***************************************************************** 12/13/05 **** RADIATION BULLETIN(RADBULL) **** VOL 13.289 ***************************************************************** RADBULL IS PRODUCED BY THE ABALONE ALLIANCE CLEARINGHOUSE ***************************************************************** Send News Stories to news@energy-net.org with title on subject line and first line of body NUCLEAR POLICY 1 Guardian Unlimited: Iran: No Need for U.S. Security Guarantee 2 AFP: Iran dismisses idea of US security guarantees 3 Korea: Digital Chosunilbo: Seoul Proposes Way Out of Six-Party Deadl 4 Korea: Digital Chosunilbo: N.Korean Indifference Scuppers Six-Nation 5 Korea Times: Chung to Visit US to Discuss Nuke Issue 6 ITAR-TASS: US hopes N Korea six-way nuke talks to be resumed in Janu 7 Korea Herald: Seoul urges Washington, Pyongyang to talk 8 US: New Mexican: Domenici honored by French for nuclear work 9 Nuclear Arms Race Between USA & Russia Revives 10 RIA Novosti: Russia respects Asean non-nuclear efforts NUCLEAR REACTORS 11 US: A4NR December 2005 Newsletter 12 US: Security Compromised at N-Plant, Insiders Say 13 Deutsche Welle: German Economics Minister Says - Nuclear Power Shoul 14 US: JS Online: Customers will pay for plant shutdown 15 RIA Novosti: Gov't to allot $8.7 mln for environmental safety of nuc 16 US: WNA: Nuclear is increasingly best choice for new baseload 17 US: NRC: FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC), et al.; Noti 18 US: NRC: Entergy Louisiana, Inc., Entergy Operations, Inc., (Waterfo 19 Korea Times: KEPCO to Build N. Power Plant in Indonesia 20 ITAR-TASS: Two Swiss n-plants conclude long-term fuel contracts with 21 AFP: Russians protest against importing Chernobyl metal - 22 US: WTNH.com: Environmental group visits AG with goat 23 Sofia Morning News: NPP Belene Construction Site Awaits OK May'06 24 ForUm: Baloha: There will be no radioactive deposit at Chernobyl NPP 25 Korea Herald: KEPCO signs deal to help Indonesia build nuclear plant NUCLEAR SECURITY 26 US: ajc.com: Radioactive samples removed from Tech campus NUCLEAR SAFETY 27 [du-list] Origin of DU projectiles tracked to 1945 - Germany 28 US: NRC: Notice of Availability of Model Application Concerning Tech 29 CTV.ca: N.B. port gets Canada's first radiation detector NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE 30 RIA Novosti: No plans to shut Mayak nuclear processing plant - Kiriy 31 Las Vegas SUN: Yucca work raising eyebrows 32 Nevada Appeal: The high cost of a bad idea 33 UPI: Yushchenko proposes Chernobyl waste site 34 US: Deseret News: Lawyers join battle against nuclear waste site PEACE US DEPT. OF ENERGY 35 Carlsbad Current Argus: DOE office gets new leader ***************************************************************** ***************************************************************** FULL NEWS STORIES ***************************************************************** ***************************************************************** 1 Guardian Unlimited: Iran: No Need for U.S. Security Guarantee From the Associated Press [UP] Wednesday December 14, 2005 12:16 AM By ALI AKBAR DAREINI Associated Press Writer TEHRAN, Iran (AP) - Iran's top negotiator said Tuesday that his country does not need the United States to guarantee its security for it to proceed with its nuclear program. Ali Larijani was responding to a suggestion by Mohamed ElBaradei, the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, that Washington offer security assurances as part of negotiations aimed at making Tehran permanently freeze nuclear enrichment. That process can produce material for use in warheads or fuel for nuclear plants to generate electricity. ``Iran doesn't need such aristocratic guarantees,'' state-run radio quoted Larijani as saying. He added that Iran had ``the national might to protect itself.'' U.S. State Department spokesman Adam Ereli said Washington would give no such guarantees to Iran. The U.S. has offered written guarantees that North Korea will not be attacked, in hopes of halting Pyongyang's nuclear weapons programs. In February, President Bush said it was ``simply ridiculous'' to assume the United States had plans to attack Iran. However, he also said that all options were open. On Sunday, Iran's Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi also said the United States could take part in international bidding to build an Iranian nuclear power plant, a move designed to ease American suspicions that Tehran is using its civilian nuclear program as a cover to build atomic weapons. But Larijani said Tuesday that Iran did not ``need America's participation'' in its nuclear projects. Ereli had rejected the Iranian offer as a ``pipe dream.'' ElBaradei had also called on Washington to become more involved in the stalled negotiations between Iran and the European Union. Iran has vowed not to give up its right under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to enrich uranium and produce nuclear fuel. Tehran temporarily froze its enrichment program in November 2004 as a voluntary measure to build trust in negotiations with Europe. But it restarted uranium conversion, a stage prior to enrichment, in August after Europe urged Iran to permanently freeze its enrichment program. That led to the collapse of the talks, which are scheduled to resume Dec. 21 in Vienna, Austria. Guardian Unlimited © Guardian Newspapers Limited 2005 ***************************************************************** 2 AFP: Iran dismisses idea of US security guarantees Tue Dec 13, 1:11 PM ET TEHRAN (AFP) - Iran" /> said it was not interested in "condescending" security guarantees from the United States, rejecting an idea which the UN's atomic watchdog chief hopes could ease tensions over the Islamic republic's nuclear drive. "Iran does not need these kind of condescending guarantees and has a good enough capacity to defend itself," Iran's top nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani was quoted as saying by the student news agency ISNA. Mohamed ElBaradei, head of the International Atomic Energy Agency" /> , urged Washington on Monday to put security assurances on the table with Iran as it had done in similar talks with North Korea" /> . Speaking after being handed the Nobel Peace Prize, ElBaradei said such a step could bring a breakthrough in efforts to persuade Iran to limit its nuclear fuel activities, seen by the West as a weapons drive. Tehran says its programme is purely for peaceful purposes. Larijani, the hardline secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, argued that the West needed to realize that Iran was not the problem in the region. "Iran is surrounded by countries like Israel" /> which have the atomic bomb, and we just want that to be understood," he was quoted as saying. Government spokesman Gholam Hossein Elham also told reporters that any talks with the Americans -- with whom diplomatic relations were cut a quarter of a century ago -- were "not on the agenda". Washington has also already rejected the idea of offering incentives to a country it has lumped into an "axis of evil". US Deputy State Department spokesman Adam Ereli said all dealings with Tehran should focus on "a consistent and established pattern of Iranian misbehaviour and Iranian violation of its commitments and Iranian deception." "And before anybody asks the United States to do something, it's up to Iran to answer the questions, act like a responsible member of the international community, and stop violating its agreements," he said. Analysts and many diplomats have suggested that security guarantees and incentives could be crucial to Iran with thousands of American troops operating in two of its neighbours, Iraq" /> in the west and Afghanistan" /> in the east. "I am not convinced that the EU has offered sufficiently interesting things to the Iranians," Hans Blix, a former IAEA head and chief UN weapons inspector in Iraq, told AFP last week. The Europeans, he said, "are also restrained by the backseat driver whom they have in the car, the Americans." The United States has said it was willing to provide written security assurances to North Korea to further six-party talks aimed at controlling Pyongyang's much-more-advanced nuclear programme. But Iran has already rejected an offer of trade and other incentives from Britain, France and Germany -- sticking by what it insists is a "right" to conduct fuel cycle work including the enrichment of uranium. Enriched uranium can be fuel for civilian nuclear power reactors but also the raw material for atom bombs. The IAEA has still not ruled, after an almost three-year investigation, on whether Iran's nuclear programme is peaceful. The EU, backed by the United States, wants Iran to permanently give up enrichment work as an "objective guarantee" that it will not acquire weapons. But with incentives off the table, the EU-3 are now pinning their hopes for a compromise under which Iran's enrichment work would be carried out in Russia, although this has also been rejected by Tehran. Copyright © 2005 Agence France Presse. All rights reserved. The ***************************************************************** 3 Korea: Digital Chosunilbo: Seoul Proposes Way Out of Six-Party Deadlock Home> National/Politics Updated Dec.13,2005 19:06 KST South Korea's chief negotiator to six-party nuclear talks with North Korea said Tuesday that Seoul proposed a way to overcome new obstacles to resuming negotiations. Washington and Pyongyang have been attacking each other over U.S. sanctions imposed on North Korean companies for Pyongyang's alleged involvement in money laundering and counterfeiting of U.S. dollars. Offering little detail, Deputy Foreign Minister Song Min-Soon said South Korea decided to step in because the growing conflict is threatening an early resumption of the multilateral talks. Song also said it was unlikely that preliminary meetings for the talks will take place any time soon. Arirang News ***************************************************************** 4 Korea: Digital Chosunilbo: N.Korean Indifference Scuppers Six-Nation Jeju Meet Home> National/Politics Updated Dec.13,2005 19:26 KST Lack of interest from North Korea makes it unlikely chief negotiators in six-party talks on PyongyangˇŻs nuclear program will informally convene in Jeju Island, as Seoul has proposed, a government official said Tuesday. Most of the involved nations agree the six-party talks should reconvene in January, he said. The U.S. State Department also said the six countries informally agreed to meet again next month. However, Chinese chief negotiator Wu Dawei said even though there was no change in plans to reconvene in January, North Korea did not consider it ˇ°appropriateˇ± to resume talks under the current circumstances. He told JapanˇŻs Mainichi Shimbun he could not be sure that the talks will resume next month. Pyongyang is miffed that the U.S. will not discuss sanctions it has imposed on North Korean firms for alleged involvement in state-sanctioned criminal activities. A fifth round of the talks in Beijing went into recess last month without setting a date for resumption or any other progress. (englishnews@chosun.com ) ***************************************************************** 5 Korea Times: Chung to Visit US to Discuss Nuke Issue Hankooki.com > The Korea Times By Seo Dong-shin Staff Reporter Unification Minister Chung Dong-young CHEJU ISLAND _ Unification Minister Chung Dong-young will leave for Washington Sunday to brief U.S. administration officials and legislators on the recent development in inter-Korean relations, an aide to Chung said here Tuesday. During the six-day visit that will come on the heels of the inter-Korean Cabinet talks, Chung plans to underline progress in economic cooperation between the two Koreas, especially focusing on the inter-Korean industrial complex in the North Korea border city of Kaesong, Yang Chang-seok, spokesman of the Unification Ministry, said. Chung heads the SouthˇŻs delegation to the 17th round of inter-Korean ministerial talks that opened earlier in the day. His Northern counterpart Kwon Ho-ung, a senior Cabinet councilor, arrived on this southern resort island leading a 29-member delegation to the four-day meeting. Earlier, ministry officials said Chung, who also chairs the presidential National Security Council, will discuss ways of resuming the six-nation talks on North KoreaˇŻs nuclear programs with U.S. officials, possibly with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley. The multilateral nuclear talks, which recessed last month in Beijing, China, have recently seemed to stall amid U.S. financial sanctions against the North over allegations of the Stalinist regimeˇŻs criminal activities, including counterfeiting U.S. dollars. North Korea has flatly denied the charges, while blaming the U.S. for risking an ``infinite delayˇŻˇŻ of the nuclear talks by making such claims. In Washington and Los Angeles, Chung is scheduled to meet with U.S. experts in the Korean Peninsula. He is also to meet U.S. Congressman Jim Leach and Chuck Hagel, a Republican senator, according to Yang. saltwall@koreatimes.co.kr 12-13-2005 17:12 ***************************************************************** 6 ITAR-TASS: US hopes N Korea six-way nuke talks to be resumed in January 13.12.2005, 14.56 WASHINGTON, December 13 (Itar-Tass) - The US Department of State hopes the six-sided talks on the North Korean nuclear problem settlement will be resumed in January 2006, according to its spokesman Adam Ereli who spoke at a regular briefing on Monday. He thus answered a question if the White House knows that the North Korean government announced on Sunday it refuses to participate in the six-nation talks further. “The parties agreed to a return to the talks as soon as possible at the end of the last round of talks. We look forward to those talks resuming as soon as possible. The Chinese -- or the parties -- I'm sorry -- the parties informally agreed that January would be the timeframe. It would obviously be up to the Chinese to announce a new date. They haven't done that yet. And we're continuing to look forward to resumption,” Ereli said. The US Department of State spokesman added he had no information about a possibility to hold preliminary consultations of the parties to the talks in South Korea this month. Last Tuesday Pyongyang warned it would boycott the talks until the United States drop financial sanctions against North Korea. The next day US Ambassador in Seoul Alexander Vershbow rejected these demands simultaneously calling Pyongyang “a criminal regime” participating in the missile technology proliferation, traffic in drugs and counterfeiting foreign currencies. On Saturday an official of the North Korean committee for peaceful unification of Korea said this statements of Vershbow “actually mean declaration of war.” On Sunday the North Korean official KCNA news agency circulated a statement of the North Korean Foreign Ministry stressing that “the six-side talks are postponed indefinitely” due to financial sanctions on the part of the United States. © ITAR-TASS. All rights reserved. You undertake not to copy, ***************************************************************** 7 Korea Herald: Seoul urges Washington, Pyongyang to talk 2005.12.14 Deputy Foreign Minister Song Min-soon said yesterday the aggravating financial clash between the United States and North Korea must be overcome if it becomes a major obstacle to the six-party talks currently in recess. "The counterfeited money issue itself is not a problem that we (South Korea) can directly mediate in°¶but if the problem becomes a major obstacle for the six-party talks' progress, the members to the negotiations have no other choice but to intervene," Song told reporters at Incheon International Airport upon returning from his trip to Malaysia on the occasion of the ASEAN + 3 summit. Song flew down to Jeju Island in the afternoon to observe the inter-Korean ministerial meeting that opened yesterday, in an apparent attempt to persuade North Korea to talk with the United States. Clouding the prospects of an early resumption of the second part of the fifth nuclear talks, Washington and Pyongyang continue to throw tirades against each other over a financial controversy that began with the United States' sanction in September against a China-based bank for purportedly helping North Korea circuit counterfeited U.S. dollars. Government officials said Washington and Pyongyang could try to solve the clash through formal or informal dialogues one-on-one within any possible framework, including the six-party talks. Blowing up the clash into an insolent spate of words, North Korea's Rodong Shinmun said in a commentary yesterday "That person called the U.S. ambassador to South Chosun is definitely a hooligan that does not know any manners nor is sensible." North Korea officially refers to South Korea as South Chosun. North Korea's commonly emotional comments were aimed at Amb. Alexander Vershbow who called Pyongyang a "criminal regime" last week in a public speech, much to the concern of South Korea and other six-party members for unnecessarily provoking rigid North Korea. The United States insists that its legal actions against North Korea's "illicit activities" are strictly for national protection, but a senior State Department official said they are also meant to curb the country's spread of missile and nuclear weapons, according to Yonhap News Agency. Undersecretary for Arms Control and International Security Robert Joseph was quoted as saying, "Economic sanctions are another valuable tool in our overall effort to combat WMD (weapons of mass destruction) proliferation," during a speech at the University of Virginia Miller Center on Friday. "Our efforts to combat proliferation can also be aided by other financial tools which are not specifically designed against WMD proliferation," Joseph said. North Korea, protesting the U.S. action, is threatening to suspend the six-party nuclear talks that is currently in recess. Song Min-soon said he held a series of meetings with chief nuclear delegates from China, Russia and Japan, as well as sharing an indirect contact with the North Korean side and exchanging a telephone call with the American counterpart. He insisted that the counterfeited money issue should be tackled strictly under proven facts and by the international law. Song flew to Jeju Island yesterday to watch the inter-Korean ministerial talks on economic cooperation among others. Deputy spokesperson Adam Ereli said in a daily press briefing in Washington yesterday that the United States was looking forward to resumption of the six-party talks. "The parties informally agreed that January would be the timeframe. It would obviously be up to the Chinese to announce a new date," Ereli said. He ruled out any imminent possibility of South Korea hosting a preliminary talks on Jeju Island, proposed by Seoul this month, and denied their being any development through the New York channel, the unofficial communication took between Washington and Pyongyang. (angiely@heraldm.com) By Lee Joo-hee ***************************************************************** 8 New Mexican: Domenici honored by French for nuclear work Tue Dec 13, 2005 6:13 pm By Andy Lenderman The New Mexicos senior senator looks forward to a global renaissance  of nuclear energy, and has been recognized by the French for his leadership in that area. Sen. Pete Domenici, R-N .M., also said in a news release Monday that eight utility companies have announced plans to build 13 nuclear-power plants since the Energy Policy Act was approved by Congress earlier this year. Domenici was in Versailles, France, on Monday to receive the French Nuclear Energy Societys top award, the Grande Medaille. Domenici also is scheduled to tour a plant in The Netherlands that produces enriched uranium fuel to be used in nuclear-power plants. Domenici is a strong advocate of a similar, proposed plant in Lea County in Southern New Mexico. I look forward to a global renaissance in the use of nuclear energy, Domenici said in the news release. No other energy provides as much economic promise to developing nations or as much hope for the global environ- ment we share and cherish as does nuclear power. In 1997, I predicted the resurgence of nuclear energy in the United States. For the last eight years, I have worked to help make that renaissance a reality. But whether nuclear power will make a strong comeback remains to be seen, a nuclearenergy expert and former Department of Energy leader said. I think the jurys still out, said Ernest J. Moniz, a former DOE deputy secretary and current professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He mentioned two competing factors  the tax credits and loan guarantees for new nuclear-power plants that were included in the energy bill, and the public perception of nuclear waste. I think the incentives in the Energy Policy Act would resolve the financial uncertainty of being the first investor of new plants, Moniz said by telephone. But its still true that the nuclear-waste issue, being unresolved, certainly casts some doubt. Moniz was part of a 2003 MIT study, The Future of Nuclear Power, which said, in part, The nuclear option should be retained precisely because it is an important carbon-free source of power. Moniz added, Maybe our prime policy recommendation was in fact to encourage the construction of a new generation of nuclear-power plants. And Domenici remains a major player in world nuclear issues, Moniz said. The French, he said, recognize him as taking leadership, particularly in this issue: Is the United States going to re-engage nuclear power, because in the end, the United States is the biggest economy in the world and where we go has a major influence on the world. Domenici is also scheduled to meet with nuclear-industry and government officials from Japan and France. He also plans to tour a uraniumenrichment plant operated by Urenco in Alemo, Netherlands. Enriched uranium is the fuel nuclear reactors need to produce electricity. A private company, Louisiana Energy Services, has applied to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to build a uranium-enrichment plant in Lea County, near Eunice. Urenco and four other companies own Louisiana Energy Services. Gov. Bill Richardsons office issued a statement Monday that said the governor has worked hard to get the strongest limitations possible on waste produced by the proposed LES facility. Richardson and Attorney General Patricia Madrid recently reached an agreement with the company that no long-term waste would be stored or disposed here, the Governors Office said in a statement. The company will also need to get several environmental permits before they can begin operating, the Governors Office said. Contact Andy Lenderman at 995-3827 or alenderman@sfnewmexican .com. the Santa Fe New Mexican. ***************************************************************** 9 Nuclear Arms Race Between USA & Russia Revives Date: Wed, 14 Dec 2005 01:49:17 -0500 X-Fingerprint: smirnowb@ix.netcom.com-127.127 ----- Original Message ----- From: To: Sent: Tuesday, December 13, 2005 6:22 PM Subject: [abolition-caucus] BMD Focus: Russia's new super-missiles http://www.upi.com/SecurityTerrorism/view.php?StoryID=20051201-115306-3062r BMD Focus: Russia's new super-missiles By MARTIN SIEFF UPI Senior News Analyst WASHINGTON, Dec. 1 (UPI) -- Almost ignored by the mainstream U.S. media, the strategic nuclear arms race between the United States and Russia has revived -- with spending and weapons development at an intensity unseen since the days of the SS-18 and Pershing II deployments a quarter of a century ago. On Nov. 17, as reported by United Press International, the U.S. Navy successfully carried out its most ambitious and successful test yet of an anti-ballistic missile interceptor launched from an Aegis class cruiser in the Pacific Ocean. The success of the test contrasted sharply with the enormous delays, cost over-runs and major test failures that have plagued the land-based anti-missile technology deployed by the Missile Defense Agency around Fort Greely, Alaska. But meanwhile, Russia continues to push ahead with its most massive intercontinental ballistic missile testing and upgrading program since the collapse of communism. Flush with oil export revenues, Russian President Vladimir Putin has been pouring resources into his Strategic Missile Forces to upgrade the land-mobile SS-27 Topol-M and submarine-launched Bulova ICBMs and make them maneuverable and impervious to America's still untried new anti-missile defense systems. "You would think the Cold War never ended," analyst James Hackett wrote in the Washington Times Nov. 14. This week, the Russian Space Troops Force announced that it and the Strategic Missile Forces had successfully test-launched another Topol missile (designated by the Russians as RS-12M) from the high security Plesetsk Cosmodrome in Russia's northern Arkhangelsk Region. "The missile was launched from an autonomous launch station. The purpose of the launch is to confirm the flight, technical and operation characteristics of the mobile ground-based Topol missile complex so that its service life can be extended to 20 years," Aleksey Kuznetsov, the head of the Space Troops' press service, told the Interfax news agency. He said that the launch went smoothly and proceeded as planned. The test was just the latest in a massive, ambitious and so far generally successfully series of tests previously reported by UPI. Hackett noted that the SS-27 Topol is the strategic centerpiece of the rapidly upgrading Russian strategic nuclear arsenal. "The mobile version, harder to find and target, will be deployed beginning next year," he wrote. "A rapid-acceleration, solid-fuel missile, it will be difficult to intercept in the boost phase and the maneuvering warhead will make it hard to stop thereafter." British analyst Duncan Lamont wrote in an executive overview to the new edition of Jane's Strategic Weapons Systems in November that the upgraded Topol-Ms and Bulavas now being tested are "armed with some sort of hypersonic payload which would be capable of maneuvering in its midcourse and terminal phase, and thereby evading the sort of ground-based, midcourse ballistic missile defenses currently being fielded in Alaska and California." "A new class of ballistic missiles is emerging, now being called 'quasi- or semi-' ballistic missiles. These are missiles that can maneuver during the boost, mid-course, and the terminal phases of flight," Lennox wrote. Submarine-launched missiles, like the Bulova SRBM "have very depressed trajectories, possibly as low as 24 miles altitude for a missile with a range of 180 to 240 miles. The trajectory shape is flat, but with the ability to change direction across track as well as to increase or decrease the range. This will make it more difficult for any defensive system to forecast the impact point," Lennox wrote. Russia already has 46 Topols deployed in silos but that is only the tip of its strategic nuclear missile iceberg. Hackett writes that the Kremlin plans to upgrade all of them with three maneuvering warheads each, and to replace all its existing, road-mobile SS-25s with road-mobile Topols. Money will not be a problem. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov announced last month a $1.8 billion increase in the Strategic Missile Forces budget to pay for the upgrades. Hackett notes correctly that the only currently feasible way, even theoretically, to develop missile defenses against the dramatically upgraded Bulavas and Topols would be to pre-position space-based anti-ballistic missile interceptors in orbit. Russian analysts agree with this conclusion. But of course, it would be much more expensive and technically demanding for the United States to add a space-based interceptor program to its current, vastly over-budget and behind schedule ABM programs at a time of unprecedented federal deficits. When the U.S. Missile Defense Agency has failed in two of its last three attempts to get even the basic engine of a ground-based ABM interceptor to ignite for take-off, the sheer engineering challenge of deploying a fleet of space-based interceptors that could intercept dozens of Topol Ms or Bulavas appears insurmountable. Therefore, for all the scores of billions of dollars that have already been poured into ABM defense, the physics and engineering advantages on the High Frontier still lie overwhelmingly with the offensive systems. A quarter century after Ronald Reagan unveiled his "Star Wars" vision of an effective anti-ballistic missile space defense, the world remains locked in the straitjacket of Mutually Assured Destruction theory as its only viable deterrent against nuclear war. © Copyright 2005 United Press International, Inc. All Rights Reserved Want to email or reprint this story? Click here for options. ***************************************************************** 10 RIA Novosti: Russia respects Asean non-nuclear efforts 13/ 12/ 2005 KUALA-LUMPUR, December 13 (RIA Novosti) - Russia recognizes and respects the efforts of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to create a nuclear free zone in Southeast Asia, Russian and Asean leaders said in a joint declaration on partnership adopted at the first Russian-Asean summit Monday. According to the declaration, Russia considers these efforts an important element of strengthening regional security and a considerable contribution to the establishment of such zones worldwide. © 2005 "RIA Novosti" ***************************************************************** 11 A4NR December 2005 Newsletter Date: Tue, 13 Dec 2005 15:18:18 -0800 lang="en-US"> 3ff85.jpg Click to open in your Browser A4NR December 2005 Newsletter ALERT! IMPORTANT EVENTS - NRC "Town Hall" Meeting - December 14, 2005 - San Luis Obispo, CA and CPUC vote on steam generator replacements for the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station - Dec 15, 2005 - San Francisco A Message from Rochelle Please take a moment this holiday season to speak out for your children, grandchildren and all generations to come, the future of our state. California's nuclear utilities and their oversight agencies historically interupt the holiday season with hearings that demand our attend, Dec 2005 is no exception. **Dec 14th - NRC open public meeting to discuss construction of onsite storage for high-level radioactive waste at Diablo Canyon. The Alliance invites you to join us for "nukemas" carols link to a copy of the carols before the meeting at 5:30 and to stay and speak or support those who make presentations to the NRC. **Dec 15th - CPUC Commission meeting that may adopt a decision to allow ratepayers to be charged for replacement steam generators at the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station with no ceiling cap for cost overruns. Please call CPUC President Peevey and let him know that SCE and SDG&E Ratepayers deserve to know what a project that must cut a 28' by 28' foot whole in each seismically qualified reactor. Nuclear utilities have never met their budgets for expenses. For example, construction costs estimated at $500 million ballooned to over $5 billion when project was completed. To contact President Peevey and let him know no more “open wallet” projects for the state’s nuclear plants: mp1@cpuc.ca.gov or (415) 703 3703. Rochelle Becker, Executive Director Alliance for Nuclear Responsibility www.a4nr.org (858) 337 2703 3fffe.jpg Upcoming Events Important events for the Alliance * CPUC on San Onfore steam generator costs * The CPUC is set to adopt a decision on the costs of steam generator replacement at the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station. Under the CPUC President's proposal there would be no cap for costs of this project in the decision. To contact President Peevey and let him know no more “open wallet” projects for the state’s nuclear plants: mp1@cpuc.ca.gov or 415 703 3703. * Read more * NRC TOWN HALL MEETING * The NRC will hold a town hall style meeting to discuss the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Facility at Diablo Canyon. They will also have an expert on hand to answer questions about emergency planning. We encourage everyone to attend. * Read more Breaking News Here's the latest news * Nuke waste coalition partner drops out * Tough stance: The company insists the slew of disengagements are not going to be major setbacks * Read more * Ukraine’s Yushchenko Mulls Chernobyl Dump for World’s Nuclear Waste * Sending the most deadly material on the planet to such an unstable part of the world??? This is why the Chernobyl events are so necessary next April. We cannot know about this travesty and not try to tell others. * Read more * California wants Yucca refund * Frustration boils over regarding glacial progress of nuclear waste management project * Read more * Small Leak at Indian Point Eludes Diver and Cameras * A drop of radioactive water leaks every minute from the pool that stores the spent fuel rods at Indian Point 2 here. The water is captured in a plastic sheet and then channeled into a plastic bottle for disposal. It adds up to a quart or two a day. * Read more * 9/11 Panel Criticizes U.S. Nuclear Terror Readiness * The former vice chairman of the federally convened panel on the September 2001 al-Qaeda attacks today identified securing nuclear materials as the most important of a host of urgent improvements needed in post-Sept. 11 U.S. national-security efforts * Read more * Judge says nuclear dump can keep permit - Barnwell, NC * An environmental group plans to appeal a judge's ruling allowing a company to keep its permit to run a low-level radioactive waste dump in Barnwell County. * Read more * Estimated cost of Yucca Mountain railroad raised to $2 billion * The Energy Department now says it could cost two (B) Billion dollars to build a railroad line to ship radioactive waste across Nevada to the proposed national nuclear waste dump. * Read more Recent Articles Recent articles of interest posted on the ANR website * CEC 2005 Draft Integrated Energy Report * This report was prepared by the California Energy Commission’s Integrated Energy Policy Report Committee as part of the Integrated Energy Policy Report Proceeding, Docket 04-IEP-1. The report will be considered for adoption by the full Energy Commission at its Business Meeting on November 16, 2005. The views and recommendations contained in this document are not official policy of the Energy Commission until the report is adopted. * Read more * Nuclear Power in California: 2005 Status Report * This consultant report provides background and factual information on California’s nuclear power plants and key nuclear power issues such as nuclear waste storage,disposal, and transportation. The report reviews the federal and state regulatory framework for nuclear power and the various agencies that oversee nuclear power plants and related issues. The report examines the costs and benefits of continuing to operate California’s aging nuclear power plants. Financial, safety, and security issues are key considerations in assessing the going-forward costs and benefits associated with nuclear power. Storing and disposing spent nuclear fuel is a major challenge for nuclear power plant operators; thus, the report reviews the status of federal efforts to develop a federal geologic repository at Yucca Mountain as well as utilities’ interim nuclear storage options. In considering the future role of nuclear power in California, policymakers must consider certain trade-offs such as whether nuclear power can be part of the solution to curbing greenhouse gas emissions despite potential safety or security risks. Finally, the report offers some preliminary findings for policymakers to consider. * Read more What you can do to help: * How To Become a Supporter * Quick, easy, effective, impressive. A contribution to the alliance will be a lasting and visible benefit to all. And it's simple to do. * Read more * 10 Things You Can Do To Help * Read more * How To Help * To help the Alliance, come to a4nr.org and make a donation, join our mailing lists, or become a Supporter. * Read more ---------- You subscribed to this newsletter or were added from a list of our friends. You may change your preferences at... http://a4nr.org/newsletters/a4nrMonthly/subscribers/subscriber.2005-02-21.0014529373/portal_form/Subscriber_editForm You may subscribe to our other newsletters in the panel on the left side of most of our pages at a4nr.org Attachment Converted: 3ff85.jpg: 00000001,5d5db4ad,00000000,00000000 Attachment Converted: 3fffe.jpg: 00000001,5d5db4ae,00000000,00000000 ***************************************************************** 12 Security Compromised at N-Plant, Insiders Say Date: Tue, 13 Dec 2005 18:15:22 -0800 Union of Concerned Scientists NC Waste Awareness and Reduction Network NEWS RELEASE & ADVISORY Contact: Jim Warren 919-416-5077 December 13, 2005 David Lochbaum 202-223-6133 Security compromised, threats made against N-Plant, say guards Groups call for urgent State, Federal action to secure Shearon Harris plant DURHAM, NC ­ Armed guards at the Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant have alleged that security is pervasively undermined by the plant owner and its security contractor, with the acquiescence of the US NRC, and that the plant currently has a number of particular vulnerabilities that must be corrected immediately. In addition, they said three serious incidents recently targeting Harris and another plant. Nuclear watchdog groups NC WARN and the Union of Concerned Scientists today called on state and federal officials to take immediate action to secure the plants, and to and investigate the whistleblower accusations of criminal misconduct and cover-up at the Harris Nuclear Plant. PRESS CONFERENCE TODAY, 3pm: NC WARN office, 2812 Hillsborough Rd., Durham. David Lochbaum will participate by phone. Media may call in to the press conference by phoning ahead to arrange it. 919-416-5077 The plant is operated by Progress Energy, which contracts security with Securitas, the worldąs largest security company. The threats, as alleged by security staff include an armed guard being fired on in August and an intrusion threatening a critical communication tower at Harris in November. On that same night in November, a railroad line was sabotaged at Progressą Brunswick plant south of Wilmington. Specific allegations of security vulnerabilities and criminal misconduct at the Harris Plant include: * Widespread cheating on state security certification exams due to the informal requirement by Securitas that guards take answer keys into the tests. * Violations of checkpoints: Progress Energy management ordering guards to not check vehicles and equipment entering protected areas. * Security doors left nonfunctioning indefinitely. * Flawed or missing intruder detection equipment. * Reprisals against security personal for reporting injuries, with the result that guards often work hurt ­ diminishing their abilities to respond to threats. * Extensive falsification of night shift records to cover for sleeping guards. * Weapons discharge violations endangering plant personnel unreported and covered up. * Ignoring alarms and detection equipment. * Violation of overtime rules for security force. * Outdated equipment vital to plant protection. As an armed guard told the groups: łWe [those speaking out] arenąt trying to hurt the plant. No one wants to do that, but we feel complicit if we know about all this and donątą try to get it corrected Š Progress Energy has created a culture where mistakes are covered up, and thatąs very dangerous.˛ The complaint by UCS and NC WARN was filed today with North Carolina Attorney General Roy Cooper, the Raleigh Office of the FBI, the Inspector General of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The Attorney General has jurisdiction over private security forces such as Securitas. Jim Warren, Executive Director of NC WARN, said that the complaint is based on information from guards concerned about what they allege is ła culture of reprisals˛ at the plant and who are therefore reluctant to be identified publicly at this time. Warren said the information was provided to him ­ during 15 hours of interviews and through extensive documentation ­ due to the guardsą strong sense of professionalism and concern for public safety. Complaints had been repeatedly lodged by guards with the State Department of Labor and the NRC. łThese people care deeply about doing an important job well and are deeply frustrated by management decisions that undermine plant security,˛ Warren said today. David Lochbaum, the Nuclear Safety Engineer at the Union of Concerned Scientists, said łThese are very serious charges. They may be a dramatic case in point of what the 9/11 Commissioners recently charged was a failure of the Department of Homeland Security to follow through on Commission recommendations ­ in this case with regard to securing nuclear plants against potential terrorist attacks.˛ He noted that if even one of the sets of allegations is confirmed, it means the risk is higher than it should be. The groups call for: * Officials to take immediate action to secure all gates and security doors at Harris and other Progress Energy Plants. * The Attorney General immediately interview all guards at the Harris plant, ensuring confidentiality, concerning the systemic and specific vulnerabilities outlined in this complaint. * The Attorney General and the FBI and NRC Inspector General to each conduct investigations into all elements of this complaint and not defer to the NRC to police itself in this vital matter of national security. ### Jim Warren, Executive Director NC WARN North Carolina Waste Awareness & Reduction Network Ph: 919-416-5077 Fax: 919-286-3985 PO Box 61051, Durham, NC 27715-1051 Email: Jim@ncwarn.org Web: www.ncwarn.org ***************************************************************** 13 Deutsche Welle: German Economics Minister Says - Nuclear Power Should Stay | | 13.12.2005 [Crucial to the economy, Glos says] Großansicht des Bildes mit der Bildunterschrift: Crucial to the economy, Glos says Even though Germany's grand coalition agreed to make no changes to a plan to gradually phase out nuclear power in Germany, German Economics Minister Michael Glos believes it should remain. Nuclear power should play a role in electricity production in Germany in the future and therefore Germany needs to reconsider closing its reactors, Glos told the Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung. "We need a broad energy mix to guarantee supplies at low prices," he said. "It doesn't make any sense for us to buy electricity produced by nuclear power from our neighbors but to totally turn our backs on it ourselves." Germany's grand coalition of conservative Christian Union parties and their Social Democratic partners disagree on nuclear policy but agreed to stick to a plan created by the Social Democrats and Greens in 2000 to phase out the country's nuclear power facilities. Glos is a member of the Christian Social Union, the Bavarian sister party of Chancellor Angela Merkel's Christian Democratic Union. Two down, so far One of the most crucial pieces of legislation passed by outgoing Chancellor Gerhard Schröder's coalition of Social Democrats (SPD) and Greens, in the eyes of many, was a planned phase-out of Germany's atomic energy plants by 2020. The idea, largely pressed by the environmentally-friendly Greens, was to focus on renewable energy and away from a crippling dependence on oil. It also found support at a time when safety concerns over nuclear power reactors were highlighted with accidents like the one in Chernobyl in 1986. [Due to close in 2008] Bildunterschrift: Due to close in 2008 So far, the government has closed two nuclear reactors. The remaining 17, owned by utilities RWE AG, E.ON AG and EnBW, are to be closed over the next 15 years. The next due to close, according to the environment ministry, is RWE's "Biblis A" reactor, in 2008. Merkel wants to stop nuclear phase out The conservatives led by chancellor-designate Angela Merkel have made no secret of the fact that they intend to put the brakes on the nuclear-phase out. Earlier this year, Merkel argued in a speech that if Germany is no longer active in nuclear power, it would have no influence on the international market when it comes to exporting nuclear technology. The conservatives are keen to provide Germany, a large importer of oil and gas, with greater energy security and allow the energy industry to earn more by extending the life of their plants. [Agree to disgree, for now] Bildunterschrift: Großansicht des Bildes mit der Bildunterschrift: Agree to disgree, for now "In my view, an ideologically motivated nuclear phase-out does not reflect economic demands," Merkel said, citing the fact that countries such as India and China are expanding their nuclear energy capacities. "For me, the question is, how can Germany, with its technical know-how, profit from this export potential. As a patriot, I would like to see my country profit from our expertise, not watch others take the profits." But, Michael MĂĽller, vice-chairman of the SPD parliamentary group demanded that the conservatives finally recognize that they "have no chance" to chip away at nuclear phase-out with the SPD. MĂĽller argued that if the nuclear plants were indeed allowed to run longer, they would have to undergo updated security modifications -- something that would cost money, he said. Making a comeback One thing that's bolstered the conservatives' case is the fact that nuclear energy has been gradually making a comeback in Europe with the first new nuclear plant on the continent in years being built in Finland. Its supporters also point out that nuclear reactors emit virtually no greenhouse gases. "We should not turn our backs on a technology of the future," Glos told the newspaper. "I hope that the last word has not been spoken." DW staff (jb) DW-World: Protestors Halt Nuclear Convoy en Route to Storage Site Anti-nuclear protestors repeatedly halted a controversial shipment of highly radioactive nuclear waste from France Monday bound for a temporary storage facility in northern Germany. (Nov. 21, 2005) + DW-World: Green Groups Urge Coalition to Consider Environment German environmental organizations appealed to the two main parties embroiled in coalition talks to stick to the nuclear phase-out agreement and to consider other ecological issues which the talks have yet to address. (Nov. 1, 2005) + DW-World: A Rebirth for German Nuclear Energy? The prospect of victory by Germany's conservative opposition in an early general election has shaken up the country's energy sector. The nuclear power industry is hoping to slow the planned phase out atomic energy. (May 25, 2005) Your Comments ***************************************************************** 14 JS Online: Customers will pay for plant shutdown But utility's rate request cut nearly in half By THOMAS CONTENT tcontent@journalsentinel.com Posted: Dec. 12, 2005 Management problems at the Kewaunee nuclear plant weren't severe enough to be termed negligence, state energy regulators decided Monday in ruling that customers of Green Bay-based Wisconsin Public Service Corp. should have to pay for $47 million in fuel costs from when the plant was out of service for four months this year. At the same time, the state Public Service Commission authorized the return to customers of money paid in over the years to help decommission the nuclear plant. That $108 million will be returned by WPS over the next two years, the agency said. The decisions came as the PSC adopted a roughly 9.9% price increase for customers of WPS. For the average residential customer, that will result in a monthly increase of roughly $6.50, and 75 cents a month for natural gas service. Including higher fuel costs as a result of hurricanes that damaged natural gas supplies, the utility was seeking an increase of $142 million, or nearly 19%. Because of the decommissioning refund and other moves, the electricity rate increase will be $79 million, the commission said. The commission sought to seek a middle ground between the amount requested by WPS and the positions taken by customer groups including the Citizens' Utility Board, a non-profit group that represents residential customers. While siding with the utility concerning the $47 million in fuel costs related to this year's shutdown, the commission decided several other matters in ways opposed by the utility. The agency said customers shouldn't have to pay for $7.7 million in fuel costs associated with a shutdown of the Kewaunee plant last fall because a PSC audit determined that the utility earned at least $9 million more than its authorized profit margin of 12.2% in 2004. The commission also said that customers of WPS must pay for only half of the $12.5 million loss WPS reported on the sale of the Kewaunee to Dominion Resources Inc. of Richmond, Va. "Both ratepayers and shareholders will reap the rewards (of selling Kewaunee)," said Dan Ebert, commission chairman. "Since they both will benefit, I believe that it is reasonable that both shareowners and ratepayers share increased costs." The commission set the company's profit level for 2006 at 11%, lower than the amount sought by the utility but higher than the amount sought by the Citizens' Utility Board and the Wisconsin Industrial Energy Group, which represents papermakers and other manufacturers that are WPS customers. On the question of whether problems at the Kewaunee plant warranted a reduction in the price increase, the commission said the customer group failed to prove that WPS' oversight of Kewaunee was negligent. Such a finding in the 1990s resulted in the customers of Milwaukee-based Wisconsin Electric, now doing business as We Energies, avoiding nearly $75 million of costs relating to a lengthy shutdown of the Point Beach nuclear plant. In that case, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission admonished the utility for repeatedly failing to take steps to fix problems at Point Beach, which didn't occur in this case, Ebert said. But he said, "I do agree that there were warning signs and I do agree that the evidence clearly shows that significant managerial weakness at the (Kewaunee) plant contributed to some degree to the 2005 outage." From the Dec. 13, 2005, editions of the Milwaukee Journal 2005, Journal Sentinel Inc. All rights reserved. | ***************************************************************** 15 RIA Novosti: Gov't to allot $8.7 mln for environmental safety of nuclear plant 13/ 12/ 2005 MOSCOW, December 13 (RIA Novosti) - The Federal Agency for Nuclear Power said Tuesday it would allocate 250 million rubles ($8.7 million) next year to address environmental problems at a nuclear processing plant in the Urals. "In 2006, the agency will earmark 2.5 times more funds than this year for the problems of the Mayak plant," Sergei Kiriyenko, the head of the agency, said during a tour of the plant. A criminal investigation was launched against Mayak in April after breaches of environmental protection regulations were found during an inspection, which revealed that the plant was allegedly releasing more than 10 million cu m of radioactive waste into the Techa River every year. Russian environmental organizations insist that the plant be shut down. © 2005 "RIA Novosti" ***************************************************************** 16 WNA: Nuclear is increasingly best choice for new baseload Washington (Platts)--13Dec2005 Although it doesn't break new ground, a new report issued Dec. 1 by the World Nuclear Association (WNA) accentuates what it says is a growing recognition of nuclear power's economic competitiveness to meet future demand for electricity. The report, titled "The New Economics of Nuclear Power," encapsulates the findings of several previous studies, including the International Energy Agency (IEA) and the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency's joint 2005 study, the University of Chicago's 2004 study, the U.K.'s Royal Academy of Engineering 2004 study, and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's 2003 analysis. The WNA report concluded that nuclear power is now cheaper to construct than fossil-fired and other generating sources for new baseload in most countries. The report says that while government subsidies are not necessary to make nuclear power economic over the long term, they may be "extremely well justified" in stimulating new investment. What is more important, the WNA report asserts, is for governments to remain focused on efficiently carrying out their oversight and licensing responsibilities. John Ritch, WNA director general, told reporters at a Dec. 1 luncheon briefing in Washington, D.C. that nuclear power has been an "under-appreciated asset" in the past. But now, due to a combination of various factors, nuclear power has become the "leading, economically competitive technology for clean energy," he said. The report attributes the positive economics to reductions in construction, financing, and operating costs, as well as waste management and decommissioning expenses. Nuclear plant construction costs are expected to be lower than in the past because of the standardization of reactor designs and construction and shorter construction periods, it said. Also, financing techniques, increased capacity factors, and longer plant lifetimes improve the case for nuclear, according to the WNA. The mission of WNA, created in 2001, is to promote nuclear power as "a sustainable and environmentally valuable energy source." The report noted that in the past, nuclear plants have been more expensive to build but had lower operating costs than other baseload power generation options. "The key development in the 'new economics' of nuclear power is that, both (construction and operating) costs considered, nuclear power has now become less expensive than fossil and any other form of electricity generation," the report said. The report says the industry believes the overnight capital costs for new plants will fall somewhere in the range of $1,000 to $1,500 per kilowatt, which includes the design, engineering, and licensing costs. The report did not look at the rise in natural gas and coal prices over the past couple of years but noted the recent increase in those fuel prices could further give nuclear power an economic edge, the WNA said. (Other studies over the past couple of years have put the overnight costs, which exclude interest and financing charges, up to around $2,000/KW. Applying discount rates of between 5% and 10%, however, put the capital costs in a more competitive range of around $1,400- to $1,800/KW, according to these reports.) Ritch said he believes the "battle for nuclear is won" and that the "question is the pace" of new construction, not whether there will be any groundbreakings. The report says there could be an expansion of nuclear capacity from about 367 gigawatts (GW) today to between 524 GW and 740 GW by 2030. That would mean bringing on line somewhere between 200 and 400 new reactors worldwide, the report said. It says some of the new reactors would be needed to replace retiring reactors, but most would be new capacity. There are 440 operating reactors today, Ritch said. There would have to be about 10,000 nuclear power plants in operation by the end of the century "to stabilize the biosphere," Ritch asserted. The report focuses on construction of nuclear plants only, not other types of generation. It notes that nuclear's cost competitiveness will further improve when fossil-fired facilities are charged carbon taxes or emissions trading comes into play. "This is particularly so where the comparison is being made with coal-fired plants (because they are so carbon-intensive) but it also applies, to a lesser extent, to gas-fired plants," the report said. The new reactors would be used to produce hydrogen and for desalination, in addition to generating electricity, he said. Of the 10,000 reactors, about 1,000 would be needed in the U.S., he said. Responding to reporters who questioned whether building such large numbers of new reactors was feasible, Ritch said he believed it would be "politically harder to go from 500 to 1,000" reactors than to increase the number of reactors in the U.S. from 103 existing today to 500 units. The report did not address the economic feasibility of such an ambitious expansion of nuclear power. The 32-page report is at http://www.world-nuclear.org/economics.pdf. For more information, take a trial to Platts Nucleonics Week at http://nucweek.platts.com. Copyright © 2005 - Platts, All Rights Reserved [The McGraw-Hill Companies] ***************************************************************** 17 NRC: FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC), et al.; Notice of FR Doc E5-7270 [Federal Register: December 13, 2005 (Volume 70, Number 238)] [Notices] [Page 73801-73802] From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr13de05-82] Issuance of Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206 Notice is hereby given that the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or Commission) has issued a Director's Decision with regard to a petition dated April 12, 2005, filed by Mr. David Lochbaum, of the Union of Concerned Scientists, hereinafter referred to as the ``Petitioner.'' The petition concerns the operation of the Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 (BVPS-1 and 2). The Petitioner requested that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or Commission) either (1) take enforcement action against FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC or the licensee) and impose a civil penalty of at least $55,000, or (2) move the license renewal application for the Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 (BVPS-1 and 2), to the end of the current review queue. As a basis for the requests, the Petitioner cited NRC news release 05-052, dated March 24, 2005, which stated that the NRC returned the February 9, 2005, license renewal application submitted by FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company. The Petitioner quoted a statement made by Mr. David Matthews, Director of the Division of Regulatory Improvement Programs at NRC: The NRC's primary mission is ensuring protection of public health and safety, and we cannot do that for an additional 20 years of Beaver Valley operation unless we have complete, accurate, and up-to-date information on the plant. Given the gaps in the current application, we simply could not properly review FirstEnergy's request. The Petitioner further stated that the licensee's February 9, 2005, submittal was not complete and accurate in all material respects and that this is a violation of 10 CFR 50.9(a) which requires, in part, that information provided to the Commission by a licensee shall be complete and accurate in all material respects. The Petitioner stated his basis for the alternative sanction of moving the license renewal application: Moving the application to the end of the current queue would allow time for the licensee to ensure the resubmittal is complete and accurate. It would also allow the NRC to review the application without requiring additional resources to recheck the resubmittal concurrent with other license renewal reviews, which the Petitioner stated could compromise the quality of the NRC review. The NRC staff performed an acceptance review of the license renewal application to determine if sufficient information existed for the NRC staff to begin its detailed technical review. The NRC staff determined that the application did not contain sufficient detail and therefore was not acceptable for docketing. This determination was conveyed to the applicant by letter dated March 24, 2005. The licensee responded to this letter by letter dated April 19, 2005. In an acknowledgment letter dated May 20, 2005, the NRC informed the Petitioner that the portion of the petition requesting that enforcement action be taken was accepted for review under 10 CFR 2.206 and had been referred to the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation for appropriate action. The NRC staff sent a copy of the proposed Director's Decision to the Petitioner and to the licensee for comment by letters dated September 15, 2005. The NRC staff did not receive any comments on the proposed Director's Decision. The Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation has determined that the request to take enforcement action against the licensee and impose a civil penalty of at least $55,000 is denied. The reasons for this decision are explained in the Director's Decision pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206 (DD-05-06), the complete text of which is available for inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, located at One White Flint North, Public File Area O1 F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland, or electronically from the Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Public Electronic Reading Room on the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html . The Director's Decision addresses (1) whether a violation of NRC regulations occurred with respect to the licensee's license renewal application and (2) whether enforcement action should be taken. With respect to the first issue, the NRC staff concluded that the licensee's license renewal application did contain an example of incorrect information and that the submission of incorrect information in the licensee's application is a violation of 10 CFR 54.13. With respect to the second issue, the NRC staff concluded that the violation is appropriately classified as minor and pursuant to Section 3.9 of the NRC Enforcement Manual, the NRC did not document its identification of this minor violation in an inspection report or correspondence to the applicant. Further, pursuant to Section 3.9 of the NRC Enforcement Manual and the NRC Enforcement Policy, Sections IV.B, VI.A-B, and Supplement VII.E, the NRC did not cite this minor violation and did not propose a civil penalty. A copy of the Director's Decision will be filed with the Secretary of the Commission for the Commission's review in accordance with 10 CFR 2.206 of the Commission's regulations. As [[Page 73802]] provided for by this regulation, the Director's Decision will constitute the final action of the Commission 25 days after the date of the decision, unless the Commission, on its own motion, institutes a review of the director's decision in that time. Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 3rd day of December, 2005. For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. J.E. Dyer, Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. [FR Doc. E5-7270 Filed 12-12-05; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590-01-P ***************************************************************** 18 NRC: Entergy Louisiana, Inc., Entergy Operations, Inc., (Waterford FR Doc E5-7271 [Federal Register: December 13, 2005 (Volume 70, Number 238)] [Notices] [Page 73800-73801] From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr13de05-81] Steam Electric Station, Unit 3); Order Approving Transfer of License and Conforming Amendment I. Entergy Louisiana, Inc. (ELI) is the owner of Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 (Waterford 3), located in St. Charles Parish, Louisiana. Entergy Operations, Inc. (EOI), is the licensed operator of Waterford 3. They are the holders of Facility Operating License No. NPF-38, which authorizes operation of Waterford 3, issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or the Commission). The license authorizes ELI to possess, and EOI to use and operate, Waterford 3. II. By application dated July 20, 2005, as supplemented September 14, 2005, EOI, acting on behalf of itself and ELI, requested approval by the NRC of the transfer of Facility Operating License No. NPF-38 for Waterford 3 from ELI to Entergy Louisiana, LLC (ELL). The initial application and the supplement are hereinafter referred to as ``the application'' unless otherwise indicated. EOI also requested approval of a conforming license amendment to reflect the transfer. The conforming license amendment would replace references to ELI with ELL. The application requested approval of the transfer of Facility Operating License and Materials License No. NPF-38 for Waterford 3, held by ELI and EOI, and approval of a conforming amendment, pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Sections 50.80 and 50.90. The transfer is associated with the restructuring of ELI from a Louisiana corporation to a Texas limited liability company, ELL. EOI will continue to operate Waterford 3, and the proposed restructuring will not affect the technical or financial qualifications of ELL or EOI. Notice of consideration of approval and an opportunity for a hearing was published in the Federal Register on October 17, 2005 (70 FR 60374). No hearing requests or written comments were received. The supplemental letter dated September 14, 2005, provided additional information that clarified the application, did not expand the scope of the application as originally noticed, and did not affect the applicability of the generic no significant hazards consideration determination. Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.80, no license, or any right thereunder, shall be transferred, directly or indirectly, through transfer of control of the license, unless the Commission shall give its consent in writing. After reviewing the information in EOI's application and other information before the Commission, and relying upon the representations and agreements contained in the application, the NRC staff has determined that ELL is qualified to hold the license for Waterford 3 and that the transfer of the license to ELL, as previously described herein, is otherwise consistent with applicable provisions of law, regulations, and orders issued by the Commission, subject to the conditions set forth below. The NRC staff has further found that the application for the proposed license amendment complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter 1; the facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; there is reasonable assurance that the activities authorized by the proposed license amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public and that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; and the issuance of the proposed license amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or the health and safety of the public. The NRC staff finds the issuance of the proposed amendment will be in accordance with 10 CFR part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied. The foregoing findings are supported by a safety evaluation dated December 2, 2005. III. Accordingly, pursuant to Sections 161b, 161i, and 184 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 2201(b), 2201(i), and 2234, and 10 CFR 50.80, it is hereby ordered that the transfer of the license as described herein to Entergy Louisiana, LLC, is approved, subject to the following conditions: (1) After receipt of all required regulatory approvals of the license transfer to Entergy Louisiana, LLC, Entergy Louisiana, Inc. shall inform the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, in writing of such receipt, within 5 business days, and of the date of the closing of the transfer no later than 7 business days before the date of closing. If the transfer is not completed by January 1, 2006, this Order shall become null and void, with the provision that, upon written application and for good cause shown, such date may be extended. (2) At the time of the closing of the transfer of ownership of Waterford 3 and license from Entergy Louisiana, Inc. to Entergy Louisiana, LLC, the Waterford 3 decommissioning trust agreement(s) shall be amended to reflect Entergy Louisiana, LLC as the owner of all the decommissioning trust funds accumulated as of the date of the closing. (3) Prior to completion of the transfer of the Waterford 3 operating license, [[Page 73801]] Entergy Louisiana, LLC shall provide the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, satisfactory documentary evidence that it has obtained the appropriate amount of insurance required of licensees under 10 CFR part 140, ``Financial Protection Requirements and Indemnity Agreements,'' of the Commission's regulations. It is further ordered that consistent with 10 CFR 2.1315(b), a license amendment that makes changes, as indicated in Enclosure 2 to the cover letter forwarding this Order, to conform the license to reflect the subject license transfer is approved. The amendment shall be issued and made effective at the time the proposed transfer is completed. This Order is effective upon issuance. For further details with respect to this action, see the initial application dated July 20, 2005, the supplemental letter dated September 14, 2005, and the safety evaluation dated December 2, 2005, which are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room (PDR), located at One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland, and accessible electronically through the Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Public Electronic Reading Room on the Internet on the NRC's Web site http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. Persons who do not have access to ADAMS or who encounter problems in accessing the document located in ADAMS, should contact the NRR PDR Reference Staff by telephone at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or by e-mail to pdr@nrc.gov. Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 2nd day of December, 2005. For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. R. William Borchardt, Deputy Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. [FR Doc. E5-7271 Filed 12-12-05; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590-01-P ***************************************************************** 19 Korea Times: KEPCO to Build N. Power Plant in Indonesia Hankooki.com > The Korea Times > Biz/Finance SEOUL (Yonhap) _ South Korea's Korea Electric Power Corp. (KEPCO) said Tuesday it has signed a memorandum of understanding with an Indonesian state-run electric company on the construction of the Southeast Asian country's first nuclear power plant. Under the MOU, KEPCO plans to devise an overall plan for one year for the construction of the plant jointly with the Korea Hydro &Nuclear Power Co. and Indonesia's state-owned electricity company, PT. PLN. Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power operates nuclear power plants in four areas in South Korea. Details on the planned construction of the plant, including its venue and costs, were not immediately known. ``We hope to introduce our OPR-1000 class reactor in Indonesia,ˇŻˇŻ KEPCO's spokesperson Park Yong-Seong said. KEPCO has developed the OPR 1000 class reactor, which refers to an optimized power reactor with a capacity of 1,000 megawatts. KEPCO, the nation's power monopoly, had been building two light water reactors in North Korea until construction was suspended in 2004. 12-13-2005 19:27 ***************************************************************** 20 ITAR-TASS: Two Swiss n-plants conclude long-term fuel contracts with Russia 13.12.2005, 12.46 MOSCOW, December 13 (Itar-Tass) -- Switzerland’s two nuclear power plants have concluded unusually long contracts for the import of nuclear fuel from Russia, the press-service of the Russian nuclear fuel manufacturer, TVEL has said. Russia’s OAO Machine-Building Plant and Framatome ANP (a joint venture of the AREVA group of companies and Siemens) in November prolonged the operation of the framework contract for the supply of nuclear fuel for West European nuclear power plants, TVEL’s press-service said. “The management of the Swiss nuclear power plants selected the Machine-Building Plant as the provider of nuclear fuel for the Goesgen n-plant till 2016, and for the Beznau n-plant till 2020. Normally such contracts are concluded for 2-3 years, but this time the management of the two Swiss nuclear plants made a decision to conclude longer deals,” the corporation said. The OAO Machine-Building Plant has cooperated with Frameatome ANP for more than a decade. It provides fuel for nine West European nuclear power plants in Germany, Swtitzerland, Sweden and the Netherlands. © ITAR-TASS. All rights reserved. You undertake not to copy, ***************************************************************** 21 AFP: Russians protest against importing Chernobyl metal - Tue Dec 13,11:56 AM ET MOSCOW (AFP) - A small group of protesters staged a demonstration in Moscow against importing scrap metal from Ukraine's Chernobyl nuclear plant, the site of the world's worst civilian nuclear accident in 1986. Some 20 demonstrators in central Moscow alleged that the scrap metal was "radioactive", and would be used to make pipes and construction material, according to the organizers. "We do not want our country turned into a radioactive dump," said Alexei Nezhivoy, a representative of the young communist organization SKM, who organized the protest on Tuesday. In 2004 alone nearly 2.4 million tons of Ukrainian piping, building frames and girders "were imported into Russian territory", he added, without stating how much was allegedly radioactive. Environmentalists such as Greens party chief, Alexey Yablokov, refused to join the protest against suspected radioactive material. "The problem exists but without precise information, the topic could be exploited," Yablokov told AFP. Earlier this year, the public company in charge of the Chernobyl site said part of the plant would be cut up and scrap metal sold to help pay for reinforcing the sarcophagus of the damaged reactor. The metal for sale was tested by the authorities for levels of radiation and was found to be "clean", the company said. The protesters also criticized Ukrainian President Victor Yushchenko's proposal last week to study the possibility of storing foreign nuclear waste at the Chernobyl site. Chernobyl's number-four reactor, in what was then the Soviet Union and is now Ukraine, exploded on April 26, 1986, sending a radioactive cloud across Europe. Following the disaster, a concrete sarcophagus was built over the stricken reactor and a new 20,000-tonne steel case to cover the whole plant is planned on being constructed in 2008 and 2009. The power station has been shut down since December 2000. Copyright © 2005 Agence France Presse. All rights reserved. The ***************************************************************** 22 WTNH.com: Environmental group visits AG with goat (Hartford-WTNH, Dec. 12, 2005 6:00 PM) _ A safety concern sent an anti-nuclear group and their four legged friend in search of justice today. Less than a month after grazing on the lawn of the capitol building, Katie the goat paid a visit to the Attorney General. + by News Channel 8's Alan Cohn Her name is Katie and she's become the symbol of a movement to shut down the Millstone Nuclear Power Plant in Waterford. The seven year old goat lives near the nuclear reactor. Her milk has tested positive for high levels of strontium-90. Radiation some people believe is responsible for incidents of cancer near Millstone. "I have a list of over 70-people in my own personal life that have succumbed or are ill from the disease of cancer," says Cynthia Besade, Katie's handler. So while Katie waited outside the Hartford office of Connecticut Attorney General Richard Blumenthal, her handler and a nationally known radiation expert were inside. "Waterford where nearest to the plant the highest rate." Dr. Ernest Sternglass presented evidence to the attorney which he claims proves the link between high levels of strontium-90 and cancer death near Millstone. "The evidence is so overwhelming because it didn't just happen around Millstone it happened all over the country near nuclear power plants," says Sternglass. Blumenthal and Governor Jodi Rell have asked the Connecticut department of environmental protection to look into the matter. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the owners of Millstone say there is no link between the radioactive isotope and cases of cancer. "We are going to weigh the very substantial scientific evidence this group has presented against or with the DEP's evaluation," says Blumenthal. Even though the science and issues are difficult to sort through Blumenthal says it will takes months, not years to decide what, if anything to do about the Millstone Nuclear Power Plant. Blumenthal says if he finds the allegations have merit he can move to enforce controls at the plant to control health and safety. Content © Copyright 2000 - 2005 WorldNow, WTNH, and ***************************************************************** 23 Sofia Morning News: NPP Belene Construction Site Awaits OK May'06 Business: 13 December 2005, Tuesday. The construction site of Bulgaria's second nuclear power plant Belene is likely to receive the approval by the regulator in May next year. According to the chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Agency Sergey Tsochev, by June next year the agency will prepare all necessary paperwork regarding the project of the new power plant. During a press conference on Tuesday, Tsochev recommended that the funds supplied by the EU for Kozloduy's units 3 and 4 decommissioning should be governed more flexibly. As of today, the fund stores some BGN 700 M (approximately EUR 350 M) for nuclear units decommissioning and another BGN 100 M (approximately EUR 50 M) for radioactive leftovers management. To decommission all units of NPP Kozloduy until 2030 Bulgaria will need BGN 5-6 B (approximately EUR 3 M), Tsochev said. Click here to receive realtime news about this topic in the future. novinite.com Forum Google Tourism Business All Rights Reserved © Novinite Ltd., 2001-2005 - Copyright ***************************************************************** 24 ForUm: Baloha: There will be no radioactive deposit at Chernobyl NPP News / 13 December 2005 | 18:11 Mykhaylo Baloha, Emergency Minister and member of NSNU Council said that Ukrainian President had not intended to create a deposit for radioactive waste on the territory of Chernobyl NPP. “Quoting the president, this question is to be studied from a political point of view,” said the Minister on the Government’s Day in the Parliament dedicated to the 5th anniversary of the closure of Chernobyl NPP. “You understand very well what he meant saying “political,” Baloha stressed. “I face the law of Ukraine on radioactive waste. The fifth article says that Verkhovna Rada is the only body competent to cope with radioactive waste. It is in the parliamentary competence. The President can not make such a decision. The President said that the body responsible for this has to take a political decision,” the Minister pointed out. “That’s why I absolutely disagree with the point of view that the President might say he would make a deposit of nuclear waste on the territory of Chernobyl nuclear power plant,” the minister added. Comment: characters left Editorial staff:english@for-ua.com All rights are reserved by © LTD. Inter-Media, ForUm 2001-2005 ***************************************************************** 25 Korea Herald: KEPCO signs deal to help Indonesia build nuclear plant 2005.12.14 The country's electricity monopoly Korea Electric Power Corp. announced yesterday it agreed to cooperate with an Indonesian state-run electric company to build its first nuclear power plant. Under the memorandum of understanding between KEPCO, its affiliate Korea Hydro &Nuclear Power Co. and PT Perusahaan Umum Listrik Negara, the three companies will co-establish the business plan for the nuclear power plant construction over the next one year. KEPCO said the two Korean companies will help PLN to lay out a scheme on power plant management, project financing and technology introduction, based on their experiences and advanced skills. After the one-year project, the Indonesian power generator is scheduled to put its 1000 megawatts nuclear power plant out to an international tender. "The deal is expected to help us take the lead in bidding for the Indonesian nuclear power plant construction," said KEPCO's spokesperson Park Yong-Seong. "It will also revitalize the Korean companies' penetration in the overseas market," he added. If KEPCO's bid is accepted, it will mark the first export of its optimized power reactor with a capacity of 1,000 megawatts based on home-grown technologies. PLN plans to commercialize its nuclear-based electric power across Indonesia in 2016, adding three more nuclear power plants to the Southeast Asian country by 2025. Details on the planned plant construction, including its venue and costs, were not immediately unveiled. Since Korea's first nuclear power generator went into commercial operation in 1978, the country currently has 20 operating nuclear reactors nationwide, providing four-tenth of the nation's total electricity requirement. The government aims to develop its nuclear power industry into one of the global top five between the year 2007-11, according to its third comprehensive nuclear energy development plant. (kkt@heraldm.com) By Ko Kyoung-tae ***************************************************************** 26 ajc.com: Radioactive samples removed from Tech campus > Atlanta The Associated Press Published on: 12/13/05 About 220 radioactive samples perviously used for research have been removed from a Georgia Tech center to prevent access to them by terrorists, federal officials said. The National Nuclear Security Administration, an agency within the federal Department of Energy, removed about 68,000 curies of radioactive cobalt-60 from the Neally Nuclear Research Center. The effort was part of the agency's Global Threat Reduction Initiative to keep such material from being used by terrorists for dirty bombs. The material previously was used by the school for research in materials science, genetics, radiation shielding and biological materials processing, according to a statement from the agency. It was safely recovered in three separate loads by the Los Alamos National Laboratory and sent to the Nevada Test Site for permanent disposal. Officials from the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory also helped in the operation. The agency has recovered almost 12,000 radiation sources and placed them securely away from the public and environmentally sensitive areas. After the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the Bush administration accelerated the recovery of unwanted radioactive sources and material that could be used as a dirty bomb. © 2005 The Atlanta Journal-Constitution| Customer care| ***************************************************************** 27 [du-list] Origin of DU projectiles tracked to 1945 - Germany Date: Tue, 13 Dec 2005 18:14:55 -0800 In the following book you can read about anti-armor projectile tecnology by using uranium. As many other nazi technology copyright it was exchanged for immunity for top nazi from prosecution: Carter Hydrick returns to the Bradbury Science Museum Feb. 15 Contact: Public Affairs Office, www-news@lanl.gov, (505) 667-7000 (04-109) LOS ALAMOS, N.M., February 7, 2005 -- Back by popular demand, Carter Hydrick, author of 'Critical Mass: How Nazi Germany Surrendered Enriched Uranium For The United States' Atomic Bomb, will speak about his book at Los Alamos' Bradbury Science Museum at 7 p.m., Tuesday (Feb. 15). The talk will be followed by a booksigning at Otowi Station Bookstore adjacent to the museum. His return offers the opportunity for individuals who missed him during his visit in November 2004, or perhaps did not get the opportunity to ask questions after the last presentation to attend his second talk. At the talk, Hydrick will present documentation that demonstrates a surrendered Nazi submarine, or U-boat, U-234, contained 560 kilograms of enriched uranium oxide, as well as other atomic-bomb components that were used by the Manhattan Project to complete both the uranium bomb dropped on Hiroshima and the plutonium bomb dropped on Nagasaki to defeat the Japanese, win World War II and usher in the Nuclear Age. Hydrick's presentation will position the contents of Nazi submarine U-234 as vital to the Manhattan Project's efforts. Was its arrival on American shores a pivotal event in atomic history, as Hydrick argues, or an unimportant footnote, as most traditional historians suggest? Hydrick will discuss this issue at Tuesday's talk. The Bradbury Science Museum is located at 15th Street and Central Avenue in downtown Los Alamos. Museum hours apart from special events are 10 a.m. to 5 p.m., Tuesday through Saturday. The Bradbury Science Museum is part of Los Alamos' Public Affairs Office. Los Alamos National Laboratory is operated by the University of California for the National Nuclear Security Administration of the U.S. Department of Energy and works in partnership with NNSA's Sandia and Lawrence Livermore national laboratories to support NNSA in its mission. Los Alamos enhances global security by ensuring the safety and reliability of the U.S. nuclear deterrent, developing technologies to reduce threats from weapons of mass destruction, and solving problems related to defense, energy, environment, infrastructure, health and national security concerns. ------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor --------------------~--> Get fast access to your favorite Yahoo! Groups. Make Yahoo! your home page http://us.click.yahoo.com/dpRU5A/wUILAA/yQLSAA/FGYolB/TM --------------------------------------------------------------------~-> To unsubscribe from this groups send a message to du-list-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com. In the body of the message type unsubscribe and send. ***************************************************************** 28 NRC: Notice of Availability of Model Application Concerning Technical FR Doc E5-7272 [Federal Register: December 13, 2005 (Volume 70, Number 238)] [Notices] [Page 73802-73809] From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr13de05-83] Specification Improvement To Extend the Completion Times for Inoperable Containment Isolation Valves at General Electric Plants Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission. ACTION: Notice of Availability. SUMMARY: Notice is hereby given that the staff of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has prepared a model application relating to changes to the Standard Technical Specifications (STSs) 3.6.1.3, ``Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs),'' for boiling-water reactors (BWR) in NUREG-1433, Revision 3, ``Standard Technical Specifications, General Electric Plants, BWR/4,'' and ``NUREG-1434, Revision 3, ``Standard Technical Specifications, General Electric Plants, BWR/6.'' The proposed change to the STSs 3.6.1.3 would extend to 7 days the completion time (CT) (or allowed outage time (AOT)) to restore an inoperable PCIV to operable status or isolate the affected penetration flow path both for selected primary containment penetrations with two (or more) PCIVs and for selected primary containment penetrations with only one PCIV. This change is based on analyses provided in a generic topical report (TR) submitted by the BWR Owners' Group (BWROG). The BWROG, through its participation in the Technical Specification (TS) Task Force (TSTF) proposed this change to the STSs in Change Traveler No. TSTF-454, Revision 1. This notice also includes a model safety evaluation (SE) and a model no significant hazards consideration (NSHC) determination relating to this matter. The purpose of these models is to permit the NRC to efficiently process amendments to incorporate this change into plant-specific TSs for General Electric (GE) BWRs. Licensees of nuclear power reactors to which the models apply can request amendments conforming to the models. In such a request, a licensee should provide supporting documentation to confirm the applicability of the SE and NSHC determination to its plant. DATES: The NRC staff issued a Federal Register Notice (70 FR 30151, May 25, 2005) which provided a model SE and a model NSHC determination relating to the extension of the CT for TS actions related to inoperable PCIVs at GE plants. The NRC staff hereby announces that the model SE and NSHC determination may be referenced in plant-specific applications to extend the PCIV completion times as described in Revision 1 to TSTF-454. The staff has posted a model application on the NRC Web site to assist licensees in using the consolidated line item improvement process (CLIIP) to request the subject TS change. The NRC staff can most efficiently consider applications based upon the model application if the application is submitted within a year of this Federal Register Notice. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Bhalchandra Vaidya, Mail Stop: O-7D1, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555- 0001, telephone (301) 415-3308. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Background Regulatory Issue Summary 2000-06, ``Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process for Adopting Standard Technical Specifications Changes for Power Reactors,'' was issued on March 20, 2000. The CLIIP is intended to improve the efficiency and transparency of NRC licensing processes. This is accomplished by processing proposed changes to the STSs in a manner that supports subsequent license amendment applications. The CLIIP includes an opportunity for the public to comment on proposed changes to the STSs, following a preliminary assessment by the NRC staff, and finding that the change will likely be offered for adoption by licensees. The CLIIP directs the NRC staff to evaluate any comments received for a proposed change to the STSs and to either reconsider the change or proceed with announcing the availability of the change for proposed adoption by licensees. Those licensees opting to apply for the subject change to TSs are responsible for reviewing the staff's evaluation, referencing the applicable technical justifications, and providing any necessary plant-specific information. Each amendment application made in response to the notice of availability would be processed and noticed in accordance with applicable NRC rules and procedures. This notice involves an increase in the allowed CTs to restore an inoperable PCIV to operable status or isolate the affected penetration flow path when selected PCIVs are inoperable at BWRs. By letter dated September 5, 2003, the BWROG proposed this change, including corresponding changes to the TS Bases, for incorporation into the STSs as TSTF-454, Revision 0. By letter dated September 21, 2005, BWROG revised the proposed change as TSTF-454, Revision 1. This change is based on the NRC staff-approved generic analyses contained in BWROG TR NEDC-33046-A, ``Technical Justification to Support Risk-Informed Primary Containment Isolation Valve AOT Extensions for BWR Plants,'' transmitted to the NRC on January 20, 2005, which is accessible electronically from the Agencywide Documents Access and Management System's (ADAMS) Public Electronic Reading Room on the Internet (ADAMS Accession No. ML050240360) at the NRC Web site http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. This transmittal incorporated TR NEDC-33046, submitted on May 3, 2002 (ADAMS Accession No. ML021280156), as supplemented by letter dated July 30, 2003 (ADAMS Accession No. ML032130164), and as approved by the NRC in its letter and SE dated October 8, 2004 (ADAMS Accession No. ML042660055). Persons who do not have access to ADAMS or who encounter problems in accessing the documents located in ADAMS, should contact the NRC Public Document Room Reference staff by telephone at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or by e- mail to pdr@nrc.gov. Applicability This proposed change to revise the TS CTs for selected PCIVs is applicable to GE BWRs. To efficiently process the incoming license amendment applications, the NRC staff requests each licensee applying for the changes addressed by TSTF-454, Revision 1, to use the CLIIP to address the seven plant- specific conditions and the one commitment identified in the model SE, as follows: [[Page 73803]] Conditions 1. Because not all penetrations have the same impact on core damage frequency (CDF), large early release frequency (LERF), incremental conditional core damage probability (ICCDP), or incremental conditional large early release probability (ICLERP), a licensee's application must provide supporting information that verifies the applicability of TR NEDC-33046, including verification that the PCIV configurations for the specific plant match the TR and that the risk parameter values used in the TR are bounding for the specific plant. Any additional PCIV configurations or non-bounding risk parameter values not evaluated by the TR should be included in the licensee's plant-specific analysis. [Note that PCIV configurations or non-bounding risk parameter values outside the scope of the TR will require NRC staff review of the specific penetrations and related justifications for the proposed CTs.] 2. The licensee's application must provide supporting information that verifies that external event risk, either through quantitative or qualitative evaluation, will not have an adverse impact on the conclusions of the plant-specific analysis for extending the PCIV CTs. 3. Because TR NEDC-33046 was based on generic plant characteristics, each licensee adopting the TR must provide supporting information that confirms plant-specific Tier 3 information in their individual submittals. The licensee's application must provide supporting information that discusses conformance to the requirements of the maintenance rule (10 CFR 50.65(a)(4)), as they relate to the proposed PCIV CTs and the guidance contained in NUMARC 93-01, Section 11, as endorsed by Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.182, ``Assessing and Managing Risk Before Maintenance Activities at Nuclear Power Plants.'' This should include verification that the licensee's maintenance rule program, with respect to PCIVs, includes a LERF and ICLERP assessment as part of the maintenance rule process. 4. The licensee's application must provide supporting information that verifies that a penetration remains intact during maintenance activities, including corrective maintenance activities. Regarding maintenance activities where the pressure boundary would be broken, the licensee must provide supporting information that confirms that the assumptions and results of the TR remain valid. This includes the assumption that maintenance on a PCIV will not break the pressure boundary for more than the currently allowed CT. 5. The licensee's application must provide supporting information that it will verify the operability of the remaining PCIVs in the associated penetration flow path before applying an extended CT for an inoperable PCIV. 6. Simultaneously utilizing the proposed extended CT for multiple inoperable PCIVs and the resulting impact on risk were not specifically evaluated by the BWROG. However, TR NEDC-33046 does state that multiple PCIVs can be out of service simultaneously during extended CTs and does not preclude the practice. Therefore, the licensee's application must provide supporting information that confirms that its Tier 3 configuration risk management program (10 CFR 50.65(a)(4)) requires that simultaneous application of an extended CT to more than one inoperable PCIV in separate penetration flow paths is evaluated. The purpose of this evaluation is to ensure that the cumulative risk of continued plant operation with multiple inoperable PCIVs utilizing extended CTs does not exceed the plant risk value, as determined by the analysis presented in TR NEDC-33046. 7. The licensee must provide supporting information that verifies that the plant-specific probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) quality is acceptable for this application in accordance with the guidelines given in RG 1.174, ``An Approach for Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-specific Changes to the Licensing Basis.'' To ensure the applicability of TR NEDC-33046 to a licensee's plant, each licensee requesting an amendment must provide additional information on PRA quality in the following areas: a. Justification that the plant-specific PRA reflects the as-built, as-operated plant. b. Applicable PRA updates including individual plant examinations (IPE) and individual plant examinations of external events (IPEEE) findings. c. Conclusions of the peer review including any A or B facts and observations (F and Os) applicable to the proposed PCIV extended CTs. d. The PRA quality assurance program and associated procedures. e. PRA adequacy, completeness, and applicability with respect to evaluating the plant specific impact of the proposed PCIV extended CT. Commitment The RG 1.177, ``An Approach for Plant-Specific, Risk-Informed Decisionmaking: Technical Specifications,'' Tier 3 program ensures that, while the plant is in a limiting condition for operation (LCO) actions condition with an extended CT for restoring an inoperable PCIV to operable status, additional activities will not be performed that could further degrade the capabilities of the plant to respond to a condition the inoperable PCIV or associated system is designed to mitigate and, as a result, increase plant risk beyond that determined by the TR analysis. A licensee's implementation of RG 1.177 Tier 3 guidelines generally implies the assessment of risk with respect to CDF. However, the proposed PCIV extended CT impacts containment isolation and, consequently, LERF as well as CDF. Therefore, each licensee requesting extended CTs for PCIVs under TSTF-454, Revision 1, must commit to enhancing its configuration risk management program (CRMP), including those implemented under 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4), the maintenance rule, to include a LERF methodology and assessment. This commitment and the CRMP enhancements must be documented in the licensee's plant-specific application. The CLIIP does not prevent licensees from requesting an alternative approach or proposing the changes without providing the information described in the above seven conditions, or making the requested commitment. Variations from the approach recommended in this notice may, however, require additional review by the NRC staff and may increase the time and resources needed for the review. Public Notices In a notice published in the Federal Register dated May 25, 2005 (70 FR 30151), the NRC staff requested comment on the use of the CLIIP to process requests to extend the CT for selected inoperable PCIVs at GE plants, as described in Revision 0 of TSTF-454. TSTF-454, Revision 1, as well as the NRC staff's SE and model application, may be examined, and/or copied for a fee, at the NRC's Public Document Room, located at One White Flint North, Public File Area O-1 F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland. Publicly available records are accessible electronically from the ADAMS Public Library component on the NRC Web site, (the Electronic Reading Room). In response to the notice soliciting comments from interested members of the public about modifying the TS requirements regarding an increase in the specified CTs to restore an inoperable PCIV to operable status or [[Page 73804]] isolate the affected penetration flow path when selected PCIVs are inoperable at BWRs, the NRC staff received three comments from the Owners Group TSTF members. These comments were specific to the model SE and are discussed as follows: Comment 1 (as stated) Condition 3, Condition 6, and the one required commitment of Section 3.2, Evaluation of Proposed Changes, of the model Safety Evaluation are not clear or consistent on the expectations for a containment performance assessment (i.e., large early release fraction [should be ``frequency''], or LERF) as part of the configuration risk management program (CRMP). These conditions should be clarified either in the Safety Evaluation or in the CLIIP model application. Condition 3 requires licensees to conform to the Maintenance Rule requirements of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4), as it relates to Primary Containment Isolation Valve (PCIV) Completion Times and the guidance of NUMARC 93-01, ``Industry Guideline for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants,'' Section 11, including a LERF and incremental conditional large early release probability (ICLERP) assessment as part of the process. In addition, Condition 6 requires the CRMP to confirm that simultaneous extended Completion Time entries in separate penetration flow paths will not exceed the Regulatory Guide 1.174 and Regulatory Guide 1.177 acceptance guidelines. The commitment required by the Safety Evaluation also requires the licensee's CRMP be enhanced to include a LERF methodology and assessment. Many licensees do not currently have a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) Level 2 model built into the CRMP for calculating a LERF risk value. Adding the LERF model will significantly delay adoption of the proposed Traveler [TSTF-454]. The containment risk management assessment is routinely addressed through qualitative methods and administrative controls. Section 11 of NUMARC 93-01 allows for qualitative assessment methods. Section 11.3.4, Assessment Methods for Power Operating Conditions, states, ``Simultaneous removal from service of multiple SSCs [structures, systems, and components] requires that an assessment be performed using quantitative, qualitative, or blended (quantitative and qualitative) methods.'' Sections 11.3.4.1 and 11.3.4.2 provide guidance regarding quantitative and qualitative considerations, respectively. Is it the intent of the conditions and commitment to require a PRA calculation to quantify LERF risk values for the specific plant configurations each time a PCIV is inoperable? Would this apply only when the extended Completion Time is used or only when multiple penetration flow paths are affected as discussed in Condition 6? Would it be acceptable to assess and manage the containment performance impacts by qualitative methods and administrative controls as currently allowed by NUMARC 93-01 as endorsed by Regulatory Guide 1.182? For example, an assessment program could manage containment performance risk by limiting the number of affected penetration flow paths depending on factors such as the flow path size and not require a LERF calculation for each occurrence. Response to Comment 1 The BWROG states that many licensee's do not have a level 2 PRA model built into the CRMP for calculating LERF. The BWROG further states that adopting a LERF model will significantly delay implementation of the proposed TSTF traveler. The BWROG references Sections 11.3.4.1 and 11.3.4.2 of NUMARC 93-01 for both quantitative and qualitative risk assessment methods in the evaluation of Tier 3. Although they are inter-related, the following questions were identified in BWROG Comment 1 concerning Conditions 3 and 6 of the staff model SE issued for comment on May 25, 2005 (70 FR 30151). 1. Is it the intent of the conditions and commitment to require a PRA calculation to quantify the LERF risk values for the specific plant configurations each time a PCIV is inoperable? 2. Would this apply only when the extended CT is used or only when multiple penetration flow paths are effected as discussed in Condition 6? 3. Would it be acceptable to assess and manage the containment performance impacts by qualitative methods and administrative controls as currently allowed by NUMARC 93-01, endorsed by RG 1.182? Condition 3 of the model SE is intended to ensure that a licensee's CRMP includes a LERF and an ICLERP assessment for PCIVs as part of the CRMP and maintenance rule process. The intent of the conditions and commitment is to ensure an assessment of risk for the actual resulting plant configuration when a PCIV is inoperable. The concerns of the NRC staff are that PCIVs affect risk mainly through LERF, and that CRMP evaluations performed as part of Tier 3 may not address LERF in the risk evaluation. An additional concern of the NRC staff stems from the fact that TR NEDC-33046 only evaluated the risk of extending the CT for a single PCIV. However, the implementation of the TR allows separate concurrent extended CTs for multiple inoperable PCIVs because the current and proposed STSs for extended PCIVs allow separate actions condition entry for each penetration flow path (see the NRC staff's response to Comment 2). As stated by the BWROG in its comment, many licensees do not have a PRA level 2 model incorporated into the CRMP for the evaluation of LERF. The intent of Condition 3 is to ensure that Tier 3 evaluations of both CDF and LERF are performed to assess PCIV CTs when PCIVs are determined to be inoperable or taken out of service. As stated in Condition 3 of the NRC staff model SE, a licensee's application must provide supporting information that discusses the plant's conformance to the requirements of the maintenance rule (10 CFR 50.65(a)(4)) and the guidance contained in NUMARC 93-01, Section 11, as endorsed by RG 1.182. With respect to comment 1 in general, the NRC staff cannot provide a definitive response without reviewing a plant- specific approach. The assessment program chosen by a licensee or the BWROG (qualitative, quantitative, or combination) must be documented in the licensee's application because Tier 3 aspects of the proposed PCIV CT extensions were not specifically addressed by TR NEDC-33046. Therefore, the NRC staff does not believe that changes to Condition 3 are warranted. Comment 2 (as Stated) Condition 6 of Section 3.2, Evaluation of Proposed Changes, requires the licensee's application to provide supporting information that verifies that the potential for any cumulative risk impact of failed PCIVs and multiple PCIV extended Completion Time entries has been evaluated and is acceptable. The verb tense ``has been evaluated'' is confusing. Is [it] the intent to require an assessment of the plant's design and historical experience to verify that the potential for multiple extended Completion Time entries is low? Please clarify either in the Safety Evaluation or in the CLIIP model application what the evaluation involves. Response to Comment 2 The following question was identified in BWROG Comment 2 concerning Condition 6 of the staff model SE issued for comment on May 25, 2005 (70 FR 30151). [[Page 73805]] The verb tense ``has been evaluated'' is confusing. Is [it] the intent of condition 6 to require an assessment of the plant's design and historical experience to verify that the potential for multiple concurrent use of extended Completion Times is low? Please clarify in either the Safety Evaluation or the CLIIP model application what the assessment should address. Condition 6 is concerned with the Tier 3 analysis that provides added assurance that the TR's conclusion that no risk significant configurations will result from the proposed extended PCIV CTs remains valid over extended periods of plant operation. However, in addition to Condition 6, as stated in the NRC staff's TR SE, a licensee adopting TR NEDC-33046 must confirm that the conclusions of the generic Tier 2 analysis are applicable to its facility. As already stated, TR NEDC-33046 does not limit the number of PCIVs that can concurrently but separately be in an actions condition with an extended CT because the PCIV TS actions allow separate condition entry for each penetration flow path. The intent of Condition 6 is to ensure that, for multiple concurrently inoperable PCIVs, including those utilizing extended CTs, the licensee will evaluate the impact on risk to verify that the conditions of TR NEDC-33046 remain satisfied. As stated in Condition 3 of the NRC staff's model SE, a licensee's application to adopt TSTF-454, Revision 1, must provide supporting information that discusses the plant's CRMP and inoperable PCIV assessment program, the plant's conformance to the requirements of the maintenance rule (10 CFR 50.65(a)(4)), and the guidance contained in NUMARC 93-01, Section 11, as endorsed by RG 1.182 for the assessment of risk, including LERF and ICLERP resulting from PCIV maintenance. Based on the above, the staff will revise Condition 6 of the model SE to clarify the applicability to Tier 3 CRMP as follows: (6) Simultaneously utilizing the proposed extended CT for multiple inoperable PCIVs and the resulting impact on risk were not specifically evaluated by the BWROG. However, TR NEDC-33046 does state that multiple PCIVs can be out of service simultaneously during extended CTs and does not preclude the practice. Therefore, the licensee's application must provide supporting information that confirms that its Tier 3 configuration risk management program (10 CFR 50.65(a)(4)) requires that simultaneous application of an extended CT to more than one inoperable PCIV in separate penetration flow paths is evaluated. The purpose of this evaluation is to ensure that the cumulative risk of continued plant operation with multiple inoperable PCIVs utilizing extended CTs does not exceed the plant risk value, as determined by the analysis presented in TR NEDC- 33046. Comment 3 (as stated) Condition 1 of Section 3.2, Evaluation of Proposed Changes, uses the terms ``incremental conditional core damage frequency (ICCDP)'' and ``incremental conditional large early release frequency (ICLERP).'' The word ``frequency'' in these two terms should be changed to ``probability.'' Response to Comment 3 The staff agrees. The editorial errors for definitions of incremental conditional core damage frequency (ICCDP) and incremental conditional large early release frequency (ICLERP) will be corrected in the model SE. Other Changes to the Notice of Opportunity To Comment, Published in the Federal Register Dated May 25, 2005 (70 FR 30151) In addition to the changes mentioned in the above discussion of comments, editorial changes, such as consistent use of ``TR'' in place of ``LTR,'' use of ``CT'' in place of ``AOT,'' etc., have been made without altering the original intent to the Notice of Opportunity for Comments published in the Federal Register dated May 25, 2005 (70 FR 30151). As described in the model application prepared by the NRC staff, licensees may reference in their plant-specific applications for adopting this change to STSs, the model SE, model NSHC determination, and the environmental consideration in this ``Notice of Availability'' published in the Federal Register. Model Safety Evaluation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission; Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Consolidated Line Item Improvement Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) Change; Traveler No. TSTF- 454, Revision 1, ``Extend PCIV Completion Times (NEDC-33046)'' 1.0 Introduction By application dated [ ], [Licensee] (the licensee) requested changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) for [facility]. The proposed changes would revise TS 3.6.1.3, ``Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs),'' by extending to 7 days the completion time (CT) to restore an inoperable PCIV to operable status or to isolate the affected penetration flow path for selected primary containment penetrations with two (or more) PCIVs and for selected primary containment penetrations with only one PCIV. 2.0 Regulatory Evaluation The existing Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.6.1.3, requires that each PCIV be operable. The operability of PCIVs ensures that the containment is isolated during a design-basis accident (DBA) and is able to perform its function as a barrier to the release of radioactive material. For boiling water reactor (BWR)/4 plants, if a PCIV is inoperable in one or more penetrations, the current required action is to isolate or restore the inoperable PCIV to operable status within 4 hours for penetrations with 2 PCIVs (except for the main steam line, in which case 8 hours is allowed), and within 4 hours for penetrations with a single PCIV (except for excess flow check valves (EFCVs) and penetrations with a closed system, and for other cases if justified with a plant-specific evaluation, in which case 72 hours is allowed). Regarding the leakage rate of EFCVs, 72 hours is also currently allowed to restore EFCV leakage to within limit. For BWR/6 plants, the current required actions are the same as those for the BWR/ 4 plants, with the exception that there are no TSs for EFCVs. The times specified for performing these actions were considered reasonable, given the time required to isolate the penetration and the relative importance of ensuring containment integrity during plant operation. In the case of a single EFCV PCIV or a single PCIV and a closed system, the specified CT takes into consideration the ability of the instrument and the small pipe diameter (associated with the EFCV) or the closed system to act as a penetration boundary. On May 3, 2002, as supplemented by letter dated July 30, 2003, the BWR Owners Group (BWROG) submitted the generic Topical Report (TR) NEDC-33046, ``Technical Justification to Support Risk-Informed Primary Containment Isolation Valve AOT [Allowed Outage Time] Extensions for BWR Plants,'' which provided a risk-informed justification for extending the TS AOT (also referred to as CT), for a specific set of inoperable PCIVs from the current 4 hours or 72 hours to 7 days. Specifically, for BWR/4 plants, if a PCIV is inoperable in one or more penetrations, the proposed action is to isolate or restore the inoperable PCIV to operable status within 7 days for penetrations with 2 PCIVs (except for the feedwater isolation valves (FWIVs) and the residual heat removal (RHR) shutdown cooling suction line PCIVs, in which case the 4 hours is kept, and except for the main steam line isolation valves (MSIVs), in which case the 8 hours is kept) and within 4 hours for [[Page 73806]] penetrations with a single PCIV, except for EFCVs and penetrations with a closed system, in which case 7 days is allowed (and except for other cases if justified with a plant-specific evaluation, in which case the 72 hours is kept). Regarding the leakage rate of EFCVs, 7 days is also proposed to restore EFCV leakage to within the limit. For BWR/6 plants, the proposed actions are the same as those for the BWR/4 plants with the exception that for penetrations with 2 PCIVs, there is an additional exception to the 7-day CT (for the low pressure core spray system PCIVs, in which case the 4 hours is kept); and with the exception that there are no TSs for EFCVs. The NRC staff used the guidance of Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.174, ``An Approach for Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-Specific Changes to the Current Licensing Basis, November 2002'' and RG 1.177, ``An Approach for Plant-Specific, Risk- Informed Decision Making: Technical Specifications, August 1998,'' in performing its review of this TR. RG 1.174 provides the guidelines to determine the risk associated with the proposed change. RG 1.177 provides a three-tiered approach to evaluate the risks associated with proposed license amendments. The first tier evaluates the probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) model and the impacts of the changes on plant operational risk. The second tier addresses the need to preclude potentially high risk configurations, should additional equipment outages occur during the CT. The third tier evaluates the licensee's configuration risk management program (CRMP) to ensure that the removal of equipment from service immediately prior to or during the proposed CT will be appropriately assessed from a risk perspective. The NRC staff's safety evaluation (SE) dated October 8, 2004, also discusses the applicable regulations and additional applicable regulatory criteria and guidelines that were considered in its review of TR NEDC- 33046. By letter dated January 20, 2005, BWROG transmitted TR NEDC- 33046-A to NRC, which incorporated the TR NEDC-33046, submitted on May 3, 2002, as supplemented by letter dated July 30, 2003, and as approved by the NRC in a letter and SE dated October 8, 2004. 3.0 Technical Evaluation 3.1 Statement of Proposed Changes The proposed changes to STS 3.6.1.3 for BWR/4 and BWR/6 plants, as approved in TSTF-454, Revision 1, include: 1. For the Condition of one or more penetration flow paths with one PCIV inoperable in a penetration flow path with two [or more] PCIVs, the Completion Times for isolating the affected penetration (in Standard Technical Specification (STS) 3.6.1.3 Required Action A.1) are revised from ``4 hours except for main steam line AND 8 hours for main steam line,'' to ``4 hours [for feedwater isolation valves (FWIVs), residual heat removal (RHR) shutdown cooling suction line PCIVs, and Low Pressure Core Spray (LPCS) System PCIVs (NUREG-1434 only)] AND 8 hours for main steam line isolation valves (MSIVs) [AND 7 days except for FWIVs, RHR shutdown cooling suction line PCIVs, LPCS System PCIVs (NUREG-1434 only), and MSIVs.]'' For PCIVs not analyzed in NEDC-33046-A (i.e., FWIVs and MSIVs), the current Completion Times of 4 hours and 8 hours of STS 3.6.1.3 Required Action A.1 are maintained; 4 hours for FWIVs and 8 hours for main steam lines (i.e., MSIVs as described in the current Bases for STS 3.6.1.3 Required Action A.1). For PCIVs analyzed in NEDC-33046-A that did not meet the criterion for extension (i.e., RHR shutdown cooling suction line PCIVs (for all BWRs) and LPCS System PCIVs (for BWR/5 and BWR/6 designs only)), the current Completion Time of 4 hours of STS 3.6.1.3 Required Action A.1 is maintained. The Completion Time for other PCIVs, associated with penetrations with two [or more] PCIVs, is extended to 7 days. 2. For the Condition of one or more penetration flow paths with one PCIV inoperable in a penetration flow path with only one PCIV, the Completion Times for isolating the affected penetrations (STS 3.6.1.3, Required Action C.1) are revised from ``[4] hours except for excess flow check valves (EFCVs) and penetrations with a closed system AND [72] hours for EFCVs and penetrations with a closed system,'' to ``[4] hours except for excess flow check valves (EFCVs) and penetrations with a closed system AND [7days] for EFCVs and penetrations with a closed system.'' (For NUREG-1434, the Completion Times for STS 3.6.1.3, Required Action C.1 are revised from ``[4] hours except for penetrations with a closed system AND [72] hours for penetrations with a closed system,'' to ``[4] hours except for penetrations with a closed system AND [7days] for penetrations with a closed system.'') 3. For the Condition of one or more [secondary containment bypass leakage rate,] [MSIV leakage rate,] [purge valves leakage rate,] [hydrostatically tested line leakage rate,] [or] [EFCV leakage rate] not within limit, for NUREG-1433, the Completion Time for restoring leakage rate to within limit, when the leakage rate exceeded is the EFCV leakage rate (in STS 3.6.1.3 Required Action D.1), is revised from ``[72 hours for hydrostatically tested line leakage [on a closed system] [and EFCV leakage]]'' to ``[72 hours for hydrostatically tested line leakage [on a closed system] [AND 7 days for EFCV leakage].'' (The EFCV leakage rate Completion Time change is not applicable to NUREG- 1434.) 3.2 Evaluation of Proposed Changes The NRC staff's SE on TR NEDC-33046, dated October 8, 2004, found that, based on the use of bounding risk parameters for General Electric (GE)-designed plants, for the proposed increase in the PCIV CT from 4 hours (for penetrations with 2 or more PCIVs) or 72 hours (for penetrations with a single EFCV PCIV, and penetrations with a single PCIV and a closed system) or 72 hours (for EFCV leakage) to 7 days, the risk impact of the proposed 7-day CT for the PCIVs, as estimated by core damage frequency (CDF), large early release frequency (LERF), incremental conditional core damage probability (ICCDP), and incremental conditional large early release probability (ICLERP), is consistent with the acceptance guidelines specified in RG 1.174, RG 1.177, and NRC staff guidance outlined in Chapter 16.1 of NUREG-0800, ``Standard Review Plan.'' The NRC staff found that the risk analysis methodology and approach used by the BWROG to estimate the risk impacts were reasonable and of sufficient quality. The NRC staff's October 8, 2004, SE also found the following: The Tier 2 evaluation did not identify any risk-significant plant equipment configurations requiring TSs, procedure, or compensatory measures. TR NEDC-33046 implements a CRMP (Tier 3) using 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) to manage plant risk when PCIVs are taken out-of-service. PCIV reliability and availability will also be monitored and assessed under the maintenance rule (10 CFR 50.65) to confirm that performance continues to be consistent with the analysis assumptions used to justify extended PCIVs CTs. 3.2.1 Conditions and Commitment The NRC staff's October 8, 2004, SE also found that certain conditions and a commitment must be addressed by licensees adopting TR NEDC-33046 (or TR NEDC-33046-A transmitted to NRC by letter dated January 20, 2005) in plant-specific applications. These conditions and the commitment, as clarified herein, that must be addressed [[Page 73807]] by licensees adopting TR NEDC-33046-A in plant-specific applications that seek approval of TSTF-454, Revision 1, for their plants, are as follows: 3.2.1.1 Conditions 1. Because not all penetrations have the same impact on CDF, LERF, ICCDP, or ICLERP, a licensee's application must provide supporting information that verifies the applicability of TR NEDC-33046, including verification that the PCIV configurations for the specific plant match the TR and that the risk parameter values used in the TR are bounding for the specific plant. Any additional PCIV configurations or non- bounding risk parameter values not evaluated by the TR should be included in the licensee's plant-specific analysis. [Note that PCIV configurations or non-bounding risk parameter values outside the scope of the TR will require NRC staff review of the specific penetrations and related justifications for the proposed CTs.] 2. The licensee's application must provide supporting information that verifies that external event risk, either through quantitative or qualitative evaluation, will not have an adverse impact on the conclusions of the plant-specific analysis for extending the PCIV CTs. 3. Because TR NEDC-33046 was based on generic plant characteristics, each licensee adopting the TR must provide supporting information that confirms plant-specific Tier 3 information in their individual submittals. The licensee's application must provide supporting information that discusses conformance to the requirements of the maintenance rule (10 CFR 50.65(a)(4)), as they relate to the proposed PCIV CTs and the guidance contained in NUMARC 93-01, Section 11, as endorsed by RG 1.182, ``Assessing and Managing Risk Before Maintenance Activities at Nuclear Power Plants.'' This should include verification that the licensee's maintenance rule program, with respect to PCIVs, includes a LERF and ICLERP assessment as part of the maintenance rule process. 4. The licensee's application must provide supporting information that verifies that a penetration remains intact during maintenance activities, including corrective maintenance activities. Regarding maintenance activities where the pressure boundary would be broken, the licensee must provide supporting information that confirms that the assumptions and results of the TR remain valid. This includes the assumption that maintenance on a PCIV will not break the pressure boundary for more than the currently allowed CT. 5. The licensee's application must provide supporting information that it will verify the operability of the remaining PCIVs in the associated penetration flow path before applying an extended CT for an inoperable PCIV. 6. Simultaneously utilizing the proposed extended CT for multiple inoperable PCIVs and the resulting impact on risk were not specifically evaluated by the BWROG. However, TR NEDC-33046 does state that multiple PCIVs can be out of service simultaneously during extended CTs and does not preclude the practice. Therefore, the licensee's application must provide supporting information that confirms that its Tier 3 CRMP (10 CFR 50.65(a)(4)) requires that simultaneous application of an extended CT to more than one inoperable PCIV in separate penetration flow paths is evaluated. The purpose of this evaluation is to ensure that the cumulative risk of continued plant operation with multiple inoperable PCIVs utilizing extended CTs does not exceed the plant risk value, as determined by the analysis presented in TR NEDC-33046. 7. The licensee must provide supporting information that verifies that the plant-specific probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) quality is acceptable for this application in accordance with the guidelines given in RG 1.174, ``An Approach for using Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-specific Changes to the Licensing Basis.'' To ensure the applicability of TR NEDC-33046 to a licensee's plant, each licensee requesting an amendment must provide additional information on PRA quality in the following areas: a. Justification that the plant-specific PRA reflects the as-built, as-operated plant. b. Applicable PRA updates including individual plant examinations (IPE) and individual plant examinations of external events (IPEEE) findings. c. Conclusions of the peer review including any A or B facts and observations (F and Os) applicable to the proposed PCIV extended CTs. d. The PRA quality assurance program and associated procedures. e. PRA adequacy, completeness, and applicability with respect to evaluating the plant specific impact of the proposed PCIV extended CT. 3.2.1.2 Commitment The RG 1.177 Tier 3 program ensures that, while the plant is in a LCO actions condition with an extended CT for restoring an inoperable PCIV to operable status, additional activities will not be performed that could further degrade the capabilities of the plant to respond to a condition the inoperable PCIV or associated system is designed to mitigate and, as a result, increase plant risk beyond that determined by the TR analysis. A licensee's implementation of RG 1.177 Tier 3 guidelines generally implies the assessment of risk with respect to CDF. However, the proposed PCIV extended CT impacts containment isolation and, consequently, LERF as well as CDF. Therefore, each licensee requesting extended CTs for PCIVs under TSTF-454, Revision 1, must commit to enhancing its CRMP, including those implemented under 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4), the maintenance rule, to include a LERF methodology and assessment. This commitment and the CRMP enhancements must be documented in the licensee's plant-specific application. 3.3 Staff Findings The NRC staff has reviewed the proposed TS changes and finds that they are consistent with previous staff reviews of TR NEDC-33046, submitted by letter dated May 3, 2002, as supplemented by letter dated July 30, 2003, and as approved by the NRC by letter and SE dated October 8, 2004, which are incorporated in TR NEDC-33046-A, transmitted to NRC by letter dated January 20, 2005, and TSTF-454, Revision 1, and are acceptable. The NRC staff has also reviewed the licensee's supporting information and the statements regarding the above conditions and commitment and finds them acceptable. Therefore, the NRC staff finds that the increase in the CTs from 4 hours (for penetrations with 2 or more PCIVs) or 72 hours (for penetrations with a single EFCV PCIV, and penetrations with a single PCIV and a closed system) or 72 hours (for EFCV leakage) to 7 days is justified. 4.0 Regulatory Commitment The licensee's letter dated [ ], contained the following regulatory commitment: [state the licensee's commitment and ensure that it satisfies the commitment in this SE, in section 3.2 above.] The NRC staff finds that reasonable controls for the implementation and for subsequent evaluation of proposed changes pertaining to the above regulatory commitment are best provided by the licensee's administrative processes, including its commitment management program. The above regulatory commitment does not warrant the creation of a license condition (item requiring prior NRC approval of subsequent changes). [[Page 73808]] 5.0 State Consultation In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the [State] State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments. The State official had [Choose one: (1) No comments, OR (2) The following comments--with subsequent disposition by the staff]. 6.0 Environmental Consideration The amendment changes a requirement with respect to the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR part 20. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts and no significant change in the types of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding ([XX FR XXXXX, dated Month DD, YYYY]). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment. 7.0 Conclusion The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) There is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by the operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public. Model No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination Description of Amendment Request: The proposed amendment extends the completion time (CT) for penetration flow paths with one valve inoperable from 4 hours or 72 hours to 7 days. The change is applicable to both primary containment penetrations with two (or more) primary containment isolation valves (PCIVs) and with one PCIV. This change is not applicable to the feedwater isolation valves (FWIVs), the residual heat removal (RHR) shutdown cooling suction line PCIVs, the low pressure core spray (LPCS) PCIVs (boiling water reactor (BWR)/6 only), the main steam isolation valves (MSIVs), and [list of plant-specific valves]. Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), an analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration is presented below: 1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated? Response: No. The proposed change revises the completion times (CTs) for restoring an inoperable primary containment isolation valve (PCIV) (or isolating the affected penetration) within the scope of the Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) Owners Group (BWROG) Topical Report (TR) NEDC- 33046-A, ``Technical Justification to Support Risk-Informed Primary Containment Isolation Valve AOT [Allowed Outage Time] Extensions for BWR Plants,'' transmitted to NRC by letter dated January 20, 2005, from 4 hours and 72 hours to 7 days. PCIVs are not accident initiators in any accident previously evaluated. Consequently, the probability of an accident previously evaluated is not significantly increased. PCIVs, individually and in combination, control the extent of leakage from the primary containment following an accident. As such, PCIVs are instrumental in controlling the consequences of an accident. However, the consequences of any accident previously evaluated are no different during the proposed extended CTs than during the existing CTs. As a result, there would be no significant increase in the consequences of an accident previously evaluated. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. 2. Does the change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated? Response: No. The proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. The proposed changes revise the CTs for restoring an inoperable PCIV or isolating the affected penetration within the scope of NEDC-33046-A, transmitted to NRC by letter dated January 20, 2005, from 4 hours and 72 hours to 7 days. PCIVs, individually and in combination, control the extent of leakage from the primary containment following an accident. The proposed CT extensions apply to the reduction in redundancy in the primary containment isolation function by the PCIVs for a limited period of time, but do not alter the ability of the plant to meet the overall primary containment leakage requirements. The proposed change does not alter the design, configuration, or method of operation of the plant. The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of the plant and no new or different type of equipment will be installed. Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated. 3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety? Response: No. The proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The proposed change revises the CTs for restoring an inoperable PCIV or isolating the affected penetration within the scope of the NEDC-33046-A, transmitted to NRC by letter dated January 20, 2005, from 4 hours and 72 hours to 7 days. PCIVs, individually and in combination, control the extent of leakage from the primary containment following an accident. The proposed CT extensions apply to the reduction in redundancy in the primary containment isolation function provided by the PCIVs for a limited period of time, but do not alter the ability of the plant to meet the overall primary containment leakage requirements. In order to evaluate the proposed CT extensions, a PRA evaluation was performed in TR NEDC-33046 submitted on May 3, 2002, as supplemented by letter dated July 30, 2003, and as approved by the NRC by letter and SE dated October 8, 2004. The PRA evaluation concluded that, based on the use of bounding risk parameters for GE- designed plants, the proposed increase in the PCIV CTs from 4 hours or 72 hours to 7 days does not alter the ability of the plant to meet the overall primary containment leakage requirements. It also concluded that the proposed changes do not result in an unacceptable ICCDP or ICLERP according to the guidelines of RG 1.177. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. Based on the above, the proposed change presents no significant hazards consideration under the standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c), and accordingly, a finding of ``no significant hazards consideration'' is justified. Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 4th day of December, 2005. [[Page 73809]] For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. David Terao, Chief, Plant Licensing Branch G, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. [FR Doc. E5-7272 Filed 12-12-05; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590-01-P ***************************************************************** 29 CTV.ca: N.B. port gets Canada's first radiation detector [ /] Tue. Dec. 13 2005 11:34 PM ET Canadian Press FREDERICTON — Federal officials have installed Canada's first radiation detector at the port of Saint John in New Brunswick in a bid to protect this country against nuclear terrorism. The Canadian Press has learned that while Saint John, N.B., is the first port to get the nuclear detection devices, all major Canadian ports soon will be equipped with the anti-terrorism technology. Jennifer Morrison of the Canada Border Services Agency says the new scanners detect radiation in container traffic. She says details of the program will be released next month. The radiation detection program is a key part of Ottawa's $172 million plan to beef up marine security - all stemming from the terrorist attacks in the United States on Sept. 11, 2001. However, critics warn it is still not enough protection in an increasingly dangerous world. Terrorism expert Douglas Ross of Simon Fraser University says Canada needs a more comprehensive program that can detect nuclear material that has been shielded inside the containers. © 2005 Bell Globemedia Inc. All Rights Reserved. ***************************************************************** 30 RIA Novosti: No plans to shut Mayak nuclear processing plant - Kiriyenko 13/ 12/ 2005 YEKATERINBURG, December 13 (RIA Novosti) - There are no plans to shut down Russia's biggest nuclear-fuel processing plant, but a government commission will be set up to deal with violations of environmental regulations, Russia's top nuclear power official said Tuesday Sergei Kiriyenko, the head of the Federal Agency for Nuclear Power, was visiting the Chelyabinsk Region, where the Mayak plant is based, and met with Governor Pyotr Sumin. "We need to find a golden mean here, specifically ensuring Mayak's further development and implementing urgent measures to prevent new environmental problems," a spokesman for the governor quoted as Kiriyenko saying. The agency head added that the plant was vital for the country's economic development. A criminal investigation was launched against Mayak in April after breaches of environmental protection regulations were identified during an inspection that revealed that the plant was allegedly releasing more then 10 million cubic meters of radioactive waste into the Techa River every year. Radiation levels in the water have since risen and threaten not only the Chelyabinsk Region, but also the neighboring Kurgansk Region. However, Kiriyenko said it would be incorrect to accuse Mayak of discharging radioactive waste into the river today, but underscored the serious nature of problems that had been developing for decades. He said a "systemic solution" was needed, though he added that contemporary science could not yet offer one. "Nevertheless," he said, "the key objective to ensure that no new harm whatsoever is inflicted on the environment, so we are ready to take urgent security measures." He said the problems dated back to a major accident in 1957, and continued that international experts would have to be brought into the search for solutions, as no one had ever faced anything on the scale before. "It is obvious today that this is not a regional problem, nor one confined to the industry, but a state-level problem," the agency head said. © 2005 "RIA Novosti" ***************************************************************** 31 Las Vegas SUN: Yucca work raising eyebrows Photos: Bret Whipple | Bret Whipple Today: December 13, 2005 at 8:34:46 PST Regent's potential aid to Lincoln County may affect his future By Launce Rake The chairman of the Nevada Board of Regents -- a Las Vegas attorney who was on Gov. Kenny Guinn's short list to replace former Attorney General Brian Sandoval -- may soon assist Lincoln County in efforts related to the proposed Yucca Mountain nuclear waste repository. Bret Whipple, a Lincoln County native who practices criminal defense law in Las Vegas, said he is considering providing legal assistance to Lincoln County's Yucca Mountain Oversight Program and the associated Joint City-County Impact Alleviation Committee. Whipple said his major purpose would be to help Lincoln County avoid some of the legal problems that have plagued the county's spending of federally provided oversight funds. Whipple is part of a family of ranchers with deep roots in Lincoln County, which has a population of about 4,500. "I love Lincoln County and Nevada, and I think it's important that they're protected as much as possible," he said. Whipple has asked the Nevada Ethics Board for an opinion on whether there would be any potential conflicts because of his regent position. The contract and pay for Whipple also would have to be settled before he would begin the job. But the mere potential of Whipple working for Lincoln County already has raised eyebrows for several reasons. One is that some observers believe the county leadership supports the Energy Department's effort to store 77,000 tons of nuclear waste in Nevada and build a railroad through the state to bring in the waste. Most of the state's elected leadership strongly opposes the proposed repository. Doing work that even indirectly supports the repository could be a handicap for someone considering running for higher office in the future, as Whipple is thought to be. Another unusual facet of Whipple's potential Lincoln County work is that his father, Kent Whipple, died from lung cancer in 1978, a victim of radioactive fallout from above-ground atomic bomb testing five decades ago, family members believe. The Whipple family was among those who sued the U.S. government in 1982 for compensation for exposure to radioactive fallout. The suit failed, but legislative remedies provided financial compensation for "downwinders" and the Whipple family received $70,000 about a decade ago, Bret Whipple said. "I would just say, shame on you, Mr. Whipple," said Peggy Maze Johnson, executive director of Citizen Alert, a Nevada group working to stop placement of the dump. "Looking at your family history, how could you? What are you thinking?" Johnson said the majority of the Lincoln County Commission is "part of that little cabal to fight the state in the state's fight against Yucca Mountain. They are totally going against the wishes of the people of the state." But Whipple said the work he is considering for Lincoln County does not mean he wants the Yucca Mountain repository. He said his work would stem from problems that Lincoln County has had following Energy Department audits of money provided to the county, resulting in the federal government withholding hundreds of thousands of dollars in recent years. The county has appealed the Energy Department's withholding of funds. Whipple, who is a certified public accountant as well as a lawyer, said he could apply both areas of expertise in the job. "I look at it as protecting them, assisting Lincoln County to ensure that they don't have those kinds of problems," Whipple said. "I'd be working with the district attorney in Lincoln County to provide legal oversight in terms of how those funds are spent." Lincoln County Commissioner Hal Keaton, the most outspoken commissioner against the dump, said people should not assume that Whipple is on the other side. "That (oversight) committee has been in trouble with the finances for three years, maybe more," Keaton said. "They (county commissioners) need someone who can give them some good advice and not this shoot-from-the-hip stuff. That's not a good way to do things." Whipple's Lincoln County roots, Keaton said, would be another plus for the county government. "He's a Lincoln County boy," Keaton said. "I thought, who better to approach to fill that spot?" Working to help avoid pitfalls in spending federal Yucca Mountain funds does not mean Whipple supports the dump, Keaton said. "I don't believe this indicates he endorses Yucca Mountain," he said. "It was me who started it by asking for him. This money is going to come to the county. We need to manage it properly. We haven't been doing that." Lea Rasura, Lincoln County's coordinator of the oversight program and the joint county-city impact group, agreed. She said that her county commission has never formally endorsed the repository. "There is a mission statement," she said. "That mission statement clearly says (the county will) minimize and clearly understand negative impacts and risks and maximize potential benefits. If this (the dump) happens, we have to protect our citizens, our livelihoods, our neighbors and families. Safety is the first issue. "All we're trying to do is take a proactive role in the decision-making process." Commissioner Tommy Rowe said the commission's stance on the Yucca proposal is misunderstood, adding that he hopes that misunderstanding does not extend to Whipple as well. "We, at least myself and my constituents, we don't support Yucca Mountain, but we feel we're going to get it anyway, and we want the benefits if we are going to get it," Rowe said. He said Whipple would work with Lincoln County's legal representation in Washington to help bring federal dollars to the county. But Johnson does not buy the argument that Whipple is simply serving his hometown and county. Working for Lincoln County's legal team would put him on the other side of the Yucca argument, she said. In the end, welcoming federal mitigation dollars is the same for Lincoln County as welcoming the dump, she said. "If he's in that position, then I don't think he's an ally," she said. "He's enabling them." Launce Rake can be reached at 259-4127 or at lrake@lasvegassun.com. All contents copyright 2005 Las Vegas SUN, Inc. ***************************************************************** 32 Nevada Appeal: The high cost of a bad idea Opinion December 13, 2005 The late Everett Dirksen is credited with saying "A billion here and a billion there, and soon you're talking about real money." Because Dirksen died in 1969, he couldn't have been talking about Yucca Mountain. But the Republican senator from Illinois knew then how large government had become - a behemoth that normal folks could no longer comprehend. The plan to store radioactive waste inside a mountain in south-central Nevada would be the nation's largest single public-works project at $58 billion, a number we simply can't wrap our minds around. Perhaps it would help Carson City residents to think of their new hospital and realize that, for the cost of Yucca Mountain, the government could build approximately 439 more hospitals just like it. Every county in Nevada could have 25 new hospitals. Much of the money that will build Yucca Mountain isn't tax dollars, although taxpayers are funding its research at $460 million a year. Electricity customers served by the nuclear-power industry pay for it every month on their bills. The money collects in a fund to fulfill Congress' promise to solve the problem of where to store the radioactive waste. A number people can easily comprehend is two - as in double. That's what's happened to the estimate for a railroad across some of Nevada's roughest mountain terrain to carry nuclear waste. It's gone from $1 billion to $2 billion without a shovel of dirt being turned. It was also Everett Dirksen who said "There is nothing so powerful as an idea whose time has come." To which we would add: There is nothing so wasteful as an idea whose time has passed. All contents © Copyright 2005 nevadaappeal.com Nevada Appeal - 580 Mallory Way - Carson City, NV 89701 ***************************************************************** 33 UPI: Yushchenko proposes Chernobyl waste site United Press International - NewsTrack - 12/12/2005 10:42:00 PM -0500 Newstrack: Former Lithuanian President Rolandas KIEV, Ukraine, Dec. 12 (UPI) -- Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko has proposed building a nuclear waste disposal plant near the site of the world's worst nuclear accident. Speaking at a session of the organizing committee established to commemorate the 20th anniversary of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, Yushchenko said the construction of a plant to process and dispose waste from Ukrainian nuclear power plants could help revive the area, Novosti reported. "We should not only attract the world's attention to the problems of the Chernobyl area, but also draft a complex plan of its restoration," he said. Ukraine annually paid $60-80 million to Russia for disposing of its nuclear waste. © Copyright 2005 United Press International, Inc. All Rights Reserved ***************************************************************** 34 Deseret News: Lawyers join battle against nuclear waste site [deseretnews.com] Tuesday, December 13, 2005 A group of lawyers has banded together to help environmentalists opposed to the expansion of the Envirocare nuclear waste site in Tooele County. The group is "Trial-lawyers Representing Utah's Environment," which goes by the acronym TRUE, said Jim McConkie and Brad Parker, two of the lawyers, in a written announcement. Other lawyers in the group are Joseph Steele, Gary Ferguson and Frank Carney, they added. All have had "extensive trial experience, handled cases involving millions of dollars and have been trial lawyers for over 20 years," says the release. During a telephone interview, McConkie said the group plans to represent the Healthy Environmental Alliance of Utah in a hearing before state regulators concerning proposed Envirocare expansion. McConkie said he is glad Gov. Jon Huntsman Jr. recently announced he would not approve Envirocare's petition to expand. The company needs approval of both the Legislature and the governor for such an action. © 2005 Deseret News Publishing Company [ /] ***************************************************************** 35 Carlsbad Current Argus: DOE office gets new leader By Victoria Parker-Stevens Current-Argus Staff Writer Dec 13, 2005, 06:00 am CARLSBAD -- A Carlsbad resident began work Monday as the new manager of the federal Energy Department's Carlsbad Field Office. Dave Moody filled the position previously held by Ines Triay, who currently serves as chief operating officer for the DOE's Office of Environmental Management in Washington, D.C. Moody was previously technical lead and deputy group leader at Los Alamos National Laboratory's Carlsbad Operations, where he served for more than five years. In that role, he provided technical leadership for efforts to accelerate shipments to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant. "We're pleased to welcome Dr. Moody on board as manager of the Carlsbad office," said Triay, who also came to the WIPP project from LANL, in a statement. "He brings tremendous technical and managerial skill to the position. He is the right person to lead the program forward." Triay served as manager for almost five years. She returned early this year to serve as acting manager, leaving in the summer. The CBFO manager provides overall direction for WIPP and the National Transuranic Waste Program. "I'm a visionary, and I will get to communicate my vision, which I hope is contagious," Moody said of his new role. "I love working with people and the team approach, and I'm looking forward to working with the team here. "The vision I want to communicate is that it's really all about reducing risk," he said of getting transuranic waste from around the country underground at WIPP. Moody said he was looking forward to large changes that loom on the horizon for WIPP, including acceptance of remote-handled waste and a reduction in mandated waste testing at shipping sites. "I look at the challenges, and they don't get any bigger," he said. Moody hails from South Carolina and has a Ph.D. in inorganic chemistry from Indiana University. His bachelor's degree in chemistry is from the University of South Carolina. He worked for LANL for more than 30 years, with 15 years in Los Alamos and 10 at the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site in Denver. He and his wife, Patricia, have three children -- Angela and Brian, who live in Colorado, and Paula, 6. Copyright © 2005 Carlsbad Current Argus, a Gannett ***************************************************************** NOTE: In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. section 107 this material is distributed without profit or payment to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving this information for non-profit research and educational purposes only. For more information go to: *****************************************************************