." 

"Iran does not see any reason to suspend nuclear activities," an
anchor on state television quoted Mottaki as saying. 

Mottaki's comments appeared to refer to uranium enrichment, a
sensitive nuclear process that the West wants Iran to suspend as
proof that it is not seeking nuclear weapons. 

Meanwhile, the US House of Representatives approved legislation
to ramp up economic pressure on Iran in an effort to convince
Tehran to abandon its nuclear programme. 

Republican Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (, , ), author of
the Iran Freedom Support Act, said the bill would deny Iran "the
technical assistance, financial resources, and political
legitimacy to develop nuclear weapons and support terrorism." 

Iran ignored an August 31 deadline set by the UN Security
Council for it to suspend uranium enrichment and reprocessing
activities that Washington and others believe is a cover for
developing nuclear weapons. 

Tehran insists the program is only for producing fuel for
nuclear power stations. 

The UN resolution allows for sanctions, but these would have to
be elaborated in another set of UN documents which Washington is
currently working on with its Security Council partners in
parallel with the Solana-Larijani talks, McCormack said. 

US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice" /> spoke with Solana
about the talks on Wednesday night and was expected to get
another briefing from the EU official Thursday, McCormack said. 

The EU-Iran talks focus on a list of economic and diplomatic
incentives put forward by the six powers in June as a reward if
Iran suspends its uranium enrichment. 

The incentives include support for an Iranian nuclear power
industry and the first direct contacts between the US and Iran
in nearly 30 years. 

McCormack insisted that negotiations involving the United States
could begin only after Iran freezes its enrichment program and
the suspension is verified by monitors from the UN nuclear
watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency" /> . 

The Solana-Larijani talks were believed to be focussing on the
"sequencing" of a possible decision by Iran to temporarily
suspend enrichment and the subsequent start of full negotiations
on the incentives package. 

European diplomats said Larijani has offered a temporary
suspension, but it was unclear if the proposal had the support
of the various factions within the Iranian leadership. 

A senior US official recently said there were signs of a "great
debate" in Tehran between those willing to offer concessions in
exchange for improved relations with the West and officials
intent on Iran developing its own nuclear capability. 

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad took a hard line Thursday
when he told supporters in a nationally televised speech that
Iran "will not bend one inch against any force and pressure"
over the nuclear issue. 

The negotiations were given a fresh chance after Washington,
under pressure from Europe and China, backed down on its demand
for immediate sanctions against Iran for failing to meet the
August 31 deadline. 

burs-vs/mac 	 		 			
					 						Recommend It: 						Not at All 						Somewhat
Copyright © 2006 Agence France Presse. All rights reserved.
*****************************************************************
 13 Asia Times Korea: Redesigning a historic alliance

Sep 30, 2006

By Donald Kirk 

SEOUL - The specter of a machine-gun atop a robot opening fire on 
onrushing tanks and soldiers would seem absurd were it not for 
the straight-faced word of a bureaucrat in Seoul that such an 
apparition exists and may be deployed on the South Korean side of 
the border with North Korea. 

The robot's visual and infra-red detection devices supposedly 
empower it to spot a likely target up to 4 kilometers away, which 
happens to be the width of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) between 
the two Koreas, but the possibilities for glitches that might 
touch off a war are too numerous to contemplate. 

The fact that this "intelligent surveillance and guard robot", as 
Lee Jae-hoon, deputy commerce, industry and energy minister, 
calls it, "has surveillance, tracking, firing and 
voice-recognition systems" does not exactly explain how it would 
respond to all those wild animals living without fear within the 
sanctuary of the DMZ. Does the robot also come with a sniffing 
device capable of telling a deer, say, from a saboteur or from a 
defector? 

It did seem more than coincidental, however, that the robot 
should have officially surfaced in an announcement on the very 
day that South Korea and the United States, against odds and over 
innumerable protests, agreed on a plan for redesigning the 
historic alliance by which the US has pledged to defend South 
Korea ever since the Korean War. 

At the heart of the deal is a controversial agreement that a 
South Korean commander would be in charge of South Korean troops 
in the event of a second Korean War - or any other kind of war. 

South Korean conservatives, including leaders of the opposition 
Grand National Party and a string of former defense ministers and 
retired generals, have lined up in opposition, charging that the 
whole idea is just another sign of the weakness of the 
left-leaning President Roh Moo-hyun in the face of North Korean 
demands and radical pressure at home. 

Such criticism, however, conflicts with the speed with which the
Pentagon and US commanders in Korea have not only gone along
with the proposal but gone one better. They say, fine, let's put
all the mechanisms in effect to separate the commands within
three years, while South Korea now says it will take six years. 

The whole discussion in a sense is esoteric and abstract. South
Korea 12 years ago took command of South Korean forces in
peacetime. No US military officer commands South Korean troops
except for those seconded under the KATUSA program. (The
acronym, part of the basic vocabulary of military life here,
stands for Korean Augmentation to the US Army.) 

If war were to break out, however, the question of who would be
in charge would be critical. The nationalist Syngman Rhee, who
survived for 12 years as president until his ouster in 1960, had
no trouble transferring his forces to US command as they were
reeling before the North Koreans and Chinese at the outset of
the Korean War. 

That was then, when the South was pathetically short of basic
infantry weapons, had no air force and virtually no tanks and
heavy armored and artillery. 

Commanders now are convinced the balance is just about reversed.
North Korean forces, with more than a million troops, vastly
outnumber the 650,000 South Korean troops, but the South's
weaponry is assumed to be far superior considering the North can
no longer count on China and Russia for new weapons, much less
spare parts for its aging equipment. South Korea, moreover, has
an enormous military-industrial complex that's capable of
producing its own weaponry, including planes, ships and tanks. 

As if South Korea's own production facilities were not enough,
moreover, the United States has committed US$10 billion to
modernizing South Korean forces. That's the payoff in the scheme
under which Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has
masterminded the pullback of US troops to well south of Seoul
while slashing the number from 37,000 to 29,500 today on the way
down to 25,000 two or three years from now. 

While the US appears to cooperate with South Korean wishes on
the transfer of wartime control, however, Roh infuriates
conservatives here by pursuing his policy of reconciliation with
North Korea in apparent conflict with the United States. 

He did it again in a television interview that lasted an hour
and 40 minutes in which he sought to portray his own government
as somehow an intermediary between the United States and North
Korea. Just as China has tried "to persuade North Korea" to
return to talks on its nuclear weapons, he argued, "we have
tried to persuade Washington". 

South Korea, he said, was "trying to go between North Korea and
the United States" - an exercise that he said "requires mutual
trust". 

The image of South Korea looking for trust in Washington and
Pyongyang in the quest for peace and reconciliation on the
Korean Peninsula only adds to conservative distrust of moves to
revise the US-Korean military alliance. They see the transfer of
command over South Korean troops to South Korean command as a
critical sign of policies dominated by leftist advisers who
would be happy to do away with the entire alliance. 

Relations, however, are far from that stage. Against intense
leftist pressure, the government remains committed to providing
the land for a huge new US base at Pyongtaek, near the west
coast about 50km south of Seoul. Police have cleared out most of
the aging villagers who were protesting the loss of their
houses. 

The US also compelled South Korea to agree to establish a new
firing range for its fighter planes around some islets 70km from
a major US Air Force base at Kunsan on the southwest coast. That
range replaces the one southwest of Seoul that closed last year
after a prolonged campaign by activists. 

The US negotiating tactic for the new range was revealing. Weary
of South Korean dithering, US negotiators said they would have
to pull all of their planes out of Korea if they had nowhere for
training. The fear of provoking still more conservative outcries
at home probably has had more to do with Seoul's going along
with the US demand than worries about a North Korean attack. 

Ultimately Roh would like to dissolve the military reliance. As
he remarked in his television conversation, he is "opposed to
depending on foreign troops to defend our most sensitive line of
defense near the North Korean border". 

But what if the North Koreans turn to their ultimate weapons -
the nuclear warheads they have been fabricating along with the
missiles capable of delivering them? 

Much to the disgust of conservatives, Roh can't get over the
view that the US and Japan are to blame for exacerbating
tensions. "There has been talk that the US and even Japan may
launch a preemptive attack on North Korea," he said, "but any
use of force against North Korea prior to its use of force is
not desirable." 

In fact, the only such talk has come from Pyongyang, which
regularly accuses Washington of planning a preemptive strike -
the rationale, of course, for the North's nuclear program. 

Nor is Roh sympathetic with the US Treasury Department's move to
shut North Korea out of international banking and finance,
direly needed to sustain its dilapidated economy. He hopes, he
said, "for a speedy conclusion" of the US probe into Banco Delta
Asia in Macau, which the US has said is the conduit for
counterfeit North Korean US$100 "supernotes". 

Roh now hopes to jump-start the six-party talks by a "common and
broad approach" that he believes will be acceptable to both the
North Koreans and the Americans. US President George W Bush had
no trouble signing on to the verbiage when he hosted Roh at the
White House a couple of weeks ago. Roh sees North Korea's
silence on the topic as a hopeful sign - even though the North
would appear to have rejected the whole thing by frequent
refusals to return to the table unless the US removes its
economic "sanctions". 

Just on "any slim chance" the North did test a nuke, said Roh,
South Korea is "making various diplomatic efforts". In any case,
he said, South Korea would want to take over wartime control of
its own troops even if the North did conduct a test. 

North Korea, moreover, isn't going to relent in its demands for
the withdrawal of all US troops regardless of the deal to place
them under South Korean command in time of war. Roh, like the
North Koreans, may want all the Americans out - but not at the
risk of conservative rage that might jeopardize his own already
unpopular regime even before conservatives muster the strength
to take over the government in the presidential election next
year. 

Journalist Donald Kirk has been covering Korea - and the
confrontation of forces in Northeast Asia - for more than 30
years. 

(Copyright 2006 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved.
Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing

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Hong Kong Thailand Bureau:                                                                                                                
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*****************************************************************
 14 Guardian Unlimited: China Back Plan for N. Korea Nuke Talks
 
From the Associated Press        

[UP] 

Friday September 29, 2006 11:16 AM

AP Photo TOK201 

By JAE-SOON CHANG 

Associated Press Writer 

SEOUL, South Korea (AP) - China on Friday backed a U.S.-South
Korean proposal aimed at luring North Korea back to long-stalled
international talks on its nuclear program. 

Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei met with top South Korean
officials in Seoul as part of renewed efforts to restart the
six-party nuclear talks after nearly a year of deadlock. The
negotiations involving China, Japan, the two Koreas, Russia and
the United States last convened in November. 

Wu's meetings focused on a joint strategy that South Korean
President Roh Moo-hyun and President Bush agreed to pursue at a
summit earlier this month. 

``I support it,'' Wu, who is Beijing's main nuclear envoy, said
Friday after his meetings. 

China's support of the plan could be crucial in getting
Pyongyang back to the negotiating table, as it is the North's
main benefactor and communist ally. 

Roh said Thursday that the proposal was made to North Korea, but
it hasn't given any response so far. Roh declined to give any
details of what was contained in the proposal. 

Seoul's nuclear envoy, Chun Yung-woo, told reporters he briefed
the Chinese diplomat on the outcome of a recent trip to
Washington but gave no further details. 

Chun returned Thursday from an extended trip to the United
States, where he tried with his U.S. counterpart, Assistant
Secretary of State Christopher Hill, to flesh out a joint
strategy aimed at luring North Korea back to the negotiating
table. 

North Korea has refused to return to the talks in anger over
U.S. efforts to cut off its access to the international banking
system because of the communist regime's alleged counterfeiting
of U.S. dollars and money laundering. 

The need to get North Korea back to the negotiating table has
taken on added urgency since it test-fired a series of missiles
in July. Reports have also suggested it might conduct a nuclear
test to further escalate tension. 

The North boasts it has nuclear bombs, but the claim has not
been independently verified. Many experts believe the North has
enough radioactive material to build at least a half-dozen or
more nuclear weapons. 

The U.S. has rebuffed the North's long-standing demand for
direct talks, but has recently shown signs of softening that
stance. The U.S. ambassador to South Korea, Alexander Vershbow,
said this week that Washington is open to ``new approaches,''
and bilateral talks are possible only if the North promises to
return to the six-party negotiations. 

North Korea remains adamant in its demand for a lifting of the
U.S. financial restrictions. One of the country's vice foreign
ministers, Choe Su Hon, told the U.N. General Assembly this week
that it is impossible to resume the nuclear talks while the U.S.
sanctions continue. 

U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice also said this week
that she would consider a trip to Asia to see if ``one last
push'' can be made to get North Korea back to the negotiations. 
		 	 	   
Guardian Unlimited © Guardian Newspapers Limited 2006
*****************************************************************
 15 AFP: Chinese, SKorean envoys meet in bid to restart NKorea nuclear talks - 

 Fri Sep 29, 5:39 AM ET 		 	 

SEOUL (AFP) - Senior Chinese and South Korean officials met in an 
effort to restart stalled talks on North Korean nuclear 
disarmament amid signs of US impatience with the diplomatic 
process. 

Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei, Beijing's chief delegate
to the six-nation talks, met his South Korean counterpart Chun
Yung-Woo. 

Wu was later to have discussions with Vice Foreign Minister Yu
Myung-Hwan and pay a courtesy call on Foreign Minister Ban
Ki-Moon. 

"I will brief him on the outcome of my recent trip to the United
States," Chun told reporters before greeting the Chinese
official. 

Chun returned home Thursday from a week-long trip to the United
States, where he met his US counterpart to the talks, Assistant
Secretary of State Christopher Hill, and other officials Friday. 

Diplomatic efforts have been intensifying to bring the communist
state back to the forum amid concern it may be planning a
nuclear test. North Korea" /> North Korealast year declared
itself a nuclear-armed nation. 

But, publicly at least, the North insists it will not return to
the six-party process unless Washington ends financial sanctions
imposed in September last year. 

The communist state has boycotted the six-party talks since last
November in protest at those sanctions, imposed on a Macau bank
accused of laundering funds for the North. 

US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice" /> Condoleezza Ricehas
said she would travel to Asia in the next six weeks to see
whether to make "one last push" to persuade the North to return. 

Hill warned Wednesday that any nuclear test would be viewed by
world powers as a "very serious" escalation of the nuclear
standoff, and the United States had been talking to China,
Russia, South Korea" /> South Koreaand Japan -- the other
members of the forum -- about how to deter any such move. 

He also said Washington was considering whether to impose new
sanctions on Pyongyang, despite warnings by several congressmen
that such a move would inflame matters. 

The North fuelled tensions by test-firing seven ballistic
missiles in July. 

Wu will also discuss an upcoming visit to Beijing by President
Roh Moo-Hyun" /> Roh Moo-Hyun, expected around the middle of
next month. 

Copyright © 2006 Agence France Presse. All rights reserved. The
*****************************************************************
 16 INSIDE JoongAng Daily: Roh: North knew about ¡®approach' beforehand

September 29, 2006 ¤Ñ 

¢º President Roh Moo-hyun talking to moderator Son Seok-hee on
the MBC-TV show "100 Minute Debate" yesterday at the Blue House.
The recording aired last night.         

Provided by the Blue House.  

President Roh Moo-hyun said yesterday that Seoul had already
talked to Pyongyang about the so-called "common and broad
approach" to the deadlocked six-party talks before his Sept. 14
summit with U.S. President George W. Bush in Washington.

 "South Korea proposed the new common and broad approach to
North Korea long before my trip to the U.S. earlier this month.
North Korea has yet to respond fully, but has not shown any
negative attitude toward it," the president said during a
special interview with local broadcaster MBC-TV, which aired
last night. 

"I don't remember the exact timing for the [secret] contact with
North Korea, but my chief secretary [of security] Song Min-soon
contacted the North regarding the new proposal."

 Last night, the president defined the phrase as being an "issue
of procedural approach" and a new starting point linked to the
Sept. 19, 2005 agreement on North Korea's nuclear program, under
which the participants of the six-party talks produced a joint
statement on North Korea's nuclear dismantlement in return for
security guarantees and economic benefits.

 Yet Mr. Roh did not offer details of the "approach." Chun
Young-woo, Seoul's point man to the six-party talks, said
yesterday said that he recently met in the United States with
several U.S. officials, including his counterpart Christopher
Hill, and had "in-depth consultations to make the approach
concrete." He did not elaborate. 

The Blue House spokesman, Yoon Tae-young, said, "There is
essence to the approach, but we cannot make it public yet."

 Neither U.S. President George W. Bush nor any U.S. officials
used the phrase after the summit meeting earlier this month.

 In the interview yesterday, Roh went on to say that South Korea
opposes any preemptive military strikes on North Korea and has
been making diplomatic efforts to prevent the North from
carrying out a nuclear test.

 "Any use of force against North Korea prior to its use of force
is not desirable considering the unimaginable impact on the
whole Korean Peninsula," he said.

 Roh then asserted that North Korea's possible attempt to
conduct a nuclear weapons test would have no bearing on South
Korea's bid to take back wartime operational control of its
troops from the U.S.

by Yonhap, Chun Su-jin sujiney@joongang.co.kr>   
	  
Copyright by Joins.com, Inc. Terms of Use |
*****************************************************************
 17 Latest Keep Space for Peace Actions List
 
Date: Fri, 29 Sep 2006 17:53:25 -0500 (CDT)

X-Sender-Host-Name: chumbly.math.missouri.edu
X-Spam-Class: HAM

October 1 - 8, 2006

Keep Space for Peace Week:

International Week of Protest to

Stop the Militarization of Space

No Weapons in Space!

Stop Star Wars Research & Development!

Convert the Military Industrial Complex!

Fund Human Needs

October 1 - 8 Local Actions (List in Formation):

1)      Albuquerque, NM (Oct 4 Showing of War from Space video,
Peace & Justice Center 7:00 pm)     Bob Anderson   citizen@comcast.net

2)      Albuquerque, NM (Oct 7 Demonstration at Starfire anti-satellite
laser weapon facility, Albuquerque Sunport 11:00 am)   Bob Anderson
citizen@comcast.net

3)      Ashland, OR (Oct 6 Tabling on space issues at Amy Goodman
event)

Linda Richards     lmrich@mind.net

4)      Asheville, NC (Oct 4 Space video showing, North Asheville
Library on Merrimon Ave 7:00 pm) Lewis Patrie   patrie.wncpsr@main.nc.us

5)      Baltimore, MD (Oct 7 Protest the role of the Nat'l Security
Agency at Ft Meade, 11:00 am)  Max Obuszewski  mobuszewski@afsc.org

6)      Bath, ME (Oct 7 vigil at Bath Iron Works Administration
Building 11:30-12:30) Maureen/George Ostensen   gmjko@yahoo.com

7)      Beaverton, OR (Oct 2 Holly Gwinn Graham space songs performance
at Southminster Presbyterian Church at 7:30 pm) Celeste Howard
celeste@pacifier.com

8)      Bridgend, WALES, UK (Oct 3 Public showing War from Space
video, Quaker Meeting House, 7:30 pm) Bridgend CND
georgecrabb@ybontfaen.freeserve.co.uk

9)      Brunswick, ME (Oct 1-8 Space video showing on local cable
TV)  Martha Spiess  mspiess@suscom-maine.net

10)  Buckley AFB, Aurora, CO (Oct 1 Demonstration 11 am-1 pm) Bill
Sulzman bsulzman@juno.com   download flyer (574 KB PDF file)

11)  Byron Bay, AUSTRALIA (Oct 1-8 Vigils and leafleting throughout
the week) Gareth Smith  maxigar@iinet.net.au

12)  Cambridge, MA (Oct 5 Public Forum/Space Video Showing at Central
Square Branch Public Library, 6:00 pm)  AFSC/WILPF   Jgerson@afsc.org

13)  Chennai, INDIA (Oct 3 assorted programmes on space weaponization)
sriraman_I@yahoo.com

14)  Colorado Springs, CO (Oct 2 Bannering at New Life Church
10:30-11:30 am) Bill Sulzman    bsulzman@juno.com

15)  Colorado Springs, CO (Oct 5 Bannering at construction site of
SI International 12-1 pm) Bill Sulzman    bsulzman@juno.com

16)  Colorado Springs, CO (Oct 6 Bannering at Catholic Chancery
12-1 pm) Bill Sulzman    bsulzman@juno.com

17)  Colorado Springs, CO (Oct 8 Rally at University of Colorado
12-1 pm) Bill Sulzman    bsulzman@juno.com

18)  RAF Croughton, Brackley, ENGLAND (Oct 7 March & picnic at U.S.
space communications base, 12-3 pm)  Oxford CND  oxonpeace@yahoo.co.uk

19)  Damascus, SYRIA (Sept 18 Forum War/Space & Human Security
Issues, Syrian Physician's Syndicate Hall)  Ghassan Shahrour, MD
ghassan@medinews.com

20)  Darmstadt, GERMANY (Leafleting TBA)
regina.hagen@jugendstil.da.shuttle.de

21)  Davis, CA (Oct 5 Public forum UC Davis at ARC Pavilion from
7-9 pm) David Dionisi    freedomfromwar@sbcglobal.net

22)  Fayetteville, AR (Oct 1-8 Space videos shown on local Cable
TV) Casey Milford  casey@everydaysimple.org

23)  Ft Lauderdale, FL (War from Space Video showing, Date/time
TBA)  Arlyne Goodwin   arlynepeace@cs.com

24)  Fylingdales BMD Radar, Yorkshire, ENGLAND (Oct 1 Demonstration)
http://www.yorkshirecnd.org.uk/   d.webb@leedsmet.ac.uk

25)  Hendersonville, NC (Oct 8 Space video showing Time/Place TBA)
Lewis Patrie   patrie.wncpsr@main.nc.us

26)  Lake Worth, FL (Oct 7 Leafletting on Lake Worth Beach, 2-3 pm)
Palm Beach County WILPF & Palm Beach County Peace and Justice
Coalition   Susan Mosely       susanm4peace@yahoo.com

27)  London, ENGLAND (Oct 18 Parliamentary Meeting on "Missile
Defence & the Weaponization of Space - Why Britain's Role Must Be
Challenged",

at House of Commons) Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament

info@yorkshirecnd.org.uk

28)  Menwith Hill NSA Spy Base, Yorkshire, ENGLAND (Oct 8 Demonstration)
http://www.caab.org.uk/     caab@btclick.com

29)  Minneapolis, MN (Launch of Keep Space for Peace week with
"Social Evening for Disarmament"  Sept 30, featuring three leaders
of national WILPF DISARM campaign participating in Stop the Merchants
of Death Conference Sept. 29 to Oct. 2 in Twin Cities).  Leslie
Reindl,   alteravista@earthlink.net

30)  Minneapolis, MN (Oct 1 Workshop on space issues at Stop the
Merchants of Death Conference) Loring Wirbel & MacGregor Eddy
macgregoreddy@gmail.com

31)  Nagpur, INDIA(Oct 7-10 assorted programmes on space weaponization)
jnrao36@sify.com

32)  Naples, FL  (War from Space Video showing, Date/time TBA)
Arlyne Goodwin arlynepeace@cs.com

33)  Nationwide in U.S. (October postcard campaign supporting  U.S.
Congress H. R. 2420 banning weapons in space)  U.S. WILPF. Contact
Kate Zaiden kzaidan@wilpf.org

34)  New Delhi, INDIA (Oct 11 - 12 assorted programmes on space
weaponization) jnrao36@sify.com

35)  Nome AK (Oct 3 Space video showing at Beltz High School, plus
teaching about Peace in Space issues in Junior High and High School
reading classes all week long) Lynn DeFilippo  ladefilippo@hotmail.com

36)  Nome, AK (Oct 5 Space Video showing, 7:00 pm Location TBA)
Lynn DeFilippo ladefilippo@hotmail.com

37)  Omaha, NE (Oct 10-12 Protest outside Strategic Space & Defense
2006 Conference, Omaha is home of Strategic Command - StratCom)
Tim Rinne nfpstate@nebraskansforpeace.org  and Nebraska Greens
francesmendenhall@yahoo.com

38)  Perth (Central), Western AUSTRALIA (Oct 3 TBA) People for
Nuclear Disarmament

39)  Portland, OR (Oct 3 Holly Gwinn Graham space songs performance
at Multnomah Friends Meeting at 7:00 pm) Carol Urner
carol.disarm@gmail.com

40)  Portland, OR (Oct 5 Portland Community College Peace Studies
discussion on Keeping Space for Peace, 12-1 pm) Carol Urner
curner@qwest.net

41)  Portland, OR (WILPF post card signing, vigil, leafleting and
Congressional office visits in support of a ban on space weapons
and militarization, 12 noon October 4 on Pioneer Square) Georgia
Pinkel gpinkel@pacifier.com

42)  Raipur, INDIA (Oct 6 assorted programmes on space weaponization)
jnrao36@sify.com

43)  Schriever AFB, CO (Oct 3 Bannering 3:30-4:30 pm) Bill Sulzman
bsulzman@juno.com

44)  Tallahassee, FL (Oct 1 Anti-Space war demo 12:30-2:30 pm at
Old Capitol) Tom Baxter    tombaxter@talstar.com

45)  Tallahassee, FL (Oct 8 Anti-Space war demo 12:30-2:30 pm at
Old Capitol) Tom Baxter    tombaxter@talstar.com

46)  Toledo, OH (Daily Vigil at Kabuki site, Madison & St. Clair
for one hour) Roz Marovitz   rkmarovitz@hotmail.com

47)  Tokyo, JAPAN (Oct 6 Public seminar on "Demilitarization of
space and missile defense" 6:30 pm at Bunkyo civic center)

No to Nuclear & Missile Defense Campaign  kojis@agate.plala.or.jp

48)  Traverse City, MI (Leafleting throughout month of October &
Oct 19 Space video            showing at Grace Episcopal Church)
Carol Still ipjn.1@juno.com

49)  Tucson, AZ (Oct 6 Community vegetarian supper/Raging Grannies
sing/space

video)  WILPF Pat Birnie   patbirnie@gmail.com

50)  Vandenberg Air Force Base, CA (Oct 7 Demonstration front gate
1-3 pm) www.vpeaceldf.org    mindful@redshift.com

download flyer (737 KB PDF file)

51)  Visakhapatnam, INDIA (Oct 5-6 assorted programmes on space
weaponization) jnrao36@sify.com

52)  Washington DC (Oct 2 White House Vigil)  Art Laffin
artlaffin@hotmail.com

53)  Washington DC (Oct 6 Pentagon Vigil)  Art Laffin
artlaffin@hotmail.com

54)  Winnipeg, Manitoba, CANADA (Peace Alliance Winnipeg, Date/time
TBA)

Margie Warner      mwarner@mts.net

Global Network Against Weapons & Nuclear Power in Space PO Box 652
Brunswick, ME 04011 (207) 729-0517 http://www.space4peace.org
globalnet@mindspring.com http://space4peace.blogspot.com (our blog)
*****************************************************************
 18 Reuters: U.S. Congress restricts Bush on Iraq spending                           

Sat 30 Sep 2006 0:11:07 BST

 Vicki Allen

 WASHINGTON, Sept 29 (Reuters) - The U.S. Congress on Friday
moved to block the Bush administration from building permanent
U.S. military bases in Iraq or controlling the country's oil
sector, as it approved $70 billion for the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan.

 The restrictions included in a record $447 billion military
funding bill were a slap at the administration, and Republicans
have stripped them out of legislation in the past.

 Democrats and many Republicans say the Iraqi insurgency has
been fueled by perceptions the United States has ambitions for a
permanent presence in the country.

 The administration has downplayed prospects for permanent
military bases in Iraq, but lawmakers have called on President
George W. Bush to make a definitive statement that the United
States has no such plans.

 U.S. officials have predicted a lengthy U.S. military presence
in Iraq.

 The Senate unanimously passed the military spending bill,
sending it to Bush for his signature. The House of
Representatives passed it earlier in the week 394-22, as
Congress rushed to leave town to campaign for Nov. 7 elections
that will determine control of Congress.

 Bush had complained the bill's funding fell short of his
request. But he issued a statement saying he would sign the
legislation that "will provide our men and women in uniform with
the necessary resources to protect our country and win the War
on Terror."

 With this bill, Congress has approved about $507 billion for
the wars, with the bulk of that spent in Iraq where costs are
averaging $8 billion per month, according to the Congressional
Research Service.

 Lawmakers called the $70 billion a "bridge fund" to last about
halfway through the next fiscal year, which starts on Oct. 1.
About $23 billion of that is to replace and refurbish equipment
worn out in the harsh environments of the two conflicts.

 The military spending bill provides $377.6 billion for the
Pentagon's core programs, $4.1 billion less than Bush wanted but
$19 billion above current levels.

 It funds a 2.2 percent military pay raise, and provides $557
million more for the Army Reserve and Army National Guard than
Bush sought.

 The House also passed a bill setting out policies for the
Pentagon and the Energy Department's nuclear weapons programs,
but the measure was stalled in the Senate.

 The $533 billion in programs outlined in the bill comes in
appropriations bills for defense and energy.

 With the military stretched by the Iraq war, the defense policy
bill recommends raising the Army's forces by 30,000 to a force
level of 512,400, and the Marines by 5,000 to a level of 180,000.

 The bill blocks a move by the Pentagon to increase health care
payments by service personnel.

 Congress usually passes the defense policy bill before the
spending bill. But the policy bill was stalled in a conference
with the Senate over a bid by House Republicans to let military
chaplains offer denominational prayers at nondenominational
events. That eventually was struck from the bill.

© Reuters 2006. All Rights Reserved.                                              [ border=] 
*****************************************************************
 19 AFP: Energy on agenda at Bush-Nazarbayev talks 

 by Stephen Collinson Fri Sep 29, 4:27 AM ET 		 	 

WASHINGTON (AFP) - US President George W. Bush" /> President 
George W. Bushwelcomes Kazakhstan's President Nursultan 
Nazarbayev to the White House, in the latest steps of the 
diplomatic dance over Central Asia's energy riches. 

The visit finds Washington finessing worries over human rights
and political reform to advance strategic and economic goals
with Muslim-majority Kazakhstan, an emerging gas and oil giant
also being courted by Russia and China. 

In a moment of symbolism, Bush sent his Energy Secretary Samuel
Bodman" /> Samuel Bodmanto join Nazarbayev at the Kazakh embassy
in Washington to unveil a monument marking the former Soviet
Republic's split from Moscow in 1991. 

"I hope the outcome of our visit will bring our bilateral
relations up to a new level," Nazarbayev said, after pulling a
light-blue sheet from a 12-foot (three metre) monument of an
ancient warrior astride a winged leopard. 

But in an absurd twist to the visit, British comedian Sacha
Baron Cohen later appeared outside the embassy in the guise of
his fictional TV reporter, Borat Sagdiyev and gave a mock press
conference. 

"Borat" who lampoons Kazakh culture and has infuriated the
Kazakh government with his "mockumentaries" later tried to get
into the White House, but was rebuffed by Secret Service" />
Secret Serviceguards. 

The stunt was a thinly veiled shill for Cohen's "moviefilm"
"Borat: Cultural Learnings of America for Make Benefit Glorious
Nation of Kazakhstan," due to be released in the United States
in November. 

Kazakhstan heralded Nazarbayev's visit with a tourism
advertising campaign which took up four pages in the New York
Times on Wednesday, and featured a lavish commercial shown on
CNN. 

A Kazakh embassy spokesman denied the advertising blitz had
anything to do with Borat, a heavily-mustached, misogynistic
comic creation from the man who brought the world mock rapper
Ali G. 

Bodman said Americans and Kazakhs shared a common heritage of
striving for self rule and had forged close economic and
strategic relations. 

Though the two sides agreed on most things, "we don't agree on
every issue," Bodman said, in an apparent reference to US
worries over Kazakhstan's record on human rights and
democratization. 

The Bush administration is conscious Kazakhstan is at the center
of the new Great Game energy grab in Central Asia. 

Nazarbayev also enjoys US kudos as he has been a valued ally in
the "war on terror", sent troops to Afghanistan" />
Afghanistanand Iraq" /> Iraq, and has been a bulwark against
Islamic fundamentalism in the region. 

In a sign of his high regard here, Nazarbayev stayed with the
current US president's father, former president George Bush" />
George Bush, at the family summer compound in Kennebunkport,
Maine, a diplomat said. 

Ahead of his meeting with Bush, Nazarbayev also met Vice
President Dick Cheney" /> Dick Cheney, and was feted at a dinner
by leading figures including former US Senator Sam Nunn and CNN
founder Ted Turner, to honor Kazakhstan's dismantling of its
former Soviet-era nuclear weapons. 

The United States has pumped billions of dollars into the Kazakh
economy since the fall of the Soviet Union, and suspicions of
rights activists were particulary spurred by Cheney's visit to
Kazakhstan in May. 

After rebuking Russia for stifling democracy, Cheney heaped
praise and "admiration" on Kazakhstan over its economic and
political development. 

That praise came despite the US government's warning last year
that "irregularities" appear to have marked December's election
which saw Nazarbayev sweep up 91 percent of the vote. 

In June, Bush urged Kazakhstan to export its oil through a
US-backed pipeline that bypasses Russian territory. 

The four-billion-dollar project goes through Azerbaijan and is
designed to carry Caspian Sea oil to Western markets via Georgia
and Turkey. 

Kazakhstan is pleading for time from its critics. 

"It's a case half full or half empty, we are moving towards
democracy," a Kazakh diplomat said on condition of anonymity
Wednesday. 

"There is no denying we are not finished with our program of
building a developed democratic society and a civil society." 

But rights groups argue that the idea that Washington can either
have a partner in Kazakhstan or demand it treat its people
better is a false choice. 

"Why is there a presumption that pushing on democracy issues,
per se is going to lose your ally?" said Rachel Denber, Central
Asia specialist with Human Rights Watch. 

"There is no reason why Kazakhstan can't do better on human
rights," she said. 

The latest State Department Human Rights Report called the
Kazakhstan government's record "poor." 	 		 			

Copyright © 2006 Agence France Presse. All rights reserved. The
*****************************************************************
 20 RIA Novosti: Missile defense: today and tomorrow

Opinion &analysis - 

29/ 09/ 2006                                  

MOSCOW. (RIA Novosti political commentator Andrei Kislyakov) -
If December full-scale tests of interceptor missiles by the
United States are successful, they will mark a watershed in
today's contradictory history of strategic missile defense. 

Is there a danger in this? There is. Lieutenant-General Henry
Obering, director of the Pentagon's Missile Defense Agency, said
the December tests would attempt an actual capture of a target
rocket in outer space. He described the coming firing as a final
stage in the testing. 

So should the December test be a success, the program will have
no other option but to deploy ground- and space-based elements
in full. It is also clear that this will put an end to
haranguing about the future of missile defense, and set the ball
rolling for opposition to the American initiative. 

At the end of last year Yury Solomonov, director-general of one
of Russia's key defense plants - the Moscow Institute of Thermal
Technology - said that new Russian missile and nuclear systems
would provide an adequate response to the American anti-missile
program and the resultant deployment of ground-based
anti-missile weapons in Eastern Europe and of strike systems in
outer space. 

"I can say with full responsibility that everything being done
in the world in this area was taken care of in advance when we
developed our Topol-M (SS-27) and Bulava missile systems. The
Topol-M design incorporates some entirely novel ideas. They have
increased its survivability tenfold. For the next ten years it
will have no rivals. The missile has a uniquely short boost
phase, which rules out its interception when the engine is
firing," he said. 

At the end of September, Vladimir Belous, leading researcher
with the Center for International Security at the Russian
Academy of Sciences, said Russia intended to thoroughly
modernize its strategic missiles. "Russia's first step in
producing an asymmetric response to the deployment of an
American anti-missile system near its borders will be to shorten
the boost phase of the missile when its engines are firing full
blast and giving off a lot of heat," he told journalists. 

At present, he said, the boost phase lasts about 5 minutes. "It
is enough to spot a missile launch from space, which takes 45 to
50 seconds. Experts estimate that if the burning time is cut to
130 seconds the possibility of kinetic interceptors hitting the
missile will be reduced to a minimum," he said. 

Belous added there are several methods of dealing with
interceptor missiles - from generating radio noise and coating
missile surfaces with reflecting materials to deploying
interceptor killers near Russian borders and undertaking
preventive destruction of anti-missile defenses. 

All that fills one with pride for the Russian armed forces, but
doesn't it amount to a fresh spiral in a missile-nuclear buildup
with all ensuing military, political and economic consequences,
plus preventive techniques? Besides, many other countries in
addition to Russia are not elated about the American missile
system. China, for example. The American program simply wipes
out the Chinese potential. Looming behind China is the nuclear
India. It is not inconceivable that the Chinese leadership, like
the U.S.S.R. in its day, and to a certain extent Russia now, may
take the road of building up its nuclear forces by massively
deploying multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles. If
this is not a potential full-scale nuclear arms race, what else
is it? And who is interested in it? 

© 2005 RIA Novosti   
*****************************************************************
 21 Comment is free: A movable nuclear feast

The negotiations continue over Iran's uranium enrichment
programme, with no sign of a deal being reached in the near
future. 

Nasrin Alavi

September 29, 2006 

On Wednesday while the EU and Iran met in Berlin for nuclear
talks the Iranian president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, completely
ruled out a freeze of its uranium enrichment programme. Six
world powers have offered Iran a range of incentives to stop
enrichment or face sanctions. 

He also toldthe gathering of army and Basij officials that
western powers were asking Iran to "pretend to suspend uranium
enrichment". He added that: "During negotiations they tell us to
- if even for a day, using an excuse of technical problems -
suspend uranium enrichment, so that we can continue with
negotiations." 

The last time EU's Javier Solana and Iran's top nuclear
negotiator Ali Larijani met, they mutually described
negotiations as "constructive". It has also been reportedthat
Iran had offered to freeze its uranium enrichment programme for
eight weeks. Yet at the close of negotiationstoday in Berlin
Solana reported that they had failed to reach any deal but that
they "have been progressing", and there was room for further
discussions. 

So, which is it? Will Iran stop enrichment, or not? Well it all
depends. And despite the international posturing by the regime,
the ruling elite are beset by internal strife that
manifestsitself with what most Iranians regard as a singular
certainty of political life in Iran: that on any given day a
high-level official will deny a policy and another will
inevitably endorse it. 

Yet there is also undoubtedly a growing bravado that could be
seen in the likes of a recent front page headlineby the Kayhan
Daily (the mouthpiece of Iran's ruling establishment) that
proclaimed that President Ahmadinejad had "uncovered the west's
ploy in dealing with Iran: they threaten us in front of the
cameras and plead during negotiations". 

Thanks largely to the so-called "war on terror", the fall of
Saddam and the recent war in Lebanon, Iran's influence both in
Shia-dominated Iraq and across the Middle East has grown,
enhanced by rising oil prices. It almost seems that, at times,
the Iranian leaders can't believe their good fortune. So is
there any wonder that negotiationswith Iran have turned into a
movable feast. 

September 29 9:51 GBR 

Guardian Unlimited © Guardian Newspapers Limited 2006. Registered 
in England and Wales. No. 908396 Registered office: 164 
Deansgate, Manchester M60 2RR
*****************************************************************
 22 [NukeNet] PG&E files appeal to 9th Circuit Court ruling
 
Date: Fri, 29 Sep 2006 17:47:28 -0700

X-Nohoney: yes white-hard - relay H=adsl-63-203-231-61.dsl.snfc21.pacbell.net (borg.energy-net.org) [63.203.231.61]
X-Sender-Host-Address: 63.203.231.61
X-Sender-Host-Name: adsl-63-203-231-61.dsl.snfc21.pacbell.net
X-Spam-Class: HAM-VERY-WHITELIST

<x-flowed>
NEWS RELEASE

For Immediate Release               Contact:         Jane Swanson, 
spokesperson
September 29, 2006                                              San Luis 
Obispo Mothers for Peace
                                                                                (805) 
595-2605
                                                                                cell 
(805) 440-1359

  This afternoon Pacific Gas and Electric Company  (PG&E) filed a writ of 
certiorari, asking the Supreme Court to review the June 2, 2006 ruling of 
the United States Court of Appeals For The Ninth Circuit, which held that
it was unreasonable for the NRC [Nuclear Regulatory Agency] to 
categorically dismiss the possibility of terrorist attack on the Storage 
Installation and on the entire Diablo Canyon facility as too "remote and 
highly speculative" to warrant consideration under NEPA [National 
Environmental Policy Act].


The June 2 ruling was in response to a challenge to both the NRC and PG&E 
filed by the San Luis Obispo Mothers For Peace, Santa Lucia Chapter of the 
Sierra Club, and Peg Pinard,

If the Supreme Court agrees to hear this appeal from PG&E, the San Luis 
Obispo Mothers for Peace will continue its efforts to force the NRC to 
require PG&E to follow federal law. "It is reasonable and logical that PG&E 
take into account the environmental effects of terrorist attacks on its 
additional nuclear waste storage facility at the Diablo Canyon nuclear 
plant," according the MFP spokesperson Jane Swanson.

If you would like me to send you PG&E's filing I can do so as an 
attachment.  Just let me know and I'll send it to you. - Molly


- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Tori Woodard is a dear friend of mine who now lives in China. She just got 
back from a 30-day trip through Mongolia. The following quote is from an 
email to me after visiting a temple -

"After we look at some particularly frightening gods, Muugii asks me
what my religion is. I shrug and say I don't have one. Her response
surprises me: "Then you're free!"

Mongolians understand freedom."

Molly Johnson
6290 Hawk Ridge Place
San Miguel, CA 93451
Cell: 805 296-0524

</x-flowed>
*****************************************************************
 23 NRC: NRC Schedules Regulatory Conference to Discuss Harris Nuclear Plant Concern
 
News Release - Region II - 2006-03 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY 
COMMISSION 

Office of Public Affairs, Region II No. II-06-039                         
September 29, 2006 CONTACT:     Ken Clark (404) 562-4416 Roger D. 
Hannah (404) 562-4417     E-mail: opa2@nrc.gov  

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has scheduled a regulatory 
conference with officials of Progress Energy on Friday, October 
13, in Atlanta to discuss an apparent violation of NRC 
requirements at the Harris nuclear power plant, located southwest 
of Raleigh. 

NRC and Progress Energy officials will discuss the significance 
of a finding involving inadequate maintenance on a water chiller 
which would be needed to cool certain emergency components 
designed to add water to the reactor in the event of some 
accident scenarios. The maintenance problem, discovered by plant 
employees, resulted in this system being inoperable for longer 
than allowed under the plants Technical Specifications. The 
chiller has been returned to service and the condition no longer 
exists. The finding was not an immediate safety concern because 
another fully redundant system was available during that time to 
provide cooling if needed. 

The NRC evaluates regulatory performance at commercial nuclear 
power plants with a color- coded system which classifies findings 
as either green, white, yellow or red, in increasing order of 
safety significance. The NRCs preliminary evaluation determined 
that this issue at Harris is white, meaning it is of low to 
moderate safety significance. 

The meeting is scheduled for 10:15 a.m. in the NRCs Region II 
office, located on the 24th floor of the Atlanta Federal Center 
at 61 Forsyth Street SW in Atlanta. The public is invited to 
observe and will have one or more opportunities to talk with NRC 
officials after the business portion, but before the meeting is 
adjourned. Persons wishing to participate in this meeting by 
toll-free audio teleconference should contact the NRCs Son Ninh 
at 404-562-4532 or SON@nrc.gov. 

No decisions on final safety significance, any apparent 
violations or possible enforcement action will be made at the 
conference. Those decisions will be made by NRC officials at a 
later time.   
  
NRC news releases are available through a free list serve 
subscription at the following Web address: 
http://www.nrc.gov/public-involve/listserver.html. The NRC 
homepage at www.nrc.gov also offers a SUBSCRIBE link. E-mail 
notifications are sent to subscribers when news releases are 
posted to NRC's Web site.   

Last revised Friday, September 29, 2006            
*****************************************************************
 24 The Hindu: No secret agenda to cap India's strategic programme - Mulford 

 Saturday, Sep 30, 2006
  
T.S. Subramanian and Kesava Menon 

``U.S. administration committed to getting nuclear deal done''
  
David C. Mulford 

Chennai: " This negotiation was always about a civilian nuclear
programme and that is the agreement. It is not a negotiation
over India's strategic programme. There was no secret agenda to
find a way indirectly to cap India's strategic programme,"
United States Ambassador David C. Mulford said in an interview
to The Hindu here on Thursday. Mr. Mulford declared that the
U.S. administration was committed to getting the deal done
whether or not the Senate passed the legislation immediately. He
said it would be possible to address India's concerns arising
out of the fact that both the Bill adopted by the House of
Representatives and the draft Senate bill deviated significantly
from the agreements reached in July 2005 and March 2006. "We
have judged that it is not the best tactic to change the
amendments on the floor of the Senate. That it is better to make
that effort in the conference between the two Houses." 
Alternatively, Mr. Mulford said, the issue could be tackled when
the 123 agreement was submitted for approval. "That vote will be
an up and down vote. There will not be any opportunity to make
amendments there." 

GNEP issue 

India was denied full access to the Global Nuclear Energy
Partnership (GNEP) because it refused to place one of its fast
breeder reactors under safeguards, Mr. Mulford said: "In the
negotiations, it was very clear that for India to have full
access to the GNEP group, it would need to place one of its fast
breeders under safeguards. India decided that it would not do
that. So, India decided not to become a full-fledged member of
that group." 

GNEP is a research and technology development initiative, led by
the U.S. It aims at expansion of the nuclear power programme in
the world in a manner that will reprocess spent fuel using new
proliferation-resistant technologies. It will address the
question how to dispose of nuclear waste safely and build
reactors that are cost-effective and can be scaled up according
to different countries' requirements.

Copyright © 2006, The Hindu. Republication or redissemination of
*****************************************************************
 25 The Hindu: "The goalposts haven't been shifted and they will not be shifted" 

Opinion / News Analysis : 

 Saturday, Sep 30, 2006
  
T.S. Subramanian and Kesava Menon 

  With the congressional elections scheduled to take place in 
November 2006, time appears to be running out for the passage of 
the legislation that will give effect to the nuclear co-operation 
deal between India and the United States. What are the chances 
that the U.S. Congress will enact the enabling law before its 
current term comes to an end? U.S. AmbassadorDavid C. 
Mulfordprovides answers to this and related questions in an 
interview in Chennai.   

  David C. Mulford: "It is up to India to decide what is in its
    national interests. If it finds that the agreement isn't
 helpful, then I suppose it will not accept it." — PHOTO: Shaju
                              John 

Mr. Ambassador, you said in Jaipur that the United States and
India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act is likely to be passed
before the U.S. Congress finishes its term. What if it isn't and
one of the Houses is captured by the Democrats? 

We have few days left for the Congressional session before they
recess for election. An effort is being made to obtain a floor
vote in the Senate. The House has already voted. This is looking
less likely because there has been some wrangling over
procedural matters even when both the sides, the Republicans and
the Democrats, are bending backwards to emphasise their support
for the Bill on the Indo-U.S. [nuclear] relationship. There are
some differences of opinion on possible amendments and how to
proceed through the Senate, which is a complicated parliamentary
format to work in. It may still be that we get a floor vote. If
we get a floor vote, I believe it will be strongly positive by a
substantial majority. It will be a bi-partisan majority. If we
get that vote, the Bill goes to the Conference of the House and
the Senate. That is a select group of members. They will
rationalise the two Bills into one single Bill and the single
Bill will go back for approval to both the Chambers, which is a
quick action and then be signed by the President. If that does
not happen before the end of this Congress, which will be
adjourning by early December. Then we will have to go back to
square one in the Congress all over again and start with the
committees, the mark-ups for floor action, and the Conference
all over again. How the elections come out will influence that
situation because if the House changes hands those committees
will be chaired by people on the other political party. 

My own view is that it will not matter a great deal [because]
both the parties are very supportive of this agreement. But I am
afraid that it would draw the process out because there wouldn't
be the same pressure on the Congress to act. So it would take
more time to re-position, work through the committees and the
whole process again. But it will not change the commitment of
this Administration to get it done. 

The July 18, 2005 Joint Statement by Prime Minister Manmohan
Singh and President George W. Bush and the March 2006 Separation
Plan are a win-win arrangement for both India and the U.S. in
civilian nuclear cooperation. So why are the House of
Representatives Bill and the draft Senate Bill trying to change
the terms of this agreement into issues of concern over
proliferation and why are efforts being made at capping India's
nuclear weapons programme? In short, why is the U.S. shifting
the goalposts? 

First of all, let me emphasise that the goalposts have not been
shifted and they will not be shifted. The Administration has
reached an agreement on the deal and for the deal to be
implemented, the law has to be changed. The law has to be
changed by the United States Congress. They have had certain
suggestions to make about legislation and they are in the form
of either what we call declaratory points which are not
enforceable but are matters of stated opinion. The other type of
amendments is in the form of substantive amendments. Most of the
people who make those amendments believe that the amendments
they are making are within the spirit of the July 18 Agreement.

The Indian Government does not agree with that and the
Administration does not agree in every case with that either. So
we are trying to soften and change some of those amendments. And
the question is what is the best tactic for doing that? 

We have judged that it is not the best tactic to change the
amendments on the floor of the Senate. That it is better to make
that effort in the conference between the two Houses. The line
that will be taken is that these amendments were put forward in
June. That was very early in the process. They were put forward
in the committees. Now we have floor votes with overwhelming
support. So we would be making the point to the members that the
overwhelming intention of the Congress, both the parties, is to
see that this Agreement is put in place. So let us not have
amendments there we know will make the deal unacceptable to the
Indian Government because in their view these would fall outside
the parameters of the Agreements of July 05 and March 06. 

The second point is that the bilateral agreement which is being
negotiated, the so-called 123 Agreement, is the operational
agreement. When it is concluded, it would be submitted to the
Congress for a vote. That vote will be an up or down vote. There
will not be any opportunity to make amendments there. So what we
will say to the people is, "Your amendment is a very detailed
provision which is changing the law and the issues that you are
worried about are dealt with in the 123 agreement. You will get
a chance to vote on that later. If you don't like what you see,
you can vote against it. We think that the Agreement will be
supportive." We hope that one way or the other, we can soften or
remove some of these amendments. But we do not know because it
is in the hands of the Congress. 

But the Administration knew that the non-proliferation lobby in
the U.S. would get active. Then why did not the Administration
take pre-emptive action to put forth its case before the
Congress before the non-proliferation lobbies got active? 

We did put our case before the Congress immediately after the
legislation was submitted in early May, may be even April. After
the July agreement, I started making calls myself to members of
the Congress in September 05 to lobby them to support this
agreement. But we have a system that permits all parties to put
forward their views. 

The other point you made is incorrect when you said the aim of
these amendments is to cap India's strategic programme. I
disagree with that. This negotiation was always about a civil
nuclear programme and that is the agreement... It is not a
negotiation over India's strategic programme. There was no
secret agenda to find a way indirectly to cap India's strategic
programme. That is simply untrue. The fact that some of these
amendments are objectionable [to India] does not mean that they
are amendments which will effectively cap India's strategic
programme. They have to do with some genuine concerns that
members of the Congress have about matters of non-proliferation,
management and handling of nuclear fuels, and so on. It is a
complicated area. Obviously, there will be different opinions on
things. 

You said you will try to reconcile things in the conference.
That is one way of getting around this. The Senate Bill also
includes a lot of provisions similar to the House Bill. It may
not be in exactly the same language but the thrust is the same.
How much of scope is there for reconciling the two in such a way
that it is acceptable to India? 

There is some scope which I have already explained. We should
first get to know what is really acceptable in the final
analysis or what is unacceptable. May be some of the things in
there will turn out to be acceptable. For example, there are
recording functions which are mentioned, I think, in the House
Bill. These are requirements that would be imposed on the
Administration. They are not imposed on India. 

It is not so much the reporting. It is an issue of waiver. 

I wouldn't worry about that. The Administration will... 
In the draft Senate Bill, there is a provision that any waiver
on nuclear technology transfers to India in areas such as
reprocessing and enrichment or on fuel supplies "shall cease to
be effective if the President determines that India has
detonated a nuclear explosive device after the date of the
enactment of this Act." 

That is an issue that is pretty well taken care of and will not
be an issue there. I can't commit on behalf of the United States
Congress but my understanding is that that issue can be worked
out. I think you might be scrutinising these issues closely. 

After India conducted its nuclear test in 1974, embargoes and
technology denial regimes were imposed on it. But India survived
for 30 years. Again, after the 1998 nuclear tests, sanctions
were imposed on India. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh made it
clear twice in Parliament in August that if extraneous
conditions, not envisaged in the agreement, find their way into
the Congressional legislation and they are going to hurt India,
India will "draw the appropriate conclusions." Anil Kakodkar,
Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, has also said that India has
got its own three-stage nuclear power programme and that it
would go on. So the bottom-line is clear: India will not be
unduly worried if this nuclear deal falls through. What is your
reaction to that? 

My reaction to what? 

If the deal does not come through, India will not be unduly
worried because India has got its own three-stage nuclear power
programme and it will go on. 

It is up to India to decide what is in its national interests.
If it finds that the agreement isn't helpful, then I suppose it
will not accept it. But that is up to India to decide. It is not
the impression I have that India thinks this deal is
unimportant. I think they think that it is very important; very
important to finish, to put into position. But India is a
sovereign nation. It will make its own decisions. It is fair to
say that you are scrutinising very closely a very complicated
process which is being handled fully transparently by two major
democracies. That is a recipe for some complication. This is not
a deal, which is being cut in the backroom somewhere. This is a
deal which is well agreed in the full light of the day and it is
being processed by both the Governments in accordance with their
democratic arrangements. So it is a very impressive process and
it also by definition has some imperfections in it. Right? I
think you will agree with that? But we should get some credit
for doing it within the full, transparent democratic process in
both the Governments. Both of us should get credit for that. 

The U.S. President is very much interested in the Global Nuclear
Energy Partnership (GNEP). There are plans to set up
international reprocessing centres under the GNEP, especially in
the P-5 countries. There is a strong feeling in the nuclear
community in India that India is being played out of these
international reprocessing centres although it has mastered the
art of reprocessing (that is, India will not host any
international reprocessing facility). Why isn't India being
given its due recognition in this? 

They [India] weren't cut out. In the negotiations, it was very
clear that for India to have full access to the GNEP group, it
would need to place one of its fast breeder reactors under
safeguards. India decided that it would not do that. So India
decided not to become a full-fledged member of that group. I
guess if they decided to do that later [place one of its fast
breeder reactors under safeguards], they will not then be
restricted. That was the understanding at that time. 

Even then you will insist that India should place one of its
breeder reactors under safeguards. 

That was the condition in the negotiations. That was well
understood and a decision was made by India not to do that.

Copyright © 2006, The Hindu. Republication or redissemination of
*****************************************************************
 26 Newslab.ru: Rosatom head: No worker will be left without a job after
stoppage of Zheleznogorsk reactor / Krasnoyarsk News 
		 		 		
9/29/2006 6:59:15 PM  

After the stoppage of the last reactor at Zheleznogorsk Mining
Chemical Combine no worker will be left without a job, as Sergey
Kirienko, the head of Rosatom (Federal Atomic Energy Agency),
stated at the press conference in Moscow on September, 28. 

According to him, in the first place, a group of workers will
keep working at the reactor after it is stopped for at least 10
years. Moreover, new production workshops will open at the
Mining Chemical Combine, first of all, a silicon production
plant. 'It is a very interesting project,' Kirienko noted, 'We
have agreed with Krasnoyarsk Territory authorities upon joint
maintenance of silicon production. Moreover, we will not only
restrict ourselves with the raw material production but are also
going to organize procession of silicon. Some of other MCC
workers will be employed in this field.' 

'Money for quick building of a dry depository for spent nuclear
fuel and upgrading of today's storage system is provided in the
plan of primary actions. Workers will be needed for this project
too,' the Rosatom head added, 'So no worker will be left without
a job after stoppage of MCC.' 									

2004-2006 Newslab.ru  
*****************************************************************
 27 Rueters: TEPCO to shut Fukushima nuclear unit for 1 month

Friday September 29, 4:48 PM
 
 TOKYO, Sept 29 (Reuters) - Tokyo Electric Power Co. Inc.
(TEPCO) said on Friday it plans to begin shutting down the
784,000-kilowatt No. 4 nuclear power generation unit at its
Fukushima-Daiichi plant in northern Japan on Sunday for
unplanned maintenance. 

TEPCO, Asia's biggest utility, said the unit was operating
normally but that it has decided to replace fuel rods as a
precaution to ensure stable electricity generation for peak
winter demand. The shutdown will last about a month, TEPCO said
in a statement. 


Copyright © 2005 Reuters Limited. All rights reserved.






*****************************************************************
 28 newsobserver.com: Council worried by Harris plant
 
Friday, September 29, 2006

Raleigh · Durham · Cary · Chapel Hill   

Resolution OK'd over chamber plea 

Jesse James DeConto, Staff Writer

CHAPEL HILL - The head of the Chapel Hill-Carrboro Chamber of

Commerce went to bat for Progress Energy this week, but he
couldn't stop the Town Council from taking a whack at the
Shearon Harris nuclear power plant.

Aaron Nelson called five council members and reached Mark
Kleinschmidt, Cam Hill and Sally Greene before Wednesday night's
council meeting. He asked them to hold off on a resolution
pressing the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for stricter fire
safety enforcement at the Wake County plant until they heard
from Progress Energy, a chamber member.

Still, the council voted unanimously to ask the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission to refuse to consider early renewal of the
company's license. The current license is good until 2026, and
Progress Energy wants to extend it through 2046.

Critical of council

Nelson said the chamber had no opinion on the safety of Shearon
Harris, but he criticized the council's relying heavily on the
North Carolina Waste Awareness and Reduction Network in making
its decision.

"I think they've heard from the prosecution and made a decision
without hearing from the defense," Nelson said.

The council did hear Wednesday night from Progress Energy's
community relations manager, Marty Clayton, who said the plant
is safe.

He said the plant's 24-hour fire patrols are "compensatory
measures." These are necessary because of substandard insulation
around potential fire sources such as electrical systems.

Clayton could not answer questions about how long the plant has
been out of compliance or how long it would remain so. On
Thursday, he sent an e-mail message to council members saying
the plant has been using the "fire watch" method since 2002 and
has until 2015 to come into full compliance.

NC WARN has said fire safety at the plant should not depend on
"heroic" people, but Clayton praised the plant's employees.

Kleinschmidt took issue with Nelson's and the company's saying
the council was trying to "shut down" the plant and with
Clayton's focus on the good people who work at the plant, rather
on than the executives who have decided not to spend the money
necessary to bring the plant up to NRC regulations.

"It serves their interest to characterize this resolution ... as
the harshest possible attack on Shearon Harris," Kleinschmidt
said Thursday. "We're not saying we want to snatch the bread
from the mouths of the children of the people who work there."

Kleinschmidt pointed out that fines -- or the necessary
improvements at the plant -- would be alternatives to the NRC
suspension.

"The resolution doesn't call for closure of the plant," he said.

At Wednesday's meeting, Greene emphasized that the council
wasn't trying to shut down the plant, even though the resolution
did support NC WARN's legal action asking the NRC to suspend the
Shearon Harris license or levy fines if Progress Energy does not
immediately move to meet the federal fire code.

"You are not in any way shut out of this conversation," Greene
told Clayton.

The council invited Clayton to appear at a community forum being
planned to discuss safety at the plant. A date for that forum
has not yet been set. Staff writer Jesse James DeConto can be
reached at 932-8760 or jdeconto@newsobserver.com.   

        		 
 © Copyright 2006, The News & Observer Publishing Company
A subsidiary of The McClatchy Company
*****************************************************************
 29 RIA Novosti: Kiriyenko to discuss nuclear power unit construction in China
 
29/ 09/ 2006                                  

MOSCOW, September 29 (RIA Novosti) - Russia's nuclear chief will
discuss the construction of a second energy unit at a nuclear
power plant in China during a visit to the country on September
29-October 3. 

Russia's nuclear power equipment and service export monopoly
Atomstroiexport has been building the Tianwan NPP, which uses
improved VVER-1000 reactors and K-100-6/3000 turbogenerators,
under the terms of a Russian-Chinese agreement signed in 1992. 

Sergei Kiriyenko, the head of the Russian Agency for Nuclear
Power, said the first unit of the Tianwan NPP was scheduled to
be put into industrial operation in November this year. 

"I am also planning to discuss the construction of the second
energy unit of this power plant during my visit to China,"
Kiriyenko said. 

Kiriyenko will also take part in a session of a subcommittee on
bilateral cooperation in the nuclear power sector and will meet
with the chairman of China's National Defense Science,
Technology and Industry Commission. 

© 2005 RIA Novosti   
*****************************************************************
 30 RIA Novosti: Russian specialists to bring Chinese reactor up to 75% capacity
 
29/ 09/ 2006                                  

MOSCOW, September 29 (RIA Novosti) - Russian experts are ready
to bring the first unit of China's Tianwan nuclear power plant
up to 75% of output capacity by October 10, the vice president
of Russia's nuclear power equipment and service export monopoly
said Friday.

 Atomstroiexport has been building the Tianwan NPP, which uses
improved VVER-1000 reactors and K-100-6/3000 turbogenerators,
under the terms of a Russian-Chinese agreement signed in 1992.

 Atomstroiexport vice-president Yevgeny Reshetnikov said,
"Russian specialists are able to meet the previously agreed date
to hand over the first power unit of the Tianwan NPP in November
2006. By October 10, they will be ready to operate the first
unit at 75% of capacity, and we are currently waiting for the
Chinese side's authorization for this."

 A spokesman for Russia's Federal Agency for Nuclear Power,
Sergei Novikov, said the 10th session of the Russian-Chinese
sub-committee for nuclear issues had been held in Beijing
earlier Friday.

© 2005 RIA Novosti   
*****************************************************************
 31 reviewjournal.com: U.S.-India nuke treaty hits snags
 
  Sep. 28, 2006

By STEVE TETREAULT<br>STEPHENS WASHINGTON BUREAU

WASHINGTON -- Yucca Mountain amendments are complicating Senate 
debate on a nuclear cooperation agreement between the United 
States and India. 

A bill carrying out the agreement would allow U.S. companies to 
sell nuclear reactors and nuclear fuel to India for the first 
time in decades while requiring the South Asian nation to work 
with the United States on nonproliferation matters. 

Sen. Harry Reid, D-Nev., supports the bill but is trying to add
an amendment requiring an affirmative vote from Congress in the
event that spent fuel from India might be shipped or stored in
the United States. 

The government has designated Yucca Mountain in Nevada as a
repository site for U.S. nuclear waste. Bush administration
officials have said the Nevada site may someday play a role in
the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership, an international fuel
reprocessing initiative. 

Reid's amendment irked Sen. Larry Craig, R-Idaho, when it
surfaced last week, Senate aides said. 

Craig proposed a counter-amendment directing the Energy
Secretary to start shipping nuclear waste to Yucca Mountain "as
soon as practicable." 

Both amendments were on a schedule for debate proposed Tuesday
by Majority Leader Bill Frist, R-Tenn. Amendments from Sens.
Russ Feingold, D-Wisc., Byron Dorgan, D-N.D., and Barbara Boxer,
D-Calif., also were announced. 

But the India bill was put on the back burner when Frist and
Reid, the Senate minority leader, could not agree on a schedule
for the bill. Reid said the bill probably will be considered
after the election. 

Reid said his amendment is the same as one that was put on the
India bill in the House by Rep. Shelley Berkley, D-Nev. The
provision was accepted by the Bush administration, according to
Richard Urey, Berkley chief of staff. 

A second Reid amendment would require an annual report to
Congress on how India manages its nuclear waste. 

According to the Nuclear Energy Institute, India has generated
5,000 metric tons of used nuclear fuel in its reactors. 	   

Copyright © Las Vegas Review-Journal, 1997 - 2006
 Stephens Media GroupPrivacy Statement
*****************************************************************
 32 NRC: Draft Report for Comment: Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 
 
                        FR Doc E6-16013 
[Federal Register: September 29, 2006 (Volume 71, Number 189)] 
[Notices] [Page 57578-57579] From the Federal Register Online via 
GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr29se06-137]                         
 
Standard Review Plan, Section 13.3, ``Emergency Planning'' 
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
 
ACTION: Notice of availability and request for comments.
 
SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) Office of 
Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) and Office of Nuclear Security 
and Incident Response (NSIR) has issued Section 13.3, Second 
Draft Revision 3, ``Emergency Planning,'' of NUREG-0800, 
``Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports 
for Nuclear Power Plants, LWR Edition,'' for public comment.
 
 
DATES: Comments on this document should be submitted by November 
13, 2006. To ensure efficient and complete comment resolution, 
comments should include references to the section, page, and line 
numbers of the document to which the comment applies.
 
 
ADDRESSES: NUREG-0800, including Section 13.3, Second Draft 
Revision 3, is available for inspection and copying for a fee at 
the Commission's Public Document Room, NRC's Headquarters 
Building, 11555 Rockville Pike (First Floor), Rockville, 
Maryland. The Public Document Room is open from 7:45 a.m. to 4:15 
p.m., Monday through Friday, except on Federal holidays. 
NUREG-0800, including Section 13.3, Second Draft Revision 3, is 
also available electronically on the NRC Web site at: 
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr0800 
/ , and from the ADAMS Electronic Reading Room on the NRC Web 
site at: http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (ADAMS 
Accession No. ML062550293). Members of the public are invited and 
encouraged to submit written comments. Comments may be 
accompanied by additional relevant information or supporting 
data. A number of methods may be used to submit comments. Written 
comments should be mailed to Chief, Rulemaking, Directives, and 
Editing Branch, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Mail Stop 
T6-D59, Washington, DC 20555-0001.
 
Hand-deliver comments to: 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD, 
between 7:30 a.m. and 4:15 p.m., Federal workdays. Comments may 
be submitted electronically to: nrcrep@nrc.gov. Comments also may 
be submitted electronically through the comment form available on 
the NRC Web site at:
 
[[Page 57579]] 
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr0800 
/.
 
Please specify the report number NUREG-0800, Section 13.3, Second 
Draft Revision 3, in your comments, and send your comments by 
November 13, 2006.
 
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION, CONTACT: Bruce Musico, Mail Stop O-6H2, 
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001.
 
Telephone: (301) 415-2310; internet: bjm2@nrc.gov.
 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This Standard Review Plan, NUREG-0800, 
has been prepared to establish criteria that the NRR and NSIR 
staff responsible for the review of applications to construct and 
operate nuclear power plants intends to use in evaluating whether 
an applicant/ licensee meets the NRC's regulations. The Standard 
Review Plan is not a substitute for the NRC's regulations, and 
compliance with it is not required. However, applicants are 
required to identify differences in design features, analytical 
techniques, and procedural measures proposed for a facility and 
corresponding SRP acceptance criteria, and evaluate how the 
proposed alternatives to the SRP acceptance criteria provide an 
acceptable method of complying with the NRC's regulations.
 
The standard review plan sections are keyed to Regulatory Guide 
1.70, ``Standard Format and Content of Safety Analysis Reports 
for Nuclear Power Plants (LWR Edition).'' Not all sections of the 
standard format have a corresponding review plan section. For 
combined license applications submitted under 10 CFR part 52, the 
applicability of standard review plan sections will be based on 
the Regulatory Guide DG- 1145, ``Combined License Applications 
for Nuclear Power Plants (LWR Edition),'' as superceded by the 
final guide.
 
The proposed revision is a rewrite of the July 1981 SRP Section 
13.3, Revision 2, and provides staff guidance for the review of 
emergency planning information submitted in license applications 
under 10 CFR parts 50 and 52. In addition to updating the July 
1981 SRP section, the proposed revision includes some of the 
proposed changes in the April 1996 draft Revision 3 to SRP 
section 13.3. The proposed revision consists mostly of changes 
that identify specific regulations and guidance, and provides SRP 
acceptance criteria for the various applications submitted under 
both 10 CFR parts 50 and 52. The most significant changes reflect 
the new application processes allowed by 10 CFR part 52. This 
also includes the incorporation of Commission policy on the use 
of emergency planning inspections, tests, analyses, and 
acceptance criteria (EP-ITAAC), which is addressed in the 
February 22, 2006, SRM SECY-05-0197, ``Review of Operational 
Programs in a Combined License Application and Generic Emergency 
Planning Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria'' 
(ML052770225). In addition, the proposed revision incorporates 
experience gained from the first three early site permit (ESP) 
application reviews, and the standard design certification 
applications. The license application review processes in both 10 
CFR part 50 and part 52 utilize the same existing emergency 
planning requirements contained primarily in 10 CFR 50.47 and 
Appendix E to part 50.
 
While the proposed SRP Section 13.3 revision is a complete 
rewrite of Section 13.3, it does not contain new or unreviewed 
staff positions. It does, however, identify a new NUREG/CR report 
on evacuation time estimates (ETEs). Guidance on the development 
of ETEs was provided in November 1980 in NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, 
Revision 1, ``Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of 
Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support 
of Nuclear Power Plants,'' and that guidance is still used today. 
The staff will continue to use the established guidance and 
criteria in Appendix 4, ``Evacuation Time Estimates Within the 
Plume Exposure Pathway Emergency Planning Zone,'' of NUREG-0654/ 
FEMA-REP-1, as the basis for compliance with applicable 
regulations.
 
The new (January 2005) ETE report, NUREG/CR-6863, ``Development 
of Evacuation Time Estimate Studies for Nuclear Power Plants,'' 
is identified in the proposed SRP Section 13.3 revision as 
providing information relating to performing an ETE analysis. In 
March 1992, NUREG/CR-4831, ``State of the Art in Evacuation Time 
Estimate Studies for Nuclear Power Plants,'' was written to 
provide updated information, assumptions, and methods to be used 
in performing ETE studies.
 
NUREG/ CR-6863 updates NUREG/CR-4831 and integrates new 
technologies in traffic management, computer modeling, and 
communication systems to identify additional tools useful in the 
development of new, or updates to existing, ETEs.
 
Of note, the proposed revision does introduce the option to use 
EP- ITAAC in an ESP application, which is consistent with the 
ongoing 10 CFR part 52 rulemaking (see proposed 10 CFR 
52.17(b)(3)). Prior to the current 10 CFR part 52 rulemaking, the 
rules only addressed the use of EP-ITAAC with a combined license 
(COL) application but not at the ESP stage. The staff's position, 
which is supported by public comments, is that the extension of 
EP-ITAAC to ESP applications is not precluded in the existing 
rules, and is necessary in order to accommodate an applicant's 
submission of a ``complete and integrated emergency plan'' at the 
ESP stage, as well as provide an additional level of flexibility 
for an ESP applicant. Without allowing the use of EP-ITAAC (or 
other such placeholders) at the ESP stage, the staff would be 
unable to reach a reasonable assurance finding at the time of 
application. The use of EP-ITAAC would allow the staff to make 
its findings based on proposed, and not yet implemented, 
emergency plans. Table 13.3-1 provides a proposed set of 
allowable EP-ITAAC (for use at either the ESP or COL application 
stage). The asterisked/bolded text in the table represents the 
earlier set of COL EP-ITAAC that was approved by the Commission 
in SRM SECY-05-0197. Table 13.3-1 reflects a process of review 
allowed by 10 CFR part 52, and does not contain new or unreviewed 
staff positions relating to emergency planning requirements.
 
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 25th day of September, 2006.
 
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
 
Robert Tregoning, Branch Chief, New Reactor Infrastructure 
Guidance, Development Branch, Division of New Reactor Licensing.
 
[FR Doc. E6-16013 Filed 9-28-06; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590-01-P

 
*****************************************************************
 33 NRC: Notice of Determination That No Further Action Is Required Under 
 
                        FR Doc E6-16014 
[Federal Register: September 29, 2006 (Volume 71, Number 189)] 
[Notices] [Page 57576-57577] From the Federal Register Online via 
GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr29se06-135] [[Page 
57576]]
 
the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Authority at the Union 
Carbide Corporation Facility in Lawrenceburg, TN AGENCY: U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). ACTION: Notice of 
Determination that no further remedial action is required.
 
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Kenneth Kalman, Materials 
Decommissioning Section, Division of Waste Management and 
Environmental Protection, NRC, Washington, DC 20555; telephone: 
(301) 415-6664; fax: (301) 415-5398; or e-mail at: .
 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Introduction The NRC is providing notice that it has 
determined that no further remedial action under the NRC's 
authority is required at the Union Carbide Corporation (UCAR) 
site located at Highway 43 South, in Lawrenceburg, Tennessee (the 
Site).
 
UCAR was issued Special Nuclear Materials License No.
 
SNM-724 (SNM- 724), on August 26, 1963, for testing equipment and 
nuclear fuels development. UCAR also held License No. SMB-720 
(SMB-720), which authorized the possession of source material at 
the Site.
 
SNM-724 was terminated on June 4, 1974, and the U.S. Atomic 
Energy Commission (AEC) released the site for unrestricted use. 
SMB-720 was superceded by the State of Tennessee License No. 
S-5002-H8 and was terminated on August 28, 1975.
 
SNM-724 authorized possession of up to 500 grams (g) of fully- 
enriched (2) direct beta/gamma. Volumetric contamination in other 
areas of the site was found to be above the release criteria: (1) 
Soil surrounding the incinerator pad; (2) sediment in the 
manholes and cooling water tanks; (3) laundry sump tank; and (4) 
the surface layer of concrete flooring. A core sample was taken 
near the incinerator pad. The range for total uranium 
concentration was 1.33 to 3,655 picocuries per gram (pCi/g). The 
estimated average depth of the soil contamination was one foot 
resulting in a contaminated soil volume estimate of 500 cubic 
feet.
 
Uranium was also the primary contaminant in Building 5 Annex. 
Surface contamination was found in four rooms in Building 5 
(Rooms 106, 107, 108, 110), ranging from background to 428,698 
dpm/100 cm2 direct beta/gamma. Volumetric contamination above the 
release criteria was found in three areas in and around Building 
5: (1) Sink trap; (2) concrete flooring; and (3) asphalt outside 
exit.
 
Contamination in the Metallurgy Laboratory consisted of localized 
surface contamination on the tops of cabinets. There was no 
indication of radioactive material above the release criteria 
beyond the former restricted area boundary in the ground water, 
settling basins, or former sanitary sewer system.
 
UCAR voluntarily conducted remediation activities without a 
license, as its license was terminated in 1974. Although UCAR was 
not a licensee, NRC staff conducted periodic inspections to 
ensure that remediation was performed in accordance with current 
regulations and release limits.
 
As part of its remediation activities, UCAR amassed fifteen (15) 
24-yard3 intermodal containers of solid low-level radiological 
waste. UCAR reported concentrations in the intermodal containers 
averaging approximately 25 pCi/g of U-235 and 1,082 pCi/g of 
total uranium.
 
On February 15 and 16, 2006, NRC staff conducted an inspection of 
the UCAR site that included Building 10, Building 5 Annex, the 
Metallurgy Lab, the incinerator pad and other areas, as well as 
the intermodal containers (Inspection Report 07000784/2005001). 
This inspection found that residual uranium contamination on 
surfaces and soil met the criteria in the remediation plan for 
unrestricted use. The remediation activities in Building 10 and 
the incinerator pad resulted in complete removal of the 
structures and the concrete floor pads so that no surfaces were 
available for surface contamination measurements. Gamma scans of 
areas where an incinerator pad, drain lines, and a buried water 
cooling tank had been located, as well as scans of various 
non-remediated areas found no areas of elevated gamma exposure 
rates. Direct alpha measurement of the Building 5 Annex and the 
Metallurgy Lab were all less than 2000 dpm/100cm2. The inspector 
found no areas of elevated gamma exposure rates in the scanned 
areas.
 
Soil samples were taken from Site areas based on operational 
history and remediation activities and were analyzed by the Oak 
Ridge Institute for Science and Education for isotopic 
concentrations of U- 234, U-235, and U-238. All samples were 
surface soil, collected within the top four inches of the soil 
surface. One sample from the Building 5 Annex showed elevated 
concentrations of U-234, but when averaged over the survey unit 
was found to be within the derived concentration guidelines for 
soils at the site.
 
 
[[Page 57577]] The NRC inspector examined the intermodal 
containers while they were stored at the site. The amount of 
U-235 in the intermodals ranged from 75 to 206 grams per 
intermodal. One of the intermodals contained a sump from Building 
10 and had a contact exposure rate of 65 microroentgens/hour. 
Measurements of the other containers were not significantly above 
background. On August 14, 2006, UCAR provided copies of the 
shipping manifests demonstrating that the 15 intermodal 
containers had been accepted for disposal by EnergySolutions in 
Utah.
 
UCAR provided a final radiological status survey and the NRC 
staff performed an independent dose assessment to demonstrate the 
site meets the license termination criteria in Subpart E of 10 
CFR Part 20.
 
Based on its reviews of UCAR submittals and its own analyses and 
assessments, the NRC staff has determined that the site meets the 
unrestricted release dose criteria in 10 CFR Part 20.1402 and 
that no further remedial action under the NRC's authority is 
required at the UCAR site. The staff prepared a Safety Evaluation 
Report (SER) (ML062580415) to support its determination.
 
II. Further Information In accordance with 10 CFR Part 2.790 of 
the NRC's ``Rules of Practice,'' details with respect to this 
action, including the SER, are available electronically at the 
NRC's Electronic Reading Room at .
 
From this site, you can access the NRC's Agency wide Document 
Access and Management System (ADAMS), which provides text and 
image files of NRC's public documents. The ADAMS accession number 
for the termination letter and SER, ``Safety Evaluation Report to 
Support the Determination that No Further Action is Required 
under the Authority of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission at 
the Union Carbide Corporation Facility in Lawrenceburg, TN'' 
(Docket Nos. 070-00784 and 040-07044) is ADAMS No. ML062620512. 
If you do not have access to ADAMS or if there are problems in 
accessing a document located in ADAMS, contact the NRC Public 
Document Room Reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or 
by e-mail to: .
 
This document may also be viewed electronically on the public 
computers located at the NRC's PDR, O-1-F21, One White Flint 
North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD 20852. The PDR 
reproduction contractor will copy documents for a fee.
 
Dated at NRC, Rockville, MD, this 22nd day of September, 2006.
 
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
 
Keith I. McConnell, Deputy Director, Decommissioning Directorate, 
Division of Waste Management and Environmental Protection, Office 
of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.
 
[FR Doc. E6-16014 Filed 9-28-06; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590-01-P

 
*****************************************************************
 34 NRC: Exelon Generation Company, LLC, Byron Station, Unit Nos. 1 and
 
                        FR Doc E6-16015 
[Federal Register: September 29, 2006 (Volume 71, Number 189)] 
[Notices] [Page 57577-57578] From the Federal Register Online via 
GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr29se06-136]                         
 
2; Braidwood Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2; Environmental Assessment 
and Finding of No Significant Impact The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC) is considering issuance of an exemption from the 
requirements of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 
CFR) Part 50, Section 50.60(a), for Facility Operating License 
Nos. NPF-37, NPF-66, NPF-72 and NPF-77, issued to Exelon 
Generation Company, LLC (the licensee), for operation of the 
Byron Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 (Byron), and Braidwood Station, 
Unit Nos. 1 and 2 (Braidwood), located in Ogle County, Illinois 
and Will County, Illinois, respectively. Therefore, as required 
by 10 CFR 51.21, the NRC is issuing this environmental assessment 
and finding of no significant impact.
 
Environmental Assessment Identification of the Proposed Action 
The proposed action would allow the use of the methods described 
in Westinghouse Commercial Atomic Power Report (WCAP)-16143, 
``Reactor Vessel Closure Head/Vessel Flange Requirements 
Evaluation for Byron/ Braidwood Units 1 and 2,'' dated November 
2003, in calculating the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) 
pressure-temperature (P-T) limits for Byron and Braidwood, in 
lieu of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix G, ``Fracture Toughness 
Requirements,'' paragraph IV.A.2.c as required by 10 CFR 
50.60(a). The proposed action is in accordance with the 
licensee's application for exemption dated October 3, 2005.
 
The Need for the Proposed Action The proposed action is needed 
because utilization of WCAP-16143 will enhance overall plant 
safety by widening the P-T operating window, especially in the 
region of low temperature operations. The primary two safety 
benefits that would be realized are the following: (1) A 
reduction in the potential challenges to the low-temperature 
overpressure protection system and resultant inadvertent opening 
of a power operated relief valve, and (2) a reduction in the risk 
of damaging the reactor coolant pump seals due to pump operation 
under conditions in which it is difficult to maintain adequate 
seal differential pressure to ensure proper pump operation.
 
Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50 contains requirements for P-T limits 
for the primary system and requirements for metal temperature of 
the closure head flange and vessel flange regions. The P-T limits 
are to be determined using the methodology of American Society of 
Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (ASME Code), 
Section XI, Appendix G, but the flange temperature requirements 
are specified in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix G. This regulation 
(Table 1 of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix G) states that the metal 
temperature at the closure flange regions must exceed the 
material unirradiated nil-ductility transition reference 
temperature (RTNDT) by at least 120 [deg]F for normal operation 
when the pressure exceeds 20 percent of the pre- service 
hydrostatic test pressure.
 
This requirement was originally based on concerns about the 
fracture margin in the closure flange region. During the boltup 
process, outside surface stresses in this region typically reach 
over 70 percent of the steady state stress, without being at 
steady state temperature. The margin of 120 [deg]F and the 
pressure limitation of 20 percent of hydrostatic pressure were 
developed in the mid-1970s using the ASME Code lower bound crack 
arrest/dynamic test fracture toughness (KIa) to ensure that 
appropriate margins would be maintained.
 
Improved knowledge of fracture toughness and other issues that 
affect the integrity of the reactor vessel have led to the recent 
change to allow the use of the ASME Code lower bound static crack 
initiation fracture toughness (KIc) in the development of P- T 
curves, as contained in ASME Code Case N-640, ``Alternative 
Reference Fracture Toughness for Development of P-T Limit Curves 
for Section XI, Division 1.'' ASME Code Case N-640 has been 
approved for use without conditions by the NRC staff in 
Regulatory Guide 1.147, ``Inservice Inspection Code Case 
Acceptability, ASME Section XI, Division 1,'' published in August 
2005.
 
However, P-T limit curves can still produce operational 
constraints by limiting the operational range available
 
[[Page 57578]] to the operator during heatup and cooldown of the 
plant, especially when considering requirements in the closure 
head flange and the vessel flange regions. Implementing the P-T 
curves that use KIc material fracture toughness without exempting 
the flange requirement of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix G, would place 
a restricted operating window in the temperature range associated 
with the closure head flange and reactor vessel flange, without a 
commensurate increase in plant safety.
 
Environmental Impacts of the Proposed Action The NRC has 
completed its evaluation of the proposed action and concludes 
that the more conservative minimum temperature requirements 
related to footnote (2) to Table 1 of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix G 
are not necessary to meet the underlying intent of 10 CFR Part 50 
Appendix G, to protect the Byron and Braidwood RPVs from brittle 
fracture during normal operation under both core critical and 
core non-critical conditions and RPV hydrostatic and leak test 
conditions.
 
The details of the NRC staff's safety evaluation will be provided 
in the exemption that will be issued as part of the letter to the 
licensee approving the exemption to the regulation.
 
The proposed action will not significantly increase the 
probability or consequences of accidents. No changes are being 
made in the types of effluents that may be released off site. 
There is no significant increase in the amount of any effluent 
released off site. There is no significant increase in 
occupational or public radiation exposure. Therefore, there are 
no significant radiological environmental impacts associated with 
the proposed action.
 
With regard to potential non-radiological impacts, the proposed 
action does not have a potential to affect any historic sites.
 
It does not affect non-radiological plant effluents and has no 
other environmental impact. Therefore, there are no significant 
non- radiological environmental impacts associated with the 
proposed action.
 
Accordingly, the NRC concludes that there are no significant 
environmental impacts associated with the proposed action.
 
Environmental Impacts of the Alternatives to the Proposed Action 
As an alternative to the proposed action, the NRC staff 
considered denial of the proposed action (i.e., the ``no-action'' 
alternative). Denial of the application would result in no change 
in current environmental impacts. The environmental impacts of 
the proposed action and the alternative action are similar.
 
Alternative Use of Resources The action does not involve the use 
of any different resources than those previously considered in 
the Final Environmental Statement for the Byron and Braidwood 
stations, NUREG-0848 dated April 1982, and NUREG-1026 dated June 
1984, respectively.
 
Agencies and Persons Consulted In accordance with its stated 
policy, on June 19, 2006, the NRC staff consulted with the 
Illinois State official, Mr. Frank Niziolek of the Illinois 
Emergency Management Agency, regarding the environmental impact 
of the proposed action. The State official had no comments.
 
Finding of No Significant Impact On the basis of the 
environmental assessment, the NRC concludes that the proposed 
action will not have a significant effect on the quality of the 
human environment. Accordingly, the NRC has determined not to 
prepare an environmental impact statement for the proposed 
action.
 
For further details with respect to the proposed action, see the 
licensee's letter dated October 3, 2005. Documents may be 
examined, and/or copied for a fee, at the NRC's Public Document 
Room (PDR), located at One White Flint North, Public File Area O1 
F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland. 
Publicly available records will be accessible electronically from 
the Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) 
Public Electronic Reading Room on the Internet at the NRC Web 
site, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. Persons who do 
not have access to ADAMS or who encounter problems in accessing 
the documents located in ADAMS should contact the NRC PDR 
Reference staff by telephone at 1-800-397-4209 or 301-415-4737, 
or send an e-mail to pdr@nrc.gov. Dated at Rockville, Maryland, 
this 22nd day of September 2006.
 
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
 
Robert F. Kuntz, Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch III-2, 
Division of Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of Nuclear 
Reactor Regulation.
 
[FR Doc. E6-16015 Filed 9-28-06; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590-01-P

 
*****************************************************************
 35 NRC: STP Nuclear Operating Company; Notice of Withdrawal of 
 
                        FR Doc E6-16016 
[Federal Register: September 29, 2006 (Volume 71, Number 189)] 
[Notices] [Page 57575] From the Federal Register Online via GPO 
Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr29se06-134]                         
 
Application for Amendments to Facility Operating Licenses The 
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC/the Commission) has 
granted the request of STP Nuclear Operating Company (the 
licensee) to withdraw its July 4, 2005, application for the 
proposed amendments to Facility Operating License No. NPF-76, to 
be issued to the licensee for operation of the South Texas 
Project, Unit 1; and Facility Operating License No. NPF-80, to be 
issued to the licensee for South Texas Project, Unit 2; located 
in Matagorda County, Texas.
 
The proposed amendments would have modified the facility 
technical specifications (TSs) to extend allowed outage time for 
TS 3.7.4, ``Essential Cooling Water System,'' and associated TSs 
for those systems that are supported by Essential Cooling Water, 
from 7 days to 14 days.
 
The Commission had previously issued a Notice of Consideration of 
Issuance of Amendments published in the Federal Register on 
August 2, 2005 (70 FR 44403). However, by letter dated September 
13, 2006, the NRC informed the licensee that the NRC would 
consider the proposed application for the amendments to be 
withdrawn unless the licensee notified the NRC by September 21, 
2006, that our understanding was incorrect. Thus, the July 4, 
2005, application for the amendments is considered to be 
withdrawn by the licensee.
 
For further details with respect to this action, see (1) the 
application for the amendments dated July 4, 2005, and (2) the 
NRC staff's letter dated September 21, 2006, which withdrew the 
application for the license amendments. Documents may be 
examined, and/or copied for a fee, at the NRC's Public Document 
Room (PDR), located at One White Flint North, Public File Area O1 
F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland. 
Publicly available records will be accessible electronically from 
the Agencywide Documents Access and Management Systems (ADAMS) 
Public Electronic Reading Room on the internet at the NRC Web 
site, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm.html. Persons who do not have 
access to ADAMS or who encounter problems in accessing the 
documents located in ADAMS should contact the NRC PDR Reference 
staff by telephone at 1-800-397-4209, or 301-415-4737 or by 
e-mail to pdr@nrc.gov. Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 25th 
day of September 2006.
 
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
 
Mohan C. Thadani, Senior Project Manager, Plant Licensing Branch 
IV, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of Nuclear 
Reactor Regulation.
 
[FR Doc. E6-16016 Filed 9-28-06; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590-01-P

 
*****************************************************************
 36 NRC: Review Methodology for Seismically Initiated Event Sequences; 
 
                        FR Doc E6-16017 
[Federal Register: September 29, 2006 (Volume 71, Number 189)] 
[Notices] [Page 57579-57584] From the Federal Register Online via 
GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr29se06-138]                         
 
Availability of Final Interim Staff Guidance Document AGENCY: 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
 
ACTION: Notice of availability.
 
SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is announcing 
the availability of final interim staff guidance (ISG) document, 
``HLWRS- ISG-01, Review Methodology for Seismically Initiated 
Event Sequences,'' and NRC responses to the public comments 
received on that document. The ISG clarifies or refines the 
guidance provided in the Yucca Mountain Review Plan (YMRP) 
(NUREG-1804, Revision 2, July 2003). The YMRP provides
 
[[Page 57580]] guidance to NRC staff for evaluating a potential 
license application to receive and possess high-level radioactive 
waste at a geologic repository constructed or operated at Yucca 
Mountain, Nevada.
 
 
ADDRESSES: The document HLWRS-ISG-01 is available electronically 
at NRC's Electronic Reading Room, at .
 
From this site, you can access NRC's Agencywide Documents Access 
and Management System (ADAMS), which provides text and image 
files of NRC's public documents. The ADAMS accession number for 
the ISG is ML062650140. If you do not have access to ADAMS or if 
there are problems in accessing the documents located in ADAMS, 
contact the NRC Public Document Room (PDR) Reference staff at 
1-800-397-4209, or (301) 415-4737, or (by e-mail), at .
 
This document may also be viewed electronically on the public 
computers located at NRC's PDR, Mail Stop: O1F21, One White Flint 
North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD 20852. The PDR 
reproduction contractor will copy documents, for a fee.
 
NRC RESPONSES TO PUBLIC COMMENTS ON HLWRS-ISG-1: In preparing 
final HLWRS-ISG-01, ``Review Methodology for Seismically 
Initiated Event Sequences,'' ADAMS ML062650140, the NRC staff 
reviewed and considered 23 comments received from five different 
organizations during the public comment period. One commenter had 
12 comments recommending specific clarifying changes to the ISG. 
One commenter questioned NRC using the ISG to clarify its 
regulatory intent, instead of addressing the issue of seismically 
initiated event sequences, more appropriately, in the YMRP. Two 
commenters questioned whether the ISG sets forth a more stringent 
standard for the seismic design of repository surface facilities 
than the existing criteria for reactors. One commenter was 
concerned that a specific methodology described in the ISG would 
bias the NRC staff's review against other methodologies that the 
U.
 
S. Department of Energy (DOE) may propose that provide equal or 
better protection of public health and safety. One commenter was 
concerned that the specific methodology proposed in the ISG lacks 
both precedent and scientific support. Two commenters were 
concerned that the ISG methodology may not produce accurate 
results over the 100-year plus operating life of the Yucca 
Mountain repository preclosure operating period. Two commenters 
raised questions as to whether NRC has adequately considered the 
geometric consequence of closely spaced, recurring seismic 
events, in determining the seismic hazard and related failure 
probability of a structure, system, or component (SSC) important 
to safety (ITS). One commenter states that ``the ISG totally 
ignores the existence of Section 63.102(f) of the regulation.'' 
The following discussion indicates how the comments were 
addressed, and the changes, if any, made to the ISG as a result 
of the comments.
 
Line numbers in the following comments refer to the draft HLWRS- 
ISG-01, ADAMS ML061170532, which was made available for public 
comment on May 22, 2006 (71 FR 29369).
 
1. Comment. The commenter recommends that the sentence starting 
at Line 38 be re-phrased as: ``The mean fragility curve for an 
SSC ITS may be estimated using: (1) Probability density functions 
for controlling parameters in a Monte Carlo analysis; (2) 
simplified methods outlined in Section 4 of Electric Power 
Research Institute, TR-103959 (Ref. 2); (3) a method that uses 
the Conservative Deterministic Failure Margin methodology to 
determine the 1percent probability of failure, and an estimate of 
the composite logarithmic standard deviation, as described by 
Kennedy (2001, pp. 44 to 45) and Ravindra (2006, p. 132); or (4) 
other methods that capture appropriate variability and 
uncertainty in parameters used to estimate the capacity of the 
SSCs ITS to seismic events.
 
Response. NRC regulations grant DOE broad flexibility in choosing 
a method or methods for preclosure safety analysis of hazards at 
the geologic repository operations area (GROA). Although NRC 
staff has stated some example methods, in the ISG, for estimating 
the fragility curve, this does not imply that alternative methods 
would be unacceptable for demonstrating compliance with 
regulatory requirements. DOE may use an alternative method, if 
sufficient technical basis for the use of the method is provided.
 
No changes were made to the ISG as a result of this comment.
 
2. Comment. The commenter recommends that the following sentence 
be added at the end of the sentence on line 43: ``Where 
appropriate, assessment of fragility for an SSC may be based on 
fragility values for an identical or similar component as found 
in the literature.'' Response. NRC agrees with the commenter that 
the fragility data for an SSC, developed and documented in 
databases and used at other facilities, may be used to estimate 
fragility for the SSCs at the repository, if the data are shown 
to be applicable to the repository SSCs.
 
The ISG has been revised to add the following at the end of the 
sentence on Line 43: ``An estimate of fragility for an SSC may be 
based on fragility values for an identical or similar component 
as found in the literature, provided technical bases for the 
relevance of the data to the SSC under consideration are 
established.'' 3. Comment. The commenter recommends that an 
explanation be provided to address why the selection of the slope 
(Lines: 235 to 237, 240 to 241: Page: 8) is appropriate. This 
explanation may include, for example, that this portion of the 
hazard curve was selected if it were the interval where the 
dominant contribution to risk arises.
 
Text could be added at the end of the sentence on Line 241: ``The 
slope should be selected to focus on the portion of the curve 
where risk is expected to dominate the convolution.'' Response. 
NRC agrees with the commenter that an explanation for the 
selection of the slope between probabilities of exceedance of 
10-6 and 10-5 should be added in the ISG.
 
The ISG has been revised to add the following at the end of the 
sentence on Line 241: ``This slope was selected to represent the 
hazard accurately at probabilities of exceedance values close to 
the target annual threshold probability of 10-6 because this 
portion of the hazard curve may have a significant contribution 
to the risk.'' 4. Comment. The commenter suggests replacing the 
sentence starting on Line 263, with the sentence: ``For the 
purposes of illustration, a single response frequency of 10 hertz 
(Hz) is assumed for this evaluation.'' The commenter also 
suggests that an explanation of why a single frequency is 
appropriate should be added.
 
Response. NRC believes that the essence of the comment, with the 
suggested change to the ISG, is adequately responded to by the 
sentences in lines 262 to 264 of the ISG. These sentences state 
that the evaluation typically would be performed at appropriate 
structural frequencies, based on the dynamic characteristics of 
the SSC, and that example evaluation is performed at a single 
frequency of 10 hertz. A single frequency was chosen in the 
example for illustration purposes only. As stated in the sentence 
in line 261, the evaluation typically would have to be performed 
for a number of structural frequencies of an SSC, based on its 
dynamic characteristics, to
 
[[Page 57581]] appropriately assess the probability of failure of 
an SSC during a seismic event.
 
No changes were made to the ISG as a result of this comment.
 
5. Comment. The commenter suggests that text be added to include 
discussion of other non-seismic factors that may 
influence/mitigate the probability of occurrence of the event 
sequence. At line 262, a sentence should be inserted to read: 
``Other non-seismic factors such as residency times, targeting 
factors, operational states, and design constraints, which may 
also influence the probability of occurrence of the complete 
event sequence, are not considered in this example.'' Response. 
NRC agrees with the commenter that in the example, design 
constraints, such as the probability of failure of the canister 
during a potential drop event, are not considered. This is 
indicated in Lines 276 to 277 of the ISG, and in the clarifying 
statement added in the ISG in response to comment 10. NRC 
believes that the clarifying statement recognizes that if the 
canister breach probability (given a drop) is demonstrated to be 
less than 1.0, the appropriate conditional probability of breach 
may be factored into the quantification of the event sequence. 
Therefore, NRC believes that a change to the ISG to clarify this 
factor in determining the probability of occurrence of the event 
sequences is not necessary. Other non-seismic factors mentioned 
in the comment appear to be related to the duration of operations 
at the proposed Yucca Mountain repository. NRC would need 
specific information on the Yucca Mountain repository operations 
and the technical bases for determining the values of these 
factors, to judge whether these factors are appropriate and can 
be used to calculate event sequence probability of occurrence in 
the preclosure safety analysis. NRC will review the use of these 
factors and their technical bases and make a determination of 
their acceptability during the potential future review of the DOE 
License Application for the proposed Yucca Mountain repository.
 
No changes were made to the ISG as a result of this comment.
 
6. Comment. The commenter recommends that the assumption made in 
the computation be clarified, and that each branch in the 
sequence be addressed in the description (Lines: 308 to 323: 
Page: 12). For instance, at the end of the sentence ending on 
Line 310, the text should be expanded to mention the other 
branches: ``Tracing Sequence 3 across the event tree shown in 
Figure B-1, this sequence also includes the STR-SHWL success 
branch and the assumed failure of the canister (CANIS-BRCH) * * 
*'' Additional text on Lines 310 to 323 should include: ``* * * 
the STR-SHWL success probability is the complement of the 
fragility of the failure branch * * *'' and ``* * * Therefore, 
the combined fragility of the three systems in the event sequence 
can be obtained by * * *.'' Response. NRC agrees with the 
commenter that the Event Sequence 3, as shown in Figure B-1, 
implies that the concrete shear wall provides a confinement 
barrier to the release of radioactive materials before they pass 
through the Heating, Ventilation and Air-Conditioning (HVAC) 
system. However, for illustration purposes only, it was assumed 
in the example that, if the HVAC duct anchor system fails, all 
radioactive materials released because of the canister breach 
would be discharged through the HVAC system. To clarify this 
assumption, the ISG has been revised as follows: Add the 
following at the end of the sentence in Line 309: ``For 
simplicity, it is assumed, in this example, that if the HVAC duct 
anchor system were to fail, all radioactive materials released 
because of the potential canister breach would be discharged 
through the HVAC system, and that the concrete shear wall would 
be unable to provide a barrier to the release of radioactive 
materials.'' 7. Comment. The commenter suggests that Figure B-1 
be revised for clarity, making the figure consistent with 
conventions for the construction of event trees in other NRC 
documents, such as NUREG-2300. The following changes are 
suggested to Figure B-1: (a) The figure be revised to indicate 
that the initiating event of the sequence is an earthquake; (b) 
The figure heading be revised to state the event in terms of 
success; (c) The missing branch be shown for the event that the 
crane does not drop the waste form.
 
(d) The probability of canister breach, which has been assumed to 
be 1.0, be indicated. Response. NRC agrees with the suggested 
change in item (b), above, regarding revision of the figure 
headings and stating the event in terms of success, and has 
revised Figure B-1. Staff, however, does not agree with the other 
suggested changes because the title of the figure identifies the 
event sequence as initiated by a seismic event.
 
This is also consistent with Section 11.2.6.2 of NUREG-2300. In 
addition, adding a success path for the crane not dropping the 
waste form would be superfluous to this example, and would not 
add any value to the illustration of the procedure for event 
sequence probability calculation. The probability of canister 
breach assumed as 1.0 is stated in section B of Appendix B.
 
Figure B-1 has been revised as a result of this comment.
 
8. Comment. Assuming that the text in lines 220 to 222 has 
broader applicability than just as part of the example, the 
commenter suggests that the sentence starting on Line 220 be 
deleted from Appendix A, moved to the Discussion section on page 
1, and inserted into the text at Lines 54 to 63. The commenter 
also suggests changes to the text for insertion into the 
Discussion section on page 1, in comment 9.
 
Response. NRC agrees with the comment. The ISG has been revised 
as follows: (a) The sentence starting on Line 220 and ending on 
Line 222, ``The technical basis * * * staff review.'', has been 
deleted. (b) The following has been added at the end of the 
sentence on Line 57: ``Technical bases for the development of the 
SSC ITS fragility curves should be available for staff review.'' 
9. Comment. The commenter suggests that, the following sentence 
consistent with the Comment 8, should be inserted into the 
Discussion section on page 1 at Lines 54 to 63: ``It is necessary 
in developing seismic fragilities that the technical basis for 
the development of the applicable fragility parameters be 
available for staff review.'' Response. NRC agrees with the 
essence of the comment. The ISG has been revised as shown in NRC 
staff response to comment 8, item (b).
 
10. Comment. The commenter recommends adding the following phrase 
to the end of Line 277: ``* * * and it is assumed that 
probability of breach is 1.0 in all cases''. In addition, the 
commenter recommends adding, in Figure B-1, ``(Pf = 1.0),'' on 
the branch indicating potential for breach. The commenter also 
recommends adding text to state that when the probability of a 
breach (given a drop) is demonstrated to be less than 1.0, the 
appropriate conditional probability of breach may be factored 
into the quantification of the event sequence.
 
Response. NRC agrees with the comment. The ISG has been revised 
to clarify that, for the example in Appendix B, it is assumed 
that the canister probability of failure (given a drop) is 1.0. 
The comment regarding the use of appropriate conditional 
probability of canister failure, in the event sequence 
probability calculation, has been addressed in response to 
comment 5.
 
The ISG has been revised to add the following at the end of the 
sentence in Line 277:
 
[[Page 57582]] ``It is assumed that the canister probability of 
failure, given a drop, is 1.0.'' 11. Comment. The commenter 
suggests adding the following text in the sentence starting on 
Line 36: ``As a conservative assessment of probability, the 
probability of occurrence of an event sequence leading to an SSC 
ITS failure, or seismic performance, can be determined by * * *'' 
Response. NRC agrees with the essence of the comment, and has 
added a new sentence to reflect the comment. The ISG has been 
revised to add the following sentence in Line 36: ``As a 
conservative assessment of the probability of occurrence of an 
event sequence, a single SSC ITS may be considered, instead of 
all SSCs ITS in the event sequence.'' 12. Comment. The commenter 
suggests that a brief statement be added at the end of line 232 
and in Appendix B, as follows: ``Computations shown in the 
appendix can be performed either by hand computations or through 
the use of computer codes. A number of computer codes are 
available that can be used for probability computations.'' 
Response. NRC agrees with the commenter that computations for the 
event sequence probabilities can be performed either by hand 
computations or through the use of computer codes. However, these 
options are available to the applicant for any calculations.
 
Although the details of associated quality assurance requirements 
may be different for the computational method selected, the 
overall staff review strategy for the DOE analysis is not 
affected significantly by the computational method selected by 
DOE. Therefore, staff does not see the need to revise the ISG.
 
No changes were made to the ISG as a result of this comment.
 
13. Comment. The commenter refers to NRC Chairman Dale E. Klein's 
statement, on July 1, 2006, that regulatory stability is a 
crucial element in ensuring that NRC can complete its work in a 
timely manner, and states that HLWRS ISG-01 has the potential to 
create regulatory instability. Accordingly, the commenter 
encourages NRC to take advantage of the opportunity afforded by 
this comment period to reconsider issuing this ISG and to instead 
address the issue of seismically initiated event sequences, more 
appropriately, in the YMRP. The commenter is recommending this 
course of action for the following five reasons: (a) ISG is not 
the most effective means for NRC to clarify its regulatory intent 
and could lead to unforeseen consequences due to inadequate 
review (including not being reviewed by the Commission itself).
 
(b) Use of an ``Interim Guidance,'' a vehicle that was meant to 
address emerging issues affecting multiple licensed activities, 
is unnecessary in a situation where there is only a single 
potential licensee that is not currently conducting any licensed 
activities.
 
(c) Draft HLRWS ISG-01 lacks safety focus in that it sets forth a 
more stringent standard for the seismic design of repository 
surface facilities than currently exists for reactors, without 
recognizing the comparatively lower level of risk associated with 
the repository facilities. In doing this, HLRWS ISG-01 directly 
contradicts the very regulation (10 CFR Part 63) that it seeks to 
inform.
 
(d) Providing guidance to staff that assumes a specific 
methodology for demonstrating compliance with 10 CFR 63.111 is 
likely to bias the staff's review against other methodologies, 
that DOE may propose, which provide equal or better protection of 
public health and safety. Furthermore, giving DOE the opportunity 
to first propose an acceptable method for meeting the regulation 
would allow for a more independent NRC review--avoiding a 
situation where NRC is both telling DOE how to demonstrate 
compliance and then determining if compliance was demonstrated as 
instructed.
 
(e) The specific methodology proposed in this draft ISG lacks 
both precedent and scientific support.
 
Response. Responses to each of the commenter's reasons are 
provided below: (a) In the commenter's view, the ISG is not an 
effective means for NRC to clarify its regulatory intent and 
could lead to unforeseen consequences because of inadequate 
review (including not being reviewed by the Commission itself).
 
The ISG reflects a focused revision of the YMRP, with the scope 
of the revision limited to a specific technical issue. The ISG 
process allows for the rapid identification and resolution of 
specific technical issues that emerge as a result of staff 
interaction, with DOE, in preparation for the future License 
Application review.
 
To increase regulatory efficiency and enhance clarity of 
communication with DOE and the public, NRC anticipates providing 
incremental updates to the YMRP in the form of ISGs. NRC believes 
it is unnecessary and inefficient to republish the YMRP, given 
the narrow scope of the technical issue addressed in the ISG. If 
re-publication of the YMRP is warranted (e.g., due to a major 
rule change or accumulation of a number of ISGs), staff will be 
able to insert the appropriate text directly from the ISG into 
the YMRP. The ISG remains available to provide background 
discussion and examples, to supplement text, in the YMRP, at a 
level of detail not normally found in a Standard Review Plan 
(SRP). Thus, staff sees the ISG process as an effective, 
efficient, and appropriate means for revising or supplementing 
the YMRP.
 
An ISG provides guidance to NRC staff on approaches to use during 
the review of a potential license application. ISG guidance is 
for illustration purposes only, and does not imply a preferred 
method or an approach that an applicant must use. An ISG's review 
approach provides a framework for staff to conduct an efficient 
review, consistent with regulatory requirements. ISGs, that are 
revisions or supplements to the SRPs, are issued at the NRC 
Office Division level, because SRPs do not represent regulatory 
commitments, or staff interpretations.
 
During the ISG development process, the technical and regulatory 
basis for the ISG is thoroughly reviewed by appropriate NRC 
technical, management, and legal staff. Also, the public and 
shareholders are informed of a proposed draft ISG and afforded 
the opportunity to comment.
 
Comments from the public and stakeholders are considered in 
developing the final ISG.
 
No changes were made to the ISG as a result of this comment.
 
(b) In the commenter's view, ISGs are not necessary for the Yucca 
Mountain project because DOE is the only potential licensee for 
the proposed repository, and no licensing activities are being 
conducted currently. Although it is true that DOE is the only 
potential licensee and no licensing activities are currently 
underway, important technical issues continue to be identified in 
the complex, one-of-a-kind Yucca Mountain project during the 
prelicensing interaction with DOE.
 
As these issues are being resolved, the ISG process provides an 
effective, efficient, and appropriate means for staff to revise 
or supplement the YMRP, as discussed in response to comment 
13(a). The ISG process also allows staff to communicate with 
potential licensees on the scope of the staff reviews on specific 
technical issues, as NRC staff prepares to review the potential 
License Application in an effective and timely manner.
 
No changes were made to the ISG as a result of this comment.
 
(c) In the commenter's view, ISG-01 lacks safety focus and sets 
forth a more stringent standard for the seismic design
 
[[Page 57583]] of repository surface facilities than for reactors 
even though the repository facility has a lower level of risk, 
which appears contradictory to the intent of 10 CFR Part 63. The 
commenter also questions the purpose of 10 CFR 63.102(f) and how 
it is accounted for in the draft HLWRS-ISG-01. Another commenter 
made a similar statement.
 
NRC does not agree with the commenter that the ISG-01 proposed 
methodology for seismically initiated event sequences sets forth 
a more stringent standard for the seismic design of repository 
facilities than for reactors. NRC also does not agree that the 
ISG-01 contradicts the intent of Part 63. The methods discussed 
in the draft ISG do not mandate seismic design requirements, but 
present approaches that NRC staff could use to review the 
performance of SSCs ITS for seismically initiated event 
sequences, as required in Part 63.
 
The preclosure compliance requirements in Part 63 are 
performance- based, in that instead of specifying specific design 
loads and corresponding acceptance criteria (i.e., 
codes/standards) the regulations in 10 CFR 63.111, for the GROA, 
specify radiological dose limits to the public and workers. In 
the preclosure safety analysis (PCSA), DOE must demonstrate that 
the GROA design will meet these dose limits, taking into 
consideration credible event sequences.
 
The ISG-01 provides a methodology to determine if a seismically 
initiated event sequence is a Category 2 event sequence, as 
defined in 10 CFR 63.2, or if it is beyond Category 2 and can be 
screened out from further consideration. If the event sequence is 
determined to be a Category 2 event sequence, DOE has to 
demonstrate that the dose limit of 5 roentgen equivalent man 
(rem) at any point on the boundary of the site is met. These 
performance-based requirements in Part 63 necessarily result in a 
different type of compliance demonstration than is traditionally 
used for reactor licensing.
 
For reactors, a seismic event is directly related to the 
characteristics of a specified safe shutdown earthquake (10 CFR 
Part 50, Appendix S), which is used as the design basis for each 
of the safety-related SSCs, and demonstration of compliance with 
regulations. In contrast, Part 63 does not specify seismic or 
other design bases or SSCs, but instead requires consideration of 
credible event sequences and their potential consequences. The 
guidance in the draft ISG shows how the fragilities of one or 
more SSCs in an event sequence can be combined with the seismic 
hazard curve to determine the likelihood of an entire event 
sequence, which is the metric used for compliance in Part 63. 
Section 63.102(f), which allows initiating events to be 
considered based on precedents adopted for nuclear facilities 
with comparable or higher risks, was not used in the ISG-01 
because the compliance demonstration for Part 63 requires safe 
performance of SSCs in seismically initiated event sequences, 
instead of a single initiating seismic event (i.e., safe-shutdown 
earthquake) that is traditionally used as a design basis in 
reactor licensing.
 
DOE will need to design to a level of performance sufficient to 
meet the requirements of Part 63, for seismically initiated event 
sequences. DOE is given broad flexibility in selecting a 
preferred design basis, and determining the degree of 
defense-in-depth contained within the GROA system. Although DOE 
must provide the basis for its proposed designs, compliance with 
Part 63 will be determined by the performance of the design 
during credible seismically initiated event sequences, not by 
adherence to a predetermined design basis for a seismic event.
 
No changes were made to the ISG as a result of this comment.
 
(d) In the commenter's view, the specific methodology in the 
ISG-01 may bias the staff's review against other methodologies 
that DOE may propose, even if these alternatives provide equal or 
better protection of public health and safety. The commenter also 
raises the concern that NRC should not dictate to DOE how to 
demonstrate compliance with regulations because it does not allow 
for a more independent review of the future DOE License 
Application. NRC does not agree with the comment that providing a 
methodology for seismically initiated event sequences in ISG-01 
may preclude DOE from proposing other methodologies for complying 
with Part 63. Similar to the YMRP, ISGs are prepared to provide 
guidance to the staff for review of any future License 
Application, from DOE, for the proposed Yucca Mountain 
repository, and are not mandatory. DOE has the option of 
proposing alternative methodologies to comply with the 
regulations, which the staff would evaluate during its review of 
the License Application. As discussed in response to Comment 1, 
presenting an example methodology in an ISG does not imply a 
preference for that method in licensing, and does not restrict 
the ability of an applicant to use an alternative method.
 
No changes were made to the ISG as a result of this comment.
 
(e) In the commenter's view, the specific methodology proposed in 
the draft ISG-01 lacks both precedent and scientific support.
 
The commenter raises the concern that applying technical analysis 
to seismic events with probability of exceedance lower than one 
in 10,000 per year to establish design bases is unprecedented, 
and that it would result in stringent design criteria. Staff 
disagrees with the commenter's concern because ISG-01 does not 
provide guidelines on the design bases or design criteria for the 
SSCs, of the GROA, at the repository, but provides one method for 
NRC staff to use in reviewing demonstration of compliance with 
the performance requirements for the SSCs in the PCSA. 
Additionally, the methodology proposed in the draft ISG has 
precedent in the mixed-oxide fuel fabrication facility at the 
Savannah River Site in South Carolina, where the applicant used a 
methodology similar to the one outlined in the draft ISG to 
demonstrate performance of the facility during seismic event 
sequences.
 
NRC disagrees with the comment that the methodology proposed in 
ISG-01 lacks scientific support. The proposed ISG-01 methodology 
to evaluate seismic performance of an SSC ITS is consistent with 
the performance-based methodology in the consensus standard ASCE 
43-05. The methodology has the scientific support of the experts 
in the industry, and is not beyond the state-of-the-art for 
performance evaluation of SSCs for seismic hazard.
 
No changes were made to the ISG as a result of this comment.
 
14. Comment. Two commenters stated that NRC's decision to approve 
the use of the methodology that is similar to the one outlined in 
ASCE 43-05 appeared to be based on the method's recent use in 
licensing of the mixed-oxide fuel fabrication facility at the 
Savannah River Site. The MOX facility has a projected operating 
life of 20-40 years and it is assumed that the NRC operating 
license is for the same period of time. The commenters are 
concerned about the ability of ASCE 43-05 to appropriately 
account for uncertainty over the longer time-frame for Yucca 
Mountain, given that the preclosure operating period for the 
repository project could be 100 years or longer. The commenter 
adds that NRC should address this issue in the final staff 
guidance.
 
Response. The commenters raise a concern that the ISG-01 
methodology, as suggested by ASCE 43-05, may not produce accurate 
results over a potential 100-year or longer operating life of the 
Yucca Mountain repository preclosure
 
[[Page 57584]] operating period. The preclosure operating period 
of the Yucca Mountain repository may affect the ISG-01 
methodology results in two ways: (i) In categorization of 
seismically initiated event sequences (e.g., one chance in 10,000 
of occurrence during the preclosure period specified in Part 63 
for category 2 event sequences); and (ii) in development of the 
SSCs ITS seismic fragility curves, with potential changes in 
material properties resulting from degradation during the 
preclosure period. Staff believes that the uncertainties, 
considered in the seismic hazard and SSCs ITS fragility curves 
development, would sufficiently account for potential materials 
degradation during the preclosure period.
 
No changes were made to the ISG as a result of this comment.
 
15. Comment. Two commenters stated that the example provided in 
Appendix A raises questions as to whether NRC has adequately 
considered the geometric consequence of closely spaced, 
recurring, seismic events in determining the mean seismic hazard 
and related failure probability of an SSC ITS. HLWRS-ISG-01 
and/or the YMRP may need to be revised to ensure that such 
characteristics of seismic hazard and related failure probability 
are appropriately considered in computing SSC ITS probability of 
failure during a seismic event.
 
Response. The example of Appendix A is based on a hypothetical 
seismic hazard curve selected only for illustrative purpose.
 
However, for the development of the Yucca Mountain site-specific 
mean seismic hazard curves (Reference, Section 6.4), DOE's 
current approach evaluates the potential of closely spaced, 
recurring, seismic events by considering simultaneous multiple 
ruptures on parallel dipping faults, and increasing the ground 
motion parameters for a given probability of exceedance value. 
Since the effects of the closely spaced, recurring, seismic 
events are considered in the seismic hazard curve, staff believes 
that the ISG-01 methodology would result in an appropriate value 
of the failure probability of an SSC ITS, and that ISG-01 or the 
YMRP need not be revised.
 
[Reference: Civilian Radioactive Waste Management System, 
Management and Operating Contractor (CRWMS, M), 1998, 
Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analyses for Fault Displacement and 
Vibratory Ground Motion at Yucca Mountain, Nevada (I. G. Wong and 
J. C. Stepp, coordinators), report prepared for U. S. Geological 
Survey, 3 Volumes] No changes were made to the ISG as a result of 
this comment.
 
16. Comment. It is unclear to the commenter whether the guidance 
directs NRC staff to use the suggested methodology or merely 
offers an alternative among possible methods. To reduce 
uncertainty, the commenter suggests that it would be helpful if 
NRC provided explicit guidance as to how the selection of an 
appropriate methodology would be made, and when, if at all, a 
given methodology might be unacceptable for use. The commenter 
believes that the discretion in choice of methods appears to 
introduce unwarranted ambiguity and uncertainty.
 
Response. An ISG provides guidance to NRC staff on suggested 
methodologies to use during the review of a potential license 
application, and do not imply a preferred methodology that an 
applicant must use. The review approach in an ISG provides a 
framework for staff to conduct an efficient review, consistent 
with regulatory requirements. DOE has the option of proposing 
alternative methodologies to comply with the regulations, which 
the staff would evaluate during its review of the License 
Application. Methodologies that demonstrate compliance with the 
regulations, and have adequate technical bases, would be 
acceptable for staff review.
 
No changes were made to the ISG as a result of this comment.
 
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jon Chen, Project Manager, 
Division of High-Level Waste Repository Safety, Office of Nuclear 
Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Washington, DC 20005-0001 (Telephone: (301) 415-5526; 
fax number: (301) 415-5399; e- mail: ); Mahendra Shah, Senior 
Level Advisor, Division of High-Level Waste Repository Safety, 
Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20005-0001 (Telephone: 
(301) 415-8537; fax number: (301) 415-5399; e- mail: ) Dated at 
Rockville, Maryland, this 22nd day of September 2006.
 
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
 
N. King Stablein, Chief, Project Management Section B, Division 
of High-Level Waste Repository Safety, Office of Nuclear Material 
Safety and Safeguards.
 
[FR Doc. E6-16017 Filed 9-28-06; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590-01-P

 
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 37 NRC: Notice of Availability of Draft Interim Staff Guidance Document 
 
                        FR Doc E6-16018 
[Federal Register: September 29, 2006 (Volume 71, Number 189)] 
[Notices] [Page 57584-57585] From the Federal Register Online via 
GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr29se06-139]                         
 
HLWRS-ISG-02, Preclosure Safety Analysis--Level of Information 
and Reliability Estimation AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
 
ACTION: Notice of availability.
 
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jon Chen, Project Manager, 
Project Management Section B, Division of High-Level Waste 
Repository Safety, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and 
Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 
20005-0001. Telephone: (301) 415- 5526; fax number: (301) 
415-5399; e-mail: jcc2@nrc.gov.
 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Introduction The Yucca Mountain Review Plan (YMRP) (July 2003, 
NUREG-1804, Revision 2) provides guidance for U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff to evaluate a U.S. Department 
of Energy license application for a geologic repository. NRC has 
prepared Interim Staff Guidance (ISG) to provide clarifications 
or refinements to the guidance provided in the YMRP. NRC is 
soliciting public comments on Draft HLWRS-ISG-02, which will be 
considered in the final version or subsequent revisions to 
HLWRS-ISG-02.
 
II. Summary The purpose of this notice is to provide the public 
with an opportunity to review and comment on draft HLWRS-ISG-02, 
which is to supplement the YMRP for the NRC staff review of 
design and operation information and reliability estimates 
required for the preclosure safety analysis. This ISG supplements 
sections 2.1.1, 2.1.1.2, 2.1.1.4, 2.1.1.6, and 2.1.1.7 of the 
YMRP. This guidance also provides examples that illustrate 
commonly used approaches for estimating reliability and the level 
and types of supporting design and operation information that 
would be necessary for structures, systems, and components (SSCs) 
at the geologic repository operations area. A sufficient level of 
information and adequate technical bases for reliability 
estimates are needed to demonstrate compliance with the 
performance objectives in Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, 
Part 63, Section 63.111 (10 CFR 63.111).
 
[[Page 57585]] III. Further Information The documents related to 
this action are available electronically at NRC's Electronic 
Reading Room, at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. From 
this site, a member of the public can access NRC's Agencywide 
Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS), which provides 
text and image files of NRC's public documents. The ADAMS 
accession numbers for the documents related to this notice are 
provided in the following table. If an individual does not have 
access to ADAMS or if there are problems in accessing the 
documents located in ADAMS, contact the NRC Public Document Room 
Reference (PDR) staff at 1-800- 397-4209 or (301) 415-4737, or by 
e-mail, at pdr@nrc.gov. 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
------- ISG                         ADAMS accession number 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
------- Draft HLWRS-ISG-02, ``Preclosure Safety  ML062360241 
Anaylsis--Level of Information and Reliability Estimation''.
 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
------- These documents may also be viewed electronically on the 
public computers located at NRC's PDR, O-1F21, One White Flint 
North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD 20852. The PDR 
reproduction contractor will copy documents, for a fee. Comments 
and questions on draft HLWRS- ISG-02 should be directed to the 
NRC contact listed below by November 13, 2006. Comments received 
after this date will be considered if it is practical to do so, 
but assurance of consideration cannot be given to comments 
received after this date.
 
Contact: Robert Johnson, Project Manager, Licensing and 
Inspection Directorate, High-Level Waste Repository Safety 
Division of the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, 
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20005-0001. 
Comments can also be submitted by telephone, fax, or e-mail, 
which are as follows: telephone: (301) 415-6900; fax number: 
(301) 415-5399; or e-mail: rkj@nrc.gov. Dated at Rockville, 
Maryland, this 25th day of September 2006.
 
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
 
N. King Stablein, Chief, Project Management Section B, Division 
of High-Level Waste Repository Safety, Office of Nuclear Material 
Safety and Safeguards.
 
[FR Doc. E6-16018 Filed 9-28-06; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590-01-P

 
*****************************************************************
 38 Bellona: Rosatom to â€œdefinitelyâ€ build the Kursk NPP-2 

Kirienko announced in a meeting with nuclear workers today -
which is the Russiaâ€™s national holiday for employees of the
atomic industry - that the second Kursk Nuclear Power plant
(NPP) will â€œdefinitely be built,â€ the RIA Novosti Russian
news agency reported. Bellona, 28/09-2006 

Everything is definitely looking optimistic with the Kursk NPP 
it will be built, he told reporters. 

Kirienko said that the date for the beginning of construction
has not yet been set, but it has been decided that the
construction of the second plant will be a substitute for the
current aging plant, which has been plagued with low level
incidents for the past decade. 

At the Kursk NPP-2 we will erect a contemporary energy block of
the NPP-2006 project, and I think that there would be sense in
building the Kursk NPP-2 not at the moment the Kursk NPP 1 is
taken out of service, but at a time when it can cover the energy
deficit of the central regions of Russia, he said, according to
RIA Novosti. 

Print Notify a friend Copyright Â© Bellona -- Reprint and
copying is recommended if source is stated ï»¿ Support Bellona's
work for the environment - Phone +47 23 23 46 00 | E-MAIL:
info@bellona.no 
*****************************************************************
 39 Los Angeles Times: Nuclear Energy: Still a Bad Idea - 

10:35 PM PDT, September 29, 2006        Weather    Traffic

Opinion : Op-Ed
  
Solar power is a better investment than a dated technology
that's too expensive and dangerous.     

By Jeremy Rifkin, JEREMY RIFKIN is the author of "The Hydrogen 
Economy: The Creation of the World Wide Energy Web and the 
Redistribution of Power on Earth." September 29, 2006 

SUDDENLY, NUCLEAR power is in vogue. At the G-8 summit in St. 
Petersburg, Russia, President Bush and Russian President Vladimir 
V. Putin announced a far-reaching agreement to cooperate in the 
rapid expansion of nuclear energy worldwide and called on other 
countries to join them. It was the latest in a series of 
high-profile initiatives by the White House to promote nuclear 
power. Bush argues that the future energy security of the United 
States and the world will depend on increasing reliance on 
nuclear energy. 

A technology that for years suffered ignominiously in scientific
purgatory has been resurrected. Its virtues have been heralded
by the likes of British Prime Minister Tony Blair, the famed
scientist Sir James Lovelock and even a few renegade
environmental activists. The nuclear accident at Three Mile
Island in Pennsylvania in 1979 and the horrific meltdown at
Chernobyl in the former Soviet Union in 1986 have become distant
memories. Now, facing rising costs of oil on world markets and
real-time global warming, nuclear technology has been given a
public relations face-lift and is touted, by some, as the energy
of choice in a post-oil era. However, before we let our
enthusiasm run away from us, we ought to take a sober look at
the consequences of re-nuclearizing the world.

First, nuclear power is unaffordable. With a minimum price tag of 
$2 billion each, new-generation nuclear power plants are 50% more 
expensive than putting coal-fired power plants online, and they 
are far more expensive than new gas-fired power plants. The cost 
of doubling nuclear power's share of U.S. electricity generation 
 which currently produces 20% of our electricity  could exceed 
half a trillion dollars. In a country facing record consumer and 
government debt, where is the money going to come from? Consumers 
would pay the price in terms of higher taxes to support 
government subsidies and higher electricity bills. 

Second, 60 years into the nuclear era, our scientists still don't 
know how to safely transport, dispose of or store nuclear waste. 
Spent nuclear rods are piling up all over the world. In the 
United States, the federal government spent more than $8 billion 
and 20 years building what was supposed to be an airtight, 
underground burial tomb dug deep into Yucca Mountain in Nevada to 
hold radioactive material. The vault was designed to be leak-free 
for 10,000 years. Unfortunately, the Environmental Protection 
Agency concedes that the underground storage facility will leak.

Third, according to a study conducted by the International
Atomic Energy Agency in 2001, known uranium resources could fail
to meet demand, possibly as early as 2026. Of course, new
deposits could be discovered, and it is possible that new
technological breakthroughs could reduce uranium requirements,
but that remains purely speculative. 

Fourth, building hundreds of nuclear power plants in an era of
spreading Islamic terrorism seems insane. On the one hand the
United States, the European Union and much of the world is
frightened by the mere possibility that just one country  Iran
 might use enriched uranium from its nuclear power plants for a
nuclear bomb. On the other hand, many of the same governments
are eager to spread nuclear power plants around the world,
placing them in every nook and cranny of the planet. This means
uranium and spent nuclear waste in transit everywhere and piling
up in makeshift facilities, often close to heavily populated
urban areas. 

Nuclear power plants are the ultimate soft target for terrorist
attacks. On Nov. 8, 2005, the Australian government arrested 18
suspected Islamic terrorists who were allegedly plotting to blow
up Australia's only nuclear power plant. The U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission found that more than half of the nuclear
power plants in this country failed to prevent a simulated
attack on their facilities. We should all be very worried. 

Finally, nuclear power represents the kind of highly
centralized, clunky technology of a bygone era. In an age when
distributed technologies are undermining hierarchies,
decentralizing power and giving rise to networks and open-source
economic models, nuclear power seems strangely old-fashioned and
obsolete. To a great extent, nuclear power was a Cold War
creation. It represented massive concentration of power and
reflected the geopolitics of a post-World War II era. Today,
however, new technologies are giving people the tools they need
to become active participants in an interconnected world.
Nuclear power, by contrast, is elite power, controlled by the
few. Its resurrection would be a step backward.

 Instead, we should pursue an aggressive effort to bring the
full range of decentralized renewable technologies online:
solar, wind, geothermal, hydro and biomass. And we should
establish a hydrogen storage infrastructure to ensure a steady,
uninterrupted supply of power for our electricity needs and for
transportation. 

Our common energy future lies with the sun, not with uranium. 
*****************************************************************
 40 EasyBourse actualit: Exelon May Build New Nuclear Plant In Texas

Friday September 29th, 2006 / 21h23   
      
NEW YORK -(Dow Jones)- Exelon Corp. (EXC), the largest nuclear
power plant operator in the U.S., said Friday it plans to submit
a license to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to build a
nuclear plant in Texas. 

Chicago-based Exelon hasn't yet chosen a specific site for the
facility, nor has it decided whether it will actually build a
new reactor. The decision rests on the outcome of the Yucca
Mountain nuclear fuel disposal project, public reaction to the
plan for a new plant and financial considerations, Exelon said. 

The Yucca Mountain project, which has been embroiled in
political wrangling for over 20 years, would permanently store
spent nuclear fuel in an underground facility in the Nevada
desert. 

The proposed plant would be Exelon's first nuclear facility in
Texas. The company selected Texas as a potential new reactor
site because the state is expecting a surge in electricity
demand over the next 20 years and because Exelon owns natural
gas-fired plants in the state. 

Exelon said it plans to apply for a combined operating and
construction license in 2008 and sees the cost of developing the
license at $30 million. The new plant, if built, would
incorporate new technology that would include heightened safety
features and allow for less costly operation. 

The company hasn't yet developed cost estimates for the proposed
plant. 

In a climate of rising fossil-fuel prices and growing
electricity demand, Exelon is one of several energy companies
that have announced tentative plans to build new nuclear
generation. NRC spokesman Neil Sheehan said that as of Sept. 14,
the NRC had received notice of companies' intentions to file 19
combined operating licenses for new plants, corresponding to 28
new reactors. 

Exelon's 17 nuclear reactors, which produce about 17,000
megawatts of electricity, represent roughly 20% of the U.S.
nuclear industry's generation capacity. The desire to acquire
more nuclear generation was the main impetus behind Exelon's
failed attempt to acquire New Jersey's Public Service Enterprise
Group Inc. (PEG). That deal was scuttled in early September by
the New Jersey regulator's demands for greater concessions from
the companies. 

Exelon's shares recently fell 41 cents to $60.89. The stock
reached a 52-week high of $61.98 on Wednesday. 

-By Christine Buurma and Ruth Mantell, Dow Jones Newswires;
201-938-2061; christine.buurma@dowjones.com 
  
  Friday September 29th, 2006 / 21h23   

  sources : Dowjones Newswires / Cercle Finance      

  Copyright © 2006 Easybourse.com - Tous droits réservés.  
Euronext: cours différés d'au moins 15 minutes   
*****************************************************************
 41 UPI: Kazaks agree to downgrade uranium, reactor
     
United Press International - NewsTrack - 

9/29/2006 1:16:00 PM -0400
 
WASHINGTON, Sept. 29 (UPI) -- Kazakhstan has agreed to downgrade
its highly enriched uranium stocks and convert its nuclear
reactor to lower grade uranium, the U.S. Energy Department says. 

The agreement announced Friday follows Kazakhstan President
Nursultan Nazarbayev's pledge late last year to rid his country
of the highly enriched uranium that can be used in nuclear
weapons. 

"This agreement represents another example of the kind of
productive cooperation the United States and Kazakhstan have
shared in furthering nuclear non-proliferation," U.S. Secretary
of Energy Samuel W. Bodman said. 

The department's Global Threat Reduction Initiative will provide
at least $4 million for the uranium project and conversion of
the nation's HEU research reactor. The Nuclear Threat
Initiative, which joined in the announcement, committed up to
$1.3 million for new reactor controls and a system to enhance
reactor safety and performance.


© Copyright 2006 United Press International, Inc. All Rights
Reserved
*****************************************************************
 42 RIA Novosti: CIS holds joint anti-nuclear terrorism exercise
 
29/ 09/ 2006                                  

YEREVAN, September 29 (RIA Novosti) - A security exercise held
by the Commonwealth of Independent States in Armenia this week
will raise the efficiency of the post-Soviet alliance's efforts
to prevent nuclear terrorism, organizers said Friday. 

The head of the CIS Anti-Terrorism Center said the exercise,
which ran from September 26 to 29 at Armenia's Metsamor nuclear
power plant, underlined how real the threat really is.

 "The participants could see for themselves just how real the
threat is that terrorists might attempt to exploit the
vulnerability of nuclear sites, and how extremely dangerous the
implications are," Boris Mylnikov said at a final news
conference.

 He said security forces should develop anti-terrorism measures
for nuclear and other sensitive facilities in close cooperation
with their staffs. 

"Representatives of potentially hazardous sites have [access to]
nuclear technologies, and can detect vulnerable points in the
operating systems of their nuclear plants," he said.

 The head of Armenia's National Security Service, Gorik Akopyan,
said the experience gained through the Metsamor war games should
be used in real life "to protect the population, nuclear sites
and the state as a whole." 

Officials from the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, the Security
Council's Anti-Terrorism Committee, the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization, and the Group of Eight leading industrialized
nations attended the event as observers. 

© 2005 RIA Novosti   
*****************************************************************
 43 NRC: Notice of License Amendment Request of BWX Technologies, Inc., 
 
                        FR Doc E6-16019 
[Federal Register: September 29, 2006 (Volume 71, Number 189)] 
[Notices] [Page 57574-57575] From the Federal Register Online via 
GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr29se06-133] [[Page 
57574]]
 
Lynchburg, VA, and Opportunity to Request a Hearing AGENCY: 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
 
ACTION: Notice of license amendment request and opportunity to 
request a hearing.
 
DATES: A request for a hearing must be filed by November 28, 
2006.
 
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Billy Gleaves, Project Manager, 
Fuel Cycle Facilities Branch, Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and 
Safeguards, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, 
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Mail Stop T-8F42, Washington, 
DC 20555, telephone: (301) 415-5848: fax number (301) 415-5955; 
e-mail:

 
bcg@nrc.gov.
 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 
I. Introduction
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has received, by 
letter dated June 23, 2006, a request from BWX Technologies, 
Inc., to amend its materials license to include an exemption from 
10 CFR part 73 requirements that limits conduct of medical 
evaluations to licensed physicians. Materials License SNM-42 
authorizes the licensee to possess nuclear materials, manufacture 
nuclear fuel components, fabricate research and university 
reactor components, fabricate compact reactor fuel elements, 
perform research on spent fuel performance, and to handle the 
resultant waste streams, including recovery of scrap uranium. 
Specifically, if the exemption is approved, the license amendment 
would allow licensed nurse practitioners to conduct security 
physical examinations as stipulated in the Commonwealth of 
Virginia regulation 18 VAC 90-30-10 et seq.
 
An NRC administrative review, documented by letter to BWX 
Technologies, Inc., dated July 18, 2006, found the application 
acceptable to begin technical review. If the NRC approves the 
exemption, the approval will be documented in an amendment to NRC 
License No. SNM-42. However, before approving the proposed 
exemption, the NRC will need to make the findings required by the 
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and NRC's regulations. 
These findings will be documented in an NRC Safeguards Evaluation 
Report and an Environmental Assessment.
 
II. Opportunity To Request a Hearing The NRC hereby provides 
notice that this is a proceeding on an application for a license 
amendment involving an exemption to 10 CFR part 73 regarding 
personnel authorized to conduct medical evaluations required by 
this regulation. In accordance with the general requirements in 
subpart C of 10 CFR part 2, as amended on January 14, 2004, (69 
FR 2182), any person whose interest may be affected by this 
proceeding and who desires to participate as a party must file a 
written request for a hearing and a specification of the 
contentions which the person seeks to have litigated in the 
hearing.
 
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.302(a), a request for a hearing must 
be filed with the Commission either by: 1. First class mail 
addressed to: Office of the Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: Rulemakings and 
Adjudications; 2. Courier, express mail, and expedited delivery 
services: Office of the Secretary, Sixteenth Floor, One White 
Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD 20852, 
Attention: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff, between 7:45 a.m. 
and 4:15 p.m., Federal workdays; 3. E-mail addressed to the 
Office of the Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
hearingdocket@nrc.gov; or 4. By facsimile transmission addressed 
to the Office of the Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Washington, DC, Attention: Rulemakings and 
Adjudications Staff, at (301) 415-1101; verification number is 
(301) 415-1966.
 
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.302(b), all documents offered for 
filing must be accompanied by proof of service on all parties to 
the proceeding or their attorneys of record as required by law or 
by rule or order of the Commission, including: 1. The applicant, 
BWX Technologies, Inc., Nuclear Products Division, P.O. Box 785, 
Lynchburg, VA 24505-0785, Attention: Leah Morrell; and 2. The NRC 
staff, by delivery to the Office of the General Counsel, One 
White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD 20852, or 
by mail addressed to the Office of the General Counsel, U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001. Hearing 
requests should also be transmitted to the Office of the General 
Counsel, either by means of facsimile transmission to (301) 
415-3725, or by e-mail to ogcmailcenter@nrc.gov. The formal 
requirements for documents contained in 10 CFR 2.304(b), (c), 
(d), and (e), must be met. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.304(f), a 
document filed by electronic mail or facsimile transmission need 
not comply with the formal requirements of 10 CFR 2.304(b), (c), 
and (d), as long as an original and two (2) copies otherwise 
complying with all of the requirements of 10 CFR 2.304(b), (c), 
and (d) are mailed within two (2) days thereafter to the 
Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 
20555-0001, Attention: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff.
 
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.309(b), a request for a hearing must 
be filed by November 27, 2006.
 
In addition to meeting other applicable requirements of 10 CFR 
2.309, the general requirements involving a request for a hearing 
filed by a person other than an applicant must state: 1. The 
name, address, and telephone number of the requester; 2. The 
nature of the requester's right under the Act to be made a party 
to the proceeding; 3. The nature and extent of the requester's 
property, financial or other interest in the proceeding; 4. The 
possible effect of any decision or order that may be issued in 
the proceeding on the requester's interest; and 5. The 
circumstances establishing that the request for a hearing is 
timely in accordance with 10 CFR 2.309(b). In accordance with 10 
CFR 2.309(f)(1), a request for hearing or petitions for leave to 
intervene must set forth with particularity the contentions 
sought to be raised. For each contention, the request or petition 
must: 1. Provide a specific statement of the issue of law or fact 
to be raised or controverted; 2. Provide a brief explanation of 
the basis for the contention; 3. Demonstrate that the issue 
raised in the contention is within the scope of the proceeding; 
4. Demonstrate that the issue raised in the contention is 
material to the findings that the NRC must make to support the 
action that is involved in the proceeding; 5. Provide a concise 
statement of the alleged facts or expert opinions which support 
the requester's/petitioner's position on the issue, and on which 
the requester/petitioner intends to rely to support its position 
on the issue; and 6. Provide sufficient information to show that 
a genuine dispute exists with the applicant on a material issue 
of law or fact.
 
This information must include
 
[[Page 57575]] references to specific portions of the application 
(including the applicant's environmental report and safety 
report) that the requester/ petitioner disputes and the 
supporting reasons for each dispute, or, if the 
requester/petitioner believes the application fails to contain 
information on a relevant matter as required by law, the 
identification of each failure and the supporting reasons for the 
requester's/ petitioner's belief.
 
In addition, in accordance with 10 CFR 2.309(f)(2), contentions 
must be based on documents or other information available at the 
time the petition is filed, such as the application, supporting 
safety analysis report, environmental report or other supporting 
document filed by an applicant or licensee, or otherwise 
available to the petitioner. On issues arising under the National 
Environmental Policy Act, the requester/petitioner shall file 
contentions based on the applicant's environmental report. The 
requester/petitioner may amend those contentions or file new 
contentions if there are data or conclusions in the NRC draft, or 
final environmental impact statement, environmental assessment, 
or any supplements relating thereto, that differ significantly 
from the data or conclusions in the applicant's documents. 
Otherwise, contentions may be amended or new contentions filed 
after the initial filing only with leave of the presiding 
officer.
 
Each contention shall be given a separate numeric or alpha 
designation within one of the following groups: 1. 
Technical--primarily concerns issues relating to matters 
discussed or referenced in the Safety Evaluation Report for the 
proposed action.
 
2. Environmental--primarily concerns issues relating to matters 
discussed or referenced in the Environmental Report for the 
proposed action.
 
3. Emergency Planning--primarily concerns issues relating to 
matters discussed or referenced in the Emergency Plan as it 
relates to the proposed action.
 
4. Physical Security--primarily concerns issues relating to 
matters discussed or referenced in the Physical Security Plan as 
it relates to the proposed action.
 
5. Miscellaneous--does not fall into one of the categories 
outlined above.
 
If the requester/petitioner believes a contention raises issues 
that cannot be classified as primarily falling into one of these 
categories, the requester/petitioner must set forth the 
contention and supporting bases, in full, separately for each 
category into which the requester/petitioner asserts the 
contention belongs with a separate designation for that category.
 
Requesters/petitioners should, when possible, consult with each 
other in preparing contentions and combine similar subject matter 
concerns into a joint contention, for which one of the 
co-sponsoring requesters/petitioners is designated the lead 
representative.
 
Further, in accordance with 10 CFR 2.309(f)(3), any 
requester/petitioner that wishes to adopt a contention proposed 
by another requester/petitioner must do so in writing within ten 
days of the date the contention is filed, and designate a 
representative who shall have the authority to act for the 
requester/petitioner.
 
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.309(g), a request for hearing and/or 
petition for leave to intervene may also address the selection of 
the hearing procedures, taking into account the provisions of 10 
CFR 2.310. III. Further Information The application, including 
the safety analysis report and other information referenced in 
the application, may be made available pursuant to a protective 
order and subject to applicable security requirements upon a 
showing that the petitioner has an interest that may be affected 
by the proceeding.
 
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 21st day of September 2006.
 
For the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Gary S. Janosko, 
Chief, Fuel Cycle Facilities Branch, Division of Fuel Cycle 
Safety and Safeguards, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and 
Safeguards.
 
[FR Doc. E6-16019 Filed 9-28-06; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590-01-P

 
*****************************************************************
 44 NRC: In the Matter of Mr. Gary Abel; Confirmatory Order (Effective 
 
                        FR Doc E6-16075 
[Federal Register: September 29, 2006 (Volume 71, Number 189)]
[Notices] [Page 57572-57573] From the Federal Register Online via 
GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr29se06-132]                         
 
Immediately) I Mr. Gary Abel is a former General Manager of the 
Sterigenics International Inc. (Sterigenics), facility in Tustin, 
California. II An NRC inspection was conducted at Sterigenics' 
facility in Tustin, California on October 18-19, 2004, to review 
compliance with the NRC's June 6, 2003, Order Imposing 
Compensatory Measures (Order) for Panoramic and Underwater 
Irradiator Licensees. Following that inspection, an investigation 
was initiated by the NRC Office of Investigations (OI) in order 
to determine whether Mr. Abel, who was the General Manager of the 
facility at the time, engaged in deliberate misconduct. Based on 
the results of the NRC inspection and investigation, the NRC 
identified that Mr. Abel acted in apparent violation of 10 CFR 
30.10, ``Deliberate misconduct.'' 10 CFR 30.10 states, in part, 
that any employee of a licensee may not: (1) Engage in deliberate 
misconduct that causes a licensee to be in violation of any order 
issued by the Commission; or (2) deliberately submit to the NRC 
information that the person submitting the information knows to 
be incomplete or inaccurate in some respect material to the NRC. 
Attachment 3 of the NRC's June 6, 2003 Order requires certain 
specific handling requirements for documents containing 
Safeguards Information- Modified Handling (SGI-M).
 
Based on the inspection and investigation, the NRC was concerned 
that between December 2003 and April 2004, Mr. Abel engaged in 
deliberate misconduct when he faxed, over unprotected 
telecommunications circuits, a document containing SGI-M, when he 
knew this was prohibited by the Order. This act caused the 
licensee to be in violation of the June 6, 2003, Order. In 
addition, the NRC was concerned that Mr. Abel submitted to the 
NRC information that he knew was incomplete or inaccurate 
regarding some of the circumstances relating to the faxed 
document.
 
III In a letter dated March 21, 2006, the NRC identified to Mr.
 
Abel an apparent violation of 10 CFR 30.10, and offered Mr. Abel 
the opportunity to either request a predecisional enforcement 
conference or request Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) with 
the NRC in an attempt to resolve any disagreement on whether a 
violation occurred and if a violation did in fact occur, the 
appropriate enforcement sanction. In response to the March 21, 
2006 letter, Mr. Abel requested ADR to resolve the matter with 
the NRC. ADR is a process in which a neutral mediator with no 
decision-making authority assists the NRC and Mr. Abel to resolve 
any differences regarding the matter.
 
An ADR session was held between Mr. Abel and the NRC in Lisle, 
Illinois,
 
[[Page 57573]] on August 4, 2006. During that ADR session, an 
agreement was reached. The elements of the agreement consisted of 
the following: 1. The NRC and Mr. Abel agree that a violation of 
10 CFR 30.10 occurred. Specifically, 10 CFR 30.10 prohibits, in 
part, any licensee or licensee employee from engaging in 
deliberate misconduct that causes a licensee to be in violation 
of any rule or Order issued by the Commission. Mr. Abel agrees 
that he deliberately faxed a document containing SGI-M 
information over unprotected telecommunications circuits to a 
security contractor in violation of the NRC's June 6, 2003, Order 
Imposing Compensatory Measures (Order) for Panoramic and 
Underwater Irradiator Licensees. This caused Mr. Abel's former 
employer to be in violation of the Order.
 
2. Mr. Abel does not agree that he violated 10 CFR 30.10 by 
deliberately providing information that was inaccurate and 
incomplete to the NRC. The NRC and Mr. Abel agree to disagree 
regarding this point.
 
3. The NRC and Mr. Abel agree that the actions in this paragraph 
are sufficient to address the NRC's concerns. Mr. Abel agrees to 
issuance of a letter and Confirmatory Order confirming this 
agreement, and also agrees to waive any request for a hearing 
regarding this Confirmatory Order. The Confirmatory Order would 
include the following elements: A. Mr. Abel will not engage in 
future NRC or Agreement State licensed activities for a period of 
1 year to begin on the date of this Confirmatory Order or on 
October 1, 2006, whichever date is sooner.
 
B. Not later than 90 days from the date of the Confirmatory 
Order, Mr. Abel will write an article for publication in the 
NRC's NMSS Newsletter that is mutually agreeable. The article 
will address the following elements: (1) That he was employed at 
a senior position at an irradiation facility, (2) how an 
individual should conduct themselves during an NRC inspection 
(e.g., the need for candor and forthrightness, the need to 
acknowledge violations forthrightly, if found, the potential 
consequences to an individual who does not provide complete and 
accurate information to the NRC, etc. * * *), and (3) the 
importance of controlling SGI-M material. The NRC agrees that Mr. 
Abel's article will be published anonymously, and Mr. Abel will 
submit the article to an addressee which the NRC will provide.
 
C. In light of Mr. Abel's agreement as described in Item 3, the 
NRC agrees not to take any further action against Mr. Abel 
regarding this matter.
 
D. Mr. Abel understands that the NRC, as part of its normal 
process, will issue a press release with the Confirmatory Order.
 
The NRC will provide Mr. Abel a copy of the press release prior 
to its release.
 
On September 16, 2006, Mr. Abel consented to issuing this 
Confirmatory Order with the commitments, as described in Section 
IV below. Mr. Abel further agreed in his September 16, 2006, 
consent and waiver that this Confirmatory Order is to be 
effective upon issuance and that he has waived his right to a 
hearing. Implementation of these commitments will provide 
enhanced assurance that documents containing SGI-M will be 
appropriately protected and will resolve the NRC's concerns. I 
find that Mr. Abel's commitments as set forth in Section IV are 
acceptable and necessary and conclude that with these commitments 
the public health and safety are reasonably assured. In view of 
the foregoing, I have determined that the public health and 
safety require that Mr. Abel's commitments be confirmed by this 
Order. Based on the above and Mr. Abel's consent, this 
Confirmatory Order is immediately effective upon issuance.
 
IV Accordingly, pursuant to Sections 147, 161b, 161i, 161o, 182 
and 186 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the 
Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 2.202 and 10 CFR Part 30, and 
the Commission's June 6, 2003 Order, it is hereby ordered, 
effective immediately, that: (1) Mr. Abel will not engage in 
future NRC or Agreement State licensed activities for a period of 
1 year to begin on the date of this Confirmatory Order or on 
October 1, 2006 whichever date is sooner.
 
4. Not later than 90 days from the date of the Confirmatory 
Order, Mr. Abel will write an article for publication in the 
NRC's NMSS Newsletter that is mutually agreeable. The article 
will address the following elements: (1) That he was employed at 
a senior position at an irradiation facility, (2) how an 
individual should conduct themselves during an NRC inspection 
(e.g., the need for candor and forthrightness, the need to 
acknowledge violations forthrightly, if found, the potential 
consequences to an individual who does not provide complete and 
accurate information to the NRC), and (3) the importance of 
controlling SGI-M material. The NRC agrees that Mr. Abel's 
article will be published anonymously, and Mr. Abel will submit 
the article to an addressee which the NRC will provide.
 
The Director, Office of Enforcement may relax or rescind, in 
writing, any of the above conditions upon a showing by Mr. Abel 
of good cause.
 
V Any person adversely affected by this Confirmatory Order, other 
than Mr. Abel, may request a hearing within 20 days of its 
issuance. Where good cause is shown, consideration will be given 
to extending the time to request a hearing. A request for 
extension of time must be made in writing to the Director, Office 
of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, 
DC 20555, and include a statement of good cause for the 
extension. Any request for a hearing shall be submitted to the 
Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Rulemakings 
and Adjudications Staff, Washington, DC 20555.
 
Copies also shall be sent to the Director, Office of Enforcement, 
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, to the 
Assistant General Counsel for Materials Litigation and 
Enforcement at the same address, to the Regional Administrator, 
NRC Region IV, 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400, Arlington, Texas 
76011, and to Mr. Abel. Because of the possible disruptions in 
delivery of mail to United States Government offices, it is 
requested that answers and requests for hearing be transmitted to 
the Secretary of the Commission either by means of facsimile 
transmission to 301-415-1101 or by e-mail to

 
hearingdocket@nrc.gov and also to the Office of the General 
Counsel either by means of facsimile transmission to 301-415-3725 
or by e-mail to OGCMailCenter@nrc.gov. If such a person requests 
a hearing, that person shall set forth with particularity the 
manner in which his interest is adversely affected by this Order 
and shall address the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 2.309 (d) and 
(f). If a hearing is requested by a person whose interest is 
adversely affected, the Commission will issue an Order 
designating the time and place of any hearing. If a hearing is 
held, the issue to be considered at such hearing shall be whether 
this Confirmatory Order should be sustained.
 
An answer or a request for hearing shall not stay the immediate 
effectiveness of this order.
 
Dated this 22nd day of September, 2006.
 
For the nuclear regulatory commission.
 
Cynthia A. Carpenter, Director, Office of Enforcement.
 
[FR Doc. E6-16075 Filed 9-28-06; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590-01-P

 
*****************************************************************
 45 Daily Yomiuri: Intl community must agree on N-fuel plan

Junichi Miura / Yomiuri Shimbun Staff Writer 

The government has drafted an initiative that could see the
supply and control of nuclear fuel for atomic power generation
brought under a multinational framework, a move in response to
global concerns about the management of nuclear fuel. 

The government's new proposal is for a registration system that
lists countries' nuclear fuel-supply capabilities. 

Nations participating in the scheme would be required to state
in a register what nuclear-related technologies they are capable
of supplying, such as the production of raw materials,
conversion of uranium, enrichment of uranium and processing of
the fuel. The register would be held by the International Atomic
Energy Agency, the U.N.'s nuclear watchdog. 

Member nations that have abandoned development of technologies
that can lead to the development of nuclear weapons--such as
enrichment of uranium and extraction of plutonium--would then be
supplied nuclear fuel from other member countries under the
IAEA's mediation. 

The government believes the scheme would prevent nuclear weapons
proliferation and reduce the economic burden on nations that are
supplied nuclear fuel. 

The Japanese initiative was compiled as a counterproposal to a
six-nation initiative Britain, France, Germany, the Netherlands,
Russia and the United States presented at a regular IAEA
directors meeting in June. 

Under the plan, the six countries, all nuclear fuel exporters,
would guarantee supply of the fuel, and other participating
nations would cease enriching uranium in exchange for the
supply. 

However, the six-nation initiative excludes Japan--which is
permitted to reprocess spent nuclear fuel--from the list of
suppliers. As many developing countries voiced strong
objections, the government decided to draft its own initiative. 

Since last year, plans to control the international supply of
nuclear fuel have been mooted around the world. 

The U.S. government has independently proposed its Global
Nuclear Energy Partnership, which would take over from the
six-nation initiative, which the United States sees as a
short-term plan. 

Under the GNEP, nations capable of reprocessing nuclear fuel,
including Japan, would supply the fuel to countries that do not
possess the technology. The former would then accept spent
nuclear fuel, which would be reprocessed into usable fuel for
fast reactors. 

As the United States took a long-term view when it drew up the
GNEP plan, its proposal calls for the development of fast
reactors, which the United States currently does not have. 

The government has responded positively to the GNEP plan. 

"We'll consider the plan from the viewpoint of how Japan can
contribute to it," a government official said. 

However, the GNEP plan assumes a reprocessing technology called
UREX (uranium recovery by extraction), which extracts plutonium
mixed with other transuranic elements from spent nuclear fuel,
will be available. Transuranic elements are created when uranium
elements absorb neutrons. 

But the method used in Japan's reprocessing plant in
Rokkashomura, Aomori Prefecture, known as PUREX
(plutonium-uranium recovery by extraction), only extracts
plutonium in a reusable form. 

Though the technological difference between the two is not huge,
the government needs to carefully examine the GNEP to prevent it
from adversely affecting Japan's reprocessing plan. 

Russia proposed another initiative that involved international
nuclear energy centers. The plan aims to construct facilities in
various locations around the world for the production and
processing of nuclear fuel. The centers would provide nuclear
fuel to nations that do not possess the technology. 

But Sergey Antipov, deputy head of the Russian Federal Atomic
Energy Agency, remarked in February that the first center might
be built in Siberia. 

This indicated the Russian plan is based on Moscow's strong
desire to grab the leadership role in international control of
nuclear fuel. Only a handful of nations, such as Iran, have so
far supported the plan. 

All of the proposals about international nuclear fuel control
reflect the varied intentions of the countries. It is certain,
however, that the movement toward international control and
supply of nuclear fuel will continue to accelerate, because it
is necessary to prevent nuclear material and related
technologies from proliferating uncontrolled, as has occurred in
Iran and North Korea. 

In addition, partly because of rising crude oil prices, more
countries, especially developing nations, have opted for nuclear
power as an energy source. How to provide nuclear fuel to those
countries is a realistic and important question that needs to be
addressed. 

The question is no longer about whether nuclear power generation
and reprocessing should be done, but how it should be done. 

Japan is regarded as having an excellent record regarding the
use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, as the nation has
fully cooperated with IAEA inspections for decades. Therefore,
the role Japan can play in any future plan could be great. 

Building a framework to more effectively control nuclear fuel
and overcome the difference in intentions of the countries
concerned is an urgent task. (Sep. 30, 2006) 

 © The Yomiuri Shimbun.   
*****************************************************************
 46 The Australian: Rann approves Honeymoon uranium mine 

 Michelle Wiese Bockmann September 29, 2006 

SOUTH Australia's government has approved the final, crucial
licence needed to open the country's fourth uranium mine at
Honeymoon.

The Environmental Protection Authority today granted the mining
and milling licence, clearing the path for developers SXR
Uranium One to begin commercial mining at the site, 80km north
west of Broken Hill. 

The Rann government has disputed claims that granting the
licence would breach the ALP's no-new-mines policy. 

The Honeymoon mine will use the contentious underground in-situ
leaching method also used at the nearby Beverley mine. 

EPA chief executive Paul Vogel said SXR Resources had
demonstrated that it could protect people and the environment
from the harmful effects of radiation. 

More than 161 public submissions were received by the Radiation
Protection Committee, established earlier this year to assess
the Honeymoon licence application. 

SXR Uranium One board approved plans last month to begin mining
at the mothballed site as early as 2008, and are building a $53
million plant to produce 400 tonnes of uranium oxide annually. 

*****************************************************************
 47 RIA Novosti: Russia launches UK-funded nuclear fuel storage facility
 
29/ 09/ 2006                                  

MOSCOW, September 29 (RIA Novosti) - A spent nuclear fuel
storage facility, whose construction was funded and controlled
by Great Britain, was inaugurated Friday in northern Russia.

 Under the Global Partnership program, Great Britain allocated
21 million GBP (about $40 million) for the construction of an
interim nuclear storage facility and 50 storage containers at
the state-run enterprise Atomflot, in Russia's Arctic port of
Murmansk.

 An inauguration ceremony was attended by Prince Michael of
Kent, who opened the facility, together with Murmansk Region
governor Yury Yevdokimov.

 Andrei Abramov, Atomoflot's chief engineer, said the facility
will contribute to the region's nuclear security and will
downgrade major nuclear and environmental concerns.

 "Spent nuclear fuel from atomic icebreakers is currently being
stored on board the Lotta, a nuclear fuel supply ship," he said.
"On-shore storage will dramatically increase safety."

 Reloading of spent nuclear fuel to the new facility will allow
the Lotta to collect further fuel from outlying sites and
icebreakers for safer storage.

© 2005 RIA Novosti   
*****************************************************************
 48 CourierPostOnline: Plan to seal slag pile meets opposition 

Friday, September 29, 2006

 By MEG HUELSMAN Gannett New Jersey NEWFIELD

 State legislators joined local officials and area residents
Thursday to protest a plan to seal low-grade radioactive waste
at an industrial site here.

 "International corporations like this company cannot just pick
up and leave their mess behind," said state Sen. Stephen M.
Sweeney, D-West Deptford, referring to the slag pile at
ShieldAlloy Metallurgical Corp.'s facility on North West
Boulevard.

 "I want this out of our town," Mayor Rick Westergaard said at a
news conference. "They created the mess, and they should have to
clean it up."

 ShieldAlloy, which ceased local operations in June, has
submitted a plan to the federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission to
seal the 76,000-cubic-yard slag pile. The company says it would
spend about $5 million to build a mound over the waste, with an
additional $750,000 set aside to maintain the site for 1,000
years.

 ShieldAlloy says it would cost about $58 million to move the
material, an amount it predicts would bankrupt the company. A
lower estimate, of about $30 million, comes from state
Department of Environmental Protection Commissioner Lisa Jackson.

 In a statement released Wednesday, ShieldAlloy said the slag
pile poses no health risk to the community. It also said sealing
the waste would allow much of the site to be developed.

 Opponents disagree, saying the 67.5-acre site could not be
subdivided under NRC regulations. 

Copyright 2006 CourierPostOnline.com. All rights reserved
*****************************************************************
 49 EPA: EPA settles with United Nuclear to investigate contamination at mine site 

Region 9 Home

Release date: 09/28/2006 

Contact Information: Wendy L. Chavez, (415) 947-4248,
chavez.wendy@epa.gov

(San Francisco, Calif. -- 09/28/2006) The U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency today reached an agreement with the United
Nuclear Corporation requiring the company to further investigate
contamination related to its historic uranium mining and
processing operations at the Northeast Church Rock Mine site
located on the Navajo Nation, approximately 16 miles northeast
of Gallup, New Mex.
 
Under the agreement, the company is required to investigate site
and facility-related contamination, including an unnamed arroyo,
and take radiation and soil samples. The company must also
replace an inadequate fence that currently allows individuals
and livestock to enter areas of potential contamination. 

The conditions at this site present a risk of potential
releases of hazardous substances to the air, surrounding soils
and sediments, said Keith Takata, the EPAs Superfund division
director for the U.S. EPA's Pacific Southwest region. United
Nuclear Corporation needs to determine how much contamination
exists at the site and then take steps to clean it up. 

The EPA will evaluate the results of the investigation and
consult with the Navajo Nation Environmental Protection Agency
on any cleanup plans. The EPA will then attempt to reach a
separate settlement with United Nuclear Corporation in which the
company would clean up the area and pay for past costs related
to the site.
 
In January, the EPA detected elevated levels of alpha radiation
at the site and radium-226 in the surface soils. Radium is a
known human carcinogen, and exposure may be a precursor to bone,
liver and breast cancers and other health conditions.
 
Residences to the northeast of the mine permit area may have
been affected by releases of hazardous substances and
contaminants transported by wind, historic dewatering of mining
operations, and runoff during snow, rain and flood events.
 
The 125-acre Northeast Church Rock Mine site operated from
approximately 1967 to 1982, and includes uranium mine waste
piles, several former ponds and sand fill areas.
 
###
 
*****************************************************************
 50 Waste News: United Nuclear Corp agrees. to probe contaminated soil at N.M. site

| Waste Management/Recycling/Landfill Headlines

[Wastenews.com 
  
 Sept. 29 -- United Nuclear Corp. has agreed to investigate
contamination related to its former uranium mining and
processing operations on the Navajo Nation reservation near
Gallup, N.M.

 The company operated the Northeast Church Rock Mine from about
1967 to 1982. Uranium waste piles, containment ponds and sand
fill areas may have contaminated the facility and surrounding
area. Under the agreement with the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, United Nuclear will take radiation and soil samples to
determine the level of contamination.

 The agency detected high levels of alpha radiation at the site
and radium-226 in surface soil during a January inspection.

 The EPA will evaluate the results of the company´s tests and
consult with the Navajo Nation Environmental Protection Agency
on cleanup plans. The EPA also will try to reach a settlement
with United Nuclear to clean the area and pay for other
associated costs.


contents copyright 2006 by Crain Communications Inc.All rights 
reserved.   
*****************************************************************
 51 MPR: Minnesota regulators approve additional storage for nuclear power plant
 
[Minnesota Public Radio]

The Minnesota PUC has given Xcel Energy permission to build 
above-ground storage for nuclear waste at its Monticello nuclear 
power plant. (Courtesy of Nuclear Management Co.)

Minnesota regulators approve additional storage for nuclear
power plant
                        
by Tim Post, Minnesota Public Radio      

September 29, 2006     
			
Xcel Energy officials say they need additional temporary storage 
to keep operating their nuclear power plant at Monticello. One 
Minnesota environmental advocacy group wants state officials to 
push the energy company to plan for a longer term a storage 
solution for its toxic waste.

Collegeville, Minn. 

Xcel's Monticello nuclear power plant opened in the early 1970s. 
The plant stores spent radioactive fuel from 35 years of 
operation in water-filled pools at the facility's main building.                                                                  
                                

But now the power company needs more room to store that 
radioactive waste. The solution, according to Xcel's Jim Alders, 
is to build a three-acre above ground site where spent dry 
nuclear fuel could be stored in metal casks. [Larger view]                           
Prairie Island plant "The containers are large 20-ton containers 
that are sealed by welding. Those containers are then brought out 
to the storage facility, and placed in large concrete vaults with 
reinforced concrete walls three to four feet thick," Alders said. 

Two guarded perimeters would surround the $55 million dollar 
project. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission, or NRC, maintains 
this kind of storage is secure from terrorist attacks, and safe 
for the environment. The company's Prairie Island nuclear power 
plant has used similar above ground storage for the past decade. 

Both Prairie Island and the Monticello plant plan to eventually 
send spent fuel to a proposed federal government nuclear waste 
site. The Department of Energy hopes to store waste at Nevada's 
Yucca Mountain.                                                                                                               
"We can either decide this stuff is permanent, this stuff is 

toxic, we need to figure out how we're going to live with it. Or 
we need to decide we don't want to live with it on a permanent 
basis and we need to stop creating it,"                                                   

- Beth Goodpaster But there's been numerous delays, and now 
government officials say it'll be 2017 before Yucca Mountain can 
accept radioactive waste. Alders says in the meantime power 
plants are seeking short term local solutions. "There's nearly 30 
of these dry storage facilities around the country at nuclear 
power plant sites. The Department of Energy hasn't moved along as 
quickly as everyone had hoped. As the result power plants around 
the country are having to add additional spent fuel storage on 
their sites," Alders said.             
							
Alders is confident that within a few decades the government will 
be able to store all of the nation's nuclear waste. For that 
reason Xcel considers its above ground storage plan as only 
temporary. Some environmental advocates, like Beth Goodpaster see 
that as wishful thinking. "The likelihood is that this waste is 
here to stay. Are we proposing a storage solution that's 
consistent with that? I think the answer honestly has to be no," 
Goodpaster said.                                                                        
                                
Goodpaster, who is with Minnesota Center for Environmental 
Advocacy, worries the federal government won't come up with a 
national storage plan anytime soon. She's also concerned that if 
a storage facility opens up it'll be filled almost immediatly, 
and won't have space for any nuclear waste from Minnesota.              
							
"We can either decide this stuff is permanent, this stuff is 
toxic, we need to figure out how we're going to live with it. Or 
we need to decide we don't want to live with it on a permanent 
basis and we need to stop creating it," Goodpaster said.
                                
While the PUC has given its stamp of approval to the plan, 
lawmakers could still weigh in on the issue in the upcoming 
legislative session. Goodpaster hopes lawmakers take that 
opportunity to ask serious questions about Xcel's long term 
nuclear waste storage plans.                                                                    
                                
Xcel officials say if everything goes as planned, they'll
start building the facility in the summer of 2006, and start
storing radioactive waste there in 2008. 		 	 	 		

Minnesota Public Radio  ©2006 All rights reserved

©2006 Minnesota Public Radio | All rights reserved 480 Cedar 
Street, Saint Paul, MN USA 55101 | 651-290-1212
*****************************************************************
 52 Morris Daily Herald: NRC: No fines expected over tritium releases

news@morrisdailyherald.com     		 		
     	
  9/29/2006 3:38:00 PM

Exelon releases reports on assessments of area plants
 
By Jo Ann Hustis Herald Reporter
 
LISLE - No fines are in the offing from the tritium-laced water 
spills at Braidwood and Dresden generating stations, a federal 
spokes-man said today.

"Because we have reviewed the issues, the company has taken 
corrective action, and we found it was a 'white finding' of low 
to moderate safety significance," Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Region 3, spokesman Jan Strasma noted today.

"Unless there's a situation in which we are provided false or 
inaccurate information, or willful violation occurs, we do not 
levy fines."

Strasma said the NRC is still reviewing tritium assessment 
reports Exelon Nuclear, owner of Braidwood Station at Braceville, 
Dresden Station at Morris, and La Salle Station in Brookfield 
Township at Marseilles, provided to the agency earlier this week.

"Initially, there's no surprises there," he said of the review. 

"We were aware of the situation at all the plants as they 
developed. There's no health and safety issues here."

The situation involved a series of tritium-laced water spills at 
Braidwood Station, which began in 1996, but was not made public 
by Exelon until last December. About six million gallons was 
spilled on and off-site because of malfunctioning valves on the 
blowdown pipe carrying tritiated water to the Kankakee River for 
disposal.

Final results of the environmental study at Braidwood confirmed 
no active leaks of tritium, and no additional detectable tritium 
off-site beyond that found in 2005 and early this year, Exelon 
said today in a prepared news brief.

Tritium is a naturally occurring isotope of hydrogen that emits
a very low level of radiation, and is found in more-concentrated
levels in water used in nuclear generating stations.

The NRC has gone on record throughout the incident stating
public health and safety has not been jeopardized by the
releases.

Strasma said today the Exelon assessment basically documents
what the NRC already knew, and that the report continues to
provide confidence the incident was not a health and safety
issue.

"In particular with Braidwood Station, remedial action is well
under way," he said. "We are continuing, obviously, to monitor
the situation at Braidwood and all Exelon plants."

Exelon said the assessment is the largest environmental tritium
study in the United States involving nuclear generating stations.

The company drilled 507 test and monitoring wells, and analyzed
more than 1,800 water samples, including those at Braidwood.

Water from 33 existing wells, 12 new wells, and six surface
water areas were tested at Braidwood Station.

Sixteen of the 51 water samples contained slightly higher levels
of tritium from historic releases, Exelon said.

These samples ranged from 204 to 1,040 picocuries per liter. The
federal government's maximum safe drinking water standard is
20,000 picocuries per liter.

"No other radionuclides, other than those occurring naturally,
were found in groundwater samples at Braidwood," the utility
noted.

Twenty-nine of 72 water samples from on-site wells at Dresden
Station showed slightly elevated levels of tritium from past
releases.

Only one sample contained strontium-90 far below the federal
maximum safe drinking water standard. The well was in a remote
location on Dresden property. 

No active leaks of tritium and no detectable tritium in
groundwater beyond plant boundaries were found in the assessment
at La Salle Station.

One water sample from an on-site well, and two surface water
samples showed slightly elevated levels of tritium, the
assessment showed.

Exelon said the groundwater sample is most likely a historic
release, and the other two are likely from background surface
water concentrations.

   Morris Daily Herald • 1804 N. Division St. • Morris, Illinois 
60450 (815) 942-3221 • (800) 215-9778 Software © 1998-2006 1up! 
Software, All Rights Reserved
*****************************************************************
 53 Hawaii Reporter: Navy's Narrowly Focused Scoping Meetings Ignore Assessing Future
and Past Environmental Risks

By Beverly Ann Deepe Keever, 9/29/2006 11:00:54 AM

 The U.S. Navy held four scoping meetings in Hawaii this month
but they were so narrowly focused that they ignore assessing the
environmental impacts of future and past major federal actions
on Hawaii or the global commons.

 The scoping sessions permitted the public to offer comments and
ask questions as an early part of a multi-step process for the
Navy to prepare a full-blown, legally required Environmental
Impact Statement/Overseas Environmental Impact Statement
(EIS/OEIS). A draft of this statement is due for public comment
next year with a final version released in 2008. 

The future federal action to be covered by the EIS/OEIS entails
an escalation in intensity, number and kind of training and
testing activities by the Navy and other federal agencies,
including those involved in missile testing at the Pacific
Facility on Kauai and those related to marine mammal research. 

Navy documents distributed at the meeting indicate the following
types of federal actions needed to "meet existing and emerging
defense challenges" that require environmental assessment:
  + Introducing new sea, land, and air-based systems,
  + Improving tracking ranges and expanding an acoustic test
facility,
  + Increasing the number and scale of training exercises,
  + Supporting high-energy laser systems,
  + Escalating ways to conduct more advanced missile testing. 

Impacts from these actions might include assessing "the use of
non-toxic chemical stimulants during missile flight tests, and
new safety arcs for missile launches," the documents indicate.

 Hawaii Missile Testing Impacts Two Million Square Miles --
Equal to Half the United States

 This escalation in federal activities would occur in the area
in which the Navy is already operating, the so-called Hawaii
Range Complex. This Complex is described by the Navy as
"encompassing offshore, near shore, and onshore operating areas"
that it uses in Hawaii and the global commons. Great arcs
detailing these areas fan out mostly around Niihau and parts of
Maui. Small illustrations of these areas were displayed on
posters at the meeting but were unavailable in hard copy or on
the Web site. 

For current missile testing, federal agencies temporarily block
off all air and sea traffic in a zone stretching from sea
surface to the outer limits of the sky for more than two million
square miles -- or equal to nearly half the land mass of the
continental United States and 300 times Hawaii's land area. 

The Navy describes this Complex as providing "a unique and
irreplaceable capability for the Navy to conduct essential
training and testing."

 The EIS/OIES is required to assess "the potential impacts a
federal action might have on the human, natural, or cultural
environment," Navy documents indicate. 

Until Oct. 13, the public may offer more scoping comments; for
details consult http://www.govsupport.us/navynepahawaii

 Navy Should Reject University Affiliated Research Center at the
University of Hawaii or else Conduct Futute EIS on Its Impacts' 

What the Complex and the scoping meetings do not cover is any
future activity the Navy is considering at the University of
Hawaii. There, a proposal to establish a Navy Affiliated
Research Center (UARC) has drawn strong opposition from campus
and community groups for the past several years. 

Establishing such a UARC has been approved by the U.H. president
under certain conditions. A new draft contract to do so is being
negotiated but has yet to be made public. A final contract would
have to be approved by U.H.'s Board of Regents and the Navy. If
the Navy does go forward to release a new draft contract, it
would be signaling its intention to engage in new types of
testing that it could expect would trigger a call for a fresh
EIS/OEIS so as to inform properly federal decision-makers, the
international community and perhaps even the Board of Regents. 

A UARC at U.H. would be the fifth in the country for the Navy
and its first in half a century. The four other ones were born
in the World War II era, long before the 1969 law requiring
federal environmental assessments.

 These early UARCs are housed in sprawling facilities isolated
from classrooms and dorms. In contrast, U.H. would gain no new
isolated facility. U.H.'s research would be conducted in
locations that are currently unknown to the public in the
nation's most isolated state with its uniquely fragile
environment. 

If the Navy releases a draft contract with U.H., a call for
preparation of an EIS could be based on an analogous controversy
in Hawaii's recent history. That controversy entailed a joint
federal-state partnership to build a commercial geothermal power
plant complex on the slopes of the Big Island's Kilauea Crater.
A lawsuit in federal district court by three environmental
groups sought to require an EIS and Judge David Ezra agreed one
was necessary, thus blocking further federal action until one
was filed.

 UARC's Negative Cultural Impacts on U.H. Often Voiced

 Establishing a Navy UARC at U.H. has already been strongly
criticized for its negative cultural impact. Critics argue that
a Navy UARC would negate one of U.H.â€™s stated missions -- to
protect and invigorate the University as â€œa Hawaiian place of
learning.â€ Native Hawaiians individually, in groups, official
councils and many others have pointed out the adverse cultural
impact on the Native Hawaiians and on others that would arise
from establishing a UARC at U.H.

 Others have argued that the UARC would adversely affect the
culture of the U.H. itself because it would negate the free flow
of information that is essential for intellectual vitality and
peer-reviewed, quality research. 

To comply with Federal Acquisition Regulations under which a
UARC at U.H. must operate, results of UARC research would be
sent directly to the Navy in Washington, where officials would
determine whether it was sensitive and appropriate for public
disclosure. Such a limitation on research results prevents the
free and open discussion of peer review and of sharing of
information between students and professors as well as between
the university and downtown business establishment. This
limitation thus subverts the educative mission of the public
university, hampers development of the nationâ€™s future
scientists, researchers, and other leaders from Hawaii and makes
impossible partnerships with Hawaii's business enterprises. 

Establishment of a UARC at U.H. has produced intense campus and
community opposition, with the resulting divisiveness often
being spotlighted in news media within the state and even
nationally. If the UARC is established, this opposition at U.H.
can be expected to continue and probably to intensify. 

Because the exact kinds of research and even the locations where
that research would be conducted under the UARC are currently
unknown, the Navy and other federal agencies should expect to be
asked to conduct another EIS/OEIS document to assess the
potential impacts that enhanced and new kinds of federal testing
might have on the human, natural and cultural environment of
Hawaii and the global commons. The negative effects on the human
environment of a UARC at U.H. as accurately assessed in a future
EIS may well outweigh benefits to the Navy and other federal
agencies.

 Navy Should Address Continuing Negative Impacts of 500,000
Years of Radioactivity Created by U.S. Pacific Nuclear Weapons
Testing

 It is ironic that the scoping meetings were held 60 years and
two months after the first and second U.S. nuclear weapons tests
were conducted in the Pacific region. The environmental,
cultural and human degradation resulting from those and
subsequent tests continues to this day. And some of this
degradation will continue for half a million years, considering
that the radioactivity emitted from the plutonium in those
weapons has been and will continue to be circulated globally for
that long. 

Operation Crossroads conducted July 1 at Bikini Atoll, the
subsequent nearby underwater test on July 25, 1946, and 84 other
tests that followed in the Marshall Islands, the Pacific waters
and at Johnston Atoll through 1962 resulted in the explosive
force of the equivalent of at least 8,580 Hiroshima-sized bombs
or the equivalent of 1.4 nuclear explosions per day over the
16-year period, according to data detailed in News Zero: The New
York Times and The Bomb. 

Major impacts of these experiments 60 years later are that: 
  + parts of Enewetak Island have been completely blown away, 
  + other parts of it and Bikini Atoll will be uninhabitable for
centuries, 
  + the destruction of the lifestyle and normal health of some
native peoples has resulted, 
  + 800 miles southwest of Hawaii, a mound of plutonium-laced
debris at Johnston Island is protected by only a skimpy
covering, thus making it a potential environmental and health
hazard during hurricane season for the next 500,000 years,
  + many civilian workers and servicemen also suffered health
problems because of their employment involved with the testing.
Bikinians and Enewetakese suffering from these tests have again
launched federal lawsuits to redress the injustices arising from
the inadequate compensation they say they were promised by the
U.S. for personal injury and property damages to them, their
descendants and their ancestral homelands.

 The Navy may be well advised to address this perceived
lingering legacy of U.S. nuclear weapons tests. Doing so would
enable it to fulfill better its mission of defending much of the
planet's surface that includes populous Islamic nations amidst a
war on terror in which just policies are considered as
beneficial as better weaponry. Thus, in determining the scope of
the forthcoming EIS/OEIS, the Navy should consider for itself
and other federal agencies:
  + That the Hawaii Range Complex is too limited a geographic
area to be assessed and instead that the U.S.-affiliated Pacific
Islands and Johnston Island should also be considered,
  + That the environmental, cultural and human degradation
initiated 60 years ago at Operation Crossroads and subsequent
Pacific nuclear experiments producing radioactivity that will
continue for 500 millennia should be considered as part of the
continuing impact of the activities of the Navy and other
federal agencies in the greater Pacific region. 

In sum, the scope of the Navy's newly proposed EIS/OEIS should
be broadened in time and space. 

In the future, the Navy should avoid the negative cultural and
other impacts of establishing a UARC at Hawaiiâ€™s only public
institution of higher learning. 

If such a UARC is to be established at U.H., then the parameters
and locations of this research must become known to the public.
Then the Navy may be called upon to conduct another EIS to
assess probable adverse impacts of the UARC on the human
environment before it can legally go forward. 

The Navy's EIS/OEIS should also be broadened to include the
greater Pacific region and the continuing environmental, human
and cultural degradation resulting from U.S. testing of nuclear
weapons dating back 60 years. 

This article is based in part on written testimony presented to
the Navy at its scoping meeting in Honolulu on Sept. 14, 2006.
The author, expressing her own views, is a professor of
journalism at the University of Hawaii. She is also the author
of News Zero: The New York Times and The Bomb, published by
Common Courage Press in 2004.

 HawaiiReporter.com reports the real news, and prints all
editorials submitted, even if they do not represent the
viewpoint of the editors, as long as they are written clearly.
Send editorials to mailto:Malia@HawaiiReporter.com 

 Hawaii Reporter 1314 S. King St., Suite 1163 Honolulu, Hawaii 
96814

 Information and Subscription Phone: 808-524-4500 Fax: 
808-524-4594
 
© 2006 Hawaii Reporter, Inc.    
*****************************************************************
 54 News & Star: MP slams nuclear group sale

Published on 29/09/2006

Criticism: Jamie Reed

COPELAND MP Jamie Reed has criticised the sale of British Nuclear 
Group, his former employers at Sellafield.
 
He claimed BNGâ€™s chief executive Mike Parker had mislead the 
public over the way the company is going about the 
Government-approved sell-off.
 
â€œI have asked him to tell me why there has been no consultation 
or explanation to the local community over the change in which 
BNG are going about the sale. 

â€œI have also asked him why he misled my constituency and his 
own workers by telling them in an internal memo of September 11 
that they had consulted with key stakeholders,â€ the MP said.
 
â€œThere has been no consultation with me or other elected 
representatives in Copeland. Mr Parker hasnâ€™t spoken to me for 
months.
 
â€œWe now seem to be on shifting sands over the way this sale is 
progressing. Itâ€™s going ahead without any rhyme or reason, with 
bits of it being sold off piecemeal. Nobody is telling us 
whatâ€™s going on. As a community we have stood by the nuclear 
industry at Sellafield for 40 years, in some cases at a cost to 
our reputation, so we deserve better than this.â€
 
A spokesman said Mr Parker was unavailable to comment.
*****************************************************************
 55 St. Paul Pioneer Press: Quiet hearing OKs nuke storage

09/29/2006 | 

Decision final in June unless legislators act

 BY DENNIS LIEN Pioneer Press 

Minnesota's big nuclear-waste decisions used to be made in noisy 
legislative chambers in front of placard-carrying protesters. 

On Thursday, the latest one was settled in a quiet room before a 
smattering of lobbyists, utility executives and environmental 
watchdogs. 

In less than an hour, the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission
unanimously approved Xcel Energy's request to store highly
radioactive nuclear waste in up to 30 above-ground containers
outside its Monticello, Minn., nuclear power plant. Unless
lawmakers intervene early next year, the decision will be final
in June, enabling Xcel to start building a storage area next
summer and to begin moving nuclear waste into the containers in
2008. 

The decision, which came eight months after Xcel sought the
extra room, had none of the rancor that accompanied similar ones
in 1994 and 2003. Then, angry protesters argued unsuccessfully
against giving Xcel's other nuclear plant, at Prairie Island,
more storage capacity. 

In the 2003 bill, conditional authority was handed off to the
commission, which otherwise regulates electric, natural gas and
telephone service. Critics argued it was done because that path
was a less challenging one than the Legislature. 

Saying they'd put in a good deal of study, the commissioners
quickly endorsed Xcel's request Thursday. 

One commissioner, former state Rep. Tom Pugh, suggested
legislators might take up the issue next winter. But another,
former state Rep. LeRoy Koppendrayer, stressed the nuclear power
industry's safety record and said endorsing Xcel's request was
the correct decision. 

"It's the longest-lived decision that will ever be made in this
room,'' said Michael Noble, executive director of Fresh Energy,
an energy-policy group formerly called Minnesotans for an
Energy-Efficient Economy. 

The decision follows a recommendation last month from an
administrative law judge to give Minneapolis-based Xcel the
extra capacity. 

Xcel wants to store waste in as many as 30 steel and concrete
containers as part of its application for a 20-year license
extension at Monticello. It contends more storage is key to
extending the life of the plant, located about 50 miles
northwest of St. Paul. 

The utility said keeping the plant open is the best option for
supplying low-priced electricity and for avoiding air pollution
from plants that burn coal or natural gas. It said no other good
option provides a comparable level of clean, reliable and
low-cost power. 

Monticello's spent fuel will stay there until well after a
federal repository, proposed for Yucca Mountain, Nev., becomes
available. 

"Under any scenario, it's going to be a substantial amount of
time before all the spent fuel could be moved,'' said Jim
Alders, Xcel's manager of regulatory projects. 

Beth Goodpaster, a lawyer for the Minnesota Center for
Environmental Advocacy, lamented the lack of discussion about
the long-term hazards of nuclear waste. 

"There was no attention to the nuclear waste that is produced
and that we will have to deal with in perpetuity,'' Goodpaster
said. 

Fresh Energy and MCEA were among several groups that questioned
the health, safety and environmental effects of storing spent
fuel in the casks. 

Dennis Lien can be reached at or 651-228-5588.
*****************************************************************
 56 Bradenton Herald: Tallevast leaders call community-wide meeting for Monday

09/29/2006 | 

 DONNA WRIGHT Herald Staff Writer 

TALLEVAST - Alarmed over pending development and unanswered
questions surrounding a 200-acre plume of underground
contamination, Tallevast leaders will hold a Community Town Hall
Meeting at 6:30 p.m. Monday at Mt. Tabor Church, 1730 Tallevast
Road. 

The meeting is being called to brief residents on the state
environmental protection agency's decision that Lockheed has
completed its investigation and to update the community on
development projects that will go before the county commission
on Thursday for approval, said Laura Ward, president of FOCUS or
Family Oriented Community United Strong, an advocacy group. 

FOCUS leaders fear the DEP approval will end the investigation
phase of the plume before the true extent of the contamination
is known. 

Proposed development projects, Ward warns, will forever change
their community. 

Rep. Bill Galvano, R-Bradenton, Rep. Frank Peterman, D-St.
Petersburg as well as reps from Sen. Bill Nelson's office and
Rep. Katherine Harris' office are expected to attend along with
an attorney from WildLaw Inc., an environmental advocacy
organization and technical advisers for the community. 

The Tallevast plume has been traced to the former Loral American
Beryllium Co plant at 1600 Tallevast Road. Lockheed Martin Corp.
owned the beryllium plant when the contamination was discovered
six years ago. 

Originally estimated to cover just 50 acres on the plant site,
the plume is now known to cover more than 200 acres, according
to Lockheed's data. 

The Florida Department of Environmental Protection ruled this
week that Lockheed's plume data is now complete and the
investigational phase of the clean-up project is over. The state
has directed Lockheed to come up with a clean-up plan to get rid
of the plume. 

That process will take an estimated 20 years, Lockheed has said. 

Donna Wright, health and social services reporter, can be
reached at 745-7049 or at dwright@HeraldToday.com. 

*****************************************************************
 57 AU ABC: Honeymoon uranium mine gets EPA approval
 
ABC North and West SA | Local News | Story 

 Friday, 29 September 2006. 15:43 (AEDT)Friday, 29 September

Final approvals have been given for Australia's fourth uranium
mine, the Honeymoon project, in South Australia's north-east. 

The South Australian Environmental Protection Authority has
issued a licence to Southern Cross Resources to operate at the
site, 80 kilometres north-west of Broken Hill. 

The licence allows uranium to be extracted using a technique
known as acid in situ leaching. 

It involves forcing fluid into underground aquifers and bringing
the uranium to the surface. 

The company was granted a 20-year mining lease by the previous
South Australian Liberal government. 

The company's board gave its approval for the mine last month
and plans to start construction this year. 

Southern Cross Resources could begin commercial production at
the site within two years. 

*****************************************************************
 58 [NYTr] New Japan PM Pledges to Ditch Pacifist Constitution
 
Date: Sat, 30 Sep 2006 02:36:57 -0400 (EDT)

X-Sender-Host-Name: 
X-Spam-Class: HAM-VERY

Via NY Transfer News Collective  *  All the News that Doesn't Fit
 
sent by Rich Winkel (activ-l) 

Al Jazeera - Sep 29, 2006
http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/B555051B-D520-4F77-8AC1-CA15CD1EA981.htm

New PM to make Japan assertive

Abe is keen on revising Japan's pacifist constitution

Japan's new prime minister has pledged to make his country a decisive
force on the international stage, while restoring values of hard
work and patriotism at home.

Shinzo Abe, who is Japan's first leader born after the second world
war, set out a vision of "beautiful country" that can distance
itself from post-war guilt that conservatives claim has deprived
Japan of its history and culture.

"Our country, Japan, is a country endowed with a long history,
culture, tradition and beautiful natural environment of which we
can be proud before the world," Abe told parliament in his first
policy speech since becoming prime minister on Tuesday.

Abe pledged to move ahead with revising the Japan's pacifist
constitution and exploring a collective defence system with close
ally the United States.

"I believe it's entirely possible to create a country brimming with
attractiveness and vigour, while maintaining the noble virtues of
the Japanese people," he said. "I aim for a country that is trusted,
revered and loved by the world and asserts its leadership'.

Patriotism

Abe's Liberal Democratic Party has long campaigned to replace the
constitution, which was drafted by US forces after the war, to
revise phrases that ban maintaining a military for warfare.

"I will immediately engage in a revival of education to create
citizens who treasure their families, their regions, their country,
and life itself"

He also promised to foster patriotism in the nation's classrooms.

"I will immediately engage in a revival of education to create
citizens who treasure their families, their regions, their country,
and life itself," Abe said.

Abe said he wanted to build trust with China and South Korea who
had been angered by his predecessor's visits to the controversial
Yasukuni war shrine.

Important neighbours

"China and South Korea are important neighbours," he said.
"Strengthening trust with the two is key for the Asian region and
for the international community, and it is important for all sides
to work to have honest, future-oriented discussions."

Abe has already agreed with Roh Moo-hyun, the South Korean president,
that they should meet soon, and Kyodo news agency reported on Friday
that the preparations were under way for him to visit Seoul in early
October.

There is also speculation that he might meet Hu Jintao, the Chinese
president, either at an Asia-Pacific leaders' gathering in Hanoi
in November, or maybe even before.

Abe - who has taken a 30 per cent pay cut to demonstrate his
commitment to trimming the budget - has a public approval rating
of up to 71 per cent in newspaper polls published before the speech.

       
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 59 DOE: U.S. Department of Energy and NTI Announce Key Nonproliferation Project with Kazakhstan
 
  September 29, 2006
 
Agreement Reached To Downblend HEU and Convert Reactor 

WASHINGTON, D.C.  The U.S. Department of Energy and the Nuclear
Threat Initiative (NTI) today announced that they have reached
an important agreement-in-principle with the Government of
Kazakhstan to move forward with the down-blending of highly
enriched uranium (HEU) currently stored at Kazakhstans
Institute of Nuclear Physics.  The agreement also calls for the
conversion of the VVR-K research reactor to operate on low
enriched uranium fuel instead of HEU, which can be used in
nuclear weapons. The agreement is an important step forward in
fulfilling Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayevs pledge
late last year to rid his country of its HEU. 

This agreement represents another example of the kind of
productive cooperation the United States and Kazakhstan have
shared in furthering nuclear nonproliferation, said U.S.
Secretary of Energy Samuel W. Bodman.  Our cooperative efforts
support the Bush Administrations Global Initiative to Combat
Nuclear Terrorism, recently announced by Presidents Bush and
Putin." 

The project will be administered through the Department of
Energys National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). 
NNSAs Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) will work with
Kazakhstan to make arrangements for the down-blending of the HEU
at the Ulba Metallurgical Plant in Kazakhstan and to initiate
conversion of the VVR-K reactor.  GTRI will contribute at least
$4 million to this important threat reduction initiative. 

NTI played a key role in the agreement being reached by
committing up to $1.3 million for a new reactor control and
protection system to improve reactor safety and a beryllium
reflector to enhance reactor performance. 

Kazakhstan and the United States are to be commended for the
foresight and creativity needed to make this agreement a
reality, said former Senator Sam Nunn, the co-chair of NTI. 
This project is an example of how governments, the private
sector, and international organizations can work together to
find innovative and effective solutions to make the world safer.
 NTI is proud to have played a role in making it happen.  Under
President Nazarbayevs leadership, Kazakhstan led the way in
getting rid of all its nuclear weapons after the break-up of the
Soviet Union and is once again showing the world a safer path by
converting its weapons-usable highly enriched uranium to low
enriched uranium. 

This nonproliferation cooperative project with Kazakhstan is
critical to our efforts to eliminate excess amounts of
potentially dangerous material around the world.  Only through
cooperation with the international community can we reduce the
threat of nuclear terrorism, said NNSA Administrator Linton F.
Brooks. 

Todays agreement follows a May 2006 agreement between the
governments of Kazakhstan and the U.S. related to NNSAs Second
Line of Defense program.  Under that program, U.S. and
Kazakhstan officials are working together to install radiation
detection and integrated communications equipment at strategic
border crossings in Kazakhstan to identify and deter illicit
nuclear and radiological materials. 

NTI is a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization dedicated to
reducing the global threats from nuclear, biological and
chemical weapons and is governed by an international Board
co-chaired by philanthropist Ted Turner and former Senator Sam
Nunn. 

The mission of GTRI is to identify, secure, recover and/or
facilitate the final disposition of high-risk vulnerable nuclear
and radiological materials around the world as quickly as
possible.  To date, approximately 230 kilograms of HEU have been
returned to the Russian Federation from vulnerable sites around
the world and 43 research reactors worldwide have been converted
from operating on HEU. 

Established by Congress in 2000, NNSA is a semi-autonomous
agency within the U.S. Department of Energy responsible for
enhancing national security through the military application of
nuclear science.  NNSA maintains and enhances the safety,
security, reliability and performance of the U.S. nuclear
weapons stockpile without nuclear testing; works to reduce
global danger from weapons of mass destruction; provides the
U.S. Navy with safe and effective nuclear propulsion; and
responds to nuclear and radiological emergencies in the U.S. and
abroad.  Visit http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/for more information. 

Media contact(s): Bryan Wilkes, (202) 586-7371 Cathy Gwin, (202) 
454-7706     [ ]   

  U.S. Department of Energy | 1000 Independence Ave., SW | 
Washington, DC 20585 1-800-dial-DOE | f/202-586-4403
   
*****************************************************************
 60 Las Vegas SUN: Editorial: Domenici as Jekyll & Hyde 

Today: September 29, 2006 at 7:31:11 PDT 

On nuclear waste storage, New Mexico's Republican senator is both 
friend and foe

As a Republican, Sen. Pete Domenici of New Mexico is
ideologically opposed to Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid,
Nevada's top Democrat. Yet Domenici has said Reid is his closest
friend in the Senate. Maybe this is why, on the issue of Yucca
Mountain, Domenici is pushing two bills - one that would
irreparably harm Nevada and incense Reid and one that would
greatly serve Nevada and please Reid. 

In June Reid and Domenici held a joint press conference to
announce a stunning agreement. They said they had been working
secretly for a year on a plan that would send high-level nuclear
waste to federally operated interim storage sites within states
that have nuclear power plants. 

Domenici said the plan would take some of the pressure off the
Energy Department and allow it to make steady progress on its
plan to open a permanent nuclear waste dump at Yucca Mountain,
90 miles northwest of Las Vegas. Domenici also said the lack of
even an interim plan for nuclear waste was holding up
construction of new nuclear power plants. 

Reid said the plan would spare Nevada from becoming an interim
storage site. Also, Reid said, the plan would surely be
protested by the affected states, gaining more support for
Nevada's position that the waste should remain where it is,
safely stored at the nuclear power plants. Additionally, Reid
said their interim plan would cover the next 25 years or so,
giving Nevada more time to convince the country and the federal
government that Yucca Mountain is a scientifically unsound
project. 

While the two senators each had his own reasons for supporting
the interim plan, at least they were in agreement and Nevada
seemed protected for a long time. 

This week, however, Domenici introduced another bill in the
Senate, one that would send all of the country's nuclear waste -
whether generated at nuclear weapons plants or nuclear power
plants - to a temporary, above-ground storage site at Yucca
Mountain. Under the bill, the waste would begin moving to Nevada
in 2010. 

One point of Domenici's bill is to support the pro-Yucca
Mountain argument, transparent as it may be, that nuclear waste
stored at power plants is an inviting target for terrorists. So,
thousands of trucks carrying the waste cross-country to Nevada
for the next 25 years wouldn't be? 

With his latest proposal, Domenici is trying to change the
Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, and amendments made in 1987,
that protect Nevada from temporary storage while it is being
studied as the sole site for permanent storage. Already there
have been many changes to the original nuclear waste legislation
that have weakened safety standards at Yucca Mountain. How much
more must Nevada endure? 

All contents copyright 2005 Las Vegas SUN, Inc.
*****************************************************************
 61 DOE: Environmental Management Site-Specific Advisory Board, Hanford
 
                        FR Doc E6-16050 
[Federal Register: September 29, 2006 (Volume 71, Number 189)] 
[Notices] [Page 57491] From the Federal Register Online via GPO 
Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr29se06-57]                         
 
AGENCY: Department of Energy.
 
ACTION: Notice of open meeting.
 
SUMMARY: This notice announces a meeting of the Environmental 
Management Site-Specific Advisory Board (EM SSAB), Hanford. The 
Federal Advisory Committee Act (Pub. L. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770) 
requires that public notice of this meeting be announced in the 
Federal Register.
 
 
DATES: Thursday, November 2, 2006--9 a.m.-5 p.m. Friday, November 
3, 2006--8:30 a.m.-4 p.m.
 
ADDRESSES: Best Western Hood River Inn, 1108 East Marina Way, 
Hood River, Oregon, Phone Number: (541) 386-2200, Fax Number: 
(541) 386- 8905.
 
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Erik Olds, Federal Coordinator, 
Department of Energy Richland Operations Office, 2440 Stevens 
Drive, P.O. Box 450, H6-60, Richland, WA, 99352; Phone: (509) 
376-8656; Fax: (509) 376-1214.
 
 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Purpose of the Board: The purpose of 
the Board is to make recommendations to DOE in the areas of 
environmental restoration, waste management, and related 
activities.
 
Tentative Agenda: General Risk Assessment.
 
Double-Shell Tank Integrity Advice.
 
Characterization of Tank Leaks.
 
Bechtel National Inc. Contract Renegotiation. Chair Election.
 
Columbia River Toxic Initiative.
 
Site-Specific Advisory Board Chairs Meeting Update.
 
Site-Specific Advisory Board Chairs Letter.
 
Tri-Party Agreement Milestone 15 Change Package.
 
Agency Updates.
 
Committee Updates.
 
Public Participation: The meeting is open to the public.
 
Written statements may be filed with the Board either before or 
after the meeting. Individuals who wish to make oral statements 
pertaining to agenda items should contact Erik Olds' office at 
the address or telephone number listed above. Requests must be 
received five days prior to the meeting and reasonable provision 
will be made to include the presentation in the agenda. The 
Deputy Designated Federal Officer is empowered to conduct the 
meeting in a fashion that will facilitate the orderly conduct of 
business. Individuals wishing to make public comment will be 
provided a maximum of five minutes to present their comments.
 
Minutes: The minutes of this meeting will be available for public 
review and copying at the U.S. Department of Energy's Freedom of 
Information Public Reading Room, 1E-190, Forrestal Building, 1000 
Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20585 between 9 a.m. and 
4 p.m., Monday-Friday, except Federal holidays. Minutes will also 
be available by writing to Erik Olds' office at the address or 
telephone number listed above.
 
Issued at Washington, DC, on September 25, 2006.
 
Rachel M. Samuel, Deputy Advisory Committee Management Officer.
 
[FR Doc. E6-16050 Filed 9-28-06; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 6450-01-P

 
    
*****************************************************************

NOTE: In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. section 107 this 
material is distributed without profit or payment to those who 
have expressed a prior interest in receiving this information for 
non-profit research and educational purposes only. For more 
information go to: 
<http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml> 
    
*****************************************************************