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                         NUCLEAR POLICY
 
1 Bush-Cheney Heading For Nuclear Rendevous in Iran
2 Guardian Unlimited: Iran Urged to Cooperate in Nuclear Talks
3 Guardian Unlimited: Iran's President Reappoints Nuclear Chief
4 Daily Times: Russia says Iran not breaching nuclear non-proliferatio
5 Reuters: Chirac urges Iran to reconsider EU nuclear offer 
6 Guardian Unlimited: State Dept. Dismisses N. Korea Complaints
7 Guardian Unlimited: U.S. Accepts New Date for N. Korea Talks
8 RIA Novosti: Russia welcomes North Korea's decision to continue 
9 Reuters: Japan sees no sign of US-N.Korea nuclear deal 
10 Reuters: Korea ratings unaffected if nuclear talks fail-S 
11 Reuters: N.Korea says 6-party talks could resume mid-Sept
12 Guardian Unlimited: N. Korea Agency Wants to Resume Nuke Talks
13 US: MIT Tech: The Peril of Americas Nuclear Policies - 
14 Khaleej Times: IAEA returns nuclear parts to Pakistan after inspecti
 
                         NUCLEAR REACTORS
 
15 MSN: Jellyfish cause shutdown of Swedish nuclear reactor 
16 US: NRC: NRC Issues Supplemental Safety Evaluation for Clinton Early
17 RIA Novosti: Balakovskaya nuclear power plant running at full capaci
18 US: NRC: NRC Monitoring Approach of Hurricane Katrina; Waterford Shu
19 US: NRC: Notice of Public Meeting of the Interagency Steering Commit
20 US: NRC: Amergen Energy Company, LLC.; Notice of Consideration of
21 The Standard: Shanghai Electric in nuclear push - 
22 ITAR-TASS: Nuclear reactor re-activated at Novovoronezh power plant
23 US: Reuters: Entergy shuts La. Waterford 3 nuke due hurricane 
24 US: Reuters: Two units back at Ariz. Palo Verde nuke station 
25 US: Reuters: PSEG shuts N.J. Hope Creek nuke 
26 US: Reuters: US NRC monitoring 3 nuclear plants in Gulf Coast 
27 US: Reuters: Exelon Ill. Dresden 3 nuke up to 99 pct power 
28 US: Reuters: SCANA S.C. Summer nuke back at full power
29 AU ABC: ACCI urges nuclear power rethink. 
30 Sofia Morning News: IAEA Official Examines Bulgaria's Nuclear Techno
 
                          NUCLEAR SECURITY
 
31 Guardian Unlimited: Unsecured Radioactive Material Discovered
32 Mos News: Former Nuclear Minister Adamov Accepts Extradition to Russ
33 AU ABC: Nuclear experts seek out dirty bomb materials in South East 
 
                          NUCLEAR SAFETY
 
34 DU Is a War Crime
35 [EMMAS] Radioactive Wounds of War
36 US: NRC: NRC Revises Procedures for Handling Possible Generic Safety
37 US: NRC: Notice of License Termination and Release of Michigan Depar
38 US: NRC: Issuance of Environmental Assessment and Finding of No 
39 US: NRC: Notice of Opportunity To Comment on Model Safety Evaluation
 
                         NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE
 
40 [NukeNet] Japanese uranium contaminated soil
41 [NukeNet] More on Japanese uranium contaminated soil
42 US: Bradenton Herald: Tests: Vapor levels too low
43 SignOnSanDiego.com: DOE takes step in plan to ship nuclear waste 
44 US: www.mineweb.net: Navajo Nation seeks to block uranium developmen
45 Las Vegas SUN: Public land sought for nuke rail study 
46 US: Chemical & Engineering News: Shipping Waste
47 ICT: United Nations calls for U.S. accountability
48 US: NRC: RIN 3150-AH70
49 KESQ: DOE takes step in plan to ship nuclear waste in Nevada by trai
 
                           PEACE
 
 
                        US DEPT. OF ENERGY
 
50 DOE: Environmental Management Site-Specific Advisory Board, Paducah
51 DOE: Environmental Management Site-Specific Advisory Board, Idaho 
52 DOE: Environmental Management Site-Specific Advisory Board, Savannah
53 DOE: Notice of Availability of the Environmental Assessment
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                         FULL NEWS STORIES
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 1 Bush-Cheney Heading For Nuclear Rendevous in Iran
 
Date: Mon, 29 Aug 2005 14:25:12 -0500 (CDT)

 
	UNDISC_RECIPS,WHITE_PHRASE autolearn=ham version=3.0.4
X-Spam-filter-host: pascal.ctyme.com - http://www.junkemailfilter.com

rense.com

Bush-Cheney Heading For Nuclear Rendevous At Desert One
By Webster Griffin Tarpley
Author - 9/11 Synthetic Terrorism: Made in USA
8-27-5

WASHINGTON DC/LOS ANGELES -- With the direct threat of military
attack against Iran issued Aug. 13 by Bush, the world has entered
a phase of new and acute danger of general war. Bush made the threat
in an interview with Israeli television. "All options are on the
table," said Bush, speaking from his estate in Crawford, Texas.
Asked if that included the use of force, Bush replied: "As I say,
all options are on the table. The use of force is the last option
for any president and you know, we've used force in the recent past
to secure our country." (Reuters, dateline Jerusalem, August 13,
2005) Bush's comments were ostensibly made in the context of the
US campaign to shut down the Iranian nuclear program, but in reality
came in the midst of feverish US-UK preparations for a new 9/11 of
state-sponsored, false flag synthetic terrorism which is intended
in the intentions of the terrorist controllers in London and
Washington to set the stage for the attack on Iran, as well as for
martial law austerity dictatorships throughout the English-speaking
world, and beyond.

A possible scenario for what is in store over the next few weeks
could well include a nuclear detonation under US military auspices
on the coast of the Carolinas under the cover of the anti-terrorism
exercise Sudden Response 05, but blamed on Hezbollah or some other
alleged Iranian asset, followed by US atomic bombing of Iranian
military bases, nuclear sites, and other strategic targets, using
nuclear devices of various yields. US confrontation with Russia,
China, and the other powers of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
would not be far behind. With that, the nuclear genie would be out
of the bottle, and we would not see him confined again in our
lifetimes.

With these new threats from Bush, so reminiscent of his 2002-2003
demagogy in advance of the invasion of Iraq, there could be no
rational doubt that the US regime was in headlong flight forward
towards war with Iran. Bush and Cheney, and their masters in the
US secret government, appeared determined to repeat, on a grand
scale, the fiasco of the April 1980 Operation Eagle Claw the attempt
to extract the US hostages from Iran which left 8 US dead among a
field of burning aircraft at the Iranian site labeled Desert One.
This time, the toll would be many orders of magnitude greater.

GERMANY: "EXTREMELY DANGEROUS" "UNCONTROLLED ESCALATION"

That Bush's threats were no mere throw-away lines was shown by the
blunt response just a few hours later by German Chancellor Gerhard
Schroeder, who in August 2002 had been the first NATO head of
government to repudiate the then-imminent Iraq war. "Take the
military options off the table, since we,ve seen that they are
worthless," said Schroeder in a campaign speech in Hanover. He told
the newspaper Bild am Sonntag: "I consider the military option
extremely dangerousI can definitely exclude that under my leadership
this government would be a part of it." Instead, Schroeder spoke
in favor of "patient diplomacy," and also of German-Russian
reconciliation. Schroeder pointed to the evident limits of the
much-touted US "superpower," noting that "in the United States, one
should realize that the US might, unilaterally, win wars, but cannot
win peace, as we have seen in Afghanistan, and even more so in
Iraq." (BamS, August 14, 2005) German Foreign Minister Fischer
warned that military operations against Iran would always bring the
risk of uncontrollable escalation. (DPA, August 13)

In an irony of history, Schroeder's prompt stand against a wider
war has increased the penalty for the aggression now being planned
by the Bush-Cheney regime and its backers. If the US attacks Iran
before the September 18 German elections, Schroeder might be swept
back into office, given the clear inability of his feckless opposition
to resist US dictation. When Wolfgang Schaeubele, one of Schroeder's
key opponents, visited Bush, Bush told him that "his greatest concern
is Iran." However, Bush reassured his guest that there would be no
US attack on Iran before the German vote on September 18. (Frankfurter
Rundschau, August 18)

The British Foreign Office was compelled to align itself with
Schroeder's critique. The Foreign Office spokesman stated: "Our
position is clear and has been made very, very clear by the Foreign
Secretary. We do not think there are any circumstances where military
action would be justified against Iran. It does not form part of
British foreign policy." (Sunday Times, August 14, 2005) Thus,
according to all present indications, the US would go into Iran
utterly alone, without even the window dressing of a sham coalition
of the bribed and the blackmailed.

PUTIN: DON,T LOWER THE NUCLEAR THRESHOLD

Russian President Vladimir Putin offered his own response to Bush
from the deck of the Russian battle cruiser Peter the Great in the
Barents Sea. Putin's warning addressed the Cheney-Rumsfeld reliance
on low-yield nuclear weapons as a key component of US strategy. "I
think that lowering the threshold for the use of nuclear arms is a
dangerous trend, because somebody may feel tempted to use nuclear
weapons," Putin told journalists. "If that happens, the next step
can be taken -- more powerful nuclear arms can be used, which may
lead to a nuclear conflict. This extremely dangerous trend is in
the back of the mind of some politicians and military officials,"
the president said. (Interfax, August 17) This can be read as a
nuclear counterthreat in response to Bush's "all options are on the
table." The threatening overtone took on consistency over the
following hours. Putin flew in a Tupolev-160 strategic bomber with
Major General Anatoly Zhikharev, deputy commander of the Russian
strategic air force. With Putin on board, this plane was one of two
which successfully flight-tested what Russia described as "a new,
high-precision, long-range cruise missile." Putin had his picture
taken in a flight helmet and, in contrast to Bush's ludicrous
"Mission Accomplished" bluster, announced that the cruise missiles
had hit their target. A new Russian RSM-54 ICBM, called SS-N-23
Skiff by NATO, was fired from the submerged nuclear sub Yekaterinburg
in the Barents Sea and also hit its target on the Kura testing range
on the Kamchatka peninsula. All this was in the context of maneuvers
by the surface warships and subs of the Russian Northern Fleet.

Russia was also joining with China in Peace Mission 05, an unprecedented
joint exercise in the Far East between August 18 and August 26,
evidently directed against US-UK meddling in the region. The political
basis of this cooperation against hegemonism had been outlined in
the July 15 Russo-Chinese joint statement on the world strategic
situation. At the same time, intelligence agencies of Russia,
Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Belarus held a drill involving the prevention
of terror attacks on energy assets. Between August 22 and August
30 the combined air defense forces of the Commonwealth of Independent
States will drill warding off air attacks around Astrakhan at the
northern end of the Caspian Sea. The hypothetical aggressor was,
once again, clearly the United States. Russian military sources
indicated that the US and NATO had so far not mounted military
exercises on this scale in multiple regions. The message of all
this is that Russia's military comeback has succeeded to a remarkable
degree, with more to come: Putin also announced a 22% increase in
the Russian military budget, which is still dwarfed overall by the
US. Russia, however, has been able to maintain substantial superiority
in a limited number of strategically decisive categories. As the
US has grown weaker under catastrophic neocon misleadership, Putin
has grown more assertive: On August 17, Putin met with King Abdullah
of Jordan in Sochi and called for a fixed timetable for the gradual
departure of foreign forces from Iraq the theme Bush sees as taboo.
Putin also called for the convocation before the end of the year
of an international conference to stabilize Iraq another Bush
bugaboo. US intentions in the Far East had been made clear by attack
dog Zbigniew Brzezinski in a July 29 article in the Moscow Nezavisimaya
Gazeta, which boasted that the Russian presence in that region was
about to collapse. During August, Pakistan was holding Tri-Service
maneuvers along its border with Iran, thus possibly creating a
diversion to complicate Iran's situation.

WAR PSYCHOSIS IN WASHINGTON

For weeks, top US officials foolishly ignoring rumblings from many
quarters around the world -- have given free rein to their obsession
with Iran. When a few days after the London 7/7 attacks, a bomb in
Israel claimed the lives of two victims, Rumsfeld placed the blame
on Hezbollah and Iran. On August 9, Rumsfeld and outgoing Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Richard Meyers complained that Iran
was responsible for the availability in Iraq of new types of shaped
charge explosive devices, which had played a key roll in the heavy
US losses of early August. Press accounts alleged that the Iranian
Revolutionary Guards had created a special terror unit for anti-US
operations inside Iraq, featuring the use of sophisticated and
deadly shaped charges which were capable of easily knocking out the
US Abrams tanks. According to one version, the Iranian commander
of this irregular warfare group is a certain Abu Mustafa al Sheibani,
who leads a score of teams of Iraqi Shiites and Hezbollah fighters
who are expert in using the shaped charges. The overall commander
of the effort is identified as Brigadier General Qassim Sullaimani.
(Michael Wane, "Inside Iran's Secret War for Iraq," Time, August
21, 2005) The propaganda value of such stories for whipping up an
anti-Iran war psychosis is obvious.

In an article appearing August 1, Rumsfeld went far towards declaring
Moslems in general as inferior beings against which crusades could
and should be waged. According to Rumsfeld, the terrorists "seek
to destroy things they could never build in 1,000 years and kill
people they could never persuade." (London Financial Times, August
1, 2005) These statements were accompanied by a campaign of
warmongering hysteria in the reactionary and neofascist media.
Arnaud de Borchgrave, the Belgian count who runs United Press
International, wrote on August 16 that Iran is responsible for
having made Iraq "hell for the US," and that the current Jaafari
regime represents a step towards a "greater Iranian Shiite empire."
In de Borchgrave's view, the "military option for air strikes is
on the table." (UPI, August 16, 2005)

THE GIRALDI SIGNAL PIECE

The acute danger of a US nuclear sneak attack on Iran had been
indicated by a signal piece contributed by CIA veteran Philip Giraldi
to the magazine The American Conservative. Giraldi is the partner
of retired CIA operations man Vince Cannistraro, and can be presumed
to be drawing on high-level leaks by those opposed to the Bush-Cheney
war scenario. Giraldi wrote:

"The Pentagon, acting under instructions from Vice President Dick
Cheney's office, has tasked the United States Strategic Command
(STRATCOM) with drawing up a contingency plan to be employed in
response to another 9/11-type terrorist attack on the United States.
The plan includes a large-scale air assault on Iran employing both
conventional and tactical nuclear weapons. Within Iran there are
more than 450 major strategic targets, including numerous suspected
nuclear-weapons-program development sites. Many of the targets are
hardened or are deep underground and could not be taken out by
conventional weapons, hence the nuclear option. As in the case of
Iraq, the response is not conditional on Iran actually being involved
in the act of terrorism directed against the United States. Several
senior Air Force officers involved in the planning are reportedly
appalled at the implications of what they are doing that Iran is
being set up for an unprovoked nuclear attack but no one is prepared
to damage his career by posing any objections." (The American
Conservative, August 1, 2005; reprinted by Justin Raimondo,
Antiwar.com, July 25, 2005)

The notion of a massive nuclear and conventional attack on Iran
which is so graphically evoked here should not obscure the other,
more immediately important, element of this warning: Cheney is
counting on "another 9/11-type terrorist attack on the United
States." It is evident that such a determined warmonger as Cheney
is hardly likely to leave the coming of that indispensable terrorist
provocation to chance: the terror event that provides the pretext
for war must be an integral part of the plan being pushed through
the US bureaucracy by the secret government, their spokesmen Bush
and Cheney, and the neocon faction in general. We are dealing in
short with state sponsored terrorism.

As for the military side, US nuclear sneak attack plans have been
in the works for some years under the supervision of the utopian
Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld. In the summer of 2004,
Rumsfeld promulgated an "Interim Global Strike Alert Order." "Global
strike" is Pentagon jargon for pre-emptive attack or, in plain
English, a sneak attack. Under this order, the US STRATCOM (Strategic
Command, corresponding to the Cold War Strategic Air Command) in
Nebraska revamped its posture to be ready to deliver nuclear and
conventional attacks on states alleged to be developing weapons of
mass destruction (WMD). The plans to deal with an alleged threat
from North Korea and/or Iran go under the designation CONPLAN (or
contingency plan) 8022-22. This planning was ordered by Bush in a
January 2003 secret directive in order to provide a "full-spectrum"
global strike, including notably "a capability to deliver rapid,
extended range, precision kinetic (nuclear and conventional) and
non-kinetic (elements of space and information operations) effects
in support of theater and national objectives." A centerpiece of
CONPLAN 8022-22 is the so-called bunker-busting nuclear projectile,
a specially configured earth-penetrating bomb designed to destroy
deeply buried facilities, command bunkers, and the like. The entire
package was foreshadowed in the pre-emptive war clauses of Bush's
National Security Strategy published in September 2002, supposedly
in response to the 9/11 events. In December 2002, the Pentagon's
quadrennial Nuclear Posture Review ordered STRATCOM to prepare for
greater flexibility in nuclear attack options against Iraq, Iran,
North Korea, Libya, Syria and China quite an enemies, list.

According to Lt. Gen. Bruce Carlson, commander of the 8th Air Force,
his fleet of B-2 and B-52 bombers had been reorganized to be able
to carry out such short-notice pre-emptive attacks. "We're now at
the point where we are essentially on alert," Carlson said in an
interview. "We have the capacity to plan and execute global strikes."
Carlson boasted that his headquarters was the U.S. Strategic Command's
"focal point for global strike" and were ready to execute an attack
"in half a day or less." In July 2004, Gen. Richard B. Myers,
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, praised the progress made
on CONPLAN 8022-22, gloating that "the president charged you to 'be
ready to strike at any moment's notice in any dark corner of the
world' [and] that's exactly what you've done." The May 15, 2005
Washington Post article by William Arkin detailing CONPLAN 8022-22
was an important signal piece and would take an important place in
a chronology of the current escalation.

CONPLAN 8022-22 appears to ignore the messy experience of defeat
in Iraq and rather chooses to harken back to a mythologized version
of the Afghan campaign of 2001-2002. It calls for nuclear and
conventional air strikes, with limited use of Special Forces teams:
the result is practically no "boots on the ground" or "follow-on
ground operations," according to published reports. Afghanistan was
subdued in 2001-2002 by means of air power to enforce deals made
on the ground by CIA negotiators with local warlords and druglords.
Something similar involving bribery of Iraqi generals was tried on
the way to the bloody morass of present-day Iraq. The CONPLAN 8022-22
strategy is utopian enough to enrage any military traditionalist
concerned about logistics, depth, and political factors. It is
Blitzkrieg, with the utopian elements accentuated.

Wayne Madsen reports information he describes as coming from the
Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), the German foreign intelligence
service, according to which the nuclear and conventional bombing
campaigns already detailed will be supplemented by infrastructure
sabotage and other acts of terrorism by the People's Mujaheddin
(Mujaheddin e Khalq, MEK), US Special Operations units, and other
marauders. (Despite recent talk of a US "war on terror," the Pentagon
is not reticent about using the MEK, who are still on the State
Department list of terrorist organizations, as auxiliaries. In fact,
some of the MEK personnel have been personally rehabilitated by
none other than General Geoffrey Miller, one of the principal felons
of Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib.) The goals of the US operations include
inciting a rebellion in the Khuzestan province of southwestern Iran,
the site of many of Iran's oil fields and refineries, most probably
including the critical Kharg Island tanker terminal. The majority
of this area's population are Shiite Arabs. According to one scenario,
the US would intervene in response to an appeal from the phantomatic
Al Ahwaz Popular Democratic Front, whose program would include
secession from Iran and the declaration of an independent Arab state
calling itself Ahwaz. This simulacrum of Ahwaz corresponds to the
new state called simply "Arabistan" in the standard Bernard Lewis
Plan for the Balkanization of the Middle East. (see map). Also in
correspondence with the Bernard Lewis Plan, the CIA is agitating
among Kurds and Turkmen along the border with Iraq and Turkey and
among Baluchis along the border with Pakistan by promising them
their own balkanized homelands. The Persians, according to this
report, would be relegated to an oil-poor "Irani triangle" (or
"Iranistan," in classic Bernard Lewis Plan terminology) around
Teheran, Isfahan, and Qom. According to the BND, the US Navy is
tapping Iranian undersea cables, while US Task Force 121 covert
action teams are swarming over sensitive points inside Iran. The
presence of US special forces teams on Iranian territory has been
an open secret since the beginning of 2005, along with numerous
violations of US airspace by US military aircraft. (See
<http://www.waynemadsenreport.com/>http://www.waynemadsenreport.com/,
August 10, 2005)

US WAR AIMS: THE BERNARD LEWIS PLAN

To clarify these points, a map reflecting the Bernard Lewis Plan
for the Balkanization of the Middle East is included with this
article. This map is based on one published in Linda de Hoyos,
Derivative Assassination: Who Killed Indira Ghandi? (New York: New
Benjamin Franklin House, 1985), with some changes. Bernard Lewis
served during World War II as an agent of the British Arab Bureau,
the imperialist agency charged with keeping the Arab world weak so
as to preserve London's domination. Bernard Lewis is associated
with two principal ideas about the Moslem and Arab world. The first
is that the real basis of Islam is not at all to be found in the
luminous Baghdad Renaissance of the Caliph Haroun al Rashid around
800 AD, in its time the most advanced civilization in the world,
but is to be sought rather in the benighted irrationalism of al
Ghazali and his Destruction of Philosophy the world of dervishes,
sheikhs, and necromancers. Over more than a century, the British
have sought to control the Arab and Islamic sense of identity by
finding, publicizing, and glorifying the most backward and
self-destructive tendencies in one and a half millennia of Moslem
history, attempting to accredit these as the true essence of Islam.
Bernard Lewis, glorification of Moslem irrationalism thus prepares
the way for the ideology attributed to al Qaeda. Lewis, second idea
is that the existing Arab countries are illegitimate, and need to
be carved up into a crazy quilt of ridiculous petty states who will
be unable to threaten any important interest of Anglo-American
imperialism. In a 1992 Foreign Affairs article in which he surveyed
the region in the aftermath of the 1991 Operation Desert Storm,
Lewis offered the following prophecy of the coming Lebanization of
the entire Middle East on the lines of the post-1975 Lebanese civil
war:

"The eclipse of pan-Arabism has left Islamic fundamentalism as the
most attractive alternative to all those who feel that there has
to be something better, truer and more hopeful than the inept
tyrannies of their rulers and the bankrupt ideologies foisted on
them from outside... The more oppressive the regime, the greater
the help it gives to fundamentalists by eliminating competing
oppositionists. If the central power is sufficiently weakened, there
is no real civil society to hold the polity together, no real sense
of common national identity or overriding allegiance to the
nation-state. The state then disintegrates"as happened in Lebanon"into
a chaos of squabbling, feuding, fighting sects, tribes, regions and
parties."

Of course, Bernard Lewis only repeats with his usual arid banality
the geopolitical nostrums which his British imperialist predecessors
had expressed with far greater panache. T.E. Lawrence ("of Arabia"),
for example, who was a far more colorful operative than Lewis,
developed similar ideas in an October 29, 1918 meeting with Lord
Cecil, Lord Curzon, Lord Balfour, General Smuts, and Mark Sykes of
the Foreign Office, who helped draw up the map of the modern Middle
East in the infamous Sykes-Picot deal. At that time the British
effort was to break up and balkanize a Caliphate that actually
existed, with its center in Constantinople. Lawrence stated:

"If the Sultan of Turkey were to disappear, then the Caliphate by
the common consent of Islam would fall to the family of the prophet,
the present representative of which is Hussein, the Sharif of Mecca.
Hussein's activities seem beneficial to us, because it marches with
our immediate aims, the breakup of the Islamic bloc and the disruption
of the Ottoman Empire, and because the states he would set up to
succeed the Turks would be as harmless to ourselves as Turkey was.
If properly handled the Arab states would remain in a state of
political mosaic, a tissue of jealous principalities incapable of
cohesion, and yet always ready to combine against an outside force."

In other words, the eternal British mantra of divide and conquer,
now embraced with giddy enthusiasm by fanatical parvenu neocons,
greedy barbarian Bushmen, and cost-plus arrivistes along the Potomac.

The Bernard Lewis Plan represents the real US-UK war aims in the
Middle East. This map is what Appalachian poor whites, no-future
rural youth, and black and Hispanic ghetto victims are dying for
in Iraq. The hogwash spouted by neocons about democracy, or Bush's
pledge to bring reform and modernization to Arab societies, are
cynical subterfuges to achieve this goal. In the light of this
analysis, the basic purpose of Bush's Iraq invasion was quite simply
the destruction of that society, and the deliberate provoking of a
three-way civil war. This is, after all, what we are observing
empirically. Maybe it is now clear why, despite an alleged $20
billion in reconstruction funds available, there is so little
electricity in Baghdad.

THE WAR PLANS FOR IRAN

According to one high-ranking retired US military officer, a warning
has been issued inside the Pentagon about a large-scale terrorist
attack in the US around the fourth anniversary of 9/11 on September
11, 2005. (EIR, August 16, 2005) According to this source, US CENTCOM
(Central Command), SOCOM (Special Operations Command) and STRATCOM
(Strategic Command) were asked what their capabilities against Iran
would be. CENTCOM reported that it was bogged down in Iraq and had
nothing to spare. SOCOM replied that it could mount raids inside
Iran, but these would not be sufficient to eliminate the Iranian
nuclear program, and might include losses so heavy as to be politically
unacceptable. STRATCOM offered a target list for nuclear attack.
According to this source, the reluctance of the US military to cross
the nuclear threshold with a sneak attack was great, with key
generals "highly resistant" to such a move. This source implied
that the center of support for US nuclear aggression against Iran
was in INSCOM, the Intelligence and Security Command, the home of
utopian psychological warfare strategists and assorted Strangeloves.
(EIR, August 16, 2005) Generally speaking, INSCOM and SOCOM, with
their old boy networks and interfaces with CIA, DIA, NSA, etc., are
the prime suspects in the terror provocations now looming.

The US campaign which thus shapes up has many of the characteristics
of a punitive expedition, The US would bomb the bases of the Iranian
Revolutionary Guards, along with the nuclear facilities at Bushehr,
Isfahan, and related locations. But published reports also indicate
that the Pentagon utopians feel that they will also need to seize
control of the areas where the laboratories, research facilities,
factories, universities, and reactors are located, in order to
ensure their complete destruction. The utter devastation of these
areas might require as much as one month. After this, the US forces
would leave most of Iran immediately, except perhaps for some
advisers attached to the Ahwaz forces and other rebels. It will
thus will be a campaign of pure vandalism and destruction, designed
to push Iran back into the Stone Age. It will aim at the destruction
of modern civilization. This will be the main thrust, and not any
neocon slogans about democracy, modernization, women's rights or
other Orwellian lies.

The war party in Washington was shocked by the July 8 demand of the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization that the US establish a firm
timetable for vacating the Uzbek and Kyrgyz bases in central Asia
which were extorted by Bush from Putin on September 11, 2001. On
July 29, President Karimov of Uzbekistan had given the US an ultimatum
to get out of his country within 180 days, meaning by January 29,
2006. As Sovietologist Stephen Cohen noted on WTOP radio in Washington
DC soon afterwards, this represented the first rollback of US-UK
expansionism into the former Soviet sphere since the collapse of
the USSR in 1991. On August 2, the Russian government newspaper
Rossiskaya Gazeta suggested that, once the US left, Russia would
take over this key airbase. It was also clear that the US was
shopping all over the region for bases from which to attack Iran
and other states. In this connection, a Russian newspaper suggested
that Azerbaijan President Ilham Aliyev, who shares a border with
Iran, was ready to grant the US a base or perhaps even two. But
Aliyev's top international affairs adviser denied it, and indicated
that his country was not interested in joining US moves against
Iran. Central Asia is beginning to resemble the Balkans of the
pre-1914 or 1939-41 phases, with the great powers jostling each
other for advantage as hostilities loom closer.

Despite the limited ground forces which the Pentagon utopians imagine
they will need to vandalize Iran, the US forces in neighboring Iraq
will nevertheless require reinforcement during the time of operations
in Iran. There may be insurrections among the Iraqis, counterattacks
across the border by the Iranians, and the like. The most probably
means to accomplish a buildup of 20,000 to 30,000 US troops in Iraq
will be available in the time between October 15 and December 15.
Anecdotal reports of individual servicemen having their leaves
cancelled for this approximate time frame have been received. US
military spokesmen have already referred to their plans for a
"plus-up" of their numerical strength during this period, allegedly
because of the need to protect the October 15 constitutional
referendum and the December 15 national elections. But that will
be a pretext, a deception. Indeed, all such US troop strength
projections are based on nothing but deception, as in the case of
Rumsfeld's July 27 visit to Iraq to promise some form of troop
reduction during 2006. These statements are calculated to deceive
US voters in advance of the (scheduled) November 2006 US Congressional
election, but above all to deceive the Iranian leadership. They are
also designed to fool US soldiers, giving them the mirage of light
at the end of the tunnel in their personal predicament. Their truth
content is equivalent to that of certain protestations of mutual
friendship made during May and early June of 1941 by Hitler and
Stalin. The US government and mass media are currently operating
in a total wartime propaganda mode. At the New York Times, for
example, the despicable tradition of Judith Miller, Iraq war
stenographer for the neocon regime, showed itself alive and well,
as Richard Bernstein attempted to write off the German warnings as
a mere election ploy by Schroeder. "No country, including the United
States, is making serious military threats against Iran," wrote the
mendacious Bernstein in the face of all reality. (NYT, August 16,
2005)

MEDIA BLACKOUT

An example of the US covert buildup with active press complicity
and lying came in the August 18 edition of The Washington Post.
Here we are informed by staff writer Bradley Graham that 700 members
of the 1st battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment of the 82nd
Airborne Division will be going to Iraq soon. The deployment will
be "to bolster prison operations," wrote Graham, who also cited
Pentagon spokesman Lt. Col. Barry Venable as saying that "The basic
fact driving this deployment is the steady rise of the prison
population. There need to be some additional resources devoted to
this." Elsewhere in the article we read that the troops will "not
necessarily provide prison guards but rather engage in a number of
detention-related operations, such as securing the area around a
prison compound or transporting detainees from one prison to another."
To see the absurdity of this cover story, we need only recall that
paratroopers are by definition among the most highly trained elite
shock troops, whose main purpose is to carry out offensive operations
behind the lines of an enemy. To use them for defensive operations
is a waste. Unless the Pentagon generals have gone mad as hatters
on the tactical plane as well as the strategic one, they would know
that the many hundreds of thousands of dollars it costs to train a
paratrooper will be quickly lost if that trooper is required to act
for any length of time as a prison guard, detainee convoy escort,
or garrison soldier around a prison. Paratroopers must train as
paratroopers or they soon cease to be paratroopers and become
useless. These paratroopers and others being shipped to Iraq are
earmarked for use in the upcoming attack on Iran, the only possible
offensive use for such troops at the present time. The US press is
now full of falsifications of this puerile character.

Pentagon planners are aware that Iran would respond to a foreign
invasion with an array of asymmetrical warfare techniques. But they
may not realize how aggressive Iran might be when facing attack.
The US has no monopoly on preventive attacks. The Taliban had few
opportunities for preventive attacks. Saddam Hussein, possibly
because of his long-standing ties to the US, never undertook
preventive action during Operation Desert Shield in late 1990, when
US forces in northern Saudi Arabia were very weak, and his passivity
probably continues to disorient US planners to this very day. Iranian
officials have proclaimed repeatedly that they are not Iraq, and
will not resign themselves to an exclusively defensive posture if
hostilities are imminent. And since the US has already committed
multiple acts of war against Iran with teams on the ground and
overflights, international law will be on the Iranian side.

IRANIAN COUNTERMEASURES

How might Iran respond to a US attack? An obvious measure would be
to step up the flow of bombs, guns, and fighters into Iraq. But the
main Iranian card is that country's long Persian Gulf coast. This
narrow seaway is of course the oil aorta of the world, and Iran
would have many operations to sever it. Iran is thought to possess
an array of missiles ranging from obsolete Chinese Silkworms to
ultra-modern Russian 3M-82 Moskit (called SS-N-Sunburn by NATO) and
even the SS-NX-26 Yakhonts sea-skimming cruise missiles. The Sunburn,
for example, has been designed for the express purpose of sinking
US aircraft carriers, and could also destroy supertankers. Even
artillery pieces and tank cannon could become interdicting factors
when deployed in the rough territory along the northern coast of
the Gulf. A few hulks scuttled in the Straits of Hormuz could block
all traffic as totally as did the freighters sunk by Nasser in the
Suez canal in 1956. And then there are mines. A few Iranian mines
set adrift in the Gulf in 1987 caused the maritime insurance premiums
for tankers to rise so sharply that the Emir of Kuwait was forced
to re-flag his ships under US registry so as to procure US escorts
and minesweepers. Deliveries destined mainly for Europe, Japan and
China would be cut off, and the economies of these countries would
be severely curtailed. The oil price would rise into the ionosphere,
with the mythical Hubbert's peak nowhere in sight. The US would
view the results with some Schadenfreude, since powerful economic
and strategic rivals would be dealt stunning blows, even as a wholly
artificial demand for dollars would emerge as nations scrambled to
pay their imported oil bills. But the constriction of Gulf oil
traffic would be a prelude to the thermodynamic collapse of the
world economy.

Finally, there is no guarantee that Iran would imitate the restraint
shown by Saddam Hussein, who never so far as is known contemplated
attacks on targets located on US territory.

As for the US forces engaged in Iran, they might quickly find
themselves in an extraordinarily critical situation, somewhat along
the lines of Mogadishu in 1993, or like the British at Saratoga.
If the Iranian human wave assaults of the Iran-Iraq war are any
indication, significant parts of the Iranian population may prove
willing to wage a form of people's war against the invaders. At
worst, the US forces might face a fate similar to that of the German
army in Romania in the closing months of 1944 annihilation. Responsible
US military leaders must act now to prevent such a needless
catastrophe.

The Pentagon has a trick of flying dying soldiers out of theatre
and not counting them in the Iraq casualty statistics even if they
expire a few moments after their airplane has left the ground. Some
reckonings of actual US deaths as a result of Iraq operations range
between 7,000 and 9,000, with part of the discrepancy due to this
practice. (Brian Harring, The Harring Report, TBRNews.org) US
deserters must be approaching 6,000, with many of them taking the
last available chance to make a run for it when their planes land
at Shannon Airport in Ireland for refueling. Cases of documented
fragging have now surfaced. These factors, plus the difficulty of
attracting recruits to be sent into the Iraqi shooting gallery, add
up to the collapse of US land forces Army and Marines by early 2006
at the latest.

ZARQAWI: A CLASSIC FALSE FLAG COUNTERGANG

Inside Iraq, the US-UK coalition has been cynically employing
terrorism as a counterinsurgency tactic. These operations have been
developed in accordance with the British colonial doctrine of General
Frank Kitson, the author of such classics as Low Intensity Operations:
Subversion, Insurgency, Peace Keeping and Gangs and Counter-Gangs.
These speak to the heart of false flag operational doctrine. When
Kitson found anti-British nationalism developing in Kenya during
the time of the Mau-Mau, he deliberately created false flag units
which, presenting themselves as Mau-Mau, committed the most unspeakable
atrocities. The effect was to discredit the nationalists and slow
down the country's progress towards independence. As I noted in
9/11 Synthetic Terrorism, the Zarqawi operation in Iraq is a US-UK
asset. Zarqawi is manifestly a false flag countergang, tasked to
carry kidnappings and grisly murders as necessary for the purpose
of discrediting and demonizing the opposition to continued occupation.

The average person around the world might well be astounded that
the neocon administration in Washington, who never learned the
lesson of Vietnam, have also been unable to learn the lesson of
Iraq. The neocons would assert that they are acting on the lessons
of Iraq, which for them add to the thesis that the US is losing in
Iraq because of infiltration of weapons, supplies, and foreign
fighters through the famously porous borders of Syria and Iran.
This amounts to a psychotic flight forward, in which the neocons
hope to escape from the problem of military defeat and the breakdown
of the US land forces by courting a larger military defeat and the
accelerated disintegration of US land forces.

The attitude of Russia and to some extent of China towards a US
invasion of Iran represents a giant question mark. There is every
reason to think that, since the fall of the Shah, the USSR and then
Russia have been determined to prevent the US occupation of Iran,
especially northern Iran and the Caspian Sea coast, the possession
of which would give London and Washington the opportunity to project
their meddling deep into new areas of central Asia. In his Carter-era
study entitled Hostage to Khomeini (New York: Benjamin Franklin
House, c. 1980), Mother Jones columnist Robert Dreyfuss wrote that
the decisive factor in blocking the US special forces action at
Desert One in April 1980 was a massive show of force over that site
by the Soviet Air Force. According to one version cited by Dreyfuss,
it was Soviet bombs, and not an accidental collision, which caused
the conflagration that ended that mission. Today there are teams
of Russian technicians at Bushehr, and Russia has reportedly installed
a mobile system of ground to air missiles to defend the reaction
from possible US or Israeli strikes. The implementation of CONPLAN
8022-22 would almost certainly cause fatalities among the Russian
personnel involved in these activities. Will Russia prove more
willing to tolerate a US presence in Iran, or the deaths of her
citizens, than the USSR had been? We may soon find out, and they
results may be anything but edifying.

IN SEARCH OF A PRETEXT FOR WAR

In order to wage war, the Anglo-Americans must have a pretext that
will allow the controlled corporate media to portray them as the
aggrieved parties, the victims of aggression. The model is the USS
Maine, the Gulf of Tonkin, or Hitler's Gleiwitz radio station
massacre, which provided the cover story for his September 1, 1939
attack. After six months of sending special forces teams and aircraft
into Iran, this is of course a hard case to argue, but the American
people generally do not know about the illegal incursions, and no
lie is too big for the media.

A duo of military madmen have come forward with one approach to
destroying Iran as a modern state. They are Lt. General Thomas
McInerney, assistant vice chief of staff of the Air Force and
director for the Defense Performance Review, and Army Maj. General
Paul Vallely, former deputy commanding general, Pacific. Vallely
also bills himself as the senior military commentator of Fox News.
In their book
<http://www.nationalreview.com/redirect/amazon.p?j=0895260662>Endgame: The
Blueprint for Victory in the War on Terror, these two develop the
following lunatic scenario for dealing with Iran:

"The United States must prepare to approach the UN Security Council
with a draft resolution for a total economic embargo on Iran, the
seizing of Iranian assets (to be held in trust for future Iranian
government), and a strict naval quarantine in the Persian Gulf and
the Strait of Hormuz. The United Nations would lift the embargo
only when the Iran government dismantles its nuclear weapons program
under the supervision of international inspections. Libya (and
before Libya, South Africa) has given Iran an example to follow on
how to dismantle a nuclear weapons program in a way that meets
international standards of verification. Iran would be required to
surrender or destroy all equipment needed to produce fissionable
materials (highly enriched uranium and plutonium), all long-range
ballistic missiles, and all cruise missiles; release all documents
related to its nuclear weapons program; and expel all foreign
scientists, technicians, and engineers involved in nuclear weapons
design, development, and production. Because the French or Russians
are likely to veto " or, at least, threaten to veto " such a Security
Council resolution, the United States should be ready to impose
these conditions on Iran with a coalition of our own." (As excerpted
in National Review.)

The method is the same as Iraq use the UN as a fig leaf for acts
of war if possible, otherwise repudiate any notion of international
law and act unilaterally, using a group of petty states as a cloak.
The proposed closing of the Straits of Hormuz would of course
represent a major act of war, and would be seen clearly as such by
Europe, Japan, and China, who depend on Persian Gulf oil. Clearly
some other approach will be required.

TERRORISM UNDER THE COVER OF EXERCISES AND DRILLS

That approach is to create a pretext for war using state sponsored,
false flag synthetic terrorism on a scale larger the previous
exercise of this type on September 11, 2001. Giraldi states above
that Cheney's planning includes "another 9/11-type terrorist attack
on the United States." Since the ruling clique manifestly wants
war, they are not going to leave such an attack to chance; they are
going to furnish themselves, with their own guaranteed apparatus.
One variant, already the object of numerous rumors and chatter
around Washington, is a "new 9/11" attack against several major US
cities, including New York and Washington. A possible occasion might
be the anniversary day of September 11, 2005. To be fully effective,
the attacks would have to be attributable to an Iranian-backed
grouping, most likely Hezbollah, which is considered by the US an
Iranian asset. Hezbollah, a mass political party in Lebanon, is big
enough to allow a considerable number of patsies and double agents
to be housed or at least sheep-dipped there.

The synthetic terror event required by the Bush-Cheney clique and
its masters is likely to be conducted through the US military and
intelligence apparatus under the cover of a terror drill or a war
exercise. Since even those parts of the 9/11 truth movement who
have talked the most about military drills have not sufficiently
clarified this matter, a word of explanation is required.

If we catalogue each coup d,etat, high-level political assassination,
destabilization, war provocation, and spectacular terrorist event
on a world scale over the past 50 years, we will find that almost
all of them have been conducted or conduited in whole or in part
through the military/intelligence apparatus of the state involved.
In many cases, the cover story which has allowed this to be done
has taken the form of a military or terrorism maneuver or exercise
which closely resembled the actual event which followed, but which
masqueraded as a mere drill up to the very last moment. For example,
the US Operation Mongoose, which on the surface had to do with the
assassination of Fidel Castro, appears to have functioned as a cover
story for operations leading to the assassination of President
Kennedy. On the day after John Hinckley Jr.'s attempt to assassinate
President Reagan, there was scheduled a presidential succession
exercise, presumably one of the Nine Lives series. This is discussed
in my book, George Bush: The Unauthorized Biography (Washington DC:
EIR, 1992; reprinted Joshua Tree CA: Progressive Press, 2004).

9/11 itself offers the greatest density of war drills and terror
drills seen so far. These included Vigilant Guardian, Vigilant
Warrior, Northern Vigilance, Northern Guardian, Tripod II, and a
National Reconnaissance office drill. The publication of William
M. Arkin's Code Names (Hanover NH: Steerforth Press, 2005) has added
Global Guardian to this list. Global Guardian is important since
it establishes beyond doubt what I argued in 9/11 Synthetic Terror:
namely that one of the main ingredients of the 9/11 plot was an
option for a thermonuclear confrontation with Russia and possibly
other states. A recent posting on cooperativeresearch.org notes
that Global Guardian also had included some simulation of a rogue
network interfering in the command and control of strategic assets
a kind of nuclear coup:

A 1998 Defense Department newsletter reported that for several years
Stratcom had been incorporating a computer network attack (CNA)
into Global Guardian. The attack involved Stratcom "red team" members
and other organizations acting as enemy agents, and included attempts
to penetrate the Command using the Internet and a "bad" insider who
had access to a key command and control system. The attackers "war
dialed" the phones to tie them up and sent faxes to numerous fax
machines throughout the Command. They also claimed they were able
to shut down Stratcom's systems. Reportedly, Stratcom planned to
increase the level of computer network attack in future Global
Guardian exercises.,
[<http://www.iwar.org.uk/infocon/dtic-ia/Vol2_No1.pdf>IAnewsletter, 6/98]

The bad" insider points towards the invisible government's 9/11
threat to launch the war of civilizations in the nuclear dimension
should Bush refuse to unleash it on the conventional plane. Details
about these exercises are found in my 9/11 Synthetic Terrorism:
Made in USA (Joshua Tree CA: Progressive Press, 2005) As I try to
show, some of these maneuvers involved sending US Air Force fighter
interceptors to Alaska and Northern Canada so as to reduce the
probability that these planes would be able to prevent the aircraft
or other flying objects from hitting the Twin Towers and the Pentagon.
These maneuvers also sowed confusion, with fake blips inserted on
radar screens manned by loyal officers, and military and commercial
aircraft masquerading as hijacked planes. This use of maneuvers on
9/11 is consistent with the LIHOP (Let It Happen on Purpose) or
perhaps HIHOP (Helped It Happen on Purpose) interpretation of 9/11
which has been ably defended by Michael Ruppert. These maneuvers
can be compared to the Fletcher Prouty character being sent to the
South Pole just at the time of the Kennedy assassination in Oliver
Stone's JFK.

But, when we come to Global Guardian, Amalgam Virgo, the plane
hijacking exercise under whose overall aegis 9/11 was manifestly
prepared over a period of months and years, and to such specific
exercises as the 9/11 National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) drill
involving a hijacked aircraft hitting that agency's own headquarters,
the terror drill mimics the actual attacks so closely that the drill
must be seen as the deliberate camouflage of the attack. Modern
military and security bureaucracies involve officers sitting in
front of consoles in war rooms and situation rooms for hours on
end. If there is to be state sponsored terrorism, some of the terror
operations have to be prepared using those very consoles. Some of
the officers present may support the coup, assassination, provocation,
or terror plot. Some may be indifferent or simply unwitting. Some
might actively oppose the plot and sabotage it if they knew what
was coming. Outside agencies of unknown orientation may also be
watching. Thus, a drill designed so as to be practically congruent
with the terror attack tremendously facilitates the work of the
plotters, faction. If a loyal officer asks the coup plotter sitting
next to him what he is doing, the coup plotter can cite the code
name of the drill, and also note that the loyal officer does not
possess the proper security clearance needed to know any more. In
other words, war drills and terror drills are the keys to making
the terror attacks happen on purpose through the state apparatus
of the relevant country. They are one key reason why any explanation
of 9/11 short of invisible government MIHOP (i.e., that the US
invisible government made 9/11 happen on purpose) is inadequate.

These basic facts were illustrated once again in London on July 7,
2005. Scotland Yard knew in advance that these attacks were coming,
as shown through the warnings to Netanyahu and, presumably, other
visiting bigwigs. The long-range preparation of the London explosions
was carried out under the aegis of a trio of exercises: Atlantic
Blue for the UK, Topoff 3 for the US, and Triple Play for Canada.
These dealt with bomb attacks on the London Underground system at
the same time that an important international conference was taking
place in the UK in this case, the meeting of the G-8 in Gleneagles,
Scotland. The drill apparently included a biowar attack on the
conference, a detail that seems to have ended up on the cutting
room floor. The immediate cover for the London 7/7 events was by
all accounts the simulation being conducted by Peter Power and Visor
Consultants, which involved bombs going off at pretty much the same
stations at the same times that the explosions actually occurred.
The Visor Consultants drill may well have involved personnel on the
ground who thought they were participating in a legally sanctioned
simulation, but who were really performing actions which led to the
explosions. In this way, drills can help to produce the destructive
effects associated with the terror attack. They can also transform
unwitting employees into patsies, some of whom can pay for their
naivete with their lives. These may or may not be the same persons
as the patsies who are ultimately accused of being responsible.

CASE STUDY: SUDDEN RESPONSE 05

With these facts in mind, let us turn to the following two items.
The first is an article from the Winston-Salem Journal of March 18,
2005. The second is a press release from the US Northern Command
(NORTHCOM) issued June 29, 2005. Both have to do with operation
Sudden Response 05, a nuclear terrorism drill which began August
17, 2005.

http://www.journalnow.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=
WSJ%2FMGArticle%2FWSJ_BasicArticle&c=MG Article&cid=1031781660453

Winston-Salem Journal

Friday, March 18, 2005

N.C. sites to be part of summer terrorism drill

THE ASSOCIATED PRESS

SHALLOTTE - The largest terrorism drill in North Carolina history
is being planned for August and will include a mock attack on the
Sunny Point Military Ocean Terminal in Brunswick County.

Officials said Wednesday the drill will stretch from Fort Bragg to
Morehead City in the state's central coast area to Brunswick County
on the southeastern coast.

Emergency and law-enforcement units from Virginia to South Carolina
have been invited to participate, as have those from the seven
counties that surround Fort Bragg. Participation by military personnel
and equipment will hinge on their availability.

The exercise is thought to be the first to test the new National
Response Plan that takes effect next month and requires coordination
among local, state and federal officials in terrorism and emergency
response.

The idea came from Fort Bragg and the FBI, said Andy Albright, an
exercise facilitator and civilian employee of the Coast Guard in
Wilmington. Other military bases and state and local agencies were
invited to join.

Planning for the drill has been going on for a year, Albright said.

The exercise is to begin with a weapons of mass destruction drill
at Fort Bragg with some of the perpetrators escaping. Other events
will occur over the next three days at or near other military bases
in eastern North Carolina, at the State Port in Morehead City and
in the Pamlico Sound.

There will be a May 17 workshop in Morehead City to help prepare
those who will participate and a July exercise to test communications
before the August events, Albright said.

Randy Thompson, Brunswick County's emergency services director,
said it has been 31/2 years since local emergency management has
tested its response to a situation at Sunny Point.

The last time was when a boat loaded with munitions caught fire and
burned at the terminal, the largest military munitions shipping
point in the United States.

http://www.northcom.mil/index.cfm?fuseaction=news.
showstory&storyid=C9BFBBAC-F3CA-BD2E-008C7B34AFE33114

NorthCom Press Release

Exercise to focus on nuclear terror scenario

Posted Jun 29, 2005 at 1:00:PM MDT

FORT MONROE, Va. -- Here's the scenarioA seafaring vessel transporting
a 10-kiloton nuclear warhead makes its way into a port off the coast
of Charleston, S.C. Terrorists aboard the ship attempt to smuggle
the warhead off the ship to detonate it. Is this really a possibility?

Joint Task Force Civil Support (JTF-CS) here is planning its next
exercise on the premise that this crisis is indeed plausible.

Sudden Response 05 will take place this August on Fort Monroe and
will be carried out as an internal command post exercise. The
exercise is intended to train the JTF-CS staff to plan and execute
Consequence Management operations in support of Federal Emergency
Management Agency Region IV's response to a nuclear detonation.

Some of this year's objectives for SR05 are to refine nuclear
incident Concept of Operations, produce a CM Operation Order, refine
command post set-up procedures and maintain situational awareness
of multiple CM incidents.

The Sudden Response exercise has been held at Quantico, Va., in the
past, but has been moved to Fort Monroe to maximize command post
training time. The senior leadership felt that it was more important
to accomplish training instead of losing up to a day and a half in
travel time, said Paul Deflueri, J7 Lead Exercise Planner. "This
will allow us to still meet our training objectives," he said.

Some external participants may work with JTF-CS during the exercise.

"We,re trying to get representatives from FEMA Region IV as well
as representatives from South Carolina Emergency Management Division
and active duty soldiers from the (Chemical, Biological, Radiological,
Nuclear and Explosive) Consequence Management Response Force to
play the role of task force units," Defluri said. "Each time we do
one of these internal exercises, we try to make it more robust and
try to add in fidelity," Defluri said. "That's what we,re trying
to do for SR05: create a good scenario and be able to replicate the
effects as best we can. That way we can give the command a really
good CM exercise."

In the related exercise Operation Orbit Comet, held at Fort Bragg,
North Carolina, under the command of Maj. Gen. Virgil Packett, the
drill involved military response to the taking of several US
Congressmen as hostages by terrorists. Congressmen Bob Etheridge
and Mike McIntyre volunteered to play the victims in this exercise,
which had some of the features of a dry run for a coup. This exercise
was also slated to include a raid on a safe house, the detonation
of a large explosive device on a ferry, and a simulated commercial
oil spill at Morehead City.

Without attempting a line-by-line exegesis, it ought to be clear
that an exercise of this type would lend itself to transformation
into an actual nuclear terrorist incident, including the detonation
of some kind of nuclear device. This is especially true given the
presence of Fort Bragg, home of the US special forces, founded by
General Edward Lansdale, who was an integral part of the Allen
Dulles-Lyman Lemnizter clique which has been key to secret government
operations since the Kennedy-LBJ era. We cannot be reassured by the
intent of the organizers to make these proceedings "more robust and
try to add in fidelity," since the maximum of fidelity would be to
include a nuclear device or nuclear detonation.

We should also bear in mind that, before they settled on the nuclear
test site of Alamogordo, New Mexico, US World War II nuclear planners
had considered setting up their nuclear proving ground on the coastal
islands of North Carolina. The advantage was seen in the fact that
the nuclear fallout from a detonation along the North Carolina coast
would tend to drift directly out over the Atlantic Ocean, instead
of falling on populated areas, as the New Mexico fallout always
threatened to do. This means that the rogue network could organize
a quite spectacular nuclear 9/11 along the Carolina coast without
also doing commensurate damage to their already rickety war machine.

CITIZENS MOBILIZE TO STOP TERROR DRILLS

It is possible to fight back. The mobilization that started at a
Sunday, July 24 morning workshop at the Washington DC Truth Convergence
has perhaps disrupted the hidden agenda of Sudden Response 05. A
mobilization by a number of websites especially www.total411.info
-- and email blasters starting on July 28 identified the obvious
subversive potential of Sudden Response 05, and urged vigilance by
world public opinion and local citizens. On August 15, the website
of the Charleston Post and Courier published a strange article which
apparently represented the attempt of this paper to respond to
widespread fears in the region that the planned drill was going to
culminate in an actual nuclear detonation. Here we read:

Still, this chatter has stirred up folks all over the Lowcountry,
worried that nuclear fallout could seriously ruin their weekend.
Officials with Charleston County, the state's emergency management
personnel and even the Department of Defense have gotten worried
calls from folks scanning the skies for mushroom clouds over Fort
Sumter. Trouble is, as with most conspiracy theories, the facts
often get in the way. Locals officials say no drills are planned
this week, and the state Ports Authority says no plans have been
made to detonate any nuclear weapons in the harbor.Other details,
such as why Iran would blow up Charleston, are not explained in
these theories.
https://www.charleston.net/stories/?newsID=36369&section=localnews ]

Of course, the web sites calling attention to this suspicious drill
never implied that Iran would have anything to do with the possible
explosion, which was always clearly attributed to the rogue network
inside the US command structure. Otherwise, the denials respecting
activity in the Charleston area was pure lying. Here was a case
where the cockroaches of the invisible government may have wilted
in the bright glare of publicity. Perhaps as a result of this
negative publicity, the start of the drill was postponed from the
scheduled August 17 to August 18 at 3:30 in the afternoon. In the
afternoon of August 18 it became apparent that the drill was going
to be postponed a second time, probably to Monday, August 22, or
perhaps definitively. Soon NORTHCOM announced that this dangerous
drill was over. If local citizens can work to prevent terror drills
from erupting into provocations, the task of the terrorist controllers
and coup plotters will become complicated beyond measure. At the
same time, the American people may finally break through to awareness
about the crimes plotted within their own government, and shut those
criminals down for good.

Another highly dangerous drill series is the so-called Urban
Dispersion Program, being held in New York City between August 6
and 26. (<http://urbandispersion.pnl.gov/>http://urbandispersion.pnl.gov/)
As Salon reported, "Government scientists released colorless,
harmless gas at four Manhattan locations Monday as part of an effort
to find out how fast and far a toxic substance could spread if
released in the city. According to this article, this program "aims
to produce a computerized model of air flow patterns that could
help authorities decide how to evacuate people after a chemical or
biological attack." Another round of gas dispersion is scheduled
to take place in the spring of 2006. This type of drill poses the
obvious threat that a single rogue network official might be able
to replace the harmless gas with some far more toxic substance.
(http://www.salon.com/wire/ap/archive.html?wire=D8BRQSO80.html) The
basic interest of New Yorkers is to have this pernicious drill
series shut down as soon as possible.

We should stress that there are numerous war drills and terror
maneuvers going on, and all of them require vigilant scrutiny
followed by timely denunciation and exposure as necessary. On August
18, a "multi-agency command and control tabletop exercise" was
scheduled to be held on the University of California Maritime Campus
with the participation of Booz Allen Hamilton, one of the most
sinister of the private military firms, involving the hypothesis
of port-related terrorism in and around San Francisco Bay. 200
people were involved as "participants, evaluators, controllers, or
observers." On Friday, August 19, a mysterious explosion, later
ascribed to a defective transformer, took place in San Francisco.
Were these events connected? Or again: from August 15 to August 19,
NORTHCOM held Alaska Shield/Northern Edge, with an array of "simulated
natural disasters and terrorist events in 21 communities." Incessant
terror drills offer the rogue network multiple opportunities to go
live with the provocation they are seeking, and also function as a
kind of mass brainwashing. With these drills, the secret government
is waging war on the people. One basic demand for activists is
therefore that these sinister and suspicious drills be called off,
since they represent a threat to the American people and to world
peace.

ANTI-NEOCON GENERAL OUSTED

As noted above, the command center for operation Sudden Response
05 is Fortress Monroe, located near where the James River meets
Chesapeake Bay, not far from the scene of the 1862 Monitor-Merrimac
battle. The fort features a cell where Confederate leader Jefferson
Davis was held prisoner after the Civil War on charges of high
treason, and it is evident that some top military officers ought
to be occupying that cell block today.

One of these is General Peter J. Schoomaker, presently the US Army
Chief of Staff, who is part of a utopian/irrationalist clique in
the Pentagon which has been fostered by Bush, Cheney, and Rumsfeld.
Schoomaker was the commander of the Joint Special Operations Command
in 1994-1996, commander of the US Army Special Operations Command
in 1994-1996, and commander in chief of the United States Special
Operations Command in 1997-2000. Schoomaker was brought back from
undistinguished retirement to head the Army after the firing of
Gen. Shinseki, who had questioned the utopian recipes for the
conquest of Iraq. He also took part in the aggressions against
Grenada, Panama, Iraq, and Haiti. Schoomaker was an integral part
of the failed hostage rescue mission at Desert One in April, 1980,
which once again prods us to ponder the high incidence of fascist
outlooks among defeated military officers. Schoomaker may be usefully
compared to Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, Hitler's military yes-man.

On August 9, 2005 Schoomaker fired General Kevin P. Byrnes, one of
the army's dozen or so four-star generals, from his post as leader
of the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). The ouster of such
a high-ranking officer was a rarity, and the reason given was the
transparent cover story of an extra-marital affair with a civilian
woman. What makes this relevant to our purposes is that the Army's
TRADOC plays a key role in maneuvers. In fact, the headquarters for
Sudden Response 05 was located at Fort Monroe, placing the entire
operation under Byrnes, command. Byrnes was replaced by Lt. Gen.
William S. Wallace. (Washington Post, August 10, 2005) What was the
goal of cashiering Byrnes, just as the Cheney drive for nuclear
terrorism and nuclear attack on Iran went into overdrive?

The utopian-terrorist faction of the US military loves to wage war
on the cheap. More traditionalist views stress logistics and force
structure. Byrne had reportedly clashed in 2002 with the Pentagon's
utopian intelligence boss, Stephen Cambone (the keystone of the
Cambone-Boykin-Miller clique responsible for Guantanamo and Abu
Ghraib) over troop strength cuts. According to one version, Byrnes,
command had been ordered to prepare for the influx of 50,000 raw
recruits into Fort Rucker, Alabama possibly in the context of a
reinstituted military draft. TRADOC had also been told to prepare
to accept recruits with no education, with criminals records, with
no ability to speak English practically penal divisions. Army
retirees were also slated to be dragooned back into service. Byrnes
would thus emerge as the leading figure of a military opposition
of sorts against the crackpot aggressive planning of the
Bush-Cheney-neocon regime. Byrnes was also said to be associated
with a group of generals linked to the US Army War College at
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. (www.waynemadsenreport.com, August
10, 2005) Carlisle Barracks is the home of Jeffrey Record, who is
the author of a decidedly down-beat evaluation of the first Gulf
War of 1990-91. Analysts associated with the War College have also
been exceptionally blunt in their criticism of the current Iraq
war. Record wrote in January 2004 that the Iraq war had been a
"strategic error," and was being waged with a strategy that "promises
more than it can deliver." The intriguing question remains as to
whether Byrnes was also disinclined to have drills and exercises
in which TRADOC was involved used as covers for state-sponsored
terrorism.

The events of 9/11 were prepared by a scenario film, The Lone Gunmen,
which depicted an airplane coming under the control of a terrorist
faction of the US government who used a sophisticated remote control
system to attempt to crash a passenger airliner into one of the
Twin Towers of the World Trade Center. Sudden Response 05 also
corresponds to a terror scenario. This one was called Special
Bulletin, and it revolved around terrorists seizing a nuclear weapon
aboard a ship in the harbor of Charleston, South Carolina and
preparing to detonate it. US security forces attempt to disarm the
bomb, but it blows up despite their efforts, causing a hecatomb.
This film was shown on television in 1983, and was directed by
Edward Zwick and written by Marshall Hersokovitz. It starred David
Rasche, Michael Madsen, and Lane Smith. Its showing caused considerable
uneasiness in the Charleston area.

If these variations should not prove viable, there is always the
possibility of staging a more traditional Gulf of Tonkin incident
in the Persian Gulf or somewhere nearby, blaming it on Iran. The
sinking of a US warship could easily be carried out by a third
country UK, Israel, Australia, or any of the Echelon powers to
reduce the possibility of exposure.

MILITARY TAKEOVER

Given the collapse of US middle class support for Bush and his
neocon war adventures signaled by the resounding success of the
Cindy Sheehan anti-war vigils on August 17, it might be expected
that the new 9/11 followed by the Iran or North Korean attacks might
cause protests and chaos inside the US. For such an eventuality,
the neocons as disciples of Hitler's main legal adviser Carl Schmitt
have the remedy: police-state, military dictatorship. At the end
of the first week of August it became known that the US Army Northern
Command (in other words, the madman Schoomaker and his cabal.
Planners in Colorado Springs, including Admiral Timothy J. Keating,
Northcom commander, and Major General Richard J. Rowe, chief
operations officer, were said to be contemplating a total of 15
crisis scenarios presupposing multiple simultaneous terror attacks
in the US. These mobilization plans were drawn up in CONPLAN 2002,
a 1,000 page overall guide to a military takeover, and in CONPLAN
0500, which addresses the specifics of the 15 scenarios. Both
CONPLANS were said to be well on their way to becoming OPLANS, or
operational plans. These activities are manifestly a continuation
of the Pentagon's 1968 Operation Garden Plot, the original plan for
a military seizure of this country. (9/11 Synthetic Terror, p. 377)

The outcry against this thinly veiled plan for a military dictatorship
in the traditional civil liberties community was decidedly muted.
In fact, the most vociferous protest came from Homeland Security
boss Chertoff, who complained in effect that the coming police state
had to be organized under his own Department of Homeland Security,
and not under the military.

TERROR POTBOILERS

An entire new scurrilous literary genre has grown up around the
neocon campaign to attack Iran. This new vogue resembles the pre-1914
German attack scenario novels published in Great Britain, but at
least those were clearly labeled as fiction. A recent tome in the
new genre is Kenneth R. Timmerman's Countdown to Crisis: The Coming
Nuclear Showdown with Iran. Timmerman tries to pin the 9/11 attacks
on Iran, in the same way Laurie Mylroie and Judith Miller tried to
pin them on Iran. His black propaganda technique is too much even
for the Washington Post, whose reviewer commented: "The reader gets
the impression that Timmerman would rather not bother with facts
precisely because they undermine his conspiracy theory. A persistent
problem with this book is its absence of credible evidence." Another
author who writes out of the attack Iran bag is Jerome Corsi, who
was part of the Swift boat slanders against Kerry and has also
founded the Iran Freedom Foundation the US domestic arm of the
Mujaheddin e Khalq. Corsi responded to the leak of the NIE on Iran
by warning that: "The atomic 9-11 plot is in full swing as you are
reading these words. The attack could happen any day." Corsi's book
is entitled Atomic Iran: How the Terrorist Regime Bought the Bomb
and American Politicians; it is dismissed as "irresponsible" by the
Washington Post, which notes that both Timmerman and Corsi "present
their ideology as self-evident verity and their assumptions as
incontrovertible facts. Still in the bookstalls is Paul L. Williams
with his lurid Osama's Revenge: The Next 9/11, full of last year's
stories about the suitcase bombs that are allegedly already inside
the US. All of these figures are at home on Fox News, and also on
the 9 PM to 1 AM John Bachelor Show on the ABC Radio Network, a
kind of radio shock theater for practitioners of extreme neocon
gothic. Among other key black propaganda conduits are Joseph Farah's
World Net Daily and G2 Bulletin. Here we can read such elucubrations
as these: "WND and G2 Bulletin previously reported, based on captured
al-Qaida leaders and documents, that the terrorist group has a plan
called American Hiroshima, involving the multiple detonation of
nuclear weapons already smuggled into the U.S. over the Mexican
border with the help of the MS-13 street gang and other organized
crime groups. (WorldNetDaily.com, August 8, 2005)

INTELLIGENCE WARFARE IN WASHINGTON DC

In the first half of August, Congressman Curt Weldon of Pennsylvania,
whose intelligence contacts make him something of an unpredictable
gadfly, came forward with allegations that a special military
intelligence unit code-named Able Danger had identified Mohammed
Atta, the chief 9/11 patsy, as part of an al Qaeda cell in the
United States. According to Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer, who said he
had worked with Able Danger, the military intelligence people wanted
to alert the FBI, but were prevented from doing so by lawyers.
Shaffer also alleged that, after 9/11, he had informed Philip
Zelikow, the highly suspect staff director of the Kean-Hamilton
commission and a partner of Condoleezza Rice, about Able Danger's
awareness of Atta's presence in the US prior to the World Trade
Center attacks. The final 9/11 commission report had no mention of
this matter. The 9/11 commission responded to this allegation with
a chaotic series of denials, finally coming to rest with the assertion
that Shaffer's story was not "historically significant." Since the
report about Atta to the FBI had been blocked during the Clinton
administration, Weldon and the right-wing radio demagogues appeared
eager to exploit this story for partisan advantage, be it only to
eclipse Cindy Sheehan. Weldon also appeared interested in attacking
the Kean-Hamilton investigation. The reality was clearly that those
who prevented the FBI from being alerted to Atta if this ever really
happened -- were by all odds moles cooperating in the invisible
government's 9/11 project. As far as Zelikow's role in suppressing
vital evidence, this incident would take its place in a long catalogue
of such sabotage developed over the past year by the 9/11 truth
movement. At the same time, it cannot be excluded that the entire
affair was a dog and pony show staged in the context of the
intelligence warfare of August 2005, not of summer 2000. The
information about Atta was allegedly generated by the U.S. Special
Operations Command at MacDill Air Force Base, and this is not a
reliable source. Reacting to the Able Danger story Kristen Breitweiser
of the Jersey Girls called the Kean-Hamilton 9/11 commission results
"an utterly hollow report," and called for the creation of a new
and independent investigation. Indeed: the only adequate answer to
this new round of allegations is a real examination of 9/11 by an
independent, international truth commission not controlled by
Washington insiders.

Opposition to the Cheney war plan was also in evidence in the broader
civilian Washington bureaucracy, where full-scale intelligence
warfare was raging among the various factions. On August 1, the CIA
issued its long-awaited National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on
Iran. The main thrust of this document was to undercut the neocon
hysteria according to which Iran was quickly approaching the point
of no return at which it would join North Korea in possessing at
least one nuclear device. According to the NIE, Iran, although
determined to acquire nuclear weapons, was about ten years away
from being able to do so about double the 5 years cited in February
2005 by Defense Intelligence Agency Director Vice Admiral Lowell
E. Jacoby in testimony to the Congress. CIA veteran Ray McGovern
pointed out that the leaking of the NIE had been designed to undercut
Cheney, Bolton, and their circle. However, noted McGovern, "Cheney
does not feel at all bound by US intelligence." (TomPaine.com,
August 3, 2005)

A few days later, on August 4, additional indictments were forthcoming
in the case of former Pentagon Larry Franklin, part of the Feith-Luti
neocon shop, accused of traducing Pentagon secrets to Israel. Two
FBI raids of the American Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC)
over the previous months had led to widespread anticipation of
further indictments . Indicted on this occasion were Steven Rosen,
former AIPAC Director of Foreign Policy issues and a former CIA and
RAND Corporation employee who held top security clearances, along
with Keith Weissman, AIPAC's former Senior Middle East Analyst. Nor
was this all. It was later reported that Rosen was meeting with
David M. Satterfield, former US Ambassador to Lebanon and currently
the deputy to neocon Zalmay Khalilzad at the US Embassy in Baghdad.
According to the article, Rosen obtained classified information
from Satterfield and sent it out in a memo to AIPAC employees, and
then disclosed it to "a foreign national." (New York Times, August
18, 2005) Satterfield had been a loud protagonist of the Bush
administration campaign to eject Syria from Lebanon; in February
2005 Satterfield had gone to Lebanon with neocon Paul Wolfowitz in
an attempt to organize a US "people power" coup in that country.
At that time, signs observed in Beirut street demonstrations read:
"Satterfield Get out of Lebanon!" AIPAC was a significant target
because it was a headquarters for so much of the neocon agitation
for war with Iran: on May 24, Richard Perle had addressed the AIPAC
annual convention with a call for war with Iran, ranting: "If Iran
is on the verge of a nuclear weapon, I think we will have no choice
but to take decisive action."

Another useful indictment was that of Jack Abramoff on August 11;
Abramoff, in addition to being a gangster who served as money bags
for Tom Delay and other Congressional Republicans, was also a pro-war
ideologue in his own right. But at the same time it was clear that
if the intent really was to stop the threatening conflagration,
more and better indictments would be needed. Leading neocons were
now at the confluence of a series of investigations: the Pentagon
leaks to Israel, the Valery Plame matter, the forged Niger yellowcake
documents, and the Achmed Chalabi leaks to Iran. Caught in the
crossfire were such figures as Wolfowitz, Scooter Libby, Michael
Ledeen, Douglas Feith, etc. Unconfirmed reports from the Chicago
grand juries working with independent counsel Fitzgerald asserted
that sealed indictments had already been returned against the top
figures of the Bush administration, but there was no way to verify
this in the short term.

Underlying the entire Iran nuclear question is the hypocrisy of the
double standards applied by the US. Just a few weeks earlier, the
US had granted India various forms of nuclear assistance, despite
India's active nuclear bomb program. Brazil was getting ready to
export nuclear fuel, and yet was not targeted in the same way as
Iran. The lesson is clear: countries the US is seeking to cultivate
are not harassed, but critics of US policy are put through the
wringer. Britain, France, and Germany, to some degree caught up in
the distorted US view, offered to guarantee Iran that they would
not start a nuclear attack on Teheran, but they could not offer any
real assurances about what the US, Israel, India, Pakistan, or
others might do. It must finally be recalled that the Bush regime's
threats of preventive nuclear attack against non-nuclear states as
embodied in the September 2002 national security statement, along
with its efforts to develop new forms of mini-nukes to use in such
sneak attacks, effectively destroy the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty in its very foundations. No sovereign state could accept
such infringements on its sovereignty as are now being demanded
from Iran.

THE ISRAELI ANGLE

Another factor tending to heighten the adventurism of the US-UK-Israel
grouping is the fact that Israeli society has been brought to the
edge of civil war by the efforts of Sharon to dismantle Israeli
settlements in the Gaza strip and to abandon that area as a Palestinian
Bantustan or "living tomb" in the framework of a longer-term strategy
to tighten the Israeli grip on Jerusalem and the West Bank. According
to former Prime Minister Barak, Sharon's Likud Party is on the verge
of collapse over this matter. Without going into the details, it
is clear that the activism of these vociferous and violent Israeli
right-wing fanatics makes an assassination of Sharon a distinct
possibility. In the wake of such an assassination, even if it were
carried out by Jewish terrorists, an Israeli attack on Iran would
surely be more likely. This might be done in ostensible disregard
of US wishes, according to the decades-old Breakaway Ally Scenario,
which was embraced by Cheney on the morning of January 20, 2005.
According to this, Israel strikes first, and then leaves the US to
deal with the consequences. According to a pro-Israeli website, the
war plan for Iran was presented to Sharon in 2004 under the title
of "Project Daniel: Israel's Strategic Future," which was largely
a recipe for Israeli pre-emptive action. Co-author Yoash Tsiddon-Chatto,
a former Knesset member and the former chief of planning for the
Israeli Air Force, told WND military action should include "striking
all known Iran nuclear facilities, including hidden facilities,
underground tunnels, covert operations, such as the killing of
scientists ... whatever is necessary." (Aaron Klein, WorldNetDaily.com,
May 4, 2005)

THE SHAME OF THE LEFT GATEKEEPERS

The present crisis would not be possible if the overall lesson of
September 11, 2001 had been learned by a significant minority of
the US population, and if that minority had an institution through
which to act. Here the responsibility of the Democratic Party is
very grave, since the Democrats have continued to portray themselves
as the True Believers of the 9/11 Myth, the most faithful devotees
of blaming 9/11 on al Qaeda, Bin Laden, the laptop, the cave, Atta,
and the rest. Especially along the left extremity of the Democratic
Party, we find a line of foundation-funded opinion leaders and
commentators whom we can only define as left gatekeepers. These
gatekeepers have stubbornly denied, mocked, vilified, censored,
blacked out and embargoed any suggestion that 9/11 was a provocation
by a US military-intelligence network, which it so manifestly was.
So much so that if we ask why the US population would still believe
the Bush administration on 9/11 and the imminent terror attacks of
2005 when they would not believe Bush about any other issue the
answer must be that the left gatekeepers are responsible. If the
American people do not finally move out of their present credulous
gullibility and realize that the large-scale international terrorism
of our time is overwhelmingly state sponsored, false flag synthetic
terrorism, they will continue to be an easy mark for the unscrupulous
factions who do not hesitate to employ terror as a means to power.

HILEX 75: ROGUE DRILLS CAN BE STOPPED

Finally, no one should give up in despair before the imminent danger
of a new round of state sponsored terrorism designed to lead to war
with Iran and/or North Korea. These plans can be defeated, and the
key to defeating them is to produce a shock wave of publicity, of
denunciation, of indignation, and of outrage. Such plans have been
defeated before. Back in the late fall of 1975, the Anglo-American
finance oligarchs and their secret team military operatives were
reeling from the recent rout the previous spring in Vietnam. Some
of them, including James Rodney Schlesinger, had held a meeting on
Easter Monday, just after the fall of Saigon, to discuss desperate
military expedients to prevent the possible collapse of the entire
US-UK world strategic position. The method chosen was a possible
nuclear confrontation with the USSR and the Warsaw Pact. Typically,
this secret and illegal plan was built into a military staff exercise,
in this case HILEX 75. HILEX (high level exercise) 75 was designed
as a staff exercise, a headquarters drill, involving top government
officials and simulating a strategic confrontation with Moscow. But
in this case the staff exercise contained and concealed a real
confrontation, to be set off over some appropriate pretext. What
pretext? We do not know, since the world thankfully never got that
far. A group of activists in the main NATO countries embarked on a
campaign of denunciation and exposure weeks in advance, flooding
newspaper, radio, and television offices, elected officials at all
levels, key academics, and others with word of what was looming.
On Christmas Eve 1975, I passed out leaflets with a half-dozen
friends on the steps of the Milan cathedral in Piazza Duomo spelling
out exactly what was planned. This was a part of a mobilization
across western Europe, the US, and Canada. Somehow, the confrontation
variant hidden within the HILEX 75 drill was allowed to lapse. We
must now do the same thing with Sudden Response 05 and similar
terror drills and war exercises. As the astounding success of the
Cindy Sheehan operation suggests, support for the Bush regime is
now evaporating with breathtaking speed. In a climate marked by the
radical rejection of Bush and everything he stands for, the 9/11
myth for which Bush was the leading salesman may also disintegrate,
making a new 9/11 and a widening of the war that much more difficult.

WHAT YOU CAN DO

The organizing committee for the Independent International Truth
Commission on the September 11, 2001 Events on July 24 set up a
Monitoring Group to attempt to apply prospectively, into the future,
the lessons about terrorism that had been learned from the intensive
study of 9/11 and earlier cases. The IITC Monitoring Group is
accordingly checking the public affairs departments of the official
websites of NORAD, the Department of Defense and its subdivisions,
FEMA, Homeland Security, the British Ministry of Defense and Home
Office, NATO Headquarters, and similar sites in Russia, China and
the OECD countries generally. The goal is to identify in advance
those drills, maneuvers and exercises which lend themselves to
cloaking acts of state sponsored synthetic terrorism, and to expose
and denounce in advance the dangers that are thus identified. The
cooperation of all persons of good will in this vital work is
actively requested; send emails to tarpley@tarpley.net. This essay
would not have been possible without the first fruits of this
monitoring activity.

The methodology used here was presented to the IITC workshop at the
Truth Convergence held at American University, Washington DC on
July 24, 2005. The basic analysis presented in this article was
posted in interview form on CloakandDagger.de on July 28, 2005, and
in subsequent programs on August 7, August 11, and August 18. It
was presented to the McClendon study group at the National Press
Club in Washington DC on August 3, 2005, on the Meria Heller internet
radio program on August 17, 2005, and with Sally O,Brien on WBAI
New York on August 21 and August 25, 2005..
*****************************************************************
 2 Guardian Unlimited: Iran Urged to Cooperate in Nuclear Talks
 
From the Associated Press        

[UP] 

Monday August 29, 2005 8:01 PM
 	
AP Photo PAR102 

PARIS (AP) - French President Jacques Chirac urged Iran on
Monday to cooperate in nuclear talks or risk having the issue
sent to the U.N. Security Council for possible sanctions. 

``We call on Iran's spirit of responsibility to re-establish
cooperation and confidence, without which the (U.N.) Security
Council will have no choice but to take up the question,''
Chirac told France's ambassadors brought home for an annual
conference. 

Chirac implored Tehran to ``truly examine'' an offer made by
France, Britain and Germany, which have held talks with Iran on
behalf of the 25-member European Union. Iran rejected a European
proposal to give up its uranium enrichment program in return for
economic, political and security incentives. 

The three countries called off planned talks set for Wednesday
after Iran renewed its conversion of uranium to gas at a plant
in Isfahan, a process that precedes enrichment. By doing so,
Tehran effectively broke an accord agreed to in Paris in
November to suspend nuclear activities and hold talks. 

On Sunday, Tehran said it wanted talks with the U.N.'s
international nuclear watchdog agency, rejecting what it called
``conditional negotiations.'' Iran has said it still wants
talks, but also wants them expanded to include other countries. 

Diplomats familiar with the International Atomic Energy Agency's
proceedings have said that Iran would have until Saturday to
halt its Isfahan activities or risk referral to the U.N.
Security Council, which could impose sanctions. 

``There is room for dialogue and negotiations,'' Chirac
insisted. 

He reiterated that Europe seeks ``objective guarantees, of the
civilian character'' of Iran's nuclear program, noting that in
the past the program was ``clandestine'' and suggesting that
left room for doubt about Tehran's real intent. 

``The recourse to civilian nuclear energy, fully legitimate,
must not serve as a pretext to the pursuit of activities whose
real end result could be constituting a military nuclear
arsenal,'' Chirac said, adding that guarantees must therefore be
put forth about the peaceful nature of such a project. 

The Iranians insist their nuclear program was designed solely to
generate electricity, but the United States suspects Tehran is
intent on making a weapon. 

      Guardian Unlimited � Guardian Newspapers Limited 2005
*****************************************************************
 3 Guardian Unlimited: Iran's President Reappoints Nuclear Chief
 
From the Associated Press        

[UP] 

Monday August 29, 2005 10:16 PM
 	
AP Photo NY195 
By NASSER KARIMI 
Associated Press Writer 

TEHRAN, Iran, (AP) - Iran's president reinstated Gholamreza
Aghazadeh as head of Iran's nuclear program on Monday, a clear
sign to the Europeans and Washington not to expect a change of
course under the country's new leadership. 

State radio announced President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's decision
to reappoint the 58-year-old Aghazadeh, who had run the
country's nuclear program since 1997. 

The United States fears Iran is using its nuclear program to
create an atomic weapon. Iran says it is only building reactors
to generate electricity. 

Aghazadeh had backed Ahmadinejad's rival, former President
Hashemi Rafsanjani, in the June national election that swept the
former Tehran mayor into office. 

Iran renewed its uranium reprocessing activities at a plant in
central city of Isfahan earlier this month after rejecting a
European proposal to give up its uranium enrichment program in
return for economic incentives. Aghazadeh called the offer a
``joke.'' 

Britain, France, and Germany held talks with Iran on behalf of
the 25-member European Union. Aghazadeh took a strong line,
insisting Europe would only show flexibility if Iran resisted
the temptation to accept Western demands. 

After saying earlier this month it was ready for further
negotiations with the Europeans, Tehran announced on Sunday that
it now wanted talks with the U.N.'s international nuclear
watchdog agency, rejecting what it called European demands for
``conditional negotiations.'' 

In Paris on Monday, President Jacques Chirac called on Iran to
cooperate in nuclear talks or risk having the issue sent to the
U.N. Security Council for possible sanctions. 

``We call on Iran's spirit of responsibility to re-establish
cooperation and confidence, without which the (U.N.) Security
Council will have no choice but to take up the question,''
Chirac told France's ambassadors brought home for an annual
conference. 

The French president implored Tehran to ``truly examine'' the
offer made by France, Britain and Germany. 

Chirac's comments are the toughest from the French president
since the European proposal was presented to Iran earlier this
month, though in July he said, ``the question should be taken to
the Security Council'' if Tehran resumed enrichment activities. 
French Foreign Minister Philippe Douste-Blazy has repeatedly
warned Iran it could face sanctions. 

The three countries called off planned talks set for Aug. 31
after Iran renewed uranium reprocessing at Isfahan, a step that
precedes enrichment which can produce fuel either for
electricity generating reactors or nuclear weapons. 

The Europeans viewed that step as effectively breaking an accord
agreed to in Paris last November for Iran to suspend nuclear
activities and hold talks.	 
		 	 	   
Guardian Unlimited � Guardian Newspapers Limited 2005
*****************************************************************
 4 Daily Times: Russia says Iran not breaching nuclear non-proliferation treaty 

 Tuesday, August 30, 2005     
  
MOSCOW: Russia, Iran�s nuclear partner, said on Thursday it saw
no evidence Tehran was breaching the global nuclear
non-proliferation regime. 

Iran angered the European Union and the United States by
resuming uranium conversion work earlier this month, rejecting
EU incentives offered in return for giving up its nuclear
programme. 

�There is no reason to think that the existence of this threat
has been proved,� Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov was
quoted by state news agencies as saying. 

�If a threat to the non-proliferation regime appears, we will
work seriously on that matter,� he added. 

Under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, (NPT), which Iran has
signed, Tehran may process and enrich uranium for peaceful
purposes. The oil-rich state insists its nuclear programme is
aimed only at the peaceful generation of electricity, but the
West fears Iran is seeking to make atomic weapons. 

Russia, which has built a nuclear power station for Iran, said
earlier this month it opposed using force to stop Iran�s nuclear
programme and warned that any such action would have grave and
unpredictable consequences. 

Russia has not directly taken part in the EU�s talks with Iran
but the West carefully monitors diplomatic moves by the
permanent member of the UN Security Council, one of Iran�s
staunchest supporters. If Iran continues to defy international
pressure, Europe and the United States are likely to press the
United Nations� nuclear watchdog to refer Iran�s case to the UN
Security Council for possible sanctions, analysts say. 

US President George W Bush has said military force remains a
last resort to press Tehran to abandon its nuclear ambitions. 

Iran has accused the three European states of damaging the
diplomatic effort by demanding Iran abandon its work on the
nuclear fuel cycle - the focus of fears Iran could acquire the
bomb - even though fuel work is technically permitted by the NPT.

But the EU-3 says Iran is to blame for the breakdown in the
talks due to its decision earlier this month to resume uranium
ore conversion work - a precursor to the ultra-sensitive
enrichment process which had been suspended.

The IAEA board, which is to receive a report on Iran on
September 3 from agency chief Mohamed ElBaradei, has called on
Tehran to reinstate the suspension. Iran has refused, and could
face referral to the UN Security Council. agencies 
Home | Foreign           

Daily Times - All Rights Reserved
*****************************************************************
 5 Reuters: Chirac urges Iran to reconsider EU nuclear offer 

Mon Aug 29, 2005 8:52 AM ET

 By Sophie Louet

 PARIS (Reuters) - French President Jacques Chirac stepped up 
pressure on Iran on Monday to reconsider a European Union offer 
of incentives in return for a suspension of sensitive nuclear 
work.

 The U.N. Security Council would have to examine the issue if 
Iran did not cooperate, Chirac said, pressing Tehran to abandon 
atomic work that both the EU and the United States suspect is a 
preliminary step towards making nuclear weapons.

 "I invite the Iranian authorities to make the choice of 
cooperation and trust by genuinely looking at this offer and by 
reverting to their commitments to suspend activities linked to 
the production of fissile materials," Chirac said in a speech.

 Iran rejected the offer earlier this month and resumed some 
nuclear work in breach of a promise to freeze such activities 
while talks lasted, prompting the EU trio of Britain, France and 
Germany to call off a negotiating meeting with the Iranians.

 The move to call off the talks, which were envisaged as part of 
the EU offer, marked a breakdown in two years of negotiations 
between the EU trio and Iran over its nuclear programme.

 Frustrated by Iran resuming uranium conversion at its Isfahan 
plant earlier this month, the EU is now preparing the road to 
possible sanctions.

 ROOM FOR DIALOGUE

 "There is room for dialogue and negotiation," Chirac said in a 
speech to French ambassadors meeting in Paris to discuss France's 
foreign policy.

 "We urge Iran to show a spirit of responsibility to re-establish 
cooperation and trust, without which the Security Council will 
have no choice but to examine the question."

 "The European offer is worthy of the role which this great 
country, which is Iran, should play in the world," Chirac said.

 The EU's proposal offers a package of economic, technical and 
political measures in return for a permanent suspension of 
Iranian uranium enrichment activities.

 The Islamic republic says it wants nuclear technology only to 
cope with booming electricity demand. The EU and the United 
States suspect it of secretly trying to build nuclear weapons.

 In Germany, Foreign Ministry spokesman Walter Lindner said: 
"Tehran's response to the proposals of the EU has so far been 
more than disappointing."

 Iran said on Friday it hoped to present a plan within a month to 
head off EU preparations to refer it to the U.N. Security Council 
for possible sanctions, but diplomats interpreted the move as 
stalling.

 Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi told a news 
conference on Sunday Tehran hoped to deliver the plan "within one 
and a half months".

 "We still believe in our talks with the three European 
countries, however we don't think the negotiations should be done 
exclusively with them," he said.

 "If they say they don't want to negotiate or if they tie the 
next round of talks to some preconditions, the Europeans are 
moving towards excluding themselves (from negotiating with 
Iran)".

 The head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the 
U.N.'s nuclear watchdog, is due to report on Iran's compliance 
with its nuclear obligations on September 3.

 The IAEA's governing board called on Iran on August 11 to halt 
the atomic work it has resumed in defiance of the West. The board 
meets again on September 19, when diplomats expect the EU trio to 
push for Iran to be referred to the U.N. Security Council.                                                

� Reuters 2005. 
All Rights Reserved.                    
*****************************************************************
 6 Guardian Unlimited: State Dept. Dismisses N. Korea Complaints
 
From the Associated Press        

[UP] 

Monday August 29, 2005 11:01 PM
 	
By BARRY SCHWEID 
AP Diplomatic Writer 

WASHINGTON (AP) - The Bush administration on Monday sidestepped
North Korean complaints about military exercises and a human
rights envoy and agreed to a delay in resuming talks on its
nuclear weapons program. 

In a gesture of good will, the administration again credited
North Korea with taking a businesslike attitude toward the
effort to halt the program in exchange for energy supplies and a
U.S. promise not to attack. 

``We are prepared to go back the week of Sept. 12 and we are
ready,'' the State Department spokesman Sean McCormack said. 

The precise date for the six-party talks will be set by China
and North Korea, McCormack said. 

American and North Korean diplomats have been meeting
periodically on the sidelines in New York to try to set the
stage for adoption of a statement of principles designed to
govern ending the weapons program. The last session was last
week. 

North Korea, in announcing it would delay its return to
negotiations for two weeks, blamed U.S. joint military exercises
with South Korea and the appointment of Jay Lefkowitz, a former
adviser to President Bush, to shine a human rights spotlight in
international settings on what the administration has called
``the long-suffering North Korean people.'' 

According to the North Korean foreign ministry, the nations in
the negotiations - the United States, China, South Korea, Japan,
Russia and North Korea - had agreed not to make comments or take
actions that would hinder a resumption of negotiations. 

The appointment last week of Lefkowitz ``is little short of
spitting at the DPRK (the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea),'' the official Korean Central News Agency quoted an
unnamed ministry official as saying. 

On the U.S.-South Korean military exercises, the foreign
ministry said it would return to the table ``when one will be
able to view that the war exercises have worn down a bit.'' 

McCormack responded that exercises were held annually and posed
no threat to North Korea. And he said Lefkowitz' appointment was
mandated by Congress. However, he added that ``it is also
something that the president and Secretary (of State
Condoleezza) Rice wholeheartedly believe in.'' 

``The appointment of Lefkowitz does not have anything to do with
the six-party talks,'' McCormack said. 

Russian Foreign Minister Serget Lavrov telephoned Rice on
Monday. They discussed the North Korean and Iranian nuclear
programs as well as the special session of the U.N. General
Assembly to be held next week in New York, the Russian foreign
ministry said. 

``They had a good conversation,'' McCormack said, confirming the
Russian account. 

Differing with the Bush administration, Russia and South Korea
have defended North Korea's right, in principle at least, to
have a civilian nuclear energy program, provided it is subject
to international inspection. 

``We're prepared to engage in six-party talks in a constructive
manner,'' McCormack said. ``We hope that all the other parties,
including North Korea, come back to the table and resume the
businesslike atmosphere that they demonstrated during the most
recent session of the talks.'' 
		 	 	   

Guardian Unlimited � Guardian Newspapers Limited 2005
*****************************************************************
 7 Guardian Unlimited: U.S. Accepts New Date for N. Korea Talks
 
From the Associated Press        

[UP] 

Monday August 29, 2005 10:46 PM
 	
By BARRY SCHWEID 
AP Diplomatic Writer 

WASHINGTON (AP) - The Bush administration on Monday sidestepped
North Korean complaints about military exercises and a human
rights envoy and agreed to a delay in resuming talks on its
nuclear weapons program. 

In a gesture of good will, the administration again credited
North Korea with taking a businesslike attitude toward the
effort to halt the program in exchange for energy supplies and a
U.S. promise not to attack. 

``We are prepared to go back the week of Sept. 12 and we are
ready,'' the State Department spokesman Sean McCormack said. 

The precise date for the six-party talks will be set by China
and North Korea, McCormack said. 

American and North Korean diplomats have been meeting
periodically on the sidelines in New York to try to set the
stage for adoption of a statement of principles designed to
govern ending the weapons program. The last session was last
week. 

North Korea, in announcing it would delay its return to
negotiations for two weeks, blamed U.S. joint military exercises
with South Korea and the appointment of Jay Lefkowitz, a former
adviser to President Bush, to shine a human rights spotlight in
international settings on what the administration has called
``the long-suffering North Korean people.'' 

According to the North Korean foreign ministry, the nations in
the negotiations - the United States, China, South Korea, Japan,
Russia and North Korea - had agreed not to make comments or take
actions that would hinder a resumption of negotiations. 

The appointment last week of Lefkowitz ``is little short of
spitting at the DPRK (the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea),'' the official Korean Central News Agency quoted an
unnamed ministry official as saying. 

On the U.S.-South Korean military exercises, the foreign
ministry said it would return to the table ``when one will be
able to view that the war exercises have worn down a bit.'' 

McCormack responded that exercises were held annually and posed
no threat to North Korea. And he said Lefkowitz' appointment was
mandated by Congress. However, he added that ``it is also
something that the president and Secretary (of State
Condoleezza) Rice wholeheartedly believe in.'' 

``The appointment of Lefkowitz does not have anything to do with
the six-party talks,'' McCormack said. 

Russian Foreign Minister Serget Lavrov telephoned Rice on
Monday. They discussed the North Korean and Iranian nuclear
programs as well as the special session of the U.N. General
Assembly to be held next week in New York, the Russian foreign
ministry said. 

Differing with the Bush administration, Russia and South Korea
have defended North Korea's right, in principle at least, to
have a civilian nuclear energy program, provided it is subject
to international inspection. 

``We're prepared to engage in six-party talks in a constructive
manner,'' McCormack said. ``We hope that all the other parties,
including North Korea, come back to the table and resume the
businesslike atmosphere that they demonstrated during the most
recent session of the talks.'' 
		 	 	   
Guardian Unlimited � Guardian Newspapers Limited 2005
*****************************************************************
 8 RIA Novosti: Russia welcomes North Korea's decision to continue 
nuclear talks
 
29/ 08/ 2005                                  


MOSCOW, August 29 (RIA Novosti) - Russia welcomes North Korea's
decision to continue the six-party nuclear program talks in
mid-September, a diplomatic source in Moscow said Monday. 

The North Korean Foreign Ministry announced Monday through the
nation's news agency that Pyongyang was ready to continue the
fourth round of the negotiations on its nuclear program in the
week starting September 12. 

The negotiations, which were launched in 2003, involve Russia,
North Korea, South Korea, the United States, Japan and China.


� 2005 "RIA Novosti"   




*****************************************************************
 9 Reuters: Japan sees no sign of US-N.Korea nuclear deal 

Mon Aug 29, 2005 2:15 AM ET

 TOKYO (Reuters) - There were no signs of the United States and 
North Korea reaching agreement on key issues in their standoff 
over Pyongyang's nuclear ambitions and the timing of the next 
round of talks is uncertain, Japan said on Monday.

 "We understand that the countries concerned are making efforts, 
but regrettably, we see no signs of the United States and North 
Korea reaching an agreement on essential areas," Japan's top 
government spokesman, Hiroyuki Hosoda, told reporters.

 Hosoda made the remarks after Thai Foreign Minister Kantathi 
Suphamongkhon said on Sunday in Pyongyang that North Korea had 
told him it was not ready to rejoin six-party talks on its 
nuclear weapons programmes.

 "The North Korean foreign minister told me what he had in mind, 
what had caused North Korea not to be able to participate in the 
six-party talks scheduled for Monday," Kantathi told reporters in 
Pyongyang.

 "The North Koreans said that they are willing to dismantle their 
nuclear weapons as long as there is trust among the parties 
concerned. They say they are ready to dismantle and go back to 
the NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty), allowing the International 
Atomic Energy Agency to step in, as long as there is trust among 
parties."

 The status of the six-party talks had been up in the air, with 
silence from all sides on a firm date to resume, after the 
participants agreed to a three-week recess in the last round 
which ended this month.

 Japan and host China, partners in the deadlocked negotiations 
along with the United States, Russia and the two Koreas, said on 
Friday the talks were on for this week, but no exact date had 
been fixed.

 "We cannot say at this stage whether there are prospects of the 
six-party talks resuming," Hosoda said.

 The United States said the talks were not likely to resume this 
week, but that it expected China to make an announcement about 
the schedule for the next round of negotiations.

 China's top negotiator, Wu Dawei, flew to Pyongyang on Saturday 
and was expected to stay until Tuesday.

 The regional powers hope to persuade reclusive and impoverished 
North Korea to dismantle its nuclear weapons programmes in 
exchange for security guarantees and economic assistance.

 North Korea's insistence on the right to develop peaceful 
nuclear energy was the key sticking point in the last round of 
talks where the parties failed to agree a joint statement.

 Pyongyang said on Saturday that Washington's decision to appoint 
a special envoy to monitor human rights in North Korea had cast a 
shadow over the six-party talks.

 North Korea, which has routinely accused the United States of 
hostility in the talks and lack of trust, has been playing the 
nuclear card to win diplomatic and economic benefits since the 
standoff began in October 2002.

 Washington said then that Pyongyang had admitted to a secret 
programme to enrich uranium in violation of a 1994 agreement, a 
claim North Korea later denied.

 Described by U.S. President George W. Bush as part of an "axis 
of evil" along with Iran and pre-war Iraq, North Korea said for 
the first time this year it had nuclear weapons, arguing it 
needed them to deter a hostile United States.                                           

� Reuters 2005. 
All Rights Reserved.                    
*****************************************************************
 10 Reuters: Korea ratings unaffected if nuclear talks fail-S 

Mon Aug 29, 2005 2:48 AM ET

 SEOUL, Aug 29 (Reuters) - South Korea's sovereign credit ratings 
would not suffer if the current round of six-country talks on 
ending North Korea's nuclear programmes fail to reach an 
agreement, Standard and Poor's said on Monday.

 Standard & Poor's Ratings Services late last month raised South 
Korea's long-term foreign currency rating by one notch to A from 
A-minus, citing an improving financial sector and increased 
flexibility in the foreign exchange rate.

 The raised ratings already factored in possible failure by the 
two Koreas, the United States, Russia, China and Japan to produce 
an agreement from the current round of talks, it said in a 
statement.

 "It would not affect our view on the sovereign rating in any 
way; indeed, a failure to reach an agreement is our base case," 
the international credit ratings agency said.

 The talks had been due to resume this week, but North Korea 
Foreign Minister Paek Nam-sun said on Monday they might not start 
up again until the end of September.

 S&P's sovereign upgrade on July 27 was the first for South Korea 
in three years and put its ratings at five notches above 
investment grade and above China and Malaysia at A-minus. The 
outlook is stable.

 South and North Korea have been technically at war since their 
1950-53 conflict ended in a truce, and the security tension 
surrounding the communist North has been the biggest single 
constraint on credit ratings of the capitalist South.

 S&P said sharp rises in property prices in South Korea appeared 
confined to a few select areas and "cannot be construed as 
presenting any sort of systemic risk."

 South Korea plans on Wednesday to announce measures to cool the 
real estate market, centred on tax increases.                                           

� Reuters 2005. 
All Rights Reserved.                    
 			
*****************************************************************
 11 Reuters: N.Korea says 6-party talks could resume mid-Sept

Mon Aug 29, 2005 7:30 AM ET

 By Nopporn Wong-Anan

 PYONGYANG, Aug 29 (Reuters) - North Korea blamed war games 
between South Korea and the United States on Monday for a delay 
in resuming six-party talks on its nuclear weapons programmes, 
but said negotiations could resume in the week of Sept. 12.

 The talks had been scheduled to resume this week, but a 
spokesman for North Korea's Foreign Ministry said Pyongyang 
thought it would be best to wait until after the joint U.S.-South 
Korean drills were over to resume the nuclear discussions.

 "Our position is to resume six-way talks in the week of Sept. 12 
by when some of the dust of war exercises has subsided ... this 
is all what we can offer at this stage," the spokesman told KCNA 
news agency, according to Yonhap new agency.

 North Korean Foreign Minister Paek Nam-sun said earlier on 
Monday the fourth round of talks involving the two Koreas, the 
United States, Russia, Japan and China might resume "just before 
the end of September".

 "If things are going well, mid-September is possible," Paek 
said, speaking through a translator to a small group of reporters 
accompanying Thai Foreign Minister Kantathi Suphamongkhon on a 
visit to the North Korean capital.

 The fourth round of talks aimed at persuading Pyongyang to scrap 
its atomic weapons programmes in return for security guarantees 
and economic aid went into recess on Aug. 7.

 Paek too blamed the delay on annual war games between the United 
States and South Korea, that run from Aug. 22 to Sept. 2 and 
consist of computer-simulated drills meant to test the readiness 
of their forces and coordination of command posts.

 North Korea routinely denounces any joint military exercise with 
U.S. and South Korean forces as a preparation for invasion and a 
prelude to actual war.

 Asked whether the exercises were responsible for the delay, Paek 
said: "That is the total responsible (factor) for the delay of 
the six-party talks."

 North Korea has been playing the nuclear card to win diplomatic 
and economic benefits since a standoff began in October 2002, 
after Washington said Pyongyang had admitted to a secret 
programme to enrich uranium, violating a 1994 accord.

 North Korea has since denied having such a programme beyond its 
known plutonium plant, but said this year for the first time that 
it had nuclear weapons, arguing that it needed them to deter a 
hostile United States.

 Paek said whether or not another round of talks would be held at 
all was in Washington's hands. "It is depending on the U.S., 
actually," Paek said. "The U.S. should abolish all the conditions 
which have compelled us to make the nuclear weapons."

 WATCHING HU

 Pyongyang said on Saturday that Washington's decision to appoint 
a special envoy to monitor human rights in North Korea had cast a 
shadow over the talks.

 But Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei, wrapping up a 
three-day visit to Pyongyang, voiced optimism that the talks were 
on track to resume.

 "The date of resuming the talks is not important," China's 
official Xinhua news agency quoted Wu as saying.

 "The important thing is all the parties agreed to resume talks 
and we all have kept (in) contact and negotiation in the 
framework of the six-party talks" during the recess, Wu said.

 During his visit, Wu met Paek and other North Korean officials 
including Kim Gye-gwan, the head of Pyongyang's delegation to the 
six-party talks.

 In Seoul, South Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman Lee Kyu-hyung 
said the talks were likely to resume after Chinese President Hu 
Jintao's visit to the United States -- due to begin on Sept. 5 -- 
and his meeting with President George W. Bush.

 Speaking before Paek made his comments, Japan's top government 
spokesman was sceptical that the talks would reconvene at all.

 Some analysts said the reason for the delay might be that 
Pyongyang wanted to assess the outcome of the summit between 
China, its main ally, and the United States, the country it 
considers its main adversary.

 "My guess is that North Korea wants to look at the result of the 
U.S.-China summit meeting," said Kim Sung-han of the Institute of 
Foreign Affairs and National Security in Seoul.

 "North Korea wants to be seen negotiating seriously, as does the 
United States," he said, but the two sides remained too far apart 
on the key issue of Pyongyang's right to a civilian nuclear 
programme to be able to reach agreement soon.

 U.S. officials have been sceptical about allowing North Korea to 
pursue such a programme out of concern that it would actually be 
used for military purposes.

 Other analysts suggested that Pyongyang might be trying to stall 
for time in the hope that a drawn-out process would make it 
difficult for the other five parties to keep a united front. 
(Additional reporting by Jon Herskovitz and Jack Kim in SEOUL, 
Teruaki Ueno in TOKYO and Benjamin Kang Lim in BEIJING)                                                 

� Reuters 2005. 
All Rights Reserved.                    
*****************************************************************
 12 Guardian Unlimited: N. Korea Agency Wants to Resume Nuke Talks
 
From the Associated Press        

[UP] 

Monday August 29, 2005 12:31 PM
 	
AP Photo NY108 

SEOUL, South Korea (AP) - North Korea's Foreign Ministry on
Monday called for the six-party nuclear talks to resume the week
of Sept. 12, the official Korean Central News Agency said. 

An unnamed ministry spokesman said the North told the United
States that it couldn't attend the talks while U.S.-South Korean
military drills were in progress. The exercises, which began
last week, end Friday. 

North Korea would hold the talks ``when the dust from the war
drills have settled down somewhat,'' the ministry spokesman
said. 

He said the United States expressed understanding of its
position during recent contact in New York, according to the
KCNA report. 

Delegates to the fourth round of talks aimed at persuading North
Korea to give up nuclear development took a recess earlier this
month and had agreed to meet again this week. After 13 days of
talks, the six countries - China, Japan, Russia, the United
States and the two Koreas - failed to agree on a statement of
basic principles to guide future negotiations. 

The ministry spokesman said that while the six countries agreed
not to make comments or actions that would pose as an obstacle
to the resumption of the talks when they went into recess, the
United States launched the military drill and appointed a North
Korean human rights envoy. 

North Korea routinely criticizes the annual military exercises
between South Korea and the United States. About 10,000
Americans and an undisclosed number of South Koreans are
participating in this year's exercise. 

The nuclear crisis erupted in late 2002 after U.S. officials say
North Korea admitted to running a secret nuclear program in
violation of an earlier deal with Washington.	 
		 	 	   
      Guardian Unlimited � Guardian Newspapers Limited 2005
*****************************************************************
 13 MIT Tech: The Peril of Americas Nuclear Policies - 

The Tech

In a recent interview, President Bush warned that if Iran did
not cease its efforts to construct a nuclear weapon, the United
States would consider using armed force to thwart them. While
the international community generally shares the Bush
administrations view that Irans recent efforts are unwelcome,
it does not look intent on arresting them. Indeed, it appears to
have arrived at a consensus that America possesses neither the
political, nor, more importantly, the moral legitimacy to
reproach Iran for establishing a nuclear program. 

President Bush has properly argued that the most critical threat
facing this countrys security lies at the crossroads of
radicalism and technology, and that strengthening the nuclear
nonproliferation regime is of paramount importance.

Unfortunately, however, the policies of his administration have
undercut the broad framework of treaties and protocols which
collectively constitute this regime. 

Since he took office in January 2001, the United States has
withdrawn from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and
declined to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Neither of
these protocols elicits mention in 2002s National Strategy to
Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, which asserts that the
United States should only ensure [the international
communitys] compliance with relevant international agreements.

The Bush administration is misguided if it believes that
agreements such as those mentioned above are antiquated or
irrelevant. Whatever deficiencies they may suffer, they anchor
the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Abandoning such agreements
implicitly sanctions others, be they allies or nemeses, to
renege on their commitments to uphold it, thereby compounding
the very threats that we seek to avert. 

At present, the United States maintains a stockpile of 10,300
nuclear weapons, second only to Russia, which maintains 16,000.

(It should be noted that, in between 2002 and 2005, Russia has
dismantled and destroyed approximately 4,000 of its weapons; the
United States, by contrast, has eliminated 400.) Furthermore, it
currently spends 12 times more on efforts to construct nuclear
weapons than it does on efforts to prevent their spread. While
the scale of the United States nuclear program is troubling, of
greater concern are its current initiatives. 

The Bush administration is allocating $485 million to the
Department of Energy to research what is known as a robust
nuclear Earth penetrator (RNEP)  commonly known as a bunker
buster. Such a weapon, if properly deployed, would burrow
itself several meters underground, detonating only upon making
contact with the weapons storage facility or facilities in
consideration. However, laboratory studies reveal that, in
addition to producing immense radioactive fallout, deploying
bunker busters would entail calamitous ramifications for
civilians. The Union of Concerned Scientists issued the
following assessment: 

  The high yield RNEP will produce tremendous fallout that will
drift for more than a thousand miles downwind & A simulation of
RNEP used against the Esfahan nuclear facility in Iran, using
the software developed for the Pentagon, showed that three
million people would be killed by radiation within two weeks of
the explosion, and 35 million people in Afghanistan, Pakistan
and India would be exposed to increased levels of cancer-causing
radiation.   


To cite another, less-publicized example, the United States also
seeks to construct a modern pit facility,  at a cost of $2 to
$4 billion  which would annually yield between 125 and 450
plutonium pits. (According to the Carolina Peace Resource
Center, a plutonium pit is a steel encased hollow ball of
plutonium surrounded by explosives that acts as a trigger for a
nuclear detonation.) It should be noted that, accounting for
all storage facilities across the country, there are already a
minimum of 5,000 such pits in existence. 

While I could enumerate other such examples here, doing so is
unnecessary. (The Natural Resources Defense Councils April 2004
report, Weaponeers of Waste, available at
http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/weaponeers/weaponeers.pdf, documents
such examples.) What is reasonable, however, is to ask if these
efforts to construct a formidable nuclear apparatus are
disparate or, rather, part of a more coordinated policy. At the
least, they are firmly grounded in the grand strategies that
influenced the United States foreign policies after World War
II. In particular, they implement the recommendation of National
Security Memorandum 7 (March 30, 1948), which argued that the
United States must maintain overwhelming nuclear supremacy. It
is difficult to conceive of a geopolitical environment in which
the pursuit of this objective would afford the United States
greater security. 

The May 2005 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference
affirmed this point, with the 188 participants failing to
achieve much, if any, substantive progress. Doctor Mohamed
ElBaradei, director of the International Atomic Energy Agency,
rendered a more pointed judgment, stating that the proceedings
accomplished absolutely nothing. The harshest criticism was
directed toward the Western powers, and, in particular, the
United States, for concurrently advancing its nuclear weapons
program and censuring others for doing the same. Even
traditional allies expressed displeasure with our posture.

Canadas chief representative, Paul Meyer, remarked that If
governments simply ignore or discard commitments whenever they
prove inconvenient, we will never be able to build an edifice of
international cooperation and confidence in the security realm. 
To single out the United States for criticism is unfair, and
ignorant of the ways in which other states have undermined the
nuclear nonproliferation regime. To wholly absolve it of fault,
however, would appear to be unwise, in light of its current
pursuits. Indeed, if we desire that emerging nuclear states
discontinue their activities, we would be prudent to examine our
own.

 This story was published on Monday, August 29, 2005. 
Volume 125, Number 31
*****************************************************************
 14 Khaleej Times: IAEA returns nuclear parts to Pakistan after inspection

OPINION
        
29 August 2005  

ISLAMABAD - The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has 
returned outdated parts of nuclear centrifuges to Pakistan 
following inspection, a senior official said on Monday.

With the completion of necessary tests by the IAEA, we have no 
further role to play,� foreign ministry spokesman Naeem Khan told 
a press briefing in Islamabad.

Pakistan had sent the components to the international nuclear 
watchdog a few months ago for a detailed analysis aimed at 
resolving international concern about Pakistan�s role in the 
Iranian nuclear programme.

Islamabad cooperated with the IAEA on a voluntary basis by 
sending experts with some outdated components of the 
centrifuges,� the spokesman said.

Khan pointed out that all the tests were conducted in the 
presence of Pakistani experts. �The IAEA will now report its 
findings to its board of directors,� he stated.

*****************************************************************
 15 MSN: Jellyfish cause shutdown of Swedish nuclear reactor 

Mainichi Daily News: International News
 
Full Report

STOCKHOLM, Sweden -- A Swedish nuclear power plant shut down one
of its three reactors Monday because of an abnormal accumulation
of jellyfish in the cooling system.

The Oskarshamn plant in southeastern Sweden uses water from the
Baltic Sea in its cooling tanks.

The water has been unusually rich in jellyfish in recent weeks,
but the problem grew worse Monday morning, forcing officials to
shut down the reactor.

"When there are too many jellyfish in the cooling water, the
flow is hindered and we have to clean it to keep the reactor
going at full effect," plant spokesman Erik Mattsen said.

Operator OKG said there was no danger to the public. The reactor
was to be restarted Tuesday.

The Oscarshamn plant supplies about 10 percent of the
electricity used in Sweden. The reactor that was shut down was
commissioned in 1972 and was Sweden's first commercial nuclear
power unit. (AP)

August 29, 2005
 				   
Copyright 2004-2005 THE MAINICHI NEWSPAPERS. All
rights reserved.
*****************************************************************
 16 NRC: NRC Issues Supplemental Safety Evaluation for Clinton Early Site Permit Application
 
News Release - 2005-11
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION   
  Office of Public Affairs     Telephone: 301/415-8200   
  Washington, DC 20555-0001     E-mail: opa@nrc.gov  
  No. 05-117     August 26, 2005   
  

  The Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff has updated its draft
safety evaluation report (SER) for an Early Site Permit (ESP)
for the Clinton site, which is located about six miles east of
Clinton, Ill. 
The ESP process allows an applicant to address site-related
issues, such as environmental impacts, for possible future
construction and operation of a nuclear power plant at the site.
The Clinton application was filed Sept. 25, 2003, by Exelon
Generation Company, LLC. If approved, the permit would give
Exelon up to 20 years to decide whether to build one or more
nuclear plants on the site and to file an application with the
NRC for approval to begin construction.
 
The SER update summarizes the NRC staff's technical evaluation
of the Clinton sites suitability in terms of seismology and
geology. The original draft SER, issued in February, did not
include these areas because Exelon used a new method for
determining the sites largest earthquake the plant could
withstand and still shut down safely. The staff has completed
reviewing the methodology and will finish evaluating the site
once Exelon submits additional information.
 
Along with completing the SER, the staff must complete an
Environmental Impact Statement, the Advisory Committee on
Reactor Safeguards must issue a report on the ESP application,
and the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel must conclude
its hearing on the matter before the Commission can reach a
final decision on issuing the ESP. The NRC expects to finish
this process by early 2007.
 
Exelon will have 14 days to review the SER supplement for
proprietary information. The report will then be available
electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document
Room, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Md. It will also be
available on the NRCs Web site at:
http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-licensing/esp/clinton.html. In
addition, the Vespasian Warner Public Library in Clinton has
agreed to make the supplement available for public inspection. 
  



  


 	Last revised Monday, August 29, 2005 	
*****************************************************************
 17 RIA Novosti: Balakovskaya nuclear power plant running at full capacity
 
29/ 08/ 2005                                  

MOSCOW, August 29 (RIA Novosti) - The fourth power-generating
unit of the Balakovskaya nuclear power plant (BNPP) on the Volga
River became operational August 28 after being repaired, the
BNPP press service said.
 The BNPP, Russia's main producer of electric energy, puts out
over 28 billion kWh of power a year, accounting for a quarter of
the electric power produced in the Volga Federal District and
one-fifth of the energy produced by Russia's nuclear power
plants.
 The press service said all four energy units were now in
operation at the power plant. There are four main
power-generating units with the VVER-1000 reactors at the BNPP.
The units were put into operation in the late 1980s to early
1990s.

 
 2005 "RIA Novosti"   



*****************************************************************
 18 NRC: NRC Monitoring Approach of Hurricane Katrina; Waterford Shuts Down
 
News Release - 2005-11
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION   
  Office of Public Affairs     Telephone: 301/415-8200   
  Washington, DC 20555-0001     E-mail: opa@nrc.gov  
  No. 05-118     August 28, 2005   
  

  The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Sunday dispatched
additional personnel to three nuclear power plants in Louisiana
and Mississippi in response to the expected landfall Monday of
Hurricane Katrina. 
One plant near New Orleans - Waterford - informed the NRC it
shut down to ensure that all safety precautions are in place
ahead of the storm.
 
The NRC is monitoring the hurricane from operations centers in
Arlington, Texas, and its Rockville, Md., headquarters.
 
"We are staying on top of the situation because protecting
public health and safety is paramount," said Nils Diaz, chairman
of the independent regulatory agency
 
At the Waterford plant the major concern beyond winds was the
storm surge, last predicted to approach the top of an18-foot
levee on the Mississippi River. Nuclear plants are very robust
structures designed to withstand winds in excess of those in
Katrina and associated storm surges. Both Waterford and the
other plants have watertight doors at key safety systems.
 
All three plants the NRC was monitoring are owned by Entergy
Nuclear. The Waterford plant is about 20 miles west of New
Orleans. The River Bend plant is about 25 miles north-northwest
of Baton Rouge, La., and Grand Gulf is located 25 miles south of
Vicksburg, Miss.
 
Waterford initially declared an "unusual event" because of the
approach of the hurricane, and will raise its level of
preparedness on the NRC's four-step scale to an "alert" as winds
reach hurricane strength and to a "site area emergency" should
winds exceed 110 mph. The alert levels are specified in advance
precautionary plans dictated by the NRC. The "site area
emergency" classification is associated with plant personnel
safety.
 
The NRC will have to approve the restart of Waterford and any
other plant that shuts down. Additionally, the Federal Emergency
Management Agency will have to determine that evacuation routes
in the area are passable.
   



  


 	Last revised Monday, August 29, 2005 	
*****************************************************************
 19 NRC: Notice of Public Meeting of the Interagency Steering Committee
 
                         FR Doc E5-4706 
[Federal Register: August 29, 2005 (Volume 70, Number 166)] 
[Notices] [Page 51098] From the Federal Register Online via GPO 
Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr29au05-87]                         
 
on Radiation Standards AGENCIES: Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
and Environmental Protection Agency.
 
ACTION: Notice of public meeting.
 
SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) will host a 
meeting of the Interagency Steering Committee on Radiation 
Standards (ISCORS) on September, 27, 2005, in Rockville, 
Maryland. The purpose of ISCORS is to foster early resolution and 
coordination of regulatory issues associated with radiation 
standards. Agencies represented on ISCORS include the NRC, U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency, U.S. Department of Energy, U.S. 
Department of Defense, U.S. Department of Transportation, the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration of the U.S. 
Department of Labor, U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services, U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Representatives 
from the Office of Science and Technology Policy, Defense Nuclear 
Facilities Safety Board, Office of Management and Budget, State 
Department, Illinois Bureau of Radiation Safety, and Pennsylvania 
Bureau of Radiation Protection may be observers at meetings. The 
objectives of ISCORS are to: (1) Facilitate a consensus on 
allowable levels of radiation risk to the public and workers; (2) 
promote consistent and scientifically sound risk assessment and 
risk management approaches in setting and implementing standards 
for occupational and public protection from ionizing radiation; 
(3) promote completeness and coherence of Federal standards for 
radiation protection; and (4) identify interagency radiation 
protection issues and coordinate their resolution. ISCORS 
meetings include presentations by the chairs of the subcommittees 
and discussions of current radiation protection issues. Committee 
meetings normally involve pre-decisional intra-governmental 
discussions and, as such, are normally not open for observation 
by members of the public or media. ISCORS has adopted the 
practice of opening one of its meetings each year to all 
interested members of the public. There will be time on the 
agenda for members of the public to provide comments. The final 
agenda for the September meeting will be posted on the ISCORS Web 
site, http://www.iscors.org, shortly before the meeting. 
Participants are encouraged to (1) notify the contact below for 
pre-registration and (2) allow sufficient time for security 
screening prior to accessing the meeting.
 
 
DATES: The meeting will be held from 1 p.m. to 5 p.m. on Tuesday, 
September 27, 2005.
 
 
ADDRESSES: The meeting will be held in the NRC auditorium, at Two 
White Flint North, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 
20852.
 
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION, CONTACT: Kyung Hee (Jessica) Shin, 
Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, telephone 
301-415-8117; fax 301-415- 5397; e-mail KXS1@NRC.GOV.
 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Visitor parking around the NRC 
building is limited; however, the NRC auditorium is located 
adjacent to the White Flint Metro Station on the Red Line.
 
Dated at Rockville, MD, this 23rd day of August, 2005.
 
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
 
Scott Flanders, Deputy Director, Environmental and Performance 
Assessment Directorate, Division of Waste Management and 
Environmental Protection, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and 
Safeguards.
 
[FR Doc. E5-4706 Filed 8-26-05; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590-01-P

 
*****************************************************************
 20 NRC: Amergen Energy Company, LLC.; Notice of Consideration of
 
                         FR Doc E5-4711 
[Federal Register: August 29, 2005 (Volume 70, Number 166)] 
[Notices] [Page 51093-51097] From the Federal Register Online via 
GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr29au05-85]                         
 
Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating License, Proposed No 
Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity 
for a Hearing The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the 
Commission) is considering issuance of an amendment to Facility 
Operating License No. NPF-62, issued to AmerGen Energy Company, 
LLC, for operation of the Clinton Power Station, Unit 1 (CPS) 
located in DeWitt County, Illinois.
 
The proposed amendment would change Technical Specification (TS) 
4.3, ``Fuel Storage,'' to reflect the increased fuel storage 
capacity in the spent fuel pool and the addition of fuel storage 
capacity in the fuel cask storage pool. A No Significant Hazards 
Consideration was previously published in the Federal Register on 
December 29, 2004 (69 FR 78051) regarding this amendment. 
However, the description of the use of the Fuel Building crane 
and the temporary crane has changed. Therefore, the No 
Significant Hazards Consideration has been revised.
 
Before issuance of the proposed license amendment, the Commission 
will have made findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of 
1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's regulations.
 
The Commission has made a proposed determination that the 
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration. 
Under the Commission's regulations in Title 10 of the Code of 
Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Section 50.92, this means that 
operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed 
amendment would not (1) involve a significant increase in the 
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; 
or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of 
accident from any
 
[[Page 51094]] accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a 
significant reduction in a margin of safety. As required by 10 
CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue 
of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented 
below: 1. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant 
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident 
previously evaluated? Response: No.
 
The proposed change involves revising CPS TS 4.3, ``Fuel 
Storage,'' to reflect the increased storage capacity of the spent 
fuel pool due to the installation of higher density storage racks 
and the addition of fuel storage capacity in the fuel cask 
storage pool.
 
The method of handling fuel is not significantly changed since 
the same equipment and procedures will be used. During spent fuel 
rack removal and installation, all work in the spent fuel pool 
and cask storage pool area will be controlled and performed in 
strict accordance with specific written guidance. Any movement of 
fuel assemblies required to be performed to support the 
modification (e.g., removal and installation of racks) will be 
performed in the same manner as during normal refueling 
operations. Shipping cask movements will not be performed during 
the modification period. There is no change to the methods or 
equipment to be used in moving fuel casks. Expanding the spent 
fuel storage capacity does not have a significant impact on the 
frequency of occurrence for any accident previously evaluated. 
Therefore, this change will not significantly increase the 
probability of occurrence of any event previously analyzed.
 
The consequences of the dropped spent fuel assembly in the spent 
fuel pool have been evaluated for the proposed change. The 
results show that the postulated drop of a spent fuel assembly 
striking the top of the spent fuel storage racks will not distort 
the racks sufficiently to impair their functionality. The minimum 
subcriticality margin (i.e., neutron multiplication factor (keff) 
less than or equal to 0.95) will be maintained. The structural 
damage to the Fuel Building, spent fuel pool liner, and any fuel 
assembly resulting from a dropped fuel assembly striking the pool 
floor or another assembly located in the racks is primarily 
dependent on the mass of the failing object and drop height.
 
Since these two parameters are not changed by the proposed 
modification, the postulated structural damage to these items 
remains unchanged. The radiological dose at the exclusion area 
boundary will not be increased since no changes are being made to 
in-core hold time or bumup as a result of the proposed amendment.
 
The consequences of a loss of spent fuel pool cooling were 
evaluated and found to not involve a significant increase as a 
result of the proposed changes. The concern with this event is a 
reduction of spent fuel pool water inventory from bulk pool 
boiling resulting in uncovering fuel assemblies. This situation 
could lead to fuel failure and subsequent significant increase in 
offsite dose. Loss of spent fuel pool cooling at CPS is mitigated 
by ensuring that a sufficient time lapse exists between the loss 
of forced cooling and uncovering fuel. This period of time is 
compared against a reasonable period to reestablish cooling or 
supply an alternative water source. Evaluation of this event 
includes determination of the time to boil. This time period is 
much less than the onset of any significant increase in offsite 
dose, since once boiling begins it would have to continue 
unchecked until the pool surface was lowered to the point of 
exposing active fuel. The time to boil represents the onset of 
loss of pool water inventory and is commonly used as a gage for 
establishing the comparison of consequences before and after a 
reracking project. The heatup rate in the spent fuel pool is a 
nearly linear function of the fuel decay heat load. The fuel 
decay heat load will increase subsequent to the proposed changes 
because of the increase in the number of assemblies. The thermal 
hydraulic analysis determined that the minimum time to boil is 
more than three hours subsequent to complete loss of forced 
cooling and a minimum of 24 hours between loss of forced cooling 
and a drop of water level to within 10 feet of the top of the 
racks. In the unlikely event that all pool cooling is lost, 
sufficient time will still be available subsequent to the 
proposed changes for the operators to provide alternate means of 
cooling before the water shielding above the top of the racks 
falls below 10 feet.
 
The consequences of a design basis seismic event are not 
increased. The consequences of this event were evaluated on the 
basis of subsequent fuel damage or compromise of the fuel storage 
or building configurations leading to radiological or criticality 
concerns. The new racks have been analyzed in their new 
configuration and were found to be safe during seismic motion.
 
Fuel has been determined to remain intact and the storage racks 
maintain the fuel and fixed poison configurations subsequent to a 
seismic event. The structural capability of the pool and liner 
will not be exceeded under the appropriate combinations of dead 
weight, thermal, and seismic loads. The Fuel Building structure 
will remain intact during a seismic event and will continue to 
adequately support and protect the spent fuel storage racks, 
storage array, and pool moderator/coolant.
 
A fuel cask drop accident was previously evaluated as described 
in the CPS Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) Section 15.7.5. 
Administrative controls will be implemented to ensure that fuel 
will be removed from storage racks located within the cask 
storage pool prior to any fuel cask being moved in this area. The 
presence of any empty racks in this area will not adversely 
affect the previously evaluated cask drop scenarios, since any 
impacted empty racks will tend to absorb the kinetic energy of 
the dropped cask and thus reduce the impact load and 
corresponding damage. The thin walled rack cell material poses 
significantly less threat to puncturing the cask than impact to 
the floor of the pool area. Thus, the results of the previously 
evaluated cask drop accident remain unchanged.
 
Therefore, the proposed change does not result in a significant 
increase in the consequences of a previously evaluated accident.
 
In summary, the proposed change does not involve a significant 
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident 
previously evaluated.
 
2. Does the proposed amendment create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated? Response: No.
 
The proposed change involves revising CPS TS 4 .3, ``Fuel 
Storage,'' to reflect the increased storage capacity of the spent 
fuel pool as a result of the installation of higher density 
storage racks and addition of fuel storage capacity in the fuel 
cask storage pool. Due to the proposed changes, an accidental 
drop of a rack module during construction activity in the pool 
was considered as the only event that might represent a new or 
different kind of accident.
 
A construction accident of a rack dropping onto stored spent fuel 
or the pool floor liner is not a postulated event due to the 
defense-in-depth approach to be taken. A new temporary crane, 
hoist, and rack lifting rig will be introduced to remove the 
existing racks and install the new racks. The temporary crane 
will be used to lift the racks from the operating deck and then 
lower them into the spent fuel pool. The temporary crane will 
then also be used to position the racks in their final location 
in the pool. The Fuel Building crane will only be used as an 
alternative method to initially introduce racks into the pool. 
The temporary lift items have been designed to meet the 
requirements of NUREG-0612, ``Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear 
Power Plants, Resolution of Generic Technical Activity A-6,'' 
Crane Manufacturer's Association of America (CMAA) Specification 
70, ``Specifications for Top Running Bridge & Gantry Type 
Multiple Girder Electric Overhead Traveling Cranes,'' and 
American National Standards Institute (ANSI) Standard N14.6, 
``Standard for Special Lifting Devices for Shipping Containers 
Weighing 10000 Pounds (4500 kg) or More for Nuclear Materials.'' 
A rack drop event is considered to be a ``heavy load drop'' over 
the pools. Racks will not be allowed to be lifted or to travel 
over any racks containing new or spent fuel assemblies, thus a 
rack drop onto fuel is precluded. A rack drop to the pool liner 
is also precluded since all of the lifting components either 
provide redundancy in load path (i.e., meet the definition of 
NUREG-0612 as a single failure proof design) or are designed to 
meet a safety factor of ten (10). The analysis of a rack dropping 
to the liner has been performed and shown to be acceptable. A 
drop of a spent lei rack onto the spent fuel pod liner, while 
unlikely, would not result in an uncontrollable loss of spent 
fuel pool water or lead to a catastrophic failure of the 
reinforced concrete slab. As noted above, the temporary crane (or 
the Fuel Building crane as an alternative) will be used to lower 
racks into the pool and place racks within their range of 
accessibility and to remove racks from the spent fuel pool. The 
temporary crane will be used to lift racks from the pool floor 
and move the racks horizontally with a limited height above the 
pool floor. All
 
[[Page 51095]] movements of heavy loads over the pool will comply 
with the applicable administrative controls and guidelines (i.e. 
plant procedures, NUREG-0612, etc.). A rack drop would not alter 
the storage configuration or moderator/coolant presence. 
Therefore, the rack drop does not represent a new or different 
kind of accident .
 
The proposed change does not alter the operating requirements of 
the plant or of the equipment credited in the mitigation of the 
design basis accidents. The proposed change does not affect any 
of the important parameters required to ensure safe fuel storage. 
Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility of 
a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
 
3. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction in 
a margin of safety? Response: No.
 
The function of the spent fuel pool and fuel cask storage pool is 
to store the fuel assemblies in a subcritical and coolable 
configuration through all environmental and abnormal loadings, 
such as an earthquake or fuel assembly drop. The new rack design 
must meet all applicable requirements for safe storage and be 
functionally compatible with the spent fuel pool and fuel cask 
storage pool. The mechanical, material, and structural designs of 
the new racks have been reviewed in accordance with the 
applicable provisions of the NRC Guidance entitled, ``OT Position 
for Review and Acceptance of Spent Fuel Storage and Handling 
Applications,'' provided as an enclosure to Generic Letter 78-11. 
The rack materials used are compatible with the spent fuel 
assemblies and the spent fuel pool environment. The fixed neutron 
absorber (i.e., Metamic) has been demonstrated to be acceptable 
for dry and wet storage applications on a generic basis. In 
addition, the NRC has approved Metamic for use in both wet and 
dry storage applications. The design of the new racks preserves 
the proper mar in of safety during abnormal loads such as a 
dropped assembly and tensile loads from stuck assembly. It has 
been shown that such loads will not invalidate the mechanical 
design and material selection to safely store fuel in a coolable 
and subcritical configuration.
 
The methodology used in the criticality analysis of the expanded 
spent fuel pool meets the appropriate NRC guidelines and the ANSI 
standards. The margin of safety for subcriticality is maintained 
by having Q equal to or less than 0.95 under all normal storage, 
fuel handling, and accident conditions, including uncertainties.
 
The criterion of having keff equal to or less than 0.95 during 
storage or fuel movement is the same as that used previously to 
establish criticality safety evaluation acceptance. Therefore, 
the accepted margin of safety remains the same.
 
The thermal-hydraulic and cooling evaluation of the spent fuel 
pool demonstrated that the pool could be maintained below the 
specified thermal limits under the conditions of the maximum heat 
load and during all credible accident sequences and seismic 
events. The spent fuel pool temperature will not exceed 150[deg] 
F during the worst single failure of a cooling pump. The maximum 
local water temperature in the hot channel will remain below the 
boiling point. The fuel will not undergo any significant heat up 
after an accidental drop of a fuel assembly on top of the rack 
blocking the flow path. A loss of cooling to the pool will allow 
sufficient time (i.e., 24 hours) for the operators to intervene 
and line up alternate cooling paths and the means of inventory 
make-up before the water shielding above the top of the racks 
falls below 10 feet. The thermal limits specified for the 
evaluations performed to support the proposed change are the same 
as those that were used in the previous evaluations.
 
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant 
reduction in a margin of safety.
 
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 
50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to 
determine that the amendment request involves no significant 
hazards consideration.
 
The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed 
determination. Any comments received within 30 days after the 
date of publication of this notice will be considered in making 
any final determination.
 
Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendment until the 
expiration of 60 days after the date of publication of this 
notice. The Commission may issue the license amendment before 
expiration of the 60- day period provided that its final 
determination is that the amendment involves no significant 
hazards consideration. In addition, the Commission may issue the 
amendment prior to the expiration of the 30- day comment period 
should circumstances change during the 30-day comment period such 
that failure to act in a timely way would result, for example in 
derating or shutdown of the facility. Should the Commission take 
action prior to the expiration of either the comment period or 
the notice period, it will publish in the Federal Register a 
notice of issuance. Should the Commission make a final No 
Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, any hearing will 
take place after issuance. The Commission expects that the need 
to take this action will occur very infrequently.
 
Written comments may be submitted by mail to the Chief, Rules and 
Directives Branch, Division of Administrative Services, Office of 
Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, 
DC 20555-0001, and should cite the publication date and page 
number of this Federal Register notice. Written comments may also 
be delivered to Room 6D59, Two White Flint North, 11545 Rockville 
Pike, Rockville, Maryland, from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. Federal 
workdays. Documents may be examined, and/or copied for a fee, at 
the NRC's Public Document Room, located at One White Flint North, 
Public File Area O-1 F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), 
Rockville, Maryland.
 
The filing of requests for hearing and petitions for leave to 
intervene is discussed below.
 
Within 60 days after the date of publication of this notice, the 
licensee may file a request for a hearing with respect to 
issuance of the amendment to the subject facility operating 
license and any person whose interest may be affected by this 
proceeding and who wishes to participate as a party in the 
proceeding must file a written request for a hearing and a 
petition for leave to intervene. Requests for a hearing and a 
petition for leave to intervene shall be filed in accordance with 
the Commission's ``Rules of Practice for Domestic Licensing 
Proceedings'' in 10 CFR Part 2. Interested persons should consult 
a current copy of 10 CFR 2.309, which is available at the 
Commission's PDR, located at One White Flint North, Public File 
Area 0- 1F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, 
Maryland.
 
Publicly available records will be accessible from the Agencywide 
Documents Access and Management System's (ADAMS) Public 
Electronic Reading Room on the Internet at the NRC Web site, 
http://www.nrc.gov/ reading-rm/ doc-collections/cfr/. If a 
request for a hearing or petition for leave to intervene is filed 
by the above date, the Commission or a presiding officer 
designated by the Commission or by the Chief Administrative Judge 
of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel, will rule on the 
request and/or petition; and the Secretary or the Chief 
Administrative Judge of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 
will issue a notice of a hearing or an appropriate order.
 
As required by 10 CFR 2.309, a petition for leave to intervene 
shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner 
in the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the 
results of the proceeding. The petition should specifically 
explain the reasons why intervention should be permitted with 
particular reference to the following general requirements: (1) 
The name, address and telephone number of the requestor or 
petitioner; (2) the nature of the requestor's/petitioner's right 
under the Act to be made a party to the proceeding; (3) the 
nature and
 
[[Page 51096]] extent of the requestor's/petitioner's property, 
financial, or other interest in the proceeding; and (4) the 
possible effect of any decision or order which may be entered in 
the proceeding on the requester/ petitioner's interest. The 
petition must also identify the specific contentions which the 
petitioner/requestor seeks to have litigated at the proceeding.
 
Each contention must consist of a specific statement of the issue 
of law or fact to be raised or controverted. In addition, the 
petitioner/requestor shall provide a brief explanation of the 
bases for the contention and a concise statement of the alleged 
facts or expert opinion which support the contention and on which 
the petitioner intends to rely in proving the contention at the 
hearing. The petitioner/requestor must also provide references to 
those specific sources and documents of which the petitioner is 
aware and on which the petitioner intends to rely to establish 
those facts or expert opinion. The petition must include 
sufficient information to show that a genuine dispute exists with 
the applicant on a material issue of law or fact. Contentions 
shall be limited to matters within the scope of the amendment 
under consideration. The contention must be one which, if proven, 
would entitle the petitioner to relief. A petitioner/requestor 
who fails to satisfy these requirements with respect to at least 
one contention will not be permitted to participate as a party.
 
Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding, 
subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to 
intervene, and have the opportunity to participate fully in the 
conduct of the hearing.
 
If a hearing is requested, the Commission will make a final 
determination on the issue of no significant hazards 
consideration. The final determination will serve to decide when 
the hearing is held. If the final determination is that the 
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration, 
the Commission may issue the amendment and make it immediately 
effective, notwithstanding the request for a hearing. Any hearing 
held would take place after issuance of the amendment. If the 
final determination is that the amendment request involves a 
significant hazards consideration, any hearing held would take 
place before the issuance of any amendment.
 
Nontimely requests and/or petitions and contentions will not be 
entertained absent a determination by the Commission or the 
presiding officer of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that 
the petition, request and/or the contentions should be granted 
based on a balancing of the factors specified in 10 CFR 
2.309(a)(1)(I)-(viii). A request for a hearing or a petition for 
leave to intervene must be filed by: (1) First class mail 
addressed to the Office of the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, 
Attention: Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff; (2) courier, 
express mail, and expedited delivery services: Office of the 
Secretary, Sixteenth Floor, One White Flint North, 11555 
Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland, 20852, Attention: Rulemaking 
and Adjudications Staff; (3) E-mail addressed to the Office of 
the Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
HEARINGDOCKET@NRC.GOV; or (4) facsimile transmission addressed to 
the Office of the Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC, Attention: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff at 
(301) 415-1101, verification number is (301) 415-1966. A copy of 
the request for hearing and petition for leave to intervene 
should also be sent to the Office of the General Counsel, U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, and it 
is requested that copies be transmitted either by means of 
facsimile transmission to 301-415-3725 or by e-mail to

 
OGCMailCenter@nrc.gov. A copy of the request for hearing and 
petition for leave to intervene should also be sent to Mr. Thomas 
S. O'Neill, Associate General Counsel, Exelon Generation Company, 
LLC, 4300 Winfield Road, Warrenville, IL 60666, the attorney for 
the licensee.
 
The Commission hereby provides notice that this is a proceeding 
on an application for a license amendment falling within the 
scope of section 134 of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 
(NWPA), 42 U.S.C. 10154. Under section 134 of the NWPA, the 
Commission, at the request of any party to the proceeding, must 
use hybrid hearing procedures with respect to ``any matter which 
the Commission determines to be in controversy among the 
parties.'' The hybrid procedures in section 134 provide for oral 
argument on matters in controversy, preceded by discovery under 
the Commission's rules and the designation, following argument of 
only those factual issues that involve a genuine and substantial 
dispute, together with any remaining questions of law, to be 
resolved in an adjudicatory hearing. Actual adjudicatory hearings 
are to be held on only those issues found to meet the criteria of 
section 134 and set for hearing after oral argument.
 
The Commission's rules implementing section 134 of the NWPA are 
found in 10 CFR Part 2, Subpart K, ``Hybrid Hearing Procedures 
for Expansion of Spent Fuel Storage Capacity at Civilian Nuclear 
Power Reactors.'' Under those rules, any party to the proceeding 
may invoke the hybrid hearing procedures by filing with the 
presiding officer a written request for oral argument under 10 
CFR 2.1109. To be timely, the request must be filed together with 
a request for hearing/petition to intervene, filed in accordance 
with 10 CFR 2.309. If it is determined a hearing will be held, 
the presiding officer must grant a timely request for oral 
argument. The presiding officer may grant an untimely request for 
oral argument only upon a showing of good cause by the requesting 
party for the failure to file on time and after providing the 
other parties an opportunity to respond to the untimely request. 
If the presiding officer grants a request for oral argument, any 
hearing held on the application must be conducted in accordance 
with the hybrid hearing procedures. In essence, those procedures 
limit the time available for discovery and require that an oral 
argument be held to determine whether any contentions must be 
resolved in an adjudicatory hearing. If no party to the 
proceeding timely requests oral argument, and if all untimely 
requests for oral argument are denied, then the usual procedures 
in 10 CFR Part 2, Subpart L apply.
 
For further details with respect to this action, see the 
application for amendment dated August 18, 2004, as supplemented 
May 13, June 14, and August 17, 2005, which is available for 
public inspection at the Commission's PDR, located at One White 
Flint North, File Public Area O1 F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first 
floor), Rockville, Maryland. Publicly available records will be 
accessible from the Agencywide Documents Access and Management 
System's (ADAMS) Public Electronic Reading Room on the Internet 
at the NRC Web site, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. 
Persons who do not have access to ADAMS or who encounter problems 
in accessing the documents located in ADAMS, should contact the 
NRC PDR Reference staff by telephone at 1- 800-397-4209, 
301-415-4737, or by e-mail to pdr@nrc.gov. Dated at Rockville, 
Maryland, this 22nd day of August, 2005.
 
 
[[Page 51097]] For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
 
Kahtan N. Jabbour, Project Manager, Section 2, Project 
Directorate III, Division of Licensing Project Management, Office 
of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
 
[FR Doc. E5-4711 Filed 8-26-05; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590-01-P

 
*****************************************************************
 21 The Standard: Shanghai Electric in nuclear push - 

Shanghai Electric Group, a mainland equipment maker in which 
Germany's Siemens owns a stake, said it plans capital spending of 
1.9 billion yuan (HK$1.82 billion) this year and hopes to expand 
in the nuclear equipment business.

Chairman Wang Chengming said the firm has so far spent 601 
million yuan this year, and the rest will be used in the second 
half for business expansion and acquisitions.
                                                                                                                                                
Shanghai Electric, which raised over HK$5 billion in a Hong Kong 
initial public offering in April, reported Friday that net profit 
increased 63.6 percent in the first half from a year ago to 826 
million yuan, brushing aside concerns of rising steel prices.
 																		
About 70 percent of its costs came from raw materials, 40 percent 
of which was steel, Wang said Monday. Costs will probably rise in 
the second half as steel prices are expected to hold steady, he 
said, adding that the company will strengthen cost controls such 
as centralized purchases.
 																		
Wang said Shanghai Electric will expand its nuclear business, 
aiming to raise its market share to 30 percent. He declined to 
give a timetable or disclose the current market share, saying 
only it's at a "low level.''                                                                                                                                           
 																		
The company said it secured an 880 million yuan contract to make 
a "certain key component'' of the nuclear island for two sets of 
600-megawatt power equipment for Qinshan Nuclear Power Station.
 																		
It also won a US$170 million (HK$1.33 billion) supply contract 
for two sets of 300 MW power station boiler-turbine units in 
India as well as a 3.5 billion yuan turnkey contract for two sets 
of 600 MW coal-fired power generation equipment for Shanxi 
Liulin.
                                                                                                                                                
"As both the government and management expect more power 
equipment to come into operation until 2007, we expect Shanghai 
Electric's power equipment business to maintain its high earnings 
growth in the period,'' Macquarie Research said.
                                                                                                                                                
Shanghai Electric's operating profit in power equipment business 
rose 147 percent to 1.2 billion yuan, electromechanical business, 
including heavy machinery and packaging equipment, fell 5.9 
percent, and transportation equipment plunged 83 percent.
                                                                                                              
Shanghai Electric shares fell 1.05 percent to HK$2.35, still 38 
percent higher than its HK$1.70 IPO price. 
staff.reporter@singtaonewscorp.com                                                                                                                                                
Standard, Sing Tao Newspaper 																						Group and
Global China Group. All rights reserved. No content may be
																						redistributed or republished, either
*****************************************************************
 22 ITAR-TASS: Nuclear reactor re-activated at Novovoronezh power plant

28.08.2005, 23.46

NOVOVORONEZH, Voronezh region, August 28 (Itar-Tass) - Nuclear
reactor of Power Unit Five of the Novoronezh power plant went
into operation Sunday after more than a year of outage due to
works to eliminate defects in it, Viktor Boldyrev, the director
of the power unit said. 

"The reactor's activation was completed as scheduled," he said. 

Power Unit Five was shut in June 2004 for regular preventive
maintenance, but technicians found cracks in joints of several
nipples that ensure nuclear safety. 

Expers said the cracks had appeared due to manufacturing defects
and big operation loads over a period of about 25 years. 

"A decision was taken then to replace all the 109 nipples and
not only the ones where the cracks had been found," Boldyrev
said. 

"Not a single country in the world has ever seen repair works
[at nucler plants] on such a massive scale," he indicated. 

This power unit of the Novovoronezh plant has a water-cooled
water-moderated reactor and it was commissioned in May 1980. It
was the first reactor of that type in nuclear machine-building. 

The intial techology of nipple assembling was changed later, and
cracks did not appear at reactors built in subsequent years. 

At this moment, the plant has two operating units with the
output of 417,000 KW each, and Power Unit Five will join them
soon. 

Radiation background at the plant and around it is within the
norm. 

� ITAR-TASS. All rights reserved. You undertake not to copy,
*****************************************************************
 23 Reuters: Entergy shuts La. Waterford 3 nuke due hurricane 

Mon Aug 29, 2005 8:31 AM ET

 NEW YORK, Aug 29 (Reuters) - Entergy Corp. (ETR.N: Quote, 
Profile, Research) shut the 1,089-megawatt unit 3 at the 
Waterford nuclear power station in Louisiana on Aug. 28 as 
Hurricane Katrina approached southern Louisiana, the company told 
the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission in an event report.

 Katrina crashed on shore in southern Louisiana this morning 
about 70 miles south-southeast of New Orleans as a Category 4 
storm with maximum sustained winds of 140 miles per hour.

 In the report, the company declared an unusual event due to the 
hurricane warning. An unusual event is the lowest of four 
emergency classifications used by the NRC.

 On Friday, the unit was operating at full power.

 The 1,911 MW Waterford station is located in Taft in St. Charles 
Parish, about 30 miles west of New Orleans. There are three units 
at the Waterford station including two 411 MW natural gas and 
oil-fired units 1 and 2, and the 1,089 MW nuclear unit 3.

 One MW powers about 800 homes, according to North American 
averages.

 Entergy's regulated Entergy Louisiana Inc. subsidiary owns the 
station.

 Entergy's subsidiaries own and operate about 30,000 MW of 
generating capacity, market energy commodities, and transmit and 
distribute power to 2.6 million customers in Arkansas, Louisiana, 
Mississippi and Texas.                                               

� Reuters 2005. 
All Rights Reserved.                    
*****************************************************************
 24 Reuters: Two units back at Ariz. Palo Verde nuke station 

Mon Aug 29, 2005 8:17 AM ET                                                                                             

 NEW YORK, Aug 29 (Reuters) - Two units at the 3,875-megawatt 
Palo Verde nuclear power station in Arizona exited outages over 
the weekend, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission said in a 
report.

 By early Monday, units 1 and 2 ramped up to 18 percent and 91 
percent of capacity, respectively.

 Unit 1 shut on Aug. 12 due to a problem with an emergency diesel 
generator. The unit was in start-up on Aug. 17 when operators 
found an oil leak and shut the unit again.

 Unit 2, which was operating at 2 percent of capacity on Friday, 
shut on Aug. 22 due to a software problem.

 The 3,875 MW Palo Verde station is located in Wintersburg in 
Maricopa County about 50 miles west of Phoenix. There are three 
units at Palo Verde: the 1,243 MW unit 1, the 1,335 MW unit 2 and 
the 1,247 MW unit 3.

 Unit 3, meanwhile, continued to operate at 99 percent.

 One MW powers about 800 homes, according to North American 
averages.

 Phoenix-based energy company Pinnacle West Capital Corp.'s 
(PNW.N: Quote, Profile, Research) regulated Arizona Public 
Service subsidiary operates the station for its owners.

 The owners include APS (29.1 percent), the Salt River Project 
(17.5 percent), Edison International's (EIX.N: Quote, Profile, 
Research) Southern California Edison Co. subsidiary (15.8 
percent), El Paso Electric Co. (EE.N: Quote, Profile, Research) 
(15.8 percent), PNM Resources Inc.'s (PNM.N: Quote, Profile, 
Research) Public Service Co of New Mexico subsidiary (10.2 
percent), Southern California Public Power Authority (5.9 
percent) and the Los Angeles Department of Water & Power (5.7 
percent).                                               

� Reuters 2005. 
All Rights Reserved.                    
 			
*****************************************************************
 25 Reuters: PSEG shuts N.J. Hope Creek nuke 

Mon Aug 29, 2005 8:39 AM ET

 NEW YORK, Aug 29 (Reuters) - Public Service Enterprise Group 
Inc.'s (PEG.N: Quote, Profile, Research) 1,049-megawatt Hope 
Creek nuclear power station in New Jersey shut on Aug. 28 due to 
an inoperable suppression chamber vacuum breaker, plant operators 
told the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission an event report.

 In the report, the operators said the vacuum breaker indication 
began cycling from closed to open. Since the operators could not 
keep the breaker closed, they had to shut the plant.

 The company said in the report it did not know what caused the 
problem.

 On Friday, the unit was operating at full power.

 The Hope Creek station is located in Hancocks Bridge in Salem 
County, about 40 miles south of Philadelphia.

 One MW powers about 800 homes, according to North American 
averages.

 Exelon Nuclear, a unit of Chicago-based energy company Exelon 
Corp.'s (EXC.N: Quote, Profile, Research) Exelon Generation Co 
LLC subsidiary, operates the station for PSEG.

 In December, Exelon, the biggest nuclear power operator in the 
United States, agreed to acquire New Jersey-based PSEG. Pending 
regulatory and shareholder approvals, the companies expect to 
complete the deal in 2006.

 Exelon's subsidiaries own and operate more than 38,000 MW of 
generating capacity, market energy commodities, and transmit and 
distribute electricity (5.1 million) and natural gas (460,000) to 
customers in Illinois and Pennsylvania.

 PSEG's regulated and unregulated subsidiaries own and operate 
more than 16,000 MW of generating capacity, market energy 
commodities, and transmit and distribute electricity and natural 
gas to customers in North America, South America, the Middle 
East, Europe and India.                                                 

� Reuters 2005. 
All Rights Reserved.                    
*****************************************************************
 26 Reuters: US NRC monitoring 3 nuclear plants in Gulf Coast 

Mon Aug 29, 2005 11:34 AM ET

 WASHINGTON, Aug 29 (Reuters) - The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission sent extra staff to three nuclear power plants owned 
by Entergy Corp (ETR.N: Quote, Profile, Research) in Louisiana 
and Mississippi, including the Waterford plant which temporarily 
shut down due to Hurricane Katrina, the agency said on Monday.


 "We are staying on top of the situation because protecting 
public health and safety is paramount," said Nils Diaz, NRC 
chairman.


 The Waterford plant is located about 30 miles west of New 
Orleans. The company said it shut its 1,089-megawatt unit 3.


 At the Waterford plant, the NRC said its major concern beyond 
winds was the storm surge which could approach the top of an 
18-foot levee on the Mississippi River.


 Nuclear plants are constructed to withstand winds stronger than 
Katrina's 135 mph (216 kph) winds. Waterford and the other two 
Entergy plants -- River Bend near Baton Rouge, Louisiana, and 
Grand Gulf near Vicksburg, Mississippi -- have watertight doors 
at key safety systems.


 The NRC will have to approve the restart of Waterford and any 
other nuclear plant that shuts down.


 LINKS:


 * Entergy shuts Waterford 3 nuclear plant [ID:nN29687357]


 * Katrina knocks out electricity in Lou.  [ID:nN29197392]


 * FACTBOX-Hurricane's impact on oil, gas  [ID:nN29188421]


 * NYMEX PJM electricity prices           


 * Reuters power news                      [ELN]
 			 			

� Reuters 2005. 
All Rights Reserved.                    
 			
*****************************************************************
 27 Reuters: Exelon Ill. Dresden 3 nuke up to 99 pct power 

Mon Aug 29, 2005 8:06 AM ET                                                                                             

 NEW YORK, Aug 29 (Reuters) - Exelon Corp.'s (EXC.N: Quote, 
Profile, Research) 850-megawatt unit 3 at the Dresden nuclear 
power station in Illinois ramped up to 99 percent of capacity by 
early Monday, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission said in a 
report.

 On Friday, the unit was operating at 61 percent of capacity.

 The 1,700 MW Dresden station is located in Morris in Grundy 
County about 60 miles southeast of Chicago. There are two 850 MW 
units 2 and 3 at the station.

 Unit 2, meanwhile, dipped to 99 percent, down from full power on 
Friday.

 One MW powers about 800 homes, according to North American 
averages.

 Chicago-based energy company Exelon's unregulated Exelon 
Generation Co LLC subsidiary operates the station.

 Exelon's subsidiaries own and operate more than 38,000 MW of 
generating capacity, market energy commodities, and transmit and 
distribute electricity (5.1 million) and natural gas (460,000) to 
customers in Illinois and Pennsylvania.                                              

� Reuters 2005. 
All Rights Reserved.                    
*****************************************************************
 28 Reuters: SCANA S.C. Summer nuke back at full power

Mon Aug 29, 2005 8:00 AM ET

 NEW YORK, Aug 29 (Reuters) - SCANA Corp.'s (SCG.N: Quote, 
Profile, Research) 966-megawatt Summer nuclear power station in 
South Carolina exited an outage and returned to full power by 
early Monday, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission said in a 
report.

 The plant automatically shut on Aug. 25 due to a fire in a 
condensate pump motor that forced the company to declare an 
unusual event, the lowest emergency classification used by the 
NRC.

 The Summer station is located in Parr in Fairfield County, about 
25 miles northwest of Columbia, South Carolina.

 One MW powers about 800 homes, according to North American 
averages.

 SCANA's regulated South Carolina Electric and Gas subsidiary 
operates Summer for its owners, SCE&G (66.67 percent) and South 
Carolina Public Service Authority, known as Santee Cooper, (33.33 
percent).

 SCANA's subsidiaries own and operate more than 5,000 MW of 
generating capacity, market energy commodities, and transmit and 
distribute electricity to about 585,000 customers in South 
Carolina and natural gas to more than 1 million in North and 
South Carolina and Georgia.                                             

� Reuters 2005. 
All Rights Reserved.                    
*****************************************************************
 29 AU ABC: ACCI urges nuclear power rethink. 

29/08/2005. ABC News Online

Australia's largest business organisation has called on the
Federal Government to seriously consider nuclear power as a way
of meeting Australia's energy needs.

 Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (ACCI) chief
executive Peter Hendy says solar and wind power are not yet
viable solutions and would cost jobs if implemented in a
widespread way.

 On the other hand, he says nuclear power is economically
efficient and does not add to greenhouse gas emissions. 
The ACCI wants the Federal Government to conduct a feasibility
study into the establishment of nuclear power generators in
Australia. 

It concedes fossil fuels will continue to supply most of the
country's energy needs but argues it is only sensible to look at
all options. 




*****************************************************************
 30 Sofia Morning News: IAEA Official Examines Bulgaria's Nuclear Technologies
 	 	 	 	 	 	
www.novinite.com Sofia News Agency

Politics: 29 August 2005, Monday.

Byung-Koo Kim of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
will arrive in Bulgaria on a three-day visit to examine the
country's nuclear technologies.
 
Kim, who is Director for Europe, Latin America and West Asia at
the IAEA Department of Technical Cooperation, was invited to
Bulgaria by the Agency for Nuclear Regulation. 

The IAEA official will meet representatives of the Bulgarian
Economy and Energy Ministry as well as of the Agency for Nuclear
Regulation. 

During his visit he is expected to focus on the construction of
a new nuclear power facility, technical cooperation between
Bulgaria and the IAEA as well as the country's specific needs in
the field of nuclear safety, and radiotherapy and oncology.

Click here to receive realtime news about this topic in the
future.


 All Rights Reserved � Novinite Ltd., 2001-2005 - Copyright
*****************************************************************
 31 Guardian Unlimited: Unsecured Radioactive Material Discovered
 
From the Associated Press        
	 
[UP] 

Monday August 29, 2005 2:46 PM
 	
By ROD McGUIRK 
Associated Press Writer 

SYDNEY, Australia (AP) - Australian researchers have found large
amounts of radioactive material in two Southeast Asian countries
at unsecured sites such as abandoned warehouses, a senior
nuclear scientist said Monday. 

Australia is involved in an international effort to ensure
radioactive material used in medicine and industry is stored
securely and systems are set up to track it. 

Ron Cameron, chief of operations at the Australian Nuclear
Science and Technology Organization, said researchers from the
government-funded group have been scouring the region for
material usually used in medicine that could be turned into a
so-called dirty bomb. 

Cameron declined to identify the countries because the sources
remained vulnerable and the materials could be stolen, but said
his group was talking to the countries about securing the
material. 

``These were sources that were no longer in use and nobody
seemed to own,'' he told The Associated Press in a telephone
interview. ``We're now working with them (the countries) to
either send them back to the manufacturers or send them to a
secure location.'' 

Cameron didn't elaborate on the materials found, but he said
occasionally a private company dealing with the materials goes
out of business ``and they don't look after their source
properly.'' 

``So it gets left in a warehouse and eventually some people
break into that warehouse.'' he said. 

He said the materials could be used to make dirty bombs, which
are detonated by conventional explosives and scatter radioactive
material over a wide area. 

``It is more likely that terrorists would steal a source rather
than just come across one that been abandoned or forgotten,'' he
said. 
		 	 	   
Guardian Unlimited � Guardian Newspapers Limited 2005
*****************************************************************
 32 Mos News: Former Nuclear Minister Adamov Accepts Extradition to Russia -
         
 MOSNEWS.COM

E. Adamov / Photo: Kommersant Photo Archive             
 	 	
Created: 29.08.2005 15:38 MSK (GMT +3), Updated: 15:38 MSK 	
 	
MosNews 
	 	 	 	 
Russia�s former nuclear energy minister Yevgeny Adamov, held in
Swiss custody on fraud charges brought against him both by the
United States and Russia has agreed to a summary extradition to
Russia, a spokesperson for the Swiss Federal Justice
Directorate, Folco Galli, told RIA-Novosti. 

According to Galli, Adamov has expressed his consent for the
alleged wrongdoings, of which the U.S. has accused him, being
probed by Russia. Adamov will remain in Swiss custody pending an
examination of the U.S. request for his extradition by the
Justice Directorate, the official said. 

Adamov was arrested in Switzerland in May of this year, after he
was charged with converting at least $9 million in funds
earmarked for nuclear safety projects in Russia into personal
assets. 

Russian prosecutors responded to the U.S. indictment by promptly
bringing fraud charges against the former minister and issuing a
request for his extradition to Moscow. 

Adamov was a minister under Russian President Boris Yeltsin but
was ousted by Vladimir Putin, who came to power in 2000 vowing
to fight corruption. Adamov was discharged from his position
after a probe into his ties to Russian businessmen.
 	 	
Copyright � 2004 MOSNEWS.COM

*****************************************************************
 33 AU ABC: Nuclear experts seek out dirty bomb materials in South East Asia
 
AM - Monday, 29 August , 2005  08:24:00
 
Reporter: Lynn Bell

 TONY EASTLEY: Australian nuclear experts have found a number of
unsecured sources of radioactive material in South East Asia,
which could be used to make a so-called 'dirty bomb'.

But Dr Ron Cameron, the Chief of Operations at the Australian
Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation, ANSTO, says it
would be difficult for terrorists to identify, and then get hold
of the material.

He says ANSTO has around 10 nuclear experts working in the
region and across the Pacific Islands to identify and secure
loose nuclear material.

Dr Cameron is speaking here to AM's Lynn Bell.

LYNN BELL: How easy is it for potential terrorists to lay their
hands on this loose radioactive material?

RON CAMERON: It's difficult to do so because they have to know
what they're actually looking for and they have to know where it
might be located. That's why it's much easier and quicker for us
to locate it than it is for them, so it's not an easy process.

LYNN BELL: Is this material capable of being used in a dirty
bomb, and can you see that as a possible consequence?

RON CAMERON: Well, of course that's one of the reasons we're
putting so much effort into this particular project to work in
the regions to raise awareness and to bring all these sources
into control because there is the potential for the larger
sources to be used in the dirty bomb.

LYNN BELL: And what would be the effect of that? If some of the
material that you have found was to be used, what would you say
would be the effect?

RON CAMERON: Because we haven't yet had the dirty bomb anywhere
in the world, it's a bit hard to see what the effect is, but
clearly the major consequence of the dirty bomb would be panic,
and that's of course what the terrorist is after.

A dirty bomb is not a weapon of mass destruction, it is a weapon
of mass disruption, but it would cause contamination of areas,
which could be quite extensive and quite difficult to clean up.

LYNN BELL: Is the amount of radioactive material that has been
found in South East Asia enough to be used in that way?

RON CAMERON: Uh yes, some of these sources are categorised into
certain categories and these are some of the larger sources that
were used for radiation therapy, that is, they were used to
treat cancer. 

And those sources, if they could be got out of the containers,
they would be the sort of thing that people would be concerned
by for dirty bombs.

There are thousands of such sources in these countries, all of
which are really under quite good control, but occasionally what
happens in a regional country is a nuclear therapy department
would be a private company and that private company goes out of
business and they don't look after their source properly, so it
gets left in the warehouse, and then eventually some people
break into that warehouse and take away that particular source
and that's the sort of concern that we have.

TONY EASTLEY: Chief of Operations at the Australian Nuclear
Science and Technology Organisation, Dr Ron Cameron speaking
there with Lynn Bell.   

*****************************************************************
 34 DU Is a War Crime
 
Date: Mon, 29 Aug 2005 11:11:09 -0500 (CDT)

 
	version=3.0.4
X-Spam-filter-host: pascal.ctyme.com - http://www.junkemailfilter.com

Forwarded with Compliments of Government of the USA in Exile (GUSAE): 
Free Americans Resisting the Fourth Reich on Behalf of All Species.

From: Ecological Options Network <eon3@earthlink.net>
Date: August 26, 2005 2:40:32 PM PDT
Subject: DU as War Crime

     Go to Original

                                    Radioactive Wounds of War

      By Dave Lindorff
      In These Times
      Thursday 25 August 2005

Tests on returning troops suggest serious health consequences of 
depleted uranium use in Iraq.

     Gerard Matthew thought he was lucky. He returned from his Iraq 
tour a year and a half ago alive and in one piece. But after the New 
York State National Guardsman got home, he learned that a bunkmate, 
Sgt. Ray Ramos, and a group of N.Y. Guard members from another unit 
had accepted an offer by the New York Daily News and reporter Juan 
Gonzalez to be tested for depleted uranium (DU) contamination, and 
had tested positive.

     Matthew, 31, decided that since he'd spent much of his time in 
Iraq lugging around DU-damaged equipment, he'd better get tested too. 
It turned out he was the most contaminated of them all.

     Matthew immediately urged his wife to get an ultrasound check of 
their unborn baby. They discovered the fetus had a condition common 
to those with radioactive exposure: atypical syndactyly. The right 
hand had only two digits.

     So far Victoria Claudette, now 13 months old, shows no other 
genetic disorders and is healthy, but Matthew feels guilty for 
causing her deformity and angry at a government that never warned him 
about DU's dangers.

     US forces first used DU in the 1991 Gulf War, when some 300 tons 
of depleted uranium - the waste product of nuclear power plants and 
weapons facilities - were used in tank shells and shells fired by 
A-10 jets. A lesser amount was deployed by US and NATO forces during 
the Balkans conflict. But in the current wars in Afghanistan and, 
especially, Iraq, DU has become the weapon of choice, with more than 
1,000 tons used in Afghanistan and more than 3,000 tons used in Iraq. 
And while DU was fired mostly in the desert during the Gulf War, in 
the current war in Iraq, most of DU munitions are exploding in 
populated urban areas.

     The Pentagon has expanded DU beyond tank and A-10 shells, for use 
in bunker-busting bombs, which can spew out more than half a ton of 
DU in one explosion, in anti-personnel bomblets, and even in M-16 and 
pistol shells. The military loves DU for its unique penetration 
capability - it cuts through steel or concrete like they're butter.

     The problem is that when DU hits its target, it burns at a high 
temperature, throwing off clouds of microscopic particles that poison 
a wide area and remain radioactive for billions of years. If inhaled, 
these particles can lodge in lungs, other organs or bones, 
irradiating tissue and causing cancers.

     Worse yet, uranium is also a highly toxic heavy metal. Indeed, 
while there is some debate over the risk posed by the element's 
radioactive emissions, there is no debate regarding its chemical 
toxicity. According to Mt. Sinai pathologist Thomas Fasey, who 
participated in the New York Guard unit testing, the element has an 
affinity for bonding with DNA, where even trace amounts can cause 
cancers and fetal abnormalities.

     Dr. Doug Rokke, a health physicist at the University of Illinois 
who headed up a Pentagon study of depleted uranium weapons in the mid 
'90s after concerns were raised during the Gulf War, concluded there 
was no safe way to use the weapons. Rokke says the Pentagon responded 
by denouncing him, after earlier commending his work.

     No one knows how many US soldiers have been contaminated by DU 
residue. Despite regulations authorizing tests for any military 
personnel who suspects exposure, the US military is avoiding doing 
those tests - or delaying them until they are meaningless.

     "When we asked to be tested at Ft. Dix, they wrongly told us we 
didn't have to worry unless we had DU fragments in our body," says 
Matthew. His buddy, Sgt. Ramos, who exhibits symptoms resembling 
radiation sickness and heavy metal poisoning, adds that at Walter 
Reed Medical Center he was grilled for hours about why he wanted to 
be tested and was then branded a troublemaker by his own unit. 
Matthew says Walter Reed "lost" his sample.

     At the war's start, the United States refused to allow UN or 
other environmental inspectors to test DU levels within Iraq. Now the 
United Nations won't even go near Iraq because of security concerns.

     "It doesn't seem right that we are poisoning the places we are 
supposed to be liberating," Ramos says.

     The Pentagon continues to insist, on the basis of no field 
evidence, that DU is safe. To date, only some 270 returned troops 
have been tested for DU contamination by the military and Veterans 
Affairs. But even those tests, mostly urine samples, are useless 30 
days after exposure, because by that time most of the DU has left the 
body or migrated into bones or organs.

     Gonzalez and the Daily News paid for costlier tests for nine 
Guardsmen - tests that could pinpoint uranium inside the body and 
identify the special isotope signature of man-made DU. Four of the 
nine tested positive for DU; all had symptoms of uranium poisoning.

     Even harder evidence may soon arrive. Connecticut State 
Representative Pat Dillon (D-New Haven), a Yale-trained 
epidemiologist, has crafted state-level legislation that Connecticut 
and Louisiana have unanimously passed, authorizing returned National 
Guard troops to request and receive specialized DU contamination 
tests at the Pentagon's expense. This approach bypasses the 
Pentagon's feet-dragging because National Guard troops fall under 
state, rather than federal, jurisdiction.

     "This was not a Democratic or a Republican issue," Dillon says. 
"These are our kids and someone needs to protect them." She says that 
since passage of her bill, which takes effect this October, military 
groups and family organizations, state legislators, and even National 
Guard unit commanders have contacted her for copies of her bill to 
promote in their states. Bob Smith, a veteran in Louisiana who got 
hold of Dillon's bill and spearheaded a successful effort to pass 
similar legislation in Louisiana, claims that 14 to 20 other states 
are considering similar measures.

     If enough Guard troops avail themselves of the testing - and 
start testing positive for contamination - it seems likely that 
reservists and active duty troops and veterans will demand similar 
access to rigorous tests, which can cost upwards of $1000 per person.

     One way or another, the Pentagon will pay a price. "DU is a war 
crime. It's that simple," Rokke says. "Once you've scattered all this 
stuff around, and then refuse to clean it up, you've committed a war 
crime."

================================================================

EON

the Ecological Options Network

"What's Working Where, Worldwide"

            www.eon3.net
*****************************************************************
 35 [EMMAS] Radioactive Wounds of War
 
Date: Mon, 29 Aug 2005 12:17:54 -0500 (CDT)

 
	autolearn=ham version=3.0.4
X-Spam-filter-host: pascal.ctyme.com - http://www.junkemailfilter.com

http://www.inthesetimes.com/site/main/article/2298/
Radioactive Wounds of War
Tests on returning troops suggest serious health consequences of
depleted uranium use in Iraq
By Dave Lindorff
August 25, 2005

Gerard Matthew thought he was lucky. He returned from his Iraq tour a
year and a half ago alive and in one piece. But after the New York
State National Guardsman got home, he learned that a bunkmate, Sgt. Ray
Ramos, and a group of N.Y. Guard members from another unit had accepted
an offer by the New York Daily News and reporter Juan Gonzalez to be
tested for depleted uranium (DU) contamination, and had tested
positive.

Matthew, 31, decided that since he'd spent much of his time in Iraq
lugging around DU-damaged equipment, he'd better get tested too. It
turned out he was the most contaminated of them all.

Matthew immediately urged his wife to get an ultrasound check of their
unborn baby. They discovered the fetus had a condition common to those
with radioactive exposure: atypical syndactyly. The right hand had only
two digits.

So far Victoria Claudette, now 13 months old, shows no other genetic
disorders and is healthy, but Matthew feels guilty for causing her
deformity and angry at a government that never warned him about DU's
dangers.

U.S. forces first used DU in the 1991 Gulf War, when some 300 tons of
depleted uranium--the waste product of nuclear power plants and weapons
facilities--were used in tank shells and shells fired by A-10 jets. A
lesser amount was deployed by U.S. and NATO forces during the Balkans
conflict. But in the current wars in Afghanistan and, especially, Iraq,
DU has become the weapon of choice, with more than 1,000 tons used in
Afghanistan and more than 3,000 tons used in Iraq. And while DU was
fired mostly in the desert during the Gulf War, in the current war in
Iraq, most of DU munitions are exploding in populated urban areas.

The Pentagon has expanded DU beyond tank and A-10 shells, for use in
bunker-busting bombs, which can spew out more than half a ton of DU in
one explosion, in anti-personnel bomblets, and even in M-16 and pistol
shells. The military loves DU for its unique penetration capability--it
cuts through steel or concrete like they're butter.

The problem is that when DU hits its target, it burns at a high
temperature, throwing off clouds of microscopic particles that poison a
wide area and remain radioactive for billions of years. If inhaled,
these particles can lodge in lungs, other organs or bones, irradiating
tissue and causing cancers.

Worse yet, uranium is also a highly toxic heavy metal. Indeed, while
there is some debate over the risk posed by the element's radioactive
emissions, there is no debate regarding its chemical toxicity.
According to Mt. Sinai pathologist Thomas Fasey, who participated in
the New York Guard unit testing, the element has an affinity for
bonding with DNA, where even trace amounts can cause cancers and fetal
abnormalities.

Dr. Doug Rokke, a health physicist at the University of Illinois who
headed up a Pentagon study of depleted uranium weapons in the mid '90s
after concerns were raised during the Gulf War, concluded there was no
safe way to use the weapons. Rokke says the Pentagon responded by
denouncing him, after earlier commending his work.

No one knows how many U.S. soldiers have been contaminated by DU
residue. Despite regulations authorizing tests for any military
personnel who suspects exposure, the U.S. military is avoiding doing
those tests--or delaying them until they are meaningless.

"When we asked to be tested at Ft. Dix, they wrongly told us we didn't
have to worry unless we had DU fragments in our body," says Matthew.
His buddy, Sgt. Ramos, who exhibits symptoms resembling radiation
sickness and heavy metal poisoning, adds that at Walter Reed Medical
Center he was grilled for hours about why he wanted to be tested and
was then branded a troublemaker by his own unit. Matthew says Walter
Reed "lost" his sample.

At the war's start, the United States refused to allow U.N. or other
environmental inspectors to test DU levels within Iraq. Now the United
Nations won't even go near Iraq because of security concerns.

"It doesn't seem right that we are poisoning the places we are supposed
to be liberating," Ramos says.

The Pentagon continues to insist, on the basis of no field evidence,
that DU is safe. To date, only some 270 returned troops have been
tested for DU contamination by the military and Veterans Affairs. But
even those tests, mostly urine samples, are useless 30 days after
exposure, because by that time most of the DU has left the body or
migrated into bones or organs.

Gonzalez and the Daily News paid for costlier tests for nine
Guardsmen--tests that could pinpoint uranium inside the body and
identify the special isotope signature of man-made DU. Four of the nine
tested positive for DU; all had symptoms of uranium poisoning.

Even harder evidence may soon arrive. Connecticut State Representative
Pat Dillon (D-New Haven), a Yale-trained epidemiologist, has crafted
state-level legislation that Connecticut and Louisiana have unanimously
passed, authorizing returned National Guard troops to request and
receive specialized DU contamination tests at the Pentagon's expense.
This approach bypasses the Pentagon's feet-dragging because National
Guard troops fall under state, rather than federal, jurisdiction.

"This was not a Democratic or a Republican issue," Dillon says. "These
are our kids and someone needs to protect them." She says that since
passage of her bill, which takes effect this October, military groups
and family organizations, state legislators, and even National Guard
unit commanders have contacted her for copies of her bill to promote in
their states. Bob Smith, a veteran in Louisiana who got hold of
Dillon's bill and spearheaded a successful effort to pass similar
legislation in Louisiana, claims that 14 to 20 other states are
considering similar measures.

If enough Guard troops avail themselves of the testing--and start
testing positive for contamination--it seems likely that reservists and
active duty troops and veterans will demand similar access to rigorous
tests, which can cost upwards of $1000 per person.

One way or another, the Pentagon will pay a price. "DU is a war crime.
It's that simple," Rokke says. "Once you've scattered all this stuff
around, and then refuse to clean it up, you've committed a war crime."
-------
Dave Lindorff, an In These Times contributing editor, is the author of
This Cant Be Happening: Resisting the Disintegration of American
Democracy. His work can be found at This Cant Be Happening.
==============
***NOTICE: In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. Section 107, this
material is distributed without profit to those who have expressed a
prior interest in receiving the included information for research and
educational purposes.***
==============

#################################################################
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zeal, courage, the non-compromising determination of intelligent
minorities, and not through the mass."  Emma Goldman

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*****************************************************************
 36 NRC: NRC Revises Procedures for Handling Possible Generic Safety Issues
 
News Release - 2005-11
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION   
  Office of Public Affairs     Telephone: 301/415-8200   
  Washington, DC 20555-0001     E-mail: opa@nrc.gov  
  No. 05-116     August 26, 2005   
  

  The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is simplifying its
procedures for considering if a potential safety issue is
generic, in that it applies to a wide range of licensees such as
nuclear power plant operators. The NRC works with its licensees
to ensure generic safety issues are appropriately resolved. 
These revisions are reflected in an NRC management directive on
the agencys Generic Issues Program, and results from the
Davis-Besse Lessons Learned Task Forces recommendation that the
process for capturing, identifying and resolving generic safety
issues should be improved.
 
These changes will make the program easier to use, encouraging
more participation by NRC staff and interested stakeholders,
said Carl Paperiello, Director of the NRCs Office of Nuclear
Regulatory Research. The improved program will help to further
ensure lessons learned from events at our licensees facilities
are properly incorporated into the NRCs oversight program.
 
Changes to the program include:
 
 Requiring NRC staff to obtain endorsements from the agencys
relevant independent advisory committee (i.e., Advisory
Committee on Reactor Safeguards) before advancing a generic
issue through the process or closing an issue out; and
 
 Providing NRC offices more flexibility, based on an issues
safety significance and other factors, in determining a target
completion date for resolving the issue.
   



  


 	Last revised Friday, August 26, 2005 	
*****************************************************************
 37 NRC: Notice of License Termination and Release of Michigan Department 
 
                         FR Doc E5-4707 
[Federal Register: August 29, 2005 (Volume 70, Number 166)] 
[Notices] [Page 51093] From the Federal Register Online via GPO 
Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr29au05-84]                         
 
of Natural Resources (MDNR) Site in Bay City, MI for Unrestricted 
Release AGENCY: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. ACTION: 
Notice of license termination and site release for unrestricted 
use.
 
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: David W. Nelson, Materials 
Decommissioning Section, Division of Waste Management and 
Environmental Protection, NRC, Washington, DC, 20555; telephone 
(301) 415-6626; fax (301) 415-5397; or e-mail at dwn@nrc.gov.
 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Introduction
Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.106, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(NRC) is providing notice that it has terminated license SUC-1581 
for the Michigan Department of Natural Resources (MDNR) 
(Licensee), and has released its Bay City, Michigan, Tobico Marsh 
State Game Area site for unrestricted use. The Licensee's request 
for an amendment to authorize decommissioning of its Bay City, 
Michigan site was previously noticed in the Federal Register on 
July 2, 2004 (69 FR 41855) with an opportunity to request a 
hearing.
 
MDNR provided a final radiological status survey and performed an 
on-site and off-site dose analysis to demonstrate the site meets 
the license termination criteria in Subpart E of 10 CFR Part 20. 
In addition, NRC staff conducted independent measurements of 
soils and surfaces at the site.
 
The NRC staff has evaluated MDNR's request, has reviewed the 
results of the final radiological survey, and has determined that 
the site meets the unrestricted release dose criteria in 10 CFR 
20.1402. The staff prepared a Safety Evaluation Report (SER) to 
support its termination of the MDNR license.
 
II. Further Information In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the 
NRC's ``Rules of Practice,'' details with respect to this action, 
including the SER, are available electronically at the NRC's 
Electronic Reading Room at 
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. From this site, you can 
access the NRC's Agencywide Document Access and Management System 
(ADAMS), which provides text and image files of NRC's public 
documents. The ADAMS accession number for the termination letter 
and SER, ``Release of Michigan Department of Natural Resources 
Bay City, Michigan, Tobico Marsh State Game Area Site and 
Termination of License (License No. SUC- 1581)'' is ADAMS No. 
ML052010626. If you do not have access to ADAMS or if there are 
problems in accessing a document located in ADAMS, contact the 
NRC Public Document Room (PDR) Reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 
301-415-4737, or by e-mail to pdr@nrc.gov. This document may also 
be viewed electronically on the public computers located at the 
NRC's PDR, O-1-F21, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, 
Rockville, MD 20852. The PDR reproduction contractor will copy 
documents for a fee.
 
Dated at NRC, Rockville, MD, this 23rd day of August, 2005.
 
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
 
Daniel M. Gillen, Deputy Director, Decommissioning Directorate, 
Division of Waste Management and Environmental Protection, Office 
of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.
 
[FR Doc. E5-4707 Filed 8-26-05; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590-01-P

 
*****************************************************************
 38 NRC: Issuance of Environmental Assessment and Finding of No 
 
                         FR Doc E5-4709 
[Federal Register: August 29, 2005 (Volume 70, Number 166)] 
[Notices] [Page 51097-51098] From the Federal Register Online via 
GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr29au05-86]                         
 
Significant Impact Regarding a Proposed License Amendment for 
Endocyte Incorporated 1205 Kent Avenue Facility, West Lafayette, 
IN AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
 
ACTION: Issuance of environmental assessment and finding of no 
significant impact.
 
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Gene Bonano, Health Physicist, 
Decommissioning Branch, Division of Nuclear Materials Safety, 
Region III, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2443 Warrenville 
Road, Lisle, Illinois 60532; telephone: (630) 829-9826; fax 
number: (630) 515-1259; e-mail: .
 
 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(NRC) is considering issuing a license amendment to Material 
License No.
 
13- 32212-01 issued to Endocyte Incorporated (the licensee), to 
authorize release of its 1205 Kent Avenue facility, West 
Lafayette, Indiana, for unrestricted use. This Environmental 
Assessment (EA) is issued in support of this amendment in 
accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 51. Based on this 
EA, the NRC has concluded that a Finding of No Significant Impact 
(FONSI) is appropriate. The amendment will be issued following 
the publication of this EA/FONSI.
 
I. Environmental Assessment Identification of Proposed Action The 
NRC staff has prepared this EA to support the Endocyte 
Incorporated May 26, 2005 (ML052340684) request to release its 
1205 Kent Avenue, West Lafayette, Indiana facility for 
unrestricted use. Endocyte's 1205 Kent Avenue facility is one of 
two authorized facilities listed under Material License Number 
13-32212-01. The licensee transferred all licensed material from 
the 1205 Kent Avenue facility to its 3000 Kent Avenue facility. 
Endocyte was granted a license on December 9, 1999, and initiated 
licensed activities in April 2000 at the 1205 Kent Avenue 
facility. The 3000 Kent Avenue facility was added to the license 
on April 4, 2005. Endocyte is authorized to use byproduct 
material for the research and development of medical products. 
Endocyte identified three isotopes, which are listed in the 
license, with half-lives greater than 120 days (hydrogen-3, 
carbon-14, technetium-99), which had been used at the 1205 Kent 
Avenue facility. The licensee conducted surveys of the facility 
and provided information to the NRC to demonstrate that the 
radiological condition of the building is consistent with 
criteria specified in 10 CFR Part 20, Subpart E for unrestricted 
use. No radiological remediation activities are required to 
complete the proposed action.
 
Need for the Proposed Action The licensee is requesting this 
license amendment because it no longer plans to conduct 
NRC-licensed activities at the 1205 Kent Avenue location. The NRC 
is fulfilling its responsibilities under the Atomic Energy Act to 
make a decision on the proposed action for decommissioning that 
ensures that residual radioactivity is reduced to a level that is 
protective of the public health and safety and the environment.
 
Environmental Impacts of the Proposed Action The NRC staff 
reviewed the information provided and surveys performed by 
Endocyte to demonstrate that the release of the 1205 Kent Avenue, 
West Lafayette, Indiana facility complies with radiological 
criterial for unrestricted use in 10 CFR 20.1402. Alternatives to 
the Proposed Action The only alternative to the proposed action 
of releasing the facility for unrestricted use is to take no 
action. Under the no-action alternative, the 1205 Kent Avenue 
facility would remain under an NRC license and would not be 
released for unrestricted use. Denial of the license amendment 
request would result in no change to current conditions at the 
facility. The no-action alternative is not acceptable because it 
is inconsistent with the NRC's Timeliness Rule, 10 CFR 30.36 
``Expiration and Termination of Licenses and Decommissioning of 
Sites and Separate Buildings or Outdoor Areas,'' which requires 
licensees who have ceased licensed activities to request 
termination of their radioactive materials license. This 
alternative also would impose an unnecessary regulatory burden 
and limit potential benefits from future uses of the facility.
 
Conclusion The NRC staff concluded that the proposed action is 
consistent with the NRC's unrestricted release use specified in 
10 CFR Part 20, Subpart E. The staff found that the radiological 
environmental impacts from the proposed action are bounded by the 
``Generic Environmental Impact Statement in Support of Rulemaking 
on Radiological Criteria for License Termination of NRC-Licensed 
Nuclear Facilities'' (NUREG-1496). Additionally, no 
non-radiological or cumulative impacts were identified. 
Therefore, the NRC has determined that the proposed action will 
not have a significant effect on the quality of the human 
environment.
 
Agencies and Persons Consulted The NRC staff has determined that 
the proposed action will not affect listed species or critical 
habitats. Therefore, no further consultation is required under 
Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act. Likewise, the NRC has 
determined that the proposed action is not a type of activity 
that has potential to cause effect on historic properties. 
Therefore, consultation under Section 106 of the National 
Historic Preservation Act is not required.
 
The NRC consulted with the Indiana State Department of Health, 
Indoor and Radiologic Health Division. The Indiana State 
Department of Health was provided the draft EA for comment on 
August 1, 2005, and responded back on the same day. The State did 
not need any additional information, and agreed with the NRC's 
finding of No Significant Impact for the License/Facility.
 
II. Finding of No Significant Impact On the basis of the EA in 
support of the proposed license amendment to release the site for 
unrestricted use, the NRC has determined that the proposed action 
will not have a significant effect on the quality of the human 
environment. Thus, the NRC has determined not to prepare an 
environmental impact statement for the proposed action.
 
Further Information A copy of this document will be available 
electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document 
Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of 
the NRC's document system.
 
From this site, you can access the NRC's Agencywide Document 
Access and Management System (ADAMS), which provides text
 
[[Page 51098]] and image files of NRC's public documents. The 
following references are available for inspection at NRC's Public 
Electronic Reading Room at (the Public Electronic Reading Room). 
ADAMS accession numbers are located in parentheses following the 
reference.
 
1. Leamon, Christopher P., Ph.D., Radiation Safety Officer, 
Endocyte Incorporated, letter to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, May 26, 2005 (ML052340684).
 
2. Decommissioning Report (Final Status Survey Report), 1205 Kent 
Avenue, West Lafayette, Indiana, May 26, 2005 (ML052340684).
 
3. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ``Environmental Review 
Guidance for Licensing Actions Associated with NMSS Programs,'' 
NUREG-1748, August 2003.
 
4. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ``Generic Environmental 
Impact Statement in Support of Rulemaking on Radiological 
Criteria for License Termination of NRC-Licensed Nuclear 
Facilities,'' NUREG- 1496, August 1994.
 
5. NRC, NUREG-1757, ``Consolidated NMSS Decommissioning 
Guidance,'' Volumes 1-3, September 2003.
 
If you do not have access to ADAMS or if there are problems in 
accessing the documents located in ADAMS, contact the NRC Public 
Document Room (PDR) reference staff at (800) 397-4209, (301) 
415-4737 or by e-mail to . Documents may also be viewed 
electronically on the public computers located at the NRC's PDR, 
O 1 F21, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, 
MD 20852. The PDR reproduction contractor will copy documents for 
a fee.
 
Dated at Lisle, Illinois, this 22nd day of August, 2005.
 
James L. Cameron, Chief, Decommissioning Branch, Division of 
Nuclear Materials Safety, RIII.
 
[FR Doc. E5-4709 Filed 8-26-05; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590-01-P

 
*****************************************************************
 39 NRC: Notice of Opportunity To Comment on Model Safety Evaluation on 
 
                         FR Doc E5-4710 
[Federal Register: August 29, 2005 (Volume 70, Number 166)] 
[Notices] [Page 51098-51100] From the Federal Register Online via 
GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr29au05-88]                         
 
Elimination of Typical License Condition Requiring Reporting of 
Violations of Section 2.C of Operating License Using the 
Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process AGENCY: Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission.
 
ACTION: Request for comment.
 
SUMMARY: Notice is hereby given that the staff of the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) has prepared a model safety 
evaluation (SE) relating to the elimination of the license 
condition involving reporting of violations of other requirements 
(typically in License Condition 2.C) in the operating license of 
some commercial nuclear power plants. The NRC staff has also 
prepared a model no significant hazards consideration (NSHC) 
determination relating to this matter. The purpose of these 
models is to permit the NRC to efficiently process amendments 
that propose to delete the reporting requirement.
 
Licensees of nuclear power reactors to which the models apply 
could then request amendments, confirming the applicability of 
the SE and NSHC determination to its reactors. The NRC staff is 
requesting comment on the model SE and model NSHC determination 
prior to announcing their availability for referencing in license 
amendment applications.
 
 
DATES: The comment period expires 30 days from date of 
publication in the Federal Register. Comments received after this 
date will be considered if it is practical to do so, but the 
Commission is able to ensure consideration only for comments 
received on or before this date.
 
 
[[Page 51099]]
 
ADDRESSES: Comments may be submitted either electronically or via 
U.S. mail.
 
Submit written comments to: Chief, Rules and Directives Branch, 
Division of Administrative Services, Office of Administration, 
Mail Stop T-6-D59, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555- 0001.
 
Hand deliver comments to 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, 
Maryland, between 7:45 a.m. and 4:15 p.m. on Federal workdays. 
Copies of comments received may be examined at the NRC's Public 
Document Room, located at One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville 
Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland.
 
Comments may be submitted by electronic mail to .
 
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: William Reckley, Mail Stop: 
O-7D1, Division of Licensing Project Management, Office of 
Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555- 0001, telephone 301-415-1323.
 
 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Background Regulatory Issue Summary 
2000-06, ``Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process for 
Adopting Standard Technical Specification Changes for Power 
Reactors,'' was issued on March 20, 2000. The consolidated line 
item improvement process (CLIIP) is intended to improve the 
efficiency of NRC licensing processes. The CLIIP includes an 
opportunity for the public to comment on a proposed change to 
operating licenses, including the Technical Specifications, after 
a preliminary assessment by the NRC staff and a finding that the 
change will likely be offered for adoption by licensees. This 
notice solicits comment on a proposed change that deletes a 
requirement for licensees to report violations of other 
requirements (typically in License Condition 2.C) of its 
facility's operating license. The CLIIP directs the NRC staff to 
evaluate any comments received for a proposed change and to 
either reconsider the change or announce the availability of the 
change for adoption by licensees. Licensees opting to apply for 
this proposed license amendment change are responsible for 
reviewing the staff's evaluation, referencing the applicable 
technical justifications, and providing any necessary 
plant-specific information. Each amendment application made in 
response to the notice of availability will be processed and 
noticed in accordance with applicable rules and NRC procedures.
 
Applicability This proposal to eliminate the reporting of 
violations of specific requirements (typically in License 
Condition 2.C) of facility operating licenses is applicable to 
any licensee that has such a provision in its facility operating 
license. The NRC staff notes that many operating licenses do not 
contain the requirement because it was never added or was removed 
by a license amendment before issuance of this notice. The CLIIP 
also addresses similar requirements if they exist in the 
Administrative Section of Technical Specifications. The CLIIP 
does not address reporting requirements contained in operating 
licenses other than those specifically involving reports of 
violations of other requirements (typically in License Condition 
2.C) of the facility operating license or requirements that 
restate the need to submit reports in accordance with 10 CFR 
50.72, ``Immediate notification requirements for operating 
nuclear power reactors,'' and 10 CFR 50.73, ``Licensee event 
report system.'' Public Notices This notice requests comments 
from interested members of the public within 30 days of the date 
of publication in the Federal Register. After evaluating the 
comments received as a result of this notice, the NRC staff will 
either reconsider the proposed change or announce the 
availability of the change in a subsequent notice (perhaps with 
some changes to the safety evaluation or the proposed NSHC 
determination as a result of public comments). If the NRC staff 
announces the availability of the change, licensees wishing to 
adopt the change must submit an application in accordance with 
applicable rules and other regulatory requirements. For each 
application, the NRC staff will publish a notice of consideration 
of issuance of amendment to facility operating licenses, a 
proposed NSHC determination, and a notice of opportunity for a 
hearing. The NRC staff will also publish a notice of issuance of 
an amendment for each plant that receives the requested change.
 
Proposed Model Safety Evaluation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Consolidated 
Line Item Improvement, Elimination of License Condition Requiring 
Reports of Violations of License Condition [2.C] in Facility 
Operating License 1.0 Introduction By application dated [ ], 
[LICENSEE] (the licensee), requested an amendment to the Facility 
Operating License for [PLANT]. The proposed amendment would 
delete Section 2[X] of the Facility Operating License, which 
requires reporting of violations of the requirements in Section 
2[C] of the Facility Operating License.
 
2.0 Regulatory Evaluation A section or condition was included in 
the facility operating licenses issued to some nuclear power 
plants requiring the licensee to make reports to the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) regarding violations of other 
sections of the operating license (typically Section 2.C). A 
typical license condition reads as follows: Except as otherwise 
provided in this license and its appendices, the Licensee shall 
report any violations of the requirements contained in Section 
2.C of this license in the following manner: initial notification 
shall be made within 24 hours to the NRC Operations Center via 
the Emergency Notification System with written followup within 
thirty days in accordance with the procedures described in 10 CFR 
50.73 (Licensee event report system).
 
In addition to the information provided to support licensing 
decisions, the NRC obtains information about plant operation, 
licensee programs, and other matters using a combination of 
inspections and reporting requirements. Routine or scheduled 
reports that are required to be submitted to the NRC are defined 
in the related regulations, specific license condition, technical 
specification, or an NRC-approved program document. The reporting 
of emergencies, unplanned events or conditions, and other special 
cases may also be addressed within such documents by the 
inclusion of reporting thresholds and are also the focus of the 
reporting requirements in 10 CFR 50.72, ``Immediate notification 
requirements for operating nuclear power reactors,'' and 10 CFR 
50.73, ``Licensee event report system.'' Changes to the reporting 
regulations in 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73 became effective in January 
2001 (see Federal Register notice on October 25, 2000 (65 FR 
63769) and included
 
[[Page 51100]] extending the allowable reporting times for 
licensee event reports (LERs) from 30 days to 60 days.
 
[Optional: The Administrative Section of the Technical 
Specifications (TS) for [PLANT] also includes a reporting 
requirement that duplicates the requirements in 10 CFR 50.72 and 
10 CFR 50.73, but which does not reflect subsequent changes in 
those regulations such as requiring LERs within 60 days instead 
of 30 days.] 3.0 Technical Evaluation Section 2.[X] of the 
Facility Operating License requires the licensee to report any 
violations of the requirements of Section 2[C] of the Facility 
Operating License and defines the method and allowable time 
periods for such reports. The reporting threshold (i.e., a 
violation) for some of the conditions included in Section 2.[C] 
of the Facility Operating License duplicates those defined in 10 
CFR 50.72 and 10 CFR 50.73. However, the requirements in the 
Facility Operating License may have different deadlines than 
those defined in the regulations (following a rule change in 
2001). This difference in reporting requirements has led to 
variations in reporting since many facility operating licenses do 
not contain the subject condition. For those licensees with a 
30-day reporting requirement in the Facility Operating License, 
the condition has decreased the benefits of the rulemaking. For 
those cases where the current Facility Operating License 
requirement to report violations is also reportable in accordance 
with the regulations defined in 10 CFR 50.72 and 10 CFR 50.73, 
the NRC staff finds that the regulations adequately address this 
issue and the elimination of the duplicative requirement in the 
Facility Operating License is acceptable.
 
Some of the conditions addressed in Section 2.[C] of the Facility 
Operating License may address the maintenance of particular 
programs, administrative requirements, or other matters where a 
violation of the requirement would not result in a report to the 
NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 or 10 CFR 50.73. In most 
cases, there are requirements for reports to the NRC related to 
these conditions in other regulations, the specific license 
condition or technical specification, or an NRC- approved program 
document. In other cases, there are reports to other agencies or 
news releases that would prompt a report to the NRC (in 
accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi)). The NRC staff also 
assessed violations of administrative requirements that could be 
reportable under the current License Condition but that may not 
have a dupicative requirement in a regulation or other regulatory 
requirement. The NRC staff finds that the requirements to report 
such problems within 24 hours with written reports to follow 
using the LER process is not needed. The NRC staff is confident 
that the information related to such violations that is actually 
important to the NRC's regulatory functions would come to light 
in a time frame comparable to the 60-day LER requirements. The 
information would become available to the appropriate NRC staff 
through the inspection program, updates to program documents, 
resultant licensing actions, public announcements, or some other 
reliable mechanism.
 
The NRC staff finds that the elimination of Section 2.[X] of the 
Facility Operating License will not result in a loss of 
information to the NRC that would adversely affect either its 
goal to protect public health and safety or its ability to carry 
out its various other regulatory responsibilities.
 
[Optional: The reporting requirement defined in TS [5.x.x] for 
[PLANT] requires a report to the NRC when [REPORT REQUIREMENT].
 
This requirement duplicates the requirements in 10 CFR 50.72 and 
10 CFR 50.73, but does not reflect subsequent changes in those 
regulations such as requiring LERs within 60 days instead of 30 
days. The NRC staff finds the elimination of the TS requirement 
acceptable since the required reports are defined in an 
established NRC regulation that is also applicable to this 
licensee.] 4.0 State Consultation In accordance with the 
Commission's regulations, the [ ] State official was notified of 
the proposed issuance of the amendment.
 
The State official had no comments.
 
5.0 Environmental Consideration The amendment changes 
recordkeeping, reporting, or administrative procedures or 
requirements. Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility 
criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 
51.22(c)(10). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental 
impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in 
connection with the issuance of the amendment.
 
6.0 Conclusion The Commission has concluded, based on the 
considerations discussed above, that (1) there is reasonable 
assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be 
endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such 
activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's 
regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be 
inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and 
safety of the public.
 
Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination 
Description of Amendment Request: The proposed amendment would 
delete Section 2.[X] of the Facility Operating License, which 
requires reporting of violations of the requirements in Section 
2.[C] of the Facility Operating License. [The proposed amendment 
would also delete a reporting requirement in Technical 
Specifications that is duplicative of NRC regulations.] Basis for 
proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As 
required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), an analysis of the issue of no 
significant hazards consideration is presented below: 1. Does the 
change involve a significant increase in the probability or 
consequences of an accident previously evaluated? Response: No.
 
The proposed change involves the deletion of a reporting 
requirement. The change does not affect plant equipment or 
operating practices and therefore does not significantly increase 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously 
evaluated.
 
2. Does the change create the possibility of a new or different 
kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated? 
Response: No.
 
The proposed change is administrative in that it deletes a 
reporting requirement. The change does not add new plant 
equipment, change existing plant equipment, or affect the 
operating practices of the facility. Therefore, the change does 
not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident 
from any accident previously evaluated.
 
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety? Response: No.
 
The proposed change deletes a reporting requirement. The change 
does not affect plant equipment or operating practices and 
therefore does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of 
safety.
 
Based on the above, the NRC staff proposes that the change 
presents no significant hazards consideration under the standards 
set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c). Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 
22nd of August, 2005.
 
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
 
William D. Reckley, Senior Project Manager, Section 1, Project 
Directorate IV, Division of Licensing Project Management, Office 
of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
 
[FR Doc. E5-4710 Filed 8-26-05; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590-01-P

 
*****************************************************************
 40 [NukeNet] Japanese uranium contaminated soil
 
Date: Mon, 29 Aug 2005 15:06:00 -0700

 
	SP_HAM_SUPER,SUBJ_GROUP,WHITE_PHRASE autolearn=ham version=3.0.4
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<x-flowed>
NukeNet Anti-Nuclear Network (nukenet@energyjustice.net)

We have sent a couple of messages previously about the plan of Japan
Nuclear Cycle Development Institute (JNC) to send uranium contaminated
soil to the US for refining. See the articles at the following links:

http://cnic.jp/english/news/newsflash/uransoil15Aug05.html

http://cnic.jp/english/newsletter/nit107/nit107articles/ nit107uraniumsoil.html

JNC continues to refuse to disclose the name of the US company to which
they intend to send the soil, but they plan to begin transporting the
soil today (August 29th) from where it has been left in Tottori
Prefecture. We assume it is being sent to a port (possibly Kobe) and it
seems that shipment to the US is imminent.

CNIC opposes the transport of radioactive waste overseas. The fact that
in this case the level of radioactivity is not high does not alter that
fundamental principle. JNC has changed its label for the soil from
'suteishi', which literally means 'thrown away waste rock', to 'uran
kouseki', which means 'uranium ore', but simply changing the label
doesn't change the fact that it is radioactive waste.

We recognize that it is up to organizations in the US to decide whether
they will take action. We are simply providing information to enable
them to mobilize if they think it is worth their effort.

Philip White

Citizens' Nuclear Information Center
3F Kotobuki Bdg, 1-58-15, Higashi-Nakano, Nakano-ku, Tokyo 164-0003
Phone: 81-3-5330-9520
Fax: 81-3-5330-9530
http://cnic.jp/english/
cnic@nifty.com


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*****************************************************************
 41 [NukeNet] More on Japanese uranium contaminated soil
 
Date: Mon, 29 Aug 2005 15:06:01 -0700

 
	SP_HAM_SUPER,SUBJ_GROUP,WHITE_PHRASE autolearn=ham version=3.0.4
X-Spam-filter-host: darwin.ctyme.com - http://www.junkemailfilter.com

<x-flowed>
NukeNet Anti-Nuclear Network (nukenet@energyjustice.net)

Immediately after sending the last mail, more news came in.

JNC indeed began transporting the uranium contaminated soil today, but 
almost immediately one of the bags containing the soil rolled off the back 
of the truck and rolled about 30 meters down the hill. As a consequence 
they had to stop further transports for the day. It was just the eighth of 
33 bags scheduled to be transported today. They say the bag did not break 
and no soil was spilled.

Each bag contains around 700 kilograms and 552 will be transported in all.

Apparently the plan is to send the uranium contaminated soil from Kobe Port 
to the US at the beginning of October.

Philip White

Citizens' Nuclear Information Center
3F Kotobuki Bdg, 1-58-15, Higashi-Nakano, Nakano-ku, Tokyo 164-0003
Phone: 81-3-5330-9520
Fax: 81-3-5330-9530
http://cnic.jp/english/
cnic@nifty.com


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 42 Bradenton Herald: Tests: Vapor levels too low

| 08/29/2005 | 

Skeptics question the methodology used in the study

 DONNA WRIGHT

 Herald Staff Writer

TALLEVAST - Contradicting residents' fears that their health is
endangered from a 131-acre plume of toxic pollution under their
community, state and local health experts report no evidence of
poisonous indoor vapors in Tallevast. 

The health experts' report states that the levels of
contaminants picked up in the indoor air tests, performed more
than a year ago, are too low to be the likely cause of illness. 

But some environmental experts question whether investigators
did enough tests under the right conditions to reach that
conclusion. 

Preliminary results of the Indoor Air Testing Exposure Report
have been discussed for several months, but the final document
was only recently approved by the Agency for Toxic Substances
and Disease Registry, a division of the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, which oversaw the study. 

Dr. Timothy Varney, Tallevast residents' independent technical
consultant, has repeatedly questioned the methodology used in
the vapor intrusion. 

His skepticism is echoed by Lenny Siegel, director of the Center
For Public Environmental Oversight, a nonprofit watchdog group
based in Mountain View, Calif. Siegel questions the timing and
numbers of air samples taken. He recently visited Tallevast to
discuss TCE exposure with leaders of FOCUS - Family Oriented
Community United Strong, the advocacy group representing
residents. 

When the test was conducted a year ago, the investigating team
from the Florida Department of Health sampled the air in three
homes and a community center. 

None of the residents who participated were asked to close their
homes up for a 24-hour period prior to the test - a precaution
Siegel said is necessary to gather accurate samples. 

Residents also should have been instructed to keep their windows
shut and their air-conditioning or heating systems turned on,
Siegel said. 

Those conditions, said Siegel, are critical to good sampling
because heating and cooling systems pull vapors from the ground
into homes. Open windows can allow air currents to dilute
samples. 

One of the houses tested had so many cracks and openings,
closing the doors and windows would have made no difference in
the results, said Charles Henry, environmental supervisor for
the Manatee County Department of Health who assisted in
gathering the air samples. 

Under those conditions, any sampling is meaningless, Siegel
said. And because TCE levels can rise and fall with drought and
rainy weather, as well as seasonal changes, at least two testing
periods over a 12-month period are necessary to reach any
conclusion on vapor intrusion. 

Water table levels can affect vapor studies, agreed Robert P.
DeMott, a Tampa toxicologist conducting a health risk study in
Tallevast for Lockheed Martin. High water tables prevent the
rise of vapors, while low water tables allow vapors to escape,
so the timing of the studies and soil conditions are important
factors in getting reliable results, DeMott said. He has not yet
reviewed the Tallevast vapor intrusion report. 

Randy Merchant, leader of the the state's public health
assessment in Tallevast, said the vapor study was designed as a
screening to determine if more extensive air testing was
necessary. 

The team wanted to determine what vapors on a typical day were
in homes over the highest-known concentrations of TCE, or
trichloroethylene, in the groundwater contamination. 

TCE is an industrial a solvent that has been linked to liver,
kidney and heart disease, impaired immune system function and
birth defects. 

One of the sites tested was outside of the known groundwater
contamination area for comparison. 

Any special requirements such as closing up the homes for a
24-hour period would have set up atypical conditions, Merchant
said. 

On Aug. 18 and 19, 2004, team leader Susan Bland and Henry
collected 16 air samples from the four sites. The samples were
collected in Summa canisters, a testing device resembling a
bowling ball that trapped air samples during an 8-hour cycle.
Three canisters were used at each site to provide air samples
over a continuous 24-hour period. Bland's team also collected
one grab sample in the late afternoon at each of the four
locations. 

The canisters were set to test for 61 volatile organic
compounds, including TCE. 

No levels of TCE were detected, the report states. None of the
levels of other contaminants found were significant enough to
cause illness, Merchant said. 

Given the lack of significant results, the team recommends no
future action, the report states. 

Varney and Tallevast residents have demanded more vapor tests be
done under more stringent conditions. 

Lockheed Martin, the former owner of the beryllium plant and
responsible party for cleaning up the contamination, has
verbally agreed to to consider paying for that testing. Lockheed
has asked FOCUS for a proposal listing the sites to be tested
and their preferred consultant to do the testing. 

FOCUS is still working on that proposal, said Wanda Washington,
vice president. 

Lockheed's latest report to the Florida Department of
Environmental Protection concludes that vapor intrusion is not
an issue in Tallevast, based upon the state's report. 

That conclusion is premature, Washington said, and ignores the
fact that too many Tallevast residents have been sick for too
long. 

Health experts agree TCE is dangerous. Breathing small amount of
TCE may cause headaches, lung irritation, dizziness, poor
coordination and difficulty concentration. Breathing large
amount of TCE may cause impaired heart function, unconsciousness
and death. Drinking large amounts of TCE can cause nausea and
liver damage. Even drinking small amounts can, over time, lead
to kidney and liver damage. 

No one knows how long the plume of contamination has been
migrating off-site from the old beryllium plant, but tests
conducted over the past year found concentrations of TCE in
drinking water wells and irrigation wells used by Tallevast
residents living near the facility. 

One of the most dangerous routes of exposure is taking showers
with TCE-laden water, because of the vapors contained in the
mist from hot water, according to Varney. 

Neither the state's study nor Lockheed's latest assessment of
the Tallevast contamination takes into consideration the
historical exposure residents may have incurred over the decades
the beryllium plant was in operation. 

Until historical exposure is addressed, Washington warned, the
real health risks facing Tallevast residents will continue to be
ignored. 

Donna Wright, health and social services reporter, can be
reached at 745-7049 or at .   

*****************************************************************
 43 SignOnSanDiego.com: DOE takes step in plan to ship nuclear waste 
in Nevada by train
 
By Ken Ritter ASSOCIATED PRESS

 2:10 p.m. August 29, 2005

 LAS VEGAS  The Energy Department took another step Monday
toward building a rail line across Nevada to ship nuclear waste
to a national repository at Yucca Mountain. 

The department announced it wants to remove a mile-wide,
319-mile long right of way from public use for 10 years and
asked for public comment on the plan. Previously DOE had planned
to exclude the mostly federal Bureau of Land Management swath
known as the Caliente Corridor for 20 years. 

The Energy Department announced last month that it intends to
use trains for some 3,500 shipments of the nation's most
radioactive waste from around the nation to the planned
repository 90 miles northwest of Las Vegas. 

Officials with the federal agency and the state's Nuclear
Projects Office characterized the release of the project's draft
environmental assessment as routine, but state officials called
the rail proposal dangerously flawed. 

"We think the selection was illegal and violated a number of
federal statutes," said Bob Loux, chief of the state Nuclear
Projects Office and Gov. Kenny Guinn's top anti-dump
administrator. 

Energy Department spokesman Allen Benson said notice published
Monday in the Federal Register is a step toward protecting
308,600 acres in the corridor from encroachment and surface
mining claims. The register notice referred to precluding new
mining claims for 20 years on five rail alternatives, but the
more detailed environmental document cut that to 10 years. 

"We're not sure we need the full 20 years," Benson said of the
Caliente route  the only one under study. "All we're getting
out of it is the right of way to be able to build the rail
line." 

The document, part of an application to the BLM and federal
Interior Department, refers to 915 existing mining claims and
leases along the route, and four natural gas leases nearby. 

It also cites the proximity of habitat for the threatened Mojave
Desert tortoise and the endangered Southwestern willow
flycatcher, and notes that a pair of yellow-billed cuckoos has
been seen nesting near the route. The bird is a candidate for a
federal endangered species designation. 

The department said grazing, public access and other current
uses of the land would not be affected. 

The Energy Department plans to take public comments through
Sept. 27, including at meetings Sept. 12 in Amargosa Valley,
Sept. 13 in Goldfield and Sept. 15 in Caliente. 

The Energy Department also said it was preparing an
environmental study about the possible effects of construction,
operation and maintenance of alternate rail alignments. 
In addition to the train shipments, the Energy Department plans
about 1,100 truck shipments to the repository. 

The agency estimates it will cost $880 million to establish a
rail head on the Union Pacific line at Caliente, a small town
150 miles northeast of Las Vegas, and build the rail line to the
Yucca Mountain site. 

Arguments are scheduled Oct. 18 in the U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia on a state request to halt
planning for the rail line until more studies are done. 

Yucca Mountain is planned as a national repository for 77,000
tons of nuclear waste from sites in 39 states. Funding shortages
and other problems  including a controversy over possible
paperwork fraud on the project  have delayed the opening date,
now estimated for 2012 or later. 

 On the Net: 
Yucca Mountain project: <b>www.ymp.gov</b>
Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management:
<b>www.ocrwm.doe.gov</b>
 		
Contact the Union-Tribune| About the Union-Tribune| Frequently
Asked Questions| UTads.com� Copyright 2005 Union-Tribune
Publishing Co.   
*****************************************************************
 44 www.mineweb.net: Navajo Nation seeks to block uranium development

sustainable mining 
 
 By: Dorothy Kosich

 Posted: '29-AUG-05 04:00' GMT � Mineweb 1997-2004

RENO--(Mineweb.com)The effort of the new national U.S. energy
bill to revive the nuclear industry has not generated much
enthusiasm among members of the Navajo Nation--which although it
stands to benefit from grants and subsidies for power
generation--banned uranium mining and processing last April.
 
Canadian junior uranium explorationist Strathmore Minerals (STM:
TSX-V) and Navajo Nation officials are currently lobbying New
Mexico state officials regarding Strathmore's effort to develop
its Church Rock and Roco Honda uranium mines. 

Kelwona, British Columbia-based Strathmore has opened a uranium
development office in Santa Fe, New Mexico, and is now pursuing
feasibility studies and permitting for its Church Rock and Roco
Honda properties. Updated resource calculations are being
reviewed for both New Mexico properties, which are Strathmore's
first two projects to be considered for production. The
properties are located within the Grant Uranium Belt, which has
historically produced more than 340 million pounds of uranium.
Currently, one-fifth of U.S. energy comes from nuclear power,
according to President George W. Bush. 

Strathmore officials announced this month that they had met with
state officials, including the governor's office, prompting
Navajo Nation President Joe Shirley, Jr., to meet with New
Mexico Governor Bill Richardson. Shirley, who had campaigned in
opposition to uranium mining on Indian lands, asked Richardson
to help the Navajo Nation uphold its ban. "The Navajo Nation as
a government and a people has said we're not going to have
uranium mining on Navajo land or in Navajo County. We'd like to
see that law stick, " Shirley told the governor. The Church Rock
project is located near Navajo lands. 

"Because of exposure to uranium, many of my medicine people have
died, many of my elderly have died. I would sure hate to go back
there. Too many of my people have died," Shirley declared in a
news release. "We have been through too much. We just do not
want it." 

Shirley has also sought the support of the United Nations
Educational, Scientific &Cultural Organization (UNESCO) to help
uphold the Dine Natural Resources Protection Act of 2005, which
enacted the uranium ban. 

Meanwhile, Strathmore had planned to meet with the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) this month to discuss its projects.
The company has retained subcontractors to prepare documentation
for environmental, social and socioeconomic studies, which will
accompany permit applications. Feasibility studies and core hold
design work have commenced on the Church Rock property, which
was previously studied by Kerr McGee Nuclear and Rio Algom. 

Kerr McGee drilled Roco Honda from 1966 to 1977. Rio Algom then
updated the results in 1995. Strathmore acquired Church Rock and
Roco Honda in 2004. Historic estimates include 5.5 million
pounds of contained U3O8 demonstrated resource for Church Rock
and 11.3 million pounds of demonstrated resource for Roco Honda. 

The new federal energy program provides billions in tax
incentives in industries, including several billion dollars in
incentives for nuclear power. President Bush said the program
would lead to the construction of new power plants before the
end of the decade. Uranium demand is expected to increase
between 1% to 2% by 2010 as 30 reactors are being built
internationally while another 34 are being planned. The first
new nuclear U.S. power plant is scheduled to be built in the
Athabascan community of Galena, Alaska, where 65% of the 700
residents are native American. The project was approved by the
community as a source of electricity and is being constructed by
Toshiba. 

In situ leaching (ISL), also known as solution mining, is
essentially a water-pumping activity, which leaves the ore in
the ground, using liquids which are pumped through it to recover
the minerals out of the ore by leaching. In-situ uranium plants
are operating in Nebraska, Texas and Wyoming, the number one
U.S. uranium producer. About a dozen small projects operate in
the U.S. today. The production life of an individual ISL well is
typically one to three years. Most of the uranium is recovered
during the first 6 months of the operation. The most successful
operations have achieved a total overall 80% recovery. ISL
production is estimated at 16% of global production, according
to an October 2004 paper published by analyst Jim Mustard of
Haywood Securities. 

Proponents assert it is environmentally benign because there is
little surface disturbance and no tailings or waste rock
generated. Nonetheless, the ore body needs to be permeable to
the liquids used, and located so that they do not contaminate
ground water away from the ore body. However, opponents of the
system argue it can cause groundwater contamination, and
contaminate formerly productive agricultural land. 

The Navajo Nation is also opposed to a proposed in-situ uranium
mining and milling project in Church Rock and Crownpoint, New
Mexico to be operated by Albuquerque-based Hydro Resources
(HRI). Attempts to develop Crownpoint began in 1998. Along the
way environmental groups have filed legal challenges to the 1999
NRC license granted to Hydro Resources Inc. for the project. The
opponents have raised various waste disposal issues concerning
the proposal. However, the NRC ruled that a number of the
environmental concerns stemming from conventional uranium mining
will not apply to in-situ leach mining. The Interveners also
raised concerns regarding HRI's ability to provide adequate
financial assurance for the operation. 

The battle between Hydro Resources and Mitchell and Rita
Capitan, a Navajo couple who have opposed the project, has even
been made into a film, "Homeland: Four Portraits of Native
Action." 

Nevertheless, the Navajo may find themselves facing an
increasingly uphill battle. Three nations--Australia,
Kazakhstan, and Canada--account for more than half of the
world's ore reserves, according to Haywood's Mustard. Australia
and Canada produce more than 50% of the world's uranium. 

Mustard estimated that there are more than 100 junior companies
looking for uranium. More than 15,000 new claims alone filed in
the U.S. last year on properties with uranium prospects.

However, the number of working uranium mines internationally
remains about the same as existed prior to the current interest
in nuclear power. Meanwhile, the World Nuclear Association
states that demand from the world's 435 nuclear power plants is
almost double the market supply. The price of uranium is trading
around $30 per pound. 

The Southwest Research and Information Center, which is based in
New Mexico, has urged the thousands of abandoned uranium mines
should be cleaned-up prior to developing new mines. 

  � Mineweb, a division of Moneyweb Holdings Limited, 1997-2004.
Redistribution or reproduction of this content, whether by
e-mail; newsletter; capture into databases; intranets; extranets
or Web sites; is permissible only with the written permission of
the publisher. Please respect our property. By using Mineweb you
agree to its terms of use.  

*****************************************************************
 45 Las Vegas SUN: Public land sought for nuke rail study 
 
Today: August 29, 2005 at 11:19:7 PDT 

By Suzanne Struglinski <suzanne@lasvegassun.com>
 SUN WASHINGTON BUREAU
 
The Energy Department's Draft Environmental Assessment on the
rail corridor land can be found at www.ocrwm.doe.gov. Copies are
also available at the Las Vegas Yucca Mountain Information
Center, 4101-B Meadows Lane in Las Vegas. Public Hearing
Schedule:
 
+ Monday, Sept. 12, 4 to 8 p.m., Longstreet Inn &Casino, Highway
373, Amargosa Valley
 
+ Tuesday, Sept. 13, 4 to 8 p.m., Goldfield School Gymnasium,
233 Ra Ave ., Goldfield
 
+ Thursday, Sept. 15, 4 to 8 p.m., Caliente Youth Center, .S.
Highway 93, Caliente   


WASHINGTON -- The Energy Department wants to lock up more than
300,000 acres of public land from mining or drilling for 10
years, as part of its plan for a new rail line to move nuclear
waste to Yucca Mountain.

 No major environmental or economic impacts would result from
the land withdrawal, according to a draft environmental
assessment published today in the Federal Register.

 Grazing permits, public access and other current uses of the
land would not be affected, according to the department. The
proposed withdrawal affects land in Esmeralda, Lincoln and Nye
counties.

 In December 2003, the department asked the Bureau of Land
Management to withdraw 308,600 acres of public land from new
surface entries and new mining claims for 20 years so it could
study the land for the construction and maintenance of a rail
line to the proposed nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain,
90 miles northwest of Las Vegas.

 The withdrawal has temporarily been in place since then,
allowing the department to study the land.

 The rail line would not take up all the land but run somewhere
through it. The withdrawal encompasses a milewide corridor
running along the possible route.

 According to today's assessment, the department said a 10-year
withdrawal would allow enough time to conduct "all the necessary
activities."

 Yucca Mountain Project spokesman Allen Benson said the
assessment is a step toward getting a right-of-way from the BLM
to build the rail line.

 The department expects to release a separate draft
environmental impact statement for building the rail line to
Yucca next year that will contain the exact location within the
308,600 acres the new railroad tracks would go.

 The draft environmental impact statement would go through a
public comment period. The department will evaluate the comments
and make any changes as needed. Once the final statement is
complete, the department will move to begin construction. Benson
said most of the land would be relinquished once the final route
was selected, although he did not give a specific timeline.

 The department wants to open Yucca by 2012.

 The department considered shorter time frames, but said "any
amount of time under 10 years may not provide the Department
adequate time to conduct activities, given the various
uncertainties the program currently faces."

 The department will take public comments on the assessment
through Sept. 27.

 Benson said a public comment period is not required for this
type of withdrawal. The department would only need to notify the
governor but instead went "way beyond" what is required to allow
the public to be involved.
 
         All contents copyright 2005 Las Vegas SUN, Inc.
*****************************************************************
 46 Chemical & Engineering News: Shipping Waste
 
August 29, 2005

+ Volume 83, Number 35 + p. 10 

GOVERNMENT & POLICY 

Nevada senators challenge DOE plan for nuclear waste train service 

Glenn Hess
 			
  [RAIL DISPUTE The government plans to transport 70,000 tons of
nuclear waste to Yucca Mountain using the nation's rail system.]

 DOE PHOTO                              
  
RAIL DISPUTE The government plans to transport 70,000 tons of
nuclear waste to Yucca Mountain using the nation's rail system.
 			 
Nevada's senators are objecting to a Department of Energyplan to
use dedicated train service to transport spent nuclear fuel and
high-level radioactive waste to the proposed Yucca Mountain
repository.
 
In an Aug. 17 letter to Energy Secretary Samuel W. Bodman, Sens.
Harry M. Reid (D-Nev.) and John Ensign (R-Nev.) charge that the
plan "is riddled with gaps and inconsistencies and provides no
sound justification or support for its conclusions."
 
Last month, DOE said trains hauling nuclear fuel from commercial
reactors and radioactive waste from government sites to Yucca
Mountain, 100 miles northwest of Las Vegas, would carry no other
freight. Previously, the department had envisioned using general
freight service for rail shipments.
 
"While we don't believe the proposed Yucca Mountainrepository
will ever open, we're also not going to let DOE get away with
misleading the public into thinking there is any way to safely
transport 70,000 tons of nuclear waste over thousands of miles
and through hundreds of communities," Reid and Ensign write.
 
The senators asked DOE to explain how it plans to ship waste by
train when one-third of the 72 reactor sites around the country
where spent fuel is stored have no rail access. Consequently,
trucks and barges might have to be used. "Will dedicated train
service be used at these 24 sites? If so, please provide DOE's
plans and timeline for providing the necessary infrastructure."
 
A DOE spokesman says the department is reviewing the letter. "We
remain committed to opening Yucca Mountain using the best
science and technology available to ensure the safety and health
of all citizens," the official says. The repository is being
developed for the permanent disposal of radioactive waste
generated by nuclear power plants and defense-related activities.

 Chemical & Engineering News 
+ ISSN 0009-2347 
+ Copyright � 2005 
+ August 29, 2005 
+ Vol. 83, Iss. 35 
+ View Current Issue 

Copyright &#169; 2005 American Chemical Society[ border=] 
*****************************************************************
 47 ICT: United Nations calls for U.S. accountability

[2005/08/29]  

  Posted: August 29, 2005   								 								 	 									
									 										 										 											
  by: Brenda Norrell / Indian Country Today   												
									 								 								 								 								 								 								
GENEVA - A United Nations committee on racial discrimination has 
asked the United States to respond to the Western Shoshone appeal 
for urgent intervention, regarding the attack on their spiritual 
and cultural areas by the United States and mining corporations.

	Mario Yutzis, chairman of the U.N. Committee for the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination, issued a formal letter to
the United States and questioned why Western Shoshone sacred
land and treaty rights are not being honored.

	The committee pressed the United States for an explanation of
expanded mining and nuclear waste storage on Western Shoshone
ancestral land, and for ''placing their land up for auction for
privatization.''

	Further, the committee questioned whether the Treaty of Ruby
Valley of 1863 has been abrogated and the imposition of grazing
fees, trespass and collection notices, horse and livestock
impoundments and restrictions on hunting and fishing.

	Western Shoshone said their lands cover approximately 60
million acres stretching across what is now referred to as the
states of Nevada, Idaho, Utah and California. The United States
claims about 90 percent of the land base is ''public'' or
federally controlled lands.

	Western Shoshone challenge the United States' assertion of
ownership, stating that there has never been a legally valid
transfer, sale or cession of land by the Western Shoshone.

	The United States was asked to report to the U.N. committee on
the arrests of Western Shoshone while using lands claimed as
their ancestral lands. Further, the United States was asked how
it deals with sacred lands and whether it ensures effective
participation by indigenous communities in decisions affecting
them.

	The United States was asked to provide an explanation of the
approval of expanded mining activities in the Mt. Tenabo area in
Crescent Valley and the approval to store nuclear waste at Yucca
Mountain.

	''Both areas are of spiritual and cultural importance to the
Western Shoshone and are sites where local creation stories
originate,'' a Western Shoshone delegation, in Geneva Aug. 8 -
20, said in a statement.

	Western Shoshone said the appeal for urgent intervention was
taken to prevent further escalation of federal assaults on
Western Shoshone people and their ancestral lands. The
delegation was and presented the requests.

	Chief Raymond Yowell of the Western Shoshone National Council
was encouraged by the U.N. response.

	''We are pleased that the United Nations committee is willing
to look into this. We encourage the U.S. to respond in an
honorable manner and to begin to work toward a solution on this
long standing matter - for the benefit of all concerned.''

	In the August letter, the U.N. committee noted with concern the
allegation that Western Shoshone are being denied their
traditional rights to land. Further, the committee questioned
whether the subsequent use and occupation of these lands by
others would cumulatively lead to irreparable harm:

	''The committee, in particular, has received information
concerning reinvigorated federal efforts to open a nationwide
nuclear waste repository on Western Shoshone land; passage of
controversial legislation allowing for distribution of
compensation for the alleged extinguishment of Western Shoshone
title over land; alleged legislative efforts to privatize
Western Shoshone lands for transfer to multinational extractive
industries and energy developers; and alleged seizures of
Western Shoshone livestock and imposition of heavy trespass
fines against Western Shoshone people.''

	Further, the committee questioned the United States' assertion
that the Western Shoshone people lost their rights to their
ancestral lands, as identified in the 1863 treaty, as a result
of ''gradual encroachment'' by non-American Indians.

	The committee asked whether this violated the right of
everyone, without discrimination, to own property alone as well
as in association with others.

	Another issue raised was whether Western Shoshone were involved
and informed of the U.S. Indian Claim Commission decision
regarding their ancestral lands.

	The United States was asked for its response to Western
Shoshone protests over compensation in the 2004 Western Shoshone
Claims Distribution Act and whether the act was fair and
adequate.

	Another question raised concerned Western Shoshone's access to
the judicial process to assert title to their land. 

	The committee's letter was issued on the final day of its 67th
session, Aug. 19, after a private meeting with representatives
from the United States. The United States was informed that the
questions presented were based on the request from the Western
Shoshone National Council, and by the Western people of the
Timbisha Shoshone Tribe, Winnemucca Indian Colony and Yomba
Shoshone Tribe.

	In the letter, Yutzis said the committee appreciates the frank
and open preliminary discussion, which took place Aug. 8 between
representatives of the United States and the committee's Working
Group on Early Warning and Urgent Action Procedure.

	According to Yutzis, the United States assured the committee
that reports on Western Shoshone issues, now far behind schedule
(they were due in November 2003), are currently being prepared.
However, the committee said it regrets that the United States
has not agreed to submit the reports by a specific date.

	The committee asked for a response to the questions by Dec. 31
for further examination at its next session, beginning Feb. 20,
2006 in Geneva. 									   													 								 		 								
						 	 		 						 
� 1998 - 2005 Indian Country Today. All Rights Reserved�
*****************************************************************
 48 NRC: RIN 3150-AH70
 
                        FR Doc 05-17058 
[Federal Register: August 29, 2005 (Volume 70, Number 166)] 
[Rules and Regulations] [Page 50957-50958] From the Federal 
Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] 
[DOCID:fr29au05-3]                         
 

 
List of Approved Spent Fuel Storage Casks: VSC-24 Revision, 
Confirmation of Effective Date AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission.
 
ACTION: Direct final rule: confirmation of effective date.
 
SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is confirming 
the effective date of September 13, 2005, for the direct final 
rule that was published in the Federal Register on June 30, 2005 
(70 FR 37647). This direct final rule amended the NRC's 
regulations to revise the VSC- 24 cask system listing to include 
Amendment No. 5 to Certificate of Compliance (CoC) No. 1007. 
EFFECTIVE DATE: The effective date of September 13, 2005, is 
confirmed for this direct final rule.
 
 
ADDRESSES: Documents related to this rulemaking, including 
comments received, may be examined at the NRC Public Document 
Room, located at One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, 
Rockville, MD 20852. These same documents may also be viewed and 
downloaded electronically via the rulemaking Web site 
(http://ruleforum.llnl.gov). For information about the 
interactive rulemaking Web site, contact Ms. Carol Gallagher 
(301) 415-5905; e-mail CAG@nrc.gov. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION 
CONTACT: Jayne M. McCausland, Office of Nuclear Material Safety 
and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, 
DC 20555, telephone (301) 415-6219, e-mail jmm2@nrc.gov.
 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On June 30, 2005 (70 FR 37647), the 
NRC published a direct final rule amending its regulations in 10 
CFR Part 72 to
 
[[Page 50958]] revise the VSC-24 cask system listing within the 
``List of Approved Spent Fuel Storage Casks'' to include 
Amendment No. 5 to CoC No. 1007. This amendment changes the 
certificate holder's name from Pacific Sierra Nuclear Associates 
to BNG Fuel Solutions Corporation. In the direct final rule, NRC 
stated that if no significant adverse comments were received, the 
direct final rule would become final on September 13, 2005. The 
NRC did not receive any comments that warranted withdrawal of the 
direct final rule. Therefore, this rule will become effective as 
scheduled.
 
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 23rd day of August, 2005.
 
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
 
Michael T. Lesar, Chief, Rules and Directives Branch, Division of 
Administrative Services, Office of Administration.
 
[FR Doc. 05-17058 Filed 8-26-05; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590-01-P

 
*****************************************************************
 49 KESQ: DOE takes step in plan to ship nuclear waste in Nevada by train

NewsChannel 3 Palm Springs, CA: 

August 29, 2005   

LAS VEGAS The Energy Department is taking another step toward
building a rail line across Nevada to ship nuclear waste to
Yucca Mountain.

The department says today it wants to remove a one-mile wide, 
319-mile long right of way from public use for TEN years.

It also said it'll take public comment on the plan until 
September 27th.Previously, the D-O-E planned to exclude the swath 
known as the Caliente Corridor from public use for 20 years.

The D-O-E announced last month that it intends to use trains to 
move the nation's most radioactive waste from around the nation 
to the planned Yucca repository 90 miles northwest of Las 
Vegas.The draft study refers to 915 existing mining claims and 
leases along the route, and four natural gas leases nearby.

It also cites the proximity of habitat for the threatened Mojave 
Desert tortoise and the endangered Southwestern willow 
flycatcher.                                                     

Copyright 2005 Associated Press. All rights

Copyright 2002 - 2005 WorldNow and KESQ. All Rights Reserved.
*****************************************************************
 50 DOE: Environmental Management Site-Specific Advisory Board, Paducah
 
                        FR Doc 05-17107 
[Federal Register: August 29, 2005 (Volume 70, Number 166)] 
[Notices] [Page 51029-51030] From the Federal Register Online via 
GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr29au05-41]                         
 
AGENCY: Department of Energy (DOE).
 
ACTION: Notice of open meeting.
 
SUMMARY: This notice announces a meeting of the Environmental 
Management Site-Specific Advisory Board (EMSSAB), Paducah. The 
Federal Advisory Committee Act (Pub. L. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770) 
requires that public notice of this meeting be announced in the 
Federal Register.
 
 
DATES: Thursday, September 15, 2005 5:30 p.m.-9 p.m.
 
ADDRESSES: 111 Memorial Drive, Barkley Centre, Paducah, Kentucky 
42001.
 
 
[[Page 51030]] FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: William E. 
Murphie, Deputy Designated Federal Officer, Department of Energy 
Portsmouth/Paducah Project Office, 1017 Majestic Drive, Suite 
200, Lexington, Kentucky 40513, (859) 219-4001.
 
 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Purpose of the Board: The purpose of 
the Board is to make recommendations to DOE in the areas of 
environmental restoration, waste management and related 
activities.
 
Tentative Agenda 5:30 p.m. Informal Discussion 6 p.m. Call to 
Order Introductions Review of Agenda Approval of August Minutes 
Election of Chair-Elect 6:15 p.m. Deputy Designated Federal 
Officer's Comments 6:35 p.m. Federal Coordinator's Comments 6:40 
p.m. Ex-officios' Comments 6:50 p.m. Public Comments and 
Questions 7 p.m. Task Forces/Presentations Waste Disposition Task 
Force Water Quality Task Force Long Range Strategy/Stewardship 
Task Force Community Outreach Task Force 8 p.m. Public Comments 
and Questions 8:10 p.m. Break 8:20 p.m. Administrative Issues 
Budget Review Review of Workplan Review of Next Agenda 8:30 p.m. 
Review of Action Items 8:35 p.m. Subcommittee Reports Executive 
Committee--Chairs Meeting Templates 8:50 p.m. Final Comments 9 
p.m. Adjourn Public Participation: The meeting is open to the 
public.
 
Written statements may be filed with the Board either before or 
after the meeting. Individuals who wish to make oral statements 
pertaining to agenda items should contact David Dollins at the 
address listed below or by telephone at (270) 441-6819. Requests 
must be received five days prior to the meeting and reasonable 
provision will be made to include the presentation in the agenda. 
The Deputy Designated Federal Officer is empowered to conduct the 
meeting in a fashion that will facilitate the orderly conduct of 
business. Individuals wishing to make public comment will be 
provided a maximum of five minutes to present their comments.
 
Minutes: The minutes of this meeting will be available for public 
review and copying at the U.S. Department of Energy's Freedom of 
Information Public Reading Room, 1E-190, Forrestal Building, 1000 
Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20585 between 9 a.m. and 
4 p.m., Monday-Friday, except Federal holidays. Minutes will also 
be available at the Department of Energy's Environmental 
Information Center and Reading Room at 115 Memorial Drive, 
Barkley Centre, Paducah, Kentucky between 8 a.m. and 5 p.m., on 
Monday thru Friday or by writing to David Dollins, Department of 
Energy, Paducah Site Office, Post Office Box 1410, MS-103, 
Paducah, Kentucky 42001 or by calling him at (270) 441-6819.
 
Issued at Washington, DC on August 24, 2005.
 
Rachel M. Samuel, Deputy Advisory Committee Management Officer.
 
[FR Doc. 05-17107 Filed 8-26-05; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 6450-01-P

 
*****************************************************************
 51 DOE: Environmental Management Site-Specific Advisory Board, Idaho 
 
                        FR Doc 05-17108 
[Federal Register: August 29, 2005 (Volume 70, Number 166)] 
[Notices] [Page 51030-51031] From the Federal Register Online via 
GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr29au05-42]                         
 
National Laboratory AGENCY: Department of Energy.
 
ACTION: Notice of open meeting.
 
SUMMARY: This notice announces a meeting of the Environmental 
Management Site-Specific Advisory Board (EMSSAB), Idaho National 
Laboratory. The Federal Advisory Committee Act (Pub. L. 92-463, 
86 Stat. 770) requires that public notice of this meeting be 
announced in the Federal Register.
 
 
DATES: Monday, September 19, 2005, 8 a.m.-6 p.m., Tuesday, 
September 20, 2005, 8 a.m.-5 p.m. Opportunities for public 
participation will be held Monday, September 19, from 12:15 to 
12:30 p.m. and 5:45 to 6 p.m.; and on Tuesday, September 20, from 
11:45 a.m. to 12 p.m. and 4 to 4:15 p.m. Additional time may be 
made available for public comment during the presentations.
 
These times are subject to change as the meeting progresses, 
depending on the extent of comment offered. Please check with the 
meeting facilitator to confirm these times.
 
 
ADDRESSES: Ameritel Inn, 645 Lindsay Boulevard, Idaho Falls, ID 
83402.
 
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Shannon A. Brennan, Federal 
Coordinator, Department of Energy, NE-ID Idaho Operations Office, 
1955 Fremont Avenue, MS-1216, Idaho Falls, ID 83401. Phone (208) 
526-3993; Fax (208) 526-1926 or e-mail: 
Shannon.Brennan@nuclear.energy.gov or visit the Board's Internet 
home page at: http://www.ida.net/users/cab.
 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Purpose of the Board: The purpose of 
the Board is to make recommendations to DOE in the areas of 
environmental restoration, waste management, and related 
activities.
 
Tentative Topics (agenda topics may change up to the day of the 
meeting; please contact Shannon A. Brennan for the most current 
agenda): Status of the closure of the Tank Farm--including 
characteristics of the Idaho tank waste, plans for cleaning and 
closure of the tanks, the performance assessment, the sodium 
bearing waste treatment plan, and plans for disposition of the 
sodium bearing waste Status of the Radioactive Waste Management 
Complex cleanup Receive a presentation addressing retrieval, 
treatment, and disposal of remote-handled transuranic waste, 
including an explanation of what it is, where it came from, and 
related issues Public Participation: The meeting is open to the 
public.
 
Written statements may be filed with the Board either before or 
after the meeting. Individuals who wish to make oral 
presentations pertaining to agenda items should contact Shannon 
A. Brennan at the address or telephone number listed above. The 
request must be received five days prior to the meeting and 
reasonable provision will be made to include the presentation in 
the agenda. The Deputy Designated Federal Officer is empowered to 
conduct the meeting in a fashion that will facilitate the orderly 
conduct of business. Individuals wishing to make public comment 
will be provided a maximum of five minutes to present their 
comments.
 
Minutes: The minutes of this meeting will be available for public 
review and copying at the U.S. Department of Energy's Freedom of 
Information Public Reading Room, 1E-190, Forrestal Building, 1000 
Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20585 between 9 a.m. and 
4 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. Minutes 
will also be available by writing to Shannon A. Brennan, Federal
 
[[Page 51031]] Coordinator, at the address and phone number 
listed above.
 
Issued at Washington, DC, on August 24, 2005.
 
Rachel Samuel, Deputy Advisory Committee Management Officer.
 
[FR Doc. 05-17108 Filed 8-26-05; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 6450-01-P

 
*****************************************************************
 52 DOE: Environmental Management Site-Specific Advisory Board, Savannah 
 
                        FR Doc 05-17109 
[Federal Register: August 29, 2005 (Volume 70, Number 166)] 
[Notices] [Page 51031] From the Federal Register Online via GPO 
Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr29au05-43]                         
 
River AGENCY: Department of Energy.
 
ACTION: Notice of open meeting.
 
SUMMARY: This notice announces a meeting of the Environmental 
Management Site-Specific Advisory Board (EMSSAB), Savannah River. 
The Federal Advisory Committee Act (Pub. L. No. 92-463, 86 Stat. 
770) requires that public notice of this meeting be announced in 
the Federal Register.
 
 
DATES: Monday, September 26, 2005, 1 p.m.-6 p.m. Tuesday, 
September 27, 2005, 8:30 a.m.-4 p.m.
 
ADDRESSES: Holiday Inn Coliseum at the University of South 
Carolina, 630 Assembly Street, Columbia, SC 29201.
 
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Gerri Flemming, Closure Project 
Office, Department of Energy Savannah River Operations Office, 
P.O. Box A, Aiken, SC 29802; Phone: (803) 952-7886.
 
 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Purpose of the Board: The purpose of 
the Board is to make recommendations to DOE in the areas of 
environmental restoration, waste management, and related 
activities.
 
Tentative Agenda Monday, September 26, 2005 1 p.m. Combined 
Committee Session.
 
5:15 p.m. Adjourn.
 
5:15 p.m. Executive Committee Meeting.
 
6 p.m. Adjourn.
 
Tuesday, September 27, 2005 8:30 a.m. Approval of Minutes, Agency 
Updates.
 
9 a.m. Public Comment Session.
 
9:15 a.m. Chair and Facilitator Update.
 
9:45 a.m. Waste Management Committee Report.
 
11:45 a.m. Public Comments.
 
12 p.m. Lunch Break.
 
1 p.m. National Nuclear Security Administration.
 
1:30 p.m. Facilities Disposition & Site Remediation Committee 
Report.
 
2 p.m. Strategic and Legacy Management Committee Report.
 
2:45 p.m. Nuclear Materials Committee Report.
 
3:30 p.m. Administrative Committee Report.
 
3:50 p.m. Public Comments.
 
4 p.m. Adjourn.
 
If needed, time will be allotted after public comments for items 
added to the agenda, and administrative details. A final agenda 
will be available at the meeting Monday, September 26, 2005.
 
Public Participation: The meeting is open to the public.
 
Written statements may be filed with the Board either before or 
after the meeting. Individuals who wish to make oral statements 
pertaining to agenda items should contact Gerri Flemming's office 
at the address or telephone listed above. Requests must be 
received five days prior to the meeting and reasonable provision 
will be made to include the presentation in the agenda. The 
Deputy Designated Federal Officer is empowered to conduct the 
meeting in a fashion that will facilitate the orderly conduct 
business. Individuals wishing to make public comment will be 
provided a maximum of five minutes to present their comments.
 
Minutes: The minutes of this meeting will be available for public 
review and copying at the U.S. Department of Energy's Freedom of 
Information Public Reading Room, 1E-190, Forrestal Building, 1000 
Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20585 between 9 a.m. and 
4 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. Minutes 
will also be available by writing to Gerri Flemming, Department 
of Energy Savannah River Operations Office, P.O. Box A, Aiken, SC 
29802, or by calling her at (803) 952-7886.
 
Issued at Washington, DC, on August 24, 2005.
 
Rachel M. Samuel, Deputy Advisory Committee Management Officer.
 
[FR Doc. 05-17109 Filed 8-26-05; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 6450-01-P

 
*****************************************************************
 53 DOE: Notice of Availability of the Environmental Assessment
 
                        FR Doc 05-17143 
[Federal Register: August 29, 2005 (Volume 70, Number 166)] 
[Notices] [Page 51029] From the Federal Register Online via GPO 
Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr29au05-40]                         
 
Supporting the Department of Energy's Application to the 
Department of the Interior for a Public Land Order To Withdraw 
Public Lands Within and Around the Caliente Rail Corridor, 
Nevada, From Surface Entry and New Mining Claims AGENCY: Office 
of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, U.S. Department of 
Energy.
 
ACTION: Notice of availability.
 
SUMMARY: This notice announces the availability, and opportunity 
for public review and comment, of the environmental assessment 
(EA) that supports the Department of Energy's (DOE) application 
to the Department of the Interior, filed with the Bureau of Land 
Management (BLM), for a Public Land Order to withdraw public 
lands within and surrounding the Caliente Rail Corridor. As 
applied for, the withdrawal would preclude surface entry and new 
mining claim locations for a 20 year period.
 
 
DATES: Comments should be received by DOE no later than September 
28, 2005.
 
 
ADDRESSES: Comments, or requests for copies of the draft EA, 
should be sent to Lee Bishop, EA Document Manager, United States 
Department of Energy, 1551 Hillshire Drive, Las Vegas, NV 89134. 
Requests for copies of the draft EA may also be made by calling 
1-800-225-6972. The draft EA and electronic comment forms are 
available at .
 
Comments may also be faxed to 1-800-967-0739.
 
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Lee Bishop, EA Document Manager, 
at the address above or at 1-800-225-6972.
 
 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: A notice of proposed withdrawal was 
published in the Federal Register on December 29, 2003 (68 FR 
74965- 74968), stating that the Bureau of Land Management had 
received an application from DOE to withdraw for 20 years 
approximately 308,600 acres of public land from surface entry and 
mining locations while DOE evaluates the land for the potential 
construction, operation, and maintenance of a branch rail line. 
The rail line would be used for the transportation of spent 
nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste as provided under 
the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended (42 U.S.C. 10101 
et seq.). BLM held public meetings on the application in June 
2004.
 
In accordance with 43 CFR 2310.3-2(b)(3), DOE has prepared a 
draft EA to support its application, with the BLM participating 
as a cooperating agency. The application seeks a Public Land 
Order for the purpose of precluding surface entry and the 
location of new mining claims which could interfere with the 
evaluation of the land.
 
The proposed Public Land Order would not affect existing mining 
claims or other activities such as grazing rights, water rights, 
and recreational uses.
 
The draft EA may be reviewed on the Internet at .
 
Copies of the EA may also be obtained by contacting Mr. Lee 
Bishop (see address above). Comments may be submitted to Mr. 
Bishop or through the comment form at the above website, and 
should be received by September 28, 2005.
 
Three public meetings on the draft EA will be held as follows: 
Monday, September 12, 2005, 4 p.m. to 8 p.m., Longstreet Inn & 
Casino, Highway 373, Amargosa Valley, NV; Tuesday, September 13, 
2005, 4 p.m. to 8 p.m., Goldfield School Gymnasium, 233 Ramsey, 
Goldfield, NV; and Thursday, September 15, 2005, 4 p.m. to 8 
p.m., Caliente Youth Center, U.S. Highway 93, Caliente, NV. 
Comments received will be considered in finalizing the EA.
 
After the EA is finalized it will be formally submitted to the 
BLM.
 
The BLM will subsequently make a recommendation to the Secretary 
of the Interior, who will make a final determination regarding 
DOE's application for a Public Land Order.
 
Issued in Washington, DC.
 
Paul M. Golan, Principal Deputy Director, Office of Civilian 
Radioactive Waste Management.
 
[FR Doc. 05-17143 Filed 8-26-05; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 6450-01-P

 
    
*****************************************************************

NOTE: In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. section 107 this 
material is distributed without profit or payment to those who 
have expressed a prior interest in receiving this information for 
non-profit research and educational purposes only. For more 
information go to: 
<http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml> 
    
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