***************************************************************** 09/08/05 **** RADIATION BULLETIN(RADBULL) **** VOL 13.208 ***************************************************************** RADBULL IS PRODUCED BY THE ABALONE ALLIANCE CLEARINGHOUSE ***************************************************************** Send News Stories to news@energy-net.org with title on subject line and first line of body NUCLEAR POLICY 1 BBC: China bank named in N Korea probe 2 Xinhua: Six-party talks to resume September 13 3 Korea Times: Nuke Talks to Reopen Tuesday 4 N.Korea six-party talks to resume 5 Guardian Unlimited: China: Six-Party Nuke Talks to Resume 9/13 6 Korea: Digital Chosunilbo: Seoul Suggests Asking N.Korea to APEC Mee 7 US: [du-list] Fw: [ACP] et comment Ch 1 - 2 : 1-1 8 US: [du-list] Entergy answered after the posting on DU list 9 ACA: U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation: A Reality Check 10 US: ACA: U.S. Nuclear Weapons Guidance, War Plans 11 Asia Times: The unthinkable: A nuclear-armed Japan 12 ACA: Between Noble Goals and Sobering Reality: An Interview with EU 13 ACA: LOOKING BACK: The UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Co NUCLEAR REACTORS 14 US: NRC: Waterford Nuclear Plant Terminates Unusual Event 15 US: newsobserver.com: $2 billion riding on nuclear initiative 16 RIA Novosti: Russian nuclear official says Russia is world's third s 17 US: Michigan Daily: Research reactor causes concern among regulators 18 Xinhua: Nuclear power equipment deal inked 19 US: NRC: Agency Information Collection Activities: Submission for th 20 Asia Times: SEG to equip Qinshan nuclear station 21 Asia Times: Let a hundred reactors bloom 22 EMS: IAEA deliberately downplays Chernobyl death toll to pave way fo 23 US: HVN: Kelly calls on FEMA to address Indian Point emergency prepa 24 Reuters: China seeks to allay US fears on energy resources 25 US: Reuters: Duke's S.C. Oconee 3 power unit up to 91 pct power 26 US: Reuters: Entergy Louisiana Waterford nuke moves closer to restar 27 AU ABC: Nuclear power will not solve climate change 28 Guardian Unlimited Envoy: Pakistan Wants Civilian Nuke Deal NUCLEAR SECURITY NUCLEAR SAFETY 29 [du-list] Medical evacuations from Iraq 30 [du-list] Understanding why we don't understand 31 US: [du-list] Mass AG certifies ballot initiative to bring Guard 32 US: NRC: RIN 3150-AH68: 10,000 year dose standard 33 US: OERP: Study of Leukemia at Portsmouth Naval Shipyard 34 US: OERP: Mortality Update for Pantex Weapons Facility 35 US: OERP: Mortality & Radiation-Related Risk of Cancer Study at INEE NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE 36 [epa-impact] USEC Inc.'s Proposed American Centrifuge Plant; Notice 37 US: Platts: DCS' request for MOX fuel fabrication facility license d 38 Chemical & Engineering News: Nevada Sues NRC Over Yucca License 39 Chillicothe Gazette: USEC restructuring won't affect Piketon operati 40 US: Salt Lake Tribune: NRC is unlikely to back Utah on N-waste prote 41 NRC: USEC Inc.'s Proposed American Centrifuge Plant; Notice of 42 US: ACA: Is U.S. Reprocessing Worth The Risk? 43 Scoop: Scientists Against Spent Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing 44 US: Scoop: Howard prioritises uranium exports over security 45 US: AU ABC: Uranium price hike tipped to lift interest. PEACE US DEPT. OF ENERGY 46 Livermore Lab Security Critized 47 DOE: Notice of Availability of a Supplement Analysis for ***************************************************************** ***************************************************************** FULL NEWS STORIES ***************************************************************** ***************************************************************** 1 BBC: China bank named in N Korea probe Last Updated: Thursday, 8 September 2005 [Foreign exchange board at a Bank of China branch] Bank of China says it is unaware of any US investigation China's number two bank, Bank of China, has been named in media reports as the subject of a US inquiry into an illicit North Korean fund-raising network. The bank is suspected by the US of links to criminal syndicates helping to finance Pyongyang's nuclear programme, the Wall Street Journal reported. The bank and two others based in Macau were caught up in a major US operation to shut down the trade, the paper said. The bank declined to comment, saying it had no knowledge of any investigation. "We have always attached great importance to anti-money laundering activities," bank spokeswoman Clarina Man said. Another bank named in the report, Seng Heng Bank, also declined to comment. The third bank, Banco Delta, said it was surprised by the report, as it had always complied strictly with anti-money laundering regulations. Hard currency The US investigation centres on "lucrative North Korean enterprises producing narcotics, counterfeit US currency and fake cigarettes", the Wall Street Journal said in its front-page report. It said such ventures produced the hard currency Pyongyang needed to procure weapons technology abroad. According to former North Korean traders and financiers who had fled their country, North Korean banks and businesses were reliant on foreign banks for nearly all international transactions, the Wall Street Journal reported. The paper said the US secret service, justice department, immigration and customs authorities and other agencies were investigating the banks as part of a new initiative against nuclear proliferation that the White House unveiled in June. In recent weeks, more than 80 people had been arrested in raids in the US and Taiwan targeting the North Korean networks, while more than $5m had been seized in fake $100 bills, the report said. ***************************************************************** 2 Xinhua: Six-party talks to resume September 13 www.xinhuanet.com www.chinaview.cn 2005-09-08 19:08:46 Special report: Fourth-round six-party talks [The second phase of the fourth-round six-party talks on the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue is to resume on Sept. 13 in Beijing, said Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang here Thursday. ] The representatives from the six countries involved in six-party talks on North Korea's nuclear program hold hands as the meeting officially begins in Beijing July 26, 2005. (Reuters) BEIJING, Sept. 8 (Xinhuanet) -- The second phase of the fourth-round six-party talks on the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue is to resume on Sept. 13 in Beijing, said Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang here Thursday. The talks will be open-ended since all the parties concerned need to make full consultations on issues concerning how to realize denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, Qin said at a regular press conference. "The ending date of the talks will be decided by all concerned parties according to the results of their consultations," Qin said. The process of denuclearization is difficult and complicated, Qin said. "We can not expect to solve all the problems in just several rounds of talks, but we are not pessimistic because of that." As long as the six parties could proceed from the overall situation of denuclearization and the maintenance of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, show flexibility and take a pragmatic attitude in discussing related related issues, progress would be achieved step by step during the denuclearization process, the spokesman said. As the negotiation is drawing near, Qin said hoped that three dialogue and consultations and in the spirit of mutual respects, equal consultations, mutual understanding and mutual accommodation, all the parties concerned could take the opportunity to find a solution that gives consideration to the concerns and interests of the parties and is acceptable for all parties. "China, as one of the six parties and host for the talks, wouldmake unswerving efforts for the talks to achieve positive results," Qin said, noting that all the parties concerned need to show a pragmatic attitude flexibility and make joint efforts to make progress in the talks. The fourth round of the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue talks started from July 26 and recessed on Aug. 7 for resumption originally scheduled in the week beginning Aug. 29. Int'l co-op in anti-terrorism needs to be fortified The international community is still facing the challenge and threat of terrorism, and thus needs to strengthen cooperation, Qin Gang said. Terrorism is public hazard of the mankind. The international community should make concerted efforts to combat terrorism, he said. Terrorist incidents have happened in succession in Turkey, the United Kingdom and Kenya, and China is also the victim of terrorism," Qin said. He stressed that China's stance on anti-terrorism is persistent, opposing terrorism in all forms. However, the spokesman noted, there should not be double standards in anti-terrorism. Anti-terrorism should benefit world peace and security and promote the progress and prosperity of the mankind. He said anti-terrorism should comply with the United Nations Charter and basic norms of international laws, highlighting that China opposes connection of the issue with certain religion and nationality. "In order to eliminate terrorism, we should eradicate its source", Qin said. Chinese FM to attend general debate of 60th UN General Assembly session Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing will head a delegation to attend the general debate of the 60th UN General Assembly session, Qin Gang announced at the press conference. Qin said that Li will speak to the general debate, explaining Chinese government's stance on development, UN reform and the African issues. Li will also participant in the bilateral and multi-lateral activities. They include the meetings with UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, UN General Assembly President Jan Eliasson, and foreign ministers of some countries, as well as the consultations with the Rio Group, Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, and the European Troika foreign ministers. Enditem Copyright ©2003 Xinhua News Agency. All rights reserved. ***************************************************************** 3 Korea Times: Nuke Talks to Reopen Tuesday Hankooki.com > The Korea Times > Nation By Park Song-wu Staff Reporter The second session of the six-party talks on North Korea¡¯s nuclear programs will resume in Beijing on Tuesday, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade said in a press release Thursday. Song Min-soon, deputy minister, will head the Seoul delegation to the talks, which will not have a scheduled closing date, following the format of the first session of the negotiations. The first session, held from July 26 to Aug. 7, entered a recess after the participating nations failed to narrow their differences on a pair of key issues _ the scope of nuclear dismantlement and Pyongyang¡¯s hope to retain civilian nuclear facilities. Unification Minister Chung Dong-young, who concurrently heads the standing committee of the National Security Council, predicted at a seminar in Seoul earlier in the day that Pyongyang¡¯s demand for a light-water reactor will be the stumbling block in the upcoming talks. It is not yet clear whether North Korea wants to see the completion of the two light-water reactors in Sinpo, South Hamkyong Province, or to retain a right to have such reactors in the future. Pyongyang obtained the reactors in a 1994 deal with Washington. South Korea has wanted to scrap the Sinpo project since it recently pledged to provide electricity to North Korea. Participating countries in the six-party talks _ the two Koreas, the U.S., host China, Russia and Japan _ originally planned to reconvene in Beijing in the week of Aug. 29. But North Korea delayed it two weeks, citing the annual South Korea-U.S. military exercise and Washington¡¯s appointment of a special envoy to monitor Pyongyang¡¯s human rights situation. Officials in Seoul say that Washington might have a ``flexible¡¯¡¯ approach toward Pyongyang¡¯s hope to have peaceful nuclear programs. But experts say that it remains to be seen how much flexible the U.S. will be toward the ``nuclear ex-convict.¡¯¡¯ The U.S. insisted that North Korea should not be allowed to have any nuclear programs, citing Pyongyang¡¯s past history of violating international nuclear treaties including the 1994 accord. But South Korea says Pyongyang should be given the right to have peaceful nuclear programs if it abandons all nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons programs and restores confidence by rejoining the non-proliferation treaty and abiding by the U.N.¡¯s nuclear safeguard regulations. North Korea expelled nuclear inspectors at the end of 2002 and quit the non-proliferation treaty in January 2003, when Washington accused Pyongyang of running a secret uranium-enrichment program. North Korea has denied the claim. im@koreatimes.co.kr 09-08-2005 19:20 ***************************************************************** 4 N.Korea six-party talks to resume Tuesday Thu Sep 8, 2005 3:38 AM ET BEIJING, Sept 8 (Reuters) - Six-party talks on North Korea's nuclear crisis will resume on Tuesday after a break of more than a month, the Chinese Foreign Ministry confirmed on Thursday. The six parties -- host China, Russia, Japan, the United States and the two Koreas -- have agreed in principle to ensuring the Korean peninsula is free of nuclear weapons but analysts say North Korea and the United States remain far apart on key issues, including Pyongyang's right to a civilian nuclear programme. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang told a news conference on Thursday the talks would begin as expected on Sept. 13 in Beijing. "We hope all relevant parties can seize this opportunity, with a spirit of mutual respect ... to find a solution through negotiations that takes into consideration the concerns and interests of all sides and is acceptable to all sides," Qin said. Washington said in 2002 that Pyongyang had admitted to a secret programme to enrich uranium in violation of a 1994 agreement, a claim North Korea later denied. North Korea threw out international inspectors at the end of 2002 and withdrew from the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in January 2003. Pyongyang, which has routinely accused the United States of hostility in the talks and lack of trust, has been playing the nuclear card to win diplomatic and economic benefits since the stand-off began. The first three rounds of six-party talks ended inconclusively. The fourth round began in late July, after a break of a year, and went into recess after 13 days. The main sticking point was North Korea's insistence on the right to a civilian nuclear programme. The U.S. State Department said on Thursday U.S. negotiators would stay in Beijing "as long as it takes" if the talks made progress. © Reuters 2005. All Rights Reserved. ***************************************************************** 5 Guardian Unlimited: China: Six-Party Nuke Talks to Resume 9/13 From the Associated Press [UP] Thursday September 8, 2005 9:31 AM AP Photo SEL104 By JAE-SOON CHANG Associated Press Writer SEOUL, South Korea (AP) - International talks on North Korea's nuclear program will resume next week, China's Foreign Ministry announced Thursday, as Pyongyang renewed its demand Washington withdraw its troops from the South to prove it doesn't plan to attack. The talks, aimed at ending North Korea's nuclear ambitions, recessed Aug. 7 after the two Koreas, the United States, China, Japan and Russia failed to agree on a statement of principles after 13 days of negotiations. North Korea has insisted on the right to a civilian nuclear program, but Washington says it shouldn't be allowed any nuclear program at all because of its record of broken promises. The talks were supposed to resume in Beijing last week, but North Korea delayed their resumption by two weeks without setting a specific date, citing U.S.-South Korean military exercises and Washington's appointment of a special envoy on North Korea's human rights. Qin Gang, spokesman for China's Foreign Ministry, said the talks would resume Tuesday but didn't provide any further details. Hours before the announcement, North Korea said the United States must withdraw its troops from South Korea if it is serious about its promise not to attack the communist state - a perceived threat the communist state has used to justify its nuclear weapons program. North Korea has repeatedly said it can't dismantle its nuclear program unless the United States drops its ``hostile'' policy. The Rodong Sinmun, the North's main newspaper, claimed the United States is driving a ``fire cloud of war'' over the Korean Peninsula by positioning state-of-the-art military hardware in the South and preparing for a pre-emptive nuclear attack against the North. ``If it is true that the U.S. has no intention to invade (North Korea) and has the stance to ensure peace on the Korean Peninsula and improve the relations with (North Korea), it should prove it in practice by making a decision for the withdrawal of its troops without delay,'' the newspaper said in a commentary carried by the North's official Korean Central News Agency. The United States has said repeatedly it has no intention of invading North Korea. Thursday was what North Korea called the 60th anniversary of U.S. troops' ``occupation'' of South Korea. Korea was divided after its liberation from Japan's colonial rule at the end of World War II in 1945, with U.S. forces stationed in the South and Soviet forces in the North. About 32,500 American troops are now stationed in the South under a mutual defense treaty as a deterrent against threats from the North. But the communist state said the recent U.S.-South Korean military exercise proved Washington was planning an invasion. The 12-day drill that ended this month was largely a computer-simulated war game that U.S. and South Korean officials say is purely defensive. The nuclear row broke out in late 2002 after U.S. officials said the North admitted having a secret nuclear program in violation of an earlier deal to abandon its weapons ambitions. The two Koreas technically remain in a state of war as the 1950-53 Korean War ended in a truce, not a peace treaty. Guardian Unlimited © Guardian Newspapers Limited 2005 ***************************************************************** 6 Korea: Digital Chosunilbo: Seoul Suggests Asking N.Korea to APEC Meet Home> Biz/Tech Updated Sep.8,2005 21:27 KST Finance Minister Han Duck-soo on Thursday proposed inviting North Korea to the next APEC finance ministers¡¯ meeting as an observer if six-party talks on the North Korean nuclear issue make substantial progress. Han made the proposal in a keynote address at this year¡¯s finance ministers¡¯ meeting, which opened in Jeju Island on Thursday. He said some Asian-Pacific countries had still not joined APEC 10 years after the organization was formed. A Finance Ministry official explained the minister merely suggested that the meeting discuss ways of providing international aid to and promoting economic cooperation with the North, which could get under way if and when the six-party talks succeed. The South Korean government has several times asked other countries to support North Korea¡¯s membership of international financial organizations, including at the annual meeting of the Asian Development Bank in 1997 and at the annual meeting of the IMF-World Bank in 2002. But the request proved unpopular with several countries. (englishnews@chosun.com ) ***************************************************************** 7 [du-list] Fw: [ACP] et comment Ch 1 - 2 : 1-1 Date: Thu, 08 Sep 2005 15:09:26 -0700 autolearn=ham version=3.0.4 X-Spam-filter-host: darwin.ctyme.com - http://www.junkemailfilter.com We are seeking comments on the EIS for the American Centrifuge Plant in Piketon,Ohio. here is the transportation route for waste there is also a list of states where the material is coming from. DU conversion plant also in the EIS..I will be sending four other e-mails. We can use all the help we can get. Thank you if you can help us..Vina/PRESS Metropolis, IL to ACP Port Hope, ON to ACP Wilmington, DE to ACP ACP to Richland, WA ACP to Columbia, SC ACP to Wilmington, NC ACP to Seattle, WA (Korea) ACP to Seattle, WA (Japan) Richland, WA to ACP Columbia, SC to ACP ACP to Clive UT ACP to Nevada Test Site, NV ACP to Gainsville, FL Comment by et on Ch 1 - 2 section 1-1 See http://www.cpanews.org/cgi-bin/deis/cover-to-ch2/xcomments?page=31 Comment: 40 CFR: Protection of Environment PART 1503-COMMENTING (from http://ecfr.gpoaccess.gov/, "electronic CFR") § 1503.3 Specificity of comments. top (a) Comments on an environmental impact statement or on a proposed action shall be as specific as possible and may address either the adequacy of the statement or the merits of the alternatives discussed or both. (b) When a commenting agency criticizes a lead agency's predictive methodology, the commenting agency should describe the alternative methodology which it prefers and why. (c) A cooperating agency shall specify in its comments whether it needs additional information to fulfill other applicable environmental reviews or consultation requirements and what information it needs. In particular, it shall specify any additional information it needs to comment adequately on the draft statement's analysis of significant site-specific effects associated with the granting or approving by that cooperating agency of necessary Federal permits, licenses, or entitlements. (d) When a cooperating agency with jurisdiction by law objects to or expresses reservations about the proposal on grounds of environmental impacts, the agency expressing the objection or reservation shall specify the mitigation measures it considers necessary to allow the agency to grant or approve applicable permit, license, or related requirements or concurrences. § 1503.4 Response to comments. (a) An agency preparing a final environmental impact statement shall assess and consider comments both individually and collectively, and shall respond by one or more of the means listed below, stating its response in the final statement. Possible responses are to: (1) Modify alternatives including the proposed action. (2) Develop and evaluate alternatives not previously given serious consideration by the agency (3) Supplement, improve, or modify its analyses. (4) Make factual corrections. (5) Explain why the comments do not warrant further agency response, citing the sources, authorities, or reasons which support the agency's position and, if appropriate, indicate those circumstances which would trigger agency reappraisal or further response. (b) All substantive comments received on the draft statement (or summaries thereof where the response has been exceptionally voluminous), should be attached to the final statement whether or not the comment is thought to merit individual discussion by the agency in the text of the statement. (c) If changes in response to comments are minor and are confined to the responses described in paragraphs (a)(4) and (5) of this section, agencies may write them on errata sheets and attach them to the statement instead of rewriting the draft statement. In such cases only the comments, the responses, and the changes and not the final statement need be circulated (§1502.19). The entire document with a new cover sheet shall be filed as the final statement (§1506.9). To see all comments on this document, go to http://www.cpanews.org/cgi-bin/deis/xshow_comments ------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor --------------------~--> Get fast access to your favorite Yahoo! Groups. Make Yahoo! your home page http://us.click.yahoo.com/dpRU5A/wUILAA/yQLSAA/FGYolB/TM --------------------------------------------------------------------~-> To unsubscribe from this groups send a message to du-list-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com. In the body of the message type unsubscribe and send. Yahoo! Groups Links <*> To visit your group on the web, go to: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/du-list/ <*> To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to: du-list-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com <*> Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to: http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/ ***************************************************************** 8 [du-list] Entergy answered after the posting on DU list Date: Thu, 08 Sep 2005 16:32:00 -0700 autolearn=ham version=3.0.4 X-Spam-filter-host: darwin.ctyme.com - http://www.junkemailfilter.com data: Thu, 8 Sep 2005 16:17:00 -0500 Da: "BOWLING, MICHAEL A" A: "'max@ocdbgroup.net'" soggetto: RE: From www.entergy.com/CORP -- Nuclear Questions Thanks for your email. Please forgive our delay in responding. This particular email account has been inaccessible for several days due to technical difficulties. All of our nuclear generating units responded in accordance with plant design and safe operating procedures. Three of our nuclear plants were affected by the hurricane - Waterford 3, River Bend and Grand Gulf. River Bend and Grand Gulf continued to operate safely and reliably and are operating reliably today. None of our nuclear plants experienced any significant damage as a result of the storm. Waterford 3 was shut down on Aug. 28, as procedurally required in advance of projected sustained hurricane force winds. Restart will still require a determination from the Federal Emergency Management Agency. FEMA works in concert with local parish and state emergency response agencies in making that determination. -----Original Message----- From: max@ocdbgroup.net [mailto:max@ocdbgroup.net] Sent: Tuesday, September 06, 2005 4:39 AM To: nuclear@entergy.com Subject: From www.entergy.com/CORP -- Nuclear Questions Nuclear Questions ---------------------------------------------------- Region: CORP CustomerName: Marco Saba Email: max@ocdbgroup.net Comments: Due to the flooding, there were any problem with the nuclear facility at Waterford 3 ? Send Information On: 9/6/2005 ------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor --------------------~--> Get fast access to your favorite Yahoo! Groups. Make Yahoo! your home page http://us.click.yahoo.com/dpRU5A/wUILAA/yQLSAA/FGYolB/TM --------------------------------------------------------------------~-> To unsubscribe from this groups send a message to du-list-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com. In the body of the message type unsubscribe and send. Yahoo! Groups Links <*> To visit your group on the web, go to: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/du-list/ <*> To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to: du-list-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com <*> Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to: http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/ ***************************************************************** 9 ACA: U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation: A Reality Check Arms Control Association: Arms Control Today: Daryl G. Kimball Leaders in Washington and New Delhi claim their July 18 civil nuclear cooperation and nonproliferation deal is a transformational event that will deepen the ties between the two countries and strengthen the effort to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. The agreement is indeed historic, but a sober reading reveals that the nonproliferation benefits are vastly overstated and the damage to the nonproliferation regime is potentially high. The deal calls for broad civil nuclear cooperation for the first time since Indias 1974 nuclear test explosion, which demonstrated that New Delhi was willing to use civilian technology assistance to build nuclear weapons and was determined not to join the 1968 nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). However, President George W. Bush will have to convince Congress to make sweeping changes in U.S. nonproliferation laws that restrict the export and licensing of nuclear and dual-use materials and technologies. Bush also will have to persuade the worlds 44 other major nuclear technology suppliers to bend rules forbidding assistance to nonmembers of the NPT unless they accept comprehensive, full-scope nuclear safeguards. This radical new approach, if implemented, would effectively grant India highly sought-after access to sensitive nuclear technology only accorded to states in full compliance with global nonproliferation standards. It would also treat India in much the same way as the five original nuclear-weapon states by exempting it from meaningful international nuclear inspections. It is a virtual endorsement of Indias nuclear weapons status. What is wrong with that? It would make the job of blocking the spread of nuclear weapons more difficult, if not now, then in the future. Other responsible countries have for decades remained true to the original NPT bargain and forsworn nuclear weapons in return for access to peaceful nuclear technology under strict and verifiable control. Many of these states made this choice despite strong pressure to spurn the NPT and pursue the nuclear weapons path. They might make a different choice in the future if India is allowed to have their radioactive cake and eat it too. For his part, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh agreed that India would assume the same responsibilities and practices as other countries with advanced nuclear capabilities. He agreed to some new nuclear practices, and he reiterated some of Indias modest nuclear restraint commitments. The main selling point is that India would identify its civilian and its military nuclear assets and put the civilian facilities under safeguards and allow tighter inspections under the terms of the 1997 Model Additional Protocol. If India were to receive technical assistance for nuclear energy, clearly separating its civilian and military programs is essential to ensure that outside assistance is not directly used to build bombs. But the core purpose of nuclear safeguards and the Model Additional Protocol is to detect and deter the diversion of nuclear weapons material and related technology to the military sector. The application of such safeguards only to the civilian sector would do little or nothing to limit or even monitor Indias production of fissile material for weapons. If the IAEA negotiates an additional protocol agreement similar to the symbolic ones that apply to the five original nuclear-weapon states, India would be permitted to exclude military-related facilities and even portions of civilian facilities on national security grounds. As a result, India might continue to use spent fuel from power generation reactors to acquire plutonium for weapons. The Bush-Singh agreement also commits India to refrain from transferring sensitive nuclear and missile technology. India deserves credit for these actions, but these are minimal steps that every country with such capabilities should be expected to undertake. At the same time, India continues to engage in a destabilizing missile race with Pakistan. There are no measures in the July communiqué that would restrain Indias nuclear weapons program. If India wants to become a responsible nuclear-weapon state with a minimum nuclear deterrent capability, it must be prepared to stop producing fissile material as the five original nuclear-weapon states claim to have done and actively support the conclusion of a verifiable fissile material production cutoff treaty. It must be prepared to declare at least some of its nuclear material excess to its military programs and place that material under international safeguards. It must also be prepared to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, as the original five nuclear-weapon states have done. Bushs gambit to radically revise U.S. nonproliferation law and policy demands detailed congressional hearings and revisions. Making far-reaching exceptions to existing international nuclear nonproliferation practices might only be justified if the nonproliferation and disarmament commitments outlined in the Bush-Singh statement significantly strengthened the nonproliferation regime. As of now, they do not. The Arms Control Association is a non-profit, membership-based organization. If you find our resources useful, please consider joining or making a contribution. Arms Control Today encourages reprint of its articles with permission of the Editor. © 2005 Arms Control Association, 1150 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 620 Washington, DC 20036 Tel: (202) 463-8270 | Fax: (202) 463-8273 ***************************************************************** 10 ACA: U.S. Nuclear Weapons Guidance, War Plans Arms Control Association: Arms Control Today: The Role of U.S. Nuclear Weapons: New Doctrine Falls Short of Bush Pledge Hans M. Kristensen A nuclear draft doctrine written by the Pentagon calls for maintaining an aggressive nuclear posture with weapons on high alert to strike adversaries armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD), pre-emptively if necessary. The doctrine, the first formal update since the Bush administration took office, is entitled Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations[1] and has been strongly influenced by the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and other directives published by the Bush administration since 2001. A final version is expected later this fall. The draft doctrine and editing comments were freely available on the Internet until recently, providing a rare glimpse into the secret world of nuclear planning in the post-Cold War era. Foremost among the doctrines new features are the incorporation of pre-emption into U.S. nuclear doctrine and the integration of conventional weapons and missile defenses into strategic planning. The Bush administration claims that it is significantly reducing the role of nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, but perhaps not surprisingly, the updated doctrine falls far short of fulfilling the administrations claim. Instead of reducing the role of nuclear weapons, the new doctrine reaffirms an aggressive nuclear posture of modernized nuclear weapons maintained on high alert. Conventional forces and missile defenses merely complementinstead of replacenuclear weapons. The new doctrine continues the thinking of the previous version from 1995 in its reaffirmation of nuclear deterrence. It differs in three other key elements: the threshold for nuclear use, nuclear targeting and international law, and the role of conventional and defensive forces. Whats New? The importance of the new doctrine is less about what it directs the military to do, and more about what it shows U.S. nuclear policy has become. It has changed considerably from the 1995 version. A new chapter has been added on theater nuclear operations, a discussion of the role of conventional and defensive forces, and an expanded discussion on nuclear operations. The addition of a chapter on theater nuclear operations reflects the post-Cold War preoccupation of U.S. nuclear planners on finding ways of deterring regional aggressors (i.e., rogue states) armed with nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. It also reflects a decade-old rivalry between the regional combatant commanders and U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) over who owns regional nuclear-strike planning. Yet, the new doctrines approach grants regional nuclear-strike planning an increasingly expeditionary aura that threatens to make nuclear weapons just another tool in the toolbox. The result is nuclear pre-emption, which the new doctrine enshrines into official U.S. joint nuclear doctrine for the first time, where the objective no longer is deterrence through threatened retaliation but battlefield destruction of targets. Another highly visible change is the incorporation of a discussion of the role of conventional weapons and defensive forces into the sections describing the purpose, planning, and employment of nuclear forces. What is most striking is the extent to which conventional and defensive capabilities are woven into the fabric of nuclear planning. Reaffirmation of Deterrence In the foreword to the 2001 NPR report, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld stated that the review puts in motion a major change in our approach to the role of nuclear offensive forces in our deterrent strategy. In Rumsfelds testimony to Congress and numerous statements made by other officials, the Bush administration portrayed the NPR as reducing the role of nuclear weapons, lowering the readiness requirement for the nuclear forces, and increasing the role of non-nuclear and missile defense capabilities. Yet, the major change in the role of nuclear weapons is difficult to find in the new doctrine. Instead, the new nuclear doctrine presents an emphatic defense for nuclear deterrence with sustaining and modernizing nuclear forces maintained on high alert. To maintain their deterrent effect, the doctrine states, U.S. nuclear forces must maintain a strong and visible state of readinesspermitting a swift response to any no-notice nuclear attack against the United States, its forces, or allies. For the authors of the new doctrine, the logic behind such an aggressive posture is simple: military strength automatically strengthens deterrence. Therefore, stronger nuclear capabilities also benefit national security. Indeed, defending the nation against its enemies is best achieved, the new nuclear doctrine declares, through a defense posture that makes possible war outcomes so uncertain and dangerous, as calculated by potential adversaries, as to remove all incentives for initiating attack under any circumstances. This nuclear dogma is by no means new to deterrence theory, but the new nuclear doctrine fails to explain, even illustrate, why deterrence necessarily requires such an aggressive nuclear posture and cannot be achieved at lower levels without maintaining nuclear forces on high alert. A deterrence posture can also be excessive, with capabilities far beyond what is reasonably needed. Threatening nuclear capabilities may in theory deter potential enemies but may just as well provoke other countries and undercut other vital aspects of U.S. foreign policy. The end result may be decreased security for all. Nor does the new nuclear doctrine spell out why the Pentagon ultimately settled on the force that it did. It says that the basis of its decision is a vague and unspecific invention called capability-based planning that the Pentagon says focuses on the means and how adversaries may fight; not a fixed set of enemies or threats. This hardly seems to be a new development, as U.S. military planning has always focused on how adversaries might fight. Even capability-based planning must identify a set of enemies and threats that is, for all intents and purposes, fixed. Still, the new doctrine repeats the NPRs decision that a force level of 1,700-2,200 operationally deployed strategic warheads is the lowest possible number that the United States can maintain while maintaining a credible deterrent. Just how the 1,700-2,200 warhead level was decided remains a mystery. The mystery is even greater because the Pentagon claims that the force-sizing is not driven by an immediate contingency involving Russia. Yet, in 1996 when STRATCOM examined force structure options in preparation for the 1997 Helsinki agreementwhen Russia was an immediate contingencythe bottom-line force level was also 2,000 warheads.[2] Keith Payne, who co-chaired the Deterrence Concepts Advisory Group that drafted the NPR and subsequently served as deputy assistant secretary of defense from 2002 to 2003, recently explained: In general, the NPRs recommended force structure and number of deployed nuclear warheads was calculated to support not only the immediate requirements for deterrence, but also to contribute to the additional goals of assuring allies and friends, dissuading potential opponents from choosing the route of arms competition or military challenge, and providing a hedge against the possible emergence of more severe, future military threats or severe technical problems in the arsenal.[3] The only item on that list that is new, and only partially so, is dissuading potential opponents from choosing the route of arms competition or military challenge. Deterring enemies, assuring allies, and hedging are all elements of U.S. nuclear planning that are as old as the post-Cold War era; the first two are even as old as the nuclear age itself. Even so, under the headline New Thinking for a New Era, the new nuclear doctrine describes capability-based planning as a major break from Cold War thinking that allows the United States to take the lead in reducing nuclear stockpiles rather than rely on protracted arms control negotiations. That claim overlooks the first Bush administrations Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991 and 1992, both of which took the lead without protracted negotiations well before the current Bush administration presented its new thinking. The claim also overlooks that not one of the strategic nuclear reductions announced by the 2001 NPR was conceived by the Bush administration. All, without exception, implemented decisions made in the 1990s. Lowering the Bar for Nuclear Use So what does the Pentagon mean when it refers to capability-based planning? One indication comes from the claim made in the new nuclear doctrine and by government officials during the past couple of years that a major break has occurred in nuclear planning. A break does seem to have occurred but is not about reducing the role of nuclear weapons. Granted, the number of weapons have been reduced, but the major break is about transforming nuclear plans and capabilities to enable destruction of targets anywhere in the world more efficiently. In that transformation lays a subtle belief that nuclear deterrence will fail sooner or later, and before it does, U.S. nuclear forces and war plans need to be ready and capable of striking, even pre-emptively. The signs of this development are evident throughout the new nuclear doctrine in its description of the need for responsive nuclear forces that can rapidly respond to threats anywhere. It even defines a new category of nuclear planning, Crisis Action Planning, as the time-sensitive development of joint operations plans and orders in response to an imminent crisis. It is different from highly structured Deliberate Planning and flexible Adaptive Planning: Crisis action planning follows prescribed crisis action procedures to formulate and implement an effective response within the time frame permitted by the crisis. It is distinct from adaptive planning in that emerging targets are likely to have no preexisting plans that could be adapted. Success in engaging these types of targets depends heavily upon the speed with which they are identified, targeted, and attacked. The basis for this drive for speed and responsiveness is the perception of the threat that faces the United States and its allies in the 21st century. It has become almost a mantra in national security discussions and analysis to portray todays multipolar security environment as more unpredictable and dangerous than even the Soviet threat during the Cold War. The new nuclear doctrine enshrines that hype into nuclear doctrine. Although todays threats from rogue states and terrorists are serious indeed, it is healthy to keep in mind, especially when discussing nuclear weapons policy, that they are on a completely different scale than the global nuclear standoff that characterized the Cold War. Then, the human race and life on the planet was held at nuclear gunpoint for four decades, only 30 minutes away from global annihilation. Todays nuclear strategy often operates on a far different scale: incorporating the far more limited threat from hostile states and even terrorists. Yet, the new doctrine ignores this distinction and instead lowers the crisis intensity level needed to potentially trigger use of U.S. nuclear weapons by replacing war with conflict. The change may seem trivial, but its implication is important and deliberate. The change was proposed by STRATCOM, which explained that [r]eplacing the word war with conflict involving the use of emphasizes the nature of most conflicts resulting in use of a nuclear weapon. Nuclear war implies the mutual exchange of nuclear weapons between warring partiesnot fully representative of the facts. During the Cold War, a nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union would have involved both countries launching nuclear weapons at each other. Yet, in the post-Cold War era a conflict may involve only one or a few nuclear weapons being used and not necessarily by both warring countries in an exchange. The new doctrine predicts that terrorists and rogue states armed with weapons of mass destruction will likely test U.S. security commitments to its allies and friends. To be sure, some parts of this approach are not new: the 1995 doctrine also considered a role for nuclear weapons against terrorists despite serious questions about the credibility of such a role. Put together, however, the rhetoric in the new doctrine indicates that military planners anticipate that U.S. nuclear weapons might be used in much less intense crises than envisioned previously. For example, the new nuclear doctrine states that an adversary might detonate a nuclear weapon high in the atmosphere to damage U.S. military electronic equipment with a high-altitude electromagnetic pulse. Whatever the adversary use might be, the new nuclear doctrine makes it clear that the United States will not necessarily wait for the attack but pre-empt with nuclear weapons if necessary. It identifies four conditions where pre-emptive use might occur: An adversary intending to use weapons of mass destruction against U.S., multinational, or allies forces or civilian populations. Imminent attack from an adversarys biological weapons that only effects from nuclear weapons can safely destroy. Attacks on adversary installations including weapons of mass destruction; deep, hardened bunkers containing chemical or biological weapons; or the command and control infrastructure required for the adversary to execute a WMD attack against the United States or its friends and allies. Demonstration of U.S. intent and capability to use nuclear weapons to deter adversary WMD use. The previous doctrine from 1995 did not describe specific scenarios where the United States might use nuclear weapons pre-emptively, but the new doctrine enshrines the Bush administrations pre-emption policy into official U.S. nuclear doctrine. It acknowledges that the belligerent that initiates nuclear warfare may find itself the target of world condemnation but adds that no customary or conventional international law prohibits nations from employing nuclear weapons in armed conflict. In other words, the Pentagon seems to conclude the United States is legally free to use nuclear weapons pre-emptively if it chooses. The End of Nonstrategic The pre-emptive nuclear options are included in the chapter on theater nuclear operations, which traditionally have been associated with nonstrategic nuclear weapons (those with shorter range). The 1995 doctrine described the theater (local or regional) mission with nonstrategic nuclear weapons as a means of controlling escalation by linking conventional forces to the full nuclear retaliatory capability of the United States. By contrast, strategic weapons historically have included weapons of intercontinental range. The separation has always been somewhat blurred, but the new nuclear doctrine does away with a separate theater role for nonstrategic nuclear forces. Instead, it assigns all nuclear weapons, whether strategic or nonstrategic, support roles in theater nuclear operations. The theater mission will be further detailed in Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Theater Nuclear Planning (Joint Pub 3-12.1), a secret subdoctrine scheduled for publication by the Pentagon sometime after the release of the Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations. Military officials have argued for years that there are no nonstrategic nuclear weapons; all nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War era should be seen as strategic because all nuclear use is strategic in nature. Yet, the language in the new doctrine and the elimination of a specific regional role for nonstrategic nuclear weapons hint of a deeper shift: strategic nuclear weapons have increasing regional (theater) roles as nonstrategic nuclear weapons are reduced and guidance and doctrine demand new missions against the capabilities of rogue states and nonstate actors. The increasing incorporation of strategic weapons from the global-intensity level into smaller regional conflicts means that the operational distinction between strategic and nonstrategic nuclear weapons is being blurred. In a regional deterrence scenario against an adversary armed with nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, all nuclear weapons can be battlefield weapons or strategic weapons, depending on the circumstances. The U.S. pre-emption or retaliation could utilize a B61 nuclear bomb deployed in Turkey or a strategic warhead launched from a Trident submarine patroling near Japan. This doctrinal shift has already progressed to the point that STRATCOM has drawn up and implemented a new global strike plan for the use of nuclear and conventional forces in regional scenarios. The new strike plan, called Contingency Plan (CONPLAN) 8022, was first put into effect in late 2003, less than a year after the White House issued National Security Presidential Directive 17, its strategy to combat weapons of mass destruction. CONPLAN 8022 makes operational the Bush administrations pre-emption policy and the new nuclear doctrine codifies it. The Role of Conventional Weapons Another new element of the nuclear doctrine is the role of advanced conventional weapons in strategic planning. This was one of the central pillars of the 2001 NPR, and the new doctrine states that targets that may have required a nuclear weapon to achieve the needed effects in previous planning may be targeted with conventional weapons. The doctrine describes how integrating conventional and nuclear attacks will ensure the most efficient use of force and provide U.S. leaders with a broader range of strike options to address immediate contingencies. Yet, in the same breath the document cautions that some contingencies will remain where the most appropriate response may include the use of U.S. nuclear weapons. The objective is still assured destruction of facilities, and it seems clear that the conventional capabilities need to evolve considerably before conventional weapons will be capable of significantly replacing nuclear weapons in the war plans. Indeed, in an acknowledgement that there are few programs to convert the NPR vision to reality, the Pentagon in April established a task force aimed in part at better integrating the new triad of nuclear, conventional, and defensive capabilities. Four and a half years after the Bush administration announced its major change to strategic targeting, the incorporation of conventional weapons still appears marginal at best. Part of the impediment appears to be the challenge of incorporating sufficient accuracy into the two ballistic missile legs of the nuclear triad. The explosive power of conventional weapons also is inherently inferior to the yield of even the smallest nuclear warheads in the stockpile. Its more than just precision, STRATCOM Commander General James Cartwright told Inside the Pentagon in April 2005. I cant generate enough [conventional explosive] energy for some of these targets to destroy them. So Im not leading you down a path that I can get rid of nuclear weapons. Also, there is the issue of command and control for conventional strategic forces. The line of command for nuclear strikes has evolved over many decades, but how will it work when a non-nuclear weapon is used in a strategic strike against an adversarys nuclear weapons facility? The Air Force, which maintains nuclear ICBMs and bombers, pointed out during the editing of the new nuclear doctrine that, although the president and secretary of defense are required to approve all nuclear targeting, they do not necessarily approve conventional targeting.[4] Presumably, the Bush administration will want to close that hole to ensure 100 percent control of strategic strikes and ensure that other nuclear powers do not misinterpret the intention. Finally, but equally important, merging nuclear and conventional warheads on ballistic missiles or on strategic platforms has serious implications for crisis stability. A nuclear-weapon state being attacked by a conventionally armed ballistic missile early in a conflict may conclude that it is under nuclear attack and launch its own nuclear weapons. Merging nuclear and conventional capabilities seems to be a recipe for disaster. Missile Defenses The second pillar of the 2001 NPR was the role of active defenses in strategic planning, and the new doctrine incorporates the new mission. The previous doctrine from 1995 also described the contribution of missile defense, but this issue is expanded in the new doctrine. Instead of describing how missile defenses can be used to protect people from missile strikes, however, the new doctrine appears to focus on how missile defenses can enhance the survivability of nuclear forces and increase offensive capabilities. Focusing on protecting nuclear forces rather than people might not seem so cynical if not for the Bush administrations emphasis on protecting people in its justification for withdrawing from the and securing congressional funding for the multibillion-dollar missile defense program. In December 2001, when preparing to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, President George W. Bush stated: I have concluded the ABM treaty hinders our governments ability to develop ways to protect our people from future terrorist or rogue state missile attacks. Defending the American people is my highest priority as commander in chief, and I cannot and will not allow the United States to remain in a treaty that prevents us from developing effective defenses.[5] In stark contrast with the presidents priority, the new doctrine describes missile defense as a tool to protect military forces. The doctrine only mentions defense of the population three times and always in a secondary role, after protection of military forces. Moreover, the doctrine states that one objective of protecting military forces is to enhance U.S. offensive nuclear strike capabilities. STRATCOM planning seeks to integrate U.S. and allied offensive and defensive forces, the doctrine explains, in order to exploit the full range of characteristics offered by U.S. strategic nuclear forces to support national and regional deterrence objectives. In an operational scenario, limited or insufficient missile defense capabilities could force U.S. decision-makers into a corner where they would have to choose between saving Los Angeles or Vandenberg Air Force Base. Nuclear Targeting and International Law The new nuclear doctrines deepening of the commitment to regional targeting beyond nuclear facilities, and lowering the bar for when nuclear weapons could be usedeven pre-emptivelyraise important questions about nuclear targeting and international law. During the editing process of the new nuclear doctrine, a debate was triggered among the different commands over which term to use for different types of targeting. Of particular concern was the legal status of countervalue targeting, a targeting methodology that was included in the 1995 nuclear doctrine: Countervalue targeting strategy directs the destruction or neutralization of selected enemy military and military-related activities, such as industries, resources, and/or institutions that contribute to the enemys ability to wage war. In general, weapons required to implement this strategy need not be as numerous or accurate as those required to implement a counterforce targeting strategy, because countervalue targets generally tend to be softer and unprotected in relation to counterforce targets.[6] During the editing of the new doctrine, STRATCOM declared that it had decided that countervalue targeting violates the Law of Armed Conflict. The command therefore suggested changing countervalue to critical infrastructure targeting. In explaining its decision, STRATCOM stated: Many operational law attorneys do not believe countervalue targeting is a lawful justification for employment of force, much less nuclear force. Countervalue philosophy makes no distinction between purely civilian activities and military related activities and could be used to justify deliberate attacks on civilians and non-military portions of a nations economy. It therefore cannot meet the military necessity prong of the Law of Armed Conflict. Countervalue targeting also undermines one of the values that underlies Law of Armed Conflictthe reduction of civilian suffering and to foster the ability to maintain the peace after the conflict ends. For example, under the countervalue target philosophy, the attack on the World Trade Center Towers on 9/11 could be justified.[7] Other military commands did not agree with the name change. The argument from European Command was that countervalue should not be changed to critical infrastructure because countervalue has an institutionalized and broadly understood meaning in the academic literature on nuclear warfare and in international security studies in general. If in doubt on this point, European Command argued, insert the word countervalue in any electronic search engine and note how many hits appear that are directly relevant to nuclear policy.[8] In the end, the commands could not agree and the term critical infrastructure targeting was withdrawn to end the discussion. Yet, the term countervalue also disappeared and is no longer included in the new nuclear doctrine. The issue was dropped, although targeting appears to continue, and simply changing the terminology obviously does not change the illegal targeting itself. To be fair, the new nuclear doctrine emphasizes U.S. abhorrence of unrestricted warfare and U.S. adherence to laws of war. Yet, if the intention of mentioning international law is that it matters, then the doctrine notably ignores that the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in its 1996 ruling on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons could not reach agreement (it was a split vote) that the threat or use of nuclear weapons is lawful, even in an extreme circumstance of self-defense where the very survival of a state is at stake. The ICJ did agree unanimously that international law does not authorize even the threat of use of nuclear weapons.[9] These important nuances are ignored by the new doctrine. Conclusion Although there has been extensive public debate on whether to build new or modified nuclear weapons, there has been essentially no debate about the doctrine that guides the use of nuclear weapons and influences future requirements. This is ironic given the considerable interest in the Bush administrations policy on pre-emption. As a result, the rewriting of the nuclear doctrine has occurred with essentially no public debate. Still, the doctrine and editing documents reveal a significant contradiction between the Bush administrations public rhetoric about reducing the role of nuclear weapons and the guidance issued to the nuclear planners. Although the overall number of warheads is being reduced, the new doctrine guiding planning for the remaining arsenal reaffirms an aggressive posture with nuclear forces on high alert, ready to be used in an increasing number of limited-strike scenarios against adversaries anywhere, even pre-emptively. The new doctrine appears to be precipitated by anticipation among military planners that deterrence will fail and U.S. nuclear weapons will be used in a conflict sooner or later. For the nuclear planners, it seems so simple: deterrence must be credible, and the way to make it more credible is to increase the capabilities and number of strike options against any conceivable scenario. Ironically, a decade and a half after we should have escaped this nuclear deterrence logic of the Cold War, the planners cling to these old business practices. Instead of drastically reducing the role of nuclear weapons, as the Bush administration told the public it would do, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism seem to have spooked the administration into continuing and deepening a commitment to some of the most troubling aspects of the nuclear war-fighting mentality that symbolized the Cold War. U.S. Nuclear Weapons Guidance, War Plans The updated Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations reflects how combatant commanders have translated the administrations attempts to reshape U.S. nuclear policy into operational guidance for military forces. It comes nearly five years after the completion of the Bush administrations Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) in December 2001 and represents the first revision of basic nuclear doctrine in a decade. The list below describes some of the major milestones that led to the new doctrine and their significance. [1] 2001 May: Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld publishes the Strategic Defense Review. This document, among other things, sets requirements for the number and types of weapons in the stockpile. December 31: Rumsfeld forwards the NPR report to Congress. 2002 June: The White House issues National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 14, Nuclear Weapons Planning Guidance. September 14: The White House issues NSPD 17, National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction. The document states that [t]he United States will make clear that it reserves the right to respond with overwhelming forceincluding potentially nuclear weaponsto the use of [weapons of mass destruction] against the United States, our forces abroad, and friends and allies. September 17: The White House issues the National Security Strategy of the United States. The document provides the first official public articulation of a strategy of pre-emptive action against hostile states and terrorist groups developing weapons of mass destruction. October 1: The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issues a new nuclear supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan for fiscal year 2002, which translates White House guidance into specific military plans. December 10: The White House releases National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, the unclassified version of NSPD 17. The wording in NSPD 17 of using potentially nuclear weapons is replaced with all of our options. December 16: The White House issues NSPD 23, National Policy on Ballistic Missile Defense, which orders withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and construction of a national ballistic missile defense system. 2003: January 10: Bush signs Change 2 to the Unified Command Plan, which, in addition to maintaining nuclear strike plans, assigns four additional missions to U.S. Strategic Command: missile defense planning, global strike planning, information operations, and global C4ISR (Command, Control, Computers, Communication, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance). March: Rumsfeld issues to Congress Nuclear Posture Review: Implementation Plan, Department of Defense Implementation of the December 2001 Nuclear Posture Review Report. The document formally implements the decisions of the 2001 NPR. 2004 March 13: The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issues the National Military Strategy of the United States, including the classified Annex B (Nuclear). The document translates the National Security Strategy into specific guidance for military planners. April 19: Rumsfeld issues the Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy. The document states in part that U.S. nuclear forces must be capable of, and be seen to be capable of, destroying those critical war-making and war-supporting assets and capabilities that a potential enemy leadership values most and that it would rely on to achieve its own objectives in a post-war world. May: The White House issues NSPD 34, Fiscal Year 2004-2012 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan, which directs a force structure through 2012 and cuts the total stockpile almost in half. May: The White House issues NSPD 35, Nuclear Weapons Deployment Authorization, which authorizes the military to continue deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. December 31: The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issues a new nuclear supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan for fiscal year 2005, codifying new global strike and theater nuclear operations guidance and implementing the 2004 Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy. 2005 January: In a letter to U.S. Strategic Command, Rumsfeld tasks the command with spearheading the Defense Departments efforts to combat weapons of mass destruction (WMD). January 10: The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issues Global Strike Joint Integrating Concept, Version 1, for conducting global strike operations during the seize the initiative phase of a conflict (seconds to days). Targets include WMD production, storage, and delivery capabilities, critical command and control facilities, anti-access capabilities (radars, surface-to-air missile sites, theater ballistic missile sites), and adversary leadership. Fall 2005: The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is expected to publish Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations. ENDNOTES 1. A chronology of nuclear weapons guidance issued by the Bush administration is available at http://www.nukestrat.com. Hans M. Kristensen is co-author of the World Nuclear Forces appendix to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institutes Yearbook and a consultant to the Natural Resources Defense Council. ENDNOTES 1. The draft doctrine might be slightly different from the final doctrine, although at this late stage any changes are expected to be cosmetic. Copies of the new doctrine, previous versions, and editing comments are available at http://www.nukestrat.com. 2. See U.S. Strategic Command, Post-START II Arms Control, 1996 (partially declassified). 3. Keith B. Payne, The Nuclear Posture Review: Setting the Record Straight, Washington Quarterly 28, no. 3 (Summer 2005), p. 147. 4. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), JP 3-12, Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations, December 16, 2004, p. 59. 5. The White House, Remarks by the President on Missile Defense, December 13, 2001. 6. CJCS, JP 3-12, Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations, December 15, 1995, p. II-5. 7. CJCS, JP 3-12, Joint Staff Input to JP 3-12, Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations (Second Draft), April 28, 2003, pp. 34-35. 8. CJCS, JP 3-12, Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations, December 16, 2004, pp. 67-69. 9. International Court of Justice, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, July 8, 1996, items A and E (advisory opinion). The Arms Control Association is a non-profit, membership-based organization. If you find our resources useful, please consider joining or making a contribution. Arms Control Today encourages reprint of its articles with permission of the Editor. © 2005 Arms Control Association, 1150 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 620 Washington, DC 20036 Tel: (202) 463-8270 | Fax: (202) 463-8273 ***************************************************************** 11 Asia Times: The unthinkable: A nuclear-armed Japan Sep 9, 2005 By Frank Barnabie and Shaun Burnie (Republished with permission from