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                         NUCLEAR POLICY
 
1 Asia Times: The fuel behind Iran's nuclear drive 
2 Reuters: China, Japan to discuss North Korea nuclear crisis
3 Guardian Unlimited: How Rainbow Warrior was played down
 
                         NUCLEAR REACTORS
 
4 US: Platts: Decommissioning funds included in FP&L settlement
5 NewsFromRussia.Com: Ukraine nuclear plant OK
6 US: North County Times: San Onofre reports fish kill
7 US: APP.COM: Let NRC know how you feel
8 US: APP.COM: DEP faults Oyster Creek plan
9 US: StarNewsOnline.com: Blanco backs third power plant proposal
10 US: Journal News: Indian Point siren song
11 US: NRC: Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, LLC and Entergy Nuclear 
12 US: NRC: In the Matter of Centerpoint Energy, Inc., Texas Genco, LP
13 US: NRC: Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Joseph M. Farley Nuclea
14 US: Reuters: Constellation's NY Nine Mile 1 nuke back at 100 pct
15 US: Reuters: Ariz. Palo Verde 2 nuke shut 
16 US: NRC: Sunshine Act Meeting Notice
 
                          NUCLEAR SECURITY
 
 
                          NUCLEAR SAFETY
 
17 US: NRC: NRC to Hold Public Meeting August 31 on License Application
18 US: DailyBulletin.com: Toxins found at Norco schools
19 US: Washington Times: Religion helped workers speak up 
20 US: DHHS: CDC: Worker's Radiation Health Board
21 US: DHHS: CDC: NIOSH worker safety board
 
                         NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE
 
22 US: BBC: Radiation disposal case adjourned
23 Platts: EPA seeks public comment on proposed Nevada nuclear waste pl
24 US: AU ABC: ALP accused of uranium debate stunt. 
 
                           PEACE
 
 
                        US DEPT. OF ENERGY
 
25 Seattle Post-Intelligencer: GAO says Hanford cleanup may be slowed
26 Tri-City Herald: Bechtel celebrates 'tremendous run' 
27 DOE: Health Effects Subcommittee (SRSHES)
28 DOE: Notice of Preferred Sodium Bearing Waste Treatment Technology
29 DOE: Environmental Management Site-Specific Advisory Board, Northern
30 DOE: Environmental Management Site-Specific Advisory Board, Rocky 
31 www.GovExec.com: GAO criticizes Energy's plutonium disposal effort 
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                         FULL NEWS STORIES
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 1 Asia Times: The fuel behind Iran's nuclear drive 

By David Isenberg 

Much of the argument over the intentions of Iran's nuclear
program revolves around a single proposition that goes like
this. Given that Iran has huge oil and gas reserves, it has no
need for nuclear power for domestic energy needs and thus its
nuclear program will be used for nuclear weapons. 

Like much so-called conventional wisdom, is this is a highly
misleading and debatable cliche? 

Certainly, the fact that a state is pursuing a nuclear program
per se, even if it is a nuclear proliferator, is not always a
cause for alarm for the United States. Earlier this year, the US
announced an agreement with India (until recently a target of US
sanctions, even under the current US president) to strengthen
the utilization of nuclear energy in its energy mix. 

The Foreign Affairs Select Committee of England's parliament
said in March 2004 that based on a study it commissioned, "It is
clear ... that the arguments as to whether Iran has a genuine
requirement for domestically produced nuclear electricity are
not all, or even predominantly, on one side." 
																	
 																	 
																	 																		<IMG alt=""
src="http://goldsea.com/GAAN/adview.php?what=zone:117&amp;n=a9234
57d" border=0>Some US arguments against Iran "were not supported
by an analysis of the facts", the committee added, noting that
much of the natural gas flared off by Iran - which US officials
say could be harnessed instead of nuclear power - was not
recoverable for energy use. 

Consider the following points. First, Iran's energy situation
today is quite different from the late 1970s, when the shah's
regime also pursued nuclear technology, a pursuit that did not
seem so alarming to the West at the time. 


David Kay, former head of the Iraq Survey Group, speaking in
November 2004 at a forum sponsored by the Center for Strategic
and International Studies said: The first thing - of what we do
know, and it's amazing how many Americans seem to skate over
this - the first nuclear reactor given to Iran was given by the
United States in 1967 - a five-megawatt trigger reactor,
research reactor, under the Eisenhower Atoms for Peace Program.
Still operated ... 

The other thing that Americans forget is that in 1974, the shah 
announced a policy of 23,000 megawatts of nuclear energy in Iraq. 
The US reaction? [Former US national security adviser and 
secretary of state] Henry Kissinger beat down the door to be sure 
that two US constructors, General Electric and Westinghouse, had 
a preferred position in selling those reactors. 

We did not say, "it's a stupid idea, why would you want to do 
that when you are flaring gas and you have immense oil reserves?" 
We said, "That is very interesting; it's an example of how the 
Iranian economy is moving and becoming modern." Imagine in 
Iranian ears how it sounds now when we denigrate that capacity. 
They remember. We were sellers of nuclear reactors and wanted to 
be sellers of nuclear reactors to the shah.

Consider that just a year or so prior to the 1979 Iranian 
revolution, the country was producing more than 6 million barrels 
a day of oil and its domestic consumption was less than 10% of 
that output. Its annual natural gas production (almost all in the 
form of associated gas) was roughly about 12 billion cubic meters 
of which some 9.5 billion cubic meters was exported to the Soviet 
Union and only 20% was consumed domestically. 

Iran's population was about 35 million. Meanwhile, Iran had 
signed a number of nuclear power construction contracts with 
France and Germany and was negotiating with others for additional 
ones. The stated objectives of these undertakings were to 
generate electricity and desalinate water. But according to the 
pre-revolution politicians there was also always an attempt to 
explore the nuclear technology for military purposes. But there 
was no overt opposition to the shah's nuclear ambitions because 
of friendly relations between Iran and US. 

In fact, president Gerald Ford signed a directive in 1976
offering Tehran the chance to buy and operate a US-built
reprocessing facility for extracting plutonium from nuclear
reactor fuel. The deal was for a complete "nuclear fuel cycle" -
reactors powered by and regenerating fissile materials on a
self-sustaining basis. 

The construction of nuclear power plants in Iran has been
contemplated for more than 30 years. The shah argued that
hydrocarbon resources would be too valuable to burn by the
beginning of 21st century and most of Iran's electricity
generation must be supplied from nuclear power plants by then. 

After the Iran-Iraq war at the end of the 1980s, the need for
electricity generation for reconstruction of the war-damaged
economy was evident and as the maximum export of hydrocarbon
resources was to be achieved for foreign exchange requirements,
the attention was focused on rebuilding the Bushehr nuclear
power plant. 

Today, Iran has a population of more than 65 million and most
people are choking from air pollution. The country produces some
4 million barrels of oil a day of which about 1.5 million are
consumed domestically. Natural gas production has skyrocketed
and almost all of it is consumed domestically and the share of
natural gas of total energy consumption has more than tripled
and a very significant portion of that is used to generate
power. Incidentally, utilization of oil or natural gas for power
generation, though more benign than coal, is not pollution free. 

A recent article in Foreign Policy journal noted: Iran is the
second-largest oil producer in the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries [OPEC] and has the world's second-largest
natural gas reserves. But its energy needs are rising faster
than its ability to meet them. Driven by a young population and
high oil revenues, Iran's power consumption is growing by around
7% annually, and its capacity must nearly triple over the next
15 years to meet projected demand. 

Where will the electricity come from? Not from the oil sector. It 
is retarded by US sanctions, as well as inefficiency, corruption 
and Iran's institutionalized distrust of Western investors. Since 
1995, when the sector was opened to a handful of foreign 
companies, Iran has added 600,000 barrels per day to its crude 
production, enough to offset depletion in aging fields, but not 
enough to boost output, which has stagnated at around 3.7 million 
barrels per day since the late 1990s. Almost 40% of Iran's crude 
oil is consumed locally. If this figure were to rise, oil 
revenues would fall, spelling the end of the strong economic 
growth the country has enjoyed since 1999. 

Plugging the gap with natural gas is not possible - yet. Iran's 
gigantic gas reserves are only just being tapped, so Iran remains 
a net importer. Second, as a sovereign nation Iran is entitled to 
make its own sovereign decisions as to how provide for its own 
energy needs. Under Article IV of the nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty, member states are assured access to the benefits of 
civilian nuclear energy. 

Iran is a resource-rich country and has all the rights to use
its resources as it sees fit. Among these resources there are
several uranium mines whose energy contents cannot be
overlooked. Expecting Iran to disregard this valuable resource
is irrational, not to mention that taking away that much energy
from the free market is an irresponsible proposition. On the
other hand, helping Iran to extract, process and use this
resource in a joint operation with the International Atomic
Energy Agency could help resolve many political as well as
financial problems. 

Third, the large oil and gas reserves that Iran possesses do not
mean that Iran can use oil and gas at no cost. 

It is not well appreciated that Iranian oil production has
dropped from a peak of more than 6 million barrels per day in
1974 to about 3.4 barrels per day in 2002. Years of political
isolation, recurring war and US sanctions have deprived the oil
sector of needed investment. Iran's share of total world oil
trade peaked at 17.2% in 1972, then declined to 2.6% in 1980,
but has since recouped to roughly 5%. In 2002, earnings from oil
and gas made up more than 70% of total government revenues,
while taxes made up about 20%. After the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq
war, the National Iranian Oil Company launched a reconstruction
program to restore damaged fields. Since 1994, production has
averaged 3.6 million barrels per day, although this is still
roughly half of Iran's 1974 levels. The government hopes that
foreign finance and technology will help raise Iran's output to
5.6 million barrels per day by 2010 and 7.3 million barrels per
day by 2020. 

In fact, the oil and gas that Iran has are almost as expensive
as the oil and gas that other countries don't have. To be able
to use oil or gas as a feed for an industry (eg power
generation), Iran has to develop the resources. Now, once
developed and produced, from an economic point of view, oil can
be treated as a commodity, which has a value. The monetization
of gas is more difficult, but not if you have ready markets
around you and also if you can use that gas to boost your oil
production capacity. In fact, considering the reality that the
majority of Iran's oil and gas reserves are in the south and the
country's population centers are in the north, it makes more
sense to export the oil and gas in the south (oil from the
terminals and gas through pipelines and gas value-add projects)
rather than pump it to the north and translate it into electric
power. 

One example explains the logic of this argument - no one has so
far posed the question why Iran actually buys oil from Caspian
sources. The simple answer is that it makes economic sense:
Caspian crude is closer to Iran's northern refineries and the
utilization of Caspian crude in the north frees up oil in the
south for export. The only argument that can be used regarding
Iran's oil and gas reserves compared to other countries is the
fact that Iran has secure domestic supplies as compared to other
countries that are importers of oil and gas. However, if Iran as
a country manages also to secure its own indigenous supply of
nuclear fuel, then the equation changes and it becomes more of
an economic evaluation. 

With regard to its gas reserves, it bears noting that there are
needs for gas in Iran that are much higher priorities than the
construction of gas power plants. As academics William Beeman
and Thomas Stauffer noted: First, gas is vitally needed for
reinjection into existing oil reservoirs [repressurizing]. This
is indispensable for maintaining oil output levels, as well as
for increasing overall, long-term recovery of oil. Second,
natural gas is needed for growing domestic use, such as in
cooking fuel and domestic heating (Iranians typically use
kerosene for both), where it can free up oil for more profitable
export. New uses such as powering bus and taxi fleets in Iran's
smoggy urban areas are also essential for development. Third,
natural gas exports - via pipelines to Turkey or in liquefied
form to the sub-continent - set an attractive minimum value for
any available natural gas. With adequate nuclear power
generation, Iran can profit more from selling its gas than using
it to generate power. Fourth, the economics of gas production in
Iran are almost backwards, certainly counter-intuitive. Much of
Iran's gas is "rich" - it contains byproducts, such as
liquid-petroleum gas [LPG, better known as propane], which are
more valuable than the natural gas from which they are derived.
Iran can profit by selling these derivatives, but not if it
burns the natural gas to generate power. Furthermore, Iran
adheres to OPEC production quotas, which combine oil and natural
gas production. Therefore Iran cannot simply increase natural
gas for export to make up for what it burns at home.Finally,
there is another important strategic element to consider. Iran
derives strategic significance from its status as an oil and gas
exporter. This is a status that Iran would like to maintain, and
as such any initiative that would maximize Iran's potential for
hydrocarbon exports has a strategic value for Iran. 

David Isenberg, a senior analyst with the Washington-based
British American Security Information Council (BASIC), has a
wide background in arms control and national security issues.
The views expressed are his own. 

(Copyright 2005 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved.
 													   												 											
Hau Fook Mansion, No. 8 Hau Fook St., Kowloon, Hong
Road, Hua Hin, Prachuab Kirikhan, Thailand 77110 											  
										 									
*****************************************************************
 2 Reuters: China, Japan to discuss North Korea nuclear crisis

Tue Aug 23, 2005 6:02 AM ET

 BEIJING (Reuters) - Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei will 
visit Japan this week to discuss North Korea's nuclear crisis 
ahead of a new round of talks aimed at dismantling the reclusive 
state's weapons programme, state media said on Tuesday.

 Wu, head of China's negotiating team at the talks that also 
involve Japan, the two Koreas, the United States and Russia, was 
to leave on Tuesday and will meet Japanese Deputy Minister for 
Foreign Affairs Nishida Tsuneo before he returns on Friday, the 
report said.

 "Wu will also talk with Sasae Kenichiro, Japan's chief 
negotiator to the six-party talks, on the next stage of the 
fourth round of six-party talks," Xinhua news agency quoted 
Foreign Ministry spokesman Kong Quan as saying.

 North Korea's nuclear crisis erupted in October 2002, when U.S. 
officials accused Pyongyang of pursuing a clandestine weapons 
programme, prompting the North to expel nuclear inspectors and 
withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

 Earlier this year, Pyongyang announced it had nuclear weapons 
and has demanded that Washington provide aid, security guarantees 
and diplomatic recognition in return for scrapping them.

 After a gap of more than a year, the six countries met in 
Beijing in July and August for talks that ended only with a 
decision to reconvene during the week of August 29.

 In the interim, the parties have been engaging in a flurry of 
bilateral meetings about North Korea.

 Cui Tiankai, director of the Asian Affairs Department at China's 
foreign ministry and a member of its negotiating team, is 
expected in Washington this week to meet the top U.S. negotiator, 
Christopher Hill.

 Chinese officials, including Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing, met 
South Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon earlier this month.
			 			

� Reuters 2005. 
All Rights Reserved.                    
 			
*****************************************************************
 3 Guardian Unlimited: How Rainbow Warrior was played down
 
Thatcher refused to sanction criticism of French over sinking of 
Greenpeace ship, archives show

Read the documents here		
 		
Paul Brown and Rob Evans
Tuesday August 23, 2005
The Guardian 		
 		
A diver photographs the hull of the Rainbow Warrior in Auckland
Harbour in 1985. Photograph: Miller/AP
 

 Margaret Thatcher refused to sanction official criticism of the
French over the blowing up of the British-registered Greenpeace
ship Rainbow Warrior even after Paris had admitted being behind
the bombing, newly released documents show.

The then prime minister sided with the foreign secretary,
Geoffrey Howe, who did not want to "rub salt in French wounds",
despite calls from cabinet colleagues who thought the government
should take a firmer line.

The then transport secretary, Nicholas Ridley, described the
incident as "an outrageous act of terrorism".

The papers also show that the Thatcher government refused to hold 
an inquiry into the sinking, as it had the power to do, but kept 
this decision secret until the public outcry had faded.

French secret agents blew up the Rainbow Warrior to prevent
Greenpeace protesting against the testing of nuclear weapons at
Mururoa in the South Pacific.

The bombing of the ship when it was moored in Auckland harbour,
New Zealand, in July 1985 killed one of the crew and brought
protests from around the world.

Greenpeace's campaigns director, Blake Lee Harwood, said
yesterday: "The Thatcher administration was famously
unsympathetic to Greenpeace and so their action in downplaying
an act of state terrorism and murder was entirely in character.
However, 20 years on, remaining mute in the face of the blowing
up of a peaceful ship in the harbour of a Commonwealth country
seems strangely at odds with Tony Blair's war on terror."

The documents, released to Greenpeace under the Freedom of
Information Act, show that when the French admitted after two
months that they were responsible for the bombing, Mr Howe
wrote: "We have no wish to rub salt in French wounds, nor do we
wish to appear more aggrieved than Greenpeace. We took care to
avoid impugning France prior to the official French admission of
responsibility."

The documents also show that Mr Howe intervened to tone down
criticism of the French.

John Prescott, then an opposition MP sponsored by the National
Union of Seamen, had written to Mr Ridley calling on the
government to condemn this "act of war" and launch an inquiry.

The Rainbow Warrior was registered in Aberdeen. Under maritime
law, the British government had the right to investigate the
loss of any British-registered ship, but was not obliged to do
so.

According to a transport department memo, Mr Ridley at first
told his officials of "the need he saw for a robust attitude by
the government to the sinking".

"The two key points he felt should be included in the reply to
Mr Prescott were the government's condemnation of this act and
the government's readiness if appropriate (ie, essentially, in
relation to any French government involvement) to seek
compensation as a manifestation of diplomatic protection of
British interests."

Mr Ridley's officials drafted a reply to Mr Prescott saying:
"This was an outrageous act of terrorism against a British
vessel with tragic loss of life, which the government utterly
condemn." It refers to Fernando Pereira, the photographer who
was killed, as a "murdered man."

Three days later, a Foreign Office official wrote to the
transport department, saying that Mr Howe had seen the draft and
suggested a softer response, which was eventually sent to Mr
Prescott: "This was a lamentable event. The government deeply
regret the death of a member of the crew. We hope the culprits
can be brought to justice."

Davey Edwards, the engineer of the Rainbow Warrior and the only
British crew member, told the Guardian this year that he
remained angry that he had not received any diplomatic support
from the government, any financial help, or even a new passport,
and that no public protest had been made about an act of
terrorism and murder.

The documents also show that British diplomats agreed that it
was in Britain's interest for the French and the New Zealand
government, which was furious at the bombing in its waters and
was trying to prosecute the perpetrators, to patch up their
differences and seek a way of ending the controversy.

One wrote: "I share the view that it is in our own and the
general western interest for France and New Zealand to seek an
accommodation now that [the French prime minister] Fabius's
frank if tardy admission of French guilt has terminated the lies
and evasion and opened the way for more constructive moves."
 	
[UP] 

      Guardian Unlimited � Guardian Newspapers Limited 2005
*****************************************************************
 4 Platts: Decommissioning funds included in FP&L settlement
 
+ A four-year hiatus in collecting decommissioning funds for St. 
Lucie and Turkey Point is among the provisions in a settlement 
reached between Florida Power &Light Co. (FP) and intervenors in 
the utility's rate proceeding, Fitch Ratings said today. The 
settlement period begins Jan. 1, 2006. 

To date, FP has collected the decommissioning monies from 
ratepayers as part of its base rates. 

Some parties in the case had wanted the decommissioning fund 
money returned to ratepayers. Among other settlement provisions, 
the parties agreed not to appeal FP's recovery of storm damage 
costs associated with the three hurricanes in 2004.

Fitch said it viewed the net effect of the various provisions in 
the rate case as "constructive and neutral for credit quality."

Intervenors included the Office of the Attorney General, the 
Florida Retail Federation, the Florida Industrial Power Users 
Group. 

Washington (Platts)--22Aug2005
 
Copyright � 2005 - Platts, All Rights Reserved
 [The McGraw-Hill Companies]       
*****************************************************************
 5 NewsFromRussia.Com: Ukraine nuclear plant OK
 
 14:28 2005-08-23

 A nuclear reactor in western Ukraine shut down automatically
when sensors indicated a malfunction in a pump in its cooling
system, officials said Tuesday. 

There was no increase in radiation levels at the troublesome
reactor No. 2 in the Khmelnitsky power plant, according to a
statement from the state-run Energoatom nuclear operator. The
faulty pump's valves were shut down manually, the statement
said. 

The No. 2 reactor at Khmelnitsky has experienced a series of
automatic shutdowns since its launch last August. 

Ukraine was the site of the world's worst nuclear accident, when
a reactor at the Chernobyl nuclear plant exploded and caught
fire in 1986. The blast and fire spewed radiation over much of
the then-Soviet Union and northern Europe. Chernobyl was closed
down in 2000, AP reminds. 

Ukraine continues to operate 15 nuclear reactors, and says it is
committed to modernizing all of them. 

Ukraine is also considering converting some Ukrainian reactors
to the use of low-enriched uranium. Such a conversion would
lower the risk of accidents and possible transfer of nuclear
components to terrorists, officials say. 


pravda.ru 
	   	 
  Copyright �1999 by "". When reproducing our materials in whole
or in part, reference to should be made.   The opinions and
views of the authors do not always coincide with the point of
view of PRAVDA.Ru's editors.   


*****************************************************************
 6 North County Times: San Onofre reports fish kill

North San Diego and Southwest Riverside County columnists
 
Archives Last modified Monday, August 22, 2005 8:30 PM PDT 

By: PAUL SISSON - Staff Writer 

SAN ONOFRE ---- More than 5 tons of anchovies met an untimely
end at the San Onofre nuclear power plant last weekend.

Plant owner Southern California Edison reported an "unusual"
fish kill to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Monday, according
to a bulletin listed on the regulatory agency's Web site. 

According to the bulletin, each of San Onofre's two cooling
pipes sucked thousands of anchovies into the plant's cooling
system Friday and Saturday. By the time the fish volume tapered
off Sunday, approximately 11,070 pounds --- or 5.5 tons --- of
anchovies had been killed. 

Plant spokesman Ray Golden said Monday that schools of anchovies
formed too close to the plant's intake structures, which are in
about 50 feet of water 3,200 feet off shore.

"We believe it was a result of schooling that we see from time
to time," Golden said.

Because it uses so much salt water for cooling, San Onofre
regularly kills some fish every day. However, if the plant kills
more than 4,500 pounds in one 24-hour period, it must report the
incident to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

"It averages 200 pounds per day," Golden said.

The last time San Onofre reported a large fish kill was in
February 2004 when an estimated 7 tons of sardines were sucked
into the plant's cooling pipes, which are 18 feet in diameter.
Together, the twin intakes pull 2.5 billion gallons of water
from the Pacific every day. The water is used to cool steam
produced by the plant's nuclear reactors before it is returned
to the ocean. 


      � 1997-2005 North County Times -       
*****************************************************************
 7 APP.COM: Let NRC know how you feel
         
Published in the Asbury Park Press 08/23/05                                           

Officials from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission will be in Lacey 
Wednesday night to outline the license renewal process for the 
Oyster Creek nuclear power plant and to answer questions from the 
public.

Residents concerned about the prospect of the nation's oldest
commercial nuclear power plant being allowed to operate another
20 years beyond its 2009 expiration date should attend the
meeting to listen, to learn and to vent. Local, county, state
and federal officials also should turn out in force.

It's unlikely anything anyone in the audience says at the
meeting will carry much weight with the NRC. But that's no
reason to stay home. It's essential that everyone understand how
badly flawed the renewal process is, as well as the impediments
faced by those committed to shutting down the plant. Without a
clear sense of that, the task of organizing against license
renewal or, if necessary, litigating to stop it is far more
difficult.

Under present rules, the NRC needs to consider only two criteria
in deciding whether to grant license renewal: whether the plant,
judged by standards established when the plant was originally
built, "continues to maintain adequate levels of safety," and
whether the plant will do any harm to the immediate environment.

The determination by the N.J. Department of Environmental
Protection Monday that Oyster Creek is out of compliance with
the state's coastal zone management program offers some hope
that the reactor won't be able to satisfy even the ludicrously
low standard for license renewal that has resulted in license
extensions for all 33 nuclear reactors seeking them. But we
wouldn't count on it.

Bills introduced in Congress would require the NRC to take
several other factors into account, including health risks,
vulnerability to terrorist attack, evacuation plans, population
increases, ability to store nuclear waste, the plant's safety
and security record, and the impact of a nuclear accident.
Broadening the scope of the renewal process is a logical,
rational response to the risks posed by nuclear plants,
particularly aging plants in densely populated areas with no
adequate means of escape should an accident occur.

But the nuclear industry, backed by the pro-nuclear Bush
administration, is unlikely to compromise on the license renewal
process. Given how intransigent the NRC has been on this issue,
fighting renewal in court appears to be the best option. The
fight to close Oyster Creek promises to be hard, long and
expensive. Given the refusal of plant owner AmerGen, the NRC and
the Bush administration to make concessions that would improve
safety and security at Oyster Creek and other nuclear plants, it
is a fight that must be won.

  Copyright � 2005 Asbury Park Press. All rights reserved.
 
*****************************************************************
 8 APP.COM: DEP faults Oyster Creek plan
         
Asbury Park Press

PROBLEM: Aquatic life killed in cooling system

NOAA NEXT? Its disapproval could sway NRC

Published in the Asbury Park Press

08/23/05 BY NICHOLAS CLUNN AND TODD B. BATES STAFF WRITERS

TRENTON � The operator of the Oyster Creek nuclear power plant in 
Lacey has failed to show that it can adhere to New Jersey's 
coastal management rules under a 20-year renewed license it seeks 
from the federal government, state environmental officials 
contend.

State Department of Environmental Protection officials reached
that conclusion in denying an approval sought by AmerGen, the
plant owner, under a federal law requiring that federal
licensees near the coast meet state environmental rules.

The primary issue in the application is whether the amount of
marine life killed by the plant's cooling system violates laws
meant to protect Barnegat Bay, which provides 1.4 billion
gallons of water daily to cool the 650-megawatt reactor.

AmerGen on Monday gave no indication that it would halt its bid
for a renewal, which it needs from the federal Nuclear
Regulatory Commission to continue generating electricity past
2009.

But Jeff Tittel, head of the New Jersey chapter of the Sierra
Club, which has been critical of the plant, said the state's
denial may spur officials at the federal National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration to question a renewal for Oyster
Creek.

"If NOAA weighed in and said that the plant was violating the
Coastal Zone Management Act, the NRC should take that into
serious consideration," he said.

Nevertheless, the NRC would still have final say over the future
of Oyster Creek, according to commission spokesman Neil Sheehan.

AmerGen studies ruling

 AmerGen officials now have two options. They could, by the end
of September, appeal the state's ruling to U.S. Secretary of
Commerce Carlos Gutierrez. His department oversees the NOAA and
the administration of the coastal management act. The company
also could comply with the state's request for corrective
action, according to DEP spokesman Fred Mumford.

Craig Nesbit, a spokesman for AmerGen, said he learned of the
denial late Monday and wanted to speak with environmental
managers today before commenting.

In an Aug. 19 letter explaining the denial to AmerGen, Mark
Mauriello, director of the DEP's land-use regulation program,
said AmerGen could comply with coastal regulations by reducing
the number of animals killed by the plant's cooling system.

The state again suggested that AmerGen reduce the mortality rate
by building a cooling tower, which Mauriello regarded as the
"best technology available" and "New Jersey's preferred
alternative."

State officials had suggested last month that AmerGen build a
cooling tower at the plant as one of two ways the company could
obtain a state permit it needs to use two bay tributaries to
help cool water used in the reaction process.

A cooling tower would drastically reduce the number of animal
deaths by recycling the water pumped through the plant.

Since the plant opened in 1969, it has used an open-loop cooling
system. Under this design, water from the south branch of the
Forked River is pumped into the plant and then discharged �
warmer than when it came in � into the Oyster Creek.

AmerGen also could restore about 3,500 acres of wetlands � to
offset the destruction of aquatic life � as a way to obtain the
permit. The company has until Sept. 7 to make a decision.

DEP details its denial

 Mauriello outlined the denial in a letter that was sent to
AmerGen licensing director Keith R. Jury.

In the 14-page letter, Mauriello wrote that AmerGen failed to
provide state officials with enough information for them
understand the plant's environmental impact.

AmerGen, wrote Mauriello, cited several studies on Barnegat Bay,
but "in each case, the response was an informative look at the
positives." Mauriello also pointed out that the application was
heavy on anecdotes and lacked data.

The application, he said, also failed to quantify the term
"small," though the company used the word several times when
describing the number of aquatic animals that die after either
being flushed through the cooling system or by being pinned
against grates placed over intake pipes sucking river water.

Nicholas Clunn: (609) 978-4597 or nclunn@app.com

the Asbury Park Press             

  Copyright � 2005 Asbury Park Press. All rights reserved.
*****************************************************************
 9 StarNewsOnline.com: Blanco backs third power plant proposal

The Voice of Southeastern North Carolina

Last updated: August 23. 2005 2:01AM
 
By MELINDA DESLATTE Associated Press Writer

A proposed $1 billion expansion of the Big Cajun II coal-fired
power plant has received a crucial state air permit and the
support of Gov. Kathleen Blanco - the third power plant proposal
backed by the governor to help reduce Louisiana's dependence on
high-cost natural gas.

Blanco gave her backing last month to Cleco Corp.'s plans to
build a new power plant in central Louisiana that would be able
to use multiple solid fuels, primarily petroleum coke, a waste
byproduct of crude oil refinement. Two weeks later, the governor
announced that Louisiana was competing to land the country's
first new nuclear energy plant in three decades.

On Monday, the governor stood with officials from NRG Energy
Inc., at the Big Cajun II power plant in Pointe Coupee Parish,
for the permitting announcement vital to the planned expansion
of the facility.

Blanco lauded all three power plant proposals as economic
development drivers that, in addition to creating permanent jobs
in Louisiana, would shrink the state's heavy reliance on natural
gas for electricity, as the costs of gas skyrocket and drive up
energy bills. The governor said the price tags of those energy
bills are hurting businesses - and the state's attempts to
attract them.

"Our industrial base is suffering. Our homeowners are suffering.
Everybody is. It's time we look at the sources of fuel
diversification," Blanco said.

David Crane, president and CEO of NRG Energy, said Louisiana is
the second most dependent state on natural gas for power
generation - and he said the price of natural gas has quadrupled
in three years.

Environmentalists, however, have concerns about the proposals,
worried they would be unsafe, worsen pollution and increase
security risks.

In the case of an expansion like the Big Cajun II project,
environmental groups have repeatedly spoken out against
coal-fired plants, saying they can increase mercury pollution -
which when accumulated in fish and eaten by humans can cause
neurological and developmental problems - and dump high
quantities of the ozone-damaging pollutant nitrogen oxide into
the air.

"We did object to the expansion. It's just going to continue to
add more pollution to an already polluted area," said Barbara
Coman, chair of the Delta Chapter of the Sierra Club in
Louisiana.

Mike McDaniel, secretary of the state Department of
Environmental Quality, said power plants are small overall
contributors to mercury emissions in Louisiana, compared to
pesticides, sewage sludge, landfills, old batteries and other
products.

"Power plants are a source of mercury. In this state, they are
not a major source," he said.

McDaniel also said mercury caused by power plants will be
reduced further by two sets of new federal regulations that
specifically target power plant emissions.

As for nitrogen oxide emissions, officials on hand for Monday's
announcement pointed to pollution control measures required as
part of the air permit granted to the Big Cajun II expansion.

NRG will add $200 million in new technology to the plant that
McDaniel said will keep the expansion from emitting any
additional nitrogen oxide. That is of special concern in the
Baton Rouge area, which has been plagued with problems keeping
ozone levels in compliance with federal regulations.

"It will be one of the cleanest coal-fired plants on the planet.
That makes me very proud," Blanco said.

The proposed expansion of Big Cajun II would add 675 megawatts
of generating capacity to the region served by NRG subsidiary,
Louisiana Generating LLC, which generates electricity for 11
Louisiana power cooperatives that operate in 58 parishes with
350,000 household customers.

NRG said the expansion could provide enough electricity to serve
as many as 675,000 households and would create 40 permanent
jobs, in addition to 1,100 construction jobs.

Crane said Big Cajun II still needs to obtain other permits and
set up purchasing agreements with municipalities and other
customers who would buy the electricity before construction,
expected to take four years, can begin. He said NRG hopes to
have the expansion running by summer 2009.

---

On the Net:

NRG Energy Inc.: 

All material �2005 Wilmington Star-News
*****************************************************************
 10 Journal News: Indian Point siren song

08/23/05 06:30:00 GMT

By BOB BAIRD rbaird@thejournalnews.com

I've never felt safe living near the Indian Point nuclear plants, 
and nothing that's happened during this long, hot summer has been 
in any way reassuring.

My primary concern has been the plan devised to evacuate the 
10-mile zone around the plants, which includes parts of four 
Rockland towns, in case of a serious emergency.

It's always been my belief � and still is � that good people have 
come up with the best possible plan for an evacuation.

I also believe it won't work.

This sum mer, the list of reasons got a little longer.

It doesn't take much to look at the Tappan Zee Bridge almost any 
afternoon � especially summer Fridays � to get a preview of what 
traffic might be like in the event of an Indian Point emergency. 
In recent years, we've seen a simple accident at the wrong time 
tie up traffic in opposite directions to Orange County and 
Connecticut. And we've seen how hard it is to empty the Palisades 
Center mal l during a bomb scare.

We've been assured and reassured th at skeptics like me are wrong 
and the evacuation plan will work. Mothers and fathers and 
grandparents will report to drive school buses to evacuate other 
parents' children rather than trying to find their own. No one 
will have an accident or run out of gas. No one will panic or 
suffer a heart attack as they try to drive to safety. The roads 
will remain clear and moving and everyone will do what they're 
told, when they're told. No one will decide on his own to leave 
and everyone just outside the 10-mile zone will stay put, 
confident that what they're being told is complete, accurate and 
timely.


Even if you buy all that � forgetting that during the Three Mile 
Island nuclear emergency, utility management at best underplayed 
and at worst outright lied to the governor of Pennsylvania � it's 
all contingent on one reality.

The warning sirens have to work, letting people who live and work 
and go to school inside the 10-mile zone know there's an 
emergency.

There are periodic tests of that siren sy stem and over the years 
we've reported its successes and failures. For the most part, 
most of the sirens usually work, giving us a sense that most 
inside the zone would get the necessary warning.

Not so fast.

This summer it hasn't been a couple of sirens in Westchester or 
one in Putnam and two in Rockland, or any similarly low number of 
failures among the 156 sirens. In early July, a power outage 
after a thunderstorm knocked out the entire system for about six 
h ours. On another occasion, small er outages cut power to about 
20 sirens.

There are other ways to alert the public, including police, 
Reverse 911 where it's available and the electronic media, which 
may have diminished effectiveness in case of power outages.

But the need for the siren system was viewed seriously enough to 
bring a pledge from Entergy Nuclear Northeast, Indian Point's 
owners, to install a backup system. It will cost several million 
dollars, a spokesman say s, and could be in place in about two 
years.

As i f those failures weren't problem enough, they've been bumped 
up to a new level, and with it our anxiety.

Several times last week, a Verizon telephone system that allows 
counties to activate the sirens dropped out of service without 
anyone at Indian Point noticing. There's a backup, but its 
reliability has been questioned.

Indian Point officials were unaware of the problem last week 
until Rockland emergency service officials called to report 
finding the system down during a r outine test, said D an 
Greeley, Rockland deputy commissioner of emergency services.

By week's end, the system had been out of service several times, 
which is pretty remarkable given that everyone should have been 
watching for repeat failures.

Westchester and Rockland officials reacted quickly, calling for a 
meeting with Verizon, Entergy and several state and federal 
regulatory agencies.

How seriously they'll be taken remains to be seen. Consider that 
when counties raised serious doubts about the evacuation plans, 
federal officials still certified the plans as workable.

Workable, maybe. Realistic? Not so much. Of course, if the sirens 
fail, that would cut down on traffic and the plan might fly.

But so far, concerns over a Sept. 11-style terror attack, worries 
about the vulnerability of spent-fuel storage and lack of faith 
in the evacuation plans hasn't been enough to shut Indian Point, 
especially during this long, hot summer when our biggest fe ars 
centered on our air conditioners breaking down.

2005 The Journal News
*****************************************************************
 11 NRC: Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, LLC and Entergy Nuclear 
 
                         FR Doc E5-4594 
[Federal Register: August 23, 2005 (Volume 70, Number 162)] 
[Notices] [Page 49323-49324] From the Federal Register Online via 
GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr23au05-115]                         
 
Operations, Inc.; Notice of Issuance of Director's Decision Under 
10 CFR 2.206 Notice is hereby given that the Director, Office of 
Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or 
Commission) has issued a Director's Decision with regard to a 
petition dated July 29, 2004, filed by Mr. Paul Blanch and Mr. 
Arnold Gundersen, hereinafter referred to as the ``Petitioners.'' 
The petition was supplemented on December 8, 2004. The petition 
concerns the operation of the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power 
Station (Vermont Yankee).
 
The petition requested that the NRC issue a Demand for 
Information requiring Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, LLC, and 
Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Entergy or the licensee) to 
provide information that clearly and unambiguously describes how 
Vermont Yankee complies with the General Design Criteria (GDC) 
specified in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 
Part 50 Appendix A, or the draft GDC published by the Atomic 
Energy Commission in 1967.
 
As the basis for their request, the Petitioners stated that this 
information is essential for two NRC regulatory activities at 
Vermont Yankee: (1) the NRC's review of Entergy's application for 
an extended power uprate (EPU), and (2) the NRC's engineering 
assessment.
 
The Petitioners stated that until the design bases are clearly 
identified, any inspection or assessment is meaningless.
 
By teleconference on August 26, 2004, the Petitioners discussed 
the petition with the NRC's Petition Review Board. This 
teleconference gave the Petitioners and the licensee an 
opportunity to provide additional information and to clarify 
issues raised in the petition.
 
By letter dated May 13, 2005, the NRC staff requested Entergy 
provide information related to the petition. Entergy responded by 
letter dated June 14, 2005, and the information provided was 
considered by the staff in its evaluation of the petition.
 
The NRC staff sent a copy of the proposed Director's Decision to 
the Petitioners and to the licensee for comment by letters dated 
May 17, 2005. The staff did not receive any comments on the 
proposed Director's Decision.
 
The Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation has 
determined that the request to issue a Demand for
 
[[Page 49324]] Information to the licensee is denied. The reasons 
for this decision are explained in the Director's Decision 
pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206 (DD- 05-02), the complete text of which 
is available for inspection at the Commission's Public Document 
Room, located at One White Flint North, Public File Area O1 F21, 
11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland, or 
electronically from the Agencywide Documents Access and 
Management System (ADAMS) Public Electronic Reading Room on the 
NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. The 
Director's Decision addresses several issues related to the 
Vermont Yankee design and licensing basis including: (1) Whether 
the licensee's designation of Appendix F of the Updated Final 
Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) as ``historical information'' 
meets the intent of 10 CFR 50.71(e) regarding maintenance of 
design basis information, and (2) whether a compilation of 
Vermont Yankee's current design conformance to the draft GDCs is 
necessary for licensing reviews and inspections.
 
With respect to the first issue, the NRC staff concluded that the 
designation of UFSAR Appendix F as historical information is 
consistent with the applicable industry guidance, and would meet 
the intent of 10 CFR 50.71(e) regarding maintenance of design 
basis information, if the relevant information, consistent with 
the definition of ``design bases'' in 10 CFR 50.2, is contained 
in other portions of the UFSAR that are updated to reflect 
current plant design. Following the licensee's next update of the 
UFSAR to add the cross references discussed in Section II.A of 
the Director's Decision, the NRC staff will evaluate if any 
enforcement action is warranted.
 
With respect to the second issue, the NRC staff concluded that 
the NRC licensing review process provides reasonable assurance 
that the plant continues to meet the intent of the draft GDC and 
adequate protection of public health and safety is assured. The 
NRC also concluded that it did not need a compilation of the 
Vermont Yankee's current conformance to the draft GDC to review 
the application for an EPU or to conduct the Engineering Team 
Inspection (inspection was completed in September 2004).
 
A copy of the Director's Decision will be filed with the 
Secretary of the Commission for the Commission's review in 
accordance with 10 CFR 2.206 of the Commission's regulations. As 
provided for by this regulation, the Director's Decision will 
constitute the final action of the Commission 25 days after the 
date of the decision, unless the Commission, on its own motion, 
institutes a review of the director's decision in that time.
 
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 16th day of August 2005.
 
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
 
R. William Borchardt, Acting Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor 
Regulation.
 
[FR Doc. E5-4594 Filed 8-22-05; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590-01-P

 
*****************************************************************
 12 NRC: In the Matter of Centerpoint Energy, Inc., Texas Genco, LP
 
                         FR Doc E5-4596 
[Federal Register: August 23, 2005 (Volume 70, Number 162)] 
[Notices] [Page 49322-49323] From the Federal Register Online via 
GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr23au05-114]                         
 
(South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2); Order Approving Application 
Regarding Indirect License Transfers I STP Nuclear Operating 
Company (STPNOC or the licensee) and owners Texas Genco, LP 
(Texas Genco or the applicant), the City Public Service Board of 
San Antonio (CPS), and the City of Austin, Texas (COA) are 
holders of Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-76 and NPF-80, 
which authorize the possession, use, and operation of the South 
Texas Project, Units 1 and 2 (the facility or STP). STPNOC is 
licensed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or 
Commission) to operate STP. The facility is located at the 
licensees' site in Matagorda County, Texas.
 
II By application dated June 28, 2005, as supplemented by letter 
dated August 4, 2005, (collectively referred to herein as the 
application), STPNOC, acting on behalf of Texas Genco, requested 
that the NRC, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.80, consent to the proposed 
indirect transfer of control of the STP licenses to the extent 
held by Texas Genco.
 
Texas Genco is a 44 percent owner and non-operating licensee of 
STP.
 
According to the application filed by STPNOC on behalf of Texas 
Genco, Texas Genco is indirectly owned by Texas Genco Holdings, 
Inc., which in turn is wholly owned by Texas Genco LLC. Texas 
Genco LLC is owned by investment funds affiliated with The 
Blackstone Group, Hellman & Friedman LLC, Kohlberg Kravis Roberts 
& Co. L.P.,
 
[[Page 49323]] and Texas Pacific Group (the Investment Funds) and 
certain members of the management team (Management owners).
 
As stated in the application, the ultimate owners of Texas Genco 
are proposing a corporate restructuring such that several new 
entities would be interposed between (i) the Investment Funds and 
Management owners and (ii) Texas Genco LLC. This proposed 
restructuring is in anticipation of a proposed initial public 
offering of a minority interest in Texas Genco Inc. Texas Genco 
Inc. was incorporated on May 20, 2005, as a wholly-owned 
subsidiary of another new entity, Texas Genco Sponsor LLC. 
Immediately prior to the initial public offering, Texas Genco 
Sponsor LLC and Texas Genco Inc. will form a new limited 
liability company, Texas Genco Holdings LLC.
 
Following certain transactions described in the application, and 
following the initial public offering, Texas Genco Inc. will 
become the sole managing member of Texas Genco Holdings LLC, and 
Texas Genco Holdings LLC will become the sole owner of Texas 
Genco LLC and the indirect owner of licensee Texas Genco, which 
shall at all times continue to be a licensed owner of STP. 
According to the application, the Investment Funds and Management 
owners would control Texas Genco Inc. through their ownership of 
a majority of the voting power in Texas Genco Inc., and continue 
to ultimately control Texas Genco. Approval of the indirect 
transfer of the facility operating licenses was requested by 
STPNOC pursuant to 10 CFR 50.80. Notice of the request for 
approval and an opportunity for a hearing was published in the 
Federal Register on July 25, 2005 (70 FR 42592). No comments or 
hearing requests were received.
 
Under 10 CFR 50.80, no license, or any right thereunder, shall be 
transferred, directly or indirectly, through transfer of control 
of the license, unless the Commission shall give its consent in 
writing. Upon review of the information in the application by 
STPNOC and other information before the Commission, the NRC staff 
concludes that the proposed transactions and resulting indirect 
transfer of control of Texas Genco will not affect the 
qualifications of Texas Genco as a holder of the STP licenses, 
and that the indirect transfer of control of the licenses as held 
by Texas Genco, to the extent effected by the proposed 
transactions discussed above, is otherwise consistent with the 
applicable provisions of laws, regulations, and orders issued by 
the NRC, pursuant thereto.
 
The findings set forth above are supported by a safety evaluation 
dated August 16, 2005.
 
III Accordingly, pursuant to Sections 161b, 161i, 161o, and 184 
of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), 42 U.S.C. 
2201(b), 2201(i), 2201(o), and 2234; and 10 CFR 50.80, it is 
hereby ordered that the application regarding the indirect 
license transfers is approved, subject to the following 
condition: Should the proposed indirect license transfer not be 
completed within one year from the date of issuance, this Order 
shall become null and void, provided, however, upon written 
application and good cause shown, such date may in writing be 
extended.
 
This Order is effective upon issuance.
 
For further details with respect to this Order, see the initial 
application dated June 28, 2005, as supplemented by letter dated 
August 4, 2005, and the safety evaluation dated August 16, 2005, 
which are available for public inspection at the Commission's 
Public Document Room (PDR), located at One White Flint North, 
Public File Area 01 F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), 
Rockville, Maryland and accessible electronically from the 
Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Public 
Electronic Reading Room on the Internet at the NRC Web site, 
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. Persons who do not have 
access to ADAMS or who encounter problems in accessing the 
documents located in ADAMS, should contact the NRC PDR Reference 
staff by telephone at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or by e-mail 
to

 
pdr@nrc.gov. Dated at Rockville, Maryland this 16th day of August 
2005.
 
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
 
Ledyard B. Marsh, Director, Division of Licensing Project 
Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
 
[FR Doc. E5-4596 Filed 8-22-05; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590-01-P

 
*****************************************************************
 13 NRC: Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Joseph M. Farley Nuclear 
 
                         FR Doc E5-4597 
[Federal Register: August 23, 2005 (Volume 70, Number 162)] 
[Notices] [Page 49324-49331] From the Federal Register Online via 
GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr23au05-116]                         
 
Power Plant, Units 1 and 2; Exemption 1.0 Background The Southern 
Nuclear Operating Company (SNC, the licensee) is the holder of 
Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-2 and NPF-8 which 
authorizes operation of Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Power Plant 
(FNP), Units 1 and 2. The license provides, among other things, 
that the facility is subject to all rules, regulations, and 
orders of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC, the Commission) 
now or hereafter in effect.
 
The facility consists of two pressurized-water reactors located 
in Houston County, Alabama.
 
2.0 Request/Action Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 
(10 CFR) Part 50, Section 50.48, ``Fire Protection,'' requires 
that each operating nuclear power plant have a fire protection 
plan that satisfies General Design Criterion (GDC) 3, ``Fire 
Protection,'' of appendix A to part 50. Section 50.48(b) also 
references Appendix R, ``Fire Protection Program for Nuclear 
Power Facilities Operating Prior to January 1, 1979,'' to part 
50, which establishes fire protection features required to 
satisfy GDC 3 with respect to certain generic issues for nuclear 
power plants licensed to operate before January 1, 1979. On 
December 29, 1986, the NRC staff granted SNC Exemption Request 
1-3, ``Service Water Intake Structure--Fire Area 72,'' from 
certain requirements of Appendix R, Section III.G.2.c that 
requires fire detection and fire suppression capabilities and the 
enclosure of cables, equipment and associated non-safety circuits 
of one redundant train of safe shutdown equipment in a one-hour 
rated fire barrier. The Exemption issued on December 29, 1986, 
listed a total of ten items specific to Fire Area 72 that were 
part of Exemption Request 1-3. Exemption Request 1-3 was included 
in SNC's request, dated March 13, 1985, as supplemented, and is 
applicable to Fire Area 72 for the Service Water Intake Structure 
(SWIS) which is common to FNP, Units 1 and 2.
 
By letters dated August 28, 2003, December 28, 2004, and June 9, 
2005, SNC submitted a proposed revision to Exemption Request 1-3. 
SNC stated in its August 28, 2003, letter that the proposed 
revisions to Exemption Request 1-3 would clarify FNP's fire 
protection licensing basis, delete unnecessary attributes of the 
prior approved exemption, and revise the remaining prior 
exemption attributes to remove references to one-hour Kaowool 
fire barrier material. SNC also stated that the proposed revision 
to Exemption Request 1-3 is part of SNC's comprehensive plan to 
respond to concerns about Kaowool fire barrier material. SNC's 
August 28, 2003, letter re-listed the Exemption Request 1-3 items 
and numbered them as 1 through 9 and ``Addendum to Request'' for 
ease of reference. The August 28, 2003, letter also added an item 
designated as ``Other'' that was not explicitly addressed in the 
December 29, 1986, NRC Safety Evaluation. Therefore, a total of 
11 items (1 through 9, ``Addendum to Request'', and ``Other'') 
comprise the revised exemption request in SNC's August 28, 2003, 
letter.
 
3.0 Discussion Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12, ``Specific Exemptions,'' 
the Commission may, upon application by any interested person or 
upon its own initiative, grant exemptions from the requirements 
of 10 CFR part 50 when (1) the exemptions are authorized by law, 
will not present an undue risk to public health or safety, and 
are consistent with the common defense and security; and (2) when 
special circumstances are present. These special circumstances 
are described in 10 CFR 50(a)(2)(ii), in that the application of 
these regulations in this circumstance is not necessary to 
achieve the underlying purpose of the regulations.
 
The underlying purpose of Appendix R, Section III.G, ``Fire 
protection of safe shutdown capability,'' is to provide features 
capable of limiting fire damage so that: (1) one train of systems 
necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions from 
either the control room or emergency control station(s) is free 
of fire damage; and (2) systems necessary to achieve and maintain 
cold shutdown from either the control room or emergency control
 
[[Page 49325]] station(s) can be repaired within 72 hours.
 
In SNC's letter dated August 28, 2003, SNC stated that they 
recognize FNP, Unit 1 was licensed to operate prior to January 1, 
1979, is subject to Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50 and requires an 
exemption for any deviation to the rule, but that FNP, Unit 2 was 
licensed to operate after January 1, 1979, and would require a 
deviation from any commitment to comply with the rule. SNC stated 
that they did not distinguish between an exemption request and 
deviation request (license amendment) in their August 28, 2003, 
letter for the two units because the subject matter of the 
original Exemption Request 1-3 and this revised exemption is 
located in an area of the plant that services both units, and 
because the original Exemption Request 1-3 did not separately 
provide for a deviation (license amendment).
 
Overview of Approach Used by Licensee For this specific fire 
protection application, SNC proposes plant and fire protection 
program modifications under FNP's current license conditions, and 
has performed deterministic re-analyses and a risk- informed, 
performance-based evaluation to revise existing Exemption Request 
1-3 for the SWIS Fire Area 72.
 
The changes proposed by SNC to Exemption Request 1-3 will (1) 
Remove some conditions in the 1986 Exemption Request 1-3; (2) 
eliminate some manual actions; (3) define new fire areas; (4) 
modify the success criterion for the ability to remove decay heat 
and safely shutdown in the event of a fire in the SWIS; and (5) 
remove reliance on FNP, Unit 1 lube and cooling water pumps 
associated with the service water pumps.
 
As reflected in 10 CFR 50.48(c), the NRC has adopted National 
Fire Protection Association Standard 805, 2001 Edition (NFPA 
805), with a few exceptions, as a risk-informed, 
performance-based alternative to NRC fire protection requirements 
in 10 CFR 50.48(b) and as an optional new licensing basis for 
plants licensed after 1979. Licensees who propose to maintain a 
complete fire protection program that complies with 10 CFR 
50.48(c) as an alternative to 10 CFR 50.40(b) must complete their 
implementation of the methodology outlined in NFPA 805 for the 
entire plant and submit a application for a license amendment in 
accordance with the regulations. Although SNC has not proposed to 
revise its complete FNP fire protection program in accordance 
with 10 CFR 50.48(c) and NFPA 805, SNC has used the methodology 
of NFPA 805 for certain specific issues in its proposed revision 
to Exemption Request 1-3, as discussed below. The NRC had also 
previously issued Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.174 (Revision 1), ``An 
Approach for Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Risk-Informed 
Decisions on Plant-Specific Changes to the Licensing Basis''. SNC 
has used risk-informed, performance-based analysis tools and has 
used RG 1.174 for the risk acceptance criteria.
 
In general, SNC conducted a review of the SWIS which included 
deterministic re-analyses and an analysis using the 
risk-informed, performance-based methods. SNC concluded that the 
review and analysis showed that some of the conditions in 
existing Exemption Request 1-3 were unnecessary, that the 
licensee would no longer rely upon some conditions in the 
exemption by upgrading a dividing wall and defining new fire 
areas, by modifying lubrication and cooling support for Service 
Water pumps and other program changes, and that, by plant 
modifications and re-analysis, show that by performing the above 
modifications, removal of the reliance on Kaowool would maintain 
or enhance safety while reducing unnecessary regulatory burden. 
The review and analysis conducted by SNC reflected a combination 
of planned modifications to FNP, deterministic re-analyses, and 
combined risk- informed and fire modeling analyses.
 
Area Description The SWIS structure is located outside of the 
nuclear main power block and its support buildings. It is common 
to FNP, Units 1 and 2 and contains cables, pumps, valves, and 
other equipment necessary for the service water system. The SWIS 
supplies cooling water from the Service Water pond to the various 
essential components in both the nuclear main power block and 
balance of plant systems which require heat removal for proper 
operation during normal and accident conditions including the 
cooling certain plant equipment needed to achieve and maintain 
safe shutdown in the event of a fire. Each reactor unit has five 
pumps, two each in redundant Trains A and B, and a swing pump 
that can be aligned to either train. These pumps are spaced 
between five and six feet apart, on centers, and are protected by 
automatic fire suppression and detection systems. Redundant Train 
A and Train B cables supply power and controls to the pumps and 
support equipment. These cables are in close proximity where they 
enter the SWIS in the northeast corner of the building. Motor 
operated valves located in the strainer pit direct the pump flow 
for Trains A and B. These valves are horizontally separated 6 
feet 6 inches on center on the FNP, Unit 1 side and 5 feet on 
center on the FNP, Unit 2 side of the strainer pit.
 
In its letter dated August 28, 2003, SNC stated that power cables 
in the SWIS are contained in conduit and all cables in the SWIS 
are qualified to the Institute of Electrical and Electronics 
Engineers (IEEE) 383 standard. In its letter dated December 28, 
2004, SNC further stated that power and control cables have 
jacket and insulation materials that are qualified to the 
IEEE-383 standard and utilize thermoset materials. SNC stated 
that nearly all cables in the SWIS have thermoset plastic jacket 
and insulation material. SNC identified eight low-voltage 
polyvinyl chloride (PVC) PVC/PVC cables in a tray along the north 
and west wall that are thermoplastic. These cables are not 
located in trays and SNC stated that portions of the cable will 
be removed to meet the fire model analysis.
 
SNC will upgrade the nominal 18 inch concrete wall between Fire 
Zone 72A and Fire Zones 72B, C, D and E to meet the requirements 
of FNP's Fire Protection Program for a minimum 3-hour fire area 
boundary. The upgrade to the wall includes sealing penetrations 
and replacing un- rated doors with 3-hour rated fire doors. Three 
new fire areas will be defined, 72A, 72B/72C and 72D/72E. These 
changes will improve fire safety and defense-in-depth by reducing 
potential fire propagation paths between the pump deck and 
switchgear rooms, as well as between redundant switchgear rooms.
 
Fire Areas 73 and 74 remain unchanged with respect to this 
exemption request revision. On the FNP, Unit 1 side of the SWIS 
pump deck, floor curbs are located between the B- and C-Pumps and 
the C- and D-Pumps. SNC will provide a new floor curb to be 
located between the FNP, Unit 1 E-Pump and the east wall of the 
SWIS. On the FNP, Unit 2 side of the SWIS pump deck, floor curbs 
are located between the B- and C-Pumps and the C- and D-Pumps. 
These floor curbs and the slope of the floor help to confine a 
lubricant spill from one of the Service Water pumps and limit 
fire damage to adjacent pumps.
 
A concrete wall from floor to ceiling is located between the FNP, 
Unit 1 and FNP, Unit 2 Service Water pumps at the pump deck 
level. Radiant heat shields are provided on each side of the FNP, 
Unit 1 and FNP, Unit 2 swing Service Water pumps (C-Pump) to 
provide radiant heat shielding to and from adjacent Service Water 
pumps.
 
 
[[Page 49326]] Fire Protection Equipment The SWIS is provided 
with an area-wide smoke detection system located in all areas of 
the SWIS including the pump motor area, under the pump motor 
deck, in the battery rooms, in the stairways, and in the strainer 
area. The smoke detection system provides a local alarm and 
annunciates in the control room. In addition, activation of any 
smoke detector trips the clappers for all three preaction 
sprinkler systems. Tripping the clappers charges the preaction 
sprinkler systems with fire water.
 
The SWIS is also protected by automatic preaction sprinkler 
systems. Two preaction systems provide coverage to the entire 
pump deck, the area in the strainer pit beneath the pump deck, 
and to safety-related cabling in the upper northeast corner of 
the Service Water pump room. In addition, a third preaction 
'spray' system for local application protects the Service Water 
pumps. Local carbon dioxide fire suppression systems are provided 
in the switchgear and transfer switch panels in Fire Zones 72B, 
72C, 72D and 72E.
 
Upon receipt of an alarm, the Control Room would dispatch the 
Fire Brigade to the SWIS. Manual fire fighting equipment 
consisting of hose stations and portable fire extinguishers is 
available inside the SWIS. In addition, two fire hose/hydrant 
houses are located directly outside of the SWIS within the 
security fence. Therefore, all areas of the SWIS can be reached 
with an effective hose stream.
 
Operability and surveillance requirements for fire protection 
systems, including those provided for the SWIS are provided by 
the FNP Final Safety Analysis Report . The operability of the 
SWIS fire protection systems will continue to ensure 
defense-in-depth is maintained.
 
Combustible Controls Processes and procedures are in place at FNP 
to address housekeeping and control of combustible loading 
throughout the plant. This includes housekeeping and combustible 
loading control in the SWIS. The procedures provide guidance for 
bringing combustibles into a fire area for any plant activity 
including guidance for determining the amount and type of fire 
extinguishing equipment in the event of temporary increases in 
potential fire loading.
 
SNC will implement additional specific transient combustible 
controls to restrict transient combustibles from being 
stored/located in the northeast corner and in the vicinity of the 
Service Water pumps. Configuration control will be maintained 
(from a fire protection program perspective) over the type and 
quantity of lubrication oil used in the Service Water pump 
motors. SNC will implement precautions to limit the amount of 
lubricant in the vicinity of the Service Water pumps during 
lubricant changes by removing the drained lubricant from the area 
prior to bringing the new (unused) lubricant into the area.
 
This will provide additional assurance that the conditions of the 
risk-informed, performance based evaluation are met and that 
defense- in-depth is maintained in the area.
 
Fire Modeling SNC's evaluation uses the concepts from NFPA 805 
for fire modeling. NFPA 805 presents two concepts, the maximum 
expected fire scenario (MEFS) and limiting fire scenario (LFS). 
The MEFSs or worst case credible scenarios are identified by 
considering the fire types that have a reasonable likelihood of 
occurrence. The LFSs are developed by altering one or more input 
parameters to MEFSs to determine the threshold at which a target 
would exceed the critical temperature or radiant heat flux. The 
purpose of determining an LFS was to perform a sensitivity 
analysis and demonstrate adequate margin between parameters when 
determining MEFS and LFS.
 
Three scenarios were evaluated by the licensee, (1) transient 
combustible material fire in the northeast corner of the SWIS, 
(2) FNP, Unit 1 Service Water pump fire, and (3) FNP, Unit 2 
Service Water pump fire. These scenarios were chosen since they 
were believed to be the most likely to affect multiple trains of 
systems. Consolidated Model of Fire Growth and Smoke Transport 
(CFAST) (Peacock et al., 2004), HEATING Version 7.3 (Childs, 
1998), and empirical correlations (thermal plume and radiant heat 
flux) were used to model the fires. The hot gas layer temperature 
and radiant heat flux exposure to the safety-related cable trays 
and junction boxes were determined for the MEFSs. The licensee 
evaluated other fire scenarios such as smaller quantities of 
lubricant oil, motor windings, and other cable trays and 
concluded that the MEFS for these fire scenarios would not have 
resulted in target damage.
 
The preaction sprinkler system actuation was evaluated for each 
fire scenario although sprinkler actuation was not directly 
credited in the fire modeling analysis except for 
defense-in-depth considerations.
 
In Scenario 1, transient combustible material fire in the 
northeast corner of the SWIS (Item 4 and Item ``Other'' of the 
revised Exemption Request 1-3), CFAST was used to calculate the 
maximum hot gas layer temperature and layer height above the 
floor. Localized target exposure temperatures to cable tray 
targets (Train A and Train B cables in the northeast corner) were 
calculated using thermal plume correlations. This simulation 
assumed there was no Kaowool fire barrier protecting the Train A 
or B cable trays. The results of the CFAST fire simulation for an 
MEFS indicate that the maximum hot gas layer temperature would be 
below the cable damage temperature and that there would be no 
significant radiant exposure to targets located in the SWIS.
 
Based on the fire modeling results, SNC concluded that the 
modeled SWIS targets would not be adversely impacted by an MEFS.
 
In Scenario 2, FNP, Unit 1 pump fire scenario (Item 9 of the 
revised Exemption Request 1-3), the effects of a lubricant oil 
pool fire, located between the FNP, Unit 1 Service Water pumps 
and the south wall of the SWIS were modeled. CFAST was used to 
calculate the maximum hot gas layer temperature and layer height 
above the floor, and thermal radiation heat transfer correlations 
were used to calculate target exposure to radiant heat flux. The 
targets evaluated in this scenario are cable trays (Train-A), 
using hot gas layer information from CFAST and pump motor 
junction boxes using thermal radiation from the heat transfer 
correlations. The results of the CFAST fire simulation indicate 
that the local targets on the Pump Deck would be immersed by the 
hot gas layer. However, the calculated hot gas layer temperature 
is lower than the damage temperature of the cable. The radiation 
heat transfer calculation shows that the fire originating from a 
lubricating oil spill could cause the incident heat flux at a 
second tier pump (i.e., pump adjacent to the pump where the spill 
occurs) or the Train A cable trays along the east wall to exceed 
critical heat flux levels; however, the duration of the fire is 
not sufficient for the flux to cause the target surface 
temperature to exceed the critical cable temperature based on the 
analysis using the HEATING7 model.
 
Therefore, based on this analysis at least one Service Water pump 
would not be adversely impacted by this fire scenario.
 
In Scenario 3, FNP, Unit 2 pump fire scenario (Item 9 of the 
revised Exemption Request 1-3), the effects of a lubricant oil 
pool fire, located between the FNP, Unit 2 Service Water pumps 
and the south wall of the SWIS were modeled. The targets 
evaluated in this scenario are pump motor junction
 
[[Page 49327]] boxes. There are no cable tray targets modeled in 
this fire scenario. Scenario 3 is bounded by Scenario 2 because 
the pumps on FNP, Unit 2 contain less oil and would define a fire 
of shorter duration than in Scenario 2. Therefore, based on this 
analysis at least one Service Water pump would not be adversely 
impacted by this fire scenario.
 
A sensitivity analysis was performed for Scenarios 1, 2, and 3 to 
demonstrate the sensitivity of the results of the calculations to 
variations in the MEFSs input parameters. The sensitivity 
analysis of the results to the assumptions regarding the 
composition of the transient fuel package and the impact of 
ventilation conditions in the SWIS was examined. The results 
clarify the degree of conservatism inherent in the calculation 
and the margin between the MEFS and the LFS. The calculations 
were compared over a parameter spread that included conditions 
that would result in failure of the target.
 
The licensee concluded that the sensitivity analysis demonstrates 
that the results and conclusions would not change with the 
exception of adjacent pump motor junction box targets. As a 
result, these targets are assumed to fail in the analysis.
 
Risk Assessment RG 1.174 specifies that the risk associated with 
a plant change be determined by considering the change in Core 
Damage Frequency (CDF) and Large Early Release Frequency (LERF) 
that result from the plant change. These changes in CDF and LERF 
are calculated by comparing the CDF and LERF values for the pre- 
and post-change locations within the fire area that will be 
affected by the change to ensure that all contributors to risk 
are included. Thus, the fire risk analysis focused only on 
elements of the SWIS that had been or were proposed to be changed 
from SNC's current licensing basis. These elements were 
associated with pump/motor lubricant fires (one for each pump or 
ten cases in all).
 
The FNP plant-specific Level 1 and Level 2 Probabilistic Risk 
Assessment (PRA) Model was used, with modifications, to evaluate 
the impacts on plant risk of postulated fires originating in the 
SWIS. The modifications involved two changes that are summarized 
below.
 
The analysis did not add any fire specific operator actions or 
recoveries to the base plant PRA Model.
 
The scope of analyses that were performed by SNC for the changes 
to Exemption Request 1-3 included a re-analysis of the service 
water system performance. SNC's re-analysis concluded that a 
single service water pump per unit was sufficient to satisfy the 
system performance requirements for fire protection safe 
shutdown. The re-analysis results were incorporated into the PRA 
Model by lowering the number of Service Water pumps per train 
required for system success from two to one. The total plant CDF 
from internal events that is reported below reflects this change 
in the success criterion.
 
The licensee modified the plant PRA model to take advantage of 
recent vendor data related to reactor coolant pump (RCP) seal 
performance. The specific data is related to seal performance 
given loss of motor bearing cooling. The licensee stated their 
model assumed increased seal leakage will begin at 15 minutes 
after loss of all RCP seal cooling based on information in 
WCAP-16141, ``RCP Seal Leakage PRA Model Implementation 
Guidelines for Westinghouse PWRs'' and that they credit recovery 
of RCP seal injection using the standby train of Component 
Cooling Water and charging through operator action done by 
procedures and performed from the main control room. Leakage due 
to loss of motor bearing cooling is an additional contribution to 
CDF with respect to the RCP seal loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) 
PRA model. When these two leakage models are combined, the 
resultant CDF contribution slightly exceeds that from an 
equivalent application via the Rhodes RCP seal LOCA model, i.e., 
it is conservative. The total plant CDF from internal events that 
is reported below reflects this change in the success criterion.
 
The performance of the PRA quantifications with the changes 
described above applied the same techniques and processes as used 
for the Fire IPEEE. This basically involved the setting of 
certain model basic events to ``TRUE'' by translating the fire 
modeling results for the MEFS into plant equipment damage states. 
SNC developed a fire ignition frequency for each fire scenario by 
partitioning the generic fire frequencies from the Electric Power 
Research Institute Fire Events Database. The resulting CDF for 
each of the fire scenarios was aggregated to obtain the 
cumulative risk for the proposed change. A separate calculation 
for the ``baseline'' CDF was not developed. Instead, the CDF for 
the changed configuration was taken as a conservative surrogate 
for the increase in risk.
 
The total plant CDF from internal events for FNP, Unit 1 and 2 is 
3.86E-05/yr and 5.81E-05/yr, respectively based on one Service 
Water pump as the success criterion. A comparison of the Fire 
IPEEE results with the internal events PRA results that were 
applicable at that time shows that the FNP, Unit 1 Fire CDF was 
approximately 20 percent higher than the corresponding FNP, Unit 
1 internal events CDF. This would result in an estimated total 
plant risk of 8.5E-05/yr. The FNP, Unit 2 Fire CDF was 
approximately 10 percent less than the corresponding Unit 2 
internal events CDF. This would result in an estimated total 
plant risk for FNP, Unit 2 of 1.1E-04/yr. The CDF and LERF for 
the changed configuration was taken as a conservative surrogate 
for the increase in risk, i.e. the baseline CDF and LERF was 
assumed to be zero such that delta CDF and LERF was 
conservatively estimated as the total CDF and total LERF for the 
changed contribution (no subtraction of baseline value). As a 
result, the licensee's risk analysis determined that a 
conservative estimate of the CDF associated with the ten cases 
would be approximately 6.5E-07/yr per unit. The licensee reports 
that the CDF for the cases ranged from 2.08E-08/yr per unit to 
1.34E-07/yr per unit with no one case dominating as a contributor 
relative to the rest. Based on the estimate for total CDF, this 
places the proposed change in Region III of the RG 1.174 
acceptance criteria for CDF. In order to gain further insights, 
the fire areas that were the dominant contributors to risk from 
the Fire IPEEE were requantified using the current plant PRA 
model. This re-quantification of dominant fire areas provided a 
cumulative CDF of 4.98E-05/yr and 5.87E-05/yr for FNP, Units 1 
and 2, respectively. Using these updated values, the estimated 
total plant risk for FNP, Units 1 and 2 is 8.84E-05/yr and 
1.17E-04/yr, respectively. The licensee stated that the 
contribution to LERF from a SWIS fire is the result of core 
damage combined with failure of containment isolation. The 
conditional probability of containment isolation failure 
(crediting only check valves and fail closed air-operated valves) 
is 2.13E-4. The licensee stated that this resulted in a total 
LERF contribution from the seven SWIS fire scenarios analyzed for 
FNP, Unit 1 of 1.38E-10/yr per unit. This indicates the same LERF 
for FNP, Unit 2 since both units have the same CDF. SNC concluded 
that the LERF associated with the proposed change is negligible 
given the acceptance criteria of RG 1.174. RG 1.174, Section 2 
also requires consideration of five key principles that the 
change is expected to
 
[[Page 49328]] meet. SNC concluded that all of the five 
principles have been met.
 
Defense-in-Depth 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, section II states 
that a licensee's fire protection program extend the concept of 
defense-in-depth to fire protection with the following 
objectives: I. To prevent fires from starting, II. To detect 
rapidly, control, and extinguish promptly those fires that do 
occur, and III. To provide protection for structures, systems and 
components important to safety so that a fire that is not 
promptly extinguished by the fire suppression activities will not 
prevent the safe shutdown of the plant.
 
RG1.174 also identifies factors to be considered when evaluating 
defense-in-depth for a risk-informed change.
 
SNC has evaluated defense-in-depth and stated the following: Fire 
prevention is strengthened by SNC's commitment to enhance the 
transient combustible control program in the SWIS northeast 
corner and in the vicinity of the Service Water pumps.
 
SNC proposes no changes to the existing fire detection and 
automatic fire suppression systems in the SWIS and will continue 
to control these systems to maintain defense-in-depth. Protection 
for structures, systems and components is weakened by the 
elimination of the reliance on the Kaowool fire barrier in the 
northeast corner of the SWIS and the strainer pit. However, the 
elimination of the reliance on Kaowool has been evaluated by SNC 
in accordance with RG 1.174 or by deterministic re-analysis. 
Protection for structures, systems and components is strengthened 
by reducing the population of equipment requiring protection due 
to deterministic re-analyses (i.e., single Service Water pump and 
motor operated valve circuit analysis) and plant modifications 
(FNP, Unit 2 elimination of lube and cooling pumps); and by 
modifying the existing barriers between the pump deck and 
switchgear rooms and between disconnect switch rooms to 3-hour 
fire rated barriers; and by installing a floor curb on the FNP, 
Unit 1 side of the pump deck to limit fire exposure to the Train 
A cables along the east wall.
 
Safety Margins RG 1.174 provides acceptable guidelines to ensure 
sufficient safety margins are maintained. RG 1.174 states that 
the proposed change provide sufficient margin to account for 
analysis and data uncertainty. The licensee concluded that for 
Scenario 1, a heat release rate to four times that modeled in the 
MEFS is needed to reach the LFS; for Scenario 2 an increase in 
combustible oil lubricant volume of 75 percent for a C-pump fire 
scenario and an increase four times the volume of combustible oil 
lubricant for an A-,B-,D-or E-pump fire scenario are needed to 
reach the LFS; and for Scenario 3 a minimum increase five times 
the volume of combustible oil lubricant to reach the LFS.
 
SNC addressed uncertainty for Exemption Request 1-3, Item 9 and 
Item ``Other'' by considering the degree to which the fire 
models/ calculations used bound the uncertainty in the input 
parameters.
 
The licensee conducted an evaluation on the input parameters and 
concluded that the models/calculations that were used bounded the 
uncertainty except for the limiting oxygen index (LOI) parameter. 
However, the licensee concluded that the LOI assumption below a 
certain threshold is not possible for the temperatures predicted 
and is therefore not credible.
 
Uncertainty was further addressed by determining an LFS for each 
fire scenario. The LFS was determined by increasing one or more 
of the parameters that characterize the fire used for the MEFS 
until a failure condition is attained.
 
A sensitivity analysis was also conducted to determine that the 
conclusions would not be altered. In the case of the SWIS fire 
scenarios, sensitivity was conducted on the natural and forced 
ventilation conditions, the composition of the transient Class A 
fuel package (for Scenario 1) and the absorptance of the targets. 
As a result of the sensitivity analysis, SNC determined that some 
adjacent pump motor targets could be heated to the critical 
temperature.
 
SNC then conservatively concluded that these targets would fail 
despite the results of the MEFS to the contrary. SNC concluded 
that other targets were not affected.
 
Evaluation of Exemption Request 1-3 Items The NRC staff examined 
the licensee's submittals to determine if the revised Exemption 
Request 1-3 in Fire Area 72 of the SWIS would meet the underlying 
purpose of the 10 CFR part 50, appendix R rule.
 
The NRC staff has evaluated each of the revised items of 
Exemption Request 1-3 on a case by case basis by ensuring 
adherence to the fire modeling approach discussed in NFPA 805, 
ensuring that RG 1.174 criteria are met, assessing that a 
reasonable balance among the elements of defense-in-depth is 
maintained, and ensuring safety margins are maintained, where 
appropriate.
 
Item 1 SNC proposes to implement modifications to each of the 
five FNP, Unit 2 service water pumps by December 2006 that will 
result in removing the need for the redundant lubricating oil and 
coolant pumps, valves and control stations for FNP, Unit 2. The 
licensee concluded that modifications will eliminate the need to 
consider fire-induced impacts from a fire on the FNP, Unit 2 
lubricating oil and coolant pumps, valves and their control 
stations as well as removing these pumps as ignition sources and 
combustible loadings. Based on the plant modifications, SNC 
concluded that the conditions of Exemption Request 1-3, Item 1 
will no longer be applicable following completion of those plant 
modifications. On these bases, the NRC staff concludes that, upon 
completion of the modifications to the pumps as discussed above, 
there will be no further need for the exemption provided in the 
first paragraph of Section 2.3 of the NRC staff's December 29, 
1986, exemption and, accordingly, it would be deleted.
 
Item 2: FNP, Unit 2 Side of Strainer Pit For the strainer inlet 
valves and swing pump discharge valves in the FNP, Unit 2 side of 
the strainer pit, SNC stated in its December 28, 2004, response 
to question 26 and in its June 9, 2005, response to question 2, 
that it had performed a deterministic re-analysis on the cables 
for these valves. SNC's review of the circuitry located in the 
strainer pit determined that spurious operation of the valves 
could not result if the power cables to the valve motors and 
control cables to the valve position switches were subjected to 
hot shorts, open circuits, or shorts to ground. SNC stated that 
power is removed during normal operation from swing service water 
pump discharge valves Q2P16V507-A and Q2P16V506-B and that 
spurious operation of the valves due to a 3-phase hot short does 
not require evaluation in accordance with the guidance in Generic 
Letter 86-10, Section 5.3.1. SNC stated that the main and control 
power to strainer inlet valves Q2P16V511-A and Q2P16V508-B is not 
isolated during normal operation and that open circuits or short 
circuits will not result in spurious operation of the valves and 
that a 3-phase hot short does not require evaluation in 
accordance with the guidance in Generic Letter 86-10, Section 
5.3.1. The licensee further states that for the control cables to 
limit switches, hot shorts, open circuits or shorts to ground 
could not result in
 
[[Page 49329]] spurious operation because the cables do not 
contain the conductors necessary to energize the motor starters 
due to open control room switch contacts. Based on SNC's 
analysis, SNC concluded that reliance on Kaowool as part of the 
basis for Exemption Request 1-3, Item 2 is no longer necessary. 
The NRC staff concludes that on the basis of SNC's 
deterministic-based findings that the valves will not be 
repositioned due to a fire, the fire detection and suppression 
features for Fire Area 72A and the defense-in-depth measures as 
discussed above, that a continued exemption from the requirements 
of appendix R, section III.G.2.c for this item is acceptable. 
Item 3: FNP, Unit 1 side of strainer pit For the strainer inlet 
valves and swing pump discharge valves in the FNP, Unit 1 side of 
the strainer pit, SNC stated in its December 28, 2004, response 
to question 26 and in its June 9, 2005, response to question 2, 
that it had performed a deterministic re-analysis on the cables 
for these valves. SNC's review of the circuitry located in the 
strainer pit determined that spurious operation of the valves 
could not result if the power cables to the valve motors and 
control cables to the valve position switches were subjected to 
hot shorts, open circuits, or shorts to ground. SNC stated that 
power is removed during normal operation from swing service water 
pump discharge valves Q1P16V507-A and Q1P16V506-B and that 
spurious operation of the valves due to a 3-phase hot short does 
not require evaluation in accordance with the guidance in Generic 
Letter 86-10, Section 5.3.1. SNC stated that the main and control 
power to strainer inlet valves Q1P16V511-A and Q1P16V508-B is not 
isolated during normal operation and that open circuits or short 
circuits will not result in spurious operation of the valves and 
that a 3-phase hot short does not require evaluation in 
accordance with the guidance in Generic Letter 86-10, Section 
5.3.1. The licensee further states that for the control cables to 
limit switches, hot shorts, open circuits or shorts to ground 
could not result in spurious operation because the cables do not 
contain the conductors necessary to energize the motor starters 
due to open control room switch contacts. Based on SNC's 
analysis, SNC concluded that reliance on Kaowool as part of the 
basis for Exemption Request 1-3, Item 3 is no longer necessary. 
The NRC staff concludes that on the basis of SNC's 
deterministic-based findings that the valves will not be 
repositioned due to a fire, the fire detection and suppression 
features for Fire Area 72A and the defense-in-depth measures as 
discussed above, that a continued exemption from the requirements 
of Appendix R, Section III.G.2.c for this item is acceptable. 
Item 4: Discharge Valves to Wet Pit and Storage Pond Flume For 
Fire Zone 72A, SNC performed a deterministic re-analysis on the 
redundant safe shutdown service water Train A and Train B cables, 
associated with service water discharge to the wet pit and 
storage pond flume, shared by Unit 1 and Unit 2. The December 29, 
1986, exemption, page 11, first paragraph, reflected SNC's 
original finding that there was a potential for these valves to 
be mis-positioned by fire effects and that this could be 
acceptably dealt with by manually realigning the valves, if 
needed, within a required 24-hour period. SNC's submittals, 
specifically its June 9, 2005, submittal states that the main and 
control power to valves QSP16V505-A, QSP16V507-A, QSP16V506-B and 
QSP16V508-B is not isolated during normal operation and that open 
circuits or short circuits will not result in spurious operation 
of the valves and that a 3-phase hot short does not require 
evaluation in accordance with the guidance in Generic Letter 
86-10, Section 5.3.1. SNC further states that for the control 
cables to limit switches, hot shorts, open circuits or shorts to 
ground could not result in spurious operation because the cables 
do not contain the conductors necessary to energize the motor 
starters due to open control room switch contacts. For the 
control cables to control room switches and other interlocks, the 
licensee concluded from its deterministic analysis that hot 
shorts could result in spurious operation of the valves. However, 
the licensee used fire modeling, as discussed in the section 
above on the modeling of fire scenarios, to demonstrate that fire 
induced cable damage from a fire could not result in spurious 
operation of both trains of valves and that there would not be a 
need to perform the long-term manual operator actions previously 
relied upon. Based on SNC's analysis, SNC concluded that reliance 
on Kaowool as part of the basis for Exemption Request 1-3, Item 4 
is no longer necessary. The NRC staff concludes that on the basis 
of SNC's deterministic and fire modeling analysis results as 
discussed above, the fire detection and suppression features for 
Fire Area 72, defense-in-depth measures as discussed above, and 
enhanced combustible controls, that a continued exemption from 
the requirements of appendix R, section III.G.2.c for this item 
is acceptable.
 
Items 5 and 6: Swing Service Water Pumps SNC's compliance 
strategy is unchanged for these two items. Therefore, the 
previous portion of the exemption issued on page 11, paragraphs 
two and three, of the December 29, 1986, exemption is unchanged 
and remains in effect. Accordingly, there is no further 
consideration in this Safety Evaluation for this item.
 
Item 7: Swing Service Water Pump Cables in Fire Zones 72D and 72E 
SNC states in its August 28, 2003, submittal that the current 
exemption and its bases (included on page 11, last paragraph, and 
page 12, first paragraph of the December 29, 2005, exemption) 
remain unchanged because they do not involve Kaowool. The 
previous conditions for this item discussed in the NRC letter 
dated December 29, 1986, remain unchanged and there is no further 
consideration in this safety evaluation of those conditions. 
However, SNC has committed to implement plant modifications that 
will upgrade certain fire barriers to 3-hour fire ratings as 
previously discussed in this exemption. The creation of the three 
hour fire barriers will enhance the overall defense-in-depth of 
the SWIS.
 
Item 8: Swing Service Water Pump Cables in Fire Zones 72B and 72C 
SNC states in its August 28, 2003, submittal that the current 
exemption and its bases (included on page 12, second paragraph, 
of the December 29, 2005, exemption) remain unchanged because 
they do not involve Kaowool. The previous condition for this item 
discussed in the NRC letter dated December 29, 1986, remains 
unchanged and there is no further consideration in this safety 
evaluation of those conditions. However, SNC has committed to 
implement plant modifications that will upgrade certain fire 
barriers to 3-hour fire ratings as previously discussed in this 
exemption. The creation of the 3-hour fire barriers will enhance 
the overall defense-in-depth of the SWIS.
 
Item 9: Raceways for Train A Service Water Pumps The exemption 
for service water pumps that was included on page 12, third 
paragraph of the December 29, 1986, exemption was based, in part, 
on the raceways servicing the Train A service water pumps for 
both units being protected with a Kaowool blanket
 
[[Page 49330]] fire barrier. SNC performed an evaluation for 
these raceways using a combined fire modeling and risk assessment 
analysis approach to revise the conditions for Exemption Request 
1-3, Item 9. This approach does not take any credit for the 
Kaowool fire barrier and is addressed in the above Fire Modeling 
section discussion of scenarios 2 and 3.
 
Based on SNC's Fire Modeling analysis, SNC concluded that at 
least one service water pump would not be adversely impacted by 
this fire scenario. As discussed in the above Risk Assessment 
section, SNC has also concluded that a single service water pump 
per unit is sufficient to satisfy the system performance 
requirements for fire protection. The NRC staff concludes that on 
the basis of SNC's deterministic and fire modeling analysis 
results as discussed above, the fire detection and suppression 
features for Fire Area 72, defense-in-depth measures as discussed 
above, and enhanced combustible controls, that a continued 
exemption from the requirements of appendix R, section III.G.2.c 
for this item is acceptable.
 
Addendum to Exemption Request 1-3, Fire Area 72
SNC included an Addendum to Exemption Request 1-3 in its
October 
18, 1985, submittal wherein SNC noted that adequate coordination
was 
not provided between certain safe shutdown and non-safe shutdown 
circuits. The December 29, 1986, exemption noted that a design
change 
had been initiated to improve breaker coordination, which would 
eliminate the concern. SNC's August 28, 2003, submittal stated
that the 
design change had been completed. Accordingly, the NRC staff
finds that 
the conditions requiring the exemption item that begins with the
last 
paragraph of page 12 of the December 29, 1986, exemption are no
longer 
present and, accordingly, this part of the exemption is no
longer 
necessary.
 
SWIS Northeast Corner Raceways
SNC stated in its August 23, 2003, submittal that in
addition to 
the nine situations that were addressed in the exemption issued
on 
December 29, 1986, that it had also considered the FNP, Units 1
and 2 
redundant Train A and Train B cables near the ceiling of the
northeast 
corner of the SWIS. The northeast corner of the SWIS includes a 
``pinch-point'' where FNP, Units 1 and 2 Train A and Train B
cables 
approach each other as they run along perpendicular walls from
the 
corner. The cables are 20 feet above the strainer pit floor. SNC 
performed an evaluation using fire modeling as discussed in the
above 
Fire Modeling section, scenario one, to support the addition of
this 
condition to the exemptions for Fire Area 72. Based on the fire 
modeling results, SNC concluded that the cables would not be
adversely 
impacted by an SNC's analysis to support this exemption item and
SNC's 
program modifications, SNC concluded that it is unlikely the
cables of 
interest would be damaged by a maximum expected fire scenario.
 
The NRC 
staff concludes that on the basis of SNC's fire modeling
analysis 
results as discussed above, the fire detection and suppression
features 
for Fire Area 72, defense-in-depth measures as discussed above,
and 
enhanced combustible controls, that an exemption from the
requirements 
of Appendix R, Section III.G.2.c for this item is acceptable.
Modifications
SNC will implement programmatic and design modifications as 
outlined in letters dated August 28, 2003, and December 28,
2004. These 
modifications include: (1) Modification of the FNP, Unit 2
service 
water pumps to eliminate their reliance on lubrication and
cooling 
support pumps, (2) upgrading of the nominal 18-inch concrete
wall 
between Fire Zone 72A and Fire Zones 72B, C, D and E to meet the 
requirements of FNP's Fire Protection Program for a minimum
3-hour fire 
area boundary. Penetrations will be sealed, un-rated doors will
be 
replaced by 3-hour rated fire doors, and three new fire areas
will be 
defined, 72A, 72B/72C and 72D/72E. In addition, the scope of the 
barrier surveillance program will be enhanced to ensure that the 
conditions of the risk-informed, performance-based assessment
are 
maintained, (3) installation of a new floor curb on the FNP,
Unit 1 
pump deck to prevent liquid spill fires associated with the FNP,
Unit 1 
pumps from pooling beneath the Train A cable tray located near
the east 
wall, (4) specific transient combustible controls will be
implemented 
to restrict transient combustibles from being stored or located
in the 
SWIS northeast corner and in the vicinity of the service water
pumps. 
Configuration control will be maintained (from a fire protection 
program perspective) over the type and quantity of lubrication
oil used 
in the service water pump motors. Precautions will be
implemented to 
limit the amount of lubricant in the vicinity of the service
water 
pumps during lubricant changes by removing the drained lubricant
from 
the area prior to bringing the new (unused) lubricant into Fire
Zone 
72A. Transient fuel packages associated with maintenance
activities 
will be controlled via procedural changes, and (5) SNC
identified eight 
low-voltage PVC/PVC cables in a tray along the north and west
wall that 
are thermoplastic. SNC stated that portions of the cable will be 
removed to meet the fire model analysis.
 
The evaluation that SNC prepared assesses the impact of the
change. 
This evaluation uses a combination of risk-insights and
deterministic 
methods to show that sufficient safety margins and
defense-in-depth are 
maintained.
 
The results of the risk-informed portions of the analysis
are 
consistent with a change that would be acceptable when compared
to the 
acceptance criteria described in RG 1.174, ``An Approach for
Using 
Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Risk-Informed Decisions on
Plant-
Specific Changes to the Licensing Basis,'' Revision 1.
 
The NRC staff examined SNC's rationale to support the
changes to 
Exemption Request 1-3 and concludes that adequate defense in
depth and 
safety margins exist and that the underlying purpose of Appendix
R, 
Section III.G.2.c is met. Fire modeling demonstrates that it is 
unlikely that the cables of interest in the northeast corner
will be 
damaged by a fire and that at least one service water pump for
each 
unit will not be damaged by a fire. Also, fire detection and
automatic 
fire suppression systems in the areas of interest remain to
provide 
defense-in-depth. Based upon the above considerations, the NRC
staff 
concludes that the revisions to Exemption Request 1-3 meet the 
underlying purpose of the rule. Therefore, the NRC staff
concludes that 
pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2) this exemption is acceptable.
4.0 Conclusion
Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to
10 CFR 
50.12(a), the changes to Exemption Request 1-3 are authorized by
law, 
will not present an undue risk to the public health and safety,
and are 
consistent with the common defense and security. Also, special 
circumstances are present. Therefore, the Commission hereby
grants SNC 
a revised exemption 1-3 from the requirements of appendix R,
section 
III.G.2.c to 10 CFR Part 50 to provide 1-hour fire separation in
Fire 
Area 72 for the FNP, Units 1 and 2, subject to the full
implementation 
of the programmatic and plant design modifications discussed
above. 
Acceptance of this revised Exemption Request 1-3 is based on the 
programmatic and plant design modifications, the deterministic
re-
analyses, the risk-informed plant change evaluation and its
results 
specific to the
 
[[Page 49331]]
SWIS, enhanced controls on transient combustibles, the existing
fire 
detection and automatic fire suppression capability to maintain 
defense-in-depth, and the availability of manual fire fighting
and 
associated fire fighting equipment.
 
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commission has determined that
the 
granting of this exemption will not have a significant effect on
the 
quality of the human environment (70 FR 46892).
 
This exemption is effective upon issuance.
 
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 16th day of August, 2005.
 
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
 
Ledyard B. Marsh,
Director, Division of Licensing Project Management, Office of
Nuclear 
Reactor Regulation.
 
[FR Doc. E5-4597 Filed 8-22-05; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P

 
*****************************************************************
 14 Reuters: Constellation's NY Nine Mile 1 nuke back at 100 pct

Tue Aug 23, 2005 7:33 AM ET

 NEW YORK, Aug 23 (Reuters) - Constellation Energy Group Inc.'s 
(CEG.N: Quote, Profile, Research) 620-megawatt unit 1 at the Nine 
Mile Point nuclear power station in New York returned to full 
power by early Tuesday, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
said in a report.

 On Monday, the unit was operating at 50 percent of capacity 
after exiting an outage that had begun on Aug. 18.

 The 1,755 MW Nine Mile Point station is in Scriba, in Oswego 
County, about 90 miles east of Rochester, New York. There are two 
units at the station: the 620 MW unit 1 and the 1,135 MW unit 2.

 Unit 2 continued to operate at full power.

 One MW powers about 800 homes, according to North American 
averages.

 Baltimore-based Constellation, which owns all of unit 1, 
operates the station for its owners. Constellation (82 percent) 
and Long Island Power Authority (18 percent) own unit 2.

 Constellation's subsidiaries own and operate more than 12,000 MW 
of generating capacity, market energy commodities in North 
America, and transmit and distribute electricity (1.2 million) 
and natural gas (600,000) to customers in Maryland.                                             

� Reuters 2005. 
All Rights Reserved.                    
 			
*****************************************************************
 15 Reuters: Ariz. Palo Verde 2 nuke shut 

Tue Aug 23, 2005 7:57 AM ET


 NEW YORK, Aug 23 (Reuters) - Arizona Public Service started to 
shut the 1,335-megawatt unit 2 at the Palo Verde nuclear power 
station in Arizona on Aug. 22 due to a problem with the core 
protection calculator system software, the operator told the U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission in an event report.

 The shutdown did not result in the release of radioactivity to 
the environment or adversely affect the safe operation of the 
plant or health or safety of the public, the company said in the 
report. In addition, the company said the electric grid is 
stable.

 On Monday, the unit was operating at full power.

 The 3,875 MW Palo Verde station is located in Wintersburg in 
Maricopa County, about 50 miles west of Phoenix. There are three 
units at Palo Verde: the 1,243 MW unit 1, the 1,335 MW unit 2 and 
the 1,247 MW unit 3.

 Unit 1 remained shut since Aug. 12 due to a problem with an 
emergency diesel generator. The unit was in start-up on Aug. 17 
when operators found an oil leak. The operators now expect the 
unit to return later this week.

 Unit 3, meanwhile, continued to operate at 99 percent.

 One MW powers about 800 homes, according to North American 
averages.

 Phoenix-based energy company Pinnacle West Capital Corp.'s 
(PNW.N: Quote, Profile, Research) regulated Arizona Public 
Service subsidiary operates the station for its owners.

 The owners include APS (29.1 percent), the Salt River Project 
(17.5 percent), Edison International's (EIX.N: Quote, Profile, 
Research) Southern California Edison Co. subsidiary (15.8 
percent), El Paso Electric Co. (EE.N: Quote, Profile, Research) 
(15.8 percent), PNM Resources Inc.'s (PNM.N: Quote, Profile, 
Research) Public Service Co of New Mexico subsidiary (10.2 
percent), Southern California Public Power Authority (5.9 
percent) and the Los Angeles Department of Water & Power (5.7 
percent).                                               

� Reuters 2005. 
All Rights Reserved.                    
*****************************************************************
 16 NRC: Sunshine Act Meeting Notice
 
                        FR Doc 05-16777 
[Federal Register: August 23, 2005 (Volume 70, Number 162)] 
[Notices] [Page 49331] From the Federal Register Online via GPO 
Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr23au05-117]                         
 
AGENCY HOLDING THE MEETINGS: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
 
DATE: Weeks of August 22, 29, and September 5, 12, 19, 26, 2005.
 
PLACE: Commissioners' Conference Room, 11555 Rockville Pike, 
Rockville, Maryland.
 
STATUS: Public and Closed.
 
MATTERS TO BE CONSIDERED: Week of August 22, 2005 There are no 
meetings scheduled for the Week of August 22, 2005.
 
Week of August 29, 2005--Tentative There are no meetings 
scheduled for the Week of August 29, 2005.
 
Week of September 5, 2005--Tentative Wednesday, September 7, 
2005: 9 a.m.--Discussion of Security Issues (Closed--Ex. 1). 1:30 
p.m.--Discussion of Security Issues (Closed--Ex. 3). Week of 
September 12, 2005--Tentative There are no meetings scheduled for 
the Week of September 12, 2005.
 
Week of September 19, 2005--Tentative There are no meetings 
scheduled for the Week of September 19, 2005.
 
Week of September 26, 2005--Tentative There are no meetings 
scheduled for the Week of September 26, 2005.
 
The schedule for Commission meetings is subject to change on 
short notice. To verify the status of meetings call 
(recording)--(301) 415- 1292. Contact person for more 
information: Michelle Schroll, (301) 415- 1662.
 
The NRC Commission Meeting Schedule can be found on the Internet 
at: http://www.nrc.gov/what-we-do/policy-making/schedule.html. 
The NRC provides reasonable accommodation to individuals with 
disabilities where appropriate. If you need a reasonable 
accommodation to participate in these public meetings, or need 
this meeting notice or the transcript or other information from 
the public meetings in another format (e.g., braille, large 
print), please notify the NRC's Disability Program Coordinator, 
August Spector, at (301) 415-7080, TDD: (301) 415- 2100, or by 
e-mail at aks@nrc.gov. Determinations on requests for reasonable 
accommodation will be made on a case-by-case basis.
 
This notice is distributed by mail to several hundred 
subscribers; if you no longer wish to receive it, or would like 
to be added to the distribution, please contact the Office of the 
Secretary, Washington, DC 20555 (301-415-1969). In addition, 
distribution of this meeting notice over the Internet system is 
available. If you are interested in receiving this Commission 
meeting schedule electronically, please send an electronic 
message to dkw@nrc.gov. Dated: August 18, 2005.
 
Dave Gamberoni, Office of the Secretary.
 
[FR Doc. 05-16777 Filed 8-19-05; 10:22 am] BILLING CODE 7590-01-M

 
*****************************************************************
 17 NRC: NRC to Hold Public Meeting August 31 on License Application for Hawaiian Commercial
Irradiator

News Release - Region IV - 2005-03
 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 

Office of Public Affairs, Region IV
  No. IV-05-030           August 23. 2005   
  CONTACT:     Victor Dricks
Phone: 817-860-8128
     E-mail: opa4@nrc.gov  
  

agency will review the application submitted by Pa'ina Hawaii,
LLC, a Hawaiian owned company, to build and operate an
underwater pool-type commercial irradiator near the Honolulu
International Airport. 

The meeting will begin at 7 p.m. at the Ala Moana Hotel, 410
Atkinson Drive. The purpose of the meeting is for the NRC staff
to provide information on the process that will be used to
review the application submitted by Pa'ina Hawaii on June 27. 

The device would primarily be used for the irradiation of fresh
fruit and vegetables bound for the mainland from the Hawaiian
islands. During use, materials to be irradiated are loaded into
a stainless steel chamber, then lowered into a water-filled pool
where they are exposed to radiation. The company also plans to
irradiate cosmetics and pharmaceutical products, conduct
research and development activities and irradiate a wide range
of other materials as specifically approved by the NRC. 

This will be the first of several public meetings the NRC staff
plans to hold in Hawaii to enhance public awareness of the
agencys independent regulatory role in protecting public health
and safety and the environment, solicit public comments on the
irradiator application, and encourage public involvement in the
regulatory process. 

"The NRC staff looks forward to meeting with members of the
community and explaining the process we will use in reviewing
this license application," said Region IV Administrator Bruce S.
Mallett. 

A copy of the license application (with security-sensitive
information redacted) will be available through the NRCs
Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS). Use
ADAMS number ML052060372. Help in using ADAMS is available by
contacting the NRC Public Document Room staff at 1-800-397-4209,
or by sending a message to: pdr@nrc.gov. 

In addition, copies of the application will be available for
inspection at the Honolulu Public Library and the library of the
University of Hawaii.   



  


 	Last revised Tuesday, August 23, 2005 	   
*****************************************************************
 18 DailyBulletin.com: Toxins found at Norco schools

www.dailybulletin.com

Article Published: Monday, August 22, 2005 -
 		   	 	
State to conduct more testing

By Sara A. Carter, Staff Writer

NORCO - Low levels of cancer-causing chemicals have been found
at three school sites near Wyle Laboratories, state officials
announced Monday.

 The state Department of Toxic Substances Control, which is
overseeing cleanup efforts at the former Defense Department and
aerospace industry contractor, detected low levels of
trichloroethylene (TCE), perchlorate and vinyl chloride at Norco
High School, Norco Intermediate School and Norco Elementary.

 And though state officials said the contaminate levels were not
high enough to warrant closing the schools, more testing will be
conducted to ensure the safety of students and teachers.

 "Right now, based on the information we have, there is no
immediate health impact," said Peter Garcia, branch chief with
the department's site mitigation program. "We are concerned that
we did get detection, and we want to continue to follow up to
make sure it stays safe." 

He added that a community meeting set for tonight in the
Corona-Norco Unified School District's Learning Center meeting
room will address residents' concerns.

 But one community activist wants no less than to keep closed
all three schools, which are set to open Sept. 6, until further
testing determines the extent of contamination and a thorough
cleanup is completed.

 Resident Larry Jenkins, whose daughter attended Norco High
decades ago and contracted a rare thyroid condition, blames Wyle
for widespread contamination and illness throughout the
community.

 "These are kids we're talking about," Jenkins said.

 In the 1950s and '60s, Wyle Labs developed various products for
the defense industry, including rocket motors and electronic
components, many of which it tested at the 425-acre Norco
facility.

 Concern about school site testing spiked in April after
perchlorate was detected at 27 parts per billion in groundwater
from a well in the 1100 block of First Street, near Temescal
Avenue.

 The state Office of Enviornmental Health Hazard Assessment in
March 2004 mandated that perchlorate levels in drinking water
should not exceed 6 parts per billion.

 Research has shown that perchlorate can lead to disruption in
thyroid functioning, which regulates metabolism and growth.

 The well, with the highest level of perchlorate found yet, is
down the street from Norco Elementary, Norco Intermediate and
Norco High - all on Temescal.

 On July 28, the state began contamination testing on the school
sites, where dozens of water, soil-gas and air samples were
taken from the three campuses. 

Dr. Bill Bosin, an environmental toxicologist with the
department, said one area of Norco High contained the highest
levels of chemical contamination of the three school sites.

 On the north end of campus adjacent to the baseball field,
water samples showed elevated levels of TCE, he said.

 However, the risk of exposure to cancer-causing agents remains
extremely low, Bosin added.

 For example, he said a teacher working 40 years at the site
with the highest detected contamination has a one in a million
chance of developing cancer.

 "It's a pretty small risk," Bosin said. "But we are taking a
precautionary approach and we are calling Wyle to do more
testing."

 Indeed, the state has requested that Wyle continue to fund
testing at the three school sites to monitor chemical levels and
ensure that no other areas are contaminated, Garcia said.

 The area qualifies as a Superfund site, a designation declaring
it among the most polluted locations in the country.

 A group of concerned residents initially called attention to
radiological materials used at the site in 2001. The grass-roots
Involved Neighbors Seeking Information, Safety and Truth, or
INSIST, continues to lobby local, county and federal officials
to focus on pollution from Wyle Labs.

 IF YOU GO

 What: Wyle Labs open house and public meeting

 When: Today 

Time: Open House, 5:30 p.m. Residents can speak with state
experts. Public Meeting, 7 p.m. Where: Corona-Norco Unified
School District, 2820 Clark Ave., Learning Center South Meeting
Room, Norco 

Sara A. Carter can be reached by e-mail at
sara.carter@dailybulletin.com or by phone at (909) 483-8552.

Copyright � 2005 Los Angeles Newspaper Group     
*****************************************************************
 19 Washington Times: Religion helped workers speak up 

By Julia Duin
THE WASHINGTON TIMES
August 22, 2005                                                                                  

Recent news accounts on the ethics of whistleblowing have left
out one major reason some government employees tell all --
religion. 

    Call it faith-based whistleblowing. 

    Joe Carson, a nuclear safety engineer at the Oak Ridge
National Laboratory in Tennessee, said it was his Christian
worldview that impelled him to blow the whistle 19 times since
1990 on workplace and public-safety hazards at the Department of
Energy, guardian of the nation's nuclear stockpile. 

    "Whistleblowers are thinking of what's good for others, not
just looking out for number one," said Mr. Carson, 51. 

    "If society wants to constrain evil, they license certain
professionals to do so," he said, "and I have a legal duty as a
licensed professional engineer to blow whistles. Either you look
the other way or confront what you believe is wrong." 

    Jesselyn Radack, a former ethics attorney for the Department
of Justice and a member of Temple Sinai, a Reform synagogue in
Northwest, said Exodus 23:2 persuaded her to blow the whistle in
the case of "American Taliban" John Walker Lindh. 

    The verse, "Do not follow a multitude to do wrong. You shall
not give perverse testimony in a dispute so as to pervert it in
favor of the mighty," was the central theme in her 1984 bat
mitzvah, a coming-of-age ceremony for Jewish girls. 

    It came to mind on Dec. 7, 2001, when she advised Justice's
criminal division not to interrogate Lindh without an attorney
present. Lindh's father had already retained counsel for his
son. 

    When the FBI did so anyway, while claiming Lindh's rights
had been respected, a federal judge began looking into the
matter. When Mrs. Radack learned that e-mails concerning the
case were missing from her files, she retrieved them from her
computer hard drive and gave copies to Newsweek magazine. 

    "I'm not a Bible thumper that goes around quoting
Scripture," she said. "But after September 11, there was such an
outcry to get the terrorists dead or alive. What bothered me was
the cutting of corners and the taking of shortcuts. In the DOJ's
ethics division, it was important to cut straight corners." 

    Calls for comment to the Department of Justice and its
Office of Special Counsel, created to protect federal
whistleblowers, were not returned. 

    Mrs. Radack, who will be the keynote speaker Sept. 23 at a
Whistleblowers for an Honest, Efficient and Accountable
Government convention at the Watergate Hotel, said she's spent
$50,000 in attorney's fees defending herself. 
*****************************************************************
 20 DHHS: CDC: Worker's Radiation Health Board

                        FR Doc 05-16635 
[Federal Register: August 23, 2005 (Volume 70, Number 162)] 
[Notices] [Page 49282] From the Federal Register Online via GPO 
Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr23au05-81]                         

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention
 
Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker Health: Notice of Charter 
Renewal

    This gives notice under the Federal Advisory Committee Act 
(Pub. L. 92-463) of October 6, 1972, that the Advisory Board on 
Radiation and Worker Health, Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention of the Department of Health and Human Services, has 
been renewed for a 2-year period extending through August 3, 
2007.

    For further information, contact: Lewis Wade, Executive 
Secretary, Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker Health, Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention of the Department of Health 
and Human Services, HHH Building, 200 Independence Avenue, SW., 
Room 715-H, M/S P-12, Washington, DC 20201. Telephone 
202/401-2192, fax 202/260-4464, e-mail LOW0@cdc.gov.

    The Director, Management and Analysis and Services Office, 
has been delegated the authority to sign Federal Register notices 
pertaining to announcements of meetings and other committee 
management activities, for both the Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention and the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease 
Registry.

    Dated: August 16, 2005. Alvin Hall, Director, Management 
Analysis and Services Office, Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention. [FR Doc. 05-16635 Filed 8-22-05; 8:45 am] BILLING 
CODE 4163-18-P
 
*****************************************************************
 21 DHHS: CDC: NIOSH worker safety board

                        FR Doc 05-16637 
[Federal Register: August 23, 2005 (Volume 70, Number 162)]
[Notices]               
[Page 49288-49289] From the Federal Register Online via GPO 
Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr23au05-83]                         

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention
 
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health Advisory 
Board on Radiation and Worker Health

    In accordance with section 10(a)(2) of the Federal Advisory 
Committee Act (Pub. L. 92-463), the Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention (CDC) announces the following committee meeting:

    Name: Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker Health (ABRWH), 
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) and 
Subcommittee for Dose Reconstruction and Site Profile Reviews, 
ABRWH.

    Subcommittee Meeting Time and Date: 10 a.m.-5 p.m., CT, 
August 24, 2005.

    Committee Meeting Times and Dates: 8:30 a.m.-5 p.m., CT, 
August 25, 2005. 8:30 a.m.-4:30 p.m., CT, August 26, 2005.

    Place: Westin St. Louis Hotel, 811 Spruce Street, St. Louis, 
Missouri, telephone 314-621-2000, fax 314-552-5700.

    Status: Open to the public, limited only by the space 
available. The meeting space accommodates approximately 100 
people. A closed portion of the meeting will held on August 25, 
2005, CT 1 p.m. to 3 p.m.

    Background: The ABRWH was established under the Energy 
Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act (EEOICPA) 
of 2000 to advise the President on a variety of policy and 
technical functions required to implement and effectively manage 
the new compensation program. Key functions of the Board include 
providing advice on the development of probability of causation 
guidelines which have been promulgated by Health and Human 
Services (HHS) as a final rule, advice on methods of dose 
reconstruction which have also been promulgated by HHS as a final 
rule, advice on the scientific validity and quality of dose 
estimation and reconstruction efforts being performed for 
purposes of the compensation program, and advice on petitions to 
add classes of workers to the Special Exposure Cohort (SEC).

    In December 2000, the President delegated responsibility for 
funding, staffing, and operating the Board to HHS, which 
subsequently delegated this authority to the CDC. NIOSH 
implements this responsibility for CDC. The charter was issued on 
August 3, 2001, and renewed on July 27, 2005.

    Purpose: This board is charged with (a) Providing advice to 
the Secretary, HHS on the development of guidelines under 
Executive Order 13179; (b) providing advice to the Secretary, HHS 
on the scientific validity and quality of dose reconstruction 
efforts performed for this Program; and (c) upon request by the 
Secretary, HHS advise the Secretary on whether the is a class of 
employees at any Department of Energy facility who were exposed 
to radiation but for whom it is not feasible to estimate their 
radiation dose, and on whether there is reasonable likelihood 
that such radiation doses may have endangered the health of 
members of this class.

    Matters To Be Discussed: The agenda for the subcommittee 
meeting is the Bethlehem Site Profile; Selection of the 4th round 
of 20 dose reconstructions; Mallinckrodt Site Profile Review; and 
a discussion of Site Profile Candidates for review by the S. 
Cohen and Associates (SC). The agenda for the Board meeting will 
include reports from the Subcommittee meeting; the Mallinckrodt 
SEC petition; a heads-up on upcoming SEC petitions under Sec.  
83.14 of the SEC rule (42 CFR 83); and policy on SC Capitol Hill 
visits. The Board will convene in closed session on August 25, 
2005 from 1 p.m. to 3 p.m. CT. The closed session will involve 
finalization of work tasks for the SC Contract for the next 
fiscal year. There will be a general public comment period

[[Page 49289]]

scheduled for August 25, 2005 from 7 p.m. to 8:30 p.m. CT.

    A portion of the meeting will be closed to the public in 
accordance with provisions set forth regarding subject matter 
considered confidential under the terms of 5 U.S.C. 
552b(c)(9)(B), and the Determination of the Director of the 
Management and Services Office, Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, pursuant to Pub. L. 92-463.

    The agenda is subject to change as priorities dictate.

    In the event an individual cannot attend, written comments 
may be submitted. Any written comments received will be provided 
at the meeting and should be submitted to the contact person 
below well in advance of the meeting.

    Contact Person For More Information: Dr. Lewis V. Wade, 
Executive Secretary, NIOSH, CDC, 4676 Columbia Parkway, 
Cincinnati, Ohio 45226, telephone 513-533-6825, fax 513-533-6826.

    Due to programmatic issues that had to be resolved, the 
Federal Register notice is being published less than fifteen days 
before the date of the meeting.

    The Director, Management Analysis and Services Office, has 
been delegated the authority to sign Federal Register notices 
pertaining to announcements of meetings and other committee 
management activities for both CDC and the Agency for Toxic 
Substances and Disease Registry.

    Dated: August 16, 2005. Alvin Hall, Director, Management 
Analysis and Services Office, Centers for Disease Control 
Prevention. [FR Doc. 05-16637 Filed 8-22-05; 8:45 am] BILLING 
CODE 4163-18-M
 
*****************************************************************
 22 BBC: Radiation disposal case adjourned

Last Updated: Tuesday, 23 August 2005
 

A court case against the University of Cambridge over disposal of 
radioactive material was adjourned on Tuesday. 

It is alleged the Wolfson Brain Imaging Centre, based at 
Addenbrooke's Hospital in Cambridge, exceeded its daily disposal 
limit for gases. 

The centre, which is run by the University for patients with 
acute brain injury, is also accused of failing to maintain 
equipment. 

At a hearing at Ely Magistrates' Court the case was adjourned 
until September. 
 
  SelectRadiation disposal case adjournedVillagers take action 
over routeUnder-age drinking cases rocketMotorcyclist dies in 
road crashWealth 'won't cut dementia risk'Course to produce 
expert hackersSchool's use of technology is topDoctors' surgery 
damaged by fireHopes fade for missing sea diver   

 
*****************************************************************
 23 Platts: EPA seeks public comment on proposed Nevada nuclear waste plan
 
+ Groups on both sides of the debate over the planned nuclear 
waste repository at Yucca Mountain in Nevada will have until Oct 
21 to comment on a proposed US Environmental Protection Agency 
standard for radiation levels outside the facility, documents 
showed. EPA formally published its proposals, including the 
deadline, on Monday. 

Nevada has threatened to sue the federal government over the 
standard if the proposal is adopted as now written. EPA developed 
the rule because the US Appeals Court for the District of 
Columbia Circuit rejected a previous standard governing radiation 
levels for 10,000 years. 

The court said the earlier proposal did not address potential 
radiation during a peak dose period, which could occur a million 
years from now.

The latest EPA proposal would retain the court-rejected standard 
of 15 millirems for 10,000 years, then raise it to 350 millirems 
for the next 990,000 years. The agency said a 350-millrem 
standard would allow for radiation levels comparable to 
background radiation levels now in existence in large cities. 

An Energy Dept spokesman said earlier in August that DOE could 
meet the proposed standard. Repository foes said that engineering 
measures to prevent radiation outside the repository are 
inadequate. 

Nevada Gov Kenny Guinn, a Republican, said the EPA standard was 
based on "junk science." For more information, take a trial to 
Nuclear Fuel at http://www.nuclearfuel.platts.com. 

Washington (Platts)--22Aug2005
 
Copyright � 2005 - Platts, All Rights Reserved
 [The McGraw-Hill Companies]       

*****************************************************************
 24 AU ABC: ALP accused of uranium debate stunt. 

23/08/2005. ABC News Online

The Western Australian Opposition has accused the governing
Labor Party of staging a political stunt over a call to reignite
the uranium debate.

 Labor's Upper House Member for Mining and Pastoral, Vince
Catania, based in Carnarvon in the Pilbara, yesterday called for
a debate on uranium mining to be reopened at a party and public
level.

 Premier Geoff Gallop quickly quashed the idea, reinforcing his
anti-uranium stance.

 But the Opposition's spokesman for resources, Norman Moore,
says Mr Catania's comments are nothing more than a facade.

 Mr Moore believes the Government has a secret agenda.

 "I've got no doubt that the Government have authorised him to
say this so that we can then look at having a sensible public
debate about the issue that would then give the Labor Party a
chance to change their position," he said. 


*****************************************************************
 25 Seattle Post-Intelligencer: GAO says Hanford cleanup may be slowed
                            
[seattlepi.com]     

Tuesday, August 23, 2005 

THE ASSOCIATED PRESS

RICHLAND -- The U.S. Department of Energy's failure to come up
with a suitable plan for processing and shipping excess
plutonium from the Hanford Nuclear Reservation to its nuclear
site in South Carolina could threaten Hanford cleanup, a new
report says. 

To lower costs and improve security, the Energy Department is
considering consolidating plutonium no longer needed for weapons
production at its Savannah River site in South Carolina until it
can be stored permanently in a nuclear waste repository. Most of
that roughly 50 metric tons of plutonium is at Hanford. 

Under an accelerated cleanup plan, plutonium must be shipped out
of the Hanford site by the end of 2006. However, the Energy
Department has not yet completed a plan to process the plutonium
into a form suitable for permanent storage and can't ship it to
Savannah River, the Government Accountability Office said in a
July report to Congress released Friday. 

Continued plutonium storage at Hanford will cost about $85
million annually and will threaten the agency's ability to meet
deadlines under its accelerated cleanup plan, the report said. 

In addition, about 20 percent of Hanford's plutonium is in the
form of unused 12-foot fuel rods from the Fast Flux Text
Facility, a one-of-a-kind reactor at the site. The fuel rods are
not scheduled to be disassembled under Hanford's cleanup plan,
but storage at Savannah River would require the plutonium to be
stored in 10-inch containers. 

"DOE is facing these storage challenges because of its failure
to adequately plan for plutonium consolidation and disposition,"
the report said. 

In its response, the Energy Department argued it is developing
its comprehensive plan for consolidation. A new committee was
created to do that, the agency said. 

"This strategic plan will encompass the comprehensive strategy
called for in your first recommendation," wrote Charles
Anderson, the Energy Department's principal deputy assistant
secretary for environmental management, in a June letter to the
GAO.                 

  [Seattle Post-Intelligencer] 101 Elliott Ave. W. Seattle, WA 
98119 (206) 448-8000
 
 Send comments to newmedia@seattlepi.com
�1996-2005 Seattle Post-Intelligencer
*****************************************************************
 26 Tri-City Herald: Bechtel celebrates 'tremendous run' 

This story was published Friday, August 19th, 2005 

By Chris Mulick, Herald Olympia bureau 

Hundreds are expected to attend an after-work reception at the
Three Rivers Convention Center this evening to toast the end of
Bechtel Hanford's 11-year run as the lead contractor for
cleaning up the nuclear reservation's river corridor. 

Bechtel Hanford turns over the job to a new contractor --
Washington Closure -- a week from Saturday. 

Bechtel will retain a piece of the action as a partner in the
limited liability corporation. Washington Closure is led by
Washington Group International but Bechtel National and CH2M
Hill are partners. 

Rank-and-file workers shouldn't notice much of a difference even
though there will be changes at the top. 

"We've had a tremendous run," said Bechtel Hanford spokeswoman
Sue Kuntz. 

And reception attendees should expect to hear all about it. The
contractor touts a series of highlights from its 11 years on the
job. 

-- Four Hanford reactors have been successfully cocooned with
work at a fifth due to wrap up this fall. 

-- About 60 percent, or 10 million tons, of the river corridor's
contaminated soil and debris has been dumped in a huge landfill
in central Hanford. 

-- Some 156 milestones under the Tri-Party Agreement, the legal
pact that governs Hanford cleanup, were met ahead of schedule
and the remaining 26 were on time. 

And the contractor has been lauded for its safety record, an
area in which President Tom Logan said there is still room for
improvement, even though the number of safety-related incidents
are down 82 percent from before it took over in 1994. 

"It's not at zero and if it's not at zero, somebody's still
getting hurt," he said. 

The new Washington Closure management team already is on the
ground working at the site, spokesman Todd Nelson said, one of
about 700 workers who are affected by the switch. 

"For most people, it's going to be business as usual," he said. 


� 2005 Tri-City Herald, Associated Press &Other Wire Services
*****************************************************************
 27 DOE: Health Effects Subcommittee (SRSHES)
 
                        FR Doc 05-16636 
[Federal Register: August 23, 2005 (Volume 70, Number 162)]
[Notices] [Page 49289] From the Federal Register Online via GPO 
Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr23au05-84]                         
 
In accordance with section 10(a)(2) of the Federal Advisory 
Committee Act (Pub. L. 92-463), the Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention (CDC) and the Agency for Toxic Substances and 
Disease Registry (ATSDR) announce the following meeting.
 
Name: Citizens Advisory Committee on Public Health Service 
Activities and Research at Department of Energy Sites: Savannah 
River Site Health Effects Subcommittee (SRSHES).
 
Time and Date: 8:30 a.m.-4 p.m., September 15, 2005. Place: The 
Partridge Inn, 2110 Walton Way, Augusta, Georgia 30904, telephone 
1-800-476-6888, and fax 706-731-0826.
 
Status: Open to the public, limited only by the space available. 
The meeting room accommodates approximately 50 people.
 
Background: Under a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed in 
December 1990 with the Department of Energy (DOE), and replaced 
by MOUs signed in 1996 and 2000, the Department of Health and 
Human Services (DHHS) was given the responsibility and resources 
for conducting analytic epidemiologic investigations of residents 
of communities in the vicinity of DOE facilities, workers at DOE 
facilities, and other persons potentially exposed to radiation or 
to potential hazards from non-nuclear energy production use. DHHS 
delegated program responsibility to CDC. In addition, an MOU was 
signed in October 1990 and renewed in November 1992, 1996, and in 
2000, between the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease 
Registry (ATSDR) and DOE. The MOU delineates the responsibilities 
and procedures for ATSDR's public health activities at DOE sites 
required under sections 104, 105, 107, and 120 of the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability 
Act (CERCLA or ``Superfund''). These activities include health 
consultations and public health assessments at DOE sites listed 
on, or proposed for, the Superfund National Priorities List and 
at sites that are the subject of petitions from the public; and 
other health-related activities such as epidemiologic studies, 
health surveillance, exposure and disease registries, health 
education, substance-specific applied research, emergency 
response, and preparation of toxicological profiles.
 
Purpose: This subcommittee is charged with providing advice and 
recommendations to the Director, CDC, and the Administrator, 
ATSDR, regarding community concerns pertaining to CDC's and 
ATSDR's public health activities and research at this DOE site. 
The purpose of this meeting is to provide a forum for community 
interaction, and serve as a vehicle for members of the public to 
express concerns and provide recommendations to CDC and ATSDR.
 
Matters to be Discussed: Agenda items include a Review of the 
Savannah River Site (SRS) Report; National Institute for 
Occupational Safety and Health Update, and Completed Work 
Involving the Site; and a Summary of ATSDR Current SRS 
Activities.
 
Agenda items are subject to change as priorities dictate.
 
Contact Person for More Information: Mr. Phillip Green, Executive 
Secretary, SRSHES, Radiation Studies Branch, Division of 
Environmental Hazards and Health Effects, National Center for 
Environmental Health, CDC, 1600 Clifton Road, NE. (E-39), 
Atlanta, Georgia 30333, telephone (404) 498-1800, fax (404) 
498-1811.
 
The Director, Management Analysis and Services Office, has been 
delegated the authority to sign Federal Register notices 
pertaining to announcements of meetings and other committee 
management activities for both CDC and ATSDR.
 
Dated: August 16, 2005.
 
Alvin Hall, Director, Management Analysis and Services Office, 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
 
[FR Doc. 05-16636 Filed 8-22-05; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4163-18-P

 
*****************************************************************
 28 DOE: Notice of Preferred Sodium Bearing Waste Treatment Technology
 
                        FR Doc 05-16674 
[Federal Register: August 23, 2005 (Volume 70, Number 162)] 
[Notices] [Page 49264] From the Federal Register Online via GPO 
Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr23au05-50]                         
 
AGENCY: Office of Environmental Management, U.S. Department of 
Energy.
 
ACTION: Extension of time for comments.
 
SUMMARY: In response to a public request, the Department of 
Energy (DOE) announces an extension of time to submit comments on 
the preferred technology announced August 3, 2005 in the Federal 
Register Notice of Preferred Sodium Bearing Waste Treatment 
Technology (70 FR 44598) to September 21, 2005.
 
 
ADDRESSES: Comments on the preferred technology may be submitted 
to Richard Kimmel, Document Manager, U.S. Department of Energy, 
Idaho Operations Office, 1955 North Fremont, MS-1222, Idaho 
Falls, Idaho, 83415 or via e-mail at 
Richard.Kimmel@nuclear.energy.gov. DOE will consider any comments 
transmitted or postmarked by September 21, 2005 before issuing a 
Record of Decision on the Idaho High-Level Waste and Facilities 
Disposition Environmental Impact Statement. Comments submitted 
after this date will be considered to the extent practicable.
 
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Requests for further information 
on the preferred technology should be addressed to: Richard 
Kimmel, Document Manager, U.S. Department of Energy, Idaho 
Operations Office, 1955 North Fremont, MS-1222, Idaho Falls, 
Idaho, 83415, Telephone (208) 526-5583, or via email at 
Richard.Kimmel@nuclear.energy.gov. For further information on 
DOE's National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) process, please 
contact: Carol M. Borgstrom, Director, Office of NEPA Policy and 
Compliance (EH-42), U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 Independence 
Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20585, Telephone: (202) 586- 4600, or 
leave a message at (800) 472-2756.
 
 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
On August 3, 2005, the DOE published a Notice of Preferred Sodium 
Bearing Waste Treatment Technology (70 FR 44598) which announced 
that comments on the preferred treatment technology should be 
submitted no later than 30-days from the date of publication of 
the notice.
 
DOE is extending the time allowed for submittal of comments to 
September 21, 2005.
 
Issued in Washington DC, August 18, 2005.
 
Steven Frank, Office of Environmental Management, NEPA Compliance 
Office.
 
[FR Doc. 05-16674 Filed 8-22-05; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 6450-01-P

 
*****************************************************************
 29 DOE: Environmental Management Site-Specific Advisory Board, Northern 
 
                        FR Doc 05-16675 
[Federal Register: August 23, 2005 (Volume 70, Number 162)] 
[Notices] [Page 49265] From the Federal Register Online via GPO 
Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr23au05-51] [[Page 49265]]
 
New Mexico AGENCY: Department of Energy.
 
ACTION: Notice of open meeting.
 
SUMMARY: This notice announces a meeting of the Environmental 
Management Site-Specific Advisory Board (EMSSAB), Northern New 
Mexico. The Federal Advisory Committee Act (Pub. L. 92-463, 86 
Stat. 770) requires that public notice of this meeting be 
announced in the Federal Register.
 
 
DATES: Wednesday, September 28, 2005, 1 p.m.-8:30 p.m.
 
ADDRESSES: Jemez Complex, Santa Fe Community College, 6401 
Richards Avenue, Santa Fe, New Mexico.
 
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Menice Manzanares, Northern New 
Mexico Citizens' Advisory Board, 1660 Old Pecos Trail, Suite B, 
Santa Fe, NM 87505. Phone (505) 995-0393; Fax (505) 989-1752 or 
e-mail:

 
mmanzanares@doeal.gov.
 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Purpose of the Board: The purpose of 
the Board is to make recommendations to DOE in the areas of 
environmental restoration, waste management, and related 
activities.
 
Tentative Agenda 1 p.m.--Call to Order by Deputy Designated 
Federal Officer (DDFO), Christina Houston Establishment of a 
Quorum Welcome and Introductions by Vice-Chairman, Jim Brannon 
Approval of Agenda Approval of Minutes of July 27, 2005 1:15 
p.m.--Board Business A. Election of Chair and Vice-Chair for 
Fiscal Year 2006 B. Report from Vice-Chair, Jim Brannon --Report 
on Site-Specific Advisory Board Chairs' Meeting in Idaho 
(September 21-23) C. Report from Department of Energy, DDFO, 
Christina Houston E. Consideration and Action on Fiscal Year 2006 
Committee Work Plans F. Consideration and Action on Fiscal Year 
2006 Northern New Mexico Citizens' Advisory Board Budget G. New 
Business 2:45 p.m.--Break 3 p.m.--Reports A. Waste Management 
Committee, Jim Brannon B. Community Involvement Committee, Grace 
Perez C. Environmental Monitoring, Surveillance and Remediation 
Committee, Chris Timm --Introduction of Recommendation 2005-6 
(Tabled on July 27th) --Introduction of Recommendation 2005-7 
(Tabled on July 27th) D. Reports from Ex-Officio Members U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency--Rich Mayer U.S. Department of 
Energy--John Ordaz University of California/Los Alamos National 
Laboratory--Ken Hargis New Mexico Environment Department--James 
Bearzi 5 p.m.--Dinner Break 6 p.m.--Public Comment 6:15 
p.m.--Consideration and Action on Recommendation 2005-6, Chris 
Timm Consideration and Action on Recommendation 2005-7, Chris 
Timm 6:30 p.m.--Presentation on Risk Assessment by Dr. Helen 
Grogan of Risk Assessment Corporation 8 p.m.--Comments from Board 
and Ex-Officio Members 8:20 p.m.--Recap of Meeting: Issuance of 
Press Releases, Editorials, etc.
 
8:30 p.m.--Adjourn. This agenda is subject to change at least one 
day in advance of the meeting.
 
Public Participation: The meeting is open to the public.
 
Written statements may be filed with the Board either before or 
after the meeting. Individuals who wish to make oral statements 
pertaining to agenda items should contact Menice Manzanares at 
the address or telephone number listed above. Requests must be 
received five days prior to the meeting and reasonable provision 
will be made to include the presentation in the agenda. The 
Deputy Designated Federal Officer is empowered to conduct the 
meeting in a fashion that will facilitate the orderly conduct of 
business. Individuals wishing to make public comment will be 
provided a maximum of five minutes to present their comments.
 
Minutes: Minutes of this meeting will be available for public 
review and copying at the U.S. Department of Energy's Freedom of 
Information Public Reading Room, 1E-190, Forrestal Building, 1000 
Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20585 between 9 a.m. and 
4 p.m., Monday-Friday, except Federal holidays. Minutes will also 
be available at the Public Reading Room located at the Board's 
office at 1660 Old Pecos Trail, Suite B, Santa Fe, NM. Hours of 
operation for the Public Reading Room are 9 a.m.-4 p.m. on Monday 
through Friday. Minutes will also be made available by writing or 
calling Menice Manzanares at the Board's office address or 
telephone number listed above.
 
Minutes and other Board documents are on the Internet at: 
http://www.nnmcab.org .
 
Issued at Washington, DC, on August 17, 2005.
 
Carol Matthews, Acting Advisory Committee Officer.
 
[FR Doc. 05-16675 Filed 8-22-05; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 6405-01-P

 
*****************************************************************
 30 DOE: Environmental Management Site-Specific Advisory Board, Rocky 
 
                        FR Doc 05-16676 
[Federal Register: August 23, 2005 (Volume 70, Number 162)] 
[Notices] [Page 49265-49266] From the Federal Register Online via 
GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr23au05-52]                         
 
Flats AGENCY: Department of Energy.
 
ACTION: Notice of open meeting.
 
SUMMARY: This notice announces a meeting of the Environmental 
Management Site-Specific Advisory Board (EMSSAB), Rocky Flats.
 
The Federal Advisory Committee Act (Pub. L. No. 92-463, 86 Stat. 
770) requires that public notice of this meeting be announced in 
the Federal Register.
 
 
DATES: Thursday, September 1, 2005, 6 p.m. to 9 p.m.
 
ADDRESSES: College Hill Library, Room L-107, Front Range 
Community College, 3705 W. 112th Avenue, Westminster, Colorado. 
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ken Korkia, Executive Director, 
Rocky Flats Citizens Advisory Board, 12101 Airport Way, Unit B, 
Broomfield, CO 80021; telephone (303) 966-7855; fax (303) 
966-7856.
 
 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Purpose of the Board: The purpose of 
the Board is to make recommendations to DOE in the areas of 
environmental restoration, waste management, and related 
activities.
 
Tentative Agenda: 1. Presentation and Discussion on Results of 
the Recent Aerial Gamma Survey Conducted at Rocky Flats.
 
2. Discussion on Board Work Plan Activities for 2006. 3. 
Presentation and Discussion on the Rocky Flats Post-Closure 
Involvement Plan.
 
4. Other Board business may be conducted as necessary. Public 
Participation: The meeting is open to the public.
 
Written statements may be filed with the Board either before or 
after the meeting. Individuals who wish to make oral statements 
pertaining to agenda items should contact Ken Korkia at the 
address or telephone number listed above. Requests must be 
received at least five days prior to the meeting and reasonable
 
[[Page 49266]] provisions will be made to include the 
presentation in the agenda. The Deputy Designated Federal Officer 
is empowered to conduct the meeting in a fashion that will 
facilitate the orderly conduct of business. Individuals wishing 
to make public comment will be provided a maximum of five minutes 
to present their comments. This Notice is being published less 
than 15 days before the date of the meeting due to programmatic 
issues.
 
Minutes: The minutes of this meeting will be available for public 
review and copying at the office of the Rocky Flats Citizens 
Advisory Board, 12101 Airport Way, Unit B, Broomfield, CO 80021; 
telephone (303) 966-7855. Hours of operations are 7:30 a.m. to 4 
p.m., Monday through Friday. Minutes will also be made available 
by writing or calling Ken Korkia at the address or telephone 
number listed above. Board meeting minutes are posted on RFCAB's 
web site within one month following each meeting at: 
http://www.rfcab.org/Minutes.HTML. Issued at Washington, DC, on 
August 17, 2005.
 
Carol Matthews, Acting Advisory Committee Officer.
 
[FR Doc. 05-16676 Filed 8-22-05; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 6450-01-P

 
*****************************************************************
 31 www.GovExec.com: GAO criticizes Energy's plutonium disposal effort 

(8/23/05)
 	 	
By David Francis, Global Security Newswire

The Energy Department should develop a plan to consolidate 
storage of plutonium stocks that are currently located across the 
country, according to a report released last week by the 
Government Accountability Office.

The report (GAO-05-665) called for moving the stocks to the
department's Savannah River Site in South Carolina and also
recommended improving monitoring systems for storage containers
at Savannah to prevent plutonium leaks once the material is
shipped to the site. 

About 50 metric tons of plutonium no longer needed by the U.S.
nuclear weapons program is now in storage at the department's
Hanford facility in Washington state, the Los Alamos National
Laboratory in New Mexico, the Rocky Flats Environmental
Technology Site in Colorado, the Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory in California and the Savannah River Site. The 2002
Defense Authorization Act requires the department to develop a
plan to store the material at the Savannah site until it can be
shipped to the planned Yucca Mountain nuclear waste repository
for permanent disposition.

Auditors found that the department has fallen far behind in this
effort since it was called for in the 2002 defense authorization
bill. The department lacks a plan to convert plutonium into a
form that can be stored at the Savannah facility. Also, Savannah
is not equipped to store the Hanford plutonium, which is still
in the form of 12-foot nuclear rods. Savannah is only equipped
for standard storage containers, which cannot hold the rods.

"Until DOE develops a permanent disposition plan, additional
plutonium cannot be shipped to SRS [Savannah] and DOE will not
achieve the cost savings and security improvements that
consolidation could offer. Continued storage at Hanford will
cost an additional approximately $85 million annually and will
threaten that site's achievement of the milestones in its
accelerated cleanup plan," the report says.

The GAO also found that Savannah's safety systems cannot
properly monitor storage containers. "Without a monitoring
capability, DOE faces increased risks of an accidental plutonium
release that could harm workers, the public, and/or the
environment," the report states.

The report points out that the department has twice scrapped
plans to build facilities at Savannah that would have been
capable of storing and monitoring excess plutonium as well as
processing the material for eventual shipment to Yucca Mountain.
Due to these cancellations, "DOE has no means for processing its
most heavily contaminated plutonium into a form suitable for
permanent disposition," the report says.

It urges the department to develop a strategy that assesses "the
storage, monitoring, and security capabilities of all of DOE's
sites currently storing plutonium. Furthermore, the strategy
should analyze the environmental impact, national security
implications, costs, and schedules to safely consolidate, store,
and eventually dispose of DOE's plutonium at existing facilities
and/or at a new storage facility constructed at one of its
sites."

"When this comprehensive strategy is completed," the report
continues, "we further recommend that the secretary of energy
ensure that each of DOE's facilities' cleanup plans are reviewed
to ensure that each site's cleanup goals time frames are
consistent with the department's comprehensive strategy for
plutonium consolidation, storage, and disposition."

Independent nuclear expert Tom Clements, former senior adviser
to Greenpeace International, blasted the department for its
failure to develop a plan. Clements also criticized Congress for
lax oversight of the department's disposal efforts.

"The report affirm[s] what many in the public have long pointed
out - that DOE has no comprehensive plan to manage, consolidate
or dispose of plutonium," Clements said in a press release. "But
Congress is very late in beginning serious oversight of this
program. It has already been a decade since the program to
dispose of surplus weapons plutonium began and DOE still hasn't
developed a workable plan to handle this deadly material. Lack
of such a plan, which should have been developed years ago,
means a tremendous waste of taxpayer money and a continued
threat to public health and safety." 

Clements told Global Security Newswire that it is difficult to
gauge how much money has been spent on plutonium disposition
because the funding has been scattered throughout various
spending bills over the last few years. "It's got to be in the
billions of dollars," he said.

Clements said all plans to ship plutonium to Savannah must be
stopped while the department develops a plan for storing the
material. Congress should not allocate more money for
construction of a Savannah facility to convert weapon-grade
plutonium into fuel for nuclear power reactors until
comprehensive safety plans are in place, he said.

"DOE has tried for many years to fool the Congress and the
public that a plan existed to dispose of plutonium. While many
in the public have not been fooled, Congress is to share the
blame with DOE for this programmatic failure as it has not
conducted adequate oversight of the troubled and costly
plutonium program," Clements said. "Congress has thrown money at
the program without first demanding of DOE a comprehensive plan.
Such abuse of the taxpayer must stop and Congress must now hold
DOE's feet to the fire."

�2005 by National Journal Group Inc. All rights reserved.   

    
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NOTE: In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. section 107 this 
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