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NUCLEAR POLICY
1 RedNova News: South Korean Nuclear Plant Halts Operation After Light
2 Persian Journal: Rice On Iran -
3 Newsweek: Iran's Nuclear Lies
4 LA Times: For Iranians, It Was the Economy, Stupid
5 ITAR-TASS: Iran insists on its right to use atom for peace
6 Al Jazeera: Changes in Irans nuclear policy -
7 MNA: Iran should promptly decide about construction of nuclear plant
8 Mehr: Next government should have new view of nuclear issue
9 Guardian Unlimited: The lies behind the lies
10 Korea: Digital Chosunilbo: New York Contacts Between Korean and U.S.
11 Daily Yomiuri: N. Korea gives no hint of move on 6-way talks
12 Xinhua: US, DPRK optimistic about resumption of six-party talks
13 Korea Times: S. Korea, US to Present Joint Proposal to NK
14 US: Bushs Uranium Lies: Case For A Special Prosecutor
15 US: Guardian Unlimited: Senate Keeps 'Bunker-Buster' Program Alive
16 Guardian Unlimited: Comment | A new generation of nuclear weapons?
17 US: Las Vegas RJ: HEADED TO CONFERENCE COMMITTEE: Energy spending bi
18 US: DallasNews.com: Running on empty
19 US: WorldNetDaily: Freezing assets on a whim
20 Guardian Unlimited: Minister ponders the nuclear option
21 London Times: BNFL on way back to the black as losses halve -
22 PRAVDA.Ru: Russia to help China oust the USA from Eurasia -
23 CRIENGLISH: Hu Jintao Wraps up Russia Tour
24 Guardian Unlimited: Nuclear fall-out
25 CTV.ca: What's all the fuss about G-8?
26 MNA: Next government should draft comprehensive energy plan - MP
27 The Observer: Minister ponders the nuclear option
28 The Observer: Comment | When the oil wars blow
NUCLEAR REACTORS
29 The Standard: Nuclear energy expansion stepped up as demand soars -
30 US: Brattleboro Reformer: Entergy offers to increase safety margin a
31 Malaysia Star: Driven by energy shortages, China races to expand nuc
NUCLEAR SECURITY
NUCLEAR SAFETY
32 US: Hawk Eye: IAAP back on federal agenda
33 US: OpEdNews.Com: BUSH'S UNFORGIVEABLE COVERUP / IGNORING VETERANS H
34 Reuters: Explosion at Japanese radiation lab injures two
NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE
35 US: Observer: Uranium missing at UK site
36 US: AU ABC: Commonwealth seeks advice on NT uranium ban
37 US: Bristol Phoenix: Warren council proactive on Narragansett Electr
38 Congressman Jon Porter (NV03) - Press Release - KEY USGS
39 US: SF Chronicle: Nuclear waste: 1 plant, 48 tons a year / In an age
40 RedNova News: BNFL's Fundraising Plan Sets Off Heated Reactions
41 US: Newsday.com: LIRR suspends Brookhaven waste
42 Pahrump Valley Times: Death Valley future 'cloudy'
43 US: St. Petersburg Times: Factory owner fined for' 04 spill
44 Guardian Unlimited: BNFL to sell building arm
45 The Observer: Report says Sellafield leak could happen again
PEACE
US DEPT. OF ENERGY
46 SF Chronicle: Senate scratches Livermore laser / Backers hope funds
47 ABQJOURNAL: LANL Successfully Completes Nuclear X-Ray Test
48 Oakland Tribune: Giant laser's fusion goal delayed
49 Times-News Online: Energy department offers three plutonium plans
50 Paducah Sun: Senators approve funding for cleanup
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FULL NEWS STORIES
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1 RedNova News: South Korean Nuclear Plant Halts Operation After Lightning
Posted on: Saturday, 2 July 2005
Text of report in English by South Korean news agency Yonhap
Yeonggwang, 2 July: A South Korean nuclear power plant was
forced to halt operation Saturday [2 July], after its power
transmission line was struck by lightning, a plant official
said.
The lightning did not cause any serious damage such as
radioactive leaks at the plant in Yeonggwang, 300 km south of
Seoul, the official said, speaking on condition of anonymity.
"The suspension is a mere lightning incident which doesn't
affect the plant's safety," the official said. "The plant will
soon resume operation after inspections on its related
facilities."
South Korea has 20 nuclear power plants in operation, which
produces about 40 per cent of its electricity needs.
Source: BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific
© 2002-2005 RedNova.com. All rights reserved.
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2 Persian Journal: Rice On Iran -
Iran News Jul 1st, 2005 - 19:03:01
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice says that the U.S. "has
focused the world's attention" on the Iranian government's
pursuit of weapons of mass destruction:
"Along with our allies, we are working to gain full disclosure
of Iran's efforts to obtain nuclear weapons. The world must not
tolerate any Iranian [regime] attempt to develop a nuclear
weapon."
The people of the Middle East, says Ms. Rice, are "expressing
ideas and taking actions that would have been unthinkable only
one year ago." She says this "moment of transformation" is very
fragile, and still has committed enemies, particularly the
government of Iran, which is the world's leading sponsor of
terrorism. But other nations cannot tolerate efforts by Iran's
clerical regime to subvert democratic governments.
The Iranian government should pay more attention to the
democratic aspirations of the Iranian people. Iran's clerical
rulers, says Secretary of State Rice, cannot look away from what
is happening in the region:
"The Middle East is changing, and even the unelected leaders in
Tehran must recognize this fact. They must know that the energy
of reform that is building all around them will one day inspire
Iran's citizens to demand their liberty and their rights. The
United States stands with the people of Iran."
President George W. Bush has said that advancing the cause of
freedom is "the calling of our time." Secretary of State Rice
says that with the support of the United States and other
nations, the peoples of the Middle East "are demonstrating that
all great human achievement begins with free individuals who do
not accept that the reality of today must also be the reality of
tomorrow."
The preceding was an editorial reflecting the views of the
United States Government.
*****************************************************************
3 Newsweek: Iran's Nuclear Lies
Iran says its nuclear program is for peaceful uses only. But a
history of deception raises doubts.
[Russian workers at Bushehr's main reactor]
Paolo Woods for Newsweek
Russian workers at Bushehr's main reactor
By By Christopher DickeyNewsweek
July 11 issue - Beyond the antiaircraft-gun emplacements and the
early-warning radar systems, and shortly before you get to the
high concrete walls topped with concertina wire that surround
Iran's Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant, there's a large sign
announcing that the facility welcomes guests. Like so much about
the Iranian nuclear program, the signals are incongruous,
contradictory and more than a little sinister.
If Iran is to be believed, then the world has nothing to fear
from its nuclear program. The United States, Europe, Israel,
Saudi Arabia and other oil producers nearby can rest easy,
because the ayatollahs have no plans to threaten the region with
atomic weapons or put nukes in the hands of terrorists. If Iran
is to be believed, its only goal, repeated countless times,
ratified in treaties and open to inspections, is to develop a
completely independent ability to make nuclear fuel and use it
to generate electricity.
But neither the United States nor Europe nor the United Nations
is ready simply to believe Iran, at least not easily, and not
without verification. Its record of concealment and deceit about
its nuclear program goes back at least 20 years. Its extensive
uranium-enrichment program was uncovered in detail only two
years ago; its promise of "full disclosure" and "transparency"
since then has been something considerably less. The election of
a new hard-line Iranian president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, last
month raises still more questions about how far Tehran can be
trusted about its nuclear programs, if at all.
Iran's concealments have been as vast as a secret underground
facility at Natanz that was being readied for 50,000 centrifuges
to enrich uranium when it was exposed in 2002. They have seemed
as small as some undeclared milligrams of plutonium from a
research laboratory. In a cat-and-mouse game reminiscent of the
lead-up to the Iraq invasion in 2003, the Iranians have claimed
to be cooperating while throwing up what often seem to be petty
obstacles in front of inspectors. Iranians have bulldozed
suspect sites. They have declined to allow investigators access
to some military areas. They say they just can't find key
documents that would show where and how they acquired key
designs when they started their enrichment program in the 1980s.
(Typically, under heavy international pressure this year, they
finally produced one page from 1987 for inspectors to look at,
but wouldn't turn it over.)
In Iran's case today, unlike that of Iraq in 2003, there is no
doubt that its nuclear program is large and growing. The Bushehr
reactor will be fueled by Russia, and the spent fuel, from which
plutonium could be extracted, will be returned there. But Iran
now also plans to build a heavy-water re-actor at the town of
Arak, and a facility to produce heavy water there is already
underway. Nor has it given up the project at Natanz for
enrichment facilities. It has just put it on hold, as it
negotiates for European and American concessions.
The breakthrough revelation about Iran's nuclear-enrichment
program came in August 2002 from the front organization for an
Iranian exile group on the State Department's list of terrorist
organizations, the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK). At a press conference
in Washington, it exposed the existence of the Natanz
uranium-enrichment facility. The group insisted that the tip came
from its own sources, but inspectors suspect that the MEK was
given the intelligence by an interested government. International
Atomic Energy Agency Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei is among
those skeptical about the MEK. "I'm sure this [group] is not the
original source of the information," he told NEWSWEEK. But never
mind. "This is the first time we got specific information we
could act on."
Paolo Woods for Newsweek
WHAT IF HE HAD THE BOMB? Iranian President-elect Ahmadinejad
The investigations moved slowly but persistently after that, and
in a clear direction. ElBaradei and his teams started a series of
visits to Iran in February 2003. The inspectors took
"environmental samples" to be analyzed by the IAEA's lab at
Seibersdorf outside Vienna. They were looking for telltale traces
of highly enriched uranium, plutonium or other isotopes. At first
the Iranians didn't seem to realize just how powerful an
investigative tool this had become: sort of the atomic equivalent
of DNA testing at a crime scene. When inspectors asked to visit
the Kalaye Electrical Co. in Tehran, for instance, the Iranians
at first put them off, apparently thinking they could clean up
the place. They let the IAEA (called "the Agency" for short)
visit parts of the facilities in March 2003, but not take
samples. Finally, in August 2003, the inspectors were allowed to
return to Kalaye, just to find part of it extensively retiled,
repainted and refloored. Only then were they allowed to take
samples. Yet even after all that, the swipes showed traces of
highly enriched uranium.
With this information in hand, but not yet public, Agency
inspectors found themselves listening to top Iranian officials
claiming their country designed and made all its own centrifuge
equipment, and that it never had been tested with radioactive
substances. "Simply lying in front of everyone," said a diplomat
who watched the show, and asked that his name be withheld because
of the sensitivity of his position.
In October 2003, with France, Germany and Britain holding out the
incentive of improved trade and relations, Tehran said it would
make a "full disclosure" of its nuclear-enrichment programs. But
the more it revealed, the more stunningly apparent it was how
much it had concealed. Efforts to develop a uranium-enrichment
program went back to 1985, and began in earnest in 1987, when
plans for centrifuges were bought from European middlemen with
connections to the network of A. Q. Khan in Pakistan.
Iran claims its right to develop its nuclear program under treaty
obligations, and -offers explanations related to peaceful
projects. It needs to manage its own nuclear-fuel cycle, it says,
because it cannot possibly depend on others, who might be
vulnerable to U.S. pressure, to provide fuel to run civilian
power plants. The Iranians' experience during their war with Iraq
in the 1980s, and with increasingly restrictive U.S. sanctions in
the 1990s, has taught them how vulnerable they can be. Plans to
make Iran nuclear-energy independent are supported throughout
society, and across the political spectrum. So officials like
Asadollah Saboury, vice president for nuclear power plants at the
Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, are frustrated by restraints,
including the suspension of uranium enrichment, put on them by
the international community. "We are wasting our time now," he
says.
Last week the United States put more pressure on, announcing it
would freeze the assets of any company doing business with the
Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, among other firms believed
involved with nuclear proliferation. In the past, some U.S.
officials have hinted at the possibility of military action. But
the United States is already overextended in the complicated mire
of the Middle East. Iran, with its diplomatic, intelligence,
religious and terrorist contacts throughout the region, "has a
lot of assets," says a senior international envoy who would not
be quoted by name because he is in the middle of the sensitive
negotiating process. "Look at what they can do in Iraq, in
Afghanistan, in Lebanon. They can turn the whole Middle East into
a ball of fire, and they know that."
Potential military targets in Iran are hardened and dispersed,
and many may be unknown. If attacked, Iran would almost certainly
"break out" of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty that it
claims to honor. And from that point on, Israeli officials
believe, it would take Iran from six months to a year to produce
the makings of an atom bomb.
The Europeans, led by France, Germany and Britain, and now
supported by the United States, have tried to push for a
diplomatic solution. But Iran is using its incipient nuclear
power to bargain for a whole new, and enhanced, relationship with
the West-even as it insists on keeping control over production of
nuclear fuel that could give it the power to build the bomb. The
big threat that can be leveled against Iran on the diplomatic
front is to take it before the Security Council. But what the
Council might actually do, especially if China opposes strong
measures, is an open question. Economic sanctions, in any case,
are likely to have little impact at a time when record oil prices
are bringing the Iranian regime tens of billions of dollars in
windfall revenues every quarter.
Who or what can hold the line to prevent Iran's becoming a
nuclear-weapon state-or a "virtual" one, with all the necessary
technology and materials but no proven bomb? That job will be
left mainly to ElBaradei's IAEA. Often criticized and sometimes
under-mined by the current U.S. administration, it is supposed to
watch over compliance by the signatories to the Non-Proliferation
Treaty. In effect, it's supposed to be a watchdog that watches
its masters.
Because of limitations in the treaty itself, the Agency's ability
to sleuth out serious violations by uncooperative states is
virtually nil. It has had no jurisdiction over Israel, Pakistan
or India, which are not signatories. It lost jurisdiction over
North Korea when Pyongyang pulled out of the treaty. And while it
was able to inspect and verify Iraq's declared nuclear activities
in the 1980s, it completely missed Saddam Hussein's secret
efforts to build a bomb at that time. "We were looking where the
light was shining," says a European diplomat involved with the
investigations, "but we didn't have the right to look in the
shadows where they were building a parallel program."
Today the Agency is more inquisitive, but its mandate to
investigate is still limited. The United States, prodded in part
by concerns for Israel's security, keeps pushing for more
aggressive action. And the Israelis-after developing their own
nuclear weapons in secret-feel sure they know what the Iranians
are up to. An official in Jerusalem directly concerned with the
issue, who did not want to be named because he holds a sensitive
position in government, says, "Israel is convinced that Iran has
three separate sources for developing nukes: a civilian program,
a military program that draws off the civilian one and another
military program that's completely separate." But as the official
explains, "The basic problem is that there's no smoking gun."
Iran insists that it's been cooperative. In 2003, it even turned
over the names of several individuals and companies involved in
covert sales of uranium-enrichment designs and components as part
of the A. Q. Khan network. But when Libya decided to fold its
nuclear program a few weeks later, the trove of details it
supplied about the same network raised questions about just how
much the Iranians might still be hiding. Why had they not
mentioned plans for more-sophisticated centrifuges? If Libya was
given blueprints for the bomb, why hadn't Iran gotten the same
thing? As usual, the Iranians supplied explanations: they left
those centrifuge plans on a shelf; they just never received the
blueprints for the warhead. But the definitive answers-ones that
can be believed-are still pending.
With Babak Dehghanpisheh at Bushehr, Dan Ephron in Tel Aviv and
Michael Hirsh in Washington
c 2005 Newsweek, Inc.
*****************************************************************
4 LA Times: For Iranians, It Was the Economy, Stupid
July 3, 2005 latimes.com : Sunday Opinion : Commentary
COMMENTARY For Iranians, It Was the Economy, Stupid By Reza
Aslan, Reza Aslan is the author of "No god but God: The Origins,
Evolution, and Future of Islam" (Random House, 2005).
Anyone struggling to understand how Mahmoud Ahmadinejad the
obscure, hard-line mayor of Tehran who had never before run for
office, who spent almost no money on his campaign for president
and who barely registered in preelection polls could have
steamrolled former President Hashemi Rafsanjani, the enormously
powerful political moderate and overwhelmingly favored
technocrat, should ask my cousin Karim.
Karim, a 30-year-old engineer from Tehran with a wife, two kids
and his own software business, is a member of the city's
disproportionately large and technologically savvy middle class.
But although in the U.S. the term middle class implies a level of
financial comfort and security, Karim enjoys neither of these.
Like the rest of Tehran's young and highly educated populace,
Karim is forced to wade through an utterly collapsed economy by
performing menial jobs. Besides running his software business, he
works some nights as an unlicensed cab driver; he helps raise
chickens on his aunt's farm; he hires himself out as a tour guide
and translator; and, if he's lucky, he sometimes sells American
contraband compact discs, DVDs, designer purses out of the
trunk of his car.
For his life of toil and struggle, Karim naturally blames Iran's
clerical regime, which holds all the power and, increasingly, all
the wealth in the country. In fact, like many Iranians, he dreams
of one day dragging the clerics out of the government by their
beards and trampling on their bodies in the streets. But first,
he has to figure out a way to feed his family. And that is why he
voted for Ahmadinejad.
Despite the shrill rhetoric coming from Washington, where
officials are now wasting their time trying to determine whether
the incoming Iranian president was or was not a radical student
hostage taker 26 years ago, Ahmadinejad did not win because of
widespread fraud or because reform-minded voters boycotted the
elections (though both played small roles). He won because most
Iranians, especially younger voters like Karim who are the
natural constituency of the reform movement, saw him as the only
candidate willing to talk about what nearly everyone in Iran
regardless of class, degree of piety or political affiliation
is most concerned about: massive inflation, high unemployment
and soaring housing prices.
While Rafsanjani and the other half-dozen or so presidential
candidates stumbled over each other with promises of social
reform and rapprochement with the West, Ahmadinejad promised to
stop corruption in the government, distribute aid to the
outlying provinces, promote healthcare, raise the minimum wage
and help the young with home and business loans. Amid all the
talk of head scarves and pop music from the front-runners,
Ahmadinejad's message had enormous appeal not just for Iran's
poor, but also for the country's youth, many of whom were
attracted to Rafsanjani's promises of reform but who ultimately
voted with their pocketbooks for Ahmadinejad.
In fact, the crumbling economy perhaps even more than the
mass arrests and political repression is to blame for
Iranian's widespread disenchantment with the reform movement.
After all, when nearly a third of the population is unemployed
and about 40% live below the poverty line, it is nearly
impossible to focus on social reform.
In this sense, the U.S. must bear some responsibility for
Ahmadinejad's victory. Because the primary cause of Iran's
economic collapse (in addition to domestic corruption and
ineptitude) is more than two decades of U.S. sanctions,
isolation and containment which, according to a report issued
last year by the Council on Foreign Relations, has only
strengthened the hard-liners, accelerated Iran's nuclear program
and made full democracy a more distant prospect.
Over the last four years, a slew of American foreign policy
experts and Iranian intellectuals, such as Nobel Peace Prize
laureate Shirin Ebadi, have pressed the Bush administration to
abandon its failed policy of isolating Iran. Instead, they
recommend a broad program of economic incentives in exchange for
meaningful reform (something akin to what the administration is
enthusiastically doing for North Korea, a brutal, totalitarian
country in the grip of a murderous megalomaniac with nuclear
weapons and the will to use them). But the administration has
rebuffed these calls, choosing instead to pursue "regime change"
by threatening military action, fomenting dissent and
encouraging Iranians to revolt against the clerical
establishment, even though the vast majority are too preoccupied
with eking out a living to consider rising up en masse.
It is too early to say for certain what the election will mean
for Iran, let alone for Iran's relations with the West. However,
the election of a tough ultraconservative suggests that the time
when the U.S. could have helped move Iran toward greater freedom
by forcing the country out of its isolation and prying it open
to the rest of the world (as it did with the Soviet Union and
China), may have come and gone.
Copyright 2005 Los Angeles Times |
*****************************************************************
5 ITAR-TASS: Iran insists on its right to use atom for peace
03.07.2005, 09.24
TEHERAN, July 3 (Itar-Tass) - Iran insists on its right to
develop peaceful nuclear technologies and to use nuclear energy
for peaceful purposes, Iranian parliament speaker Gholamali
Haddad Adel who completed his Belgian visit on Saturday evening,
said in an interview with Iranian radio on Sunday.
We again stated at the talks in Brussels that the new
initiatives of the European Union should not be based on demands
to Iran to continue the moratorium on uranium enrichment. The
negotiating process on the Iranian nuclear programme should
continue in the framework of the Paris agreements and take into
account the Islamic Republics right to develop nuclear
technologies, Adel emphasized. He called his three-day visit to
Brussels useful.
Iran had fully suspended activities on uranium enrichment last
November on the basis of the Paris agreement, reached with the
European Union. However, Iranian officials stressed that the
moratorium is of temporary nature and would continue only for a
period of talks with the European Trio. Their next round is to
be held late this month after a lengthy pause in the negotiating
process, caused by the recent presidential elections in Iran.
ITAR-TASS. All rights reserved. You undertake not to copy,
*****************************************************************
6 Al Jazeera: Changes in Irans nuclear policy -
Aljazeera.com
7/3/2005 9:30:00 PM GMT
Khatami has failed to reach suitable results from nuclear talks
with the European Union
A close aide to Irans president-elect Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
revealed on Sunday that the new government will make some
changes to the countrys nuclear policies.
Adopting a new approach towards the nuclear issue and talks
with the European Union will be one of Ahmadinejads top
priorities, Alaeddin Boroujerdi, head of the parliamentary
foreign policy and security commission, said on Sunday, without
giving further details on how different the new approach would
be.
Boroujerdi, moreover, slammed the government of President
Mohammad Khatami for failing to reach suitable results from
nuclear talks with the European Union over the past two years.
With the appointment of the new foreign minister, the framework
of cooperation between government and parliament on the nuclear
issue would become clear, Boroujerdi said.
Rowhani resigns
Also Sunday, some unconfirmed reports stated that moderate chief
nuclear negotiator and secretary of Irans National Security
Council, Hassan Rowhani has resigned.
Boroujerdis remarks come in contrast to a statement made by
Ahmadinejad last week, in which he affirmed that Irans nuclear
policy would not be changed.
Meanwhile, leaders of Russia, Germany and France are due to
discuss Irans nuclear program at a summit that will be held in
Kaliningrad today, a Kremlin official said.
The Russian President Vladimir Putin is holding talks with
French President Jacques Chirac and German Chancellor Gerhard
Schroeder in the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad.
A discussion on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, particularly as far as the Iranian nuclear
programme is concerned, is expected in Kaliningrad, the
official said o condition of anonymity.
Ignoring U.S. continuous pressure, Russia is building a reactor
in Irans first nuclear power plant at Bushehr, that will be be
switched on in 2006, the head of Russias federal atomic energy
agency Alexander Rumyantsev said last week.
Russia stressed more than once that Iran has the right to pursue
nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, yet there should be
international controls on the Islamic republics nuclear
program.
Copyright 2005 Al Jazeera Publishing Limited
*****************************************************************
7 MNA: Iran should promptly decide about construction of nuclear plants
- Salehi
2005/07/02
[ src=] Print version [ src=]
TEHRAN, July 2 (MNA) -- Iran’s former envoy to the
International Atomic Energy Agency, Ali Akbar Salehi, said on
Saturday that the construction of nuclear power plants should be
placed high on the agenda of the next government.
“Since construction of power plants is a time-consuming
process, we should not lose time in making a definite
decision,” he told the Mehr News Agency.
Referring to the rising price of oil, Salehi said previous
researches had shown if the price of oil increased to 30 dollars
per barrel it would be much more economical for all countries
including Iran to make use of nuclear energy than fossil fuels.
“With the current price of 60 dollars per barrel that will
probably rise even higher over the next few years, many
countries including China, India and Taiwan have been obliged to
seriously consider the use of nuclear energy; even the U.S. is
reviewing its policy on nuclear power plants.”
Salehi, who is currently deputy in charge of scientific and
technological affairs at the Organization of the Islamic
Conference, noted that the country’s current nuclear
capabilities are the result of the work of many universities and
the country’s industrial potential.
If the government makes a serious decision on the Majlis bill to
produce 20,000 megawatts of nuclear electricity, then it will
necessarily have to make serious efforts in developing nuclear
studies at universities, he observed.
Salehi also said Iran’s nuclear policies are free from
personal preferences.
“It’s the system that decides on the issue and the system is
obliged to move in line with the nation’s demand, that is to
benefit from the right to make use of nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes.”
HL/MS
End
© 2003 Mehr News Agency
*****************************************************************
8 Mehr: Next government should have new view of nuclear issue
MehrNews.com -
2005/07/03
[ src=] Print version [ src=]
TEHRAN, July 3 (MNA) -- Majlis National Security and Foreign
Policy Committee Chairman Aladdin Borujerdi announced on Sunday
that the next government should have a new outlook on Iran’s
nuclear energy program.
Access to nuclear technology is a right of the Iranian nation and
the next government should consider this fact in its future
moves, he told the Mehr News Agency.
“Over the past years we failed to reach a favorable result in
our nuclear negotiations with the European Union big three of
Britain, Germany and France,” Borujerdi noted, adding “This
is why the next government should make more strenuous efforts to
help the country advance in its nuclear program.”
“We are ready to cooperate with the new administration as soon
as it has appointed the next foreign minister,” he observed.
Iran’s diplomacy will not change with new government
Member of the Majlis National Security and Foreign Policy
Committee, Manuchehr Mottaki said on Sunday that Iran’s
foreign policy is based on national interests, the Constitution,
and the instructions of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic
Revolution.
“The Islamic Republic’s diplomacy will not change with the
new administration,” he told reporters after the Majlis open
session.
Mottaki called the recent moves against Iran’s newly elected
president by the U.S. as a psychological warfare.
“The next government is a ‘government of work’ seeking to
develop the country and we consider any move aimed to deprive
the administration from implementing its plans as an organized
attempt against the country,” he added.
Majlis speaker says foreign ministry did not neglect its duty
Majlis speaker Gholam Ali Haddad Adel presented a report on his
recent three-day trip to Belgium ahead of the Majlis open
session on Sunday. Haddad Adel noted that his visit to Brussels
took place at the invitation of his Belgian counterpart, adding
Iran-Belgium ties have expanded over the recent months.
He noted that in his meetings with President of the Belgian
Parliament's Lower House Herman De Croo, Foreign Minister Karel
De Gucht and Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt, the two sides
discussed avenues for boosting bilateral relations as well as
issues of mutual interest.
Haddad Adel said that in his meeting with the EU Foreign Policy
chief Javier Solana, the issue of human rights and the Iranian
parliament’s position toward the peaceful use of nuclear
energy were discussed.
“Two minor incidents also occurred during the trip, which were
broadcast in a different light,” he went on to say.
“Iranian officials refuse to attend banquets where alcoholic
beverages are served but the Belgian side did not consent to
this and the ceremony was finally cancelled.”
The Majlis speaker stressed that the issue had put no influence
on the process of bilateral ties.
He added that the Iranian delegation also cancelled a meeting
with Senate female president Anne-Marie Lizin since the Belgian
side did not respect the Islamic principles that do not allow
men to shake hands with women.
“I didn’t feel the foreign ministry had neglected any part
its duty” he said.
“In fact foreign ministry officials performed their duties
quite efficiently,” he underlined.
MPs call on ministries to take action
A group of MPs called on various executive officials on Sunday
to pursue certain issues in separate written warnings.
Teymur Ali Asgari, an MP from Mashhad, called for holding an
unofficial session attended by the intelligence minister for
dealing with forces involved in the organized effort to ruin
certain candidates during the presidential election campaigns.
MP Sattar Hedayatkhah urged the foreign ministry to adopt a firm
position against British officials’ interfering remarks on
Iran’s presidential poll.
Three newly elected MPs sworn in
Three MPs elected during the Majlis by-elections were sworn in.
The swearing-in ceremony was held for MPs from Gachsaran, Ali
Morad Jabbari, from Qorveh, Emad Hosseini and from Marand and
Jolfa, Karim Shafe.
According to Article 3 of the Majlis bylaws and Article 67 of
the Constitution, the MP-elects should be sworn in upon their
first presence in the parliament.
HL/MS
End
MNA
© 2003 Mehr News Agency
*****************************************************************
9 Guardian Unlimited: The lies behind the lies
[UP]
Roy Greenslade salutes Dilip Hiro's Secrets and Lies, a
depressing but magisterial assessment of the reasoning that led
to the invasion of Iraq
Saturday July 2, 2005
The Observer
[Secrets and Lies by Dilip Hiro]
Buy Secrets and Lies at the Guardian bookshop
Secrets and Lies: The True Story of the Iraq War
by Dilip Hiro
564pp, Politico's, 9.99
Millions across the world who marched in the hope of preventing
the invasion of Iraq were angered by the fact that their
opposition was ignored. If they read this book their anger will
be redoubled. But the people who will surely feel even more
embittered are those who were taken in, having been persuaded by
the arguments of President Bush and Prime Minister Blair to
support the war.
Dilip Hiro coolly dismantles the political lies, distortions and
obfuscations that allowed the United States and Britain to
launch an illegal invasion of Iraq. That he does the job so
meticulously - even, arguably, in too detailed a fashion on
occasion - makes his overall indictment even more powerful than
the scatter-gun approach of other war critics, such as Michael
Moore.
Hiro brings to the subject a thorough knowledge of the Middle
East, having written extensively about the region in several of
his previous 26 books. Here is an author for whom, to paraphrase
Bush's secretary of defence, Donald Rumsfeld, there are no
unknown unknowns. He has made it his business to know exactly
how Bush's White House team managed to prosecute a war based on
a giant fabrication. That, of course, was the claim that Iraq's
dictator, Saddam Hussein, had defied the United Nations by
holding on to weapons of mass destruction that presented a
threat to global stability. In order to support the central lie,
to give it the semblance of credibility, there were scores of
intertwined supporting lies. Saddam was not linked to al-Qaida
and was not, therefore, responsible for 9/11. He did not buy
uranium oxide from Niger. Iraq did not have a fleet of unmanned
aircraft nor did it have mobile labs to produce chemical and
biological weapons. Nor was it operating poison factories.
Hiro is painstaking as he holds up every piece of fake
intelligence to scrutiny, revealing both its falsity and the
propaganda use to which it was put. Every excuse advanced by
Bush and Blair for the invasion is shown to be hollow, as they
seek to conceal the main reason for their pre-emptive strike:
the desire for regime change. In some of the most telling
passages, Hiro reveals the key roles played by the sinister
group who surrounded Bush, such as his deputy, Dick Cheney;
Rumsfeld's deputy, Paul Wolfowitz; the under secretary of
defence, Douglas Feith; the defence adviser Richard Perle; the
president's chief political adviser, Karl Rove; and, of course,
the national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice. Meanwhile, the
senior man, Colin Powell, the secretary of state, was largely
isolated from Bush's gung-ho squad. Despite his policy
disagreements however, he performed important tasks on behalf of
the warriors, none more so than his lengthy speech to the UN
Security Council in the build-up to the invasion. Hiro's
point-by-point rebuttal of Powell's allegations is masterly.
In similar fashion he destroys the so-called evidence in Blair's
now infamous dossiers on WMD and the far-fetched claim about
Iraq being able to deploy such weapons within 45 minutes.
Evidently, even the Americans scoffed at the statement, though
they grew less concerned themselves about the WMD reasoning
because they had successfully convinced their public that Saddam
was one of the 9/11 culprits.
Hiro mounts convincing evidence that Bush was determined to
invade Iraq on virtually any pretext soon after his first
election victory. He also shows how, some seven months before
the war, US special forces were operating within Iraq at the
behest of Rumsfeld. Their work was specifically linked to an
invasion that had not even been raised with the UN and while its
weapons inspectors were still carrying out their tasks with what
later transpired to be great efficiency.
The geopolitical manoeuvres are certainly riveting, but the more
human, and inhuman, story emerges in the passages that tell of
the invasion itself. There are several examples of just how
badly the civilian Iraqi population suffered as the
Anglo-American forces swept through their country. But the
haunting moments come, just as they did in the revelations about
the reality of the Vietnam war, when one discovers that neither
politicians nor military leaders ever tell the truth. For
example, the Pentagon strenuously denied that it had used napalm
in Iraq, despite an Australian correspondent witnessing its use.
That wasn't napalm, said a spokesman, it was a Mark 77 firebomb.
As Hiro observes this statement was "cynical sophistry", since
the Mark 77 is a mixture of kerosene and polystyrene, while
napalm is a mixture of jet fuel and polystyrene. The result is
just the same: death in a fireball.
There were also official denials about the use of lethal, and
indiscriminate, cluster bombs. Yet Hiro is not only able to
state that 1,566 cluster bombs were dropped along with more than
20,000 cluster munitions, he also reproduces a map to show
exactly where they were used.
In the greater scheme of things it was a small lie, just one
among so many. The promulgation of pre-war lies was followed by
further lies during the war. Now Bush and Blair tell us that
life in post-Saddam Iraq is improving. But why should we believe
them?
&183; Roy Greenslade is professor of journalism at London's
City University. To order Secrets and Lies for 9.99 with free
UK p&p call Guardian book service on 0870 836 0875 or go to
www.guardian.co.uk/bookshop
[UP]
Guardian Unlimited Guardian Newspapers Limited 2005
*****************************************************************
10 Korea: Digital Chosunilbo: New York Contacts Between Korean and U.S. Officials End with
> Updated July.3,2005 18:17 KST
A series of contacts between officials from the U.S. and North
Korea, as well as North and South Korea, have ended without a
clear breakthrough regarding the stalled talks on North Korea's
nuclear weapons program.
While the American side is saying that North Korea has not
produced a date for the next round of talks, the North Korean
side is saying it will wait for the next move by the U.S.
Two days of contacts in New York among officials from Seoul,
Pyongyang and Washington wrapped up on Friday with no clear
progress toward the next round of talks on dismantling North
Korea's nuclear arsenal. While all three sides say frank
discussions were held during the security conference, organized
by the U.S. National Committee on American Foreign Policy, none
were forthcoming on the specifics of the contacts.
The U.S. State Department confirmed that its envoy Joseph
DeTrani met with Li Gun, the Pyongyang official at the
conference, but stressed that there was no negotiating during
the meeting.
"It was a contact. I'm not going to characterize it beyond that.
I have said what we and the other members of the six-party talks
continue to wait to hear from the North Koreans is that they
will return to the talks. That's what matters."
As for the North Koreans, Li Gun told reporters after the
conference that he had demanded the U.S. withdraw its reference
to North Korea as an "outpost of tyranny," reiterating that the
Bush administration had to give Pyongyang a reason to return to
the multilateral nuclear talks.
Wi Sung-lac, the South Korean official attending the gathering
had a positive assessment, saying that the contacts have
improved understanding and trust between North Korea and the
U.S. He also said he expects further dialogue between the two
sides in other formats and through other channels.
Arirang News
*****************************************************************
11 Daily Yomiuri: N. Korea gives no hint of move on 6-way talks
Takao Hishinuma Yomiuri Shimbun Correspondent
A senior North Korean diplomat participating in a three-day
conference that ended here Friday, demanded the United States
withdraw its reference to his country's government as
tyrannical, but failed to show any sign that Pyongyang would
return to six-way talks on its nuclear program any time soon.
"I urged [the U.S. officials] to withdraw the 'outpost of
tyranny' remark," Ri Gun, director of the North Korean Foreign
Ministry's American Affairs Bureau, told reporters after the
closed-door conference on Northeast Asian security that was
sponsored by a U.S. think tank.
Ri was referring to the remarks made earlier this year by U.S.
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice as she described North
Korea's regime.
Officials and scholars from all participating countries in the
six-way talks--Japan, China, North and South Koreas, Russia and
the United States--took part in the three-day New York
conference.
A U.S. government source said prior to the conference that the
administration had expected to hear some positive remarks from
Ri about setting a date for the next round of six-way talks, the
last of which were held in June 2004.
The source said the expectation was raised last month when North
Korean leader Kim Jong Il told a South Korean delegation that
his government might return to the talks in July. (Jul. 3, 2005)
Copyright The Yomiuri Shimbun.
*****************************************************************
12 Xinhua: US, DPRK optimistic about resumption of six-party talks
www.xinhuanet.com
www.chinaview.cn 2005-07-02 09:20:29
NEW YORK, July 1 (Xinhuanet) -- The academic conference on
northeast Asian security with participants from the United
States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)
concluded on Friday on an optimistic note that the six-party
talks on the Korean nuclear issue will be resumed.
The conference, which was held on Thursday and Friday, was
co-hosted by the National Committee on American Foreign Policy
(NCAFP) and the DPRK Institute of Disarmament and Peace.
Participants at the symposium included Ri Gun,
director-general from the DPRK Foreign Ministry and negotiator
on the nuclear issue, Joseph Detrani, the US State Department's
special envoy for the six-way talks, Jim Foster, director of the
State Department's Office of Korean Affairs, Henry Kissinger,
former US Secretary of State, George D. Schwab, president of the
National Committee on American Foreign Policy, and officials
from China, Russia, South Korea and Japan.
The officials discussed the nuclear issue on the Korean
Peninsula during the meeting, which, according to a press
release at the end of the meeting, was the third such conference
co-hosted by the two organizations.
In the press release, participants said the purpose for
organizing these dialogues is "to foster mutual understanding
among the parties to the official six-party talks."
Conference participants agreed that discussions were frank
and constructive and they are optimistic that the DPRK will
return to the six-party talks.
By June last year, three rounds of the six-party talks,
which involved the DPRK, South Korea, the United States, China,
Japan and Russia, had been held. The talks have since then been
stalled as the DPRK accused the United States of adopting a
hostile policy toward Pyongyang.
To revive the talks, officials from the United States and
the DPRK held negotiations last November, December and this May
respectively. Enditem
Copyright 2003 Xinhua News Agency. All rights reserved.
*****************************************************************
13 Korea Times: S. Korea, US to Present Joint Proposal to NK
Hankooki.com > The Korea Times > Nation
By Lee Jin-woo Staff Reporter
South Korea and the United States are ready to combine their
proposals to convince North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons
program, a senior Seoul official said.
Wrapping up his five-day visit to Washington on Friday,
Unification Minister Chung Dong-young said the two allies agreed
to combine the proposal the U.S. has presented in the third
round of six-way talks with South Koreas new ``important
proposal, so they could see ``substantial progress once
a new round of six-party talks is held.
``We agreed that the next six-party talks, once resumed, will
gain momentum if we combine the proposals from the previous
talks and South Koreas recent one, he said. He had a
series of meetings with top U.S. officials involved in
negotiations with North Korea, including Vice President Dick
Cheney.
Chung did not elaborate on the details of his talks with Cheney,
saying they had agreed not to disclose them. He only said the
vice president listened carefully and emphasized that a result
should be made promptly through peaceful and diplomatic
six-party talks.
Chung, who also heads the standing committee of South Koreas
National Security Council (NSC), met U.S. Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice and National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley.
The minister gave a detailed explanation to the high-level
American officials concerning his one-on-one meeting with North
Korean leader Kim Jong-il on June 17. Kim indicated his country
could rejoin the nuclear talks in July if Washington treats his
regime with respect.
On Thursday, Christopher Hill, assistant secretary of state and
the U.S. point man on the North Korean nuclear issue, told Chung
that Washington has no problems with Seouls much-vaunted
proposal, the contents of which has yet to be publicized.
Experts believe the ``important proposal includes calls for
simultaneous concessions by the U.S. and North Korea and a large
amount of economic aid to the impoverished state in return for
its denuclearization. Some news articles reported it would be a
kind of North Korean ``Marshall Plan, referring to the U.S.
program to rebuild Europe following World War II.
In the third round of talks in Beijing, South Korea, the U.S.
and North Korea presented their respective proposals in which
the North would dismantle its nuclear programs in exchange for
some rewards.
North Korea demanded various incentives for its nuclear freeze
from the very initial stages, such as a security guarantee and
economic aid from the U.S. But, the U.S. suggested such
incentives could be offered only at the end of a comprehensive
denuclearization process.
With both refusing to budge, Seoul offered a three-stage
proposal, which calls for verbal promises to address each
others concerns, followed by ``reciprocal actions toward
denuclearization, and finally, the normalization of diplomatic
ties between the two nations.
Meanwhile, the unofficial meeting between U.S. and North Korean
nuclear negotiators at an academic conference in New York ended
without any substantially good news for the Norths return to
the negotiation table, but room for the possibility in the
future.
Both Ri Gun, Pyongyangs deputy chief delegate to the six-way
talks, and his U.S. counterpart Joseph DeTrani described the
meeting as a good chance to exchange opinions, implying more
talks will follow to discuss resuming the negotiations.
The two Koreas, the U.S., China, Japan and Russia held three
rounds of six-party talks in Beijing until a year ago, to
resolve the growing North Korean nuclear crisis.
The nuclear row erupted in 2002 when U.S. officials claimed
North Korea had admitted to having a secret uranium-enrichment
program, in addition to its known plutonium-based arms program
frozen under a 1994 deal between the two sides.
things@koreatimes.co.kr 07-03-2005 17:16
*****************************************************************
14 Bushs Uranium Lies: Case For A Special Prosecutor
Date: Sun, 3 Jul 2005 02:27:04 -0500 (CDT)
http://democracyrising.us/content/view/268/164
Bushs Uranium Lies: Case For A Special Prosecutor
Written by Francis T. Mandanici
Wednesday, 29 June 2005
Some have observed that the Bush Administration's claims that Iraq
had weapons of mass destruction were not just good faith mistakes
but actual lies. Some have even recently compared President Bush's
false claims about Iraq to the Watergate scandal that led to President
Nixon's resignation. See Truth And Deceit by Bob Herbert and Don't
Follow the Money by Frank Rich in The New York Times, June 2, 12,
2005. Some, such as the organizations AfterDowningStreet and
DemocracyRising.US, have even called for the initiation of impeachment
proceedings based in part on the Downing Street Memo that revealed
that according to a British intelligence official the Bush
Administration prior to the war against Iraq fixed the intelligence
and facts to justify the war.[1]
In response to press reports on the Downing Street Memo, Congressman
John Conyers and 90 other Congressional Democrats in a May 5 letter
to President Bush asked him if there was a coordinated effort to
fix the intelligence and facts to justify the war.[2] Congressman
Conyers and other Congressional Democrats on June 16 held an
unofficial hearing concerning the Downing Street Memo that resembled
an impeachment inquiry.
Although the Downing Street Memo clearly raises serious questions
about President Bush's honesty about Iraq and some claim it to be
a smoking gun, it pales in comparison to the public record that
already exists concerning his specific claim that Iraq had sought
uranium for a nuclear weapon, which he presented as a key reason
to justify the war rather than wait for United Nations weapons
inspectors to finish their work. When the dots in the public record
are connected on that matter, including a close analysis of
Congressional investigative reports and resolutions, there is a
strong case that President Bush and senior members of his Administration
made fraudulent claims to Congress. Since criminal statutes prohibit
making fraudulent statements to Congress and obstructing its
functions, the Justice Department should pursuant to its regulations
appoint an outside special counsel. A specific motive for the
uranium claims that the Administration made would have been to
thwart the efforts of Congress and the UN to delay the start of the
war. The current public record is as strong as the Starr Report
that commenced the impeachment proceedings against President Clinton
and is surely strong enough to require the initial appointment of
a special counsel to conduct a criminal investigation. Such a
special counsel investigation could then lead to impeachment
proceedings, as well as expand to cover other possible fraudulent
claims.
President Bush and his senior officials made five uranium claims,
which along with other claims were catalogued and analyzed in the
report Iraq On The Record (IR) that was prepared by the Minority
Staff of the House Committee On Government Reform and released on
March 16, 2004.[3]
Concerning the uranium claims, that report including its database
states that (1) President Bush on January 20, 2003 told Congress
that Iraq's disclosure to the UN (which was supposed to reveal all
of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction) "failed to deal with issues
which have arisen since 1998, including ... attempts to acquire
uranium and the means to enrich it"; (2) President Bush on January
28, 2003 in his State of the Union Address told Congress that the
"British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought
significant quantities of uranium from Africa"; (3) then National
Security Advisor and now Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice on
January 23, 2003 in an op-ed article stated that Iraq's disclosure
to the UN "fail(ed) to account for or explain Iraq's efforts to get
uranium from abroad"; (4) then Secretary of State Colin Powell on
January 26, 2003 in a speech stated "Why is Iraq still trying to
procure uranium and the special equipment needed to transform it
into material for nuclear weapons?"; and (5) Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld on January 29, 2003 at a press conference stated
that Hussein's "regime has the design for a nuclear weapon, was
working on several different methods of enriching uranium, and
recently was discovered seeking significant quantities of uranium
from Africa." IR pp. 13-15, and IR Database (Speaker: All; Keyword:
uranium; Subject: Nuclear Capabilities; choose Show All). All five
uranium statements were made within a nine-day period between January
20 and 29, 2003.
Furthermore President Bush's above two uranium claims are in documents
that he submitted to Congress. President Bush's 2003 State of the
Union Address that he gave to Congress is labeled House Document
108-1.[4] The report Iraq On The Record quotes the sentence
concerning uranium in President Bush's State of the Union Address
but the prior sentence is also important since it mentions the
purpose for the uranium. As shown by the document President Bush
told Congress that the UN's International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) confirmed in the 1990's that "Saddam Hussein had an advanced
nuclear weapons development program, had a design for a nuclear
weapon, and was working on five different methods of enriching
uranium for a bomb. The British government has learned that Saddam
Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from
Africa."
The statement that President Bush made to Congress on January 20,
2003 that Iraq's report to the UN "failed to deal with issues which
have arisen since 1998, including ... attempts to acquire uranium
and the means to enrich it" was made in a report that President
Bush submitted to Congress that is labeled House Document 108-23.[5]
After the above sentence, President Bush reported to Congress: "In
short, we have not seen anything that indicates that the Iraqi
regime has made a strategic decision to disarm. On the contrary,
we believe that Iraq is actively working to disrupt, deny, and
defeat (UN) inspection efforts." Public Law 107-243, which was
the war resolution that Congress passed earlier in October 2002
authorizing President Bush to use military force in Iraq, required
President Bush to submit the above report.
The report Iraq On The Record states that all of the Bush
Administration's above uranium claims were misleading. IR pp. 3,
13-15. Concerning the importance of the claims the report states:
"Another significant component of the Administration's nuclear
claims was the assertion that Iraq had sought to import uranium
from Africa. As one of few new pieces of intelligence, this claim
was repeated multiple times by Administration officials as proof
that Iraq had reconstituted its nuclear weapons program." IR p.
13 (emphasis added).
The report further states that the above officials (President Bush,
Secretary Rumsfeld, Secretary Powell and National Security Advisor
Rice) who made the uranium claims and Vice President Richard Cheney
made a total of 237 misleading statements about the threat that
Iraq posed (including the above mentioned uranium claims). IR pp.
ii, 3. The statements started on March 17, 2002, which was one
year before the start of the war. IR pp. ii, 3. Most (161) of the
misleading statements were made prior to the war while 76 misleading
statements were made after the war started to justify the decision
to go to war. IR pp. ii, 3-4. The 237 misleading statements covered
four areas: statements that Iraq posed an urgent threat, statements
about Iraq's nuclear capabilities (such as the uranium claims),
statements about Iraq's chemical and biological weapons programs,
and statements about Iraq's support for al Qaeda. IR p. 6. Minus
the 51 misleading statements of Vice President Cheney, the other
four officials who made the misleading uranium claims made a total
of 186 misleading statements. IR pp. 3, 26.
As observed in Iraq On The Record, the "Administration's statements
about Iraq's nuclear capabilities had a large impact on congressional
and public perceptions about the threat posed by Iraq." IR p. 8.
The most glaring examples of the misleading statements are the above
five uranium claims, which are discussed herein.
The report Iraq On The Record states that the uranium claims were
misleading because the Central Intelligence Agency had earlier
expressed doubts about the claim in two memos to the White House
including one addressed to then National Security Advisor Rice, and
the then CIA Director George Tenet argued personally against using
the claim in a telephone call to Rice's deputy, Stephen Hadley. IR
pp. 14-15, and IR Database (Speaker: All; Keyword: uranium; Subject:
Nuclear Capabilities; choose Show All).
In addition to Iraq On The Record, the full Senate Select Committee
On Intelligence released on July 7, 2004 an investigative report
entitled Report On The U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar
Intelligence Assessments On Iraq (SR).[6] That report cites President
Bush's above two uranium statements and Secretary Powell's uranium
statement, SR pp. 63-64, 66, and reveals many more details of what
President Bush and his senior officials did not disclose.
President Bush and his senior officials made their uranium claims
in January 2003, and the Senate report mentions that some in the
American intelligence community including in the CIA had believed
the uranium claim. SR pp. 47, 52, 62. Also the report states that
the CIA had actually cleared two proposed presidential speeches
that the White House's National Security Council (NSC) had sent to
the CIA in September 2002 that contained the claims that Iraq was
caught trying to purchase 500 tons of uranium and that Iraq had
sought large amounts of uranium from Africa. SR pp. 49, 51.
President Bush did not use the approved language publicly. SR pp.
49, 51.
The Senate report states that the British government on September
24, 2002 published a White Paper stating that "there is intelligence
that Iraq has sought the supply of significant quantities of uranium
from Africa." SR p. 50. The above information in British White
Paper did not state that the attempt was recent.
The Senate report then reveals that a CIA analyst in September 2002
suggested to a staff member of the White House's NSC that the White
House remove from a proposed speech the claim that Iraq attempted
to acquire uranium from Africa. SR p. 51. According to the CIA
analyst the NSC staff member responded by stating that removing the
claim would leave the British "flapping in the wind." SR p. 51.
The Senate report reveals that in October 2002, the White House's
NSC sent to the CIA a draft of a speech that President Bush was to
give in Cincinnati that contained the statement that Iraq had been
caught attempting to purchase up to 500 tons of uranium from Africa.
SR p. 55. Due to the concerns expressed by a CIA Iraq nuclear
analyst, the CIA's Associate Deputy Director for Intelligence faxed
a memo to the Deputy National Security Advisor (Hadley) and to the
speechwriters suggesting that they remove the uranium claim from
the speech because the amount was in dispute, the claim was debatable,
the CIA had told Congress that the British had exaggerated the
issue, and Iraq already had 500 tons of uranium in its inventory.
SR pp. 55-56. (The reference to telling Congress would be to certain
select intelligence committees that cannot divulge the secret
information to all members of Congress).
The NSC then sent to the CIA another draft of the speech containing
a revised statement that Iraq had been caught attempting to purchase
substantial amounts of uranium from Africa. SR p. 56. The CIA's
Associate Deputy Director believed that the NSC had not addressed
the uranium information in its later draft and alerted the CIA
Director (Tenet). SR p. 56. The CIA Director responded by telling
the Deputy National Security Advisor (Hadley) that President Bush
should not provide any facts on the issue in the speech because CIA
analysts told him that the "reporting (on the uranium claim) was
weak". SR p. 56. After the White House's NSC removed the claim
from the speech, the CIA sent a second fax to the White House stating
the "evidence (on the claim) is weak". SR p. 56. On October 7,
2002, President Bush delivered his speech in Cincinnati and kept
out the uranium claim. SR p. 57.
The Senate report states that the CIA on October 11, 2002 received
copies of documents that supposedly supported the claim that Iraq
had a deal to obtain uranium from Africa. SR p. 58. On January
13, 2003 (which was before the first above mentioned uranium claim
of January 20, 2003), the Iraq nuclear analyst for the State
Department's intelligence bureau (INR) sent an e-mail to several
American intelligence community analysts outlining the reasons why
he believed that the document supposedly supporting the uranium
deal was probably a "hoax" and a "forgery". SR p. 62.
After the State Department's intelligence bureau alerted the CIA
and Defense Intelligence Agency about the problems with the documents,
said agencies published assessments that, as summarized in the
Senate report, stated that "Iraq may have been seeking uranium from
Africa." SR pp. 77, 62, 64 (emphasis added).
Concerning the State of the Union Address of January 28, 2003, the
Senate report reveals that a NSC official at the White House and a
CIA official discussed the draft of that speech that the White House
had sent to the CIA that stated "we know that (Hussein) has recently
sought to buy uranium in Africa." SR pp. 64-65 (emphasis added).
The final draft that President Bush actually gave was that the
"British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought
significant quantities of uranium from Africa." SR p. 66 (emphasis
added). Both officials stated that there was never a discussion
on the credibility of the reporting. SR pp. 65-66. The stated
reason for the switch from we' to the British was the desire to
identify in the speech a source for the uranium claim that was not
classified, and the British White Paper source was not classified
while the American source was classified. SR pp. 65-66. However,
the original draft that the White House sent apparently did not
name any source for America's knowledge but merely said we'. There
was really no need to further identify any sources. Concerning
other claims against Hussein, President Bush in his speech actually
used the phrase intelligence sources' without providing any specifics
on the sources.[7]
Thus it might be argued that the forgotten reason why the switch
was made from "we know" to the "British government has learned" was
that the CIA was not really comfortable with the "we know" especially
since that might include the CIA Director who had previously told
the White House that the President should not make any uranium claim
because CIA analysts believed it was weak. It is plausible that
the CIA became comfortable with the speech only when it was changed
and merely repeated what the British had stated rather than what
the CIA Director knew. The CIA official had originally told the
Senate committee that he had told the White House official to remove
parts of the draft that contained the words "Niger" and "500 tons"
because of concerns about the sources and methods but he later
recanted that claim since such words were not in the draft of the
speech. SR p. 65.
The Senate report also states that according to the National
Intelligence Officer (NIO), on January 24, 2003 the NSC "believed
the nuclear case (against Iraq) was weak" and requested additional
information from the intelligence community. SR p. 240. The
intelligence officer then provided the NSC with portions of the
earlier October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), which
mentioned that Iraq had vigorously tried to procure uranium and
which according to the intelligence officer "outlined possible
uranium acquisition attempts in Niger, Somalia, and possibly the
Congo." SR p. 240. However, the NSC members would have had the
NIE report for months and would have already read it. The NIE
contained the opinion of the State Department's intelligence bureau
that "the claims of Iraqi pursuit of natural uranium from Africa
are ... highly dubious." SR pp. 53-54. Thus no additional information
was provided that would change the weak nuclear case against Iraq
concerning the uranium claim.
President Bush chairs the NSC as President, and the other key members
of the NSC include the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State,
and the National Security Advisor. Thus the very people who were
claiming in January 2003 that Iraq had sought uranium were the key
members of a council that believed in January 2003 that the nuclear
case against Iraq was weak.
The Senate report also states that after President Bush told the
American Congress on January 28, 2003 that the British had learned
that Iraq had recently sought significant quantities of uranium
from Africa, the American government a few days later on February
4, 2003 privately told the UN's IAEA that it "cannot confirm (the
uranium) reports". SR pp. 67-68. On that date the American
government gave the IAEA copies of documents that supposedly supported
the claim that Iraq attempted to acquire the uranium. SR p. 67.
On March 3, 2003, the IAEA told the American government that the
documents were forgeries. SR p. 69.
After the United States on February 4, 2003 gave the IAEA the forged
documents along with the warning that the uranium reports could not
be confirmed, it does not appear that the Bush Administration ever
again risked making the public claim that Iraq had attempted to
acquire uranium from Africa. The next day on February 5 Secretary
of State Powell gave a speech to the UN in which he did not make
any uranium claims but as noted above he had made a uranium claim
in an earlier speech on January 26, 2003. SR pp. 68, 64.
According to the presidential commission, the Commission On The
Intelligence Capabilities Of The United States Regarding Weapons
Of Mass Destruction and its report released on March 31, 2005 (PCR),
Secretary of State Powell during meetings at the CIA to vet his UN
speech was informed that there were doubts about the reporting on
the Niger uranium matter and he did not include it in his speech
for that reason. PCR p. 213, note 210.[8] Thus the Bush
Administration stopped using the uranium claim the day after the
IAEA obtained possession of the forged documents that supposedly
supported the claim.
Approximately two weeks after the IAEA told the Bush Administration
that the documents were forgeries, the Bush Administration on March
19, 2003 commenced the war against Iraq. According to the presidential
commission, the Iraq Survey Group that conducted investigations
after the United States commenced the war "found no evidence that
Iraq sought uranium from abroad after 1991." PCR p. 64. President
Bush and his senior officials had a motive for their misleading
uranium claims that they made in late January 2003 - they needed
to maintain support for the war and to thwart efforts of Congress
and the UN to delay the start of the war. Although President Bush
and said officials had obtained the Congressional resolution for
the war against Iraq in October 2002, they did not start the war
until five months later in March 2003 and during that five months
they needed to maintain support for the war resolution that Congress
could have withdrawn if Congress believed that the purpose of the
resolution had been accomplished. The war resolution had not been
unanimous, the vote in the House had been 296 to 133, and the vote
in the Senate had been 77 to 23, and the resolution had strings
attached. The resolution, Public Law 107-243, Sec. 4, stated that
the "President shall, at least once every 60 days, submit to Congress
a report on matters relevant to this joint resolution". One of the
grounds for the war resolution was that international weapons
inspectors had left Iraq in 1998 because Iraq had thwarted their
efforts, and another ground was the belief of Congress that Iraq
was "actively seeking a nuclear weapons capability". As observed
in Iraq On The Record, the Bush Administration's barrage of misleading
statements about Iraq's nuclear capabilities had a "large impact
on congressional and public perceptions about the threat posed by
Iraq." IR p. 8.
After Congress passed the war resolution, the UN Security Council
on November 8, 2002 passed Resolution 1441 that demanded a declaration
by Iraq of all its chemical, biological and nuclear weapons and
programs, and which also set forth an enhanced weapons inspections
regimen in Iraq that gave inspectors unrestricted access to any
sites and buildings as well as the right to remove and or destroy
any prohibited weapons.[9] The resolution stated that if Iraq
provided a false declaration and did not cooperate then there could
be serious consequences.
Iraq then agreed to the resolution and on November 27, 2002 allowed
UN weapons inspectors to reenter Iraq, and on December 7 Iraq
provided a declaration that it had no weapons of mass destruction
or programs.
According to Bob Woodward's Plan Of Attack, p. 253, in the first
week of January 2003 President Bush discussed with then National
Security Advisor Rice the loss of support for the war. According
to Woodward the press reports of Iraqis cooperating with UN weapons
inspectors by opening up buildings "infuriated" President Bush who
believed in Woodward's words that the "unanimous international
consensus of the November (UN) resolution was beginning to fray."
President Bush told Rice that the "pressure isn't holding together".
President Bush also commented about the antiwar protests in the
United States and Europe.
On January 27, 2003, which was the day before President Bush gave
his State of the Union Address to Congress in which he claimed that
Iraq had recently sought significant quantities of uranium from
Africa, the UN issued a press release stating that "it would appear
that Iraq had decided in principle to provide cooperation on substance
in order to complete the disarmament task through inspection."[10]
Although there were some outstanding issues and questions concerning
chemical and biological weapons, the press release stated regarding
nuclear weapons that the UN weapons inspectors had reported that
after 60 days of inspections with a total of 139 inspections at 106
locations they had found "no evidence that Iraq had revived its
nuclear weapons programme" and "no prohibited nuclear activities
had been identified". The press release stated that the inspectors
had investigated the claim that Iraq had sought to import uranium
and that the Iraqis denied the claim but the inspectors would
continue to pursue the matter.
The UN press release concluded with the UN chief nuclear weapons
inspector's statement that "With our verification system now in
place, barring exceptional circumstances, and provided there is
sustained proactive cooperation by Iraq, we should be able, within
the next few months, to provide credible assurance that Iraq has
no nuclear weapons programme. These few months would be a valuable
investment in peace because they could help us avoid a war."
In response to the fact that Iraq had allowed UN weapons inspectors
to reenter Iraq and in apparent response to the same press reports
that President Bush read, five members of Congress on January 7,
2003 submitted a resolution, H.Con.Res.2, which expressed the sense
of Congress that Congress should repeal the war resolution in order
to allow more time for the UN weapons inspections.[11] The new
resolution contended that the threat posed by Iraq had lessened
because after the war resolution was passed Iraq then "allowed
international weapons inspectors to re-enter Iraq in order to
identify and destroy Iraq's weapons of mass destruction stockpiles
and development capabilities." The new resolution stated "Congress
should reexamine the threat posed by Iraq, including by allowing
time to review fully and accurately the findings of the international
weapons inspectors". As of February 25, 2003, seven more members
of Congress signed onto the resolution as cosponsors.
The Bush White House would certainly have learned about the new
resolution since, according to Woodward's Plan of Attack, pp. 137,
171, the White House has a congressional relations office that it
runs like an intelligence agency and which has 25 people who monitor
everything in Congress including closed-door briefings.
Also, according to Woodward's Plan of Attack, p. 286, in January
2003 the Bush White House "was planning a big rollout of speeches
and documents to counter Saddam and the growing international antiwar
movement."
On February 5, 2003, thirty members of Congress submitted another
resolution, H.J.Res.20, to actually repeal the war resolution.[12]
Prior to the start of the war on March 19, 2003, eight more members
of Congress signed onto the February 5 resolution to repeal the
earlier war resolution, bringing the total to thirty-eight members
of Congress who supported the repeal resolution since it had been
introduced.
Thus during the nine-day period of January 20 to 29, 2003 when
President Bush submitted the above reports to Congress and his
senior officials made their speeches and statements about the
uranium, they were facing and apparently infuriated by Iraq's
cooperation with UN Resolution 1441. More specifically, when
President Bush submitted his State of The Union Address to Congress
on January 28, 2003 in which he claimed that Iraq had recently
sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa, he was obviously
aware of the fact that the UN had issued a press release the previous
day stating that Iraq was cooperating with UN weapons inspectors
and that after 60 days of inspections the weapons inspectors had
found no evidence that Iraq had revived its nuclear program.
More significantly, when President Bush and his senior official
made their uranium claims between January 20 and 29 there was pending
the Congressional resolution of January 7 that suggested that the
purpose of the war resolution had been achieved because Iraq had
allowed weapons inspectors to reenter Iraq to make inspections as
well as to destroy any weapons of mass destruction. As mentioned
earlier, one of the grounds for the war resolution was that weapons
inspectors had left Iraq in 1998 because Iraq had thwarted their
efforts. Another ground was the belief of Congress that Iraq was
actively seeking a nuclear weapons capability. Thus many in Congress
who had voted for the war resolution might now actually claim victory
and declare that Hussein had surrendered, perhaps not to an invading
army but to the UN and if he flinched then he would face that army.
Thus to thwart the UN and Congressional efforts to delay the start
of the war, President Bush and said officials needed to show that
Iraq posed an immediate threat and that the UN weapons inspections
were not working. Although they were the key members of the NSC
which believed that the nuclear case against Iraq was weak, President
Bush and his said senior officials in January 2003 in order to
deceive the UN and Congress into believing that the nuclear case
against Iraq was actually strong twisted the unconfirmed uranium
reports into unquestioned evidence that would surely scare everyone.
According to President Bush and his senior officials they might not
have found a smoking gun but they did have evidence that Iraq had
an advanced nuclear weapons development program, had a design for
a nuclear weapon and just recently sought the fuel that could without
further delay ignite such a weapon that would produce a mushroom
cloud over America. To persuade Congress that the UN weapons
inspections approach was not working, President Bush in his report
to Congress, House Document 108-23, told Congress that Iraq was
defeating the inspection process by not disclosing its attempts to
acquire uranium, and a few days later in his State of the Union
Address, House Document 108-1, he told Congress that the British
had learned that Iraq had sought that uranium. The uranium claim
had an impact on Congress because it was "one of few new pieces of
intelligence" and the Administration offered it "as proof that Iraq
had reconstituted its nuclear weapons program." IR p. 13 (emphasis
added).
President Bush and his senior officials kept using the uranium claim
until a few days prior to February 4, 2003 when the American
government handed over to the UN the supporting documents that were
found to be forgeries and actually told the UN that the uranium
reports could not be confirmed. Approximately two weeks after the
UN told the American government that the documents were forgeries,
President Bush on March 19, 2003 started the war rather than allow
the UN weapons inspectors to finish their work.
Some have described the Bush Administration's uranium claims as
deceptive and misleading, which implies that the claims were perhaps
criminal. In a statement issued January 25, 2005 involving the
confirmation hearings of now Secretary of State Rice, Senator Carl
Levin who is a member of the Senate Select Committee On Intelligence
criticized the uranium claim that President Bush made in his 2003
State of the Union Address to Congress.[13] Senator Levin stated
that the CIA received the original draft of the speech that asserted
the purported American view that Iraq had sought uranium and that
did not mention the British. A senior CIA staff member then called
the NSC to repeat its concerns about the allegation. Senator Levin
stated that the NSC and White House instead of removing the text
from the speech "changed the text to make reference to the British
view, suggesting, of course, that the US believed the British view
to be accurate." Senator Levin stated that this was a "formula
(that) was highly deceptive" since the "only reason" to say that
the British learned that Iraq was seeking uranium from Africa "was
to create the impression that we believed it" although "we actually
did not believe" it. Senator Levin noted Secretary Rice's above
op-ed article and stated that she was "responsible for her own
distortions" and that she "distorted the facts and the intelligence
provided to her to help convince the American public of the need
to go to war." Senator Levin complained that no one in the Bush
Administration was held accountable.
The report Iraq On The Record that concluded that the Bush
Administration's above uranium claims were misleading defined a
statement as misleading "if it conflicted with what intelligence
officials knew at the time or involved the selective use of
intelligence or the failure to include essential qualifiers or
caveats." IR p. 2.
Such misleading statements can be considered actually fraudulent
since legal cases hold that a statement is fraudulent if it is
misleading, conveys a false impression, contains half-truths, and
discloses favorable information but omits unfavorable information.
The legal treatise Corpus Juris Secundum (Fraud, Sec. 2) states
that fraud is "a generic term which embraces all the multifarious
means which human ingenuity can devise and are resorted to by one
individual to gain an advantage over another by false suggestions
or by suppression of the truth." That treatise also states that
"(f)raudulent misrepresentation may be effected by half truths
calculated to deceive; and a half truth may be more misleading than
an outright lie. A representation literally true is actionable if
used to create an impression substantially false, as where it is
accompanied by conduct calculated to deceive or where it does not
state matters which materially qualify that statement." Fraud,
Sec. 24.
The uranium claims that President Bush and his senior officials
made were fraudulent statements because although some in the American
intelligence community including in the CIA somewhat agreed with
the British about the uranium and that "Iraq may have been seeking
uranium from Africa", SR p. 77 (emphasis added), President Bush and
his senior officials did not tell the whole truth consisting of the
contrary views held by prominent American intelligence officials.
Nor did President Bush and his senior officials use the weak word
may' but rather used much stronger and unqualified words such as
when President Bush stated that the "British government has learned
that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium
from Africa."
Furthermore, the statements that President Bush and Secretary
Rumsfeld made on January 28 and 29, 2003 that Iraq recently attempted
to acquire uranium, and the statement that Secretary Powell made
on January 26, 2003 that Iraq was still trying to acquire uranium
were actually false in that there was no evidence that Iraq had
recently sought uranium. The British White Paper did not provide
any information concerning the timing of the alleged attempt. SR
p. 50.
The Bush Administration's uranium claims were not only false and
fraudulent claims but were arguably actual crimes. Concerning the
two uranium claims that President Bush made directly to Congress,
the criminal statute 18 U.S.C., Sec. 1001(a) states that "whoever,
in any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative,
or judicial branch of the Government of the United States, knowingly
and willfully - (1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick,
scheme, or device a material fact; (2) makes any materially false,
fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation; or (3) makes
or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain
any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry;
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 5 years,
or both." (Emphasis added.) However, the statute does not prohibit
all false and fraudulent statements to Congress but only those made
under certain circumstances, such as statements involving "administrative
matters ... or a document required by law, rule or regulation to
be submitted to the Congress".
The statute covers the statement that President Bush made on January
20, 2003 to Congress since that statement was made in a report that
the Congressional war resolution required. The war resolution,
Public Law 107-243, Sec. 4, states that the "President shall, at
least once every 60 days, submit to the Congress a report on matters
relevant to this joint resolution". President Bush in his said
report actually mentioned that he was making the report "(p)ursuant"
to Public Law 107-243 and that he was "providing a report prepared
by (his) Administration on matters relevant to that Resolution".
President Bush's uranium claim was relevant to the part of the war
resolution that expressed the belief of Congress that Iraq was
"actively seeking a nuclear weapons capability". The uranium claims
buttressed that belief. President Bush's report to Congress is
labeled House Document 108-23.
The statute also covers the statement that President Bush gave on
January 28, 2003 in his State of the Union Address since Article
II, Section 3 of the United States constitution requires the President
to give a State of the Union Address to Congress. That constitutional
provision states that the President "shall from time to time give
to the Congress Information of the State of the Union, and recommend
to their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary
and expedient". President Bush's 2003 State of the Union Address
is a document since a document according to Merriam-Webster's
Collegiate Dictionary is a "writing conveying information". Presidents
hand the State of the Union Address to the Speaker of the House and
Vice President. President Bush's 2003 State of the Union Address
is labeled House Document 108-1.
President Bush's uranium claims arguably violated Section 1001
because both claims were fraudulent and one was actually false. In
his January 28 State of the Union Address President Bush stated
that the attempt to acquire uranium was recent but that was a false
claim since there was no evidence that the attempt was recent.
President Bush's basic uranium claims in that Address and in his
January 20 report to Congress were fraudulent claims because he did
not provide Congress with the whole truth. As mentioned earlier,
legal cases and treatises hold that a statement is fraudulent if
it is misleading or contains half-truths. As Senator Levin stated,
the formula that President Bush used in his State of the Union
Address was a "formula (that) was highly deceptive". The report
Iraq On The Record described President Bush's uranium statements
as misleading. IR pp. 13-15.
Concerning all five uranium claims that President Bush and his
senior officials made, the criminal statute 18 U.S.C., Sec. 371
states: "If two or more persons conspire ... to defraud the United
States ... in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of
such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy,
each shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than
five years, or both." The Supreme Court in the case of Hammerschmidt
v. United States, 265 U.S. 182, 188 (1924) held that to "conspire
to defraud the United States means primarily to cheat the government
out of property or money, but it also means to interfere with or
obstruct one of its lawful governmental functions by deceit, craft
or trickery, or at least by means that are dishonest." This statute
does not restrict its application to documents that are required
to be given to Congress nor does it require proof that the conspiracy
was successful.
The Administration's five uranium claims arguably violated Section
371 because the claims had the effect of obstructing or interfering
with the function of Congress to reconsider its war resolution and
to allow further time for UN weapons inspections. Some claims were
made directly to Congress in reports while other claims were made
indirectly to Congress in public statements to counter Iraq's
cooperation with UN weapons inspectors, which was the basis for the
Congressional resolution that sought a delay in the start of the
war. If President Bush and his senior officials had told the whole
truth surrounding their uranium claims, including telling Congress
what the American CIA Director told the White House, what Secretary
Powell was told during meetings at the CIA, what the American
government privately told the UN, and what the NSC believed, then
their half-truths about the uranium or what the British believed
would have lost their effect. If they had only stated that "Iraq
may have been seeking uranium from Africa", then no one would have
paid attention. If the whole truth had been told, Congress might
have withdrawn the war resolution or delayed the start of the war
to allow further UN weapons inspections, which would have shown
what we now know which is that Iraq had no weapons of mass destruction
nor had sought the uranium.
Of course President Bush and his senior officials will claim ignorance
as a defense and that they are not accountable for their own
statements. But few convictions are based on confessions but rather
most convictions are based on circumstantial evidence. The public
record has overwhelming circumstantial evidence concerning their
knowledge of the whole truth and the reasons why they did not tell
it. There is also the evidence of their pattern of misconduct
consisting of their 186 misleading statements on the threat posed
by Iraq. Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence allows the
admission of evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts for the purpose
of establishing "motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident". (Emphasis
added.) A few mistakes might be plausible but 186 mistakes would
be absurd. So many misleading statements clearly reveal a plan of
deception.
The circumstantial evidence now includes the Downing Street Memo.
President Bush and his senior officials can no longer claim with
any believability that they just received and analyzed the intelligence
but now must explain why their British ally believed that they fixed
the intelligence to justify the war.
Rather than wait to see if President Bush and his senior officials
will again mislead our nation into war possibly against Iran or
North Korea, it is necessary to hold them accountable now for their
misleading statements that led us to war against Iraq. The public
record is compelling enough to require the Justice Department to
appoint an outside special counsel to commence a criminal investigation
on the five fraudulent uranium claims. The Department has a
regulation, 28 CFR, Sec. 600.1, under which it can appoint an outside
special counsel when it has a conflict of interest.
Prior to the independent counsel law, the Nixon Administration felt
enough pressure to appoint Archibald Cox as an outside special
prosecutor to investigate the Watergate scandal. Prior to the
reenactment of the independent counsel law under which courts
appointed independent counsels such as Kenneth Starr, then Attorney
General Janet Reno felt enough pressure to appoint under the above
Justice Department regulation Robert Fiske as an outside special
counsel to investigate the Whitewater matter. Although the independent
counsel law has now expired, the Bush Justice Department felt enough
pressure to appoint a current United States Attorney, Patrick
Fitzgerald, as a type of special prosecutor to investigate the leak
of the name of a CIA agent, who happened to be the wife of Joseph
Wilson who in an op-ed article published in The New York Times on
July 6, 2003 was the first person to publicly challenge President
Bush's claim that Iraq had sought uranium. See The Politics of
Truth by Joseph Wilson.
The new special counsel could base an investigation on the Watergate
mantra of what did the President and his top officials know and
when did they know it, as well as why did they say it. Certainly
any such violations of the above criminal statutes would necessitate
not only a criminal prosecution by the special counsel but also
impeachment proceedings by Congress.
Francis T. Mandanici
The author is a lawyer in Connecticut. In 1968 he graduated from
Fairfield University where he wrote a lengthy paper on the
unconstitutionality of the Vietnam War. From 1968 to 1970 he served
in the Peace Corps as a rural community development worker in Roi
Et Province in northeast Thailand. He was a public defender for
18 years. In the late 1990's he filed a series of ethical grievances
against independent counsel Kenneth Starr. Of the four judges who
addressed the merits of his grievances, two of the four agreed that
Starr suffered from the appearance of a conflict of interest that
should be investigated. The judge who dismissed his last grievance
and ridiculed him also a few days later dismissed an ethics complaint
that 6 federal judges had filed against Starr's office. That
complaint and its dismissal were kept secret until after the 2000
presidential elections when Robert Ray revealed the matter in his
final independent counsel report. Go to
http://icreport.access.gpo.gov/lewinsky.html (pages 109-112, 140).
The author's summary of his grievances and the statements of the
judges who agreed with him can be found in the Comments section at
the end of Ray's report, pages 195-222.
[1] The Downing Street Memo is available on the website
of AfterDowningStreet at www.afterdowningstreet.org. See also the
website of DemocracyRising.US at www.democracyrising.us/.
[2] The letter is on the website of House Judiciary
Committee Democrats. Go to www.house.gov/judiciary_democrats/ and
choose Latest News, May 5, 2005 Text of Letter from Democratic
Members Calling on the President to Answer Questions Concerning the
"Secret Downing Street memo".
[3] The report is on the website of the House Reform
Committee Democrats. Go to www.democrats.reform.house.gov/ and on
the right side choose Iraq On The Record, which then goes to the
Database on the left, and in the comments on the right provides
further access to the summary report Iraq On The Record Report (IR)
referred to above.
[4] The document is on the website of the Government
Printing Office. Go to www.gpo.gov/, then to GPO Access, go to A-Z
Resource List, go to Congressional Documents 104th Congress forward,
under Previous Congresses, go to Search, and Select 108th Congress,
Choose House Documents, Search "108-1", go to #4, which shows
President Bush's State of the Union Address.
[5] This document is also on the website of the Government
Printing Office. Follow the same procedure as in note 4 but at the
end search for "108-23", and go to #3 which is President Bush's
report to Congress.
[6] The report is on the website of the Senate Select
Committee On Intelligence. Go to www.intelligence.senate.gov/ and
choose Report On The U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence
Assessments On Iraq.
[7] See note 4.
[8] The report is available on the presidential commission's
website. Go to www.wmd.gov/report/ and choose Part One: Chapter
One Case Study: Iraq.
[9] The resolution is available on the UN's website. Go
to www.un.org/, go Welcome (English), go to Search on the top row,
enter "Resolution 1441", go to second listing - Links to documents
S/RES/1441(2002), and enter English.
[10] The press release is on the UN's website. Go to
www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2003/sc7644.doc.
[11] The resolution is available on the website of the
House of Representatives. Go to www.house.gov/, then under Legislative
Information go to Find a Bill or Law, Search the Thomas website,
go to Legislation, Search Bills and Resolutions, under Simple Search
go to Search in and enter Summary and Status Information about Bills
and Resolutions, then Search for Bill Number, then Enter Search
"H.Con.Res.2", then Select Congress 108th.
[12] That resolution is also available on the website of
the House of Representatives. Follow the same procedure as in note
11 but at the end, Enter Search "H.J.Res.20", Select Congress 108th.
[13] That statement is available on Senator Levin's website.
Go to www.levin.senate.gov/ and go to Newsroom, enter January 25,
2005 to January 25, 2005, under Issue go to All Issues, under
Category go to Statements, then go to Nomination of Condoleezza
Rice to be Secretary of State.
*****************************************************************
15 Guardian Unlimited: Senate Keeps 'Bunker-Buster' Program Alive
From the Associated Press
[UP]
Friday July 1, 2005 10:16 PM
By H. JOSEF HEBERT
Associated Press Writer
WASHINGTON (AP) - The Bush administration may get another chance
to try to develop an earth-penetrating nuclear warhead. The
Senate on Friday agreed to revive the ``bunker-buster'' program
that Congress last year decided to kill.
Administration officials have maintained that the country needs
to try to develop a nuclear warhead that would be capable of
destroying deeply buried targets including bunkers tunneled into
solid rock.
But opponents said that its benefits are questionable and that
such a warhead would cause extensive radiation fallout above
ground killing thousands of people. And they say it may make it
easier for a future president to decide to use the nuclear
option instead of a conventional weapon.
The Senate early Friday voted 53-43 to include $4 million for
research into the feasibility of a bunker-buster nuclear
warhead. Earlier this year, the House refused to provide the
money, so a final decision will have to be worked between the
two chambers.
The money is included in a $31.2 billion spending measure for
the Energy Department and other programs. Last year Congress
killed the program, but the Bush administration asked that it be
revived.
Supporters of the program said the $4 million does not signal
development of any new warheads. They argue that the money would
be used to see whether a sufficiently hardened casing could be
developed for an existing warhead so that it can penetrate
beneath the earth before exploding and destroy reinforced
underground bunkers.
But Sen. Dianne Feinstein, D-Calif., one of Congress' most vocal
opponents of the bunker-buster, said the program ``sends the
wrong signals to the rest of the world by reopening the nuclear
door and beginning the testing and development of a new
generation of nuclear weapons.''
``A bunker-buster cannot penetrate into the Earth deeply enough
to avoid massive casualties and the spewing of millions of cubic
feet of radioactive materials into the atmosphere,'' said
Feinstein.
Last April, a panel of the National Academy of Sciences,
concluded that an earth-penetrating nuclear device would likely
cause the same casualties as a surface burst if the weapons are
of the same size. Such a bomb could cause from several thousand
to 1 million casualties depending on its yield and location,
according to the report requested by Congress.
At a congressional hearing earlier this year, Linton Brooks,
head of the National Nuclear Security Administration, which
oversees nuclear weapons programs, acknowledged that there is no
way to avoid significant fallout of radioactive debris from use
of a bunker-buster warhead.
He said the administration never intended to suggest ``that it
was possible to have a bomb that penetrated far enough to trap
all fallout. I don't believe the laws of physics will ever let
that be true.''
Nevertheless, Brooks and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld have
argued that a nuclear weapon that can destroy hardened, deeply
buried targets is needed in the U.S. arsenal.
When challenged by Feinstein over the bunker buster at a hearing
in April, Rumsfeld said there are many potential U.S.
adversaries that are capable of putting hardened facilities deep
underground, often in solid rock, that conventional weapons
cannot reach.
Guardian Unlimited Guardian Newspapers Limited 2005
*****************************************************************
16 Guardian Unlimited: Comment | A new generation of nuclear weapons?
Let's talk about it
The Trident decision must not be made in secret
Marjorie Thompson and Julian Lewis
Monday July 4, 2005
Just three days before the last general election, Tony Blair was
reported to have secretly decided that Britain would build a new
generation of nuclear weapons to replace Trident. The story was
denied, which is why so many believed it to be true.
Since then it has been very difficult to get a straight answer
out of either the prime minister or his new defence secretary,
John Reid. In the debate that is happening without them, there
have been some surprises. Among them is the assertion by Michael
Portillo, the former Tory defence secretary, that "the case for
Britain having an independent nuclear deterrent depended on the
existence of the Soviet Union". With the downfall of communism,
he says, the capability became redundant. It is time Blair and
Reid stopped trying to circumvent what is undoubtedly an
unpalatable debate for Labour.
In December 2003, the defence white paper Delivering Security in
a Changing World stated: "Our minimum nuclear deterrent
capability, currently represented by Trident, is likely to remain
a necessary element of our security ... Decisions on whether to
replace Trident are not needed in this parliament but are likely
to be required in the next one."
That parliament has now arrived, but there is little sign of
those decisions being opened up to democratic debate. Why is
this? History gives us a clue. The transition from the V-bombers
to Polaris saw the first wave of the Campaign for Nuclear
Disarmament break on to the British political scene in the late
1950s.
The transition from Polaris to Trident, coupled with the
deployment of US cruise missiles, saw the second wave of CND
rise up even more dramatically in the early 1980s. The hugely
expensive Chevaline upgrade of Polaris attracted no debate or
protest between these dates, because no one knew anything about
it. Is this New Labour's model for the Trident replacement
programme?
For more than 20 years the authors of this article have debated,
disputed and totally disagreed about almost every aspect of
British nuclear-weapons policy. From our opposite perspectives,
we anticipate that any announcement on a successor to Trident
will swiftly rekindle CND. This prospect gives New Labour
nightmares. Yet, irrespective of one's viewpoint, it is
essential that key questions are addressed.
To what extent, if any, are nuclear weapons relevant after
September 11? Have they any role at all after the end of the
cold war? Is a new generation of British nuclear weapons
compatible with the non-proliferation treaty and its strictures
on vertical proliferation? Can British nuclear disarmament be
safely reconciled with the unpredictable nature of international
relations? Could conventional military campaigns be stymied by
enemy WMD that cannot be stalemated? And what type of successor
generation, if any, could Britain afford to deploy and maintain?
It is beyond the scope of this article to attempt to answer any
of these questions: we would be unable to agree on a single
point. But we both know that these are the key points that need
to be publicly debated - and that this is unlikely to happen.
Reid was repeatedly asked in the House of Commons on June 6 if
the government intends to replace Trident and keep nuclear
weapons as long as other countries have them. He equivocated:
"Labour's recent general election manifesto spelled out our
commitment to the retention of the independent nuclear
deterrent. However, as I confirmed to the house on May 18, no
decision on any replacement for Trident has been taken either in
principle or otherwise."
What are we to make of this? If no decision on replacement has
been taken in principle, then it is possible that no replacement
will occur; but the Labour manifesto committed the government
"to retaining the independent nuclear deterrent". Did this refer
only to the existing Trident system or to the maintenance of a
British nuclear-weapons capability in general, whenever Trident
comes to an end? Reid is not saying.
Nor was he pleased to be questioned from his own backbenches by
such committed anti-nuclear MPs as Harry Cohen and David
Chaytor. He was probably lucky that more Scottish MPs were not
in the chamber given some of their constituents' concerns about
hosting Trident and any submarine-based successor system. These
concerns will no doubt find a voice in the Scottish parliament
too, whether or not it is supposed to have jurisdiction over
defence.
At Westminster, a series of written questions has produced
singularly evasive answers. What is the relationship between the
new building programme at Aldermaston and the next generation of
British nuclear weapons? Answer: to "keep open options in
respect of any decision on whether or not to replace Trident".
What preliminary assessments have been made of the relative
merits of extending the life of Trident and of replacing it with
a new system? Answer: "We have not yet made an assessment of the
relative merits of such options."
Do the options for the future of the UK deterrent include not
proceeding with a new generation of weapons? Answer: "The Labour
party's manifesto for the 2005 general election made clear our
commitment to retain the UK's independent nuclear deterrent.
Although decisions on any replacement for Trident are likely to
be taken in the current parliament, it is too early to rule out,
or rule in, any particular option."
The prime minister has been no less delphic. Asked last
Wednesday by Chris Mullin for an assurance that "before any
irrevocable decisions are made, he will take parliament into his
confidence", Blair said that the government "will listen to
honourable members before making any decisions on replacing
Trident". No decisions had yet been taken, he said, but "they
are likely to be necessary in the current parliament".
Labour's manifesto commitment "to retaining the United Kingdom's
independent nuclear deterrent" was again trotted out, but
immediately qualified with a promise of "plenty of opportunities
to discuss that before the final decision is taken".
So there you have it (or not). We are going to keep Britain's
"independent nuclear deterrent" but we are not ruling out "any
particular option" - including an option of not proceeding with
a new-generation weapons system at all.
If, as is claimed, we are bringing democracy to Iraq, we should
not be stifling it in the most important and controversial area
of British military policy - whether or not we continue to
possess nuclear weapons.
Marjorie Thompson was parliamentary officer, vice-chair and
chair of CND between 1983 and 1993; Julian Lewis MP was a
director of the Coalition for Peace Through Security in the
1980s and is a shadow defence minister
[UP]
Guardian Unlimited Guardian Newspapers Limited 2005
*****************************************************************
17 Las Vegas RJ: HEADED TO CONFERENCE COMMITTEE: Energy spending bill clears
Saturday, July 02, 2005
Senate Measure contains $338 million for projects in Nevada
By STEVE TETREAULT STEPHENS WASHINGTON BUREAU
WASHINGTON -- The Senate early Friday passed a bill that
contains more than $300 million for energy research and water
projects in Nevada. In addition, the bill sets Yucca Mountain
spending next year at $577 million, which is less than President
Bush requested.
The annual appropriations bill for the Energy Department, the
Bureau of Reclamation and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
passed 92-3. Sens. Harry Reid, D-Nev., and John Ensign, R-Nev.,
voted for it.
The $577 million allocation advances nuclear waste repository
planning at Yucca Mountain during the fiscal year that begins
Oct. 1. The amount is the same that Congress approved last year,
but $74 million less than the president's requested budget.
The bill was sent to a conference committee where it will be
negotiated against a corresponding House bill. The House
approved $661 million for the nuclear project, including $10
million to develop temporary nuclear waste storage at government
sites.
Senators rejected the idea of temporary nuclear waste storage,
making it a point that would be subject to negotiations on a
final bill.
Some lawmakers worry that temporary storage could become
permanent and the House plan alarmed lawmakers representing
sites such as the Hanford complex in Washington state that were
mentioned in a report accompanying the House bill.
The $31.2 billion bill contains $338 million in Nevada
earmarked spending for flood control, environmental management
and energy research at the University of Nevada, Reno and the
University of Nevada, Las Vegas.
The Nevada Test Site was allocated almost $80 million in
spending above its budgeted amount through the Department of
Energy. Among the added improvements were $20 million for
security and $15 million for road upgrades.
Research into the feasibility of a bunker-busting nuclear weapon
also would be kept alive under the legislation. The bill
contained $4 million for studies of the weapon, which would be
aimed at penetrating underground enemy bunkers.
Administration officials have maintained that the country needs
to try to develop a nuclear warhead that would be capable of
destroying deeply buried targets including bunkers tunneled into
solid rock.
But opponents said that its benefits are questionable and that
such a warhead would cause extensive radiation fallout above
ground killing thousands of people.
"A bunker buster cannot penetrate into the Earth deeply enough
to avoid massive casualties and the spewing of millions of cubic
feet of radioactive materials into the atmosphere," said Sen.
Dianne Feinstein, D-Calif.
Critics also say the bunker buster may make it easier for a
future president to decide to use the nuclear option instead of
a conventional weapon. And they say the weapon is unworkable and
that the development of a new nuclear weapon would be the wrong
signal for the United States to send to countries such as North
Korea while trying to persuade them to shelve their weapons
programs.
The House measure contains no money for the bunker buster,
officially known as the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator.
Supporters of the weapon won a 53-43 Senate vote.
They said the funding was only for a feasibility study to see
whether a new, sufficiently hardened casing can be developed for
existing warheads to see whether it could penetrate the earth
sufficiently to destroy reinforced underground bunkers.
Ensign voted for bunker-buster research. Reid voted to delete
the funding.
The Associated Press contributed to this report.
Copyright Las Vegas Review-Journal
*****************************************************************
18 DallasNews.com: Running on empty
In 'The Long Emergency,' author JAMES HOWARD KUNSTLER envisions
the end of the fossil-fuel era - and of life as we know it
06:23 PM CDT on Saturday, July 2, 2005
Carl Jung, one of the fathers of psychology, famously remarked
that "people cannot stand too much reality." What you're about to
read may challenge your assumptions about the kind of world we
live in, and especially the kind of world into which events are
propelling us. We are in for a rough ride through uncharted
territory.
It has been hard for Americans lost in dark raptures of nonstop
infotainment, recreational shopping and compulsive motoring to
make sense of the gathering forces that will fundamentally alter
the terms of everyday life in our technological society. I call
this coming time the Long Emergency. Most immediately we face the
end of the cheap-fossil-fuel era. It is no exaggeration to state
that reliable supplies of cheap oil and natural gas underlie
everything we identify as the necessities of modern life not to
mention all of its comforts and luxuries: central heating, air
conditioning, cars, airplanes, electric lights, inexpensive
clothing, recorded music, movies, hip-replacement surgery,
national defense you name it.
The few Americans who are even aware that there is a gathering
global-energy predicament usually misunderstand the nature of
the crisis. We don't have to run out of oil to start having
severe problems with industrial civilization and its dependent
systems. We only have to slip over the all-time production peak
and begin a slide down the arc of steady depletion.
The term "global oil-production peak" means that a turning point
will come when the world produces the most oil it will ever
produce in a given year and, after that, yearly production will
inexorably decline. It is usually represented graphically in a
bell curve. The peak is the top of the curve, the halfway point
of the world's all-time total endowment, meaning half the
world's oil will be left.
That seems like a lot of oil, and it is, but there's a big
catch: It's the half that is more difficult to extract, far more
costly to get, of much poorer quality, and located mostly in
places where the people hate us.
**
What's the best thing ordinary Americans
can do to prepare for a possible permanent oil crisis? Comment |
**
The United States passed its own oil peak about 11 million
barrels a day in 1970, and since then production has dropped
steadily. Today, we have to import about two-thirds of our oil,
and the ratio will continue to worsen.
Now we are faced with the global oil-production peak. The best
estimates of when this will actually happen have been somewhere
between now and 2010. It will be a permanent energy crisis that
will change everything about how we live.
To aggravate matters, American natural-gas production is also
declining, at 5 percent a year, with the potential of much
steeper declines ahead. Just about every power plant built after
1980 has to run on gas. Half the homes in America are heated
with gas and gas isn't easy to import.
The wonders of steady technological progress achieved through
the reign of cheap oil have led many Americans to believe that
anything we wish for hard enough will come true. But no
combination of alternative fuels will allow us to run American
life the way we have been used to running it.
The widely touted "hydrogen economy" is a particularly cruel
hoax. We are not going to replace the U.S. automobile and truck
fleet with vehicles run on fuel cells. For one thing, the
current generation of fuel cells is largely designed to run on
hydrogen obtained from natural gas.
The other way to get hydrogen in the quantities wished for would
be electrolysis of water using power from hundreds of nuclear
plants. Apart from the dim prospect of our building that many
nuclear plants soon enough, there are also severe problems with
hydrogen's nature as an element that present forbidding
obstacles to its use as a replacement for oil and gas.
Solar-electric systems and wind turbines face enormous problems
of scale. Coal is far less versatile than oil and gas, extant in
less abundant supplies than many people assume and fraught with
huge ecological drawbacks.
If we wish to keep the lights on in America after 2020, we may
indeed have to resort to nuclear power. Under optimal
conditions, it could take 10 years to get a new generation of
nuclear power plants into operation, and the price may be beyond
our means.
The upshot of all this is that we are entering a historical
period of potentially great instability, turbulence and
hardship. Obviously, geopolitical maneuvering around the world's
richest energy regions has already led to war and promises more
international military conflict.
Since the Middle East contains two-thirds of the world's
remaining oil supplies, the U.S. has attempted desperately to
stabilize the region by, in effect, opening a big police station
in Iraq. The intent was not just to secure Iraq's oil but to
modify and influence the behavior of Persian Gulf states. The
results have been far from entirely positive, and our future
prospects in that part of the world are not something we can
feel altogether confident about.
And then there is the issue of China, which in 2004 became the
world's second-greatest consumer of oil. If China wanted to, it
could easily walk into some of these places the Middle East,
former Soviet republics in central Asia and extend its
hegemony by force. Is America prepared to contest for this oil
in an Asian land war with the Chinese army? I doubt it.
Nor can the U.S. military occupy regions of the Eastern
Hemisphere indefinitely, or hope to secure either the terrain or
the oil infrastructure of one distant, unfriendly country after
another. The U.S. could exhaust and bankrupt itself trying to do
this.
Our national leaders are hardly uninformed about this
predicament. In March, the Department of Energy released a
report that officially acknowledges for the first time that peak
oil is for real and states plainly: "The world has never faced a
problem like this. Without massive mitigation more than a decade
before the fact, the problem will be pervasive and will not be
temporary."
Most of all, the Long Emergency will require us to make other
arrangements for the way we live in the United States. We let
our towns and cities rot away and replaced them with suburbia.
We made the ongoing development of housing subdivisions, highway
strips, fried-food shacks and shopping malls the basis of our
economy, and when we have to stop making more of those things,
the bottom will fall out.
The circumstances of the Long Emergency will require us to
downscale and rescale virtually everything we do and how we do
it, from the kind of communities we physically inhabit to the
way we grow our food to the way we work and trade. Our lives
will become profoundly and intensely local. Daily life will be
far less about mobility and much more about staying where you
are.
Anything organized on the large scale, whether government or a
corporate business enterprise such as Wal-Mart, will wither as
the cheap energy props that support bigness fall away.
Food production is going to be an enormous problem. As
industrial agriculture fails because of a scarcity of oil- and
gas-based inputs, we will have to grow more food closer to where
we live and do it on a smaller scale. This raises difficult
questions about the reallocation of land and the nature of work.
Readjustment is apt to be disorderly and improvisational.
The way that commerce is currently organized in America will not
survive. Tens of thousands of the common products we enjoy today
are made out of oil. They will become increasingly scarce or
unavailable. Commerce will have to be reorganized at the local
scale. It will have to be based on moving merchandise shorter
distances. It is almost certain to result in higher costs for
the things we buy and far fewer choices.
The automobile will be a diminished presence in our lives. With
gasoline in short supply, not to mention tax revenue, our roads
will surely suffer. If we don't refurbish our rail system, then
there may be no long-range travel or transport of goods at all a
few decades from now. The commercial aviation industry is likely
to vanish.
The successful regions in the 21st century will be the ones
surrounded by viable farming hinterlands that can reconstitute
locally sustainable economies on an armature of civic cohesion.
Small towns and smaller cities have better prospects than the
big cities, which will probably have to contract substantially.
The process will be painful and tumultuous.
Some regions will do better than others. The Southwest will
suffer in proportion to the degree that it prospered during the
cheap-oil blowout of the late 20th century. Sun Belt states like
Arizona and Nevada will become significantly depopulated, since
the region will be short of water as well as gasoline and
natural gas. Imagine Phoenix without cheap air conditioning.
I'm not optimistic about the Southeast, either. I think it will
be subject to substantial levels of violence as the grievances
of the formerly middle class boil over and collide with the
delusions of Pentecostal Christian extremism. The latent encoded
behavior of Southern culture includes an outsized notion of
individualism and the belief that firearms ought to be used in
the defense of it. This is a poor recipe for civic cohesion.
The Mountain States and Great Plains will face an array of
problems, from poor farming potential to water shortages to
population loss. The Pacific Northwest, New England and the
Upper Midwest have somewhat better prospects. I regard them as
less likely to fall into lawlessness, anarchy or despotism and
more likely to salvage the bits and pieces of our best social
traditions and keep them in operation at some level.
These are daunting and even dreadful prospects. The Long
Emergency is going to be a tremendous trauma for the human race.
We will not believe that this is happening to us, that 200 years
of modernity can be brought to its knees by a worldwide power
shortage.
If there is any positive side to stark changes coming our way,
it may be in the benefits of close communal relations, of having
to really work intimately (and physically) with our neighbors,
to be part of an enterprise that really matters and to be fully
engaged in meaningful social enactments instead of being merely
entertained to avoid boredom.
Years from now, when we hear singing at all, we will hear
ourselves, and we will sing with our whole hearts.
Adapted from "The Long Emergency," copyright 2005 by James
Howard Kunstler and reprinted with the permission of the
publisher, Atlantic Monthly Press, a division of Grove/Atlantic
Inc. Mr. Kunstler is the author of "The Geography of Nowhere"
and other books. You may e-mail him at kunstler@aol.com. This
text is invisible on the page, but this text is affected by the
invisible item's flow. This text is invisible on the page, but
this text is affected by the invisible item's flow. More
2005 The Dallas Morning News Co.
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19 WorldNetDaily: Freezing assets on a whim
SATURDAY JULY 2 2005
[Supercritical Thoughts] [Gordon Prather]
2005 WorldNetDaily.com
President Bush will no doubt have U.N. Ambassador John Bolton
once ensconced demand the Security Council endorse the
implementation of his Proliferation Security Initiative. That
is, demand the Security Council endorse the use of 1) economic
sanctions, 2) interdiction and seizure, and/or 3) pre-emptive
military force against any and all entities Bush judges to be
"proliferators" of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons [and
of the means of delivering such weapons] as well as to all
entities "facilitating the procurement" thereof.
Meanwhile, Bush has issued a presidential directive "blocking"
the transfer, sale, withdrawal or export of "all property and
interests in property" of "proliferators" of "weapons of mass
destruction and the means of delivering them as well as that of
their "supporters."
What property does the directive effectively seize?
All properties "that are in the United States, that hereafter
come within the United States, or that are or hereafter come
within the possession or control of United States persons."
Who does Bush define to be a WMD "proliferator"?
(ii) any foreign person determined by the secretary of state
in consultation with the secretary of the treasury, the attorney
general and other relevant agencies to have engaged [or
attempted to engage] in activities or transactions that have
materially contributed to [or pose a risk of materially
contributing to] the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction or their means of delivery [including missiles
capable of delivering such weapons], including any efforts to
manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer or
use such items, by any person or foreign country of
"proliferation concern."
Great Zot!
Condi Rice can effectively seize the U.S. assets of any "foreign
person" she supposes may have attempted to engage in activities
she supposes may pose a risk of materially contributing to the
development of among other things a "wheat smut" production
capability?
Well, what about "supporters" of WMD proliferation? Who are
they?
(iii) any person determined by the secretary of the treasury
in consultation with the secretary of state, the attorney
general and other relevant agencies to have provided [or
attempted to provide] financial, material, technological or
other support for or goods or services in support of any
activity or transaction described in paragraph (ii) of this
section, or any person whose property and interests in property
are blocked pursuant to this order.
So, Secretary Snow can effectively seize all the U.S. assets of
any person foreign or domestic he "determines" may have
attempted to provide financial support to any foreign person
that Condi has "determined" may have attempted to engage in
activities that might have contributed to the development of a
wheat smut production facility.
Can you believe that?
In other words, if Condi decides some Iranian is purchasing
equipment to brew wheat smut rather than beer and "blocks"
all his U.S. assets, including his line-of-credit, if you loan
him the money to buy the equipment, Snow can effectively seize
all your assets, too.
It gets worse:
Any transaction or dealing by a United States person or within
the United States in property or interests in property blocked
pursuant to this order is prohibited, including, but not limited
to, (i) the making of any contribution or provision of funds,
goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of, any person
whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to
this order, and (ii) the receipt of any contribution or
provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person.
Incredible!
You can't even give him or accept from him a lift to the
airport!
Of course, "person" as defined in the directive includes an
"individual, partnership, association, trust, joint venture,
corporation, group, subgroup or other organization."
An "annex" to the directive lists eight "persons" whose U.S.
assets have now been summarily "blocked." Three are North Korean
semi-government companies, four are Iranian including the
Atomic Energy Agency of Iran and one is a Syrian government
research agency.
Bush-Bolton-Rice have made it very clear they believe that the
Iranians are pursuing a nuclear weapons program. But
Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei continues to report that his
International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors can find no
'indication' that Iran has, ever had, or intends to have a
nuclear weapons program.
Hence, Bush's executive order, which threatens to effectively
confiscate all the U.S. assets of those "persons" including
European Union companies and banks that are still attempting
to negotiate big business deals with the Iranian Atomic Energy
Agency.
Physicist James Gordon Prather has served as a policy
implementing official for national security-related technical
matters in the Federal Energy Agency, the Energy Research and
Development Administration, the Department of Energy, the Office
of the Secretary of Defense and the Department of the Army. Dr.
Prather also served as legislative assistant for national
security affairs to U.S. Sen. Henry Bellmon, R-Okla. -- ranking
member of the Senate Budget Committee and member of the Senate
Energy Committee and Appropriations Committee. Dr. Prather had
earlier worked as a nuclear weapons physicist at Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory in California and Sandia National
Laboratory in New Mexico.
2005 WorldNetDaily.com, Inc.
*****************************************************************
20 Guardian Unlimited: Minister ponders the nuclear option
Business focus: the energy crunch
Oliver Morgan
Sunday July 3, 2005
The Observer
When Malcolm Wicks stepped in to his new job as Energy Minister,
he faced a number of problems that needed urgent solutions.
These were spelt out for him on his first day as follows: (1) how
to achieve goals on climate change while maintaining security of
(energy) supply and international competitiveness; (2) how to
handle the tight supply/ demand balance next winter; (3) how far
he could rely on the present market framework to deliver the very
large investment needed to ensure security of supply in future;
(4) what role nuclear build and new technologies might play in
helping to meet CO2 and supply objectives; (5) implications of
energy prices staying high or going even higher.
Tricky enough without Blair choosing climate change as a key
issue for the Gleneagles G8 summit this week.
Wicks says he loved the pensions job, and loves energy too:
'They are both complex and controversial and everyone has got a
view. Everyone has got an opinion on nuclear, it is big stuff,
it is controversial.'
So, since he brings it up, what's his opinion on nuclear? 'I
don't have an opinion. I am open-minded about it, which I don't
think is the same as being empty-minded.'
Does this mean the subject is closed - as it has officially been
since 2003, when the last energy White Paper constructed a
compromise policy that neither backed the building of nuclear
power stations to generate 'carbon- free' electricity nor closed
the door on them to placate both pro- and anti-nuclear ministers?
Sort of. Wicks points out that the polarised positions of the
nuclear and renewable power lobbies have distorted the argument.
'A lot of enthusiasts say it is all about wind power or all
about nuclear,' he says. 'Quite a chunk [a fifth] of our
generation comes from nuclear. It is about whether we maintain
that in future.'
The background is what makes the decision tricky. Britain will
probably fail to meet its target of reducing CO2 emissions by 20
per cent from 1990 levels by 2010 - they have risen in recent
years thanks to high oil and gas prices and cheap coal, which
generators have increasingly used. Old nuclear and coal power
stations will start closing in 2008. The DTI calculates that 25
gigawatts of generation - around a third of today's capacity -
will need to be built by 2020. These will need to be low- or
zero-emission.
'It [climate change] is the most pressing issue in the world, I
think it is as big an issue for this department as it is for
Defra [the Department for the Environment, Food and Rural
Affairs]. There can be no doubt that the climate is changing in
very worrying ways. People who doubt it, for whatever reasons,
have got their heads in the sand.
'We disagree with the American analysis and have told them so.
But that is not a reason for us to become belligerent.' He adds
that some states - New England and California - have taken
measures to reduce emissions.
Despite widespread scepticism in and outside the DTI, Wicks is
sticking to its target of 10 per cent of electricity from
renewable sources (chiefly onshore wind power) by 2010 and to
its aspiration of 20 per cent by 2020, which will depend on the
development of offshore wind and new technologies.
'It is a tough target to hit,' he says of 2010. 'I am very
committed to it. But this is more than a story about wind
turbines... it is also other technologies.' He believes that the
Renewables Obligation, which supports the higher price of
renewables - wind turbines, energy crops, wave and solar power -
through tradeable certificates, is clearing a space in the
market for these technologies. He mentions two social housing
solar power schemes (among the most expensive of the
technologies) he has visited: 'From what I can see, I am
convinced.'
Wicks has another emerging area - directing 25 million of
public money into clean coal technology, where CO2 from
coal-fired power stations is separated and pumped into former
North Sea oil reservoirs or into aquifers under the mainland.
Opec, he says, has expressed interest in the technology and 'the
Norwegians are doing it and there are some pilots in the US I
want to look at'.
In reflections that might appeal to Lee Raymond, chief executive
of Exxon, but be less welcome to environmentalists, he adds: 'We
[he highlights India and China] are going to be burning lots of
fuels, lots of coal, lots of oil and lots of gas. If we can find
ways of burning the stuff more efficiently and more
significantly if we can find ways of capturing CO2, maybe in the
North Sea, I think we have to look at that very hard.'
Despite his view that the DTI has as important a role in climate
change policy as Defra, he concedes that the key policy work is
the Defra-led Climate Change Review, due to be finalised this
year.
Central to that review - which deals with meeting Kyoto targets
to 2010, and so will not be affected by longer-term decisions on
generation - is the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, which caps the
output of generators and industrial users and forces them to pay
for overshooting by buying tradeable certificates from those who
undershoot, who in turn receive payment. The scheme has seen the
price of carbon rise from about 7 a tonne to 24 this year.
Wicks is in a difficult position. The DTI, wary of threats to
business competitiveness, is fighting in the European courts to
increase the UK cap. Defra wants it raised in phase two, from
2008. He repeats the DTI line that the original cap was a
miscalculation and stresses the importance of competitiveness
and economic growth.
But asked which is more important, competitiveness or global
warming, he is blunt: 'Climate change. In the long term if you
don't get that right we are all dead.'
On building new nuclear plants he says: 'We are not going to
take a decision this year.' He adds that it is unlikely that a
white paper on nuclear is necessary. 'What we need is a
decision,' he says.
And if the answer was yes? Could they be funded privately?:
'There would have to be some kind of understanding between the
government and the market.'
That would probably mean fixed-price contracts to guarantee
investors a return - a highly controversial move.
[UP]
Guardian Unlimited Guardian Newspapers Limited 2005
*****************************************************************
21 London Times: BNFL on way back to the black as losses halve -
Angela Jameson
thetimes.co.uk
BNFL is part way through a restructuring that will transfer all
its assets and historic liabilities to the Nuclear
Decommissioning Authority (NDA). After that, the company will
concentrate on cleaning up nuclear sites, including Sellafield,
and will have to compete for contracts with private sector
rivals.
Mike Parker, group chief executive, said that the group would be
able to continue its transition into becoming the contractor of
choice for nuclear decommissioning work.
The improved numbers were achieved by progress in BNFLs
controversial MOX (mixed oxide) plant which made its first
shipment to a Swiss customer, but is still not fully
operational; changes to customer arrangements; and higher
wholesale electricity prices, which offset low volumes of
output.
The figures would have been higher had it not been for
exceptional charges of 243 million, associated with the
restructuring, and a provision of 132 million to draw a line
under US legacy contracts.
Despite record electricity prices, BNFLs ageing Magnox power
generators continued to record a 200 million loss,
demonstrating their inefficiency.
BNFL spent 725 million to clean up historic liabilities. This
will be financed by the NDA. The cash outflow of 438 million
was substantially improved at the year end by a $460 million
(260 million) payment from the US as settlement of certain
legacy contracts.
The strong operational performance was spoilt by a serious leak,
which was detected in April, after the year-end.
The leak from a pipe at Thorp, BNFLs main unit for reprocessing
nuclear waste, was classified as a level three incident, on a
scale of one to seven. The company said that the leak was
contained in a heavily shielded cell and that there was no
danger to the staff, the public or the environment.
Mr Parker added: All the spilt liquor has now been collected
and drained. We think we know how to fix this problem but it
will take several more months and our solution will need to be
said grace over by a safety inspector.
The company also confirmed that it would sell Westinghouse, its
profitable US nuclear plant construction arm drawing criticism
from unions and the Conservative party.
Prospect, the union that represents 6,000 nuclear engineers,
scientists and managers, said that the decision to sell would
amount to economic madness and would deprive the UK of
essential nuclear expertise. He called it short termism at its
worst.
BNFL expects to make operating profits of 150 million in 2006,
which will allow the company to pay interest on its 575 million
debenture and pay a dividend to the Government for the first
time in six years.
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