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Send News Stories to news@energy-net.org with title on subject
line and first line of body
NUCLEAR POLICY
1 Guardian Unlimited: White House Renews Contact With N. Korea
2 Korea Herald: Roh raises hopes of six-party talks
3 Korea Herald: [EDITORIAL] Still shrouded in secrecy
4 Korea: Digital Chosunilbo: New Wind Blows in Washington's Korea Poli
5 Xinhua: US, DPRK officials hold talks in New York
6 Reuters: Optimism raised on N. Korea talks, no date fixed
7 US: Guardian Unlimited: Senate OKs Continued Study of Nuclear Arms
8 US: NRC: Louisiana Energy Service's Proposed National Enrichment
9 [NukeNet] Statement re ITER Site Decision
10 RIA Novosti: Russian and Chinese leaders to discuss cooperation issu
11 EurActiv: Mixed reactions to ITER
12 Japan Times: Government eyes two facilities tied to ITER project
NUCLEAR REACTORS
13 US: CEAC: Utilities Show Interest In New Nuclear Power Plant
14 US: NRC: NRC Renews Operating License for Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit
15 US: BBC: BNFL plans to sell Westinghouse
16 China CRI: China to Build Its Own Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor
17 US: NRC: Nuclear Management Company, LLC; Notice of Withdrawal of
18 Japan Times: No leakage in nuclear plant fire
19 US: NRC: Carolina Power and Light Company, Duke Energy Corporation,
20 US: NRC: Nuclear Management Company, LLC, Notice of Issuance of Amen
NUCLEAR SECURITY
21 US: Secret Understandings on the Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1950-1974
22 ITC: Uranium from Russia
23 US: CEAC: Much Work Remains To Secure Nuclear Material
24 US: NRC: Security policies for Import of radioactive materials
NUCLEAR SAFETY
25 US: [du-list] The CT House and Senate passed a DU bill, after the
26 [du-list] French Veteran on hunger strike over lack of pension
27 [du-list] USUK in Iraq prepares bases to live under siege
28 US: Memo To NRC Says 41,200 Will Day Every Year In USA From Mill Tai
29 US: National-Academies.org: Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation May Cau
NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE
30 US: [epa-impact] Louisiana Energy Service's Proposed National Enrich
31 US: [NukeNet] Memo To NRC Says 41, 200 Will Die Every Year In USA
32 US: AU ABC: Company confident NT uranium mining will go ahead
33 Interfax: Russia plans to complete nuclear sub disposal in 2010
34 RIA Novosti: Putin signs law on ratifying Russia-Italy agreement
35 Las Vegas SUN: Editorial: Yucca probe moves ahead
36 Las Vegas SUN: Yucca funds fall short of president's '05 request
37 US: St. Louis Post-Dispatch: Radioactive shipments pick up pace
38 HSE: HSE grants decommissioning consent for Calder Hall
39 US: Radio Iowa: Source of water contamination in Hills still not cer
40 Ireland Business World: BNFL sells US unit, reduces losses
41 US: PE.com: Feinstein calls for a cleanup
42 US: Portsmouth Daily Times: Two new companies begin cleanup at plant
PEACE
43 Xinhua: Ukraine says not to deploy NATO nukes
US DEPT. OF ENERGY
44 [du-list] Two new companies begin cleanup at plant
45 Casper Star Tribune: Jackson group contests plutonium plans
46 Daily Review Online: Promise of fusion unlikely in the debut of gian
47 KRQE News 13: Senate OKs millions for Sandia, LANL
48 lamonitor.com: Senate OKs bill to fund lab projects
49 DOE: Proposed Agency Information Collection
50 DOE: Agency Information Collection Extension
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FULL NEWS STORIES
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1 Guardian Unlimited: White House Renews Contact With N. Korea
From the Associated Press
[UP]
Friday July 1, 2005 8:16 PM
By BARRY SCHWEID
AP Diplomatic Writer
WASHINGTON (AP) - The United States has resumed contact with
North Korea, but the talks at a security conference in New York
have not produced a decision to reopen negotiations on
Pyongyang's nuclear weapons program, the State Department said
Friday.
The same two American diplomats who met secretly in May with
North Korean counterparts in New York, State Department envoy
Joseph DeTrani and James Foster, were involved, spokesman Sean
McCormack said. Foster is in charge of the department's office
of Korean affairs.
He described it as a ``contact'' and said there was no
negotiating between the two sides at the conference held by the
National Committee on American Foreign Policy.
The conference dealt primarily with the Korean peninsula, and
customarily at such events ``there is a natural exchange among
the attendees,'' McCormack said.
``I am not going to characterize it beyond that,'' the U.S.
official said, but added: ``We are still waiting to hear from
North Korea a date when they will return to the six-party talks
and engage in those talks in a constructive manner.''
In fact, McCormack said, ``all the members of the six-party
talks are still waiting to hear from North Korea a date when
they will return'' to the talks.
After the May meeting surfaced, McCormack said North Korea had
registered an interest in reopening the negotiations, last held
a year ago. No date or location has been set since, and
McCormack declined to say whether the North Koreans had
expressed interest again in the latest encounter.
``What matters is that they return to the talks and engage in a
constructive manner,'' he said.
China, Russia, South Korea and Japan are aligned with the United
States in the negotiations, trying to persuade North Korea to
halt a nuclear weapons program that U.S. intelligence is
convinced already has produced at least two bombs.
Last week, Undersecretary of State Robert Joseph suggested that
China put economic pressure on North Korea to induce it to
reopen nuclear weapons negotiations.
Joseph, who has succeeded John R. Bolton as the department's top
arms control official, said, ``We think China can do more to get
them to eliminate their nuclear weapons program.''
China shares with the United States and other nations an
interest in a nuclear-free Korean peninsula, Joseph said. ``It
is very much in China's interest to exert as much influence as
it can,'' he said.
``My sense is that the North Koreans will come back,'' he said.
``I hope in the near term.''
Guardian Unlimited © Guardian Newspapers Limited 2005
*****************************************************************
2 Korea Herald: Roh raises hopes of six-party talks
Rice expected to visit Seoul July 11-13 for fresh consultations
By Lee Joo-hee
President Roh Moo-hyun further raised hopes yesterday of an
early resumption of the six-party talks by promising closer
inter-Korean exchanges once the North Korean nuclear standoff is
resolved.
"When North Korea's nuclear problem is solved in the future,
there are many ways opened for both Koreas to cooperate for the
benefits of all of us on the fields of IT, SOC and tourism among
others," Roh said in a speech at a meeting of the Advisory
Council on Democratic and Peaceful Unification which he heads.
"The government will resolutely push ahead with such policies,"
he told participants at the conference at Cheong Wa Dae.
Roh added that the nuclear problem is slowly unraveling and
active communication not only between the two Koreas but among
the members of the six-party talks has been taking place
recently.
Urging closer trust between the two Koreas, he said, "Most
importantly, the South and the North must overcome its division,
and trust will be the first stage to accomplishing that."
U.S. Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice is set to visit South
Korea around July 11-13, government sources said, hinting at an
impending development in the nuclear standoff.
The sources, quoted by Yonhap News Agency, said the final
schedule will be confirmed soon for Rice, who is reportedly
planning a visit to Japan and China as well.
There is rising speculation among analysts here that a top
Washington official may decide to visit North Korea in the near
future to try to forge a breakthrough in the nuclear standoff.
South Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon agreed such a move was
possible. "If necessary I don't why U.S. Assistant Secretary of
State Christopher Hill should not visit North Korea as the top
negotiator in the six-party talks," he said in an interview with
the Korean daily Hankyoreh. "Hill has already visited all the
member countries including South Korea, China, Japan and Russia.
There is no reason why he should not visit North Korea."
Hill himself wrote recently on the U.S. Embassy Web site here,
in reply to a question by an Internet user, that he would like
to meet North Korean leader Kim Jong-il to try to resolve the
standoff.
Reports said China, the closest ally to North Korea, has begun
preparing for the six-party talks, convinced that they will
resume this month. The Chinese Foreign Ministry deems two weeks
would be enough to prepare for the talks.
In yet another contact, U.S. and North Korean negotiators
discussed how to resolve the nuclear standoff at a seminar in
New York on Thursday.
The rare official meeting between Washington and Pyongyang
representatives brought together Ri Gun, the North's deputy
chief negotiator at the six-party talks and Joseph DeTrani, his
U.S. counterpart as deputy to Hill.
Before the seminar, Ri said he expected to meet U.S. officials
for talks on resuming the stalled nuclear negotiations.
But no further comments were forthcoming after the seminar,
although De Trani reportedly commented that the meeting was
"very good."
South Korea's ambassador to the United States, Hong Seok-hyun,
had talks the same day with Amb. Park Gil-yon, head of the
North's mission to the United Nations. It was the first meeting
between two Koreas' ambassadors to key posts in the United
States.
North Korea has no diplomatic relations with the United States
but has a mission at the United Nations in New York which often
works as an unofficial contact channel between Washington and
Pyongyang.
Hong said he urged North Korea's early return to the six-party
talks.
Park was quoted as reiterating that his country has never said
it would not return to the talks but needs "respect" from the
United States first.
Hong said there were no specifics on when North Korea's return
could be expected.
Other countries involved in the six-party talks apart from the
Koreas - the United States, China, Japan and Russia - continued
to discuss how to bring the North back to the talks, including
an "important proposal" South Korea promises if Pyongyang rids
itself of its nuclear ambitions.
In Washington, South Korean Unification Minister Chung
Dong-young met U.S. National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley to
discuss the standoff, while Hill said elsewhere that Washington
has no problems with the South Korean proposal.
The U.S. House of Representatives passed a resolution Thursday
condemning North Korea for its abductions of South Korean and
Japanese citizens and urging the administration to continue to
watch the Stalinist state as a sponsor of terrorism.
Submitted last month by Henry Hyde, chairman of the House
International Relations Committee, with five other
representatives, Resolution 168 also criticizes China for
allowing North Korean agents to operate within its borders.
It says that recognizing the "critical importance" of the North
Korean nuclear issue "should not preclude" the U.S. government
from raising abduction cases and other human rights concerns in
negotiations with Pyongyang.
It asks the administration to keep North Korea on the State
Department's list of state sponsors of terrorism until the
regime renounces kidnappings.
Kim Jong-il admitted in late 2002 that Pyongyang had abducted
Japanese nationals in the 1970s and 1980s to train its spies to
disguise as Japanese citizens. And North Korea still holds
captive South Koreans from hijacked planes and ships from as far
back as 1958, and is believed also to hold some 540 South Korean
prisoners-of-war from the 1950-1953 Korean War.
(angiely@heraldm.com)
2005.07.02
*****************************************************************
3 Korea Herald: [EDITORIAL] Still shrouded in secrecy
Back in 1947, U.S. Secretary of State George Marshall announced
a plan for the reconstruction of war-torn Europe. The United
States spent as much as $12 billion on this "Marshall Plan"
during the 1948-52 period.
With frigid, hostile inter-Korean relations starting to thaw
five decades later, some opinion makers began to assert that a
South Korean version of the Marshall Plan would be needed to
forestall a collapse in North Korea's economic system. But it
remained a vague idea until recently, with the South Korean
government taking no initiative to flesh it out.
Then came the dispatch of Unification Minister Chung Dong-young
to Pyongyang as President Roh Moo-hyun's emissary. Chung
conveyed Roh's "important proposal" to Kim Jong-il on June 17,
which many say is an offer of large-scale economic assistance in
exchange for the scrapping of North Korea's nuclear weapons
program.
On his return, Chung refused to go into detail, arguing that
ample time should be given to North Korea to deliberate on the
proposal. But it did not take long before the news media began
to call it a "Marshall Plan for North Korea."
Now the South Korean government says it is wrong to call Roh's
proposal a Marshall Plan. Here again, it does not offer an
explanation about how they differ. Nor does it offer any
clarification when it denies the proposal has anything to do
with its recently unveiled research on assistance for North
Korea in seven areas including energy, infrastructure, tourism
and agriculture.
If Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon's claim holds true, Roh's
proposal and the U.S. Marshall Plan must be more different than
similar. But the main point here is that the South Koreans will
have to shoulder a huge financial burden if North Korea accepts
Roh's proposal, as the Americans did when the Marshall Plan was
enforced. It does not take much imagination to conjecture that
Roh's proposal contains a conditional commitment to a huge
amount of money in grants and soft loans.
Still, helping North Korea stand on its own may not be a bad
idea at all, given the unimaginable impact North Korea's
implosion would otherwise have on the South. On the contrary,
the provision of large-scale assistance will prove to be a sound
policy if it helps reduce the high future cost of unification,
which an economic research institute estimates at 564 trillion
won.
An offer of massive economic assistance to North Korea will
require endorsement by taxpayers, which presupposes its public
disclosure. That is the reason why lawmakers, those from
opposition parties in particular, are calling on the
administration to make public what exactly it offered in
exchange for an end to the North's nuclear ambitions.
Here lies the dilemma for the Roh administration, which claims
that secrecy is needed in negotiating with the clandestine North
Korean leadership. But it cannot keep the proposal under cover
indefinitely, given that it has in the past committed itself to
transparency in economic cooperation with North Korea.
In fact, transparency was a keyword for the Roh administration
when it agreed to an inspection by independent counsel into an
allegation that his predecessor, Kim Dae-jung, sent hundreds of
millions of dollars to Kim Jong-il for the 2000 summit in
Pyongyang.
The incumbent administration will have to make Roh's proposal
public and put it under public scrutiny as soon as possible.
Should it drag its feet too long, it will surely boomerang. It
should keep in mind that even supportive lawmakers, if angered
about a delay, may turn their back on the proposal when it is
put to a National Assembly vote in the future.
2005.07.02
*****************************************************************
4 Korea: Digital Chosunilbo: New Wind Blows in Washington's Korea Policy
Home> National/Politics Updated July.1,2005 23:24 KST
Wrong Click Publicises Workings of U.S. Korea Policy
Six months into U.S. President George W. Bush¡¯s second term, a
new wind is blowing in Washington¡¯s Korea policy. The neocons
and Asia hands that had an iron grip on Korea policy during his
first term are being replaced by pragmatists, with priority on
specialization and Europe experts.
¡ß State Department: Rise of the Europe Experts
(Clockwise, from upper left) White House Advisor Michael
Gerson, Vice President Dick Cheney, National Security Advisor
Stephen Hadley, Chief of Staff Andrew H. Card, Deputy Chief of
Staff Karl Rove, White House Spokesperson Scott McClellan
¡°Foggy Bottom,¡± the gray seven-story building named for the
neighborhood of Washington D.C. where it is located, is the
command center for U.S. diplomacy worldwide. It has undergone
enormous changes in the last six months, with all officials in
charge of Korea policy above the rank of deputy assistant
secretary being replaced. When Secretary of State Condoleezza
Rice took office, Christopher Hill took over from James Kelly as
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
and lost no time in replacing many of the working level
officials in the bureau. All the upper-level officials dealing
with Korea above the rank of the new Korea desk head were
replaced -- a move prompting comments within the department that
the entire Korean lineup has changed.
Observers read the moves as a way of cleaning out the legacy of
former secretary of state Colin Powell. There had been friction
between Powell and the neocons over the North Korean nuclear
dispute throughout his tenure, and North Korea policy became one
of the signal foreign policy failures of Bush¡¯s first term.
The personnel selection policy of Rice and Hill, the top Korea
policy makers, can be summarized as leaving neocon ideologues
out in the cold and appointing pragmatists, with priority given
to professional capabilities. R. Nicholas Burns, the under
secretary for political affairs, Stephen Krasner, the director
for policy planning, Kathleen Stephens, the deputy assistant
secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, and Alexander
Vershbow, the putative new ambassador to Korea, are key figures
in that shift.
Among State Department officials involved with Korea policy, the
most influential are Philip D. Zelikow, an advisor to Rice and
her co-author in writing ¡°Germany Unified and Europe
Transformed¡±; Krasner, who is a friend of Rice¡¯s from
Stanford; Burns, a former ambassador to NATO; and Hill. None but
Hill has much experience with Asia. By contrast, the former
assistant secretaries of state Richard Armitage and James Kelly
were Japan experts.
These personnel changes signal a wider shift in U.S. foreign
policy away from the force-based unilateralism of Bush¡¯s first
term to one emphasizing cooperation with allies and prioritizing
a diplomatic solution to the North Korean problem. But they have
yet to show any concrete results in the department¡¯s biggest
headache, the dispute over North Korea¡¯s nuclear arms program.
¡ß White House: Sudden Rise of Rove and Gerson
Early this year, Deputy Chief of Staff Karl Rove and policy
advisor Michael Gerson saw a stellar rise in their influence in
matters Korean. After news that North Korea shut down its
Yongbyon reactor in April, it was Rove who went on CNN and
warned the U.S. could take the issue to the UN Security Council.
A domestic policy advisor until last year, he now has an office
just to the left of the Oval Office on the first floor of the
White House, even closer than the Chief of Staff¡¯s.
Gerson is an even more interesting case. At 40, he has an office
like Rove¡¯s right next to the Oval Office. A theology major, he
has been Bush¡¯s speechwriter for the last six years, and if the
president¡¯s speeches frequently quote the Bible and reflect an
evangelical view of the world as a battleground of good versus
evil it is down to Gerson¡¯s theological background. Even though
he is said to enjoy the president¡¯s complete trust, his
promotion to presidential policy and strategy advisor took many
by surprise. From his position behind the throne, he is credited
with making ¡°the spread of freedom and democracy¡± a core
policy of the administration. Bush¡¯s policy direction that the
North Korean human rights and WMD proliferation must be dealt
with clearly and firmly is also believed to have been drafted
with input from Gerson.
Along with these two top aides, the White House Korea policy
lineup consists of the core members of the National Security
Council, including advisors Stephen Hadley, Michael Green and
Victor Cha. But behind them, neocon ¡°godfather¡± Vice President
Dick Cheney is alive and well, and sets the big picture in Korea
policy. Lewis ¡®Scooter¡¯ Libby, Cheney¡¯s chief of staff with
whom he discusses all matters, is a core neocon. It is due to
the influence of the ¡°Cheney gang¡± that hard-line
pronouncements intermittently clang out of the White House amid
a mood of dialogue and diplomacy.
¡ß Pentagon: Exit of the neocons
In the Pentagon, core neocons like Paul Wolfowitz and Douglas J.
Feith have gone, as has the State Department¡¯s John Bolton, now
an embattled nominee as UN ambassador, clearing the air of their
incessant bickering with the pragmatists. Replacing them are
Gordon R. England, formally Secretary of the Navy, and Eric
Edelman, formerly ambassador to Turkey. Neither has much in
common with the ¡°cabal.¡±
The core figure in the Pentagon¡¯s Korea policy is Richard
Lawless, the under assistant secretary of defense for Asian and
Pacific Affairs. That Lawless skips over the established chain
of command and reports directly to Secretary Rumsfeld gives the
measure of his influence. He has caused stirs with blunt talk
saying things like ¡°Korea¡¯s strategic value is finished,¡± but
he is also seen as understanding Korea better than anyone and
stressing the need for the alliance above all.
(englishnews@chosun.com )
*****************************************************************
5 Xinhua: US, DPRK officials hold talks in New York
www.xinhuanet.com
www.chinaview.cn 2005-07-01 11:00:30
NEW YORK, June 30 (Xinhuanet) -- Officials from the United
States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) held
talks Thursday in New York on the prospects of resuming the
six-party talks on the Korean nuclear issue.
The officials discussed the nuclear issue on the Korean
Peninsula when they were attending a two-day academic conference
organized by Professor Donald Zagoria of Hunter College.
Participants at the symposium included Ri Gun,
director-generalof the DPRK Foreign Ministry and negotiator on
the nuclear issue, Joseph Detrani, the US State Department's
special envoy for the six-way talks, Jim Foster, director of the
State Department's Office of Korean Affairs, Henry Kissinger,
former US Secretary of State, George D. Schwab, president of the
National Committee on American Foreign Policy, and officials
from South Korea and Japan.
Kissinger said at the end of the meeting that they had a
"useful dialogue" which was done "in a friendly spirit with
intention to make progress."
He noted that "it depends on DPRK's decision when the
six-partytalks will be resumed."
Zagoria stressed that he is optimistic about the resumption
of the six-party talks, saying both US and DPRK officials had a
"goodexchange of views."
By June last year, three rounds of the six-party talks,
which involved the DPRK, South Korea, the United States, China,
Japan and Russia, had been held. The talks have since then been
stalled as the DPRK accused the United States of adopting a
hostile policytoward Pyongyang.
To revive the talks, officials from the United States and
the DPRK held negotiations last November, December and this May
respectively. Enditem
Copyright ©2003 Xinhua News Agency. All rights reserved.
*****************************************************************
6 Reuters: Optimism raised on N. Korea talks, no date fixed
National, World and Business News | Reuters.com
Fri Jul 1, 2005 4:12 PM ET
(adds details, State Dept comments)
NEW YORK, July 1 (Reuters) - Informal discussions on the North
Korean nuclear crisis ended on Friday with participants
optimistic that Pyongyang would return to six-country
negotiations, the organizer said, but no date was fixed.
"Conference participants agreed that discussions were frank and
constructive and we are optimistic that the North Koreans will
return to the Six Party Talks," Donald Zagoria of the National
Committee on American Foreign Policy said in a written statement.
Participants included officials from all six countries involved
in the long-stalled formal negotiations on Pyongyang's nuclear
weapons programs -- the United States, North Korea, South Korea,
Japan, China and Russia.
Zagoria, who was not immediately available to answer questions,
said the committee would hold further such conferences.
His statement did not give any details, including whether the
reclusive communist state had a date in mind when the six-party
talks would resume. Speculation has focused on the latter part
of July.
In Washington, State Department spokesman Sean McCormack
indicated the North Korean official attending the New York
conference -- Ri Gun -- did not specify a date.
"All the members of the six-party talks are still waiting to
hear from North Korea a date when they will return to the ...
talks and engage in those talks in a constructive manner," he
told reporters.
McCormack acknowledged that Ri and the head of the U.S.
delegation -- Ambassador Joseph DeTrani -- had had a "contact"
in the course of the conference but insisted "this was not a
negotiation." He gave no details on what was discussed.
The Bush administration is adamant it will not negotiate
bilaterally with Pyongyang. It says the six-party talks are the
essential forum for achieving an end to North Korea's nuclear
program, which it sees as a major security threat.
Reviving the talks has taken on special urgency because of
signs North Korea is expanding its nuclear capabilities. U.S.
officials say Pyongyang may have eight or more nuclear weapons,
up from one or two at the start of the Bush presidency.
McCormack urged Pyongyang to return to the six-country talks
and negotiate on a U.S. proposal that he said would give North
Korea "the opportunity for the respect that they say they want
and the aid that they say that they need."
During the invitation-only New York conference, participants
discussed competing ideas about Pyongyang's nuclear program and
ways to break the year-long impasse.
The conference provided a rare opportunity for U.S. and North
Korean officials to communicate directly at a critical time.
North Korea for over a year has boycotted talks seeking a
diplomatic solution and U.S. officials say they increasingly
believe Pyongyang is determined to keep its nuclear programs.
Analysts say divisions in the U.S. administration undermine
President George W. Bush's commitment to a diplomatic solution
and some increasingly fear Bush will never agree to any deal
that props up Pyongyang's communist government.
© Reuters 2005. All Rights Reserved.
*****************************************************************
7 Guardian Unlimited: Senate OKs Continued Study of Nuclear Arms
From the Associated Press
[UP]
Friday July 1, 2005 6:01 AM
By ANDREW TAYLOR
Associated Press Writer
WASHINGTON (AP) - Research into the feasibility of a
bunker-busting nuclear weapon would be kept alive under
legislation the Senate passed early Friday.
The research was approved as part of a $31.2 billion spending
bill for energy and water projects. The bill also includes funds
for the Yucca Mountain nuclear waste dump, though not as much as
President Bush requested.
The bill passed 92-3 after a debate over whether to spend $4
million for research into the bunker buster nuclear warhead,
which would be aimed at penetrating underground enemy bunkers.
The House measure contains no funds for the bunker buster,
officially called the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator. Critics
say the weapon is unworkable and that the development of a new
nuclear weapon would be the wrong signal for the United States
to send to countries such as North Korea while trying to
persuade them to shelve their weapons programs.
``A bunker buster cannot penetrate into the Earth deeply enough
to avoid massive casualties and the spewing of millions of cubic
feet of radioactive materials into the atmosphere,'' said Sen.
Dianne Feinstein, D-Calif.
Supporters of the weapon won a 53-43 vote. They said its funding
was only for a feasibility study to see whether a new,
sufficiently-hardened casing can be developed for existing
warheads to see whether it could penetrate the earth
sufficiently to destroy reinforced underground bunkers.
The underlying Senate measure provides $1.5 billion more than
both Bush's request and a version that passed the House last
month. Even so, the chamber declined to fully fund Bush's $651
million request for the troubled Yucca Mountain facility,
freezing spending for it at $577 million. The Senate also
repelled a House effort to establish temporary storage sites as
a backup to Yucca Mountain.
Instead, the Senate would funnel $5.3 billion into the Army
Corps of Engineers, which is responsible for waterways and flood
control projects, providing almost $1 billion more than Bush
asked for.
And Energy Department nuclear research labs located in the home
state of Sen. Pete Domenici, R-N.M., would get an impressive
boost as well.
The Senate did meet Bush's request for $339 million for a new
plant at the federal Savannah River complex in South Carolina to
produce mixed-oxide fuel. The new facility is a key part of the
Bush administration's effort to safeguard the tons of excess
weapons-grade plutonium held by both the United States and
Russia and reduce the risks of the material being obtained by
terrorists or a rogue state.
The House bill provided just $35 million for the mixed-oxide
plant.
The Senate also rebuffed a House effort to establish temporary
storage sites as a backup to Yucca Mountain.
The House called on the Energy Department to produce a plan for
aboveground storage for spent reactor fuel from commercial
nuclear power plants within four months at one or more federal
sites. It also set October 2006 as the date to begin accepting
waste and provided $10 million for the program.
Some lawmakers worry that temporary storage could become
permanent and the House plan alarmed lawmakers representing
sites such as the Hanford complex in Washington state that were
mentioned in a report accompanying the House bill.
Yucca Mountain, approved by Bush in 2002, is planned as a
national repository for 77,000 tons of defense and commercial
nuclear waste, to be buried for 10,000 years and beyond in the
desert 90 miles northwest of Las Vegas. A string of recent
setbacks has put the program in doubt.
The Yucca Mountain facility is now projected not to be finished
until 2012 and could be delayed further.
Guardian Unlimited © Guardian Newspapers Limited 2005
*****************************************************************
8 NRC: Louisiana Energy Service's Proposed National Enrichment
FR Doc E5-3433
[Federal Register: July 1, 2005 (Volume 70, Number 126)]
[Notices] [Page 38218-38219] From the Federal Register Online via
GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr01jy05-138]
Facility;
Notice of Availability of Final Environmental Impact Statement
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Notice of availability of Final Environmental Impact
Statement.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: James Park, Project Manager,
Environmental and Performance Assessment Directorate, Division of
Waste Management and Environmental Protection, Office of Nuclear
Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC 20555. Telephone: (301) 415-5835;
e-mail: jrp@nrc.gov.
SUMMARY: Notice is hereby given that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) is issuing a Final Environmental Impact
Statement (FEIS) on the proposed construction, operation, and
decommissioning of the National Enrichment Facility (NEF), a
gaseous centrifuge uranium enrichment facility, near Eunice, New
Mexico. The FEIS is being issued as part of the NRC's
decision-making process on whether to authorize Louisiana Energy
Services (LES) to construct, operate, and decommission the
proposed NEF.
The proposed NEF would produce enriched uranium-235 (235U) up to
5 weight percent by the gas centrifuge process with a nominal
production of 3 million separative work units per year. The
enriched uranium would be used in commercial nuclear power
plants. The FEIS discusses the purpose and need for the proposed
NEF, and reasonable alternatives to the proposed action,
including the no-action alternative. The FEIS also discusses the
environment potentially affected by the proposed action, presents
and compares potential environmental impacts resulting from the
proposed action and its alternatives, and identifies the
mitigation measures proposed by LES to eliminate or lessen the
potential environmental impacts.
Based on the evaluation in the FEIS, the NRC environmental review
staff has concluded that the proposed action will generally have
small to moderate effects on the public and the existing
environment.
This FEIS reflects the final analysis of environmental impacts of
LES's proposal and its alternatives, including the consideration
of public comments received by the NRC.
ADDRESSES: The NRC maintains an Agencywide Documents Access and
[[Page 38219]] Management System (ADAMS), which provides text and
image files of NRC's public documents. The FEIS and its
appendices may be accessed through the NRC's Public Electronic
Reading Room on the Internet at
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html , using the ADAMS
accession numbers ML051730238 and ML051730292 for Volumes 1 and 2
of the FEIS, respectively. If you do not have access to ADAMS or
if there are problems in accessing the documents located in
ADAMS, contact the NRC Public Document Room (PDR) Reference staff
at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415- 4737 or by email to pdr@nrc.gov. The
FEIS is also available for inspection at the Commission's Public
Document Room, U.S. NRC's Headquarters Building, 11555 Rockville
Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland. Upon written request and
to the extent supplies are available, a single copy of the FEIS
can be obtained for a fee by writing to the Office of the Chief
Information Officer, Reproduction and Distribution Services
Section, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC
20555-0001; by electronic mail at DISTRIBUTION@nrc.gov; or by fax
at (301) 415-2289. A selected group of documents associated with
the NEF may also be obtained from the Internet on NRC's NEF Web
page:
http://www.nrc.gov/materials/fuel-cycle-fac/lesfacility.html
(case sensitive).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The NRC staff has prepared this FEIS
in response to a December 2003 application submitted by LES for a
license to construct, operate and decommission a gas centrifuge
uranium enrichment facility in Lea County, New Mexico. The FEIS
for the proposed NEF was prepared by the staff of the NRC and its
contractors, Advanced Technologies and Laboratories,
International, Inc. and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, in
compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and
the NRC's regulations for implementing NEPA (10 CFR Part 51).
The NRC staff published a Notice of Intent to prepare an
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for the proposed NEF and to
conduct a scoping process, in the Federal Register on February 4,
2004 (69 FR 5374). The NRC staff accepted scoping comments
through March 18, 2004, and subsequently issued a Scoping Summary
Report in April 2004 (ADAMS Accession Number: ML041050128). The
NRC staff prepared and issued a Draft EIS in September 2004;
notice of the availability of the Draft EIS appeared in the
Federal Register on September 17, 2004 (69 FR 56104). Public
comments on the Draft EIS were accepted by the NRC staff until
January 7, 2005. The NRC staff's responses to these comments and
copies of the submitted comments are provided in appendices to
the FEIS.
The FEIS describes the proposed action and alternatives to the
proposed action, including the no-action alternative, and
describes the proposed mitigation measures. The NRC staff
assesses the impacts of the proposed action and its alternatives
on public and occupational health, air quality, water resources,
waste management, geology and soils, noise, ecology resources,
land use, transportation, historical and cultural resources,
visual and scenic resources, socioeconomics, accidents and
environmental justice. Additionally, the FEIS analyzes and
compares the costs and benefits of the proposed action.
After weighing the impacts, costs, and benefits of the proposed
action and comparing alternatives, the NRC staff, in accordance
with 10 CFR 51.91(d), sets forth its final NEPA recommendation
regarding the proposed action. The NRC staff recommends that the
proposed action be approved, unless safety issues mandate
otherwise.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 23rd day of June 2005.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Scott C. Flanders, Deputy Director, Environmental and Performance
Assessment Directorate, Division of Waste Management and
Environmental Protection, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and
Safeguards.
[FR Doc. E5-3433 Filed 6-30-05; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
*****************************************************************
9 [NukeNet] Statement re ITER Site Decision
Date: Fri, 01 Jul 2005 15:54:23 -0700
NukeNet Anti-Nuclear Network (nukenet@energyjustice.net)
Citizens' Nuclear Information Center and Japan Congress Against A- and H-Bombs
Translation of 30 June 2005 statement re the decision to site ITER in France
A 28 June Cabinet meeting of the Japanese government unanimously agreed to
the siting of ITER (International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor) in
Cadarache, France. The decision came after three years of international
negotiations.
We would like to make of the following points in regard to the long running
dispute over the siting of ITER:
1. We have been fed a series of untruths about this research project
Contrary to the claims of its proponents, the ITER project is not "a
wonderful future-oriented research project for the benefit of the people".
In reality, despite the fact that huge amounts of tax payers' money will be
invested in the project, no explanation has been offered to the general
public and the future generations who are supposedly going to benefit. All
that has happened is that a bunch of people with vested interests have
haggled over the spoils.
Furthermore, researchers forgot the idea that was supposed to be behind the
project, namely "to develop the ideal energy source". Instead, in blind
pursuit of their own self-interest, they went running after the research
money. As a result, they made fools of themselves through the diplomatic
problems that ensued and wasted a lot of time and money in the process.
If this is what happens just in order to determine the site, we can't hope
for much from the research project itself, which will span several decades.
2. The site has been decided, but the problems aren't resolved
The protagonists in this dispute are trying to conceal their diplomatic
failure by pointing to the preferential treatment that has been given to
Japan. For example, the number of Japanese researchers allocated to the
project will be twice what it would otherwise have been. That simply means
that instead of twenty people there will be forty people. Many more people
would have benefited if the 67.5 billion yen so far invested by the central
government and Aomori Prefecture in ITER had instead been invested in
developing other energy sources and other employment schemes. Such
investments could have revealed possibilities for creating a much better
society.
Vested interests in Japan haven't given up yet. They are already haggling
over related facilities, for example an International Fusion Materials
Irradiation Facility. This facility is supposed to generate a high energy
neutron beam, although there are no regulations governing the safety of this.
3. It has been decided that ITER won't be built in Japan, but it is still
necessary to consider the future of large scale fusion research projects.
Huge quantities of energy are required to generate a fusion reaction and
masses of radioactive waste are produced in the process. There is no
indication that fusion will ever become a reality.
We are unable to accept fusion projects for which decisions are made on the
basis of international politics, or based on the reasoning that, "having
spent so much money already, it would be a shame not to continue", even
though they have produced no results. There must be system of a critical
review and proper citizen monitoring.
Citizens' Nuclear Information Center
3F Kotobuki Bdg, 1-58-15, Higashi-Nakano, Nakano-ku, Tokyo 164-0003
Phone: 81-3-5330-9520
Fax: 81-3-5330-9530
http://cnic.jp/english/
cnic@nifty.com
_______________________________________________________________________
Subscribe/Unsubscribe Here: http://www.energyjustice.net/nukenet/
Change your settings or access the archives at:
http://energyjustice.net/mailman/listinfo/nukenet_energyjustice.net
*****************************************************************
10 RIA Novosti: Russian and Chinese leaders to discuss cooperation issues
2/07/2005
MOSCOW, July 1 (RIA Novosti) - Russian and Chinese leaders
Vladimir Putin and Hu Jintao will discuss boosting high
technology cooperation and increasing mutual supplies of cars
and equipment during their talks in the Kremlin. "Russia is
growing into an important market for Chinese products, such as
telecommunications equipment, household appliances and home
electronics, cars and industrial equipment," a source in the
Kremlin said.
Russia is interested in augmenting energy equipment supplies,
both for nuclear power and conventional plants, civil aviation,
mining and other kinds of equipment.
"Special attention should be paid to cooperation in
environmental protection," the source said.
He called the joint monitoring of trans-border water bodies, the
development of specially protected natural area networks and the
protection of forests and other biological resources priorities
in this sphere.
Economic cooperation remains the most important sector of
bilateral cooperation.
"Bilateral trade turnover was more than $20 billion last year,
as had been expected. And high growth rates have been registered
this year too," the Kremlin representative said.
He emphasized such achievements as progress in hi-tech and
innovative cooperation, the enhancement of inter-bank
partnerships and the growing mutual interest in Russian and
Chinese business.
According to the source, practical work on a medium-term program
for Russian-Chinese trade and economic relations in 2006-2010
has begun.
"This document must present a comprehensive analysis of our
cooperation's potential, specific recommendations to solve
actual problems in the way of a progressive advance of
Russian-Chinese trade and economic interaction," the source
said.
"Investment cooperation is expanding. A number of major projects
to attract Chinese investment in the Russian economy proposed at
the first Russian-Chinese investment forum in Khabarovsk last
June, are being implemented," the representative said.
He said the second investment forum, which was held in St.
Petersburg from June 9-10, gave additional impetus to extending
the "geography" of Chinese investment in European Russia.
© 2005 "RIA Novosti"
*****************************************************************
11 EurActiv: Mixed reactions to ITER
+ [EurActiv.com]
Published: Wednesday 29 June 2005
In Short:
The quest to find a cheap and inexhaustible way to meet global
energy needs was given a boost when a 30-nation consortium chose
France to host the world's first nuclear fusion reactor.
Opinions remain divided over whether nuclear fusion is safe and
economically viable as a sustainable source of energy
production.
Background:
The ten billion euro experimental reactor being constructed in
Cadarache, southern France, will seek to turn seawater into fuel
by mimicking the way the sun produces energy. The 500 megawatt
ITER reactor will use deuterium, extracted from seawater, as its
major fuel and a giant electromagnetic ring to fuse atomic
nuclei at extremely high temperatures.
The ITER project began in 1985 but the scientific challenges
and ongoing disputes between its partners concerning
the location of the first reactor and the nature of its
financing have caused repeated delays. At a meeting in Moscow on
20 June, officials from the six-partner ITER
consortium including China, the 25-nation EU, Japan, Russia,
South Korea and the United States chose Cadarache, near
Marseille, over a rival bid to host the project from Japan.
The EU is to take on 40 percent of the project's cost, France
will pay ten percent while the remaining five partners will
invest ten percent each. Building the reactor is expected to
take about ten years at a cost of 4.6 billion
euros. However, some scientists estimate that the project could
take significantly longer than foreseen at a far greater cost.
Environmental campaign groups such as Greenpeace fear
that pursuing ITER could prove ecologically hazardous and insist
that money should be spent on more concrete and environmentally
acceptable renewable energy projects.
Issues:
Proponents of nuclear fusion claim that if it succeeds, the ITER
project will result in a cost effective and potentially
inexhaustible supply of energy that will eventually replace oil
and gas altogether. Officials from the six-partner consortium
predict that the project will create approximately 10,000 jobs
and take eight years to build. An experimental reactor would
then be fully operational by 2040.
Opponents argue that the project is purely experimental and that
it will take at least 50 years before a commercially viable
reactor is even built. Environmentalists are suggesting that
despite being a more environmentally sound energy source than
nuclear fission, fusion fuel is neither clean nor safe. Some
scientists are estimating that the project could take three
times longer than expected and environmental campaign group
Greenpeace have stated that if the project yields any results at
all, it will not be until the second half of this century. If
the project is to proceed, the nation states comprising the
consortium must also overcome differences on a number of
issues, such as the extent of financing.
Positions:
French President Jacques Chirac greeted the news of France's
succesful bid to host the ITER reactor with praise for EU
technological and scientific expertise. Thanking rivals Japan
for agreeing to negotiate a compromise, Chirac claimed that the
project was a testiment to international co-operation and the
global commitment to assuring sustainable energy sources: "It is
a big success for France, for Europe and for all partners of
ITER [...] I think we can delight in having maintained the
spirit of dialogue and mutual trust throughout our discussions."
Dominique de Villepin, recently appointed prime minister of
France, also welcomed the agreement and viewed it as an
indication that EU member states could achieve great things if
they worked together harmoniously.
Following the decision to host the ITER reactor in France, Dr.
Peter Haug, director general of FORATOM and secretary general of
the European Nuclear Society (ENS) commented: "This will provide
a major boost for the European nuclear energy industry and is
well-earned recognition of its excellent research credentials.
Choosing this bid endorses the European nuclear industry’s
long-held view that the ITER project is one that requires broad
and effective international co-operation and the pooling of
resources and know-how."
In agreement was Bertrand BARRÉ, President of the European
Nuclear Society, ENS, who declared: "The long-awaited decision
to select the European site of Cadarache to build the ITER
international fusion facility is very good news for the whole
European R&D community, and especially for those of us who have
been working for decades to develop the peaceful uses of nuclear
energy, both fission and fusion. This is also recognition of the
key contribution made by Europe to fusion research, one of the
very few areas of truly international co-operation."
Voicing oppoisition to the project was Rebecca Harms, Green/EFA
member of the European Parliament's Committee on
Industry, Research and Energy, who said: "The International
Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) is an enormous project
of no practical relevance whatsoever. The €10 billion that will
be spent on this white elephant bears no relation to what we can
expect to gain from it. In the next 50 years nuclear fusion will
neither tackle climate change nor guarantee the security of our
energy supply". Arguing that the EU's energy research should be
focused elsewhere, she said: "The Green/EFA group demands that
these funds be spent instead on energy research that is relevant
to the future. A major focus should now be put on renewable
sources of energy."
According to Greenpeace, the project, estimated to cost 10bn
euro, will not generate any electricity, but will instead need
massive amounts of energy to heat up. Although the nuclear
industry poses as the solution to climate change, Greenpeace
insist that the nuclear option would introduce a whole new set
of nuclear risks, create a serious waste problem, emit large
amounts of radioactive material and be available for use in the
production of materials for nuclear weapons."With 10 billion, we
could build 10,000MW offshore windfarms, delivering electricity
for 7.5 million European households," said Jan Vande Putte,
spokeperson for Greenpeace International. "Governments should
not waste our money on a dangerous toy which will never deliver
any useful energy. Instead, they should invest in renewable
energy which is abundantly available, not in 2080 but today."
French Green party lawmaker Noël Mamère claims that more
concrete efforts to fight present-day global warming will be
neglected as a result of ITER: "This is not good news for the
fight against the greenhouse effect because we're going to
put ten billion euro towards a project that has a term of 30-50
years when we're not even sure it will be effective."
Ian Fells, an expert on energy conversion from the Royal Academy
of Engineering in Britain believes that the success of the
ITER nuclear fusion reactor would solve the world's energy
problems "for the next 1,000 to 2,000 years". However, Fells
also warns of the dangers: "In the course of the reaction it
produces a lot of neutrons and they get into the actual fabric
of the machine and over years it becomes radioactive, so there
is still a problem of decommissioning."
Links
Official Documents
+
Europa: Press release: ITER and fusion energy research – your
questions answered (28 June 2005)
+
ITER website: homepage
Political Groups
+
The Greens/European Free Alliance: Press release: France to
build world's first experimental fusion reactor (28 June 2005)
International Organisations
+
European Nuclear Society (ENS): Decision on ITER reactor “a
significant boost” for nuclear industry (28 June 2005)
NGOs and Think-Tanks
+
Greenpeace: Nuclear fusion reactor project in France: an
expensive and senseless nuclear stupidity (28 June 2005)
Press articles
+
Financial Times: France to host nuclear fusion project (28 June
2005)
+
Reuters: France to host world's first nuclear fusion plant (28
June 2005) Related DocumentsFrance to host ITER project (29
June 2005)Tokyo still mulling ITER decision (04 May
2005)Poto
nik: Views are converging on ITER (19 April
2005)'Privileged partnership with Japan' is new Commission
mandate for ITER talks (29 November 2004)EU still hopes to reach
international agreement on ITER (28 September 2004)
Mixed reactions to ITERToolsSystran rough translation
Feed-back to section coordinator
© EurActiv 2000-2005 / E-mail to EurActiv
*****************************************************************
12 Japan Times: Government eyes two facilities tied to ITER project
Friday, July 1, 2005
The government plans to host a data analysis center and a remote
control center for the world's first nuclear fusion reactor,
which is to be built in France, government officials said
Thursday.
The village of Rokkasho, Aomori Prefecture, is the candidate
site for the two facilities related to the International
Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor project. Senior science and
technology ministry officials will soon visit the prefecture to
explain the plan to local government officials, the officials
said.
On Tuesday, France won the bid to build the ITER plant in
Cadarache after Tokyo abandoned its attempt to build it in
Rokkasho in exchange for preferential arrangements under which
Japan will build related facilities.
The European Union will shoulder half of the construction costs
under a Japan-EU agreement.
Aomori Gov. Shingo Mimura has shown willingness to host the
facilities.
Four ITER-related facilities, including the data analysis and
remote control centers, will be built for the project, and
Britain has expressed interest in hosting one of the facilities.
The ITER plant is an experimental facility that aims to mimic
the way the sun produces energy and to explore a new,
inexhaustible source of energy. Thermonuclear fusion reactions
would be produced by fusing the nuclei of heavy hydrogen and
tritium at temperatures of more than 100 million.
The Japan Times: July 1, 2005
(C) All rights reserved
*****************************************************************
13 CEAC: Utilities Show Interest In New Nuclear Power Plant
The Chief Engineer
WASHINGTON (AP) - For two months, Ray Ganthner took to the road,
visiting a dozen power companies to find out if his bosses
should take a $100 million gamble.
Asking executives ``eyeball-to-eyeball about their future
needs for generating capacity, he wanted to know how serious
utilities were about building a nuclear power plant in the U.S.
for the first time in three decades.
``I was surprised at the consistency of the answers, said
Ganthner, a Lynchburg, Va.-based senior executive for the French
reactor manufacturer, Framatome, in an interview.
Based on what he found, AREVA, Framatomes parent company, is
investing $100 million on U.S. marketing and to get a design
certificate from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for its
newest reactor. This type already is being built in Finland.
It may be a long shot.
Two other manufacturers, Westinghouse and General Electric, have
a head start. But the French companys decision to make it a
three-way race demonstrates the renewed interest in nuclear
power. Not since 1973 has an order been placed for a new
reactor.
Two events helped end, for a time, any U.S. interest in reactors
beyond those already under construction: In 1979, the Three Mile
Island nuclear plant in Pennsylvania had a partial meltdown; in
1986, there was an explosion at the Chernobyl plant in the
Ukraine.
Recently a consortium of eight U.S. utilities, under the banner
of NuStart, announced potential sites where one or more of its
members might put a new reactor. Two other American utilities
are pursuing separate licensing efforts.
While no one has yet committed to construction, Energy Secretary
Samuel Bodman recently told an industry group, ``If all goes
well, we could see new plants on line by 2014.
Westinghouse Electric Co., a subsidiary of the British company
BNFL, has approval from the NRC for its new 1,000 megawatt
AP1000 reactor design. General Electric will submit an
application this year for its 1,500 megawatt ESBWR reactor.
Both companies are working hard to line up customers, convinced
that electricity demand a decade from now will require more
large power plants, including nuclear ones.
``We think everything is heading in absolutely the right
direction, says Vaughn Gilbert, a Westinghouse spokesman.
``Nuclear has to be part of the energy picture. We expect the
U.S. market will come back and eventually be robust.
The new reactors are described as ``evolutionary advancements
over the 103 now in operation in 31 states.
The new reactors basically use the same technology, but with
fewer valves, pipes and pumps. In the case of Westinghouse and
GE, these reactors also have passive safety systems that, if
needed, can shut the reactor down automatically and pour in
cooling water. Other modifications such as setting the
radioactive fuel lower into the ground were added in response to
post-Sept. 11 worries about terrorism.
President Bush has promoted nuclear power as a way to take the
pressure off fossil fuels - oil, natural gas and coal. While the
U.S. gets 20 percent of its electricity from nuclear reactors,
France meets 78 percent of its electricity needs with nuclear
power.
``The world needs to share technologies on nuclear power. ... So
we need to work together on developing technologies that will
not only ensure people that nuclear power will be safe, but that
we can dispose of it in a safe way, said Bush at a news
conference last week with British Prime Minister Tony Blair.
Even some environmentalists have abandoned their opposition to
nuclear power, arguing it is needed to address climate change
because reactors do not produce ``greenhouse gases as do
fossil fuels. Other environmentalists are not convinced, citing
worries about reactor waste and safety.
A University of Chicago study concluded that a new fleet of
reactors can be expected to produce power as cheaply as coal and
natural gas, givens todays prices.
``People are getting comfortable with nuclear, Paul Dabber, a
vice president for mergers and acquisitions at J.P. Morgan, told
a conference on new reactor technology in February. One reason
is that existing nuclear power plants have been making a profit,
he said.
Wall Street long has been skeptical about committing $2 billion
or more to a new nuclear reactor. Investors still consider such
a venture risky unless the government provides tax breaks or
other incentives to get the first group of reactors started.
Without some government help, no new reactors are likely to be
built before 2025, according to the Energy Information Agency,
the governments energy statistical agency.
Congress is considering loan guarantees for new-design reactors,
and lawmakers are expected to come up with other tax breaks. But
a Bush proposal to provide ``risk insurance to protect the
industry against licensing or legal delays has attracted little
interest on Capitol Hill.
No one has yet committed to building a new reactor. Despite the
optimistic rhetoric, utilities are moving toward that decision
cautiously.
A premature pronouncement about a new reactor could rattle
investors and depress a utilitys stock, industry experts say.
Utilities and investors still remember the pitfalls of long
licensing delays that doubled and tripled the cost of many
reactors in the 1980s.
In one of the biggest cost overruns, the proposed twin-reactor
Seabrook plant in New Hampshire was projected to cost $850
million in 1976 and be finished in six years. It ended up
costing $7 billion when it was completed in 1990. The second
reactor was canceled.
``My company lost $5 billion to $10 billion on the last round of
nuclear construction, Exelon chairman John Rowe said in a
recent speech, explaining why he is approaching new reactor
investments with caution.
Rowes Chicago-based utility company owns 17 nuclear reactors,
more than any other utility.
He says his company will not invest in a new plant until there
is more progress in dealing with reactor waste. A proposed waste
repository at Yucca Mountain in Nevada has had a string of
setbacks. The date for its completion is optimistically put at
2012.
Still, Exelon and two other utilities, Dominion and Entergy,
have separately applied to the NRC for early site permits for
reactors with the idea of shortening the licensing process if a
decision is made to go ahead with one.
``There is a growing recognition that if we are going to meet
our future need for electric energy and also reduce our
emissions of greenhouse gases ... we simply must build the next
generation of advanced nuclear energy plants, said Marilyn
Kray, an Exelon vice president and head of the NuStart
consortium.
In an interview, she said the goal is to preserve the nuclear
option by testing the NRCs streamlined licensing process.
Duke Energy, based in Charlotte, N.C., is talking about possibly
having a new reactor operating by 2014. Dominion, based in
Virginia, is making plans to seek an NRC reactor construction
permit. Neither company has made a final decision.
The Energy Department is paying half the cost of the various
initial licensing efforts, including an expected $46 million
next year.
``Adding nuclear capacity ... makes a lot of sense, says Henry
Barron, in charge of nuclear operations at Duke Power, a
subsidiary of Duke Energy that serves 2 million customers in the
Carolinas.
By 2014, Duke will need at least one more large power plant to
meet demand in one of the countrys fastest growing regions.
Many other utilities around the country are facing similar
electricity demands.
Once the logjam is broken with the first orders, the U.S.
reactor market could become the worlds second largest, after
China, given expected growth in U.S. electricity demand and
environmental and cost concerns about fossil fuels, says Andy
White, president of GE Energys nuclear business.
``Weve probably never had a better situation, White said in
an interview, predicting that 60 or more new reactors may be
built in the United States over the next 20 to 30 years with
several designs finding customers.
Chief Engineers Association of Chicagoland 4701 Midlothian
Turnpike, Suite 4 Crestwood, IL 60445 Phone: 708.293.1720 Fax:
708.293.1432 Copyright © 2005, Chicagoland Chief Engineer All
Rights Reserved www.chiefengineer.org
*****************************************************************
14 NRC: NRC Renews Operating License for Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2, for an Additional 20 Years
News Release - 2005-09
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Office of Public Affairs
Telephone: 301/415-8200 Washington, DC 20555-0001 E-mail: No.
05-098 July 1, 2005
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has renewed the operating
license of the Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO) power plant, Unit 2,
for an additional 20 years.
The ANO plant is located about 6 miles from Russellville, Ark.
The licensee, Entergy Operations Inc., submitted its license
renewal application on Oct. 15, 2003. With the renewal, the
license for ANO Unit 2 is extended to July 17, 2038. The
operating license for ANO Unit 1 was renewed June 20, 2001, and
will expire May 20, 2034.
The NRCs environmental review for this license renewal is
described in a site-specific supplement to the NRCs Generic
Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear
Power Plants (NUREG-1437, Supplement 19), issued in April. The
review concluded there were no environmental impacts that would
preclude renewal of the license for environmental reasons. Two
public meetings to discuss the environmental review were held
near the plant on Feb. 3 and Oct. 21, 2004.
After carefully reviewing the plants safety systems and
specifications, the staff concluded that there were no safety
concerns that would preclude license renewal, because the
licensee had demonstrated the capability to manage the effects
of plant aging. The Safety Evaluation Report Related to the
License Renewal of Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2, was published
in June. In addition, NRC conducted inspections of the plants to
verify information submitted by the licensee. The reports
relating to the ANO Unit 2 renewal are available on the NRC Web
site at this address:
http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/licensing/renewal/applicati
ons/ano-2.html.
On May 13, the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards an
independent body of technical experts which advises the
Commission issued its recommendation that the operating license
for ANO Unit 2 be renewed. That recommendation is contained in
Report on the Safety Aspects of the License Renewal Application
for Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2. This document is available on
the NRC Web site at this address:
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/acrs/letters/2005/.
The ANO Unit 2 renewal brings the total number of renewals to 33
reactor units. A complete listing of renewal applications can be
found on the NRC Web site at
http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/licensing/renewal/applicati
ons.html.
Last revised Friday, July 01, 2005
*****************************************************************
15 BBC: BNFL plans to sell Westinghouse
Last Updated: Friday, 1 July, 2005
[Sellafield nuclear power plant in Cumbria]
BNFL runs the Sellafield plant in Cumbria
British Nuclear Fuels (BNFL) confirmed controversial plans to
sell its US-based nuclear power station construction unit
Westinghouse.
The state-owned firm has already received some approaches, and a
sale could raise about £1bn ($1.8bn).
Critics of the sale say it is shortsighted as many countries want
cheap and environmentally-friendly nuclear energy.
At the same time, BNFL announced it had cut its losses by half to
£144m.
'Prime asset'
BNFL said a sale makes sense if it is to deliver value to UK
taxpayers.
[Professor Ian Fells]
I a a lot of other people who follow the nuclear industry are
mystified by this decision Nuclear expert Prof Ian Fells
"Our strategy review concluded that BNFL's businesses would be
managed to deliver value and control risks to the UK tax payer,"
BNFL chairman Gordon Campbell said in a statement.
"In line with this strategy, we are starting a structured sales
process for the Westinghouse business."
BNFL, which operates the Sellafield waste reprocessing plant in
Cumbria and the UK's remaining older Magnox stations, said on
Friday that it had already received a number of approaches for
Westinghouse.
"It has reached all its targets, continues to win new business
and is in an excellent position to capitalise on the China new
build programme," said BNFL chief executive Mike Parker.
'Bizarre timing'
Energy expert Professor Ian Fells of the Royal Academy of
Engineering, described BNFL's decision to sell Westinghouse as
"mystifying".
"I and a lot of other people who follow the nuclear industry are
mystified by this decision," he said.
"Westinghouse is being sold off just before it looks like
starting to make a serious amount of money.
"China has announced that it is to build 40 nuclear power
stations over the next 15 years, and President George W Bush has
said nuclear power will be a core component of America's future
energy provision."
He added that he thought the decision to sell could have been
prompted by government pressure. Critics of nuclear power say it
is dangerous and the high cost of storing spent fuel and
decommissioning old power stations makes it expensive.
Dai Hudd, assistant general secretary of the Prospect union,
which represents 6,000 BNFL staff, described the decision to sell
Westinghouse as "bizarre", given increased demand for nuclear
power.
"This is short-termism at its worst," he said.
Falling losses
BNFL also announced that it had cut its losses before one-off
items to £144m in the year to 31 March, down from £283m for the
previous 12 months.
This fall can be attributed to the fact that BNFL has transferred
the majority of its liabilities to the Nuclear Decommissioning
Authority (NDA).
The NDA has been charged with the decommissioning of the UK's
aging nuclear plants.
Half of the UK's 14 nuclear power stations are to be
decommissioned between now and 2010, and by 2023 all but one -
Sizewell B - will have closed.
*****************************************************************
16 China CRI: China to Build Its Own Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor
2005-7-1 10:53:35 People's Daily
A leading Chinese plasma physicist said Thursday China might
build its own thermonuclear experimental reactor, which would be
expected to supply sustained electricity for the world's most
populous country.
While building their own sophisticated devices in thermonuclear
reaction, Chinese scientists have already participated in the
International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER), a
testing step between today's plasma physics studies and
tomorrow's electricity-producing fusion power plants.
The scientist, who has access to the ITER, said to Xinhua on
condition of anominity, "The ultimate goal of the Chinese
scientists is to build thermonuclear experimental reactors with
their own efforts."
"International cooperative endeavors like the ITER make us keep
abreast of the world's most advanced technologies," He said.
"We're entitled to share all top-notch know-how once we enter
the global consortium."
Using deuterium, which is in seawater, as fuel for reactions, a
hydrogen plasma torus operating at over 100 million Celsius
degrees will produce 500 megawatts of fusion power. The ITER,
which means "the way" in Latin, is based on the idea.
All the commercialized nuclear reactors in the world were
designed for fission, a process contrary to the ITER's fusion,
and have to consume irrecycled mineral resources such as uranium
and plutonium. Waste of fission reactors is radioactive while a
fusion reaction is rather environment-friendly.
Chinese scientists started to develop a fusion operation torus
four decades ago in mountains southwest of inland Sichuan
Province.
In the late 1980s, the United States and Japan launched the
ITER, which was joined by China in 2003. Among the six partners
of the 10 billion-euro ambitious plan, the European Union will
cover 50 percent of the total budget. The remaining five, the
US, Japan, Russia, the Republic of Korea and China, will pay 10
percent each.
Since 2003, the Chinese team has mandated a batch of important
missions. The ITER international coordinator, Japanese physicist
Yasuo Shimomura said, "The work done by the Chinese is the most
impressive."
The Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) Institute of Plasma
Physics is developing an Experimental Advanced Superconducting
Tokamak (EAST), one prototype of the ITER.
The EAST, which costs 200 million yuan (24 million US dollars)
and is scheduled for completion late this year, could operate at
over 100 million Celcius degrees and produce electricity in a
consecutive 1,000 seconds, which will be a world record.
"The EAST is the only prototype nearest to the ITER and will be
unbeatable in at least one decade," an official with the CAS
Bureau of Basic Research said.
After fierce diplomatic manoeuvers, the six partners agreed
Tuesday in Moscow to construct the first ITER at Cadarache, near
Aix-en-Provence, France, overriding Japan's competition for
hosting the innovative reactor.
It is ready to start ITER construction and the first plasma
operation might be in 2016. But the most optimistic estimation
on first commercialization of ITER said it needs at least half a
century.
After the deal was clinched in Moscow, Chinese Minister of
Science and Technology Xu Guanhua said, "As China is short of
energy, global research endeavors for energy supply solutions
meet our strategic interest."
Copyright of crienglish.com. All rights reserved.
*****************************************************************
17 NRC: Nuclear Management Company, LLC; Notice of Withdrawal of
FR Doc 05-12989
[Federal Register: July 1, 2005 (Volume 70, Number 126)]
[Notices] [Page 38217-38218] From the Federal Register Online via
GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr01jy05-136]
Application for Amendment to Facility Operating License The U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has granted the
request of Nuclear Management Company, LLC (the licensee) to
withdraw its April 29, 2005, application for proposed amendment
to Facility Operating License No. DPR-24 for the Point Beach
Nuclear Plant (PBNP), Unit 1, located in Two Rivers, WI.
The proposed amendment would modify the PBNP Final Safety
Analysis Report to include a reactor vessel head drop accident.
The Commission had previously issued a Notice of Consideration of
Issuance of Amendment published in
[[Page 38218]] the Federal Register on May 13, 2005 (70 FR
25621). The April 29, 2005, application proposed amendments to
PBNP, Units 1 and 2, Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-24 and
DPR-27, respectively. However, by letter dated May 13, 2005, the
licensee withdrew the proposed amendment for PBNP, Unit 1,
Facility Operating License No. DPR-24. For further details with
respect to this action, see the application for amendment dated
April 29, 2005, and the licensee's letter dated May 13, 2005,
which withdrew the application for license amendment. Documents
may be examined, and/or copied for a fee, at the NRC's Public
Document Room (PDR), located at One White Flint North, Public
File Area 01 F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville,
Maryland. Publicly available records will be accessible
electronically from the Agencywide Documents Access and
Management Systems (ADAMS) Public Electronic Reading Room on the
internet at the NRC Web site, . Persons who do not have access to
ADAMS or who encounter problems in accessing the documents
located in ADAMS, should contact the NRC PDR Reference staff by
telephone at 1-800-397-4209, or (301) 415-4737 or by e-mail to .
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 24th day of June 2005.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Harold K. Chernoff, Sr., Project Manager, Section 1, Project
Directorate III, Division of Licensing Project Management, Office
of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 05-12989 Filed 6-30-05; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
*****************************************************************
18 Japan Times: No leakage in nuclear plant fire
Friday, July 1, 2005
SHIZUOKA (Kyodo) A fire broke out Thursday night at a facility
of the Hamaoka nuclear power plant in Omaezaki, Shizuoka
Prefecture, but no radioactivity leaked outside of the plant,
the operator said Thursday.
The company said the fire caused no injuries.
The 9:10 p.m. fire occurred in the second basement of a
building constructed for disposal of waste materials, Chubu
Electric Power Co. said.
The Japan Times: July 1, 2005
(C) All rights reserved
*****************************************************************
19 NRC: Carolina Power and Light Company, Duke Energy Corporation,
FR Doc 05-12990
[Federal Register: July 1, 2005 (Volume 70, Number 126)]
[Notices] [Page 38217] From the Federal Register Online via GPO
Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr01jy05-135]
Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power
Plant, LLC, Receipt of Request for Action Under 10 CFR 2.206
Notice is hereby given that by petition dated May 12, 2005, Mr.
Paul Gunter, on behalf of Nuclear Information and Resource
Service, Citizens Awareness Network (CAN), Indian Point Safe
Energy Coalition, North Carolina Waste Awareness and Reduction
Network (NCWARN), Alliance for Affordable Energy, and Blue Ridge
Environmental Defense League (the Petitioners), has requested
that the NRC engage emergency enforcement actions to modify
and/or suspend operating licenses for Shearon Harris Nuclear
Power Station Unit 1, Docket No. 50-400, License No. NPF-63; H.
B. Robinson Unit 2, Docket No. 50-261, License No. DPR-23;
McGuire Units 1 and 2, Docket No. 50-369, License No. NPF-9;
Catawba Units 1 and 2, Docket Nos. 50-413 and 50-414, License
Nos. NPF-35 and NPF-52; Ginna, Docket No. 50-244, License No.
DPR-18; James A. FitzPatrick, Docket No. 50-333, License No.
DPR-59; Indian Point Units 2 and 3, Docket Nos. 50-247 and
50-286, License Nos. DPR-26 and DPR-64; Vermont Yankee, Docket
No. 50-271, License No. DPR-28; Waterford Unit 3, Docket No.
50-382, License No. NPF-38; and Arkansas Nuclear One Units 1 and
2, Docket No. 50-313 and 50-368, License No. DPR-51 and NPF-6,
with regard to potential violations of NRC regulations for fire
protection under Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10
CFR) part 50. Specifically, the petition requested emergency
enforcement under 10 CFR 2.206 to include following actions by
the Commission: (1) Collect information through generic
communication with nuclear industry and specifically with the
named reactor sites to determine the extent of condition of the
inoperable fire barriers; including the requirement that the
licensees conduct a full inventory of the type Hemyc/MT to
include the amount in linear and square footage, its specific
applications, and the identification of safe shutdown systems
which are currently unprotected by the noncompliance and an
assessment of the safety significance of each application; (2)
The communication should require, at minimum that the above named
sites provide justification for operation in non-compliance with
all applicable fire protection regulations; and (3) With the
determination that any and/or all of the above mentioned sites
are operating in unanalyzed condition and/or that assurance of
public health and safety is degraded, promptly order a suspension
of the license or a power reduction of the affected reactors
until such time as it can be demonstrated that the licensees are
operating in conformance with all other applicable fire
protection regulations.
The request is being treated pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206, of the
Commission's regulations. The request has been referred to the
Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. As provided
by 10 CFR 2.206, appropriate action will be taken on this
petition within a reasonable time. Mr. Paul Gunter, as Director
of the Reactor Watchdog Project for Nuclear Information and
Resource Service, Debbie Katz of CAN, and Jim Warren of NCWARN,
participated in a telephone conference call with the NRC's
Petition Review Board (PRB) on June 1, 2005, to discuss the
petition. The results of that discussion were considered in the
PRB's determination regarding the petitioner's request for action
and in establishing the schedule for the review of the petition.
During the June 1, 2005, PRB conference call, the petitioners
requested that the NRC consider other fire barrier issues beyond
the Hemyc electric raceway fire barrier system. This request will
not be accepted under the 2.206 process because the petitioner
did not provide adequate information to justify expanding the
scope of the review.
A copy of the petition and the transcript of the telephone
conference call are available for inspection at the Commission's
Public Document Room (PDR), located at One White Flint North,
Public File Area O1 F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor),
Rockville, Maryland, and from the NRC's Agencywide Documents
Access and Management System (ADAMS), Public Electronic Reading
Room, on the Internet at the NRC Web site,
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (ADAMS Accession Nos.
ML051440209 and ML051640452). Persons who do not have access to
ADAMS or who encounter problems in accessing the documents
located in ADAMS, should contact the NRC PDR Reference staff by
telephone at 1-800-397- 4209 or 301-415-4737, or by e-mail to
pdr@nrc.gov. Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 27th day of June
2005.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
J.E. Dyer, Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 05-12990 Filed 6-30-05; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
*****************************************************************
20 NRC: Nuclear Management Company, LLC, Notice of Issuance of Amendment
FR Doc 05-12991
[Federal Register: July 1, 2005 (Volume 70, Number 126)]
[Notices] [Page 38218] From the Federal Register Online via GPO
Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr01jy05-137]
to Facility Operating License The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (Commission) has issued Amendment No. 225 to Facility
Operating License No. DPR-27 issued to Nuclear Management
Company, LLC (the licensee), which modified the Point Beach
Nuclear Plant (PBNP), Unit 2, Final Safety Analysis Report to
include a reactor vessel head drop accident for operation of the
PBNP, Unit 2, located in Two Rivers, WI. The amendment is
effective as of the date of issuance.
The amendment authorized changes to the design basis and Final
Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) related to a postulated reactor
vessel head drop accident in accordance with 10 CFR 50.71(e). The
application for the amendment complies with the standards and
requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the
Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations. The Commission
has made appropriate findings as required by the Act and the
Commission's rules and regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I, which are
set forth in the license amendment.
Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendment to Facility
Operating License and Opportunity for a Hearing in connection
with this action was published in the Federal Register on May 13,
2005 (70 FR 25621).
For further details with respect to this action see (1) the
application for amendment dated April 29, 2005, as supplemented
by letters dated May 13, May 19, June 1, June 4, June 9, June 20,
and June 23, 2005, (2) Amendment No. 225 to License No. DPR-301,
and (3) the Commission's related Safety Evaluation dated June 24,
2005. The Commission made a final no significant hazards
consideration determination in its Safety Evaluation dated June
24, 2005.
Documents may be examined, and/or copied for a fee, at the NRC's
Public Document Room, located at One White Flint North, Public
File Area O1 F21,11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville,
Maryland. Publicly available records will be accessible
electronically from the Agencywide Documents Access and
Management Systems (ADAMS) Public Electronic Reading Room on the
internet at the NRC Web site,
http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/ADAMS/index.html. Persons who do not have
access to ADAMS or who encounter problems in accessing the
documents located in ADAMS should contact the NRC Public Document
Room Reference staff by telephone at 1-800-397- 4209,
301-415-4737 or by e-mail to pdr@nrc.gov. Dated at Rockville,
Maryland, this 24th day of June 2005.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Harold K. Chernoff, Sr. Project Manager, Section 1, Project
Directorate III, Division of Licensing Project Management, Office
of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 05-12991 Filed 6-30-05; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
*****************************************************************
21 Secret Understandings on the Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1950-1974
Date: Fri, 1 Jul 2005 15:05:36 -0500 (CDT)
National Security Archive Update, July 1, 2005
"Consultation is Presidential Business"
Secret Understandings on the Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1950-1974
British Wanted Washington to Consult on Nuclear Weapons Use During
Cold War; Worried that U.S. Might Not be "Sober and Responsible"
Declassified Documents Show U.S. Presidents Would Agree to Consultation
Only if "Circumstances" Permitted
http://www.nsarchive.org
For more information contact:
William Burr - 202/994-7032 - wburr@gwu.edu
Washington, D.C., July 1, 2005 - Since late 1950, when British Prime
Minister Clement Atlee worried that President Truman might use
nuclear weapons in the Korean War, the British government has sought
commitments from American presidents that they would not launch
nuclear strikes without first consulting London, according to
declassified documents posted on the Web today by the National
Security Archive.
These U.S. archival records disclose the long history of one of the
most sensitive aspects of the historic Anglo-American "special
relationship," which was always treated as a Top Secret item in the
official record. While senior U.S. officials like Secretary of State
Dean Acheson wanted the British to recognize that they were "sober
and responsible" and would not use nuclear weapons unwisely,
presidents since Truman have refused to make firm commitments on
consultation, instead agreeing to loose understandings. The British
accepted this, and for decades have sought to renew and update the
understandings whenever a new prime minister or president came into
office.
With this electronic briefing book, the National Security Archive
publishes for the first time the record of Anglo-American discussions
and understandings on nuclear weapons use from Atlee and Truman to
Richard Nixon and Edward Heath. The documents, released through
Freedom of Information Act requests or identified through archival
research, also disclose secret understandings with Canada, West
Germany and NATO.
Among the findings:
* The U.S. insistence on escape hatches in the understandings to
avoid any limitations on "freedom of action"
* The strict emphasis on keeping the understandings secret so that
European members of NATO would not be encouraged to seek agreements
* The 1965 agreement that consultations would extend to nuclear
depth bombs stored in the United Kingdom for a Netherlands
anti-submarine warfare unit, although the Dutch were kept in the
dark about the secret understanding
* The extension of the Anglo-American understanding to U.S. nuclear
depth bombs in Bermuda
* Secret U.S. agreements with West Germany to consult on the selective
use of nuclear weapons based in Germany
* A secret understanding with NATO reached in 1962
* Secret agreements with Canada on the use of nuclear defensive
weapons in Canadian air space and nuclear strikes launched from
Canadian bases
Please follow the link below for more on the new documents:
http://www.nsarchive.org
________________________________________________________
THE NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE is an independent non-governmental
research institute and library located at The George Washington
University in Washington, D.C. The Archive collects and publishes
declassified documents acquired through the Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA). A tax-exempt public charity, the Archive receives no
U.S. government funding; its budget is supported by publication
royalties and donations from foundations and individuals.
_________________________________________________________
PRIVACY NOTICE The National Security Archive does not and will never
share the names or e-mail addresses of its subscribers with any
other organization. Once a year, we will write you and ask for your
financial support. We may also ask you for your ideas for Freedom
of Information requests, documentation projects, or other issues
that the Archive should take on. We would welcome your input, and
any information you care to share with us about your special
interests. But we do not sell or rent any information about subscribers
to any other party.
_________________________________________________________
TO UNSUBSCRIBE FROM THE LIST You may leave the list at any time by
sending a "SIGNOFF NSARCHIVE" command to .
You can also unsubscribe from the list anytime by using the following
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22 ITC: Uranium from Russia
FR Doc 05-13159
[Federal Register: July 1, 2005 (Volume 70, Number 126)]
[Notices] [Page 38212-38214] From the Federal Register Online via
GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr01jy05-129]
INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION [Investigation No. 731-TA-539-C
(Second Review)]
Uranium From Russia AGENCY: United States International Trade
Commission. ACTION: Institution of a five-year review concerning
the suspended investigation on uranium from Russia.
SUMMARY: The Commission hereby gives notice that it has
instituted a review pursuant to section 751(c) of the Tariff Act
of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1675(c)) (the Act) to determine whether
termination of the suspended investigation on uranium from Russia
would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of material
injury. Pursuant to section 751(c)(2) of the Act, interested
parties are requested to respond to this notice by submitting the
information specified below to the Commission; \1\ to be assured
of consideration, the deadline for responses is August 22, 2005.
Comments on the adequacy of responses may be filed with the
Commission by September 13, 2005. For further information
concerning the conduct of this review and rules of general
application, consult the Commission's Rules of Practice and
Procedure, part 201, subparts A through E (19 CFR part 201), and
part 207, subparts A, D, E, and F (19 CFR part 207).
\1\ No response to this request for information is required
if a currently valid Office of Management and Budget (OMB) number
is not displayed; the OMB number is 3117-0016/USITC No. 05-5-137,
expiration date June 30, 2005. Public reporting burden for the
request is estimated to average 10 hours per response. Please
send comments regarding the accuracy of this burden estimate to
the Office of Investigations, U.S. International Trade
Commission, 500 E Street, SW., Washington, DC 20436.
DATES: Effective Date: July 1, 2005.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mary Messer (202) 205-3193,
Office of Investigations, U.S. International Trade Commission,
500 E Street SW., Washington, DC 20436. Hearing-impaired persons
can obtain information on this matter by contacting the
Commission's TDD terminal on (202) 205-1810. Persons with
mobility impairments who will need special assistance in gaining
access to the Commission should contact the Office of the
Secretary at (202) 205-2000. General information concerning the
Commission may also be obtained by accessing its Internet server
(http://www.usitc.gov). The public record for this review may be
viewed on the Commission's electronic docket (EDIS) at
http://edis.usitc.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Background.--On October 16, 1992, the
Department of Commerce suspended an antidumping duty
investigation on imports of uranium from Russia (57 FR 49220,
October 30, 1992). Following five-year reviews by Commerce and
the Commission, effective August 22, 2000, Commerce issued a
continuation of the suspended investigation on imports of uranium
from Russia (65 FR 50958 and 65 FR 52407 (corrected)). The
Commission is now conducting a second review to determine whether
termination of the suspended investigation would be likely to
lead to continuation or recurrence of material injury to the
domestic industry within a reasonably foreseeable time. It will
assess the adequacy of interested party responses to this notice
of institution to determine whether to conduct a full review or
an expedited review. The Commission's determination in any
expedited review will be based on the facts available, which may
include information provided in response to this notice.
Definitions.--The following definitions apply to this review:
(1) Subject Merchandise is the class or kind of merchandise
that is within the scope of the five-year review, as defined by
the Department of Commerce.
(2) The Subject Country in this review is Russia.
(3) The Domestic Like Product is the domestically produced
product or products which are like, or in the absence of like,
most similar in characteristics and uses with, the Subject
Merchandise. In its original preliminary determination concerning
the U.S.S.R. and in its first full five-year review determination
concerning Russia, the Commission defined the Domestic Like
Product as uranium coextensive with Commerce's scope.
(4) The Domestic Industry is the U.S. producers as a whole of
the Domestic Like Product, or those producers whose collective
output of the Domestic Like Product constitutes a major
proportion of the total domestic production of the product. In
its original preliminary determination concerning the U.S.S.R.,
the Commission defined the Domestic Industry as domestic
producers of the product coextensive with Commerce's scope of the
investigation, including the U.S. Department of Energy's uranium
enrichment operations. In its full five-year review determination
concerning Russia, the Commission defined the Domestic Industry
as all domestic producers of uranium, including concentrators,
the converter, the enricher, and fabricators.
(5) An Importer is any person or firm engaged, either
directly or through a parent company or subsidiary, in importing
the Subject Merchandise into the United States from a foreign
manufacturer or through its selling agent.
Participation in the review and public service
list.--Persons, including industrial users of the Subject
Merchandise and, if the merchandise is sold at the retail level,
representative consumer organizations, wishing to participate in
the review as parties must file an entry of appearance with the
Secretary to the Commission, as provided in section 201.11(b)(4)
of the Commission's rules, no later than 21 days after
publication of this notice in the Federal Register. The Secretary
will maintain a public service list containing [[Page 38213]] the
names and addresses of all persons, or their representatives, who
are parties to the review.
Former Commission employees who are seeking to appear in
Commission five-year reviews are reminded that they are required,
pursuant to 19 CFR 201.15, to seek Commission approval if the
matter in which they are seeking to appear was pending in any
manner or form during their Commission employment. The Commission
is seeking guidance as to whether a second transition five-year
review is the ``same particular matter'' as the underlying
original investigation for purposes of 19 CFR 201.15 and 18
U.S.C. 207, the post employment statute for Federal employees.
Former employees may seek informal advice from Commission ethics
officials with respect to this and the related issue of whether
the employee's participation was ``personal and substantial.''
However, any informal consultation will not relieve former
employees of the obligation to seek approval to appear from the
Commission under its rule 201.15. For ethics advice, contact
Carol McCue Verratti, Deputy Agency Ethics Official, at (202)
205-3088.
Limited disclosure of business proprietary information (BPI)
under an administrative protective order (APO) and APO service
list.-- Pursuant to section 207.7(a) of the Commission's rules,
the Secretary will make BPI submitted in this review available to
authorized applicants under the APO issued in the review,
provided that the application is made no later than 21 days after
publication of this notice in the Federal Register. Authorized
applicants must represent interested parties, as defined in 19
U.S.C. 1677(9), who are parties to the review. A separate service
list will be maintained by the Secretary for those parties
authorized to receive BPI under the APO.
Certification.--Pursuant to section 207.3 of the Commission's
rules, any person submitting information to the Commission in
connection with this review must certify that the information is
accurate and complete to the best of the submitter's knowledge.
In making the certification, the submitter will be deemed to
consent, unless otherwise specified, for the Commission, its
employees, and contract personnel to use the information provided
in any other reviews or investigations of the same or comparable
products which the Commission conducts under Title VII of the
Act, or in internal audits and investigations relating to the
programs and operations of the Commission pursuant to 5 U.S.C.
Appendix 3.
Written submissions.--Pursuant to section 207.61 of the
Commission's rules, each interested party response to this notice
must provide the information specified below. The deadline for
filing such responses is August 22, 2005. Pursuant to section
207.62(b) of the Commission's rules, eligible parties (as
specified in Commission rule 207.62(b)(1)) may also file comments
concerning the adequacy of responses to the notice of institution
and whether the Commission should conduct an expedited or full
review. The deadline for filing such comments is September 13,
2005. All written submissions must conform with the provisions of
sections 201.8 and 207.3 of the Commission's rules and any
submissions that contain BPI must also conform with the
requirements of sections 201.6 and 207.7 of the Commission's
rules. The Commission's rules do not authorize filing of
submissions with the Secretary by facsimile or electronic means,
except to the extent permitted by section 201.8 of the
Commission's rules, as amended, 67 FR 68036 (November 8, 2002).
Also, in accordance with sections 201.16(c) and 207.3 of the
Commission's rules, each document filed by a party to the review
must be served on all other parties to the review (as identified
by either the public or APO service list as appropriate), and a
certificate of service must accompany the document (if you are
not a party to the review you do not need to serve your
response).
Inability to provide requested information.--Pursuant to
section 207.61(c) of the Commission's rules, any interested party
that cannot furnish the information requested by this notice in
the requested form and manner shall notify the Commission at the
earliest possible time, provide a full explanation of why it
cannot provide the requested information, and indicate
alternative forms in which it can provide equivalent information.
If an interested party does not provide this notification (or the
Commission finds the explanation provided in the notification
inadequate) and fails to provide a complete response to this
notice, the Commission may take an adverse inference against the
party pursuant to section 776(b) of the Act in making its
determination in the review.
Information to be provided in response to this notice of
institution: As used below, the term ``firm'' includes any
related firms.
(1) The name and address of your firm or entity (including
World Wide Web address if available) and name, telephone number,
fax number, and e-mail address of the certifying official.
(2) A statement indicating whether your firm/entity is a U.S.
producer of the Domestic Like Product, a U.S. union or worker
group, a U.S. importer of the Subject Merchandise, a foreign
producer or exporter of the Subject Merchandise, a U.S. or
foreign trade or business association, or another interested
party (including an explanation). If you are a union/worker group
or trade/business association, identify the firms in which your
workers are employed or which are members of your association.
(3) A statement indicating whether your firm/entity is
willing to participate in this review by providing information
requested by the Commission.
(4) A statement of the likely effects of the termination of
the suspended investigation on the Domestic Industry in general
and/or your firm/entity specifically. In your response, please
discuss the various factors specified in section 752(a) of the
Act (19 U.S.C. 1675a(a)) including the likely volume of subject
imports, likely price effects of subject imports, and likely
impact of imports of Subject Merchandise on the Domestic
Industry.
(5) A list of all known and currently operating U.S.
producers of the Domestic Like Product. Identify any known
related parties and the nature of the relationship as defined in
section 771(4)(B) of the Act (19 U.S.C. 1677(4)(B)).
(6) A list of all known and currently operating U.S.
importers of the Subject Merchandise and producers of the Subject
Merchandise in the Subject Country that currently export or have
exported Subject Merchandise to the United States or other
countries after 1999.
(7) If you are a U.S. producer of the Domestic Like Product,
provide the following information on your firm's operations on
that product during calendar year 2004 (report quantity data in
pounds and value data in U.S. dollars, f.o.b. plant). If you are
a union/worker group or trade/business association, provide the
information, on an aggregate basis, for the firms in which your
workers are employed/which are members of your association.
(a) Production (quantity) and, if known, an estimate of the
percentage of total U.S. production of the Domestic Like Product
accounted for by your firm's(s') production;
(b) the quantity and value of U.S. commercial shipments of
the Domestic Like Product produced in your U.S. plant(s); and
(c) the quantity and value of U.S. internal
consumption/company transfers of the Domestic Like Product
produced in your U.S. plant(s). [[Page 38214]]
(8) If you are a U.S. importer or a trade/business
association of U.S. importers of the Subject Merchandise from the
Subject Country, provide the following information on your
firm's(s') operations on that product during calendar year 2004
(report quantity data in pounds and value data in U.S. dollars).
If you are a trade/business association, provide the information,
on an aggregate basis, for the firms which are members of your
association.
(a) The quantity and value (landed, duty-paid but not
including antidumping duties) of U.S. imports and, if known, an
estimate of the percentage of total U.S. imports of Subject
Merchandise from the Subject Country accounted for by your
firm's(s') imports;
(b) the quantity and value (f.o.b. U.S. port, including
antidumping duties) of U.S. commercial shipments of Subject
Merchandise imported from the Subject Country; and
(c) the quantity and value (f.o.b. U.S. port, including
antidumping duties) of U.S. internal consumption/company
transfers of Subject Merchandise imported from the Subject
Country.
(9) If you are a producer, an exporter, or a trade/business
association of producers or exporters of the Subject Merchandise
in the Subject Country, provide the following information on your
firm's(s') operations on that product during calendar year 2004
(report quantity data in pounds and value data in U.S. dollars,
landed and duty-paid at the U.S. port but not including
antidumping duties). If you are a trade/business association,
provide the information, on an aggregate basis, for the firms
which are members of your association.
(a) Production (quantity) and, if known, an estimate of the
percentage of total production of Subject Merchandise in the
Subject Country accounted for by your firm's(s') production; and
(b) the quantity and value of your firm's(s') exports to the
United States of Subject Merchandise and, if known, an estimate
of the percentage of total exports to the United States of
Subject Merchandise from the Subject Country accounted for by
your firm's(s') exports.
(10) Identify significant changes, if any, in the supply and
demand conditions or business cycle for the Domestic Like Product
that have occurred in the United States or in the market for the
Subject Merchandise in the Subject Country after 1999, and
significant changes, if any, that are likely to occur within a
reasonably foreseeable time. Supply conditions to consider
include technology; production methods; development efforts;
ability to increase production (including the shift of production
facilities used for other products and the use, cost, or
availability of major inputs into production); and factors
related to the ability to shift supply among different national
markets (including barriers to importation in foreign markets or
changes in market demand abroad). Demand conditions to consider
include end uses and applications; the existence and availability
of substitute products; and the level of competition among the
Domestic Like Product produced in the United States, Subject
Merchandise produced in the Subject Country, and such merchandise
from other countries.
(11) (OPTIONAL) A statement of whether you agree with the
above definitions of the Domestic Like Product and Domestic
Industry; if you disagree with either or both of these
definitions, please explain why and provide alternative
definitions.
Authority: This review is being conducted under authority of
title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930; this notice is published
pursuant to section 207.61 of the Commission's rules.
Issued: June 22, 2005.
By order of the Commission. Marilyn R. Abbott, Secretary to
the Commission. [FR Doc. 05-13159 Filed 6-30-05; 8:45 am] BILLING
CODE 7020-02-P
*****************************************************************
23 CEAC: Much Work Remains To Secure Nuclear Material
Chief Engineers Association of Chicagoland
WASHINGTON (AP) Even as the government warns of al-Qaidas
determination to obtain nuclear weapons, programs funded by the
United States secured less Russian nuclear material in 2004 than
the year before, according to a report by private nuclear
analysts.
The study on global nuclear threat reduction programs came the
day after U.S. and Pakistani officials announced the arrest of
al-Qaidas No. 3 operative, Abu Farraj al-Libbi. The Pakistani
government believes al-Libbi may have allies in its militarys
senior rungs, and U.S. experts say those officers may play a
role in guarding Pakistani nuclear sites.
The danger of nuclear theft is a global problem. It is not
just a Russian problem, said Matthew Bunn, a co-author of a
report from Harvards John F. Kennedy School of Government and
the Nuclear Threat Initiative.
We need to forge common nuclear standard for the world because
terrorists are going to get nuclear material wherever it is
easiest, Bunn added. Nuclear security is only as strong as its
weakest link.
U.S. intelligence officials have warned for some time about
al-Qaidas interest in launching a nuclear attack, although the
group is not believed to possess a nuclear device. Obtaining the
weapon is believed to be harder than getting radiological
material, which could be used in a dirty bomb.
The study looks at the terrorist threat and provides a detailed
assessment of Russia, where most of the worlds vulnerable
stockpiles lie.
Since 1991, the United States has paid for programs to secure
nuclear material developed by the former Soviet government. The
report finds that such work in Russia is half done.
It said comprehensive security upgrades were completed in 2004
on 4 percent of Russias nuclear material its highly enriched
uranium and plutonium down from 6 percent in 2003. At the end
of last year, 26 percent had been secured.
Safeguards include ensuring nuclear sites have undergone full
vulnerability assessments and received a full complement of
intrusion detectors and other modern security equipment.
The good news is that we are making progress, said former
Sen. Sam Nunn, D-GA, a chief architect of the legislation that
created the U.S. programs supporting Russian nuclear security.
The bad news is that we are doing too little and moving too
slowly.
Bryan Wilkes, a spokesman for the Energy Departments National
Nuclear Security Administration, disputed the reports
pessimistic findings and its focus on amount of material secured
instead of the number of facilities. He set the figure of
secured nuclear material at 46 percent instead of only 26
percent. He also said more than 75 percent of Russian facilities
have been secured, with negotiations progressing on access to
two major facilities that hold most of the remaining material.
The U.S.-backed programs in Russia have been riddled with
issues, including disputes over who is liable if someone gets
hurt while securing the material. The Russians also want access
to sensitive U.S. nuclear sites, comparable to what the U.S.
government is asking of them.
Contact Webmaster
Chief Engineers Association of Chicagoland
4701 Midlothian Turnpike, Suite 4
Crestwood, IL 60445
Phone: 708.293.1720 Fax: 708.293.1432
Copyright ©2005, Chicagoland Chief Engineer All Rights
Reserved
www.chiefengineer.org
*****************************************************************
24 NRC: Security policies for Import of radioactive materials
FR Doc 05-12985
[Federal Register: July 1, 2005 (Volume 70, Number 126)] [Rules
and Regulations] [Page 37985-37994] From the Federal Register
Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr01jy05-1]
Rules and Regulations
Federal Register
This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER contains regulatory
documents having general applicability and legal effect, most of
which are keyed to and codified in the Code of Federal
Regulations, which is published under 50 titles pursuant to 44
U.S.C. 1510. The Code of Federal Regulations is sold by the
Superintendent of Documents. Prices of new books are listed in
the first FEDERAL REGISTER issue of each week.
[[Page 37985]]
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
10 CFR Part 110
RIN 3150-AH44
Export and Import of Radioactive Materials: Security Policies
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Final rule.
SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is amending its
regulations pertaining to the export and import of radioactive
materials. The amendments implement recent changes to the nuclear
and radioactive material security policies of both the Commission
and the Executive Branch. The final rule takes into account
provisions in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Code
of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources
(Code of Conduct) concerning the import and export of radioactive
sources, and the supplemental IAEA Guidance on the Import and
Export of Radioactive Sources (Guidance document) on
internationally harmonized guidance for the import and export of
radioactive sources. The amendments provide for enhanced tracking
of certain exports and imports of radioactive sealed sources and
bulk material for certain radionuclides. The amended regulation
includes new specific export and import license requirements,
advance notification procedures prior to shipment, verification
of the recipient facility's licensing status, and review of the
adequacy of the receiving country's controls on radioactive
sources. The amendments apply to a small number of radioactive
materials when exported or imported in amounts exceeding clearly
defined International System (SI) limits. The amended regulation
provides the Commission with flexibility to treat each export and
import license application on a case-by-case basis, with the
ability to accommodate the still evolving domestic and
international security measures for radioactive material. DATES:
This final rule becomes effective on December 28, 2005, to allow
a period of six months for exporters and importers to apply for
and receive required specific export and import licenses.
ADDRESSES: Copies of the final rule, the regulatory analysis,
public comments received and related documents may be examined on
public computers and copied for a fee at the NRC's Public
Document Room (PDR), located at One White Flint North, 11555
Rockville Pike, Public File Area O1F21, Rockville, Maryland.
These documents are also available electronically at the NRC's
Public Electronic Reading Room on the Internet at
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. From this site, the
public can gain entry into the NRC's Agencywide Document Access
and Management System (ADAMS), which provides text and image
files of NRC's public documents. For further information contact
the PDR reference staff at 1 (800) 387-4209, (301) 415-4737 or by
e-mail to pdr@nrc.gov. The final rule and related documents are
also available on the NRC's rulemaking Web site at
http://ruleforum.llnl.gov. Address questions about our rulemaking
Web site to Carol Gallagher (301) 415-5905; e- mail: cag@nrc.gov.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Suzanne Schuyler-Hayes, Office
of International Programs, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555-0001, telephone (301) 415-2333, e-mail:
ssh@nrc.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background and Summary
On September 16, 2004, the NRC published in the Federal Register
a proposed rule that would amend 10 CFR part 110 pertaining to
the export and import of nuclear material and equipment (69 FR
55785). The NRC is now issuing a final rule based on the comments
received on the proposed rule. This final rule takes into account
the results of the NRC's comprehensive review of nuclear and
radioactive material security requirements in the post-September
11, 2001 environment and the resulting Orders issued to domestic
licensees of the NRC and Agreement States under the Commission's
authority under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (AEA),
to assure the common defense and security. The Orders are
separate from this rulemaking and remain in effect for domestic
shipments. The final rule codifies provisions in the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Code of Conduct on the
Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources (Code of Conduct) for
the import and export of radioactive material, and the
supplemental IAEA Guidance on the Import and Export of
Radioactive Sources (Guidance document). Paragraphs 23-29 of the
Code of Conduct are intended to guide countries in the
development and harmonization of policies and laws on certain
exports and imports of radioactive sources, which if handled
improperly, may pose a significant risk to individuals, society
and the environment, to ensure that such sources are only
exported to authorized end-users in countries with adequate
regulatory controls, and that they are not diverted for illicit
use. The U.S. and many other countries have politically committed
to follow the Guidance contained in the Code of Conduct and
Guidance document, which were each approved by the IAEA Board of
Governors in 2003 and endorsed by the IAEA General Conference in
2004. The final rule also goes beyond the Code of Conduct and its
Guidance document in the area of bulk material to reflect the
post September 11, 2001 security policies of the Commission and
the Executive Branch. Material in ``bulk'' or ``loose'' form
raises security concerns that equal or exceed those for material
in sealed sources.
The specific radioactive material and quantities that will be
covered by this final rule are listed in Table 1 of the new
Appendix P to part 110. Table 1 is essentially identical to the
list of radioactive materials in Categories 1 and 2 in Annex 1,
Table 1, of the Code of Conduct. The amendments to part 110
require NRC authorization of certain exports and imports by
specific license of radioactive material at the Category 2 level
and above of the IAEA Code of Conduct and the Guidance document
which may pose a significant risk to individuals, society and the
[[Page 37986]]
environment if handled improperly. Exports and imports of these
radioactive materials will take place with prior notification to
the NRC and the importing country authority. Exports of Category
1 quantities of such material will require the consent of the
government of the importing country prior to shipment.\1\ While
prior notification of the importing government authority may
originate from either the exporting licensee or exporting
government authority, consent to the import of Category 1
material is to be provided on a government to government basis.
The NRC will not issue a license for Category 1 exports prior to
receiving consent from the importing government. In cases where
the recipient does not have an authorization to possess the
radioactive material and/or the importing country does not have
the technical and administrative capability, resources, and
regulatory structure needed to ensure that the radioactive source
will be managed in a manner consistent with the provisions of the
Code of Conduct, the NRC may, at its discretion, authorize an
export of Category 1 and 2 radioactive material in cases of
exceptional circumstances, as defined in Sec. 110.2. Category 1
and 2 exports will not be permitted under exceptional
circumstances unless the government of the importing state
provides its consent to the United States Government for the
import.
\1\ The more restrictive requirements for the export of plutonium
238 and 239 contained in Sec. 110.21 will continue to be the
limiting controls.
Although the provision for ``exceptional circumstances'' in the
Guidance document applies to both imports and exports, this final
rule will only address such circumstances as they apply to
exports. This is because the U.S. has the technical and
administrative capability, resources and regulatory structure
needed to ensure that radioactive sources will be managed in the
United States in a manner consistent with the provisions of the
Code of Conduct, and to ensure that the domestic recipient is
authorized to receive and possess the source under U.S. national
law.
With the exception of plutonium, the radioactive materials listed
in Appendix P, Table 1, are categorized as byproduct material as
defined in the AEA. Although radium-226 is encompassed by the
Code of Conduct, it is not listed in Appendix P, Table 1, or
covered by the scope of this final rule because, as a naturally
occurring radioactive material, under the AEA, it is not under
the jurisdiction of the NRC. The Department of Commerce regulates
the export of radium-226. The NRC is seeking legislation from
Congress that will confer upon it licensing jurisdiction over
discrete sources of radium-226. Should that legislation be
enacted, the NRC will amend its export and import regulations in
a manner consistent with the Code.
It should be noted that yttrium-90 has been added to Appendix P,
Table 1, as a decay product of strontium-90, consistent with
Annex 1, Table 1 of the Code of Conduct. Also, the final rule
makes clear that the threshold amounts in Table 1 are specified
by terabequerels (TBq). Curie values are provided by NRC for
informational purposes only, since the values have been rounded
after conversion. Any conversion to the curie must still meet the
TBq limit. Appendix P also prescribes the methodology, ``sum of
fractions,'' to be used for calculating the shipment of bulk
material and/or multiple radionuclides. This methodology is used
in 10 CFR part 71, Appendix A, for calculating the transport of
multiple radionuclides. The requirements described in this final
rule apply to all identified licensees, both NRC and Agreement
State.
Consistent with the scope of part 110, this rule does not apply
to the Departments of Defense and Energy for activities
authorized by sections 54, 64, 82 and 91 of the AEA, except when
the Department of Energy seeks an export license under section
111 of the AEA (see Sec. 110.1(b)(1)). In addition, paragraph F.5
of the Guidance document notes that ``States should construe this
non-legally binding Guidance in accordance with activities
furthering non-proliferation, nuclear security, and the avoidance
of malicious acts using radioactive sources.''
Exports. Under the AEA and 10 CFR part 110, the principal
criterion for approving exports of the materials listed in
Appendix P is a finding that the export is not inimical to the
common defense and security of the United States. The
non-inimicality finding is relevant to both the nuclear
proliferation significance of exports and the related security
concerns about radioactive material falling into the hands of
non-country organizations, including terrorist groups. In making
its inimicality determination, the Commission will, under the
rule and consistent with the Guidance document, and in
consultation with the Executive Branch, consider whether the
importing country has the technical and administrative capability
and the resources and regulatory structure to manage the
radioactive material in a safe and secure manner, and has
authorized the recipient to receive and possess this material.
For proposed exports of Category 1 amounts of radioactive
material listed in Appendix P, the Commission will also assess
whether the government of the importing country has provided its
consent to the import. For both Category 1 and Category 2
exports, the Commission will require the applicant for the export
license to provide the NRC with pertinent documentation
demonstrating that the recipient of the radioactive material has
the necessary authorization under the laws and regulations of the
importing country to receive and possess the material.
The Code of Conduct and the Guidance document provide for exports
and imports in situations where a potential recipient lacks the
necessary authorization to receive and possess the radioactive
material, or where a receiving country is lacking in technical
and administrative capability, resources, or regulatory
structure, under ``exceptional circumstances.'' The Commission
has considered that guidance in preparation of this final rule,
and therefore will consider as part of its overall inimicality
determination whether the export qualifies as an ``exceptional
circumstance.'' In such a case, the Commission will also consider
whether the government of the importing country has provided its
consent to the import of Category 1 or Category 2 amounts of
radioactive material.
In examining these and other factors that may be pertinent to
assessing whether the proposed export will be inimical to the
U.S. common defense and security, the Commission will, as
appropriate, seek the advice of the Executive Branch and will
take into account information it receives as part of regular
interactions with its foreign regulatory counterparts, the IAEA,
and the Executive Branch. If, after considering the above
information, the Commission authorizes the export, then export
licensees will be required to provide prior notification of
individual shipments to the importing country authority and to
the NRC.
Imports. For imports, the licensing criteria are non-inimicality
to the U.S. common defense and security and a finding that the
import does not constitute an unreasonable risk to the public
health and safety. The final rule incorporates the Guidance
document's criteria for making these determinations. Since all
recipients in the U.S. must be properly authorized by the NRC, an
Agreement State, or the Department of Energy to receive and
possess such
[[Page 37987]]
radioactive material, import licenses under NRC's licensing
authority of radioactive material will simply require that the
recipient licensee provide (1) a copy of its authorization to the
exporter or exporting country authority (or alternatively that
the NRC confirm to the exporting country's authority that the
U.S. recipient is authorized to receive and possess the
radioactive material), (2) prior notification to the NRC of
individual shipments, and (3) pertinent documentation to the NRC
that each recipient of the radioactive material has the necessary
authorization to possess this material. For proposed imports into
the U.S. of Category 1 amounts of radioactive material, specified
in Appendix P to Part 110, the Commission will be responsible for
providing the necessary formal U.S. Government consent to the
export authority of the exporting country.
Flexibility. The Commission will evaluate each license
application on a case-by-case basis, but may exercise some
discretion on whether a license may cover multiple shipments. For
example, the Commission may wish to limit exports made to new
recipients or to a country/ destination with limited experience
with its regulatory infrastructure to single shipments of
radioactive material. On the other hand, for countries with
mature regulatory infrastructures with known and competent
recipients, the Commission intends to use the provisions of Sec.
110.31(e) to issue broad specific export and import licenses for
multiple radionuclides, shipments, and destinations and with
authorizations valid for multiple years. The duration of the
import or export authorization will be consistent with the
expiration date of the recipient's authorization to receive and
possess the radioactive material. In all cases, each shipment
will require prior notification as discussed previously.
II. Comments on the Proposed Rule
On October 19, 2004, the staff held a public meeting at NRC to
answer questions and address concerns about the proposed rule and
how it would be implemented. A summary of the October 2004 public
meeting and a list of questions and answers prepared by the NRC
staff for discussion at the public meeting, are available on the
NRC's rulemaking Web site at http://ruleforum.llnl.gov (ADAMS
accession nos. ML043020582 and ML042930012, respectively).
Another public meeting was held on February 16, 2005.
Written comments on the proposed rule were due to the NRC by
November 30, 2004. The Commission received eighteen letters from
the public commenting on the proposed rule. In general, the
comments received related either to the scope of the rule or the
effect of its implementation on licensees, from the potential for
disruption of supply to the cost of fees required to obtain the
new licenses that would be required.
Comment: With regard to comments on the scope of the proposed
rule, several private individuals indicated that it is not broad
enough because it does not address radiological safety or fully
address security concerns due to the basic international decision
to limit government imposed controls to exports and imports of
Category 1 and 2 material, leaving Category 3 material
uncontrolled.
For Category 3 material, comments suggested that the Commission
should do three things: (1) Modify the current general export
license by requiring the exporter to notify the NRC in advance of
each shipment, (2) require that all exports under the general
license be to specific end-users whose bona fides have been
verified, and (3) differentiate among Category 3 exports by
establishing subcategories of specific concern and authorizing
exports under the general license to a limited number of
countries.
Commenters also indicated that the final rule should require
shipments of radioactive sources, and the devices containing
them, to comply with standards for radiation safety and when
applicable, for patient safety, prior to export. It should also
require date and confirmation of receipt by the intended
recipients of the radioactive sources scheduled for export, in
order to complete the security linkage governing transfers.
NRC Response: While it is conceivable that additional security
measures for Category 3 material are possible in the future, an
attempt to achieve such enhanced controls would extensively delay
the implementation of the final rule. At this time, there is no
international export/import guidance relating to Category 3
sources. This issue was discussed at length during the meetings
sponsored by the IAEA which led to the adoption of the Code of
Conduct and the Guidance document. Balancing security and the
need to provide a reliable and commercially viable radioactive
source industry, the involved countries decided to limit
internationally harmonized export/import controls to Category 1
and 2 sources. In so doing, the involved countries recognized the
need for proper security for Category 3 sources, but concluded
that such security measures could be adequately addressed by a
combination of domestic safety/security regulatory oversight and
by recognizing the overall competence of the radioactive source
industry. Providing additional government authority over such
material, without clear indications of wider government and
industry support for such measures, would likely be
counterproductive and harm the larger public interest by impeding
international commerce in the use of Category 3 sources.
Confirmation of receipt by the intended recipients of the
radioactive sources scheduled for export, in order to complete
the security linkage governing transfers, is required in the
recipient's certification to the licensee.
Comment: Several comments from industry indicated that the scope
of the proposed rule should be relaxed for certain exports and
imports being placed under specific license requirements to avoid
potential supply disruptions. One commenter requested that
exports of smoke detectors containing less than one microcurie of
americium-241 be exempted from Part 110 licensing, and if this is
not possible that it be exempted from specific license and the
reporting requirements as listed in Sec. 110.23(b). Several
commenters requested that instead of requiring a specific
license, that the following be allowed under general license:
exports and imports of americium-241 and AmBe contained in
industrial process control equipment or petroleum exploration
equipment, to any country not listed in Sec. 110.28 (embargoed
destinations); the return or import of used sources to the U.S.
exporter; the use of end-user statements instead of specific
licenses; and the use by exporters/shippers of local quality
assurance procedures to validate the legitimacy of the end user
using standard business practices in accordance with already
existing Customs requirements. Commenters suggested that, for
Category 2 shipments, the regulations should allow e-mail
notifications to NRC at the time of shipment, currently done
under the Commission's Orders; and for Category 2 exports, the
owner or licensee should be able to determine if the foreign
recipient is properly authorized to receive material which is
authorized by the Code of Conduct Guidance. Finally, it was
suggested that the IAEA standard should be used for verifying
suitability of an importing country instead of redundant
assessments by multiple countries. In connection with this, the
NRC should provide a list of countries which meet the suitability
requirements.
[[Page 37988]]
NRC Response: While NRC is not excluding such byproduct material
from Part 110 coverage, essentially all such exports are covered
by the general licenses in Sec. 110.23(a). Also, the reporting
requirement for americium-241 in Sec. 110.23(b) must remain due
to a commitment among the U.S. Government and the governments of
the United Kingdom, France, the Russian Federation and Japan to
exchange annual reports of americium-241 and neptunium-237 as
alternate nuclear materials.''
With regard to comments that favored the control of Category 2
shipments under the general license in Sec. 110.23(a), the
Commission has determined that its security policy for the export
and import of Appendix P radioactive material will require
specific export and import licenses, including Category 2
shipments.
In response to the Commission's requirement of export and import
licenses, and the public's view that they will cause supply
disruptions, NRC will employ a series of steps to prevent this
scenario from developing. First, the NRC will issue specific
licenses that are carefully crafted and contain appropriate
conditions. Second, licenses can be issued for broad periods of
time to multiple destinations. Third, staff resources in the
Office of International Programs that were used in the
development of this rule will be devoted to implementing it and
reviewing the export and import license applications so that
licenses can be issued on a timely basis. Fourth, to the extent
possible, the NRC and Executive Branch will consider information
from the importing countries, the IAEA, and other sources when
deciding on whether to license an export to an importing country.
Because there is no single set of criteria to determine whether
an importing country has adequate regulatory controls, this
assessment in most cases will rely on multiple sources of
information. In that regard, the Commission plans to (1) initiate
contacts with NRC's foreign regulatory counterparts in key
countries in an effort to obtain information on their
capabilities in handling Appendix P radioactive material, and (2)
obtain any publicly available information from the IAEA. Fifth,
during the early stages of rule implementation, the Commission
will rely on its authority to issue specific export licenses
under the ``exceptional circumstances'' clause (as reflected in
Sec. 110.42(e)(3)), where appropriate, in order to avoid serious
supply disruptions while at the same time being mindful of
security concerns.
Comment: Several commenters indicated that the scope of the NRC
proposed rule does not conform to the Code of Conduct because (1)
it includes bulk material; (2) the threshold value or regulatory
standard needs to be in metric units, or U.S. shipments will
exceed international standards; (3) it requires a specific
license instead of an authorization; and (4) the notification
requirement is 10 days instead of 7. Other commenters were
concerned as to the conformance of the export/import rule with
domestic transportation regulations.
NRC Response: The Commission believes that shipments of bulk
material need to be within the scope of this rule in the new
security environment. While international guidance does not as
yet cover such exports or imports, NRC does not anticipate any
difficulty in the timely processing of such export or import
requests since they are less frequent (compared to radioactive
source exports and imports) and each request can be handled on a
case-by-case basis with appropriate interaction between NRC, the
importing country and the importing facility owner or licensee.
With regard to the regulatory standard, the final rule makes it
clear that the threshold amounts in Table 1 of Appendix P are
specified in the International System (SI) of weights and
measures of TBq. Any conversion to curies must meet the SI or TBq
limit. Therefore, curies cannot be rounded up if they violate
that limit. Also, the 10-day prior notification period in the
proposed rule in Sec. 110.50(b)(4), is being changed to 7 days in
the final rule, in conformance with the Guidance document. With
regard to possible conflicts in the domestic transport of
radioactive materials, NRC is closely monitoring requirements in
the transportation area to ensure that there is no conflict.
Conversely, any security-related enhancements in the domestic
area may impact the Commission's export/import regulations, not
only as they pertain to Appendix P material, but also with
respect to the NRC's standard provisions for handling other
exports (such as source and special nuclear material). The NRC is
working with other agencies and the international community to
address the issue of possible discrepancies between this rule and
any future transportation standards.
Comment: Several comments concerned the potential cost of the
many export and import licenses that would be required, and the
cost of disrupting supply and commerce. Several commenters
indicated that the NRC license fees are high and will drive some
small companies out of business, because the fee and/or amendment
request could prove more expensive than the source itself. They
noted the lack of relief for small business entities.
Additionally, commenters expressed concern that it would be
necessary to apply for many NRC specific licenses for each
foreign end user. A globally harmonized approach is needed to
ensure a level playing field for commerce. Commenters argued that
for radiography and oil well logging, particularly for producers
and shippers of americium-241, AmBe, and iridium-192, a delay in
receiving the source can jeopardize the project or critical
safety inspections.
A number of comments pointed to the specific license requirements
in the proposed rule, suggesting these would adversely affect
commerce in the following ways. First, the commenters noted the
estimated burden of 15 minutes per advance notification is
inaccurate, and is expected to take 30 minutes or more. Second,
the commenters noted the requirement to list all foreign end
users on each export license application, if required for each
new foreign customer, would exceed NRC's domestic licensing
regulations. Third, the commenters noted that new rule will
require a potentially large number of licenses that will be
required by the proposed rule, e.g., if a new license is required
for each foreign end-user. Fourth, the commenters noted that
there is a possible three- to four-month time period required to
process each application which already exists with current part
110 procedures. Fifth, the commenters noted that there is
uncertainty over whether a U.S. company doing business in another
country will require a specific license that has been issued by
the other country. Sixth, some countries issue import permits for
each shipment, which could complicate the process of issuing the
related NRC export license. Seventh, some countries may not be
able to receive shipments from the U.S. because in that country
the material is not regulated or there is no regulatory authority
to implement the Code of Conduct.
NRC Response: To alleviate some of the concerns about the costs
of this rule, the Commission intends to issue broad specific
licenses which will allow spreading the licensing fees over
several shipments. With regard to the burden estimate for
submitting advance notifications to the NRC prior to shipment,
comments received from industry during the Public Meeting of
October 19, 2004, indicated that the estimated 15 minutes per
advance
[[Page 37989]]
notification will take closer to 30 minutes each. Therefore, in
the final rule, the estimated burden for each advance
notification to the NRC by the licensee is being changed to 30
minutes. In Sec. 110.50 paragraph (b)(4) of the proposed rule,
advance notifications were due to the NRC at least 24 hours in
advance of each shipment, and to the extent practical, 10 days in
advance of each shipment, consistent with comments received by
the Commission in the development of the Commission Additional
Security Measures (ASMs). In the final rule, ``to the extent
practical'' has been adjusted downward to 7 days for consistency
with the Guidance document. Hence, although the final rule
requires at least 24-hours advance notification prior to
shipment, such notifications under Sec. 110.50(b)(4) are expected
within 7 days, ``to the extent practical.'' Further, the U.S. is
actively encouraging other countries to follow the Code of
Conduct and Guidance document to harmonize import and export
procedures. The NRC has the discretion to consider exceptional
circumstances, defined in Sec. 110.2, if a country does not have
the regulatory structure needed to ensure that radioactive
sources will be managed in a manner consistent with the Code of
Conduct.
Comment: Several individuals indicated that the six-month
implementation period is not long enough to provide adequate time
for the U.S. and other governments to ensure that all end users
are properly qualified and licensed to receive and possess the
material. The commenters also pointed out that part 110 does not
indicate what penalties are to be used to punish those countries
which choose to violate NRC's regulations.
NRC Response: NRC expects that the majority of new licenses
required by the rule will be issued within the six-month period
following its publication in the Federal Register, particularly
to those entities in countries with known, competent nuclear
regulatory systems. To address the issue of countries and/or end
users that may have difficulty in meeting all the new
requirements, the Commission can rely on certain ``exceptional
circumstances,'' where present, as the basis for issuing export
licenses.
The penalties to be applied for violating NRC's export/import
regulations are addressed in part 110, subpart F. The U.S. is
actively encouraging other countries to follow the guidance in
the Code of Conduct and Guidance document. It is to the advantage
of all suppliers that the export and import procedures be applied
in a harmonized manner to avoid undercutting and to help ensure a
level playing field.
III. Section by Section Analysis of the Final Rule
Section 110.2. A definition of ``exceptional circumstances''
consistent with the Code of Conduct and Guidance document is
being added to the final rule. Also, the definition of ``specific
activity'' is being revised in the final rule to reflect the TBq
SI unit as the regulatory standard. This will make part 110
consistent with the Commission's 1996 metrication policy. Any
conversion to curies must not exceed the TBq limit. New sources
to be exported or imported under the general license will have to
conform to the TBq limits by the time the final rule is
implemented.
Subpart C--Licenses. The final rule requires specific licenses
for all exports and imports of radioactive material listed in
Table 1 of the new Appendix P to part 110, if the shipment
amounts meet or exceed those listed.
Section 110.21. In paragraph (a)(4), the curie value is replaced
by the SI unit of TBq to make Sec. 110.21 consistent with the SI
units used in Appendix P.
Section 110.22. In paragraph (a)(3), the curie value is replaced
by the SI unit of TBq to make Sec. 110.22 consistent with the SI
units used in Appendix P.
Section 110.23. In paragraphs (a)(2), (3), (5), and (6) of this
section, the curie and gram values are replaced by TBq to make
these paragraphs consistent with the SI units used in Appendix P.
In paragraph (a)(2), a sentence is added to indicate that
individual shipments must be less than the TBq values specified
in Category 2 of Appendix P to this part. In paragraph (a)(3), a
sentence is added to require that individual shipments be less
than the TBq values specified in Category 2 of Appendix P to this
part. Paragraphs (a)(3) and (7) of the proposed rule are not
being adopted. Proposed paragraph (a)(3) contained a drafting
error which conflicts with the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) Part
2 controls for certain alpha-emitting radionuclides. Proposed
paragraph (a)(7) is no longer necessary because the sentences
being added to paragraphs (a)(2) and (3) contain the relevant
information.
Section 110.27. Paragraph (a) is revised to include a reference
to the new paragraph (f) in this section. A new paragraph (f) is
inserted that requires that individual import shipments of
radioactive material listed in the new Appendix P to part 110 and
conducted under the general license provisions of Sec. 110.27(a)
be below the amounts for Category 2.
Section 110.32. In paragraph (f)(1), the curie value is replaced
with TBq to make this paragraph consistent with the SI units used
in Appendix P. A new paragraph (g) describing the documentation
that must accompany an import application for radioactive
material listed in the new Appendix P is added. Also, a new
paragraph (h) describing the documentation that must accompany an
export license application for radioactive material listed in the
new Appendix P is added.
Subpart D--Review of License Applications. Licensing criteria for
radioactive material exports and imports, listed in Appendix P,
are being added to this subpart.
Section 110.40. In paragraph (b)(6)(iv), the curie value is
replaced with TBq to make this paragraph consistent with the SI
units used in Appendix P.
Section 110.41. In paragraph (a)(3), the curie value is replaced
with TBq to make this paragraph consistent with the SI units used
in Appendix P.
Section 110.42. New paragraph (e) is added to specify the
licensing criteria for the export of Category 1 and 2 shipments
of radioactive material listed in the new Appendix P.
Section 110.43. New paragraphs (e) and (f) specify the licensing
criteria for the import of radioactive material listed in the new
Appendix P in amounts indicated for Categories 1 and 2.
Section 110.45. A new paragraph (b)(5) describes the requirements
for issuing import licenses for the radioactive material listed
in the new Appendix P in amounts specified in Categories 1 and 2.
Also, the final rule renumbers paragraphs (c) and (d) as
paragraphs (d) and (e) and adds a new paragraph (c) that
describes the appropriate steps that the U.S. Government will
take to inform the exporting country that the recipient is
authorized to receive and possess the source or sources to be
exported. Subpart E--License Terms and Related Provisions
Section 110.50. In accordance with the proposed rule, existing
paragraph (a)(3) had the word ``transport'' added after the word
``use.'' Existing paragraphs (b)(4) and (b)(5) are redesignated
as paragraphs (b)(5) and (b)(6) and a new paragraph (b)(4) is
added to specify the advance notification requirements for the
licensee exporting or importing material listed in Appendix P.
Paragraph (b)(4) in the final rule differs from the proposed rule
language in the following respects: (1) It is revised to indicate
that a list of points of contact in the importing [[Page 37990]]
countries will be made available on the NRC Office of
International Programs external Web site
http//:http://www.nrc.gov; (2) it is revised to indicate that the
point of contact for receiving advance notifications for all
export and import shipments is the NRC Operations Center and that
relevant contact information will be provided on each export and
import license; and (3) the requirement for advance notification
of shipment within 10 days ``to the extent practical'' is changed
to require notification within 7 days ``to the extent
practical,'' to conform with the Guidance document. Paragraph
(a)(3) is revised to make it clear that transport within the
United States of radioactive material is not authorized by a
general or specific export or import license issued under part
110. Redesignated paragraph (b)(5) is revised to clarify that
part 110 licensees must comply with the NRC's domestic
regulations covering transportation in 10 CFR part 71. Also, a
new paragraph (b)(7) is added to indicate that advance
notifications containing information on shipment dates for the
quantities of the radionuclides in Appendix P should be
controlled as sensitive, unclassified information.
Appendix P to Part 110. The new Appendix P lists the radioactive
material and the quantities requiring specific licenses. A new
footnote added to Table 1 of Appendix P in the final rule states
that the threshold values are specified in TBq, the regulatory
standard consistent with the Code of Conduct. The curie value is
given in parentheses only for information purposes and has been
rounded after conversion from the TBq value. This change is
necessary for two reasons. First, it will ensure the consistency
of these regulations with the Code of Conduct and will facilitate
advance shipment notifications to other competent government
regulatory authorities which use the SI unit of TBq, not curies.
Second, as was noted by a licensee during the Public Meeting of
October 19, 2004, purchasers of sealed sources are, in some
cases, already ordering the sources to be sized at just under the
perceived Category 2 limit. For example, ordering a sealed source
containing 19.75 curies of Am-241, just under the ``20 curie''
limit will result in a violation of the SI limit because a
precise conversion of the 0.6 TBq Category 2 limit for Am-241
equates to a 16.2 curie limit. Therefore, a lack of clarity in
the regulatory standard would impede licensees' planning to
coordinate their operational and investment plans with these
regulations. In order to minimize the potential for conversion
mistakes, the final rule differs from the proposed rule and the
Code of Conduct in that the curie values in Appendix P have been
rounded to two significant figures instead of one.
In the final rule, Appendix P, Table 1, also includes Y-90, a
decay product of the radionuclide, Sr-90, to maintain consistency
with the Code of Conduct. A new footnote has been added to
prescribe the methodology ``sum of the fractions'' for
calculating effective quantities for combinations of
radionuclides being transported together. The proposed rule did
not contain any provisions on threshold limits for import and
export shipments of multiple sealed sources or bulk material of
the same radionuclide or multiple radionuclides. A ``sum of
fractions'' methodology, already used by the NRC in 10 CFR part
71, Appendix A, when evaluating the transportation limits of
combination shipments of radionuclides, is included in Appendix P
and is to be used for calculating shipments of bulk material and
multiple sources and/or radionuclides. Agreement State
Compatibility
Regulatory authority over the export and import of sources of
concern is reserved to NRC under the AEA. Therefore, under the
``Policy Statement on Adequacy and Compatibility of Agreement
State Programs,'' approved by the Commission on June 30, 1997,
and published September 3, 1997 (62 FR 46517), the rules being
adopted are classified as compatibility Category ``NRC.''
Agreement States should not adopt equivalent rules.
Voluntary Consensus Standards
The National Technology Transfer Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-113,
requires that Federal agencies use technical standards that are
developed or adopted by voluntary consensus standards bodies
unless the use of such a standard is inconsistent with applicable
law or otherwise impractical. There are no voluntary consensus
standards addressing this subject matter.
Environmental Impact: Categorical Exclusion
The NRC has determined that this final rule is the type of action
described in categorical exclusion 10 CFR 51.22 (c)(1).
Therefore, neither an environmental impact statement nor an
environmental assessment has been prepared for this rule.
Paperwork Reduction Act Statement
This final rule amends information collection requirements that
are subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C.
3501 et seq.). These requirements were approved by the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB), approval numbers 3150-0036 and
3150-0027.
The burden to the public for these information collections is
estimated to average 2.4 hours per application, 30 minutes per
licensee advance notification to the NRC, and 15 minutes per
recipient's certification to the licensee, including the time for
reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources,
gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and
reviewing the information collection. Send comments on any aspect
of these proposed information collections, including suggestions
for reducing the burden, to the Records and FOIA/Privacy Services
Branch (T-5 F52), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington,
DC 20555-0001, or by Internet electronic mail to
INFOCOLLECTS@nrc.gov; and to the Desk Officer,
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202
(3150-0036 and 3150-0027), Office of Management and Budget,
Washington, DC 20503. Public Protection Notification
If a means used to impose an information collection does not
display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not
conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to,
the information collection. Regulatory Analysis
The Commission has prepared a regulatory analysis for this final
rule. The analysis examines the cost and benefits of the
alternatives considered by the Commission. The regulatory
analysis is available in ADAMS (Accession No. ML051430150) and on
the NRC's rulemaking Web site at http://ruleforum.llnl.gov. See
also the discussion under Regulatory Flexibility Certification.
Regulatory Flexibility Certification
This rule is necessary to reflect the nuclear and radioactive
material security policies of the Executive Branch and to comply
with international agreements and guidance to which the U.S.
Government subscribes. On the basis of information available to
the Commission, the final rule will not have a significant
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.
[[Page 37991]]
Backfit Analysis
The NRC has determined that a backfit analysis is not required
for this rule because these amendments do not involve any
provisions that would impose backfits as defined in 10 CFR
chapter I. Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act
In accordance with the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement
Fairness Act of 1996, the NRC has determined that this action is
not a major rule and has verified this determination with the
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs of OMB.
List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 110
Administrative practice and procedure, Classified information,
Criminal penalties, Exports, Imports, Intergovernmental
relations, Nuclear materials, Nuclear power plants and reactors,
Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Scientific equipment. 0
For the reasons set out in the preamble and under the authority
of the AEA; the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended;
and 5 U.S.C. 552 and 553, the NRC is adopting the following
amendments to 10 CFR part 110.
PART 110--EXPORT AND IMPORT OF NUCLEAR EQUIPMENT AND MATERIAL 0
1. The authority citation for part 110 continues to read as
follows:
Authority: Secs. 51, 53, 54, 57, 63, 64, 65, 81, 82, 103, 104,
109, 111, 126, 127, 128, 129, 161, 181, 182, 183, 187, 189, 68
Stat. 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 936, 937, 948, 953, 954, 955, 956,
as amended (42 U.S.C. 2071, 2073, 2074, 2077, 2092-2095, 2111,
2112, 2133, 2134, 2139, 2139a, 2141, 2154-2158, 2201, 2231-2233,
2237, 2239); sec. 201, 88 Stat. 1242, as amended (42 U.S.C.
5841); sec. 5, Pub. L. 101-575, 104 Stat. 2835 (42 U.S.C. 2243);
sec. 1704, 112 Stat. 2750 (44 U.S.C. 3504 note).
Sections 110.1(b)(2) and 110.1(b)(3) also issued under Pub. L.
96-92, 93 Stat. 710 (22 U.S.C. 2403). Section 110.11 also issued
under sec. 122, 68 Stat. 939 (42 U.S.C. 2152) and secs. 54c and
57d, 88 Stat. 473, 475 (42 U.S.C. 2074). Section 110.27 also
issued under sec. 309(a), Pub. L. 99-440. Section 110.50(b)(3)
also issued under sec. 123, 92 Stat. 142 (42 U.S.C. 2153).
Section 110.51 also issued under sec. 184, 68 Stat. 954, as
amended (42 U.S.C. 2234). Section 110.52 also issued under sec.
186, 68 Stat. 955 (42 U.S.C. 2236). Sections 110.80-110.113 also
issued under 5 U.S.C. 552, 554. Sections 110.130-110.135 also
issued under 5 U.S.C. 553. Sections 110.2 and 110.42(a)(9) also
issued under sec. 903, Pub. L. 102-496 (42 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.).
0
2. In Sec. 110.2, the definition of ``exceptional circumstances''
is added, and the definition of ``specific activity'' is revised
to read as follows:
Sec. 110.2 Definitions.
* * * * *
Exceptional circumstances means, with respect to exports from the
United States of radioactive material listed in Table 1 of
Appendix P of this part:
(1) Cases of considerable health or medical need as acknowledged
by the U.S. Government and the government of the importing
country;
(2) Cases where there is an imminent radiological hazard or
security threat presented by one or more radioactive sources; and
(3) Cases in which the exporting facility or U.S. Government
maintains control of the radioactive material throughout the
period the material is outside of the U.S. and removes the
material at the conclusion of this period.
* * * * *
Specific activity means the radioactivity of a radionuclide per
unit mass of that nuclide, expressed in the SI unit of
Terabequerels per gram (TBq/g). Values of specific activity are
found in Appendix A to part 71 of this chapter.
* * * * *
Sec. 110.21 [Amended] 0
3. In Sec. 110.21, paragraph (a)(4) is amended by removing ``100
millicuries'' and adding in its place ``3.7 x 10-\5\ TBq (100
millicuries).'' Sec. 110.22 [Amended] 0
4. In Sec. 110.22, paragraph (a)(3) is amended by removing ``100
millicuries'' and adding in its place ``3.7 x 10-\5\ TBq (100
millicuries).'' 0
5. In Sec. 110.23, paragraphs (a)(2), (a)(3), (a)(5), and (a)(6)
are revised as follows: Sec. 110.23 General license for the
export of byproduct material.
(a) * * *
(2) Actinium-225 and -227, americium-241 and -242m, californium-
248, -249, -250, -251, -252, -253, and -254, curium-240, -241,
-242, - 243, -244, -245, -246 and -247, einsteinium-252, -253,
-254 and -255, fermium-257, gadolinium-148, mendelevium-258,
neptunium-235 and -237, polonium-210, and radium-223 must be
contained in a device, or a source for use in a device, in
quantities of less than 3.7 x 10-5 TBq (100 millicuries) of alpha
activity per device or source, unless the export is to a country
listed in Sec. 110.30. Individual shipments must be less than the
TBq values specified in Category 2 of Table 1 of Appendix P to
this part. Exports of americium and neptunium are subject to the
reporting requirements listed in paragraph (b) of this section.
(3) For americium-241, exports must not exceed 0.6 TBq (16
curies) per device or 60 TBq (1,600 curies) to any one country
listed in Sec. 110.29, and must be contained in industrial
process control equipment or petroleum exploration equipment in
quantities of less than 0.6 TBq (16 curies) per device and per
shipment, not to exceed 60 TBq (1,600 curies) per year to any one
country. Individual shipments to all countries other than those
listed in Sec. Sec. 110.28 and 110.29 must be less than 0.6 TBq
(16 curies) per shipment, consistent with Appendix P to this
part.
* * * * *
(5) For polonium-210, the material must be contained in static
eliminators and may not exceed 3.7 TBq (100 curies) per
individual shipment.
(6) For tritium in any dispersed form, except for recovery or
recycle purposes (e.g., luminescent light sources and paint,
accelerator targets, calibration standards, labeled compounds),
exports must not exceed the quantity of 0.37 TBq (10 curies (1.03
milligrams)) or less per item, not to exceed 37 TBq (1,000 curies
(103 milligrams)) per shipment or 370 TBq (10,000 curies (1.03
grams)) per year to any one country. Exports of tritium to the
countries listed in Sec. 110.30 must not exceed the quantity of
1.48 TBq (40 curies (4.12 milligrams)) or less per item, not to
exceed 37 TBq (1,000 curies (103 milligrams)) per shipment or 370
TBq (10,000 curies (1.03 grams)) per year to any, one country,
and exports of tritium in luminescent safety devices installed in
aircraft must not exceed a quantity of 1.48 TBq (40 curies (4.12
milligrams)) or less per light source.
* * * * *
0
6. In Sec. 110.27, the introductory text of the paragraph (a) is
revised and a new paragraph (f) is added as follows: Sec. 110.27
General license for import.
(a) Except as provided in paragraphs (b), (c), and (f) of this
section, a general license is issued to any person to import
byproduct, source, or special nuclear material if the consignee
is authorized to receive and possess the material under:
* * * * *
(f) Individual import shipments of radioactive material listed in
Appendix P must be less than the amounts specified in Category 2
in Table 1 of Appendix P to this part. 0 7. In Sec. 110.32,
paragraph (f)(1) is revised and new paragraphs (g) and (h) are
added to read as follows: [[Page 37992]] Sec. 110.32 Information
required in an application for a specific license/NRC Form 7. * *
* * *
(f) * * *
(1) Maximum quantity of material in grams or kilograms
(terabequerels or TBq for byproduct material) and its chemical
and physical form. * * * * *
(g) For proposed imports of material listed in Table 1 of
Appendix P to this part, a copy of the applicant's authorization
to receive and possess the radioactive material to be imported
for each recipient.
(h) For proposed exports of material listed in Table 1 of
Appendix P to this part, pertinent documentation that the
recipient of the material has the necessary authorization under
the laws and regulations of the importing country to receive and
possess the material. Pertinent documentation shall consist of a
copy of the recipient's authorization to receive and possess the
material to be exported or a confirmation from the government of
the importing country that the recipient is so authorized. The
recipient authorization shall include the following information:
(1) Name of the recipient
(2) Recipient location and legal address or principal place of
business
(3) Relevant radionuclides and radioactivity being imported or
that the recipient is authorized to receive and possess
(4) Uses, if appropriate
(5) The expiration date of the recipient's authorization (if any)
Sec. 110.40 [Amended] 0 8. In Sec. 110.40, paragraph (b)(6)(iv)
is amended by removing ``1,000 curies of tritium'' and adding in
its place ``37 TBq (1,000 curies) of tritium.'' Sec. 110.41
[Amended] 0 9. In Sec. 110.41, paragraph (a)(3) is amended by
removing ``100 curies of tritium'' and adding in its place ``3.7
TBq (100 curies) of tritium.'' 0 10. In Sec. 110.42, new
paragraph (e) is added to read as follows: Sec. 110.42 Export
licensing criteria. * * * * *
(e) In making its findings under paragraphs (a)(8) and (c) of
this section for proposed exports of radioactive material listed
in Appendix P to this part, the NRC shall consider:
(1) Whether the foreign recipient is authorized based on the
authorization or confirmation required by Sec. 110.32(g) to
receive and possess the material under the laws and regulations
of the importing country;
(2) Whether the importing country has the appropriate technical
and administrative capability, resources and regulatory structure
to manage the material in a safe and secure manner;
(3) For proposed exports of Category 1 amounts of radioactive
material listed in Table 1 of Appendix P to this part, whether
the government of the importing country provides consent to the
United States Government for the import of the material;
(4) In cases where the importing country does not have the
technical and administrative capability described in paragraph
(e)(2) of this section, and in cases where there is insufficient
evidence of the recipient's authorization to receive and possess
the material to be exported, described in paragraph (e)(1) of
this section, whether exceptional circumstances exist, and if so,
whether the export should be licensed in light of those
exceptional circumstances and the risks, if any, to the common
defense and security of the proposed export;
(5) For proposed exports under exceptional circumstances of
Category 1 or Category 2 amounts of radioactive material listed
in Table 1 of Appendix P to this part, whether the government of
the importing country provides consent to the United States
Government for the import of the material;
(6) For proposed exports of radioactive material listed in Table
1 of Appendix P to this part under the exceptional circumstance
in which there is a considerable health or medical need as
acknowledged by the U.S. Government and the importing country,
whether the United States and the importing country have, to the
extent practicable, made arrangements for the safe and secure
management of the radioactive sources during and at the end of
their useful life;
(7) Based upon the available information, whether the foreign
recipient has engaged in clandestine or illegal procurement of
radioactive material listed in Table 1 of Appendix P to the part;
(8) Based upon available information, whether an import or export
authorization for radioactive material listed in Table 1 of
Appendix P to this part has been denied to the recipient or
importing country, or whether the recipient or importing country
has diverted any import or export of radioactive material
previously authorized; and
(9) Based upon available information, whether there is a risk of
diversion or malicious acts involving radioactive material in
Table 1 of Appendix P to this part. 0 11. In Sec. 110.43, new
paragraphs (e) and (f) are added to read as follows: Sec. 110.43
Import licensing criteria. * * * * *
(e) With respect to proposed imports of radioactive material
listed in Appendix P to this part, the NRC shall consider whether
the U.S. recipient is authorized to possess the material under a
contract with the Department of Energy or a license issued by the
Commission or a State with which the Commission has entered into
an agreement under Section 274b of the AEA.
(f) In making its findings under paragraphs (a) and (b) of this
section for proposed imports of radioactive material listed in
Appendix P to this part, the NRC shall consider:
(1) Based upon available information, whether the applicant has
been engaged in clandestine or illegal procurement of radioactive
material listed in Table 1 of Appendix P to this part;
(2) Based upon available information, whether an import or export
authorization for radioactive material has been denied to the
applicant or whether the applicant has diverted any import or
export of radioactive material previously authorized; and
(3) Based upon available information, whether a risk of diversion
or malicious acts involving the radioactive material listed in
Table 1 of Appendix P to this part. 0 12. In Sec. 110.45,
paragraphs (c) and (d) are redesignated as paragraphs (d) and
(e), respectively, and new paragraphs (b)(5) and (c) are added as
follows: Sec. 110.45 Issuance or denial of license. * * * * *
(b) * * *
(5) With respect to a proposed import of radioactive material
listed in Table 1 of Appendix P to this part, the U.S. recipient
is authorized to receive and possess the material under a
contract with the Department of Energy or a license issued by the
Commission or a State with which the Commission has entered into
an agreement under Section 274b. of the Atomic Energy Act.
(c) With respect to a proposed import of radioactive material
listed in Table 1 of Appendix P to this part:
(1) If the Commission authorizes a proposed import of Category 1
or Category 2 amounts of radioactive material, it will take
appropriate steps to ensure that a copy of the recipient
authorization, or confirmation by the U.S. Government that the
recipient is authorized to receive and possess the source or
sources to be exported, is provided to the Government of the
[[Page 37993]] exporting country or to the exporting facility.
(2) If the Commission authorizes a proposed import of Category 1
amounts of radioactive material, it will take appropriate steps
to ensure that a copy of the consent of the United States
Government to the import is provided to the government of the
exporting country in cases where it is requested by such
government. * * * * * 0 13. Section 110.50, is amended as
follows: 0 a. In paragraph (a)(3), add the word ``transport''
after the word ``use,'' 0 b. Paragraphs (b)(4) and (b)(5) are
redesignated as paragraphs (b)(5) and (b)(6), 0 c. Add the number
``71'' after the number ``70'' in the newly redesignated
paragraph (b)(5), and 0 d. Add new paragraphs (b)(4) and (b)(7)
to read as follows: Sec. 110.50 Terms. * * * * *
(b) * * *
(4) A licensee authorized to export or import the radioactive
material listed in Appendix P to this part is responsible for
notifying NRC and, in cases of exports, the government of the
importing country in advance of each shipment. A list of points
of contact in importing countries is available at NRC's Office of
International Programs website, accessible on the NRC Public Web
Site by the following links to What We Do--International
Programs. The NRC's office responsible for receiving advance
notifications for all export and import shipments is the NRC
Operations Center. Specific details on where to send the
information will be listed in each specific export and import
license. Notifications must be received by the NRC at least 7
days in advance of each shipment, to the extent practical, but in
no case less than 24 hours in advance of each shipment.
Notifications may be electronic or in writing on business
stationary, and must contain or be accompanied by the information
which follows.
(i) For export notifications:
(A) Part 110 export license number and expiration date;
(B) Name of the individual and licensee making the notification,
address, and telephone number;
(C) Foreign recipient name, address, and end use location(s) (if
different than recipient's address);
(D) Radionuclides and activity level in TBq, both for single and
aggregate shipments;
(E) Make, model and serial number, for any Category 1 and 2
sealed sources, if available;
(F) End use in the importing country, if known;
(G) Shipment date;
(H) A copy of the foreign recipient's authorization or
confirmation of that authorization from the government of the
importing country as required by Sec. 110.32(h).
(ii) For import notifications:
(A) Part 110 import license number and expiration date;
(B) Name of individual and licensee making the notification,
address, and telephone number;
(C) Recipient name, location, and address (if different than
above);
(D) Radionuclides and activity level in TBq, both for single and
aggregate shipments;
(E) Make, model and serial number, radionuclide, and activity
level for any Category 1 and 2 sealed sources, if available;
(F) End use in the U.S.;
(G) Shipment date from exporting facility and estimated arrival
date at the end use location;
(H) NRC or Agreement State license number to possess the import
in the U.S. and expiration date. * * * * *
(7) Advance notifications containing the above information must
be controlled, handled, and transmitted in accordance with Sec.
2.390 of this chapter and other applicable NRC requirements
governing protection of sensitive information. 0 14. A new
Appendix P to part 110 is added to read as follows: Appendix P to
Part 110--Category 1 and 2 Radioactive Material
Table 1.--Import and Export
Threshold Limits
-----------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------
Category 1
Category 2
-----------------------------------------------------------------
------
Radioactive material Terabequerels
Terabequerels
(TBq)
Curies (Ci) \1\ (TBq) Curies (Ci) \1\
-----------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------
Americium-241........................... 60
1,600 0.6 16
Americium-241/Be........................ 60
1,600 0.6 16
Californium-252......................... 20
540 0.2 5.4
Curium-244.............................. 50
1,400 0.5 14
Cobalt-60............................... 30
810 0.3 8.1
Cesium-137.............................. 100
2,700 1.0 27
Gadolinium-153.......................... 1,000
27,000 10.0 270
Iridium-192............................. 80
2,200 0.8 22
Plutonium-238\2\........................ 60
1,600 0.6 16
Plutonium-239/Be \2\.................... 60
1,600 0.6 16
Promethium-147.......................... 40,000
1,100,000 400 11,000
Selenium-75............................. 200
5,400 2.0 54
Strontium-90 (Y-90)..................... 1,000
27,000 10.0 270
Thulium-170............................. 20,000
540,000 200 5,400
Ytterbium-169........................... 300
8,100 3.0 81
-----------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------
\1\ The values to be used to determine whether a license is
required are given in TBq. Curie (Ci) values are provided for
practical usefulness only and are rounded after conversion.
\2\ The limits for Pu-238 and Pu-239/Be in this table apply for
imports to the U.S. The limits for exports of Pu- 238 and
Pu-239/Be can be found in Sec. 110.21. Calculation of Shipments
Containing Multiple Sources or Radionuclides
The ``sum of fractions'' methodology for evaluating combinations
of radionuclides being transported, is to be used when import or
export shipments contain multiple sources or multiple
radionuclides. The threshold limit values used in a sum of the
fractions calculation must be the metric values (i.e., TBq).
I. If multiple sources and/or multiple radionuclides are present
in an import or export shipment, the sum of the fractions of
[[Page 37994]]
the activity of each radionuclides must be determined to verify
the shipment is less than the Category 1 or 2 limits of Table 1,
as appropriate. If the calculated sum of the fractions ratio,
using the following equation, is greater than or equal to 1.0,
then the import or export shipment exceeds the threshold limits
of Table 1 and the applicable security provisions of this part
apply.
II. Use the equation below to calculate the sum of the fractions
ratio by inserting the actual activity of the applicable
radionuclides or of the individual sources (of the same
radionuclides) in the numerator of the equation and the
corresponding threshold activity limit from the Table 1 in the
denominator of the equation. Ensure the numerator and denominator
values are in the same units and all calculations must be
performed using the TBq (i.e., metric) values of Table 1. R1 =
activity for radionuclides or source number 1 R2 = activity for
radionuclides or source number 2 RN = activity for radionuclides
or source number n AR1 = activity limit for radionuclides or
source number 1 AR2 = activity limit for radionuclides or source
number 2 ARN = activity limit for radionuclides or source number
n [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR01JY05.055
Dated in Rockville, Maryland, this 27th day of June, 2005.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Annette L. Vietti-Cook,
Secretary of the Commission.
[FR Doc. 05-12985 Filed 6-30-05; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
*****************************************************************
25 [du-list] The CT House and Senate passed a DU bill, after the
Date: Fri, 01 Jul 2005 15:54:44 -0700
The CT House and Senate passed a DU bill, after the Louisiana Governor
signed their version of a bill.
Both bills are posted to our site, with related information and links.
http://www.traprockpeace.org (top left column)
Thanks to Leuren Moret for sending the legislation, and to Buddy Spell
of the Louisiana Activist Network for sending their press release.
Best wishes, Charlie
Charles Jenks
Web Manager and Past President
Traprock Peace Center
103A Keets Road
Deerfield, MA 01342
413-773-7427
fax 413-773-7507
http://www.traprockpeace.org
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26 [du-list] French Veteran on hunger strike over lack of pension
Date: Fri, 01 Jul 2005 15:51:09 -0700
Dear all,
this has just passed on to me by CADU. The veteran in question needs all
the support he can get, especially from veterans in other countries. The
french government needs to be embarrassed on this, and that there actions
are getting international coverage and condemnation. Please circulate this
as wide as you can on your various networks.
many thanks
davey garland
(Pandora DU Research Project)
On May 13th 2005 a French victim of Gulf War Syndrome, M. Christian
Prud'homme, who lives at Riquewihr (Haut Rhin) began a hunger strike to try
to get the French Army to award him a pension. He had served 7 years in
the Gulf and had had to be brought back on a stretcher. His condition has
become worse over the years: he has lost his sight, suffers from dreadful
muscular pain and is dependent on a wheelchair. He has tried for years to
get the army to provide a pension to pay for the care he needs. By now he
is very weak and has lost 30 kilos but he is determined to pursue the
hunger strike to the end - justice or death.
We are asking you to write to the French Minister of Defence, Mme
Alliot-Marie at courrier-ministre@sdbc.defense.gouv.fr to express your
concern at the lack of action on the part of her department. Please ask her
to have the case of M. Prudhomme and those of Gulf War veterans in similar
circumstances investigated as soon as possible by competent authorities
that are independent of the army.
---------------------------------
How much free photo storage do you get? Store your holiday snaps for FREE
with Yahoo! Photos. Get Yahoo! Photos
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27 [du-list] USUK in Iraq prepares bases to live under siege
Date: Fri, 01 Jul 2005 15:54:27 -0700
USUK occupiers prepare to live under siege indefinitely, showering all with
DU nanoparticles and breaking out for the occasional "pre-emptive" massacre.
http://www.strategypage.com/dls/articles/20056301044.asp
Naval Gunfire Heard Over Baghdad
by James Dunnigan
June 30, 2005
Discussion Board on this DLS topic
Two Phalanx anti missile system have been sent to Iraq, modified to destroy
rockets and mortar shells fired into the Green Zone (the large area in
Baghdad turned into an American base). The Phalanx is a 20mm cannon
designed to defend American warships, by destroying anti-ship missiles.
Phalanx does this by using a radar that immediately starts firing at any
incoming missile it detects. The modified versions sent to Iraq, called the
C-RAM (Counter-Rocket Artillery Mortar) system has had it's software
modified to detect smaller objects (like 82mm mortar shells). The original
Phalanx, it was found, could take out incoming 155mm artillery shells. This
capability is what led to C-RAM. The other modifications include linking
Phalanx to the Lightweight Counter Mortar Radar and Q-36 Target Acquisition
Radar. When these radars detect incoming fire, C-RAM points toward the
incoming objects and prepares to fire at anything that comes within range
of its cannon. C-RAM also uses high explosive 20mm shells, that detonate
near the target, spraying it with fragments. By the time these fragments
reach the ground, they are generally too small to injure anyone. The Vulcan
used 20mm depleted uranium shells, to slice through incoming missiles. The
C-RAM, like the Vulcan, fires shells at the rate of 75 per second. Another
advantage of C-RAM, is that it makes a distinctive noise when firing,
warning people in the Green Zone that a mortar or rocket attack is
underway, giving people an opportunity to duck inside if they are out and
about. Without C-RAM to stop the incoming shells, they usually land without
hitting people. The Green Zone is a big place, but something usually gets
damaged during each attack, and sometimes the shells are duds, meaning they
remain dangerous until found and removed. It took about a year, from the
time an army general demanded that some kind of anti-mortar weapon be
found, until the first C-RAMs arrived in Iraq.
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28 Memo To NRC Says 41,200 Will Day Every Year In USA From Mill Tailing Radon Releases- What About You & Your Country?
Date: Fri, 1 Jul 2005 14:16:32 -0400
Please act on this and try to get this out to
local and national media as George Bush and the
nuclear industry try to add to commercial reactors
in the USA, not abolish them and replace them with
renewables and conservation- great for the
environment, economy, health and no terrorist
targets or accidental meltdowns and/or boil offs
at spent fuel pools.
"Just" in the USA, those 41,200 people that are
murdered annually by the nuclear industry [just
from mill tailings] and their politicians for sale
in Congress will, assumming that 103 reactors
continue to operate for 40 years each [ the life
for which they were made] that is1,648,000. With
the 20 year extension that utilities are applying
for and receiving left and right from NRC, 103
reactors running for 60 years each will kill [just
from the mill tailings] 2,472,000 people. That's
almost half of the number of Jews that the Nazis
killed.
If you live in a country outside the USA this is
applicable for you, too.
From Jeannine Honicker:
Remember that we have always said that there is no
safe dose of radiation, and that nuclear plants
ROUTINELY release radiation to the air and to the
water, that is concentrated in fish and milk.
Ingested radionuclides become lodged in various
organs and continually irradiate the surrounding
tisues for various lenghts of time. Hense, the
delayed effects between the time the radionuclide
was injested until a cancer or leukemia is
clinically detected. Dr. John Gofman wrote in
"Poisoned Power" that if everyone received the
allowable dose nuclear plants were suppose to be
limited to emit during routine, not accident,
conditions, there would be 32,000 additional
cancer and leukemia deaths per year. The Jordan
Memorandum, (Jordon was the retired assistant
director of the Oak Ridge National Lab when he
wrote the memo to the NRC,) stated that the radon
released from mill tailings from the uranium
required to fuel a single reactor for a single
year would result in "hundreds" of additional
cancer deaths. Our Nashville Congressman,
Clifford Allen, disclosed this at a press
conference just after Thanksgiving, 1977. He asked
for an exact number of "hundreds." Jordan
quantified this as "four hundred for each year's
fuel requirement per reactor." We have 103
operating reactors in the U. S. now. If DOE has
its way, this will vastly increase. Their plan is
outlined in the 2005 Congressional Budget. It's
called the "Roadmap for Recovery of the Nuclear
Industry," and was writen by a group called NERAC,
Nuclear Energy Research Advisory Committee. Do
some research on them. Who are they, and what
ties do they have to the nuclear industry? If you
can't get the 2005 DOE Nuclear Budget, contact me.
I have the first 58 pages. Very informative.
Please read the forwarded material . National
Academy of Sciences confirms "No safe dose."
*****************************************************************
29 National-Academies.org: Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation May Cause Harm
Office of News and Public Information
June 29, 2005
Contacts: Vanee Vines, Senior Media Relations Officer Megan
Petty, Media Relations Assistant Office of News and Public
Information 202-334-2138; e-mail
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
WASHINGTON -- A preponderance of scientific evidence shows that
even low doses of ionizing radiation, such as gamma rays and
X-rays, are likely to pose some risk of adverse health effects,
says a new report from the National Academies' National Research
Council.
The report's focus is low-dose, low-LET -- "linear energy
transfer" -- ionizing radiation that is energetic enough to
break biomolecular bonds. In living organisms, such radiation
can cause DNA damage that eventually leads to cancers. However,
more research is needed to determine whether low doses of
radiation may also cause other health problems, such as heart
disease and stroke, which are now seen with high doses of
low-LET radiation.
The study committee defined low doses as those ranging from
nearly zero to about 100 millisievert (mSv) -- units that
measure radiation energy deposited in living tissue. The
radiation dose from a chest X-ray is about 0.1 mSv. In the
United States, people are exposed on average to about 3 mSv of
natural "background" radiation annually.
The committee's report develops the most up-to-date and
comprehensive risk estimates for cancer and other health effects
from exposure to low-level ionizing radiation. In general, the
report supports previously reported risk estimates for solid
cancer and leukemia, but the availability of new and more
extensive data have strengthened confidence in these estimates.
Specifically, the committee's thorough review of available
biological and biophysical data supports a "linear,
no-threshold" (LNT) risk model, which says that the smallest
dose of low-level ionizing radiation has the potential to cause
an increase in health risks to humans. In the past, some
researchers have argued that the LNT model exaggerates adverse
health effects, while others have said that it underestimates
the harm. The preponderance of evidence supports the LNT model,
this new report says.
"The scientific research base shows that there is no threshold
of exposure below which low levels of ionizing radiation can be
demonstrated to be harmless or beneficial," said committee chair
Richard R. Monson, associate dean for professional education and
professor of epidemiology, Harvard School of Public Health,
Boston. "The health risks particularly the development of
solid cancers in organs rise proportionally with exposure. At
low doses of radiation, the risk of inducing solid cancers is
very small. As the overall lifetime exposure increases, so does
the risk." The report is the seventh in a series on the
biological effects of ionizing radiation.
Assessing Health Risks
The committee's risk models for exposure to low-level ionizing
radiation were based on a sex and age distribution similar to
that of the entire U.S. population, and refer to the risk that
an individual would face over his or her life span. These models
predict that about one out of 100 people would likely develop
solid cancer or leukemia from an exposure of 0.1 Sv (100 mSv).
About 42 additional people in the same group would be expected
to develop solid cancer or leukemia from other causes. Roughly
half of these cancers would result in death. These particular
estimates are uncertain, however, because of limitations in the
data used to develop risk models.
Survivors of atomic bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan,
were the primary sources of data for estimating risks of most
solid cancers and leukemia from exposure to ionizing radiation.
The committee's review included an examination of updated
cancer-incidence data from tumor registries of the survivors,
and of research data on solid cancer deaths -- which is now more
abundant because the number of deaths available for analysis has
nearly doubled since the Research Council published its previous
report on this topic in 1990. The committee combined this
information with data on people who had been medically exposed
to radiation to estimate risks of breast cancer in women and
thyroid cancer. Data from additional medical studies and from
studies of people exposed to radiation through their occupations
also were evaluated and found to be compatible with the
committee's statistical models. Follow-up studies should
continue for the indefinite future, the report says.
Adverse hereditary health effects that could be attributed to
radiation have not been found in studies of children whose
parents were exposed to radiation from the atomic bombs.
However, studies of mice and other organisms have produced
extensive data showing that radiation-induced cell mutations in
sperm and eggs can be passed on to offspring, the report says.
There is no reason to believe that such mutations could not also
be passed on to human offspring. The failure to observe such
effects in Hiroshima and Nagasaki probably reflects an
insufficiently large survivor population.
Follow-up studies of people who receive computed tomography (CT)
scans, especially children, should be conducted, the report
adds. Also needed are studies of infants who are exposed to
diagnostic radiation because catheters have been placed in their
hearts, as well as infants who receive multiple X-rays to
monitor pulmonary development. CT scans, often referred to as
whole body scans, result in higher doses of radiation than
typically experienced with conventional X-rays.
Sources of Ionizing Radiation
People are exposed to natural background ionizing radiation from
the universe, the ground, and basic activities such as eating,
drinking, and breathing. These sources account for about 82
percent of human exposure.
Nationwide, man-made radiation comprises 18 percent of human
exposure. In this overall category, medical X-rays and nuclear
medicine account for about 79 percent, the report says. Elements
in consumer products -- such as tobacco, tap water, and building
materials -- account for another 16 percent. Occupational
exposure, fallout, and the use of nuclear fuel constitute
roughly 5 percent of the man-made component nationwide.
Factors that could increase exposure include greater use of
radiation for medical purposes, working around radioactive
materials, and smoking tobacco. Living at low altitudes, where
there is less cosmic radiation, and living and working on the
upper floors of buildings, where there is less radon gas -- a
primary source of natural ionizing radiation -- are factors that
could decrease exposure.
The report was sponsored by the U.S. departments of Defense,
Energy, and Homeland Security, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. The
National Research Council is the principal operating arm of the
National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of
Engineering. It is a private, nonprofit institution that
provides science and technology advice under a congressional
charter. A committee roster follows.
Copies of Health Risks from Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing
Radiation (BEIR VII - Phase 2) will be available this summer from
the National Academies Press; tel. 202-334-3313 or 1-800-624-6242
or on the Internet at http://www.nap.edu. Reporters may obtain a
copy from the Office of News and Public Information (contacts
listed above).
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL
Division on Earth and Life Studies
Board on Radiation Effects Research
Committee to Assess Health Risks From Exposure to Low Levels of
Ionizing Radiation
Richard R. Monson, M.D., Sc.D. (chair)
Associate Dean for Professional Education, and
Professor of Epidemiology
School of Public Health
Harvard University
Boston
James E. Cleaver, Ph.D.(1) (vice chair)
Professor of Dermatology
Cancer Center and Department of Pharmaceutical Chemistry
University of California
San Francisco
Herbert L. Abrams, M.D. (2)
Professor Emeritus of Radiology
Stanford University Medical School, and
Member in Residence
Stanford Center for International Security and Cooperation
Stanford, Calif.
Eula Bingham, Ph.D. (2)
Professor of Environmental Health
University of Cincinnati
Cincinnati
Patricia A. Buffler, Ph.D. (2)
Kenneth and Marjorie Kaiser Chair of Cancer Epidemiology, and
Professor of Epidemiology
School of Public Health
University of California
Berkeley
Elisabeth Cardis, Ph.D.
Chief, Unit of Radiation and Cancer
International Agency for Research on Cancer
Lyon, France
Roger Cox, Ph.D.
Director
National Radiological Protection Board
Chilton, United Kingdom
Scott Davis, Ph.D.
Professor and Chair
Department of Epidemiology
School of Public Health and Community Medicine
University of Washington, and
Full Member
Program in Epidemiology
Division of Public Health Sciences
Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center
Seattle
William C. Dewey, Ph.D.
Emeritus Professor of Radiation Oncology
University of California
San Francisco
Ethel S. Gilbert, Ph.D.
Biostatistician
Radiation Epidemiology Branch
National Cancer Institute
Bethesda, Md.
Albrecht Kellerer, Ph.D.
Professor Emeritus
University of Munich
Munich, Germany
Daniel Krewski, Ph.D., M.H.A.
Director
McLaughlin Centre for Population Health Risk Assessment, and
Professor of Medicine and of Epidemiology and Community Medicine
University of Ottawa
Ontario, Canada
Tomas Lindahl, M.D.
Director
Clare Hall Laboratories
Cancer Research U.K.
London
Katherine E. Rowan, Ph.D.
Professor and Associate Chair
Department of Communication
George Mason University
Fairfax, Va.
K. Sankaranarayanan, Ph.D.
Professor Emeritus
Department of Toxicogenetics
Leiden University Medical Centre
Leiden, Netherlands
Daniel W. Schafer, Ph.D.
Professor
Department of Statistics
Oregon State University
Corvallis
Robert L. Ullrich, Ph.D.
Barbara Cox Anthony University Chair in Oncology
Departments of Environmental and Radiological Health Sciences
and of Clinical Sciences
Colorado State University
Fort Collins
RESEARCH COUNCIL STAFF
Rick Jostes, Ph.D.
Study Director
Evan B. Douple, Ph.D.
Director
Board on Radiation Effects Research
(1) Member, National Academy of Sciences
(2) Member, Institute of Medicine
Copyright © 2004 National Academy of Sciences. All rights
reserved. 500 Fifth St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20001.
Terms of Use and Privacy Statement
*****************************************************************
30 [epa-impact] Louisiana Energy Service's Proposed National Enrichment
Date: Fri, 1 Jul 2005 11:45:16 -0400 (EDT)
http://epa.gov/EPA-IMPACT/2005/July/Day-01/
=======================================================================
[Federal Register: July 1, 2005 (Volume 70, Number 126)]
[Notices]
[Page 38218-38219]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr01jy05-138]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket No. 70-3103]
Louisiana Energy Service's Proposed National Enrichment Facility;
Notice of Availability of Final Environmental Impact Statement
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Notice of availability of Final Environmental Impact Statement.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: James Park, Project Manager,
Environmental and Performance Assessment Directorate, Division of Waste
Management and Environmental Protection, Office of Nuclear Material
Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington,
DC 20555. Telephone: (301) 415-5835; e-mail: jrp@nrc.gov.
SUMMARY: Notice is hereby given that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) is issuing a Final Environmental Impact Statement
(FEIS) on the proposed construction, operation, and decommissioning of
the National Enrichment Facility (NEF), a gaseous centrifuge uranium
enrichment facility, near Eunice, New Mexico. The FEIS is being issued
as part of the NRC's decision-making process on whether to authorize
Louisiana Energy Services (LES) to construct, operate, and decommission
the proposed NEF.
The proposed NEF would produce enriched uranium-235
(235U) up to 5 weight percent by the gas centrifuge process
with a nominal production of 3 million separative work units per year.
The enriched uranium would be used in commercial nuclear power plants.
The FEIS discusses the purpose and need for the proposed NEF, and
reasonable alternatives to the proposed action, including the no-action
alternative. The FEIS also discusses the environment potentially
affected by the proposed action, presents and compares potential
environmental impacts resulting from the proposed action and its
alternatives, and identifies the mitigation measures proposed by LES to
eliminate or lessen the potential environmental impacts.
Based on the evaluation in the FEIS, the NRC environmental review
staff has concluded that the proposed action will generally have small
to moderate effects on the public and the existing environment. This
FEIS reflects the final analysis of environmental impacts of LES's
proposal and its alternatives, including the consideration of public
comments received by the NRC.
ADDRESSES: The NRC maintains an Agencywide Documents Access and
[[Page 38219]]
Management System (ADAMS), which provides text and image files of NRC's
public documents. The FEIS and its appendices may be accessed through
the NRC's Public Electronic Reading Room on the Internet at http://
www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html, using the ADAMS accession
numbers ML051730238 and ML051730292 for Volumes 1 and 2 of the FEIS,
respectively. If you do not have access to ADAMS or if there are
problems in accessing the documents located in ADAMS, contact the NRC
Public Document Room (PDR) Reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-
4737 or by email to pdr@nrc.gov.
The FEIS is also available for inspection at the Commission's
Public Document Room, U.S. NRC's Headquarters Building, 11555 Rockville
Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland. Upon written request and to
the extent supplies are available, a single copy of the FEIS can be
obtained for a fee by writing to the Office of the Chief Information
Officer, Reproduction and Distribution Services Section, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; by electronic mail at
DISTRIBUTION@nrc.gov; or by fax at (301) 415-2289.
A selected group of documents associated with the NEF may also be
obtained from the Internet on NRC's NEF Web page:
http://www.nrc.gov/materials/fuel-cycle-fac/lesfacility.html
(case sensitive).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The NRC staff has prepared this FEIS in
response to a December 2003 application submitted by LES for a license
to construct, operate and decommission a gas centrifuge uranium
enrichment facility in Lea County, New Mexico. The FEIS for the
proposed NEF was prepared by the staff of the NRC and its contractors,
Advanced Technologies and Laboratories, International, Inc. and Pacific
Northwest National Laboratory, in compliance with the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the NRC's regulations for
implementing NEPA (10 CFR Part 51).
The NRC staff published a Notice of Intent to prepare an
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for the proposed NEF and to
conduct a scoping process, in the Federal Register on February 4, 2004
(69 FR 5374). The NRC staff accepted scoping comments through March 18,
2004, and subsequently issued a Scoping Summary Report in April 2004
(ADAMS Accession Number: ML041050128). The NRC staff prepared and
issued a Draft EIS in September 2004; notice of the availability of the
Draft EIS appeared in the Federal Register on September 17, 2004 (69 FR
56104). Public comments on the Draft EIS were accepted by the NRC staff
until January 7, 2005. The NRC staff's responses to these comments and
copies of the submitted comments are provided in appendices to the FEIS.
The FEIS describes the proposed action and alternatives to the
proposed action, including the no-action alternative, and describes the
proposed mitigation measures. The NRC staff assesses the impacts of the
proposed action and its alternatives on public and occupational health,
air quality, water resources, waste management, geology and soils,
noise, ecology resources, land use, transportation, historical and
cultural resources, visual and scenic resources, socioeconomics,
accidents and environmental justice. Additionally, the FEIS analyzes
and compares the costs and benefits of the proposed action.
After weighing the impacts, costs, and benefits of the proposed
action and comparing alternatives, the NRC staff, in accordance with 10
CFR 51.91(d), sets forth its final NEPA recommendation regarding the
proposed action. The NRC staff recommends that the proposed action be
approved, unless safety issues mandate otherwise.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 23rd day of June 2005.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Scott C. Flanders,
Deputy Director, Environmental and Performance Assessment Directorate,
Division of Waste Management and Environmental Protection, Office of
Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.
[FR Doc. E5-3433 Filed 6-30-05; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
------------------------------------------
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31 [NukeNet] Memo To NRC Says 41, 200 Will Die Every Year In USA
Date: Fri, 01 Jul 2005 15:52:30 -0700
NukeNet Anti-Nuclear Network (nukenet@energyjustice.net)
Please act on this and try to get this out to
local and national media as George Bush and the
nuclear industry try to add to commercial reactors
in the USA, not abolish them and replace them with
renewables and conservation- great for the
environment, economy, health and no terrorist
targets or accidental meltdowns and/or boil offs
at spent fuel pools.
"Just" in the USA, those 41,200 people that are
murdered annually by the nuclear industry [just
from mill tailings] and their politicians for sale
in Congress will, assumming that 103 reactors
continue to operate for 40 years each [ the life
for which they were made] that is1,648,000. With
the 20 year extension that utilities are applying
for and receiving left and right from NRC, 103
reactors running for 60 years each will kill [just
from the mill tailings] 2,472,000 people. That's
almost half of the number of Jews that the Nazis
killed.
If you live in a country outside the USA this is
applicable for you, too.
From Jeannine Honicker:
Remember that we have always said that there is no
safe dose of radiation, and that nuclear plants
ROUTINELY release radiation to the air and to the
water, that is concentrated in fish and milk.
Ingested radionuclides become lodged in various
organs and continually irradiate the surrounding
tisues for various lenghts of time. Hense, the
delayed effects between the time the radionuclide
was injested until a cancer or leukemia is
clinically detected. Dr. John Gofman wrote in
"Poisoned Power" that if everyone received the
allowable dose nuclear plants were suppose to be
limited to emit during routine, not accident,
conditions, there would be 32,000 additional
cancer and leukemia deaths per year. The Jordan
Memorandum, (Jordon was the retired assistant
director of the Oak Ridge National Lab when he
wrote the memo to the NRC,) stated that the radon
released from mill tailings from the uranium
required to fuel a single reactor for a single
year would result in "hundreds" of additional
cancer deaths. Our Nashville Congressman,
Clifford Allen, disclosed this at a press
conference just after Thanksgiving, 1977. He asked
for an exact number of "hundreds." Jordan
quantified this as "four hundred for each year's
fuel requirement per reactor." We have 103
operating reactors in the U. S. now. If DOE has
its way, this will vastly increase. Their plan is
outlined in the 2005 Congressional Budget. It's
called the "Roadmap for Recovery of the Nuclear
Industry," and was writen by a group called NERAC,
Nuclear Energy Research Advisory Committee. Do
some research on them. Who are they, and what
ties do they have to the nuclear industry? If you
can't get the 2005 DOE Nuclear Budget, contact me.
I have the first 58 pages. Very informative.
Please read the forwarded material . National
Academy of Sciences confirms "No safe dose."
_______________________________________________________________________
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32 AU ABC: Company confident NT uranium mining will go ahead
"Australian Broadcasting Corporation
Saturday, 2 July 2005. 06:47 (AEST)Saturday, 2 July 2005. 06:47
A company exploring for uranium in the Northern Territory says
it believes the Martin Government will let it mine any deposits
it finds.
Labor has said there will not be any new uranium mines in the
Territory but the Opposition says 14 companies are currently
looking for uranium in the region.
One of the companies exploring for uranium in the Northern
Territory says it is not fazed by the NT Government's ban on the
operation of new uranium mines.
Western Australian-based Deep Yellow Limited has just bought the
rights to explore for uranium in 60,000 square kilometres around
Alice Springs.
Director Gary Steinepreis says the company does not think the
Government is opposed to all uranium mining.
"We would believe that the Government would assess any new
project on its merits and it's our view that some of the
comments that were made were specifically target towards another
project and not our project at all - rather than uranium as a
resource in its own right," he said.
Mr Steinepreis says although there have been mixed messages from
the Territory and Federal Governments, he is confident once
exploration is complete, the deposits will be mined.
"Deep Yellow is aware of the discussions that have been held - I
mean we as an exploration company are positive that uranium is
an energy source for the future and that the Northern Territory
Government is positive on exploring for uranium, and we would
take that as it comes through once we get to the point of having
a mine," he said.
*****************************************************************
33 Interfax: Russia plans to complete nuclear sub disposal in 2010
Interfax.com Text version Site map
Jul 1 2005 12:04PM
MOSCOW. July 1 (Interfax) - Russia plans to complete the
disposal of its decommissioned nuclear submarines and surface
vessels in 2010, said Federal Atomic Energy Agency chief
Alexander Rumyantsev.
Rehabilitation of the territory adjacent to the military bases
of the Northern and Pacific Fleets should be finished by
2015-2017, Rumyantsev said while speaking at the State Duma on
Friday.
Developed countries are prepared to provide Russia with free
financial assistance to scrap nuclear submarines and chemical
weapons, but not because Russia cannot cope with the problem
itself, Rumyantsev said.
"Russia can resolve this problem itself, but assistance from
foreign states will halve the timeframe within which this
program can be implemented," he said.
© 1991-2005 Interfax
All rights reserved
*****************************************************************
34 RIA Novosti: Putin signs law on ratifying Russia-Italy agreement
on nuclear submarine disposal
2/07/2005
MOSCOW, July 1 (RIA Novosti) - Russian President Vladimir Putin
signed a law on ratifying a Russia-Italy cooperation agreement
on the disposal of decommissioned Russian nuclear submarines,
and the safe treatment of radioactive waste and spent fuel, the
presidential press service said.
The law was approved by the State Duma (the lower chamber of
parliament) on June 10 and approved by the Federation Council
(the upper chamber) on June 22.
The agreement creates a legal base for free financial and
technical aid allocated by Italy to dismantle Russia's nuclear
submarines and solve environmental problems in the northwest of
the country.
The agreement follows other agreements on foreign assistance to
Russia in the destruction of arms slated for cutbacks. The
agreement's implementation will complement cooperation under
other multilateral and bilateral accords.
© 2005 "RIA Novosti"
*****************************************************************
35 Las Vegas SUN: Editorial: Yucca probe moves ahead
Today: July 01, 2005 at 8:46:42 PDT
LAS VEGAS SUN
One of the central figures under scrutiny in a congressional
investigation, which is looking into whether scientists
fabricated scientific work on the Yucca Mountain project,
testified before Congress on Wednesday. Joe Hevesi, a U.S.
Geological Survey scientist, told a House subcommittee that he
didn't falsify any information in the scientific inquiry to
determine whether Yucca Mountain could safely store 77,000 tons
of high-level nuclear waste.
Hevesi contended that e-mails he wrote used "poor wording" and
nothing more. One of those e-mails with "poor wording" contained
the following sentence: "I don't have a clue when these programs
were installed. So I've made up the dates and names. ... This is
as good as it's going to get. If they need more proof, I will be
happy to make up stuff." Hevesi told the subcommittee, according
to an Associated Press account of the hearing, that the e-mail
reflected his surprise that some nonessential programs had to go
through quality assurance. Rep. Jon Porter, chairman of the
House subcommittee investigating the issue, said that while
Hevesi denied falsifying data, that doesn't mean the probe is
over. "As I've stated before, we will get to the bottom of this
mess," Porter said.
Porter expressed his frustration that the Energy Department
continues to be uncooperative with the probe. The congressman
still is waiting for documents related to e-mails written by
Hevesi and other scientists. Porter is weighing the possibility
of issuing a subpoena to get action. "Is (the Energy Department)
unable to provide information due to poor management, or are
they hiding something?" Porter asked. We don't believe, as
Porter suggests, that it is necessarily an either-or
proposition. In light of the Energy Department's abysmal track
record on the Yucca Mountain Project, the department is quite
capable of being poorly run and hiding something simultaneously.
Porter has demonstrated diligence so far in this investigation,
and we hope his doggedness continues with support from the rest
of the subcommittee.
All contents copyright 2005 Las Vegas SUN, Inc.
*****************************************************************
36 Las Vegas SUN: Yucca funds fall short of president's '05 request
Today: July 01, 2005 at 11:26:1 PDT
Measure doesn't include money for research on temporary waste
storage
SUN STAFF AND WIRE REPORTS
WASHINGTON -- The Senate approved $577 million for the Energy
Department's Yucca Mountain project in a bill passed this
morning and did not include additional money to begin research
into temporary waste storage.
The House approved $661 million for the project in May, with
$10 million specifically set aside for the department to produce
a plan for above ground storage as a backup for the delayed
underground geologic repository at Yucca, 90 miles northwest of
Las Vegas.
Some lawmakers worry that temporary storage could become
permanent and the House plan alarmed lawmakers representing
sites such as the Hanford complex in Washington state that were
mentioned in a report accompanying the House bill.
Yucca Mountain, approved by Bush in 2002, is planned as a
national repository for 77,000 tons of defense and commercial
nuclear waste. The government was supposed to take waste in
1998, but a series of setbacks have pushed the opening date to
2012 or 2015.
The White House requested $651 million for the Yucca Mountain
project.
Research into the feasibility of a bunker-busting nuclear
weapon would also be kept alive under the $31.2 billion energy
and water spending bill passed around 1 a.m. Friday.
The bill passed 92-3 after a debate over whether to spend $4
million for research into the bunker buster nuclear warhead,
which would be aimed at penetrating underground enemy bunkers.
The House measure contains no funds for the bunker buster,
officially called the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator. Critics
say the weapon is unworkable and that the development of a new
nuclear weapon would be the wrong signal for the United States
to send to countries such as North Korea while trying to
persuade them to shelve their weapons programs.
"A bunker buster cannot penetrate into the Earth deeply enough
to avoid massive casualties and the spewing of millions of cubic
feet of radioactive materials into the atmosphere," Sen. Dianne
Feinstein, D-Calif., said.
Supporters of the weapon won a 53-43 vote. They said its
funding was only for a feasibility study to see whether a new,
sufficiently hardened casing can be developed for existing
warheads to see whether it could penetrate the earth
sufficiently to destroy reinforced underground bunkers.
The underlying Senate measure provides $1.5 billion more than
both Bush's request and a version that passed the House last
month. Even so, the chamber declined to fully fund Bush's $651
million request for the troubled Yucca Mountain facility,
freezing spending for it at $577 million. The Senate also
repelled a House effort to establish temporary storage sites as
a backup to Yucca Mountain.
Instead, the Senate would funnel $5.3 billion into the Army
Corps of Engineers, which is responsible for waterways and flood
control projects, providing almost $1 billion more than Bush
asked for.
And Energy Department nuclear research labs located in the home
state of Sen. Pete Domenici, R-N.M., would get an impressive
boost as well.
The Senate did meet Bush's request for $339 million for a new
plant at the federal Savannah River complex in South Carolina to
produce mixed-oxide fuel. The new facility is a key part of the
Bush administration's effort to safeguard the tons of excess
weapons-grade plutonium held by both the United States and
Russia and reduce the risks of the material being obtained by
terrorists or a rogue state.
The House bill provided just $35 million for the mixed-oxide
plant.
All contents copyright 2005 Las Vegas SUN, Inc.
*****************************************************************
37 St. Louis Post-Dispatch: Radioactive shipments pick up pace
By Elizabethe Holland
Of the Post-Dispatch
06/30/2005
By now, dozens of shipments of radioactive waste were to have
passed through the area on their way from a Cold War-era uranium
processing plant in Ohio to a temporary storage site in west
Texas.
Instead of dozens, though, only five shipments have made the
1,300-mile trek.
Jeff Wagner, a spokesman for Fluor Fernald, the contractor in
charge of the move, said the company isn't yet satisfied with
the composition of the waste for all the shipments. The
shipments contain blends of radioactive waste, cement and fly
ash, which are to be stored in an estimated 4,000
half-inch-thick carbon steel containers. Wagner said he expects
it will take another three weeks to get the blend - described as
having the consistency of loose grout - to the desired condition
for all shipments.
"They really are working to get the most amount of waste in each
of the containers and still meet our radiation levels for
over-the-road shipping," Wagner said.
By this point, Fluor Fernald had expected to be sending out 15
trucks a day - each carrying two 20,000-pound containers of
waste - seven days a week. Instead, one shipment went out June
6, two went out June 19, and another two left Sunday, Wagner
said. Those shipments met the company's standards, he said.
"Any time you start a facility, it's just going to take a little
while until you can actually ramp up to your optimal output,"
said Wagner, who said plans call for six trucks to be sent out
Sunday and eight trucks July 10.
Despite the delays, Wagner said, Fluor Fernald still hopes to
have all of the waste in Texas by the end of the year.
Because Fluor Fernald is behind in its shipments,
construction-related traffic jams on Interstate 44 east of Cuba
haven't created a situation requiring rerouting, said an
official with Visionary Solutions LLC, the Oak Ridge,
Tenn.-based company that is transporting the waste.
Construction crews are replacing pavement on nine miles of
eastbound I-44, from 1.2 miles east of Highway F to just west of
Highway H in Cuba. The work is expected to continue into next
month.
Both issues - the composition of the shipments and the potential
traffic problems - are further proof for Kay Drey, a local
activist and board member of the Washington-based Nuclear
Information and Resource Service, that the waste shouldn't be
moved yet.
"What's the rush?" said Drey, of University City. "They've had
this stuff there for 50 years. Shouldn't it be done safely - if
it can be done safely?"
More than half of the waste came from the Mallinckrodt Chemical
Works on the riverfront just north of downtown. Mallinckrodt
changed the course of World War II by developing a way to purify
uranium to the grade needed to make the atomic bomb.
After the war, 6,000 tons of radioactive byproducts from the
processing were shipped to the uranium processing plant in
Fernald, northwest of Cincinnati. In cleaning up Fernald, the
U.S. Department of Energy chose a temporary site in Andrews
County, Texas, at which to store the waste. The site is owned by
Dallas-based Waste Control Specialists, which is licensed to
hold the waste for two years but is seeking a change in its
license that would allow it to permanently dispose of the waste.
The Lone Star chapter of the Sierra Club has appealed a
licensing change that allowed for the shipments. The hearing for
that appeal is scheduled for July 11.
Reporter Elizabethe Holland
E-mail: eholland@post-dispatch.com
Phone: 314-340-8259
St. Louis Post-Dispatch.
*****************************************************************
38 HSE: HSE grants decommissioning consent for Calder Hall
E090:05 30 June 2005
The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) has published a report on
its decision to grant consent for a decommissioning project at
Calder Hall nuclear power station in West Cumbria, to the
licensee, British Nuclear Group Sellafield Ltd (BNGSL). Consent
was granted earlier this month.
The report is primarily a document of record. It describes the
reasons and considerations behind HSEs decision, conditions
attached to the consent and the main measures that BNGSL will
take to control any significant adverse environmental effects of
the project. It also provides details of the current legal
framework for nuclear safety, in particular the environmental
impact assessment regulations under which consent was granted.
Mike Weightman, HSEs Director of Nuclear Safety and HM Chief
Inspector of Nuclear Installations, commented: The process of
considering potential environmental impacts has involved
extensive public consultation and there has been a great deal of
interest shown by national bodies and local groups alike. I
believe that process has been open and inclusive and I wish to
thank everyone who has been involved, especially those who took
the time to send comments on the documentation provided by the
licensee .
Regulators, licensee, staff and particularly the local
population all have a vested interest
in the effective control of environmental impacts during Calder
Halls decommissioning. BNGSL must provide HSEs Nuclear
Installations Inspectorate with a copy of its environmental
management plan, and any subsequent revisions. We also require
BNGSL keep the public regularly informed on progress, by making
these plans available for inspection. We have striven to make
our decision-making process open and transparent and will
continue to do so throughout the coming decades of this
project."
Copies of the decision on the application to carry out a
decommissioning project at Calder Hall Power Station under the
Nuclear Reactors (Environmental Impact Assessment for
Decommissioning) Regulations 1999: A report prepared by HM
Nuclear Installations Inspectorate on behalf of the Health and
Safety Executive, are available from: Nuclear Safety Directorate
Information Centre, HSE, St Peters House, Stanley Precinct,
Bootle, Merseyside L20 3LZ. Tel: 0151 951 4103, email:
nsd.infocentre@hse.gsi.gov.uk
The report is also available on the HSE website at:
http://www.hse.gov.uk/nuclear/nuc23.pdf
Notes to Editors
1. European Council Directive 85/337/EEC, as amended by
Directive 97/11/EC, sets out a framework for assessing the
effects of certain public and private projects on the
environment. For nuclear reactor decommissioning projects, the
Directive is implemented in Britain by the Nuclear Reactors
(Environmental Impact Assessment for Decommissioning)
Regulations 1999. The intention of the Directive and Regulations
is to involve the public, through consultation, in considering
the potential environmental impact of decommissioning projects,
and to make the decision-making process on granting consent open
and transparent.
2. The Regulations require a licensee to undertake an
environmental impact assessment, prepare a statement summarising
the environmental effects of the project, and apply to HSE for
consent to carry out a decommissioning project. There is an
optional stage where the licensee may request from HSE an
opinion on what the environmental statement should contain
(called a pre-application opinion).
3. The licensee of Calder Hall power station, British Nuclear
Group Sellafield Ltd (BNGSL), previously British Nuclear Fuels
plc, requested a pre-application opinion and provided
information in a pre-application opinion report in October 2003.
HSE undertook a public consultation and provided its
pre-application opinion in February 2004. BNGSL applied to HSE
for consent to carry out a decommissioning project and provided
an environmental statement in August 2004. A further public
consultation, which ended in December 2004, was undertaken on
the environmental statement. HSE requested evidence to verify
information in the statement, which BNGSL subsequently provided.
Both public consultations involved around 70 organisations.
4. HSE granted consent to carry out a decommissioning project at
Calder Hall NPS on 21 June 2005. HSE took the following factors
into account when reaching its decision: the adequacy of
information provided in the environmental statement; the
conclusion that environmental benefits would far outweigh
detriments; the prediction that there would be no significant
effects on other countries and recognition that some issues
would be covered adequately elsewhere, such as through other
regulatory regimes.
5. The conditions attached to the consent concern mitigation
measures to prevent, reduce and, if possible, offset adverse
environmental effects of the project. In brief, BNGSL must
prepare an environmental management plan that identifies
mitigation measures, and reports on implementation and
effectiveness of, and any changes to, those measures (plus the
reasons for any changes) in light of experience.
6. HSE must be notified in advance of any significant change to
a mitigation measure to control any major adverse effects on the
environment. A copy of the environmental management plan and its
subsequent revisions must be sent to HSE and made available to
the public.
7. Calder Hall power station is situated on the west coast of
Cumbria within the Sellafield nuclear site. Commissioned in
1956, it was the oldest station in the Magnox fleet when it
ceased generating electricity in March 2003. Calder Hall is the
third nuclear power station site at which HSE has granted
consent for a decommissioning project, the others being Hinckley
Point A, Somerset (in July 2003) and Bradwell, Essex (in
December 2003).
Public Enquiries : Nuclear Safety Directorate Information
Centre,Tel.0151 951 4103
PRESS ENQuiries : Journalists only : Mark Wheeler 020 7717 6905
Out of hours 020 7928 8382
HSE information and press releases can be accessed on the
Internet:
www.hse.gov.uk/
+ Updated 01.07.05
*****************************************************************
39 Radio Iowa: Source of water contamination in Hills still not certain
Friday, July 01, 2005
by Stella Shaffer
While you get ready to watch your town, fair or ballpark
fireworks display this holiday, one community's wondering if the
rockets had a more lasting effect. EPA senior engineer Craig
Smith recently visited Hills, a small town south of Iowa City,
to talk with local residents about why a chemical called
perchlorate turned up in their well water. The environmental
protection agency's been working on the case for almost there
years and thinks the most likely cause is fireworks. "Duds that
were unexploded or partially exploded and eft at the surface and
caused the groundwater contamination that we're seeing."
Perchlorate is best known as a rocket fuel and it's been a
mystery what might have led to its appearance in the rural
east-central Iowa community. Smith says this is the first case
they think is linked to a community fireworks display. In a few
other cases it's been blamed on the presence of a big fireworks
factory. Two years ago investigators told Radio Iowa the
chemical had been used years ago to fumigate grain in USDA
storage bins but Smith says now they don't think that was the
source. The EPA engineer says the chemical's found in fairly low
levels that don't pose much of a hazard to residents in Hills.
He says the "action level" that triggers the agency to take
action is just 18 parts-per-billion in the groundwater. Smith
says they've found about 25 homes with shallow wells turning up
groundwater contamination above that "action level." They've
provided bottled water to those residents, about a tenth of the
homes in that community. The highest level found in any
drinking-water well was 66 parts-per-billion, not significantly
higher than the alert level. He says it's probably never caused
any health problems. Smith says providing bottled water to some
residents is "primarily a precaution." Smith says since the
chemical first turned up in water tests, it seems to be
declining and is gone from water sources in the area.
http://www.radioiowa.com
Tel: 515.282.1984; Fax: 515.282.1879;
Learfield Communications, Inc.
*****************************************************************
40 Ireland Business World: BNFL sells US unit, reduces losses
Friday, July 01 11:17:42
(BizWorld)
UK nuclear power group British Nuclear Fuels (BNFL) said it has
put its Westinghouse power station building business up for sale,
and announced a 50pc drop in full-year losses.
In a statement BNFL said it had launched a structured sales
process for US-based Westinghouse after receiving "a number" of
unsolicited bids for the company, confirming press reports last
month.
The group is being advised on the sale by investment bank NM
Rothschild and Sons. Westinghouse is tipped to fetch a price of
about USD1bn, with US private equity groups seen as possible
buyers.
The company is involved in nuclear power plant construction in
the US, and has been bidding for contracts to build new power
facilities in China.
BNFL added that its pretax loss before investment income and
exceptional items for the year to March 31 2005 came in at
STG144m, down from STG283m the previous year. Turnover stood at
STG2.36bn, up from STG2.32bn.
However, exceptional items soared to STG243m from just STG4m a
year earlier, fuelled by a UK restructuring programme and the
cost of closing out some of its older contracts in the US.
The restructuring process involved rationalising BNFL into three
business units, of which Westinghouse is one, and transferring
most of the group's assets to the Nuclear Decommissioning
Authority (NDA), a newly-created government body.
"As the high level restructuring of the company nears completion
we now have to concentrate on our businesses, making them
tangible and demonstrable successes that are able to maximise
shareholder value," chief executive Mike Parker said in a
statement.
The company said the nuclear industry's prospects were
"exciting," noting that public attitudes towards nuclear power
had undergone a "marked" change.
05:28 Sat 2 Jul 2005
Business World is a service of Media World Ltd. All rights
*****************************************************************
41 PE.com: Feinstein calls for a cleanup
Inland Southern California
DEFENSE DEPARTMENT: Perchlorate contaminates the groundwater in
at least 10 Inland cities.
10:36 PM PDT on Thursday, June 30, 2005
By CLAIRE VITUCCI / Washington Bureau
WASHINGTON - Sen. Dianne Feinstein is calling on the Pentagon to
take steps to clean up perchlorate-contaminated groundwater and
drinking water sources in the wake of a congressional report
that slammed the Defense Department for inaction.
In a letter to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, Feinstein,
D-Calif., said the recent General Accountability Office report
indicates that the department is failing to live up to its
responsibility when it comes to sampling for perchlorate.
"Most of the perchlorate contamination across the country is
from Defense-related activities and as such, the department has
a responsibility to the American people to clean up the
groundwater and drinking water sources impaired by those
activities," Feinstein wrote in her letter, dated Thursday.
Perchlorate -- an ingredient in rocket fuel and other defense
manufacturing -- has been found to interfere with thyroid
function.
At least 10 Inland cities, including Riverside, Chino, Colton
and Redlands, and numerous water districts are dealing with
perchlorate in drinking-water supplies. Some of the
contamination is linked to military contractors that used the
chemical.
The study, which was released last week, said Defense Department
activities are a leading cause of perchlorate contamination.
The report "mischaracterizes" the Pentagon's response to
perchlorate, Philip W. Grone, a Defense Department assistant
deputy undersecretary for environmental issues, told the
Associated Press when the report came out. He added that the DOD
has tested at 800 sites and has spent more than $40 million to
develop cleanup techniques.
Reach Claire Vitucci at (202) 661-8422 or
cvitucci@pe.comMore
2005, The Press-Enterprise Company
*****************************************************************
42 Portsmouth Daily Times: Two new companies begin cleanup at plant
July 2, 2005
PIKETON
By JEFF BARRON, PDT Staff Writer
Two new companies took over cleanup duties this week at the
Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant, according to the U.S.
Department of Energy.
LATA/Parallax Portsmouth will conduct environmental remediation
and the Theta Pro2Serve Management Company will be responsible
for infrastructure services at the plant.
The pair take over from Bechtel Jacobs. That company’s contract
with the DOE expired in March.
The United States Enrichment Corp. leases the plant from the
DOE. It plans to begin uranium enrichment operations at the
plant and is a separate entity from LATA and TPMC.
United Steel Workers Union President Dan Minter expressed
concern that some of the 600 union members may lose their jobs
because of the transfer of remediation companies.
While that hasn’t happened yet, Minter said it could.
“There is still some uncertainty, which is concerning,” he said.
“With the change, things are still in a flux.”
Minter said he didn’t know when the issue of jobs may be
resolved.
“In some cases, one or two people could be at risk,” he said.
“But if you’re one of those people, there is a 100 percent
chance of losing your job, not a 5-percent chance.”
LATA Public Affairs Manager Sandy Childers said through a
statement the company has appointed a management team to work at
the plant. However, she did not address whether there would be
any job losses.
Gail Mattson will be the Project Manager and David Kent is the
Environment, Safety, Health and Quality Manager. William Franz
Jr. is the Waste Disposition and Decontamination and
Decommissioning Program Manager. Del Baird is the company’s new
Environmental Restoration, Monitoring and Reporting Program
Manager, with Paul Kreitz taking over as Deputy Project Manager.
LATA will be responsible for groundwater and soil remediation,
removing legacy waste, operating decontamination and
decommissioning buildings, highly-enriched uranium disposition,
managing waste storage and surveillance and maintenance, among
other duties.
TPMC will also be involved in surveillance and maintenance. It
will also be responsible for plant security, computing and
telecommunications services, property records management,
janitorial services and grounds and roadway maintenance.
Also, Uranium Disposition Services is now responsible for the
yards which contain thousands of containers of depleted uranium
hexaflouride (DUF6). Minter said the union reached a collective
bargaining agreement with the company through 2014.
UDS is responsible for the design, construction and initial
operations to convert the DUF6 into more stable forms for use or
disposal. Construction on a conversion plant is set for a 2007
completion date.
“This represents another milestone in the conversion plant’s
continued and long-term success,” Minter said. “The conversion
plant represents nearly a decade of effort, including the
balancing of regulatory and environmental issues. Today, a
solution exists to eliminate long-term legacy waste materials
from the site while creating employment opportunities.”
In a related issue, the DOE will host a public meeting on July
14 at 6 p.m. at the Ohio State University Endeavor Center in
Piketon to discuss the status of environmental cleanup at the
plant.
The center is located at 1864 Shyville Road.
JEFF BARRON can be reached at (740) 353-3101, ext. 236.
Story created Friday, July 01, 2005 at 9:36 AM.
©2005 - The Portsmouth Daily Times
*****************************************************************
43 Xinhua: Ukraine says not to deploy NATO nukes
www.xinhuanet.com
www.chinaview.cn 2005-07-01 14:29:49
BEIJING, July 1 -- Ukrainian Defense Minister Anatoly
Gritsenko said Thursday that his country would not deploy NATO
nuclear weapons after joining NATO.
He said that his country had voluntarily renounced its
nuclear weapons.
Ukraine inherited the third largest nuke arsenals when the
former Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. It gave up all its
nuclear weapons to Russia in 1996.
Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko set 2008 as a target
date for joining NATO. Ukraine is already a member of NATO's
Partnership for Peace program.
(Source: CRIENGLISH.com)
Copyright ©2003 Xinhua News Agency. All rights reserved.
*****************************************************************
44 [du-list] Two new companies begin cleanup at plant
Date: Fri, 01 Jul 2005 15:55:17 -0700
Portsmouth Daily Times
Piketon, Ohio July 1, 2005
Two new companies begin cleanup at plant
PIKETON
By JEFF BARRON, PDT Staff Writer
Two new companies took over cleanup duties this week at the
Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant, according to the U.S. Department of
Energy.
LATA/Parallax Portsmouth will conduct environmental remediation and
the Theta Pro2Serve Management Company will be responsible for
infrastructure services at the plant.
The pair take over from Bechtel Jacobs. That company's contract with
the DOE expired in March.
The United States Enrichment Corp. leases the plant from the DOE. It
plans to begin uranium enrichment operations at the plant and is a separate
entity from LATA and TPMC.
United Steel Workers Union President Dan Minter expressed concern
that some of the 600 union members may lose their jobs because of the
transfer of remediation companies.
While that hasn't happened yet, Minter said it could.
"There is still some uncertainty, which is concerning," he said.
"With the change, things are still in a flux."
Minter said he didn't know when the issue of jobs may be resolved.
"In some cases, one or two people could be at risk," he said. "But
if you're one of those people, there is a 100 percent chance of losing your
job, not a 5-percent chance."
LATA Public Affairs Manager Sandy Childers said through a statement
the company has appointed a management team to work at the plant. However,
she did not address whether there would be any job losses.
Gail Mattson will be the Project Manager and David Kent is the
Environment, Safety, Health and Quality Manager. William Franz Jr. is the
Waste Disposition and Decontamination and Decommissioning Program Manager.
Del Baird is the company's new Environmental Restoration, Monitoring and
Reporting Program Manager, with Paul Kreitz taking over as Deputy Project
Manager.
LATA will be responsible for groundwater and soil remediation,
removing legacy waste, operating decontamination and decommissioning
buildings, highly-enriched uranium disposition, managing waste storage and
surveillance and maintenance, among other duties.
TPMC will also be involved in surveillance and maintenance. It will
also be responsible for plant security, computing and telecommunications
services, property records management, janitorial services and grounds and
roadway maintenance.
Also, Uranium Disposition Services is now responsible for the yards
which contain thousands of containers of depleted uranium hexaflouride
(DUF6). Minter said the union reached a collective bargaining agreement
with the company through 2014.
UDS is responsible for the design, construction and initial
operations to convert the DUF6 into more stable forms for use or disposal.
Construction on a conversion plant is set for a 2007 completion date.
"This represents another milestone in the conversion plant's
continued and long-term success," Minter said. "The conversion plant
represents nearly a decade of effort, including the balancing of regulatory
and environmental issues. Today, a solution exists to eliminate long-term
legacy waste materials from the site while creating employment opportunities."
In a related issue, the DOE will host a public meeting on July 14 at
6 p.m. at the Ohio State University Endeavor Center in Piketon to discuss
the status of environmental cleanup at the plant.
The center is located at 1864 Shyville Road.
JEFF BARRON can be reached at (740) 353-3101, ext. 236.
Story created Friday, July 01, 2005.
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45 Casper Star Tribune: Jackson group contests plutonium plans
Casper, Wyoming - Friday, July 01, 2005
By The Associated Press Friday, July 01, 2005
JACKSON, Wyo. (AP) -- A nuclear watchdog group is questioning
the federal government's plans to consolidate plutonium-238
production at a laboratory in eastern Idaho.
Members of Keep Yellowstone Nuclear Free charged Tuesday that
the U.S. Department of Energy has stacked the deck in favor of
choosing the Idaho National Laboratory without seriously
considering other options. In addition, they noted the lab's
reactor is 40 years old and sits in an earthquake-prone region.
The lab near Idaho Falls is about 100 miles west and upwind of
Grand Teton and Yellowstone national parks in northwest Wyoming.
"They've got their bull's-eye right on INL," KYNF president Tom
Patricelli said after meeting Tuesday with energy officials.
Tim Frazier, head of the radioisotope power systems for DOE,
said the Idaho lab is the only one with an operational reactor
that can generate the amount of plutonium-238 the agency wants
each year.
DOE has scheduled a formal public hearing on the plan in Jackson
at 7 p.m. on July 21.
The Energy Department is moving to resume production of
plutonium-238 as an energy source for spacecraft and some
national security activities because existing supplies will be
virtually gone in five years.
The department said a decision on production of plutonium-238,
reaffirmed last year, "will not be revisited" and that
production activities should be consolidated at the government's
Idaho National Laboratory to increase security.
A final decision on consolidation is expected later this year by
Energy Secretary Samuel Bodman, department spokesman Mike
Waldron said.
But Waldron reiterated that the decision to resume production of
plutomiun-238 was made years ago and reaffirmed last year
because it has become clear current stocks of the unique isotope
will be depleted shortly after 2010.
Plutonium-238 is not used for nuclear weapons, but its steady,
virtually infinite release of heat during decay makes the
isotope valuable as a heat source to produce electricity in
spacecraft and for some satellites that are unable to rely on
the sun as an energy source. It is many times more radioactive
than weapons-grade plutonium-239, however, and ingesting a speck
can be fatal.
The United States stopped producing plutonium-238 when it shut
the last weapons reactor at the Savannah River complex in South
Carolina in the mid-1990s. Instead it has relied on existing
stockpiles and a supply provided by Russia that is limited to
use by NASA in the space program.
Currently the government has about 87 pounds of plutonium-238
but expects all but 14 pounds to be used up by 2010 including
about 55 pounds for national security related programs.
"These power systems have been used for the past 30 years, and
we expect that their need will continue," Waldron told The
Associated Press. "Production of plutonium-238 is critical if
the United States is to continue its leadership in areas of
space exploration and provide for certain classified security
operations. ..."
A draft environmental analysis concludes that consolidation of
the program at the Idaho research lab would not cause additional
health concerns from radiation releases and have minimal impact
on the environment. It also would end the need to transport
plutonium-238 over highways.
"The EIS clearly shows the environmental impact ... would be far
less than resuming production at three sites around the
country," said Waldron. Under the plan, activities that
otherwise would be at the Oak Ridge facility in Tennessee and
the Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico would be
shifted to the Idaho site.
The new complex, if approved, would be expected to be finished
by 2009 and cost as much as $300 million. Plans call for making
11 pounds of plutonium-238 a year over 35 years.
In a series of hearings last year on the plan, dozens of Idaho
residents opposed the consolidation for fear it would increase
cancer deaths, threaten the nearby Yellowstone ecosystem and
make the region a potential terrorist target.
Copyright © 2005 by the Casper Star-Tribune published by Lee
Publications, Inc., a subsidiary of Lee Enterprises,
Incorporated
*****************************************************************
46 Daily Review Online: Promise of fusion unlikely in the debut of giant laser
Article Last Updated: 07/01/2005 02:46:25 AM
Livermore scientists say odds of success will improve by 2011
By Ian Hoffman, STAFF WRITER
A giant laser at Lawrence Livermore weapons lab might — but is
"unlikely" to in early experiments — achieve its defining
mission: the world's first creation of a miniature star inside a
laboratory, according to an elite panel of defense scientists
advising the federal government.
Instead, when scientists fire up the National Ignition Facility
more than four years from now, they will be pouring half its
energy into a fusion target different from the one used to
persuade the physics community and Congress to spend billions of
dollars on the laser.
The odds of making hydrogen burn itself into helium, the key to
stars and a potentially limitless energy supply on Earth, will
improve as Livermore scientists boost the laser's energy and
delve into fusion physics more deeply, according to the panel,
known as the JASONs.
That leaves the nation's most promising attempts at
self-sustaining fusion with a laser — a brass ring that has
eluded scientists for 40 years — receding at least a year to
2011 or later, in a project recently recovered from delays and
cost overruns in the late 1990s.
Even so, many fusion scientists still are enthusiastic
about getting
the laser running. Fusion or not, it will produce pressures and
temperatures found only at the centers of stars and planets.
"Some questions won't be answered until you can get a megajoule
(of energy) in that laser or another laser, so why not charge
ahead with construction?" said Raymond Jeanloz, a planetary
scientist at the University of California, Berkeley, who
reviewed the chances of fusion burn.
"By delaying gratification a little bit, the experimentalists
hope to work on a truly unique facility," Jeanloz said.
Meanwhile, a new government review says Livermore dramatically
has improved its management of what is the nation's largest
scientific construction project.
"The project staff is a strong team with demonstrated
professional commitment," federal reviewers wrote. "The project
is being managed appropriately for successful completion."
Directors of all three U.S. nuclear weapons labs plus a laser
fusion lab at the University of Rochester also endorsed the
laser's completion Thursday in a letter to Congress, backing a
plan to suspend all experiments on the laser until late 2009 and
focus solely on finishing its construction.
"This is a major scientific and technical challenge," they
wrote.
But news of the reduced likelihood of success in the first round
of ignition experiments comes at a politically difficult time. A
senior Senate appropriator, New Mexico Republican Pete Domenici,
has nixed all construction money for NIF, putting the laser's
supporters in Congress on the defensive even as prospects dim
for accomplishing its signature mission on time.
"I don't think this JASONs report helps very much in pursuing
it," Domenici said.
The big laser is designed to pour more energy into a tiny ball
of hydrogen than scientists ever have attempted outside of a
thermonuclear explosion. Scientists would aim 192 intense light
beams into a small metal pipe containing an even tinier sphere
of frozen hydrogen. A flood of X-rays would crush the hydrogen
pellet at 400 times the speed of a rifle bullet to 1/30th of its
original size, heating it so that the atomic nuclei of hydrogen
would fuse, releasing enormous amounts of energy.
Scientists think they've already fused small amounts of hydrogen
on other experimental machines, but the National Ignition
Facility is billed as the most serious attempt to date at true
fusion ignition — burning enough hydrogen to produce more energy
than the lasers deliver in the beginning.
NIF's beams carry many times more energy than any other laser,
roughly the energy in
1,800 fastballs thrown at 100 mph or, more whimsically, the
caloric energy content of a liter of orange juice.
Nature has erected high hurdles for fusion scientists, however,
because the laser beams can scatter harmlessly, the X-rays can
drain away and the hydrogen pellet can squirt apart, all in
billionths of a second and before much fusion can occur.
In a report to Congress on Thursday, the JASONs made an
"incomplete" list of 11 separate, potential obstacles to success
at ignition. Many of those challenges ease as scientists
increase the energy of the laser. But for 2010, Livermore
scientist expect to conduct experiments at a megajoule of laser
energy or so, slightly more than half of its design energy of
1.8 megajoules.
The JASONs concluded that the first round of fusion experiments
carry "substantial technical risk" and that ignition "while
possible, is unlikely." It is "unrealistic" to expect success in
2010, the panel found.
"Backing down from 1.8 to 1.2 or 1.1 (megajoules) has to
increase the likelihood of failure, but how great is that
likelihood?" said Berkeley's Jeanloz. "It's hard to tell."
Livermore scientists are more optimistic, said physicist Ed
Moses, head of the National Ignition Facility project.
"But we understand why people from the outside might be more
conservative than we would be," he said. "These risks can and
should be mitigated. And we are doing all that."
The JASONs report contrasts with more than a decade of
assurances by Livermore scientists and federal officials that
the giant laser as early as 2003 was almost certain to achieve
fusion ignition.
"I guess that I would be willing to be — I don't know, a quarter
of my retirement — that if it gets built as advertised, it will
reach ignition," former Livermore lab director Bruce Tarter told
The Energy Daily in 1997.
How the new findings will play in Congress remains to be seen.
"There has been a lot of skepticism about NIF from the
beginning," Domenici said. But federal nuclear weapons officials
in the Clinton and Bush administrations have insisted the
big laser
be built, he said, even as the cost estimates climbed from
$800,000 to $1.1 billion to $2.5 billion to more than $4
billion. In recent years, expenditures on NIF have drained money
away from other research more closely tied to "stockpile
stewardship," the government's program for keeping nuclear
weapons in operable condition without testing.
"If one funds NIF the way the laboratory is asking us and the
president is asking, we have to take a whole lot of other things
in stockpile stewardship and say they have to be cut or cut out
while we proceed with NIF," Domenici said.
But he suggested the laser will be built. Two administrations
have asked for NIF as a high priority, Domenici said, "and that
can't be ignored up here" in Congress.
© 2005 ANG Newspapers
*****************************************************************
47 KRQE News 13: Senate OKs millions for Sandia, LANL
Posted: 7/1/2005 12:06:00 PM
Source: AP
WASHINGTON -- The US Senate early this morning passed a measure
that includes a boost for New Mexico's nuclear research labs.
The measure includes $65 million for a microsystems building at
Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque.
It includes $75 million to buy a supercomputer for weapons
calculations at Los Alamos National Laboratory.
It also includes $4.6 million to finish building a Center for
Integrated Nanotechnology.
That's a joint venture between Los Alamos and Sandia national
laboratories.
New Mexico Republican Senator Pete Domenici heads the Senate
Energy and Water Appropriations Subcommittee, and will lead
negotiations to reconcile differences between the House and
Senate versions.
KRQE News 13 | KBIM News 10 | KREZ News 6 | KRQE.com|
*****************************************************************
48 lamonitor.com: Senate OKs bill to fund lab projects
The Online News Source for Los Alamos
CAROL A. CLARK, , Monitor Staff Writer
The Senate's passage of the FY2006 Energy and Water
Appropriations Bill moves millions in federal dollars forward to
fund critical scientific and nuclear weapons security programs,
Sen. Pete Domenici, R-N.M. said today.
The bill provides $25.04 billion for DOE in FY2006, $1.12
billion more than the budget request and $778 million more than
FY2005.
The Senate approved the $31.2 billion total funding measure,
92-3, early this morning to fund DOE and water programs
administered by the Army Corps of Engineers and Bureau of
Reclamation.
In a news release from Domenici's Washington, D.C., office he
stated, "This bill has been carefully crafted to strike the
right balance between maintaining our nuclear arsenal and
advancing basic scientific research in this country. I believe
the strong Senate support shown today reflects the careful
consideration we took in making sure that America's immediate
water needs are balanced without long-term need for scientific
advances."
As chairman of the Senate Energy and Water Appropriations
Subcommittee, Domenici will lead the conference committee
negotiations to reconcile differences between the House and
Senate versions of this bill.
Domenici said he looks forward to a productive conference to
reconcile two very different Senate and House bills.
"It will be a challenge, but it is important that we reach an
accord that suits our security and scientific priorities," he
said.
"I know that Sens. Domenici and (Jeff) Bingaman have both worked
very hard to take care of Los Alamos and protect and promote the
science being done here," Rep. Jeannette Wallace, R-Los Alamos,
said in an interview this morning. "I know they feel confident
that this bill has what it should."
Domenici provides $1.7 billion for nonproliferation activities,
which is $91.8 million above the request and $236 million over
FY2005. The bill provides level funding, $577 million, for the
Yucca Mountain project in Nevada.
Domenici included a provision for Lab Directed Research and
Development (LDRD) that will allow up to 8 percent - up from 6
percent-of a lab budget to be used for laboratory-initiated
scientific R.
"These funds for LDRD support a central program that contributes
to the revolutionary technologies researched at the
laboratories. The innovations explored here have a profound
impact on our national security strategy," Domenici said.
For New Mexico, Domenici added $4.6 million to complete
construction of the Center for Integrated Nanotechnology (CINT),
a joint Sandia and Los Alamos venture at Kirtland Air Force
Base. The bill also has $30 million to establish a National
Nanotechnology Enterprise Development Center at CINT to support
the transfer of technology from four nanotechnology centers into
the commercial market.
The bill provides $25.04 billion for DOE in FY2006, $1.12
billion above the budget request and $778 million more than
FY2005. The bill has $1.08 billion for the Bureau of Reclamation
($130 million more than the budget request and $63.5 million
more than FY2005) and $5.3 billion for the Army Corps of
Engineers ($258 million more than FY2005 and $966 million over
the budget request).
For DOE National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) nuclear
weapons activities, the bill has $6.55 billion. This is $76
million less than the budget request largely due to the $222
million transfer of cleanup operations from the NNSA to the
Office of Environmental Management and a reduction in
construction funds for the National Ignition Facility (NIF).
The bill also includes $230.6 million for WIPP, including $18
million for a variety of related projects in the Carlsbad area
and $24.5 million to the state of New Mexico for transportation
funding.
Highlights of the New Mexico-related spending included by
Domenici in the FY2006 Energy &Water Development Appropriations
Bill include:
+ Environmental Cleanup-$142.2 million for cleanup of lab
property. The bill rejects the Administration's proposal to
require NNSA to perform cleanup and requires the Office of
Environmental Management to maintain this responsibility.
+ Environmental Cleanup / Los Alamos County - $5.2 million to
Los Alamos County to support the cleanup and stabilization of
the LANL landfill at the Los Alamos Airport, an increase of $3.3
million more than the budget request.
+ Advance Simulation Computing (NNSA)-$75 million earmarked to
purchase a 150 teraflop machine at Los Alamos to reduce the time
it takes to perform a weapons calculations. Currently, LANL has
the most responsibility under the Life Extension Program (LEP),
but the slowest computer (20 teraflop). LANL has been running a
calculation on the existing computer for the past 19 months.
The new computer will only take three months to develop a
solution for the same calculation. (LANL share of the $735
million in Advanced Simulation and Computing, including the $75
million earmark is $269.8 million.)
+ Science Campaigns-Additional $46 million to the Science
campaign to support increased R efforts at LANL. Within the
increases, LANL will receive: $5 million to initiate preliminary
engineering and design work on upgrades to the LANSCE facility;
and, $15 million from the Dynamic Materials Properties program
to support experimentation on the Atlas Machine to validate
thermodynamic properties.
+ Stockpile Systems/R Certification-$10 million to support
additional hydrodynamics test at LANL.
+ Red Network Expansion-$20 million increase to complete the
expansion of classified network at LANL, the same level as
FY2005.
+ TA-18 Cat III/IV-$2 million increase to begin design effort
for a new facility to accommodate Cat III/IV material that is in
the process of moving out of TA-18
+ Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Facility (CMR)-$65 million,
a $10 million increase, to keep construction on track and reduce
costs because of schedule delays. Domenici secured $39.6 million
for the project in FY2005.
+ Advanced Fuel Cycle-$7 million earmark for Material Test
Station at LANSCE to support material science research. This is
the second year request for the material test station at LANL.
This account is provided $85 million in FY2006.
For Joint Lab Funding:
+ National Nanotechnology Enterprise Development Center-$30
million to establish the National Nanotechnology Enterprise
Development Center at CINT, a joint Los Alamos and Sandia
facility. This fund will support the transfer of technology out
of the four nanotechnology centers into the commercial market.
+ Chemical/Biological Detection R-$30 million is added to the
Nuclear Detection R effort within the Office of Nuclear
Nonproliferation to support long-term R efforts.
+ ICF Stockpile Support (Inertial Confinement Fusion
Campaign)-$41.1 million has been provided to support stockpile
stewardship activities on Z Machine, which will be distributed
in the following manner: $12.9 million to Sandia National Labs;
$16.5 million to LANL; $11.6 million to Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory. The budget request proposed to eliminate
these activities in an effort to support NIF construction.
+ Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW)-$25 million, an increase
of $15 million, to support a design competition between Los
Alamos and Lawrence Livermore to design replacement components
on existing weapons. The goal will be to reduce overall
lifecycle cost, improve safety and reliability of our nuclear
deterrent.
+ Lab Directed Research and Development-Bill and report
language have been included supporting an increase in the LDRD
program to spend up to 8 percent (up from 6 percent) of the lab
budget for laboratory-initiated scientific R. This will provide
additional resources to support cutting-edge science that
contribute to the mission, but may not be directly relevant to
today's challenges.
+ WASTE ISOLATION PILOT PLANT-$230.6 million for the DOE
Carlsbad Area Office and WIPP, an $18 million increase over the
budget request. The bill has $24.5 million in transportation
funding to be provided directly to the state of New Mexico. This
overall funding level includes the following earmarks added by
Domenici:
+ Accelerated Cleanup: $6 million added by Domenici the
purchase of TRUPACT-III containers.
+ Community Impact: $3.5 million for infrastructure
improvements, and acceleration impact funding for the Carlsbad
community.
+ Center of Excellence: $2 million for continued development of
the Center of Excellence for Hazardous Materials Management.
+ Neutrino Research: $1.5 million to support ongoing research
at WIPP.
+ MIND Institute: Domenici secured $12 million, a $1.0 million
increase over FY2005, to continue federal support for the Mental
Illness and Neuroscience Discovery Institute (MIND Institute).
The institute funds three national centers of excellence in
functional brain imaging in Albuquerque, Minneapolis, and
Boston. The New Mexico center of excellence involves the
University of New Mexico Health Sciences Center, the Veterans
Affairs Medical Center, Sandia and Los Alamos national
laboratories.
+ Global Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention - $50 million
for IPP program to cost-share with industry to engage Russian
Scientists in commercial and non-weapons related activities.
There is strong New Mexico support for this Domenici-created
initiative.
+ Yucca Mountain: $577 million, the same level as FY2005 and
$64 million below the budget request. The bill does not address
the interim storage issue.
+ NNSA Stockpile Stewardship Program: $6.57 billion for nuclear
weapons Stockpile Stewardship activities, $224 million over
FY2005. This program is carried out at Los Alamos National
Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratories, Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory, the Nevada Test Site, and at plants in
Texas, Missouri, Tennessee and South Carolina. This funding
includes:
$2.09 billion - Science-based Stockpile Stewardship ($17 million
over request).
$25 million - Reliable Replacement Warhead program ($15 million
over request).
$314 million - National Ignition Facility, but no funds to
continue construction.
+ Defense Environmental Management: $7.2 billion, a $324
million above the request.
+ Directed Stockpile Stewardship-$1.45 billion, up $37 million
above the request (+2.5%). This includes:
+ Reliable Replacement Warhead-$25 million, an increase of $15
million, to initiate a design competition between the weapons
laboratories to improve the existing stockpile to reduce design
tolerance to reduce maintenance cost and ensure the lab
directors ability to certify the stockpile.
+ Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator-$4 million to complete the
testing of this concept by FY2007. There are no plans or funding
to develop this weapon.
+ Science Campaign-$307.9 million, up $46 million above the
request, to support research and experiments that are critical
to certification of the stockpile.
+ Engineering Campaign-$272.7 million, up $52 million, to
support R efforts in weapons security to prevent terrorist from
ever using U.S. weapons.
+ Inertial Confinement Fusion-$314 million to support critical
R funding to support high yield experiments on Z machine, the
Omega Laser and NIF. The budget virtually eliminated all
experimental work in order to support NIF construction.
+ National Ignition Facility (NIF)-No construction funding is
provided. Instead the NNSA is directed to use the existing
laser, the most powerful in the world to focus on supporting the
Science Campaign and stockpile stewardship activities.
+ Advanced Simulation Computing-$735 million, $75 million over
the budget request, which will support the purchase of new
computers to support the stewardship program. This will improve
the Life Extension Program (LEP) at LANL, which has the smallest
computer but largest LEP responsibility.
+ Pit Manufacturing and Certification-$248.7 million, equal to
the budget request and including $7.68 to support a Modern Pit
Facility.
+ NNSA Infrastructure-$1.66 billion, up $64 million, for
construction and O of NNSA facilities (RTBF Account), including
$65 million (up $10 million) for LANL CMR Replacement, and $65.5
million for construction and $12 million for operation of
Sandia's MESA facility.
+ Nuclear Nonproliferation - $1.73 billion, an increase of
$91.8 million above the request and $236 million above FY2005
levels.
+ Nonproliferation Detection R-$297 million, up $30 million, to
support long-term research into chemical and biological
detection.
+ International Materials Control-$343 million, a $24 million
increase over FY2005, to support nuclear materials control
activities in Russia.
+ Global Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention- $50.9
million, up $13 million, to engage Russian weapons scientist in
commercial efforts. Additional funding is provided to expand the
scope of cooperation to other countries that may pose a
proliferation threat.
+ Plutonium Disposition (MOX)-$362 million for construction of
a MOX fabrication facility. This program is fully funded as a
result of positive U.S.-Russia negotiations.
+ Global Threat Reduction Initiative-$108.9 million, an
increase of $11 million, to increase the collection of civilian
radiation sources in the United States, and $7 million to
convert up to four U.S. university research reactors from highly
enriched uranium fuel to low enriched uranium fuel.
+ DOE Office of Science Research-$3.7 billion in basic
scientific research, which is $240 million over the budget
request and $97 million over FY2005. This includes:
+ Genomes for Life -$40 million to accelerate the deployment of
four research facilities
+ DOE Science Facilities-$100 million to support 100 percent
utilization of all DOE facilities.
+ Nanotechnology Transfer Fund-$30 million to establish this
fund to help commercialize. nanotechnology discoveries at the
four nanoscience research centers. These collaborative
facilities will provide access to world-class DOE and NNSA
facilities.
+ Spallation Neutron Source-$41.7 million to fully fund this
Oakridge National Lab program.
+ Domestic Fusion Research-$290 million to restore funding for
this work.
+ DOE Office of Science-$3.72 billion, $240 million above the
request and $102 million above FY2005, which includes:
$100 million to guarantee 100 percent runtime capacity for all
DOE science facilities, some of which may only run 12 weeks this
year.
$40 million for the Genome to Life program, as well as language
instructing DOE to use the nanotechnology centers as a model and
build four proposed genome facilities.
$30 million is provided to establish a technology development
fund.
+ Fossil Energy R-$646.6 million, $79 million over FY2005,
including:
Clean Coal Power - $50 million
Future Gen - $18 million
Carbon Sequestration - $74 million, up $7 million
Fuel Cells - $69 million
Natural Gas Technologies R - $27 million, up $17 million
Oil Technology R - $32 million, up $22 million
+ Nuclear Energy: $449.9 million for nuclear energy
initiatives, a $64.3 million over FY2005 and $60 million over
the request. This includes $76 million for Nuclear Power 2010
(up $20 million); $60 million for the Generation IV Nuclear
Energy Initiative (up $15 million), including language requiring
DOE to focus on two reactor designs; $40 million for the Next
Generation Nuclear Reactor project in Idaho; and $85 million for
the Advanced Fuel Cell Initiative (up $10 million, in addition
to including $7 million for the LANCE program at LANL).
+ Renewable Energy Technologies-$1.24 billion, $53 million over
the budget and $13 million over FY2005, for renewable energy R.
All Congressional earmarks are paid for and will not undercut
DOE research. This funding includes:
$182 million for hydrogen, $13 million over FY2005
$92 million for biomass research, $20 million above the request
$187 million for vehicle technology R, a $20 million over FY2005
$240 million for weatherization assistance, up $15 million
+ High Temperature Superconductivity R: $55.5 million, a $5.5
million increase over the budget request, for this research.
LANL plays a big role in this superconductivity research.
© 2003 Los Alamos Monitor All Rights Reserved.
*****************************************************************
49 DOE: Proposed Agency Information Collection
FR Doc 05-13008
[Federal Register: July 1, 2005 (Volume 70, Number 126)]
[Notices] [Page 38124] From the Federal Register Online via GPO
Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr01jy05-74]
AGENCY: Department of Energy.
ACTION: Notice and request for comments.
SUMMARY: The Department of Energy (DOE) invites public comment on
a proposed collection of information that DOE is developing for
submission to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) pursuant
to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995. The Office of Science
reports annually in the President's Budget Request the numbers of
researchers, post docs, graduate students and technicians
supported through Research Grants and Field Work Proposals
(FWPs). However, these data are based on forecasts by the
principal investigator (i.e., PIs) at the time the grants and
FWPs were initially funded. These estimates are unreliable
because they are based on the best guess of the PIs at the time
of funding. While the PI's initial estimate could be accurate at
the time of the request, the reliability of the initial estimate
decreases as the project matures. Further, the forecasts by the
PIs are subjective. Therefore, it is not possible to quantify the
inaccuracies with any confidence. To better plan for future
investments, the Office of Science must better understand the
actual impact of its budget on the technical manpower supported.
A short (approximately 17 minutes) web- based survey has been
developed to collect actual workforce data from a small sample of
researchers currently supported by the Office of Science. The
result will be compared to proposal data to estimate the average
and range of variation and to derive a statistically valid
methodology for approximating budgetary impacts on the technical
manpower supported. Comments are invited on: (a) Whether the
proposed collection of information is necessary for the proper
performance of the functions of the agency, including whether the
information shall have practical utility; (b) the accuracy of the
agency's estimate of the burden of the proposed collection of
information, including the validity of the methodology and
assumptions used; (c) ways to enhance the quality, utility, and
clarity of the information to be collected; and (d) ways to
minimize the burden of the collection of information on
respondents, including through the use of automated collection
techniques or other forms of information technology. Comments
submitted in response to this notice will be summarized and/or
included in the request for OMB approval of this information
collection; they also will become a matter of public record.
DATES: Comments regarding this proposed information collection
must be received on or before August 30, 2005. If you anticipate
difficulty in submitting comments within that period, contact the
person listed below as soon as possible.
ADDRESSES: Written comments may be sent to: Christine Chalk,
Office of Science, SC-1.22, U.S. Department of Energy, 1000
Independence Ave. SW., Washington, DC 20585. or by fax at
202-586-7203, or by e-mail at
christine.chalk@science.doe.gov and to: Sharon A. Evelin,
Director, IM-11, U.S. Department of Energy, 19901 Germantown
Road, Germantown, Maryland 20874 or by fax, 301-903-9061 or by
e-mail at sharon.evelin@hq.doe.gov. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION
CONTACT: Requests for additional information or copies of the
information collection instrument and instructions should be
directed to Christine Chalk at the address listed above in
ADDRESSES.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This package contains: (1) OMB No.
{enter ``New''{time} ; (2) Package Title: DOE 2005 Technical
Manpower Online Survey; (3) Type of Review: {New{time} ; (4)
Purpose: To improve planning efforts by improving the quality of
data regarding the numbers and types of personnel supported
through research grants; (5) Respondents: 366; (6) Estimated
Number of Burden Hours: approximately 17 minutes per respondent
times 366 respondents is 103.7 hours. Statutory Authority:
Department of Energy Organization Act (Pub.
L. 95- 91, as amended) Sec. 209 defines the duty and the
responsibilities of the Director of Office of Science to include:
Advising the Secretary with respect to education and training
activities required for effective short- and long-term basic and
applied research activities of the Department; and Advising the
Secretary with respect to grants and other forms of financial
assistance required for effective short- and long-term basic and
applied research activities of the Department.
Issued in Washington, DC, on June 23, 2005.
Sharon A. Evelin, Director, Records Management Division, Office
of the Chief Information Officer.
[FR Doc. 05-13008 Filed 6-30-05; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 6450-01-P
*****************************************************************
50 DOE: Agency Information Collection Extension
FR Doc 05-13009
[Federal Register: July 1, 2005 (Volume 70, Number 126)]
[Notices] [Page 38124-38125] From the Federal Register Online via
GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr01jy05-75]
AGENCY: Department of Energy.
ACTION: Notice and request for comments.
SUMMARY: The Department of Energy (DOE), pursuant to the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 intends to extend for three
years, an information collection package with the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) concerning Security requirements for
DOE contractors. The collections consist of information (1) for
the nuclear materials control and accountability for DOE-owned
and leased facilities and DOE-owned nuclear materials at other
facilities that are exempt from licensing by the NRC; (2) for the
protection of classified information, special nuclear materials
and other national security assets (DOE site self- assessments
and site security plans); and (3) on DOE Federal and contractors
traveling to foreign countries; for tracking and recording
background information on foreign nationals having access to DOE
facilities and information; and collection of Foreign Ownership,
Control or Influence data from bidders on DOE contracts requiring
personnel security clearances. Comments are invited on: (a)
Whether the extended collection of information is necessary for
the proper performance of the functions of the agency, including
whether the information shall have practical utility; (b) the
accuracy of the agency's estimate of the burden of the proposed
collection of information, including the validity of the
methodology and assumptions used; (c) ways to enhance the
quality, utility, and clarity of the information to be collected;
and (d) ways to minimize the burden of the collection of
information on respondents, including through the use of
automated collection techniques or other forms of information
technology.
Comments submitted in response to this notice will be summarized
and/or included in the request for OMB approval of this
information collection.
[[Page 38125]] They also will become a matter of public record.
DATES: Comments regarding this proposed information collection
must be received on or before August 30, 2005. If you anticipate
difficulty in submitting comments within that period, contact the
person listed below as soon as possible.
ADDRESSES: Written comments may be sent to: Kathy Murphy, SP-1.22
Germantown Building, U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 Independence
Ave SW., Washington, DC 20585-1290. Or by fax at 301- 903-6081 or
by e-mail at Kathy.murphy@hq.doe.gov and to: Sharon A. Evelin,
Director, IM-11/Germantown Building, U.S. Department of Energy,
1000 Independence Ave SW., Washington, DC 20585-1290. Or by fax
at (301) 903-9061 or by e-mail at sharon.evelin@hq.doe.gov FOR
FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Requests for additional information
or copies of the information collection instrument and
instructions should be directed to Kathy Murphy at the address
listed above in ADDRESSES.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This package contains: (1) OMB No.
1910- 1800; (2) Package Title: Security; (3) Type of Review:
renewal; (4) Purpose: for DOE management to exercise management
oversight and control over its contractors; (5) Respondents:
39,136; (6) Estimated Number of Burden Hours: 249,955.
Statutory Authority: Department of Energy Organization Act,
Public Law 95-91, of August 4, 1977.
Issued in Washington, DC, on June 27, 2005.
Sharon A. Evelin, Director, Records Management Division, Office
of the Chief Information Officer.
[FR Doc. 05-13009 Filed 6-30-05; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 6450-01-P
*****************************************************************
NOTE: In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. section 107 this
material is distributed without profit or payment to those who
have expressed a prior interest in receiving this information for
non-profit research and educational purposes only. For more
information go to:
*****************************************************************