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                         NUCLEAR POLICY
 
1 [southnews] Iraq War ties US hands on Iran
2 Blix Report
3 IPS-English IRAN-U.S.: Good sense must prevail, says UAE press
4 [NYTr] Talking to Iran: Rice's Problematic Conditions
5 New York Times: For Bush, Talks With Iran Were a Last Resort - 
6 Guardian Unlimited: Iran 'could have bomb in 10 years'
7 Guardian: Comment is free | Right move on a risky path
8 AFP: China tells Iran it will back diplomacy to resolve nuclear cris
9 AFP: World powers await Iran response to nuclear proposals - 
10 Guardian Unlimited: 6 World Powers Agree on Iran Incentives
11 Guardian Unlimited: Rice Warns Iran It Doesn't Have Much Time
12 Guardian Unlimited: Iranian TV Dismisses Meeting in Europe
13 INSIDE JoongAng Daily: Reflections on KEDO
14 INSIDE JoongAng Daily: [EDITORIALS]Dear U.S.: Talk to the North
15 Korea Times: Inter-Korean Economic Talks Start 
16 US: Landmark Court Decision Re EIS & Potential For Nuclear Terrorism
17 US: Spectrum: Ensure bomb delay sticks
18 US: Public Citizen: U.S. Supreme Court Ruling Limits First Amendment
 
                         NUCLEAR REACTORS
 
19 [NYTr] Head of French Nuke Watchdog Lied over Chernobyl Fallout
20 [NYTr] Head of French Nuke Watchdog Lied over Chernobyl Fallout
21 US: APP.COM: Safety regulators eye nuclear power plant's critical
22 Independent: Head of France's nuclear watchdog 'lied over Chernobyl 
23 US: Burlington Free Press: Activists question Yankee relicensing
24 China Daily: Nuke fusion reactor gives nation a headstart 
25 US: THERECORD.COM: Nuclear energy isn't safe
26 HEN News: Docs volunteer to operate on Chernobyl girl
27 US: NRC: Exelon Generation Company, LLC; Byron Station, Unit Nos. 1 
28 US: NRC: FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company and FirstEnergy Nucle
29 US: NRC: Agency Information Collection Activities: Proposed Collecti
30 US: NRC: Sunshine Act Meeting
31 US: EPA: Nuclear EIS's 
32 Korea Times: NK Reactor Project Terminated 
33 US: Times-Herald Record: Nuclear power is not only green, but also s
34 US: Cape Cod Times: Pilgrim plant gets tighter scrutiny 
 
                          NUCLEAR SECURITY
 
 
                          NUCLEAR SAFETY
 
35 US: NRC: Notice of Opportunity to Comment on Model Safety Evaluation
36 B92: Comments - Radioactivity of iron confirmed
37 US: PRN: California Grants License to Remove Uranium from Drinking W
38 KLASTV.com: Las Vegas Forges Friendship With Kazakhstan
39 US: Caller.com: Nuclear-fission era relic still rests near side of H
 
                         NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE
 
40 US: [NukeNet] Court revokes radioactive storage permit (at Diablo
41 reviewjournal.com: YUCCA MOUNTAIN: DOE eyes old rail plan
42 US: DailyBulletin.com: Aerojet site cleanup enters new phase
43 US: Pasadena Star-News: Clean water funds sought
 
                           PEACE
 
44 Guardian Unlimited: Study Wants Nuclear Weapons Outlawed
 
                        US DEPT. OF ENERGY
 
45 Seattle Times: DOE fights in court to add to Hanford's waste 
46 lamonitor.com: IG questions warhead schedule 
47 lamonitor.com: Lab marks 'a new day' 
48 Knox News: Report: Tests at Y-12 plant delay project
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                         FULL NEWS STORIES
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 1 [southnews] Iraq War ties US hands on Iran
 
Date: Fri, 2 Jun 2006 23:05:12 -0500 (CDT)

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A proposed deal to end Iran's disputed nuclear program highlights a new 
reality facing the United States: American intercessions overseas will 
be seen through the prism of an Iraq war that is highly unpopular around 
the globe.

Analysis: Iraq War Ties U.S. Hands on Iran

By ANNE GEARAN AP Diplomatic Writer
) 2006 The Associated Press
June 2, 2006, 11:19AM

VIENNA, Austria  A proposed deal to end Iran's disputed nuclear program 
highlights a new reality facing the United States: American 
intercessions overseas will be seen through the prism of an Iraq war 
that is highly unpopular around the globe.

The Iran proposal also highlights two truths of diplomacy that endure 
from the days of the Cold War _ nuclear weapons buy nations bargaining 
power they would not otherwise have, and that power can only be 
countered with muscle from the United States.

With U.S. forces and fortunes lashed to Iraq for years to come, nations 
that the United States cannot afford to alienate can insist that 
Washington give diplomacy every chance to succeed before resorting to 
economic punishment or military force, foreign policy scholars said. 
Even many American allies believe the Iraq war was avoidable.

"Obviously, Iraq has made a major negative impact on American 
credibility," said Trita Parsi, a Middle East specialist at Johns 
Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies.

Russia and China, which both opposed the Iraq war, have held off 
consideration of global sanctions on Iran in part out of concern that 
the United States had not tried every other option, Parsi said.

The U.S. offer on Wednesday to bargain directly with Iran helped begin 
to dispel that worry.

The United States, Russia, China and three major European powers agreed 
Thursday on an either-or deal of incentives or punishments for Iran that 
would form the basis for a new round of talks involving the U.S. If Iran 
agrees to talk, it would be the first major face-to-face diplomacy 
between the U.S. and Iran in more than a quarter century.

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice met with the foreign ministers from 
the European nations that led talks with Iran that stalled last year. 
Also present were representatives of Russia and China, which have been 
Tehran's trading partners and might join in any future talks with Iran.

Since Russia and China hold vetoes in the U.N. Security Council, the 
U.S. needs their cooperation to seek sanctions or other harsh measures 
by that body.

Iran would follow North Korea and Libya as the third recent example of 
nations whose possession or pursuit of weapons of mass destruction 
forced the United States to hold its nose and negotiate with tyrants 
whose political, economic and military might is no match for Washington's.

"The Iraq example coupled with the North Korea example probably is part 
of the motivation for some in Iran to get a nuclear weapon," and do so 
quickly, said Ken Pollack, research director at the Brookings 
Institution's Saban Center for Middle East Policy.

Iran absorbed the lessons of those other two nations that President Bush 
linked as a three-way "axis of evil," Pollack said.

"We didn't invade North Korea because they had a nuclear weapon. We did 
invade Iraq because they didn't have a nuclear weapon but we thought 
they were trying to get one. If you're Iran, what is the logical lesson?"

Under heavy U.S. pressure, North Korea agreed last year to give up its 
declared weapons and swear off future development. The deal is now in 
limbo, with North Korea refusing to return to six-way talks.

The United States said last month it would resume full diplomatic ties 
with Libya, a reward for leader Moammar Gadhafi's decision three years 
ago to renounce weapons of mass destruction.

Both North Korea and Libya feared U.S. military action, and used their 
weapons programs as leverage to get Washington to make a deal.

The Bush administration strongly resisted calls from allies and others 
to negotiate with Iran. Some conservative policy-makers have repeatedly 
accused Iran of funding and sowing terrorism.

Rice decided about six weeks ago that the stalled European efforts to 
bargain with Iran were doomed unless the United States lent its weight 
to the effort, aides said. She drew up a timeline for U.S. involvement 
that would try to resolve the impasse before the end of the year, and 
conditioned U.S. involvement on suspension of uranium enrichment 
activities that have alarmed the West.

Rice announced the U.S. overture Wednesday morning, and worked the 
phones in Washington for hours to blunt criticism from conservative 
leaders and writers.

The deal she helped broker in Vienna would give Iran economic incentives 
and international help developing a peaceful program to produce atomic 
energy if it gives up activities the West suspects are aimed at building 
a bomb, diplomats said.

A short statement issued by foreign ministers from the six powers and 
the European Union did not mention economic sanctions _ the punishment 
or deterrent favored by the United States and that Iran has tried hard 
to avoid.

The powers agreed privately, however, that Iran could face tough 
Security Council sanctions if it fails to give up the enrichment of 
uranium and other disputed nuclear activities, U.S. officials said.

Diplomats feared Iran would immediately reject any invitation to bargain 
if the threat of sanctions was explicit, officials involved in the 
discussions said on condition of anonymity because the seven-party 
negotiations were private.

The foreign ministers' statement threatens unspecified "further steps" 
in the Security Council.

___

Eds: Anne Gearan covers diplomatic issues in Washington for The 
Associated Press

The archives of South News can be found at
http://southmovement.alphalink.com.au/southnews/ 

*****************************************************************
 2 Blix Report
 
Date: Fri, 2 Jun 2006 12:50:06 -0500 (CDT)

Institute for Public Accuracy
915 National Press Building, Washington, D.C. 20045
(202) 347-0020 * http://www.accuracy.org * ipa@accuracy.org
___________________________________________________

	PM Thursday, June 1, 2006

	Blix Report

Today the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission chaired by Hans Blix 
presented its report "Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, 
Biological and Chemical Arms" to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan.

The following nuclear disarmament specialists are available for interviews:

JOHN BURROUGHS, johnburroughs@lcnp.org, http://www.lcnp.org
    Burroughs, executive director of the Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear 
Policy, said today: "The Blix report rightly says that these 
catastrophic devices are dangerous in anyone's hands; that the problems 
of existing arsenals, potential spread, and potential acquisition by 
terrorists are all linked; and that the problems can be solved only by a 
comprehensive approach leading to elimination of all nuclear weapons."

JACQUELINE CABASSO, wslf@earthlink.net, http://www.wslfweb.org
    Cabasso is executive director of the Western States Legal 
Foundation, which focuses on nuclear policy issues. She said today: "The 
Commission clearly holds the United States largely responsible for the 
present crisis. By walking away from tried and true arms control 
treaties, and by launching an illegal war in the name of 
'counterproliferation,' the U.S. has seriously undermined international 
law and endangered international security."
    Cabasso offered one strong criticism of the report, stating: "The 
Commission explores options for controlling uranium enrichment and 
plutonium separation activities in order to minimize the risks of 
proliferation associated with those activities. But they fail to even 
mention the possibility of phasing out nuclear energy."

JENNIFER NORDSTROM, jennifer@reachingcriticalwill.org, 
http://reachingcriticalwill.org
    Nordstrom is project associate for Reaching Critical Will, a program 
of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom. She 
highlighted the report's statement that a "nuclear disarmament treaty is 
achievable and can be reached through careful, sensible and practical 
measures." Nordstrom cited activity of networks of civil society, such 
as the Abolition 2000 Global Network to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons, as 
well as the existing Chemical Weapons Convention.

For more information, contact at the Institute for Public Accuracy:
Sam Husseini, (202) 347-0020; or David Zupan, (541) 484-9167

_________________________________________________________________
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*****************************************************************
 3 IPS-English IRAN-U.S.: Good sense must prevail, says UAE press
 
Date: Fri, 02 Jun 2006 14:49:35 -0700


<x-flowed>
IRAN-U.S.: Good sense must prevail, says UAE press

Att.Editors: The following item is from the Emirates News Agency (WAM)

ABU DHABI, June 2 (WAM) - Two major United Arab Emirates (UAE) English
dailies today commented on efforts to bring Iran and the U.S. to let
common sense prevail in their tussle over Tehran's nuclear programme.

Commenting editorially on the issue today under the title "Good sense must
prevail", the Dubai-based 'Khaleej Times' said: "At last, after long
months of tough talk and endless scoring of diplomatic brownie points by
both sides, there are signs that Iran and U.S. are willing to let common
sense prevail. Iran has responded positively to the U.S. offer saying it
is willing to talk to Washington but it will not halt its nuclear
enrichment."

    In a major breakthrough on Wednesday, Washington had offered to hold
talks with Iran if Tehran halted its nuclear activities.

    "While both Washington and Tehran still stick to their original stand
with Iran refusing to halt enrichment and U.S. insisting on stopping
nuclear activities, there is a clear willingness on the part of the two
sides to talk over the issue. This is unprecedented and opens new
possibilities of resolving this vexed issue diplomatically and peacefully.


    "If all goes well and the initiative is not sabotaged by vested
interests on both sides and Iran and the U.S. do eventually break the ice,
it would be a watershed in the region's history. For this would be the
first such official interaction between the Islamic Republic and reigning
superpower following their bitter parting in the wake of Islamic
Revolution of 1979.

    "The international community, especially the people of the Middle East,
would be fervently hoping for a positive outcome of such an encounter.
There is far too much at stake to hope otherwise.

    "One hardly needs to emphasise the fact that this part of the world has
had more than its fair share of wars, destruction and instability. With
Palestine and Iraq already burning, surely we don't need another pointless
showdown over Iran.

    "Iran and the U.S. would do well to heed the world community's desire
for a peaceful resolution of this dangerous confrontation. It's time for
the two sides to demonstrate greater political maturity and realism on the
issue of nuclear programme. While Iran has to do all it can to address
international concerns about its nuclear ambitions, the U.S. needs to take
into account Iran's aspirations for a peaceful nuclear programme.
Especially when there is a growing realisation in the EU that Iran should
be allowed to pursue a peaceful enrichment programme, if it offers
guarantees not to make nuclear weapons.

    "The Non-Aligned Movement leaders too have defended Iran's right for
peaceful nuclear energy. There is no issue in this world that cannot be
discussed and settled at the negotiating table.

    "The leaders who, haunted by their own delusions of elusive grandeur,
fail to recognise this are condemned forever by history and by their own
people. Iran and the U.S. have to gift a legacy of peace and progress to
their people and the world."

    Commenting on the same issue under the title "Old whine with new
label", the 'Gulf News' said: "The latest U.S. 'offer' to Iran over the
nuclear energy controversy has the EU shouting loud hurrahs in praise. But
then EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana, the head cheerleader, is the
eternal optimist even when he has no cause to be so. At least, when called
upon, he can provide diplomatic placatory words of comfort in an attempt
to ease tensions.

    "But the U.S. offer to talk, while approaching a new and less
confrontational line, is so riddled with conditions which have previously
been rejected by Iran that it poses the question of how serious the U.S.
is in resolving the dispute.

    "The Big Five UN Security Council, veto-wielding members, meet in
Vienna, with Germany, a rotating member, to decide where next to go but
they are unsure where. Iran's intransigence, with assistance from China
and Russia, has forced the hand of the U.S. All is brinkmanship, but
people's lives could be at stake," concluded the 'Gulf News'. (WAM)
                     (WAM)

</x-flowed>
*****************************************************************
 4 [NYTr] Talking to Iran: Rice's Problematic Conditions
 
Date: Fri, 2 Jun 2006 19:03:07 -0500 (CDT)

Via NY Transfer News Collective  *  All the News that Doesn't Fit
 
Inter Press Service - 1 June 2006
http://www.antiwar.com/lobe/?articleid=9075

Rice's Conditional Offer to Iran May Be Problematic

By Jim Lobe

Wednesday's unprecedented offer by U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice
to join multilateral negotiations over its nuclear program was hailed as a
positive step by Iran specialists who warned, however, that its conditional
nature could prove problematic.

Bowing to weeks of growing pressure from European allies, Rice announced
that Washington was willing to join ongoing talks between the EU-3 -
Britain, France, and Germany - and Tehran provided, however, that the
Islamic Republic first "verifiably" freeze its uranium-enrichment efforts.

"This is a positive step, but it's fraught with some danger in the sense
that imposing preconditions, as reasonable as they may be, may invite the
Iranians to put forward their own preconditions," said Trita Parsi, an Iran
scholar at Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies (SAIS).

"And then suddenly we're back to Square One in which we have no talks, no
progress, and no diplomacy, while the Iranians go ahead with their program,"
he told IPS.

"I suspect that the Iranians won't absolutely dismiss the offer and walk
away," noted Gary Sick, director of the Middle East Institute at Columbia
University, who served as the chief Iran expert on the National Security
Council under former President Jimmy Carter.

"But by putting it in the form of a contingency where Iran first has to bow
to our wishes, Iran will be very reluctant to go along," he predicted.

Rice's announcement came on the eve of the latest rounds of talks between
the U.S., the EU-3, Russia, and China in Vienna on a package of carrots and
sticks that they hope will persuade Iran to halt its enrichment activities
as a first step toward an agreement that would ensure that Tehran could not
build nuclear weapons.

With support from the EU-3, the administration of President George W. Bush
has been pushing hard in the UN Security Council for a resolution that would
impose sanctions against Iran if it did not freeze its enrichment program.
China and Russia, however, have opposed such a resolution in the absence of
greater flexibility on Washington's part.

The Europeans, who, for the last three years, have acted as Washington's
surrogates in talks with Iran, have also appealed with growing urgency -
most recently via last week's visit to Washington by British Prime Minister
Tony Blair - for the U.S. to join them at the table.

Their position has strengthened in recent weeks amid signals by Tehran,
including an unprecedented 18-page letter from President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
to Bush himself, that it was ready to engage in direct talks with Washington
on a range of issues, including its nuclear program.

"Some kind of positive response became almost obligatory, especially in the
context of Ahmadinejad's letter and other reported feelers that Tehran has
put out," noted Charles Kupchan, director of European Studies at the Council
on Foreign Relations (CFR).

In addition to persuading Washington to join the talks, the EU-3 have also
promoted a package that includes providing Iran with light-water nuclear
reactors, trade benefits and other economic incentives, and discussion of a
"framework" to address Iran's security concerns.

The last component, however, is strongly opposed by administration
hardliners, who are led by Vice President Dick Cheney and favor a policy of
"regime change" in Iran.

One source Wednesday suggested that administration hawks may have gone along
with Rice's negotiations offer in exchange for European promises that
Washington will not be asked to provide security assurances as part of any
eventual negotiation.

Indeed, in answer to one reporter's question Wednesday, Rice stressed that
"we have not been asked about security assurances, and I don't expect that
we will be."

She also stated that the administration was not taking its military options
off the table and stressed that Washington was not interested, at least for
now, either in bilateral talks or in negotiations for a "grand bargain" with
Tehran that would address all of the key issues which have divided the two
countries, as recently advocated by a number of prominent Republicans,
including the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Richard
Lugar, and Richard Armitage, who served as deputy secretary of state during
Bush's first term.

"We are not in a position to talk about full diplomatic relations with a
state with which we have so many fundamental differences," said Rice, who
added, however, that a successful resolution of the nuclear question could
"change the relationship that it has with the United States [and] begin to
open the possibilities for cooperation."

The careful terms in which she couched the new offer, as well as the
precondition that she imposed on it, made clear to observers here that the
internal battle over Iran policy between administration hardliners and the
"realists" centered at the State Department remains unresolved, even if the
latter appear to have scored an important victory.

"We know that this is an issue over which a lot of blood has been spilled in
the corridors of power," Kupchan told IPS. "I would assume that what one
could call the State Department gang is prevailing in this round of the
fight, although it's not over."

"For the purists, even a stated willingness to talk with the Tehran regime
is hard to swallow, whether conditional or not," he said.

Indeed, as European pressure on the administration to compromise increased
over the past weeks, hard-line neoconservatives, whose influence in the
administration runs chiefly through Cheney's office, have been arguing that,
by talking directly with Tehran, Washington would not only fall into a
"trap" designed to extract more U.S. concessions, but also would demoralize
the "opposition" in Iran by implicitly according unprecedented recognition
to the regime.

Sick and Parsi also see Rice's offer as a victory for the "realists" and an
important policy change but, given the precondition of an enrichment freeze
that comes with it, remain skeptical that it will yield diplomatic fruit.

"It's an open question," according to Sick, who noted that, after offering
to meet with Iranians about Iraq earlier this year, Washington got "cold
feet" once Tehran showed interest in convening talks.

Moreover, he suggested, if Tehran agrees to an indefinite and verifiable
freeze in its nuclear program to fulfill the precondition, it is unclear
what the purpose of the negotiations will be. "I disagree with the idea that
we can only talk with Iran after our major problems [with it] are taken care
of. We should be talking to get problems solved."

Parsi also worried that the precondition to suspend enrichment indefinitely
could be a "deal-breaker."

"The Iranian fear is that, if they agree to suspend enrichment, and there's
no progress in the talks, then two or three or four years from now, they
could find themselves in a much weaker position," he said. "This is what
happened with the EU-3; the Iranians agreed to suspend so long as talks were
taking place, but then the Europeans just stalled."

As a result, Parsi said Tehran may seek to set its own preconditions for
talks, possibly including a limited time horizon in which enrichment will be
suspended - a suggestion, he said, it has proposed before - or even a demand
that Washington formally recognize it before negotiations take place.

"For a week or two, there will be some haggling, and then the question will
be, to a large extent, how the other powers will react," he said, adding,
however, that Rice's announcement should not be taken lightly. "Privately,"
he said, "administration officials now clearly recognize that it's the U.S.
that has the weight to make diplomacy work, and that is very positive."
       
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*****************************************************************
 5 New York Times: For Bush, Talks With Iran Were a Last Resort - 

By Published: June 1, 2006 			 

WASHINGTON, May 31 � After 27 years in which the has refused
substantive talks with , President Bush reversed course on
Wednesday because it was made clear to him � by his allies, by
the Russians, by the Chinese, and eventually by some of his
advisers � that he no longer had a choice. Skip to next

  Video: David E. Sanger's Analysis

 The White House correspondent examines President Bush's
realization on Iran: no good choice is left except talks.   

During the past month, according to European officials and some
current and former members of the Bush administration, it became
obvious to Mr. Bush that he could not hope to hold together a
fractious coalition of nations to enforce sanctions � or
consider military strikes on Iranian nuclear sites � unless he
first showed a willingness to engage Iran's leadership directly
over its nuclear program and exhaust every nonmilitary option.

Few of his aides expect that Iran's leaders will meet Mr. Bush's
main condition: that Iran first re-suspend all of its nuclear
activities, including shutting down every centrifuge that could
add to its small stockpile of enriched uranium. Administration
officials characterized their offer as a test of whether the
Iranians want engagement with the West more than they want the
option to build a nuclear bomb some day. 

And while the Europeans and the Japanese said they were elated
by Mr. Bush's turnaround, some participants in the drawn-out
nuclear drama questioned whether this was an offer intended to
fail, devised to show the extent of Iran's intransigence. 

Either way, after five years of behind-the-scenes battling
within the administration, Mr. Bush finally came to a crossroads
at which both sides in the debate over Iran � engagers and
isolaters, and some with a foot in each camp � saw an advantage
in, as one senior aide said, "seeing if they are serious."

Mr. Bush, according to one participant in those debates, told
Secretary of State several months ago that he needed "a third
option," a way to get beyond either a nuclear Iran or an
American military action. 

Ms. Rice spent a long weekend in early May drafting a proposal
that included a timetable for diplomatic choreography through
the summer.

 "Nobody wants to get to that kind of crisis situation � whether
it is us or the next administration � where you either accept an
Iranian weapon or you are forced to do something drastic," said
the participant, who declined to speak on the record about
internal White House deliberations. 

The idea of engagement is hardly new. When was secretary of
state, several members of his senior staff argued vociferously
that the United States needed to test Iran's willingness to deal
with the United States � especially in the aftermath of Sept. 11.

 There was strong opposition from the White House, particularly
from Vice President , according to several former officials. 

"Cheney was dead set against it," said one former official who
sat in many of those meetings. "At its heart, this was an
argument about whether you could isolate the Iranians enough to
force some kind of regime change." But three officials who were
involved in the most recent iteration of that debate said Mr.
Cheney and others stepped aside � perhaps because they read Mr.
Bush's body language, or perhaps because they believed Iran
would scuttle the effort by insisting that the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty gives it the right to develop nuclear
fuel. The United States insists that Iran gave up that right by
deceiving inspectors for 18 years.

In the end, said one former official who has kept close tabs on
the debate, "it came down to convincing Cheney and others that
if we are going to confront Iran, we first have to check off the
box" of trying talks. 

Mr. Bush offered a more positive-sounding account: "I thought it
was important for the United States to take the lead, along with
our partners, and that's what you're seeing. You're seeing
robust diplomacy."

As part of the diplomatic timetable, Ms. Rice will be in Vienna
on Thursday to endorse an international offer to Iran that
includes several plums. Among them will be the dialogue with
Washington that Iran has periodically sought, a lifting of many
long-standing economic sanctions, and even light water reactors
for nuclear power with and the West controlling access to the
fuel. 

Yet skepticism abounds. "It's true that the conditions are
significantly different than they were four or five years ago,
but candidly they are not as favorable now for the United
States," said Richard Haass, who as the head of the State
Department's policy planning operation during Mr. Bush's first
term was a major advocate of engagement with Iran. 

First, the new president, Mahmoud Ahmadinijad, "has vowed that
the country will never back down on enriching uranium. 

"Oil's at $70 a barrel instead of $20, said Mr. Haass, now the
president of the Council on Foreign Relations. "And we are
bogged down in Iraq," where the United States is vulnerable to
Iranian efforts to worsen the violence and arm the insurgents.

But the internal debates in the White House included vigorous
discussion of the risks associated with any effort to negotiate
with foes suspected of seeking nuclear weapons. And in this, Mr.
Bush already has bitter experience. 

In its dealings with North Korea, which Mr. Bush branded a
member of the "axis of evil" along with Iran and Iraq, the
administration also decided a few years ago to try limited
engagement, locked arm-in-arm with neighboring nations. 

But North Korea has kept making weapons fuel, and the allies
have not stayed united: and South Korea continue to aid the
North. The Iranians have doubtless noticed. 

The question now is whether there is any middle ground between
Mr. Bush's demand that Iran give up everything, and Iran's
insistence that it will give up nothing. Without breaking that
logjam, the American-Iranian dialogue may never begin. More

NYTimes.com
*****************************************************************
 6 Guardian Unlimited: Iran 'could have bomb in 10 years'
 
Mark Tran

Friday June 2, 2006              

[Foreign secretary Margaret Beckett] 

Margaret Beckett said Iran should expect "further steps" if it
refuses to negotiate. Photograph: Getty Images

 Military force is not on the agenda in the international
impasse over Iran's uranium enrichment programme, Britain said
today.

The comment from the Foreign Office followed last night's
agreement in Vienna on a package of proposals to be presented to
Iran.

The five permanent members of the UN security council and
Germany signed off on a package of carrots and sticks in the
latest initiative to break the diplomatic deadlock over Iran's
nuclear ambitions. 

			 		 			 			Article continues
Last night's package is expected to be presented to Tehran within 
the next few weeks by the EU's foreign policy chief, Javier 
Solana. Details of the package have not been made public but the 
Foreign Office today issued a categorical statement ruling out 
the use of force.

"All parties are committed to a diplomatic solution," the
statement said. "The use of military force was not discussed at
all last night. This reflects the fact that military force is
not on the agenda."

Earlier Russia said plans to break the impasse excluded the use
of military force "in any circumstances".

"I can say unambiguously that all the agreements from
yesterday's meetings rule out, in any circumstances, the use of
military force," the Russian foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov,
was quoted as saying by Moscow's RIA news agency.

But the Bush administration has resisted offering assurances
that Iran would not be the target of a military attack. The US
today put the matter more starkly.

Condoleezza Rice, the US secretary of state, told CNN: "They
need to make a choice. The international community needs to know
if negotiation is a real option... Russia and China have signed
on to the two paths." 

Ms Rice also said Iran had a matter of weeks, not months, in
order to respond to the US-EU initiative.

Iran today remained defiant, insisting on its right to proceed
with uranium enrichment, a process that can produce material for
use in nuclear weapons.

"Iran is determined to go ahead with its nuclear enrichment work
for peaceful purposes," said Mohammad Saeedi, deputy head of
Iran's Atomic Energy Organisation.

In response, the Washington said Iran should take its time over
the US-EU approach.

"As we've said, we think it's fair to give the government of
Iran an opportunity to review carefully everything in the
package," said White House spokesman Tony Snow. 

"We understand people may make statements, but we want to give
them time to study this." The foreign secretary, Margaret
Beckett, last night said Iran would be offered the opportunity
to reach agreement with the international community through
negotiation and cooperation.

However, she warned Iran to expect "further steps" to be taken
by the UN security council if it refused to come to the
negotiating table.

"We are prepared to resume negotiations should Iran resume
suspension of all enrichment and reprocessing activities, as
required by the International Atomic Energy Agency, and we would
also suspend action in the security council," she said.

"We have also agreed that, if Iran decides not to engage in
negotiation further, steps would have to be taken in the
security council." The package to be put before Tehran is
believed to include an offer to help build a light-water nuclear
reactor. 

That is considered less of a threat than Tehran's uranium
enrichment programme. If Iran rejects the offer, the US, Britain
and France would return to the UN security council to table a
resolution setting a deadline for it to suspend uranium
enrichment or face sanctions.

These would include a ban on arms sales, no transfer of nuclear
technology, no visas for Iranian leaders or officials and a
freeze on Iranian assets. Iran has insisted on its "natural
right" to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes, and has rejected
a Washington offer to hold talks on the condition that it
suspends enrichment.

Meanwhile, John Negroponte, the head of US intelligence, said
Iran could have a nuclear bomb within 10 years. "We don't have a
clear-cut knowledge, but the estimate we have made is [that]
some time between the beginning of the next decade and the
middle of the next decade they might be in a position to have a
nuclear weapon, which is a cause of great concern," Mr
Negroponte said.

"At the moment, there's an initiative on the table with respect
to Iran, and we will have to watch the government of Iran's
reaction to that. In the meanwhile, we have to recognise that
they are the principal state sponsor of terrorism in the world." 

[UP] 

Guardian Unlimited � Guardian Newspapers Limited 2006
*****************************************************************
 7 Guardian: Comment is free | Right move on a risky path

Friday June 2, 2006

The Guardian             

George Bush has finally done the right thing in agreeing to hold
direct talks with Iran about its nuclear programme. The old
division of labour under which the Europeans negotiated with
Tehran while Washington held its nose and looked the other way
is no longer tenable. With all due respect to the EU's ambition
to play a bigger global role, the relationship that really
matters is the one between the world's only superpower and the
country it has struggled to deal with since the Islamic
Revolution in 1979. Europe, represented by Britain, France and
Germany, cannot deliver what is needed to resolve this
potentially grave crisis. Far bigger carrots, and perhaps
sticks, are required.

Excitement at Wednesday's announcement of this significant
policy shift by Condoleezza Rice gave way to a more sober mood
when Iran insisted it would not halt uranium enrichment. It is
entitled to do this for the declared purpose of generating
energy, but as the US, Europeans, Arabs and Israelis all warn
(pointing to 18 years of concealment) it can also be used for
weapons production. Complicating matters, there are sharply
differing assessments about when Iran might acquire a military
nuclear capability.

But it would be wrong to read too much into what sounds like a
ritual re-assertion of a core position. There have been enough
nuanced signals from Iranian officials to suggest that there is
indeed something to talk about. Iran's UN ambassador, for
example, said only last week that enrichment could be capped at
a level below what is required to produce a weapon. And Iran did
suspend its enrichment during earlier talks with the EU. Still,
pragmatic and moderate messages have often been contradicted by
the fundamentalist president, Mohammed Ahmadinejad. Western
attempts to encourage his rivals have not been successful.

Mr Ahmadinejad and his colleagues should think carefully about
what they want to happen. The reason Mr Bush took the
domestically risky step (ignoring Dick Cheney and neocon hawks)
of engaging conditionally with Tehran was that he could not
count on the support of Russia and China for punitive action
against a non-compliant Iran. At the UN, the US has quietly
agreed to assurances that sanctions would not be adopted without
a vote by the security council (a lesson learned the hard way
over Iraq), and accepted that threatening force is not part of
this process. So talk of air strikes and regime change has given
way, for now at least, to real multilateral diplomacy. With the
US shifting dramatically to engagement - even if presented as
"tactical shift" rather than the much discussed "grand bargain"
that will be necessary - Iranian intransigence could meet a more
united response in the council. Tehran, bolstered by booming oil
prices and America's problems in Iraq, may gamble that it will
not.

The importance of this move goes far beyond the nuclear dossier.
The US was the shah's main supporter until he fell 27 years ago.
The 444-day hostage crisis is part of a bitter legacy of mutual
demonisation that includes the Iran-Contra affair, US backing
for Israel, Mr Bush's "axis of evil" rhetoric and Iranian
support for groups such as Lebanon's Hizbullah and Hamas in
Palestine. Mr Ahmadinejad's recent anti-Israel rhetoric is a
serious aggravating factor.

The incentives being presented by the EU troika, with US
backing, are likely to be an upgraded version of what they first
put forward last summer. The imperative in any trade-off must be
Iranian agreement to allow intrusive inspections by the
International Atomic Energy Agency - the very best defence
against dodgy intelligence assessments of Iranian capabilities.
For Tehran, the big prize in the package would be formal
security guarantees, fully endorsed by Washington, that would
recognise its legitimate concerns about a volatile region.
Jaw-jaw has to be better than a slide to war-war. It is up to
both sides to find enough common ground to start talking - and
keep doing so. 

Guardian Unlimited � Guardian
Newspapers Limited 2006. 
Registered in England and Wales. No. 908396
 Registered office: 164 Deansgate, Manchester M60 2RR
*****************************************************************
 8 AFP: China tells Iran it will back diplomacy to resolve nuclear crisis - 

>Friday June 2, 07:38 AM 


  [An Iranian boy flashes the victory-sign in front the Isfahan
Uranium Conversion Facilities, 430 Kms south of the Iranian
capital]   

BEIJING (AFP) - China has told Iran it would support all efforts
to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue through diplomacy, during a
phone call between their foreign ministers.

"China supports all efforts conducive to the resolution of the
Iran nuclear issue through diplomatic negotiations," Xinhua news
agency said, citing a phone call between China's Li Zhaoxing and
Iran's Manouchehr Mottaki.

The two discussed Wednesday's offer from the United States to
join European nations in nuclear talks with Iran if Tehran
agreed to suspend its uranium enrichment plans, according to
Xinhua.

The move was seen as a major shift in US policy on the issue,
although Washington has also urged Russia and China to agree to
adopt sanctions on Iran if the proposed talks fail to produce an
agreement.

Iranian officials on Thursday said they were open to
negotiations but rejected the US condition to suspend all
nuclear enrichment activities.

Chinese President Hu Jintao told US President George W. Bush in
a telephone call on Thursday that Beijing was willing to join in
negotiations on the issue.

"China is ready to keep contact and coordination with the United
States and play a constructive role in resuming the negotiations
on the Iran nuclear issue at an early date," a foreign ministry
statement quoted Hu as telling Bush.

Although China, a UN Security Council permanent member, welcomed
the US effort, it also said Thursday it was still opposed to the
"arbitrary" use of sanctions against Iran.

"We are not supportive of the arbitrary use of sanctions in
international issues," foreign ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao
said when asked if Beijing opposed sanctions against Iran under
any circumstances. 

    Copyright � 2006 Yahoo! UK Limited. All rights reserved.
AFP '); [ src=] 
*****************************************************************
 9 AFP: World powers await Iran response to nuclear proposals - 

 by Michael Adler Fri Jun 2, 8:26 AM ET 		 	 

VIENNA (AFP) - Iran" /> weighed its response to landmark 
proposals by key world powers designed to ease fears over its 
nuclear program, as US spy chief John Negroponte warned that 
Tehran could have atomic weapons within a decade. 

 Foreign ministers of the five permanent UN Security Council
members, plus Germany, offered Iran a package of benefits if it
suspends uranium enrichment, which makes nuclear fuel but what
can also be material for a bomb. 

It came conditioned with a threat of penalties, including UN
sanctions, if Tehran refuses to suspend enrichment and
reprocessing for plutonium. 

US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice" /> told the US
television network NBC: "We do need to have an answer and it
can't be months. It really needs to be within weeks." 

According to Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Thursday's
talks here involving Britain, China, France, Germany, Russia and
the United States ruled out any recourse to force as a way of
resolving the crisis. 

"All the agreements from yesterday's (Thursday's) meeting in all
respects exclude the use of military force" against Iran, he was
quoted by RIA-Novosti news agency as saying. 

The United States has repeatedly in the past refused to rule out
the use of force against the Islamic republic. 

British Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett gave no details of
the package, but said late Thursday after the Vienna talks that
"we are now talking to the Iranians about our proposals." 

There was no immediate official reaction from Iran to the deal
Friday, but Tehran has previously said the work is part of a
peaceful nuclear energy drive and that it will not halt
enrichment. 

An Iranian cleric Friday dismissed Rice's warning of "great
costs" if Iran dismissed the offer. 

"We are ready to pay a great cost to defend our ideals,"
Hojatoleslam Ahmad Khatami said in his sermon at the main weekly
Muslim prayers. 

The agreement by six of the world's most powerful countries caps
months of diplomacy during which the United States has tried to
meet Russian and Chinese demands to avoid escalating the
showdown over Iran's nuclear program. 

Beckett, hailing the "far-reaching" proposals adopted at the
Vienna talks, urged Tehran to respond positively and avoid
Security Council punishment. 

In Ankara, German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier was
hopeful the proposals would bring a breakthrough. 

"Very important progress has been achieved in the efforts for
solution and there are very strong signs that they will be
successful," he told reporters after talks with Turkish
counterpart Abdullah Gul. 

"We consider it a step forward in our quest to deny Iran a
nuclear weapons capability," US Under Secretary of State for
political affairs Nicholas Burns told reporters. 

US National Intelligence Director John Negroponte meanwhile said
that Iran appeared determined to make nuclear weapons and could
develop such an arsenal as early as 2010. 

"We don't have a clear-cut knowledge but the estimate we have
made is some time between the beginning of the next decade and
the middle of the next decade they might be in a position to
have a nuclear weapon," the US spy chief said. 

The Vienna proposals came after the United States, in a major
policy shift 26 years after breaking off diplomatic relations
with Tehran, offered to join multi-party talks with Iran if it
suspended enrichment. 

US officials stressed the package offered had bite, despite some
diplomats saying the disincentive side had been watered down. 

A draft proposal of the text seen by AFP includes helping Iran
build light water reactors for its civilian nuclear energy
programme. 

According to this text, possible sanctions could include an arms
embargo -- something Russia, a key arms supplier to Iran, and
China, a major consumer of Iranian oil, resist -- but that
sanctions would be targeted rather than a full economic or other
boycott. 

Beckett said that if Iran complied, the West "would suspend
action in the Security Council," where the United States and
Europe seek sanctions against Iran. 

If not, she warned, "further steps would have to be taken in the
Security Council." 	 		 			

Copyright � 2006 Agence France Presse. All rights reserved. The
*****************************************************************
 10 Guardian Unlimited: 6 World Powers Agree on Iran Incentives
 
From the Associated Press        

[UP] 

Friday June 2, 2006 9:31 AM

AP Photo VIE135 

By GEORGE JAHN and ANNE GEARAN 

Associated Press Writers 

VIENNA, Austria (AP) - The U.S. and five other world powers have
an offer they say Iran can't refuse - if it knows what's best
for it. 

The six nations on Thursday came up with incentives they hope
will persuade Tehran to stop suspect nuclear activities, but
made it clear that Iran risks U.N. sanctions if it rejects the
package. 

``There are two paths ahead,'' British Foreign Secretary
Margaret Becket said in announcing the proposals put together by
the United States, Britain, France, Germany, Russia and China. 

The package would be on the table for a proposed new round of
bargaining with Tehran over what the West calls a rogue nuclear
program that could produce a bomb. The U.S., in a major policy
shift, agreed this week to join those talks under certain
conditions. It would be the first major public negotiations
between the adversaries in more than a quarter century. 

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice met with the foreign
ministers from the European nations that led talks with Iran
that stalled last year. Also present were representatives of
Russia and China, which have been Tehran's trading partners and
might join in any future talks with Iran. 

Since Russia and China hold vetoes in the U.N. Security Council,
the U.S. needs their cooperation to seek sanctions or other
harsh measures by that body. 

``We are very satisfied by the results of today's meetings here
in Vienna,'' U.S. Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns told
reporters. ``We consider them a step forward in our quest to
deny Iran nuclear weapons capability.'' 

A short statement issued by foreign ministers from the six
powers and the European Union did not mention economic sanctions
- the punishment or deterrent favored by the United States and
that Iran has tried hard to avoid. 

The powers agreed privately, however, that Iran could face tough
Security Council sanctions if it fails to give up the enrichment
of uranium and other disputed nuclear activities, U.S. officials
said. 

Diplomats feared Iran would immediately reject any invitation to
bargain if the threat of sanctions was explicit, officials
involved in the discussions said on condition of anonymity
because the seven-party negotiations were private. 

The foreign ministers' statement threatens unspecified ``further
steps'' in the Security Council. 

The group's statement also contained no details of the
incentives to be offered to Iran in the coming days. Diplomats
previously have said the package includes help developing
legitimate nuclear power plants and various economic benefits. 

``We are prepared to resume negotiations should Iran resume
suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing
activities,'' as previously required by the U.N. nuclear
watchdog agency, Becket said. 

If Iran returned to the talks stalled since last year, ``we
would also suspend action in the Security Council,'' Becket
said. 

The Security Council, which can levy mandatory global sanctions
and back its mandates with military force, has been reviewing
Iran's case for two months. Its permanent, veto-holding members
have been at odds over the possibility of sanctions, with Russia
and China opposed. 

Iran's foreign minister welcomed the idea of direct talks, but
rebuffed the U.S. condition that Tehran must put uranium
enrichment on hold before talks can begin. Iran insists its
nuclear work is peaceful and aimed at developing a new energy
source. 

``Iran welcomes dialogue under just conditions but won't give up
our rights,'' the state-run Iranian television quoted Foreign
Minister Manouchehr Mottaki as saying Thursday. 

At the White House, President Bush warned that the confrontation
would end up at the Security Council if Iran continues to enrich
uranium. 

``If they continue to say to the world, `We really don't care
what your opinion is,' then the world is going to act in
concert,'' Bush said. 

The shift in U.S. tactics was meant to offer the Iranians a last
chance to avoid punishing sanctions, and to let the United
States assert that it was willing to exhaust every opportunity
to resolve the Iranian impasse without force. 

Previous talks among Iran, Britain, France and Germany foundered
last year. European diplomats and others said the United States
was partly at fault, arguing that it alone carries the global
weight to make any agreement stick. 

The U.S. offer for talks is conditioned on Iran suspending its
enrichment of uranium and related activities and allowing
inspections to prove it. Uranium enrichment can make fuel for
nuclear power reactors or the fissile core of warheads. 

European nations and the Security Council have demanded the same
thing, but Iran has refused to comply. 

--- 

On the Net: 

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 11 Guardian Unlimited: Rice Warns Iran It Doesn't Have Much Time
 
From the Associated Press        

[UP] 

Friday June 2, 2006 1:01 PM

AP Photo VIE136 

By GEORGE JAHN and ANNE GEARAN 

Associated Press Writers 

VIENNA, Austria (AP) - The United States warned Iran it will not
have much time to respond once it is offered an international
package of rewards to encourage it to suspend uranium
enrichment, suggesting that the window could soon close and be
replaced by penalties. 

``It really needs to be within weeks,'' U.S. Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice told NBC's ``Today'' show, referring to the
six-power package of perks or penalties aimed at halting Iran's
enrichment activities. 

In separate comments on National Public Radio, Rice suggested
she was ready to meet her Iranian counterpart, Manouchehr
Mottaki, if Tehran agreed to suspend the activity that can be
used to make nuclear arms and negotiate the details of the deal. 

The package agreed on Thursday carries the threat of U.N.
sanctions if Tehran remains defiant over what the West calls a
rogue nuclear program that could produce a bomb. The United
States, in a major policy shift, conditionally agreed this week
to join those talks. It would be the first major public
negotiations between the two countries in more than 25 years. 

Rice met with the foreign ministers from the European nations
that led talks with Iran, which stalled last year. European
Union foreign policy chief Javier Solana, Russia's foreign
minister and a deputy Chinese foreign minister also attended. 

Russia and China might join in any future talks with Iran. Both
hold vetoes in the U.N. Security Council, and the United States
needs their cooperation to seek sanctions or other harsh
measures. 

The formal offer of talks are expected to be made by France,
Britain and Germany - the three nations that previously
negotiatiated with Tehran. A senior U.S. state department
official said he expected Tehran would be invited to begin new
negotiations ``within a matter of days.'' 

A short statement issued by foreign ministers from the six
powers and the European Union did not mention economic
sanctions, which the U.S. wants and Iran has tried hard to
avoid. 

The powers agreed privately, however, that Iran could face tough
Security Council sanctions if it failed to give up unranium
enrichment and other disputed nuclear activities, U.S. officials
said. 

U.S. Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns called the meeting's
outcome ``a step forward in our quest to deny Iran nuclear
weapons capability.'' 

The U.S. intelligence director, meanwhile said Tehran could
reach that status in as little as four years. 

``This is a matter of assessment, we don't have a clear-cut
knowledge,'' National Intelligence Director John Negroponte told
British Broadcasting Corp. ``But the estimate we have made is
that some time between beginning of the next decade and the
middle of the next decade they might be in a position to have a
nuclear weapon.'' 

Diplomats feared Iran would reject any offer of talks if the
threat of sanctions was explicit, officials involved in the
discussions said on condition of anonymity because the
seven-party negotiations were private. 

The foreign ministers' statement threatens unspecified ``further
steps'' in the Security Council. 

The group's statement contained no details of incentives Iran
could be offered. Diplomats previously have said the package
includes help to develop legitimate nuclear power plants and
various economic benefits. 

``We are prepared to resume negotiations should Iran resume
suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing
activities,'' as previously required by the U.N. nuclear
watchdog agency, said British Foreign Secretary Margaret
Beckett. 

If Iran returns to the talks, ``we would also suspend action in
the Security Council,'' Beckett said. 

The Security Council, which can levy mandatory global sanctions
and support its mandates with military force, has been reviewing
Iran's case for two months. Its permanent, veto-holding members
have been at odds over the possibility of sanctions, with Russia
and China opposed. 

``At this crucial stage, it is very important that none of the
sides involved in the situation makes any sharp movements that
would create a threat to the real prospect of using the chance
to reach agreement,'' ITAR-Tass quoted Russian Foreign Minister
Sergey Lavrov as saying before talks began in Vienna. 

Iran insists its nuclear work is peaceful and aimed at
developing a new energy source. 

Mottaki, Iran's foreign minister, welcomed the idea of direct
talks but rebuffed the U.S. condition that Tehran must suspend
uranium enrichment before talks can begin. 

At the White House, President George W. Bush warned that the
confrontation would go to the Security Council should Iran
continue to enrich uranium. 

``If they continue their obstinance, if they continue to say to
the world, `We really don't care what your opinion is,' then the
world is going to act in concert,'' Bush said. 

Bush said he got a ``positive response'' in a telephone
conversation Tuesday with Russian President Vladimir Putin,
adding, ``We expect Russia to participate in the United Nations
Security Council. We'll see whether or not they agree to do
that.'' 

Bush also spoke about Iran on Thursday with Chinese President Hu
Jintao. He revealed little about that conversation, saying,
``They understood our strategy.'' 

The shift in U.S. tactics was meant to offer the Iranians a last
chance to avoid punishing sanctions and to let the United States
assert that it was willing to exhaust every opportunity to
resolve the Iranian impasse without force. 

^--- 

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 12 Guardian Unlimited: Iranian TV Dismisses Meeting in Europe
 
From the Associated Press        

[UP] 

Friday June 2, 2006 1:16 PM

AP Photo VAH101 

By NASSER KARIMI 

Associated Press Writer 

TEHRAN, Iran (AP) - Iranian officials kept silent Friday about a
meeting of world powers on an incentives package to bring Tehran
back to the negotiating table over its nuclear program, while
state television dismissed the gathering. 

``The noisy 5+1 meeting ended without a new proposal for Iran,''
state television commented during its report on Thursday's
gathering in Vienna. 

The meeting of the permanent members of the United Nations
Security Council - the United States, Britain, France, Russia
and China - plus Germany, made it clear that Iran risks
sanctions if it rejects the package. 

On Friday, state television also quoted Iranian President
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as indirectly blaming Israel for the impasse
but did not say when he spoke. 

``Some states who have not signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty, want to deprive us from our obvious rights,'' television
quoted him as saying. He reiterated his position that Tehran has
given full cooperation to the International Atomic Energy
Agency, which oversees the inspection of Iran's nuclear
facilities. 

But Iranian analyst conceded that the latest meeting narrows
Iran's room to maneuver. 

``Such unprecedented unity in the international community,
including the representatives of Russia and China, has put
Iranian officials in an awkward position. They need more time to
make decision,'' political analyst Mostafa Mirzaian told The
Associated Press. 

Throughout the international impasse over Iran's nuclear
program, Russia and China - major trading partners for Iran -
have called for a diplomatic solution. The U.S., Britain and
France, who have called for strong measures, need the
cooperation of Russia and China to take such a step. 

Iranian television, citing a report by the Chinese official news
agency Xianhua, said China's foreign minister reassured his
Iranian counterpart in a telephone conversation that Beijing
will support all efforts to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue
through diplomacy. 

On Thursday Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki welcomed
the idea of direct talks with Washington on the nuclear issue,
but rebuffed the U.S. condition that Tehran must suspend
enrichment activity. 

The U.S. and several European countries believe Iran is using
its civilian nuclear program as a cover to produce nuclear
weapons. Tehran has denied this, saying its nuclear program is
merely to generate electricity, not bombs. 

Iran has said it will not give up its right under the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty to enrich uranium and produce nuclear
fuel. 

Iran announced April 11 that it had enriched uranium for the
first time, using 164 centrifuges. Enrichment can produce either
fuel for a nuclear reactor or material for a warhead - but tens
of thousands of centrifuges are needed to do either on a large
scale. 

Iran intends to move toward large-scale uranium enrichment
involving 3,000 centrifuges by late 2006, and then expand the
program to 54,000 centrifuges. 

Guardian Unlimited � Guardian Newspapers Limited 2006
*****************************************************************
 13 INSIDE JoongAng Daily: Reflections on KEDO

June 3, 2006 KST 15:34 (GMT+9)                                                                         
	   	   		 	   	   		 	   	   		 	   	 	 
[EDITORIALS]

  The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, or KEDO,
announced yesterday that the project to build light water
reactors at Sinpo, North Korea, has been scrapped. The
infiltration of a North Korean submarine into Gangneung, South
Korea, in 1996 and the firing of a Daepodong missile in 1998
were all incidents that cast a shadow on the project. In
particular, the admission in 2002 by North Korea that it was
working on a nuclear program using enriched uranium was the
final straw in the Bush administration's decision to halt a
project that it was already skeptical about. In response, the
North withdrew from the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty in 2003 and
went on to declare in 2005 that it possessed nuclear weapons.

Such developments led to today's situation. 

The confrontation between North Korea and the United States does
give us something to think about. While agreeing with us on the
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, the North secretly
hung on to developing nuclear weapons. In response, in 1994, we
cooperated with the United States but were not even allowed into
the negotiations yet we still agreed to cover 70 percent of the
cost of the light water reactor project. That may have been
inevitable, because South Korea was the country most threatened.

Nevertheless, it is debatable whether the negotiations in which
Seoul paid the bills but had no say in the matter were the best
method. This is an issue that the government needs to ponder
seriously. 

It has also become clear that the changes in U.S. foreign policy
with a new administration are too much for us to deal with. Even
though we threw away $1.1 billion, a solution to the North
Korean nuclear problem seems to be even further away, Washington
continues to cling stubbornly to its new policies.

 So the administration should think about what it has learned
from this experience and how it should use that knowledge. One
good example is the announcement by Seoul last year that it
would provide 2 million kilowatts of electricity to the North
even before figuring out what the North's answer would be. 

The announcement was billed as an "important proposal," but the
North has turned a blind eye to it and says it wants a light
water reactor. With an astronomical amount of tax money already
having disappeared, isn't offering to provide electricity to the
North another burden? Whether it's North Korea or the United
States, others have an ability to think strategically and look
into their opponents' minds. Why not us?   
	  
  2006.06.01       

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*****************************************************************
 14 INSIDE JoongAng Daily: [EDITORIALS]Dear U.S.: Talk to the North

June 3, 2006 KST 15:34 (GMT+9)

  The six-nation talks have long been in a stalemate due to
Pyongyang's reaction to U.S. financial sanctions. 
Meanwhile, North Korea invited Christopher Hill, the chief U.S.
nuclear negotiator and an assistant secretary of state, to
Pyongyang.

 North Korea announced yesterday that it would invite the U.S.
chief delegate to the six-party talks to Pyongyang if the United
States made the "political decision to implement truthfully the
September 2005 statement and give us its explanation," as a
Foreign Ministry spokesman put it.

 The six-party talks have been rapidly losing their drive due to
conflicts between Pyongyang and Washington over the issues of
the North's alleged illicit trades, such as in counterfeit money.

 Experts' analysis is divided over Pyongyang's real reason for
inviting Mr. Hill in such circumstances.

 Some say that the North is trying to find a face-saving measure
to return to the talks. Others say that it is preparing to make
an excuse to blame Washington for the failure of the talks.

 No matter what its intentions might be, we believe that the
United States can think positively about the North's invitation.

 The prolonged stalemate of the six-party talks is no good for
anyone. To get out of this situation, some kind of breakthrough
needs to happen in North Korea-U.S. relations. However, no
breakthroughs can be made without dialogue.

 The form of dialogue is not important, whether it is held
inside or outside the framework of the six-party talks.

 It is not a bad idea for Mr. Hill to go to Pyongyang to explain
Washington's stance and to listen to what Pyongyang has to say.

 North Korea's offer to meet with Mr. Hill needs to be looked at
closely, particularly when the global debates over Iran's
nuclear programs have changed the atmosphere.

 U.S. President George W. Bush had refused to have a dialogue
with Iran in the face of opposition from his neo-conservative
backers, but lately he has accepted advice from people who
emphasize practical diplomacy, such as Secretary of State
Condoleeza Rice. This change is very meaningful.

 In terms of nuclear development programs, North Korea and Iran
have been taking the same steps, with one ahead of the other.

 Washington should keep up the momentum it has been building for
so long to solve these problems.   
	  
  2006.06.02       

Copyright by Joins.com, Inc. Terms of Use |
*****************************************************************
 15 Korea Times: Inter-Korean Economic Talks Start 

Hankooki.com > The Korea Times   

By Christopher Carpenter
 Staff Reporter

 Economic talks between North and South Korea begin Saturday
despite the North��s continued boycott of the six-party talks to
end the North��s nuclear weapons program, Unification Ministry
officials said Friday.

 The 12th round of Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation Promotion
Committee talks on Cheju Island could result in a finalized
agreement that would provide North Korea with tens of millions
of dollars in South Korean aid for its light industries.

 The North has long sought materials for its shoe and garment
industries free of charge, while Seoul insists they can be
provided only as a loan.

 Working-level officials from both countries meeting in Kaesong
on May 18 and 19 neared agreement on the size of the South��s
assistance and how the North would repay, although they did not
release details.

 ``The agreement is to be announced after final approval at the
12th round of the Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation Promotion
Committee meeting,���� according to a statement released after
the May meeting.

 The meeting will also be the first between Ju Dong-chan, chief
of the North��s Special Economic Zone Development Agency, and
his South Korean counterpart, Vice Finance Minister Bahk
Byong-won, since the two signed an agreement to test the two
inter-Korean railways on May 25.

 The North cancelled the tests one day before they were to
occur, claiming the lack of a safety-guarantee between the
countries' militaries and what it called ``unstable
conditions���� in the South made them impossible to conduct.

 South Korea��s government protested the North's unilateral
cancellation.

 The Koreas have remained divided by a heavily-fortified border
since the end of the 1950-53 Korean War. Nearly 1.8 million
troops from both sides are still stationed along the border as
the war ended only with an armistice agreement, not a peace
treaty. 

jccarpen@gmail.com 06-02-2006 17:14         
  
*****************************************************************
 16 Landmark Court Decision Re EIS & Potential For Nuclear Terrorism, Sabotage
 
Date: Fri, 2 Jun 2006 23:38:17 -0400


  -----Original Message-----
>> From: pmj1@citizenalert.org
>> Sent: Jun 2, 2006 5:41 PM
>> To: Glenn Carroll <atom.girl@mindspring.com>
>> Subject: >>
>>
>> Quoting Glenn Carroll
<atom.girl@mindspring.com>:
>>
>>> NEVER DOUBT THAT A SMALL GROUP OF PEOPLE CAN
CHANGE THE WORLD!
>>>
>>>
http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/2BFBC6088AF13AA9882571800072
>>> 3C79/$file/0374628.pdf?openelement
>>>
>>> A landmark decision was issued today by the
Ninth Circuit U.S. Court of
>>> Appeals in favor of Mothers for Peace and
nuclear security. At issue is
>>> whether the potential for acts of terrorism
and sabotage must be considered
>>> in the Environmental Impact Statement for
nuclear facilities. It finds that
>>> acts of terrorism are not "remote and
speculative" as claimed by the Nuclear
>>> Regulatory Commission and Pacific Gas &
Electric and must be considered in
>>> weighing environmental impacts as required by
the National Environmental
>>> Policy Act (NEPA).
>>>
>>> On August 13, 2001, Georgians Against Nuclear
Energy intervened before the
>>> NRC challenging the lack of consideration of
terrorism and insider sabotage
>>> for the MOX plutonium fuel factory at Savannah
River Site. GANE's challenge
>>> was based on comments from the State of
Georgia (Jim Hardeman, 1999) in the
>>> DOE EIS for Surplus Plutonium Disposition.
>>>
>>> In accepting GANE's security contention for
public hearing the NRC's panel
>>> of judges said: "Regardless of how foreseeable
terrorist acts that could
>>> cause a beyond [design] basis accident were
prior to the terrorist acts of
>>> September 11, 2001, involving the deliberate
crash of hijacked jumbo jets
>>> into the twin towers of the World Trade Center
in New York City and the
>>> Pentagon in the Nation's Capitol killing
thousands of people, it can no
>>> longer be argued that terrorist attacks of
heretofore unimagined scope and
>>> sophistication against previously unimaginable
targets are not reasonably
>>> foreseeable." (Judge Thomas S. Moore 12/6/01)
>>>
>>> Public interest attorney Diane Curran
subsequently represented GANE (-MOX
>>> plus Blue Ridge Environmental Defense
League-Catawba relicensing, Nuclear
>>> Information Resource Service-McGuire
relicensing, Connecticut Coalition
>>> Against Millstone-spent fuel pool expansion,
State of Utah-Private Fuel
>>> Storage, and San Luis Obispo Mothers for
Peace-Diablo dry cask storage) with
>>> Dr. Gordon Thompson serving as expert witness
to force the NRC to analyze
>>> the environmental impacts of terrorism at the
respective sites.
>>>
>>> The contentions were ultimately passed up to
the Commission which denied
>>> considering them. San Luis Obispo Mothers for
Peace's case took the NRC to
>>> Federal appeals court and won the
unprecedented decision today.
>>>
>>> The Mothers, strongly led by Rochelle Becker,
was joined in its suit by,
>>> among others, Sierra Club, San Luis Obispo
County, and the States of
>>> California, Washington, Utah and
Massachusetts. It was a long, expensive
>>> battle with tremendous popular support.
>>>
>>> The Federal court said, "We hold only that the
NRC�s stated reasons for
>>> categorically refusing to consider the
possibility of terrorist attacks
>>> cannot withstand appellate review based on the
record before us. ...because
>>> we conclude that the NRC�s determination that
NEPA does not require a
>>> consideration of the environmental impact of
terrorist attacks does not
>>> satisfy reasonableness review, we hold that
the EA prepared in reliance on
>>> that determination is inadequate and fails to
comply with NEPA�s mandate."
>>> (Sidney R. Thomas, 6/2/06)
>>>
>>> Many, many, many people and organizations have
contributed to this
>>> watershed.
>>>
>>> Sure the appeal has been filed already, but
the precedent is also written. I
>>> was wondering, is it retroactive? Doesn't it
require all existing facilities
>>> to conduct as EIS with respect to terrorism?
Will we be having environmental
>>> impact scoping and comment hearings at every
nuclear facility in the
>>> country? A government-sponsored forum for
citizens to say, "Nah. We're over
>>> THIS nuke!"
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> --
>>> Glenn Carroll
>>> Coordinator
>>> NUCLEAR WATCH SOUTH
>>> (aka GANE - Georgians Against Nuclear Energy)
>>> P.O. Box 8574
>>> Atlanta, GA 31106
>>> PHONE/FAX: 404-378-4263
>>> atom.girl@mindspring.com
>>>
>>> STOP PLUTONIUM! GANE ON THE WEB --
>>>
http://www.greenpeace.fr/stop-plutonium/en/20050301_en.php3




*****************************************************************
 17 Spectrum: Ensure bomb delay sticks

St. George  UT. - www.thespectrum.com - 

When trust has been broken, restoring it can be an astronomical 
feat as Southern Utah residents and the federal Defense Threat 
Reduction Agency have jointly discovered.

Anti-nuclear activists, Downwinders, the Winnemucca Indian Colony 
and Utah and Nevada congressional lawmakers diligently pressed 
the government to address health and safety concerns surrounding 
the detonation of the non-nuclear, 700-ton ammonium nitrate and 
fuel oil bomb called Divine Strake.

The urgency for convincing, no-risk information is based on fear
of the past repeating itself. Consider governmental assurance
that nuclear tests in the 50s and 60s posed no harm to Western
States - when the truth was that the government had full
knowledge from scientific evidence that it would. Divine Strake
was originally intended to be set off today. The large-yield
explosive is comprised of the same material as the bomb that
destroyed the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City
in 1995, but 280 times larger.

Because studies are lacking with respect to the open-air blast's
impact on the environment from potential radioactive fallout
left over from nuclear weapons tests conducted at the Nevada
Test Site from 1947 to 1992, lawsuits were filed that pushed the
test date to June 23.

After U.S. District Court Judge Lloyd George in Las Vegas
recognized that more time was needed to determine the bomb's
overall effects, he ruled against the explosion. The DRTA
maintains that its sole purpose is to collect information about
penetrating underground bunkers and is not intended as a
precursor to resume nuclear testing.

Now the blast has been indefinitely postponed, leaving citizens
to "wait and see" what happens next. But we believe playing the
waiting game will only facilitate the government's pursuit of
digging a big hole somewhere in the nearly 1,400 square miles of
the test site, packing it with the 1.4 million pounds of fuel
oil and fertilizer and setting it off to find out if it would
perforate an 1,110-foot tunnel located directly under the
massive hole.

The fact that the bomb's detonation has been suspended means
there is some level of safety still in question. We need to
unfalteringly hold the government accountable to answering such
a question in order to regain the trust once given freely
without reservation. While we must exercise patience, it doesn't
mean we abandon involvement in the process.

Sen. Orrin Hatch and Rep. Jim Matheson did their part, and as
their constituents, we must keep them armed with our vigilant
participation, lest risk being victimized again. Rebuilding
trust takes grueling, intensive work, not just on the
government's end but on our end as well. Let's make sure as
Southern Utahns that we do our part and keep our eyes and ears
open and alert to the issue.

 Copyright �2006 The Spectrum.
*****************************************************************
 18 Public Citizen: U.S. Supreme Court Ruling Limits First Amendment 
Rights of Government Whistleblowers While Performing Their 
Duties; Public Employees Unprotected From Retaliation for 
Speaking Out in the Workplace
 
June 1, 2006 

Statement of Bonnie Robin-Vergeer, Attorney, Public Citizen
Litigation Group 

The U.S. Supreme Courts 5-to-4 decision this week in Garcetti
v. Ceballos limiting constitutional free-speech protections for
public employees in the course of performing their official
duties strikes a blow to public welfare and safety. In light of
the Courts ruling, the nations 21 million federal, state and
local employees will not have First Amendment protection from
punishment or retaliation for exposing misconduct if it is
communicated as part of their jobs, even though speaking up
within the government is often critical to the health and safety
of the public. 

The ruling affects exactly the class of workers who are best
positioned to expose governmental mismanagement, waste, fraud
and abuse, and will have a chilling effect on workplace speech
of critical public importance. For instance, if a Federal
Emergency Management Agency hurricane preparedness specialist
raised concerns to his superior that the agency was unprepared
for the next hurricane, the employee could be fired or otherwise
punished for being the bearer of unwelcome news. 

Government employees who have the most information about what
ails an agency must have an avenue to communicate issues of
public importance. The only other options for potential
government whistleblowers are to remain silent or to air
problems in a public forum rather than using internal channels
that are most likely to avoid workplace disruption. Surely this
is not the best method for guaranteeing the efficient
performance of government and for ensuring public safety. 

Given the Supreme Courts opinion, Congress, states and
localities should act promptly to strengthen whistleblower
protections for public employees, particularly those who are the
bearers of bad news while performing their jobs and are thus in
the most knowledgeable position to expose government waste,
fraud or incompetence. Our very safety could depend upon it. 

Note: The employee in�Garcetti v. Ceballos  Richard Ceballos 
was represented in the Supreme Court by Public Citizen
Litigation Group attorney Bonnie Robin-Vergeer. 

The majority opinion was written by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy,
joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. and Justices Antonin
Scalia, Clarence Thomas and Samuel A. Alito Jr. Dissenting were
Justice David H. Souter who wrote an opinion joined by Justices
John Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg. Justices Stephen G.
Breyer and Stevens each filed dissenting opinions. 
[P]rivate and public interests in addressing official
wrongdoing and threats to health and safety can outweigh the
governments stake in the efficient implementation of policy and
when they do public employees who speak on these matters in the
course of their duties should be eligible to claim First
Amendment protection, Souter wrote. 
Wrote Stevens, [I]t seems perverse to fashion a new rule that
provides employees with an incentive to voice their concerns
publicly before talking frankly to their superiors. 
To read Public Citizens brief, the decision and dissenting 
opinions,� To listen to a NPR All Things Considered interview 
with Robin-Vergeer,� 

### 

*****************************************************************
 19 [NYTr] Head of French Nuke Watchdog Lied over Chernobyl Fallout
 
Date: Fri, 2 Jun 2006 16:33:41 -0400 (EDT)

Via NY Transfer News Collective  *  All the News that Doesn't Fit
 
sent by Simon McGuinness

The Independent - 02 June 2006 
http://news.independent.co.uk/europe/article623413.ece

Head of France's nuclear watchdog 'lied over Chernobyl fallout' 

By John Lichfield in Paris 

Twenty years after the explosion at the nuclear reactor at Chernobyl in
the Ukraine, the legal fallout has just reached France. 

Professor Pierre Pellerin, who was the head of France's nuclear safety
watchdog 20 years ago, has been formally accused of deliberately
concealing the seriousness of contamination of parts of the French
countryside from the French people.

An investigation is continuing into the responsibilities of politicians
in the alleged cover-up, including the role of Jacques Chirac, who was
the prime minister. But for the time being, anti-nuclear campaigners and
a group of 500 thyroid cancer sufferers are celebrating a first victory
in a marathon legal campaign.

Professor Pellerin, now 82, has been placed under formal investigation
for "aggravated deception", but a potentially more serious accusation of
causing "involuntary bodily harm" was dropped on Wednesday.

At the time of the explosion at the Chernobyl reactor on 26 April 1986,
the professor was head of the agency, attached to the Health Ministry,
which reported on risks to health. As the "cloud" of contamination
passed over France between 30 April and 5 May that year, Professor
Pellerin issued a series of reassuring statements. He published low
average findings of radiation across whole regions. Campaigners have
long protested that this deliberately concealed the fact that there were
pockets of contamination which suffered high rainfall as the Chernobyl
cloud moved westwards.

In a four-hour interrogation by a judge on Wednesday, Professor Pellerin
said that he had issued accurate and balanced information to the public.
The investigation is likely to continue for several years and the case
may never come to trial. 
       
                                *
================================================================
.NY Transfer News Collective    *    A Service of Blythe Systems
.          Since 1985 - Information for the Rest of Us         .
.339 Lafayette St., New York, NY 10012     http://www.blythe.org
.List Archives:   https://olm.blythe-systems.com/pipermail/nytr/
.Subscribe: https://olm.blythe-systems.com/mailman/listinfo/nytr
================================================================
*****************************************************************
 20 [NYTr] Head of French Nuke Watchdog Lied over Chernobyl Fallout
 
Date: Fri, 2 Jun 2006 15:38:40 -0500 (CDT)

Via NY Transfer News Collective  *  All the News that Doesn't Fit
 
sent by Simon McGuinness

The Independent - 02 June 2006 
http://news.independent.co.uk/europe/article623413.ece

Head of France's nuclear watchdog 'lied over Chernobyl fallout' 

By John Lichfield in Paris 

Twenty years after the explosion at the nuclear reactor at Chernobyl in
the Ukraine, the legal fallout has just reached France. 

Professor Pierre Pellerin, who was the head of France's nuclear safety
watchdog 20 years ago, has been formally accused of deliberately
concealing the seriousness of contamination of parts of the French
countryside from the French people.

An investigation is continuing into the responsibilities of politicians
in the alleged cover-up, including the role of Jacques Chirac, who was
the prime minister. But for the time being, anti-nuclear campaigners and
a group of 500 thyroid cancer sufferers are celebrating a first victory
in a marathon legal campaign.

Professor Pellerin, now 82, has been placed under formal investigation
for "aggravated deception", but a potentially more serious accusation of
causing "involuntary bodily harm" was dropped on Wednesday.

At the time of the explosion at the Chernobyl reactor on 26 April 1986,
the professor was head of the agency, attached to the Health Ministry,
which reported on risks to health. As the "cloud" of contamination
passed over France between 30 April and 5 May that year, Professor
Pellerin issued a series of reassuring statements. He published low
average findings of radiation across whole regions. Campaigners have
long protested that this deliberately concealed the fact that there were
pockets of contamination which suffered high rainfall as the Chernobyl
cloud moved westwards.

In a four-hour interrogation by a judge on Wednesday, Professor Pellerin
said that he had issued accurate and balanced information to the public.
The investigation is likely to continue for several years and the case
may never come to trial. 
       
                                *
================================================================
.NY Transfer News Collective    *    A Service of Blythe Systems
.          Since 1985 - Information for the Rest of Us         .
.339 Lafayette St., New York, NY 10012     http://www.blythe.org
.List Archives:   https://olm.blythe-systems.com/pipermail/nytr/
.Subscribe: https://olm.blythe-systems.com/mailman/listinfo/nytr
================================================================
*****************************************************************
 21 APP.COM: Safety regulators eye nuclear power plant's critical
radiation barrier 

| Asbury Park Press Online
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Friday, June 2, 2006

Operator asked to measure liner more

BY STAFF WRITER

ROCKVILLE, Md. � Safety regulators on Thursday asked Oyster Creek 
nuclear power plant officials to step up scrutiny of a critical 
radiation barrier if measurements slated for October reveal that 
it's thinner than expected.

As it stands now, plant operator AmerGen Energy Co. has pledged
to measure the lower portion of the 100-foot-tall steel barrier,
called the drywell liner, during a planned outage in October and
then 10 years after that.

The liner surrounds the reactor vessel, a container in which
atoms are split to make heat. During a serious emergency, the
liner would contain highly pressurized and highly radioactive
steam and gas from entering the environment.

AmerGen expects October's measurements to show that an epoxy
coating applied to the liner in 1993 to halt rusting continues
to work; and that the figures collected at that time come close
to matching the previous round of measurements taken in 1996,
company officials have said.

But in case AmerGen's prediction is wrong, the federal Nuclear
Regulatory Commission would want the company to measure the
liner more often.

Whether the liner could last during an extended operating period
was the sole topic discussed by regulators and AmerGen officials
� and heard by plant critics and state environmental officials �
during a three-hour public meeting at NRC headquarters.

Michael Gallagher, an AmerGen vice president, told regulators
that the company had planned all along to measure the liner more
often if test results show that it shrank. The company, he said,
will file those plans with the NRC.

The future condition of the liner is at issue because regulators
are considering whether to renew Oyster Creek's operating
license for an additional 20 years.

Believing that the 36-year-old Lacey plant could operate safely
and profitably until 2029, AmerGen officials applied for the
renewal about a year ago.

Regulators' focus on the liner lent credibility to a formal
contention raised by renewal opponents, said Paula Gotsch, a
Brick resident and a member of the renewal opposition group
Grandmother, Mothers and More for Energy Safety.

"The meeting demonstrated the validity and power of the
citizens' contention," said Gotsch, whose group is one of five
that filed the contention.

It accuses AmerGen of failing to come up with an adequate plan
for monitoring the liner for rust, peeling and other forms of
degradation.

Regulators, too, have looked hard at the liner.

Water that had leaked from an upper floor of the plant caused
the liner to rust and thin before then-operator GPU Nuclear
discovered the damage in the early 1980s.

Regulators asked for the commitment, in part, to give themselves
and the public peace of mind, said Frank Gillespie, NRC license
renewal director.

"The public, they need to have a certain assurance," he told
officials from AmerGen.

AmerGen also now needs to explain to regulators why they choose
to conduct a measurement ten years after the one scheduled for
October. Gillespie said a measurement taken four or six years
later would give regulators more confidence.

  Copyright � 2006 Asbury Park Press. All rights reserved.
*****************************************************************
 22 Independent: Head of France's nuclear watchdog 'lied over Chernobyl fallout' 

By John Lichfield in Paris 

Published: 02 June 2006 


Twenty years after the explosion at the nuclear reactor at
Chernobyl in the Ukraine, the legal fallout has just reached
France. 

Professor Pierre Pellerin, who was the head of France's nuclear
safety watchdog 20 years ago, has been formally accused of
deliberately concealing the seriousness of contamination of
parts of the French countryside from the French people. 

An investigation is continuing into the responsibilities of
politicians in the alleged cover-up, including the role of
Jacques Chirac, who was the prime minister. But for the time
being, anti-nuclear campaigners and a group of 500 thyroid
cancer sufferers are celebrating a first victory in a marathon
legal campaign. 

Professor Pellerin, now 82, has been placed under formal
investigation for "aggravated deception", but a potentially more
serious accusation of causing "involuntary bodily harm" was
dropped on Wednesday. 

At the time of the explosion at the Chernobyl reactor on 26
April 1986, the professor was head of the agency, attached to
the Health Ministry, which reported on risks to health. As the
"cloud" of contamination passed over France between 30 April and
5 May that year, Professor Pellerin issued a series of
reassuring statements. He published low average findings of
radiation across whole regions. Campaigners have long protested
that this deliberately concealed the fact that there were
pockets of contamination which suffered high rainfall as the
Chernobyl cloud moved westwards. 

In a four-hour interrogation by a judge on Wednesday, Professor
Pellerin said that he had issued accurate and balanced
information to the public. The investigation is likely to
continue for several years and the case may never come to trial. 

� 2006 Independent News and Media Limited 
*****************************************************************
 23 Burlington Free Press: Activists question Yankee relicensing

burlingtonfreepress.com  |  Burlington, Vermont 

Published: Friday, June 2, 2006

 The Associated Press

BRATTLEBORO -- Vermont, Massachusetts and an anti-nuclear group
have asked federal regulators for heightened review of Entergy
Nuclear's request to continue operating its Vermont Yankee
nuclear power plant for an extra 20 years. 

The two states and the group New England Coalition have asked to
participate in a quasi-judicial federal review of the
relicensing request. If granted, the new license would allow
Vermont Yankee to continue producing electricity through 2032. 

History suggests the trio may have a tough time. Federal
regulators have approved 44 license renewal applications and
granted the higher level of review in only a few, said Neil
Sheehan, a spokesman for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Vermont Yankee is on the banks of the Connecticut River in
Vernon, near both Massachusetts and New Hampshire.

To be granted the review they seek, Vermont, Massachusetts and
the coalition must prove they represent people who would be
affected by another 20 years of the plant's operation and there
are serious safety or maintenance concerns. 

Vermont, through its Public Service Department, has questioned
whether the building core is adequate to permit relicensing. It
also objected to storage of spent fuel on the plant grounds and
wants a review of security equipment. 

Vermont has "firmly established values associated with land
use," it said in asking for more information about storage of
spent fuel if there is no national resolution of fuel storage. 

"It follows that it is reasonable to expect that at least a part
of spent fuel to be generated at VY during the period of an
extended license will remain at the site for a much longer time
than evaluated and perhaps indefinitely," the filing reads. 

Massachusetts raised the specter of terrorism, questioning
whether the plant might be a target because of the storage of
the spent fuel.

"The attorney general is concerned that Entergy and the NRC have
not adequately informed the public regarding the risks of a
severe accident in the Vermont Yankee spent fuel pool during the
license renewal term, nor have they implemented adequate design
measures to avoid such an accident," according to documents
filed by Attorney General Thomas Reilly's office. 

Vermont Yankee spokesman Robert Williams said the plant "meets
every applicable federal and state regulation."

"The Nuclear Regulatory Commission process with the Atomic
Safety and Licensing Board is a very open avenue to have issues
formally addressed," Williams said. "We expect to participate in
the process." 

Copyright �2006 Burlingtonfreepress.com All rights reserved.
*****************************************************************
 24 China Daily: Nuke fusion reactor gives nation a headstart 

 By Wu Chong (China Daily)

 Updated: 2006-06-02 06:05

A nuclear fusion device will be built in the country by the end
of the year, which will help scientists try to come to grips
with the new source of power before the rest of the world. 

Minister Xu Guanhua [file photo]  

The device will allow Chinese scientists involved in an
international project to build a giant experimental fusion
reactor in France to begin work before the latter is ready,
Minister of Science and Technology Xu Guanhua said recently. 

The Experimental Advanced Superconducting Tokamak, or EAST, will
be the first of its kind in the world and is quite similar to
but much smaller than the International Thermonuclear
Experimental Reactor (ITER), which is not expected to be fully
operational for a decade. 

EAST is based in Hefei, capital of East China's Anhui Province. 

"Over the next 10 years, while ITER is being built, we can
conduct preliminary research on EAST to facilitate the operation
and exploitation of ITER in the future," Xu told China Daily in
an interview. 

EAST will be one of the two major Tokamak devices in China the
other traditional one is based in Sichuan Province. 

Both facilities will contribute to ITER, the largest
multinational scientific co-operation project China has ever
taken part in, said the minister. 

Last month, the government reached an agreement with the
European Union, the United States, Russia, Japan, India and
South Korea, to build the multi-billion-dollar reactor to
address the world's energy crisis and global warming. 

The reactor will emulate the fusion power of the Sun, harnessing
the tremendous amounts of energy that are released when atoms
fuse. 

Inside the reactor, deuterium and tritium atoms will be forced
together at a temperature of 100 million C, fuse and emit blasts
of energy. 

It will have fusion power of about 500 megawatts. 

Chinese experts are involved in 12 of ITER's programmes
including manufacturing superconductors, creating insulation to
contain super-heated plasma, and providing high-powered pulse
supply units. 

"Our scientific and industrial prowess in these fields will
improve by participating in these programmes, especially as they
are totally new to the world," said Xu. 

"We will also take advantage of the project to foster a number
of experts in nuclear fusion for more self-reliant development." 

As an equal member with the other six parties, several managers
and researchers will be deputed to ITER; and the country will
have access to all intellectual property rights of generated
technologies. 

Fusion power holds the key to solving projected energy
shortages, with just 1 kilogram of fusion fuel capable of
creating as much power as 10 million kilograms of fossil fuel. 


(China Daily 06/02/2006 page1)   

*****************************************************************
 25 THERECORD.COM: Nuclear energy isn't safe
               
GEORGE FELTHAM

(Jun 2, 2006) 

It seems the Ontario Liberal government is set on building more
nuclear plants.

According to the nuclear people, there are 20 plants in Ontario
with each producing 100 tons of radioactive material; that's a
lot when you multiply 20 plants by 40 years. It's presently
stored in tanks filled with water. Now they are getting
desperate and planning on storing it in a mine near the Great
Lakes.

Think of what would happen if even a small amount leaked into
the lakes. Why are they shunning the coal- fired plants when
there is technology available to burn coal with zero discharge
of pollutants? A company has developed a way to do this, but the
nuclear addicts don't want to even discuss this method. Why?

Nuclear is not clean, it is not cheap and it is not safe. Why
aren't more people protesting this method of producing
electricity?

George Feltham

Guelph

160 King St. East, Kitchener, Ontario, Canada, N2G 4E5 
519-894-2231
 
  [Torstar Digital] [City Media Group]   
*****************************************************************
 26 HEN News: Docs volunteer to operate on Chernobyl girl

: Hertfordshire Mercury News : 


KIND-hearted doctors from East Herts have come to the rescue of
a 13-year-old Belarusian girl on the brink of blindness. 

Ksenya Audzeyeva's eyesight is failing dramatically due to her
exposure to fallout from the nuclear disaster at Chernobyl. 

Unless treated, she will lose her sight altogether and in all
probability be sent to an asylum by the authorities in her home
country, which refuses to educate blind children. 

The seriousness of her condition came to light when Hertford
optician Jim Holt, of SpecSavers in Bircherley Green, was giving
free eye tests to several youngsters brought to England by
charity Friends of Chernobyl Children (FOCC) last summer. 

Mr Holt, together with Hertford-based FOCC members Chris
Sycamore and Angela Phipps, set about finding her help. 

This has arrived in the shape of surgeon Michael Toma and his
anaesthetist, who will perform an eye operation on Ksenya's
severe cataracts free of charge at the Queen Elizabeth Hospital
in Welwyn Garden City next month. It is due to take place on
either July 5 or 17. 

Mr Holt said: "For them to volunteer their services for free is
just fantastic. We always have to be guarded about the
prognosis, but we are cautiously optimistic [that Ksenya's sight
will be saved]." 

He is now trying to raise £1,500 to pay for hospital costs and
is tapping into World Cup fever with a patriotic fund-raising
initiative. 

Contact lenses with a St George's flag design, which normally
cost £80, are being sold at SpecSavers in Hertford for £50. 

All proceeds will be donated to Ksenya's cause. Mr Holt said:
"All we need to do is fit 30 people and we're there." 

Ksenya is from Mogilev, one of several areas in Belarus, Russia
and Ukraine which are still feeling the effects of being
contaminated with radiation following the world's worst nuclear
power accident at Chernobyl in April 1986. 

Several disadvantaged children from the city are bought to
England every year for a month by FOCC. 					 						 					 					
					  					 					

02 June 2006 								 							   						 					

another URL is the property of Herts and Essex Newspapers Ltd
�2005 and may not be reproduced without permission. 				   				 
 					 
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 27 NRC: Exelon Generation Company, LLC; Byron Station, Unit Nos. 1 and
 
                         FR Doc E6-8580 
[Federal Register: June 2, 2006 (Volume 71, Number 106)] 
[Notices] [Page 32144-32145] From the Federal Register Online via 
GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr02jn06-129]                         
 
2; Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact 
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is considering 
issuance of an exemption from Title 10 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations (10 CFR) section 50.44, 10 CFR 50.46, and 10 CFR part 
50, Appendix K, for Facility Operating Licenses Nos. NPF-37 and 
NPF-66, issued to Exelon Generation Company, LLC (Exelon, the 
licensee), for operation of Byron Station, Units 1 and 2, located 
in Ogle County, Illinois. Therefore, as required by 10 CFR 51.21, 
the NRC is issuing this environmental assessment and finding of 
no significant impact.
 
Environmental Assessment Identification of the Proposed Action 
The proposed action would allow the licensee to place four lead 
test assemblies containing a limited number of AXIOMTM fuel rods 
into the Byron Station, Unit 1, core during the fall 2006 
refueling outage. The four lead test assemblies will be placed in 
non- limiting core locations. For subsequent cycles, two of the 
lead test assemblies will be placed into Byron Station, Unit 2, 
and two lead test assemblies will remain in Byron Station, Unit 
1.
 
The proposed action is in accordance with the licensee's 
application dated September 23, 2005.
 
The Need for the Proposed Action Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12, 
``Specific exemptions,'' Exelon has requested exemptions from 10 
CFR 50.44, ``Combustible gas control for nuclear power 
reactors,'' 10 CFR 50.46, ``Acceptance criteria for emergency 
core cooling systems [EECS] for light-water nuclear power 
reactors,'' and Appendix K to 10 CFR part 50, ``ECCS Evaluation 
Models.'' The regulation at 10 CFR 50.44 specifies requirements 
for the control of hydrogen gas generated after a postulated 
loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) for reactors fueled with 
zirconium-clad fuel.
 
Section 50.46 contains acceptance criteria for ECCS for reactors 
fueled with zircaloy or ZIRLOTM clad fuel. In addition, Appendix 
K to 10 CFR part 50 requires that the Baker-Just equation be used 
to predict the rates of energy release, hydrogen concentration, 
and cladding oxidation from the metal-water reaction.
 
The exemption request relates solely to the specific types of 
cladding material specified in these regulations. As written, the 
regulations presume the use of zircaloy or ZIRLOTM fuel rod 
cladding. Thus, an exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 
50.44, 10 CFR 50.46, and Appendix K to 10 CFR part 50 is needed 
to irradiate lead test assemblies employing AXIOMTM developmental 
clad alloys at Byron Station, Units 1 and 2.
 
The proposed action will use the irradiation of the lead test 
assemblies incorporating the developmental cladding to provide 
data on fuel and material performances to support future 
licensing activities.
 
Environmental Impacts of the Proposed Action The NRC has 
completed its safety evaluation of the proposed action and 
concludes that specific application of the limitations on fuel 
cladding material in 10 CFR 50.44, 10 CFR 50.46, and 10 CFR part 
50 Appendix K to the lead test assemblies is not necessary for 
the licensee to achieve their underlying purposes. In addition, 
the NRC staff has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12(a), 
the exemption is authorized by law, will not present an undue 
risk to public health and safety, and is
 
[[Page 32145]] consistent with the common defense and security.
 
The details of the NRC staff's safety evaluation will be provided 
in the exemption that will be issued as part of the letter to the 
licensee approving the exemption to the regulation.
 
The proposed action will not significantly increase the 
probability or consequences of accidents. No changes are being 
made in the types of effluents that may be released off site. 
There is no significant increase in the amount of any effluent 
released off site. There is no significant increase in 
occupational or public radiation exposure. Therefore, there are 
no significant radiological environmental impacts associated with 
the proposed action.
 
With regard to potential non-radiological impacts, the proposed 
action does not have a potential to affect any historic sites.
 
It does not affect non-radiological plant effluents and has no 
other environmental impact. Therefore, there are no significant 
non- radiological environmental impacts associated with the 
proposed action.
 
Accordingly, the NRC concludes that there are no significant 
environmental impacts associated with the proposed action.
 
Environmental Impacts of the Alternatives to the Proposed Action 
As an alternative to the proposed action, the NRC staff 
considered denial of the proposed action (i.e., the ``no-action'' 
alternative). Denial of the application would result in no change 
in current environmental impacts. The environmental impacts of 
the proposed action and the alternative action are similar.
 
Alternative Use of Resources The action does not involve the use 
of any different resources than those previously considered in 
the Final Environmental Statement for Byron Station, Units 1 and 
2, NUREG-0848, dated April 1982.
 
Agencies and Persons Consulted In accordance with its stated 
policy, on April 7, 2006, the NRC staff consulted with the 
Illinois State official, Mr. Frank Niziolek of the Illinois 
Emergency Management Agency, regarding the environmental impact 
of the proposed action. The State official had no comments.
 
Finding of No Significant Impact On the basis of the 
environmental assessment, the NRC concludes that the proposed 
action will not have a significant effect on the quality of the 
human environment. Accordingly, the NRC has determined not to 
prepare an environmental impact statement for the proposed 
action.
 
For further details with respect to the proposed action, see the 
licensee's letter dated September 23, 2005. Documents may be 
examined, and/or copied for a fee, at the NRC's Public Document 
Room (PDR), located at One White Flint North, Public File Area O1 
F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland. 
Publicly available records will be accessible electronically from 
the Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) 
Public Electronic Reading Room on the Internet at the NRC Web 
site, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. Persons who do 
not have access to ADAMS or who encounter problems in accessing 
the documents located in ADAMS should contact the NRC PDR 
Reference staff by telephone at 1-800-397-4209 or 301-415-4737, 
or send an e-mail to pdr@nrc.gov. Dated at Rockville, Maryland, 
this 25th day of May 2006.
 
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
 
Robert F. Kuntz, Project Manager, Plant Licensing Branch III-2, 
Division of Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of Nuclear 
Reactor Regulation.
 
[FR Doc. E6-8580 Filed 6-1-06; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590-01-P

 
*****************************************************************
 28 NRC: FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company and FirstEnergy Nuclear 
 
                         FR Doc E6-8581 
[Federal Register: June 2, 2006 (Volume 71, Number 106)] 
[Notices] [Page 32144] From the Federal Register Online via GPO 
Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr02jn06-128]                         
 
Generation Corp.; Notice of Withdrawal of Application for 
Amendment to Facility Operating License The U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has granted the request of 
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company and FirstEnergy Nuclear 
Generation Corp. (FENOC) to withdraw its May 22, 2005, 
application for proposed amendment to Facility Operating License 
No. NPF-3 for the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station (DBNPS), Unit 
1, located in Ottawa County.
 
The proposed amendment would have revised the technical 
specifications pertaining to a qualified alternate repair 
criteria for axial tube end cracking indications in the DBNPS 
once through steam generator tubes. Specifically, the proposed 
amendment would revise the TS surveillance requirements for the 
steam generator inservice inspection to include tube end cracking 
alternate repair criteria.
 
The Commission had previously issued a Notice of Consideration of 
Issuance of Amendment published in the Federal Register on July 
5, 2005 (70 FR 38720). However, by letter dated February 16, 
2006, in response to Generic Letter 2006-01, ``Steam Generator 
Tube Integrity and Associated Technical Specifications,'' FENOC 
committed to submit a license amendment application by May 31, 
2006, proposing to amend the DBNPS TS to be consistent with TS 
Task Force (TSTF)-449, ``Steam Generator Tube Integrity,'' 
Revision 4. Since this new license application will be 
incompatible with the changes proposed in the earlier license 
amendment application, by letter dated April 20, 2006, FENOC 
withdrew the May 22, 2005, amendment request. FENOC plans to 
resubmit the license amendment application at a later date.
 
For further details with respect to this action, see the 
application for amendment dated May 22, 2005, and the licensees' 
letter dated April 20, 2006, which withdrew the application for 
license amendment. Documents may be examined, and/or copied for a 
fee, at the NRC's Public Document Room (PDR), located at One 
White Flint North, Public File Area O1 F21, 11555 Rockville Pike 
(first floor), Rockville, Maryland. Publicly available records 
will be accessible electronically from the Agencywide Documents 
Access and Management Systems (ADAMS) Public Electronic Reading 
Room on the Internet at the NRC Web site, 
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm.html. Persons who do not have 
access to ADAMS or who encounter problems in accessing the 
documents located in ADAMS should contact the NRC PDR Reference 
staff by telephone at 1-800- 397-4209, or 301-415-4737 or by 
e-mail to pdr@nrc.gov. Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 25th 
day of May 2006.
 
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
 
Stephen J. Campbell, Project Manager, Plant Licensing Branch 
III-2, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of Nuclear 
Reactor Regulation.
 
[FR Doc. E6-8581 Filed 6-1-06; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590-01-P

 
*****************************************************************
 29 NRC: Agency Information Collection Activities: Proposed Collection; 
 
                         FR Doc E6-8583 
[Federal Register: June 2, 2006 (Volume 71, Number 106)] 
[Notices] [Page 32143-32144] From the Federal Register Online via 
GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr02jn06-127]                         
 
Comment Request AGENCY: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). 
ACTION: Notice of pending NRC action to submit an information 
collection request to OMB and solicitation of public comment.
 
SUMMARY: The NRC is preparing a submittal to OMB for review of 
continued approval of information collections under the 
provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 
Chapter 35). Information pertaining to the requirement to be 
submitted: 1. The title of the information collection: NRC Form 
531, Request for Taxpayer Identification Number.
 
2. Current OMB approval number: OMB No. 3150-0188. 3. How often 
the collection is required: One time from each applicant or 
individual to enable the Department of the Treasury to process 
electronic payments or collect debts owed to the Government.
 
4. Who is required or asked to report: All individuals doing 
business with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, including 
contractors and recipients of credit, licenses, permits, and 
benefits.
 
5. The number of annual respondents: 300. 6. The number of hours 
needed annually to complete the requirement or request: 25 hours 
(5 minutes per respondent).
 
7. Abstract: The Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996 requires 
that agencies collect taxpayer identification numbers (TINs) from 
individuals who do business with the Government, including 
contractors and recipients of credit, licenses, permits, and 
benefits. The TIN will be used to process all electronic payments 
(refunds) made to licensees by electronic funds transfer by the 
Department of the Treasury.
 
The Department of the Treasury will use the TIN to determine 
whether the refund can be used to administratively offset any 
delinquent debts reported to the Treasury by other government 
agencies. In addition, the TIN will be used to collect and report 
to the Department of the Treasury any delinquent indebtedness 
arising out of the licensee's or applicant's relationship with 
the NRC.
 
Submit, by August 1, 2006, comments that address the following 
questions: 1. Is the proposed collection of information necessary 
for the NRC to properly perform its functions? Does the 
information have practical utility? 2. Is the burden estimate 
accurate? 3. Is there a way to enhance the quality, utility, and 
clarity of the information to be collected? 4. How can the burden 
of the information collection be minimized, including the use of 
automated collection techniques or other forms of information 
technology? A copy of the draft supporting statement may be 
viewed free of charge at the NRC Public Document Room, One White 
Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Room O-1 F21, Rockville, MD 
20852. OMB clearance requests are available at the NRC worldwide 
Web site: .
 
The document will be available on the NRC home page site for 60 
days after the signature date of this notice.
 
Comments and questions about the information collection 
requirements may be directed to the NRC Clearance Officer, Brenda 
Jo. Shelton (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555-0001, by
 
[[Page 32144]] telephone at 301-415-7233, or by Internet 
electronic mail to .
 
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 25th day of May 2006.
 
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
 
Brenda Jo. Shelton, NRC Clearance Officer, Office of the Chief 
Information Officer.
 
[FR Doc. E6-8583 Filed 6-1-06; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590-01-P

 
*****************************************************************
 30 NRC: Sunshine Act Meeting
 
                         FR Doc 06-5083 
[Federal Register: June 2, 2006 (Volume 71, Number 106)] 
[Notices] [Page 32145] From the Federal Register Online via GPO 
Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr02jn06-130]                         
 
Date: Week of May 29, 2006.
 
Place: Commissioner's Conference Room, 11555 Rockville Pike, 
Rockville, Maryland.
 
Status: Public and Closed.
 
Additional Matters to Be Considered: Week of May 29, 2006 Friday, 
June 2, 2006 3:30 p.m.--Affirmation Session (Public Meeting) 
(Tentative) a. Louisiana Energy Services, L.P. (National 
Enrichment Facility) Intervenors' Petition for Review of 
LBP-06-08 and LPT-06-09. (Tentative) * * * * * The schedule for 
Commission meetings is subject to change on short notice. To 
verify the status of meetings call (recording)--(301) 415- 1292. 
Contact person for more information: Michelle Schroll, (301) 415- 
1662.
 
* * * * * Additional Information By a vote of 5-0 on May 30, 
2006, the Commission determined pursuant to U.S.C. 552b(e) and 
Sec.  9.107(a) of the Commission's rules that Affirmation of 
``Louisiana Energy Services, L.P. (National Enrichment Facility) 
Intervenors' Petition for Review LBP-06-08 and LBP-06-09'' be 
held June 2, 2006, and on less than one week's notice to the 
public.
 
* * * * * The NRC Commission Meeting Schedule can be found on the 
Internet at: http://www.nrc.gov/what-we-do/ 
policy-making/schedule.html. * * * * * The NRC provides 
reasonable accommodation to individuals with disabilities where 
appropriate. If you need a reasonable accommodation to 
participate in these public meetings, or need this meeting notice 
or the transcript or other information from the public meetings 
in another format (e.g. braille, large, print), please notify the 
NRC's Disability Program Coordinator, Deborah Chan, at 
301-415-7041, TDD: 301-415-2100, or by e-mail at DLC@nrc.gov. 
Determinations on requests for reasonable accommodation will be 
made on a case-by-case basis.
 
* * * * * This notice is distributed by mail to several hundred 
subscribers; if you no longer wish to receive it, or would like 
to be added to the distribution, please contact the Office of the 
Secretary, Washington, DC 20555 (301)-415-1969). In addition, 
distribution of this meeting notice over the Internet system is 
available. If you are interested in receiving this Commission 
meeting schedule electronically, please send an electronic 
message to dwk@nrc.gov. Dated: May 30, 2006.
 
R. Michelle Schroll, Office of the Secretary.
 
[FR Doc. 06-5083 Filed 5-31-06; 10:25 am] BILLING CODE 7590-01-M

 
*****************************************************************
 31 EPA: Nuclear EIS's 

FR Doc E6-8593 

[Federal Register: June 2, 2006 (Volume 71, Number 106)] 
[Notices] [Page 32085-32086] From the Federal Register Online via 
GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr02jn06-71] 

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 
[ER-FRL-6675-8] 

Environmental Impact Statements and Regulations; Availability of 
EPA Comments 

Availability of EPA comments prepared pursuant to the 
Environmental Review Process (ERP), under section 309 of the 
Clean Air Act and section 102(2)(c) of the National Environmental 
Policy Act as amended. Requests for copies of EPA comments can be 
directed to the Office of Federal Activities at 202-564-7167. 

An explanation of the ratings assigned to draft environmental 
impact statements (EISs) was published in the Federal Register 
dated April 7, 2006 (71 FR 17845). Draft EISs 

EIS No. 20060034, ERP No. D-NRC-F06028-MN, GENERIC--License 
Renewal of 
Nuclear Plants, Supplement 26 to NUREG 1437, Regarding 
Monticello 
Nuclear Generating Plant (TAC NO. MC6441) Renewal of Operating 
License 
DRP-22 for Additional 20-Years of Operation, Mississippi River, 
City of 
Monticello, Wright County, MN. 

Summary: EPA expressed environmental concerns about radiological 
impacts and risk estimates, future up rates, spent fuel storage 
facilities, and abnormal effluent releases. Rating EC2. EIS No. 
20060077, ERP No. D-COE-E36184-FL, Central and Southern Florida 
Project, New Authorization for Broward County Water Preserve 
Areas, South Florida Water Management District (SFWMD), 
Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan, (CERP), Broward 
County, FL. 

Summary: EPA fully supports the restoration components of the 
project and its expedited implementation. EPA requested 
quantification of water quality benefits and an exotics 
management plan. Rating EC1. EIS No. 20060089, ERP No. 
DS-AFS-L65400-ID, West Gold Creek Project, Updated Information, 
Forest Management Activities Plan, Implementation, Idaho 
Panhandle National Forests, Sandpoints Ranger District, Bonner 
County, ID. 

Summary: EPA expressed environmental concerns about the potential 
adverse impacts to water [[Page 32086]] quality and on the bull 
trout spawning area under the preferred alternative. The Final 
EIS should evaluate additional reductions in sediment loading to 
West Gold Creek. Rating EC2. Final EISs EIS No. 20060112, ERP No. 
F-OSM-D36120-PA, ADOPTION--Dents Run Watershed Ecosystem 
Restoration, Construction and Operation of Six Acid Mine Drainage 
Abatement Projects, Implementation, Benezette Township, 
Susquehanna River Basin, Elk County, PA. 

Summary: No formal comment letter was sent to the preparing 
agency. EIS No. 20060116, ERP No. F-NPS-F65076-OH, First Ladies 
National Historic Site General Management Plan, Implementation, 
Canton, OH. 

Summary: EPA does not object to the proposed action. EIS No. 
20060129, ERP No. F-FRC-E03014-FL, Cypress Pipeline Project and 
Phase VII Expansion Project, Construction and Operation, U.S. 
Army COE Section 10 and 404 Permits, Northern and Central 
Florida. 

Summary: EPA continues to have environmental concerns about 
impacts to wetland. EIS No. 20060134, ERP No. F-SFW-K99034-CA, 
Coachella Valley Multiple Species Habitat Conservation Plan 
(MSHCP), Santa Rosa and San Jacinto Mountains Trails Plan, 
Issuance of Incidental Take Permit, Riverside County, CA. 

Summary: EPA does not object to the proposed action. 

Dated: May 30, 2006. Robert W. Hargrove, Director, NEPA 
Compliance Division, Office of Federal Activities.

[FR Doc. E6-8593 Filed 6-1-06; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 6560-50-P 
*****************************************************************
 32 Korea Times: NK Reactor Project Terminated 

Hankooki.com > The Korea Times > Opinion   

 Astronomic Amount of Construction Cost Wasted   
      
The international project to build light water reactors (LWRs)
in North Korea has been terminated. The New York-based Korean
Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), an
international consortium for the project, officially announced
the termination Thursday. The hope of international society to
deter North Korean nuclear weapons program in return for the
reactors has ended in failure.

 Though the announcement was nothing but a formality, as the
project has long stood meaningless in the face of North Korean
non-compliance with the basic agreement, we can't help being
gripped with dismay and exasperation.

 The astronomic amount of money we have spent for the project
has been blown away with no reward at all. It was a typical
example of the complexity and difficulties in dealing with the
North Korean nuclear weapons program. KEDO was formed jointly by
South Korea, the United States, Japan and European Union in 1995
to build two LWRs in Kumho, on the North's east coast, based on
a bilateral agreement between Washington and Pyongyang. Under
the agreement, North Korea promised to suspend all nuclear
activities. The construction began in August 1997.

 Of some $1.56 billion in construction costs, Seoul shouldered
some 70 percent of the bill or over $1.13 billion while Japan
paid $407 million, the EU $18 million and the U.S. was in charge
of providing heavy fuel oil. People in the South readily
accepted the massive financial burden out of the expectation
that the project would serve as a basic framework to bring about
peace and stability in Northeast Asia. But, nothing has been
yielded from costly project. It was suspended in 2002 when the
North was found to have been secretly pursuing enriched uranium
for a nuclear build-up.

 KEDO criticized the North for having breached the agreement
while the North denied the charges and demanded compensation for
the unfinished work. We can't help having the impression that
KEDO's member nations have been manipulated by North Korean
brinkmanship. Eventually, the costly project has done nothing
but give the North enough time to develop nuclear weapons.
Pyongyang had nothing to lose either way and now North Korea has
declared itself a nuclear power.

 We should not repeat the mistake of spending a massive amount
of money for a vague agreement with no effect of making the
North stop its nuclear program in the days to come. The best
scenario for Pyongyang is being able to extract as much
assistance as possible while maintaining its nuclear program.
Their strategy is deemed successful until now and they are sure
to stick to it in the future too. We should not forget the fact
that the North devoted itself to developing nuclear weapons
while the reactor project was in progress. 

06-02-2006 16:44         
  
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 33 Times-Herald Record: Nuclear power is not only green, but also safe 

src="http://www.recordonline.com/navs/rss.gif" hspace="3"

  June 02, 2006 

By John Worts 

With all the squawking and whining from the limousine elite
effete who always complain and never have a good idea for an
alternative, take a look at the great success rate of nuclear
power worldwide. More than 85 percent of electric power in
France is generated with nuclear power and our American
technology. I haven't read of any substantial problems with
nuclear power in France.

Since the early 1960s, we have had nuclear electric generating
plants without serious incident. Three Mile Island and Indian
Point nuclear plants are proof of this. The technology of all
our plants and our technology being used by the French preclude
a Chernobyl-type of incident. Nuclear power is the only way to
develop, with current technology, clean renewable fuel without
relying on imported oil, whereby much of the oil money is
siphoned off by terrorist groups.

The only other alternative to nuclear power plants that have
zero pollution and no greenhouse gases is hydrogen power or
windmill power, as is successfully being used in many European
countries. With a substantial increase of nuclear power in this
country, we can have electric vehicles with true zero emissions.

California a few years back touted the electric vehicle as the
emission-free vehicle. This might be an emission-free vehicle
for California because California generates very little of its
own electricity, instead purchasing electric from neighboring
states that develop their electric power from fossil fuels.
California is merely exporting the air pollution to other states.

Other benefits: Nuclear power can create the power needed to
take ordinary gasoline stations and give them the ability to
generate hydrogen. We have the ability and the technology to
produce hydrogen-powered vehicles, which run on a totally
renewable energy source. A hydrogen-powered vehicle is truly an
emission-free vehicle whose exhaust engine only emits water
vapor, which, as far as I know, is still safe. Any current gas
station can easily be converted to be a hydrogen generator. The
only things we need to create hydrogen are electricity and water.

Additionally, cheap nuclear power would provide a home-heating
alternative to electric. Again, we have to look at the safety
viability of nuclear power. There has not been a serious
incident with nuclear power in any of the Free World countries
now using nuclear power. It has already been nearly a half
-century, and the technology and safety of these plants has only
gotten better and better. 

John Worts of Middletown is an auto dealer. 
  

Record Online is brought to you by the Times Herald-Record,
serving New York's Hudson Valley and the Catskills.
*****************************************************************
 34 Cape Cod Times: Pilgrim plant gets tighter scrutiny 

(June 2, 2006)

 By KEVIN DENNEHY
 STAFF WRITER

PLYMOUTH - Federal regulators may send inspectors within weeks
to gauge how well the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station tracks
radioactive materials after devices contaminated by small
amounts of radiation were found to be missing.

Nine missing neutron detectors contaminated by highly
radioactive uranium 235 would not pose a high public safety
risk, according to Neil Sheehan, a Nuclear Regulatory Commission
spokesman. But Entergy's inability to account for the devices
raises a question of accountability, he said.

 The federal agency had already begun tracking how well power
plants track spent nuclear fuel after two fuel rods went missing
in Connecticut, Sheehan said.

 The Pilgrim plant, which stores spent fuel and other
radioactive material in on-site cooling basins about the size of
an Olympic swimming pool, may now move to the head of the line
of inspections.

 ''When it comes to the special nuclear materials, they need to
be able to account for every item that's in the pool,'' Sheehan
said.

 Entergy, owner of the 35-year-old Pilgrim plant and one of the
largest companies in the U.S. nuclear industry, is seeking a
20-year license extension to continue operations in Plymouth.
The plant, on Cape Cod Bay, provides electricity for about
670,000 homes in the Northeast.

 Typically, any tools or instruments contaminated by radioactive
materials during plant operations at Pilgrim are placed into the
same 40-foot-deep cooling pools where spent fuel has collected
for decades.

 But during a recent inventory, plant operators were unable to
locate the contaminated instruments, small devices that are
about 1 inch long and would have been inserted into the reactor
core to measure power levels decades ago.

 On May 22, Entergy reported the missing instruments to the NRC,
which is now investigating.

 David Tarantino, a Pilgrim spokesman, said the incomplete
inventory is likely the result of faulty paperwork. He said the
contaminated instruments were probably removed from the facility
as low-level radioactive material in the mid-1980s.

 ''We believe it hasn't been on the site for 20 years,'' he said.

 Tarantino said the missing instruments could not be used for a
nuclear weapon or so-called dirty bomb, adding that since the
missing items are smaller than 1 gram, they would not have been
regulated by the NRC before 1987. That may be the reason the
materials were not adequately tracked, he said.

 Officials estimate anyone exposed to the contaminated
instruments would be subjected to a radioactive exposure
anywhere from 10 to 200 millirems per hour, Sheehan said.

 By comparison, humans are exposed to an average of 360
millirems per year by natural and man-made sources of
radioactivity.

 The NRC believes any material that was taken off site at those
levels would have tripped the plant's radiation alarms.

While the nuclear industry has gotten much more effective at
tracking radioactive materials, Sheehan said, the inventory
problem at Pilgrim must be taken seriously.

 ''It boils down to an issue of accountability,'' he said.

 ''We expect them to know what's in the pool and where it's
stored.''

 Kevin Dennehy can be reached at kdennehy@capecodonline.com. 

(Published: June 2, 2006)           

Copyright � 2006 Cape Cod Times. All rights reserved. 
*****************************************************************
 35 NRC: Notice of Opportunity to Comment on Model Safety Evaluation on 
 
                         FR Doc 06-5044 
[Federal Register: June 2, 2006 (Volume 71, Number 106)] 
[Notices] [Page 32145-32153] From the Federal Register Online via 
GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr02jn06-131]                         
 
Technical Specification Improvement to Modify Requirements 
Regarding the Addition of LCO 3.0.9 on the Unavailability of 
Barriers Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process 
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
 
ACTION:  Request for comment.
 
SUMMARY: Notice is hereby given that the staff of the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) has prepared a model safety 
evaluation (SE) and model
 
[[Page 32146]] application relating to the modification of 
requirements regarding the impact of unavailable hazard barriers, 
not explicitly addressed in technical specifications, but 
required for operability of supported systems in technical 
specifications (TS). The NRC staff has also prepared a model 
no-significant-hazards-consideration (NSHC) determination 
relating to this matter. The purpose of these models is to permit 
the NRC to efficiently process amendments that propose to add an 
LCO 3.0.9 that provides a delay time for entering a supported 
system TS when the inoperability is due solely to an unavailable 
hazard barrier, if risk is assessed and managed. Licensees of 
nuclear power reactors to which the models apply could then 
request amendments, confirming the applicability of the SE and 
NSHC determination to their reactors. The NRC staff is requesting 
comment on the model SE and model NSHC determination prior to 
announcing their availability for referencing in license 
amendment applications.
 
 
DATES: The comment period expires July 3, 2006. Comments received 
after this date will be considered if it is practical to do so, 
but the Commission is able to ensure consideration only for 
comments received on or before this date.
 
 
ADDRESSES: Comments may be submitted either electronically or via 
U.S. mail. Submit written comments to Chief, Rules and Directives 
Branch, Division of Administrative Services, Office of 
Administration, Mail Stop: T-6 D59, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001. Hand deliver comments to: 
11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland, between 7:45 a.m. and 
4:15 p.m. on Federal workdays. Copies of comments received may be 
examined at the NRC's Public Document Room, 11555 Rockville Pike 
(Room O-1F21), Rockville, Maryland.
 
Comments may be submitted by electronic mail to CLIIP@nrc.gov. 
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: T.R. Tjader, Mail Stop: O-12H4, 
Division of Inspection and Regulation Support, Office of Nuclear 
Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555-0001, telephone 301-415-1187.
 
 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Background Regulatory Issue Summary 
2000-06, ``Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process for 
Adopting Standard Technical Specification Changes for Power 
Reactors,'' was issued on March 20, 2000. The consolidated line 
item improvement process (CLIIP) is intended to improve the 
efficiency of NRC licensing processes by processing proposed 
changes to the standard technical specifications (STS) in a 
manner that supports subsequent license amendment applications.
 
The CLIIP includes an opportunity for the public to comment on a 
proposed change to the STS after a preliminary assessment by the 
NRC staff and a finding that the change will likely be offered 
for adoption by licensees. This notice solicits comments on a 
proposed change that allows a delay time for entering a supported 
system TS when the inoperability is due solely to an unavailable 
hazard barrier, if risk is assessed and managed. The CLIIP 
directs the NRC staff to evaluate any comments received for a 
proposed change to the STS and to either reconsider the change or 
announce the availability of the change for adoption by 
licensees. Licensees opting to apply for this TS change are 
responsible for reviewing the staff's evaluation, referencing the 
applicable technical justifications, and providing any necessary 
plant- specific information. Each amendment application made in 
response to the notice of availability will be processed and 
noticed in accordance with applicable rules and NRC procedures.
 
This notice involves the addition of LCO 3.0.9 to the TS which 
provides a delay time for entering a supported system TS when the 
inoperability is due solely to an unavailable hazard barrier, if 
risk is assessed and managed. This change was proposed for 
incorporation into the standard technical specifications by the 
owners groups participants in the Technical Specification Task 
Force (TSTF) and is designated TSTF-427, Revision 1 (Rev 1). 
TSTF-427, Rev 1, can be viewed on the NRC's Web page at 
http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/licensing/techspecs.html .
 
Applicability This proposal to modify technical specification 
requirements by the addition of LCO 3.0.9, as proposed in 
TSTF-427, Rev 1, is applicable to all licensees.
 
To efficiently process the incoming license amendment 
applications, the staff requests that each licensee applying for 
the changes proposed in TSTF-427, Rev 1, to use the CLIIP. The 
CLIIP does not prevent licensees from requesting an alternative 
approach or proposing the changes without the requested Bases and 
Bases control program. Variations from the approach recommended 
in this notice may require additional review by the NRC staff, 
and may increase the time and resources needed for the review. 
Significant variations from the approach, or inclusion of 
additional changes to the license, will result in staff rejection 
of the submittal. Instead, licensees desiring significant 
variations and/or additional changes should submit a LAR that 
does not claim to adopt TSTF-427, Rev 1.
 
Public Notices This notice requests comments from interested 
members of the public within 30 days of the date of publication 
in the Federal Register. After evaluating the comments received 
as a result of this notice, the staff will either reconsider the 
proposed change or announce the availability of the change in a 
subsequent notice (perhaps with some changes to the safety 
evaluation or the proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination as a result of public comments). If the staff 
announces the availability of the change, licensees wishing to 
adopt the change must submit an application in accordance with 
applicable rules and other regulatory requirements. For each 
application the staff will publish a notice of consideration of 
issuance of amendment to facility operating licenses, a proposed 
no significant hazards consideration determination, and a notice 
of opportunity for a hearing. The staff will also publish a 
notice of issuance of an amendment to an operating license to 
announce the modification of requirements related to systems in 
TS, due to unavailable non-technical specification barriers, for 
each plant that receives the requested change.
 
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 26th day of May 2006.
 
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
 
Timothy J. Kobetz, Chief, Technical Specifications Branch, 
Division of Inspection and Regional Support, Office of Nuclear 
Reactor Regulation.
 
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Technical Specification Task 
Force (TSTF) Change TSTF-427 1.0 Introduction On February 6, 
2006, the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) Risk Informed Technical 
Specifications Task Force (RITSTF) submitted a proposed change, 
TSTF-427, Revision 1, to the standard technical specifications 
(STS) (NUREGs 1430-1434) on behalf of the industry (TSTF-427, 
Revision 0 was a prior draft iteration). TSTF-427, Revision 1, is 
a proposal to add an STS Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 
3.0.9, allowing a delay time for entering a
 
[[Page 32147]] supported system technical specification (TS), 
when the inoperability is due solely to an unavailable hazard 
barrier, if risk is assessed and managed. The postulated 
initiating events which may require a functional barrier are 
limited to those with low frequencies of occurence, and the 
overall TS system safety function would still be available for 
the majority of anticipated challenges.
 
This proposal is one of the industry's initiatives being 
developed under the risk-informed TS program. These initiatives 
are intended to maintain or improve safety through the 
incorporation of risk assessment and management techniques in TS, 
while reducing unnecessary burden and making TS requirements 
consistent with the Commission's other risk- informed regulatory 
requirements.
 
The proposed change adds a new limiting condition of operation, 
LCO 3.0.9, to the TS. LCO 3.0.9 allows licensees to delay 
declaring an LCO not met for equipment supported by barriers 
unable to perform their associated support function, when risk is 
assessed and managed.
 
This new LCO 3.0.9 states: ``When one or more required barriers 
are unable to perform their related support function(s), any 
affected supported system LCO(s) are not required to be declared 
not met solely for this reason for up to 30 days provided that at 
least one train or subsystem of the supported system is OPERABLE 
and supported by barriers capable of providing their related 
support function(s), and risk is assessed and managed. This 
specification may be concurrently applied to more than one train 
or subsystem of a multiple train or subsystem supported system 
provided at least one train or subsystem of the supported system 
is OPERABLE and the barriers supporting each of these trains or 
subsystems provide their related support function(s) for 
different categories of initiating events. [BWR only: For the 
purposes of this specification, the [High Pressure Coolant 
Injection/High Pressure Core Spray] system, the [Reactor Core 
Isolation Cooling] system, and the [Automatic Depressurization 
System] are considered independent subsystems of a single 
system.] If the required OPERABLE train or subsystem becomes 
inoperable while this specification is in use, it must be 
restored to OPERABLE status within 24 hours or the provisions of 
this specification cannot be applied to the trains or subsystems 
supported by the barriers that cannot perform their related 
support function(s).
 
At the end of the specified period, the required barriers must be 
able to perform their related support function(s), or the 
affected supported system LCO(s) shall be declared not met.'' 2.0 
Regulatory Evaluation In 10 CFR 50.36, the Commission established 
its regulatory requirements related to the content of TX. 
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.36, TS are required to include items in the 
following five specific categories related to station operation: 
(1) Safety limits, limiting safety system settings, and limiting 
control settings; (2) limiting conditions for operation (LCOs); 
(3) surveillance requirements (SRs); (4) design features; and (5) 
administrative controls. The rule does not specify the particular 
requirements to be included in a plant's TS. As stated in 10 CFR 
50.36(c)(2)(I), the ``Limiting conditions for operation are the 
lowest functional capability or performance levels of equipment 
required for safe operation of the facility. When a limiting 
condition for operation of a nuclear reactor is not met, the 
licensee shall shut down the reactor or follow any remedial 
action permitted by the technical specification * * *.'' TS 
Section 3.0, on ``LCO and SR Applicability,'' provides details or 
ground rules for complying with the LCOs.
 
Barriers are doors, walls, floor plugs, curbs, hatches, 
mechanical devices, or other devices, not explicitly described in 
TS, that support the performance of the functions of systems 
described in the TS.
 
For purposes of this TS, the term ``barrier'' refers to one or 
more devices which protect one train of a safety system from a 
given initiating event. A ``degraded barrier'' refers to a 
barrier that has been found to be degraded and must be repaired, 
or to a barrier that is purposefully removed or reconfigured to 
facilitate maintenance activities. As stated on NEI 04-08, LCO 
3.0.9 specifically does not apply to fire barriers, snubbers, 
barriers which support ventilation systems or non-TS systems, or 
barriers which support TS systems where the unavailability of the 
barrier does not render the supported system inoperable.
 
Some TS required systems may require one or more functional 
barriers in order to perform their intended function(s) for 
certain initiating events for which the barriers provide some 
protective support function. For example, there are barriers to 
protect systems from the effects of internal flooding, such as 
floor plugs and retaining walls, and barriers are used to protect 
equipment from steam impingement in case of high energy line 
breaks. Barriers are also used to protect systems against 
missiles, either internally generated, or generated by external 
events.
 
Barriers are not explicitly described in the TS, but are required 
to be capable of performing their required support function by 
the definition of OPERABILITY for the supported system which is 
described in the TS. Therefore, under the current STS, the 
supported system must be declared inoperable when the related 
barrier(s) are unavailable. However, the magnitude of plant risk 
associated with the barrier which cannot perform its related 
support function is much less than the risk associated with 
direct unavailability of the supported system, since barriers are 
only required for specific, low frequency initiating events.
 
Some potential undesirable consequences of the current TS 
requirements include: 1. When maintenance activities on the 
supported TS system require removal and restoration of barriers, 
the time available to complete maintenance and perform system 
restoration and testing is reduced by the time spent maneuvering 
the barriers within the time constraints of the supported system 
LCO; 2. Restoration of barriers following maintenance may be 
given a high priority due to time restraints of the existing 
supported system LCO, when other activities may have a greater 
risk impact and should therefore be given priority; and 3. 
Unnecessary plant shutdowns may occur due to discovery of 
degraded barriers which require more time than provided by the 
existing supported system LCO to complete repairs and restoration 
of the barrier.
 
To improve the treatment of unavailable barriers and enhance 
safety, the TSTF proposed a risk-informed TS change that 
introduces a delay time before entering the actions for the 
supported equipment, when one or more barriers are found to be 
degraded, or are removed or reconfigured to support maintenance 
activities, if risk is assessed and managed. Such a delay time 
will provide needed flexibility in the performance of maintenance 
and at the same time will enhance overall plant safety by: 1. 
Performing system maintenance and restoration activities, 
including post-maintenance testing, within the existing TS LCO 
time, and allowing barrier removal and restoration to be 
performed outside of the TS LCO, providing more time for the safe 
conduct of maintenance and testing activities on the supported TS 
system; 2. Requiring barrier removal and restoration activities 
to be assessed and prioritized based on actual plant risk 
impacts; and 3. Avoiding unnecessary unscheduled plant shutdowns 
and thus minimizing plant transition and realignment risks.
 
 
[[Page 32148]] 3.0 Technical Evaluation The industry submitted 
TSTF-427, Revision 1 (Reference 1), ``Allowance for Non Technical 
Specification Barrier Degradation on Supported System 
OPERABILITY'' in support of the proposed TS change. This 
submittal documents a risk-informed analysis of the proposed TS 
change. Probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) methods are used, in 
combination with deterministic and defense-in-depth arguments, to 
identify and justify delay times for entering the actions for the 
supported equipment associated with unavailable barriers at 
nuclear power plants. The industry also submitted implementation 
guidance NEI 04-08, November 2005 (Reference 2). This submittal 
provides detailed guidance on assessing and managing risk 
associated with unavailable barriers. This is in accordance with 
guidance provided in Regulatory Guides (RGs) 1.174 (Reference 3) 
and 1.177 (Reference 4). The risk impact associated with the 
proposed delay times for entering the TS actions for the 
supported equipment can be assessed during the same approach as 
for allowed completion time (CT) extensions. Therefore, the risk 
assessment was performed following the three-tiered approach 
recommended in RG 1.177 for evaluating proposed extensions in 
currently allowed CTs: 1. The first tier involves the assessment 
of the change in plant risk due to the proposed TS change. Such 
risk change is expressed (1) by the change in the average yearly 
core damage frequency ([utri]CDF) and the average yearly large 
early release frequency ([utri]LERF) and (2) by the incremental 
conditional core damage probability (ICCDP) and the incremental 
conditional large early release probability (ICLERP). The 
assessed [utri]CDF and [utri]LERF values are compared to 
acceptance guidelines, consistent with the Commission's Safety 
Goal Policy Statement as documented in RG 1.174, so that the 
plant's average baseline risk is maintained within a minimal 
range. The assessed ICCDP and ICLERP values are compared to 
acceptance guidelines provided in RG 1.177, which aim at ensuring 
that the plant risk does not increase unacceptably during the 
period the equipment is taken out of service.
 
2. The second tier involves the identification of potentially 
high- risk configurations that could exist if equipment in 
addition to that associated with the change were to be taken out 
of service simultaneously, or other risk-significant operational 
factors such as concurrent equipment testing were also involved. 
The objective to ensure that appropriate restrictions are in 
place to avoid any potential high-risk configurations.
 
3. The third tier involves the establishment of an overall 
configuration risk management program (CRMP) to ensure that 
potentially risk-significant configurations resulting from 
maintenance and other operational activities are identified. The 
objective of the CRMP is to manage configuration-specific risk by 
appropriate scheduling of plant activities and/or appropriate 
compensatory measures.
 
A simplified risk assessment was performed to justify the 
proposed addition of LCO 3.0.9 to the TS. This approach was 
necessitated by (1) the general nature of the proposed TS change 
(i.e., it applies to all plants and is associated with an 
undetermined number of barriers that are n not able to perform 
their function), and (2) the lack of detailed modeling in most 
plant-specific PRAs which do not include passive structures as 
barriers.
 
The simplified risk assessment considers three different 
parameters: 1. The length of time the affected barrier is 
unavailable, 2. The initiating event frequency for which the 
affected barrier is designed to mitigate, and 3. The importance 
to CDF (or LERF) of the TS equipment (train, subsystem, or 
component) for which the affected barrier is designed to protect, 
measured by the risk achievement worth of the equipment.
 
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TN02JN06.011 Where: --Tc is the time the 
barrier is unavailable (hours) --Tc/8766 is therefore the 
fraction of the year during which the barrier is unavailable, 
--IEi/IET is the ratio of the initiating event frequency for 
which the affected barrier is designed to mitigate, IEi, and the 
total initiating event frequency, IET, --RAWj is the risk 
achievement worth of the component(s) for which the barrier 
provides protection, and --CDFbase is the baseline core damage 
frequency (per year).
 
ICLERP also may be similarly determined, using baseline LERF and 
RAW values with respect to LERF. It is assumed that the magnitude 
of the LERF risk resulting from the barrier unable to perform its 
related support function would be generally at least one order of 
magnitude less than the corresponding CDF risk. Containment 
bypass scenarios, which are typically the significant 
contributors to LERF, would not be uniquely affected by 
application of LCO 3.0.9, and initiating events which would be 
significant LERF contributors, such as steam generator tube 
rupture and interfacing systems LOCA, are not typically 
associated with barriers within the scope of LCO 3.0.9. 
Therefore, the assumption regarding LERF risk is reasonable and 
acceptable for the generic risk evaluation, provided that LERF 
risk impacts are considered on a plant- specific basis for 
unavailable barriers, as described in section 3.3. The relevant 
initiating events (i.e., events for which barriers subject to LCO 
3.0.9 provide protection) are: --Internal and external floods 
--High energy line breaks --Feedwater line breaks --Loss of 
coolant accident (small, medium, and large) --Tornados and high 
winds --Turbine missiles.
 
Generic frequencies for most of these initiating events were 
obtained from NUREG/CR-5750 (Reference 5). For external floods, 
turbine missiles, and tornados, other industry source documents 
were referenced. The most limiting (highest frequency) initiating 
event was obtained for a high energy line break from 
NUREG/CR-5750, with a frequency of 9.1E-3 per year. The risk 
assessment is therefore based on this limiting frequency, and the 
proposed methodology to apply LCO 3.0.9 is similarly restricted 
to barriers protecting against initiating events whose total 
frequency is no more than 9.1E-3 per year. 3.1 Risk Assessment 
Results and Insights The results and insights from the 
implementation of the three- tiered approach of RG 1.177 to 
support the
 
[[Page 32149]] proposed addition of LCO 3.0.9 to the TS are 
summarized and evaluated in the following Sections 3.1.1 to 
3.1.3. 3.1.1 Risk Impact The bounding risk assessment approach, 
described in Section 3.0, was developed for a range of plant 
baseline CDF values and for a range of protected component RAW 
values. The maximum allowable 30-day outage time was used. The 
results are summarized in Table 1. Table 1.--Risk Assessment 
Results for a Postulated 30-Day Barrier Outage 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
------- RAW                           ICCDP ICLERP 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
------- Baseline CDF = 1E-6 Per Year 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
------- 2.................................................    
7.5E-10 7.5E-11 
10................................................    6.7E-09 
6.7E-10 50................................................    
3.7E-08 3.7E-09 
100...............................................    7.4E-08 
7.4E-09 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
------- Baseline CDF = 1E-5 Per Year 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
------- 2.................................................    
7.5E-09 7.5E-10 
10................................................    6.7E-08 
6.7E-09 50................................................    
3.7E-07 3.7E-08 
100...............................................    7.4E-07 
7.4E-08 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
------- Baseline CDF = 1E-4 Per Year 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
------- 2.................................................    
7.5E-08 7.5E-09 
10................................................    6.7E-07 
6.7E-08 50................................................    
3.7E-06 3.7E-07 
100...............................................    7.4E-06 
7.4E-07 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
------- The above results represent a sensitivity analysis 
covering the expected range of plant baseline CDF values and 
component RAW values. The most limiting configurations involving 
very high risk components (RAW > 10) would not be anticipated to 
occur for most planned maintenance activities.
 
The calculations conservatively assume the most limiting (highest 
frequency) initiating event and the longest allowable outage time 
(30 days). Occurrence of the initiating event during 
unavailability of the barrier is conservatively assumed to 
directly fail the protected equipment; no credit is taken for 
event-specific circumstances which may result in the equipment 
remaining functional even with the barrier unavailable. (For 
example, a barrier required to protect equipment from steam 
impingement for high energy line breaks may only be required for 
breaks occurring in specific locations and orientations relative 
to the protected equipment, and only for large size breaks.) No 
credit is taken for avoided risk identified in Section 2.
 
The risk assessment results of Table 1 were compared to guidance 
provided in the revised Section 11 of NUMARC 93-01, Revision 2 
(Reference 6), endorsed by RG 1.182 (Reference 7), for 
implementing the requirements of paragraph (a)(4) of the 
Maintenance Rule, 10 CFR 50.65. Such guidance is summarized in 
Table 2. Guidance regarding the acceptability of conditional risk 
increase in terms of CDF for a planned configuration is provided. 
This guidance states that a specific configuration that is 
associated with a CDF higher than 1E-3 per year should not be 
entered voluntarily. The staff notes that the higher risk 
configurations documented in Table 1 would exceed this guidance, 
and would therefore not be permitted to be entered voluntarily. 
For example, with a baseline CDF of 1E-4 per year, a component 
with a RAW greater than 10 would exceed the 1E-3 per year 
criteria.
 
Therefore, the sensitivity analyses presented in Table 1 are 
understood to include higher risk configurations which would not 
be permitted under the guidance of Reference 6.
 
Table 2.--Guidance for Implementing 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
------- 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
------- [Delta]RCDF............................  Guidance. 
Greater than 1E-3/year.................  Configuration should not 
normally be entered voluntarily.
 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
------- ICCDP                     Guidance ICLERP 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
------- Greater than 1E-5.............  Configuration should    
Greater than 1E- not normally be         6.
 
entered voluntarily.
 
1E-6 to 1E-5..................  Assess non-             1E-7 to 
1E-6.
 
quantifiable factors.
 
Establish risk management actions.
 
Less than 1E-6................  Normal work controls..  Less than 
1E-7.
 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
------- Guidance regarding the acceptability of ICCDP and ICLERP 
values for a specific planned configuration and the establishment 
of risk management actions is also provided in NUMARC 93-01. This 
guidance, as shown in Table 2, states that a specific plant 
configuration that is associated with ICCDP and ICLERP values 
below 1E-6 and 1E-7, respectively, is considered to require 
``normal work controls.'' Table 1 shows that for the majority of 
barrier outage configurations the conservatively assessed ICCDP 
and ICLERP values are within the limits for what is recommended 
as the threshold for the ``normal work controls'' region.
 
As stated in the implementation guidance for LCO 3.0.9 (Reference 
2), plants are required to commit to the guidance of NUMARC 93-01 
Section 11, and therefore the above limits would be applicable.
 
Plant configurations including out of service barriers may 
therefore be entered voluntarily if supported by the results of 
the risk assessment required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4), and by LCO 
3.0.9. RG 1.177 (Ref. 4) provides guidance of 5E-7 ICDP and 5E-8 
ILERP as the limit for a TS allowed outage time. As shown in 
Table 1, the guidance is met for the typically anticipated 
configurations, unless either the baseline CDF for the plant 
approaches 1E-4 per year or the RAW of the protected components 
is well above 10. Such configurations may exceed the criteria 
described in Ref. 6 (Table 2) and would not be voluntarily 
entered. Such configurations are not expected to be frequently 
encountered, and may be addressed on a case-by-case plant- 
specific basis by limiting the allowed outage time and by 
implementing plant-specific risk management actions, as per the 
implementing guidance (Reference 2).
 
RG 1.174 (Ref. 3) provides guidance of 1E-5 per year [Delta]CDF 
and 1E-6 per year [Delta]LERF. The ICCDP calculations 
demonstrated that each individual 30-day barrier outage is 
anticiapted to be low risk. Although there is no explicit limit 
on the number of times per year that LCO 3.0.9 may be applied, 
even assuming barrier outages occurred continuously over the 
entire year, the risk incurred would still be anticipated to be 
below the limits of the guidance.
 
The staff finds that the risk assessment results support the 
proposed addition of LCO 3.0.9 to the TS. The risk increases 
associated with this TS change will be insignificant based on 
guidance
 
[[Page 32150]] provided in RGs 1.174 and 1.177 and within the 
range of risks associated with normal maintenance activities.
 
3.1.2 Identification of High-Risk Configurations The second tier 
of the three-tiered approach recommended in RG 1.177 involves the 
identification of potentially high-risk configurations that could 
exist if equipment, in addition to that associated with the TS 
change, were to be taken out of service simultaneously. Insights 
from the risk assessments, in conjunction with important 
assumptions made in the analysis and defense-in-depth 
considerations, were used to identify such configurations. To 
avoid these potentially high-risk configurations, specific 
restrictions to the implementation of the proposed TS changes 
were identified.
 
When LCO 3.0.9 is applied, at least one train or subsystem is 
required to be operable with required barriers in place, such 
that this train or subsystem would be available to provide 
mitigation of the initiating event. LCO 3.0.9 may be applied to 
multiple trains of the same system only for barriers which 
provide protection for different initiating events, such that at 
least one train or subsystem is available to provide mitigation 
of the initiating event. The use of LCO 3.0.9 for barriers which 
protect all trains or subsystems from a particular initiating 
event is not permitted. Therefore, potentially high-risk 
configurations involving a loss of function required for 
mitigation of a particular initiating event are avoided by the 
restrictions imposed on applicability of LCO 3.0.9. LCO 3.0.9 
also addresses potential emergent conditions where unplanned 
failures or discovered conditions may result in the 
unavailability of at least one train or subsystem for a 
particular initiating event. Such conditions may result during 
application of LCO 3.0.9 from equipment failure on the operable 
train, or discovery of degraded barriers. In such cases, a 
24-hour allowed time is provided to restore the conditions to 
permit continued operation with unavailable barriers, after which 
the applicability of LCO 3.0.9 ends, and the supported system LCO 
becomes effective. This allowed time is provided so that emergent 
conditions with low risk consequences may be effectively managed, 
rather than requiring immediate exit of LCO 3.0.9 and the 
potential for an unplanned plant shutdown.
 
A limit of 30 days is applied to the LCO 3.0.9 allowed outage 
time for each barrier, after which the barrier must be restored 
to an available status, or the supported system TS must be 
applied.
 
This 30- day backstop applies regardless of the risk level 
calculated, and provides assurance that installed plant barriers 
will be maintained available over long periods of time, and that 
the application of LCO 3.0.9 will not result in long term 
degradation of plant barriers. The staff finds that the 
restrictions on the applicability of LCO 3.0.9 assuring that one 
safety train remains available to mitigate the initiating event, 
along with the 30-day limit applicable to each barrier, assure 
that potentially high-risk configurations are avoided in 
accordance with the guidance provided in RGs 1.174 and 1.177. 
3.1.3 Configuration Risk Management The third tier of the 
three-tiered approach recommended in RG 1.177 involves the 
establishment of an overall configuration risk management program 
(CRMP) to ensure that potentially risk-significant configurations 
resulting from maintenance and other operational activities are 
identified. The objective of the CRMP is to manage 
configuration-specific risk by appropriate scheduling of plant 
activities and/or appropriate compensatory measures. This 
objective is met by licensee programs to comply with the 
requirements of paragraph (a)(4) of the Maintenance Rule (10 CFR 
50.65) to assess and manage risk resulting from maintenance 
activities, and by LCO 3.0.9 requiring risk assessments and 
management using (a)(4) processes if no maintenance is in 
progress. These programs can support licensee decision making 
regarding the appropriate actions to manage risk whenever a risk- 
informed TS is entered.
 
The implementation guidance for LCO 3.0.9 (Reference 2) requires 
that the risk determination for an unavailable barrier be 
performed per the ICCDP calculation as described in Section 3.1 
using the plant- specific configuration as the basis for 
determining the protected component RAW value. Further, the 
calculations are to be updated whenever emergent conditions 
occur. These requirements assure that the configuration-specific 
risk associated with unavailable barriers is assessed and managed 
prior to entry into LCO 3.0.9 and during its applicability as 
conditions change.
 
These evaluations for the unavailable barrier are performed as 
part of the assessment of plant risk required by 10 CFR 
50.65(a)(4). The numerical guidance identified in Table 2 are 
applicable to implementation of LCO 3.0.9, using the results of 
the configuration- specific risk assessment which addresses the 
risk impact of the unavailable barrier along with all other out 
of service components and plant alignments.
 
Risk management actions are required to be considered when the 
calculated risk exceeds specific thresholds per NUMARC 93-01 
Section 11, as identified in Table 2. Additional guidance on risk 
management actions are provided in the implementation guidance 
for LCO 3.0.9. The allowed outage time for a barrier is 
calculated based on an ICCDP limit of 1E-6. This is the NUMARC 
93-01 Section 11 guidance for applicability of normal work 
controls, and is conservatively lower than the guidance of 1E-5 
for voluntary maintenance activities. The use of 1E-6 will result 
in conservatively short allowed outage times for barriers 
compared to allowed times for other maintenance activities.
 
If the scope of the PRA model used to support the plant-specific 
CRMP does not include the initiating event for which a barrier 
provides protection, then LCO 3.0.9 applicability is limited to 
one barrier on a single train. Multiple barriers for such 
initiating events may not be unavailable under LCO 3.0.9, and in 
such situations the LCO(s) associated with the protected 
components would be applicable. Applicability of LCO 3.0.9 to the 
single barrier for an initiating event that is not modeled in the 
plant PRA is acceptable based on the generic risk analysis 
provided by TSTF-427, as described in Section 3.1. Assessment of 
the LERF risk impact on an unavailable barrier is required to be 
performed in accordance with NUMARC 93-01 Section 11. If an 
unavailable barrier provides protection to equipment which is 
relevant to the containment function, or which protects equipment 
from the effects of an initiating event which is a contributor to 
LERF, then the methodology requires a calculation for ICLERP 
similar to the calculations performed for ICCDP, described in 
Section 3.1, or the applicability of LCO 3.0.9 must be limited to 
that one barrier. The staff finds that the risk evaluations 
required to support the applicability of LCO 3.0.9 appropriately 
consider the risk from unavailable barriers in an integrated 
manner based on the overall plant configuration. Therefore 
potentially high-risk configurations can be identified and 
managed in accordance with the guidance provided in RGs 1.174 and 
1.177. 3.2 Summary and Conclusions The unavailability of barriers 
which protect TS required components from the effects of specific 
initiating events is typically a low risk configuration which
 
[[Page 32151]] should not require that the protected components 
be immediately declared inoperable. The current TS require that 
when such barriers are unavailable, the protected component LCO 
is immediately entered.
 
Some potential undesirable consequences of the current TS 
requirements include: 1. When maintenance activities on the 
supported TS system requires removal and restoration of barriers, 
the time available to complete maintenance and perform system 
restoration and testing is reduced by the time spent maneuvering 
the barriers within the time constraints of the supported system 
LCO; 2. Restoration of barriers following maintenance must be 
given a high priority due to time restraints of the existing 
supported system LCO, when other more risk important activities 
may have a greater risk impact and should therefore be given 
priority; and 3. Unnecessary plant shutdowns due to discovery of 
degraded barriers which may require more than the existing 
supported system LCO time to complete repairs and restoration.
 
To remove the overly restrictive requirements in the treatment of 
barriers, licensees are proposing a risk-informed TS change which 
introduces a delay time before entering the actions for the 
supported equipment when one or more barriers are found degraded 
or removed to facilitate planned maintenance activities. Such a 
delay time will provide needed flexibility in the performance of 
maintenance during power operation and at the same time will 
enhance overall plant safety by (1) performing system maintenance 
and restoration activities, including post-maintenance testing, 
within the existing TS LCO time, and allowing barrier removal and 
restoration to be performed outside of the TS LCO, providing more 
time for the safe conduct of maintenance and testing activities 
on the supported system; (2) requiring barrier removal and 
restoration activities to be assessed and prioritized based on 
actual plant risk impacts; and (3) avoiding unnecessary 
unscheduled plant shutdowns, thus minimizing plant transition and 
realignment risks.
 
The risk impact of the proposed TS changes was assessed following 
the three-tiered approach recommended in RG 1.177. A simplified 
bounding risk assessment was performed to justify the proposed TS 
changes. This bounding assessment was selected due to the lack of 
detailed plant-specific risk models for most plants which do not 
include failure modes of passive structures such as barriers.
 
The impact from the addition of the proposed LCO 3.0.9 to the TS 
on defense-in-depth was also evaluated in conjunction with the 
risk assessment results.
 
Based on this integrated evaluation, the staff concludes that the 
proposed addition of LCO 3.0.9 to the TS would lead to 
insignificant risk increases. Indeed, this conclusion is true 
without taking any credit for the removal of potential 
undesirable consequences associated with the current conservative 
treatment of barriers.
 
Consistent with the staff's approval and inherent in the 
implementation of TSTF-427, licensees interested in implementing 
LCO 3.0.9 must, as applicable, operate in accordance with the 
following stipulations: 1. The licensee must commit to the 
guidance of NUMARC 93-01, Section 11 (Reference 6) and to NEI 
04-08 (Reference 2).
 
2. Licensee procedures must be revised to ensure that the risk 
assessment and management process described in NEI 04-08 is used 
whenever a barrier is considered unavailable and the requirements 
of LCO 3.0.9 are to be applied. This must be done in accordance 
with an overall CRMP to ensure that potentially risk-significant 
configurations resulting from maintenance and other operational 
activities are identified and avoided.
 
4.0 State Consultation In accordance with the Commission's 
regulations, the [] State official was notified of the proposed 
issuance of the amendment.
 
The State official had [(1) no comments or (2) the following 
comments--with subsequent disposition by the staff].
 
5.0 Environmental Consideration The amendments change a 
requirement with respect to the installation or use of a facility 
component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR 
Part 20 and change surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has 
determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in 
the amounts and no significant change in the types of any 
effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no 
significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational 
radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a 
proposed finding that the amendments involve 
no-significant-hazards considerations, and there has been no 
public comment on the finding [FR ]. Accordingly, the amendments 
meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth 
in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9) [and (c)(10)]. Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), 
no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment 
need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the 
amendments.
 
6.0 Conclusion The Commission has concluded, on the basis of the 
considerations discussed above, that (1) there is reasonable 
assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be 
endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such 
activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's 
regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be 
inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and 
safety of the public.
 
7.0 References 1. TSTF-427, Revision 1, ``Allowance for Non 
Technical Specification Barrier Degradation on Supported System 
OPERABILITY,'' February 3, 2006.
 
2. NEI 04-08, ``Allowance for Non Technical Specification Barrier 
Degradation on Supported System OPERABILITY (TSTF-427) Industry 
Implementation Guidance'', March 2006.
 
3. Regulatory Guide 1.174, ``An Approach for Using Probabilistic 
Risk Assessment in Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-Specific 
Changes to the Licensing Basis,'' USNRC, August 1998.
 
4. Regulatory Guide 1.177, ``An Approach for Plant-Specific, 
Risk-Informed Decisionmaking: Technical Specifications,'' USNRC, 
August 1998.
 
5. ``Rates of Initiating Events at U.S. Nuclear Power Plants,'' 
NUREG/CR-5750, Idaho National Engineering and Environmental 
Laboratory, February 1999.
 
6. Nuclear Energy Institute, ``Industry Guideline for Monitoring 
the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants'', 
NUMARC 93-01, Revision 2, Section 11.
 
7. ``Assessing and Managing Risk Before Maintenance Activities at 
Nuclear Power Plants'', Regulatory Guide 1.182. Proposed 
No-Significant-Hazards-Consideration Determination Description of 
Amendment Request: A change is proposed to the standard technical 
specifications (STS)(NUREGs 1430 through 1434) and plant specific 
technical specifications (TS), to allow a delay time for entering 
a supported system technical specification (TS) when the 
inoperability is due solely to an unavailable hazard barrier, if 
risk is assessed and managed consistent with the program in place 
for complying with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4). LCO 
3.0.9 will be added to individual TS providing this allowance.
 
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), an analysis of the 
issue of no significant hazards consideration is presented below:
 
[[Page 32152]] Criterion 1--The Proposed Change Does Not Involve 
a Significant Increase in the Probability of Consequences of an 
Accident Previously Evaluated The proposed change allows a delay 
time for entering a supported system technical specification (TS) 
when the inoperability is due solely to an unavailable hazard 
barrier if risk is assessed and managed. The postulated 
initiating events which may require a functional barrier are 
limited to those with low frequencies of occurrence, and the 
overall TS system safety function would still be available for 
the majority of anticipated challenges. Therefore, the 
probability of an accident previously evaluated is not 
significantly increased, if at all. The consequences of an 
accident while relying on the allowance provided by proposed LCO 
3.0.9 are no different than the consequences of an accident while 
relying on the TS required actions in effect without the 
allowance provided by proposed LCO 3.0.9. Therefore, the 
consequences of an accident previously evaluated are not 
significantly affected by this change. The addition of a 
requirement to assess and manage the risk introduced by this 
change will further minimize possible concerns. Therefore, this 
change does not involve a significant increase in the probability 
or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
 
Criterion 2--The Proposed Change Does Not Create the Possibility 
of a New or Different Kind of Accident From Any Previously 
Evaluated The proposed change does not involve a physical 
alteration of the plant (no new or different type of equipment 
will be installed). Allowing delay times for entering supported 
system TS when inoperability is due solely to an unavailable 
hazard barrier, if risk is assessed and managed, will not 
introduce new failure modes or effects and will not, in the 
absence of other unrelated failures, lead to an accident whose 
consequences exceed the consequences of accidents previously 
evaluated. The addition of a requirement to assess and manage the 
risk introduced by this change will further minimize possible 
concerns. Thus, this change does not create the possibility of a 
new or different kind of accident from an accident previously 
evaluated.
 
Criterion 3--The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant 
Reduction in the Margin of Safety The proposed change allows a 
delay time for entering a supported system TS when the 
inoperability is due solely to an unavailable hazard barrier, if 
risk is assessed and managed. The postulated initiating events 
which may require a functional barrier are limited to those with 
low frequencies of occurrence, and the overall TS system safety 
function would still be available for the majority of anticipated 
challenges. The risk impact of the proposed TS changes was 
assessed following the three-tiered approach recommended in RG 
1.177. A bounding risk assessment was performed to justify the 
proposed TS changes. This application of LCO 3.0.9 is predicated 
upon the licensee's performance of a risk assessment and the 
management of plant risk. The net change to the margin of safety 
is insignificant. Therefore, this change does not involve a 
significant reduction in a margin of safety.
 
Based upon the reasoning presented above and the previous 
discussion of the amendment request, the requested change does 
not involve a no-significant-hazards consideration. Dated at 
Rockville, Maryland, this 26 day of May 2006.
 
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
 
Timothy J. Kobetz, Branch Chief, Technical Specifications Branch, 
Division of Inspection and Regional Support, Office of Nuclear 
Reactor Regulation.
 
For Inclusion on the Technical Specifications Web Page The 
following example of an application was prepared by the NRC staff 
to facilitate use of the consolidated line item improvement 
process (CLIIP). The model provides the expected level of detail 
and content for an application to revise technical specifications 
regarding the addition of LCO 3.0.9 on the unavailability of 
barriers using CLIIP. Licensees remain responsible for ensuring 
that their actual application fulfills their administrative 
requirements as well as nuclear regulatory commission 
regulations.
 
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Document Control Desk, 
Washington, DC 20555 SUBJECT: PLANT NAME DOCKET NO. 
50--APPLICATION FOR TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE TO ADD LCO 
3.0.9 ON THE UNAVAILABILITY OF BARRIERS USING THE CONSOLIDATED 
LINE ITEM IMPROVEMENT PROCESS Gentlemen: In accordance with the 
provisions of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 
50.90, [LICENSEE] is submitting a request for an amendment to the 
technical specifications (TS) for [PLANT NAME, UNIT NOS.]. The 
proposed amendment would modify TS requirements for unavailable 
barriers by adding LCO 3.0.9. Enclosure 1 provides a description 
of the proposed change, the requested confirmation of 
applicability, and plant-specific verifications. Enclosure 2 
provides the existing TS pages marked up to show the proposed 
change. Enclosure 3 provides revised (clean) TS pages. Enclosure 
4 provides a summary of the regulatory commitments made in this 
submittal.
 
[LICENSEE] requests approval of the proposed License Amendment by 
[DATE], with the amendment being implemented [BY DATE OR WITHIN X 
DAYS].
 
In accordance with 10 CFR 50.91, a copy of this application, with 
attachments, is being provided to the designated [STATE] 
Official.
 
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United 
States of America that I am authorized by [LICENSEE] to make this 
request and that the foregoing is true and correct. (Note that 
request may be notarized in lieu of using this oath or 
affirmation statement).
 
If you should have any questions regarding this submittal, please 
contact [NAME, TELEPHONE NUMBER] Sincerely, [Name, Title] 
Enclosures: 1. Description and Assessment 2. Proposed Technical 
Specification Changes 3. Revised Technical Specification Pages 4. 
Regulatory Commitments 5. Proposed Technical Specification Bases 
Changes. cc: NRC Project Manager NRC Regional Office NRC Resident 
Inspector State Contact Enclosure 1--Description and Assessment 
1.0 Description The proposed amendment would modify technical 
specifications (TS) requirements for unavailable barriers by 
adding LCO 3.0.9. The changes are consistent with Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) approved Industry/Technical 
Specification Task Force (TSTF) STS change TSTF-427 Revision 1. 
The availability of this TS improvement was published in the 
Federal Register on [DATE] as part of the consolidated line item 
improvement process (CLIIP).
 
2.0 Assessment 2.1 Applicability of Published Safety Evaluation 
[LICENSEE] has reviewed the safety evaluation dated [DATE] as 
part of the CLIIP. This review included a review of the NRC 
staff's evaluation, as well as the supporting information 
provided to support TSTF-427. [LICENSEE] has concluded that the 
justifications presented in the TSTF proposal and the safety 
evaluation prepared by the NRC staff are applicable to [PLANT, 
UNIT NOS.] and justify this amendment for
 
[[Page 32153]] the incorporation of the changes to the [PLANT] 
TS.
 
2.2 Optional Changes and Variations [LICENSEE] is not proposing 
any variations or deviations from the TS changes described in the 
TSTF-427 Revision 1 or the NRC staff's model safety evaluation 
dated [DATE].
 
3.0 Regulatory Analysis 3.1 No Significant Hazards Consideration 
Determination [LICENSEE] has reviewed the proposed no significant 
hazards consideration determination (NSHCD) published in the 
Federal Register as part of the CLIIP. [LICENSEE] has concluded 
that the proposed NSHCD presented in the Federal Register notice 
is applicable to [PLANT] and is hereby incorporated by reference 
to satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR 50.91(a). 3.2 Verification 
and Commitments As discussed in the notice of availability 
published in the Federal Register on [DATE] for this TS 
improvement, plant-specific verifications were performed as 
follows: 1. [LICENSEE] commits to the guidance of NUMARC 93-01 
Section 11, which provides guidance and details on the assessment 
and management of risk during maintenance.
 
2. [LICENSEE] will revise procedures to ensure that the risk 
assessment and management process described in NEI 04-08 is used 
whenever a barrier is considered unavailable and the requirement 
of LCO 3.0.9 are to be applied, in accordance with an overall 
CRMP to ensure that potentially risk-significant configurations 
resulting from maintenance and other operational activities are 
identified and avoided.
 
4.0 Environmental Evaluation [LICENSEE] has reviewed the 
environmental evaluation included in the model safety evaluation 
dated [DATE] as part of the CLIIP. [LICENSEE] has concluded that 
the staff's findings presented in that evaluation are applicable 
to [PLANT] and the evaluation is hereby incorporated by reference 
for this application.
 
Enclosure 2--Proposed Technical Specification Changes (Mark-Up) 
Enclosure 3--Proposed Technical Specification Pages Enclosure 
4--List of Regulatory Commitments The following table identifies 
those actions committed to by [LICENSEE] in this document. Any 
other statements in this submittal are provided for information 
purposes and are not considered to be regulatory commitments. 
Please direct questions regarding these commitments to [CONTACT 
NAME].
 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
------- Regulatory commitments                   Due date/event 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
------- [LICENSEE] commits to the guidance of       [Ongoing or 
implement with NUMARC 93-01, Revision 2, Section 11,       
amendment].
 
which provides guidance and details on the assessment and 
management of risk during maintenance.
 
[LICENSEE] commits to the guidance of NEI   [Implement with 
amendment, 04-08, ``Allowance for Non Technical        when 
barrier(s) are Specification Barrier Degradation on        
unavailable].
 
Supported System OPERABILITY (TSTF-427) Industry Implementation 
Guidance,'' March 2006.
 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
------- Enclosure 5--Proposed Changes to Technical Specification 
Bases Pages [FR Doc. 06-5044 Filed 6-1-06; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 
7590-01-M

 
*****************************************************************
 36 B92: Comments - Radioactivity of iron confirmed
 
2 June 2006 | Source:B92   

BELGRADE --     Experts at the Vin�a Institute have confirmed the 
radioactivity of the iron shipment confiscated yesterday.

The shipment of 40 tons of iron was stopped yesterday while 
making its way from Serbia to Macedonia. According to the 
Director of the Environmental Protection Administration, Miroslav 
Nik�evi�, not all of the iron is radioactive, only sediments 
found in the inner pipes that probably came from an industrial 
zone.

 	Nik�evi� said that the institute�s experts are currently
working on decontaminating the entire wagon, which is currently
at the railroad customs terminal in Tabanovci. 

�The pipes will be put aside; the load will be cleaned and
decontaminated. Every part of the load will be looked at
individually. If contamination remains in some areas, everything
will be cleaned according to the procedure that Vin�a already
uses for such situations.� Nik�evi� said. 

He told B92 that the companies who are transporting the iron are
responsible for running checks for radioactivity and other
possible hazards. In this case, the Belgrade Ekopreving company
should have run the checks. 

�However, all indications show that this company is obviously
not able to take care of this, and this oversight is a great
burden. Everything points to the fact that they do not take
their jobs seriously enough.� Nik�evi� said, adding that the
Environmental Protection Ministry will probably revoke the
company�s inspections licence. 

The 40 tons of iron was being transported from the Serbian
Maksiko company to the Macedonian Makstil iron exporters and is
currently being held at the Serbia-Montenegro border.	   

  Friday, 2 June 2006   

� 1995 - 2006 , B92 | Contact | About us | Impresum |
*****************************************************************
 37 PRN: California Grants License to Remove Uranium from Drinking Water 

  						
    ARVADA, Colo., June 2 /PRNewswire/ -- RMD Operations, LLC, a 
sister company to Water Remediation Technology, LLC (WRT), has 
been issued a Radioactive Materials License by the State of 
California for the storage, removal and handling of natural 
uranium from drinking water. RMD Operations is the first company 
to obtain this license in California, a requirement for systems 
removing uranium from drinking water.
    
WRT provides cost-efficient processes for the removal of radium, 
uranium and other contaminants from water in conjunction with the 
safe disposal of the treatment residuals by RMD. The license 
format is an innovative multi-site approach that will apply to 
all of WRT/RMD's water treatment operations in California. No 
chemicals are added and no liquid waste is generated, and the 
radioactive residuals will be transported to a licensed facility 
outside the state of California.
    
WRT's complete solutions represent the simplest and most 
effective processes for meeting regulatory compliance and are 
available on a cost-per- gallons-treated, long-term contract 
basis.
    
For more information, visit our website at  or call us at (303) 
424-5355. This release was issued through eReleases(TM). For more 
information, visit . SOURCE Water Remediation Technology, LLC

Copyright � 1996- PR Newswire Association LLC. All Rights 
Reserved. A company. 

*****************************************************************
 38 KLASTV.com: Las Vegas Forges Friendship With Kazakhstan

  George Knapp, Investigative Reporter
Las Vegas Forges Friendship With Kazakhstan

The legacy of the Nevada Test Site is well known to Nevadans,
but half way around the world there's another atomic test site
that irradiated residents without their knowledge. 

In Las Vegas, the ambassador from Kazakhstan joined
Congresswoman Shelley Berkley and a panel of experts Thursday to
compare notes from the Cold War testing programs and to forge a
friendship that could bring Las Vegas casinos to Central Asia. 

Atomic testing in Nevada ended many years ago, but Congresswoman
Shelley Berkley's office deals with test site related issues
every single day, either helping test site workers who've been
denied compensation for their illnesses or assisting the
downwinders exposed to fallout. 

Rep. Shelley Berkley, (D) Nevada, said, "I'm not sure our fellow
citizens fully appreciate the suffering that continues in this
country because of atomic testing at the Nevada Test Site in the
50s and 60s." 

It should be no surprise that Berkley has formed a friendship
with Kanat Saudabayev, ambassador to the U.S. From Kazakhstan,
which was the site of the U.S.S.R.'s atomic testing program.
More than 450 tests were conducted there, exposing millions of
people to radiation, causing bizarre genetic effects that are
still being seen. Unlike Americans, the Kazaks were told almost
nothing about the tests by their Soviet masters. 

Ambassador Kanat Saudabayev said, "Even though Kazakhstan wasn't
involved in nuclear testing, it was there as part of the global
rivalry between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. It's us that are left to
deal with the consequences of these tests." 

The world has done little to help the Kazakhs recover, but
they've done plenty for themselves. Even before breaking away
from the U.S.S.R., they shut down the test site. They later
dismantled a massive arsenal of nuclear weapons they inherited
and have been moving toward democracy ever since. They might be
America's staunchest ally in Asia, all the more fortunate since
their newly proven oil reserves are second only to Saudi Arabia. 

In addition to comparing notes at the atomic testing museum, the
Kazak delegation is in Las Vegas to learn about, as Rep. Shelley
Berkley explains," There are 200 casinos in Kazakhstan and one
of the reasons they are here is to speak with industry leaders
about bringing Las Vegas-style gaming to Kazakhstan. It's a
wealthy nation in a strategic area. There's a lot of money there
and nowhere to spend it. We're going to see if we can help them
acquire those resources." 

Ambassador Kanat Saudabayev, "There is no better place to learn
the experience of Las Vegas than Las Vegas. We have sold the
issue of bread, now we are looking for entertainment." 

Kazakhstan is the 9th largest country in the world, but has only
15 million citizens. It is bordered by Russia to the north and
China to the east, so it has the potential to attract millions
of tourists and gamblers. Plus, its location makes it of vital
strategic interest. 

Email investigative reporter George Knapp at   

  
All content � Copyright 2000 - 2006 WorldNow and KLAS. All
Rights Reserved.
*****************************************************************
 39 Caller.com: Nuclear-fission era relic still rests near side of Highway 37

Thursday, Jun 1

A 13- by 30-foot model of a nuclear containment vessel is seen 
near Interstate Highway 37 and Cantwell Drive. It was built by 
Prescon, which became the nation�s largest supplier of 
post-tensioning tendons for pre-stressed concrete construction.
 					   				 				 				

By Mike Baird Caller Times

June 2, 2006

While legislators and environmentalists feud over wind power
alternatives and gasoline prices sail sky high, drivers zooming
across Corpus Christi often see a relic of the nuclear-fission
era that still stands strong. 

An 11-foot-tall concrete "dinosaur," adorned with rusty
protruding wires and pipes, has been at Cantwell Drive and
Interstate Highway 37 since the dawn of nuclear power - more
than 45 years. 

 It's on a property of one-time steel fabrication company
Prescon Corp. Pre-stressed concrete, which the company's name
came from, was used beginning in the 1950s in nuclear power
plant projects from Oregon to Connecticut because of its steel
tendon innards. 

"The first few nuclear plants built had Prescon material," said
Billy Guy Braselton, grandson of the company's original owner.
The Braselton family of Corpus Christi primarily owned Prescon,
which grew from their local construction business organized in
1954. It became the nation's largest supplier of post-tensioning
tendons for pre-stressed concrete construction, a product later
adopted by the U.S. highway department for bridge construction,
Braselton said. 

The strength of Prescon's pre-stressed concrete is shown in
Corpus Christi International Airport's original 130-foot-wide
waffle ceiling, which has no supportive columns. 

The remnant 13- by 30-foot full-scale model of a nuclear
concrete containment vessel, built with the pre-stressed
concrete, has 20 chamber holes that were used in 1970 to perform
detailed studies on stress, reinforcing patterns and
tension-feasibility, said Glenn T. Johnson, the project's
civil/structural engineer. Test results assured Duke Energy,
Bechtel Corp. of San Francisco and other construction companies
to innovate the Prescon product into nuclear plants they built,
including one built south of Bay City, Johnson said. 

Prescon sold the property to Wm. B. Ewing, who has it leased to
EnviroCare Inc. A few years ago, Ewing hired a man with a
backhoe and jackhammer to bust up the structure. 

"He whacked at it about three days, then came in and said the
strength of that thing was so hard he couldn't do a thing,"
Ewing said. 

After the structure was broken into several times, Ewing thought
his best use for it would be to put a roof over it and hanging a
sign that said, "tool shed," he said. 

There's no way that dinosaur will ever be disintegrated, he
said. "And it might have kept me from being ripped off again." 

Contact Mike Baird at 886-3774  

Howard</b>newspaper. All Rights Reserved. Site users are subject
*****************************************************************
 40 [NukeNet] Court revokes radioactive storage permit (at Diablo
 
Date: Fri, 02 Jun 2006 20:41:21 -0700


<x-flowed>
NukeNet Anti-Nuclear Network (nukenet@energyjustice.net)

This story is appearing in newspapers all over the US - hooray for the
Mothers and Sierra Club.  Molly

Court revokes radioactive storage permit
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20060602/ap_on_re_us/nuclear_power_1

A federal appeals court Friday revoked a permit allowing new radioactive
waste storage structures to be built at a nuclear power plant, ruling that
federal regulators must consider the likelihood of a terrorist attack more
seriously.

A three-judge panel of the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, in the first
ruling of its kind, unanimously disagreed with the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission's 2003 finding that an attack was "remote and speculative" and
therefore unnecessary to consider.

The case involves the storage of spent fuel at the Diablo Canyon power
plant in San Luis Obispo County. A group calling itself San Luis Obispo
Mothers For Peace challenged the permit issued by the NRC.

"The whole purpose of this lawsuit, before they build a facility, they
would have to protect it, they would have to look at ways they could
protect it from a potential attack," said the nonprofit group's attorney,
Diane Curran.

The new storage facilities are needed because the current waste repository
at the Pacific Gas & Electric Co. site is filling up.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
"If sunbeams were weapons of war, we would have had solar energy centuries 
ago": Sir George Porter, quoted in The Observer, 26 August 1973

"The pioneers of a warless world are the youth that refuse military
service": Albert Einstein

"Throughout history, it has been the inaction of those who could have
acted; the indifference of those who should have known better; the silence 
of the voice of justice when it mattered most; that has made it possible 
for evil to triumph": Haile Selassie

Molly Johnson
6290 Hawk Ridge Place
San Miguel, CA  93451

__________________________________________________
Do You Yahoo!?
Tired of spam?  Yahoo! Mail has the best spam protection around
http://mail.yahoo.com

_______________________________________________________________________
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*****************************************************************
 41 reviewjournal.com: YUCCA MOUNTAIN: DOE eyes old rail plan
 
  Jun. 02, 2006

Nuclear waste would travel western path          

WASHINGTON -- Facing a $2 billion price tag to build a railroad
from eastern Nevada to Yucca Mountain, the Energy Department
wants to take a new look at shipping nuclear waste by rail
through the western part of the state to the proposed repository
site, local, federal and industry officials said. 

Department officials want to examine a path along Union Pacific
Railroad track south from Winnemucca, crossing east of Fallon,
through the Walker River Indian Reservation to Hawthorne. 

From there, a rail line would be built along an abandoned
Southern Pacific Railroad bed to a location five miles north of
Mina in Mineral County, then generally south through or near
Tonopah and Goldfield and along the western edge of the Nellis
Air Force Range to the Yucca site, according to alignments DOE
identified in the 1980s and early 1990s. 

The Energy Department placed the Mina route on the back burner
in 1991 when the Walker River Paiute Tribe served notice it
would not allow nuclear waste to be moved through its
reservation. 

But the tribe recently withdrew its long-held objections, DOE
officials said, prompting department lawyers to explore how the
route might be re-evaluated for shipping high-level radioactive
waste. 

Transportation experts said early studies indicated a rail line
209 miles from Mina to Yucca Mountain could be much less
expensive and faster to build than a 319-mile rail corridor
originating in Caliente that DOE is characterizing in an
environmental impact study. 

In the fall, DOE revised its cost estimate for a Caliente rail
line from $880 million initially to about $2 billion. 

On the Mina route, experts said DOE could take advantage of
alignments where rail once served thriving mining operations. 

Also, the DOE would need to negotiate several mountainous areas
crossing the range from Caliente, but the Mina alignment is
largely within valleys except for a challenging grade at
Railroad Pass, said Bob Halstead, a transportation consultant
for Nevada. 

"Given what we know about terrain, land use ownership and land
use conflicts, if the Walker River Paiute Tribe allows (DOE) to
transverse the reservation, then this route would certainly
appear to be less difficult than Caliente," Halstead said. 

The views of the Nevada consultant were echoed by several
nuclear industry executives who asked not to be identified so as
not to cross DOE. 

"Bottom line is (the government) could save a billion dollars,"
Halstead said. 

But nuclear waste from power plants in the East would travel
across a larger swath of Northern and western Nevada under the
Mina option. It could bring nuclear waste trains within 50 miles
of Reno and Carson City where public interest in the Yucca
Mountain project has not been as pronounced as in Las Vegas. 

"I think this will exercise people in Northern Nevada much more
than they have been," said Bob Loux, director of the Nevada
Agency for Nuclear Projects. 

Shifting focus to western Nevada also could complicate DOE
relations with officials in Lincoln County such as Caliente
Mayor Kevin Phillips who have been the department's strongest
allies in Nevada in hopes of landing a waste transfer station
and other economic opportunities. 

"I am not going to jump on that horse," Phillips said of the
prospect that DOE might turn elsewhere. "We ought to let the
process work its way out, and I will make a decision from there
on what I would do or not do." 

"Any route that would be reasonable must be investigated, so
(DOE) is going to investigate," Phillips said. 

DOE spokesman Allen Benson said the Walker River Paiutes told
DOE by letter on May 4 that they were withdrawing opposition to
studying nuclear waste transportation by rail across their
reservation. 

"We are considering the new information provided by the tribe
and are analyzing our options," Benson said. "There have been
some meetings with the tribe. We are once again in the process
of looking at it, but until we know more, there is nothing more
to say." 

The Caliente corridor "is in the mix also," Benson said. 

Industry and government officials said the DOE general counsel's
office was researching whether the Caliente environmental impact
study legally could be expanded to characterize the Mina route
too. 

One DOE official described the legal work as preliminary, and
the department could take weeks or longer before it reaches any
conclusions. 

Gary Lanthrum, the DOE's transportation director for Yucca
Mountain, was asked about the Mina route during a May 23 meeting
in Pahrump that was attended by nuclear and transportation
industry executives and officials from rural counties. 

Lanthrum said the leadership of the Walker River Paiutes changed
in December, and the tribal council subsequently withdrew its
opposition, "and so the route can now be considered," according
to notes kept by an attendee that were shared with the
Review-Journal. 

Genia Williams, who was elected chairwoman of the Walker River
Paiutes in 2005, said DOE's account "is not entirely accurate."
Williams said the tribe would comment further in writing, but a
statement was unavailable by deadline. 

Tribal officials have told DOE in meetings they want a new rail
line built through the northern part of their reservation so
that high-level explosives sent to the nearby Hawthorne Army
Ammunition Depot and possible nuclear waste shipments would
avoid the town of Schurz, according to the May 4 letter obtained
by the Review-Journal. 

The Walker River Paiutes thought that nuclear waste might be
destined to travel through the reservation one way or another. 

"We understand that if rail shipments are not allowed, nuclear
waste may still be shipped through the reservation by truck,"
according to the tribe's letter, which was signed by Williams.
"Our intent in allowing the (environmental impact study) is to
determine if shipments on the railroad would be less dangerous
than shipments by truck through Schurz." 

Adding Mina to the environmental impact statement could add
between eight months to a year to the study, which has been
delayed for months, said a transportation industry official who
asked not to be identified. 

Government officials also are said to be awaiting the outcome of
a lawsuit that Nevada filed against DOE over the Caliente
corridor. 

If the judges order DOE to make changes, that could open the way
for the Mina route to be considered, said attorneys following
the case. 	   


Copyright � Las Vegas Review-Journal, 1997 - 2006
*****************************************************************
 42 DailyBulletin.com: Aerojet site cleanup enters new phase

Article Launched: 06/02/2006 12:13:00 AM PDT  

  By Joanna Parsons, Staff Writer  

Waste material removal starts this Monday 
    
  CHINO HILLS - Karen Miller remembered when trucks carried
uncovered waste material from the Aerojet munitions site near
her home a few years ago.

"I was one of the ones who would chase down the trucks," she
said recalling how shed ask the drivers if they knew what they
were carrying.

 Now Aerojet-General Corp. is beginning the next phase of the
cleanup of its 800-acre facility on Monday. Waste materials will
be transported off-site in covered trucks, while explosives will
be detonated in a chamber that is sound-proof and
environmentally friendly.

 That doesnt ease residents nearby, however, who expressed
concerns that cleanup may not remove all hazardous material at
the site or in the soil. Miller indicated that the cleanup being
done now, even though its been going on several years, may not
be enough to remove all material that may have seeped into the
ground.

 "In 15 years, Im still picking up building materials from the
home I built," Miller said about her home. It sits on Medlar
Lane, its backyard facing the Aerojet facility on a hilltop
nearby. 

The facility sits at the end of Woodview Road in the hills
overlooking the city. Aerojet tested and manufactured organic
chemical explosives and munitions there from 1954 to 1995, until
it ceased operations. The company has been cleaning up the site
since 1999 under the supervision of the California Department of
Toxic Substances. 

Tim Murphy, public affairs director for Aerojets parent
company, GenCorp, said ongoing cleaning projects include
removing solid waste and soil with chemical residue. The company
has also removed depleted uranium bullets, which were used to
penetrate military bunkers and tank armor.

 The Department of Toxic Substances will determine if the site
is environmentally safe when cleanup is completed. 

"Were shooting for the highest level of cleanup," Murphy said,
adding that cleanup is taking longer then they had hoped. "We
want to achieve site cleanup that is thoroughly and properly
done."

 Nevertheless, neighbors like Miller worry there may be
long-term environmental and health-related effects on residents
as a result of munitions and weapons testing on the site in
previous years. 

In fact, families in the surrounding community filed a lawsuit
against Aerojet in 2001 for violation of state law and
environmental regulations. The suit alleged that the company
illegally mixed hazardous waste and then burned and detonated
the toxic mixture from 1989 to the late 1990s. 

The suit said such procedures resulted in the release of
dangerous gases in the community and was ultimately the cause of
several children contracting a rare form of cancer in the
nervous system. 

The parties involved in the class-action suit settled with the
company in 2005. 

Murphy said the explosives will be detonated in a sound-proof
chamber equipped with a filter to keep back any dangerous
pollutants released upon explosion. 

The trucks that are transporting other waste material will be
decontaminated and covered. Material will be taken to a licensed
facility in Kettleman City, Murphy said.

 There will also be removal of contaminated soil, along with the
testing and retesting of soil in the area.

 The detonation and transportation will begin Monday and
continue into September between 8 a.m. and 5 p.m. on weekdays.   
                  
Los Angeles Newspaper Group 
*****************************************************************
 43 Pasadena Star-News: Clean water funds sought

Article Launched: 06/02/2006 12:00:00 AM PDT  

Basin cleanup debt increases
 			 			 			 			 			 			 
  By Shirley Hsu Staff Writer  

Water quality authorities and federal officials on Thursday
called on the state to pick up more of the tab for cleaning
local groundwater, an effort estimated to cost nearly $1 billion
over the next 30 years. 

Perchlorate contamination and a $400 million gap in funding to
clean up pollution were the main concerns cited at a forum on
San Gabriel Valley groundwater pollution. The event was
sponsored by Rep. Hilda Solis, D-El Monte, at Cal State Los
Angeles. 

"We have been overlooked time after time" when trying to get
groundwater cleanup on a state bond, said Grace Burgess,
executive director of the San Gabriel Basin Water Quality
Authority. "The feds have done their part. Where is the state in
all of this?" 

The San Gabriel Basin is the primary source of water for 1
million Valley residents. Volatile organic compounds were
discovered in San Gabriel Valley water in 1979, and perchlorate
was discovered in 1997. 

The Valley's six contamination sites, under Baldwin Park, South
El Monte, El Monte, La Puente, Whittier Narrows and Alhambra,
have been polluted with various chemicals including volatile
organic compounds and perchlorate. The EPA is investigating
perchlorate contamination in an area under Alhambra. 

The companies responsible for the pollution have funded the bulk 
of clean-up costs thus far, contributing 81.1 percent, while 
federal funds account for 13.4 percent and local sources 
(including water companies) another 4 percent. The state has 
contributed 1.5 percent to date, according to the Water Quality 
Authority, which projected a funding shortage of $418 million 
over the next three decades. The WQA oversees cleanup efforts in 
the San Gabriel Valley. 

San Gabriel Valley Water Co. president Michael Whitehead said if
the problem is ignored, the burden of paying for cleanup would
fall on rate-payers. 

"The funding gap is going to create a potential crisis in this
Valley," Whitehead said. "We need for the state to participate
in cleaning this basin." 

Cleanup of the basin would increase storage capacity for dry
years and reduce dependence on imported water from the Colorado
River, Whitehead said. 

shirley.hsu@sgvn.com

(626) 962-8811, Ext. 2306   
                  
Los Angeles Newspaper Group     Feedback   
*****************************************************************
 44 Guardian Unlimited: Study Wants Nuclear Weapons Outlawed
 
From the Associated Press        

[UP] 

Thursday June 1, 2006 10:45 PM

AP Photo XUN108 

By EDITH M. LEDERER 

Associated Press Writer 

UNITED NATIONS (AP) - A study led by former U.N. chief weapons
inspector Hans Blix called Thursday for outlawing nuclear
weapons and reviving global cooperation on disarmament including
security guarantees to curb the nuclear programs in Iran and
North Korea. 

As long as any nuclear, chemical and biological arms remain in
any country's arsenal, ``there is a high risk that they will one
day be used by design or accident,'' the two-year probe by the
independent Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission concluded. 

Despite the end of the Cold War the stocks of such weapons
remain ``extraordinarily high'' including 27,000 nuclear
weapons, about 12,000 of them still actively deployed, the
commission said, making 60 recommendations to free the world
from nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. 

At a news conference launching the 227-page report entitled
``Weapons of Terror,'' Blix stressed that ``the first line of
defense against the spread of nuclear weapons is indeed to make
states feel that they don't need them'' - which must be rooted
in foreign policy not military action. 

Blix said all countries in the Middle East support a zone free
of weapons of mass destruction, including Israel. He estimated
Israel has 200 nuclear weapons, though it has never acknowledged
it is a nuclear power. 

But he said ``we are going to have to come much further in the
area of a settlement of the Middle East before this can be a
possibility.'' 

As an interim measure, he urged states in the Middle East to
follow the example of North Korea and South Korea, which don't
have either enrichment or reprocessing. 

``We are seeking a commitment from Iran that they should not do
any enrichment, but what about widening it, as you do in the
Korean peninsula - have a zone, an area, in which all the
countries commit themselves not to ... enrich uranium and not to
produce plutonium?'' Blix asked. 

This would mean that both Iran and Israel would make a
commitment not to enrich uranium or produce plutonium, the key
ingredient for nuclear weapons, for a prolonged period, he said. 

Blix said countries that make a commitment to nonproliferation
should be given assurances ``that if they do away with these
weapons they will not be attacked by nuclear weapons by anyone -
and we think that is important.'' 

As a party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the report
said, Iran has a right ``to participate in all stages of
fuel-cycle activity'' in a peaceful civilian nuclear energy
program. ``Trying to reinterpret the NPT and assert a new
division of the world into `nuclear fuel-cycle-haves' and
`have-nots' would hardly get broad support,'' it said. 

``Nevertheless,'' the commission said, ``a right to do something
does not necessarily mean that this right must be exercised.'' 

He also urged those negotiating with Iran to look at the issue
through their eyes. 

``They see 130,000 American soldiers in Iraq, and they see
American bases in Pakistan and Afghanistan,'' Blix said. ``They
remember that (Mohammed) Mossadeq, who was elected premier, was
ousted with subversive methods from the outside'' in the 1950s. 

In the broader effort to free the world of weapons of mass
destruction, the commission said the single most important thing
that countries can do is to ratify the nuclear test ban treaty,
which the U.S. Senate has rejected. 

``We don't see any sign of that here in the current
administration, and the U.S. is opposed to a ratification but
the reality is probably that if the U.S. were to ratify then
China would, if China did then India would, if India did
Pakistan would, if Pakistan did then Iran would. So it would set
in motion a good domino effect,'' Blix said. 	 
		 	 	   

      Guardian Unlimited � Guardian Newspapers Limited 2006
*****************************************************************
 45 Seattle Times: DOE fights in court to add to Hanford's waste 

Opinion: Editorial views from across the state
 
Friday, June 2, 2006 - Page updated at 12:00 AM 	
     	 	
Washington Voices 		


The federal government continues to insist that it has the
authority to turn the Hanford nuclear reservation into a toxic
waste dump, and it's spending considerable amounts of time and
money to establish that authority. 

The U.S. Department of Energy first argued its case
unsuccessfully more than a year ago before U.S. District Court
Judge Alan McDonald, who barred the shipment of low-level
radioactive waste to Hanford unless it meets strict storage
requirements set by the state. Last week, DOE attorneys were
back in McDonald's Yakima court, seeking to overturn a
voter-approved initiative that prohibits shipment of any
radioactive waste to Hanford until all existing waste has been
cleaned up. McDonald said he expects to issue his ruling within
three weeks. However he decides this case, the government's
ongoing effort to assert a federal right to bring more
radioactive waste to Hanford sends a discouraging message about
its intentions with regard to cleaning up the site. 

Already, too many tax dollars have been wasted in litigation 
dollars that ought to have been applied to the cleanup. Indeed,
even as the government mounted its legal effort to repeal the
state initiative, it was reducing the current fiscal year's
cleanup budget. Moreover, the White House budget plan for the
budget year that begins Oct. 1 reduces funding for tank-waste
removal by some $52 million. 

The federal government, in fact, has given Washingtonians ample
reason to suspect its commitment to cleaning up Hanford  reason
enough for 69 percent of state voters to approve the 2004
initiative barring shipment of additional waste to the
south-central Washington site until all existing waste had been
eliminated. 

Time and again, the government has failed to live up to the
Tri-Party Agreement signed in 1989 by the DOE, federal
Environmental Protection Agency and the state of Washington.
It's missed one cleanup deadline after another, setting the
project back years. 

The years of delay, mismanagement and budget reductions are hard
to excuse. Hanford is the most contaminated nuclear site in the
nation. The 586-square-mile reservation contains roughly
two-thirds of the country's high-level nuclear waste. 

Before Judge McDonald halted the shipment of low-level
radioactive waste to the site, the government had dumped about
37,000 drums and 1,200 boxes of contaminated clothing, equipment
and rags at Hanford. With the cleanup already years behind
schedule, it's almost inconceivable that the government would be
in court seeking to add to this toxic waste. 

 The Daily News (Longview), May 30 	 		 		
Copyright � 2006 The Seattle Times Company 	 	 		 		
*****************************************************************
 46 lamonitor.com: IG questions warhead schedule 

The Online News Source for Los Alamos
 

ROGER SNODGRASS, roger@lamonitor.com, Monitor Assistant Editor

A new report from the Energy Department's Inspector General has
found delays, cost increases and management shortcomings related
to extending the life of the W76 nuclear warhead. 
Seven nuclear weapons facilities, including Los Alamos and
Sandia national laboratories in New Mexico, are engaged in the
project to refurbish the warhead under a stockpile stewardship
activity known as life extension.

LANL and Y-12 National Security Complex both encountered delays
in testing activities, the report said, that had reduced the
scope of the current project for revitalizing the W76, used with
submarine-launched Trident missiles. 

At LANL, the IG reported from two years ago, a number of
component tests, including six hydrotests and nine
intermediate-scale tests were scheduled for completion in
advance of a Final Design Review. Two of these hydrotests were
not completed; one was cancelled and the other was conducted in
June 2005, but a month after the Final Design Review in May 2005.

The hydrotest was conducted at LANL's Dual Axis Radiographic
Hydrodynamic Test Facility (DARHT), a flash X-ray device that
provides high-resolution X-ray images of imploding mock-ups of
weapons components. 
A spokesman for LANL said this morning the lab is confident the
deadline for delivering the first W76 production unit will be
met by the deadline of Sept. 30, 2007.

"We believe that the necessary project controls for the W76
program are in place and that the program is healthy," said
Kevin Roark in the LANL communications office this morning. 
In reply to the Inspector General's audit, the National Nuclear
Security Administration wrote that the nuclear weapons
management agency "believes that the appropriate management
tools and management focus are in place to ensure successful
execution of the W76 refurbishment."

The response continued, "Although there have been some schedule
delays - many of them, as noted by the IG, out of the program's
control, we believe there will be no significant impact on
full-scale production."

The issue of schedule delays is addressed in the audit.

"Some delays and deviations occurred due to circumstances
outside NNSA's control," the IG acknowledged, but added that
those circumstances have already been discounted from the report.

"Rather, this report addresses delays and scope deviations that
were, in our judgment, directly related to weaknesses in project
management," wrote the auditors.

The audit also describes an inability of three out of four sites
to reconcile the costs reported to Congress or explain variances
ranging from $200,000 to $2 million. The report criticizes
inadequate documentation and coordination of changes in the
plans.

The audit found an increase in the total cost, as of December
2004, through FY 2022 of $639 million or 28 percent of the
estimated project cost, but noted that only $84 million of that
amount is formally documented.

"According to an NNSA official," the authors reported,
"efficient verbal communications made change control process
documentation less necessary."

Greg Mello of the Los Alamos Study Group pointed out that NNSA's
response included a total cost estimate as of FY 2007 of $2.649
billion, which amounts to a five-year cost increase of 42
percent over the initial projection of $1.86 billion.

The audit is published at a time when nuclear weapons managers
and Congress are questioning the sustainability of the current
system of stockpiling nuclear weapons. Some officials are
proposing instead an alternative system, designed around a
Reliable Replacement Warhead, that is supposed to be longer
lasting and easier and less expensive to maintain.

The idea of stockpile stewardship, that grew out of the U.S.
moratorium on nuclear testing, was to maintain a sufficient
number of nuclear weapons that could be used over a longer
lifetime without returning to nuclear testing.

Printed 6/1/06   


  � 2003 Los Alamos Monitor All Rights Reserved.   
*****************************************************************
 47 lamonitor.com: Lab marks 'a new day' 

The Online News Source for Los Alamos
 
Monitor Staff Report

Los Alamos National Laboratory inaugurated a new era of
management under Los Alamos National Security, LLC (LANS) today,
the first time in the lab's 63-year history that its operations
have not been exclusively managed by the University of
California. 

The new management group includes the University of California,
now in partnership with Bechtel National, the University of
California, BWX Technologies and Washington Group International.

"Building upon LANL's rich history and the accomplishments of
its people, we now look toward an even brighter future," said
incoming Laboratory Director Michael Anastasio in an
announcement this morning. 

"With our highly skilled team of nuclear experts and industry
leaders, we'll put top science and scholarship together with
leadership, innovation and best business practices and a clear
goal: Make Los Alamos the premier national security science
laboratory for the 21st century."

LANS was chosen on Dec. 21, 2005, after a competitive bidding
process by the National Nuclear Security Administration, to
assume the laboratory's management contract. 
The new contract runs from today through Sept. 30, 2013. It may
be renewed for up to 20 years, and includes a Maximum Available
Performance Incentive Fee from the government of between $60
million and $73 million per year.

Printed 6/1/06 
  
  � 2003 Los Alamos Monitor All Rights Reserved.   
*****************************************************************
 48 Knox News: Report: Tests at Y-12 plant delay project

                                                                        
Inspector general urges changes in warhead refurbishment plans

By FRANK MUNGER, munger@knews.com 
                                
June 2, 2006

OAK RIDGE - A federal audit released this week criticized 
preparations to refurbish W-76 nuclear warheads - deployed on 
Trident II missile systems - and said test delays and other 
issues could jeopardize the production schedule. 

The Y-12 National Security Complex is among six government plants 
working on the "life-extension" project. The report attributes at 
least one of the project's many delays to testing at the Oak 
Ridge plant, which manufactures warhead parts from uranium and 
other materials. 
 				     				     			 				
"Based on the audit work performed, we concluded that (the 
National Nuclear Security Administration, a part of the U.S. 
Department of Energy) is at risk of not achieving the first 
production unit for the W-76 refurbishment within the established 
scope, schedule and cost parameters," the May 25 report by DOE's 
inspector general said. 

The first production unit is supposed to be completed by Sept. 
30, 2007. The overall program cost at that point is projected to 
be $916 million. 

Failure to do the initial work as planned could affect future 
production schedules, inflate costs and have a future impact on 
national-security goals and objectives, the IG audit report said. 

Similar problems have been identified previously with 
refurbishment work on other weapon systems, including the B-61 
bomb and the W-80 nuclear warhead, the report said. 

DOE's inspector general recommended a number of changes to
strengthen the project management and control costs. The report
said managers in the weapons program agreed with recommendations
but did not believe that the W-76 production schedule was in
jeopardy. 

Steven Wyatt, a federal spokesman at Y-12, declined comment on
the report. 

Senior writer Frank Munger may be reached at 865-342-6329.

� 2006 - Knoxville News Sentinel
    
*****************************************************************

NOTE: In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. section 107 this 
material is distributed without profit or payment to those who 
have expressed a prior interest in receiving this information for 
non-profit research and educational purposes only. For more 
information go to: 
<http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml> 
    
*****************************************************************