*****************************************************************
12/05/05 **** RADIATION BULLETIN(RADBULL) **** VOL 13.282
*****************************************************************
RADBULL IS PRODUCED BY THE ABALONE ALLIANCE CLEARINGHOUSE
*****************************************************************
Send News Stories to news@energy-net.org with title on subject
line and first line of body
NUCLEAR POLICY
1 IRNA: ElBaradei warns against brinkmanship over Iran's program
2 UPI: Intl. Intelligence - Europe to resume nuclear talks with Iran
3 IRNA: Iran will welcome proposal for enrichment inside Iran, Larijan
4 Xinhua: Iran upbeat on outcome of nuclear talks
5 Xinhua: Six-party talks example for Iran negotiations: Russia
6 IRNA: EU negotiations with Iran wrongly framed, says analyst -
7 AFP: Netanyahu hints could consider Iran nuclear strike
8 MNA: Czech Republic supports Iran’s right to develop nuclear techn
9 IRNA: Larijani urges nuclear talks without any preconditions
10 MNA: Iran will not brook time-wasting in nuclear talks
11 UPI: Iran announces second new nuclear plant
12 UPI: India to seek nuke energy from Russia
13 Guardian Unlimited: Netanyahu Backs Pre-Emptive Strike on Iran
14 Guardian Unlimited: Russia Confirms Sale of Missiles to Iran
15 Korea: Digital Chosunilbo: Unification Minister Offers Outline for D
16 Korea: Digital Chosunilbo: U.S., N.K. Must Solve Issues Bilaterally
17 US: Las Vegas SUN: Editorial: Whistleblowers not protected
18 US: Arms Control Association: Congress Cuts Nuclear Bunker Buster Ag
19 US: Arms Control Association: Strengthening Nuclear Safeguards: Spec
20 [NYTr] US, EU Conspire Against Non-Proliferation Treaty
21 RIA Novosti: Adamov's lawyer expects Swiss court ruling before Chris
22 BBC: MSP fined after Trident protest
NUCLEAR REACTORS
23 US: [epa-impact] Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc.; Millstone Power
24 [NukeNet] Japanese nuclear energy policy - English version
25 Guardian Unlimited: Iran plans new nuclear reactor
26 hvg.hu: Atom power
27 RIA Novosti: Russia could build another nuclear power plant in Iran
28 RIA Novosti: Presidential envoy appointed nuclear watchdog head
29 BBC: Plea to make Wales nuclear-free
30 BBC: Iran to build new nuclear plant
31 Herald: Ministers stand by powers on nuclear stations
32 News-Record.com: N.C. could be key in nuclear comeback
33 TheStar.com: Premier denies contact with nuclear lobbyist
34 US: NRC: In the Matter of Exelon Generation Company, LLC, LaSalle Co
35 US: NRC: Notice of Availability of Environmental Assessment and Find
36 US: NRC: Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc.; Millstone Power Station
37 Indian Express: PM to take up nuclear reactor issue with Putin
38 Japan Times: Restart of Mihama reactor OK'd
39 Belfast Telegraph: I'm dreaming of a nuclear powered Christmas
40 AU: On Line Opinion: Jim Green argues the use of nuclear power is f
41 Rediff: Russia may construct more reactors for India
42 Guardian Unlimited: Iran Announces Plans for 2nd Nuclear Plant
NUCLEAR SECURITY
43 US: [NukeNet] 9/11 Panel Says Nuke Power Plants Vulnerable To
NUCLEAR SAFETY
44 [du-list] Development of DU Munitions
45 Arms Control Association: Space Weapons and the Risk of Accidental N
46 US: STLtoday: They told him it was safe'
47 AU ABC: Former naval officers seek compensation for beryllium exposu
NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE
48 US: [NukeNet] DOE Pushing Spent Fuel Reprocessing
49 US: NRC: NRC Seeks Comments on Proposal Requiring Electronic Submiss
50 US: Indiatimes: Uranium finds to boost nuke energy plans[Add to Clip
51 Platts: Yucca Mountain application appears unlikely to go to NRC in
52 Socialist Alliance: No nuke dump campaign: a fighting spirit
53 US: IndyStar.com: Army investigating Newport facility |
54 US: Salt Lake Tribune: Update: Supreme Court won't hear Utah's N-was
55 Letters To The Editor: Yucca: DOE response to Loux
56 MNA: Russian nuclear plan not viable - Esmaeili
PEACE
57 BBC: Life after The Bomb in Kazakhstan
US DEPT. OF ENERGY
*****************************************************************
*****************************************************************
FULL NEWS STORIES
*****************************************************************
*****************************************************************
1 IRNA: ElBaradei warns against brinkmanship over Iran's program
London, Dec 5, IRNA
Iran Nuclear Talks-ElBaradei
The director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA), Mohamed ElBaradei, warned Monday against the dangerous
game of brinkmanship in the west's dispute with Iran over its
nuclear program.
"Everybody would hurt," ElBaradei said. "You would then open a
Pandora's box. There would be efforts to isolate Iran; Iran
would retaliate," he said.
"At the end of the day you have to go back to the negotiating
table to find the solution," he warned in an interview published
in the Independent newspaper.
The head of the UN nuclear watchdog suggested that the main
hope of resuming EU negotiations lay with comprise proposals,
which is offering to allow Iran to develop uranium conversion at
Isfahan but for enrichment outside its territory at a jointly
owned plant.
Last week, the EU wrote to Iran offering to resume negotiations
while supporting ideas such as the Russian proposal for a joint
venture for uranium enrichment.
ElBaradei said that he had noted that Iran had not rejected the
EU offer outright and said that he expected "talks" to be held
before next month.
During a visit to London last Thursday, Germany's new Foreign
Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier expressed optimism about the
resumption of the negotiations that have been stalled since they
broke down when Iran rejected an initial EU offer of political
incentives.
"I think in all our talks we have seen that we can start a new
round of negotiations and perhaps with new proposals that might
allow enrichment outside the borders of Iran," Steinmeier said
at a joint news conference with UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw.
The IAEA director general suggested that a dangerous escalation
in the stand-off could come if Iran ends its voluntary
suspension of its Natanz enrichment plant.
"If they start enriching this is a major issue and a serious
concern for the international community," he said, suggesting
that the plant would take two years to be fully operational and
then effectively "a few months away" from nuclear weapons
technology.
"That's why there is the concern of the international community
about Iran, because lots of people feel it could be a dual
purpose program," ElBaradei said.
With regard to his own views about Iran's intentions, he said
that "the jury's out. It's difficult to read their intention.
We're still going through the program to make sure it's all for
peaceful purposes."
"I know they are trying to acquire the full fuel cycle. I know
that acquiring the full fuel cycle means that a country is
months away from nuclear weapons, and that applies to Iran and
everybody else," the UN watchdog chief said.
Despite the focus on Iran, he believed that the most worrying
nuclear threat came from the prospect of nuclear terrorism,
where the concept of deterrence did not apply.
"That is the most critical danger we are facing now because
there is a lot of nuclear material and nuclear facilities that
need to be adequately protected," ElBaradei warned.
He said that although such a scenario was "highly unlikely",
the countries, where the risk was greatest, were ironically
those such as Iraq and Afghanistan where governments are not in
control of their territory following US-led invasions.
*****************************************************************
2 UPI: Intl. Intelligence - Europe to resume nuclear talks with Iran
United Press International -
12/5/2005 1:23:00 PM -0500
Newstrack: A Florida judge postponed a hearing
TEHRAN, Dec. 5 (UPI) -- Iran welcomed Monday Europe's
announcement that it is ready to resume negotiations with Tehran
over its uranium enrichment as a "positive step."
Secretary General of the Higher National Security Council Ali
Larijani said according to the Iranian News Agency, IRNA, "The
focus of the negotiations is to make sure there is no deviation
in enrichment. We are seeking a constructive dialogue to agree
on a method for an acceptable solution."
He stressed that Iran "is determined to hold serious and
acceptable negotiations which should focus on essential issues
which are points of contention."
"We do not want to tackle marginal or fringe matters in the
negotiations, such as granting economic privileges and other
issues of that sort," Larijani said.
He said the issue of negotiations is enrichment, "and we want to
be certain about possessing the nuclear fuel cycle because
possessing such a nuclear technology is an important subject for
Iran."
Larijani pointed out that negotiations might start in two weeks
at the level of experts.
He stressed that Iran will give the U.N. nuclear watchdog, the
International Atomic Energy Agency, all the answers to its
questions within the framework of the law "in order that it
would be assured that Iran wants peaceful nuclear technology."
© Copyright 2005 United Press
International, Inc. All Rights Reserved
*****************************************************************
3 IRNA: Iran will welcome proposal for enrichment inside Iran, Larijani
Tehran, Dec 5, IRNA
Iran-Nuclear Program-Larijani
Secretary of Supreme Security Council Ali Larijani said on
Monday that Iran will welcome any proposal for enrichment of
uranium inside Iran.
He told reporters that Iran will not object to any proposal for
enrichment of uranium inside Iran. Russia or any other country
would be welcomed if they put forward such an offer.
"Of course, the proposal should aim to resolve the problem and
not to erase entirety of the problem itself," he said, a
reference to European call to dismantle nuclear sites.
"The new proposal should respect Iran's right to enrich uranium
on its territory and ensure non-Iranian parties that Iranian
nuclear program will not be diverted from civilian application,"
Larijani said.
A reporter asked whether Iran granted access to inspectors of
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to Shian and Lavizan
military bases, Larijani said that Iranian cooperation with the
UN nuclear watchdog is in the context of Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) and Safeguards Agreement of IAEA.
He said that IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei had called
for inspection of the two sites and Iran allowed the Agency's
inspectors to see them.
"We allowed the inspection to show that Iranian nuclear program
is transparent. Otherwise, Iran is obliged to accept the IAEA
demands within regulations of the Agency."
"The US methodology of propaganda is that every time the Agency
planned to hold talks on Iranian nuclear program, the US came up
with new allegations and asked the UN Agency to examine them.
Iran will no longer agree to such a practice in the future."
Asked about possibility of talks between Iran and the US,
Larijani said that the US officials are repeating their own
allegations and it is not clear how to make sure about their
honesty.
He said that the US officials should change their behavior.
"When Iranians see double standard of the US officials, they are
right not to take the offer for talks seriously."
He said that starting negotiations with the US is an important
topic and in case of raising it such a decision should be taken
by Supreme National Security Council (SNSC).
*****************************************************************
4 Xinhua: Iran upbeat on outcome of nuclear talks
www.xinhuanet.com
www.chinaview.cn 2005-12-04 01:53:58
TEHRAN, Dec. 3 (Xinhuanet) -- Iran voiced confidence on
Saturday over the upcoming new round of nuclear negotiations
with the European Union (EU), the official IRNA news agency
reported." Getting access to peaceful nuclear technology is a
basic principle for Iran, and negotiations on the issue can
certainly be fruitful," chief nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani
was quoted assaying.
Larijani said it was significant for Iran to secure its
nuclear rights through "a peaceful way", stressing that Iran
would continue its efforts in this regard.
"We will wait for a while and will proceed patiently.
However, we shall make decisions according to future
conditions," Larijiani added.
Meanwhile, he noted that Iran would present a proposal to
solvethe country's nuclear issue but refused to reveal
details.Larijani also dismissed Israeli Prime Minister Ariel
Sharon'sremarks as "propaganda".
Sharon said on Thursday that "Israel can not accept a
situation in which Iran would be in possession of nuclear
weapons." "Whenever the process of negotiation about the
country's nuclear issue becomes constructive, such reactions are
not unusual," he added.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the UN
nuclear watchdog, adopted a resolution in September urging Iran
to re-suspend its uranium conversion activities or to face a
referral of its nuclear case to the UN Security Council for
possible sanctions. However, the agency's board of governors
decided on Nov. 24 to postpone the referral in order to allow
Iran and the EU to seek a peaceful solution to the issue.
In response, the two sides agreed to resume nuclear
negotiations later this month, which have been stranded since
Tehran defiantly resumed the uranium conversion activities in
early August.
The United States accuses Iran of developing nuclear weapons
secretly, a charge dismissed by Tehran as politically
motivated.Enditem
Copyright ©2003 Xinhua News Agency. All rights reserved.
*****************************************************************
5 Xinhua: Six-party talks example for Iran negotiations: Russia
www.xinhuanet.com
www.chinaview.cn 2005-12-05 23:11:17
MOSCOW, Dec. 5 (Xinhuanet) -- The six-party negotiations on
the Korean nuclear issue provide an example for a possible
format of consultations with Iran over its disputed nuclear
program, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said Monday.
In an article posted on the Foreign Ministry's website,
Lavrov said everybody recognized that neither the Korean nuclear
issue nor the Iranian one can be solved by military means or
imposing sanctions.
"There is a common rule applicable to both cases: problems
are best resolved through involvement, rather than by the
isolation of problem states'," Lavrov said.
"It would be useful to compare the two situations if we
agree that there is no alternative to a political and diplomatic
settlement," he said, adding that such comparative analysis
would prove that re-arranging existing contacts could become a
considerable resource in resolving the Iranian nuclear problem.
"All these contacts could be brought together to establish
bilateral dialog," Lavrov said.
Germany, France and Britain, which have represented European
Union in talks with Iran, had been trying to persuade Tehran to
scrap uranium enrichment, but the talks collapsed after Iran
ended a freeze on uranium conversion in August. Iran has
insisted on a full nuclear fuel cycle.
Moscow has proposed a plan that would allow Iran a civilian
nuclear program but transfer uranium enrichment, the most
sensitive part of the nuclear fuel cycle, to Russia. The
proposal was backed by the EU and the United States. Enditem
Copyright ©2003 Xinhua News Agency. All rights reserved.
*****************************************************************
6 IRNA: EU negotiations with Iran wrongly framed, says analyst -
London, Dec 5, IRNA
Iran Nuclear-EU Policy
The EU's negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program should
be framed on preventing the collapse of the Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) rather than the premises of US pressure, according
to a former Australian government advisor.
Greg Austin, the research director at the London-based Foreign
Policy Center (FPC), believes efforts should be based more on
what constitutes the development of nuclear power for civilian
purposes under the NPT regime.
"It is very important for the US to step back and to understand
what its process of 'demand' diplomacy, that is imposing on
Iran, might lead to," he said.
"It is important to take into account the feelings that are
circulating in Iran and the reaction of the ordinary Iranians to
pressure by the United States on Iran in this issue," the
defence intelligence analyst said in an interview with IRNA.
He expressed alarm about the level of American pressure and the
way in which the Europeans were falling in behind the US
position.
Asked whether the US and EU are using the nuclear issue as a
pretext for putting political pressure on Iran, Austin who also
works for the Brussels-based International Crisis Group, said he
did not believe that there was a covert political agenda.
"But I think there is a confusion in the leading circles of the
Unites States about the existing international regime regarding
nuclear power for peaceful purposes and nuclear weapons," he
said.
The political director believed that it is important for the
international community to agree for a new regime for the
development of nuclear power for civil purposes and its
relationship to the development of nuclear weapons.
"Until then countries like Iran, India, Pakistan and North
Korea should brought together in some consensus with the US and
EU on what constitutes a legitimate use of a nuclear power for
civil purposes and whether states can go to threshold status
towards a nuclear weapon," he said.
Austin emphasized that it was a huge unresolved issue and
warned that it posed a threat to the collapse of the NPT and
that the review of the treaty needs to be put back on the table
urgently.
"The US-Iran problem or the US-North Korea problem cannot be
solved on a bilateral basis with the 'demand' diplomacy on the
coercion that is currently being forced by the US," he said.
The analyst warned that the issues would not be resolved "as
long as Israel has got nuclear weapons, as long as Pakistan and
India have nuclear weapons." "The negotiations between Iran and
the EU cannot work unless it addresses the fundamental weakening
of the
proliferation regime and understanding of the need for a new
consensus about the nuclear power and nuclear weapons," he said.
Austin, who also served as an Australian diplomat in Hong Kong
added that the British government is acutely aware of the need
for a new and effective international regime on nuclear
proliferation.
"It is the question that how quickly can they move towards that
and how quickly international community be mobilized to do
that," he said.
The political director of the FPC believed that the new
proliferation regime is going to take five to 10 years, but
suggested that in terms of nuclear research and nuclear
capability Iran would be ready in one to two years.
"If I was Iran, if I was EU, I would be pressing for to get
back to the table for a new global nuclear regime rather than
just settling back and try to handle these intense negotiations
under this intense pressure from the United States," he said.
*****************************************************************
7 AFP: Netanyahu hints could consider Iran nuclear strike
Mon Dec 5, 3:49 AM ET
JERUSALEM (AFP) - Former Israeli prime minister Benjamin
Netanyahu" /> Benjamin Netanyahuhinted that he could consider a
pre-emptive air strike against Iran" /> Iran's nuclear
installations if he were to be re-elected.
Netanyahu, who is widely expected to regain the leadership of
the right-wing Likud party later this month, said Israel" />
Israelneeded to "act in the spirit" of the late premier Menachem
Begin who ordered an air strike on Iraq" /> Iraq's Osirak
nuclear reactor in 1981.
"I view the development of the Iranian nuclear (programme) as a
paramount threat and as a real danger to the future of the state
of Israel," Netanyahu told the Yediot Aharonot newspaper.
"Israel needs to do everything to prevent Iran from developing a
nuclear threat against it."
"We need to act in the spirit of Menachem Begin, who defied the
entire world and with a bold step prevented Iraq from arming
itself with nuclear weapons."
Prime Minister Ariel Sharon" /> Ariel Sharon, Netanyahu's arch
rival said last week that Israel would never allow its
arch-enemy Iran to come into possession of nuclear weapons.
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad caused an international
backlash in October when he called for the Jewish state to be
"wiped off the map".
The International Atomic Energy Agency" /> International Atomic
Energy Agency(IAEA) in September found Iran in non-compliance
with the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, paving the way for
the matter to be referred to the UN Security Council if Iran
does not halt nuclear fuel work and cooperate fully with an IAEA
investigation.
Iran has insisted that its nuclear programme is merely designed
to meet domestic energy needs.
Copyright © 2005 Yahoo! Inc. All rights reserved.
*****************************************************************
8 MNA: Czech Republic supports Iran’s right to develop nuclear technology
Tehran:09:21,2005/12/06
Tehran, Dec. 5 (MNA) -- MP Hamid-Reza Hajbabaii, chairman of the
Iran-Czech Parliamentary Friendship Group, said here on Monday
that Czech officials have formally announced their support for
the nuclear initiative of Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad
calling for the participation of world countries in the
construction of nuclear power plants in Iran.
Speaking to the Mehr News Agency, Hajbabaii went on to say that
the Iranian parliamentary delegation had held meetings with
Czech officials the most significant outcome of which had been
the Czech government’s support for Iran’s nuclear
technology.
Hajbabaii, who is also a member of the Majlis Presiding Board,
noted that bilateral talks were held in all political and
economic arenas.
He said that considering the fact that the Czech Republic is
located in Europe, it can assist Iran in its nuclear relations
with the European Union and the International Atomic Energy
Agency Board of Governors.
The MP stated that the Czech foreign minister is set to visit
Tehran some two months later, and expressed hope that bilateral
relations between the two countries would improve in comparison
with the past.
Hajbabaii who represents Hamedan in the Majlis pointed to the
meetings held between the Iranian Parliamentary delegation with
the Czech premier, parliament speaker and vice president, head
of the Communist Party and head of the Czech foreign committee,
adding that the most significant discussions between the two
sides included the issues of energy, rail transportation,
railroad, extraction of raw materials such as oil,
auto-industry, construction of sugarcane factories, environment
and manufacturing weaving machines.
He further noted that Czech officials have announced that they
intend to establish excellent economic and political relations
with the Islamic Republic of Iran, adding that the Islamic
Republic would cooperate with the Czech Republic in economic,
agricultural and industrial fields.
The MP added that Czech officials have also announced that a new
round of political and economic relations will be established
between the two countries after the Czech foreign minister’s
visit to Tehran.
He noted that Czech officials have said that the U.S. can not
inflict any pressure on bilateral relations between the two
countries.
Hajbabaii said that as a step forward to improve both political
and economic relations between Iran and the Czech Republic,
trade taxes between the two countries would be omitted.
At the end of his remarks, he concluded that the political
parties of the Czech Republic have expressed interest in
developing relations with the political parties of Iran.
Hajbabaii was accompanied in his recent visit to Czech by a
member of the Majlis National Security and Foreign Policy
Committee, a member of the Majlis Committee of Industries, a
member of the Majlis Development Committee and three members of
the Majlis Agriculture Committee.
SA/HL
End
MNA
© 2003-2005 Mehr News Agency
*****************************************************************
9 IRNA: Larijani urges nuclear talks without any preconditions
Tehran, Dec 5, IRNA
Iran-Larijani-Nuclear
Secretary of Supreme National Security Council Ali Larijani said
here Monday nuclear talks between Iran and Europe should be held
with no preconditions, warning that setting any conditions can
harm the negotiations.
"No conditions have been announced yet for resumption of
negotiations," Larijani told domestic and foreign reporters.
"It seems negotiations at expert level will start within the
next two weeks."
In response to a question on the Europeans' demand that
enrichment be carried out outside Iran while Tehran believes
fuel cycle should be conducted inside the country, he said, "The
place of enrichment will not be the topic of of our talks.
"What will be raised during the talks is that enrichment
process in Iran will not be diverted from its peaceful path. We
have no words on enrichment."
Asked about the possibility of holding talks in Iran, the SNSC
secretary said, "The venue of talks is not important.
Negotiations can be held anywhere."
*****************************************************************
10 MNA: Iran will not brook time-wasting in nuclear talks
TEHRAN, Dec. 5 (MNA) -- Supreme National Security
Council Secretary Ali Larijani said here on Monday that Iran has
called for unconditional talks with the European Union.
“Setting conditions for talks will disrupt the process, and I
don’t think either of the two sides would want to do that,”
he told reporters.
Asked if Iran’s insistence that it will not transfer uranium
enrichment abroad is a condition, Larijani replied, “No. This
is not a condition, it is the subject of talks. Our nuclear
negotiations revolve around enrichment in Iran. In order to
conduct enrichment in any other country, we have to hold talks
with that country.
“The topic of talks is non-deviation in enrichment and other
issues, including economic and security affairs, are all
marginal subjects.”
He noted that the preliminary talks would be about the agenda
and method of negotiations, in other words, formulating a model
for talks.
The nuclear issue is not a complicated matter, he said, adding,
“If we all try to reach a logical solution, an appropriate
conclusion can be reached over the next few months.
He said, “We are pleased that European states, Russia, China,
and member countries of the Non-Aligned Movement have announced
their readiness for talks,” adding that Iran regards
Europe’s step to resume talks as positive.
“We will try to hold constructive as well as serious talks
with the three EU countries (Britain, Germany, and France), and
negotiations will continue in order to reach a logical and
accessible solution.”
Larijani stressed that the talks would focus on the main points
of contention, i.e., assurances that Iran’s nuclear fuel
program would not be diverted toward weapons development and
Iran’s right to master the complete nuclear fuel cycle on its
soil.
“Iran views the future talks as a win-win game,” he said.
“We certainly have a positive view of the talks, otherwise we
would never have wasted so much time on them.
“Our nuclear diplomacy was not limited to the EU3, and we have
held serious talks with countries like China, Russia, and the
non-aligned states since our talks with Europe broke down. But
the fact we have negotiated with non-European states does not
mean we reject any other type of talks.”
Asked how Iran would react if asked to continue the suspension
of some nuclear activities, Larijani said, “Any kind of
suspension must have a logical basis. We believe that the right
to make peaceful use of nuclear technology, which is officially
recognized for countries like Japan, India, and others, should
also be recognized for Iran.
“Enrichment will certainly take place in Iran. But since some
countries stressed the need for confidence-building and
transparency, we preferred to spend some time in talks in order
to clear up ambiguities and allay the concerns.
“If we fail to reach any logical conclusion from talks, the
path is open for Iran to continue with its work. No one can
limit Iran to any pre-determined conditions. Therefore, this is
not a matter of concern for us.”
Commenting on President Mahmud Ahmadinejad’s plan to conduct
enrichment projects with the participation of domestic and
foreign companies, he stated, “This plan has a great potential
for confidence-building on the peaceful nature of Iran’s
nuclear activities.”
Larijani said he does not have any precise information about the
Russian nuclear proposal, which, according to the media, would
entail shipping UF6 from Iran to be enriched in Russia.
“The Russian proposal was only an idea, and we announced that
it had some problems when it was first mentioned.”
He noted that Iran has not received any written plan from
Moscow, adding, “But this does not mean we want to prevent
anyone from presenting a plan to us.
“We will welcome any plan that would enable Iran to possess
the nuclear fuel cycle on its soil and demonstrate that our
nuclear program will not deviate (toward military use).”
He went on to say that Iran is currently studying some plans
which it intends to present during the talks.
Larijani called Iran’s plan to offer nuclear shares to
domestic and foreign public and private sector companies the
utmost effort for transparency in nuclear activities.
On the resumption of work at the Natanz nuclear complex, he
stated, “If nuclear talks continue seriously, we prefer to
negotiate on the production of nuclear fuel at Natanz.”
Responding to a question on the recent remarks by former Israeli
prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who said he could consider a
pre-emptive air strike against Iran's nuclear installations if
he were to be elected, Larijani said the issue should not be
taken seriously.
“We should not pay much attention to the harsh remarks made by
Zionist officials. Those who make harsh statements quickly back
down.
“Iran is a powerful country and a hard target which very few
countries are able to confront, and it will not change its
attitude as a result of such remarks.
“Comparing Iran with Iraq is a mistake… Confronting Iran
would have serious consequences. The legitimacy that Iran enjoys
both inside and outside the country is basically incomparable
with that of Iraq (at the time of the U.S. invasion) in the
entire region and within its own nation.
“The Zionist regime only adds to its problems by making such
threats, and I believe it is not in a situation to do so. As
long as the rights of the Palestinian nation are not realized,
such threats will not be taken seriously by regional states.
These remarks are meant as psychological warfare rather than as
a practical political approach.”
Larijani strongly rejected claims that Iran has made
behind-the-scenes compromises for the transfer of uranium
enrichment abroad for a limited time.
“There has been nothing behind the scenes. Everything about
Iran’s nuclear policy is the same, both behind and in front of
the scenes: that is, the Iranians’ right to possess peaceful
nuclear technology must be restored.”
He also said that in the coming months Iran would offer an
international tender for the construction of two 1000-megawatt
nuclear power stations to produce 20 megawatts of electricity.
“It would be carried out through issuing a tender, so nothing
is hidden about it,” he noted.
Asked about his previous statement that Tehran's patience toward
Western opposition to its nuclear program was wearing thin,
Larijani explained that one should accept that there is a
limited amount of time to solve every political issue in the
modern world.
“You should accept that we spent a very long time to solve the
nuclear issue, so we have the right to expect it to be solved
quickly.
“We know very well the line between wasting opportunities and
struggling for the solution of the nuclear issue,” he stated.
However, Iran will patiently work to resolve the nuclear
dispute, Larijani asserted.
On International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Mohamed
ElBaradei’s recent remarks, in which he said that Iran would
be just two months away from making atomic bombs if it resumed
activities at the Natanz nuclear complex, Iran’s top nuclear
negotiator said that it is Iran’s right to conduct nuclear
activities based on the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
“Mr. ElBaradei and the others should not (try to) read
Iran’s intentions. Rather, they should consider Iran’s
performance and actions.
“We will continue our cooperation with them to reach a final
result, but they should not overlook the Iranians’ right by
making these statements.”
Larijani went on to say that enrichment "is not something that a
country invests in and then transfers.
"We don't see the need for such a thing. What could be done in a
few years, we can do right now. It is not proper and not
politically reasonable," he noted, renewing his objection to
Moscow's latest nuclear proposal.
On the possibility of talks with the United States within the
talks with the European Union, Larijani said, “I don’t think
it is a good thing for the Europeans to be the mouthpiece of
another country.”
Commenting on the proposals on Iran-U.S. cooperation to help end
the insurgency in Iraq, he stated that Iran regards the behavior
of the U.S. as the key issue.
“The United States has been pursuing a troublesome policy in
the region, so before any cooperation, this type of policy
should be changed,” he added.
HL/RS/HG
End
MNA
© 2003-2005 Mehr News Agency
*****************************************************************
11 UPI: Iran announces second new nuclear plant
United Press International - NewsTrack -
12/5/2005 8:03:00 AM -0500
Newstrack: A Florida judge postponed a hearing
TEHRAN, Dec. 5 (UPI) -- Iran's state media announced Monday the
country is going to build a second nuclear power plant in the
southwestern Khuzestan province.
The news, released by the IRNA state news agency, comes amid
growing U.S. and European concern over Tehran's nuclear
ambitions, with talks between Iran and EU negotiators due to
restart within days.
The country's first reactor at Bushehr is due to start producing
electricity soon, the BBC said.
Meanwhile, Iran's Secretary of Supreme National Security Ali
Larijani told reporters Monday that the nuclear talks between
Iran and Europe should be conducted with no preconditions, such
as Russia's suggestion that it process spent uranium and return
it.
"The place of enrichment will not be the topic of our talks,"
Larijani said. "What will be raised during the talks is that
enrichment process in Iran will not be diverted from its
peaceful path."
Iran has previously said it wants to build 20 nuclear power
stations in as many years to meet its future energy needs.
© Copyright 2005 United Press
International, Inc. All Rights Reserved
*****************************************************************
12 UPI: India to seek nuke energy from Russia
United Press International - Intl. Intelligence -
12/5/2005 12:55:00 PM -0500
Newstrack: A Florida judge postponed a hearing
NEW DELHI, Dec. 5 (UPI) -- Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh
said low-enriched uranium used for the Tarapur nuclear reactors
is separate from a signed U.S.-India nuclear agreement.
"The fuel for Tarapur is a separate question; it is not related
to the nuclear deal," said Singh, The Hindu newspaper reported
Monday.
"The agreement is clear. In the meantime the United States will
encourage its partners to also consider this request (of fuel
supplies for safeguarded reactors at Tarapur) expeditiously,"
said an Indian Foreign Ministry official.
He said this means the supply of low-enriched uranium is not
linked to the implementation of other commitments like the
separation of civil and military facilities.
The United States disagrees with India's interpretation of the
nuclear deal signed on July 18, arguing that a low-enriched
uranium agreement goes beyond the U.S.-India deal, making it
harder to pass legislative changes in the U.S. Congress.
India signed a deal with the United States in July, whereby
Washington agreed to provide nuclear energy to New Delhi for
civilian use provided India separates it civilian and nuclear
facilities.
Singh noted that issues related to energy security would figure
in his discussions with Russian President Vladimir Putin in
Moscow.
"It is quite possible that we may touch upon uranium for Tarapur
as well," Singh said.
The Foreign Ministry official said early indications from Russia
were positive and that even if the India-United States nuclear
deal were to hit a major roadblock, Moscow was leaning towards
providing low-enriched uranium for Tarapur commitments like the
separation of civil and military facilities.
© Copyright 2005 United Press
International, Inc. All Rights Reserved
*****************************************************************
13 Guardian Unlimited: Netanyahu Backs Pre-Emptive Strike on Iran
From the Associated Press
[UP]
Monday December 5, 2005 6:46 PM
AP Photo JRL113
By JOSEF FEDERMAN
Associated Press Writer
JERUSALEM (AP) - Former Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said
in remarks published Monday that he would support a pre-emptive
strike against Iran's nuclear program.
Netanyahu's comments, made in the heat of a campaign for
leadership of the hardline Likud Party, drew criticism from
rivals, who accused him of playing politics with the country's
security. Iranian leaders brushed off the threat, warning that
an attack ``will have a lot of consequences.''
Israeli leaders have long identified Iran as the nation's
biggest threat. Israel accuses Tehran of supporting Palestinian
militant groups and rejects Iran's claim that its nuclear
program is for peaceful purposes. Iran's president, Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad, said in October that Israel must be ``wiped off the
map.''
Iran's announcement Monday that it plans to build a second
nuclear power plant - along with a deadly suicide bombing the
same day by the Iranian-backed Islamic Jihad group in the
central town of Netanya - is likely to heighten Israel's
concerns.
While Prime Minister Ariel Sharon says the world cannot accept a
nuclear Iran, he contends that diplomacy remains the first line
of defense. He has not said what should be done if diplomacy
fails.
Netanyahu left few doubts about his solution: a pre-emptive
strike similar to the 1981 attack ordered by then-Prime Minister
Menachem Begin that destroyed an unfinished Iraqi nuclear
reactor.
``I will continue the tradition established by Menachem Begin,
who did not allow Iraq to develop such a nuclear threat against
Israel, and by a daring and courageous act gave us two decades
of tranquility,'' Netanyahu told the Maariv daily. ``I believe
that this is what Israel has to do.''
Netanyahu, a bitter political enemy of Sharon, said he would
support the prime minister if he carried out a pre-emptive
strike. ``If it is not done by the present government, I intend
to lead the next government and to stop this threat. I will take
every step required to avoid a situation in which Iran can
threaten us with nuclear weapons.''
Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz, a rival in the Likud race, said
accused Netanyahu of making ``inflammatory statements'' that
``endanger the very security of Israel.''
``The nuclear issue has to be taken out of the election
campaign,'' Mofaz said.
Sharon recently left the Likud to form a new centrist party,
saying he will have more freedom to negotiate a peace deal with
the Palestinians. Sharon is widely expected to win the March 28
general election, but analysts say the domestic campaign
rhetoric could hurt the prime minister's cautious efforts in
dealing with Iran.
Judith Kipper, a Middle East specialist at the Council on
Foreign Relations in Washington, called Netanyahu's comments ``a
desperate political move.'' She said such remarks would make it
difficult to have a ``rational and sane discussion'' about
policy toward Iran and undermine U.S. and European efforts to
curb the Iranian nuclear program.
``A war of words is not something anyone needs now,'' she said.
``The U.S. and EU are trying to get Iran to calm down its
nuclear program. Netanyahu pouring fuel on the fire is not going
to help.''
In Tehran, Ali Larijani, Iran's top nuclear negotiator, said he
did not take Netanyahu's comments seriously. ``If they make such
a mistake, they will add to their own problems. Attacking Iran
will have a lot of consequences,'' he said.
Experts say a unilateral military strike against Iran would be
extremely difficult. In contrast to the Iraqi reactor, Iran's
nuclear installations are heavily fortified and spread
throughout the country. And Arab nations like Syria, Jordan and
Saudi Arabia are unlikely to permit Israel to use their air
space to carry out an attack.
Guardian Unlimited © Guardian Newspapers Limited 2005
*****************************************************************
14 Guardian Unlimited: Russia Confirms Sale of Missiles to Iran
From the Associated Press
[UP]
Monday December 5, 2005 5:16 PM
AP Photo MOSB213
By HENRY MEYER
Associated Press Writer
MOSCOW (AP) - Russia has struck a deal to sell short-range,
surface-to-air missiles to Iran, the defense minister said
Monday, confirming reports that have raised concern in the
United States and Israel.
Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov didn't give details. But Russian
media have said that Moscow agreed in November to sell $1
billion worth of weapons to Iran, including up to 30 Tor-M1
missile systems over the next two years.
``A contract for the delivery of air defense Tor missiles to
Iran has indeed been signed,'' Ivanov was quoted as saying by
the Interfax news agency.
``This unequivocally will not change the balance of forces in
the region,'' Ivanov added. Tor M1 missiles are short-range,
surface-to-air missiles already used by several other armed
forces, including China.
The reports last week prompted expressions of concern from the
U.S administration and Israel, which considers Iran to be its
biggest threat. Israeli concerns recently were heightened after
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad urged that Israel be
``wiped off the map.''
Top politicians in Israel have ratcheted up the tough talk
against Iran, led by former Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu,
who called for a pre-emptive strike against Iranian nuclear
installations. Such a strike would be similar to a 1981 attack,
ordered by then-Prime Minister Menachem Begin, that destroyed an
unfinished Iraqi nuclear reactor.
``I will continue the tradition established by Menachem Begin,
who did not allow Iraq to develop such a nuclear threat against
Israel, and by a daring and courageous act gave us two decades
of tranquility,'' Netanyahu told the daily newspaper Maariv. ``I
believe that this is what Israel has to do.''
Interfax said the Tor-M1 system could identify up to 48 targets
and fire at two targets simultaneously at a height of up to
20,000 feet.
On Saturday, an influential Iranian official played down the
deal, telling the official Islamic Republic News Agency that
Tehran has been trading arms with many countries and would
continue to do so.
The Russian Foreign Ministry, without commenting on the reported
missile sale, also said Saturday that all Russian weaponry
supplied to Iran is purely for defensive purposes.
However, a senior Bush administration official, who declined to
be named because he was not authorized to speak publicly on the
subject, said last week that any arms sale to Iran is a source
of concern. The official would not say whether Russia had
advised the United States of any negotiations with Iran.
The United States and Russia are supporting efforts by the
European Union to persuade Iran to halt development of nuclear
weapons in exchange for economic incentives, such as trade
opportunities.
Russia, which has a long and lucrative relationship with Iran,
has offered to try to resolve a key dispute by offering to
enrich uranium for an Iranian civilian nuclear energy program as
a safeguard against Iran using enrichment for weapons purposes.
Guardian Unlimited © Guardian Newspapers Limited 2005
*****************************************************************
15 Korea: Digital Chosunilbo: Unification Minister Offers Outline for Dealings With N.Korea
> Updated Dec.5,2005 22:35 KST
Unification Minister Chung Dong-young said Monday,
ˇ°Non-nuclear complaints by the United States against North
Korea should be solved by bilateral talks between the two
parties. As the six-party talks focus on resolving the nuclear
issue, other matters should be kept separate from the six-party
issue.ˇ±
Chung told a forum during a breakfast hour lecture at the Lotte
Hotel in Seoul, ˇ°Major non-nuclear complaints fall into six
categories, the most important of which is the North's missile
program, others include biochemical and conventional weapons and
human rights abuses, as well as its alleged involvement in drug
trafficking and currency counterfeiting.ˇ±
Regarding a deepening row between Washington and Pyongyang over
financial sanctions imposed by Washington, he said, ˇ°I had
anticipated such setbacks, but they came a bit too early. The
Six-party talks may seem to have ended up lost in an
impenetrable fog, but it is still early to jump to
conclusions.ˇ±
(englishnews@chosun.com )
*****************************************************************
16 Korea: Digital Chosunilbo: U.S., N.K. Must Solve Issues Bilaterally - Seoul
> Updated Dec.5,2005 18:21 KST
Unification Minister Chung Dong-young says issues other than
the nuclear standoff raised by the U.S. against North Korea
should be resolved through bilateral discussions between
Washington and Pyongyang. Chung said problems like conventional
weapons, human rights, drug trafficking and counterfeit money
dealings by the North are being cited by the U.S. as key pending
problems. But he said they should be addressed separately from
the six-way talks aimed at shutting down North Korea's nuclear
programs.
The nation's top diplomat Ban Ki-moon took a similar stance
saying the U.S. government's sanctions against North Korea's
illicit activities should not affect negotiations at the
six-party talks. The foreign minister said the counterfeiting
and other issues should be dealt with in the framework of an
international court of law.
He stressed this should be considered separate from the agenda
on denuclearizing North Korea and should not become a stumbling
block at the dialogue table. The comment came following a
meeting in Slovenia with the countryˇŻs Foreign Minister
Dimitrij Rupel.
Arirang News
*****************************************************************
17 Las Vegas SUN: Editorial: Whistleblowers not protected
Today: December 05, 2005 at 9:2:44 PST
Employees say government's system for protecting whistleblowers
is broken
Las Vegas Sun
Federal workers who after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks were
charged with preventing future terrorist strikes have little or
no protection against being demoted or losing their jobs when
they reveal inadequacies within their own security agencies,
according to Cox News Service.
These are workers who, for example, revealed the government's
failure to adequately track the suicide hijackers responsible
for the Sept. 11 attack. According to Cox News Service, the laws
that protect the livelihoods of those who report government
wrongdoing have been neglected or ignored, leaving employees who
expose internal waste and fraud to be fired or warehoused in
meaningless jobs.
In one example, Cox News Service cites a former leader of the
Federal Aviation Administration's security test team, who before
the Sept. 11 attacks had warned that his workers successfully
penetrated security at 90 percent of the nation's airports and
that a hijacking was inevitable.
After the 2001 attacks, he filed a complaint with the U.S.
Office of Special Counsel, which is charged with investigating
claims and providing legal support for whistleblowers. The
investigation supported his claim.
But the employee was stripped of his seniority and ended up
answering phones on the graveyard shift and updating a phone
book for the Department of Homeland Security.
People who reveal government shortcomings while working for
federal intelligence agencies reported losing vital security
clearances and job responsibilities and said they often end up
parking cars or working in some baesement filing room until they
are let go.
In October a Bush administration lawyer asked the U.S. Supreme
Court to overturn a California ruling that favored a Los Angeles
County prosecutor who was demoted after revealing a sheriff's
deputy lied in an affidavit. The government lawyer maintained
that public workers don't have free-speech rights when speaking
up in the framework of their jobs.
It's bad enough when the federal government misleads the public
on its reasons for going to war with Iraq, covers up the torture
and abuse of its prisoners and leaks the identity of a covert
CIA operative in revenge. To then strip protection from and
punish those who speak up when they see such misdeeds is a
disgrace.
All contents copyright 2005 Las Vegas SUN, Inc.
*****************************************************************
18 Arms Control Association: Congress Cuts Nuclear Bunker Buster Again
Arms Control Today:
Wade Boese
Congress and the Bush administration differed sharply this year
over the future direction of the U.S. nuclear weapons complex.
For the second consecutive year, lawmakers denied the Department
of Energys request to explore modifying a nuclear warhead to
penetrate deeper underground before detonating. They also
restricted administration plans to make nuclear warheads more
durable, rebuffed an effort to construct a new facility to build
plutonium cores for nuclear weapons, denied a request to shorten
the time needed to conduct a nuclear weapons test, and pushed
for faster warhead dismantlement work.
Led by Rep. David Hobson (R-Ohio), legislators last year
eliminated funding for the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator
(RNEP), which is also known as a bunker buster because of its
intended mission to destroy targets buried deep underground. The
administration sought to revive funding for studying the weapon
as part of its fiscal year 2006 budget request, asking for $4
million for the Energy Department and $4.5 million for the Air
Force to study the weapon. (See ACT, March 2005.)
Hobson, who chairs the House Appropriations Energy and Water
Development Subcommittee, again spearheaded opposition to the
nuclear bunker buster and prevailed. Congress in November passed
a $30.5 billion energy and water appropriations bill that
contains no Energy Department funding for RNEP as part of the
$6.4 billion assigned to nuclear weapons activities. The
president signed the bill into law Nov. 19.
Lawmakers have yet to finalize the defense appropriations bill,
which includes the Air Force portion of the study, and Hobson is
not certain about what the final RNEP outcome will be. I have to
watch in the defense bill to try and make sure they dont go
around me, Hobson was quoted as saying in The Columbus Dispatch
Nov. 13. The Ohio paper further quoted Hobson as declaring, I
dont think [the Pentagon has] given up, based on a meeting he
had with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.
The Senate earlier this year supported funding the Energy
Departments RNEP efforts, setting up a showdown with Hobson and
the House, which had allocated nothing for the project. But Pete
Domenici (R-N.M.), who chairs the Senate Appropriations Energy
and Water Development Subcommittee, announced Oct. 25 that the
funding would be zeroed out because the National Nuclear
Security Administration (NNSA) had dropped the request. The NNSA
indicated that this research should evolve around more
conventional weapons rather thannuclear devices, Domenici
stated.
An excerpt of the statement sent to Domenici by the NNSA, which
is the Energy Departments semi-autonomous agency responsible for
the nuclear stockpile, differs from the senators description of
it. The NNSA stated that, as information gleaned from planned
RNEP activities would be valuable in the development of
conventional earth penetrators, the [d]epartment supports
renaming the program. Nevertheless, now there is no Energy
Department program because of Hobson and Domenici.
Congress also axed the administrations $7.7 million request to
move forward on a Modern Pit Facility to build new plutonium
cores for nuclear warheads. The administration contends that,
because plutonium degrades over time, the United States needs
eventually to resume mass production of these cores to keep
warheads in good working order. However, Hobson has questioned
the administrations underlying assumptions about how fast
plutonium degrades and how many new warhead cores need to be
produced for a shrinking arsenal.
Currently, the United States possesses roughly 10,000 warheads,
but the administration announced in June 2004 its intention to
cut this stockpile almost in half. (See ACT, July/August 2004.) Lawmakers are urging the
administration to accelerate this work. They boosted the
administrations request for warhead dismantlement by $25 million
up to $60 million and, citing the importance of an aggressive
warhead dismantlement program, instructed NNSA to provide a
report by March 1, 2006, on increasing the U.S. dismantlement
capacity.
The administrations program to make warheads easier to maintain
and last longer by replacing their parts with new components
enjoyed similar support. Indeed, Congress almost tripled the
administrations Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) request of $9
millionthe funding level approved last yearto $25 million.
But lawmakers are not granting the program free rein. Concerned
that too many changes might result in a radically different
warhead that could prompt calls for testing to prove that it
would function properly, the Senate and House directed that any
weapon design work done under the RRW program must stay within
the military requirements of the existing deployed stockpile
andthe design parameters validated by past nuclear tests. The
United States last conducted a nuclear test in 1992.
Despite assurances that it has no plans to conduct a nuclear
test, the Bush administration has been seeking to reduce the
amount of time needed to resume nuclear testing to 18 months in
case a technical problem impairs existing warheads or a new
threat emerges. Lawmakers rebuffed this effort, ordering that
the current test-readiness posture of 24 months be maintained.
Departing from long-standing U.S. policy, Congress, again
spurred by Hobson, approved $50 million to launch a spent
nuclear fuel reprocessing initiative with the aim of starting
construction on at least one advanced nonmilitary reprocessing
facility beginning in fiscal year 2010. This involves separating
plutonium and uranium from some other radioactive wastes found
in spent reactor fuel so they can be used again as new fuel.
Although France currently reprocesses spent civilian reactor
fuel and Japan has an ambitious plan of its own, the United
States essentially abandoned commercial reprocessing in the
1970s as too expensive and too dangerous because it produced
surplus nuclear bomb-ready material that could fall into the
wrong hands. Instead, Washington decided to mothball spent
nuclear fuel in huge geological repositories, the first of which
is supposed to be at Nevadas Yucca Mountain. However, legal and
political battles have forestalled the opening of this
repository.
The Arms Control Association is a non-profit, membership-based
organization. If you find our resources useful, please consider
joining or making a contribution. Arms Control Today encourages
reprint of its articles with permission of the Editor.
© 2005 Arms Control Association, 1150 Connecticut Avenue, NW,
Suite 620 Washington, DC 20036 Tel: (202) 463-8270 | Fax: (202)
463-8273
*****************************************************************
19 Arms Control Association: Strengthening Nuclear Safeguards: Special Committee to the
Rescue?
Arms Control Today:
Jack Boureston and Charles D. Ferguson
In June, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of
Governors created a special committee to further strengthen its
safeguards systemthe inspections, accounting, and analyses the
agency uses to detect and deter diversion of nuclear material
and technology for weapons programs. The decision was made under
pressure from the United States following a February 2004 speech
by President George W. Bush in which he proposed creating the
committee as part of a seven-point plan to combat nuclear
proliferation.
Still, the United States had to compromise to win backing for
the decision, which many states feared would hamper peaceful
nuclear activities. China, for example, said that the committee
should serve only as an adviser to the IAEA board and should not
interfere with the boards authority or role.[1] The new
committee will be fully advisory in nature and wholly
subordinate to the board. Also, the committee will not intervene
in the day-to-day operations of the secretariat, although it
could probably draw on the expertise of the IAEAs safeguards
department or other agency offices.
Still, the compromise left a big hole. The committee appears to
lack a clear mandate, and there is a struggle to determine what
the agenda should be. Some members want the committee to focus
on existing safeguards problems and examine legal instruments
that are not being fully used, while others, such as the United
States, want it to tackle a more ambitious agenda. It is also
not clear how the committee will differentiate itself from the
IAEAs long-standing Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards
Implementation (SAGSI), established in 1975 to advise the
director-general on technical aspects of agency safeguards.
The Evolution of IAEA Safeguards
Wrestling over safeguards is almost as old as the nuclear age.
In October 1945, President Harry S. Truman first proposed
international arrangements looking, if possible, to the
renunciation of the use and development of the atomic bomb. The
next year, the United States unveiled a detailed plan for
international control of nuclear energy through the United
Nations. Although this proposal was blocked at that time, it
laid the foundation for the eventual development of
international safeguards.
The first steps toward todays safeguards took place after the
IAEA was born in 1957. Two years later, the first IAEA ad hoc
safeguards were applied to the natural uranium fuel that Canada
was supplying to Japan for a small research reactor. In 1961 the
first formal IAEA safeguards agreement was developed as document
INFCIRC/26. Until 1964, INFCIRC/26 agreements were only applied
to reactors of less than 100 megawatts because these were the
predominant technologies being exported to countries starting
nuclear programs.
To take account of the evolution of nuclear development, the
IAEA board in 1965 approved safeguards agreement INFCIRC/66,
which applied to reactors of all power ratings. INFCIRC/66/Rev.1
included reprocessing facilities in its provisions, and
follow-on revision INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 included fuel fabrication
plants. Enrichment plants, however, were not included under the
INFCIRC/66 safeguards agreements because none of these
facilities were operating in a non-nuclear-weapon state at that
time.
Today, only Israel, India, and Pakistan have safeguards applied
under the facility-specific INFCIRC/66 agreements. These
countries are not parties to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
(NPT) and are known to have nuclear weapons programs. Approval
of the NPT in 1970 spurred further updating of safeguards to
help uphold the treatys underlying purpose: preventing
proliferation of nuclear weapons to new countries. In
particular, the IAEA in 1971 enacted the so-called comprehensive
safeguards agreement under INFCIRC/153.
Comprehensive safeguards, as they are known today, can be
described as a set of internationally approved technical and
legal measures to verify the political undertakings of states
not to use nuclear material to manufacture nuclear weapons and
to deter any such use. The basic procedural elements for these
safeguards are the facility design review and verification,
maintenance of facility operating records, reports on facility
operations, and on-site inspections. Information analysis and
nuclear material accountancy are also integral to comprehensive
safeguards.[2]
In the mid-1970s, faced with growing global interest in nuclear
energy and with the political fallout from Indias 1974 peaceful
nuclear explosive test, the IAEA sought to strengthen and
streamline the safeguards system. The following year,
Director-General Sigvard Eklund established the 20-member SAGSI
to evaluate the agencys safeguards operations. Since then, SAGSI
has examined a variety of topics, including integrated
safeguards and new technical measures and equipment. The
director-general and the Department of Safeguards continue to
use this group of experts from member states for advice on
technical and procedural matters involving the implementation of
nuclear safeguards.
An urgent push to strengthen safeguards came during the early
1990s following the discovery of Iraqs clandestine nuclear
weapons program, discrepancies in the North Koreas initial
safeguards declarations, and South Africas confession that it
had clandestinely built nuclear weapons.
SAGSI, in particular, recommended that the agency re-energize
its efforts to strengthen safeguards. In response, in June 1996,
the IAEA board established Committee 24 to draft a model
protocol that was approved in May 1997 as the Model Additional
Protocol (INFCIRC/540). An additional protocol requires a state
to provide greater information about and inspector access to all
aspects of its nuclear activities, from mining uranium to
disposing of nuclear waste. It also gives inspectors
short-notice access to suspect nuclear related facilities.
But the Model Additional Protocols main innovation goes beyond
declared nuclear activities. Such protocols grant the IAEA
greater authority to investigate and determine whether a state
is engaged in any undeclared activities. As of November 25, 106
member states have signed additional protocols to their
safeguards agreements, and 69 of those have entered into force.
Because more intrusive inspections require more money and staff,
there is a drive to make the strengthened safeguards system more
cost effective. When a member state concludes an additional
protocol, the result is additive measures on top of those under
the comprehensive safeguards agreements[3] However, the Model
Additional Protocol drafters were not simply seeking to stack
varying types of safeguards measures on top of each other.
Recognizing that this will result in a certain amount of
redundancy, the IAEA developed the concept of integrated
safeguards. According to one IAEA official, Integrated
safeguards is the search for the optimum combination of
traditional safeguards measures with the measures of the [Model]
Additional Protocol to ensure a system that is cost efficient
while achieving a high degree of effectiveness.[4]
A state is not eligible for integrated safeguards until it has
brought an additional protocol agreement into force, the IAEA
has resolved any questions it has about the states nuclear
program, the IAEA concludes that there has been no diversion of
nuclear material from declared facilities, and there is no
indication of undeclared nuclear activities or material. As of
July, the IAEA has applied integrated safeguards to Australia,
Bulgaria, Hungary, Indonesia, Japan, Norway, Peru, and
Uzbekistan. For each of these countries, the agency has reduced
the number of routine scheduled inspections at certain types of
facilities, such as light-water reactors and low-enriched
uranium conversion plants.
Committee Agenda: Missing In Action
The 2004 unveiling of Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khans
clandestine nuclear network, which supplied Iran, Libya, and
North Korea with nuclear technologies, shocked the international
community and inspired further calls for changes in the
safeguards system. Bush, in a February 2004 speech to the
National Defense University, called on the international
community to consider seven potential improvements to nuclear
controls.
One recommendation was the creation of a special IAEA committee
to focus on safeguards and verification. It took the United
States more than a year, however, to lay the groundwork for the
June decision to create the committee. Part of the delay stemmed
from the concerns of other countries. China was emphatic that,
in creating the committee, the IAEA needed to maintain its
traditional balance between preventing proliferation and
promoting peaceful nuclear activities.
Not much has happened since the decision was made. According to
a senior diplomat, the panels first meeting on Nov. 11 did not
produce significant developments. The various parties staked out
familiar ground. For instance, the secretariat proposed
committee action based on shoring up its existing operational
technical needs rather than pushing for new authorities. Western
countries called for the committee to work on universal
adherence to the Model Additional Protocol. Developing countries
pushed predictably for keeping the committee open-ended, working
by consensus, and preserving the right to peaceful uses of
nuclear technologies.
Consultations are taking place to prepare a work program, while
the next meeting is scheduled for January. The lack of progress
is particularly noteworthy, however, because the committee is
only slated to last for two years, although its term could be
extended.
Progress could be further hampered because of the composition of
the special committee. It was to be chaired by the chairman of
the IAEA board, currently Japanese Ambassador Yukiya Amano. At
the first meeting of the committee, however, he declined to be
named as the committees chair. After consultations, consensus
was reached to designate Ambassador Taous Feroukhi of Algeria as
the chair for the next year. The committees participation is
open to any member state on the board. That could prove
politically troublesome to the United States because three of
its antagonists Belarus, Cuba, and Syriahave recently joined the
board, and Iran has also expressed interest in joining the
committee. In his 2004 speech, Bush demanded that states, such
as Iran, under IAEA investigation for violating nonproliferation
obligations not be allowed to be members of the board or the
special committee. Nevertheless, in February the United States
reversed this position after some member states insisted on
keeping membership in the committee open.[5]
Still, the biggest problem the committee faces is the lack of a
clear agenda. The IAEA has recently asked outside consultants to
help develop a slate of issues for the committee to consider. In
addition, Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei has provided some
guidance by pointing out that the committee can act as a reality
check and can conduct a revisit of the whole safeguards system
to see whether it is still effective to meet emerging
challenges.[6] Some challenges he has pointed to include illicit
trafficking of nuclear material and facilities, the threat of
nuclear terrorism, and the discovery of clandestine nuclear
programs in certain countries.
A high-level official in Vienna fleshed out other possibilities
that the committee could consider, such as strengthening
measures to enforce compliance of safeguards; assessing existing
legal authorities to prevent or halt illicit activities;
investigating new or emerging threats from nonstate actors, such
as future Khan networks; contemplating the expansion of the
agencys legal authorities to inspect and verify facilities; and
examining recommendations from the past, including those made
during seminars, SAGSI meetings, and possibly those made in
Committee 24 meetings. The committee could also consider more
limited steps, such as reviewing annual safeguards
implementation reports and assessing IAEA safeguards-related and
analytical training programs.
A senior U.S. official said that Washington hopes to see the
committee focus on ways to meet new threats and challenges such
as nuclear terrorism and clandestine supplier networks, explore
ways to bring about universal adherence to the Model Additional
Protocol, and find new ways to urge member states to submit
their safeguards declarations in a timely manner. Although most
member states submitted their declarations on time or just a few
days late, some are more than 180 days late, and four states are
more than one year late.
The official said the United States was also interested in
seeing more member states voluntarily report their
nuclear-related export activities. He said he hoped the
committee would urge states to be less hesitant about giving
information to the agency. Another area the official thought the
committee might investigate is implementing recent modifications
that the IAEA approved in September in relation to the Small
Quantities Protocol. For some years, the IAEA has permitted some
NPT state-parties with small quantities of fissionable
materials, such as highly enriched uranium or plutonium, to
conclude such a protocol suspending certain agency verification
requirements. The recent changes introduced more rigorous
criteria for states wishing to conclude such agreements and
placed further obligations on all present and future states with
such protocols.[7]
In addition, the U.S. official suggested the committee look at
ways to help states work within the framework of the IAEA to
comply with UN Security Council Resolution 1540. In April 2004,
the Security Council unanimously passed this resolution, which
is legally binding on all states because it was adopted under
Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The resolution calls on states to
implement appropriate effective controls to prevent weapons of
mass destruction-related materials from contributing to
proliferation or terrorism. States are required to file reports
to the 1540 Committee specifying what controls they have
enacted. However, a major shortcoming of the resolution is that
it does not adequately define what is meant by effective
controls. To help bridge this gap, the IAEA special committee
may consider defining these controls by specifying appropriate
standards and best practices in safeguarding nuclear equipment
and materials.
What Should the Committee Do?
All of these are worthy proposals. It seems evident, above all,
that the committee needs to take a step back and fully assess
the concept of safeguards, ensuring that halting the
proliferation of nuclear weapons is the systems top priority. It
also needs to differentiate itself clearly from SAGSI. One way
to do so would be to focus on legal and political issues, while
leaving the more technical issues to SAGSI, the body that has
traditionally tackled the implementation of safeguards
agreements.
The new committee should consider improving IAEA practices in
four particular areas: greater access, greater authority,
greater capabilities, and greater incentives and disincentives
to prevent proliferation.
Greater Access
The agency needs greater access to facilities and information.
During the drafting of the Model Additional Protocol, it was
agreed that broader access must be provided, but that did not
equate to unlimited access. Political and commercial
considerations have at times limited access to IAEA inspectors,
and this needs to be resolved to the satisfaction of those
trying to develop an even more strengthened proliferation and
deception-resistant verification system.
The Khan network highlighted the need for a better understanding
of nuclear-related transfers of materials between nations. To
that end, the IAEA has established a special unit to
investigate, document, and analyze worldwide nuclear trade
activities. The new committee should review safeguards
provisions and determine if states can be more transparent about
their nuclear related activities such as providing more
information regarding their nuclear related exports and imports.
Greater Authority
Hand in hand with greater access requirements, the agency needs
greater authority to question national authorities, interview
facility operators, and investigate records, reports, and
facilities. This equates to the provision of greater legal
authority to be more intrusive. In particular, the agency has
the authority to request a special inspection. However, the IAEA
has only twice formally invoked the special inspection provision
of INFCIRC/153. In the first instance, Romania in 1992 invited
the IAEA to conduct a special inspection to resolve an
outstanding issue that had taken place under the Ceausescu
regime. In contrast, in the second instance, North Korea in 1993
did not consent to the requested special inspection. Although
the board has been reluctant to invoke this special inspection
power, these inspections do not have to be confrontational, as
demonstrated by Romania, and can help provide needed additional
information to gain greater understanding about a states
adherence to its safeguards requirements.[8] The special
committee should help guide the board in determining when
special inspections would be appropriate.
Greater Capabilities
The agency needs better capabilities to analyze the nuclear fuel
cycle processes, facilities, and research activities of member
states. To this end, new safeguards monitoring systems are under
development and consideration. In particular, the agency has
been developing unattended monitoring systems that can provide
continuous coverage of a safeguarded facility while reducing the
need for a costly human presence. For example, the Japanese
Rokkasho reprocessing plant will make extensive use of this type
of technology. The committee should consider whether it is
feasible to apply advanced continuous monitoring techniques to
Irans sensitive nuclear facilities, such as the
uranium-conversion facility at Isfahan and the
uranium-enrichment facilities, which are currently suspended, at
Natanz.
To cut costs and increase monitoring capabilities further, the
agency is trying to make use of encoded long-distance
transmission of verification data. It is also important to make
wider use of environmental sampling techniques to detect
possible undeclared nuclear activities. Such techniques allow
inspectors to analyze the isotopic composition of uranium and
plutonium at enrichment and reprocessing facilities.[9]
One of the biggest concerns is that a state may divert
relatively small amounts of plutonium or enriched uranium from
facilities that handle bulk quantities of fissile material.[10]
Over time, a proliferator could amass enough material for
several bombs. To try to diminish this problem, the special
committee should investigate whether it is possible to make
improvements in fissile material accountancy and measurements to
reduce the amount of material unaccounted for, but this effort
will require close cooperation with facility operators.
Additionally, the agency needs to have a greater ability to
differentiate between member states in good standing and those
that may attempt to take advantage of or circumvent the
system.[11] Officials from Australias Safeguards Office recently
discussed a new approach to safeguards called information driven
safeguards approaches, the process of developing safeguards
after due consideration of the states specific factors. In this
new approach, aspects such as the technical capabilities of a
member state, potential political motivation to develop nuclear
weapons, and any specific indicators that a member state is
interested in developing nuclear weapons are all taken into
account. The committee should consider adopting this
approach.[12]
Greater Incentives and Disincentives
Greater incentives and disincentives can encourage member states
to follow the rules. Incentives may come in the form of greater
technical assistance in building reactors and a guarantee of
fuel and spent fuel disposal if states forgo the development of
facilities that could be of proliferation concern. Disincentives
might include a possible role for the special committee as a
monitoring and advisory group to the board on activities of
proliferation concern by member states. In this capacity,
committee members from rollback states, such as South Africa and
Sweden, could provide an interesting perspective to the
detection of questionable activities. In this role, the
committee would also assist the board in deciding whether a
state is in violation of its safeguards agreement and should be
referred to the Security Council.
In addition, the committee could usefully be given three other
tasks. One would be to think creatively about how to involve
Israel, India, and Pakistan effectively in the safeguards
system. In July, the United States and India agreed to expand
peaceful nuclear cooperation. Because U.S. peaceful nuclear
assistance is usually contingent on the recipient country having
comprehensive safeguards, the United States is confronting how
to provide such assistance to India. India has pledged to
separate its military and civilian nuclear facilities, but still
the mere existence of an Indian military nuclear program
prevents the implementation of truly comprehensive safeguards.
If this deal continues to move forward, the agency could help
sort out what safeguards might be appropriate for additional
facilities in order to make sure that the nonproliferation
benefits of the deal outweigh its costs. Likewise, more
safeguards and verification work could be done in all of these
countries, especially Pakistan, which served as the headquarters
of the Khan nuclear network.
Similar to these countries, North Korea is outside the bounds of
the NPT, from which Pyongyang walked away in 2003. During a
September round of six-party talks on its nuclear program,
Pyongyang declared its intention to return to the NPT to gain
access to peaceful nuclear technologies. Before North Korea can
rejoin the NPT, it must verifiably and irreversibly dismantle
all its nuclear weapons programs. The special committee should
contribute its expertise to help determine effective means for
verifying that North Korea has done so.
Another useful task would be further study and clarification of
the concept of integrated safeguards. Although integrated
safeguards are touted as more efficient and cost effective
because they reduce the number of inspections per year in
countries that have a history of responsible nonproliferation
behavior, they may also bring opportunities for countries to
restart dormant nuclear programs clandestinely or develop
parallel weapons programs without the agency noticing.
Conclusion
It is difficult to say if the safeguards committee will be
effective. Based on discussions with one senior diplomat, the
committee risks becoming a redundant group of insiders, not
willing or able to go beyond the political boundaries so often
hampering work. On the other hand, it might also usefully
identify gaps in the safeguards system and find ways to fill
them.
Having spent significant diplomatic energy to propose and launch
the committee, the United States should invest more effort in
working closely with other committee members to craft an
ambitious agenda. The United States should strive to ensure that
the past history of safeguards development does not become the
prologue for the future.
The evolution of the safeguards system has usually followed a
reactive course in which the IAEA and member states made
improvements after major shocks to the system or after countries
have acquired new nuclear technologies. By helping the agency
gain greater access, greater authorities, and greater
capabilities, the committee can help the agency forestall or
foresee future threats instead of falling behind.
Jack Boureston is managing director of FirstWatch International,
a private nuclear proliferation research group in Monterey,
California and Charles D. Ferguson is a science and technology
fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.
ENDNOTES
1. Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs Chinese Statement on Item
8: Creation of a Special Committee on Safeguards and
Verification, March 3, 2005.
2. Hooper, The IAEAs Additional Protocol, Disarmament Forum,
Vol. 3 (1999).
3. John Carlson et al., Back to Basics: Re-Thinking Safeguards
Principles, Annual Meeting of the Institute of Nuclear Material
Management (INMM), July 13-17, 2003.
4. Piet de Klerk, The Evolution of IAEA Safeguards, March 2001.
5. Statement by the United States of America, on Agenda Item 8:
Creation of a Special Committee on Safeguard and Verification,
March 3, 2005.
6. IAEA, Transcript of the Director Generals Press Statement,
June 17, 2005.
7. Paul Kerr, “IAEA Board Closes Safeguards
Loophole,”Arms Control Today, November 2005.
8. John Carlson and Russell Leslie, Special Inspections
Revisited, Paper presented at the INMM 2005 symposium, Phoenix,
July 2005.
9. Pierre Goldschmidt, Present Status and Future of
International Safeguards, Paper presented at JNC International
Forum for Peaceful Utilization of Nuclear Energy, February 2003.
10. Paul Leventhal, Safeguards Shortcomings: A Critique,
September 12, 1994 (Nuclear Control Institute report); Henry
Sokolski, “After Iran: Back to the Basics on
‘Peaceful’ Nuclear Energy,”Arms Control Today,
April 2005.
11. Kaoru Naito, Safeguards Challenges: A Japanese View, Paper
presented at INMM Annual Meeting, July 13-17, 2003.
12. John Carlson, email communications with author, September
2005.
The Arms Control Association is a non-profit, membership-based
organization. If you find our resources useful, please consider
joining or making a contribution. Arms Control Today encourages
reprint of its articles with permission of the Editor.
© 2005 Arms Control Association, 1150 Connecticut Avenue, NW,
Suite 620 Washington, DC 20036 Tel: (202) 463-8270 | Fax: (202)
463-8273
*****************************************************************
20 [NYTr] US, EU Conspire Against Non-Proliferation Treaty
Date: Mon, 5 Dec 2005 19:18:46 -0600 (CST)
X-Fingerprint: owner-imap@chumbly.math.missouri.edu-127.127
Via NY Transfer News Collective * All the News that Doesn't Fit
Workers World - Dec 8, 2005 issue
http://www.workers.org/2005/world/iran-1208/
US, EU conspire against Non-Proliferation Treaty
Part one
By Ardeshir Ommani
Vice President Dick Cheney--whose popularity plunged in mid-November
to 27 percent, even lower than his boss, President George W. Bush, who
has managed to please only 34 percent of the U.S. public--once said
that the country that controls Middle East oil can exercise a
"stranglehold" over the global economy. Did Cheney let the cat out of
the bag?
Far back in 1997, in a Foreign Affairs article titled "A Geo-strategy
for Eurasia," Zbigniew Brzezinski, the former National Security
Advisor to President Jimmy Carter, wrote: "A power that dominated
Eurasia would exercise decisive influence over two of the world's most
economically productive regions, Western Europe and East Asia. A
glance at the map also suggests that a country dominant in Eurasia
would almost automatically control the Middle East and Africa."
On the basis of what has transpired since these opinions reached
print, one can conclude that the United States has been in the deadly
business of dominating the world--and at this juncture targeting Iraq,
Iran and Syria, three countries that have dared to differ with
Washington's whims and wants.
U.S. belligerence against other nations can take many forms. These
include economic and trade sanctions, diplomatic containment,
orchestrating an environment of isolation, spreading fabricated
propaganda and outright lies, intruding into air space, carrying out
acts of sabotage, buying off individuals to commit acts of treason,
bribing other governments to take Washington's side, or carrying out
naked acts of aggression and war to subvert or overthrow a government.
In the language of the U.S. government, all these acts are committed
under the cover of spreading "American democracy." And now an old,
all-too-familiar argument is being resurrected to bring countries into
line with U.S. plans to dominate the Middle East: that Iran cannot be
"trusted" and must be "thwarted" in its plans to develop nuclear
energy.
To deny Iran or any other country from "researching, developing and
producing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes" is a violation of the
right of not only Iran, but other nations, as is embodied in the
fourth paragraph of the Nuclear Non-Prolif eration Treaty. The NPT is
administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency, which is
currently headed by Mohammed ElBaradei.
Officials of the IAEA, a United Nations monitoring agency, have
visited the Iranian nuclear facilities many times in the last
two-and-a-half years. They have held meetings with the Iranian
authorities in charge of the nuclear energy programs. Throughout this
long period the United States has adamantly claimed, without a shred
of proof, that Iran plans to produce nuclear bombs--and therefore must
be denied the right to produce enriched uranium, a process for
producing nuclear fuel used in nuclear reactors.
All along, Washington has brought pressure on the agency and its
governing board to pass a resolution stating that Iran is in violation
of the NPT--another unsubstantiated charge--and must be referred to
the UN Security Council for possible economic sanctions.
And what has been Iran's response? In order to build confidence, the
Iranian government has not only allowed regular inspection by the
IAEA. It has accepted an additional protocol that permits the nuclear
agency to inspect any nuclear site without prior warning.
It is interesting to note that Israel is not a party to the NPT
agreement, has more than 250 nuclear bombs in its "secret" arsenal and
is building a huge apartheid wall on Palestinian land, against
international law--but has never been referred anywhere for any
reason.
Also, "the United States has not yet adop ted the necessary
implementing legislation for the additional protocol to become a law,"
according to the Arms Con trol Association's fact sheet of January
2005.
In contrast, Iran, in addition to cooperating with ongoing inspections
by the IAEA, held joint meetings with the three major Western European
powers. And, for the purpose of "confidence building," Iran
"voluntarily" suspended its nuclear-enrichment operations for almost a
year.
After the three European and the Iranian representatives had met for a
year, the Europeans insisted that Iran extend the period it would
suspend uranium enrichment--but did not agree on a resolution to
assure Iran's right to produce its own fuel for nuclear reactors. On
the contrary, this period of suspension sets a pre ce dent. So if Iran
decides to resume the enrichment process, in the eyes of the so-called
international community this resump tion would be considered a
violation.
In other words, the apparent European enthusiasm to meet with the
Iranian government really serves the U.S. policy of containment and
imposition of sanctions. As in Iraq, having Europeans hold the meeting
usurps the UN's authority and paves the way for a genocidal crime
against the people of Iran.
Learning from this experience, the Iranian government under the new
president, Ahmadinejad, decided to withdraw from the endless meetings
and bickering. Iran began not the process of uranium enrichment, but
the earlier stage of turning yellow cake (uranium raw material) into a
gaseous state called tetrafluoride.
A day did not pass without the major European countries--Britain,
France and Germany, with the United States lurking behind the
scenes--declaring Iran in utter violation of the NPF and pressing the
IAEA to pass a resolution referring Iran to the UN Security Council
for probable economic and trade sanctions. At this stage the European
powers had completely capitulated to Wash ington's foreign policy
designs against not only Iran but all the countries in the Middle East
and Central Asia, particularly Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and Palestine.
It did not take much persuasion on the part of the United States to
make the Euro pean powers and Britain's Labor government show their
true imperialist colors.
In the history of the IAEA, no resolution had passed without a total
consensus on the part of its board, composed of 35 members. In this
case, even though the resolution lacked muscle and teeth, the United
States and the European imperialist powers could not muster a
consensus. Without a deadline for referral, the IAEA resolution passed
with 26 for, eight abstentions including China and Russia, and one
against. The no vote came from Venezuela.
The Iranian response was that should the resolution be referred to the
UN Security Council, Iran may decide to withdraw from the IAEA and end
its membership in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
It was at this point that George W. Bush and British Prime Minister
Tony Blair declared that no measure with regard to Iran is off the
table. In other words, they were implying a threat of force and war
against Iran.
[Ardeshir Ommani is co-founder of the recently formed American-Iranian
Friendship Committee.]
Next: Bush and Blair's threats, the Iranian Oil Bourse and dollar
supremacy v. euro
This article is copyright under a Creative Commons License.
Workers World, 55 W. 17 St., NY, NY 10011
Email: ww@workers.org
Subscribe wwnews-subscribe@workersworld.net
*
================================================================
.NY Transfer News Collective * A Service of Blythe Systems
. Since 1985 - Information for the Rest of Us .
.339 Lafayette St., New York, NY 10012 http://www.blythe.org
.List Archives: https://olm.blythe-systems.com/pipermail/nytr/
.Subscribe: https://olm.blythe-systems.com/mailman/listinfo/nytr
================================================================
*****************************************************************
21 RIA Novosti: Adamov's lawyer expects Swiss court ruling before Christmas
05/ 12/ 2005
GENEVA, December 5 (RIA Novosti) - The Swiss Federal Court in
Lausanne could pass the ruling on the case of former Russian
Nuclear Power Minister Yevgeny Adamov before Christmas, Adamov's
lawyer said Monday.
"We have not received a ruling from the federal court and we do
not even know about possible dates," Stefan Wehrenberg said. "I
am still hoping to get the ruling before Christmas."
Earlier, spokesperson for the Swiss Federal Court Antoinette
Schneider said the court had not decided on Adamov's case and
declined to indicate any possible dates.
Adamov, who served as Russia's nuclear power minister in
1998-2001, was arrested in Bern May 2 at the request of U.S.
authorities, who are accusing him of misappropriating the $9
million granted to Russia for improving the safety of its
nuclear facilities.
The Russian Prosecutor General's Office also launched
proceedings against Adamov, charging him with embezzlement and
the abuse of office.
Both countries petitioned for Adamov's extradition. Although the
U.S. requested his arrest May 2, Swiss authorities did not
receive the extradition request until June 24. Moscow's request
for extradition was received May 17.
On October 3, the Swiss Federal Justice Department announced its
decision to extradite the former Russian minister to the U.S.
Adamov's defense team appealed the decision at the Lousanne
court in November.
Until the federal court, whose rulings are final, rules on the
appeal, Adamov will remain in custody in Bern. The court is not
bound by a deadline.
© 2005 "RIA Novosti"
*****************************************************************
22 BBC: MSP fined after Trident protest
Last Updated: Monday, 5 December 2005
[Rosie Kane]
MSP Rosie Kane was among those fined for causing an obstruction
Socialist MSP Rosie Kane was among a group of 10 anti-nuclear
demonstrators fined for blocking part of Edinburgh's Royal Mile
in a 15-hour protest.
The demonstrators used a 25ft mock submarine to make their point
outside the Scottish Parliament on 10 March.
After a three-day trial at Edinburgh Sheriff Court, they were
found guilty of obstructing traffic and the police.
The individuals, representing Trident Ploughshares Movement, were
each fined Ł300 by the court on Monday.
At the start of the court hearing, the Crown withdrew an
allegation that the demonstration had placed road users in
danger.
'Democratic deficit'
Fiscal Malcolm Stewart said the demonstrators claimed they had
tried all legal, democratic moves, but said they claimed there
was a "democratic deficit" in Scotland and that they could do
nothing else but stage the protest.
Mr Stewart said that when asked to move the submarine in the
evening and warned that they would be charged, the protesters
refused to help and linked arms inside the submarine, which had
to be cut apart by police.
The demonstrators all represented themselves and said they had a
legal right under international law to protest and had a
reasonable excuse.
They claimed the event had been peaceful, friendly and
good-natured.
Protesters' reasons
Ms Kane said no-one knew when, where or how Trident missiles
might be used.
"We have a duty to let the rest of the world be aware of what we
are aware and so they can also make representations to their
elected representatives," she said.
Sheriff Noel McPartlin said he took into account the protesters'
reasons for acting as they did and conducting themselves in a
civilised manner.
He allowed them all three months to pay, although some of them
indicated they would not pay the fines.
*****************************************************************
23 [epa-impact] Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc.; Millstone Power
Date: Mon, 5 Dec 2005 10:48:46 -0500 (EST)
X-Fingerprint: bounce-431732-485116@lists.epa.gov-127.127
http://epa.gov/EPA-IMPACT/2005/December/Day-05/
=======================================================================
[Federal Register: December 5, 2005 (Volume 70, Number 232)]
[Notices]
[Page 72472-72473]
>From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr05de05-91]
=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket Nos. 50-336 and 50-423]
Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc.; Millstone Power Station,
Units 2 and 3; Notice of Issuance of Renewed Facility; Operating
License Nos. Dpr-65 And Npf-49; for an Additional 20-Year Period
Notice is hereby given that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC or the Commission) has issued Renewed Facility Operating License
Nos. DPR-65 and NPF-49 to Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc.
(licensee), the operator of Millstone Power Station (MPS), Units 2 and
3. Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-65 authorizes operation
of MPS Unit 2 by the licensee at reactor core power levels not in
excess of 2700 megawatts thermal, in accordance with the provisions of
the MPS renewed license and its Technical Specifications. Renewed
Facility Operating License No. NPF-49 authorizes operation of MPS Unit
3 by the licensee at reactor core power levels not in excess of 3411
megawatts thermal, in accordance with the provisions of the MPS renewed
license and its Technical Specifications.
MPS Units 2 and 3 are pressurized water reactors located in
Waterford, Connecticut. The licensee's applications for the renewed
licenses complied with the standards and requirements of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's
regulations. As required by the Act and the Commission's regulations in
10 CFR Chapter 1, the Commission has made appropriate findings, which
are set forth in each license. Prior public notice of the action of
issuing the proposed renewed licenses and of an opportunity for a
hearing on the proposed issuance of the renewed licenses was published
in the Federal Register on March 12, 2004 (69 FR 11897).
For further details about this action, see: (1) Dominion Nuclear
Connecticut's license renewal applications for MPS Units 2 and 3, dated
January 20, 2004, as supplemented by letters dated through July 21,
2005; (2) the Commission's safety evaluation report dated October 2005
(NUREG-1838); and (3) the Commission's final environmental impact
statements (NUREG-1437, Supplement 22, for the Millstone Power Station,
Units 2 and 3, dated July 2005). These documents are available at the
NRC's Public Document Room, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville
Pike, Rockville, MD 20852, and can be viewed from the NRC Public
[[Page 72473]]
Electronic Reading Room at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html.
Copies of Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-65 and NPF-49
may be obtained by writing to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC, 20555-0001, Attention: Director, Division of License
Renewal. Copies of the MPS Units 2 and 3, Safety Evaluation Report
(NUREG-1838) and the Final Environmental Impact Statements (NUREG-1437,
Supplement 22) may be purchased from the National Technical Information
Service, U.S. Department of Commerce, Springfield, VA 22161 (http://
www.ntis.gov), 703-605-6000, or Attention: Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, P.O. Box 371954, Pittsburgh,
PA 15250-7954 (http://www.gpoaccess.gov), 202-512-1800. All orders
should clearly identify the NRC publication number and the requestor's
Government Printing Office deposit account number or VISA or MasterCard
number and expiration date.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 28th day of November 2005.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Frank P. Gillespie,
Director, Division of License Renewal, Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation.
[FR Doc. E5-6833 Filed 12-2-05; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
------------------------------------------
http://www.epa.gov/fedrgstr/EPA-IMPACT/index.html
Comments: http://www.epa.gov/fedrgstr/comments.htm
Search: http://epa.gov/fedreg/search.htm
EPA's Federal Register: http://epa.gov/fedreg/
------------------------------------------
You are currently subscribed to epa-impact as: NEWS@energy-net.org
To unsubscribe, send a blank email to leave-epa-impact-485116N@lists.epa.gov
OR:
Use the listserver's web interface at https://lists.epa.gov/read/all_forums/ to manage your subscription.
For problems with this list, contact epa-impact-Owner@lists.epa.gov
------------------------------------------
*****************************************************************
24 [NukeNet] Japanese nuclear energy policy - English version
Date: Mon, 05 Dec 2005 14:56:42 -0800
NukeNet Anti-Nuclear Network (nukenet@energyjustice.net)
(Resending a message that didn't get through to this list.)
The Atomic Energy Commission of Japan has produced an English version
of its new nuclear energy policy entitled 'Framework for Nuclear Energy
Policy'. It is available on the web site below.
http://aec.jst.go.jp/jicst/NC/eng/index.htm
Philip White
Citizens' Nuclear Information Center
3F Kotobuki Bdg, 1-58-15, Higashi-Nakano, Nakano-ku, Tokyo 164-0003
Phone: 81-3-5330-9520
Fax: 81-3-5330-9530
http://cnic.jp/english/
cnic@nifty.com
_______________________________________________________________________
Subscribe/Unsubscribe Here: http://www.energyjustice.net/nukenet/
Change your settings or access the archives at:
http://energyjustice.net/mailman/listinfo/nukenet_energyjustice.net
*****************************************************************
25 Guardian Unlimited: Iran plans new nuclear reactor
David Fickling and agencies
Monday December 5, 2005
Iran is to build a second nuclear reactor to match the plant
currently under construction in the coastal city of Bushehr,
state television reported today.
The decision came after a meeting of the country's cabinet and
president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad last night.
The reactor has been on the drawing board since the 1970s and
comes as part of government plans to build up to 20 nuclear
plants with Russian help.
But concerns over Iran's intentions on nuclear weapons mean that
the announcement will inevitably be viewed as a provocation.
The US argues that Iran wants to develop its own nuclear weapons,
although Tehran says it only intends to use the plants for
electricity generation.
British diplomats last month told the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) that documents held by Iran suggest the
government intends to manufacture nuclear warheads.
Talks with the European Union on the status of Iran's nuclear
programme broke down in August after Tehran resumed uranium
conversion, a first step towards producing reactor-grade fuel.
The IAEA has asked Iran to halt its uranium enrichment
programme, which can turn converted uranium into either
reactor-grade or weapons-grade material.
But despite Tehran putting the programme on hold, Iran's
powerful Guardian Council ruled on Saturday that enrichment
should go ahead regardless of international pressure.
In a sign of the escalating tension over the issue, the former
Israeli prime minister Binyamin Netanyahu told Israel's Maariv
newspaper that he would consider a pre-emptive strike against
Iranian nuclear facilities if elected leader.
Mr Netanyahu, who is campaigning for leadership of the rightwing
Likud party after founder member Ariel Sharon walked out last
month, promised to echo the actions of a former prime minister,
Menachem Begin, who bombed an Iraqi nuclear facility in 1981.
"If [a pre-emptive strike] is not done by the present government
I intend to lead the next government and to stop this threat,"
he said. "I will take every step required to avoid a situation
in which Iran can threaten us with nuclear weapons."
Iran's first nuclear reactor at Bushehr is scheduled to start
producing power next year. Two reactors at the site began
construction with the help of German engineering giant Siemens
in the 1970s, but were never finished and were further damaged
during the Iran-Iraq war.
The IAEA has warned Tehran that it would refer the nuclear
programme to the UN security council, paving the way for
sanctions against the country. But Saturday's Guardian Council
ruling promised to block international inspections in the event
of a security council referral.
Russia's foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, today urged Iran to
resume cooperation with the IAEA, in a statement on the
ministry's website.
"A lot will depend on Tehran's readiness to respond to
international concerns and continue cooperation with the
agency," he wrote.
Russia is a key supporter of Iran's nuclear intentions, and Mr
Lavrov's warning shot gives hope of a backdown from the current
state of brinksmanship over Iran's nuclear programme.
[UP]
Guardian Unlimited © Guardian Newspapers Limited 2005
*****************************************************************
26 hvg.hu: Atom power
UtolsĂł mĂłdosĂtás: 2005. december 05. 10:55
Istv n Zvolenszky
2005. december 05. 10:52
Utols˘ m˘dosˇt s: 2005. december 05. 10:55
For months, Paks nuclear power station has been placing full-page
adverts in local and national papers testifying to the
generator's safety, to its bright future prospects, to its
promise of carbon-free energy, and even about the cheapness of
their power.
The head of the International Atomic Energy Authority was in
Budapest recently at a conference and was received by our 'green'
president. This signals that our energy chiefs have almost
achieved their dream of building two new 1000MW generators at the
power station. Billions of forints have been spent on this
project over many years. The main focus so far has been on
securing an extension of the station's working life. This is
unavoidable, just to satisfy our energy needs. For the next step,
building two new reactors, they will need more than HUF1000bn in
state subsidies.
The proponents of nuclear energy dwell upon the fact that nuclear
generation produces no greenhouse gasses. But the tens of
thousands of tons of iron used to build a nuclear power station,
the mining of uranium and waste treatment are all based on
traditional power sources. It thus increases carbon dioxide
emissions. So the indirect carbon dioxide emissions from a
nuclear power station is around a fifth of a traditional power
station's. This could be attractive - except the cooling water
running out of the power station just pumps 2,500MW of heat into
the Danube. That could be used to heat 250,000 homes.
In Hungary, renewable energy would almost certainly mean biomass
utilisation. Biomass just recycles carbon, it does not create it.
Our overproduction of corn and wheat alone could replace 3bn
cubic metres of natural gas each year - about as much gas as we
import.
But the nuclear lobby thinks that biomass could only produce a
tenth of this energy. Several coal-fired stations have switched
to burning wood, even those these could burn corn for around 30
per cent less money, without pushing up wood prices. We lead the
EU in unused biomass surpluses, but we use less of it than anyone
else. With just half of the money we plan to spend on new
reactors, we could provide 30 per cent of the country's energy
needs. We could create 100,000 jobs at the same time.
Istv n Zvolenszky is a retired engineer.
*****************************************************************
27 RIA Novosti: Russia could build another nuclear power plant in Iran
05/ 12/ 2005
MOSCOW, December 5 (RIA Novosti) - Russia can build another
nuclear power plant in Iran, a senior official from the company
that builds Russian-designed nuclear plants abroad said Monday.
"If Iran holds a tender to build a nuclear plant,
Atomstroieksport will bid for it, because we have the
opportunity for the successful construction of another nuclear
power plant in Iran," Vladimir Pavlov said.
He said Russia's recent successful projects to build nuclear
power plants overseas, including in China, attested to Russia's
ability to carry out another project in Iran.
Earlier reports said an Iranian government session chaired by
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad decided to build another nuclear
power plant in its southwestern province of Huzestan.
In early 2005, the Iranian parliament ratified a bill on the
construction of nuclear power plants in the country in the next
10 years, targeting 20,000 Megawatts to satisfy Iran's
electricity demand.
Russia is currently finishing the construction of the first unit
of a nuclear power plant in the Persian Gulf city of Bushehr to
become operational in 2006.
© 2005 "RIA Novosti"
*****************************************************************
28 RIA Novosti: Presidential envoy appointed nuclear watchdog head
05/ 12/ 2005
MOSCOW, December 5 (RIA Novosti) - Konstantin Pulikovsky, 57,
former presidential envoy to Russia's Far Eastern Federal
District, has been appointed head of the Federal Agency for
Environmental, Technological and Atomic Oversight.
Pulikovsky was introduced to his staff Monday, the agency said.
Kamil Iskhakov, mayor of the Russian Republic of Tatarstan's
capital of Kazan, replaced Pulikovsky. The agency was
temporarily headed by deputy head Andrei Malyshev since July 2,
2004.
Pulikovsky was deputy commander of the North Caucasus military
district and was in command of the Northwest military group in
the first 1994-1996 military campaign in Chechnya. From July to
August 1996, Pulikovsky was commander of the Unified Federal
Group of Federal Forces in Chechnya.
His political career started in Krasnodar, southern Russia, in
1998. Pulikovsky was presidential envoy to the Far East since
May 2000 until his recent appointment.
© 2005 "RIA Novosti"
*****************************************************************
29 BBC: Plea to make Wales nuclear-free
Last Updated: Monday, 5 December 2005
[A Greenpeace protester last week]
Greenpeace members protested to the Prime Minister
Welsh politicians are being urged by environmental campaigners to
say "no" to nuclear power.
Friends of the Earth Cymru has written to all Welsh Assembly
Members saying it should be rejected as an energy option because
it is unsafe and uneconomic.
The Assembly Government said it did not see a commercial need for
nuclear power, but welcomed "an open debate.
Prime Minister Tony Blair has launched an energy review which
could pave the way for new nuclear plants.
The Scottish Executive has already made it clear that it would
not accept new stations until the issue of waste disposal was
solved.
Friends of the Earth Cymru (FoEC) wants a similar declaration
from the Welsh Assembly Government.
The WAG has made it clear that it supports the use of renewable
energy sources, particularly wind power.
The aim is to increase the amount of energy from renewable
sources by 10% over the next five years.
A WAG spokeswoman said it had recently published details of how
it would continue to meet the energy needs of Wales "whilst
minimising the impact on the environment".
[Electricity pylon]
Alternatives to traditional energy generation must be found
She added: "We believe we have identified the right mix of energy
sources and with substantial new energy investments coming on
stream over the next three to five years we do not see a
commercial need for new nuclear energy installations - quite
apart from the perennial issues associated with nuclear power
i.e. costs, waste and security.
"However we welcome an open debate in this important area."
Gordon James of FoEC said: "Nuclear power has had 50 years to
prove itself, but has failed to deliver economic, safe or clean
energy and has left a legacy of hazardous waste and financial
costs for future generations.
"It is once again being promoted as a quick-fix solution to an
energy challenge, but in reality amounts to no more than an
expensive fig leaf to cover the embarrassment of failed attempts
to make adequate reductions in carbon dioxide emissions."
FoEC argues that, within Wales, nuclear power could not fill the
gap left by the closure of Wylfa nuclear power station in five
years time.
It claims it would, take at least 10 years to build a new nuclear
power station and that the gap could be filled by renewable
energy sources.
Alternatives include using onshore and offshore windfarms, wave
power and solar power.
The environmental organisation said many other options were also
available for filling this gap cost-effectively while reducing
emissions of carbon dioxide.
These include new gas-fired power stations and combined heat and
power (CHP) systems, which use the heat normally wasted in
electricity generation.
Fitting the coal-fired power stations at Aberthaw and Uskmouth
with modern technology to reduce carbon dioxide emissions was
also an option, it said.
*****************************************************************
30 BBC: Iran to build new nuclear plant
Last Updated: Monday, 5 December 2005
[A general view of Iran's first nuclear reactor, being built in Bushehr]
Iran's first reactor at Bushehr is due to start producing
electricity soon
Iran's government has approved plans to build a second nuclear
power plant, Iranian state media has reported.
This comes amid growing Western concern over Tehran's nuclear
ambitions, with talks between Iran and EU negotiators due to
restart within days.
Few details were given about the proposed plant, to be built in
the south-western Khuzestan province.
The US and EU suspect Iran of pursuing a nuclear weapons
programme but Tehran says its intentions are peaceful.
IRAN'S NUCLEAR STANDOFF
September 2002: Wor begins on Iran's first nuclear reactor at
Bushehr December
2002: Satellite photographs reveal nuclear sites at Arak and
Natanz. Iran agrees to an IAEA inspection
September 2003: IAEA gives Iran weeks to prove it is not pursuing
atomic weapons
November 2003: Iran suspends uranium enrichment and allows
tougher inspections; IAEA says no proof of any weapons programme
June 2004: IAEA rebukes Iran for not fully co-operating with
nuclear inquiry
November 2004: Iran suspends uranium enrichment as part of deal
with EU
August 2005: Iran rejects EU proposals and resumes work at
Isfahan nuclear plant
The International Atomic Energy Agency and western countries have
repeatedly expressed concern over a lack of transparency in
Iran's nuclear activities.
Iran has previously said it wants to build 20 nuclear power
stations in as many years to meet its future energy needs.
BBC Teheran correspondent Frances Harrison says the announcement
of the new plans could be aimed at deflecting criticism that Iran
does not have any operational nuclear power stations to justify
its production of enriched uranium for nuclear fuel.
Iran's first nuclear power plant at Bushehr is due to start
generating electricity next year, years behind schedule.
*****************************************************************
31 Herald: Ministers stand by powers on nuclear stations
Web Issue 2413 December 05 2005
TOM GORDON, Scottish Political Correspondent
MINISTERS asserted yesterday that they could impose a blanket
ban on new nuclear power stations.
Lord Sewel, one of the architects of devolution, told a Sunday
newspaper that Scottish ministers simply did not have the powers
to block nuclear plants on principle.
He accused ministers of suffering a convenient "loss of
collective memory" over the limitations of the Scotland Act.
He said the Scottish Executive could not, as it has previously
argued, use its planning powers to prevent nuclear plants as a
matter of policy.
"If there were legitimate planning grounds they could object to
a particular site, they could say, 'The place you've chosen is
not appropriate.' But they could not use the planning system to
thwart the entire policy," he said.
The executive was unimpressed. "Lord Sewel has got it wrong," a
spokesman said.
He said Scottish ministers had to give explicit permission for
the construction of any nuclear plant above 50 megawatts under
the amended 1989 Electricity Act. In addition, ministers had the
power to "call in" large planning applications for further
scrutiny and a final decision.
With Tony Blair apparently keen to replace the UK's ageing
nuclear stations to avoid over-reliance on imported gas, nuclear
power is likely to be a key issue at the 2007 Holyrood elections.
Jack McConnell, first minister, has said no plants will be
built until the issue of how to deal with nuclear waste is
resolved.
Labour's Liberal Democrat allies in the executive take a
tougher stance, arguing that burying it is not good enough.
Copyright © Newsquest (Herald & Times) Limited. All Rights
*****************************************************************
32 News-Record.com: N.C. could be key in nuclear comeback
Greensboro, North Carolina: News:
Monday, December 5, 2005
By Elyse Ashburn Staff Writer GREENSBORO
The last U.S. nuclear reactor was approved when the Berlin Wall
was firmly in place, abortion had just been legalized in the
United States and women were still burning their bras.
But the power source that seems more "Cold War" than "War on
Terror" is poised for a comeback -- and North Carolina, possibly
even the Piedmont Triad, is at the forefront of the movement.
In the past 12 months, six utilities have told the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission that they might build nuclear power plants.
And two, Duke Power and Progress Energy, have said that they're
looking at sites in North Carolina. Progress doesn't operate in
the Piedmont Triad.
Duke Power does, and it owns at least two properties -- in
Davidson and Davie counties -- that fit the basic criteria the
company has set for housing nuclear reactors. The two sites,
which adjoin each other, are about 40 miles southwest of
Greensboro.
Duke says it is considering about a dozen sites across its
coverage area in North and South Carolina for a nuclear plant.
The company isn't divulging which sites are being considered,
only that it will announce its plans by Jan. 1.
And the Charlotte-based company is considering options other
than building nuclear plants It could expand its coal-fired
plants or buy electricity from the wholesale market.
But coal-fired plants are a tricky option, especially in North
Carolina, because of new limits on smog-forming emissions like
those produced by burning coal.
Duke already has begun preparing a construction and operating
license for a nuclear plant, and many energy experts say it's
just a matter of time before one of the major U.S. utilities
commits to new nuclear power.
"My belief -- and the belief of a lot of people in the industry
-- is that somebody is going to take that next step and
commission a new reactor," Mitchell Singer, a spokesman for the
Nuclear Energy Institute in Washington, said. "It's more than
just a gut feeling. There's definitely a consensus."
Nuclear industry officials say that the new reactors will be
safer than the ones in operation today, and they point out that
no one in the United States has died after any nuclear-reactor
incident.
The United States did have a near-miss in 2002, when workers at
the Davis-Besse nuclear plant outside Toledo, Ohio, discovered a
football-sized hole in the reactor vessel. The problem had been
missed by Nuclear Regulatory Commission inspectors.
"Depending on who you ask, we were three months to a year and a
half away from a Three Mile Island type event, at the least,"
said Edwin Lyman, a nuclear specialist and senior staff
scientist for the Union of Concerned Scientists. The Three Mile
Island plant in Pennsylvania suffered a core meltdown in 1979.
And while new reactors may be safer, experts widely agree that
the first companies to build those new reactors would be taking
on a greater risk than those that follow.
"If you're talking about a first-of-a-kind anything, even a car,
these are very complex systems, and there are going to be things
you didn't understand," Lyman said. "You just hope they don't
rise to the level of a real problem."
Still, utilities are poised to act. That consensus has grown
over the past year as utilities searched for new ways to meet
ballooning power demand.
Natural-gas power plants were the darlings of the 1990s, but as
natural gas prices remain high, they've lost their luster. Not
to mention, natural-gas plants can't provide the kind of
so-called "baseload power" needed to meet projected demand.
The U.S. population has grown by almost 20 percent in the past
15 years. Our houses are bigger -- averaging more than 2,300
square feet -- and fewer people are living in each one. We have
more gadgets, more appliances and more big-screen televisions.
And those trends are expected to continue -- which add up to a
big demand for electricity. In fact, the U.S. Department of
Energy expects electricity sales to increase by about 50 percent
between now and 2025.
That increase could be even more dramatic in high-growth states
such as North Carolina. Duke Power and Progress Energy, formerly
known as Carolina Power &Light, each add between 30,000 and
40,000 new customers each year in the Carolinas.
In the face of increasingly stringent regulations on plant
emissions, like the N.C. Clean Smokestacks Act, utilities are
looking to nuclear power to meet demand.
Nuclear plants, unlike coal-fired plants, do not produce
greenhouse gases, which cause smog and contribute to global
warming.
"Nuclear has no impact other than waste," said Paul Turinsky,
head of the nuclear engineering department at N.C. State.
But the issue of what to do with spent fuel, or nuclear waste as
it's commonly called, is unresolved. The government has planned
for it to be stored in Yucca Mountain in Nevada, but the project
has been repeatedly delayed, and most nuclear plants are storing
spent fuel on-site.
Many think tanks, advocacy groups, and a growing number of
businesses think conservation, not new nukes, should be the wave
of the future. Wal-Mart, for instance, announced an initiative
last month to dramatically decrease its energy consumption over
the next 20 years.
"It's really important over the next few months that we have
some public debate on these issues," said Jim Warren, executive
director of advocacy group N.C. Waste Awareness and Reduction
Network.
In many ways, the Triad is already at the center of that
fledgling debate.
One statewide environmental group's annual meeting, held in
Mocksville last month, focused almost entirely on the issue of a
nuclear revival in North Carolina.
Mocksville is near the two Duke properties in the Piedmont Triad
-- about 1,600 acres in Davidson County and 1,700 acres in Davie
County, both on the Yadkin River. Both sites were purchased in
the 1970s as potential sites for power plants.
In the late 1970s, the company considered building three nuclear
reactors on the Davie County site, and did initial environmental
studies, before scrapping its plans in the early 1980s.
Duke officials say they abandoned plans for the plant because
electricity demand fell short of their estimates, but opposition
groups say public outcry played a role.
As speculation mounts that the Davie site is being considered
again, groups like Clean Water for North Carolina and Citizens
Against Perkins (the Davie property is commonly referred to as
the Perkins site) are publicly opposing a nuclear plant.
Clean Water members don't think the Yadkin River has enough
water to safely meet the cooling needs of a nuclear plant, and
its members also are concerned about the effect of low-level
radiological releases -- not to mention the potential for a
catastrophic event.
The group is pushing for alternatives like conservation and
renewable energy. "Conservation is the only truly clean way to
improve energy effectively," said Hope Taylor Guevara, executive
director of Clean Water.
Contact Elyse Ashburn at 373-7090 or eashburn@news-record.com
*****************************************************************
33 TheStar.com: Premier denies contact with nuclear lobbyist
Mon. Dec. 5, 2005. | Updated at 06:21 PM
STEVE ERWIN CANADIAN PRESS
A former top adviser to Ontario Premier Dalton McGuinty is
lobbying the province on behalf of a nuclear reactor developer
just as the government considers expanding its nuclear power
base.
McGuinty denied Monday that David MacNaughton, a senior Liberal
adviser during his 2003 election campaign and later his
principal secretary, has contacted the premier's office
regarding Atomic Energy of Canada, a developer of nuclear units.
AECL is one of MacNaughton's top clients at Strategy Corp., a
Toronto-based government relations firm he now chairs.
Sources have told The Canadian Press that the province is
considering plans to build two of AECL's Candu reactor units at
the Darlington nuclear power station east of Toronto. The
Strategy Corp. website says MacNaughton is lobbying the
provincial energy and finance ministries in regards to AECL.
MacNaughton's new role allows McGuinty a chance to reward a
former political ally with a multibillion-dollar contract for
the lobbyist's top client, New Democrat Leader Howard Hampton
charged Monday.
"The optics of this stink," Hampton told reporters Monday,
noting that top officials from the finance and energy ministries
used to report to MacNaughton when he was the "No. 2 person" in
McGuinty's office.
Hampton, long-opposed to expanding Ontario's nuclear power
supply, said MacNaughton is now in a position "to make a lot of
money" at the expense of hydro ratepayers.
"For someone looking at this from the outside, this looks
exactly like the kind of thing that goes on with your federal
cousins in Ottawa looking after political cronies instead of
looking after the public interest," Hampton shouted to McGuinty
inside the legislature in reference to the recent federal
Liberal sponsorship scandal.
McGuinty said he's had no contact with MacNaughton, who as a
former member of the premier's staff is prohibited from lobbying
and interacting with staff from that office.
"He is abiding by the rules and regulations that govern his
activities as a lobbyist connected with AECL," McGuinty said.
Speaking on MacNaughton's behalf, John Matheson, Strategy
Corp.'s vice-president of general counsel, said the former
political adviser ``is in full compliance with his obligations
under post-employment guidelines."
Matheson added that AECL was a Strategy Corp. client before
MacNaughton began working with the lobby firm in July.
MacNaughton took on AECL as a client in early September.
Energy Minister Donna Cansfield said she also has not met with
MacNaughton in regards to nuclear power.
McGuinty said it's "no secret" that AECL is lobbying the
province for nuclear expansion. And McGuinty has said he'll
consider building new nuclear reactors should that be
recommended in a report due Friday by the Ontario Power
Authority.
However, Hampton noted that another Strategy Corp. official
with Liberal ties, Hillary Dawson, is lobbying the premier's
office on AECL's behalf, according to the Office of the
Integrity Commissioner.
Dawson served for six years in senior roles with the Ontario
Liberal Party, including current cabinet ministers David Caplan
and Gerard Kennedy.
Hampton said it's naive to think MacNaughton and Dawson don't
communicate in regards to their talks with the government
regarding AECL.
Legal Notice: Copyright Toronto Star Newspapers Limited. All
*****************************************************************
34 NRC: In the Matter of Exelon Generation Company, LLC, LaSalle County
EA-04-170]
FR Doc E5-6827
[Federal Register: December 5, 2005 (Volume 70, Number 232)]
[Notices] [Page 72473-72475] From the Federal Register Online via
GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr05de05-92]
Station, 2601 North 21st Road, Marseilles, IL 61341-9757;
Confirmatory Order Modifying License (Effective Immediately) I
Exelon Generation Company, LLC (Exelon or licensee) is the holder
of Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-11 and NPF-18 issued by
the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or Commission)
pursuant to 10 CFR part 50 on April 17, 1982, and February 16,
1983. The licenses authorize the operation of LaSalle County
Station, Units 1 and 2 (LaSalle), in accordance with conditions
specified therein. The facility is located on the licensee's site
in LaSalle County, IL.
II On January 25, 2004, three employees of The Venture (Venture),
contractors to Exelon, and their foreman, also a Venture
employee, entered a High Radiation Area (HRA) in the LaSalle Unit
1 Reactor Building raceway to conduct preparations for valve
replacement.
The contractors did not sign onto the required HRA radiation work
permit (RWP) or receive the required briefing for work in the
HRA. This resulted in an apparent violation of LaSalle Technical
Specification (TS) 5.7.1, ``High Radiation Areas with Dose Rates
Not Exceeding 1.0 rem/hour at 30 Centimeters from the Radiation
Source or from any Surface Penetration by the Radiation,'' which
requires that an appropriate RWP be utilized by radiation workers
and that a pre-job brief be provided prior to entry into any HRA.
The NRC's Office of Investigations determined that two of the
three craft workers and the foreman willfully violated the
station radiation procedures implementing the TSs.
In a letter dated November 19, 2004, transmitting the Summary of
Investigation, the NRC provided Exelon an opportunity to address
the apparent violation. In a letter dated December 17, 2004,
Exelon responded to the apparent violation by acknowledging that
a willful violation occurred, that the violation should be
categorized at Severity Level IV, and that the violation met the
NRC criteria to be categorized as a non-cited violation (NCV). In
a letter dated May 2, 2005, the NRC categorized the violation at
Severity Level III and issued Exelon a ``Notice of Violation and
Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty--$60,000,'' for LaSalle. On
May 12, 2005, in response to the NRC's enforcement action, Exelon
informed the NRC of its intent to appeal the Notice of Violation
and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty and requested the use of
the Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) process as a means to
obtain resolution.
ADR is a general term encompassing various techniques for
resolving conflict outside of court using a neutral third party,
and the NRC currently has a pilot program for using ADR. The
technique that the NRC decided to employ during the pilot
program, which is now in effect, is mediation.
III On July 11, 2005, the NRC and Exelon met at the Exelon
headquarters in Warrenville, IL, at an ADR session mediated by a
professional mediator and arranged through Cornell University's
Institute on Conflict Resolution. As a result of this ADR
session, all parties reached a settlement agreement, which was
signed by both Exelon and NRC representatives on July 11, 2005.
Subsequent to the ADR mediation session, the parties agreed to
the addition of two time frames.
The phrase, ``prior to the next two refueling outages'' replaced
the word ``each'' in item 2.I, and a corrective actions
completion date of no later than 6 months from the date of
issuance of this Confirmatory Order, unless otherwise stated, was
added to section IV of this Confirmatory Order. This resulted in
the following stipulations: 1. The NRC issued a May 2, 2005,
Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of a Civil Penalty
(Severity Level III violation, $60,000 civil penalty) based upon
three craft workers and their foreman willfully entering a posted
HRA without signing the required radiation work permit or
receiving a HRA briefing in violation of TSs 5.7.1.b and e.
2. After having had an opportunity to examine these issues during
mediated ADR, Exelon and the NRC have concluded that they can
resolve all issues on a mutually satisfactory basis. Accordingly,
Exelon and the NRC have agreed to enter this settlement agreement
to provide for full settlement of any enforcement matters between
Exelon and the NRC related to or arising out of events which were
the subject of the NRC's proposed enforcement action on May 2,
2005. Both Exelon and the NRC agree to the following: a. A
willful violation occurred as documented in the NRC's May 2,
2005, Notice of Violation; however, the NRC agreed to categorize
this as a Severity Level IV violation and agreed not to consider
it as part of the civil penalty assessment process (NRC
Enforcement Policy, section VI.C.2) should the NRC consider
future enforcement actions against LaSalle.
b. A Confirmatory Order is an appropriate enforcement sanction to
confirm action in this case, and the NRC agrees to a reduced
civil penalty of $10,000.
c. Exelon will document in LaSalle station procedures or training
material, the following corrective actions: i. Revise initial
radiation worker training material to highlight HRA entry
requirements and consequences for the radiation worker if
requirements are not met; ii. Revise RWP instructions that allow
HRA entry to state ``high radiation entry brief required;'' iii.
Add warnings to worker acknowledgments on the computer screen
during the access control electronic dosimetry log-in process;
iv. Add the radiation protection aid for conducting HRA
briefings; and v. Require a signature from transient refueling
outage workers prior to
[[Page 72474]] issuance of dosimetry that acknowledges their
understanding of HRA entry requirements and the consequences for
violating them.
d. During the first 10 days, or longer as necessary, of the next
two refueling outages, LaSalle will have greeters at primary
access points to the radiologically controlled area to enhance
awareness of radiological controls.
e. For the next two refueling outages, all transient refueling
outage workers, except as specifically authorized by the
Radiation Protection Manager, will be required to attend and pass
a dynamic learning activity on proper HRA entry.
f. LaSalle will perform an industry benchmark evaluation of HRA
controls, and evaluate changes to existing practices prior to the
next refueling outage.
g. In addition to the corrective actions already documented in
Exelon's December 17, 2004 response, Exelon will require that
Venture revise its Operating Procedures, which are applicable
fleet-wide, to further assure compliance with HRA entry
requirements and to specifically include the following
requirements: i. That a discussion of pertinent radiological
practices be conducted at each daily shift brief; ii. That
Venture employees who will work in radiation areas will read,
understand, and sign a pledge to attest to his/her commitment to
follow all radiological requirements. (Each pledge will be
co-signed by the Venture site manager, project superintendent, or
site as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) coordinator and will
be retained for a period of one year.); iii. That Venture
superintendents will be present at select pre-job briefs
involving HRA entries; and iv. That Venture will participate in
Exelon Radiation Protection Manager peer group meetings at least
semi-annually to evaluate and take action on radiation protection
issues.
h. Exelon will conduct a review of the implementation and
effectiveness of its and Venture's corrective actions covered in
this Order. This review shall be conducted for at least the next
two refueling outages at LaSalle. The results of each review will
be made available for NRC review upon request. The review shall
be conducted by knowledgeable individuals independent of the
LaSalle facility.
i. The LaSalle Plant Manager or Site Vice President will meet
with contract leadership prior to the next two refueling outages
to establish personnel expectations in following radiological
work requirements.
j. The scope of this agreement includes the events which were the
subject of the NRC's proposed enforcement action on May 2, 2005.
By a letter from Exelon to the NRC dated August 25, 2005, Exelon
documented these settlement agreement stipulations and
acknowledged concurrence with the terms and conditions of the
settlement agreement dated and signed by representatives of
Exelon and the NRC on July 11, 2005.
In view of the Confirmatory Order, which was consented to by
Exelon, as evidenced by your signed ``Consent and Hearing Waiver
Form'' (copy attached) dated November 18, 2005, and based, in
part, on the expectation that Exelon will satisfactorily
implement the conditions of this Confirmatory Order; the NRC is
reclassifying the violation from Severity Level III to Severity
Level IV and will not consider it as part of the civil penalty
assessment process (Enforcement Policy, section VI.C.2) should
the NRC consider future enforcement actions at LaSalle.
Additionally, the NRC will reduce the proposed $60,000 civil
penalty to $10,000.
I find that the licensee's commitments as set forth in section IV
are acceptable and necessary and conclude that, with these
commitments, the public health and safety are reasonably assured.
In view of the foregoing, I have determined that the public
health and safety require that the licensee's commitments be
confirmed by this Order.
Based on the above and the licensee's consent, this Order is
immediately effective upon issuance.
IV Accordingly, pursuant to sections 103, 161b, 161i, 161o, 182,
and 186 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the
Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 2.202 and 10 CFR part 50, it
is hereby ordered, effective immediately, that License Nos.
NPF-11 and NPF-18 are modified as follows: By no later than 6
months from the date of issuance of this Confirmatory Order,
unless otherwise stated, the licensee will complete the
following: 1. Exelon will document in LaSalle station procedures
or training material, the following corrective actions: a. Revise
initial radiation worker training material to highlight HRA entry
requirements and consequences for the radiation worker if
requirements are not met; b. Revise RWP instructions that allow
HRA entry to state ``high radiation entry brief required;'' c.
Add warnings to worker acknowledgments on the computer screen
during the access control electronic dosimetry log-in process; d.
Add the radiation protection aid for conducting HRA briefings;
and e. Require a signature from transient refueling outage
workers prior to issuance of dosimetry that acknowledges their
understanding of HRA entry requirements and the consequences for
violating them.
2. During the first 10 days, or longer as necessary, of the next
two refueling outages, LaSalle will have greeters at primary
access points to the radiologically controlled area to enhance
awareness of radiological controls.
3. For the next two refueling outages, all transient refueling
outage workers, except as specifically authorized by the
Radiation Protection Manager, will be required to attend and pass
a dynamic learning activity on proper HRA entry.
4. LaSalle will perform an industry benchmark evaluation of HRA
controls, and evaluate changes to existing practices prior to the
next refueling outage.
5. In addition to the corrective actions already documented in
Exelon's December 17, 2004 response, Exelon will require that
Venture revise its Operating Procedures, which are applicable
fleet-wide, to further assure compliance with HRA entry
requirements and to specifically include the following
requirements: a. That a discussion of pertinent radiological
practices be conducted at each daily shift brief; b. That Venture
employees who will work in radiation areas will read, understand,
and sign a pledge to attest to his/her commitment to follow all
radiological requirements. (Each pledge will be co-signed by the
Venture site manager, project superintendent, or site as low as
reasonably achievable (ALARA) coordinator and will be retained
for a period of one year.); c. That Venture superintendents will
be present at select pre-job briefs involving HRA entries; and d.
That Venture will participate in Exelon Radiation Protection
Manager peer group meetings at least semi-annually to evaluate
and take action on radiation protection issues.
6. Exelon will conduct a review of the implementation and
effectiveness of its and Venture's corrective actions covered in
this Order. This review shall be conducted for at least the next
two refueling outages at LaSalle. The results of each review will
be made available for NRC review upon request. The review shall
be conducted by knowledgeable individuals independent of the
LaSalle facility.
[[Page 72475]] 7. The LaSalle Plant Manager or Site Vice
President will meet with contract leadership prior to the next
two refueling outages to establish personnel expectations in
following radiological work requirements.
8. The licensee shall pay a civil penalty in the amount of
$10,000 within 30 days of the date of this Order, in accordance
with NUREG/BR- 0254. In addition, at the time of making the
payment, the licensee shall submit a statement indicating when
and by what method payment was made, to the Director, Office of
Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, One White Flint
North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD 20852-2738.
The Director, Office of Enforcement, may relax or rescind, in
writing, any of the above conditions upon a showing by the
licensee of good cause.
V Any person adversely affected by this Confirmatory Order, other
than the licensee, may request a hearing within 20 days of its
issuance. Where good cause is shown, consideration will be given
to extending the time to request a hearing. A request for
extension of time must be made in writing to the Director, Office
of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington,
DC 20555, and include a statement of good cause for the
extension. Any request for a hearing shall be submitted to the
Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Chief,
Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff, Washington, DC 20555. Copies
of the hearing request shall also be sent to the Director, Office
of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington,
DC 20555; to the Assistant General Counsel for Materials
Litigation and Enforcement at the same address; to the Regional
Administrator, NRC Region III, 2443 Warrenville Road, Suite 210,
Lisle, IL 60532-4352, and to the licensee. Because of continuing
disruptions in delivery of mail to U.S. Government offices, it is
requested that answers and requests for hearing be transmitted to
the Secretary of the Commission either by means of facsimile
transmission to (301) 415-1101 or by e-mail to
hearingdocket@nrc.gov and also to the Office of the General
Counsel either by means of facsimile transmission to (301)
415-3725 or by e-mail to OGCMailCenter@nrc.gov. If a person other
than the licensee requests a hearing, that person shall set forth
with particularity the manner in which his interest is adversely
affected by this Order and shall address the criteria set forth
in 10 CFR 2.309(d) and (f). If a hearing is requested by a
person, other than the licensee, whose interest is adversely
affected, the Commission will issue an Order designating the time
and place of any hearing. If a hearing is held, the issue to be
considered at such hearing shall be whether this Confirmatory
Order should be sustained.
In the absence of any request for hearing, or written approval of
an extension of time in which to request a hearing, the
provisions specified in section IV above shall be final 20 days
from the date of this Order without further order or proceedings.
If an extension of time for requesting a hearing has been
approved, the provisions specified in section IV shall be final
when the extension expires if a hearing request has not been
received. An answer or a request for hearing shall not stay the
immediate effectiveness of this order.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Dated this 22nd day of November 2005.
Michael R. Johnson, Director, Office of Enforcement.
Attachment--Consent and Hearing Waiver Form Exelon Generation
Company, LLC (EGC) hereby agrees to comply with the commitments
described in the NRC's letter dated November 15, 2005, and agrees
to incorporation of those commitments into a Confirmatory Order
that will be immediately effective upon issuance. I recognize
that by signing below, EGC consents to the issuance of the
Confirmatory Order, effective immediately, with the commitments
agreed to at an Alternative Dispute Resolution mediation session
held in Warrenville, IL, on July 11, 2005; as documented in an
August 25, 2005, letter from EGC to the NRC; and as incorporated
in the draft Confirmatory Order. I also recognize that by signing
below, pursuant to 10 CFR 2.202(a)(3) and (d), EGC waives the
right to request a hearing on all or any part of the Order.
Dated: November 18, 2005.
T. S. O'Neill, Vice President, Licensing and Regulatory Affairs.
[FR Doc. E5-6827 Filed 12-2-05; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
b
*****************************************************************
35 NRC: Notice of Availability of Environmental Assessment and Finding
FR Doc E5-6829
[Federal Register: December 5, 2005 (Volume 70, Number 232)]
[Notices] [Page 72475-72476] From the Federal Register Online via
GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr05de05-93]
of No Significant Impact for License Amendment for the Department
of the Army, Watervliet Arsenal's Facility in Watervliet, NY
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Notice of Availability.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Betsy Ullrich, Commercial and R
Branch, Division of Nuclear Materials Safety, Region I, 475
Allendale Road, King of Prussia, Pennsylvania, 19406, telephone
(610) 337-5040, fax (610) 337-5269; or by e-mail: exu@nrc.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: I. Introduction The Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) is issuing a license amendment to the Department
of the Army, Watervliet Arsenal for Materials License No.
STB-1554, to authorize release of Building 120 at its facility in
Watervliet, New York, for unrestricted use. NRC has prepared an
Environmental Assessment (EA) in support of this action in
accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR part 51. Based on the
EA, the NRC has concluded that a Finding of No Significant Impact
(FONSI) is appropriate. The amendment will be issued following
the publication of this Notice.
II. EA Summary The purpose of the action is to authorize the
release of Building 120 at the licensee's Watervliet, New York,
facility for unrestricted use. The Department of the Army,
Watervliet Arsenal was authorized by NRC from 1972 to use
radioactive materials for research and development purposes at
the site. On March 7, 2005, the Department of the Army,
Watervliet Arsenal, requested that NRC release Building 120 at
the facility for unrestricted use. The Department of the Army has
conducted surveys of the facility and provided information to the
NRC to demonstrate that Building 120 meets the license
termination criteria in subpart E of 10 CFR part 20 for
unrestricted use.
The NRC staff has prepared an EA in support of the license
amendment. The facility was surveyed prior to the licensee
requesting the license amendment. The NRC staff has reviewed the
information and final
[[Page 72476]] status survey submitted by the Department of the
Army. Based on its review, the staff has determined that there
are no additional remediation activities necessary to complete
the proposed action. Therefore, the staff considered the impact
of residual radioactivity at the facility and concluded that
since the residual radioactivity meets the requirements in
subpart E of 10 CFR part 20, a Finding of No Significant Impact
is appropriate. Additionally, no non-radiological or cumulative
impacts were identified.
III. Finding of No Significant Impact The staff has prepared the
EA (summarized above) in support of the license amendment to
release Building 120 for unrestricted use.
The NRC staff has evaluated the Department of the Army,
Watervliet Arsenal's request and the results of the surveys and
has concluded that the completed action complies with the
criteria in subpart E of 10 CFR part 20. The staff has found that
the radiological environmental impacts from the action are
bounded by the impacts evaluated by NUREG-1496, Volumes 1-3,
``Generic Environmental Impact Statement in Support of Rulemaking
on Radiological Criteria for License Termination of NRC- Licensed
Facilities'' (ML042310492, ML042320379, and ML042330385).
Additionally, no non-radiological or cumulative impacts were
identified. On the basis of the EA, the NRC has concluded that
the environmental impacts from the action are expected to be
insignificant and has determined not to prepare an environmental
impact statement for the action.
IV. Further Information Documents related to this action,
including the application for the license amendment and
supporting documentation, are available electronically at the
NRC's Electronic Reading Room at
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. From this site, you can
access the NRC's Agencywide Document Access and Management System
(ADAMS), which provides text and image files of NRC's public
documents. The ADAMS accession numbers for the documents related
to this Notice are: The Environmental Assessment [ML053290136]
and the Final Survey Report for Room 255, Building 120,
Watervliet Arsenal, dated March 2005 [ADAMS Accession No.
ML051080464]. Persons who do not have access to ADAMS or who
encounter problems in accessing the documents located in ADAMS,
should contact the NRC PDR Reference staff by telephone at (800)
397- 4209 or (301) 415-4737, or by e-mail to pdr@nrc.gov.
Documents related to operations conducted under this license not
specifically referenced in this Notice may not be electronically
available and/or may not be publicly available. Persons who have
an interest in reviewing these documents should submit a request
to the NRC under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).
Instructions for submitting a FOIA request can be found on the
NRC's Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/foia-privacy.html
.
Dated at King of Prussia, Pennsylvania, this 25th day of
November, 2005.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
James P. Dwyer, Chief, Commercial and R Branch, Division of
Nuclear Materials Safety, Region I.
[FR Doc. E5-6829 Filed 12-2-05; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
*****************************************************************
36 NRC: Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc.; Millstone Power Station,
FR Doc E5-6833
[Federal Register: December 5, 2005 (Volume 70, Number 232)]
[Notices] [Page 72472-72473] From the Federal Register Online via
GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr05de05-91]
Units 2 and 3; Notice of Issuance of Renewed Facility; Operating
License Nos. Dpr-65 And Npf-49; for an Additional 20-Year Period
Notice is hereby given that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC or the Commission) has issued Renewed Facility
Operating License Nos. DPR-65 and NPF-49 to Dominion Nuclear
Connecticut, Inc. (licensee), the operator of Millstone Power
Station (MPS), Units 2 and 3. Renewed Facility Operating License
No. DPR-65 authorizes operation of MPS Unit 2 by the licensee at
reactor core power levels not in excess of 2700 megawatts
thermal, in accordance with the provisions of the MPS renewed
license and its Technical Specifications.
Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-49 authorizes
operation of MPS Unit 3 by the licensee at reactor core power
levels not in excess of 3411 megawatts thermal, in accordance
with the provisions of the MPS renewed license and its Technical
Specifications.
MPS Units 2 and 3 are pressurized water reactors located in
Waterford, Connecticut. The licensee's applications for the
renewed licenses complied with the standards and requirements of
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the
Commission's regulations. As required by the Act and the
Commission's regulations in 10 CFR Chapter 1, the Commission has
made appropriate findings, which are set forth in each license.
Prior public notice of the action of issuing the proposed renewed
licenses and of an opportunity for a hearing on the proposed
issuance of the renewed licenses was published in the Federal
Register on March 12, 2004 (69 FR 11897).
For further details about this action, see: (1) Dominion Nuclear
Connecticut's license renewal applications for MPS Units 2 and 3,
dated January 20, 2004, as supplemented by letters dated through
July 21, 2005; (2) the Commission's safety evaluation report
dated October 2005 (NUREG-1838); and (3) the Commission's final
environmental impact statements (NUREG-1437, Supplement 22, for
the Millstone Power Station, Units 2 and 3, dated July 2005).
These documents are available at the NRC's Public Document Room,
One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD 20852,
and can be viewed from the NRC Public
[[Page 72473]] Electronic Reading Room at
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. Copies of Renewed
Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-65 and NPF-49 may be obtained
by writing to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington,
DC, 20555-0001, Attention: Director, Division of License Renewal.
Copies of the MPS Units 2 and 3, Safety Evaluation Report
(NUREG-1838) and the Final Environmental Impact Statements
(NUREG-1437, Supplement 22) may be purchased from the National
Technical Information Service, U.S. Department of Commerce,
Springfield, VA 22161 (http://www.ntis.gov ), 703-605-6000, or
Attention: Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office, P.O. Box 371954, Pittsburgh, PA 15250- 7954
(http://www.gpoaccess.gov), 202-512-1800. All orders should
clearly identify the NRC publication number and the requestor's
Government Printing Office deposit account number or VISA or
MasterCard number and expiration date.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 28th day of November 2005.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Frank P. Gillespie, Director, Division of License Renewal, Office
of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. E5-6833 Filed 12-2-05; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
*****************************************************************
37 Indian Express: PM to take up nuclear reactor issue with Putin
Monday, December 05, 2005
PRANAB DHAL SAMANTA
MOSCOW, DECEMBER 4: As India and US prepare for another meeting
later this month of the joint working group on implementing the
July 18 joint statement, New Delhi is eyeing Russia to deliver on
four additional nuclear reactors for Koodankulam during Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh’s stay here.
The PM, who arrived here this evening, will raise this along with
the fuel for Tarapur during his meeting with Russian President
Vladimir Putin on Tuesday. The PM made it clear that fuel for
Tarapur is a ‘‘separate issue’’ and must not be linked with
fulfilling commitments made in July 18 joint statement.
In fact, the joint statement is clear that the US will assist
‘‘in the meantime’’ for obtaining fuel for Tarapur. This,
sources said, provides Russia with an opportunity to take the
lead and expand the scope for civilian nuclear cooperation that
is currently restricted by guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers
Group.
In what is an indicator of the pace at which Indo-US talks are
moving, official sources said, Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran may
carry with him an outline of the Indian plan to separate its
civilian and military nuclear reactors when he will go to the US
later this month for the next round of meeting with US Under
Secretary for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns.
While Washington is still not in favour of India moving on
obtaining fuel for Tarapur pointing out that this may complicate
matters, sources said, New Delhi is going by the joint statement
which clearly does not make any link with Indian commitments in
the deal. It may be recalled that Burns had said in Delhi there
were no conditions outside what had been made in the joint
statement in Washington. In this context, India hopes that
Russia will give a positive response this time on reactors for
Koodankulam, which have been on the agenda for sometime.
It may be noted that US President George W Bush and French
President Jacques Chirac will be visiting India in February. At
both these visits, significant strides are expected on the
civilian nuclear issue and India hopes that Russia will take the
first step now. The Prime Minister, on board the special
aircraft, indicated he would be taking up these issues with
Putin in the context of energy security.
Besides this, Manmohan Indian businessmen to look at Russian
seriously as an investment destination. He felt that Russia was
a fast growing economy and there were possibilities which Indian
businessmen should explore more effectively.
© 2005: Indian Express Newspapers (Mumbai) Ltd.
*****************************************************************
38 Japan Times: Restart of Mihama reactor OK'd
Tuesday, December 6, 2005
The No. 3 reactor of the Mihama nuclear power plant in Fukui
Prefecture was cleared Monday to resume operations suspended
since a fatal steam leak last year, the Nuclear and Industrial
Safety Agency said.
The Aug. 9, 2004, accident at the Kansai Electric Power Co.
reactor, in which superheated nonradioactive steam leaked from a
ruptured pipe, left five dead people and six seriously injured.
It was blamed on pipes that had not been inspected for 28 years.
The agency ordered the utility to suspend the reactor's
operations in September 2004 until it was confirmed to meet
government standards.
The Japan Times: Dec. 6, 2005
(C) All rights reserved
*****************************************************************
39 Belfast Telegraph: I'm dreaming of a nuclear powered Christmas
www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/
Belfast Telegraph Home > News > Opinion
Pól Ó Muirí 05 December 2005
Where do you think we should build Northern Ireland's nuclear
power station? The Mournes? The Sperrins or, perhaps, the Maze?
You didn't know we were going to get a nuclear power plant?
Don't you read the newspapers?
Tony Blair has put the question of nuclear power back on the
political agenda. Natural resources used to produce electricity
- coal and gas - are growing ever more scarce and global warming
threatens day and daily.
For once, Blair is not blowing when he says: "Climate change is
producing a sense of urgency." He believes that nuclear power
must be an energy option for the future.
Needless to say, Greenpeace and other environmental groups
disagree and want the emphasis put on renewable sources.
So where does that leave us? Admittedly, nuclear power is not
included in the Belfast Agreement or in much else we discuss.
Still, that won't protect us from dwindling resources or the
effects of global warming.
Few of us like the idea of nuclear power and the row over
Sellafield (or whatever it is called this week) and its effects
on this side of the water is one that has been ongoing for
years.
More often than not, we are passive in the face of these
discussions. They don't concern us, we say, while turning to our
own (often legitimate) causes of concern. Well, nuclear power
and global warming do concern us - and they will concern our
children and our grandchildren even more.
The oddest thing about the global warming debate is, despite
knowing so much, how little we actually do to remedy the
situation.
Take, for example, Christmas tree lights. (Yes, folks, there is
a 'bah humbug' moment fast approaching!) Many councils in
Northern Ireland are enlightened enough to have recycle centres
where ratepayers can take glass, plastic, organic waste (grass
cuttings to you) and other material and leave them, safe in the
knowledge that they will be recycled and do a little to save the
environment.
Some councils even have special bins in which they collect
newspapers, tin cans and the like from individual households.
They are well worth the couple of extra quid on the rates to
save Mother Earth.
Contrast then their sensible approach to recycling with the
numerous Christmas lights councils hang each year.
Bad enough that they use energy and resources that we should be
preserving but many councils light up in November and don't turn
them off until January. Feel the goodwill; say bye-bye to the
global chill (and the ice-caps).
I know it's Christmas and it only comes once a year. But why
bother lighting up street after street for hours on end when the
late-night shopping is over by eight in the evening?
The only people to appreciate the decorations thereafter are the
drunks rolling out of the bars looking for a fish supper or a
kebab.
I will have lights on my Christmas tree like anyone else - but I
turn them off when I go to bed. That's a lot more than can be
said for most councils.
Bah humbug, says you. Fair enough - but don't be surprised if
Santa leaves a nuclear power plant under the Christmas tree this
year.
MALE readers of a certain age will remember when wearing white
socks was enough to get you barred from a club. They were the
sartorial equivalent of the switch blade and anyone wearing them
was supposed to be trouble.
Hoodies are now the new white socks. I have a nice hoodie from
GAP. I like it because it makes me look slim. I feel like an
athlete and I do wear it to shopping centres. Now, if I could
only find the white socks to go with it...
ANOTHER outbreak of eating raw steak in the SDLP. This week it
is Alex Attwood, the party's spokesman on policing. Commenting
on on-the-run legislation Attwood got wired into Sinn Féin in a
very unmiddle-class way, saying that the Shinners have known
since April, 2003, that the law would cover "State killers" and
that loyalist murderers would also benefit.
Sinn Féin were complicit he said, while happily punching Sinn
Féin's denials in the ribs. Is Alex Attwood the new Karate Kid?
© 2005 Independent News and Media (NI)
*****************************************************************
40 AU: On Line Opinion: Jim Green argues the use of nuclear power is fraught with
problems for little significant benefit. -
6/12/2005
"University of Sydney" />
Nuclear power: no solution to climate change
2005 has seen the Federal Government reverse its position on
climate change, accepting that its impact is severe and serious,
and that fast action is imperative.
But the government has diverted attention away from real
solutions and Australia’s poor performance on curbing emissions
by insisting that Australia consider domestic nuclear power
generation. In short, the government proposes something which is
currently illegal, inordinately expensive, relying on
government-subsidised capital investments and too slow to
respond to the immediate challenge of climate change. Now
Brendan Nelson and Ian Macfarlane (science and industry and
resources ministers) want to waste more time and money on a high
level inquiry into the feasibility of a nuclear power industry
in Australia.
The nuclear debate has been based on a false claim: that nuclear
power is “greenhouse-free”. Significant emissions are produced
at every stage of the nuclear fuel cycle - nuclear power can
only reduce greenhouse gas emissions in comparison with fossil
fuels, rather than renewable energy sources and energy
efficiency. As a method of reducing greenhouse gas emissions,
nuclear power is further limited because it is used almost
exclusively for electricity generation, which is responsible for
less than one third of global greenhouse gas emissions. A
doubling of nuclear power output by 2050 would only reduce
greenhouse gas emissions by about five per cent - less than one
tenth of the reductions required to stabilise atmospheric
concentrations of greenhouse gases.
Nuclear power relies on an exhaustible energy source.
High-grade, low-cost uranium ores are limited and will be
exhausted in about 50 years at the current rate of consumption.
The estimated total of all conventional uranium reserves is
thought to be sufficient for about 200 years at the current rate
of consumption. But in a scenario of nuclear expansion, these
reserves will be depleted more rapidly. Most of the Earth's
uranium is found in very poor grade ores, and recovery of
uranium from these ores is likely to be considerably more
greenhouse intensive.
And to this problem we must add the risk of accidents at nuclear
plants; routine releases of radioactive gases and liquids, the
intractable problem of nuclear waste and risks of terrorism and
sabotage.
Safety concerns at reactors are not limited to the ex-Soviet
states. For example, the Japanese nuclear power industry has
been in turmoil since revelations in August 2002 of 29 cases of
false reporting on the inspections of cracks in numerous
reactors. There have also been a number of serious accidents,
some of them fatal, at nuclear reactors and other nuclear
facilities in Japan in the past decade.
Commercial pressures and inadequate regulation have clearly
played some part in the flawed safety standards in Japan. Such
pressures are by no means unique to Japan; they will intensify
if liberalisation of electricity markets proceeds.
Furthermore, there’s another hazard associated with nuclear
power expansion on a global scale and it’s of such concern that
alone it must lead to a rejection of the nuclear proposal. As
the government plans to increase Australian uranium exports,
it’s time we considered the established pattern of “peaceful”
nuclear facilities being used for nuclear weapons research and
production.
The proliferation problem is profound:
+ of the 60 countries which have built nuclear power or
research reactors, over 20 are known to have used their
“peaceful” nuclear facilities for covert weapons research and or
production;
+ four or five countries have produced nuclear arsenals under
cover of a “peaceful” nuclear program - Israel, India, South
Africa, Pakistan, and possibly North Korea. Others have come
close - most notably Iraq from the 1970s until the 1991 Gulf
War;
+ nuclear power programs also provide pools of expertise for
weapons programs in the five major nuclear weapons states - the
US, Russia, the UK, France and China. These five countries
account for almost 60 per cent of global nuclear power output;
+ the “peaceful” nuclear power industry has produced
sufficient plutonium to produce about 160,000 nuclear weapons,
each with a yield similar to the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and
Nagasaki. If 99 per cent of this plutonium is indefinitely
safeguarded against military use - a monumental challenge - the
remaining plutonium would suffice to produce 1,600 nuclear
weapons. Australian uranium has resulted in the production of
over 78 tonnes of plutonium - sufficient for about 7,800 nuclear
weapons, and
+ the UN's Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has
considered a scenario involving a ten-fold increase in nuclear
power over this century and calculated that this could produce
50,000 - 100,000 tonnes of plutonium. The IPCC concluded that
the security threat would be "colossal".
The International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) safeguards
system still suffers from flaws and limitations despite
improvements over the past decade. Statements from the IAEA and
US President George W. Bush about the need to limit the spread
of enrichment and reprocessing technology and to establish
multinational control over sensitive nuclear facilities, are an
effective acknowledgement of the limitations of the
international non-proliferation system.
The NPT enshrines an “inalienable right” of member states to all
“civil” nuclear technologies, including dual-use technologies
with both peaceful and military capabilities. In other words,
the NPT enshrines the “right” to develop a nuclear weapons
threshold or breakout capability.
Nuclear smuggling - much of it from civil nuclear programs -
presents a significant challenge. The IAEA's Illicit Trafficking
Database records over 650 confirmed incidents of trafficking in
nuclear or other radioactive materials since 1993. In 2004
alone, almost 100 such incidents occurred. Smuggling can
potentially provide fissile material for nuclear weapons or a
wider range of radioactive materials for use in “dirty bombs”.
Civil nuclear plants are potentially attractive targets for
terrorist attacks because of the importance of the electricity
supply system in many societies, the large radioactive
inventories in many facilities and of the potential or actual
use of “civil” nuclear facilities for weapons research or
production.
The problem of radioactive waste management is nowhere near
resolution. Not a single repository exists anywhere in the world
for the disposal of high-level waste from nuclear power. Only a
few countries - such as Finland, Sweden and the US - have
identified potential sites for a high-level waste repository.
The legal limit for the proposed repository at Yucca Mountain in
the US is less than the projected output of high-level waste
from the reactors currently operating in the US. If global
nuclear output was increased three-fold, new repository storage
capacity equal to the legal limit for Yucca Mountain would have
to be created somewhere in the world every three to four years.
With a ten-fold increase in nuclear power, new repository
storage capacity equal to the legal limit for Yucca Mountain
would have to be created somewhere in the world every single
year.
Whatever Bob Hawke might think on the matter, attempts to
establish international repositories are likely to be as
unpopular and unsuccessful as Pangea Resources’ bid to win
support for such a repository in Australia. Pangea abandoned its
proposal in 2002.
Synroc - the ceramic waste immobilisation technology developed
in Australia - seems destined to be a permanently “promising”
technology. As even nuclear advocate Leslie Kemeny concedes,
Synroc "... showed great early promise but so far its
international marketing and commercialisation agendas have
failed".
Enough of the bad news: renewable energy, mostly
hydroelectricity, already supplies 19 per cent of world
electricity, compared to nuclear's 16 per cent. The share of
renewables is increasing, while nuclear's share is decreasing.
Wind power and solar power are growing by 20-30 per cent every
year. In 2004, renewable energy added nearly three times as much
net generating capacity as nuclear power. (In Australia, only 8
per cent of electricity is from renewable energy - down from 10
per cent in 1999.)
The biggest gains are to be made in the field of energy
efficiency. Energy experts have projected that adopting a
national energy efficiency target could reduce the need for
investment in new power stations by between 2,500 - 5,000 MW by
2017 in Australia (equal to about 2-5 large nuclear power
stations). The energy efficiency investments would pay for
themselves in reduced bills before a nuclear power station could
generate a single unit of electricity.
The Australian Ministerial Council on Energy has identified that
energy consumption in the manufacturing, commercial and
residential sectors could be reduced by 20-30 per cent with the
adoption of current commercially available technologies with an
average payback of four years.
A July 2002 study by The Australia Institute (pdf file 139KB)
maps out a plan to achieve a 60 per cent reduction in greenhouse
gas emissions in Australia by 2050. The study envisages
widespread energy efficiency measures, a major expansion of wind
power, modest growth of hydroelectricity, significant use of
biomass and niche applications for solar photovoltaic
electricity.
And in 2004, the Clean Energy Future Group - which comprises
renewable energy companies and the Worldwide Fund for Nature-
produced a report which details how major greenhouse gas
emissions reductions can be achieved. It finds that Australia
can meet our energy needs and halve greenhouse gas emissions by
2040 using a range of commercially-proven fuels and
technologies. The study envisages the following energy mix by
2040: natural gas providing 30 per cent; biomass from
agriculture and plantation forestry residues, 26 per cent; wind,
20 per cent; photovoltaic and solar thermal systems, 5 per cent;
hydroelectricity, 7 per cent; while coal and petroleum continue
to play a minor role in electricity generation.
Dr Jim Green is the national nuclear campaigner for Friends of
the Earth and author of the report No Solution To Climate
Change(pdf file 1.98MB) launched in September 2005.
[Creative Commons License]
© The National Forumand contributors 1999-2005. All rights
reserved. ISSN 1442-8458.
*****************************************************************
41 Rediff: Russia may construct more reactors for India
> PTI
Amitabha Roychowdhury in Moscow | December 05, 2005 21:04 IST
Following the success of the Kudankulam project in Tamil Nadu,
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on Monday conveyed New Delhi's
willingness to consider construction of additional nuclear
reactors by Russia in view of India's growing energy demand.
"The prime minister conveyed India's willingness to consider
positively construction of additional reactors by Russia in view
of our growing energy needs," External Affairs Ministry
Spokesman Navtej Sarna said after the meeting Singh had with
Russia's Energy and Industry Minister Viktor Khristenko.
Both sides also agreed to promote commercial cooperation among
each other's oil companies through various measures including
floating of joint ventures and equity participation.
+ Also read: India-Russia -- strategic
brotherhood
The Russian minister welcomed India's interest to invest in
Sakhalin III oil and gas project and other areas.
They also discussed ways and means to increase investment in
aluminium and steel industries and hydroelectric and thermal
power stations.
The prime minister said India and Russia must develop long-term
energy partnership and expressed India's keenness to join Russia
in exploration and production of oil and gas in third countries
specially those in Central Asia, Sarna said.
Earlier, speaking at a joint meeting of Indian and Russian
businessmen, Singh said both nations should expand joint
operations in the energy sector to third countries, adding that
talks between Indian and Russian oil companies would soon yield
concrete results.
Complete coverage of Dr Singh's visit
© Copyright 2005 PTI. All rights reserved. Republication or
Copyright © 2005 rediff.com India Limited. All Rights Reserved.
*****************************************************************
42 Guardian Unlimited: Iran Announces Plans for 2nd Nuclear Plant
From the Associated Press
[UP]
Monday December 5, 2005 9:01 AM
By NASSER KARIMI
Associated Press Writer
TEHRAN, Iran (AP) - Iran plans to construct a second nuclear
power plant despite international concern over its nuclear
program, state television reported on Monday.
The broadcast said President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Cabinet
ministers decided Sunday night to build the reactor in Khuzistan
province, southwestern Iran.
Previously Iran had said it would build a second power plant at
Bushehr, where its first nuclear reactor is due to begin
generating electricity in 2006.
Khuzistan province was the site of a French-built power plant
that began in the mid-1970s and was stopped after 1979 Islamic
revolution.
The Iranian parliament is seeking the construction of 20 nuclear
power plants. Russia, which built the Bushehr reactor, has
offered to build more nuclear plants in Iran.
Iran is under intense pressure to curb its nuclear program,
which the United States claims is part of an effort to produce
weapons. Iran says its program is limited to generating
electricity.
The International Atomic Energy Agency has warned Iran that its
nuclear program could be referred to the U.N. Security Council,
which has the power to impose sanctions on the country.
On Saturday, Iran approved a bill that would block international
inspections of its nuclear sites if it were referred to the
Security Council. The step strengthens the government's hand in
resisting international pressure to permanently abandon uranium
enrichment, a process that can produce fuel for either nuclear
reactors or atomic bombs.
While Iran has frozen its enrichment program, it restarted
uranium conversion - a step toward enrichment - in August.
The United States and European Union want Iran to permanently
halt uranium enrichment. But Tehran says the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty allows it to pursue a nuclear program
for peaceful purposes. It has said it will never give up the
right to enrich uranium to produce nuclear fuel.
Guardian Unlimited © Guardian Newspapers Limited 2005
*****************************************************************
43 [NukeNet] 9/11 Panel Says Nuke Power Plants Vulnerable To
Date: Mon, 05 Dec 2005 14:57:01 -0800
NukeNet Anti-Nuclear Network (nukenet@energyjustice.net)
CRAC-2 Report [Greatly Watered Down] On
Fatalities, Deaths, Injuries, $$ Damage From NPP
Meltdowns: http://www.mothersalert.org/crac.html
[Mandated By NRC, Study Carried Out By Sandia
Labs]
Nuke Terror Site: http://www.tmia.com/sabter.html
http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/politics/politics-security-usa.html
September 11 Panel Leaders Say US Still at Risk
a.. E-Mail This
b.. Printer-Friendly
c.. Save Article
By REUTERS
Published: December 4, 2005
Filed at 6:26 p.m. ET
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The United States is still
unprepared for another inevitable terrorist attack
after not doing enough to improve communications
for emergency personnel and bolster security at
nuclear plants, the heads of the former September
11 Commission said on Sunday.
Skip to next paragraph
Former commission chairman Thomas Kean said
preparing for another attack has not been a high
enough priority for President George W. Bush and
Congress.
``A lot of the things we need to do really to
prevent another 9/11 just simply aren't being done
by the president or by the Congress,'' Kean, the
former Republican governor of New Jersey, said on
NBC's ``Meet the Press.''
The comments come ahead of the commission's final
update, which will be released Monday, grading the
status of its post-September 11 security
recommendations and in most cases the Bush
administration and U.S. lawmakers earned a failing
grade, said Kean and Lee Hamilton, the former
Democratic representative from Indiana who was the
September 11 Commission's vice chairman.
While there has been a little progress in some
areas, several major issues remain, Kean and
Hamilton said. Among the major shortcomings they
cited was setting aside radio airwaves for police,
firefighters and other first responders to use in
an emergency.
Allocating funds in areas most at risk and setting
up a central command system with clear leaders
also is floundering, they said.
``We believe that another attack will occur and we
had better get to it and protect the American
people,'' Hamilton said. ``It's not a question of
if.''
In the last of a series of updates since the
commission's official report was released in
August 2004, Hamilton said they plan to highlight
``that there is a lack of a sense of urgency'' in
making reforms.
Work by the Department of Homeland Security to
evaluate the risk of attack at nuclear power
plants and chemical plants was ''totally
inadequate,'' Kean said.
``It doesn't set the priorities out,'' he said.
``It just sets basically vague guidelines, what
the priorities should be.''
Congress is working to finish two bills on the
first responder issue and the appropriations
process.
``If these two bills are passed on radio spectrum
and allocation of funds, the grades will quickly
switch to a B or an A,'' Kean said.
The chairmen also criticized the Transportation
Security Administration's decision last week to
allow small scissors and screwdrivers back on U.S.
airplanes as a step backward.
They said efforts to conduct random passenger
checks were misguided and more should be done to
screen cargo for explosives.
_______________________________________________________________________
Subscribe/Unsubscribe Here: http://www.energyjustice.net/nukenet/
Change your settings or access the archives at:
http://energyjustice.net/mailman/listinfo/nukenet_energyjustice.net
*****************************************************************
44 [du-list] Development of DU Munitions
Date: Mon, 05 Dec 2005 14:56:54 -0800
3.1 The emergence of the military use of DU
Uranium has been mined since the Middle Ages but it is only in the
last 100 years, and particularly in the last 50, that uranium mining
has taken place on a large scale.[1] Historically, uranium has been
used in the coloring of ceramics and glass, in the production of
dental porcelains, and as a chemical catalyst.[2] Since the Curies'
discovery in 1898 of radium—which is extracted from ores containing
uranium— the demand for radium for medical uses has increased and
with it the mining of uranium.[3]
The discovery of nuclear fission in 1938 vastly increased the mining
and processing of uranium and consequently enlarged the production
and supply of depleted uranium. After World War II, increased
production of enriched uranium for nuclear power plants and weapons
created large stockpiles of DU in the United States.
In the late-1950s, the US Atomic Energy Commission weighed two
options for the future of its growing DU stockpiles:
- `In anticipation of its energy value as a fertile material
for use in power reactors of the breeder type the depleted [uranium]
could be continued to be stockpiled for the long-term future; or
- material could be exempted from restrictions with regard to
nonnuclear [sic] industrial uses and placed on sale by the Commission
at an established fair price.'[4]
The potential availability of large stockpiles of DU caught the
attention of military planners, who use high-density alloys for
ammunition, tank armour and other purposes. In addition, private
industry developed commercial products made from DU, including
radiation shielding and counterbalances in aircraft.[5]
The development of DU munitions began around 1959 in the United
States,[6] and in the early 1960s in the United Kingdom.[7] Weapons
manufacturers developed high-density DU alloys for use in armor-
piercing ammunition known as kinetic energy penetrators. This
ammunition is simply a solid rod of dense metal stabilized by tail
fins; there is no explosive charge. The large energy of motion
(kinetic energy) of the rod, traveling at speeds between 1 and 1.8
kilometers per second, is sufficient to punch a hole in tank armor.
[8] These penetrators generally have greater success in piercing
heavily armored targets, such as the turrets on tanks, than
traditional high explosive tank rounds.
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the US military used armor-piercing
ammunition made from tungsten alloy.[9] For use in munitions,
tungsten is alloyed with an iron-copper, iron-nickel, or nickel-
copper binder.[10] In the early 1970s, concerns about the high cost
of tungsten alloy,[11] combined with improved performance of DU
munitions,[12] prompted the US Department of Defense (DoD) to
consider replacing tungsten alloy with DU in kinetic energy
penetrators.
In 1974, DoD announced its intention to switch to DU, and gave five
reasons for its decision:
- Depleted uranium was readily available in large quantities
from the stockpiles of the Atomic Energy Commission, and (at that
time) was more cost effective and more readily available than
tungsten;
- The use of DU in munitions did not compete with other uses
for DU;
- The metallurgical properties of DU allow it to be heat-treated
into varying hardnesses and strengths;
- The pyrophoricity of DU produces burning fragments upon
impact with a target, which can ignite flammable materials and cause
secondary damage;
- The U.S. Navy stated DU was the best material available for
ammunition for its (then) new Phalanx missile-defense gun.[13]
After DU became controversial in the late-1990s, one Pentagon
spokesman claimed the decision to use DU took place `when it became
clear tungsten carbide rounds could not defeat the latest generation
of Soviet armor',[14] an apparent ex post facto justification which
is noticeably missing from the 1974 report.
In announcing the switch to DU, DoD acknowledged some potential
adverse consequences of using DU munitions, but it downplayed their
significance:
`Overall, implementation of the proposed action [use of DU in
munitions] is expected to have no significant medical and
environmental impact. Depending on conditions locally, significant
impact can occur in the event of uncontrolled release of DU.'[15]
Since the use of DU munitions in combat results in an uncontrolled
release of DU, this statement appears to contradict itself about the
potential for significant impacts from the use of DU munitions. The
report goes on to state:
`In combat situations involving the widespread use of DU munitions,
the potential for inhalation, ingestion, or implantation of DU
compounds may be locally significant. However, it should be noted
that problems from the use of DU on the battlefield or at sea are
insignificant when compared to other dangers of combat.'[16]
Following the release of this report, production and testing of DU
munitions expanded, and DU munitions were fielded in the US arsenal
by the late-1970s.
British development of DU munitions did not begin in earnest until
the 1970s. A 1979 report from the Ministry of Defence noted that the
Soviet Union had introduced large numbers of `sophisticated, heavily
armored vehicles' (T-72 tanks) in Central Europe. In
addition, `sources indicate that the USSR is also working on depleted
uranium ammunition'.[17] The Soviet actions and the US incorporation
of DU ammunition into its arsenal prompted the Ministry of Defence to
initiate a `development and proof firings programme', which was
closely followed by a production program.[18]
----------------------------------------------------------------------
----------
[1] Supra n. 1, p. 23.
[2] M. Betti, "Civil use of depleted uranium," 64 Journal of
Environmental Radioactivity (2003) 114-116.
[3] H. Nelson and R. Carmichael, `Potential Nonnuclear Uses for
Depleted Uranium (Washington State, Battelle Memorial Institute, 29
January 1960) p. 3.
[4] Ibid. p. 1.
[5] M. Betti, "Civil use of depleted uranium," 64 Journal of
Environmental Radioactivity (2003) 116-117.
[6] See J.D. Edmands et al, `Uptake and mobility of uranium in black
oaks: implications for biomonitoring depleted uranium-contaminated
groundwater', 44 Chemosphere (2001) pp. 790-791.
[7] Dr. Tony Carter, Comparison of Kirkcudbright and Eskmeals
Environmental Monitoring Data for Generalized Derived Limits for
Uranium (London: Ministry of Defence, June 2002) vii.
[8] Supra n. 2 at p. 2. R. Pengelley, `The DU Debate: what are the
risks', Jane's Defence Weekly, 15 January 2001).
[9] The density of available tungsten alloys ranges from 17 g/cmł to
19 g/cmł, roughly equal to that of DU.
[10] International Tungsten Industry Association, `Tungsten',
(London, 1997) http://www.itia.org.uk/tunstext1.htm. `RO Defence
120mm tank gun ammunition', Jane's Defense Weekly, 8 January 2001.
Tungsten alloy ammunition contains tungsten (91-93%), nickel (3-5%),
and either cobalt (2-4%) or iron (2-4%).
[11] J. Middleton, `Elimination of Toxic/Hazardous Materials from
Small Caliber Ammunition An Overview', International Tungsten
Industry Association, December 2000 Newsletter, p. 5.
http://www.itia.org.uk.
[12] P. Bolté, `The Tank Killers Tungsten v. Depleted Uranium',
National Defense (May-June 1983) p. 44.
[13] Joint Technical Coordinating Group for Munitions Effectiveness
(JTCG/ME), Ad Hoc Working Group for Depleted Uranium, Special Report:
Medical and Environmental Evaluation of Depleted Uranium, Volume 1
(1974) pp. 1, 2.
[14] The Office of the Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of
Defense for Gulf War Illnesses, `Remarks by Dr. Bernard Rostker at
the American Legion Washington Conference', (Washington, DC, 23
March 1998) pp. 4, 5. http://www.gulflink.osd.mil/DU_speech.html.
[15] Joint Technical Coordinating Group for Munitions Effectiveness
(JTCG/ME), Ad Hoc Working Group for Depleted Uranium, Special Report:
Medical and Environmental Evaluation of Depleted Uranium, Volume 1
(1974) p. vi.
[16] Joint Technical Coordinating Group for Munitions Effectiveness
(JTCG/ME), Ad Hoc Working Group for Depleted Uranium, Special Report:
Medical and Environmental Evaluation of Depleted Uranium, Volume 1
(1974) p. 96.
[17] Memorandum by the Ministry of Defence, ;Anti-Armour Ammunition
with Depleted Uranium Penetrators', (March 1979) p. 2.
[18] Memorandum by the Ministry of Defence, `Anti-Armour Ammunition
with Depleted Uranium Penetrators', (March 1979) p. 2.
------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor --------------------~-->
Get fast access to your favorite Yahoo! Groups. Make Yahoo! your home page
http://us.click.yahoo.com/dpRU5A/wUILAA/yQLSAA/FGYolB/TM
--------------------------------------------------------------------~->
To unsubscribe from this groups send a message to
du-list-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com. In the body of the message type
unsubscribe and send.
*****************************************************************
45 Arms Control Association: Space Weapons and the Risk of Accidental Nuclear War
Arms Control Today:
Thomas Graham, Jr.
The United States and Russia maintain thousands of nuclear
warheads on long-range ballistic missiles on 15-minute alert.
Once launched, they cannot be recalled, and they will strike
their targets in roughly 30 minutes. Fifteen years after the end
of the Cold War, the chance of an accidental nuclear exchange
has far from decreased. Yet, the United States may be
contemplating further exacerbating this threat by deploying
missile interceptors in space.
Both the United States and Russia rely on space-based systems to
provide early warning of a nuclear attack. If deployed, however,
U.S. space-based missile defense interceptors could eliminate
the Russian early warning satellites quickly and without
warning. So, just the existence of U.S. space weapons could make
Russias strategic trigger fingers itchy.
The potential protection space-based defenses might offer the
United States is swamped therefore by their potential cost: a
failure of or false signal from a component of the Russian early
warning system could lead to a disastrous reaction and
accidental nuclear war. There is no conceivable missile defense,
space-based or not, that would offer protection in the event
that the Russian nuclear arsenal was launched at the United
States.
Nor are the Russians or other countries likely to stand still
and watch the United States construct space-based defenses.
These states are likely to respond by developing advanced
anti-satellite weapon systems.[1] These weapons, in turn, would
endanger U.S. early warning systems, impair valuable U.S.
weapons intelligence efforts, and increase the jitteriness of
U.S. officials.
The Dangers of Failed Early Warning Systems
The Russian early warning system is in serious disrepair. This
system consists of older radar systems nearing the end of their
operational life and just three functioning satellites, although
the Russian military has plans to deploy more. The United States
has 15 such satellites. Ten years ago, on January 25, 1995, this
aging early warning network picked up a rocket launch from
Norway. The Russian military could not determine the nature of
the missile or its destination. Fearing that it might be a
submarine-launched missile aimed at Moscow with the purpose of
decapitating the Russian command and control structure, the
Russian military alerted President Boris Yeltsin, his defense
minister, and the chief of the general staff. They immediately
opened an emergency teleconference to determine whether they
needed to order Russias strategic forces to launch a
counterattack.
The rocket that had been launched was actually an atmospheric
sounding rocket conducting scientific observations of the aurora
borealis. Norway had notified Russia of this launch several
weeks earlier, but the message had not reached the relevant
sections of the military. In little more than two minutes before
the deadline to order nuclear retaliation, the Russians realized
their mistake and stood down their strategic forces.
Thus, 10 years ago, when the declining Russian early warning
system was stronger than today, it read this single small
missile test launch as a U.S. nuclear missile attack on Russia.
The alarm went up the Russian chain of command all the way to
the top. The briefcase containing the nuclear missile launch
codes was brought to Yeltsin as he was told of the attack.
Fortunately, Yeltsin and the Russian leadership made the correct
decision that day and directed the Russian strategic nuclear
forces to stand down.
Obviously, nothing should be done in any way further to diminish
the reliability of the space-based components of U.S. and
Russian ballistic missile early warning systems. A decline in
confidence in such early warning systems caused by the
deployment of weapons in space would enhance the risk of an
accidental nuclear weapons attack. Yet, as part of its plans for
missile defense, the Pentagon is calling for the development of
a test bed for space-based interceptors as well as examining a
number of other exotic space weapons. In an interview published
in Arms Control Today, Lt. Gen. Henry Obering,director of the
Missile Defense Agency, touted what he said was a very modest
and moderate test-bed approach to launch some experiments.
Obering said the Pentagon would only deploy a handful of
interceptors: We are talking about onesies, twosies in terms of
experimentation.[2]
Despite Oberings claims, however, establishing a test bed for
missile defense in space, as opposed to current preliminary
research, would be a long step toward space weaponization. Once
space-based missile defenses are tested, they are likely to be
deployed, and in significant numbers, no matter if the tests are
successful.
To see the path that a space test bed is likely to follow, one
need only look at the present ground-based program: the Pentagon
claims there is little true difference between a test bed and an
operational deployment. Moreover, in space the deployment could
be more dramatic. Although the current ground-based
configuration envisions a few dozen interceptors, continuous
space coverage over a few countries of concern would likely
require a very large number of interceptors because a particular
interceptor will be above a particular target for only a few
minutes a day. Todays missile defenses provide very little real
protection as the United States currently faces no realistic
threat of deliberate attack by nuclear-armed long-range
missiles. But space weapons could actually be detrimental to
U.S. national security. They would increase the perceived
vulnerability of early warning systems to attack and cause
Russia and perhaps other countries such as China to pursue
potentially destabilizing countermeasures, such as advanced
anti-satellite weapons.
These dangers would be particularly worrisome for those
components that are placed in geosynchronous orbits (GEO). Space
objects in GEO are sufficiently far from the Earth (about 36,000
kilometers) so that their speed roughly matches the rotational
speed of the Earth and they remain stationary above one
location. To be sure, any country that can place a satellite in
these farther orbitsand there are severalcould potentially
threaten another countrys satellites there. Yet, it would be
easier to do so, and perhaps more importantly, the threat
perception would be greater with weapons based in space than
with existing ground-based technology. The 15 U.S. early warning
satellites are almost entirely in GEO. The three functioning
Russian early warning satellites utilize two different orbits.
Two of the satellites use a highly elliptical orbit, which
ranges from low-Earth orbit (LEO)100 to 2,000 kilometers above
the Earth where space objects travel at about 8 kilometers per
secondout to GEO. The other satellite is permanently stationed
in GEO.
Moreover, a space arms competition could hinder the flow of
satellite imagery that can be used to track activities that
might reveal programs to develop weapons of mass destruction in
countries of concern. For example, activities detected through
space-based collection systems can be used to trigger requests
for inspections pursuant to the Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC)(implicitly) or the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
(explicitly), should that treaty be brought into force. It is
important in this respect to recall that the suspicions that
Israel and South Africa may have conducted an atmospheric
nuclear test in 1979 were driven by readout from a U.S. VELA
satellite.
Similarly, the United States has benefited from the revolution
in national intelligence that began with and is based on
photographic reconnaissance satellites and related systems,
which has helped bring to an end the worst-case analysis and
close calls with nuclear war that existed throughout the Cold
War. If a truly peaceful and stable world order is ever
achieved, the advent of this technology beginning in the late
1950s will be regarded by future generations as a major
historical turning point.
These are crucial efforts that must never be allowed to be
disrupted, either by space-based weapons or with the relatively
simplistic ground-based anti-satellite weapon systems that could
today be deployed. The United States has considerable
anti-satellite weapons capability. An F-15-based homing vehicle
system was successfully tested in the 1980s, and the
anti-ballistic missile system currently being deployed in Alaska
and California has an inherent anti-satellite capability. Right
now, no other country is developing a counterspace system,
although the Soviet Union successfully tested a co-orbital
anti-satellite system in the 1970s and 1980s and Russia and
China are believed to be capable of doing so. Notably, 28
countries have ballistic missiles that can reach LEO satellites,
and all have the technical capability to develop a LEO
anti-satellite system by modifying these missiles.
Active defensesthe deployment of devices intended to deflect,
destroy, or render unworkable offensive systemscannot by
themselves be expected to provide adequate protection of space
assets either now or in the long term. These technologies, as
well as hardening and other passive means of defense, may
provide some means of defending against the current generation
of anti-satellite technology. Eventually, however, our would-be
attackers would find ways to counter those defenses. Thus, it
would appear that an agreed legal regime, predicated on mutually
beneficial and, of course, verifiable restraint, should at least
be considered.
Protecting Early Warning Systems
Rather than building space weapons, it may be best to put space
off-limits for arms. Domestic law in major spacefaring countries
around the world could prohibit programs for developing
space-based weapons. To reinforce this effort, there could be a
worldwide understanding that placing weapons in space or further
developing existing anti-satellite weapons capability is
contrary to international law and thereby a basis for economic
and political pressure and punitive sanctions by a united world
community. The best way to accomplish these twin objectives is
by the development and negotiation of an international treaty on
space weapons and anti-satellite weapons. Treaties become
domestic law when ratified, and they can establish worldwide
norms of behavior.
The Outer Space Treaty of 1967is included in a unique class of
arms control agreements sometimes referred to as nonarmament
treaties. These agreements were intended to prevent and have
been successful in preventing the deployment of weapons in areas
where they have not previously been present. Today, after more
than three decades, space remains free of weapons of mass
destruction thanks to the Outer Space Treaty. Pursuant to the
initiative of President Dwight Eisenhower, who at the time of
his establishment of NASA made it clear that it was U.S. policy
to keep space weapons-free, space remains free of weapons of all
kinds. Space has long been militarizedearly warning systems are
military systemsbut it has never been weaponized. This policy
has served us well for decades, and there is a strong burden of
persuasion on any who argue that it should be changed.
It was asserted during the administrations of George H. W. Bush
and Bill Clinton that there was no need for limitations beyond
the existing Outer Space Treaty as no arms race or threat of an
arms race in space existed. The Eisenhower policy held in the
United States and was supported everywhere else. Consistent with
the Bush-Clinton position, over the years, the United States
routinely opposed the creation of a negotiating mandate for
outer space at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. A number
of years ago, a more formal effort began in Geneva and New York
called Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS). The
United States did not support this, abstaining from voting on
the resolution in the UN General Assembly each year. And this
year it voted no. Moreover, the standard argument for
continuance of the Bush-Clinton position is no longer valid in
the wake of the January 2001 report of the Rumsfeld space
commission, which declared that a serious risk existed of a
Pearl Harbor in space.
It has been suggested that a legal regime to prevent the
weaponization of space could be crafted simply by expanding or
building on the Outer Space Treaty. There may be some merit to
this notion, especially considering that the treaty has more
than 90 states-parties. However, the subject is complicated, and
there are many important interests to protect in addition to
space assets for early warning and for intelligence and
verification such as remote sensing, telecommunications,
navigation, and the enhancement of ground-based military
capabilities.
An expanded Outer Space Treaty could include first and foremost
a prohibition on all weapons in space, both offensive and
defensive, as they are not distinguishable. Weapon would have to
be defined for the purposes of this treaty so as to exclude
space objects with a peaceful purpose and items that are not
relevant to the objective of preventing space weaponization.
Also, space objects designed to support terrestrial military
operations such as the Global Positioning System maintained by
the U.S. Air Force should be explicitly permitted. Some kind of
inspection of payloads of space launches would be necessary,
perhaps modified by the principle of managed access as found in
the CWC. Provisions on transparency of space activities and on
information sharing would be required. These amendatory
provisions could be negotiated in a separate stand-alone
protocol to reduce somewhat the risk of reopening other
provisions of the Outer Space Treaty.
Some have argued that it is premature to consider additional
legal obligations in space, that informal rules of the road
would get far more support. Others argue that the United States
must resist the call for any new international legal obligations
inhibiting the deployment of weapons in space. It is asserted
that any such agreement or arrangement would be unenforceable
and unverifiable and that the ignominious record of enforcing
and verifying treaties prohibiting activities on Earth is proof
enough to give pause to any conversation about a treaty
governing activities in space.[3]
Yet, where would we be without the nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty? Likely, more than 40 states would be armed with nuclear
weapons, meaning that every conflict would run the risk of going
nuclear, and nuclear weapons would be so widespread it would be
impossible to keep them out of the hands of terrorist
organizations. Where would we be without the strategic arms
limitation and reduction agreements of the 1970s, 1980s, and
1990s? Likely, the United States and Russia would have so many
nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles, they could
never be controlled. Where would we be without the Outer Space
Treaty? Nuclear weapons could be orbiting the Earth with the
capability to strike anywhere, anytime without warning. Where
are we now in the wake of the dissolution of the Anti-Ballistic
Missile (ABM) Treaty? We possibly could be on the verge of
actively considering the development and deployment of
space-based ABM systems that would address no current or
foreseeable threat but could unhinge strategic stability.
The history of the last 50 years teaches us that, if dangerous
weapons and technologies are to be controlled to the safety and
security of all, it must be done early, before the programs
become entrenched. That time may well be now with respect to
weapons in space. The United States does not have a secure
future in space without broad and sustained international
cooperation. The deployment of weapons in space, whether
offensive or defensive, would make this necessary cooperation
difficult if not impossible. There would likely be retaliation,
which would seriously degrade the progress that has been made
over the last five or six decades toward multilateral
international cooperation in space.
The groundwork for a comprehensive treaty-based regime has been
laid, and the importance of this objective is clear. Much work
remains, but the creation of a space regime, under which the
international community decisively enshrines space as a peaceful
environment, ultimately is the only thoroughgoing alternative to
a weaponized space free-for-all. The United States and the rest
of the world risk being rendered forever vulnerable to the
vagaries and fluctuations of technology development. In this age
of a worldwide struggle against international terrorism, this is
the last thing we should want.
Preventing the weaponization of space is of paramount importance
to world stability. Any deployment of weapons of a significant
nature in space, particularly highly capable weapons systems
such as a space-based missile defense, could provoke
countermeasures. There are many important assets in space, and
it is highly likely that they will only continue to flourish in
the current sanctuary environment in place since the days of
Eisenhower. Above all, we should never take the slightest chance
of impairing early warning systems on which the long nuclear
peace between the United States and Russia may continue to
depend.
Thomas Graham, Jr. is a former special representative of the
president for arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament.
In this and other senior capacities, he participated in every
major arms control and nonproliferation negotiation in which the
United States took part from 1970 to 1997. Graham is the author
of Disarmament Sketches (2002), Cornerstones of Security with
Damien LaVera (2003), and Common Sense on Weapons of Mass
Destruction (2004).
ENDNOTES
1. Michael Krepon, Space Weapons and Proliferation,
Nonproliferation Review, September 2005.
2. “Defending Missile Defense: An Interview With Missile
Defense Agency Director Lt. Gen. Henry Obering,” Arms
Control Today, November 2005, pp. 6-11.
3. Jeff Kueter and Andrew Plieninger, Saving Space: Securing Our
Space Assets, Marshall Institute Policy Outlook, July 2005.
The Arms Control Association is a non-profit, membership-based
organization. If you find our resources useful, please consider
joining or making a contribution. Arms Control Today encourages
reprint of its articles with permission of the Editor.
© 2005 Arms Control Association, 1150 Connecticut Avenue, NW,
Suite 620 Washington, DC 20036 Tel: (202) 463-8270 | Fax: (202)
463-8273
*****************************************************************
46 STLtoday: They told him it was safe'
Maggie Carlson
St. Louis Post-Dispatch
Of the Suburban JournalsO'Fallon Mo Journal12/04/2005
Mary Lou Johnson works at her desk at her family business, the DS
Johnson Insurance Group, Friday. Since her husband died in 1998,
she said her job responsibilities and worries that come with
running a business have more than doubled. (Ryan Prewitt
photo/Suburban Journals)
WELDON SPRING
As many former nuclear weapons workers are receiving government
compensation for their radiation-induced illnesses, others
continue to wait for reparation.
Many of those still waiting are the former workers of
Mallinckrodt's Weldon Spring uranium processing plant or their
families.
The daughters of former worker David S. Johnson, who died in
1998, wonder when and if they will be compensated after being
denied twice.
Johnson began working for Mallinckrodt in Weldon Spring in 1957,
but the results of his alleged exposure to radiation did not
show up until 40 years later.
Freshly out of high school, Johnson took a job at the uranium
plant as an office clerk, but his daughters, LeAnn Cross and
Karen Johnson, said the title didn't match the job description.
"When we talked to him, we found out they did much more than
office work," Cross said. "He worked in the mail room, but he
was also asked to deliver unidentified containers to locations
within the plant, as well as to other plants."
Their father told them that some of the containers had lids and
some didn't. Some were made of Styrofoam. Sometimes he was asked
to make the deliveries in his own vehicle, where the radioactive
contents would sometimes spill out.
"Some of the contents of the canisters just resembled dirt or
liquid," Karen said. "He said they treated it like it was
nothing. They treated it like it was water."
Johnson occasionally wore the badge given to him and other
workers. It was said to measure the radioactive beta and gamma
rays that the workers came in contact with.
But his daughters said he probably did not wear it when he made
deliveries, believing he was not at risk.
"He was 18," Cross said. "He wasn't going to question authority.
They told him it was safe and he believed it."
We are just outraged'
David Johnson worked at Mallinckrodt until 1961, when he left
for the U.S. Air Force. His daughters said it was when he began
taking physics classes at Washington University in St. Louis and
the University of Missouri-St. Louis that he began to question
what effect the exposure might have on him.
He found out in 1997, at the age of 58.
"He was a healthy guy and went on to run a business then, one
day, while he was waiting for our mom to go to lunch, he fell to
floor with a seizure," Cross said. "He was rushed to the
emergency room and they found a mass on his brain."
He was diagnosed with glioblastoma multiforme, a high grade,
highly malignant brain tumor. He was given five months to five
years to live. He died six months later.
His wife Mary Johnson took over his business, DS Johnson
Insurance Group, in O'Fallon. In 2002, she found out there might
be a way to receive compensation.
In 2000, Congress passed the Energy Employees Occupational
Illness Compensation Program Act, which offered $150,000 to each
nuclear weapons worker who developed cancer, silicosis or
beryllium disease as a result of exposure to radioactive
materials at the workplace. Deceased workers' families are also
entitled to this compensation.
Karen said they heard about a group of these workers that met,
trying to get compensation. She said they went to the first
meeting in 2002.
Advocate Denise Brock of Moscow Mills organized the meeting.
Brock's father worked at Mallinckrodt and suffered from leukemia
and lung cancer before dying in 1978.
Through these meetings, the Johnson family realized there were
other people going through similar experiences.
"The first meeting I had no idea there were others, and I heard
these older gentlemen who worked there and most of them were
ill," Karen said. "The stories were unbelievable -- it sounded
like it was out of a movie. One after the other, you think 'is
this really true?'"
After the meetings, Mary Johnson applied for compensation twice,
but was denied both times.
"We are just outraged," Karen said. "It's ridiculous."
"It's $150,000," Cross said. "It's nothing compared to the
medical bills, income loss and our loss and suffering.
Brock dealt with Washington for the next three years to get
workers immediate reparations.
The first victory came in February and the next one in November.
Together, these two Special Exposure Cohorts gave compensation
to those who worked Mallinckrodt's St. Louis plant between the
years 1942 and 1957. To qualify, they must have worked during
that period for at least 250 days, and developed one of 22 rare
cancers.
They are then eligible to receive $150,000 to $400,000 from the
government.
Losing hope
Johnson's daughters said the process to get compensation is
tedious.
To receive compensation, the National Institute for Occupational
Health and Safety has to perform a dose reconstruction to see if
the illness could have been caused by the workplace radiation,
Brock said.
A dose reconstruction looks at a number of components for each
case, such as a site profile, radiation information from the
badge, the type of illness, the worker's job title and the
number of year's worked there.
Brock said this information is plugged into a program and if the
number comes out 50 percent or higher, the worker or family is
eligible for compensation.
The site profile is just one problem with her father's dose
reconstruction.
"They never did a site profile of the Weldon Spring site," Karen
said. "They pull up a site profile from another facility that
may or may not even have the same chemicals."
They also don't think the badge data is accurate, considering
the workers did not always wear them.
"We don't think there is enough information to deny it," Cross
said.
They are now left waiting to see what will happen after the two
groups from Mallinckrodt's St. Louis plant received reparations.
"I think we started feeling like the government started paying
claims to the St. Louis site to shut up the whole region, and
then start issuing denials without even doing a site profile,"
Cross said.
Others share in their frustration.
Dorothy Heitz, of St. Louis County, said her late husband, Rudy,
worked at the Weldon Spring site from 1957 to 1966.
"He was exposed to uranium I don't know how many times," she
said. "He had all kinds of illnesses after he worked there."
Heitz said she is not expecting the compensation any time soon.
"I've been sending in requests since 2002," Heitz said. "I don't
have my hopes up anymore."
It's not about money
Brock, however, said she will not walk away. She is already
preparing the petition to form another Special Exposure Cohort.
But Brock fears getting a cohort for the Weldon Spring workers
will be more difficult than the last two.
She said that two members of the 12-person Advisory Board for
Radiation and Worker Health, have been replaced members who,
Brock said, are more "pro-nuclear." This board approves the
requests to recognize a special cohort.
"The government that made this problem is overseeing it," Brock
said.
And if the cohort is denied, Brock said she is prepared to take
it straight to the White House.
No matter the outcome, money has little to do with it, Cross and
Karen said.
"We lost our dad before be expected to, and it changed our
mother," Cross said. "They were a joined-at-the-hip couple. She
was left to run a family business. She lost her life partner and
her best friend."
Maggie Carlson can be contacted at mcarlson@yourjournal.com
St. Louis Post-Dispatch.
*****************************************************************
47 AU ABC: Former naval officers seek compensation for beryllium exposure
The World Today - Monday, 5 December , 2005 12:34:00
Reporter: Matt Wordsworth
ELEANOR HALL: Several former Australian naval officers are
preparing to launch a lawsuit against the Federal Government,
alleging that they were exposed to a potentially deadly metal
between the 1960s and the 1980s.
Dust from beryllium can cause a condition similar to asbestosis.
There's no cure, and the officers say that they came into
contact with the metal in the course of their duties stripping
paint from ships.
The beryllium issue has already been fought in the United
States, and government employees there have received large
compensation payouts.
But, as Matt Wordsworth reports, the Australian Government says
beryllium was never used in Australia.
MATT WORDSWORTH: Beryllium is a common metal used in everything
from television sets to dental bridges. It's cheap, strong and a
good conductor. But in powder form it's potentially deadly.
Bob Currin came into contact with beryllium while in the Navy
between the late 60s and early 80s. He says it was then used in
jason pistols, the drills that stripped paint off ships.
BOB CURRIN: Oh, you used to come out of the tanks and the spaces
where you're working absolutely covered in dust.
I can still remember my wife complaining that when I came home
at nighttime, even though I'd showered and everything, the next
morning she'd have to get up and change the sheets because of
the perspiration and the dirt that came out of your system even
after you'd washed yourself.
MATT WORDSWORTH: Now he says his life has been ruined.
BOB CURRIN: You have shortness of breath, you have symptoms very
similar to chronic fatigue syndrome, you have aching joints to
the point where you can't sleep at night because of the joint
swelling and aching and you also have - some people, not all
people - a skin rash.
Now, unfortunately there is no treatment for it whatsoever and
it is terminal once you have the berylliosis.
MATT WORDSWORTH: What's your health like?
BOB CURRIN: Mine is not good. I was supposed to have an
operation for this but now I can't have an operation because my
lungs have deteriorated.
MATT WORDSWORTH: Not everyone who comes into contact with
beryllium will go on to suffer berylliosis. Research has shown
only about one in seven people are susceptible.
But symptoms can take more than 20 years to appear and Brisbane
lawyer Simon Harrison says more and more sufferers are coming
forward.
SIMON HARRISON: It's similar to asbestosis. I think it's more
akin to blue asbestosis, which is a very virulent lung disorder,
and at the present time there's no cure for berylliosis.
MATT WORDSWORTH: He's now preparing a mass negligence action and
the payouts could be huge.
The United States Government has already offered its affected
employees $150,000 each.
SIMON HARRISON: In terms of compensation, what we're looking
for, of course, is an undertaking or preferably an order
enforcing the Government to conduct life-long monitoring and
testing so that people can just be checked out every now and
then, make sure that everything is under control.
We're also looking for compensation for the fear of these
conditions and the conditions, of course, themselves. So these
could be quite significant claims.
MATT WORDSWORTH: But Simon Harrison says Veterans Affairs
Minister De-Anne Kelly has done a complete about turn.
SIMON HARRISON: On the 25th of January this year we got a media
release by the Defence Department which said: "Navy no longer
uses jason pistols needles containing beryllium, but
acknowledges that jason pistol needles containing beryllium were
used in the past."
They then set up a helpline.
We then get a back flip about a month ago when De-Anne Kelly
writes to me and says: "the jason pistols used by Defence have
not used rods made of beryllium."
We've written for an explanation from the minister. We're yet to
receive a reply.
MATT WORDSWORTH: Veterans Affairs Minister De-Anne Kelly was not
available for comment this morning. Court action is expected to
begin early next year.
ELEANOR HALL: Matt Wordsworth in Brisbane with that report.
*****************************************************************
48 [NukeNet] DOE Pushing Spent Fuel Reprocessing
Date: Mon, 05 Dec 2005 14:55:40 -0800
NukeNet Anti-Nuclear Network (nukenet@energyjustice.net)
Science 2 December 2005:
Vol. 310. no. 5753, p. 1406
NUCLEAR POWER:
Congress Tells DOE to Take Fresh Look at Recycling
Spent Reactor Fuel
Eli Kintisch
The United States is laying plans that could lead
to recycling commercial nuclear waste into fuel
for the first time in almost 30 years. But critics
worry that such a boost for nuclear power could
undermine global efforts to stop the spread of
nuclear weapons.The Department of Energy's (DOE's)
new budget, signed by President George W. Bush
last month, contains $50 million toward a goal of
beginning construction on an engineering-scale
reprocessing plant by 2010. Supporters say that
recycling fuel could not only save time and money
but also ease a mounting nuclear waste problem.
Opponents dispute each of those points, adding
that the technology needed is not yet at hand and
that the United States, by recycling waste, would
be sending the wrong signal to the rest of the
world.Researchers have explored reprocessing spent
nuclear fuel rods since the dawn of the nuclear
age. U.S. government officials pushed recycling
commercial fuel in the 1960s when uranium was
thought to be scarce and plutonium was considered
a good fuel.
Separating out the plutonium and uranium from
other fissionable material also would reduce
quantities of certain types of highly radioactive
nuclear waste, thus in theory increasing the
storage potential at the yet-to-be-built Yucca
Mountain repository in Nevada. "The pursuit of
[safe] recycling technologies . must be considered
not just a worthwhile but a necessary goal," DOE
Secretary Samuel Bodman said earlier this month.
Reduce, reuse, recycle? Argonne's Laurel Barnes
studies a nuclear fuel
reprocessing technique that converts oxide fuel
to metal.CREDIT: ARGONNE NATIONAL LABORATORY
But plutonium is also used in nuclear weapons, and
critics say that producing more of it increases
the likelihood that some will get into the wrong
hands. The United Kingdom, France, and Japan use
an aqueous method to recover uranium and plutonium
from spent fuel rods. That technique, called
PUREX, involves dissolving the rods with acid and
chemically separating the two fuels. Japanese
scientists have found that the approach is not
economically viable, and the French experience has
been mixed. Supporters also say reprocessing could
forestall construction of an expensive second
storage facility if, as projected, Yucca runs out
of space within a decade--assuming the facility
overcomes legal barriers to open.
With the growing interest in nuclear energy as an
alternative to greenhouse gas-emitting
technologies, scientists have developed advanced
reprocessing techniques aimed at solving the waste
issue without adding to the proliferation threat.
One experimental approach, touted by scientists at
DOE's Argonne National Laboratory in Illinois, is
to use aqueous methods similar to PUREX with extra
chemical steps to keep plutonium mixed with
uranium and to retain nasty fission products that
make the product too radioactive to steal. Another
method, called pyroprocessing, employs
electrochemistry to create a metal fuel that could
include a fission product called cerium-144, which
remains highly radioactive for 2 years. The fuel,
which would be hot and therefore tough for thieves
to handle, could theoretically be fed immediately
into an adjacent reactor to provide power, say
advocates. Argonne deputy associate lab director
Phillip Finck says that radiation monitors and
tight security could make both recycling methods
proliferation-resistant.
But Princeton University physicist Frank von
Hippel and others dispute the advantages. Most
U.S. spent fuel is about 20 years old, he points
out, making the nonproliferation advantages of
cerium in pyroprocessing "irrelevant for the spent
fuel we have."
Monitoring techniques to keep track of plutonium
in a complex facility are woefully inadequate,
says Edwin Lyman of the Union of Concerned
Scientists in Cambridge, Massachusetts. Moreover,
said Representative Edward Markey (D-MA) during a
House debate in May, the current ban on
reprocessing nuclear fuel "gives us the high moral
ground as we look at the North Koreans and
Iranians to tell them not to do it." In 1977,
President Jimmy Carter halted federal support for
commercial recycling after India used civilian
reprocessing to obtain nuclear weapons.
Experts say the technology is likely to remain
prohibitively expensive. A 1996 National Research
Council study found that recycling existing U.S.
spent fuel rods could cost up to $100 billion;
building the fast reactors to burn recycled fuel
obtained by pyroprocessing or by advanced methods
would be a major element of that cost. A 2003
study by researchers at Harvard University and the
University of Maryland found that reprocessing
uranium using current industrial methods would be
economical only if the cost of obtaining uranium
were to increase by a factor of 10. Geologists
have only recently begun to look for new sources,
but former Argonne reprocessing specialist Milt
Levenson says the price could soon rise if demand
increases--although he says there are too many
factors at play to make an economic argument for
or against reprocessing.
Reprocessing could cut storage costs by keeping
very-long-lasting isotopes in the fuel cycle, say
supporters, allowing DOE to store the fission
products with less long-term heat more compactly
within Yucca. The Yucca repository is designed to
store spent fuel rods in dry casks for 10,000
years. Opponents of reprocessing would prefer that
U.S. utilities continue to follow that course--and
that Congress expand Yucca only after exploring
aboveground storage for fuel rods.
Research on advanced recycling should continue,
they add, but not at the risk of undermining
diplomatic efforts to stop reprocessing abroad. If
recycling methods show promise down the road, they
say, spent fuel could be retrieved from Yucca and
tapped for power. "We don't need to do it now. We
don't have the technical knowledge to do it now,"
says physics Nobelist Burt Richter, a member of an
American Physical Society technical committee that
in May called for a cautious approach.
But growing energy demands require more nuclear
plants, say supporters, and the waste problem
needs reprocessing. "The federal government does a
lot that isn't economical," says Representative
Judy Biggert (R-IL), whose district includes
Argonne, "often because doing so is in the best
interests of the nation for other reasons." By
giving DOE its marching orders, Congress has
revived the debate over exactly what those
interests are.
_______________________________________________________________________
Subscribe/Unsubscribe Here: http://www.energyjustice.net/nukenet/
Change your settings or access the archives at:
http://energyjustice.net/mailman/listinfo/nukenet_energyjustice.net
*****************************************************************
49 NRC: NRC Seeks Comments on Proposal Requiring Electronic Submissions for Most Agency Hearings
News Release - 2005-16
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Office of Public Affairs Telephone: 301/415-8200
Washington, DC 20555-0001 E-mail:
No. 05-163 December 5, 2005
comment on a proposed rule that would require electronic
submissions for all agency hearings. Presently, electronic
submissions are required only with respect to an application for
a high-level radioactive waste repository.
If the proposal becomes a final rule, the Commission expects NRC
adjudicatory proceedings will be expedited and the cost reduced.
Under the proposed rule, electronic submissions would need to be
made to all of the NRCs adjudicatory boards and to other parties
in the proceedings. Under the proposed rule, exceptions would be
made to allow paper filings only in limited circumstances.
The proposed rule builds on developments in the federal courts
as well as previous NRC rules and creates a uniform system for
electronic submissions. Since 2001, the NRC has encouraged power
reactor licensees to submit documents either through an
electronic information exchange system or on CD-Rom. In 2003,
the NRC issued a final rule that allowed licensees, vendors,
applicants and members of the public to submit documents,
including Freedom of Information Act requests, in an electronic
format. Almost all parties in adjudicatory proceedings currently
file by electronic mail, although they are not required to do
so. The public may submit comments on the proposed rule and
related draft guidance within 75 days of publication of the
notice in the Federal Register, expected soon. Comments
submitted later than this date may be considered if practical.
The NRC staff will also hold a public meeting to demonstrate
electronic filings and answer questions on Jan. 10, 2006. The
public meeting will be held in the auditorium at NRC
headquarters, Two White Flint North, 11545 Rockville Pike,
Rockville, Md.
Comments can be submitted to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, D.C., 20555-0001, ATTN: Rulemaking and
Adjudications Staff. Comments can also be hand-carried to 11555
Rockville Pike, Rockville, Md., between 7:30 a.m. and 4:15 p.m.
on federal work days, or they can be faxed to 301-415-1101.
E-mail comments can also be sent to . In addition, comments can
also be submitted through the NRCs rulemaking Web page, at .
Please include 3150-RIN AH74 in the subject line of your
comments.
Last revised Monday, December 05, 2005
*****************************************************************
50 Indiatimes: Uranium finds to boost nuke energy plans[Add to Clippings
DEBJOY SENGUPTA
TIMES NEWS NETWORK[ TUESDAY, DECEMBER 06, 2005 12:15:11 AM]
KOLKATA: The problem of uranium shortage will be addressed
over the next 18 months and this is likely to speed up nuclear
power projects. Indications are that the likes of NTPC, Bhel,
L&T and Reliance Energy, will consequently, be able to set up
nuclear power plants with Nuclear Power Corp.
Additionally, the department of atomic energy (DAE) has
discovered uranium at three locations in central India and
assessments suggest there are adequate mining reserves.
Baldev Raj, a DAE director, said prospecting may be completed in
the next 18 months, although he declined to divulge the
locations for security reasons.
The DAEs atomic mineral division is in talks with all related
parties and we are trying to expedite the whole process. At DAE,
we are sure that these locations hold enough reserves for viable
mining, he said.
There are enough uranium reserves in the North-east but
environmental factors are coming in the way and we dont intend
to upset the ecological balance, said Mr Raj. Reserves in
central India will help India set up additional nuclear power
stations , he said.
DAE is also looking at the possibility of allowing NTPC, Bhel,
L&T, and Reliance Energy to set up nuclear power stations in
collaboration with NPC. The success of this project depends on
new uranium finds.
If the current discovery is good enough, a new company can be
floated soon, said Dr Raj.
Indian uranium reserves are a tiny 0.8% of the worlds and India
has ten nuclear power reactors in operation. Four plants are
currently under construction and another ten are in the
pipeline. These include the 500 MW plant fully designed and
developed in India.
The government is also contemplating a few light water
reactor-based plants with foreign collaboration to accelerate
the growth of nuclear power. The immediate objective is to
achieve 20,000 MW of nuclear generation capacity by 20.
The success of the governments plan to allow non-nuclear power
companies to enter this arena will also depend on uranium
discovered from these areas, added Dr Raj.
The centre has also cleared four sites for nuclear power
stations. These are at Kudankulam in Tamil Nadu, Kakrapar in
Gujarat, Rawatbhata in Rajasthan, and Jaitapur in Maharashtra.
Copyright © 2005 Times Internet Limited. All rights reserved.
*****************************************************************
51 Platts: Yucca Mountain application appears unlikely to go to NRC in FY-06
Washington (Platts)--2Dec2005
The Dept of Energy's defense of a repository license application
is not a spending priority for the civilian nuclear waste program
in fiscal-year 2006, but the preparation of an application will
be, a move that suggests the department will not send an
application to NRC this fiscal year, which ends Sept 30, 2006.
In response to questions from Platts, DOE spokesman Allen
Benson listed priorities for the program's $450-mil budget as
"full investments in science and technology, full investments in
preparing a license application [for a repository with minimal
fuel handling], and full investments in improving safety
infrastructure." The allocation for FY-06, which began Oct 1, is
30% below the administration's budget request and 20% below its
FY-05 level.
"Clearly, we're not where we wanted to be...especially in
terms of not being in a license-defense mode," Benson said. The
repository planned for Yucca Mountain, Nevada, will be the
disposal facility for thousands of metric tons of utility spent
nuclear fuel.
Separately, DOE told an NRC licensing board in a Dec 1
status report that contractor Bechtel SAIC Co has not yet
completed a report detailing program changes needed to develop
and implement a new cradle-to-grave canister system that would
minimize repository fuel handling requirements.
It added that DOE was unlikely to complete its review of
that report, once received, during first quarter of calendar year
2006. "Any time thereafter required to revise the license
application will depend on the nature and extent of the
modifications," the report stated. ---Elaine Hiruo,
elaine_hiruo@platts.com
For more information, take a trial to Platts Nucleonics Week
at http://nucweek.platts.com.
Copyright © 2005 - Platts, All Rights Reserved [The McGraw-Hill
Companies]
*****************************************************************
52 Socialist Alliance: No nuke dump campaign: a fighting spirit
Socialist Alliance website![]()
*****************************************************************