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NUCLEAR POLICY
1 USATODAY.com: Book: CIA ignored info Iraq had no WMD
2 Guardian Unlimited: Iran Plans to Resume Nuclear Research
3 Guardian Unlimited: Secret services say Iran is trying to assemble a
4 AFP: Iran to resume suspended nuclear fuel research
5 AFP: Russian officials to visit Iran over nuclear offer
6 AFP: US urges Iran to 'come clean', cooperate with nuclear inspector
7 AFP: Iran to resume suspended nuclear research
8 Guardian Unlimited: Iran Decides to Resume Nuclear Research
9 Guardian Unlimited: White House Won't Undo N. Korea Sanctions
10 AFP: NKorea reaffirms no six-way talks under US sanctions
11 Guardian Unlimited: N. Korea Says Sanctions Tabling Nuke Talks
12 US: Platts: 2006 seen as important year for fuel market
13 HoweStreet.com: The Potential Emerging Energy Crunch Part II
14 [NukeNet] Russian gas row reignites nuclear debate
15 Guardian Unlimited: Russia steps back from brink with Ukraine and
16 Guardian Unlimited: No threat to UK gas supply, says No 10
17 Times of India: Pakistan to buy 6 nuclear reactors from China-
18 BBC ON THIS DAY | 3 | 1993: US and Russia halve nuclear warheads
19 Herald: Scotland, the powerhouse of Europe
20 Xinhua: Power shortage to be eased
21 CNN.com: Europe press slams Putin in 'gas war' -
22 Telegraph: OP: Russian/Ukraine gas fight
23 BusinessWeek: This Gas Dispute Could Burn Russia
NUCLEAR REACTORS
24 Times of India: Pak nuclear shopping spree in response to US-India d
25 US: Concord Monitor: A busy year ahead for nuclear plant
26 US: Cincinnati Enquirer: Good arguments for nuclear power
27 US: El Paso Times: City will use utility's savings
28 US: News-Leader.com: Callaway plant may expand in future
29 AFP: Anti-nuclear activists block Austrian-Czech border - report -
30 US: NRC: Notice of Availability of Environmental Assessment and Find
31 US: NRC: Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, LLC and Entergy Nuclear
32 Prague Daily Monitor: Temelin to shut down second unit on Tuesday -
33 Asian Tribune: Pak denies reports of acquiring nuclear reactors from
34 UK: News & Star: Project: Nuclear decommissioning Cost: £30 billion
35 US: NRC: NRC, FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co. Managers to Discuss
NUCLEAR SECURITY
36 US: Guardian Unlimited: Homeland Security to Re-Prioritize Grants
NUCLEAR SAFETY
37 [du-list] USUK bombing up to 150 air attacks for December
38 US: [du-list] Self Described Exposures That Have Occured in Op
39 [du-list] Mururoa: Results of nuclear tests probe due soon
40 [du-list] DU victims (and others) may protest by resigning all
41 After "Dirty Bomb" Residents Might Be Allowed Back In Spite Of 25%
42 US: Coastal Post: Depleted Uranium: Dirty Bombs, Dirty Missiles, Dir
43 US: Coastal Post: Depleted Uranium Testing For Returning US Servicem
44 US: SF Chronicle: Government Has 'Dirty Bomb' Cleanup Guide
45 US: Homeland Security: Radiological protection guidelines (175K)
46 US: Morris Daily Herald: Tritium evident in well
47 US: Colorado Daily News: Glowing in the wind
NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE
48 US: Platts: Waste determination approach proposed by DOE can meet cr
49 US: NRC: Expanded Definition of Byproduct Material (NARM Rulemaking)
50 Yucca Mt News: Vol. 3, No. 5
51 US: NRC: NRC Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste to Meet in Rockvill
52 UPI: Nuclear power station cleanup cost soars
53 Pahrump Valley Times: YUCCA MOUNTAIN: BLM withdraws rail study land
PEACE
US DEPT. OF ENERGY
54 Cincinnati Enquirer: Fernald's cleanup on track
55 Crain's Chicago Business: Contract to run Argonne Lab put out for co
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FULL NEWS STORIES
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1 USATODAY.com: Book: CIA ignored info Iraq had no WMD
Posted 1/3/2006 8:32 AM
WASHINGTON (AP) — A new book on the government's secret
anti-terrorism operations describes how the CIA recruited an
Iraqi-American anesthesiologist in 2002 to obtain information
from her brother, who was a figure in Saddam Hussein's nuclear
program.
Dr. Sawsan Alhaddad of Cleveland made the dangerous trip to Iraq
on the CIA's behalf. The book said her brother was stunned by
her questions about the nuclear program because he said it
had been dead for a decade.
New York Times reporter James Risen uses the anecdote to
illustrate how the CIA ignored information that Iraq no longer
had weapons of mass destruction. His book, State of War: The
Secret History of the CIA and the Bush Administration describes
secret operations of the Bush administration's war on terrorism.
The major revelation in the book has already been the subject of
extensive reporting by Risen's newspaper: the National Security
Agency's eavesdropping of Americans' conversations without
obtaining warrants from a special court.
The book said Dr. Alhaddad flew home in mid-September 2002 and
had a series of meetings with CIA analysts. She relayed her
brother's information that there was no nuclear program.
A CIA operative later told Dr. Alhaddad's husband that the
agency believed her brother was lying. In all, the book says,
some 30 family members of Iraqis made trips to their native
country to contact Iraqi weapons scientists, and all of them
reported that the programs had been abandoned.
In October 2002, a month after the doctor's trip to Baghdad, the
U.S intelligence community issued a National Intelligence
Estimate that concluded Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear
program.
In the book, which quotes extensively from anonymous sources,
Risen said the NSA spying program was launched in 2002 after the
CIA began to capture high-ranking al-Qaeda operatives overseas,
and took their computers, cellphones and personal phone
directories.
The CIA turned the telephone numbers and e-mail addresses from
the material over to the NSA, which then began monitoring the
phone numbers in addition to anyone in contact with the
telephone subscribers, the book said, saying this led to an
expansion of the monitoring, both overseas and in the United
States.
The book said the NSA does not need approval from the White
House, the Justice Department or anyone else in the Bush
administration before it begins eavesdropping on a specific
phone line in the United States.
In another chapter on a "rogue operation," the book said a CIA
officer mistakenly sent one of its Iranian agents information
that could be used to identify virtually every spy the agency
had in Iran. The book said the Iranian was a double agent who
turned over the data to Iranian security officials.
The book said the information severely damaged the CIA's Iranian
network, and quoted CIA sources as saying several of the U.S.
agents were arrested and jailed.
Copyright 2005 The Associated Press. All rights reserved.
© Copyright 2006 USA TODAY, a division of Gannett Co. Inc.
*****************************************************************
2 Guardian Unlimited: Iran Plans to Resume Nuclear Research
From the Associated Press
[UP]
Wednesday January 4, 2006 1:32 AM
AP Photo VAH102
By ALI AKBAR DAREINI
Associated Press Writer
TEHRAN, Iran (AP) - Iran told the U.N. nuclear watchdog agency
Tuesday it planned to resume nuclear fuel research after a
2-year hiatus, issuing a fresh challenge to Western nations
concerned that Tehran is trying to build an atomic weapon.
International Atomic Energy Agency head Mohamed Elbaradei said
it was important that Tehran ``maintains its suspension of all
enrichment-related activity'' as a way of reducing international
suspicions about its nuclear plans.
Mohammad Saeedi, deputy head of the Atomic Energy Organization
of Iran, said research would ``resume in cooperation and
coordination with the IAEA in the next few days,'' adding that
it would ``have little to do with the production of nuclear
fuel.''
Beyond that, he would not specify what type of research Tehran
planned but claimed its nuclear program had suffered
significantly during the research suspension. He said Iran could
no longer keep its research scientists in limbo.
Iran has said it remains determined, at some point, to resume
uranium enrichment, a process that can produce fuel for nuclear
weapons.
Hard-line President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, meanwhile, told
lawmakers Tuesday that he had abandoned a previous policy of
trying to mollify the West because it had proved fruitless, the
official Islamic Republic News Agency reported.
The Tuesday announcement, while vague, as certain to raise
further concerns in the United States and among its European
allies who believe Iran wants to build a nuclear arsenal. Tehran
says its nuclear program is for electricity generation.
ElBaradei also called on Iran to ``build confidence and enable
the resumption of dialogue with all concerned parties.''
The Iranian mission to the IAEA said Tehran has decided to
resume from Feb. 9 research and development ``on the peaceful
nuclear energy program which has been suspended,'' ElBaradei
told the agency's board.
The United States later warned Iran against pursuing new nuclear
research. ``We strongly oppose Iran proceeding with any further
enrichment-related activities,'' State Department spokesman Sean
McCormack said. ``Our view is that if Iran takes any further
enrichment-related steps, the international community will have
to consider additional measures to constrain Iran's nuclear
ambitions.''
A European diplomat accredited to the agency said it was too
early to evaluate whether it would scuttle talks planned for
later this month.
The EU has previously said that any decision by Iran to resume
work on its uranium enrichment program would be ``the red line''
that would end European attempts to negotiate differences with
Iran.
Furthermore, the EU has said a resumption of work on the program
would revive attempts to take Iran to the U.N. Security Council
for violating the nuclear nonproliferation treaty.
But the diplomat, who demanded anonymity because he was not
authorized to publicly discuss European Union strategy, said the
Europeans needed details of precisely what Iran planned to
research before making a decision on future talks.
Iran has come under heavy international pressure from the IAEA
and the West to abandon its program to produce fuel for its
Russian-built nuclear reactor that is due to come online this
year and for its future nuclear power plants.
Iran has vowed it will never give up the right to produce
nuclear fuel, which it says is guaranteed by the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty.
While refusing to permanently renounce uranium enrichment, Iran
suspended many aspects of its nuclear fuel program in 2003 as a
goodwill gesture during negotiations with the big three European
powers, Britain, France and Germany.
The talks collapsed in August after Iran resumed uranium
reprocessing activities, a step before enrichment, at its
Uranium Conversion Facility in Isfahan, central Iran.
While the two sides resumed dialogue last month, talks have so
far failed to resolve the dispute. More talks are scheduled for
later this month.
Iran's decision to resume nuclear research coincided with the
announcement by Asefi that Iran would reject a U.S. and
European-backed Russian proposal to end the dispute if it
required Tehran to cede the right to enrich uranium at home.
``The Russian proposal is ambiguous. We have to talk to the
Russians to see what are the details,'' Asefi told reporters.
``If it means enrichment be carried out (only) in Russia, we
have said it is not acceptable. But if it is a complementary
plan, we will study it,'' Asefi said.
Extremists within the increasingly hard-line Iranian government
have denounced the Russian proposal as a ``dirty trick.''
---
Associated Press correspondent George Jahn contributed to this
report from Vienna.
Guardian Unlimited © Guardian Newspapers Limited 2006
*****************************************************************
3 Guardian Unlimited: Secret services say Iran is trying to assemble a nuclear missile
Document seen by Guardian details web of front companies and
middlemen
Ian Cobain and Ian Traynor
Wednesday January 4, 2006
The Guardian
The Iranian government has been successfully scouring Europe for
the sophisticated equipment needed to develop a nuclear bomb,
according to the latest western intelligence assessment of the
country's weapons programmes.
Scientists in Tehran are also shopping for parts for a ballistic
missile capable of reaching Europe, with "import requests and
acquisitions ... registered almost daily", the report seen by
the Guardian concludes.
The warning came as Iran raised the stakes in its dispute with
the United States and the European Union yesterday by notifying
the International Atomic Energy Authority that it intended to
resume nuclear fuel research next week. Tehran has refused to
rule out a return to attempts at uranium enrichment, the key to
the development of a nuclear weapon.
The 55-page intelligence assessment, dated July 1 2005, draws
upon material gathered by British, French, German and Belgian
agencies, and has been used to brief European government
ministers and to warn leading industrialists of the need for
vigilance when exporting equipment or expertise to so-called
rogue states.
It concludes that Syria and Pakistan have also been buying
technology and chemicals needed to develop rocket programmes and
to enrich uranium. It outlines the role played by Russia in the
escalating Middle East arms build-up, and examines the part that
dozens of Chinese front companies have played in North Korea's
nuclear weapons programme.
But it is the detailed assessment of Iran's nuclear purchasing
programme that will most most alarm western leaders, who have
long refused to believe Tehran's insistence that it is not
interested in developing nuclear weapons and is trying only to
develop nuclear power for electricity. Governments in the west
and elsewhere have also been dismayed by recent pronouncements
from the Iranian president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who has said
that Holocaust denial is a "scientific debate" and that Israel
should be "wiped off the map".
The leak of the intelligence report may signal a growing
frustration at Iran's refusal to bow to western demands that it
abandon its programme to produce fuel for a Russian-built
nuclear reactor due to come on stream this year.
The assessment declares that Iran has developed an extensive web
of front companies, official bodies, academic institutes and
middlemen dedicated to obtaining - in western Europe and in the
former Soviet Union - the expertise, training, and equipment for
nuclear programmes, missile development, and biological and
chemical weapons arsenals.
"In addition to sensitive goods, Iran continues intensively to
seek the technology and know-how for military applications of
all kinds," it says.
The document lists scores of Iranian companies and institutions
involved in the arms race. It also details Tehran's growing
determination to perfect a ballistic missile capable of
delivering warheads far beyond its borders.
It notes that Iran harbours ambitions of developing a space
programme, but is currently concentrating on upgrading and
extending the range of its Shahab-3 missile, which has a range
of 750 miles - capable of reaching Israel.
Iranian scientists are said to be building wind tunnels to
assist in missile design, developing navigation technology, and
acquiring metering and calibration technology, motion simulators
and x-ray machines designed to examine rocket parts. The next
generation of the Shahab ("shooting star" in Persian) should be
capable of reaching Austria and Italy.
Useful links
Control Arms campaign site
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Federation of American Scientists
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
saferworld.org.uk
Wisconsin Project
Foreign Policy magazine
[UP]
Guardian Unlimited © Guardian Newspapers Limited 2006
*****************************************************************
4 AFP: Iran to resume suspended nuclear fuel research
Tue Jan 3, 6:43 AM ET
TEHRAN (AFP) - Iran" /> Iranwill resume nuclear fuel research
activities in the next days after a suspension of over two
years, the deputy head of its atomic energy agency said.
"In a letter, the IAEA ( International Atomic Energy Agency" />
International Atomic Energy Agency) has been informed that Iran
will start research on the technology of nuclear fuel in a few
days, with the cooperation and coordination of the agency,"
Mohammad Saidi told state television on Tuesday.
Saidi did not specify exactly what the research concerned, but
said that the Islamic republic had "voluntarily" suspended such
activities during the past two-and-a-half-years.
However he made clear that the decision was not linked to the
production of nuclear fuel. Iran has maintained a suspension on
its uranium enrichment operations since October 2003.
"This issue... has nothing to do with production of nuclear
fuel. These two are separate things from one another. No
decision has been made about nuclear fuel production."
Copyright © 2006 Agence France Presse. All rights reserved. The
*****************************************************************
5 AFP: Russian officials to visit Iran over nuclear offer
Tue Jan 3, 5:37 AM ET
TEHRAN (AFP) - Iran" /> said a high-level Russian delegation
would visit Tehran this week to discuss Moscow's compromise
proposal on the Islamic republic's nuclear programme.
"A Russian delegation led by Deputy Foreign Minister (Sergei)
Kisliak, is due to come on January 7 to discuss the Russian
proposal," said foreign ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi on
Tuesday.
In a bid to break deadlock in negotiations, Moscow has suggested
allowing Iran to conduct uranium enrichment in Russia, giving it
access to the nuclear fuel cycle while guaranteeing its nuclear
program is for peaceful purposes only.
However Asefi reaffirmed Iran would not consider the offer
unless it acknowledges the country's right to conduct uranium
enrichment operations in Iran, a key sticking point in talks
with the European Union" /> .
"It's not a structured proposal it is still an idea, we have to
discuss it. There are ambiguities but if it says that enrichment
can only happen in Russia it's not acceptable, but if it's a
parallel and complementary plan we will consider that."
Copyright © 2006 Agence France Presse. All rights reserved. The
*****************************************************************
6 AFP: US urges Iran to 'come clean', cooperate with nuclear inspectors
Tue Jan 3, 2:19 PM ET
WASHINGTON (AFP) - Iran" /> Iranmust abide by international
agreements and "come clean" with the International Atomic Energy
Agency" /> International Atomic Energy Agency(IAEA) as well as
giving its full cooperation to the UN agency's nuclear
inspectors, the White House said.
White House spokesman Scott McClellan made the plea after the
Vienna-based IAEA said earlier Tuesday it had received a letter
from Tehran saying it would resume nuclear fuel research next
week.
Iran says it wants to develop a peaceful nuclear energy program,
but Washington suspects Tehran of seeking nuclear weapons.
"They (Iran's government) made some agreements, they need to
abide by those agreements and act in a good-faith way in the
negotiations," McClellan told reporters at the White House.
"They need to come clean and cooperate fully with the
International Atomic Energy Agency.
"We continue to support the European Three's efforts to resolve
this in a peaceful and diplomatic way," the spokesman added,
referring to diplomatic efforts by Britain, France and Germany
to broker a deal on the matter.
McClellan spoke after the UN nuclear watchdog agency urged Iran
to "maintain its suspension of all enrichment-related activity"
after receiving the letter from Tehran saying it would resume
nuclear fuel research.
The IAEA said it was seeking clarification from Tehran. Iran had
previously suspended its uranium enrichment activities in
October 2003.
Moscow has suggested allowing Iran to conduct uranium enrichment
in Russia, giving it access to the nuclear fuel cycle while
guaranteeing that its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes
only.
Copyright © 2006 Agence France Presse. All rights reserved. The
*****************************************************************
7 AFP: Iran to resume suspended nuclear research
03/01/2006 20h57
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad delivers a speech
©AFP - Atta Kenare
TEHRAN, Jan 3 (AFP) - Iran announced it would resume nuclear
fuel research after a suspension of over two years, prompting
the UN atomic watchdog to warn Tehran that it must maintain a
freeze on sensitive nuclear work.
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said that Iran would not "step
back" on its decision to resume nuclear fuel work, state
television reported.
"Our country will go forward on the nuclear path with patience,
wisdom and planning," the hardline president was quoted as
saying after a parliament session on the state budget.
"We will not make a step back on our path," he said, adding that
he had informed the UN atomic agency of Iran's intent in a
letter.
Iran's student-run news agency ISNA further quoted Ahmadinejad
as rejecting Western influence on Iranian policies because
"research has no restrictions or red lines."
"We cannot base our national interest on their policy," he said.
IAEA flag in front of the International Atomic Energy Agency
headquarters
©AFP/File - Joe Klamar
The deputy head of Iran's atomic energy agency, Mohammad Saidi,
also said the UN nuclear watchdog has already been informed of
the step, which risks creating further strains in talks with
European negotiators.
"In a letter, the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) has
been informed that Iran will start research on the technology of
nuclear fuel in a few days, with the cooperation and
coordination of the agency," Saidi told state television.
"We think our experts have undergone lots of losses during this
period (of suspension). Many of our researchers have lost their
jobs," he added.
Saidi did not specify exactly what the research concerned, but
said that the Islamic republic had "voluntarily" suspended such
activities for around "the past two-and-a-half years."
This timescale would correspond to the date when Iran announced
in October 2003 that it was temporarily suspending uranium
enrichment, a process that can be used to create nuclear fuel
for reactors and also the cores of atomic bombs. Iran's
suspected nuclear installations FLASH GRAPHIC
©AFP iactiv
Diplomats have said that were Iran to resume enriching uranium
it would deal a fatal blow to the negotiating process, already
fragile after Tehran restarted uranium conversion last year --
the precursor step to enrichment.
In a statement confirming receipt of the letter, the IAEA said
its director general Mohammed ElBaradei "recalls the importance
placed by the IAEA Board that Iran maintains its suspension of
all enrichment-related activity as a key confidence building
measure."
It said "he continues to call on Iran to take the steps the IAEA
requires to resolve outstanding issues regarding the nature of
Iran's nuclear programme."
However Saidi insisted that the decision was not linked to the
production of nuclear fuel.
"This issue... has nothing to do with production of nuclear
fuel. These two are separate things from one another. No
decision has been made about nuclear fuel production." Iranians
of the People's Mujahadeen organization demonstrate against Iran
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's regime
©AFP/File - Thierry Monasse
The IAEA said it was seeking clarifications from Iran as to the
"implications" of the decision.
France on Tuesday called on Iran to reverse its move, saying if
Iran was to observe a suspension on enrichment it also had to
halt research.
"We would like Iran to abide by the suspension of all activities
related to the enrichment and reprocessing... which includes
centrifuges and research," foreign ministry spokesman
Jean-Baptiste Mattei said.
Meanwhile, a delegation from Moscow is to visit Tehran on
Saturday amid continued Russian efforts to break the deadlock
between Iran's insistence on maintaining its right to enrichment
and EU demands it renounces the practice.
"A Russian delegation led by Deputy Foreign Minister (Sergei)
Kisliak, is due to come on January 7 to discuss the Russian
proposal," said foreign ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi.
Moscow has suggested allowing Iran to conduct uranium enrichment
in Russia, giving it access to the nuclear fuel cycle while
guaranteeing its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes only.
Two Iranians work at the zirconium production plant at Isfanhan
©AFP/File - Henghameh Fahimi
However Asefi reaffirmed Iran would not consider the offer
unless it acknowledges the country's right to conduct uranium
enrichment operations in Iran, so far the key sticking point in
negotiations with the European Union.
"It's not a structured proposal it is still an idea, we have to
discuss it. There are ambiguities but if it says that enrichment
can only happen in Russia it's not acceptable, but if it's a
parallel and complementary plan we will consider that."
The United States accuses Iran of trying to master the civil
nuclear fuel cycle as a cover for a military programme to obtain
atomic weapons -- a charge vehemently denied by Tehran.
Iran is set to have new talks with EU negotiators on January 18
but both sides have acknowledged that wide differences remain.
Copyright Disclaimer ©AFP 2006
*****************************************************************
8 Guardian Unlimited: Iran Decides to Resume Nuclear Research
From the Associated Press
[UP]
Tuesday January 3, 2006 1:02 PM
TEHRAN, Iran (AP) - Iran has decided to resume research into
nuclear fuel production, but would not enrich uranium, a top
official said Tuesday.
Mohammad Saeedi, deputy head of Iran's Atomic Energy
Organization, said the country had suffered a lot from its
suspension of such research during the past 2 years and that it
could no longer keep its scientists from doing this type of
work.
Saeedi did not say what nuclear activity Iran would now resume,
but he said no decision had been made to resume uranium
enrichment.
The West has long opposed Iran's enrichment of uranium as the
process, when pursued to high levels, can produce the fuel for
nuclear weapons.
Saeedi stressed the resumed work would not actually produce
nuclear fuel.
``The research in this field will have little to do with the
production of nuclear fuel,'' Saeedi said.
Earlier Tuesday, a Foreign Ministry spokesman had also said that
resumed research would not involve enriching uranium. Saying
that a full statement was likely to be made later, spokesman
Hamid Reza Asefi said the ``research has nothing to do with the
production of nuclear fuel.''
``It has been decided that the International Atomic Energy
Agency will be informed today about (our) research in the field
of nuclear fuel. Research will resume in cooperation and
coordination with the IAEA in the next few days,'' Saeedi said.
Iran has come under heavy international pressure from the IAEA,
the U.N. nuclear watchdog, and the West to abandon its program
to produce fuel for its Russian-built nuclear reactor that is
due to come online this year.
It has refused to renounce the enrichment of uranium but
suspended many aspects of its nuclear fuel program as a goodwill
gesture during negotiations with Britain, France and Germany.
The talks have failed to resolve the dispute and more are
scheduled for later this month.
The United States has accused Iran of secretly aspiring to build
nuclear weapons. Iran denies this, saying its program is limited
to producing electricity.
Guardian Unlimited © Guardian Newspapers Limited 2006
*****************************************************************
9 Guardian Unlimited: White House Won't Undo N. Korea Sanctions
From the Associated Press
[UP]
Tuesday January 3, 2006 9:17 PM
By BARRY SCHWEID
AP Diplomatic Writer
WASHINGTON (AP) - The Bush administration on Tuesday rejected a
North Korean demand that it lift sanctions as a way of possibly
resuming stalled nuclear disarmament talks.
The two issues are unrelated, State Department spokesman Sean
McCormack said. ``I don't see in what way they are preventing
North Korea from going back to the six-party talks.''
The sanctions were imposed for alleged currency counterfeiting
and other illegal activities.
``While under U.S. sanctions, it's impossible to sit
face-to-face and discuss abandoning our nuclear deterrent,''
said the Rodong Sinmun, the North's ruling Workers Party
newspaper, in a Korean-language commentary carried by the
official Korean Central News Agency.
``The U.S. sanctions are obviously the fundamental element that
disrupts the six-party talks,'' the newspaper said.
McCormack said it was important and reasonable for the United
States to protect American currency. ``We, the United States, as
well as other countries are going to take steps to stop, inhibit
or prevent illicit activities,'' he said.
The negotiations are designed to halt North Korea's nuclear
weapons program. The six nations, which include Japan, China,
South Korea and Russia, as well as the United States and North
Korea, agreed to return to the negotiations as soon as possible,
McCormack said.
``We are prepared to do so, and we look forward to the
resumption of those talks,'' he said.
As for the alleged violations, McCormack said the United States
had offered North Korea a briefing and was turned down.
Guardian Unlimited © Guardian Newspapers Limited 2006
*****************************************************************
10 AFP: NKorea reaffirms no six-way talks under US sanctions
Tue Jan 3, 4:50 AM ET
SEOUL (AFP) - Stalinist North Korea" /> North Koreareaffirmed it
would not resume six-nation nuclear disarmament talks unless the
United States lifts sanctions imposed for alleged counterfeiting
and money laundering.
Rodong Sinmun, mouthpiece of the the North's ruling communist
party, urged the United States to unblock talks by removing the
sanctions.
"It is impossible to go to six-way talks and sit face-to-face
with a counterpart who seeks to isolate and stifle us," it said
in a Korean-language dispatch monitored by Yonhap news agency on
Tuesday.
After a round ot talks in September North Korea agreed in
principle to dismantle its nuclear weapons program in exchange
for diplomatic and economic benefits and security guarantees.
But in November, the North said US sanctions were blocking any
progress.
The US Treasury Department" /> Treasury Departmentin September
told US financial institutions to stop dealing with a Macau
bank, Banco Delta Asia, which it accused of being a willing
front for North Korean counterfeiting.
A month later the US blacklisted eight North Korean companies
allegedly involved in the spread of weapons of mass destruction.
The North said last month it would boycott the six-way talks --
which also include China, Japan, Russia, South Korea" /> South
Koreaand the United States -- unless Washington lifts the
financial sanctions.
But Pyongyang has yet to pull out of the talks, Rodong Sinmun
said in a separate dispatch carried by the Korean Central News
Agency Tuesday.
"The US should, first of all, lift its sanctions against the
DPRK (North Korea), the main factor of scuttling the talks,
before talking about the resumption of the talks," Rodong said.
"The prospect of the resumption of the talks entirely depends on
the US behavior."
*****************************************************************
11 Guardian Unlimited: N. Korea Says Sanctions Tabling Nuke Talks
From the Associated Press
[UP]
Tuesday January 3, 2006 8:17 AM
By JAE-SOON CHANG
Associated Press Writer
SEOUL, South Korea (AP) - North Korea said Tuesday it cannot
return to international nuclear disarmament talks unless the
United States lifts sanctions imposed for its alleged currency
counterfeiting and other illegal activities.
``While under U.S. sanctions, it's impossible to sit
face-to-face and discuss abandoning our nuclear deterrent,''
said the Rodong Sinmun, the North's ruling Workers Party
newspaper, in a Korean-language commentary carried by the
official Korean Central News Agency.
``The U.S. sanctions are obviously the fundamental element that
disrupts the six-party talks,'' the newspaper said.
Also Tuesday, a pro-North Korea newspaper based in Japan said
the North's leader is ``determined to go on an all-out
offensive'' and will take a ``resolute measure'' regarding the
nuclear issue, according to South Korea's Yonhap news agency.
``There is a possibility of the situation surrounding the Korean
Peninsula making a great shift this year,'' the Choson Sinbo
said in a Pyongyang-datelined story.
The paper did not elaborate.
Koh Yu-hwan, a North Korea expert at Seoul's Dongguk University,
said the report suggests steps aimed at boosting the country's
negotiating power, such as test-firing a missile or increasing
its nuclear arsenal. But Koh said a nuclear test was unlikely
``as it would provoke China and other neighboring countries too
much.''
In September, Washington placed sanctions on a Macau-based bank,
alleging it helped the North distribute counterfeit currency and
engage in other illicit activities.
The next month, the U.S. sanctioned eight North Korean companies
it claimed were fronts for proliferating weapons of mass
destruction.
North Korea reacted swiftly and angrily, calling the U.S.
allegations a ``sheer lie'' and threatening to boycott the
nuclear talks with the Washington, South Korea, China, Japan and
Russia unless the sanctions were lifted.
Washington says it has convincing evidence of the North's
wrongdoing, but stressed that the issue is a law enforcement
matter unrelated to the nuclear talks.
North Korea claims the U.S. is seeking to overthrow its regime
behind a smoke screen of dialogue. It says the sanctions and
emphasis by the U.S. on the North's human rights abuses are
signs of Washington's ``hostility.''
In September, the North pledged at the nuclear talks in Beijing
to give up its atomic programs in return for aid and security
assurances. But no progress was made on implementing the
agreement after North Korea placed new conditions - which the
U.S. said were unacceptable - on its disarmament.
The talks recessed in November. Negotiators agreed to meet
again, but did not set a date.
The dispute flared in October 2002, following U.S. allegations
that the North was running a secret nuclear weapons program in
violation of international agreements.
Guardian Unlimited © Guardian Newspapers Limited 2006
*****************************************************************
12 Platts: 2006 seen as important year for fuel market
London (Platts)--3Jan2006
For the nuclear fuel market, 2006 is shaping up as a particularly
important year. Developments market analysts are watching
include: LES is still on track to receive an NRC license to build
and operate a centrifuge enrichment plant in New Mexico.
USEC Inc.'s American Centrifuge development strategy will either
be validated or not.
Companies currently investigating Silex Systems Ltd.'s laser
enrichment process will probably decide one way or the other on
whether to invest in a pilot 250,000 SWU/year plant.
The winning bidder to take over Westinghouse likely will be
known, as will the company that will buy RWE Solutions and its
key RWE Nukem uranium trading unit.
There should be much more clarity as to the impact of the court
decision declaring SWU to be a service on the commercial SWU
market, as well as on the Russian antidumping suspension
agreement, which is currently undergoing a sunset review.
The spot price of uranium is likely to climb over $40 a pound
U3O8, but the rapid rise of the spot price?an increase of 75% in
the past year and 150% over the past two years?won't continue,
most analysts say. Consolidation of the more than 200 junior
uranium companies will probably accelerate.
Regarding the spot price, most analysts now see it climbing above
$40/lb sometime during the first half of the year. But there is
no consensus as to how much higher it will climb. A big unknown
is whether buying by hedge fund/investment companies will
continue in 2006 at its 2005 pace. As the year ended, analysts
said that almost 10-million lb were in the control of these
entities, which have so far been content to hold their
inventories. Also it is unclear how much supply will be available
to meet continuing demand of utilities, many of which are taking
steps to build inventory. For example, in a Dec. 21 filing with
the U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission, the owners of the
South Texas Project said the owners committee had approved the
acquisition of "a strategic refueling reload of uranium."
Although analysts believe that the spot price will not continue
to rise indefinitely, they also suggest that until supply catches
up with demand there is not going be much sustained downward
pressure on the price.
Consultant International Nuclear Inc. (INI) estimates 2006
worldwide uranium production at 110-million lb, with consumption
around 170-milllion lb. But how soon that gap will be closed is
unclear. Bullish estimates of production out of Kazakhstan by
2010?as much as 39,000,000 lb U3O8?may be off by as much as a
third, say some analysts. INI estimates 2006 production in
Kazakhstan at close to12-million lb U3O8 and projects that
production in 2010 could be as much as 22.5-million lb.
But there are hurdles that could hinder a smooth production
increase. Wallace Mays, one of the key figures in UrAsia Energy
Ltd.'s foray into production in Kazakhstan, said in a paper
delivered at the World Nuclear Association's annual meeting in
September, that a key bottleneck to production by in situ leach
mining is the availability of drill rigs in Kazakhstan.
"Many of the manufacturers of drill rigs have gone out of
business," Mays said. And in Kazakhstan, "the lack of competition
from government-licensed drilling companies (only two are
licensed) has limited the development of competitively effective
drilling equipment and methods," he added. There are also
indications that the expansion of BHP Billiton's Olympic Dam
copper-uranium operation may proceed more slowly, driven in large
part by BHP Billiton's strategy in the copper marketplace.
Among the junior uranium companies, Paladin Resources is expected
to begin production at its Langer Heinrich mining operation in
Namibia late this year.
In a recent coup, Paladin announced that it had hired Wyatt Buck,
Cameco's general manager of the McArthur River mine and Key Lake
mill, as the general manager of the Langer Heinrich mining
operations. Buck will start work for Paladin Feb. 1.
And Mestena Uranium has started up its Alta Mesa ISL project in
Texas. And Uranium Resources Inc. is hoping for increased
production in 2006.
This story was published in full in Platts Nuclear Fuel. Request
Copyright © 2006 - Platts, All Rights Reserved [The McGraw-Hill
Companies]
*****************************************************************
13 HoweStreet.com: The Potential Emerging Energy Crunch Part II
Sol Palha: The Tactical Investor
January 3 2006
The nuclear solution
You can swim all day in the Sea of Knowledge and still come out
completely dry. Most people do. - Norman Juster
Over 50% of the world’s supply of Uranium is located in just 3
countries, Australia 30%, Canada 14% and Kazakhstan 17%. Even
though Australia has the world’s largest reserves, Canada
produces the most uranium, accounting for 18% of total output.
Over the next 15 years China plans on building 40 additional
nuclear plants (these numbers keep changing the thing to keep in
mind is that they are going to keep building). China's known
uranium reserves stand at 77,000 tons; currently it consumes
1,650 tons a year. In 2020 this could increase to 8250 tons a
year. Further more China has signed strategic deals with
Kazakhstan and Canada. It is just a matter of time before it
does so with Australia; currently Australia supplies China with
significant quantities of uranium. Why are we spending time
focusing on what China is doing? We have always stated that one
must view the Chinese as advanced chess players; they plan for
events decades in advance. Patience and discipline seem to be
one of their key strengths and assets. Presently China has
enough uranium to power their existing reactors for 46 years;
think about that for a second. How many countries have managed
to build up such huge reserves so fast; this action definitely
indicates that these chaps like to plan for things way in
advance. We are positive that they are going to make sure that
they have enough uranium to feed the new plants they are
building for at least 18 years without any interruption. Hence
the bidding war will be left to the other nations. China must be
building huge reserves of uranium for a reason; they probably
foresee massive price swings in the future.
Consider the following facts
1) Uranium prices have almost tripled since the start of 2004.
2) It is projected that world’s energy demand will increase by
an additional 65% in approx 15 years. At this point in time the
only solution that appears to have a chance of dealing with this
increase is nuclear power plants; the only material able to
power these plants is uranium. 3) One pound of Uranium produces
roughly the same energy as 37 barrels of oil or 8.9 tons of
coal; the choice is all but obvious.
Technically speaking there is more than enough uranium out there
to power all the stations that are going to be built. (Look at
the chart towards the end of this article). The problem is that
this uranium is in the ground and needs to be mined and at the
moment there are not enough mines to produce all the uranium we
need. Furthermore not enough money and resources are being
dedicated to exploration and the opening up of new mines;
another thing to remember is that it can take up to 2 years
before a closed mine or a new mine becomes fully operational.
Hence demand cannot be rapidly quenched even with the opening of
100’s of new mines. It’s for this reason we think that the long
term out look for uranium is rather bright.
Conclusion
The race to build new nuclear plants to supply developing
nations future electric needs is about to create a very
explosive situation. It’s no longer a matter of if but when this
situation will go out of control; we do not have enough uranium
above the ground to power current nuclear power plants. At
present approx 50% of the demand is coming from reserve supplies
(mostly the decommissioning of old nuclear war heads); imagine
what will happen when all those new nuclear power plants come
online. The tragedy here is that these plants can only operate
on uranium and nothing else and so at some point in time these
plants will have to do whatever it takes to get uranium or shut
down. It’s for this reason we have been taking position in
certain stocks that we feel will benefit tremendously from this
potentially huge disaster. One such stock already doubled in
less than 3 months.
On a separate note there is plenty of Uranium in the ground; the
problem is that it takes time for these new mines to come
online. It can take up to two years for these mines to be fully
operational. So far no major effort has been mounted to address
this issue and demand already exceeds supply and the supply
situation keeps getting worse with the passage of each day.
A few experts in the field have written articles about new and
existing technologies (both non military and military) out there
that can extract additional energy from spent nuclear fuel rods
(some experts suggest that only about 20-30% of the potential
energy has been extracted from these spent nuclear rods.); the
problem is always the same companies take forever to implement
new technologies. As of now very few companies have decided to
implement these technologies and another issue to consider is
the cost factor. Even if cost were not issue there is still
going to be a lag time between deciding to implement and
implementing these new technologies. All one needs to do is look
at the coal sector; cleaner coal burning technologies exist
which make new coal plants nearly as clean burning as natural
gas plants. However there has been no mad rush to build new coal
plants even though the USA has extremely huge reserves. The
thing to keep in mind is that most disasters are actually
preventable but history has clearly indicated that man does not
believe in prevention but only in responding after such an event
has taken place.
The graph below clearly indicates that there is actually an
endless amount of uranium available in the Earths crust and in
seawater; the main problem right now is the exorbitant cost
factor. One day it might be economical to obtain uranium from
these sources but not right now which means uranium still has
the potential to move up significantly higher. Every market goes
through a bullish phase, a bearish phase and bottoming phase;
there is no exception to this rule. Uranium happens to be in the
early stages of a bullish phase.
source:
http://www.americanenergyindependence.com/NuclearSlides/Uranium
01.htm
A child-like man is not a man whose development has been
arrested; on the contrary, he is a man who has given himself a
chance of continuing to develop long after most adults have
muffled themselves in the cocoon of middle-aged habit and
convention. - Aldous Huxley 1894-1963, British Author
© 2002 - 2006 Howe Street Media Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
*****************************************************************
14 [NukeNet] Russian gas row reignites nuclear debate
Date: Tue, 03 Jan 2006 17:34:24 -0800
NukeNet Anti-Nuclear Network (nukenet@energyjustice.net)
Mothersalert: http://www.mothersalert.org
http://www.mothersalert.org/moreinfo.html
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk_news/story/0,3604,1676560,00.html
Russian gas row reignites nuclear debate
Domestic bills likely to be forced up
Terry Macalister
Monday January 2, 2006
The Guardian
A Russian gas supply crisis triggered warnings
last night that UK householders will face further
significant price increases in 2006. Growing
unease over future energy security in Britain also
led to calls for a quick decision on a new
generation of nuclear power stations. Analysts
predict that, as things stand, by 2020 almost 70%
of Britain's electricity generation will be
reliant on gas imported from countries such as
Russia.
Many homeowners began the new year yesterday with
a 14.5% rise in their bills, but British Gas said
a 40% increase in wholesale prices since September
made further rises inevitable.
Article continues
--------------------------------------------------
------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------
------------------------------
The latest energy scare came yesterday when Russia
cut its supplies of gas to Ukraine in a row over
pricing. The shortages and accompanying political
row threatened to spill into continental Europe,
which gets a quarter of its gas from Russia via a
pipeline through Ukraine. A spokesman for British
Gas, which controls 55% of the UK residential
market, said: "No decisions have been made yet,
but across the industry suppliers are looking at
their pricing because of steep increases in
wholesale costs in the last quarter.
"Most suppliers recognise that they [the price
increases] will feed through to the retail market
to some degree," he added, arguing that his
company's residential energy business made a
financial loss in the last six months.
British Gas lost 1 million customers in 2004 and
670,000 in 2005 on the back of a 14.2% rise in
bills from September 2005, plus a 12.4% hike in
September 2004. There was also a 5.9% rise in
January of that year. Yesterday, rival Scottish &
Southern Energy put an extra 13.6% - around £50 a
year - on domestic gas bills, while npower put up
its prices by 14.5% for gas, the equivalent of
around £58.
The consumer group, energywatch, warned suppliers
that there was "no excuse" to use the Russian
problems as a reason to unleash another round of
price rises during 2006. "We don't draw very much
gas at all, well none, from that part of the
world, and there are lots of other sources of gas
for us. However, it might put a bit of pressure on
prices there and, sadly, the gas and oil companies
are always looking for excuses to ramp up prices,"
energywatch's chief executive, Allan Asher, told
the BBC.
Energy minister Malcolm Wicks said the dispute
posed "no immediate threat" to UK supplies but he
conceded it could impact on gas prices. "There is
no immediate threat to gas supplies in the UK;
none of the UK's gas is imported directly from
Russia."
British Gas admitted that the Russian problems had
not had any discernible impact yet on British
prices, but said a range of other earlier problems
had already made its business unprofitable. These
included the rundown in UK North Sea supplies, a
lack of sufficient existing infrastructure to
import liquefied natural gas, plus the
stranglehold of large French and German monopolies
controlling pipelines in mainland Europe.
The crisis in Ukraine has highlighted the need for
Britain to have indigenous supplies, such as
nuclear, the former UK energy minister Brian
Wilson told the Guardian yesterday.
"This [crisis] could have a short-term impact on
gas supplies and prices in the European Union but
long-term it points up a more serious issue of
Britain's reliance on imported gas," he said. By
2020, 70% of UK electricity will come from gas and
90% of that will have to be imported. A
substantial amount - at least a third - will come
from Russia and confidence in that must depend on
Russia honouring its contracts."
_______________________________________________________________________
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15 Guardian Unlimited: Russia steps back from brink with Ukraine and
restores gas supplies to Europe
Tom Parfitt in Moscow and Luke Harding in Berlin
Tuesday January 3, 2006
The Guardian
Russia's image as a reliable international energy supplier became
increasingly tarnished yesterday as a stand-off with Ukraine over
gas prices disrupted supplies to Europe.
The Russian energy group Gazprom accused Ukraine of stealing
about $25m (£14.5m) worth of natural gas from transit supplies
destined for other European countries, but most EU members blamed
President Vladimir Putin for the crisis. Last night Gazprom
appeared to bow to international pressure by increasing transit
supplies flowing through Ukraine by the amount allegedly siphoned
off.
Germany's economy minister, Michael Glos, called on Moscow to
compromise in its feud with Ukraine. "Russia has the presidency
of the G8 and therefore has to act responsibly," he said.
The Russian state-owned energy company Gazprom switched off
flows to Ukraine on Sunday after a bitter, politically charged
dispute over gas prices. A drop in deliveries to other countries
sent through the same pipeline network was noticed within 24
hours.
In the UK the energy minister, Malcolm Wicks, admitted the
dispute could affect European and global markets. Speaking to
the BBC, he reminded Russia it had "never let down Europe during
the cold war" and expressed hope it would be "mindful of its
reputation as a secure energy supplier".
Five EU countries yesterday confirmed that the amount of gas
arriving from Russia had fallen off dramatically. Germany,
Austria, Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia all reported a sharp drop
in supplies, with Hungary saying its gas deliveries had gone
down by 40%.
"This situation cannot be accepted. Russia is mixing its foreign
policy with its policy for gas supplies," Poland's deputy prime
minister, Ludwik Dorn, told broadcaster Radio Zet. While harsh
judgment of Russia from former Soviet satellite states was
predictable, there was fresh debate from "old Europe" as to how
it should respond ahead of tomorrow's emergency meeting of EU
energy experts.
The EU buys a quarter of its gas from Gazprom. Mr Glos, who
belongs to a conservative coalition led by Germany's chancellor,
Angela Merkel, said the country should now reconsider its
decision to phase out nuclear energy.
Two German importers of Russian gas, Wintershall and E.ON
Ruhrgas, confirmed that Germany, which imports 30% of its gas
from Russia, "had been affected". The firms refused to say,
however, how much gas had disappeared, with a Wintershall
spokesman insisting that "here everyone will get through the
winter warm".
Looking on from Washington, the US state department said it was
concerned that the gas stoppage created "insecurity in the
energy sector in the region and raises serious questions about
the use of energy to exert political pressure".
Russia took over the presidency of the G8 nations on Sunday, and
President Putin has promised to make energy security a
cornerstone of his leadership.
Moscow attempted to shift all blame for the conflict to Kiev.
Gazprom deputy chairman Alexander Medvedev said that since
delivery of gas had stopped, Ukraine had siphoned off 100m cubic
metres from pipelines crossing the country. The Ukrainian prime
minister, Yury Yekhanurov, denied that gas had been taken.
Andrei Illarionov, a former senior Kremlin adviser who resigned
last week, claimed yesterday that Gazprom had no legal right to
stop gas flows to its neighbour. Mr Illarionov said a price of
$50 per 1,000 cubic metres had been fixed for five years in
2004. Moscow now wants $230.
Useful links
Itar-Tass news agency
Moscow Times
Russia Today
St Petersburg Times
Caucasian Knot
[UP]
Guardian Unlimited © Guardian Newspapers Limited 2006
*****************************************************************
16 Guardian Unlimited: No threat to UK gas supply, says No 10
Matthew Tempest, political correspondent
Tuesday January 3, 2006
Downing Street today moved to reassure the public that the spat
between Russia and Ukraine over gas supplies would not affect UK
imports.
With Mr Blair returning from his holiday in Egypt today, it was
left to his official spokesman to insist that the cut in exports
from Russia would have no affects on Britain's "immediate supply
situation".
But Number 10 revealed that a top official from the department of
trade and industry - which oversees energy policy - would sit in
on an emergency meeting of the EU commission tomorrow to discuss
the stand-off between the Russian state firm Gazprom and Ukraine.
Exports from Russia to the EU are carried through the same pipes
that carry gas to Ukraine, and countries such as France, Germany,
Poland, Italy and other have reported drops in supply.
Today, in the first official words from Number 10 on the
situation, the prime minister's spokesman said: "The immediate
supply situation is not affected in any substantial way by this
dispute."
However, he added that it "underlined" Mr Blair's thinking on
the security of energy supplies - the focus of which is a
possible expansion of UK domestic nuclear power.
But he denied the brewing crisis over gas supplies, and Europe's
growing reliance on Russia, would create a "knee-jerk" response
in the energy review, which is due out by the summer.
He said: "Clearly, we believe that it's in the interests of
everybody, not least Russia and the Ukraine, that this matter is
resolved as quickly as possible.
"[But] does an energy review knee-jerk to one particular event?
No. But it does take into account the need for security of
supply, diversity of supply, further down the line?
"That's one of the issues that needs to be considered. There is
an issue of security of supply, there was already before this
event and clearly this event underlines that issue."
Number 10 pointed out that Mr Blair used the EU summit at
Hampton Court last November to call for a strategic EU energy
policy, highlighting the current vulnerability of supplies.
But he added: "In terms of the immediate situation for Europe
the EU gas storage would act as a temporary buffer."
Yesterday, the energy minister, Malcolm Wicks, pointed out that
no gas is imported directly from Russia to the UK, so there was
no immediate threat to supplies, but that prices could still be
affected.
Currently the UK gets around 90% of its gas supplies from its
own North Sea supplies, with much of the shortfall coming from
Norway, but domestic reserves are dwindling.
Today Jeremy Nicholson, the director of the Energy Intensive
Users Group, which represents heavy industry, said high gas
prices had already led some heavy users to cut back, and could
potentially see factories close temporarily.
He told the Daily Mail: "This new development is bound to affect
the market prices in the rest of Europe.
"The effect could be that some factories remain shut or on
reduced consumption for longer, and others could join them."
Yesterday Mr Wicks said the equation between supply and demand
was "tight".
"There's always a worry about knock-on effects. This is a
difficult winter throughout Europe. It's colder than average and
for various reasons in Britain we have got quite a tight
equation between demand and supply.
"We need to look at this one very carefully but we are not a
heavy importer of gas from Russia so the effects here should be
less than elsewhere."
He said Britain should not get involved in the row, but
suggested Russia should be "mindful of its reputation" as a
reliable supplier.
He will join other EU energy ministers to discuss the growing
crisis at an emergency meeting scheduled for Wednesday.
Mr Wicks said there was "clearly a history" between Russia and
Ukraine, but the dispute was also fuelled by "major commercial
factors". He added: "It's not very helpful, I don't think, for
the United Kingdom to take a view on the rights or wrongs of
this.
"At the end of the day a new contract is being negotiated. That
has to be left to the companies involved and the two countries
involved.
"We've got to use our good offices through the European Union to
bring about a resolution."
Ukraine believes the price rise is a political act and the row
has raised fears across Europe about the reliability of Russia
as an energy supplier.
The UK market has seen a 35% surge in wholesale gas prices in
two years, brought about in part by dwindling North Sea supplies.
Two companies put up domestic bills yesterday and consumer
groups warned firms could exploit the uncertainty to push them
even higher, whether or not supplies were hit.
[UP]
Guardian Unlimited © Guardian Newspapers Limited 2006
*****************************************************************
17 Times of India: Pakistan to buy 6 nuclear reactors from China-
Wednesday, January 04, 2006 01:46:20 amTIMES NEWS NETWORK ]
LONDON: Pakistan is negotiating to buy at least six nuclear
power reactors from China during the next decade in its most
ambitious nuclear facility expansion, according to media reports
here.
A newspaper report said Pakistan's nuclear shopping could cost
as much as $10 billion. Islamabad’s talks with Beijing involve
a minimum of six and a maximum of eight reactors, a newspaper
said.
It quoted an unnamed, senior Pakistani official to say that the
nuclear plants being negotiated were expected to be completed by
2025, with construction starting by 2015.
The report said the massive expansion in nuclear power
capability, courtesy the Chinese, could take Pakistan
substantially down the path of meeting Islamabad’s declared
targets of raising its nuclear power generation capacity to
8,800 mw by 2030, up from a current capacity of 425 mw.
The reactors under negotiation are of 600 mw. News of
negotiations with China comes just days after the formal start of
a Chinese-supplied nuclear plant at Chashma in the Pakistani
province of Punjab.
The Chashma plant, Pakistan's third, was formally launched by
Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz just last week.
Commentators agreed that the news would underline western
concerns about nuclear proliferation as Pakistan increasingly and
boldly makes clear its reliance on China as the main supplier of
its nuclear reactors.
According to remarks attributed to unnamed senior western
diplomats, Pakistan's latest round of nuclear negotiations with
China may be a reaction to a recent American offer to sell
reactors to India.
But according to a London daily, Lieutenant General (retd) Talat
Masood, a Pakistani commentator on security affairs, insisted the
discussions with China were long-standing and of greater vintage
than the Indo-US talks.
Masood is quoted as saying Pakistan has a long-term relationship
with China and there is a great trust factor.
The agreement to buy a series of reactors from Beijing is
understood to have been reached on December 28 during a meeting
between Aziz and Chinese minister for science and technology,
national defence and chairman of China's Atomic Energy Authority
Sun Qin at Chashma.
At the time, Aziz had declared that Pakistan's nuclear technology
had a peaceful history, something that also categorised the
N-ties between Pakistan and China.
Aziz said that the Chinese would help Pakistan build larger
reactors to meet its growing energy needs.
But western commentators said they feared a growing trade in
nuclear wares, considering Pakistan's father of nuclear
technology, A Q Khan, had increasingly been revealed as the
world's top proliferator, with clients scattered dangerously far
afield, including North Korea, Libya and Iran.
Copyright © 2006Times Internet Limited. All rights reserved.
*****************************************************************
18 BBC ON THIS DAY | 3 | 1993: US and Russia halve nuclear warheads
The United States of America and the Russian Federation have
agreed to cut the number of nuclear warheads they have by between
3,000 and 3,500.
US President George Bush, who leaves office this month, and his
Russian counterpart Boris Yeltsin, signed the second Strategic
Arms Reduction Treaty - Start II - in Moscow.
Currently each side has about 10,000 warheads and Start II marks
the biggest reduction ever agreed.
In addition, sea-based weapons will be cut to 1,750 each and all
land-based multiple-warhead missiles will be eliminated.
Mr Bush said the treaty offers "for parents and children, a
future free from fear", and Mr Yeltsin called it "a treaty of
hope".
'Russia's might'
The treaty means that by 2003, three-quarters of the nuclear
warheads possessed by both countries at the start of the 1990s
will have been destroyed.
Mr Yeltsin believes Start II shows that Russia has abandoned the
arms race.
"I think it important for Russia's might as a great power to be
determined not by the quantity of missiles but by the living
standards of its citizens, the development of culture, education
and national traditions," he said.
Mr Yeltsin admitted the treaty will meet opposition before it is
ratified in the Russian parliament.
The US Congress also has to agree to Start II, as well as the
parliaments of the former Soviet republics of Byelorussia,
Ukraine and Kazakhstan where nuclear weapons are still held.
Mr Yeltsin has been criticised for making too many concessions
to the US, by relinquishing all of Russia's land-based SS-18
missiles with multiple warheads - the core of its strike
capability.
By contrast the US appears to have kept a tactical advantage by
agreeing to halve its submarine-based warheads, which form the
heart of its nuclear arsenal.
Start II builds on previous treaties which helped bring about
the end of the Cold War.
Start I was signed by Mr Bush and former President of the Soviet
Union Mikhail Gorbachev in 1991.
It pledged to reduce the number of nuclear warheads by roughly
half to 6,000 on each side and long-range missile launchers to
1,600 for each country.
With Start II, the US nuclear arsenal will return to levels not
seen since the early 1960s and in Russia since the mid-1970s.
In Context
By 2001, the two countries had met the
criteria set out in Start I.
Start II was ratified by the US Congress in 1996 and
Byelorussia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan transferred warheads in
their territory to Russia and destroyed the accompanying
delivery vehicles.
In 1997, US President Bill Clinton and Russian President Boris
Yeltsin had to extend the treaty's deadline to 2007 and set out
to begin negotiations on a Start III treaty for further
reductions.
The Russian parliament eventually agreed to Start II in 2000,
but it, and Start III, were abandoned.
Instead, in 2002, US President George W Bush and Russian
President Vladimir Putin signed the Strategic Offensive
Reductions Treaty - better known as the Treaty of Moscow.
By 2012, the treaty aims to cut the nuclear warheads of each
side from levels of between 6,000 and 7,000, to between 1,700
and 2,200 each.
But measures outlined in Start II to destroy the methods of
delivering nuclear weapons - such as bombers, submarines and
launchers - were not addressed in the Moscow Treaty.
The arms race
Nuclear-armed countries
United States
United Kingdom
Russia
China France
India Pakistan
Israel
Suspected nuclear aspirants
Iran North Korea
Total warheads worldwide
Over 40,000
*****************************************************************
19 Herald: Scotland, the powerhouse of Europe
Web Issue 2434 January 04 2006
Alex Salmond January 04 2006
The politics of energy supply are back and back with a bang.
Oil prices remain at record levels, but this time round it is
gas which is king. Countries that have the big fields have the
whip hand, while countries who consume it are scrambling to
secure supplies. Russia's decision even briefly to turn off the
taps to Ukraine has sent shockwaves through the anxious west
European gas-guzzling economies.
Although not this time directly affecting UK supplies, it does
provide another perfect illustration of the total unreliability
of the European interconnector from Belgium to Bacton.
This connection from Zeebrugge is at the end of the line of gas
transmission. Late last year, gas prices spiked when France,
Italy and Spain helped themselves to more gas, after the
temporary failure of the North African pipeline. As a result,
there was little gas left to go though the interconnector to
Norfolk.
The Belgium interconnector is a bit like bank and lending money.
You can get plenty of gas out of it when you don't need it, but
next to none when you do.
In addition, this is against a position when only 5% of UK gas
is imported. What will it be like in a few years when that
percentage becomes 30% or 40%?
Luckily, help is on the way. Massive liquid natural gas (LNG)
import plants are planned for Milford Haven and the Isle of
Grain. Even more importantly, the Norwegian cavalry is coming
over the hill in the shape of large new supplies through the
Flags pipeline to St Fergus and also the new Ormen Lange
pipeline.
However, three further actions are required. First, successive
UK governments have been complacent on gas supplies. Believing
that gas would always flow securely, they have allowed a system
to develop with little capacity for storage.
They also effectively abdicated responsibility to a crazy
regulator in Ofgem, who actively discouraged investment in
additional capacity. This now has to be changed so that the
threat of any temporary interruption to supply does not send
spot prices through the roof.
Secondly, English electricity generation was skewed by a frantic
dash for cheap gas, which now makes up 40% of the total power
around double that of Scotland, the country which actually
produces the gas! The prime minister, and, indeed, previous
energy ministers, who allowed this imbalance to develop, now say
that the solution must be the resort to nuclear.
If so, then it will be an extremely expensive and dangerous one,
and one which would take many years to bring to fruition. The
real answer is to stop Ofgem from exercising its daft market
theories in the electricity market, which previously mucked up
the gas market, and to allow alternative energies and new
technologies to flourish.
Currently, Ofgem taxes potential electricity generators in the
north of England and Scotland and subsidises in the south. For
example, if you want to develop an offshore wind farm around the
old Beatrice oil field in the Moray Firth as Talisman Energy
does generating as much power as a nuclear station, Ofgem
allows the national grid to demand £20m a year for a grid
connection.
However, if you want to put a wind farm on top of Big Ben
which nobody does then you would be offered a subsidy of £6 a
kilowatt.
Never mind current production, Scotland has two-thirds of the
European Union's oil reserves, one-eighth of the gas reserves,
one-twelfth of the coal reserves, no less than one-quarter of
the offshore wind potential, the same massive proportion of
tidal potential and around one-tenth of the potential wave
power.
No country in Europe has this array of potential power and
therefore no country less in need of the nuclear gamble.
However, in the short-term, little of this real potential will
be developed if it is strangled by punitive connection charges.
Thirdly, the declared government policy of maximising offshore
gas production has to carry through to the fiscal regime.
The chancellor has just grabbed a further £2bn on to this year's
North Sea revenues; apparently oblivious to the fact that one of
the near-term offshore projects most at risk from this tax hike
is the proposal to develop the discovered gas fields to the west
of Shetland, by use of a common pipeline network to St Fergus.
In a regime of high tax, you must have high incentives for
exploration and infrastructure to keep the show on the road.
We are now in a world of energy scarcity. It poses great
challenges and risks, but it is by no means unmanageable.
It also, for Scotland, provides the clearest opportunity to
become one of the powerhouses of Europe.
However, to achieve that, we will need political power to go
with energy potential.
Copyright © Newsquest (Herald & Times) Limited. All Rights
*****************************************************************
20 Xinhua: Power shortage to be eased
www.xinhuanet.com
www.chinaview.cn 2006-01-04 09:33:12
BEIJING, Jan.4 -- WITH the fast growth of total installed
capacity, China's power shortage will be significantly eased in
2006, and come to an end in 2007, said Zhang Guobao, vice
minister of the National Development and Reform Commission
(NDRC) recently.
A 600,000 kilowatt (kW) supercritical generating unit was put
into official production Dec. 27 in a power plant of Shenhua
Group in Ninghai County, East China's Zhejiang Province. China's
total installed capacity now tops 500 million kW.
The country's newly built installed capacity in 2005 had thus
exceeded 60 million kW, and its annual electric energy
production will reach 2.4 trillion kWh, said Zhang.
While launching a large number of high-capacity generating
units, China's power industry has attached importance to
changing the extensive production mode and developing water and
coal efficiency, low-emission and environmental protection,
Zhang added.
At the end of 2004, thermal power, hydropower, nuclear power and
wind power accounted for 73.7 percent, 24.5 percent, 1.6 percent
and 0.2 percent of the country's total installed capacity
respectively. However, the proportion of large-capacity
generating units, nuclear power and wind power will see a big
increase in the 11th Five-Year Development Program (2006-2010),
predicted the NDRC.
(Source: Shenzhen Daily/Agencies)
Copyright ©2003 Xinhua News Agency. All rights reserved.
*****************************************************************
21 CNN.com: Europe press slams Putin in 'gas war' -
Jan 3, 2006
Russian gas deliveries have resumed across Europe, easing fears
the price dispute will lead to shortages.
PARIS, France (Reuters) -- Russian President Vladimir Putin was
irresponsible and spiteful to cut gas supplies to Ukraine and
has resurrected Cold War-style fear and mistrust of Moscow
abroad, European newspapers said on Tuesday.
Many said the row over how much Kiev pays for gas from its
eastern neighbour could only be solved by a step-by-step price
rise, not the fourfold hike Russia's Gazprom monopoly demands.
Wary of Europe's dependence on Russian gas and oil, some papers
asked if more nuclear power might be the way out.
Russia said on Tuesday it had restored gas supplies but the
new-year blockade on what was once part of its Soviet empire --
a move which also hit supplies to other countries -- has
unnerved the rest of the continent.
"Europe thought the Cold War was over with after the end of the
Soviet Union," said the left-leaning French Liberation.
"Now it's caught in the crossfire between Russia and Ukraine and
discovers the Kremlin can brandish the energy weapon with as
much if not more devastating effect than it used to do with its
nuclear weapons."
London's Financial Times said the tactics Russia deployed
against its far weaker neighbour were irresponsible and
tarnished its image just as it takes over the presidency of the
G8 club of industrial powers for the first time.
"Mr. Putin is taking revenge on Ukraine for the triumph of
Viktor Yushchenko, the West-oriented president," it said. He won
elections in 2004 and ousted the pro-Kremlin candidate.
Wider frustration
Irritation with Russia's record on democracy and frustration
with excessive Kremlin influence over the economy was evident
across the board, with comment that Russia was let into the G8
for the sake of stability after the collapse of the Soviet Union
-- not for its democratic or market credentials.
"You cannot seriously preach democracy to Russia if you are on
the drip feed of Russia's oil," said Austria's Die Presse.
French business daily La Tribune said there was little
difference between flexing economic might and sending the tanks
in to quell disloyalty as in Soviet times.
"Instead of using the persuasive power of tanks as was once the
case in Budapest and Prague ... Putin's Russia is today using
the economic weapon in the same unscrupulous manner to bring to
their knees those who refuse their allegiance," it said. The
Paris-based International Herald Tribune accused Putin of
turning trade into a political weapon, in an analysis calling
Moscow's behaviour "spiteful and unwise".
Britain's Independent said the saga had the "whiff of a
dangerous and unstable world."
Ironically, after oil prices hit records in August, Putin chose
to make security of energy supply a priority of Russia's first
turn leading the G8, whose other members are the United States,
Japan, Germany, France, Britain, Italy and Canada.
Some Italian newspapers focused on debate there over the need to
return to nuclear power, while French officials seized on the
matter to justify France's decision to invest heavily in nuclear
power after the oil crises of the 1970s.
Copyright 2006 Reuters. All rights reserved.This material may
*****************************************************************
22 Telegraph: OP: Russian/Ukraine gas fight
Opinion
Russia has still to shake off some of the capricious habits of
Homo sovieticus, not least a disregard for diplomatic niceties
and the view that brute strength can win most arguments. Until
Mr Putin and Gazprom saw sense, these were much in evidence in
this recent crisis. The good news is that Britain has thought
ahead about securing long-term supplies of gas and oil; the bad
news is that Russia features prominently in those plans. It, and
other former Soviet republics that are also rich in these
resources, are notoriously volatile. Any long-term policy
reliant on that region is risky.
In Europe yesterday, and notably in France, the cry went up for
a common energy policy. Many of our EU partners are far more
reliant on Russia now than we are, or have neglected to plan
quite so far ahead as would have been wise. France, whose
instinct in these matters is always to appease and to seek
accommodations - as it did in sanctions-busting with Iraq over
oil - is keen to ensure that if there is a boat going in the
wrong direction, we are all in it together.
For strategic and economic reasons, Britain cannot possibly put
its energy policy in the hands of a third, supranational party;
the lesson of the disaster of the common agricultural and
fisheries policies should surely be enough to convince anyone of
that. France has identified that it has a difficulty for the
years ahead, and so do other European countries. It is a problem
that they will best and most easily solve by the shrewd exercise
of their respective national sovereignties.
For Britain, the answer is obvious. A review is under way to
judge whether this country should make a new commitment to
nuclear energy. As this newspaper has said before, a vigorous
nuclear energy policy is essential to the future of Britain and
of the British economy. It is not realistic to carpet this
country with wind farms, and with the thousands of miles of
pylons needed to carry the energy they might generate.
Large-scale wave power is a fantasy. Reopening the coal mines is
not currently economically feasible, always assuming a workforce
could be found to man them. Above all, a policy that relies on
importing huge quantities of energy has now been seen to be a
dangerous surrender of independence. If Mr Blair wanted either
the courage or the excuse to advocate the nuclear policy that
Britain so obviously needs, Mr Putin has just given it to him.
© Copyright of Telegraph Group Limited 2006. Terms &Conditions
*****************************************************************
23 BusinessWeek: This Gas Dispute Could Burn Russia
NEWS ANALYSIS By Stanley Reed
The supply cutback resulting from Gazprom's pricing fracas with
Ukraine does little to bolster confidence in the energy giant
Russia and its gas giant Gazprom have spent decades establishing
a position as suppliers of gas to Western Europe. On Jan. 1,
they jeopardized that lucrative position by purposely disrupting
supplies of natural gas through a pipeline transiting Ukraine.
While the Russians have accused the Ukrainians of "stealing" gas
destined for points further west, what's clear is that utilities
across Europe saw their pressure gauges drop.
How much damage has been done? In the short-term not much. Gas
prices in most of Europe have barely moved because they're
indexed to oil prices with a six-month lag. Even in Britain,
which has a freer market, prices are still well below their
November peaks.
But over the longer run, the consequences could be more serious
if Moscow, which has in recent years become more willing to cut
off gas supplies in disputes with its neighbors, allows
disruptions to happen again. Russia and Gazprom may find their
reputation for reliability tarnished, and, ultimately, they
could drive their customers to seek other suppliers.
CUTOFF RISKS. "I think the Russians would probably recognize
that they have done some damage to themselves here," says
William C. Ramsay, deputy executive director of the Paris-based
International Energy Agency, which monitors energy supplies and
orchestrates responses to crises, such as the one caused by the
U.S. hurricanes last year. "We would rather see commercial
disputes resolved in a commercial way without prejudice to other
people's commercial interests," Ramsay says.
Of course Europe, which gets about 50% of its gas imports and a
quarter of its energy supplies from Russia, has few alternatives
in the short run. But as time goes on, it will develop other
sources of supply from Algeria, Egypt, and Qatar. Higher risks
of cutoffs of gas from Russia may well accelerate these efforts,
says IEA gas analyst Daniel Simmons. But he points out that it's
hard to see how Russia, with 25% of the world's gas reserves,
can ever be brushed out of the energy picture.
Gazprom had threatened to slash shipments to Ukraine on New
Year's Day if the Ukrainians did not agree to a steep price
increase from $50 per 1,000 cubic meters to around $230. When no
deal was reached, that's exactly what it did. But Ukraine was
far from the only country to feel the impact. All across Europe
utilities in Hungary, Germany, Italy, France, Austria, and
elsewhere saw their gas supplies from Russia drop. Gaz de
France, the big French utility, was typical in reporting a 25%
to 30% decline. Like most other companies it reported that
deliveries were back to normal on Jan. 3.
"INSTRUMENT OF STATE POLICY." Russia has a point in wanting
Ukraine to pay closer to world rates for natural gas. Indeed,
global gas producers are seeking to boost prices for their
product, which is cleaner and growing faster as a fuel than oil
is. But the Russia-Ukraine dispute seems to be about more than
just money. It's hard to avoid the appearance that the Kremlin
is trying to put pressure on Ukrainian Prime Minister Victor
Yuschenko, who came to power in the so-called Orange Revolution
of late 2004 and has been trying to steer Ukraine more toward
the West. Moscow also may be trying to influence Ukraine's
parliamentary elections, scheduled for later this year.
But in playing rough with its neighbor, Russia risks shooting
itself in the foot. President Vladimir Putin's government's
increasing tendency to interfere in Russia's energy industry has
already likely contributed to a slowdown in the country's oil
production growth. Indeed, Gazprom's manuever gives the lie to
the gas giant's ongoing campaign to portray itself as an
independent, profit-driven enterprise, rather than a Kremlin
pawn. "This situation demonstrates that Gazprom isn't fully a
commercial company. It's also an instrument of state policy,"
says Stewart Gray, an analyst at energy consultants Wood
Mackenzie in Edinburgh.
The incident could set back Gazprom's efforts to recruit Western
companies to help develop a liquefied natural gas business based
on deposits beneath the Barents Sea in the Arctic. Estimated
cost: $10 billion to $20 billion. Companies that may be
interested in taking up to a 49% stake in the project, which
could send gas all the way to the U.S., include ConocoPhillips
(COP ), Chevron (CVX ), Total (TOT ) of France, and Statoil (STO
) and Norsk Hydro (NHY ) of Norway (see BW, 10/24/05, "A Russian
Giant Tromps Onto The World Stage").
ARBITRATION? If playing politics with gas becomes a Kremlin
habit, Gazprom's potential partners and customers may begin to
rethink their approach to Russia. Gray of Wood Mackenzie thinks
if Russian gas becomes more politicized, other energy sources
including nuclear power, coal, and liquefied natural gas will
get a boost.
The Russians may have blinked, but there's no sign of a
resolution to the current dispute. A Yuschenko adviser says his
government planned to take the battle to international
arbitration in Stockholm. In the meantime, Ukraine would
substitute other fuels for gas. But he conceded that the
country's gas-intensive chemicals industry would be hurt by
supply disruptions. Both countries -- and Europe -- would be
better off swallowing their pride and settling. READER COMMENTS
Roman Olearchyk in Kiev
is BusinessWeek's London bureau chief
Copyright 2006, by The McGraw-Hill Companies Inc. All rights
*****************************************************************
24 Times of India: Pak nuclear shopping spree in response to US-India deal?
[ Wednesday, January 04, 2006 02:50:44 amTIMES NEWS NETWORK ]
LONDON: According to remarks attributed to unnamed senior
western diplomats, Pakistan 's latest round of nuclear
negotiations with China may be a reaction to a recent American
offer to sell reactors to India.
But according to the Financial Times, Lieutenant General (retd)
Talat Masood, a Pakistani commentator on security affairs,
insisted the discussions with China were long-standing and of
greater vintage than the Indo-US talks. Masood is quoted as
saying, "Pakistan has a long-term relationship with China and
there is a great trust factor."
The agreement to buy a series of reactors from Beijing is
understood to have been reached on December 28, during a meeting
between Aziz and Chinese Minister for Science and Technology
National Defense and Chairman of China's Atomic Energy Authority
Sun Qin at Chashma.
At the time, Aziz declared that Pakistan's nuclear technology
had a history testifying to its inherently peaceful nature,
something that also categorised the nuclear cooperation between
Pakistan and China.
Aziz said that the Chinese reactors would help Pakistan build
larger reactors to meet its growing energy needs.
But Western commentators said they feared a growing trade in
nuclear wares, considering Pakistan's father of nuclear
technology, Dr AQ Khan, had increasingly been revealed as one of
the world's top proliferators, with his clients scattered
dangerously far afield, including North Korea, Libya and Iran.
Copyright © 2006Times Internet Limited. All rights reserved.
*****************************************************************
25 Concord Monitor: A busy year ahead for nuclear plant
Vermont
Online - Concord, NH 03301
January 3, 2006
Copyright 1997-2005 Concord Monitor and New Hampshire Patriot
P.O. Box 1177 Concord NH 03302 603-224-5301
By DAVID GRAM The Associated Press
Seeking to boost its power output, expand its nuclear waste
storage capabilities and add 20 years to its license, the
Vermont Yankee nuclear plant is looking forward to a busy 2006.
"At some point all three of them will be under consideration at
the same time," said Nuclear Regulatory Commission spokeswoman
Diane Screnci. The NRC only reviews two of the major projects
Vermont Yankee has on its plate -the 20 percent power increase
and relicensing.
Dry cask storage - the plant's plan to store highly radioactive
nuclear waste in concrete and steel casks on its grounds in
Vernon -needs only to get approval from the state Public Service
Board, which could issue a decision by April. The casks
themselves already have a generic license from the NRC.
Jay Thayer, plant owner Entergy Nuclear's site vice president
and top executive at its Vermont facility, said in an interview
that Vermont Yankee has separate teams working on the power
increase, dry cask storage and license extension.
"We really look at them as independent projects," Thayer said.
"We don't think the overlap (in timing) really has any effect
one way or another."
Screnci said she saw at least one link besides the close timing
of the plant's projects. "If they're going to have license
renewal, they're going to need a place to store spent fuel."
Raymond Shadis, technical adviser with the New England
Coalition, a nuclear watchdog group, maintained in an interview
that the power boost is closely related to dry cask storage as
well.
"If you have to go to such extreme lengths to store it
(radioactive waste), how do you justify making 20 percent more
of it per year?" Shadis asked.
Vermont Yankee, located just across the Connecticut River from
Hinsdale, N.H., will run out of room in its spent fuel pool to
store waste by 2008 and will have to shut down if it can't
expand waste storage, Thayer said.
Vermont Yankee had hoped by now to have approval for its
proposed 20 percent power increase in hand by last January; it
just cleared a key regulatory hurdle earlier this month and is
expected to get final approval from the NRC in February.
The plan for an "uprate," as such a power increase is known in
nuclear industry and regulatory circles, has run into tough
scrutiny from nuclear watchdog groups. And the state Department
of Public Service has questioned whether, after the uprate,
enough cold water could be pumped into the reactor in an
accident to cool it or if steam bubbles might form that could
interfere with that.
Before Vermont Yankee expects final approval for the power
increase, it will formally apply to the NRC for permission to
add 20 years to its license, which currently is set to expire in
2012, when the reactor hits 40 years old.
Thayer said a team from Vermont Yankee and Entergy had been
working for two years to prepare the application for the license
extension.
The New England Coalition and other groups critical of nuclear
power say they are gearing up for a big fight over relicensing.
Shadis, who is not a lawyer, represented NEC in recent state and
federal hearings on the power boost and state hearings on dry
cask storage.
For the relicensing fight, the Coalition has decided to hire a
lawyer, as well as technical experts. It recently launched a
$350,000 fund-raising campaign to help in those efforts.
It's a sure bet that NEC and Vermont Yankee will be striving to
paint very different pictures of the plant as the regulatory
processes go forward.
NEC board member Scott Ainslie called Vermont Yankee "our
Katrina. That plant is the only threat to our homes, lives, and
businesses that could throw this region into the sort of chaos
and destruction we see today on our Gulf Coast and in New
Orleans."
Thayer pointed to the costs of power from the plant - a relative
bargain in the New England energy market. Vermont's two largest
utilities, Central Vermont Public Service and Green Mountain
Power, saved about $60 million from the market price for power
during the first 11 months of this year, due to a contract they
have to buy power from the Vernon reactor, Thayer said. The
savings for all the electric companies around the region that
get Vermont Yankee power was a combined $110 million, he said.
By DAVID GRAM
The Associated Press
Guide for details. Concord Monitor Online, P.O. Box 1177, Concord
NH 03302 Phone: 603-224-5301
*****************************************************************
26 Cincinnati Enquirer: Good arguments for nuclear power
Tuesday, January 3, 2006
Letters to the editor
Professor G. Ivan Maldonado argued in his column ("Foes of
nuclear power may soon run out of steam," Dec. 18) for nuclear
energy to reduce greenhouse gases. While I am far from convinced
that global warming is manmade, I do believe there are stronger
and more immediate arguments for going nuclear. Advances in
nuclear power technologies in the last 30 years have made the
new plants safe. Nuclear power can be used to drastically reduce
our dependence on petroleum. For all the publicity on hydrogen
as a replacement for gasoline, hydrogen is an energy transport,
not an energy source. It must be produced by using energy from
natural gas, coal or electricity, the product of nuclear power.
Earl Ward, Blue Ash
Nuclear power still wrong answer
Kudos to G. Ivan Maldonado for his keen interest in thwarting
climate change. His insight into the social acceptability and
safety of nuclear energy, however, could not be any further from
the mark. Those groups that the author was so bold to note
"appear to be extremists who are blocking any realistic energy
policies" are the only environmental groups dealing with the
issues he left out of his column: Where would the waste go? How
long would it be there? What are the national security risks
associated with uranium and its processing, transporting, using,
re-transporting, and final resting place? We Cincinnatians got
it right the first time when we refused to have a nuclear Zimmer
power plant. Nuclear wasn't right for us then, and it's not
right for us now.
Geoffrey Milz
College Hill
[Cincinnati.Com]
*****************************************************************
27 El Paso Times: City will use utility's savings
Tuesday, January 3, 2006
David Crowder
El Paso Times
For more than a year, $5.9 million from El Paso Electric Co. has
been on the table for the city to pick up, and today the City
Council will probably do just that.
In 1999, the Texas Public Utility Commission directed the
electric company to divvy up nearly $12 million in unexpected
savings from the operation of Arizona's Palo Verde Nuclear
Generating Station to help the utility's customers pay their
electric bills and save energy.
The electric company in 2004 gave $5.8 million to the El Paso
County General Assistance Agency and the Big Bend County
Community Action Committee to help defray the bills of poor
ratepayers.
The other half of the Palo Verde Performance Standard Rewards
money, plus interest, was available to the city, which didn't
get around to initiating its claim until earlier this year.
But a dispute broke out when it appeared that the city was about
to appropriate the full amount, despite a 2001 agreement
involving the utility commission and several advocacy groups
that seemed to direct 40 percent of the money to Project Bravo's
energy efficiency program.
El Paso Electric has asked the city to allocate 40 percent to
Project Bravo and to properly allocate the rest by Jan. 24.
The item on today's council agenda proposes to give $1.9 million
-- about a third of the total -- to Project Bravo over three
years, a third to a city-administered energy efficiency program,
yet to be created, for small businesses and a third to the
city's own infrastructure needs.
Those needs include a 10-year Dark Sky Compliance program the
council approved to install new energy-efficient and
light-saving fixtures on city streets, around city buildings and
in parks.
East Side city Rep. Presi Ortega confirmed that the council
originally agreed to the Dark Sky program without proposing to
use the money that the electric company was directed to return.
"We passed Dark Skies, but the city doesn't have the money to do
it," he said. "This could mean we don't have to raise taxes to
spend millions to fix those fixtures."
City Manager Joyce Wilson said, "I can't say that's where we're
gong to use it, but it could allow us to change (fixtures) out
faster."
The documentation supporting the agenda item also indicates that
some of the $1.9 million coming to the city could be for new
heating and air-conditioning units in city buildings.
David Crowder may be reached at dcrowder@elpasotimes.com;
546-6194.
Make plans
+ What: El Paso City Council meeting.
+ When, Where: 9 a.m. today, City Council Chambers, second
floor, City Hall.
+ Television: The meeting will be broadcast live and replayed at
7 p.m. Tuesday on cable Channel 15.
+ Information: www.ci.elpaso.tx.us. or 541-4127.
*****************************************************************
28 News-Leader.com: Callaway plant may expand in future
ozarks Local News Published Tuesday, January 3, 2006
Economic development spokesman calls nuclear plant addition
"very speculative."
By Kevin Coleman COLUMBIA DAILY TRIBUNE
FULTON — Nuclear Regulatory Commission spokesman Scott Burnell
promptly returned a phone call to a reporter who was seeking
comment on plans to build a new nuclear power plant near Fulton.
"Hey, no problem," he said when thanked for the speedy response.
"It's good to have something to do on a Friday."
Burnell's comment summarized the past 30 years in a dormant
nuclear power industry that appears to be coming out of
hibernation to compete with coal, natural gas and wind power to
turn the turbines that generate electricity.
"It's interesting how the tide turns," said Roger Clark, chief
executive officer of Boone Electric Cooperative. "Ten years ago
you wouldn't mention it."
Ameren Corp. CEO Gary Rainwater said the company was "seriously
considering" a second reactor unit at the Callaway Nuclear Plant.
"On paper, nuclear is clearly the right choice," Rainwater said.
"I want to emphasize the 'on paper' part."
A new reactor at the Callaway plant, operated by the company's
AmerenUE subsidiary, means about 2,000 construction jobs during
the five years it would take to build the $2 billion second
unit. It also means a staff of 300 to operate the plant, which
could be online by 2017.
The possibility of another reactor unit at Callaway is "very
speculative," said Paul Sloca, spokesman for Missouri's
Department of Economic Development, but he said the benefits
could be positive for the state.
"Anytime there's a project of that magnitude with jobs and
economic activity, it's a good thing," he said. The additional
electric power generation also would help attract industry to
the area, he said.
Industry proponents say the technology is better and safer than
it was 30 years ago when the most-recent plant construction
license was issued, and it doesn't pollute the air as does
burning fossil fuels, such as coal. Opponents say it's costly
and dangerous and fraught with waste-disposal and security
issues.
One local expert says it's time that nuclear energy gets a
second chance.
"I'm pleased to see the industry start moving forward," said
Bill Miller, University of Missouri-Columbia professor of
nuclear engineering. "There's a lot of advantages to nuclear
power. It's extremely safe technically. Fossil fuels are finite
and are going to run out, and there's the global warming issue."
Forty years ago, nuclear power seemed the ideal solution for
generating electricity. But in 1979, a partial meltdown at the
Three Mile Island plant near Middletown, Pa., spooked the
nation. In 1986, the explosion at the Chernobyl plant in the
Soviet Union further squashed most remaining optimism.
Nuclear power plants use heat from atomic chain reactions to
boil water and produce steam, which turns turbines that generate
electricity. The chain reaction splits uranium atoms, which
attach to long fuel rods as radioactive waste.
Chris Hayday, a spokesman for the Osage Group of the Sierra
Club, agrees there is a renewed interest to build nuclear power
plants, but he said the industry still has two major problems:
Where to build plants and how to pay for them.
"Nobody wants to be near a nuclear power plant," Hayday said,
but added that expanding a plant, such as building a second unit
at Callaway, might be a different story. "They might have less
opposition."
With energy analysts predicting a constantly growing need for
energy generation and a lead-time of some 10 to 15 years to
build a nuclear power plant, industry planners are taking the
first steps away from fossil fuels and toward nuclear.
NRC spokesman Burnell said six utilities and a consortium — made
up of eight utilities, the Tennessee Valley Authority, General
Electric and Westinghouse — have been talking to the NRC "at
some length" about soon applying for combined construction and
operating licenses for new nuclear power plants.
One of these is Southern Nuclear, a subsidiary of Atlanta-based
Southern Co., which serves 4.2 million electrical customers
throughout the south.
"It's the most reliable and best-cost alternative for additional
generating capacity," said Steve Higginbottom, corporate
communications director for Southern Nuclear.
© 2006 Springfield News-Leader. Use of this site indicates
*****************************************************************
29 AFP: Anti-nuclear activists block Austrian-Czech border - report -
Mon Jan 2, 2:28 PM ET
PRAGUE (AFP) - Anti-nuclear activists blocked a border crossing
between Austria and the Czech Republic for five hours, to protest
security concerns at a Czech nuclear power plant, according to
the Czech news agency CTK.
The nuclear plant in Temelin, which went into service in October
2000, has had numerous technical problems forcing emergency
shutdowns. The anti-nuclear demonstrators said they are
concerned about possible radioactive pollution.
Temelin is located about 60 kilometers from the border with
Austria, which has been a non-nuclear country since 1978.
The anti-nuclear protest was organized at the Wullowitz-Dolni
Dvoriste border crossing by several Austrian environmentalist
groups including Anti-Atom, Stop Temelin and Atomstopp, which
claim the Austrian government is not doing enough.
"The Austrian government is not exercising sufficient pressure
to get a resolution to concerns about security and is losing the
chance to get vast improvements at Temelin," the groups said in
a joint communique.
The Czech Temelin plant, which was developed under the ex-Soviet
regime and includes Russian reactors, was entirely reviewed
after the fall of communism, by the US nuclear power plant
builder Westinghouse, among others.
Copyright © 2006 Agence France Presse. All rights reserved. The
*****************************************************************
30 NRC: Notice of Availability of Environmental Assessment and Finding
FR Doc E5-8205
[Federal Register: January 3, 2006 (Volume 71, Number 1)]
[Notices] [Page 144-145] From the Federal Register Online via GPO
Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr03ja06-104]
of No Significant Impact for ROHM & HAAS Company's Facility in
Philadelphia, PA AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Notice of availability.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: John Nicholson, Commercial and R
Branch, Division of Nuclear Materials Safety, Region I, 475
Allendale Road, King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406, telephone
(610) 337-5236, fax (610) 337-5269; or by e-mail: jjn@nrc.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: I. Introduction The U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) is considering the issuance of a
license amendment to Rohm & Haas Company for Materials License
No. 037-01665-01, to authorize release of its facility in
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for unrestricted use and license
termination. NRC has prepared an Environmental Assessment (EA) in
support of this proposed action in accordance with the
requirements of 10 CFR Part 51. Based on the EA, the NRC has
concluded that a Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI) is
appropriate. The amendment will be issued following the
publication of this Notice.
II. EA Summary The purpose of the proposed action is to authorize
the release of the licensee's Philadelphia, Pennsylvania facility
for unrestricted use. Rohm & Haas Company was authorized by NRC
(AEC at the time) from 1956 to use radioactive materials for
research and development purposes at the site. On April 26, 2005,
Rohm & Haas Company requested that NRC release the facility for
unrestricted use. Rohm & Haas Company has conducted surveys of
the facility and
[[Page 145]] provided information to the NRC to demonstrate that
the site meets the license termination criteria in Subpart E of
10 CFR Part 20 for unrestricted use.
The NRC staff has prepared an EA in support of the license
amendment. The facility was remediated and surveyed prior to the
licensee requesting the license amendment. The NRC staff has
reviewed the information and final status survey submitted by
Rohm & Haas Company. As discussed in the EA, the staff has
determined that the residual radioactivity meets the requirements
in Subpart E of 10 CFR Part 20.
III. Finding of No Significant Impact The staff has prepared the
EA (summarized above) in support of the license amendment to
release the facility for unrestricted use.
The NRC staff has evaluated Rohm & Haas Company's request and the
results of the surveys and has concluded that the completed
action complies with the criteria in Subpart E of 10 CFR Part 20.
The staff has found that the radiological environmental impacts
from the action are bounded by the impacts evaluated by
NUREG-1496, Volumes 1-3, ``Generic Environmental Impact Statement
in Support of Rulemaking on Radiological Criteria for License
Termination of NRC-Licensed Facilities'' (ML042310492,
ML042320379, and ML042330385). Additionally, no non- radiological
or cumulative impacts were identified. On the basis of the EA,
the NRC has concluded that the environmental impacts from the
action are expected to be insignificant and has determined not to
prepare an environmental impact statement for the action.
IV. Further Information Documents related to this action,
including the application for the license amendment and
supporting documentation, are available electronically at the
NRC's Electronic Reading Room at
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. From this site, you can
access the NRC's Agencywide Document Access and Management System
(ADAMS), which provides text and image files of NRC's public
documents. The ADAMS accession numbers for the documents related
to this Notice are: Environmental Assessment (ML053570288); Final
Status Survey and amendment request dated April 26, 2005 [ADAMS
Accession No. ML051390274]; Letter dated May 16, 2005 providing
additional information [ADAMS Accession No. ML051510089]; Letter
dated May 27, 2005 providing additional information [ADAMS
Accession No. ML051590269]; Letter dated May 31, 2005 providing
additional information [ADAMS Accession No. ML051590359]; and
Letter dated June 29, 2005 providing additional information
[ADAMS Accession No. ML051880162]. Persons who do not have access
to ADAMS or who encounter problems in accessing the documents
located in ADAMS, should contact the NRC PDR Reference staff by
telephone at (800) 397-4209 or (301) 415-4737, or by e-mail to
pdr@nrc.gov. Documents related to operations conducted under this
license not specifically referenced in this Notice may not be
electronically available and/or may not be publicly available.
Persons who have an interest in reviewing these documents should
submit a request to NRC under the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA). Instructions for submitting a FOIA request can be found
on the NRC's Web site at
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/foia/foia-privacy.html .
Dated at King of Prussia, Pennsylvania, this 23rd day of December
2005.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
James P. Dwyer, Chief, Commercial and Research & Development
Branch, Division of Nuclear Materials Safety, Region I.
[FR Doc. E5-8205 Filed 12-30-05; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
*****************************************************************
31 NRC: Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, LLC and Entergy Nuclear
FR Doc E5-8206
[Federal Register: January 3, 2006 (Volume 71, Number 1)]
[Notices] [Page 144] From the Federal Register Online via GPO
Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr03ja06-103] [[Page 144]]
Operations, Inc.; Notice of Issuance of Director's Decision Under
10 CFR 2.206 Notice is hereby given that the Director, Office of
Nuclear Reactor Regulation, has issued a Director's Decision with
regard to a petition dated May 3, 2005, filed pursuant to Title
10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), section 2.206, by
Mr. Raymond Shadis on behalf of the New England Coalition (NEC),
hereinafter referred to as the ``Petitioner.'' The petition was
supplemented on May 17, 2005. The petition concerns the use of
the Hemyc electric raceway fire barrier system (EFRBS) at Vermont
Yankee Nuclear Generating Station (Vermont Yankee).
NRC Information Notice 2005-07, ``Results of Hemyc Electrical
Raceway Fire Barrier System [ERFBS] Full Scale Fire Testing,''
dated April 1, 2005, informed the operators of nuclear power
plants that the Hemyc ERFBS did not perform for one hour as
designed. The NRC listed Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station
(Vermont Yankee) among the sites that had installed Hemyc ERFBS.
The NEC petition requested that the NRC promptly restore
reasonable assurance of adequate protection of public health and
safety with regard to the fire barriers in electrical cable
protection systems at Vermont Yankee, or otherwise to order a
derate of Vermont Yankee until such time as the operability of
the fire barriers can be assured. Specifically, the petition
requested that the Commission take the following actions: (1)
Require Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee (ENVY) to promptly conduct
a review at Vermont Yankee to determine the extent of condition,
including a full inventory of the type, amount, application, and
placement of Hemyc, and an assessment of the safety significance
of each application; (2) require ENVY to promptly provide
justification for operation in nonconformance with 10 CFR Part
50, Appendix R; and (3) upon finding that Vermont Yankee is
operating in an unanalyzed condition and/or that assurance of
public health and safety is degraded, promptly order a power
reduction (derate) of Vermont Yankee until such time as it can be
demonstrated that ENVY is operating in conformance with 10 CFR
Part 50, Appendix R, and all other applicable regulations.
Mr. Raymond Shadis, in his capacity as the petitioner's Staff
Technical Advisor, participated in a telephone conference call
with the NRC's Petition Review Board (PRB) on May 17, 2005, to
discuss the petition. The results of that discussion were
considered in the PRB's determination regarding the Petitioner's
request for action and in establishing the schedule for the
review of the petition. During the May 17, 2005, PRB conference
call, the Petitioner requested that the licensee review fire
barriers beyond the Hemyc electric raceway fire barrier system.
This request was not accepted under the 2.206 process because the
petitioner did not provide adequate information to justify
expanding the scope of the review.
In an acknowledgment letter dated June 15, 2005, the NRC informed
the Petitioner that the petition was accepted, in part, for
review under 10 CFR 2.206 and had been referred to the Office of
Nuclear Reactor Regulation for appropriate action.
The NRC staff sent a copy of the proposed Director's Decision to
the Petitioner for comment on October 11, 2005. The NRC staff did
not receive any comments.
The Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation has
determined that the NRC has in effect granted the Petitioner's
request. The reasons for this decision are explained in the
Director's Decision pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206 (DD-05-07). The
Petitioner's concerns regarding the use of Hemyc at Vermont
Yankee have been adequately resolved such that no further action
is needed. The licensee has replaced the Hemyc on all equipment
that is relied upon for compliance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix
R.
The documents cited in this Director's Decision are available for
inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room (PDR) at One
White Flint North, Public File Area O1 F21, 11555 Rockville Pike
(first floor), Rockville, Maryland and from the NRC's Agencywide
Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Public Electronic
Reading Room on the NRC Web site at . Persons who do not have
access to ADAMS or who encounter problems in accessing the
documents located in ADAMS should contact the NRC PDR reference
staff at 1-800-397-4209 or 301-415-4737, or by e-mail to .
A copy of the Director's Decision will be filed with the
Secretary of the Commission for the Commission's review in
accordance with 10 CFR 2.206 of the Commission's regulations. As
provided for by this regulation, the Director's Decision will
constitute the final action of the Commission 25 days after the
date of the decision, unless the Commission, on its own motion,
institutes a review of the Director's Decision in that time.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 23rd day of December 2005.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
R.W. Borchardt, Acting Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation.
[FR Doc. E5-8206 Filed 12-30-05; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
*****************************************************************
32 Prague Daily Monitor: Temelin to shut down second unit on Tuesday -
WEDNESDAY 4 JANUARY
http://www.praguemonitor.com
CESKE BUDEJOVICE, South Bohemia, Jan 2 (CTK) - The Temelin
nuclear power station will shut down its second unit on Tuesday
afternoon to repair a highure rotor of its turbogenerator,
Temelin spokesman Milan Nebesar told CTK today.
"The exchange of the rotor will enable operation at the
projected output of 980 megawatts. Up to now, it has been
working at a reduced output of about 80 percent," he added.
The shutdown is scheduled to last about three weeks. The rotor
lacks one of four runners, removed after problems with turbine
vibrations.
Nebesar said operators would disconnect the unit from the grid
at 7:00 p.m. on Tuesday. The shutdown was scheduled for
December, but it was delayed because the power station first had
to shut the first unit down due to a defect.
Austrian opponents of the power station today blockaded the
Wullowitz/Dolni Dvoriste border crossing again to express
dissatisfaction with the implementation of safety measures at
Temelin.
This story copyright 2005 CTK Czech News Agency.
*****************************************************************
33 Asian Tribune: Pak denies reports of acquiring nuclear reactors from China
A Newspaper Published by World Institute for Asian Studies.
Vol. 5 No. 254
Date : 2006-01-04
By Iqbal Hussain Khan Yousafzai – Reporting from Islamabad
Islamabad, 04 January, (Asiantribune.com): Pakistan has denied
reports that it was holding talks with China to buy up to eight
nuclear reactors from Beijing in a deal worth up to $10 billion.
A British daily the Financial Times has quoted an official
saying construction could begin in 2015 and take 10 years.
Such a deal would add more than 4,000 megawatts of electricity
to Pakistan's national grid, the paper said.
But a spokesperson of the foreign ministry of Pakistan Tasnim
Aslam said that Pakistan was considering more nuclear energy bu
the Financial Times report was "baseless".
"As our economy is expanding we require more energy and we
remain interested in acquiring safe nuclear energy," she said.
"But the report about Pakistan's talks with China regarding six
to eight nuclear reactors is baseless.
"Since this report has also given specifics of the so-called
talks we want to clarify that the report is not true."
Pakistan already has two nuclear reactors, and began building a
third with Chinese help at Chashma in Punjab province last week.
At the time Pakistani Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz said Pakistan
would import two further 600MW plants from China.
"Co-operation between China and Pakistan in nuclear energy for
peaceful use will increase in the future," he added.
In September Pakistan had urged the United States and other
Western countries to help it develop civilian nuclear technology
to meet its growing energy needs.
- Asian Tribune -
Copyright © 2006 www.asiantribune.com. All rights reserved.
*****************************************************************
34 UK: News & Star: Project: Nuclear decommissioning Cost: £30 billion at Sellafield alone
NUCLEAR POWER
Published on 03/01/2006
Timescale: 2006-22nd century
THE closure and clean-up of Britain’s ageing nuclear power
stations will be a Herculean task expected to take more than 100
years.
It is a mixed blessing for Sellafield where 8,000 jobs, mostly
in reprocessing, will go by 2018.
The good news is that the body in charge of nuclear clean-up at
17 sites throughout the country is based in West Cumbria.
The Nuclear Decommissioning Agency has plans for a nuclear
institute at Westlakes, near Whitehaven, and to establish a
national nuclear skills academy. The aim is to make West Cumbria
an internationally-renowned centre for nuclear decommissioning
so bringing high-quality jobs to replace some of those lost.
The Government, meanwhile, has launched an energy review that
could lead to a new nuclear power plant being built at
Sellafield.
*****************************************************************
35 NRC: NRC, FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co. Managers to Discuss Company’s Fleet of
Nuclear Plants
News Release - Region I - 2006-00
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Office of Public Affairs, Region I
No. I-06-001 January 3, 2006
CONTACT: Diane Screnci (610) 337-5330
Neil A. Sheehan (610) 337-5331 E-mail: opa1@nrc.gov
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co. (FENOC) will meet on Tuesday,
Jan. 10, to discuss FENOCs three nuclear power plants, which are
located in Pennsylvania and Ohio.
It will provide NRC senior managers from the two regional
offices responsible for oversight of the plants (Regions I and
III) with an opportunity to discuss them simultaneously with the
companys senior management.
The meeting is scheduled to begin at 9 a.m. at FENOCs Beaver
Valley nuclear power plant in Shippingport, Pa., in Room 103 in
the plants Training Building, on Shippingport Road. The building
is across from the plants parking lot entrance. Members of the
public are invited to observe the meeting. Those in attendance
will be able to ask questions or offer comments to NRC officials
after the business portion has been concluded but before the
overall session has been adjourned. The meeting notice is
available on the agencys web site at:
http://www.nrc.gov/public-involve/public-meetings/index.cfm.
Besides Beaver Valley, FENOC also owns and operates the
Davis-Besse nuclear power plant, located near Oak Harbor, Ohio,
and the Perry nuclear power plant, at Perry, Ohio.
Information about the NRCs assessment of performance at the
respective plants is available on the agencys web site at the
following addresses: Beaver Valley 1
http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/ASSESS/BV1/bv1_chart.html
Beaver Valley 2
http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/ASSESS/BV2/bv2_chart.html
Davis-Besse
http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/ASSESS/DAVI/davi_chart.html
Perry 1
http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/ASSESS/PERR1/perr1_chart.html
Last revised Tuesday, January 03, 2006
*****************************************************************
36 Guardian Unlimited: Homeland Security to Re-Prioritize Grants
From the Associated Press
[UP]
Tuesday January 3, 2006 8:02 AM
By LARA JAKES JORDAN
Associated Press Writer
WASHINGTON (AP) - The Homeland Security Department is poised to
alter the annual competition for its federal grants, seeking to
direct money to cities that face multiple threats - and not just
from terrorism.
The change, outlined in departmental documents sent to state and
local officials, addresses both the destruction and lack of
preparedness seen during Hurricane Katrina.
It also reflects Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff's
efforts to give his department an all-hazards mission, even
though it was created as a direct result of the Sept. 11, 2001,
terror attacks.
Chertoff was prepared to announce Tuesday which cities will
receive part of $765 million in annual Urban Area Security
Initiative grants. The program usually pits highly populated
areas against rural regions.
In past years, the grants generally have gone to the nation's 50
largest cities for terror-related security measures. This year,
however, cities that risk being hit by a natural disaster or a
health crisis would also be eligible, according to the
documents.
``In light of several major new national planning priorities,
which address such issues as pandemic influenza and the
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, the allowable scope of (grant)
activities (include) catastrophic events - provided that these
activities also build capabilities that relate to terrorism,''
according to a 203-page Homeland Security plan for state and
local officials.
``For example, mass evacuation planning supports terrorism
preparedness but also other types of catastrophic events,'' it
said. ``Planning for pandemic influenza and linking that effort
to a larger bioterrorism preparedness effort offers another
example. Grantees must demonstrate the dual-use nature of any
activities implemented under this program that are not
explicitly focused on terrorism preparedness.''
Homeland Security spokesman Russ Knocke would not comment on
which cities will be eligible for grants this year. Aides to
lawmakers who oversee Homeland Security said they received very
vague briefings by department officials on the changes, but
weren't told which cities would be eligible.
Calls to city officials around the country and to the U.S.
Conference of Mayors for comment were not immediately returned.
A senior Homeland Security official, speaking only on condition
of anonymity because the plan isn't public yet, said the new
formula uses highly detailed data - down to an area's ZIP code -
to determine the most vulnerable communities.
It also looks at daily and event-driven commuter populations
within cities, and for the first time ranks local infrastructure
by risk - drawing distinctions, for example, between a nuclear
power plant and a subway system, the official said.
In another shift, the cities will not know how much money they
will receive when their eligibility is announced. Their grants
will be determined later based on applications detailing how
they planned to spend the money, officials said.
The cities are vying for a smaller pot this year than in 2005,
when Homeland Security distributed $829 million in urban area
grants. The largest share was $207 million for New York City;
the smallest was $5 million to Louisville, Ky.
---
Homeland Security Department: http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/
Guardian Unlimited © Guardian Newspapers Limited 2006
*****************************************************************
37 [du-list] USUK bombing up to 150 air attacks for December
Date: Tue, 03 Jan 2006 17:34:22 -0800
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2089-1965182,00.html
Item begins....
US forces step up Iraq airstrikes
Sarah Baxter, Washington, Ali Rifat, Baghdad and Peter Almond
AMERICAN forces are dramatically stepping up air attacks on
insurgents in Iraq as they prepare to start the withdrawal of ground troops
in the spring.
The number of airstrikes in 2005, running at a monthly average
of 25 until August, surged to 120 in November and an expected 150 in
December, according to official military figures.
----------
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38 [du-list] Self Described Exposures That Have Occured in Op
Date: Tue, 03 Jan 2006 17:34:28 -0800
Dear All,
FYI ~~ Have recently posted to the DSJF web-site a report concerning
Soldiers who completed their Post Deployment Health questioner's regarding
self described exposures that had occurred in OIF. Please take note of
answers where DU, Deet, treated uniforms, and CBR played a huge factor in
the individual Soldiers perception related to what they perceived as a
decline in their health. This report was filled out by all ranks so you
can't say that those who believe that their health had/has been
compromised, are strictly lower enlisted as this report actually shows just
the opposite. The Doc is located @
http://www.dsjf.org/FHP%20Files/FHP%20Files%20.htm
Best to All and Happy New Years,
Paul Lyons,
President,
Desert Storm Justice Foundation, Inc
www.dsjf.org
[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
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39 [du-list] Mururoa: Results of nuclear tests probe due soon
Date: Tue, 03 Jan 2006 17:34:30 -0800
Mururoa: Results of nuclear tests probe due soon
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/section/story.cfm?c_id=2&ObjectID=10362261
03.01.06
A commission of inquiry into claims that French nuclear testing on
Mururoa atoll in French Polynesia caused deaths and severe long-term health
problems is due to publish its findings this month.
France conducted 41 atmospheric nuclear tests between 1966 and 1974.
It followed those with 134 underground nuclear tests between 1975 and 1991.
Eight more tests took place in 1995 and 1996.
In July, the territory's president, Oscar Temaru, set up a
commission to investigate the effects of the tests.
British Sunday newspaper the Observer reported that French
Polynesian opponents of France had consistently blamed nuclear tests for
the region's chronic levels of leukaemia and other cancers.
They believed that they would be vindicated by the report and that
it would establish that France had, for years, engaged in an elaborate
cover-up. They also claimed Paris was aware of the health risks when
testing began in 1966.
"We are now getting more than 600 cases of cancer a year and more
than 250 deaths because of these tests," Roland Oldham, president of
Mururoa e Tatou, the association of former Mururoa workers, told the Observer.
The report would prove an important test for the credibility of Mr
Temaru, the newspaper said. Since being elected, he had disappointed
supporters by saying independence from France could be 20 years away.
- NZPA
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40 [du-list] DU victims (and others) may protest by resigning all
Date: Tue, 03 Jan 2006 17:34:43 -0800
[We are arranging it in Italy - after we removed the
governor of the central bank on Dec 2005]
Debt Free Sovereign Trust
http://www.centrostudimonetari.org/articoli/debtfreesovereigntrust.html
A typical real estate purchase and sale goes down as
described below after the buyer and the seller have
signed the agreement of purchase and sale:
The buyer goes to Magic Bank in response to the bank’s
claim that it is in the business of lending money in
accordance to its corporate charter. The buyer went to
the bank believing that Magic Bank had the asset
(money) to lend. Magic Bank never tells its customers
the truth that it does not have any money to lend, nor
are they permitted to use their depositors’ money to
lend to its borrowers.
Notwithstanding the fact that Magic Bank does not have
any money to lend, Magic Bank makes the buyer/borrower
to sign a mortgage loan application form which is
essentially a promissory note that the buyer/borrower
promises to pay Magic Bank for the money (what money?)
he/she is supposed to receive from Magic Bank even
before any value or consideration is received by the
buyer/borrower from Magic Bank. This promissory note
is a valuable consideration, a receivable and
therefore an asset transferred from the buyer to the
bank which Magic Bank enters into its own asset
account as a cash deposit.
After making sure that the buyer has the ability to
pay the required monthly payments (the buyer has
credit), Magic Bank agrees to lend the buyer the money
(cash) to pay the seller. Magic Bank has no money to
lend but it gave the buyer a promise to lend money by
way of a commitment letter, loan approval letter, loan
authorization or loan confirmation letter, etc.,
signed by a bank official or loans/mortgage officer
employed by Magic Bank.
Magic Bank’s acceptance of the buyer’s promissory note
made the bank liable to the buyer/borrower for the
full face value of the promissory note which is the
agreed purchase price of the property, less any cash
deposit or down payment money paid by the buyer
directly to the seller.
It is important to note at this point that all real
estate transaction requires that the property being
sold must be conveyed by the seller to the buyer free
of all liens and encumbrances which means that all
liens such as existing mortgages, judgments, etc. must
be paid before the property can be mortgaged by the
seller as collateral to the mortgage loan which is yet
to be received by the seller pursuant the promise made
by Magic Bank. How can the seller obtain clear title
if he has not yet received any money from the buyer?
And how can the buyer mortgage a property that does
not yet belong to him or her?
This dilemma is solved using Magic Bank’s magic
tricks. Magic Bank in concert with other magicians
the lawyers or notaries causes all the liens and
encumbrances to disappear by using a cheque drawn in
the name of Magic Bank backed by the buyer’s
promissory note and the agreement of purchase and
sale. This cheque is deposited into the lawyer’s trust
account. In essence, Magic Bank and its magicians, the
lawyers and notaries used the buyer’s promissory note
as the cash to enable the purchase agreement. It was
the buyer’s promissory note that made the conveyancing
possible. Magic Bank caused the property to be
conveyed to buyer from the seller clear title, free
and clear of all liens and encumbrances. The property
now belongs to the buyer which makes it possible for
the buyer to mortgage the property to Magic Bank. The
buyer paid for it using his/her own promissory note.
At this point, the seller has not yet received any
money or cash so Magic Bank and its magicians must
perform another magic in order to satisfy the seller’s
requirement that he/she must get paid or the whole
deal is null and void. The seller does not even know
that the property had been magically conveyed to the
buyer’s name in order for the seller to receive any
money.
The ensuing magic trick is accomplished this way. The
buyer is made to sign another promissory note. The
mortgage contract is attached to the bottom of the
promissory note which makes the buyer liable to pay
Magic Bank for the money or the loan which the buyer
has not yet or will never receive for up to twenty
five years or more depending on the amortization term
of the mortgage contract. This note is linked to the
collateral through the mortgage contract and as such,
it is valuable to Magic Bank.
Magic Bank then goes to Bank of Canada or to another
bank through its accomplice, the Canadian Payment
Association to pledge the deal that they have just
gotten from the buyer for credit. Bank of Canada then
gives Magic Bank the “credit.” Remember, it is not
Magic Bank’s credit, it was the buyer’s credit who
promised to pay Magic Bank if and when the money is
received by the buyer from Magic Bank, payable for up
to 25 years or more.
Note: What happened above is basically a “swap”, a
transaction all banks do to ‘monetize’ security. In
this case, the second promissory note that is linked
to the mortgage contract and signed by the buyer is a
mortgage-backed security.
Magic Bank will then agree to pay Bank of Canada a
certain percentage of interest over “prime”. Thus the
buyer’s loan package goes to Bank of Canada which
credits Magic Bank with the full amount of credit
which is the total amount of the money Magic Bank is
entitled to receive after 25 years which is the amount
of the principal plus all the interest payments the
buyer has promised to pay to Magic Bank for 25 years
or more which is usually three times the amount of the
money promised by Magic Bank to the buyer. By magic,
Magic Bank just enriched itself and got paid in
advance, without using or risking its own money.
Magic Bank’s magician, the lawyer who holds the cheque
that is backed by the buyer’s original promissory note
then cuts a cheque to the seller as payment for the
property. In effect, The buyer paid the seller with
his/her own money by virtue of the fact that it was
the buyer’s own money (the promissory note) that made
the purchase and sale possible. Magic Bank just made a
cool 300% profit without using or risking any capital
of its own. Neither was there any depositor’s money
deducted from Magic Bank’s asset account in this
transaction.
What really happened was pure deception that if we the
people try to do this, we would end up in the
calaboose and be found guilty of fraud and criminal
conversion not to mention that the subject property
would have been seized from us by the court.
This is only a crime if we the people do it to each
other such as it would be an indictable crime if we
issue a cheque with no funds. There would not be any
deal, no purchase and sale agreement because there is
no valuable consideration. In order to de-criminalize
the transaction, we need Magic Bank and their cohorts
to make the deal happen. It is really a conspiracy of
sorts but these “persons”, the banks, the lawyers, the
land title offices or even the courts do not consider
the transaction as fraudulent transactions because
these transactions happen all the time.
Such a contract is void ab-initio or void from the
beginning which meant that the contract never took
place in the first place. Moreover, the good faith and
fair dealing requirement through full disclosure is
non-existent which further voids the contract. Magic
Bank failed to disclose to the buyer that it will not
be giving the buyer any valuable consideration and
taking interest back as additional benefit to unjustly
enrich the corporation. Magic Bank also failed to
disclose how much profit they are going to make on the
deal.
Magic Bank led the buyer to believe that the money
going to the seller would be coming from its own asset
account. They lied because they knew or ought to have
known that their own book or ledger would show that
Magic Bank does not have any money to lend and that
their records will show that no such loan transaction
ever took place. Their own book will show that there
would be no debits from Magic Bank’s asset account at
all and all that would show up are the two entries
made when the buyer gave Magic Bank the first
collateral or the promissory note which enabled Magic
Bank to cut a cheque which made it possible to convey
the property from seller to the buyer free and clear
of all liens or encumbrances as required by the
agreement of purchase and sale entered into in writing
between the buyer and the seller. What really happened
was not magic; in reality, the buyer’s promissory note
was used by Magic Bank and its magicians the lawyers
and land title clerks to convey free title to the
buyer from the seller. So why do we need the mortgage
contract for?
The other entry that would show up when we audit Magic
Bank’s book is the other pledge of collateral
including the buyer’s promissory note which was
converted (unlawfully and without disclosure or
permission from the buyer) into a mortgage-backed
security which was “swapped” or deposited by Magic
Bank to Bank of Canada and “cleared” through the
Canadian Payment Association for which another deposit
was entered into Magic Bank’s transaction account.
>From the above, we can list all the criminal acts
perpetrated by Magic Bank:
The mortgage contract was void ab-initio because Magic
Bank lied and never intended to lend a single cent of
their own asset or depositor’s money to the buyer. A
valid contract must have lawful or valuable
consideration. The contract failed for anticipated
breach. Magic Bank never planned to give the
buyer/borrower any valuable consideration.
Magic Bank breached all its fiduciary duties to the
buyer and are therefore guilty of criminal breach of
trust by failing in its good faith requirement.
Magic Bank concealed the fact from the buyer that it
would be using the buyer’s promissory notes; first to
clear all the liens and encumbrances in order to
convey clear title to the buyer; then use the second
promissory note to obtain more money from Bank of
Canada or other institutions that buy and sell
mortgage-backed security. Magic Bank received up to
three times the amount of money required to purchase
the property and kept the proceeds to itself without
telling the buyer.
Magic Bank violated its corporate charter by loaning
“credit” or nothing at all to the buyer and then
charging interests on such make-believe loan. Banks
are only licensed to loan their own money, not other
people’s money. Magic Bank used the buyer’s promissory
note to clear the title which essentially purchased
the property from the seller. The transaction is an
ultra vires transaction because Magic Bank has engaged
in a contract outside of its lawful mandate. An ultra
vires contract is void or voidable because it is
non-existent in law.
Everyone involved in this undertaking with Magic Bank,
starting with the loan or mortgage officer, the
lawyers, the land title office and even the central
bank are equally guilty by association by aiding and
abetting Magic Bank in its commission of its crimes
against the buyer and the people who would eventually
have to absorb all of the loss through increased
taxes, etc.
In the final analysis, Magic Bank and the others who
profited from the ultra vires transaction are all
guilty of unjust enrichment and fraud for deceiving
the buyer and the people for acting in concert in this
joint endeavor to deceive the buyer.
What can we do?
The above clearly demonstrate how Magic Bank deceives
thousands if not millions of people by making us think
we are getting a loan when the truth is there is no
loan. Do the bank’s loan officers know what they are
doing? Absolutely. Therefore they must be stopped. But
who is going to stop them from deceiving thousands of
people everyday? The SYSTEM the banks, the lawyers
and the courts will not. Stopping Magic Bank and
others like it is entirely up to us. We allowed them
to deceive us by becoming lethargically and knowingly
ignorant.
This is where we come in. We have done extensive
research and understand how the banks are stealing and
plundering our wealth. We know what they do and how
they do it. We also know that the banks have the money
to buy the most expensive lawyers and pay the courts
in order to receive a favorable outcome. The
government knows that the banks consistently violate
the law and their corporate charter and use their
influence against the public servants who have sworn
to serve and protect our best interest.
Only you can hold these banks and public officials to
account. We need you to tell us that you want to
become debt-free and that you want all of the money
stolen from you by the banks returned to you with
interest. We cannot help everybody but we can help you
and those want our help.
This is how it’s done:
You assign all your debts to us. That’s right, we
assume all your debts. Crazy eh? Who in the world
would want to assume anyone else’s debt? Only we from
Debt Free Sovereign Trust do this sort of thing
because we know our process works. In essence, by
assuming your debts, we become your payment agent. Our
job is to help you pay for all your debts. We
eliminate your debts by paying them off.
As your payment agent, we assume all your debts by
transferring them all into a trust. Debt Free
Sovereign Trust becomes your trustee. This is required
in order to remove any excuse by Magic Bank and others
like them to refuse to deal with us on your behalf. As
your lawful payment agent, we become cloaked in law
with a vested interest and a fiduciary duty with
regards to your debt to do whatever is necessary to
cause your creditors to discharge, settle or close
your accounts permanently and to receive whatever
amount of money has been stolen or converted by the
banks from you without your knowledge or permission.
Upon transferring all your debts into Debt Free
Sovereign Trust, we inform the bank of the fact and we
ask to see what the pay off is for the supposed loan
which you never received. We then create a Surety Bond
backed by your personal exemption with a face value of
up to double the pay off amount.
We then make a presentment to the bank with the
attached bond. If fictional “persons” like
corporations can create money out of thin air, so can
you. This is because there is no money. Real money
does not exist and therefore money must be created.
The presentment itself offers the bank the choice of
whether to honor or dishonor the presentment. Should
the bank decide to honor the presentment, all they
have to do is accept the attached bond for value and
discharge, settle or write off the account, no
questions asked. You are now completely debt free. Our
fee for this service is calculated at 40% of the loan
balance. This amount may be shared between you and the
bank who still stand to profit by way of a tax write
off of up to 100% of the total unpaid balance.
Should the bank decide to dishonor the presentment by
rejecting the bond as payment (which is usually the
case), they are required by law (law merchant) to
produce all the evidence required in order to prove
they have a valid claim against you. This includes but
not limited to the following:
The original contracts and loan application or
promissory notes or mortgage documents they received
from you.
In the absence of the original documents and
promissory notes, the bank must compensate or
indemnify you for the loss or non-return of your
promissory notes.
Full accounting records, ledgers, bookkeeping entries
signed and sworn by the person who made the entries
under penalty of perjury and his/her full commercial
liability.
Certified true copies of all audited statements of
accounts sworn under penalty of perjury and full
commercial liability of the person or persons who made
and or audited the statements.
The bank must return the bond they received within 10
days of deciding it will not accept the bond in return
for discharge and settlement of your account.
Upon the bank’s dishonoring the presentment, we make
another presentment, a Notice of Fault/Opportunity to
Cure. This gives the bank another opportunity to
settle the account or produce all verifiable evidence
to prove the existence or validity of the loan in
question. The bank has ten days to make up its mind
whether or not they will reconsider your good faith
offer to discharge and settle the account in good
faith.
Should the bank decide to dishonor or reject the
offer, the Notice of Fault/Opportunity to Cure shall
be the banks tacit admission and agreement that they
do not have any valid claim against you. This would
result in an automatic Notice of Default to be served
to the bank. The Notice of Default is your notice that
you have accepted the bank’s default under these terms
and conditions: that your acceptance means that the
bank must now pay you back the principal amount of the
loan, plus compensatory damages up to four times the
principal amount and punitive damages up to two
hundred times the principal amount. The bank has
further ten days to accept or dispute your original
good faith offer to settle and discharge the loan
amount or accept the terms and conditions contained in
the Notice of Fault/Opportunity to Cure and the Notice
of Default.
The banks non-response shall cause us to issue to the
bank a Certificate of Dishonor which is a default
judgment against the bank. We now have the option to
either sue the bank in court, force them into
involuntary bankruptcy or sell the judgment to other
banks. The buyers of these judgments may do whatever
they like with the judgments.
In return, as compensation for our work, we will
charge you, the client 40% of the proceeds of any
money we receive either from the bank directly, or
from the proceeds of the judgments. In other words,
you get 60% and we get 40%.
End of story
John-Ruiz: Dempsey
Debt Free Sovereign Trust
___________________________________
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41 After "Dirty Bomb" Residents Might Be Allowed Back In Spite Of 25% Chance Of Cancer, Leukemia
Date: Tue, 3 Jan 2006 23:36:24 -0500
X-Fingerprint: smirnowb@ix.netcom.com-127.127
The Dept. Of Homeland "Security" besides
perpetrating Bush/Cheney's "The Boogey Man Is
Coming" Terrorist Scenario, In Case There Ever Is
A Dirty Bomb, Say It's Just Fine If There's A 25%
Chance Over 30 Years Of Contracting Cancer Or
Leukemia.
Call your Rep & Senators [ Phone:
202-224-3121] and tell them you see through
Bush/Cheney's Scare Tactics About Some Alleged
Terrorist Boogey Man Coming & You're Sick To Death
Of It. It's Just A Huge Hoax Against A Largely
Emotionally Infantile Population. See The
Following For A Great Expose On The Great Fraud Of
Terrorism Against The USA:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/3755686.stm
Where to purchase DVD or video of "The Power
Of Nightmares":
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/search-handle-url/index%3Dblended%26field-keywords%3Dthe%20power%20of%20nightmares%26results-process%3Ddefault%26dispatch%3Dsearch/ref%3Dpd%5Fsl%5Faw%5Ftops-1%5Fblended%5F11101997%5F2/002-8950179-8785668
>The document issued Tuesday lists a variety of
factors, including the cost of cleanup. Mr. Hirsch
and a >second antinuclear group, the Nuclear
Information and Resource Service, said that the 10
rem figure >would produce cancer or leukemia in
one person in four who was exposed to that amount
annually for a >total of 30 years. The two groups
called the advice "a nuclear Katrina in the
making."
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/03/national/nationalspecial3/03cnd-nuke.html
Even After 'Dirty Bomb' Exposure, Residents
Might Be Allowed Back In
a.. E-Mail This
b.. Printer-Friendly
c.. Reprints
d.. Save Article
By MATTHEW L. WALD
Published: January 3, 2006
WASHINGTON, Jan. 3 - The Homeland Security
Department, preparing for an attack by terrorists
who would spread radioactive material, advised
government officials on Tuesday that they should
consider permitting people to re-occupy
contaminated land and buildings even if they would
be exposed to radiation at a level double what
nuclear plant workers can legally receive.
Skip to next paragraph
The department published a document that stressed
trying to balance the health risk of radiation
exposure with minimizing the disruption that a
"dirty bomb" would cause.
If there is a delay in reoccupying areas evacuated
because of contamination, "the disruption and harm
caused by the incident could be inadvertently and
unnecessarily increased," the department advised.
"Failure to restore important services rapidly
could result in additional adverse public health
and welfare impacts that could be more significant
than the direct radiological impacts."
The document, published in The Federal Register,
listed precise exposure limits for emergency
workers and members of the public in the immediate
aftermath of a dirty bomb attack.
For the long term, it said that officials
responsible for public health and safety should
consider a variety of "benchmarks" in use around
the world, some far higher than the standards in
use in the United States for protection of the
public in routine operations and nuclear
accidents. One of those, from the International
Commission on Radiation Protection, says that
actions to reduce exposure to radiation, like
evacuation or cleanup, may not be required until
doses equal 10 rem a year, an amount that is about
30 times what the average American receives from
natural and manmade sources of radiation, and
double what power plant workers can legally
receive. It is also about five times as high as
the maximum that power plant workers commonly
receive in a year.
An opponent of nuclear power, Daniel Hirsch, of
the Committee to Bridge the Gap, said the standard
that should apply is the one that the
Environmental Protection Agency uses when power
plants are torn down, which is 25-thousandths of a
rem per year, one-400th of the international
standard.
But a spokesman for the Environmental Protection
Agency, John Millett, said that when his agency's
guidelines were set in 1991, with nuclear power
plant accidents in mind, there was no consensus on
what long-term exposure should be allowed.
Larry Orluskie, a spokesman for the Department of
Homeland Security, said the new guidance did not
necessarily suggest using the international agency
's number, but recommended considering its use,
"depending on what the circumstance is, and what
the environment is, and the state and local
authorities' need for that area.''
The document issued Tuesday lists a variety of
factors, including the cost of cleanup. Mr. Hirsch
and a second antinuclear group, the Nuclear
Information and Resource Service, said that the 10
rem figure would produce cancer or leukemia in one
person in four who was exposed to that amount
annually for a total of 30 years. The two groups
called the advice "a nuclear Katrina in the
making."
The department characterized its advice as a
draft, because, it said, it would take public
comment until March 6, but the advice takes effect
immediately.
The document offered advice on both dirty bombs, a
postulated weapon that is a conventional explosive
laced with a radioactive contaminant, and on
nuclear bombs that a terrorist group might smuggle
into a city. Security experts say that a dirty
bomb is far easier to construct and thus might be
the more likely threat, and that if a terrorist
group managed to detonate an actual nuclear bomb,
then the No. 1 issue would probably not be the
long-term health risk of radiation exposure.
The Homeland Security Department, with the E.P.A.,
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and other
agencies, has been working on the advice since
2003 but has had trouble developing a consensus.
*****************************************************************
42 Coastal Post: Depleted Uranium: Dirty Bombs, Dirty Missiles, Dirty Bullets A
Death Sentence Here and Abroad
Online Article January, 2006
MARIN COUNTY'S NEWS MONTHLY - FREE PRESS (415)868-1600 -
(415)868-0502(fax) - P.O. Box 31, Bolinas, CA, 94924
January, 2006
By Leuren Moret
At an April press conference, a group of New York Army National
Guard vets raised their hands when asked if they have health
problems. The soldiers, all from the 442nd Military Police
Company, are complaining of headaches and fatigue after what they
think is exposure to depleted uranium during their recent tour in
Iraq.
"Military men are just dumb stupid animals to be used as pawns in
foreign policy." - Henry Kissinger, quoted in "Kiss the Boys
Goodbye: How the United States Betrayed Its Own POW's in Vietnam"
Vietnam was a chemical war for oil, permanently contaminating
large regions and countries downriver with Agent Orange, and
environmentally the most devastating war in world history. But
since 1991, the US has staged four nuclear wars using depleted
uranium weaponry, which, like Agent Orange, meets the US
government definition of Weapons of Mass Destruction. Vast
regions in the Middle East and Central Asia have been permanently
contaminated with radiation.
And what about our soldiers? Terry Jemison of the Department of
Veterans Affairs reported this week to the American Free Press
that "Gulf-era veterans" now on medical disability since 1991
number 518,739, with only 7,035 reported wounded in Iraq in that
same 14-year period.
This week the American Free Press dropped a "dirty bomb" on the
Pentagon by reporting that eight out of 20 men who served in one
unit in the 2003 US military offensive in Iraq now have
malignancies. That means that 40 percent of the soldiers in that
unit have developed malignancies in just 16 months.
Since these soldiers were exposed to vaccines and depleted
uranium (DU) only, this is strong evidence for researchers and
scientists working on this issue, that DU is the definitive cause
of Gulf War Syndrome. Vaccines are not known to cause cancer. One
of the first published researchers on Gulf War Syndrome, who also
served in 1991 in Iraq, Dr. Andras KorŽnyi-Both, is in agreement
with Barbara Goodno from the Department of Defense's Deployment
Health Support Directorate, that in this war soldiers were not
exposed to chemicals, pesticides, bioagents or other suspect
causes this time to confuse the issue.
This powerful new evidence is blowing holes in the cover-up
perpetrated by the Pentagon and three presidential
administrations ever since DU was first used in 1991 in the
Persian Gulf War. Fourteen years after the introduction of DU on
the battlefield in 1991, the long-term effects have revealed that
DU is a death sentence and very nasty stuff.
Scientists studying the biological effects of uranium in the
1960s reported that it targets the DNA. Marion Fulk, a nuclear
physical chemist retired from the Livermore Nuclear Weapons Lab
and formerly involved with the Manhattan Project, interprets the
new and rapid malignancies in soldiers from the 2003 war as
"spectacular" and a matter of concern."
This evidence shows that of the three effects which DU has on
biological systems - radiation, chemical and particulate - the
particulate effect from nano-size particles is the most dominant
one immediately after exposure and targets the Master Code in
the DNA. This is bad news, but it explains why DU causes a
myriad of diseases which are difficult to define.
In simple words, DU "trashes the body." When asked if the main
purpose for using it was for destroying things and killing
people, Fulk was more specific: "I would say that it is the
perfect weapon for killing lots of people."
Soldiers developing malignancies so quickly since 2003 can be
expected to develop multiple cancers from independent causes.
This phenomenon has been reported by doctors in hospitals
treating civilians following NATO bombing with DU in Yugoslavia
in 1998-1999 and the US military invasion of Iraq using DU for
the first time in 1991. Medical experts report that this
phenomenon of multiple malignancies from unrelated causes has
been unknown until now and is a new syndrome associated with
internal DU exposure.
Just 467 US personnel were wounded in the three-week Persian
Gulf War in 1990-1991. Out of 580,400 soldiers who served in
Gulf War I, 11,000 are dead, and by 2000 there were 325,000 on
permanent medical disability. This astounding number of disabled
vets means that a decade later, 56 percent of those soldiers who
served now have medical problems.
The number of disabled vets reported up to 2000 has been
increasing by 43,000 every year. Brad Flohr of the Department of
Veterans Affairs told American Free Press that he believes there
are more disabled vets now than even after World War II.
They brought it home
Not only were soldiers exposed to DU on and off the
battlefields, but they brought it home. DU in the semen of
soldiers internally contaminated their wives, partners and
girlfriends. Tragically, some women in their 20s and 30s who
were sexual partners of exposed soldiers developed endometriosis
and were forced to have hysterectomies because of health
problems.
In a group of 251 soldiers from a study group in Mississippi who
had all had normal babies before the Gulf War, 67 percent of
their post-war babies were born with severe birth defects. They
were born with missing legs, arms, organs or eyes or had immune
system and blood diseases. In some veterans' families now, the
only normal or healthy members of the family are the children
born before the war.
The Department of Veterans Affairs has stated that they do not
keep records of birth defects occurring in families of veterans.
How did they hide it?
Before a new weapons system can be used, it must be fully
tested. The blueprint for depleted uranium weapons is a 1943
declassified document from the Manhattan Project.
Harvard President and physicist James B. Conant, who developed
poison gas in World War I, was brought into the Manhattan
Project by the father of presidential candidate John Kerry.
Kerry's father served at a high level in the Manhattan Project
and was a CIA agent.
Conant was chair of the S-1 Poison Gas Committee, which
recommended developing poison gas weapons from the radioactive
trash of the atomic bomb project in World War II. At that time,
it was known that radioactive materials dispersed in bombs from
the air, from land vehicles or on the battlefield produced very
fine radioactive dust which would penetrate all protective
clothing, any gas mask or filter or the skin. By contaminating
the lungs and blood, it could kill or cause illness very
quickly.
They also recommended it as a permanent terrain contaminant,
which could be used to destroy populations by contaminating
water supplies and agricultural land with the radioactive dust.
The first DU weapons system was developed for the Navy in 1968,
and DU weapons were given to and used by Israel in 1973 under US
supervision in the Yom Kippur war against the Arabs.
The Phalanx weapons system, using DU, was tested on the USS
Bigelow out of Hunters Point Naval Shipyard in 1977, and DU
weapons have been sold by the US to 29 countries.
Military research report summaries detail the testing of DU from
1974-1999 at military testing grounds, bombing and gunnery
ranges and at civilian labs under contract. Today 42 states are
contaminated with DU from manufacture, testing and deployment.
Women living around these facilities have reported increases in
endometriosis, birth defects in babies, leukemia in children and
cancers and other diseases in adults. Thousands of tons of DU
weapons tested for decades by the Navy on four bombing and
gunnery ranges around Fallon, Nevada, is no doubt the cause of
the fastest growing leukemia cluster in the US over the past
decade. The military denies that DU is the cause.
The medical profession has been active in the cover-up - just as
they were in hiding the effects from the American public - of
low level radiation from atmospheric testing and nuclear power
plants. A medical doctor in Northern California reported being
trained by the Pentagon with other doctors, months before the
2003 war started, to diagnose and treat soldiers returning from
the 2003 war for mental problems only. Medical professionals in
hospitals and facilities treating returning soldiers were
threatened with $10,000 fines if they talked about the soldiers
or their medical problems. They were also threatened with jail.
Reporters have also been prevented access to more than 14,000
medically evacuated soldiers flown nightly since the 2003 war in
C-150s from Germany who are brought to Walter Reed Hospital near
Washington, DC
Dr. Robert Gould, former president of the Bay Area chapter of
Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR), has contacted three
medical doctors since February 2004, after I had been invited to
speak about DU. Dr. Katharine Thomasson, president of the Oregon
chapter of the PSR, informed me that Dr. Gould had contacted her
and tried to convince her to cancel her invitation for me to
speak about DU at Portland State University on April 12.
Although I was able to do a presentation, Dr. Thomasson told me
I could only talk about DU in Oregon "and nothing overseas.
nothing political."
Dr. Gould also contacted and discouraged Dr. Ross Wilcox in
Toronto, Canada, from inviting me to speak to Physicians for
Global Survival (PGS), the Canadian equivalent of PSR, several
months later. When that didn't work, he contacted Dr. Allan
Connoly, the Canadian national president of PGS, who was able to
cancel my invitation and nearly succeeded in preventing Dr.
Wilcox, his own member, from showing photos and presenting
details on civilians suffering from DU exposure and cancer
provided to him by doctors in southern Iraq.
Dr. Janette Sherman, a former and long-standing member of PSR,
reported that she finally quit some time after being invited to
lunch by a new PSR executive administrator. After the woman had
pumped Dr. Sherman for information all through lunch about her
position on key issues, the woman informed Dr. Sherman that her
last job had been with the CIA.
How was the truth about DU hidden from military personnel
serving in successive DU wars? Before his tragic death, Sen.
Paul Wellstone informed Joyce Riley, R.N., B.S.N., executive
director of the American Gulf War Veterans Association, that 95
percent of Gulf War veterans had been recycled out of the
military by 1995. Any of those continuing in military service
were isolated from each other, preventing critical information
being transferred to new troops. The "next DU war" had already
been planned, and those planning it wanted "no skunk at the
garden party."
The US has a dirty (DU) little (CIA) secret
A new book just published at the American Free Press by Michael
Collins Piper, "The High Priests of War: The Secret History of
How America's Neo-Conservative Trotskyites Came to Power and
Orchestrated the War Against Iraq as the First Step in Their
Drive for Global Empire," details the early plans for a war
against the Arab world by Henry Kissinger and the neo-cons in
the late 1960s and early 1970s. That just happens to coincide
with getting the DU "show on the road" and the oil crisis in the
Middle East, which caused concern not only to President Nixon.
The British had been plotting and scheming for control of the
oil in Iraq for decades since first using poison gas on the
Iraqis and Kurds in 1912.
The book details the creation of the neo-cons by their
"godfather" and Trotsky lover Irving Kristol, who pushed for a
"war against terrorism" long before 9/11 and was lavishly funded
for years by the CIA. His son, William Kristol, is one of the
most influential men in the United States.
Both are public relations men for the Israeli lobby's
neo-conservative network, with strong ties to Rupert Murdoch.
Kissinger also has ties to this network and the Carlyle Group,
who, one could say, have facilitated these homicidal wars
beginning from the time former President Bush took office. It
would be easy to say that we are recycling World Wars I and II,
with the same faces.
When I asked Vietnam Special Ops Green Beret Capt. John
McCarthy, who could have devised this omnicidal plan to use DU
to destroy the genetic code and genetic future of large
populations of Arabs and Moslems in the Middle East and Central
Asia - just coincidentally the areas where most of the world's
oil deposits are located - he replied: "It has all the
handprints of Henry Kissinger."
In Zbignew Brzezinski's book "The Grand Chessboard: American
Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives," the map of the
Eurasian chessboard includes four regions strategic to US
foreign policy. The "South" region corresponds precisely to the
regions now contaminated permanently with radiation from US
bombs, missiles and bullets made with thousands of tons of DU.
A Japanese professor, Dr. K. Yagasaki, has calculated that 800
tons of DU is the atomicity equivalent of 83,000 Nagasaki bombs.
The US has used more DU since 1991 than the atomicity equivalent
of 400,000 Nagasaki bombs. Four nuclear wars indeed, and 10
times the amount of radiation released into the atmosphere from
atmospheric testing!
No wonder our soldiers, their families and the people of the
Middle East, Yugoslavia and Central Asia are sick. But as Henry
Kissinger said after Vietnam when our soldiers came home ill
from Agent Orange, "Military men are just dumb stupid animals to
be used for foreign policy."
Unfortunately, more and more of those soldiers are men and women
with brown skin. And unfortunately, the DU radioactive dust will
be carried around the world and deposited in our environments
just as the "smog of war" from the 1991 Gulf War was found in
deposits in South America, the Himalayas and Hawaii.
In June 2003, the World Health Organization announced in a press
release that global cancer rates will increase 50 percent by
2020. What else do they know that they aren't telling us? I know
that depleted uranium is a death sentence. For all of us. We
will all die in silent ways.
Leuren Moret is a geoscientist who has worked around the world on
radiation issues, educating citizens, the media, members of
parliaments and Congress and other officials. She became a
whistleblower in 1991 at the Livermore Nuclear Weapons Lab after
experiencing major science fraud on the Yucca Mountain Project.
An environmental commissioner in the City of Berkeley, she can be
reached at leurenmoret@yahoo.com.
*****************************************************************
43 Coastal Post: Depleted Uranium Testing For Returning US Servicemen
Online Article January, 2006
MARIN COUNTY'S NEWS MONTHLY - FREE PRESS (415)868-1600 -
(415)868-0502(fax) - P.O. Box 31, Bolinas, CA, 94924
January, 2006
Depleted Uranium Testing For Returning US Servicemen
Radioactive depleted uranium (DU) is 1.7 times as heavy as lead.
According to the Federation of American Scientists, "These solid
metal projectiles have the speed, mass and physical properties
to perform exceptionally well against armored targets."
During the Gulf War, munitions and armor made with depleted
uranium were used for the first time in a military action; and
during the recent war in Iraq, the US government has used more
than 2200 tons of depleted uranium weapons.
However, in the aftermath of the Gulf War, some startling
statistics have started to emerge.
Former US Attorney General Ramsey Clark, who has been
campaigning against the use of depleted-uranium weapons for
years, says, "Of the 697,000 US troops who served in the Gulf,
over 90,000 have reported medical problems. Symptoms include
respiratory, liver and kidney dysfunction, memory loss,
headaches, fever, and low blood pressure. There are birth
defects among their newborn children. DU is a leading suspect
for a portion of these ailments. The effects on the population
living in Iraq are far greater. Under pressure, the Pentagon has
been forced to acknowledge Gulf War Syndrome, but they are still
stonewalling any connection to DU." As well as immediate
illnesses, returning servicemen have experienced other, even
more far-reaching effects. A US Department of Veterans study of
the families of 251 Gulf War veterans found that 67% had
children with severe illnesses or birth defects.
The World Health Organization and NATO both steadfastly deny
that there is a problem. However, increasing evidence, including
the spate of deformed babies born to US servicemen who have
returned from the Gulf in the last year or two, will change
that.
In a recent exposŽ in the New York Daily News, Democracy Now!
co-host Juan Gonzalez interviewed Army National Guard Specialist
Gerald Darren Matthew, who returned from active duty in Iraq
suffering from constant migraine headaches, blurred vision,
blackouts and a burning sensation whenever he urinated.
His daughter, conceived shortly after he returned from Iraq, was
born without three fingers and most of her right hand. This is
just one in an increasing dossier of stories in the same vein.
Testing is a starting point. However, what is the next step?
According to the New York Times bestseller Clear Body, Clear
Mind by writer and humanitarian L. Ron Hubbard, there is
something that can be done to remove the residual effects of
drugs and other toxins, including radiation, which are stored in
the fatty tissues. The book offers a carefully balanced program
of exercise to increase circulation, vitamin and mineral
supplements and time sweating in the sauna.
This program specifically reports successes with individuals who
have been exposed to radiation. One graduate, who grew up in
Utah and as a child was exposed to radioactive fallout from
nuclear tests in Nevada, stated, "I feel I have now run out all
the extreme radiation that I was exposed to in this lifetime. I
regained my affinity for people there have been times on this
program when I felt such exhilaration and felt the way I felt
when I was a kid. My energy level has picked up tremendously."
Other graduates consistently report increased mental clarity,
ability to face up to and resolve the problems of life, vitality
and positive attitude. They are mentally and spiritually much
improved by the program. For more information on this program,
visit www.clearbodyclearmind.com.
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44 SF Chronicle: Government Has 'Dirty Bomb' Cleanup Guide
By H. JOSEF HEBERT, Associated Press Writer
Tuesday, January 3, 2006
(01-03) 18:49 PST WASHINGTON (AP) --
The government issued cleanup standards Tuesday for a "dirty
bomb" terrorist attack that would in some cases be far less
rigorous than what is required for Superfund sites, nuclear power
plants and nuclear waste dumps.
After such an attack, long-term radiation exposure could remain
at levels that would be expected to produce cancers in one of
every four people who return to the contaminated sites,
anti-nuclear watchdog groups said after analyzing the new federal
guidelines.
Dirty bombs largely theoretical terrorist weapons would use
conventional explosives to disperse radioactive material without
a nuclear explosion. Such weapons, which could use Cesium 137 or
other radioactives, would be useful as terror devices because
they can render an area dangerous or uninhabitable.
The guidelines issued by the Homeland Security Department say
the impact from detonating a crude nuclear device or a dirty
bomb could vary widely, from contaminating a small area, such as
a single building or city block, to conceivably many square
miles. So, it said, cleanup requirements also could vary widely.
In some cases, the document suggested, long-term radiation
exposures of as much as 10,000 millirems per year a level
equivalent to hundreds of chest X-rays a year or 30 times the
annual exposure to radiation from natural "background" sources
could be allowed for areas that are returned to general use.
If there is widespread contamination from a dirty bomb or an
"improvised nuclear device" which could cause a crude nuclear
explosion some areas may have to be put off limits permanently,
the guidelines said.
The guidelines, which go into effect immediately but could be
modified after a public comment period, brought sharp criticism
from some environmental groups and nuclear watchdog
organizations.
Long-term radiation levels of 10,000 millirems a year as would be
permitted by the guidelines in some cases can be expected to
produce a cancer in one of every four people exposed, said Diane
D'Arrigo, of the Nuclear Information and Resource Service, a
Washington-based nuclear industry watchdog group, citing
government radiation risk assessments.
The federal guidelines do not establish specific numerical
standards for cleanup, but they cite radiation "benchmarks"
established by other agencies or international organizations that
would be acceptable.
Among those benchmarks that could be used under the guidelines is
one established by the International Commission on Radiation
Protection which cites a long-term release of 10,000 millirems a
year as an acceptable exposure standard after cleanup.
By comparison, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission does not allow
exposure to the public of more than 100 millirems per year in its
cleanup standard. The exposure at a future Yucca Mountain nuclear
waste site has a limit of 15 millirems. Background radiation from
natural sources averages about 350 millirems, while exposure from
a chest X-ray is about 6 millirems.
Donald Tighe, a spokesman for the White House Office of Science
and Technology, said the guidelines specifically avoided setting
a numerical cleanup standard for long-term radiation exposure.
Instead, he said, it is hoped the guidelines will help state,
local and federal officials choose appropriate cleanup standards
depending on circumstances.
"It would be very inaccurate for anyone to characterize this as
leaning toward any one side of the range of (cleanup) standards"
that might be available, said Tighe.
But Daniel Hirsch, of the Committee to Bridge the Gap, a nuclear
watchdog group in California, said the guidelines are so lax that
it opens the way for cleanup efforts to fall short of what is
needed to protect public health.
The Department of Homeland Security "is proposing a nuclear
Katrina, a formal policy of allowing the public to be exposed to
massive radiation doses from a dirty bomb while the government
does nothing to protect them," he said.
The San Francisco Chronicle]
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45 Homeland Security: Radiological protection guidelines (175K)
FR Doc 05-24521
[Federal Register: January 3, 2006 (Volume 71, Number 1)]
[Notices] [Page 173-196] From the Federal Register Online via GPO
Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr03ja06-118] [[Page 173]]
-----------------------------------------------------------------
------ Part II Department of Homeland Security
-----------------------------------------------------------------
------ Preparedness Directorate; Protective Action Guides for
Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) and Improvised Nuclear Device
(IND) Incidents; Notice [[Page 174]]
-----------------------------------------------------------------
------ DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY Z-RIN 1660-ZA02
Preparedness Directorate; Protective Action Guides for
Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) and Improvised Nuclear Device
(IND) Incidents AGENCY: Preparedness Directorate, Department of
Homeland Security. ACTION: Notice of draft guidance for interim
use with request for comment.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
------ SUMMARY: The Preparedness Directorate of the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) is issuing guidance entitled,
``Application of Protective Action Guides for Radiological
Dispersal Devices (RDD) and Improvised Nuclear Device (IND)
Incidents'' for Federal agencies, and as appropriate, State and
local governments, emergency responders, and the general public
who may find it useful in planning and responding to an RDD or
IND incident. The guidance recommends ``protective action
guides'' (PAGs) to support decisions about actions that may need
to be taken to protect the public when responding to or
recovering from an RDD or IND incident. It also outlines a
process to implement the recommendations and discusses
operational guidelines that may be useful in the implementation
of the PAGs. The full text of the document is included in this
Notice. This guidance is provided for interim use and will be
revised based on comments received. The Preparedness Directorate
is seeking input on the appropriateness, implementability and
completeness of the guidance. DATES: The draft guidance contained
in this notice is released for interim use effective January 3,
2006. Comments on this draft guidance should be received on or
before March 6, 2006. ADDRESSES: You may submit comments,
identified by Docket Number DHS- 2004-0029 and Z-RIN 1660-ZA02,
by one of the following methods:
Federal eRulemaking Portal: http://www.regulations.gov.
Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
E-mail: FEMA-RULES@dhs.gov. Include Docket Number DHS-
2004-0029 and Z-RIN 1660-ZA02 in the subject line of the message.
Fax: 202-646-4536.
Mail/Hand Delivery/Courier: Rules Docket Clerk, Office of
the General Counsel, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Room
840, 500
C Street, SW., Washington, DC 20472.
Instructions: All submissions received must include the agency
name and docket number (if available) or Regulatory Information
Number (RIN) for this rulemaking. All comments received will be
posted without change to http://www.regulations.gov, including
any personal information provided.
Docket: For access to the docket to read background documents or
comments received, go to http://www.regulations.gov. Submitted
comments may also be inspected at 500 C Street, SW., Room 840,
Washington, DC 20472. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Craig
Conklin, Chief, Nuclear and Chemical Hazards Branch, Preparedness
Division, Department of Homeland Security, NAC, Washington, DC
20528, 703-605-1228 (phone), 703-605-1198 (facsimile), or
craig.conklin@dhs.gov (e-mail.) SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: (a)
Introduction (1) Background on the Guidance
Since the terrorist events in the United States on September 11,
2001, there has been increased worldwide effort to avert and
respond to terrorist attacks. In addition, based on intelligence
information, the potential for terrorist attacks in the United
States involving radiological materials or a nuclear device has
grown. The Federal Government has responded with an aggressive
approach to planning and preparedness, utilizing the resources
and expertise found in departments and agencies across the
government. Prior to September 11, radiological emergencies were
considered bounded by potential nuclear power plant accidents.
However, new terrorist scenarios have emerged that offer new and
different response challenges.
In order to prepare for potential attacks, DHS held a Federal
interagency ``dirty bomb'' exercise as part of the Top
Officials-2 Exercise (TOPOFF-2) in Seattle, Washington, May
12-16, 2003. The exercise brought to light a number of issues in
Federal radiological emergency response and recovery. One of the
most important issues raised was how long-term site restoration
and cleanup would be accomplished following an act of
radiological terrorism. This question was part of a larger
discussion of Federal Government protective action
recommendations following acts of radiological or nuclear terror.
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) published PAGs in the
``Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for
Nuclear Incidents'' (EPA 400-R-92-001, May 1992), in coordination
with the Federal Radiological Preparedness Coordinating Committee
(FRPCC). However, the EPA Manual, often called the PAG Manual,
was not developed to address response actions following
radiological or nuclear terrorist incidents. Also, the PAG Manual
does not address long-term cleanup.
In 2003, DHS tasked an interagency working group to address these
issues. The working group consisted of senior subject matter
experts in radiological/nuclear emergency preparedness, response,
and consequence management. The following Federal departments and
agencies were represented on the working group: DHS, EPA,
Department of Commerce (DOC), Department of Energy (DOE),
Department of Defense (DOD), Department of Labor (DOL),
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC).
The result of the interagency working group process is the
following Federal consensus guidance entitled, ``Application of
Protective Action Guides for Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD)
and Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) Incidents.'' (June 1, 2004).
In it, the Federal agencies support the use of existing early and
intermediate phase PAGs, as found in the EPA PAG Manual, for acts
of radiological and nuclear terrorism. The working group also
developed late phase guidance, also contained in the consensus
guidance, for the cleanup and restoration of a site following an
act of radiological or nuclear terrorism that is based on the
principle of site-specific optimization.
In developing this draft guidance, DHS convened a focus group of
representatives from 13 State agencies with expertise in
radiological emergency response and consequence management. The
State representatives were asked to review the draft guidance and
provide detailed comments on its content, structure, and
presentation. DHS was particularly interested in how States would
make use of the guidance and how well the guidance would serve to
facilitate Federal and State (or local) government interactions
during a radiological terrorism response. Overall, the State
representatives responded very positively to the guidance. A
number of improvements suggested by the States were incorporated
into the draft guidance being published today.
The purpose of this guidance is to aid Federal decision makers in
protecting the public and emergency responders from the effects
of radiation during an emergency and to provide guidelines and a
process for site cleanup and recovery following an RDD or IND
incident. This guidance is designed to [[Page 175]] be compatible
with the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the
National Response Plan (NRP).
This guidance presents levels of radiation exposure at which the
Federal Government recommends that actions be considered to avoid
or reduce radiation dose to the public from an RDD or IND
incident. The intended audience for this document is principally
Federal Government emergency response planners and officials;
however, this document should also be useful to State and local
governments for response planning. The protective action guides
incorporate guidance and regulations published by the EPA, the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (OSHA), and address key health
protection questions faced in the various phases (early,
intermediate, and late) of response to an incident.
These PAGs are not absolute standards and are not intended to
define ``safe'' or ``unsafe'' levels of exposure or
contamination. Rather, they represent the approximate levels at
which the associated protective actions are recommended. This
guidance may also be used by State and local decision makers, and
provides flexibility to be more or less restrictive as deemed
appropriate based on the unique characteristics of the incident
and local considerations.
This guidance is not intended for use at site cleanups occurring
under other statutory authorities such as EPA's Superfund
program, the NRC's decommissioning program, or other Federal or
State cleanup programs. In addition, the scope of this guidance
does not include situations involving United States nuclear
weapons accidents. (2) Characteristics of RDD and IND Incidents
An RDD is any device that causes the purposeful dissemination of
radioactive material across an area without a nuclear detonation.
The mode of dispersal typically described as an RDD is an
explosive device coupled with radioactive material. An RDD poses
a threat to public health and safety and the environment through
the spread of radioactive materials, and any explosive device
presents an added immediate threat to human life and property.
Other means of dispersal, both passive and active, may be
employed. Dissemination of radioactive material not carried out
via a device would still be treated like an RDD by responders and
decision makers.
There is a wide range of possible consequences that may result
from an RDD depending upon the type and size of the device, the
type and quantity of radioactive material, and how dispersion is
achieved. The consequences of an RDD may range from a small,
localized area (e.g., a street, single building or city block) to
large areas, conceivably several square miles. However, most
experts agree that the likelihood of a large impacted area is
low. In most plausible scenarios, the radioactive material would
not result in acutely harmful radiation doses and the public
health concern from the radioactive materials would likely focus
on the chronic risk of developing cancer among exposed
individuals. Hazards from fire, smoke, shock, shrapnel (from an
explosion), industrial chemicals and other chemical or biological
agents may also be present.
An IND is an illicit nuclear weapon bought, stolen, or otherwise
originating from a nuclear State, or a weapon fabricated by a
terrorist group from illegally obtained fissile nuclear weapons
material that produces a nuclear explosion. The guidance does not
apply to acts of war between nation-states involving nuclear
weapons. The nuclear yield achieved by an IND produces extreme
heat, powerful shockwaves, and prompt radiation that would be
acutely lethal for a significant distance. It also produces
potentially lethal radioactive fallout, which may spread far
downwind and deposit over very large areas. An IND would result
in catastrophic loss of life, destruction of infrastructure and
contamination of a very large area. If nuclear yield is not
achieved, the result would likely resemble an RDD in which
fissile weapons material was dispersed locally. (3) RDD and IND
Incidents v. Accidents
Acts of radiological and nuclear terrorism differ from
radiological and nuclear accidents in several key ways. Accidents
occur almost exclusively at well-characterized fixed facilities,
or along prescribed transit routes. Facility operators have a
good understanding of the kinds of radiological incidents that
may occur, and have developed safeguards, plans, and procedures
to deal with them. Exercises are regularly held to practice
emergency plans and procedures, and improvements are made where
necessary. Local communities, such as those around nuclear power
plants (NPPs) or weapons production facilities, are informed and
involved in emergency planning, including development of public
communication strategies, practicing shelter-in-place, and
orderly evacuation along prescribed routes. Accidents may also
occur along transit routes, but these are relatively rare and
substantial contingency planning and exercising occurs for
transportation accidents as well.
Acts of radiological and nuclear terrorism, on the other hand,
may occur virtually anywhere. Major cities are potential targets
of such incidents. The number of potential targets and the
diverse circumstances of potential attacks make focused response
planning almost impossible. Even a rural setting could fall
victim, if for example, a device were to go off prematurely. Most
nuclear facilities are located in semi-rural settings around
which the number of people affected would be less and the amount
of critical infrastructure impacted is likely to be less.
The scope of potential accidents is limited and fairly well
understood. Facilities tend to have fixed quantities of licensed
radioisotopes or well characterized types of radionuclides on
site that may be released in an accident. The number of ways
accidents can occur (within reason) is limited, making possible
effective contingency planning and improved safety. Accidents of
any magnitude are limited to a relatively small number of
facilities, and these tend to have highly trained personnel,
advanced security, advanced process designs with the most
rigorous safeguards and back-up systems, and the most aggressive
contingency planning. The design of commercial nuclear power
reactors in the United States, for example, precludes a
Chernobyl-type of nuclear accident. Smaller facilities, such as
radiopharmaceutical or radiation source manufacturers, generally
possess much less radioactive material (or only short half-life
materials) that may be involved in an accidental release.
Finally, an RDD or IND incident may be initiated without any
advance warning and the release would likely have a relatively
short duration. With a major NPP accident, the most severe type
of incident previously considered, there is likely to be several
hours or days of warning before the release starts and the
release may be drawn out over many hours. The benefit of time is
critical. Advance notice affords time to make appropriate
decisions, communicate to the public, and execute orderly
evacuation, if necessary, or other protective actions. This
difference means that most early and some intermediate phase
protective actions must be made more quickly and with less
information in an RDD or IND incident if they are to be
effective. [[Page 176]] (4) Phases of Response
Typically, the response to an emergency can be divided into three
time phases. Although these phases cannot be represented by
precise time periods and may overlap, they provide a useful
framework for the considerations involved in emergency response
planning. The early phase (or emergency phase) is the period at
the beginning of the incident when the source (e.g., fire or
contaminated plume) at the incident is active, field measurement
data are limited or not available, and immediate protective
action decisions are required. Exposure to the radioactive plume,
short-term exposure to deposited materials and inhalation of
radioactive material are generally included when considering
protective actions for the early phase of a radiological
emergency. The response during the early phase includes the
initial emergency response actions to retrieve and care for
victims, stabilize the scene, and public health protective
actions (such as sheltering-in- place or evacuation) in the short
term. Life-saving and first aid actions should be given priority.
In general, early phase protective actions need to be made very
quickly, and the protective action decisions can be modified
later as more information becomes available. If an explosive RDD
is deployed without warning, there may be no time to take
protective actions to reduce plume exposure. In the event of a
covert dispersal, discovery or detection may not occur for days
or weeks, allowing contamination to be dispersed broadly by foot,
vehicular traffic, wind, rain or other forces. If an IND
explodes, there would only be time to make early phase protective
action recommendations to protect against exposure from fallout
in areas miles downwind from the explosion.
The intermediate phase of the response may follow the early phase
response within as little as a few hours, up to several days. The
intermediate phase of the response is usually assumed to begin
after the incident source and releases have been brought under
control and protective action decisions can be made based on some
field measurements of exposure and radioactive materials.
Activities in this phase typically overlap with early and late
phase activities, and may continue for weeks to many months until
protective actions are terminated. During the intermediate phase,
decisions must be made on the initial actions needed to begin
recovery from the incident, reopen transportation systems and
critical infrastructure, and return to some state of normal
activities.
The late phase is the period when recovery and cleanup actions
designed to reduce radiation levels in the environment to
acceptable levels commence and ends when all the recovery actions
have been completed. In the late phase, decision makers will have
more time and information to allow for better data collection and
options analyses. In this respect, the late phase is no longer a
response to an ``emergency situation,'' as in the early and
intermediate phases, and is better viewed in terms of the
long-term objectives of cleanup and restoration of the site to
meet the needs and desires of the community and region. With the
additional time and increased understanding of the situation,
there will be opportunities to involve key stakeholders in
providing sound, cost-effective recommendations. (5) Protective
Action Guides
A PAG is the projected dose to a reference individual from an
accidental or deliberate release of radioactive material at which
a specific protective action to reduce or avoid that dose is
recommended. Thus, protective actions, such as evacuation or
sheltering-in-place, should normally be taken before the
anticipated dose is realized. The PAG Manual, published by EPA in
coordination with the FRPCC, provides the basis for this proposed
guidance and may be referred to for additional details. The EPA
PAGs achieve the following criteria and goals: (1) Prevent acute
effects, (2) reduce risk of chronic effects and, (3) require
optimization to balance protection with other important factors
and ensure that actions taken cause more benefit than harm.
The PAG Manual was written to address the kinds of nuclear or
radiological incidents deemed likely to occur. While intended to
be applicable to any radiological release, the PAGs were designed
principally to meet the needs of commercial nuclear power plant
accidents, the worst type of incident under consideration in the
PAGs. This is important for two reasons: commercial nuclear power
plant accidents are almost always signaled by preceding events,
giving plant managers time (hours or days) to make decisions, and
local emergency managers time to communicate with the public and
initiate evacuations if necessary; and, the suite of
radionuclides is well-known, and is dominated by relatively
short-lived isotopes. As a result of September 11, the Federal
Government has reevaluated the PAGs for their applicability to
RDD and IND incidents.
The PAGs are non-regulatory, and are meant to provide a flexible
basis for decisions under varying emergency circumstances. Many
factors should be considered when deciding whether or not to
order an action based on the projected dose to a population. For
example, evacuation of a population is much more difficult and
costly as the size of the subject population increases. Further,
there is a statistical increase in casualties directly related to
the size of the population evacuated that must be taken into
consideration. Thus, considering incident- specific factors like
these, actual projected doses at which action is recommended may
vary up or down. (b) Developing the Proposed Guidance (1) Use of
Existing PAGs
In deriving the recommendations contained in this guidance, new
types of incidents and scenarios that could lead to environmental
radiological contamination were considered. The working group
determined that the existing PAGs for the early and intermediate
phases, including worker protection guides, published in the EPA
PAG Manual, are also appropriate for use in RDD and IND
incidents. The proposed recommendations are provided in Table 1
in Section D.3 of the following guidance. Appendix 1 of the
following guidance provides additional details regarding worker
protection recommendations and includes additional Response
Worker Guidelines in Table 1B. (2) Guidance for Late Phase Site
Cleanup and Restoration
The working group evaluated existing Federal dose and risk-based
standards, guidance and benchmarks for site cleanup and
restoration as possible guidance for use after an RDD or IND.
Standards considered included those of the EPA under the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act (CERCLA), and DOE and NRC standards under the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954, as amended. In addition, cleanup guidance and
benchmarks issued by national and international radiation
advisory bodies (such as the International Commission on
Radiological Protection and the International Atomic Energy
Agency) were considered.
The working group also examined variations of these standards,
guidance and benchmarks by explicitly considering the possibility
of achieving more or less stringent risk or dose levels, and by
using target ranges. [[Page 177]]
The working group determined that the nature of potential impacts
from radiological and nuclear terror incidents was extremely
broad. Because of the broad range of potential impacts that may
occur from RDDs and INDs ranging, for example, from light
contamination of a street or building, to widespread destruction
of a major metropolitan area, a pre-established numeric guideline
was not recommended as best serving the needs of decision makers
in the late phase. Rather, a site- specific process is
recommended for determining the societal objectives for expected
land uses and the options and approaches available to address RDD
or IND contamination. For example, if the incident is an RDD of
limited size, such that the impacted area is small, then it might
reasonably be expected that a complete return to normal
conditions can be achieved within a short period of time.
However, if the impacted area is very large, then achieving even
very low criteria for remediation of the entire area and/or
maintaining existing land uses may not be practicable.
The process recommended in the guidance was based on the risk
management framework discussed in Appendix 2. This process may be
implemented through engaging knowledgeable technical experts and
key stakeholders to provide decision makers with advice on the
options, costs and implications of various courses of action. The
guidance recommends that the level of effort and resources
invested be scaled to the significance of the incident, scope of
contamination, potential severity of economic impact, technical
feasibility, and resource constraints. This process should result
in the selection of the most appropriate solution that is
sensitive to the range of involved stakeholders. Such a process
where multiple factors are considered in developing options and
deciding on action is often referred to as optimization.
Optimization is a concept that is common to many State, Federal
and international risk management programs that address
radionuclides and chemicals, although it is not always referred
to as such. Broadly speaking, optimization is a flexible,
multi-attribute decision process that seeks to consider and
balance many factors. Optimization analyses are quantitative and
qualitative assessments applied at each stage of site restoration
decisionmaking, from evaluation of remedial options, to
implementation of the chosen alternative. The evaluation of
cleanup alternatives, for example, should factor all relevant
variables, including; areas impacted (e.g., size, location
relative to population), types of contamination (chemical,
biological, and radioactive), human health, public welfare,
technical feasibility, costs and available resources to implement
and maintain remedial options, long-term effectiveness,
timeliness, public acceptability, and economic effects (e.g., on
residents, tourism, business, and industry).
The optimization process is an approach that may accommodate a
variety of dose and/or risk benchmarks identified from State,
Federal or other sources (e.g., national and international
advisory organizations) as goals or starting points in the
analysis of remediation options. These benchmarks may be useful
for analysis of remediation options and levels may move up or
down depending on the site-specific circumstances and balancing
of other relevant factors. (3) Implementation of Site Cleanup and
Restoration
The guidance presents an implementation plan for long-term site
cleanup and restoration analysis and decisionmaking that is
described in detail in Appendix 3 of the guidance. The
implementation plan was designed principally to describe Federal
interactions with State and local governments and public
stakeholder representatives. For purposes of this guidance, it is
assumed that the RDD or IND incident is significant in size and
scope of contamination and that the Federal Government will be
the primary source of funding for site cleanup and restoration.
This plan is compatible with NIMS and the NRP, and should be seen
as a framework for assessing a site, evaluating technologies and
remediation options, assessing costs and timeframes, and
incorporating local input on current and future land uses so that
site cleanup and restoration may be approached in a fair and open
manner.
The plan describes a collaborative and iterative approach in
which two work groups, one of stakeholders and one of technical
subject matter experts, interact to develop cleanup options for
the site under the supervision and oversight of a team of senior
local, State and Federal management officials. The stakeholder
workgroup would represent local interests, and relate local land
use preferences and public health and welfare concerns. The
technical work group would perform analyses, evaluate
technologies and options, assess cost-effectiveness, and estimate
timelines for completion. Ongoing discussions between the groups
should result in a remediation solution and cleanup criteria for
site restoration that are generally acceptable to involved
stakeholders. The options and recommended decision would be
forwarded up to decisionmakers for final approval so that cleanup
can commence.
The constitution of the groups and the interactions among them
may be shaped to meet specific local needs and concerns. For
example, larger, more complex incidents may require a number of
technical experts with specific skills and knowledge, and the
location may warrant varying stakeholder group composition. The
implementation plan is scalable to the situation.
The goal of the whole process is to reach an agreed upon approach
to site cleanup and restoration within a reasonable timeframe
that is effective, achievable, and meets the needs of local
stakeholders. The final decision must be approved by local, State
and Federal decision makers. (c) Tools and Guidelines To Support
Application of the PAGs
The need for protective action will be based on a determination
of whether PAGs will be exceeded. To facilitate first responder
activities and the use of PAGs in the field, operational
guidelines are needed which can be readily used by local decision
makers and by responders. Radiation doses are not directly
measurable and must be calculated based on measurable quantities
such as exposure rates, radiation count rates or decays per unit
surface area, or radioactivity per unit volume. Operational
guidelines are levels of radioactivity or concentrations of
radionuclides that can be accurately measured by radiation
detection and monitoring equipment and related or compared to the
dose-based PAGs to quickly determine if protective actions need
to be implemented. Appendix 4 of the guidance provides examples
of existing operational guidelines, and those being developed.
Federal Government agencies are continuing development of the
operational guidelines to support the application of the
protective action guides in this document, as well as tools that
will help in the development of incident-specific operational
guidelines when they are needed. As the Federal agencies develop
these guidelines and tools, they will be made available for
review on the internet at the DOE's Web site at
http://www.ogcms.energy.gov. This webpage will provide the status
of operation guideline development and contain or provide a link
to downloadable documents and tools related to the guidelines.
[[Page 178]] (d) Specific Questions for Reviewers
The Preparedness Directorate/DHS welcomes any comments and
suggestions regarding the subject document. However, we would
appreciate if reviewers specifically address the following
issues:
Is the presentation and format of the document useful and
appropriate for its intended purpose? If not, why not and how
should it be changed?
Is the implementation process in Appendix 3 of the proposed
guidance clear and appropriate for its intended purpose? Are
roles and responsibilities sufficiently defined in the document?
Does the guidance provide the appropriate balance between (a)
public health and environmental protection goals; and (b) the
flexibility needed for the decision makers to conduct emergency
response actions and address public welfare needs, costs and
benefits, technical feasibility and societal interests during
response to and recovery from an incident? If not, how should the
guidance be changed to provide the appropriate balance?
Are the proposed PAGs for the early and intermediate phases
implementable? Are they appropriate? If not, why not and what
alternatives do you recommend?
Is the discussion on worker protection and response worker
protection helpful? Does Appendix 1 of the proposed guidance
provide an adequate discussion of expectations and the use of the
alternate response worker guidelines for life and property saving
situations? If not, what additional information is needed to make
the discussion adequate?
Are the operational guidelines being developed and discussed in
Appendix 4 of the proposed guidance useful? Are the groupings
clear and appropriate? Are there additional operational guides
that should be developed?
Is the optimization process proposed for late phase site
restoration and cleanup reasonable and sufficiently flexible to
address RDD and IND situations? If not, what changes need to be
made to improve the process?
Is a flexible process without pre-established limits an
appropriate method for site recovery? Would a flexible process
with goals, ranges or limits be more appropriate?
What other guidance or tools are needed to assist in the
implementation of the recommendations? (e) References
``National Response Plan'' (NRP), January 2005.
``National Incident Management Plan'' (NIMS), March 1, 2004
``Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for
Nuclear Incidents'' (EPA PAG) EPA 400-R-92-001, May 1992.
Complete Text of the Guidance Application of Protective Action
Guides for Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) and Improvised
Nuclear Device (IND) Incidents
Prepared by the Department of Homeland Security in coordination
with the Department of Commerce, Department of Defense,
Department of Energy, Department of Labor, Department of Health
and Human Services, Environmental Protection Agency, Nuclear
Regulatory Commission. Table of Contents (a) Introduction (b)
Characteristics of RDD and IND Incidents
(1) Radiological Dispersal Device
(2) Improvised Nuclear Device
(3) Differences Between Acts of Terror and Accidents (c) Phases
of Response
(1) Early Phase
(2) Intermediate Phase
(3) Late Phase (d) Protective Actions and Protective Action
Guides for RDD and IND Incidents
(1) Protective Actions
(2) Protective Action Guides
(3) Protective Action Guides for RDD and IND Incidents
(i) Early Phase PAGs
(ii) Intermediate Phase PAGs
(iii) Late Phase PAGs (e) Federal Implementation (f) Operational
Guidelines
Appendix 1. Radiation Protection for the Responder and Planning
for Implementation of the Protective Action Guides
Appendix 2. Risk Management Framework for RDD and IND Incident
Planning
Appendix 3. Federal Implementation
Appendix 4. Operational Guidelines for Implementation of the PAGs
During RDD or IND Events
Appendix 5. Acronyms/Glossary Preface
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5), Management
of Domestic Incidents, states, ``to prevent, prepare for, respond
to and recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other
emergencies, the United States Government shall establish a
single, comprehensive approach to domestic incident management.''
It also assigns the Secretary of the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) the role of Principal Federal Official for
domestic incident management.
DHS coordinated the development of this document in order to
address the critical issues of protective actions and protective
action guides (PAGs) to mitigate the effects caused by terrorist
use of a Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) or Improvised
Nuclear Device (IND). This document was developed to provide
guidance for site cleanup and recovery following an RDD or IND
incident and affirms the applicability of existing PAGs for
radiological emergencies. The intended audience of this document
is Federal radiological emergency response and consequence
management officials. In addition, State and local governments
may find this document useful in response and consequence
management planning. These guides are not intended for use at
site cleanups occurring under other statutory authorities such as
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Superfund program, the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission's decommissioning program, or other
Federal and State cleanup programs. In addition, the scope of
this document does not include situations involving United States
nuclear weapons accidents.
Underlying the development and implementation of the
recommendations in the report is a risk management framework for
making decisions to provide for public safety and welfare.
Appendix 2 provides a summary of the framework based upon the
report, ``Framework for Environmental Health Risk Management,''
published in 1997 by the Commission on Risk Assessment and Risk
Management. The stages in this framework--(1) Defining the
problem and putting it into context, (2) analyzing the risks, (3)
examining the options, (4) making decisions about which options
to implement, (5) taking action, and (6) conducting an evaluation
of the results--are applicable to each of the stages of response
to an RDD or IND incident. However, the recommended guidelines
for early and intermediate phase actions already incorporate
consideration of the first four stages, so that action can be
taken immediately to respond to the incident. All of the stages
of the risk management framework will be applicable in the
process of establishing the criteria for the late phase of the
response, as described later in this report, because each
situation will have its own unique problems, risks, options, and
decisions.
The Consequence Management, Site Restoration/Cleanup and
Decontamination (CMS) Subgroup of the DHS RDD/IND Working Group
accomplished this effort. The CMS Subgroup consists of subject
matter experts in radiological/nuclear [[Page 179]] emergency
preparedness and response. In addition to DHS, the following
departments and agencies contributed to this effort: Department
of Commerce (DOC), Department of Defense (DoD), Department of
Energy (DOE), Department of Labor (DOL), Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS), Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). (a) Introduction
For the early and intermediate phases of response, this document
presents levels of radiation exposure at which the Federal
Government recommends that actions be considered to avoid or
reduce adverse public health consequences from an RDD or IND
incident. These PAGs incorporate guidance and regulations
published by the EPA, Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). For the
late phase of the response, this document presents a process to
establish appropriate levels based on site-specific
circumstances. This document addresses the key questions at each
stage of an incident (early, intermediate, and late) and
constitutes advice by DHS to Federal, State, and local decision
makers.
The objectives of the guides are to aid decision makers in
protecting the public, first responders, and other workers from
the effects of radiation, while balancing the adverse social and
economic impacts following an RDD or IND incident. Restoring the
normal operation of critical infrastructure, services,
industries, business, and public activities as soon as possible
can minimize adverse social and economic impacts.
These guides for RDD and IND incidents are not absolute
standards. The guides are not intended to define ``safe'' or
``unsafe'' levels of exposure or contamination, but rather they
represent the approximate levels at which the associated
protective actions are justified. The guides give State and local
decision makers the flexibility to be more or less restrictive as
deemed appropriate based on the unique characteristics of the
incident and local considerations.
The PAGs can be used to select actions to prepare for, respond
to, and recover from the adverse effects that may exist during
any phase of a terrorist incident--the early (emergency) phase,
the intermediate phase, or the late phase. There may be an urgent
need to evacuate people; there may also be an urgent need to
restore the services of critical infrastructure (e.g., roads,
rail lines, airports, electric power, water, sewage, medical
facilities, and businesses) in the hours and days following the
incident--thus, some response decisions must be made quickly. If
the decisions on the recovery of critical infrastructure are not
made quickly, the disruption and harm caused by the incident
could be inadvertently and unnecessarily increased. Failure to
restore important services rapidly could result in additional
adverse public health and welfare impacts that could be more
significant than the direct radiological impacts. (b)
Characteristics of RDD and IND Incidents
A radiological incident is defined as an event or series of
events, deliberate or accidental, leading to the release, or
potential release, into the environment of radioactive material
in sufficient quantity to warrant consideration of protective
actions. Use of an RDD or IND is an act of terror that produces a
radiological incident. (1) Radiological Dispersal Device
An RDD poses a threat to public health and safety through the
spread of radioactive materials by some means of dispersion. The
mode of dispersal typically conceived as an RDD is an explosive
device coupled with radioactive material. The explosion adds an
immediate threat to human life and property. Other means of
dispersal, both passive and active, may be employed.
There is a wide range of possible consequences that may result
from an RDD, depending on the type and size of the device, and
how dispersal is achieved. The consequences of an RDD may range
from a small, localized area, such as a single building or city
block, to large areas, conceivably many square miles. However,
most experts agree that the likelihood of impacting a large area
is low. In most plausible scenarios, the radioactive material
would not cause acutely harmful radiation doses, and the primary
public health concern from those materials would be chronic risk
of cancer to exposed individuals. Hazards from fire, smoke, shock
(physical, electrical or thermal), shrapnel (from an explosion),
industrial chemicals, and other chemical or biological agents may
also be present. (2) Improvised Nuclear Device
An IND is a nuclear weapon originating from an adversary State or
fabricated by a terrorist group from illicit special nuclear
material that produces a nuclear explosion. The nuclear yield
achieved by an IND produces extreme heat, powerful shockwaves,
and prompt radiation that would be acutely lethal for a
significant distance. It also produces radioactive fallout, which
may spread far downwind and deposit over very large areas. If
nuclear yield is not achieved, the result would likely resemble
an RDD in which fissile weapons material was utilized. (3)
Differences Between Acts of Terror and Accidents
Most radiological emergency planning has been conducted to
respond to potential nuclear power plant accidents. RDD and IND
incidents may differ from a nuclear power plant accident in
several ways, and response planning should take these differences
into account. First, the severity of an IND incident would be
dramatically greater than any nuclear power plant accident
(although an RDD would likely be on the same order of magnitude
as a nuclear power plant accident). An IND would have vastly
greater radiation levels and would create a large radius of
severe damage from blast and heat, which could not occur in a
nuclear power plant accident.
Second, the release from an RDD or IND may start without any
advance warning and would likely have a relatively short release
duration. With a major nuclear power plant accident there is
likely to be several hours of warning before the release starts,
and the release is likely to be drawn out over many hours. This
difference means that most early, and some intermediate phase,
protective action decisions must be made more quickly (and with
less information) in an RDD or IND incident if they are to be
effective.
Third, an RDD or IND incident is more likely to occur in a major
city with a large population. Because of the rural setting in
which many nuclear facilities are located, the number of people
affected by a nuclear power plant incident may be less and the
amount of critical infrastructure impacted is also likely to be
smaller.
Fourth, large nuclear facilities have detailed emergency plans
that are periodically exercised, including specified protective
action sectors, evacuation routes, and methods to quickly warn
the public on the protective actions to take. This would not be
the case in an RDD or IND incident. This level of radiological
emergency planning typically does not exist for most cities and
towns without nuclear facilities.
Fifth, the type of radioactive material involved could and
probably will be different from what is potentially [[Page 180]]
released for a nuclear power plant incident. (c) Phases of
Response
Typically, the response to an RDD or IND incident can be divided
into three time phases--the early phase, the intermediate phase,
and the late phase--that are generally accepted as being common
to all nuclear incidents. Although these phases cannot be
represented by precise time periods and may overlap, they provide
a useful framework for the considerations involved in emergency
response planning. (1) Early Phase
The early phase (or emergency phase) is the period at the
beginning of the incident when immediate decisions for effective
use of protective actions are required and actual field
measurement data is generally not available. Exposure to the
radioactive plume, short-term exposure to deposited materials,
and inhalation of radioactive material are generally included
when considering protective actions for the early phase. The
response during the early phase includes initial emergency
response actions to protect public health and welfare in the
short term. Priority should be given to lifesaving and first-aid
actions.
In general, early phase protective actions should be taken very
quickly, and the protective action decisions can be modified
later as more information becomes available. If an explosive RDD
is deployed without warning, there may be no time to take
protective actions to reduce plume exposure. In the event of a
covert dispersal, discovery or detection may not occur for days
or weeks, allowing contamination to be dispersed broadly by foot,
vehicular traffic, wind, rain, or other forces. If an IND
explodes, there would only be time to make early phase,
protective action recommendations to protect against exposure
from fallout in areas many miles downwind from the explosion. (2)
Intermediate Phase
The intermediate phase of the response may follow the early phase
response within as little as a few hours. The intermediate phase
of the response is usually assumed to begin after the source and
releases have been brought under control and protective action
decisions can be made based on measurements of exposure and
radioactive materials that have been deposited as a result of the
incident. Activities in this phase typically overlap with early
and late phase activities, and may continue for weeks to many
months, until protective actions are terminated.
During the intermediate phase, decisions must be made on the
initial actions needed to recover from the incident, reopen
critical infrastructures, and return to a general state of normal
activity. In general, intermediate phase decisions should
consider late phase response objectives. However, some
intermediate phase decisions will need to be made quickly (i.e.,
within hours) and should not be delayed by discussions on what
the more desirable permanent decisions will be. All of these
decisions must take into account the health, welfare, economic,
and other factors that must be balanced by local officials. For
example, it can be expected that hospitals and their access roads
will need to remain open or be reopened quickly. These interim
decisions can often be made with the acknowledgement that further
work may be needed as time progresses. (3) Late Phase
The late phase is the period when recovery and cleanup actions
designed to reduce radiation levels in the environment to
acceptable levels are commenced, and it ends when all the
recovery actions have been completed. With the additional time
and increased understanding of the situation, there will be
opportunities to involve key stakeholders in providing sound,
cost-effective recommendations. Generally, early (or emergency)
phase decisions will be made directly by elected public
officials, or their designees, with limited stakeholder
involvement due to the need to act within a short timeframe.
Long-term decisions should be made with stakeholder involvement,
and can also include incident- specific technical working groups
to provide expert advice to decision makers on impacts, costs,
and alternatives.
The relationship between typical protective actions and the
phases of the incident response are outlined in Figure 1.
Plainly, there is overlap between the phases, and this framework
should be used to support a timely decision making process,
irrespective of the perception of which incident phase might be
applicable. BILLING CODE 9110-21-P [[Page 181]] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF
OMITTED] TN03JA06.000 BILLING CODE 9110-21-C (d) Protective
Actions and Protective Action Guides for RDD and IND Incidents
(1) Protective Actions
Protective actions are activities that may be conducted in
response to an RDD or IND incident in order to reduce or
eliminate exposure to members of the public to radiation or other
hazards. These actions are generic and are applicable to RDDs and
INDs. The principal protective action decisions for consideration
in the early and intermediate phases of an emergency are whether
to shelter-in-place, evacuate, or relocate affected or
potentially affected populations. Secondary actions include
administration of prophylactic drugs, decontamination, use of
access restrictions, and use of restrictions on food and water.
In some situations, only one protective action needs to be
implemented, while in others, numerous protective actions should
be implemented. (2) Protective Action Guides
PAGs are the projected dose to a reference individual, from an
accidental or deliberate release of radioactive material at which
a specific protective action to reduce or avoid that dose is
recommended. Thus, protective actions are designed to be taken
before the anticipated dose is realized. The ``Manual of
Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear
Incidents'' \1\ published by the EPA (also known as the EPA PAG
Manual) provides a significant part of the basis [[Page 182]] of
this document and may be referred to for additional details.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
----------
\1\ ``Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions
for Nuclear Incidents,'' U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
May 1992, EPA-400-R-92-001.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
----------
The existing PAGs meet the following principle criteria and
goals: (1) Prevent acute effects, (2) reduce risk of chronic
effects, and (3) require optimization to balance protection with
other important factors and ensure that actions taken cause more
benefit than harm.
In this document, PAGs are generic criteria based on balancing
public health and welfare with the risk of alternatives applied
in each of the phases of an RDD or IND incident. The PAGs are
specific for radiation and radioactive materials, and must be
considered in the context of other chemical or biological hazards
that may also be present. Though the PAGs are values of dose
avoided, published dose conversion factors and derived response
levels may be utilized in estimating doses, and for choosing and
implementing protective actions. Other quantitative measures and
derived concentration values may be useful in emergency
situations; for example, for the release of goods and property
from contaminated zones, and to control access in and out of
contaminated areas.
Because of the short time frames required for emergency response
decisions, it is likely there will not be opportunities for local
decision makers to consult with a variety of stakeholders before
taking actions. Therefore, the early and intermediate phase EPA
PAGs have been based on the significant body of work done in the
general context of radiological emergency response planning, and
represent the results of public comment, drills, exercises, and a
consensus at the Federal level for appropriate emergency action.
In order to use the PAGs to make decisions about appropriate
protective actions, decision makers will need information on
suspected radionuclides; projected plume movement and
depositions; and/or actual measurement data or, during the period
initially following the release, expert advice in the absence of
good information. Sources of such information include: on-scene
responders as well as monitoring, assessment, and modeling
centers. (3) Protective Action Guides for RDD and IND Incidents
The PAGs for RDD and IND incidents are generally based on the
following sources: the PAGs developed by EPA in coordination with
other Federal agencies through the Protective Action Guide
Subcommittee of the Federal Radiological Preparedness
Coordinating Committee; guidance developed by the FDA for food
and food products and the distribution of potassium iodide; and
OSHA regulations.
In order to use this guide, there may be a need to compare the
PAG to the results of a risk assessment or dose projection. It
should be emphasized that, in general, when making radiation dose
projections, realistic assumptions should be used so the final
results are representative of actual conditions.
Table 1 provides a summary of the key actions and suggested PAGs
for an RDD or IND incident.
Table 1.--Protective Action Guides for RDD or IND Incidents
-----------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------
Phase Protective action Protective action guide Reference
-----------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------
Early.............................. Limit Emergency Worker 5 rem
(or greater under EPA PAG Manual.
Exposure. exceptional
circumstances\1\.
Sheltering of Public.. 1 to 5 rems projected EPA PAG Manual.
dose\2\.
Evacuation of Public.. 1 to 5 rems projected EPA PAG Manual.
dose\3\.
Administration of For potassium iodide, FDA FDA Guidance \6\.
Prophylactic Drugs. Guidance dose values\4\
\5\. Intermediate....................... Limit Worker Exposure. 5
rem/yr................... See Appendix 1.
Relocation of General 2 rems, projected dose EPA PAG Manual.
Public. first year Subsequent
years: 500 mrem/yr
projected dose.
Food Interdiction..... 500 mrem/yr projected dose. FDA Guidance
\7\.
Drinking Water 500 mrem/yr dose........... EPA guidance in
Interdiction.
development. Late............................... Final Cleanup
Actions. Late phase PAG based on
optimization .
-----------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------- \1\ In cases when
radiation control options are not available or, due to the
magnitude of the incident, are not
sufficient, doses above 5 rems may be unavoidable. For further
discussion see Appendix 1. \2\ Should normally begin at 1 rem;
however, sheltering may begin at lower levels if advantageous.
\3\ Should normally begin at 1 rem. \4\ Provides protection from
radioactive iodine only. \5\ For other information on medical
prophylactics and treatment please refer to
http://www.fda.gov/cder/ drugprepare/default.htm or
http://www.bt.cdc.gov/radiation/index/asp or
http://www.orau.gov/reacts.
ttp://www.bt.cdc.gov/radiation/index/asp or or
http://www.orau.gov/reacts">http://www.orau.gov/reactstion/index/
asp or http://www.orau.gov/reacts.. \6\ ``Potassium Iodide as a
Thyroid Blocking Agent in Radiation Emergencies,'' December 2001,
Center Drug
Evaluation and Research, FDA, HHS
(http://www.fda.gov/cder/guidance/5386fnl.htm). \7\ ``Accidental
Radioactive Contamination of Human Food and Animal Feeds:
Recommendations for State and Local
Agencies,'' August 13, 1998, Office of Health and Industry
Programs, Center for Devices and Radiological
Health, FDA, HHS (http://www.fda.gov/cdhr/dmqrp/84.html). (i)
Early Phase PAGs
For the early phase, the existing PAGs for evacuation,
sheltering, relocation, and protection of emergency workers are
appropriate for RDD and IND incidents. FDA guidance on the
administration of stable iodine is also considered appropriate
(only useful for an IND or NPP incident involving radioiodine
release). The administration of other prophylactic drugs should
be evaluated on a case-by-case basis and depend on the nature of
the event and radioisotopes involved. It can be expected that an
initial zone will be established and controlled around the site
of the incident, as is the case for other crime scenes and
hazards. These guides allow for the refinement of that area if
the presence of radiation or radioactive material warrants such
action.
The response during the early phase includes initial emergency
response actions to protect public health and welfare in the
short term. Priority should be given to lifesaving and first-aid
actions. Incident commanders should define and enforce an
allowable emergency dose limit in accordance with the immediate
risk situation. Following IND detonation, the highest priority
missions will include suppression of ignited fires to prevent
further loss of life. High radiation doses to emergency personnel
in IND situations, substantially exceeding the nominal
occupational level of 5 rem may be unavoidable. While every
effort to employ as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA)
principles after an [[Page 183]] IND event will be made,
medically significant exposures may also be unavoidable (see
Appendix 1, Section E). Medical evaluation of emergency response
personnel after such exposure is recommended. (ii) Intermediate
Phase PAGs
The decisions in the intermediate phase will focus on the return
of key infrastructure and services, and the rapid restoration of
normal activities. This will include decisions on allowing use of
roads, ports, waterways, transportation systems (including
subways, trains, and airports), hospitals, businesses, and
residences. It will also include responses to questions about
acceptable use and release of real and personal property such as
cars, clothes, or equipment that may have been impacted by the
RDD or IND incident. Many of the activities will be concerned
with materials and areas that were not affected but for which
members of the public may have a concern. Thus, the PAGs serve to
guide decisions on returning to impacted areas, leaving impacted
areas, and providing assurance that an area or material was not
impacted. See Appendix 1 for a discussion of occupational safety
and health standards.
For the intermediate phase, relocation of the population is a
protective action that can be used to reduce dose. Relocation is
the removal or continued exclusion of people (households) from
contaminated areas in order to avoid chronic radiation exposure,
and it is meant to protect the general public. For the
intermediate phase, the existing relocation PAGs of 2 rems in the
first year and 500 mrems in any year after the first are
considered appropriate for RDD and IND incidents. However, for
some IND incidents, the area impacted and the number of people
that might be subject to relocation could potentially be very
large and could exceed the resources and infrastructure
available. For example, in making the relocation decision, the
availability of adequate accommodations for relocated people
should be considered. Decision makers may need to consider
limiting action to those most severely affected, and phasing
relocation implementation based on the resources available.
The relocation PAG applies principally to personal residences but
may impact other facilities as well. For example, it could impact
work locations, hospitals, and park lands as well as the use of
highways and other transportation facilities. For each type of
facility, the occupancy time of individuals should be taken into
account to determine the criteria for using a facility or area.
It might be necessary to avoid continuous use of homes in an area
because radiation levels are too high. However, a factory or
office building in the same area could be used because occupancy
times are shorter. Similarly, a highway could be used at higher
contamination levels because the exposure time of highway users
would be considerably less than the time spent at home.
The intermediate phase PAGs for the interdiction of food and
water are set at 500 mrem/yr each for RDD and IND incidents.
These values are consistent with those now used or being
considered as PAGs for other types of nuclear incidents.
The use of simple dose reduction techniques is recommended for
personal property and all potentially contaminated areas that
continue to be occupied. This use is also consistent with the
PAGs developed for other types of nuclear incidents. Examples of
simple dose reduction techniques would be washing of all
transportation vehicles (e.g., automobiles, trains, ships, and
airplanes), personal clothing before reuse, eating utensils, food
preparation surfaces before next use, and other personal
property, as practicable and appropriate. (iii) Late Phase PAGs
The late phase involves the final cleanup of areas and property
with radioactive material present. Unlike the early and
intermediate phases of an RDD or IND incident, decision makers
will have more time and information during the late phase to
allow for better data collection, stakeholder involvement, and
options analysis. In this respect, the late phase is no longer a
response to an ``emergency situation,'' and is better viewed in
terms of the objectives of site restoration and cleanup.
Because of the extremely broad range of potential impacts that
may occur from RDDs and INDs (e.g., ranging from light
contamination of one building to widespread destruction of a
major metropolitan area), a pre-established numeric guideline is
not recommended as best serving the needs of decision makers in
the late phase. Rather, a process should be used to determine the
societal objectives for expected land uses and the options and
approaches available, in order to select the most acceptable
criteria. For example, if the incident is an RDD of limited size,
such that the impacted area is small, then it might reasonably be
expected that a complete return to normal conditions can be
achieved within a short period of time. However, if the impacted
area is large, then achieving even low cleanup levels for
remediation of the entire area and/or maintaining existing land
uses may not be practicable.
The Risk Management Framework described in Appendix 2 provides
such a process and helps assure the protection of public health
and welfare. Decisions should take health, safety, technical,
economic, and public policy factors into account. Appendix 3
utilizes the framework to manage Federal RDD and IND site cleanup
and restoration.
Optimization (broadly defined) is a concept that is common to
many State, Federal, and international risk management programs
that address radionuclides and chemicals, although it is not
always identified as such. Optimization is a flexible approach
where a variety of dose and/ or risk benchmarks may be identified
from State, Federal, or other sources (e.g., national and
international advisory organizations). These benchmarks may be
useful for analysis of remediation options and levels may move up
or down depending on the site-specific circumstances and
balancing of other relevant factors.
Optimization activities are quantitative and qualitative
assessments applied at each stage of site restoration
decisionmaking, from evaluation of remedial options, to
implementation of the chosen alternative. The evaluation of
options for the late phase of recovery after an RDD or IND
incident should balance all of the relevant factors, including:
Areas impacted (e.g., size, location relative to population)
Types of contamination (chemical, biological, and radiological)
Other hazards present
Human health
Public welfare
Ecological risks
Actions already taken during the early and intermediate phases
Projected land use
Preservation or destruction of places of historical, national, or
regional significance
Technical feasibility
Wastes generated and disposal options and costs
Costs and available resources to implement and maintain remedial
options
Potential adverse impacts (e.g., to human health, the
environment, and the economy) of remedial options
Long-term effectiveness
Timeliness
Public acceptability, including local cultural sensitivities
Economic effects (e.g., tourism, business, and industry) [[Page
184]]
The optimization process provides the best opportunity for
decision makers to gain public confidence through the involvement
of stakeholders. This process may begin during, and proceed
independently of, intermediate phase protective actions.
The Recovery Management Team (see Appendix 3) should develop a
schedule with milestones for conducting the optimization process
as soon as practicable following the incident. While the goal of
the team should be to complete the initial optimization process
within six months of the incident, the schedule must take into
consideration incident-specific factors that would affect
successful implementation. It should be recognized that this
schedule may need to represent a phased approach to cleanup and
is subject to change as the cleanup progresses. (e) Federal
Implementation
This guidance describes the approach the Federal Government will
take in making protective action recommendations and provides
guidance for long-term site restoration following radiological
and nuclear terror incidents. Appendix 3 provides additional
details on the process that will be used to implement this
guidance, focusing on describing the role of the Federal
Government and how it will integrate its activities with State
and local governments and the public. In particular, Appendix 3
addresses the scenario in which the Federal Government is
expected to be the primary funding entity for cleanup and
restoration activities. It should be recognized that for some
radiological terror incidents, States might take the primary
leadership role in cleanup and contribute significant resources
toward restoration of the site. The appendix does not address
such a scenario. (f) Operational Guidelines
Implementation of the PAGs is supported by operational guidelines
that can be readily used by decision makers and responders in the
field. Operational guidelines are levels of radiation or
concentrations of radionuclides that can be accurately measured
by radiation detection and monitoring equipment, and then related
or compared to the PAGs to quickly determine if protective
actions need to be implemented. Federal agencies are continuing
development of operational guidelines to support the application
of protective action recommendations in this document.
Some values already exist that could potentially serve as
operational guidelines for RDD and IND recovery operations.
However, there are many more operational guidelines that need to
be developed or applied in order to provide decision makers and
responders with the capability to quickly determine that the
suite of PAGs for RDDs and INDs are being met. Appendix 4
presents a summary of the potential types of operational
guidelines likely needed for RDD and IND response operations.
Some examples of existing values that could be used as
operational guidelines for RDD and IND response operations
include: (i) Derived Response Levels
The PAG Manual published by the EPA contains guidance and Derived
Response Levels (DRLs) for use with the early phase PAGs. These
values serve as operational guidelines to readily determine if
protective actions associated with the PAGs need to be
implemented. If concentrations of radionuclides obtained through
field measurements are less than the DRLs, the PAGs will not be
exceeded and, thus, a protective action may not need to be taken.
(ii) Derived Intervention Levels for Food
The FDA has developed Derived Intervention Levels (DILs) for
implementation of the PAGs for food. These DILs establish levels
of contamination than can exist on crops and in food products and
still maintain exposure levels below the food PAGs, and could
therefore be used as operational guidelines for RDD and IND
events. (iii) Radiation Levels for Control of Access to Radiation
Areas
Another example of an operational guideline is a 2mR/hr radiation
level that can be established for control of access to radiation
areas during the response. The rationale for this operational
guideline is that first responders need an easily measurable dose
rate for restricting access to more highly contaminated areas.
The operational guideline would not limit access by emergency
workers performing duties such as rescuing victims, but it would
allow the establishment of a hot zone boundary for an area to
which unnecessary access should be prevented. While emergency
workers' total doses would be monitored and decisions made
accordingly, the 2mR/hr operational guideline is also useful to
control access for non-emergency workers and members of the
public who are subject to lower dose constraints. For example,
non- emergency workers may need limited access to infrastructure
and facilities within the contaminated zone, and residents may
need access to homes for limited time periods.
Additional operational guidelines for use with PAGs in each phase
of recovery will need to be developed for a wide range of
personal and real property. Appropriations language from House
Report 108-076, Making Emergency Wartime Supplemental
Appropriations for the Fiscal Year 2003, and for Other Purposes,
directs the DOE ``to develop standards for the cleanup of
contamination resulting from a potential RDD event.''
Accordingly, DOE is leading an effort to develop needed
standards, in the form of operational guidelines, for a wide
range of personal (e.g., vehicles, equipment, personal items,
debris) and real (e.g., buildings, roads, bridges, residential
and commercial areas, monuments) property types likely to be
impacted by an RDD or IND incident. The work is being coordinated
with other Federal agencies, and an inter-agency work group has
been established to foster collaboration and acceptance of the
operational guidelines upon completion. The goal is to arrive at
the needed set of operational guidelines that can then be
incorporated into appropriate Federal response documents and used
by decision makers and responders. Appendix 1--Radiation
Protection for the Responder and Planning for Implementation of
the Protective Action Guides
The purpose of this appendix is to discuss the context for the
PAGs and to provide guidance for their application, particularly
for the protection of emergency responders. Response
organizations need to develop plans and protocols that address
radiation protection during an RDD or IND incident and that
ensure appropriate training for responders and decision makers.
Although this appendix discusses some of the important issues and
information that must be communicated, it is not intended to
provide a comprehensive discussion of the topic. Other detailed
reports on radiation risk, risk management decisionmaking,
training, and public communication should be consulted in the
development of plans, protocols, and training materials.
Organizations that have published such reports include the
National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements, the
International Commission on Radiological Protection, the
International Atomic Energy Agency, the American Nuclear Society,
and the Health Physics Society. (a) The Protective Action Guides
and Operations Guidelines Into Perspective
The recommendations in this report were developed to assist
decision makers and responders in planning for radiological
[[Page 185]] emergencies, in particular, those related to
terrorist incidents using RDDs and INDs. Decisions regarding
protective actions for workers and the public during such
incidents are risk management decisions, and the recommendations
in this report are provided in that context. In all cases, all
practical and reasonable means should be used to reduce or
eliminate exposures that are not necessary to protect public
health and welfare. (b) The Difference Between PAGs for
Emergencies and Other Operations
Worker and public protection guidance and standards for normal
operations are typically developed through risk management
approaches and are documented in Federal and State regulations
(e.g., 10 CFR part 20; 10 CFR part 835; 29 CFR 1910.1096).
However, many factors or decision criteria differ during a
radiological emergency versus normal operations. Some of the key
decision criteria differences between emergency PAGs and typical
occupational and public protection standards are shown in Table
1A.
Although there are times when implementation of standards or
guidelines can cause or enhance other risks, these secondary
risks normally can be controlled. Standards for normal operations
provide a margin of safety that is greater than that in
guidelines for emergency response because that margin can be
provided in a manner that ensures no significant increase in
public health risk or detriment to the public welfare. Currently,
the development of standards and guidelines for normal operations
is done in a manner that provides reasonable assurance that
implementation of the standards will not cause more risk than it
averts.
Table 1A.--Different Risk Management Considerations for Emergency
and
Normal Operations
-----------------------------------------------------------------
-------
Emergency Normal operations
-----------------------------------------------------------------
------- An adversary may attempt to create Key elements to
radiation
conditions that will cause high protection are to contain
radiation exposures, widespread radioactivity and confine
contamination, and mass disruption. access to it. Actions must be
taken as soon as There is adequate time to fully
possible to minimize exposures even characterize situations and
when information on the risks is determine risks and mitigating
incomplete. measures. Lack of action--due to unclear, overly
Inaction or delays may increase
complicated, or reactive guidelines-- costs but rarely results in
have a high possibility of causing consequences that cannot be
unintended consequences. mitigated. During emergencies, the
undesired Consequences associated with
consequences can be significant, implementation of the standard
uncontrollable, and unpredictable. are well characterized,
considered, and controlled so
as not to be of concern from
either a health or public
welfare perspective.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
-------
During the early phase of an emergency response, however,
tradeoffs are not only cost-related but may directly impact
public health and welfare. It is difficult to ensure that
implementation of recommendations does not result in more harm
than good.
Guidelines that prevent or restrict a responder's ability to
provide medical assistance based on an uncertain cancer risk may
result in loss of life of incident victims. If the PAGs delay
firefighters' ability to control fires, resulting property damage
can seriously affect overall public welfare or even cause an
increase to health risks associated with the incident. The
decision maker's use of public protection PAGs also must consider
secondary risks. Evacuation of the public could result in loss of
life and injury as a result of the evacuation process that
exceeds the increased public risk should the evacuations not
occur. These and other considerations require that the PAGs and
associated operational guides be developed so that decisions can
appropriately consider risks, detriments, and costs associated
with an RDD or IND incident, as well as those associated with
implementation of the protective action to, on balance, benefit
the public welfare.
Emergency response actions should be carried out following a
careful consideration of both the benefits to be achieved by the
``rescue'' or response action (e.g., the significance of the
outcome to individuals, populations, property, and the
environment at risk considering their likely impaired status
following an incident), and the potential for additional health
impacts to those conducting the emergency response operation.
That is, in making an emergency response decision, the potential
for the success of the response/ rescue operation and the
significance of its benefits to the community should be balanced
against the potential for rescuers to be exposed to new and
significant health and safety risks.
Actions should be based on balancing risks and benefits. Nothing
in this guidance should be construed to imply that appropriate
steps should not be taken to minimize dose to workers and the
public, consistent with the ALARA principle applied to radiation
protection activities in the United States. However, actions
similarly should not restrict lifesaving or property-saving
actions necessary for protection of public and public welfare.
(c) Controlling Occupational Exposures and Doses to First
Responders
This section provides guidance for first responders concerning
occupational doses of radiation, during an emergency response. In
many emergency situations, actual exposure of workers, including
first responders, may be controlled to low doses when proper
precautions are taken. However, it is important to recognize that
conditions that exist during an RDD or IND incident may limit the
effectiveness of these precautions for some first responders. One
of the major radiation protection controls used for normal
operations is containment of the radioactive material. Another is
to keep people away from the sources. However, during an RDD or
IND incident, use of these controls may not be possible. As a
result, radiation exposures, particularly to first responders,
may be unavoidable and may have the potential to exceed limits
used for normal operations. Nonetheless, every reasonable effort
should be made to control doses to levels that are as low as
practicable. (d) Maintaining the ``As Low As Reasonably
Achievable'' Principle
To minimize the risks from exposure to ionizing radiation,
employers of first responders should prepare emergency response
plans and protocols in advance to keep worker exposures as low as
reasonably achievable. These protocols should include, to the
extent they can be employed, the following health physics and
industrial hygiene practices:
Minimizing the time spent in the contaminated area (e.g.,
rotation of workers);
Maintaining the maximum distance from sources of radiation;
Shielding of the radiation source from the receptor;
Tailoring of hazard controls to the work performed;
Properly selecting and using respirators and other personal
protective equipment (PPE) may be useful to prevent exposure to
internally deposited radioactive materials (e.g., alpha and beta
emitters); and
Using prophylactic medications, where medically appropriate, that
either block the uptake or reduce the retention time of
radioactive material in the body.
The incident commander should be prepared to identify, to the
extent possible, all hazardous conditions or substances and to
perform appropriate site hazard analysis. Emergency management
plans should include protocols to control worker exposures,
establish exposure guidelines in advance, and outline procedures
for worker protection. All activities should be performed in
conjunction with emergency procedures that include provisions for
exposure monitoring, worker training on the hazards involved in
response operations and ways to control them, and medical
monitoring. (e) Understanding Dose and Risk Relationships
Responders and incident commanders should understand the risks
associated with radiation. PAG recommendations in this document
provide a guideline level of 5 rems for worker protection and
alternative [[Page 186]] response worker guidelines \2\ (see
Table 1B) for certain activities where exposures below 5 rems
cannot be maintained.
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----------
\2\ Alternative response worker guidelines are applicable only
during emergency situations. They typically apply during the
early phase of the emergency but may also be applicable in later
phases under emergency situations such as a fire or a structure
failure that puts life and property at risk. In addition to the
obvious life saving situation, other examples of where the
guidelines may be applicable include situations where it is
necessary to access controls to prevent or mitigate explosions,
fires or other catastrophic events. The alternative response
worker guidelines are not applicable to normal restoration or
cleanup actions.
Table 1B.--Response Worker Guidelines
-----------------------------------------------------------------
-------
Total effective date
equivalent (TEDE) guideline Activity Condition
-----------------------------------------------------------------
------- 5 rems...................... All occupational All
reasonably
exposures. achievable actions
have been taken to
minimize dose. 10 rems *................... Protecting valuable
Exceeding 5 rems
property necessary unavoidable and all
for public welfare appropriate actions
(e.g., a power taken to reduce
plant). dose. Monitoring
available to
project or measure
dose. 25 rems **.................. Lifesaving or Exceeding 5 rems
protection of large unavoidable and all
populations. appropriate actions
taken to reduce
dose. Monitoring
available to
project or measure
dose.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
------- * For potential does >10 rems, special medical monitoring
programs
should be employed, and exposure should be tracked in terms of
the
unit of absorbed dose (rad) rather than TEDE (rem). ** In the
case of a very large incident such as an IND, incident
commanders may need to consider raising the property and
lifesaving
response worker guidelines in order to prevent further loss of
life
and massive spread of destruction.
It is likely during most RDD incidents that the radiation control
measures discussed above will be able to maintain doses below the
5 rem occupational exposure PAG in almost all situations,
including fire fighting; general emergency response; and
transport to, and medical treatment of, contaminated victims at
hospitals. However, in those situations in which victims are
injured or trapped in high radiation areas or only be reached via
high radiation areas, exposure control options may be unavailable
or insufficient, and doses above 5 rem may be unavoidable.
Response decisions allowing actions that could result in doses in
excess of 5 rems can only be made at the time of the incident,
under consideration of the actual situation. In such situations,
incident commanders and other responders need to understand the
risk posed by such exposures in order to make informed decisions.
The Response Worker Guidelines for life and property saving
activities in Table 1B are provided to assist such decisions.
The catastrophic event represented by an IND can cause other
immediate widespread physical hazards such as firestorm and
building instability; emergency intervention will be integral to
preventing further loss of life and additional destruction. This
intervention may result in increased exposure to emergency
response personnel. Exceeding the Response Worker Guidelines in
Table 1B in such an event may be unavoidable.
Persons undertaking an emergency mission covered under the
alternative occupational PAG levels should do so with full
awareness of the sub-chronic and chronic risks involved,
including knowledge of numerical estimates of the risk of delayed
effects, and they should be given reasonable assurance that
normal controls cannot be utilized to reduce doses below the
general 5 rem occupational exposure PAG. The 25 rem lifesaving
Response Worker Guidelines provide assurance that exposures will
not result in detrimental deterministic health effects (i.e.,
prompt or acute effects). If, due to extensive public health and
welfare benefits (i.e., optimization considerations), response
actions are deemed necessary that cause exposures that may exceed
the 25 rem alternative Response Worker Guideline, such response
actions should only be taken with an understanding of the
potential acute effects of radiation to the exposed responder
(Table 1C) and based on the determination that the benefits of
the action clearly exceed the associated risks. [[Page 187]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TN03JA06.001
The following paragraph is presented to help illustrate how
certain toxicity information may be relevant in response
decisionmaking during emergencies. It is important to note that
the approach used below to translate dose to risk in this
discussion is a simplistic approach useful in developing rough
estimates of risks for comparative purposes given limited data.
However, other more realistic approaches are often used in
assessing risks for risk management decisions (other than for
emergencies) when more complete information about the
contaminants and the potential for human exposure is available.
These other approaches rely on radionuclide- specific risk
factors (e.g., Federal Guidance Report 13 \3\ and EPA Health
Effects Assessment Summary Tables).
-----------------------------------------------------------------
----------
\3\ ``Risks from Low-Level Environmental Exposure to
Radionuclides,'' Federal Guidance Report 13, U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, January 1998, EPA 402-R-97-014.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
----------
The estimated risk of fatal cancer \4\ for workers exposed to 10
rem is 0.6 percent (six cases per thousand exposed). Workers
exposed to 25 rem have an estimated risk of fatal cancer of 1.5
percent (15 cases per thousand exposed). Because of the latency
period of cancer, younger workers face a larger risk of fatal
cancer than older workers (for example, when exposed to 25 rem,
twenty to 30 year-olds have a 9.1 per thousand risk of premature
death, while 40 to 50 year-olds have a 5.3 per thousand risk of
premature death).\5\
-----------------------------------------------------------------
----------
\4\ Risk per dose of a fatal concern is assumed to be about
6x10-4 per rem. Cancer incidence is assumed to be about 7x10-4
per rem. (See Federal Guidance Report 13.
\5\ Federal Guidance Report 13.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
----------
(f) Incident Commanders and Responders Need to Proper Training in
Advance
When the 5-rem guideline is exceeded, workers should be provided
the following:
Medical follow-up
Training with respect to the risk associated with exposure to
ionizing radiation
A thorough explanation of the latent risks associated with
receiving exposures greater than 5 rems.
In addition, these PAGs represent dose constraint levels (e.g.,
when this level of dose is accumulated, the responder should not
take part in the later stages of the response that may
significantly increase their dose). It is assumed that doses
acquired in response to a radiological incident would be ``once
in a lifetime'' doses, and that future radiological exposures
would be substantially less.
Incident commanders and responders need a thorough understanding
of the worker exposure guidelines for radiological emergency
response, including the associated risks and specific worker
protection procedures. The reader is referred to the EPA PAG
Manual and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents (May 1992),
and the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center
(FRMAC) Radiological Emergency Response Health and Safety Manual
(May 2001).\6\
-----------------------------------------------------------------
----------
\6\ Available at
http://www.nv.doe.gov/programs/frmac/DOCUMENTS.htm .
-----------------------------------------------------------------
---------- (g) Occupational Standards
Under the provisions of the Occupational Safety and Health Act,
and equivalent statutes in the 26 States that operate
OSHA-approved State plans, each employer is responsible for the
health and safety of its employees. In accomplishing this,
employers are expected to comply with the requirements of the
Federal OSHA or State plan occupational safety and health
standards applicable in the jurisdiction in which they are
working. States with State plans enforce standards, under State
law, which are ``at least as effective as'' Federal OSHA
standards, and therefore may have more stringent or supplemental
requirements. There are currently 22 States and jurisdictions
operating complete State plans (covering both the private sector
and State and local government employees, including State and
local emergency responders). Four of these State plans cover
public (State and local government) employees only. Federal OSHA
administers the safety and health program for the private sector
in the remaining States and territories, and also retains
authority with regard to safety and health conditions for Federal
employees throughout the nation, but it does not have enforcement
jurisdiction over State and local government employees.
The primary occupational safety and health standard for emergency
response is the Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response
(HAZWOPER) standard (29 CFR 1910.120). The EPA has a Worker
Protection (40 CFR 311) standard that applies the HAZWOPER
standard to State and local workers in States that do not have
their own occupational safety and health program. [[Page 188]]
For emergency response, the OSHA standard (among many other
requirements) states that ``the individual in charge of the
incident command system shall identify to the extent possible,
all hazardous substances or conditions present and shall address
as appropriate site analysis, use of engineering controls,
maximum exposure limits, hazardous substance handling procedures,
and use of any new technologies'' (29 CFR 1910.120(q)). As part
of emergency preparedness activities, individuals authorized as
incident commanders should receive the necessary training and
planning prior to the incident, use the hazard information
available, consult relevant standards, and apply all feasible and
useful measures to minimize hazards to emergency responders.
OSHA's ionizing radiation standard (29 CFR 1910.1096), which may
also apply in certain circumstances, limits quarterly dose \7\
and includes other requirements such as monitoring,
recordkeeping, training, and reporting.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
----------
\7\ 1.25 rems or rems if cumulative lifetime dose is less than
5(n-18), where n is the worker's age at the last birthday, and
adequate past and current exposure records are maintained to show
exposures do not exceed the standard's radiation levels (29 CFR
1910.1096).
-----------------------------------------------------------------
----------
The worker exposure levels are not PAGs but instead are
regulatory limits that cannot be exceeded except under certain
conditions. These occupational limits allow workers to receive
radiation exposure during the course of performing their jobs.
This limit offers the possibility that industrial and
manufacturing facilities, critical infrastructures and other
business operations could be reopened without having to be
cleaned up, as long as they are in compliance with the 5 rem dose
limit and other OSHA requirements found in 29 CFR 1910.1096.
Otherwise, the relocation PAGs could be used by decision makers
to protect their citizens.
DOE employees and contractors are subject to DOE radiation
protection regulations, and requirements for worker protection
from radiation exposure are contained in 10 CFR part 835. These
requirements apply to all DOE employees and contractors that may
be exposed to ionizing radiation as a result of their work for
DOE, including work relating to emergency response activities.
Section 835.3(d) indicates that nothing in the regulation ``shall
be construed as limiting actions that may be necessary to protect
health and safety.'' This clause is intended to recognize the
fact that during emergencies, lifesaving or property-saving
actions may necessitate actions that have the potential to cause
doses in excess of the Department's radiation dose limits.
Subpart N of section 835 provides direction for emergency
exposure situations and indicates that:
The risk of injury should be minimized.
Actual and potential risks should be weighed against benefits of
such actions causing exposures.
No individual should be forced to perform a rescue action that
involves substantial personal risk.
Individuals authorized to perform emergency actions that may
result in exposures exceeding DOE dose limits should receive
prior training and briefing on known or anticipated hazards.
Under all circumstances, doses should be maintained as low as is
reasonably achievable. Under DOE requirements, emergency response
doses are not included with worker doses measured and calculated
to demonstrate compliance with 10 CFR Part 835 dose limits.
Requirements for the protection of NRC employees are covered by
NRC Management Directive 10.131, ``Protection of NRC Employees
Against Ionizing Radiation.'' Section VI, Guidance for Emergency
Exposure Controls During Rescue and Recovery Activities, deals
specifically with radiation exposure control during emergencies.
Section VI adopts the dose limits in the EPA PAG Manual (EPA
400-R- 92-001) for exposure of NRC employees during emergencies.
Similarly, NRC and Agreement State licensees have established
on-site exposure guidelines consistent with EPA PAGs.
For an IND incident, the radiological consequences could be so
severe that many workers would be exposed in activities, such as
emergency lifesaving functions, that would result in doses in
excess of the 5 rem limit for normal occupational activities.
Appendix 2--Risk Management Framework for RDD/IND Incident
Planning
This appendix contains a description of a risk management
framework for making decisions to protect public health and
welfare in the context of cleanup and site restoration following
an RDD or IND incident. The framework is based on the report,
``Framework for Environmental Health Risk Management,'' mandated
by the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments published by the Commission
on Risk Assessment and Risk Management in 1997. This appendix
provides specific material for RDD and IND incidents, and
reference to the report is encouraged for the details of the
general framework. Details of a plan for implementing this
framework for certain RDD and IND incidents are provided in
Appendix 4.
The ``Framework for Environmental Health Risk Management'' is
considered generally suitable for addressing the long-term
recovery issues for RDDs and INDs. Given the time frames
following an RDD or IND incident, there is generally not
sufficient time in the early and intermediate phases to conduct
full risk assessment and get stakeholder involvement. Therefore,
in order for the framework to be effective for these phases, it
must be used in planning and preparing for a radiological or
nuclear incident. As a result, many of the principles have
already been incorporated into the establishment of the PAGs for
RDD and IND incidents on a generic basis.
The framework is designed to help decision makers make good risk
management decisions. The level of effort and resources invested
in using the framework should be scaled to the importance of the
problem, the potential severity and economic impact of the risk,
the level of controversy surrounding the problem, and resource
constraints. In the context of an RDD or IND incident, the risk
management decisions involve responding to the consequences of a
particular incident. The risks that must be considered are both
radiation risks and potentially chemical or biological agents.
Other factors to be considered include the continued sense of
uncertainty and disruption in normal activities; the loss of, or
limited access to, critical infrastructure and health care; and
general economic disruption.
The framework relies on the three key principles of broad
context, stakeholder participation, and iteration. Broad context
refers to placing all of the health and environmental issues in
the real-world context following an RDD or IND incident, and is
intended to assure that all public welfare related factors and
impacts are taken into account. Stakeholder participation is
critical to making and successfully implementing sound,
cost-effective, risk-informed decisions. Iteration is the process
of continuing to refine the information available, and therefore
the decisions and actions that can be taken at any point in time.
Together these principles outline a fair, responsive approach to
making the decisions necessary to effectively respond to the
impacts of an RDD or IND incident.
Risk management is the process of identifying, evaluating,
selecting, and implementing actions to reduce risk to public
health and the environment. The goal of risk management is
scientifically sound, cost-effective, integrated actions that
reduce or prevent risks while taking into account social,
cultural, ethical, public policy, and legal considerations. In
order to accomplish this goal, information will be needed on the
nature and magnitude of the risks present as a result of the
incident, the options for reducing or eliminating the risks, and
the effectiveness and costs of those options. Decision makers
also consider the economic, social, cultural, ethical, legal, and
public policy implications associated with implementing each
option, as well as the unique safety and health hazards facing
emergency workers and community health, or ecological hazards the
cleanup actions themselves may cause. Often a stakeholder
advisory group can provide the advice needed to consider all of
the relevant information.
Stakeholders can provide valuable input to decision makers during
the long-term recovery effort, and the key decision makers should
establish a process that provides for appropriate stakeholder
input. Identifying which stakeholders need to be involved in the
process depends on the situation. In the case of a site
contaminated as a result of an RDD or IND incident, stakeholders
may include those whose health, economic well-being, and quality
of life are currently affected or would be affected by the
cleanup and the site's subsequent use. They may also include
those who are legally responsible for the site's contamination
and cleanup, those with regulatory responsibility, and those who
may speak on behalf of environmental considerations or future
generations.
Stakeholder input should be considered throughout all stages of
the framework as appropriate, including analyzing the risks,
[[Page 189]] identifying potential cleanup options, evaluating
options, selecting an approach, and evaluating the effectiveness
of the action afterwards. Their input will assist decision makers
in providing a reasonable basis for actions to be taken. Further
information on the importance and selection of stakeholders can
be found in the Framework for Environmental Health Risk
Management.
Decision makers can also benefit from the use of working groups
that can provide expert technical advice regarding the decisions
that need to be made during the long-term recovery process.
Further information on how to incorporate the use of technical
working groups is provided later in this appendix. (a) The Stages
of the Risk Management Framework for Responding to RDD and IND
Incidents
The ``Framework for Environmental Health Risk Management'' has
six stages:
1. Define the problem and put it in context.
2. Analyze the risks associated with the problem in context.
3. Examine options for addressing the risks.
4. Make decisions about which options to implement.
5. Take actions to implement the decisions.
6. Evaluate results of the actions taken.
Risk management decisions under this framework should do the
following:
Clearly articulate all of the problems in their public health and
ecological contexts, not just those associated with radiation.
Emerge from a decisionmaking process that elicits the views of
those affected by the decision.
Be based on the best available scientific, economic, and other
technical evidence.
Be implemented with stakeholder support in a manner that is
effective, expeditious, and flexible.
Be shown to have a significant impact on the risks of concern.
Be revised and changed when significant new information becomes
available.
Account for their multi-source, multimedia, multi- chemical, and
multi-risk contexts.
Be feasible, with benefits reasonably related to their costs.
Give priority to preventing risks, not just controlling them.
Be sensitive to political, social, legal, and cultural
considerations. (1) Define the Problems and Put Them in Context
In the case of RDDs, the initial problem is caused by the
dispersal of radioactive material. This dispersion may also
result in the release of other types of contaminants (chemical or
biological) or create other types of public health hazards.
Individuals exposed may include workers and members of the
public, and there may be different associated assumptions; for
example, how long the individuals will be exposed in the future.
The potential for future radiation exposure must be considered
within the context of the societal objectives to be achieved, and
must examine the options in the context of all of the other
sources, hazards, and impacts the community faces. There may also
be broader public health or environmental issues that local
governments and public health agencies have to confront and
consider. Understanding the context of a risk problem is
essential for effectively managing the risk.
The goals of the recovery will extend well beyond the reduction
of potential delayed radiation health effects, and may include:
Public health protection goals, including acute hazards,
long-term chronic issues, and protection of children and other
sensitive populations.
Social and economic goals, such as minimizing disruption to
communities and businesses, maintaining property values, and
protecting historical or cultural landmarks or resources.
National security goals, such as maintaining and normalizing use
of critical arteries, airports, or seaports for mass transit;
maintaining energy production; and providing for critical
communications.
Public welfare goals, including maintaining hospital capacity,
water treatment works, and sewerage systems for protection of
community health; assuring adequate food, fuel, power, and other
essential resources; and providing for the protection or recovery
of personal property. (2) Analyze the Risks
To make effective risk management decisions, decision makers and
other stakeholders need to know what potential harm a situation
poses and how great is the likelihood that people or the
environment will be harmed. The nature, extent, and focus of a
risk assessment should be guided by the risk management goals.
The results of a risk assessment--along with information about
public values, statutory requirements, court decisions, equity
considerations, benefits, and costs--are used to decide whether
and how to manage the risks.
Risk assessments can be controversial, reflecting the important
role that both science and judgment play in drawing conclusions
about the likelihood of effects on public health and the
environment. It is important that risk assessors respect the
objective scientific basis of risks and procedures for making
inferences in the absence of adequate data. Risk assessors should
provide decision makers and other stakeholders with plausible
conclusions about risk that can be made on the basis of the
available information, along with evaluations of the scientific
support for those conclusions, descriptions of major sources of
uncertainty, and alternative views.
Stakeholders' perception of a risk can vary substantially
depending on such factors as the extent to which the stakeholders
are directly affected, whether they have voluntarily assumed the
risk or had the risk imposed on them, and whether they are
connected with the cause of the risk. For this reason, risk
assessments should characterize the scientific aspects of a risk
and note its subjective, cultural, and comparative dimensions.
Stakeholders play an important role in providing information that
should be used in risk assessments and in identifying specific
health and ecological concerns that should be considered. (3)
Examine the Options
This stage of the risk management process involves identifying
potential recovery management options and evaluating their
effectiveness, feasibility, costs, benefits, cultural or social
impacts, and unintended consequences. This process can begin
whenever appropriate, after defining the problem and considering
the context. It does not have to wait until the risk analysis is
completed, although a risk analysis often will provide important
information for identifying and evaluating risk management
options. In some cases, examining risk management options may
help refine a risk analysis. Risk management goals may be
redefined after decision makers and stakeholders gain some
appreciation for what is feasible, what the costs and benefits
are, and what contribution reducing exposures and risks can make
toward improving human and ecological health.
Once potential options have been identified, the effectiveness,
feasibility, benefits, detriments, and costs of each option must
be assessed to provide input into selecting an option. Key
questions include determining (1) the expected benefits and
costs; (2) who gains the benefits and who bears the costs; (3)
the feasibility of the option given the available time;
resources; and any legal, political, statutory, and technology
limitations; and (4) whether the option increases certain risks
while reducing others. Other adverse consequences may be
cultural, political, social, or economic--such as economic
impacts on a community, including reduced property values or loss
of jobs; environmental justice issues; and harming the social
fabric of a town or tribe by relocating the people away from a
contaminated area.
Many risk management options may be unfeasible for social,
political, cultural, legal, or economic reasons--or because they
do not reduce risks to the extent needed. For example, removing
all the soil from an entire valley that is heavily contaminated
with radioactive material may be infeasible. On the other hand,
the costs of cleaning up an elementary school may be considered
justified by their benefits: protecting children and returning
daily activities to a sense of normalcy. Of course, the
feasibility and cost- effectiveness of an option may change in
the future as technology is improved or as society's values
change. (4) Make a Decision
A productive stakeholder involvement process can generate
important guidance for decision makers. Thus, decisions may
reflect negotiation and compromise, as long as risk management
goals and intent are met. In some cases, win-win solutions are
available that allow stakeholders with divergent views to achieve
their primary goals.
Decision makers must balance the value of obtaining additional
information against the need for a decision, however uncertain.
Sometimes a decision must be made primarily on a precautionary
basis. Every effort should be made to avoid ``paralysis by
analysis,'' in which the need for additional information, or the
inability to reach consensus, is used as an excuse to avoid or
[[Page 190]] postpone decisionmaking. When sufficient information
is available to make a risk management decision, or when
additional information or analysis would not contribute
significantly to the quality of the decision, the decision should
not be postponed. ``Value-of- information'' techniques can be
used to provide perspective on the next steps to be taken. (5)
Take Action To Implement Decision
When options have been evaluated and decisions made, a plan for
action should be developed and implemented. Traditionally,
implementation of protective actions is driven by decision
makers' responsibilities to protect the public and the
environment. State and local officials, business leaders, private
industries, and the general public are generally the implementers
of these protective actions. Actions may take considerable time
for completion, and additional decisions may often be necessary
as the actions proceed. (6) Evaluate the Results
Decision makers and other stakeholders must continue to review
what risk management actions have been implemented and how
effective these actions have been. Evaluating effectiveness
involves monitoring and measuring, as well as comparing actual
benefits and costs to estimates made in the decisionmaking stage.
The effectiveness of the process leading to implementation should
also be evaluated at this stage. Evaluation provides important
information about: Whether the actions were successful; whether
they accomplished what was intended; whether the predicted
benefits and costs were accurate; whether any modifications are
needed to the risk management plan to improve success; whether
any critical information gaps hindered success; whether any new
information has emerged that indicates a decision or a stage of
the framework should be revisited; whether the process was
effective; how stakeholder involvement contributed to the
outcome; and what lessons can be learned to guide future risk
management decisions or to improve the decisionmaking process.
Evaluation is critical to accountability and to ensure wise use
of valuable but limited resources. Tools for evaluation include
environmental and health monitoring, research, disease
surveillance, analyses of costs and benefits, and discussions
with stakeholders. (b) Technical Advisory Groups
Making decisions on the appropriate cleanup approaches and levels
following an RDD or IND incident of any significant size will
undoubtedly be a challenging task for decision makers. As already
noted, the technical issues may be complex, many potentially
competing factors will need to be carefully weighed, and public
anxiety can be expected to be high in the face of a terrorist act
involving radioactive materials. In addition, it is recognized
that different regulatory authorities and organizations
historically have taken different cleanup approaches for
radioactively contaminated sites. Given this context, decision
makers will need to determine how best to obtain the necessary
technical input to support these decisions and demonstrate to the
public that the final decisions are credible and sound.
There are a variety of ways this approach may be accomplished,
and decision makers will need to tailor a process best suited to
particular site circumstances. This section describes one process
that is available to decision makers, which is based on the ``ad
hoc'' mechanisms used for coordinating interagency expertise and
assessing the effectiveness in general of the cleanup in response
to the 2001 anthrax attacks. The anthrax cleanup involved the use
of two technical groups that were used to advise key decision
makers: a technical working group and a technical peer review
advisory committee. (Unlike the other steps described in this
appendix, these concepts are not described in the 1997 framework
and are thus described in greater detail here.) (1) Technical
Working Group
Decision makers may choose to convene a technical working group
to provide multi-agency, multi-disciplinary expert input to the
planning and implementation of the cleanup effort, especially in
setting appropriate cleanup goals and developing strategies for
meeting them.
The group would be an ad hoc technical advisory group, not a
decisionmaking body. It may include representatives from Federal,
State, local, and tribal agencies. It may also include experts
from the private sector or universities. Inclusion of a qualified
local physician or health official also helps enhance the
credibility of the working group within the community.
The composition of the group and the scope of its charter will
vary depending on the needs of the situation and the nature of
the contamination. For example, expertise in chemical or
radiation toxicology will be needed for attacks involving
chemical or radioactive agents. In some cases (e.g., where there
is simultaneous release of similar contamination at numerous
locations), one working group may be charged with providing
national-level advice to be applied locally at multiple
individual sites. In other cases (i.e., where contamination is
minimal or exposure is unlikely), a technical working group may
not be necessary.
A technical working group can provide expert input in the form of
cross-agency coordination on technical issues, analysis of
relevant requirements and guidelines, review of data and plans,
and recommendations that will aid in ensuring that cleanup will
be adequate. The group may also provide technical information to
the Joint Information Center (JIC) to explain public health or
environmental impacts to the public and the press. This group,
like the advisory committee discussed below, reports to the
decision maker, however, and not directly to the public. A
technical working group can complement other ``special teams''
that may assist in the recovery effort, and representatives from
these other special teams may be members of the technical working
group. (2) Technical Peer Review Advisory Committee
For significant decontamination efforts, the key decision makers
may choose to convene an independent committee of technical
experts to conduct a deliberative and comprehensive
post-decontamination review. The committee would evaluate the
effectiveness of the decontamination process and make
recommendations on whether the decontaminated areas or items may
be reoccupied or reused. It is important to note that although
this review may enhance the scientific credibility of the final
outcome, final cleanup decisions rest with decision makers.
The committee may consist of experts from the involved Federal
agencies, State and tribal public health and environmental
agencies, universities and private industry, the local health
department, and possibly representatives of the employees and the
community. To maximize objectivity, the committee would be an
independent group that will advise and report to the decision
makers, but not be a part of the decisionmaking team.
The scientific expertise in the committee should reflect the
needs of the decision makers in conducting a peer review of all
aspects of the decontamination process (e.g., environmental
sampling, epidemiology, risk assessment, industrial hygiene,
statistics, and engineering). Agencies on the committee may also
have representatives on the technical working group, but in order
to preserve the objectivity of the committee, it is best to
designate different experts to serve on each group. The chair and
co-chair of the committee should not be a part of the
decisionmaking group at the site.
The decision makers should develop a charter for the committee,
specifying the tasks committee members are intended to perform,
the issues they are to consider, and the process they will use in
arriving at conclusions and recommendations. The charter should
also specify whether the individual members are expected to
represent the views of their respective agencies or just their
own opinions as independent scientific experts. Consensus among
committee members is desirable but may not be possible. If
consensus cannot be achieved, the charter should specify how
decision makers expect the full range of opinions to be reflected
in the final committee report. All members of the committee
should agree to the terms of charter and sign it before
participating.
In general, the technical peer review committee would evaluate
pre- and post-decontamination sampling data, the decontamination
plan, and any other information key to assessing the
effectiveness of the cleanup. Based on this evaluation, the
committee would make recommendations to the decision makers on
whether cleanup has reduced contamination to acceptable levels,
or whether further actions are needed before re-occupancy.
Appendix 3--Federal Implementation
This appendix provides an implementation plan for the protective
action recommendations in the body of this [[Page 191]] document.
It also describes how to implement the risk management framework
for recovery after a radiological or nuclear incident described
in Appendix 2. This implementation plan presents the Federal role
in long-term site restoration, and how Federal departments and
agencies will interact with State and local government
counterparts and the public. The plan does not attempt to provide
detailed descriptions of State and local roles and expertise. It
is assumed those details would be provided in State-, area-, and
local-level planning documents that address radiological/ nuclear
terrorism incidents.
This site cleanup implementation plan is intended to function
under the National Response Plan (NRP) with Federal agencies
performing work consistent with their established roles,
responsibilities and capabilities. Agencies should be tasked to
perform work under the appropriate Emergency Support Function, as
a primary or support agency, as described in the NRP.
This plan is designed to be compatible with the Incident
Command/Unified Command (IC/UC) structure embodied in the
National Incident Management System (NIMS). The functional
descriptions and processes in this plan are provided to address
the specific needs and wide range of potential impacts of an RDD
or IND incident. During the intermediate phase, site restoration
planners should begin the process described below, in
coordination with the on-site IC/UC. Coordination of Federal
activities may organize along IC/UC functional lines coordinating
with the on-site organization to avoid redundancy. After early
and intermediate phase activities have come to conclusion, and
only long-term cleanup and site restoration activities are
ongoing, the IC/UC structure may continue to support planning and
decisionmaking for the long-term cleanup. The IC/UC may make
personnel changes and structural adaptations to suit the needs of
a lengthy, multifaceted and highly visible remediation process.
For example, a less formal and structured command, more focused
on technical analysis and stakeholder involvement, may be
preferable for site restoration than what is required under
emergency circumstances. Some of the Teams described below, such
as the Decision Team or the Recovery Management Team may be
coordinated from, or coincident with, functional portions of the
IC/UC at the site. Although the makeup of the Teams may vary, the
functions should remain the same.
Radiological and nuclear terrorism incidents cover a broad range
of potential scenarios and impacts. For the sake of this
appendix, it is assumed that the incident is of sufficient size
to trigger a State request for Federal assistance, and that the
Federal Government is the primary funding agent for site
restoration. In particular the process, described for the late
phase in Section D.3.3 of this document, assumes an incident of
larger size. For smaller incidents, all of the elements in this
section may not be warranted. The process should be tailored to
the circumstances of the particular incident. It should be
recognized that for some radiological/nuclear terrorist
incidents, States will take the primary leadership role and
contribute significant resources toward restoration of the site.
This section does not address such a scenario.
As described earlier in the document, radiological/nuclear
emergency responses are often divided roughly into three phases:
(1) The early phase, when the plume is active and field data are
lacking or not reliable; (2) the intermediate phase, when the
plume has passed and field data are available for assessment and
analysis; and (3) the late phase, when long-term issues are
addressed, such as restoration of the site. For purposes of this
appendix, the response to a radiological or nuclear terrorism
incident is divided into two separate, but interrelated and
overlapping, processes. The first is comprised of the early and
intermediate phases of response, which consist of the immediate
on-scene actions of State and local first responders under
Incident Command/Unified Command (IC/UC), as well as those of
Federal teams and officials, to perform incident stabilization,
lifesaving activities, access control and security, emergency
decontamination of persons and property, ``hot spot'' removal
actions, dose reduction actions for members of the public and
emergency responders, and resumption of basic infrastructure
functions.
The second process pertains to environmental restoration, which
is initiated soon after the incident (during the intermediate
phase) and continues into the late phase. The process starts with
the convening of stakeholders and technical subject matter
experts to begin identifying and evaluating options for the
restoration of the site. The environmental restoration process
overlaps the intermediate phase activities described above and
should be coordinated with those activities.
This implementation plan does not address law enforcement
coordination during terrorism incident response, including how
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and DHS will manage
on-scene actions immediately following an act of terror. Also,
victim triage and other medical response aspects are not
addressed. The plan presented in this appendix is not intended
for use at site cleanups occurring under other statutory
authorities such as EPA's Superfund program, the NRC's
decommissioning program, or State-administered cleanup programs.
(a) Response and Recovery Activities Overview
The following are actions expected to occur according to existing
plans, protocols, and capabilities. These early activities are
primarily for context and are not intended to be exhaustive. The
major change from current operating plans and protocols is the
assumption of Federal leadership by DHS. The early phase of the
response will be run at the scene by State and local responders,
who are likely to make protective action decisions for the
protection of public health, property, and environment early in
the incident based on judgment, protocol, and what limited data
are available. As Federal response assets arrive on scene, they
will be incorporated into the on-scene incident command
established by State and local officials and then become part of
the unified command structure. Other Federal assets will be
located in the Joint Field Office (JFO), co-located with a
State/local Emergency Operations Center (EOC), if possible, to
support the local incident management activities. (1) Early Phase
0-3 hours.
Local incident command established
Radiation detected and a terrorism incident recognized
DHS Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC) notified of
incident and mobilized to provide support and coordination until
JFO is operational
DHS determines if this incident is an Incident of National
Significance, as defined in the NRP
Initial protective actions ordered (downwind shelter-
in-place/evacuation)
Comments:
Some Federal assets will self-deploy under their own authority
(HHS, FBI, OSHA, EPA, DOE)
Protective actions by locals likely to occur before Federal
assets arrive
6 hours.
DHS designates a Principal Federal Official (PFO)
Nuclear Incident Response Team (NIRT) activated by DHS (i.e.
Radiological Assistance Program (RAP), Aerial Measuring System
(AMS), FRMAC, Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site
(REAC/TS), Radiological Emergency Response Team (RERT))
Initial dispersion plots developed, other analyses done, and
initial Federal protective action recommendations may be provided
Domestic Emergency Support Team (DEST) deploys
Comments:
An ``Initial PFO'' may be named until the PFO can arrive at the
site
The PFO may deploy with the DEST
The PFO is responsible for coordinating Federal assets in
collaboration with other Federal officials
6-12 hours.
Initial JFO established to include FBI Joint Operations Center
(JOC)
Advance FRMAC stood up, field measurements being taken
AMS arrives, provides initial deposition data to JFO
12-24 hours.
JFO operational
Federal teams in place (NIRT, DEST, Advisory Team for Food and
Health)
PAG being provided by JFO to State and local decision makers
State requests, and is granted, a major disaster or emergency
declaration
Early phase activities are expected to proceed as described under
existing plans and agreements. If DHS declares an Incident of
National Significance, the PFO will coordinate Federal activities
from the JFO and integrate Federal activities in support of the
State and local response. A Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief
and Emergency Assistance Act declaration will facilitate funding
for public and individual assistance, and for recovery
operations. [[Page 192]]
In general, the primary agencies expected to be represented in
the unified command for an RDD or IND response incident are the
agencies with primary response authority and include DHS, FBI,
DOE, EPA, and other Federal, State, and local government
agencies, as appropriate. Other Federal agencies (e.g., NRC,
OSHA, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and DoD) will be requested to
support the response in accordance with the NRP and NIMS. (2)
Intermediate Phase
During the intermediate phase, actions initiated in the early
phase will continue as needed, such as lifesaving, fire
suppression, perimeter security, and field data collection and
analysis. Preliminary shelter-in-place or evacuation may occur
within the first hours at the order of local incident command,
but as data become available, Federal, State, and local officials
will have better information with which to make protective action
decisions, assist emergency workers, and inform the public.
Federal protective action recommendations will be provided to
State and local governments on public dose constraints,
restrictions regarding consumption of food and water, and dose
reduction actions. Intermediate phase actions may include
relocation, control of public access, decontamination of persons,
decontamination/removal of ``hot spots,'' response worker dose
monitoring, population monitoring, food and water controls, and
clearance of personal property. Public information and
communication programs should be implemented as soon as
practicable. Federal officials will work with State and local
officials to develop information for the public in coordination
with the JIC. (See the ``Application of PAGs for RDD or IND
Incidents'' for more information on intermediate phase protective
actions and recommendations.) (3) Late Phase--Recovery and Site
Restoration Activities Process Overview
As noted earlier, the long-term recovery process should be
initiated during the intermediate phase. This process is
interrelated with the ongoing intermediate phase activities, and
the intermediate phase protective actions continue to apply
through the late phase until cleanup is complete. However, the
long-term recovery phase is likely to involve separate
individuals who can focus on long-term restoration issues while
others continue working on intermediate phase activities.
Cleanup planning and discussions should begin as soon as
practicable after an incident to allow for selection of key
stakeholders and subject matter experts, planning, analyses,
contractual processes, and cleanup activities. States may choose
to pre-determine stakeholders. These activities should proceed in
parallel with ongoing intermediate phase activities, and
coordination between these sets of activities should be
maintained. Preliminary remediation activities carried out during
the intermediate phase--such as emergency removals,
decontamination, resumption of basic infrastructure function, and
some return to normalcy in accordance with intermediate phase
guidelines--should not be delayed for the final site remediation
decision.
Presented below is a process for addressing environmental
contamination that applies an optimization process for site
cleanup. Optimization (described more fully in the ``Application
of PAGs for RDD or IND Incidents'') is a flexible process in
which numerous factors are considered to achieve an end result
that balances local needs and desires, health risks, costs,
technical feasibility, and other factors. The general process
outlined below provides decision makers with input from both
technical experts and stakeholder representatives, as well as
providing an opportunity for public comment. The extent and
complexity of the process for an actual incident should be
tailored to the needs of the specific incident; for smaller
incidents, the teams discussed below may not be necessary.
The goals of the process described below are: (1) Transparency--
the basis for cleanup decisions should be available to
stakeholder representatives, and ultimately to the public at
large; (2) inclusiveness--representative stakeholders should be
involved in decisionmaking activities; (3)
effectiveness--technical subject matter experts should analyze
remediation options, consider dose and risk benchmarks, and
assess various technologies in order to assist in identifying a
final solution that is optimal for the incident; and (4) shared
accountability--the final decision to proceed will be made
jointly by DHS, State, and local officials.
If Federal agencies do not have their own authorities to enable
them to participate in the overall recovery and restoration
process, then DHS would issue mission assignments to the involved
Federal agencies to participate in the overall recovery and
restoration process. Additional funding may be provided to
State/local governments to perform response/restoration
activities through other mechanisms. The components of the
process are as follows: (i) Teams (A) Decision Team
Makeup: The Decision Team consists of the Secretary of DHS, the
governor of the State, the mayor or equivalent, and the head of
the lead Federal agency (or their respective designated
representatives with authority to commit resources on behalf of
affected persons).
Function: The function of the Decision Team is to make the final
decision on recommendations received from the Recovery Management
Team, commit resources, and commence cleanup activities. The
Decision Team will raise unresolved national level policy issues
to the Interagency Incident Management Group (IIMG) and/or to the
Assistant to the President for Homeland Security, as appropriate.
(B) Recovery Management Team
State and DHS officials should select a Recovery Management Team
as soon as possible after the incident. The size and makeup of
the team will be dependent on the incident, but would be expected
to consist of senior-level officials. The Recovery Management
Team will normally be located at the JFO in order to enhance
information flow and response coordination.
Makeup: The Recovery Management Team should include DHS, affected
State and/or local representatives, and the Federal lead
technical agency. The Recovery Management Team should be
co-chaired by a DHS and State official. The makeup is flexible
and may accommodate other individuals, as necessary.
Functions: The functions of the Recovery Management Team are to
select participants for the Stakeholder and Technical Working
Groups; provide facilitation, oversight and guidance during the
cleanup analyses and decisionmaking process; oversee working
group interactions; maintain communications between working
groups; receive and review options and recommendations; ensure
the development and implementation of community involvement and
public information strategy; and prioritize recommendations when
they are forwarded to the Decision Team for action. (C)
Stakeholder Working Group
The Stakeholder Working Group should be convened as soon as
practicable, normally within weeks of the incident.
Makeup: The Stakeholder Working Group should include selected
Federal, State, and local representatives; local non-governmental
representatives; and local business interests. The exact
selection and balance of stakeholders is incident specific. The
Stakeholder Working Group should be co-chaired by DHS and State
and/or local representatives.
Function: The function of the Stakeholder Working Group is to
provide input to the Technical Working Group and the Recovery
Management Team concerning local needs and desires for site
restoration, proposed cleanup options, and recommendations for
recovery. (D) Technical Working Group
The Technical Working Group should be convened as soon as
practicable, normally within weeks of the incident.
Makeup: The Technical Working Group should include selected
Federal, State, local, and private sector subject matter experts
in such fields as environmental fate and transport modeling, risk
analysis, technical remediation options analysis, cost risk and
benefit analysis, health physics/radiation protection,
construction remediation practices, and relevant regulatory
requirements. The exact selection and balance of subject matter
experts is incident specific. The Technical Working Group should
be chaired by the Federal lead technical agency assigned
responsibility for performing cleanup operations and co-chaired
by the State/local technical agency.
Function: The Technical Working Group provides expert input on
technical issues, analysis of relevant regulatory requirements
and guidelines, risk analyses, and evaluation of options as
directed by the Recovery Management Team. The actual technical
analyses will be the responsibility of the Federal lead technical
agency for cleanup. The Technical Working Group should also
receive input from the Stakeholder Working [[Page 193]] Group.
Technical Working Group written products are provided to the
Recovery Management Team. (ii) Activities (A) Optimization and
Recommendation (Lasts Weeks to Months)
The Recovery Management Team, in consultation with the
Stakeholder Working Group and Technical Working Group, will
develop a process for the three teams to work together in order
to provide the opportunity for local concerns to inform the work
of the Technical Working Group. The Technical Working Group and
Recovery Management Team should assist in answering questions the
Stakeholder Working Group may have regarding technical issues and
provide information regarding cleanup options.
The Stakeholder Working Group should present local goals, needs,
and desires for the use of the site, and prioritize current and
future potential land uses and functions, such as utilities and
infrastructure, light industrial, downtown business, and
residential land uses. The lead technical agency will oversee
technical optimization analyses for site cleanup in collaboration
with the Recovery Management Team, Technical Working Group, and
Stakeholder Working Group. The Technical Working Group will
analyze assumptions, review risk analyses for various proposed
remediation options, assess technical feasibility and cost of the
options, and identify the estimated time to complete restoration
options and their potential impacts on the local community.
The Stakeholder Working Group will provide input to the Technical
Working Group, but may also provide options and recommendations
directly to the Recovery Management Team. The Technical Working
Group will consider input from the Stakeholder Working Group in
its analyses, and provide input to the Recovery Management Team
on remediation options and recommended approaches and rationale.
It is important that the Technical Working Group and the
Stakeholder Working Group maintain confidentiality concerning all
aspects of the analyses. All outside contacts, such as press
interviews, concerning the ongoing work and deliberations should
be coordinated through the Recovery Management Team.
As the Technical Working Group completes its analyses and
formulates its recommendations, it will present this information
to the Recovery Management Team for final review. The Recovery
Management Team will present the Decision Team with options,
recommendations for final action, and supporting documentation.
(B) Public Review of Decision
The Decision Team should publish a summary of the process, the
options analyzed, and the recommendation for public comment.
Public meetings may also be convened as appropriate. Public
comment should be considered and incorporated as appropriate. A
reconvening of the Recovery Management Team, Stakeholder Working
Group, and Technical Working Group may be useful for resolving
some issues. (C) Execute Cleanup
Assuming a Presidential declaration of a major disaster or
emergency, DHS may issue mission assignments to the Federal
departments and agencies that have the capability to perform the
required cleanup or remediation activities. For significant de-
contamination efforts, decision makers may choose to employ a
technical peer review advisory committee to conduct a review of
the effectiveness of the cleanup. (b) Implications of DHS as Lead
Federal Agency
In both the early and intermediate phases of the response,
activities are expected to proceed as described under existing
plans and agreements, except that the Federal response will be
coordinated by DHS through the PFO. Anticipated actions include
the following:
When NIRT assets are called upon by the Secretary of DHS, they
will come under the ``authority, direction, and control'' of the
Secretary or his designee for the duration of the response. As
such, they will not work for State or local governments, nor will
they work independently under their agency of origin (either DOE
or EPA), as they may under existing plans. A DOE senior energy
official will act as the single point of contact for tasking of
DOE nuclear/ radiological support requested by the PFO or Federal
Coordinating Office (FCO).
Federal, State, and local field teams and experts should
coordinate data collection and analysis through the FRMAC (now a
DHS-directed asset) once it is operational.
All Federal information--such as protective action
recommendations, analyses, projections, and information to be
provided to the public--is expected to pass through the PFO or
FCO, in coordination with State and local officials, prior to its
release to the press and the public. A JIC may be established to
provide the organizational structure for coordinating and
disseminating official information to the public. It is
recognized, however, that in some cases, on-scene responding
Federal agencies may need to communicate directly with the
media/public on tactical operations and matters affecting public
health and safety, particularly early in the response. Appendix
4--Operational Guidelines for Implementation of the Protective
Action Guides During RDD or IND Events
As noted in Section F of the document, operational guidelines are
levels of radiation or concentrations of radionuclides that can
be accurately measured by radiation detection and monitoring
equipment, and then related or compared to the PAGs to quickly
determine if protective actions need to be implemented. In most
situations, the guidelines will be given in terms of external
gamma rates or media-specific radionuclide concentration units.
Both external and internal exposure potential will be considered
in their development.
This appendix describes examples of measurable guidelines that
will be developed by groups or categories to assist decision
makers and response workers in deciding on and applying
protective actions. This appendix discusses the guidelines
qualitatively and does not provide actual values. The operational
guidelines will be developed to provide reasonable assurance that
the PAGs, the dose levels recommended in this report, can be met
for appropriate situations under assumed circumstances. The
guidelines will also consider the impact of protective actions,
such as rinsing of vehicles to remove contamination, and when
control of wash water is necessary. Actual conditions may warrant
development of incident-specific guides, and this document does
not preclude such development. Part of the development process
will include the development of tools to allow for the
preparation of site-specific operational guidelines that can be
tailored to the emergency and the required response.
At this time, the operational guidelines are subdivided into six
groups. They are:
Access Controls During Emergency Response Operations (Group A)
Relocation Areas (Group B)
Critical Infrastructure Utilization in Relocation Areas (Group C)
Temporary Access to Relocation Areas for Essential Activities
(Group D)
Transportation and Access Routes (Group E)
Property Control for Release of Property to Non- impacted Areas
(Group F)
The purpose of operational guidelines for each of these groups is
discussed in the following paragraphs, along with examples of
specific operational guides that are needed for each group.
However, as discussed in Section F, some operational guidelines
have been previously developed and are available (e.g., EPA PAG
Manual \8\ and ``Radiological Emergency Response Health and
Safety Manual'' \9\). At this time, the appendix contains no
recommendations for actual values. As they are developed,
information on recommended operational guidelines and associated
tools will be made available for review.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
----------
\8\ ``Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions
for Nuclear Incidents,'' U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
May 1992, EPA-400-R-92-001.
\9\ ``Radiological Emergency Response Health and Safety Manual,''
May 2001, available at
http://www.nv.doe.gov/programs/frmac/DOCUMENTS.htm .
-----------------------------------------------------------------
---------- (a) Access Controls During Emergency Response
Operations (Group A)
The operational guidelines in this group are intended for use
during emergency response operations. They guide responders in
establishing radiological control zones or boundaries in affected
areas where response activities are being conducted. These
operational guides are not intended to restrict emergency
responder access but rather to inform responders of potential
radiological hazards existing in the areas and to provide tools
for those responsible for radiation protection during response
activities. Group A operational guidelines may be used to
restrict access of non-essential personnel and members of the
public to specific areas.
These guidelines are most applicable during the early and
intermediate phases of [[Page 194]] the emergency when the
situation has not been fully stabilized or characterized and may
therefore need to be applied initially with limited data and then
revised (e.g., areas reclassified or remarked), as appropriate.
Group A operational guidelines are generally for the areas
directly impacted by the RDD or IND incident where first
responders and emergency response personnel are working. However,
they may also be applicable in contaminated areas where unrelated
accidents or emergencies occur after the RDD or IND situation has
been stabilized. Group A operational guidelines are not intended
to restrict emergency response or lifesaving actions, but they
are rather intended to help focus radiological protection
resources on areas of highest priority. They do, however, define
areas that should be restricted to the public and non-essential
personnel. Examples of operational guidelines being developed in
this group include those for the following: (1) Life and Property
Saving Measures
Areas exceeding guidance levels pose a significant radiological
hazard even if access is for short periods. Access should be
permitted only when there is a significant benefit associated
with the activity to be conducted that outweighs the associated
radiological risks. The PAGs applied for development of these
operational guides include the 25 rem lifesaving response worker
guidelines (Table 1B in Appendix 1) and the property-saving
guidelines that are applicable when it is not possible to limit
response worker dose to the 5 rem worker PAG. (2) Emergency
Worker Demarcation
Areas exceeding these guides should not be used to restrict
response worker access. However, the public and non-essential
personnel should not be allowed general access to the areas
exceeding these levels. To the extent time and resources permit
and do not interfere with response actions, officials responsible
for radiation protection should establish procedures to monitor
worker access and exposures in these areas. In most situations,
the worker protection PAG of 5 rems is applicable (Table 1 in the
main text and Table 1B in Appendix 1). (b) Relocation Areas
(Group B)
The operational guidelines for this group are intended as
screening values to delineate areas that exceed the relocation
PAGs. These, or similar operational guides, have been developed
or are presented in the FRMAC manual (Volume II) and will be
assessed. Examples of operational guidelines being developed in
this group include: (1) Relocation From Residential Areas
Areas exceeding these levels pose a significant possibility of
causing doses that exceed relocation PAGs under normal
residential use, and unless specific assessments indicate
otherwise, the public should be relocated from the areas. The 2
rems in the first year and 0.5 rem/yr thereafter (Table 1) are
applicable for the development of these operational guidelines.
Temporary access may be consistent with Group D, Temporary Access
Operational Limits. (2) Relocation Considerations for
Commercial/Industrial Areas
Areas exceeding these guides pose a significant likelihood for
causing doses that exceed public relocation PAGs under normal
industrial or commercial use scenarios and should be considered
for relocation. The 2 rems in the first year and 0.5 rem/yr
thereafter (Table 1) are applicable for the development of these
operational guidelines unless the employers have radiation
protection programs in place to protect workers consistent with
applicable requirements (e.g., OSHA 29 CFR 1910.1096, NRC 10 CFR
20, DOE 10 CFR 835), or unless site-specific analyses justify
other operational limits. Temporary access for essential
activities should be guided by operational guides in Group D. Or,
if the facility is providing a service necessary to maintain
public welfare, Group C operational limits should serve as a
guide. (3) Other Areas
These operational guides apply to areas that are not used as
residences and are not normal work places (e.g., parks,
cemeteries, monuments). The value of these guidelines will likely
differ from the relocation areas previously mentioned because of
differing occupancy and use, although the dose guidelines remain
2 rems in the first year and 0.5 rems/yr thereafter (Table 1).
Access to such areas should be limited if the guides are
exceeded.
These relocation operational guidelines will provide reasonable
assurance that the worker or the public, as appropriate, will not
exceed PAGs, and that appropriate radiological protection
supervision is available in, and focused on, the higher risk
areas so as to provide protection and oversight for emergency
responders. (c) Critical Infrastructure Utilization in Relocation
Areas (Group C)
The operational guidelines for this group are intended as
screening values to ensure facilities critical to the public
welfare can continue to operate if needed. These guides only
apply to facilities in areas that exceed relocation PAGs and, as
a result, have been closed for general use and access. The
operational guidelines are generally applicable during
intermediate phase activities.
During the emergency activities, Group A operational guidelines
will generally be applicable or in use. Group C operational
guides assume a generally stable and characterized situation. The
levels are derived assuming employees spend two thousand hours
per year (a more realistic value may be employed if known) on the
job and that the maximum dose will be less than 5 rems/yr.
Facilities that exceed these operational guides and are essential
for overall public welfare may need to be assessed to identify
specific conditions and possible mitigation controls. In the
following list of possible operational guidelines, a number of
different guides have been identified, and future analyses may
indicate that the same operational guidelines may be used for all
or some of the facilities so that the list may be compressed. (1)
Hospitals
These guidelines are recommended to allow continued use of health
care facilities and services that are in areas that exceed
relocation criteria. If alternative facilities and services are
available, they should be employed before applying these
guidelines. (2) Airports, Railroads, and Ports
These guidelines are recommended to allow use of transport
facilities located in areas exceeding relocation guidelines that
are essential to providing services and products necessary for
the welfare of the region. (3) Water and Sewer Facilities
These guidelines are for utilities in relocation areas that are
necessary to provide services for the region. (4) Power and Fuel
These guidelines are for utilities in relocation areas that are
necessary to provide services for the region.
It is emphasized that these guidelines only apply when continuous
operation of these and other facilities are essential to
maintaining the public welfare and when this cannot be achieved
under Group B or Group D guidelines for relocation and temporary
access decisions, respectively. (d) Temporary Access to
Relocation Areas for Essential Activities (Group D)
The public, or employees of businesses, may need to have
temporary access to residences or commercial, agricultural, or
industrial facilities in order to retrieve essential records or
equipment, conduct maintenance to protect the facility, prevent
environmental damage, attend to animals, or retrieve pets. These
operational guides are levels at which these actions can be taken
without radiological supervision. The public or employees may
occasionally access (a few days per month) the areas not
exceeding these guides. Temporary access to relocation areas that
exceeds the levels should only be permitted under the
supervision, or with the permission of, radiation protection
personnel. These operational guidelines will be derived to
provide assurance that the doses will be below the 0.5 rem
relocation PAG (Table 1, after the first year) for the following:
(1) Worker Access to Businesses for Essential Actions
Areas meeting these levels may be accessed for limited periods to
retrieve essential materials or perform essential functions
(e.g., perform facility maintenance, attend to animals, maintain
security). (2) Public Access to Residences for Retrieval of
Critical Property, Pets, or Records
Areas in relocation areas meeting these criteria may be accessed
by the public for limited periods to attend to important
maintenance, retrieve needed records, or retrieve pets. [[Page
195]] (e) Transportation and Access Routes (Group E)
The operational guidelines for this group are intended to assist
in determining if transportation routes or access ways may be
used by the public for general, limited, or restricted use. The
relocation PAGs are used as the basis for operational guidelines
for general access. Restricted use may be based on other
guidelines as well. For example, operational guides may be
defined for industrial/ commercial use of various roads, bridges,
or access ways. These may be necessary to allow for access
between non-relocation areas via a relocation area or to allow
for emergency recovery access in the immediate area of the RDD or
IND incident. These operational guides assume regular or periodic
use and are not appropriate for one-time events, such as
evacuation or relocation actions. In general, these operational
guidelines need to be developed giving consideration to the
relocation PAGs, worker protection guidelines, and potential for
combined doses. Three examples of operational guidelines for this
group are discussed as follows, and as these are developed, it is
possible that all or some of the categories can be consolidated.
(1) Bridges
Bridges meeting these operational guidelines are acceptable for
public vehicular use (or restricted use, where appropriate). (2)
Streets and Thoroughfares
Streets and thoroughfares meeting these operational limits are
acceptable for general vehicular passage or restricted vehicular
passage, as appropriate. (3) Sidewalks and Walkways
These operational limits are for non-vehicular access (e.g.,
individuals walking from parking lots or trains to places of
business, or workers delivering goods). They should also apply to
bridges and streets if significant non-vehicular passage is
anticipated. (f) Release of Property From Radiologically
Controlled Areas (Group F)
During response and recovery operations, property (vehicles,
equipment, and waste) will need to be cleared from controlled
areas. The operational guidelines in this group will be developed
to support such actions. Because retrieval of cleared or released
properties would be difficult, wherever practicable, these levels
should be similar to those likely to define late phase goals. For
this reason, they should not be applied to property that will
remain in use in controlled areas. Many areas may not exceed
relocation PAGs and therefore, they will be accessible to the
public at levels considerably above the operational guides in
this group. Use of such property should not be assumed
unacceptable merely because it exceeds these guides. These
operational guidelines should also be used for screening property
that was outside the controlled area. In general, the operational
guides in this group provide reasonable assurance that the
property cleared is acceptable for long-term, unrestricted use
(or designated disposition in the case of wastes) without further
or future reassessment. Property includes the following: (1)
Personal Property (Except Waste)
These operational guides will apply to property to be permanently
cleared from the affected area for general reuse. They should not
be used for property that will continue to be used in the
affected areas (e.g., areas where residual activity is
significantly above background). (2) Waste
The RDD or IND incident may generate significant quantities of
waste that contain small amounts of radioactivity. This waste may
be rubble resulting from the device or from demolition associated
with recovery, or it may be in the form of municipal waste or
industrial waste from areas that are contaminated at levels below
the relocation PAGs and associated operational guidelines. Waste
meeting these operational limits may be considered for disposal
in normal landfills, and waste exceeding these limits should be
disposed at appropriate low-level radioactive waste sites. (3)
Hazardous Waste
Hazardous waste resulting from the RDD or IND or associated
recovery operations will contain varied levels of residual
radioactive material. Waste meeting these criteria may be
considered for treatment and disposal to a legally permitted
facility. Waste exceeding these concentrations should be managed
as mixed waste. (4) Real Property
Relocation PAGs and associated operational guides will be
developed for application to the management of real property, but
it is recognized that the optimization process applied during
late phase activities (which will likely overlap with the
intermediate phase) will be applied to areas that contain
residual radioactive material at concentrations below the
operational guides for relocation. Until the optimization process
determines the target cleanup levels, it is not possible to
generically define release operational guidelines for release of
real property. Tools and unit concentrations to dose factors may
be developed that can be applied on a site-specific basis by
decision makers involved in the optimization to help define
interim, or even final, operational guides for certain areas.
However, no suggested or recommended generic operational
guidelines can be developed before optimization process
considerations.
Group F operational guides are intended to provide guidance for
permanent clearance of property leaving radiologically controlled
areas. These guides are developed to provide reasonable assurance
that attaining them will minimize or eliminate the need for
further response actions. It will be difficult to collect or
re-call ``released property'' should late phase decisions about
``safe exposures'' identify more restrictive levels than those
used to release property in the early and intermediate phases.
Therefore, the property control operational guides (Group F) will
be based on potential doses that are a fraction of the
intermediate phase PAGs. Wherever practicable, these levels
should be similar to those likely to define late phase goals. As
with all the operational guidelines, alternative levels may be
developed and used if conditions and needs justify. Group F
operational guides are not applicable to continued use of
property in impacted areas.
Note: Although agencies have identified values for selected
operational guides, none have reached consensus. The development
of these values will continue as part of an interagency process.
Several sources exist that contain useful operational guidelines
or information to support the development of operational
guidelines that will eventually be included directly, or by
reference with, the recommendations in this document and
subsequent reports documenting the operational guidelines. The
interagency workgroup developing these guidelines will consider
these and other materials being developed by Federal agencies and
other groups, such as the American National Standards Institute
(ANSI) and National Council on Radiation Protection and
Measurement (NCRP). Consistent with direction from Congress in
FY2003 Supplemental Appropriations Legislation, the DOE is
conducting analyses and developing models to support the
completion of operational guidelines identified in this appendix.
A significant fraction of the operational guidelines were
completed and submitted for interagency review in late FY2005.
Completion of the analyses and revisions based on interagency
input (and peer review) is anticipated in the middle of FY2006.
As the operational guidelines are developed and worked through
the interagency process, they will be made available for review
on the Internet. Appendix 5--Acronyms/Glossary AMS
Aerial Measuring System--A DOE technical asset consisting of both
fixed wing and helicopter systems for measuring radiation on the
ground; a deployable asset of the NIRT. ALARA
As low as reasonably achievable--A process to control or manage
radiation exposure to individuals and releases of radioactive
material to the environment so that doses are as low as social,
technical, economic, practical, and public welfare considerations
permit. ANSI
American National Standards Institute. CFR
Code of Federal Regulations. CMS
Consequence Management Site Restoration, Cleanup and
Decontamination Subgroup. DEST
Domestic Emergency Support Team--A technical advisory team
designed to pre-deploy and assist the FBI Special Agent in [[Page
196]] Charge. The DEST may deploy after an incident to assist the
FBI and the PFO. DHS
Department of Homeland Security. DIL
Derived Intervention Level--the concentration of a radionuclide
in food expressed in Becquerel/kg which, if present throughout
the relevant period of time (with no intervention), could lead to
an individual receiving a radiation dose equal to the PAG. DOD
Department of Defense. DOE
Department of Energy. DRL
Derived Response Level--A level of radioactivity in an
environmental medium that would be expected to produce a dose
equal to its corresponding PAG. EOC
Emergency Operations Center. EPA
Environmental Protection Agency. FBI
Federal Bureau of Investigation. FCO
Federal Coordinating Officer. FDA
Food and Drug Administration. FRMAC
Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center--A
coordinating center for Federal, State, and local field personnel
performing radiological monitoring and assessment--specifically,
providing data collection, data analysis and interpretation, and
finished products to decision makers. The FRMAC is a deployable
asset of the NIRT. HHS
Department of Health and Human Services. HAZWOPER
Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response Standard (29
CFR 1910.120). HSOC
Homeland Security Operations Center--DHS headquarters to
integrate and provide overall steady-state threat monitoring and
situational awareness for domestic incident management on a 24/7
basis. HSPD
Homeland Security Presidential Directive. IC/UC
Incident Command/Unified Command--A system to integrate various
necessary functions to respond to emergencies. The system is
widely used by local responders. Under Unified Command, multiple
jurisdictional authorities are integrated. IIMG
Interagency Incident Management Group--A headquarters-level group
to facilitate national-level domestic incident management and
coordination of Federal operations and resources for certain
incidents defined in HSPD-5 or in anticipation of such incidents.
IND
Improvised Nuclear Device--Nuclear weapons that are fabricated by
an adversary State or terrorist group from illicit nuclear
material and that could produce nuclear explosions. JFO
Joint Field Office--The operations of the various Federal
entities participating in a response at the local level should be
collocated in a Joint Field Office whenever possible, to improve
the efficiency and effectiveness of Federal incident management
activities. JIC
Joint Information Center--A focal point for the coordination and
provision of information to the public and media concerning the
Federal response to the emergency. JOC
Joint Operations Center--The focal point for management and
coordination of local, State and Federal investigative/law
enforcement activities. NCRP
National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurement. NIMS
National Incident Management System--The Homeland Security Act of
2002 and HPSD-5 directed the DHS to develop a NIMS. The purpose
of the NIMS is to provide a consistent nationwide approach for
Federal, State, and local governments to work effectively and
efficiently together to prepare for, respond to, and recover from
domestic incidents. NIRT
Nuclear Incident Response Team--Created by the Homeland Security
Act of 2002, the NIRT consists of radiological emergency response
assets of the DOE and the EPA. When called upon by the Secretary
for Homeland Security for actual or threatened radiological
incidents, these assets come under the ``authority, direction,
and control'' of the Secretary. NRC
Nuclear Regulatory Commission. NRP
National Response Plan--The Homeland Security Act of 2002 and the
HPSD-5 directed the DHS to develop an NRP. The purpose of the NRP
is to integrate Federal Government domestic emergency prevention,
preparedness, response, and recovery plans into one all-
discipline, all-hazards plan. OSHA
Occupational Safety and Health Administration. PAG
Protective Action Guide--Provides the projected dose to a
reference individual, from an accidental or deliberate release of
radioactive material at which a specific protective action to
reduce or avoid that dose is recommended. PFO
Principal Federal Official--The PFO will act as the Secretary of
Homeland Security's local representative, and will oversee and
coordinate Federal activities for the incident. PPE
Personal Protective Equipment. R
Roentgen--Measure of exposure in air. RAD
Radiation absorbed dose. RAP
Radiological Assistance Program--A DOE emergency response asset
that can rapid deploy at the request of State or local
governments for technical assistance in radiological incidents.
RAP teams are a deployable asset of the NIRT. RDD
Radiological Dispersal Device--A device or mechanism that is
intended to spread radioactive material from the detonation of
conventional explosives or other means. REAC/TS
Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site--A DOE asset
located in Oak Ridge, TN, with technical expertise in medical and
health assessment concerning internal and external exposure to
radioactive materials. REAC/TS is a deployable asset of the NIRT.
rem
The conventional unit of dose equivalent. The product of the
absorbed dose in rad, a quality factor related to the biological
effectiveness of the radiation involved and any other modifying
factors. RERT
Radiological Emergency Response Team--An EPA team trained to do
environmental sampling and analysis of radionuclides. RERT
provides assistance during responses and takes over operation of
the FRMAC from DOE at a point in time after the emergency phase.
RERT is a deployable asset of the NIRT. TEDE
Total Effective Dose Equivalent--The sum of internal and external
doses.
Dated: December 5, 2005. Robert Stephan, Assistant Secretary,
Office of Infrastructure Protection, Preparedness Directorate.
[FR Doc. 05-24521 Filed 12-30-05; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 9110-21-P
*****************************************************************
46 Morris Daily Herald: Tritium evident in well
Greater Grundy County Area
Email Us at: news@morrisdailyherald.com
1/3/2006 1:00:00 PM
NRC still sees no health threat
By Jo Ann Hustis Herald Writer
LISLE — A federal spokesman reiterated today a tritium leak at
Braidwood Station does not pose a danger to the public.
“But, the situation needs to be addressed by the NRC and
Illinois Environmental Protection Agency,” said Jan Strasma,
speaking for Region 3 of the Nuclear Reg-ulatory Commission.
Strasma said new information from when Braidwood Nuclear Station
is-sued the first release about the leak a month ago notes that
measurable tritium has been found in one residential drinking
water well in the area.
“However, it is less than the EPA drinking water standard, so
it’s not a health and safety problem,” he said.
Strasma said station owner Exelon Nuclear continues to collect
samples from their monitoring wells, which were drilled
specifically to sample the groundwater. These are not drinking
water wells, he said.
“And they continue to see levels of tritium onsite and offsite.
The NRC has taken independent samples from some wells — split
samples in which we take part of the water and they take part —
and we analyze it in our lab and they in theirs,” Strasma added.
“The results we get have been consistent with the results from
their lab, which gives us confidence in the measuring results.”
The incident occurred eight years ago, when a pipe leaked the
tritium-laced water into the ground instead of emptying it into
the Kankakee River, its ultimate destination.
The incident appears isolated, and there have been no discharges
of tritium along that pipe since the problem surfaced in
November 2005, Strasma said.
“The problem occurred in 1998, when they had a leak from the
pipe through a failed valve, and discharged several millions
gallons of water, which soaked into the ground,” Strasma said.
“All the information we have so far shows that’s when the
tritium problem first occurred and there was not an ongoing
leakage problem.”
Strasma said there is a slow, gradual movement of water
containing tritium from that point onsite, and ultimately
offsite to the north.
“There is no ongoing leakage,” he said.
Strasma said Braidwood is looking at methods to possibly reduce
or change the flow pattern. He said the IEPA notified Exelon and
Braidwood Station on Dec. 20 the tritium concentrations in two
offsite wells, a 25-acre nearby pond, and five onsite test wells
were in violation of the agency’s Protection Act.
Braidwood is required to provide the IEPA results of its ongoing
investigation, and plans to resolve the violations by early
February, Exelon said in a prepared news release.
“The NRC is involved because it involves the release of
radioactive material from the site, and the EPA is involved
because it is a release to the environment,” Strasma said.
“At this point in time, although the tritium is measurable in
the one drinking water well, it is well within the drinking
water standards. A number of other residential wells in the area
were tested, and no detectable tritium was found.”
Exelon said in a release that 13 of the 14 drinking water wells
near the plant showed no tritium above normal background levels.
The 14th well showed a low level of tritium — about 7 percent,
or 1,524 picocuries per liter — of the federal drinking water
limit.
The utility said the U.S. EPA’s upper limit for tritium in
drinking water is 20,000 picocuries per liter.
“A person drinking two liters of water a day at that upper limit
would receive an annual radiation exposure roughly equal to that
from an airplane flight across the country — about four
millirem,” the Exelon release said. “The average American
receives 300 millirem of background exposure annually from
natural and manmade sources.”
Exelon said water samples from the private, monitoring and test
wells showed no radionuclides other than tritium in the
groundwater. This was a standard isotopic test for a range of
possible station-produced and naturally occurring radioactive
substances.
Strasma said Exelon will continue to monitor and see what
movement of tritium is in the groundwater.
“They have hydrologists analyzing groundwater flow to determine
depth and where it is moving, and the best solution to minimize
the problem,” he said. “At this point, tritium is in the
groundwater, and measurable in shallow monitoring wells and pond
near the site.”
Strasma said all nuclear plants release small amounts of
radioactivity under controlled, monitored conditions.
“What happened here (in 1998) is the release that was supposed
to go into the Kankakee River, where it would be diluted by
literally millions of gallons of water, didn’t get there,” he
noted. “It drained out into the land around this pipe.”
The highest concentration of tritium in both on and offsite test
wells was about 226,000 picocuries per liter, Exelon said in the
release. This was at the location where the leak occurred.
“While the news is generally good, and there is no health or
safety threat, our goal and obligation is to eliminate this
tritium in groundwater and make sure no tritium is ever again
allowed to go where it is not supposed to go,” Braidwood Vice
President Keith Polson said in the release.
Strasma said NRC has ongoing inspections at Braidwood, and will
continue to collect samples.
“To make sure Exelon is doing what they need to do to analyze
and fix the problem,” he said.
Morris Daily Herald • 1804 N. Division St. • Morris, Illinois
60450 (815) 942-3221 • (800) 215-9778 Software © 1998-2006 1up!
Software, All Rights Reserved
*****************************************************************
47 Colorado Daily News: Glowing in the wind
Monday, January 2, 2006 7:45 PM MST
As the price of uranium continues to rise, so does the potential
for another uranium rush in Arizona - something Navajos are
trying to stop.
Last year, 700 mining claims were filed and 100 test holes were
bored into the remote high desert in northern Arizona, The
Arizona Republic reported.
Scott Florence, director of the Bureau of Land Management's
Arizona Strip district in St. George, Utah, said those numbers
are significantly higher than any year since the frenzy of the
1980s.
#8220Finding the right mine site is a real art. But it seems
like everyone and their mother is trying now, Florence said.
Fueling the hunt is the price of uranium, which has tripled in
the past two years to $36 a pound on the spot market. At the
height of the last rush in 1979, uranium got to $43 a pound.
Fearing another rush, Navajo Nation President Joe Shirley Jr.
issued an executive order in November banning negotiations with
uranium companies or uranium exploration on the three-state
Navajo Nation.
Arizona, which has the richest deposits of the ore, also has the
worst legacy associated with its mining, along with New Mexico.
After the first wave of uranium mining began on its reservation
in the 1950s, the Navajo Nation became embroiled in a public
health tragedy. Dozens of premature deaths of Navajo miners and
passed-on genetic defects have been attributed to uranium
exposure.
#8220You look around the reservation and see so many elderly
people who are crippled and can barely breathe, said Robert
Stewart Sr. of Tuba City, a Navajo who worked for five years in
a mine in the mid- to late 1950s. #8220This pretty much
devastated much of a generation.
Meanwhile, some say the exploration ban on the Navajo Nation
could increase the urgency to look for ore on state, federal and
private lands between Interstate 40 and the Utah border. There
are dozens of potential uranium-ore bodies that would make
financial sense to mine if market prices remain at their highest
levels in 25 years.
Despite the creation in 2000 of two national monuments north of
the Grand Canyon - Grand Canyon-Parashantand Vermilion Cliffs -
fears remain about mining between the monuments and old claims.
Florence said the creation of the monuments restricts any future
mining claims, but pre-existing claims have grandfathered
rights.
Colorado Daily Online Edition 2610 Pearl St. Boulder, CO 80302
303.443.6272
*****************************************************************
48 Platts: Waste determination approach proposed by DOE can meet criteria
+ A waste determination approach proposed by DOE can meet
congressionally mandated criteria, NRC concluded in a Dec 28
report.
A fiscal 2005 defense authorization bill required DOE to consult
with NRC on its strategy for treating and disposing of salt waste
at the department's Savannah River Site.
The bill required DOE to determine, in consultation with NRC,
that certain radwaste resulting from reprocessing of spent fuel
is not high-level waste.
NRC's technical evaluation report, released by the agency on Dec
29, said DOE could meet the criteria in the bill, "provided
certain assumptions made in DOE's analyses are verified via
monitoring."
NRC spokesman David McIntyre said the NRC's review "does not
constitute regulatory approval of DOE's waste management
activities" and that it was DOE's responsibility to determine
"whether the waste is not high-level waste." For more
information, take a trial to Nuclear News Flashes at
http://www.nuclearnews.platts.com.
Washington (Platts)--30Dec2005
Copyright © 2006 - Platts, All Rights Reserved
[The McGraw-Hill Companies]
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49 NRC: Expanded Definition of Byproduct Material (NARM Rulemaking),
FR Doc E5-8218
[Federal Register: January 3, 2006 (Volume 71, Number 1)]
[Proposed Rules] [Page 29] From the Federal Register Online via
GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr03ja06-24]
Availability of Web Page AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Notice of availability.
SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has crafted a
Web page for the rulemaking titled ``Expanded Definition of
Byproduct Material,'' also known as the ``NARM rulemaking.'' The
Energy Policy Act of 2005 requires the NRC to establish a
regulatory framework for the expanded definition of byproduct
material to include certain naturally occurring and
accelerator-produced radioactive material through rulemaking.
Documents in support of this rulemaking will be posted on the Web
page via the NRC's rulemaking Web site at
http://ruleforum.llnl.gov as they become publicly available.
DATES: The NRC is not soliciting comments at this time; however,
NRC will request formal public comments when a notice of proposed
rulemaking is published in the Federal Register.
ADDRESSES: Documents related to the NARM rulemaking may be
examined at the NRC Public Document Room, located at One White
Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD 20852. They may
also be viewed and downloaded electronically from the ``Expanded
Definition of Byproduct Material (NARM Rulemaking)'' Web page via
the rulemaking Web site http://ruleforum.llnl.gov and selecting
``Other Rulemaking-Related Comment Requests'' from the selection
menu. For information about the interactive rulemaking Web site,
contact Ms. Carol Gallagher (301) 415- 5905; e-mail CAG@nrc.gov.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ms. Jayne M. McCausland, Office
of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, telephone (301)
415-6219, e-mail jmm2@nrc.gov. For questions related to the NARM
rulemaking, contact Ms. Lydia Chang, Office of Nuclear Material
Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555-0001, telephone (301) 415-6319, e-mail
lwc1@nrc.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Section 651(e) of the Energy Policy
Act of 2005 (the Act) expanded the definition of Byproduct
material in section 11e. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, to
include certain naturally occurring and accelerator-produced
radioactive material (NARM).
The Act also required the NRC to provide a regulatory framework
for licensing and regulating the additional byproduct material.
The NRC is developing a rulemaking to revise its regulations to
expand the definition of Byproduct material to include the
following materials produced, extracted, or converted after
extraction for use for a commercial, medical, or research
activity: (1) Any discrete source of radium-226; (2) Any
accelerator-produced radioactive material; and (3) Any discrete
source of naturally occurring radioactive material, other than
source material, that the Commission, in consultation with the
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, the
Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the
head of any other appropriate Federal agency, determines would
pose a threat to public health and safety or the common defense
and security similar to the threat posed by a discrete source of
radium- 226.
To aid the rulemaking process, NRC held a roundtable public
meeting on November 9, 2005, to solicit input from stakeholders
on the NARM rulemaking. Participants for the roundtable public
meeting included representatives from other Federal agencies,
State governments, the medical community, professional
organizations, public interest groups, and members of the general
public. The transcripts from the November 9, 2005, public meeting
and a meeting summary have been posted on the NARM rulemaking Web
page with other supporting documents. Additional documents may be
added as they become publicly available, including the draft
proposed rule. The Web page can be accessed via NRC's rulemaking
Web site at http://ruleforum.llnl.gov under ``Other
Rulemaking-Related Comment Requests'' selection menu. The
specific link to the NARM rulemaking Web page is
http://ruleforum.llnl.gov/cgi-bin/rulemake?source=narm&st=ipcr.
Once the proposed rule is published in the Federal Register, the
NARM rulemaking Web page would still be accessed at
http://ruleforum.llnl.gov but relocated under ``Proposed Rules''
selection menu.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 21st day of December, 2005.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Scott W. Moore, Chief, Rulemaking and Guidance Branch, Division
of Industrial and Medical Nuclear Safety, Office of Nuclear
Material Safety and Safeguards.
[FR Doc. E5-8218 Filed 12-30-05; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
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50 Yucca Mt News: Vol. 3, No. 5
January 1, 2006
Nevada's Online State News Journal
Challenges Continue To Plague Yucca Mountain Planners Nevada
Nuclear Projects Agency Fires Off Another Blistering Challenge
To EPA is continuing its fight to halt the Yucca Mountain Nuclear
Repository, and they are using good science in the arguments. In
another blistering challenge to proposed nuclear standards as
offered by the Environmental Agency (EPA), the NPA calls into
question some of the science used by the federal agency. (Read
the challenge in pdf form here.)
NPA Executive Director Bob Loux in the challenge is referring to
environmental radiation standards for Yucca Mountain that were
proposed by EPA and published in the Federal Register in August
of 2005. EPA is expected to finalize their proposed standards by
the end of 2006. (Read the EPA proposed rules in pdf form here.)
Congressional action on the rise
As the congressional year came to a close Nevada Senators
(D) and (R) introduced legislation mandating that nuclear waste
be stored on-site, that is at the nuclear power plants around the
country. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 is what created the
concept of a single underground repository for high level nuclear
waste, and the federal government wanted that site to be Yucca
Mountain, 90-miles north of Las Vegas.
According to a from Reid and Ensign, "The legislation introduced
today would eliminate the need for a single repository, ensuring
nuclear waste can be safely stored on-site and under control of
the federal government." Senator Reid also said, "The Yucca
Mountain project is never going to open." Reid is Senate Minority
Leader, and although Congress is not in session and won't be
until later this month, he says, "It is time we put the safety of
this country first and approach the storage of nuclear waste in a
way that is productive and realistic."
Companion legislation was introduced in the House of
Representatives sponsored by the Nevada delegation, Jim Gibbons
(R), Jon Porter (R), and Shelley Berkley (D). There is support
from senators and representatives inother states, particularly
Utah.
At this time it isn't clear whether new legislation will have to
be introduced when congress comes back into session or whether
this legislation will remain on the books and carry over to the
new session. There has been continued opposition to the Yucca
plan and to storing the nuclear waste at the power plant sites.
It is expected that in the not too distant future there will be
technology that will allow the high level waste to be recycled
into a useable form. Work along those lines is already underway
on nuclear warheads taken from missiles of the old Soviet Union.
Hear that train a-comin'
From one federal agency to another, "any help we can give ... "
seems to be the way to get things done. The DOE insists it will
be building a 300 mile railroad from Caliente in Clark County,
north through portions of Lincoln County, then west through
portions of Nye County, turning south through portions of
Esmeralda County, and back into Nye, and finally, Yucca Mountain.
The first step is to get the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) on
your side, and apparently that has been done. BLM has agreed to
open a 300-mile corridor for the railroad project. There are
ranches with grazing rights along the track, there are active
mines along the track, and there are current water rights in
areas of the track. BLM insists these will not be affected.
In the proposal to withdraw the lands for a railroad, nothing has
been determined about protecting archeological sites or of
maintaining open public access to the public's land. Caliente is
a rail head for intercontinental Union Pacific and DOE's last
announced plan for transportation of the high level nuclear waste
was for trains to bring the waste to Caliente, then it would
transported to Yucca on the DOE sponsored 300-mile rail line.
There are convoluted maps issued by DOE over the last couple of
years in which even barges are discussed for transportation of
the waste. Trucks traveling through high-density cities, rail
lines traveling through high-density cities are part of the
problems that Senators Reid and Ensign discussed in their latest
congressional effort to halt the Yucca Mountain operation.
It was recently disclosed that the rail line from Caliente to
Yucca Mountain probably won't cost the estimated $1 billion
originally thought. It will probably cost $2 billion. •••
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51 NRC: NRC Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste to Meet in Rockville, Maryland, Jan. 10-12
News Release - 2006-00
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Office of Public Affairs
Telephone: 301/415-8200 Washington, DC 20555-0001 E-mail: No.
06-001 January 03, 2006
Nuclear Waste (ACNW) will meet Jan. 10-12 in Rockville, Md., to
continue to discuss, among other things, several items related
to the transportation of radioactive waste including a study on
the impact of a tunnel fire on transportation casks and a study
by the Federal Railroad Administration on the use of dedicated
trains to transport radioactive waste to the proposed Yucca
Mountain project. The committee will also meet with the NRC
Chairman and Commissioners to discuss recent and planned
activities.
The committee reports to and advises the Commission on all
aspects of nuclear waste management.
The session on Tuesday will run from 8:30 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. and
the session on Wednesday will run from 9:30 a.m. to 5:30 p.m.
The session on Thursday will run from 8:30 a.m. to 12:45 p.m.
The two-hour meeting between the ACNW and the Commission, which
is scheduled for 2 p.m. on Wednesday, will take place in the
Commissioners Conference Room, on the first floor of the One
White Flint North Building. The remainder of the meeting will be
held in Room T-2B3 of the agencys Two White Flint North
Building, at 11545 Rockville Pike.
Anyone wanting to use video teleconferencing to observe the
meeting should contact Theron Brown, at 301-415-8066 to ensure
availability.
A complete agenda will be available on the NRCs Web site at this
address:
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/acnw/agenda/2006/.
Individuals interesting in making statements or those seeking
more information should contact Michael Lee, at 301-415-6887.
Last revised Tuesday, January 03, 2006
*****************************************************************
52 UPI: Nuclear power station cleanup cost soars
United Press International - NewsTrack -
1/3/2006 10:23:00 AM -0500
LONDON, Jan. 3 (UPI) -- The cost of cleaning up the sites of
Britain's aging nuclear power stations could be more than $121
billion, up from an earlier estimate of $96 billion.
The Nuclear Decommissioning Authority, set up last April to
supervise state-owned nuclear plants, says it is "almost
certain" the earlier estimate will need to be revised upward to
adjust for revision and to account for additional costs
resulting from a closer look at some of the older nuclear sites,
reports the Independent newspaper.
Additionally, the previous estimate itself was only to clean up
the former state-run civil nuclear program, the report said. It
did not include the weapons establishment at Aldermaston, run by
the Defense Ministry or the privately owned nuclear plants.
A major decision facing the government is whether to order the
building of a new generation of nuclear power stations, as the
last of the old state-owned plants goes out of action, says the
report.
Supporters say nuclear power will provide a domestic source of
energy that does not emit carbon dioxide. But opponents say new
stations are extremely cost prohibitive.
© Copyright 2006 United Press International, Inc. All Rights
Reserved
*****************************************************************
53 Pahrump Valley Times: YUCCA MOUNTAIN: BLM withdraws rail study land
December 23, 2005
STATE OFFICIALS CLAIM BUREAU NOT STRINGENT ENOUGH; HUNDREDS OF
MILES OF LAND AT STAKE
By STEVE TETREAULT PVT WASHINGTON BUREAU
WASHINGTON - The Bureau of Land Management has agreed to a
public land withdrawal across 300 miles of rural Nevada that are
being studied for a railroad line to carry nuclear waste to
Yucca Mountain in Nye County.
The BLM announced Wednesday it has reserved a mile-wide corridor
from Caliente to the Yucca site where the Department of Energy
wants to ship radioactive spent fuel to an underground
repository.
The land withdrawal cements the Department of Energy's access
to the property as it studies rail alignments to the proposed
repository site 50 miles from Pahrump and 20 miles north and
east of Amargosa Valley and Beatty, respectively.
A two-year temporary land withdrawal was set to expire on
Thursday, according to Dennis Samuelson, a BLM realty specialist
in Reno. The new order extends the land withdrawal for 10 years
on 308,600 acres.
The land withdrawal will prevent mineral prospectors from
filing mining claims along the route. It also will deter BLM
from selling any of the land or allowing other federal agencies
to make use of it, Samuelson said.
Current valid mining claims, grazing rights, water rights and
public access to the land would not be affected, BLM officials
said.
The DOE said in a draft study in August its work would be
minimally invasive, consisting of photographing topography and
conducting land surveys.
But Nevada state officials and other critics of the Yucca
program contend DOE underestimated the impact of the land
withdrawal on ranchers and other land users. They argue that
on-the-ground activities will be more disruptive than DOE has
advertised, with implications for property values, the local
economy and archaeological and cultural features.
"We are still contending the selection of the corridor itself
was illegal and that BLM dropped the ball in not requiring a
more thorough environmental impact statement," said Joe Strolin,
planning division administrator for the Nevada Agency for
Nuclear Projects.
Attorneys for the state have sued the government over DOE's
transportation planning, and a three judge panel heard oral
arguments in the case in October. A ruling was expected early in
the new year.
The land withdrawal may provide fodder for further legal action
by the state or possibly from ranchers along the corridor, said
Bob Halstead, a Nevada-hired transportation consultant from
Wisconsin.
"We are going to take a close look at this. If we can find
anything that is unacceptable we will not be shy about going
after them," Halstead said.
The land withdrawal "is our first really final action in terms
of control of the specific corridor," Halstead said.
Samuelson said the Energy Department completed BLM requirements
for a land withdrawal three or four weeks ago, including
finalizing an environmental assessment.
The land order was signed on Dec. 21 in Washington by Mark
Limbaugh, the Interior Department's assistant secretary for
water and science, Samuelson said. It was published Wednesday in
the Federal Register.
The Energy Department is pursuing a strategy of shipping
nuclear waste from most commercial power reactors by rail to a
railyard outside Caliente, and then west around the Nevada Test
Site boundary and south to Yucca Mountain on newly built rail.
Caliente is on the existing Union Pacific line between Salt Lake
City and Las Vegas.
DOE officials recently doubled the cost estimates for a Nevada
railroad, to $2 billion.
Copyright © Pahrump Valley Times, 1997 - 2006
*****************************************************************
54 Cincinnati Enquirer: Fernald's cleanup on track
Tuesday, January 3, 2006
Watchdog pleased with final months of construction
By Dan Klepal
Enquirer staff writer
CROSBY TWP. - One of the biggest stories of 2006 might just slip
by more quietly than leaves rustling in a forest. And that's
just what Lisa Crawford is hoping for.
The region's largest construction project is scheduled to end in
June, when the 10-year, $4.4 billion ecological restoration
project at Fernald is completed, returning 1,050 radioactively
charged acres at the Cold War-era uranium foundry into a series
of connected swamps, forest, prairie and riparian zones that
will be a haven for wildlife and wildlife watchers.
In the future, Fernald will be "undeveloped park," but it's more
undeveloped than park.
In June, the government contractor supervising the cleanup will
turn the site over to the federal Office of Legacy Management,
which will spend about $8 million a year, with a staff of 20
people, managing Fernald.
Crawford, a neighbor of the cleanup who has been an active and
vocal watchdog during the project, said that she is impressed at
how smoothly - and quietly - the end of Fernald is running.
It's been quiet because there have been no accidents or
incidents during the processing of the most dangerous waste at
the plant - from the concrete storage silos - and the shipping
of that waste to Texas.
The biggest concern she has is that the public may be getting
the wrong idea when it hears Fernald and park in the same
sentence, she said.
"We're not talking soccer fields," Crawford said.
Fernald will be open to the public and will feature an education
center to teach about both histories at Fernald - the four
decades of weapons production that spoiled the land, and the
10-years of restoration that brought it back.
There will be dirt roads and some walking trails with scenic
overlooks.
But the future at Fernald is being built for creatures, not man.
"The best term might be green space," said Eric Woods,
restoration manager for the site, "with an emphasis on wildlife."
To date, almost 550 of the 900 acres have been restored. About
120 acres at the site will be a disposal cell for radiological
waste, and will be off-limits to the public.
Scientists with the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency, which
sued the federal government to get the cleanup accomplished,
said Fernald will be one of the best examples of restored
wilderness in Ohio. For more than a year, they have been
measuring the number of bugs, bacteria and animals in the
wetlands already restored.
"This is in the upper echelon of restored sites in the state,"
said Tom Schneider, OEPA's site representative. "It's not a
small wetland surrounded by houses. It's a lot of small wetlands
surrounded by other small wetlands."
E-mail dklepal@enquirer.com
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55 Crain's Chicago Business: Contract to run Argonne Lab put out for competition
Jan. 03, 2006 By Paul Merrion
Fermilab management contract also for tender
(Crain’s) — The Energy Department formally kicked off the
bidding process on a new contract to run Argonne National
Laboratory, creating the first competition for its long-time
overseer, the University of Chicago, since the lab’s Manhattan
Project origins six decades ago.
More than two dozen firms, including Computer Sciences Corp. and
Northrop Grumman Corp., have reportedly expressed interest in
competing to manage the multi-purpose lab near Lemont and its
$492 million budget.
Also in play this year is a management contract for
Batavia-based Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory, which is
run by a university consortium called Universities Research
Assn. Inc. However, it is not known whether the Department of
Energy (DOE) received any other expressions of interest to run
the lab by its deadline late last month.
Intent on retaining its control of Argonne, the University of
Chicago has teamed up with two firms that are experienced in
managing national scientific facilities: BWX Technologies Inc.
of Lynchburg, Va., which operates nuclear facilities for the
U.S. government and commercial entities, and Pasadena, Ca.-based
Jacobs Engineering Group Inc., which manages construction
projects at Argonne and Oak Ridge National Laboratory in
Tennessee.
The Energy Department’s draft request for proposals requires
the creation of a “stand-alone corporate entity” to run Argonne
in order to “clarify lines of responsibility and
accountability.” The five-year contract will be renewable for up
to 15 years for “superior performance.”
Three years ago, Congress directed the Energy Department to put
national lab management contracts out to bid for the first time.
The University of Chicago’s contract to run Argonne expires
Sept. 30.
Back to Top Copyright © 2006 Crain Communications, Inc.
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