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Send News Stories to news@energy-net.org with title on subject
line and first line of body
NUCLEAR POLICY
1 Xinhua: Iran softens stance on resumption of enrichment activities
2 Recent Events In Iran, Dpr Of Korea Should Spur On Work Of UN Nuclea
3 INSIDE JoongAng Daily: Nuclear conference keeps seat for North
4 INSIDE JoongAng Daily: China is said to want U.S. to engage North
5 US: HoustonChronicle.com: Part of energy bill to be revealed
6 US: TomPaine.com: Bolton's Yellowcake
7 US: Tri-Valley Herald: Critics smother bunker-buster
8 [du-list] PLEASE READ Important NPT Info
9 The Hindu: No change in nuclear policy, says India
10 AFP: India successfully test fires nuclear-capable surface missile
NUCLEAR REACTORS
11 US: [shundahaialert] Accelerating the timeline for "temporary"
12 RIA Novosti: Damaged Chernobyl Reactor to Receive New Cover
13 US: APP.COM: Safety upgrade vowed at reactor
14 US: NRC: Proposed Generic Communication; Clarification of Post-Fire
NUCLEAR SECURITY
15 Soviets Planned Nuclear First Strike to Preempt West, Documents
16 Did US torpedo the Russian submarine?
17 INSIDE JoongAng Daily: World watches 1 tunnel of 8,200 in North
NUCLEAR SAFETY
18 US: Spectrum: Downwinders need answers while there is still time
19 US: AxisofLogic: Louisanna: Toxic Tours of Duty? Historic legislatio
20 AxisofLogic: Horror Of US Depleted Uranium In Iraq Threatens World
21 US: DallasNews.com: Midlothian: Facing possible suit, industry denie
22 US: NRC: Nuclear Management Company, LLC; Notice of Consideration of
23 US: NRC: Nuclear Management Company, LLC; Notice of Consideration of
24 US: USATODAY.com: 'Downwinders' case finally goes to court
NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE
25 Las Vegas RJ: YUCCA MOUNTAIN: Panel adds $10 million to request
26 Las Vegas SUN: Columnist Jeff German: Gibbons has late awakening
27 Las Vegas SUN: House panel OKs funds for moving nuke waste
28 US: Platts: US House panel approves funding for interim nuclear wast
29 Mail & Guardian: 'No final home for nuke waste'
30 US: Salt Lake Tribune: 34 now-closed bases are still toxic despite
31 US: Salt Lake Tribune: Panel: Send N-waste to temporary site by '06
32 Greenpeace: Leak forces Sellafield to close
33 US: Courier-Post: Judge: Let water out of landfill
34 US: Las Vegas SUN: Hawthorne Army Depot on proposed base closing lis
35 US: Bradenton Herald: Tallevast tribute planned
PEACE
US DEPT. OF ENERGY
36 Seattle Post-Intelligencer: Closing arguments heard on Hanford
37 Tri-City Herald: Panel agrees to restore Hanford budget
38 SF Chronicle: BERKELEY / UC has big rival bidding to run Los Alamos
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FULL NEWS STORIES
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1 Xinhua: Iran softens stance on resumption of enrichment activities
www.xinhuanet.com
www.chinaview.cn 2005-05-13 19:22:22
TEHRAN, May 13 (Xinhuanet) -- Iran has softened its stance
on the declared resumption of uranium enrichment activities, but
stressed that it will never abandon its rights on peaceful
nuclear technology, the official IRNA news agency reported on
Friday.
"Iran plans to continue talks with the European Union (EU)
but it will never abandon its inalienable right to use nuclear
technology for peaceful purposes," Foreign Minister Kamal
Kharazi was quoted as saying.
Kharazi said that Tehran would remain committed to the
Non-Proliferation Treaty and the confidence-building
measures,referring to the suspension of uranium enrichment that
Iran has repeatedly threatened to restart.
Meanwhile, Gholam Reza Aghazadeh, Vice-President and Head of
Iran's Atomic Energy Organization, told state television Friday
that Iran's resumption of some enrichment activities was
"certain"but Tehran might delay it for a while.
Iran's softened attitude came soon after the EU and
Washington warned that Tehran would confront "serious
consequences" if the resumption were carried out.
Tehran is currently in negotiations with the EU on its
nuclear issue, and the EU has been trying hard to talk Iran out
of its work on building nuclear reactors.
Iran, accused by the United States of developing nuclear
weapons secretly, insists that it will never give up its
legitimate rightson nuclear technology and its related
activities are completely peaceful.
Due to its dissatisfaction with the "prolonged
negotiations",Iran recently threatened to resume part of the
uranium enrichment activities, which it suspended last November
to build confidence with the EU. Enditem
Copyright ©2003 Xinhua News Agency. All rights reserved.
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2 Recent Events In Iran, Dpr Of Korea Should Spur On Work Of UN Nuclear Review Conference - Annan
Date: Fri, 13 May 2005 14:01:01 -0400
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RECENT EVENTS IN IRAN, DPR OF KOREA SHOULD SPUR ON WORK OF UN NUCLEAR
REVIEW CONFERENCE – ANNAN
New York, May 13 2005 2:00PM
United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan said today that recent
developments with the nuclear programmes in Iran and the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) illustrated how important
it was for parties currently in New York reviewing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) to speed up their work.
Just back from visits to Moscow and Geneva, Mr. Annan <"http://www.un.org/apps/sg/offthecuff.asp?nid=728">told
reporters on his way
into UN Headquarters that recent events showed the importance of
making progress at the <"http://www.un.org/events/npt2005/">2005
Review Conference of State Parties to the NPT.
Countries are nearly halfway through their month-long session, emerging
from a near two-week deadlock just 48 hours ago to announce
that they had <"http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/dc2963.doc.htm">agreed
on an agenda that will allow them to begin their work.
The President of the Conference yesterday <"http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2005/NPTBrf050512.doc.htm">called
this a "promising"
but "very tiny first step," with much work ahead.
Today, Mr. Annan said he was concerned that it took two weeks to
agree on an agenda, adding, "I hope they will accelerate their work."
Addressing the Iranian issue, he said it was not out of the question
that talks between Iran and three European nations would continue,
while for the DPRK, he hoped six-party talks – including China,
Japan, Russia, the United States and the Republic of Korea –
would succeed, calling them "the only game in town."
Mr. Annan also noted that the UN has been assisting the DPRK with
humanitarian aid and also encouraging it to cooperate on the nuclear
front.
Meanwhile, in other news from the NPT review, the Conference's General
Committee, which handles questions of procedure, concluded
its meeting yesterday afternoon with no agreement yet to recommend
to the plenary session the allocation of items on the agenda to
the three Main Committees. Intensive consultations continued this
morning among the Main Committee chairs and regional groups.
2005-05-13 00:00:00.000
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3 INSIDE JoongAng Daily: Nuclear conference keeps seat for North
May 14, 2005 KST 13:34 (GMT+9
May 14, 2005 ¤Ń Despite North Korea's withdrawal from the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, a review conference on the
1970 accord is keeping a seat open for Pyongyang in the hope
that it will return to the convention, Reuters reported
yesterday. Among the 189 nations that have ratified the treaty,
delegates from 188 are attending the meeting, which started May
2, to strengthen its provisions. North Korea announced its
decision to renounce the treaty twice, in 1994 and 2003.
"Politically there should be an open door in case they decide
to return," said Brazil's delegate and president of the
conference, Sergio de Queiroz Duarte, who has custody of North
Korea's nameplate.
The nuclear nonproliferation treaty bars nuclear arms
development programs by non-nuclear weapon states, and bans the
transfer of nuclear weapons technology by nuclear armed states.
Copyright by Joins.com, Inc. Terms of Use |
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4 INSIDE JoongAng Daily: China is said to want U.S. to engage North
May 14, 2005 KST 13:34 (GMT+9)
May 14, 2005 ¤Ń BEIJING ˇŞ After strenuous U.S. efforts to
convince China to pressure North Korea into returning to nuclear
disarmament negotiations, a leading Japanese politician says
that what Beijing wants is for Washington to give Pyongyang
ground and engage in direct talks in order to revive the
six-party effort to resolve the crisis.
Yoshito Sengoku, chairman of the Policy Research Committee of
Japan's main opposition Democratic Party, said Thursday that in
a recent meeting in Beijing with Wang Jiarui, head of the
Chinese Communist Party Central Committee's International
Department, Mr. Wang urged Tokyo to convince Washington to
explain to Pyongyang the harsh rhetoric U.S. Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice used to describe North Korea.
Ms. Rice called the communist country "an outpost of tyranny" at
her Senate confirmation hearing in January and Pyongyang has
been demanding an apology. Since then she has said that she will
not engage in any "semantic analysis."
Mr. Sengoku told reporters that Mr. Wang also said that Beijing
favors some sort of direct communication between Washington and
Pyongyang in order to resume the six-party talks. The Japanese
politician quoted Mr. Wang as saying that the North would have
no excuse not to return to the negotiations if such contact is
established. Washington has repeatedly said that it would only
accept bilateral talks within the framework of the six-party
talks. Mr. Wang reportedly also warned Pyongyang that Beijing
would react strongly to a North Korean nuclear test. Quoting
unnamed U.S. officials, U.S. media have hinted at such a
possibility.
Separately, in an interview with a U.S. newspaper, Yang Xiyu, a
senior Foreign Ministry official and Beijing's top expert on the
North Korea nuclear problem, also directed blame for the current
impasse at Washington, saying Mr. Bush destroyed the atmosphere
for negotiations when he labeled the North's leader, Kim Jong
Il, a "tyrant" in late April. Pyongyang responded by calling Mr.
Bush a "philistine and hooligan."
Mr. Yang also urged Washington to establish some informal
channel with Pyongyang as a measure to build confidence.
Together the reported remarks of the Chinese officials suggest
how Beijing wants to approach the problem.
On Tuesday, Liu Jianchao, China's Foreign Ministry spokesman,
said Beijing opposed "strong-arm tactics" ˇŞ such as a threat to
cut off energy supplies ˇŞ to bring North Korea back to the
negotiation table, something that Washington would like Beijing
to do to break the impasse.
In other developments, Song Min-soon, Seoul's top representative
to the six-party talks, who is visiting Washington to discuss
how to revive negotiations said on Thursday that South Korea and
the United States have agreed to step up efforts and strengthen
"constructive diplomatic measures." Mr. Song didn't offer
details but said that at this point forceful measures are not
being considered.
by Yoo Kwang-jong, Brian Lee africanu@joongang.co.kr>
Copyright by Joins.com, Inc. Terms of Use |
*****************************************************************
5 HoustonChronicle.com: Part of energy bill to be revealed
May 13, 2005, 12:31AM
Senate version deals with coal, nuclear issues
By TOM DOGGETT
Reuters News Service
WASHINGTON - The Senate Energy Committee will unveil an energy
bill today that would boost U.S. production of coal and nuclear
energy, although more contentious measures on oil, natural gas
and automobile fuel efficiency are still being drafted,
committee leaders said Thursday.
The House of Representatives approved its version of energy
legislation last month. President Bush wants Congress to send
him a final energy package by late summer.
Republican and Democratic members of the Senate energy panel
have been meeting privately for months to draft a bill. Today,
the committee will release a portion of its energy bill related
to coal, electricity, hydrogen and certain nuclear power issues
that have been generally agreed upon.
The full committee will meet next Tuesday through Thursday to
fine-tune and vote on those provisions in the energy bill.
However, other contentious provisions in the bill relating to
renewable energy, oil and natural gas, and motor fuel and
vehicle issues are still being worked on by congressional staff
members.
The committee is scheduled to vote on that remaining bill
language during the week of May 23. If that schedule is kept,
the entire energy bill could be sent to the Senate floor for
debate before the Memorial Day holiday recess at the end of this
month.
The Senate bill will not contain language in the House
legislation that would open Alaska's Arctic National Wildlife
Refuge to oil drilling, because leaders have expressed a
preference to include that in annual budget legislation.
Pete Domenici, the Republican chairman of the energy committee,
has also refused to include any protection from lawsuits for oil
companies that make the water-polluting gasoline additive MTBE.
Last year's energy bill died in Congress largely because House
Majority Leader Tom DeLay of Sugar Land insisted that an energy
bill must shield the industry from product liability lawsuits
for MTBE and give it some $2 billion in transition costs to make
other products.
Those two major differences will have to be settled by a joint
Senate-House conference committee that will hammer out the
language for a final package. Return to top
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6 TomPaine.com: Bolton's Yellowcake
Ray McGovern
May 11, 2005
Ray McGovern spent 27 years as a CIA analyst and is a founding
member of Veteran Intelligence Professionals for Sanity, a group
of 50 former intelligence community members formed in January
2003. He now works at Tell the Word, the publishing arm of the
ecumenical Church of the Saviour in Washington, DC.
What role did John Bolton play in the Bush administration's
efforts to manufacture the intelligence needed to justify the
invasion of Iraq? As it turns out, a hidden but important role.
Remember the "yellowcake from Niger?"
Briefly reported last week in Steve Clemons' was that a
Congressional subcommittee, citing a State Department inspector
general's report, found that Bolton ordered and received updates
on the notorious "Fact Sheet" of Dec. 19, 2002 that claimed Iraq
had been trying to procure uranium "yellowcake" from Niger. In
other words, John Bolton played a key role in ordering that
discredited intelligence be used to support the president's case
for war, three months before the attack on Iraq.
A Plan To Fix The Facts
TomPaine.com readers, unlike those malnourished by "mainstream
media," were among the first published by the London Sunday
Times on May 1, in which the head of British intelligence told
Prime Minister Tony Blair that President George W. Bush had
decided to make war on Iraq. The date, you will remember, was
July 23, 2002long before the president consulted Congress, and
long before any intelligence was cooked up to "justify" such a
decision.
The official minutes of that meeting show that the U.K.
intelligence chief, Richard Dearlove, just back from
consultations in Washington with then-CIA director George Tenet
and other officials, announced matter-of-factly that the attack
on Iraq is to be "justified by the conjunction of terrorism and
weapons of mass destruction." British Foreign Secretary Jack
Straw is quoted as confirming that Bush has decided on war, but
interjects ruefully that the case for WMD was "thin." Not a
problem, says Dearlove, "Intelligence and facts were being fixed
around the policy."
Boltonization
But how does this kind of "fixing" play out? Insights leap out
of recently declassified email messages from the office of
Undersecretary of State John Bolton, archdeacon of
politicization. I was particularly struck today to learn from
the Washington Post that Bolton's principal aide and chief
enforcer, Frederick Fleitz, is actually a CIA analyst on loan to
Bolton. In this light, his behavior in trying to cook
intelligence to the recipe of high policy is even more
inexcusable. CIA analysts, particularly those on detail to
policy departments, have no business playing the enforcer of
policy judgments, have no business conjuring up "intelligence
around the policy."
Fleitz must have flunked Ethics and Intelligence Analysis 101.
Or perhaps the CIA does not offer the course any more. This is
the same Fleitz who "explained" to State Department's
intelligence analyst Christian Westermann that it was "a
political judgment as to how to interpret this data [on Cuba's
biological weapons program] and the I.C. [intelligence
community] should do as we asked."
Emails released more recently show Fleitz acting as stalking
horse for Bolton to make sure the intelligence fit the policies
Bolton was pushing. Fleitz is furious that State Department
intelligence experts feel it their duty to demur on
Bolton/Fleitz judgments regarding the efficacy of missile export
controls against China. Fleitz, whose home office at CIA is the
one which gave us "high confidence" judgments on the presence of
WMD in Iraq, apparently ordered up analysis from CIA to suit his
boss' strongly held judgment that the controls on exports to
China were deficient.
Not surprisingly, Bolton liked the analysis that was served up
by Fleitz' CIA colleagues and told him to pass it to Deputy
Secretary of State Richard Armitage. But State's intelligence
analysts had the temerity to do their job, and attached a cover
memo taking the opposite position, viewing the export controls
positively. Questioned on this by Senate staffers last week,
Fleitz admitted that his experience in his CIA home office gave
him a personal stake in how the analysis was treated. This is
doubly inappropriate.
The idea of seconding intelligence analysts to policy
departments dates back almost three decades to a time when many
analysts found themselves working in a vacuum, blissfully
unaware of policymakers' interests and needs. The analysts'
(otherwise laudable) search for relevance has now swung the
pendulum too far in the other direction, with folks like Fleitz
"cherry-picked" by folks like Bolton to "support" policy in
wholly inappropriate ways. That top CIA officials allow the
Boltons of this administration to get away with that shows CIA
managers to be weak, witting and willing accomplices in this
corruption of the intelligence process.
Enter The Yellowcake
The Fleitz technique is one way to Boltonize intelligence, but
there are other ways to counter attempts by intelligence
analysts to "tell it like it is," when "like it is" needs to be
"fixed" around a policy. Just go around the analysts.
An instructive example of this can be seen by harkening back to
a key juncture in the saga on Iraqi "weapons of mass
destruction," in which Bolton achieved his aims by simply
cutting State Department intelligence analysts out of the flow.
Painful as it is to bring up the embarrassing canard about Iraq
seeking uranium in Niger, that sad chapter illustrates how
Bolton operates when he knows he cannot bully intelligence
community analysts to come up with the desired "analysis."
Before President Bush's key speech on Oct. 7, 2002 setting the
stage for Congress' vote on the war three days later, then-CIA
director Tenet personally intervened to prevent the president
from using spurious "intelligence" on the alleged attempts to
acquire "yellowcake" (the ore from which unenriched uranium is
extracted) from Africa.
Just two months later, however, this canard reappeared in an
official State Department "Fact Sheet" dated Dec. 19, debunking
Baghdad's submission to the U.N. Security Council accounting for
Iraqi weapons programs. The "Fact Sheet" directly cited the
"yellowcake" deal as proof that Saddam Hussein was lying to the
United States about his nuclear program (which had been
"reconstituted" only in the rhetoric of Bolton's patron, Dick
Cheney).
Small problem: State's intelligence analysts had long shared
CIA's skepticism about that report. Indeed, in the National
Intelligence Estimate of Oct. 1, 2002 they had branded it
"dubious."
What accounts for new life being injected into this canard? We
learned some time ago from a former senior Bush State Department
official that the impetus came from Bolton's office. And now we
have documentary proof, thanks to a State Department Inspector
General investigation, the results of which were shared with a
congressional subcommittee. In sum, when Bolton realized that
the Iraq-Niger report itself left most analysts holding their
noses (even before it was established that it was based on crude
forgeries), his office inserted the bogus story into the
official State Department "Fact Sheet" without clearing it with
the department's own intelligence analysts. Easy.
This strongly suggests that it was also no accident that a month
later the yellowcake fable found its way into the president's
state-of-the-union address. Bolton's rogue operation ensured the
subsequent embarrassment of one and all when the head of the
U.N.'s International Atomic Energy Agency, Mohammed El Baradei
declared the reports "not authentic," forcing both White House
officials and George Tenet to apologize.
Bolton kept his head down during all this, doing all he could to
disguise his involvement in the "Fact Sheet" misadventure.
Indeed, the House Committee on Government Reform's Subcommittee
on National Security found that "the State Department
deliberately concealed unclassified information about the role
of John Bolton, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control, in
the creation of a fact sheet that falsely claimed that Iraq
sought uranium from Niger."
In a letter of Sept. 25, 2003, State told the subcommittee that
"Bolton did not play a role in the creation of this document."
However, subcommittee investigators subsequently obtained access
to a State Department Inspector General report that showed that
Bolton not only ordered that the Fact Sheet be created, but also
received updates on its development.
Later, Bolton fell back on his default modus operandi-the
by-now-familiar attempts to fire for their insolence analysts,
managers, senior U.N. officialsit doesn't matter. Late last
year, Bolton led a one-man, one-country vendetta aimed at
preventing the well-respected El Baradei from getting another
term as Director of the U.N.'s International Atomic Energy
Agency. That quixotic campaign was unprecedented in its
vindictiveness and won the U.S. no friends.
And this is the president's nominee for ambassador to the United
Nations. Remarkable.
[Posted: 05/11/05 20:00; Revised 05/12/05 08:22]
TomPaine.com.] [ /]
[ /]
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7 Tri-Valley Herald: Critics smother bunker-buster
Article Last Updated: 05/13/2005 04:42:25 AM
Actions in House bar experiments, deny funding for new nuclear
weapon
By Ian Hoffman, STAFF WRITER
In a two-pronged assault Thursday, congressional critics of a
bunker-busting H-bomb denied permission for the U.S. Energy
Department to experiment on the weapon and at the same time
eliminated money for those experiments.
With the Senate expected to clear the weapon, the House maneuvers
don't necessarily spell an end for the Robust Nuclear Earth
Penetrator.
But the decisions of two Republican-led committees suggest the
administration is losing support for adding a newly modified bomb
to the U.S. arsenal.
"What this says is that support for the Robust Nuclear Earth
Penetrator continues to erode," said Daryl Kimball, executive
director of the Arms Control Association in Washington, D.C. "The
proponents for RNEP will have a more difficult time sustaining a
program" in the face of opposition from two key committees.
Weapons scientists at Lawrence Livermore and Sandia labs in
California were halted last year from testing a rough design of
the bomb, intended as a last-resort threat to the hardened
underground hideaways of foreign adversaries and their weaponry.
Scientists believe they've designed the world's most rugged
weapon of mass destruction, capable of plunging the equivalent of
a million tons of TNT into solid rock and sending seismic shock
waves 1,000 feet down to crush bunkers and tunnels. They want to
replace the bomb's nuclear explosive with sensitive instruments
and sling it with a rocket into a block of concrete to test its
survival in rock.
The Bush administration is making its strongest push to date for
such a bomb, with Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld making a
personal pitch to key lawmakers, according to congressional
aides.
But the administration's promotion of the nuclear penetrator
comes as diplomats debating the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
accuse the United States of not doing enough to reduce its
reliance on nuclear arms.
Opponents also gained support froma recent National Academy of
Sciences study concluding that while the penetrator could destroy
deep bunkers — assuming they could be targeted accurately — it
also could kill a million or more people on the surface with the
blast and radioactive fallout.
Rep. Ellen Tauscher, D-Alamo, and Rep. John Spratt, D-S.C.,
persuaded a House Armed Services subcommittee to take spending
authority on the weapon away from the Energy Department and give
it to the Defense Department, for experiments on generic
bunker-busting weapons, not necessarily nuclear ones.
"I continue to vehemently oppose using taxpayer dollars to fund
a RNEP weapon that poses tremendous and unpredictable risks,"
Tauscher said. She said the deal with House Republicans "stymies
the Bush Administration's effort to create new nuclear weapons
over the objections of Congress and provides our military with
resources to continue defeating conventional 'bunker busters.'"
Government officials say the deal could bar nuclear bunker buster
experiments at Energy Department facilities but allow them at
military facilities.
But the Tauscher-Spratt deal marks the first time in three years
that opponents of the weapon have curtailed government authority
to work on it.
David Culp, who monitors nuclear-weapons matters for a Quaker
group, the Friends Committee on National Legislation, said
Republicans realized political backing for the bomb was falling
apart.
"So rather than risk having a vote and being defeated on the
floor, they did it themselves," he said.
The more powerful statement came from the House Energy and Water
Appropriations Committee, where chairman David Hobson, R-Ohio,
eliminated the administration's requested $4 million for the
bunker buster experiments.
His Senate counterparts are expected to approve the spending,
setting the stage this summer or early fall for lawmakers of
both chambers to agree on a compromise.
© 2005 ANG Newspapers
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8 [du-list] PLEASE READ Important NPT Info
Date: Fri, 13 May 2005 18:34:25 -0700
The 2005 NPT RevCon is in full swing at the UN. This is one of the
most important NPT conferences in a long time and the media is not
covering it to any substantial degree. There are so many things
going on there that we as activists need to know about. So how do we
find out what's going on there on a day to day basis? Please check
out asap, http://www.banningthebomb.tv
BTB provides up-to-the-minute video reports and interviews from the
NPT RevCon. At BTB, you will also see video coverage of: daily NPT
meetings; what's happening at the U.S. nuclear labs; international
developments in nuclear policy, and related topics.
Some examples of what is available on BTB right now include:
Ambassador Sergio Duarte,
President of the seventh NPT Review Conference
"On the adoption of the NPT Agenda "
Walter Cronkite,
Eminent Journalist
"Opening Remarks to the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation Panel Discussion "
Dr. Daniel Ellsberg,
Independent International Security Analyst
"Discussing the German Delegation's announcement to ask the U.S to
remove their nuclear weapons "
As well as interviews with some rockin' activists whom we all know and love:
Susi Snyder,
Secretary-General
WILPF-International
William Peden,
Head of Delegation
Greenpeace International
Greg Mello,
Executive Director
Los Alamos Study Group
Loulena Miles,
Staff Attorney
Tri Valley C.A.R.E.s
and many others.
BTB is updated daily, so check back every day to keep up to the
minute on the 2005 happenings (and unhappenings), and please, spread
the word.
Thank you for all that you do.
[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor --------------------~-->
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Network for Good is THE place to support health awareness efforts!
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9 The Hindu: No change in nuclear policy, says India
Friday, May 13, 2005 : 1900 Hrs
New Delhi, May. 13 (PTI): The Government today said the new
legislation to prohibit unlawful activities in relation to
weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and their means of delivery
in no way indicated any change in India's nuclear policy.
"It does not indicate any change in our nuclear policy. It does
not in any manner constrain our nuclear programme, civilian or
strategic," External Affairs Ministry spokesman Navtej Sarna,
told reporters here.
Describing the Weapons of Mass Destruction and their Delivery
Systems (Prohibition of Unlawful Activities) Bill, 2005 approved
by Parliament as an "overarching and integrated" legislation, he
said India was determined to utilise advanced technologies for
its security, welfare of its people and to meeting the nation's
developmental requirements.
Through updated controls for the export of WMD-usable materials,
equipment and technologies and prohibitions related to non-State
actors, India fulfilled its mandatory obligations under relevant
UN Security Council resolution.
He said the legislation and its passage underlined India's role
as a responsible nuclear power and its respect for such
responsibility arising from the possession of sensitive dual use
technologies.
India has stated that it was fully committed to safeguard its
security as a Nuclear Weapon State and to deepen its autonomous
scientific and technical capability for meeting its security
imperatives and developmental goals.
Copyright © 2005, The Hindu. Republication or redissemination of
*****************************************************************
10 AFP: India successfully test fires nuclear-capable surface missile
Thursday May 12, 07:57
BHUBANESHWAR, India (AFP) - India successfully tested a
nuclear-capable missile from a test range in the eastern state of
Orissa, a defence ministry spokesman said.
The test of the Prithvi-1 (earth) missile took place at the
Chandipur-on-Sea test site in the eastern state of Orissa at 1:04
pm (0734 GMT), the spokesman said on Thursday. The missile has a
range of 250 kilometres (190 miles) and can carry conventional or
low-yield nuclear warheads.
Nuclear-capable India and Pakistan, which have fought three wars,
two over the disputed Himalayan territory of Kashmir, routinely
carry out missile tests and normally notify each other in advance
under an agreement. The 8.5-metre (28-foot) surface-to-surface
missile, first tested in February 1988, is under trials before
its induction into the army's arsenal, other defence officials
said.
The missile was lasted tested on March 19. The missile is
designed for battlefield use against troops or armoured
formations, defence officials said. Two other variants of the
Prithvi, with a strike range of between 250 and 350 kilometres
would be handed over to the navy and air force once tests were
completed.
Copyright © 2005 AFP. All rights reserved. All information
*****************************************************************
11 [shundahaialert] Accelerating the timeline for "temporary"
Date: Fri, 13 May 2005 18:34:22 -0700
http://www.sltrib.com/utah/ci_2731895
Panel: Send N-waste to temporary site by '06
By Robert Gehrke
The Salt Lake Tribune
Salt Lake Tribune
WASHINGTON - A House subcommittee wants the Energy Department to start
sending nuclear reactor waste to an interim storage site by next year.
The proposal's possible impact on a planned temporary storage center in
Utah, which would be operated by private owners, is unclear. But the House
backers of a new public waste storage alternative want it in place before
the Utah site is scheduled to be operating.
Rep. David Hobson, R-Ohio, chairman of the House subcommittee that sets
the Energy Department budget, on Thursday added $10 million to the bill,
directing DOE to select one or more above-ground sites that can store
spent fuel by 2006.
The temporary site would address the need for storage until a permanent
repository in Yucca Mountain, Nev., can be opened.
Private Fuel Storage, a consortium of electric utilities, has proposed
a privately funded and operated fuel storage site on the Skull Valley Band
of Goshutes Indian reservation. PFS is awaiting a license from the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, but is not expected to be operating before 2007.
Hobson's language also asks the Energy Department to study reprocessing
spent fuel, and have a reprocessing technology selected by 2007.
Hobson told The Associated Press he wants to move the waste before the
opening of Yucca Mountain, which would occur in 2012 at the earliest.
"We're incurring a lot of litigation when we don't get the spent fuel
rods out from these power plants like we said we we're going to do," he
said. "This way we could eliminate that, cut down on the security problems
they have, and put them into some above-ground sites."
PFS spokeswoman Sue Martin said she could not say for certain how
Hobson's proposal might affect the Skull Valley proposal, assuming
Hobson's aggressive schedule could be met.
"It doesn't really change our plans because you see how long it's taken
to plan and go through the licensing process for our facility and it would
probably take DOE just as long. . . . In the meantime, the [power plants]
are continuing to run out of space," Martin said.
"I think it would be an important thing for Congress to approve, but it
doesn't obviate the need for our facility at this time."
She said it could mean the Skull Valley site would not be in operation
as long, adding "and that's fine."
The energy spending bill containing Hobson's storage proposal is still
in the early stages. It still would require approval of the House
Appropriations Committee, the full House and Senate and the president.
Thousands of tons of commercial reactor fuel and defense waste are
scattered around 39 states.
The Bush administration is committed to moving it to Yucca Mountain,
but a string of problems - most recently allegations that workers
falsified scientific data - have delayed the project.
*****************************************************************
12 RIA Novosti: Damaged Chernobyl Reactor to Receive New Cover
LONDON, May 13 (RIA Novosti's Alexander Smotrov). At a Thursday
meeting at the headquarters of the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, the donor countries for the
Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant have promised to spend around $200
million on a new safer cover for the ruin of its former Unit
Four.
In this amount, $185 million will come from G-8 member states
and the EU, the other $22 million from Ukraine. Notably, an EBRD
representative said, this is the first time that Russia also
makes its contribution to the project.
EBRD is in charge of the Chernobyl Shelter Fund with 28 member
states. The fund was able to collect around �600 million to
keep the plant safe. Together with the latest batch, the overall
aid will get close to $1 billion. The new cover - the primary
spending item, according to the fund - will be completed in
2008-2009.
EBRD president Jean Lemierre welcomed new funds and described
the move as a sign that the international community remains
committed to complete the Chernobyl shelter.
He also expressed his assurance that Ukraine would be able to
complete the project in good time and that the Ukrainian
leadership would watch closely where the Chernobyl money is
spent.
The Chernobyl nuclear blast of April 26, 1986 was a major
technological and humanitarian catastrophe of the 20th century.
After the blast, the European Community made a survey of cesium
contamination in Europe to find out that 17 countries with a
total area of 207, 500 sq km were affected by cesium activity in
excess of 1 Curie per square kilometer: 43,500 square km were
contaminated in Belarus, 59,300 square km in Russia, and 37,600
square km in Ukraine.
© 2005 "RIA Novosti"
*****************************************************************
13 APP.COM: Safety upgrade vowed at reactor
Asbury Park Press Online
NRC told system will help cure ills
Published in the Asbury Park Press 05/13/05
BY NICHOLAS CLUNN TOMS RIVER BUREAU
OVERSIGHT
While federal regulators gave the Oyster Creek nuclear power
plant good marks overall on how it operated in 2004, they found
five cases of reactor owner AmerGen failing to follow through on
plans to correct problems.
The most serious case stemmed from an incident in May 2003, when
workers, for the third time in eight years, failed to notice a
power line ruined by water. The faulty line caused the plant to
lose a power distributor connected to safety equipment.
As a result, operators shut down the reactor as a safety
precaution. This year, regulators will look more closely at how
AmerGen solves problems at the plant.
TOMS RIVER — Workers at the Oyster Creek nuclear power plant will
begin using a new computer system next month to help ensure
deficiencies are corrected, a change that will come four months
after federal regulators cited the plant as deficient in that
area.
The system, announced by plant Vice President Bud Swenson during
an annual safety assessment meeting with federal regulators
Thursday night, was described as more thorough, though it may
cause problems during its first four weeks in use.
Oyster Creek Manager Jim Randich said plant owner AmerGen did
not introduce the system because of the problem-resolution
finding by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission but had planned for
it all along.
Regulators found five cases of AmerGen failing to follow through
on plans to correct problems at the Lacey reactor in 2004. Most
of the problems were determined to pose little risk of a safety
problem but collectively indicated a need for plant managers to
be more attentive to resolving concerns faster, according to the
NRC.
Overall, regulators said the plant "preserved public health and
safety."
Although the thrust behind the presentation, held at the Ocean
County Administration Building on Hooper Avenue, was the safety
at Oyster Creek in 2004, several of the 50 people in the
audience were there to ask about AmerGen's plan to keep the
plant open for another 20 years past 2009.
For that to happen, AmerGen would need to ask the NRC for a
license renewal, an application for which the company plans to
submit by the end of July.
Dover resident Stephen Lazorchak, an engineer who once worked
for GPU Nuclear when that company owned the Oyster Creek plant,
asked how NRC officials could rationalize a renewed license for
a plant vulnerable to a 9/11-like attack with an aircraft.
An NRC official responded that regulators believe that the best
defense against an threatening aircraft lies in airport security
and in the military's ability to respond to an impending attack
of that sort. The official also noted that the potential for a
terrorist attack on nuclear plants is a threat that could affect
all plants and shouldn't be considered while assessing
individual reactors.
Phasing in new system
Swenson mentioned the new computer system after NRC officials
presented its safety assessment of Oyster Creek. Although the
new program may initially cause problems as a result of workers
getting used to it, additional AmerGen staff familiar with the
program from elsewhere in the company will be at Oyster Creek to
help with the change-over.
Oyster Creek's problem-resolution issue is partially based on a
safety violation that caused the reactor to shut down in May
2003. Workers then, for the third time in eight years, had
failed to notice a power line ruined by water.
Workers at the plant would have replaced the faulty cable if
they had labeled it correctly in 1996. Instead, it caused the
plant to lose a distributor that allocates power to
safety-related equipment. NRC regulations require plant
operators to shut down reactors as a safety measure when that
distributor doesn't work.
Regulators Thursday night also reiterated their concern about a
finding they announced in March. That mistake, regarded as an
administrative error by plant management, could have delayed
timely responses by authorities charged with protecting the
public during a radioactive release, according to the NRC.
The error would have allowed water used to cool the reactor to
drop farther than necessary for a "general emergency"
declaration to occur, said Neil A. Sheehan, an NRC spokesman.
A general emergency would occur if a reactor has been seriously
damaged and risked releasing radiation beyond plant boundaries.
The only such emergency happened in 1979 during a partial
meltdown of the reactor core at Three Mile Island in
Pennsylvania.
The NRC regarded the March mistake at Oyster Creek as "white" on
a four-color scale: green, white, yellow and red, in ascending
order of severity.
Of the country's 103 commercial reactors, Oyster Creek had one
of 11 "white" findings in 2004, according to NRC figures. The
commission recorded 778 "green" findings during that same period
and none in the other two categories.
Nicholas Clunn: (609) 978-4597 or nclunn@app.com
Go Back | Subscribe to the Asbury Park Press
*****************************************************************
14 NRC: Proposed Generic Communication; Clarification of Post-Fire Safe-
FR Doc E5-2377
[Federal Register: May 13, 2005 (Volume 70, Number 92)] [Notices]
[Page 25622-25628] From the Federal Register Online via GPO
Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr13my05-94]
Shutdown Circuit Regulatory Requirements AGENCY: Nuclear
Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Notice of opportunity for public comment.
SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is
proposing to issue a regulatory information summary (RIS) to
clarify regulatory requirement issues associated with post-fire
safe-shutdown circuit analyses and protection, particularly the
requirements of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part
50 (10 CFR 50), Appendix R, which have been interpreted by
licensees in a manner that is not consistent with regulatory
expectations. The industry and NRC regional inspectors have
requested clarification of regulatory expectations with respect
to post-fire safe-shutdown circuits. In addition, clarification
of these requirements will assist licensees in evaluating the
transition to a risk-informed, performance-based fire protection
program.
Three terms are to be addressed in this RIS: ``any-and-all''
(with respect to spurious actuations), ``associated circuits,''
and ``emergency control station.'' Clarification of the term
``one-at-a- time'' (with respect to spurious actuations) will be
provided in a separate generic communication. For each term
addressed, this RIS identifies the applicable NRC regulatory
requirement, provides the regulatory expectation with respect to
the requirement, and specifies one acceptable approach to
achieving regulatory compliance.
Attachment 1 to this RIS provides additional discussion that
explains the basis for the regulatory expectations, including a
discussion of the various ways in which each term or phrase has
been interpreted by stakeholders.
This RIS also gives the staff's views on the use of Nuclear
Energy Institute (NEI) guidance document NEI 00-01, ``Guidance
for Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Circuit Analysis,'' Revision 1
(ML050310295), in complying with Appendix R. The deterministic
methodology presented in NEI 00-01, in conjunction with the
guidance in this RIS, is one acceptable approach to achieving
regulatory compliance with post-fire safe-shutdown circuit
protection requirements. Note that RIS 2004-03, Revision 1,
``Risk-Informed Approach for Post-Fire Safe-Shutdown Circuit
Inspections'' (ML042440791) provides guidance on conducting
risk-informed circuit inspections, whereas this RIS clarifies the
regulatory requirements for compliance with Appendix R.
This Federal Register notice is available through the NRC's
Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) under
accession number ML051110160.
DATES: Comment period expires July 12, 2005. Comments submitted
after this date will be considered if it is practical to do so,
but assurance of consideration cannot be given except for
comments received on or before this date.
ADDRESSES: Submit written comments to the Chief, Rules and
Directives Branch, Division of Administrative Services, Office of
Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Mail Stop
T6-D59, Washington, DC 20555-0001, and cite the publication date
and page number of this Federal Register notice. Written comments
may also be delivered to NRC Headquarters, 11545 Rockville Pike
(Room T-6D59), Rockville, Maryland, between 7:30 am and 4:15 pm
on Federal workdays.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION, CONTACT: Robert F. Radlinski at
301-415-3174 or by email , Chandu Patel at 301-415-3025 or email
, or Sunil Weerakkody at 301-415-2870 or by email at .
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2005-XX;
Clarification of Post-Fire Safe- Shutdown Circuit Regulatory
Requirements Addressees All holders of operating licenses for
nuclear power reactors, except those who have permanently ceased
operations and have certified that fuel has been permanently
removed from the reactor vessel.
Intent The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing
this
[[Page 25623]] regulatory issue summary (RIS) to clarify
regulatory requirement issues associated with post-fire
safe-shutdown circuit analyses and protection, particularly the
requirements of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part
50 (10 CFR 50), Appendix R, which have been interpreted by
licensees in a manner that is not consistent with regulatory
expectations.
The industry and NRC regional inspectors have requested
clarification of regulatory expectations with respect to
post-fire safe-shutdown circuits. In addition, clarification of
these requirements will assist licensees in evaluating the
transition to a risk-informed performance-based fire protection
program.
Three terms are to be addressed in this RIS: ``any-and-all''
(with respect to spurious actuations), ``associated circuits,''
and ``emergency control station.'' Clarification of the term
``one-at-a- time'' (with respect to spurious actuations) will be
provided in a separate generic communication. For each term
addressed, this RIS identifies the applicable NRC regulatory
requirement, provides the regulatory expectation with respect to
the requirement, and specifies one acceptable approach to
achieving regulatory compliance.
Attachment 1 to this RIS provides additional discussion that
explains the basis for the regulatory expectations, including a
discussion of the various ways in which each term or phrase has
been interpreted by stakeholders.
This RIS also gives the staff's views on the use of Nuclear
Energy Institute (NEI) guidance document NEI 00-01, ``Guidance
for Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Circuit Analysis,'' Revision 1
(ML050310295), in complying with Appendix R. The deterministic
methodology presented in NEI 00-01, in conjunction with the
guidance in this RIS, is one acceptable approach to achieving
regulatory compliance with post-fire safe-shutdown circuit
protection requirements. Note that RIS 2004-03, Revision 1,
``Risk-Informed Approach for Post-Fire Safe-Shutdown Circuit
Inspections'' (ML042440791) provides guidance on conducting
risk-informed circuit inspections, whereas this RIS clarifies the
regulatory requirements for compliance with Appendix R.
This RIS requires no action or written response on the part of an
addressee.
Background Information The regulatory requirements regarding
post-fire safe shutdown are contained in 10 CFR 50.48 and 10 CFR
Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion (GDC) 3.
Additionally, all nuclear power plants (NPPs) licensed to operate
prior to January 1, 1979, are required to comply with 10 CFR Part
50, Appendix R, Section III.G, ``Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown
Capability.'' All NPPs licensed to operate after January 1, 1979,
were evaluated against Section 9.5.1 of NUREG-0800, Standard
Review Plan (SRP). All NPP licensees are responsible for meeting
fire protection and license condition commitments made during the
establishment of their fire protection program.
The objective of the fire protection requirements and guidance is
to provide reasonable assurance that one train of systems
necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown is free of fire
damage. This includes protecting circuits whose fire-induced
failure could prevent the operation, or cause maloperation, of
equipment necessary to achieve and maintain post-fire
safe-shutdown. As part of its fire protection program, each
licensee performs a circuit analysis to identify these circuits
and to provide adequate protection against fire-induced failures.
Beginning in 1997, the NRC staff noticed that a series of
licensee event reports (LERs) identified plant-specific problems
related to potential fire-induced electrical circuit failures
that could prevent operation or cause maloperation of equipment
necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown. The staff
documented these problems in Information Notice 99-17, ``Problems
Associated With Post-Fire Safe- Shutdown Circuit Analysis.''
Based on the number of similar LERs, the NRC treated the issue
generically. In 1998, the NRC staff started to interact with
interested stakeholders in an attempt to understand the problem
and develop an effective risk-informed solution to the circuit
analysis issue. NRC also issued Enforcement Guidance Memorandum
(EGM) 98-002, Revision 2 (ML003710123), to provide a process for
treating inspection findings while the issues were being
clarified. Due to the number of different stakeholder
interpretations of the regulations, the NRC decided to
temporarily suspend the associated circuit portion of fire
protection inspections. This decision is documented in an NRC
memorandum from John Hannon to Gary Holahan dated November 29,
2000 (ML003773142). In 2001 the Electric Power Research Institute
(EPRI) and NEI performed a series of cable functionality fire
tests to further the nuclear industry's knowledge about the
nature and characteristics of fire-induced circuit failures,
particularly the potential for spurious equipment actuations
initiated by hot shorts. The Electric Power Research Institute
(EPRI) coordinated this effort and issued the final report,
``Spurious Actuation of Electrical Circuits Due to Cable Fires:
Results of an Expert Elicitation'' (Report No. 1006961, May
2002).\1\ The results of the testing were considered in the
preparation of NEI 00-01.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
---------- \1\ Additional analysis of the EPRI/NEI test results
can be found in NUREG/CR-6776, ``Cable Insulation Resistance
Measurements Made During Cable Fire Tests,'' which can be
accessed on the NRC's public Web site.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
---------- Over the past 5 years, the industry and the staff have
worked together to gain a better understanding of possible and
probable modes of circuit failures. This work has included
numerous meetings and facilitated public workshops. Based on this
work the staff has identified circuit configurations that are
likely to fail in the event of a fire and circuit configurations
that have little or no likelihood of failing. The results of this
work are reflected in RIS 2004-03 and in the revised inspection
procedures. Inspection of fire-induced safe- shutdown circuits
was resumed in January 2005.
The issues clarified in this RIS were discussed in an NRC public
meeting on October 14, 2004, in Atlanta, GA (Summary of October
2004 Public Meeting on Fire Protection in Atlanta, ML043290020).
The clarifications in this RIS have considered the comments
provided by stakeholders during the October meeting and
subsequent to the meeting.
Summary of Issue Although the NRC has issued a number of guidance
documents to assist licensees in assuring compliance with fire
protection requirements, certain terms related to post-fire
safe-shutdown circuit analysis have been interpreted differently
by stakeholders or in a manner inconsistent with our regulatory
expectations/requirements. In accordance with SECY-99-143,
``Revisions to Generic Communication Program,'' dated May 26,
1999 (ML992850037), the staff believes that a RIS is the
appropriate regulatory vehicle to address this need for
additional clarification. This RIS clarifies terms related to
post-fire safe-shutdown circuits to help a licensee understand
the staff's expectations with respect to regulatory requirements.
The variety of interpretations of the terms addressed in this RIS
is due in part to the previous lack of knowledge regarding the
potential for certain types of circuit failure mechanisms. The
cable fire tests performed by EPRI/NEI
[[Page 25624]] significantly increased the body of knowledge
available to the industry and the NRC with respect to
fire-induced circuit failures and their potential to cause
spurious actuations that could impact post-fire safe shutdown.
The staff positions presented in this RIS are justified based on
the potential safety significance of these issues and on
compliance with the current regulations applicable to these
circuits. The staff positions are also consistent with the
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) industry consensus
standard NFPA 805, ``Performance- Based Standard for Fire
Protection for Light Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants,''
2001 Edition, as they relate to deterministic- based fire
protection program features.
The positions presented in this RIS describe the bases for
compliance with the current deterministic regulations applicable
to post-fire safe-shutdown circuits. With the issuance of 10 CFR
50.48(c), licensees have the alternative of adopting a fire
protection licensing basis which allows the use of risk-informed,
performance-based methods to address program features that do not
comply with the deterministic regulations. In accordance with 10
CFR 50.12 and 10 CFR 50.90, licensees may also submit exemption
requests or license amendment requests for NRC's consideration
where deviations from the regulatory requirements can be
adequately justified for a plant-specific condition.
The deterministic methodology in NEI 00-01, Chapter 3, for
analysis of post-fire safe-shutdown circuits, in conjunction with
the guidance provided in this RIS, is one acceptable approach to
achieving regulatory compliance with post-fire safe-shutdown
circuit protection requirements. The risk significance analysis
methodology provided in Chapter 4 of NEI 00-01 should not be
applied as a basis for regulatory compliance except where an NFPA
805 licensing basis has been adopted in accordance with 10 CFR
50.48(c). Risk-informed or performance-based methodologies which
use the methods and information provided in NEI 00- 01 (e.g.,
Chapter 4 and Appendix B-1) may also be used to support exemption
requests for plants that have not adopted an NFPA 805 licensing
basis. Furthermore, regardless of the plant licensing basis, the
NRC endorses the NEI 00-01 guidance that ``all failures deemed to
be risk significant, whether they are clearly compliance issues
or not, should be placed in the plant Corrective Action Program
with an appropriate priority for action.'' The remaining sections
of NEI 00-01 provide acceptable circuit analysis guidance on both
the deterministic approach and the risk-informed,
performance-based approach.
The phrase ``one-at-a-time,'' as used to characterize
fire-induced hot shorts that cause spurious actuations that could
impact safe shutdown has been interpreted in a number of
different ways.
However, since the staff position on the regulatory basis for
this phrase may be considered a new staff position by some
stakeholders, the staff position on this phrase will be handled
in a separate generic communication.
Three terms are to be addressed in this RIS: ``any-and-all''
(with respect to spurious actuations), ``associated circuits,''
and ``emergency control station.'' The discussion for each term
includes a summary description of the regulatory requirement, a
statement of the NRC staff position and a method to achieve
compliance. A more detailed discussion of the staff's positions
is contained in the Attachment.
Any-and-All A. NRC Regulatory Requirement--Paragraph III.G.2 of
Appendix R states that ``cables or equipment, including
associated non-safety circuits that could prevent operation or
cause maloperation due to hot shorts, open circuits, or shorts to
ground, of redundant trains of systems necessary to achieve and
maintain hot shutdown conditions'' must be protected.
B. NRC Staff Position--The requirement to protect against ``any-
and-all'' spurious actuations is implicit in Paragraph III.G.2.
Post- fire safe-shutdown circuit analyses should address
any-and-all possible failures and combinations of multiple
failures caused by spurious actuations resulting from
fire-induced circuit failures in redundant systems in areas in
which the failures could impact safe shutdown (III.G.2 areas).
The requirement to protect against ``any-and-all'' possible
failures includes, for example, the requirement to protect
against a possible failure of a motor operated valve as a result
of a fire- induced spurious signal that could override the valve
motor's protective features, causing valve failure, where such
fire-induced valve damage could impair the capability to shut
down the plant and maintain it in a safe-shutdown condition.
C. Method To Achieve Compliance--The staff position described
above with respect to the term ``any-and-all'' is consistent with
the circuit analysis approach described in NEI 00-01, Revision 1.
The deterministic methodology presented in Chapter 3 and Appendix
B of NEI 00-01, in conjunction with the guidance provided in this
RIS, is one acceptable approach to achieving regulatory
compliance with respect to the application of the term
``any-and-all.'' Further discussion of the staff's position on
this issue is contained in the Attachment.
Associated Circuits A. NRC Regulatory Requirement--Appendix R,
Section III.G.2, states: ``Except as provided for in paragraph
G.3 of this section, where cables or equipment, including
associated non-safety circuits that could prevent operation or
cause maloperation due to hot shorts, open circuits, or shorts to
ground, of redundant trains of systems necessary to achieve and
maintain hot shutdown conditions are located within the same fire
area outside of primary containment, one of the following means
of ensuring that one of the redundant trains is free of fire
damage shall be provided * * *'' B. NRC Staff
Position--Any-and-all cables that could cause maloperation of
redundant trains in a III.G.2 area due to fire-induced hot shorts
must be protected. Unless approved by the NRC, post-fire
safe-shutdown circuit analyses may not credit operator manual
actions (under current regulations for plants that have not
adopted an NFPA 805 licensing basis) for protection against
spurious actuations caused by fire-induced failure of circuits
associated with a redundant safe shutdown train located in a
III.G.2 area. The requirement to protect ``associated'' circuits
includes a requirement to protect against circuits that are
themselves not directly required to perform safe-shutdown
function but which could cause a spurious actuation that could
impact safe shutdown.
Therefore, operator manual actions may not be credited for such
circuits.
C. Method To Achieve Compliance--The deterministic methodology
presented in Chapter 3 and Appendix B of NEI 00-01, in
conjunction with the guidance provided in this RIS, is one
acceptable approach to achieving regulatory compliance with
respect to the application of the term ``associated circuit''.
The NEI 00-01 approach to identifying circuits that must be
protected and to protecting those circuits is consistent with the
NRC position on this issue.
Further discussion of the staff's position on this issue is
contained in the Attachment.
[[Page 25625]] Emergency Control Station A. NRC Regulatory
Requirement--10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section I,
``Introduction and Scope,'' states: ``One train of equipment
necessary to achieve hot shutdown from either the control room or
emergency control station(s) must be maintained free of fire
damage by a single fire, including an exposure fire.'' Paragraph
III.G.1.a of Appendix R also refers to emergency control
stations.
B. NRC Staff Position--III.G.1 protection for redundant safe-
shutdown systems may not be claimed for redundant systems in a
III.G.2 area by crediting an operator manual action at an
emergency control station. Unless alternative or dedicated
shutdown capability is provided, redundant circuits credited for
post-fire safe shutdown and located in the same fire area must be
protected in accordance with III.G.2 without the use of emergency
control stations of any kind.
C. Method To Achieve Compliance--The deterministic methodology
presented in Chapter 3 and Appendix B of NEI 00-01, in
conjunction with the guidance provided in this RIS, is one
acceptable approach to achieving regulatory compliance with
respect to the application of the term ``emergency control
station.'' NEI 00-01 refers to the regulations, the plant
licensing basis, and NRC approvals for guidance on this issue.
The NEI guidance document also includes the NRC position on this
issue without commenting on the position.
Further discussion of the staff's position on this issue is
contained in the Attachment.
Backfit Discussion Some inspectors have not challenged
alternative licensee interpretations of the regulatory
requirements mentioned in this RIS. However, as stated in
NUREG-1409, ``Backfitting Guidelines,'' if a determination is
made that action is needed to bring the licensee back into
compliance with the regulations, no backfit analysis is required.
Section 3.3(1) of NUREG-1409 states that ``simply not challenging
a licensee's practice would not be considered tacit approval.''
Since this RIS does not change any staff position on the terms
addressed herein and does not require an action or written
response from licensees, this RIS is not a backfit under 10 CFR
50.109. Consequently, the staff did not perform a backfit
analysis.
Federal Register Notification The subject matter of this RIS was
discussed on October 14, 2004, at a public meeting in Atlanta,
Georgia. Stakeholder feedback was considered in developing the
final version of this RIS.
In addition, a notice of opportunity for public comment on this
RIS will be published in the Federal Register.
Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 In
accordance with the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement
Fairness Act of 1996, the NRC has determined that this action is
not a major rule and has verified this determination with the
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs of OMB.
Paperwork Reduction Act Statement This RIS does not contain
information collections and, therefore, is not subject to the
requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C.
3501 et seq.). Contact Please direct any questions about this
matter to the technical contact(s) or the Lead Project Manager
listed below, or to the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation (NRR) project manager.
Patrick L. Hilland, Chief, Reactor Operations Branch, Division of
Inspection Program Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation.
Technical Contact: Bob Radlinski, NRR/DSSA/SPLB, 301-415-3174. E-
mail: .
Lead Project Manager: Chandu Patel, NRR/DLPM, 301-415-3025.
E-mail: .
Note: NRC generic communications may be found on the NRC public
Web site, , under Electronic Reading Room/Document Collections.
Attachment 1--Discussion of Regulatory Expectations Post-Fire
Safe- Shutdown Circuit Analysis The following discussion provides
the background of each of the terms that have been clarified by
the RIS. This background discussion identifies the various
interpretations that have been applied to the terms and notes the
regulatory position and the basis for that position for each
interpretation.
Any-and-All Appendix R, paragraph III.G.2, does not identify any
exceptions to the type of post-fire safe-shutdown circuit
failures that must be protected against in accordance with
III.G.2. However, Generic Letter 86-10 (response to Question
5.3.1) describes two specific exceptions to the circuit
evaluation requirement of ``all possible functional failure
states.'' These two exceptions are (1) three-phase hot shorts in
proper sequence and (2) more than two hot shorts of the proper
polarity in ungrounded DC circuits (the response does not allow
either of these exceptions to be applied to high/low pressure
interfaces). Since these two exceptions were not characterized in
GL 86-10 as examples of exceptions, they are the only exceptions
allowed by GL 86-10 to the type of post-fire safe-shutdown
circuit failures that must be protected against in accordance
with III.G.2. Furthermore, it is generally agreed that for a
deterministic approach to fire protection, such as that required
by Appendix R, a fire is assumed to damage all circuits and
equipment in the fire area under consideration. Therefore,
any-and-all other post-fire safe-shutdown circuits must be
protected in accordance with III.G.2 (unless an alternative or
dedicated shutdown system is provided in accordance with
III.G.3). One industry challenge to the ``any-and-all'' scope of
circuit failures defined by Appendix R and GL 86-10 was presented
to the NRC in a letter from R.E. Beedle of NEI dated January 14,
1997, to F.J. Miraglia, Jr. of the NRC and in a letter from D.J.
Modeen of NEI dated May 30, 1997, to L. B. Marsh of the NRC.
These letters were in response to Information Notice 92-18,
``Potential for Loss of Remote Shutdown Capability During a
Control Room Fire'' (IN 92-18). The letters stated the industry's
position on the possible failure of motor operated valves as a
result of a fire-induced spurious signal that could override the
valve motor's protective features, causing valve failure.
Although the industry agreed that IN 92-18 describes a credible
failure and that some licensees had addressed this failure
mechanism in response to IN 92-18, the industry's position on
this type of failure is that it is highly improbable and does not
warrant consideration.
The NRC position on this issue, as noted in IN 92-18, is that
such fire-induced valve damage could impair the capability to
shut down the plant and maintain it in a safe-shutdown condition.
In addition, in Regulatory Guide 1.106, ``Thermal Overload
Protection for Electric Motors on Motor-Operated Valves'' (RG
1.106), the staff had stated that if thermal overload protection
devices are bypassed, it is important to ensure that the
bypassing does not jeopardize the completion of the safety
function or degrade other safety systems because of any sustained
abnormal circuit currents that may be present.
Following the January 14, 1997, letter from NEI, a public meeting
was held on
[[Page 25626]] February 7, 1997, in which the NRC staff discussed
with NEI the questions and comments in NEI's letter. Following
the meeting, an NRC letter was sent from S.J. Collins dated March
11, 1997, to R.E. Beedle of NEI to further document and clarify
the NRC's position on this issue. During the meeting and in the
followup letter the staff stated that the safety issue addressed
in IN 92-18 does not represent a new staff position and is within
the scope of the existing fire protection regulation.
Consequently, fire-induced failure, whether direct (failure to
perform a safe-shutdown function) or indirect (maloperation that
impacts safe shutdown), of a motor-operated valve that is
required for post-fire safe shutdown must be addressed. The May
30, 1997, letter response from NEI did not result in a change to
the NRC's original position. The second NEI letter also
questioned whether the potential risk is applicable to fires in
areas other than the control room since IN 92-18 identified a
potential failure resulting from a control room fire. Regulatory
requirements do not identify any exceptions for fires in other
areas of the plant. Consequently, if the mechanistic failure of a
motor-operated valve, as described in IN 92-18, can be caused by
the fire-induced failure of an electrical circuit and prevent
safe shutdown, the circuit must be protected. Where a licensee
can make a case that this type of failure is possible but not
safety significant in a specific fire area, the licensee can
apply for an exemption or adopt a licensing basis in accordance
with 10 CFR 50.48(c) and address the issue in accordance with
this rule.
Associated Circuits The Appendix R requirement to protect
circuits from the effects of fire does not exempt any type of
circuits and specifically mentions nonsafety circuits to
emphasize that all circuits whose fire-induced failure could
prevent safe shutdown must be protected from the effects of fire,
even nonsafety circuits. The term ``associated circuit'' has been
used to identify circuits that are not directly required to
perform a safe-shutdown function (e.g., the control circuit cable
to a pump suction valve that is normally in the correct position
for post- fire shutdown) but must also not cause a spurious
actuation that could impact safe shutdown. However, no
distinction is made in Appendix R between circuits whose failure
could directly affect safe shutdown and those whose failure could
indirectly affect safe shutdown (e.g., by causing spurious
actuations).
Note that the term ``associated circuits'' has a different
connotation in Regulatory Guide 1.75, ``Criteria for Independence
of Electrical Safety Systems,'' than it does for fire protection.
Regulatory Guide 1.75 defines ``associated circuits'' as
``non-safety- related circuits that are not physically separated
or not electrically isolated from safety-related circuits by
acceptable separation distance, safety class structures,
barriers, or isolation devices.'' The ``associated circuits'' in
Appendix R include both safety-related and non-safety-related
circuits. Post-fire safe-shutdown capability is distinctly
different from, and credits operability of different equipment
than the safety-related equipment required for emergency shutdown
of a nuclear power plant. In 1981, the NRC issued Generic Letter
(GL) 81-12, ``Fire Protection Rule'' (45 FR 76602, November 19,
1980), to clarify and provide guidance on alternative and
dedicated shutdown systems. Enclosure 2 of GL 81-12 gives the
following definition of associated circuits (called ``associated
circuits of concern'') as they relate to alternative and
dedicated shutdown systems: ``In evaluating alternative shutdown
methods, associated circuits are circuits that could prevent
operation or cause maloperation of the alternative train which is
used to achieve and maintain hot shutdown condition due to fire
induced hot shorts, open circuits or shorts to ground.'' The NRC
provided additional guidance on alternative and dedicated
shutdown systems in a followup memorandum of March 22, 1982, from
R.J. Mattson to Darrell G. Eisenhut (ML050140137). This
memorandum, which was made publically available, defined
associated circuits of concern as follows: Associated Circuits of
Concern are defined as those cables (safety related, non-safety
related, Class 1E, and non-Class 1E) that: 1. Have a physical
separation less than that required by Section III.G.2 of Appendix
R, and; 2. Have one of the following: a. A common power source
with the shutdown equipment (redundant or alternative) and the
power source is not electrically protected from the circuit of
concern by coordinated breakers, fuses, or similar devices, or b.
A connection to circuits of equipment whose spurious operation
would adversely affect the shutdown capability (e.g., RHR/RCS
isolation valves, ADS valves, PORVs, steam generator atmospheric
dump valves, instrumentation, steam bypass, etc.), or c. A common
enclosure (e.g., raceway, panel, junction) with the shutdown
cables (redundant and alternative) and, (1) Are not electrically
protected by circuit breakers, fuses or similar devices, or (2)
Will allow propagation of the fire into the common enclosure.
As noted above, these definitions of associated circuits were
presented in the context of alternative and dedicated shutdown
systems and apply to the specific categories of circuits
specified in the definitions. The industry has also used the term
``associated'' to refer to a larger category of circuits that
includes all post-fire safe-shutdown circuits that have the
potential to cause spurious operations that could prevent or
adversely affect safe shutdown.
This broader definition of associated circuits has caused
confusion about the protection required for post-fire
safe-shutdown circuits.
The Mattson/Eisenhut memorandum of March 1982 and Regulatory
Guide 1.189, ``Fire Protection for Operating Nuclear Power
Plants,'' noted acceptable methods for mitigating spurious
actuations, including operator manual actions. However, these
methods are only applicable to alternative and dedicated shutdown
systems and they do not comply with regulations for protection of
post-fire safe-shutdown circuits in III.G.2 areas. The NRC has
specifically noted in correspondence with licensees that ``it is
essential to remember that these alternative requirements (i.e.,
III.G.3 and III.L) are not deemed to be equivalent * * * '' to
III.G.2 protection. The examples of equipment identified in the
above definition belong to a specific category of systems and
components that does not include redundant shutdown components
and systems.
Redundant safe-shutdown systems are defined in the response to
Question 3.8.3 in GL 86-10 as follows: ``If the system is being
used to provide its design function, it generally is considered
redundant. If the system is being used in lieu of the preferred
system because the redundant components of the preferred system
do not meet the separation criteria of paragraph III.G.2, the
system is considered an alternative shutdown capability.'' The GL
81-12 definition of associated circuits specifically refers to
both redundant and alternative shutdown trains with respect to
circuits associated by common enclosures and common power
supplies (2.a and 2.c above), but does not mention redundant
systems with respect to circuits associated by spurious actuation
(2.b above). The examples given in GL 81-
[[Page 25627]] 12 for components that could spuriously actuate
and affect the safe- shutdown capability are not components of
normal redundant safe- shutdown systems (the RHR/RCS isolation
valves are in a normal redundant safe-shutdown system, but the
post-fire function of these valves is to prevent a
loss-of-coolant accident). These components were included in the
definition as possible alternative shutdown components.
The response to Question 5.3.8 of GL 86-10 allows operators to
clear multiple high-impedance faults by manual breaker trips
governed by written procedures. This question and response apply
to a unique set of circuits associated with redundant
safe-shutdown systems by virtue of having a common power supply
where multiple high impedance faults could cause a loss of that
power supply to the safe-shutdown equipment. The response
references III.G.2 areas and allows operator manual action to
mitigate the fault. Some licensees have interpreted this response
to imply that the regulations allow them to credit operator
manual actions in III.G.2 areas for any associated circuit,
including circuits whose failure could cause spurious actuations.
However, multiple high- impedance faults are not the same as
spurious actuation faults. Consequently, this response does not
provide a basis for crediting operator manual actions for
mitigation of spurious actuations.
The reference to III.G.2 in the GL 86-10 Question 5.3.8 response
is recognition that a high-impendence fault could affect a
redundant shutdown train located in a III.G.2 area and does not
imply that manual actions may be credited in these areas for
other types of faults. It is also important to note that the
questions and responses in GL 86-10 are under the heading
Alternative and Dedicated Shutdown Capability. Therefore it is
not appropriate to apply the guidance provided by this response
to the protection of spurious actuation circuit faults for
redundant safe-shutdown systems in III.G.2 areas of the plant.
The staff position on associated circuits presented in this RIS
is consistent with Section 9.5.1 of the SRP, which distinguishes
between ``associated circuits'' and ``associated circuits of
concern'' by giving a separate definition for each. Associated
circuits are defined as ``circuits within a fire area that may be
subject to fire damage that can affect or prevent post-fire safe
shutdown capability.'' Associated circuits of concern are defined
as ``those cables (safety- related, non-safety-related Class 1E
and non-Class 1E) that do not meet fire separation requirements
and have (1) a common power source with the safe shutdown
equipment, (2) a connection to circuits for equipment whose
spurious operation could adversely affect safe shutdown, or (3) a
common enclosure with safe shutdown circuits.'' This section of
the SRP also states: ``Manual actions may not be credited in lieu
of providing the required separation of redundant systems or
associated circuits located in the same fire area unless
alternate, dedicated, or backup shutdown capability is
provided.'' To summarize, circuits that are associated with the
operation of credited redundant post-fire safe-shutdown systems
in accordance with III.G.2 such as ``cables or equipment,
including associated non-safety circuits that could prevent
operation or cause maloperation due to hot shorts, open circuits,
or shorts to ground, of redundant trains of systems necessary to
achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions'' must be protected
in accordance with III.G.2 and operator manual actions may not be
credited for III.G.2 redundant train circuits under regulations
for plants that have not adopted an NFPA 805 licensing basis
(except through staff-approved exemptions for specific manual
actions). This staff position was reiterated in a May 16, 2002,
NRC letter from J. N. Hannon to A. Marion of NEI (ML021410026).
Committee To Review Generic Requirements (CRGR) Meeting Minutes
No. 367 (ML021750218) noted that this letter does not contain any
new staff positions.
This staff position is also supported by the results of the EPRI/
NEI fire testing. The distinction between associated circuits and
other safe-shutdown circuits has been used as a basis for
addressing hot shorts and spurious actuations that could prevent
safe shutdown by crediting operator manual actions to maintain
redundant safe-shutdown trains free of fire damage. The tests
demonstrated that operator manual actions may not be practical or
possible for the required mitigation between multiple spurious
actuations since there may not be sufficient time to take action.
To clarify this issue for all stakeholders, future NRC
documentation related to post-fire safe-shutdown circuits will
not distinguish between associated circuits and other post-fire
safe- shutdown circuits, except for alternative and dedicated
shutdown systems as defined by GL 81-12. RIS 2004-03,
``Risk-Informed Approach for Post-Fire Safe-Shutdown Associated
Circuit Inspections'' (ML040620400), has been revised and
reissued as RIS 2004-03, Revision 1, ``Risk-Informed Approach for
Post-Fire Safe-Shutdown Circuit Inspections'' (ML042440791), to
eliminate this distinction in inspection guidance. NFPA 805 uses
a similar approach, noting that any circuit whose function or
absence of malfunction, including circuits whose failure can
cause a spurious actuation, is required for safe shutdown and
should be protected from fire.
Emergency Control Station The term ``emergency control station''
has not been clearly defined and it has not been used
consistently by the industry. The term was most recently defined
in Regulatory Guide 1.189 as a ``location outside the main
control room where actions are taken by operations personnel to
manipulate plant systems and controls to achieve safe shutdown of
the reactor.'' However, this definition does not tell what type
of hardware is considered an emergency control station, a control
panel with multiple functions or a single device such as a valve
or breaker. The definition also does not indicate the number of
emergency control stations that are considered reasonable and
acceptable to maintain a single train free of fire damage.
Since Appendix R did not require post-fire protection of
automatic functioning of systems, manual actions may be credited
to maintain a train free of fire damage in accordance with
III.G.1, as noted in an NRC memorandum of July 2, 1982, from R.
J. Mattson to R. H. Vollmer (ML050140106). This memorandum, which
was made public, notes that for III.G.1 areas, ``manual operation
of valves, switches and circuit breakers is allowed to operate
equipment and isolate systems and is not considered a repair.''
This allowance for manual operation of individual devices for
III.G.1 areas has led to the interpretation that emergency
control stations include individual valves, switches, and circuit
breakers.
The interpretation of emergency control station to include
individual devices has been used by some licensees as a basis for
substituting operator manual actions for the protection of
redundant safe-shutdown trains located in the same fire area.
This industry position is that if operator manual actions can
restore a post-fire safe-shutdown train to a free-of-fire-damage
condition, the criteria for a III.G.1 level of protection have
been met and therefore even where redundant trains are located in
the same fire area, the
[[Page 25628]] protection requirements of III.G.2 are not
applicable. During an NRC internal meeting on May 7, 1986, to
discuss SECY-85-306, ``Appendix R, Post-Fire Safe Shutdown''
(ML050140123), one staff member voiced this industry position. In
that meeting, the NRC Office of the Executive Legal Director (now
Office of General Counsel) confirmed that the line of reasoning
proposed is only applicable to licensees that have requested and
received an exemption, as this position does not meet regulatory
requirements. These meeting minutes later became publicly
available.
The requirements of paragraph III.G.1 are not independent of the
requirements of paragraph III.G.2 and the requirements are not
necessarily progressive. Paragraph III.G.2 states: ``Except as
provided for in paragraph G.3 of this section, where cables or
equipment, including associated non-safety circuits that could
prevent operation or cause maloperation due to hot shorts, open
circuits, or shorts to ground, of redundant trains of systems
necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions are
located within the same fire area outside of primary containment,
one of the following means of ensuring that one of the redundant
trains is free of fire damage shall be provided: * * * ''
Consequently, unless alternative or dedicated shutdown capability
is provided, redundant circuits credited for post- fire safe
shutdown and located in the same fire area must be protected in
accordance with III.G.2 without the use of emergency control
stations of any kind. The regulatory requirement to provide
either III.G.2 or III.G.3 protection was noted in GL 86-10
(response to Question 5.1.2). This staff position was reiterated
in the May 16, 2002, letter from J. N. Hannon of the NRC to A.
Marion of NEI (ML021410026), and Committee To Review Generic
Requirements (CRGR) Meeting Minutes No. 367 (ML021750218) noted
that this letter does not contain any new staff positions.
This RIS does not give a precise definition of emergency control
stations, but clarifies that, under the current regulations,
manual actions may not be credited to claim that a III.G.2 area
is a III.G.1 area. Where redundant trains are located in the same
fire area and where an alternative shutdown capability is not
provided, the protection required by III.G.2, including detection
and suppression (where noted), must be provided.
The operator manual actions rulemaking currently in process is
expected to provide guidance to licensees on using operator
manual actions to comply with III.G.2. In addition, licensees may
address these issues by adopting a risk-informed,
performance-based fire protection program in accordance with NFPA
805 and 10 CFR 50.48(c). End of Draft Regulatory Issue Summary
Documents may be examined, and/or copied for a fee, at the NRC's
Public Document Room at One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville
Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland. Publicly available
records will be accessible electronically from the Agencywide
Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Public electronic
reading room on the internet at the NRC Web site, . If you do not
have access to adams or if you have problems in accessing the
documents in adams, contact the NRC public document room (pdr)
reference staff at 1-800-397-4209 or 301-415-4737 or by e-mail to
.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 4th day of May 2005.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Patrick H. Hiland, Chief, Reactor Operations Branch, Division of
Inspection Program Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation.
[FR Doc. E5-2377 Filed 5-12-05; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
*****************************************************************
15 Soviets Planned Nuclear First Strike to Preempt West, Documents
Date: Fri, 13 May 2005 14:00:07 -0500 (CDT)
National Security Archive Update, May 13, 2005
SOVIETS PLANNED NUCLEAR FIRST STRIKE TO PREEMPT WEST, DOCUMENTS
SHOW
Warsaw Pact Allies Resented Soviet Dominance and "Nuclear Romanticism"
Bloc Saw Military Balance in West's Favor from 1970s On, Especially
in Technology
New Volume of Formerly Secret Records Published on 50th Anniversary
of Warsaw Pact
http://www.nsarchive.org
For further information, contact Vojtech Mastny 202/415-6707 Malcolm
Byrne 202/994-7043
Washington D.C. May 13, 2005 - The Soviet-led Warsaw Pact had a
long-standing strategy to attack Western Europe that included being
the first to use nuclear weapons, according to a new book of
previously Secret Warsaw Pact documents published today. Although
the aim was apparently to preempt NATO "aggression," the Soviets
clearly expected that nuclear war was likely and planned specifically
to fight and win such a conflict.
The documents show that Moscow's allies went along with these plans
but the alliance was weakened by resentment over Soviet domination
and the belief that nuclear planning was sometimes highly unrealistic.
Just the opposite of Western views at the time, Pact members saw
themselves increasingly at a disadvantage compared to the West in
the military balance, especially with NATO's ability to incorporate
high-technology weaponry and organize more effectively, beginning
in the late 1970s.
These and other findings appear in a new volume published today on
the 50th anniversary of the founding of the Warsaw Pact. Consisting
of 193 documents originating from all eight original member-states,
the volume, "A Cardboard Castle? An Inside History of the Warsaw
Pact, 1955-1991," provides significant new evidence of the intentions
and capabilities of one of the most feared military machines in
history.
The new collection of documents published today is the first of its
kind in examining the Warsaw Pact from the inside, with the benefit
of materials once thought to be sealed from public scrutiny in
perpetuity. It was prepared by the Parallel History Project on NATO
and the Warsaw Pact (PHP), an international scholarly network formed
to explore and disseminate documentation on the military and security
aspects of contemporary history. The book appears as part of the
"National Security Archive Cold War Reader Series" through Central
European University Press.
On Saturday, May 14, a book launch for "A Cardboard Castle?" will
take place in Warsaw at the Military Office of Historical Research.
The address is: 2, ul. Stefana Banacha, Room 218. It will begin at
11:30 a.m. Speakers include:
- Gen. William E. Odom, former Director, U.S. National Security
Agency - Gen. Tadeusz Pioro, senior Polish representative to the
Warsaw Pact - Brig. Gen. Leslaw Dudek, Polish representative to the
alliance - Prof. dr. hab. Andrzej Paczkowski, Polish Academy of
Sciences - Dr hab. Krzysztof Komorowski, Military Office of Historical
Research - Prof. dr hab. Wojciech Materski, Polish Academy of
Sciences
Ten representative documents from the new volume were published
today on the Web site of the National Security Archive:
http://www.nsarchive.org
The documents in their original languages can be found in their
entirety on the Center for Security Studies website:
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/php/collections/coll_wapa.htm
________________________________________________________
THE NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE is an independent non-governmental
research institute and library located at The George Washington
University in Washington, D.C. The Archive collects and publishes
declassified documents acquired through the Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA). A tax-exempt public charity, the Archive receives no
U.S. government funding; its budget is supported by publication
royalties and donations from foundations and individuals.
_________________________________________________________
PRIVACY NOTICE The National Security Archive does not and will never
share the names or e-mail addresses of its subscribers with any
other organization. Once a year, we will write you and ask for your
financial support. We may also ask you for your ideas for Freedom
of Information requests, documentation projects, or other issues
that the Archive should take on. We would welcome your input, and
any information you care to share with us about your special
interests. But we do not sell or rent any information about subscribers
to any other party.
_________________________________________________________
TO UNSUBSCRIBE FROM THE LIST You may leave the list at any time by
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*****************************************************************
16 Did US torpedo the Russian submarine?
Date: Fri, 13 May 2005 18:34:07 -0700
From: jblankfort@earthlink.net
Subject: Did US torpedo the Russian submarine?
Date: May 12, 2005 7:10:07 PM PDT
To: undisclosed-recipients: ;
US 'torpedoed Kursk nuclear sub'
Daniel Stacey, London
May 09, 2005
The Australian
http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/common/story_page/ 0,5744,15220443%255E2
703,00.html
A FORMER British military official has backed a sensational claim that
the
Russian nuclear submarine, the Kursk, was torpedoed by US forces in
August 2000.
An official inquest concluded that the disaster - in which all 118 crew
drowned
in the Barents Sea, 135km off the Russian coast - was caused by an
accidental
explosion of an onboard torpedo.
But Maurice Stradling, a former torpedo engineer and a key figure in the
original investigation, believes a new French documentary, The Kursk: A
Submarine in Troubled Waters, should change world opinion on the
sinking.
"On the balance of probabilities, the Kursk was sunk by an American
MK-48
torpedo," said Mr Stradling, formerly a senior member of the British
Defence
Ministry.
BBC editor Nick Fraser called the claim a "pack of lies" and has
refused to air
the documentary, which attracted a record audience of more than 4
million when
it screened on French TV.
The BBC used Mr Stradling as its main authority for a documentary it
made in
2001 - What Sank the Kursk?, in which Mr Stradling theorised that the
sinking
was caused by the malfunctioning of an old-fashioned HTP torpedo.
Mr Stradling, who also appears in the new French documentary, said: "At
the time
(2001), that was a perfectly reasonable film, given the facts as we
knew them
then, when there seemed to be no third-party involvement,"
The new explanation for the Kursk's downing is based on film footage of
a hole
in the side of the vessel, and evidence placing US submarines in the
area at the
time it was sunk.
The French film shows stills of the Kursk raised above the water after
being
salvaged, with a precise circular hole in its right side. The hole
clearly bends
inwards, consistent with an attack from outside the submarine.
A US military source in the documentary declares the hole to be the
trademark
evidence of an American MK-48 torpedo, which is made to melt cleanly
through
steel sheet due to a mechanism at its tip that combusts copper.
The film suggests the attack happened while two US submarines, the
Toledo and
Memphis, were shadowing the Kursk in a routine military exercise.
The documentary says the Toledo accidentally collided with the Kursk,
at which
point the Russian submarine opened its torpedo tubes, leading to an
attack from
the Memphis, which was protecting the damaged Toledo while it retreated.
The cause of the sinking was covered up at the time in an act of
diplomacy
between then US presidents Bill Clinton and Russian President Vladimir
Putin - a
deal that included the cancellation of $US10 billion ($12.5 billion) of
Russian
debt, the film states.
After the documentary received its only public broadcast in Britain,
some
claimed the Russian navy had drilled the hole and fed doctored footage
to the
film-makers to create a false impression.
*****************************************************************
17 INSIDE JoongAng Daily: World watches 1 tunnel of 8,200 in North
May 14, 2005 ¤Ń Following reports on North Korea's activities
at a tunnel near its northeastern city of Kilju, which is viewed
by some intelligence analysts as a possible nuclear weapons test
site, South Korean sources said yesterday the North has many
such underground facilities.
Intelligence sources in Seoul estimate that North Korea has
8,200 such tunnels nationwide, with a total length of 547
kilometers (340 miles).
A South Korean businessman who visited Pyongyang recently for an
economic project told the JoongAng Ilbo he had seen thousands of
laborers and soldiers disappearing into a tunnel between the
city center and Sunan Airport. He said South Korean intelligence
officials told him after his return that the tunnel may be an
entrance to an underground munitions factory.
Beginning in the late 1990s, Pyongyang started moving major
military supply factories underground, the sources said. The
North even built a tunnel penetrating a small mountain to
contain part of an Air Force runway, they noted. "South Korea
and the United States have been closely monitoring these
underground facilities for the past 10 years," an intelligence
official said. "When we see unusually busy activities, such as
large amounts of dirt being piled up, then we pay even more
attention."
North Korea has already gained significantly from the
facilities. In 1998, after U.S. spy satellites detected that
thousands of soldiers were working at Kumchang-ri in North
Pyongan province, the United States, suspecting it was a nuclear
facility, offered Pyongyang 600,000 tons of rice in return for
surveying the site. The inspectors found nothing but empty
tunnels.
The underground facilities are maintained at a high cost, the
officials said, noting that many were built in the 1970s and
have fraying electrical systems. As a result, efficiency is
extremely low, with about 30 percent of power lost during
transmission, the South's Unification Ministry said.
Meanwhile, Ko Young-koo, head of the National Intelligence
Service, rejected international speculation that the North was
preparing an underground nuclear test. At a closed-door briefing
yesterday to lawmakers on the intelligence committee, Mr. Ko
said South Korea and the United States had been monitoring Kilju
in North Hamkyong province since the late 1990s. Lawmakers
quoted Mr. Ko as saying no evidence has emerged that the North
is preparing a nuclear test. He said previous reports that North
Korea had built a viewing tower and filled up the tunnels ˇŞ
possible preparations for a nuclear test ˇŞ were incorrect.
by Lee Young-jong, Kim Jung-wook myoja@joongang.co.kr>
Copyright by Joins.com, Inc. Terms of Use |
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18 Spectrum: Downwinders need answers while there is still time
Editorials
St. George - www.thespectrum.com
Friday, May 13, 2005
A report issued by the National Academy of Science about the
effects of the nuclear testing that took place at the Nevada
Test Site does little to answer the questions of what happened
and, most importantly, how many lives were lost or seriously
altered by the effect of the blasts.
One part of the report suggests that more scientific research
is needed to determine who should and who should not be
compensated for illnesses suffered from nuclear fallout.
Another part of the report states that breathing or swallowing
radioactive iodine originating in contaminated milk was the most
significant pathway to radioactive exposure.
Yet a third part of the report concludes that there are
"substantial gaps in existing data and other factors" related to
the research.
In summary, however, the NAS report recommends that the number
of diseases compensated by the federal government should not be
expanded beyond the current 18, but that the Centers for Disease
Control and the National Cancer Institute should complete
national dose estimates for all fallout radioactivity, not just
Iodine 131, that fell, according to the report, on every county
in the nation.
The NCI has already determined that there are as many as
212,000 cases of thyroid cancer that could have been caused by
fallout exposure. No number is pegged to the 17 other types of
cancer that currently qualify for compensation, although the NCI
also recently released a study about the number and types of
cancer found in the Marshall Islands where 66 nuclear weapons
were detonated from 1946-1958. According to the NCI, 530
different cancers were caused by that fallout.
And although the U.S. Senate, when it approved the Radiation
Exposure Compensation Act in 1990, concluded that such
radionuclides as Cesium 137 and Strontium 90 are responsible for
some of the illnesses, the report failed to offer any
significant information regarding the effects of those elements.
The recent NAS report was issued, coincidentally, on the same
day that the White House reasserted its commitment to research
on a new generation of nuclear weapons - the so-called bunker
buster bombs - and one day after the National Research Council
concluded that these new weapons would not be any safer than the
current nuclear arsenal and expose millions to radiation.
In essence, what the NAS report does is buy time for the
government and time is not a commodity the people who call
themselves downwinders - those who suffered illness as a result
of nuclear fallout - have.
The longer the government takes to determine the effects of
spraying countless Americans with poisonous fallout, the fewer
survivors there will be to compensate for their sacrifice.
The longer the government can stall on offering more
information about the effects of radiation poisoning, the
farther along the research and testing of this needless next
generation of nukes is allowed to progress.
The NAS report is nothing more than a smokescreen to cover the
tracks of the government for killing thousands of innocent
victims and paving the way for more of the same in the future.
It's time for the people of this country to stand up and demand
some answers before it's too late.
Originally published May 13, 2005
Copyright ©2004 The Spectrum. All rights reserved.
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19 AxisofLogic: Louisanna: Toxic Tours of Duty? Historic legislation would
ensure uranium testing for local soldiers
/ U.S. Military
www.axisoflogic.com
By Jan Clifford
May 13, 2005, 07:45
According to some military and science experts, the U.S.
military has been using the equivalent of dirty bombs in the
1991 Persian Gulf War, Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation
Enduring Freedom; and the resulting contamination is
biogenetically affecting U.S. and Iraqi soldiers and civilians
and will continue to do so for generations to come.
The Louisiana House of Representatives became the first
legislative body in the nation to acknowledge the toxic effects
of depleted uranium (DU) when it passed a bill on Tuesday that
guarantees DU testing for war veterans as a medical benefit. The
bill passed by a vote of 101-0. No state expenses will be
incurred since the federal government subsidizes the $170 test.
The bill will become law if passed by the state Senate and
signed by Louisiana Gov. Kathleen Blanco.
"The Army calls it the silver bullet. But the team that was
assigned to go in and clean up after the first Gulf War was one
hundred men," said Ret. Marine Corps Command Sgt. Maj. Bob
Smith, who served three tours of duty in the elite Green Berets
during the Vietnam War. "A third of them are already dead," he
said. Smith is responsible for bringing the issue to the
attention of House Rep. Jalila Jefferson. Jefferson enlisted
House Rep. Juan LaFonta, who agreed to sponsor the bill.
"Louisiana is very service friendly," LaFonta said. "We're
concerned about our troops."
During the Persian Gulf War in 1991, Army officials assembled a
team to clean up the DU contaminated tanks and Bradley fighting
vehicles. Most team members became sick within 48 hours, with
the first cancers developing within nine months and first deaths
from lung cancer within two years. Today, 14 years later, some
veterans are still attempting to obtain medical testing and
care, but say that military and Veterans Administration (VA)
officials simply refuse to provide mandated services.
Permanent contamination, impossible containment
Many U.S. weapons, such as missiles, bombs, bullets, and tank
shells contain DU, and act as "kinetic energy penetrators" that
ignite during flight, and break into burning fragments upon
impact. DU weapons are effective because they can penetrate and
destroy all targets, including boring through 20 feet of
super-reinforced concrete bunkers. DU is virtually cost-free,
since it is a by-product of nuclear weapons production. The U.S.
ADAM and PDM sub-munitions are called "the perfect dirty bombs"
as each has a uranium casing filled with high explosives.
But these weapons are the proverbial double-edged swords. On
detonation, uranium particles vaporize into a radioactive dust
(uranium oxide) that coats everything within proximity. The dust
can be swept high into the atmosphere, where upper level winds
redistribute toxins across national boundaries.
When inhaled, these nano-particles, 100 times smaller than a
cell, follow the respiratory system to attack the master code of
DNA, and disable the immune system. Uranium has a half-life of
4.5 billion years, so contamination is permanent, and
containment is impossible.
According to Leuren Moret, a geoscientist who has worked around
the world on radiation issues, depleted uranium is coming back
into the U.S. "in veterans' uniforms and trophies and bags."
It's also coming back in their bodies, transferred through
semen.
Moret cited a U.S. government study, conducted by the VA on
post-Gulf War babies in a group of 251 soldiers in Mississippi
who all had normal babies before the Gulf War. The study found
67 percent of their post-war babies were born with severe birth
defects. Some were born without eyes (anophthalmos), ears, with
missing organs, missing legs and arms, fused fingers, thyroid or
other organ malformations. Moret said that in some families, the
only healthy members are those born before the Gulf Wars.
A WMD used against our own?
The health repercussions in Iraq are unprecedented. In babies
born in 2002, the incidence of anophthalmos was 250,000 times
greater (20 cases in 4,000 births) than the natural occurrence,
one in 50 million births.
The Army and Air Force fired at least 127 tons of DU shells in
Iraq last year, according to Pentagon spokesman Michael
Kilpatrick, in an interview with the New York Daily News.
"Because of its density, it is the superior heavy metal for
armor to protect tanks and to penetrate armor," Kilpatrick said.
In fact, the effects of DU meet U.S. government standards of
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). According to the U.S.
Department of Defense (DOD) Joint Publication 1-02, WMDs are
"Weapons that are capable of a high order of destruction and/or
of being used in such a manner as to destroy large numbers of
people. Weapons of mass destruction can be high explosives or
nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological weapons."
"DU is illegal in any sense of the imagination," said Dr. Doug
Rokke, a retired U.S. Army Major, nuclear health physicist, and
the Pentagon's expert on the health effects of DU ammunition on
the battlefield. Rokke was director of the Army's DU project,
and wrote the Army regulations for handling and clean up for DU
-- regulations he says the U.S. government is blatantly refusing
to enforce. Today, although US Army Regulation 700-48
(http://www.traprockpeace.org/rokke_du_3_ques.html) requires DOD
officials to provide medical care to all DU casualties and clean
up DU contamination, Rokke said they simply refuse to do so.
Rokke said that by continuing to use DU, and by refusing to
admit the acknowledged adverse environmental and health effects,
DOD officials violate their own orders and regulations. "When we
can no longer clean up the environment and we can no longer
provide medical care for anybody that's exposed, then that
weapon must never be used in conflict," Rokke said.
Long-term casualties
The official number of wounded in the three-week Persian Gulf
War in 1990-1991 was just 467. Out of 580,400 soldiers who
served in the first Gulf War, 11,000 are now dead, and more than
325,000 are on permanent medical disability. That means 56
percent of those soldiers who served now have medical problems.
According to a Department of VA Fact Sheet, "Several scientific
studies have shown that as a group, Gulf War veterans are
reporting symptoms or diseases more frequently than non-Gulf
comparison groups." Additionally, the Fact Sheet reports that a
Center for Disease Control (CDC) epidemiological study found
"multiple symptoms more prevalent in Air Force Gulf veterans
compared with controls who served in other areas of the world.
Although 39 percent of Air Force Gulf War veterans who were
still on duty and were studied by CDC suffered from chronic
problems with fatigue, mood, thinking and muscle aches and
pains, this was also reported by 15 percent of the non-Gulf
group."
And pediatricians for the VA are gathering data to enable "a
comparison of child health not only among the Gulf War theater
veterans and control cohorts, but also between children in the
same family born before the Gulf deployment compared to those
born after the conflict."
Marilyn Brown is the customer service coordinator for the
Veterans Health Program in New Orleans. Brown said that her
office is taking a proactive stance, and making visits to local
units to inform veterans of available services. Returning
veterans are entitled to two years free medical care, including
psychological services; but they must apply within 90 days of
returning from active duty. Brown said that she had no record of
recently returning veterans suffering from symptoms related to
contact with DU. Veterans can apply for services or simply
discuss options by calling (504) 568-0811, extension 5913, or
1.800.985.8387. The office is at 1601 Perdido Street.
http://www.louisianaweekly.com/cgi-bin/weekly/news/articlegate.pl
?20050509j
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20 AxisofLogic: Horror Of US Depleted Uranium In Iraq Threatens World
www.axisoflogic.com
By James Denver
May 13, 2005, 06:57
American use of DU is "A crime against humanity which may, in
the eyes of historians, rank with the worst atrocities of all
time." US Iraq Military Vets "are on DU death row, waiting to
die."
"I'm horrified. The people out there - the Iraqis, the media
and the troops - risk the most appalling ill health. And the
radiation from depleted uranium can travel literally anywhere.
It's going to destroy the lives of thousands of children, all
over the world. We all know how far radiation can travel.
Radiation from Chernobyl reached Wales and in Britain you
sometimes get red dust from the Sahara on your car."
The speaker is not some alarmist doomsayer. He is Dr. Chris
Busby, the British radiation expert, Fellow of the University of
Liverpool in the Faculty of Medicine and UK representative on
the European Committee on Radiation Risk, talking about the
best-kept secret of this war: the fact that by illegally using
hundreds of tons of depleted uranium (DU) against Iraq, Britain
and America have gravely endangered not only the Iraqis but the
whole world.
For these weapons have released deadly, carcinogenic and
mutagenic, radioactive particles in such abundance that-whipped
up by sandstorms and carried on trade winds - there is no corner
of the globe they cannot penetrate-including Britain. For the
wind has no boundaries and time is on their side: the
radioactivity persists for over 4,500,000,000 years and can
cause cancer, leukemia, brain damage, kidney failure, and
extreme birth defects - killing millions of every age for
centuries to come. A crime against humanity which may, in the
eyes of historians, rank with the worst atrocities of all time.
These weapons have released deadly, carcinogenic and
mutagenic, radioactive particles in such abundance that there is
no corner of the globe they cannot penetrate - including
Britain. Yet, officially, no crime has been committed. For this
story is a dirty story in which the facts have been concealed
from those who needed them most. It is also a story we need to
know if the people of Iraq are to get the medical care they
desperately need, and if our troops, returning from Iraq, are
not to suffer as terribly as the veterans of other conflicts in
which depleted uranium was used.
A Dirty Tyson
'Depleted' uranium is in many ways a misnomer. 'Depleted'
sounds weak. The only weak thing about depleted uranium is its
price. It is dirt cheap, toxic, waste from nuclear power plants
and bomb production. However, uranium is one of earth's heaviest
elements and DU packs a Tyson's punch, smashing through tanks,
buildings and bunkers with equal ease, spontaneously catching
fire as it does so, and burning people alive. 'Crispy critters'
is what US servicemen call those unfortunate enough to be close.
And, when John Pilger encountered children killed at a greater
distance he wrote: "The children's skin had folded back, like
parchment, revealing veins and burnt flesh that seeped blood,
while the eyes, intact, stared straight ahead. I vomited."
(Daily Mirror)
The millions of radioactive uranium oxide particles released
when it burns can kill just as surely, but far more terribly.
They can even be so tiny they pass through a gas mask, making
protection against them impossible. Yet, small is not beautiful.
For these invisible killers indiscriminately attack men, women,
children and even babies in the womb-and do the gravest harm of
all to children and unborn babies.
A Terrible Legacy
Doctors in Iraq have estimated that birth defects have
increased by 2-6 times, and 3-12 times as many children have
developed cancer and leukemia since 1991. Moreover, a report
published in The Lancet in 1998 said that as many as 500
children a day are dying from these sequels to war and sanctions
and that the death rate for Iraqi children under 5 years of age
increased from 23 per 1000 in 1989 to 166 per thousand in 1993.
Overall, cases of lymphoblastic leukemia more than quadrupled
with other cancers also increasing 'at an alarming rate.' In
men, lung, bladder, bronchus, skin, and stomach cancers showed
the highest increase. In women, the highest increases were in
breast and bladder cancer, and non-Hodgkin lymphoma.[1]
On hearing that DU had been used in the Gulf in 1991, the UK
Atomic Energy Authority sent the Ministry of Defense a special
report on the potential damage to health and the environment. It
said that it could cause half a million additional cancer deaths
in Iraq over 10 years. In that war the authorities only admitted
to using 320 tons of DU-although the Dutch charity LAKA
estimates the true figure is closer to 800 tons. Many times that
may have been spread across Iraq by this year's war. The
devastating damage all this DU will do to the health and
fertility of the people of Iraq now, and for generations to
come, is beyond imagining.
The radioactivity persists for over 4,500,000,000 years
killing millions of every age for centuries to come. This is a
crime against humanity which may rank with the worst atrocities
of all time.
We must also count the numberless thousands of miscarried
babies. Nobody knows how many Iraqis have died in the womb since
DU contaminated their world. But it is suggested that troops who
were only exposed to DU for the brief period of the war were
still excreting uranium in their semen 8 years later and some
had 100 times the so-called 'safe limit' of uranium in their
urine. The lack of government interest in the plight of veterans
of the 1991 war is reflected in a lack of academic research on
the impact of DU but informal research has found a high
incidence of birth defects in their children and that the wives
of men who served in Iraq have three times more miscarriages
than the wives of servicemen who did not go there.
Since DU darkened the land Iraq has seen birth defects which
would break a heart of stone: babies with terribly foreshortened
limbs, with their intestines outside their bodies, with huge
bulging tumors where their eyes should be, or with a single
eye-like Cyclops, or without eyes, or without limbs, and even
without heads. Significantly, some of the defects are almost
unknown outside textbooks showing the babies born near A-bomb
test sites in the Pacific.
Doctors report that many women no longer say 'Is it a girl
or a boy?' but simply, 'Is it normal, doctor?' Moreover this
terrible legacy will not end. The genes of their parents may
have been damaged for ever, and the damaging DU dust is
ever-present.
Blue on Blue
What the governments of America and Britain have done to the
people of Iraq they have also done to their own soldiers, in
both wars. And they have done it knowingly. For the battlefields
have been thick with DU and soldiers have had to enter areas
heavily contaminated by bombing. Moreover, their bodies have not
only been assaulted by DU but also by a vaccination regime which
violated normal protocols, experimental vaccines, nerve agent
pills, and organophosphate pesticides in their tents. And yet,
though the hazards of DU were known, British and American troops
were not warned of its dangers. Nor were they given thorough
medical checks on their return-even though identifying it
quickly might have made it possible to remove some of it from
their body. Then, when a growing number became seriously ill,
and should have been sent to top experts in radiation damage and
neurotoxins, many were sent to a psychiatrist.
Over 200,000 US troops who returned from the 1991 war are
now invalided out with ailments officially attributed to service
in Iraq-that's 1 in 3. In contrast, the British government's
failure to fully assess the health of returning troops, or to
monitor their health, means no one even knows how many have died
or become gravely ill since their return. However, Gulf
veterans' associations say that, of 40,000 or so fighting fit
men and women who saw active service, at least 572 have died
prematurely since coming home and 5000 may be ill. An alarming
number are thought to have taken their own lives, unable to bear
the torment of the innumerable ailments which have combined to
take away their career, their sexuality, their ability to have
normal children, and even their ability to breathe or walk
normally. As one veteran puts it, they are 'on DU death row,
waiting to die.'
Whatever other factors there may be, some of their illnesses
are strikingly similar to those of Iraqis exposed to DU dust.
For example, soldiers have also fathered children without eyes.
And, in a group of eight servicemen whose babies lack eyes seven
are known to have been directly exposed to DU dust.
They too have fathered children with stunted arms, and rare
abnormalities classically associated with radiation damage. They
too seem prone to cancer and leukemia. Tellingly, so are EU
soldiers who served as peacekeepers in the Balkans, where DU was
also used. Indeed their leukemia rate has been so high that
several EU governments have protested at the use of DU.
The Vital Evidence
Despite all that evidence of the harm done by DU,
governments on both sides of the Atlantic have repeatedly
claimed that as it emits only 'low level' radiation DU is
harmless. Award-winning scientist, Dr. Rosalie Bertell who has
led UN medical commissions, has studied 'low-level' radiation
for 30 years. 2 She has found that uranium oxide particles have
more than enough power to harm cells, and describes their pulses
of radiation as hitting surrounding cells 'like flashes of
lightning' again and again in a single second.[2] Like many
scientists worldwide who have studied this type of radiation,
she has found that such 'lightning strikes' can damage DNA and
cause cell mutations which lead to cancer.
Moreover, these particles can be taken up by body fluids and
travel through the body, damaging more than one organ. To
compound all that, Dr. Bertell has found that this particular
type of radiation can cause the body's communication systems to
break down, leading to malfunctions in many vital organs of the
body and to many medical problems. A striking fact, since many
veterans of the first Gulf war suffer from innumerable,
seemingly unrelated, ailments.
In addition, recent research by Eric Wright, Professor of
Experimental Haematology at Dundee University, and others, have
shown two ways in which such radiation can do far more damage
than has been thought. The first is that a cell which seems
unharmed by radiation can produce cells with diverse mutations
several cell generations later. (And mutations are at the root
of cancer and birth defects.) This 'radiation-induced genomic
instability' is compounded by 'the bystander effect' by which
cells mutate in unison with others which have been damaged by
radiation-rather as birds swoop and turn in unison. Put
together, these two mechanisms can greatly increase the damage
done by a single source of radiation, such as a DU particle.
Moreover, it is now clear that there are marked genetic
differences in the way individuals respond to radiation-with
some being far more likely to develop cancer than others. So the
fact that some veterans of the first Gulf war seem relatively
unharmed by their exposure to DU in no way proves that DU did
not damage others.
The Price of Truth
That the evidence from Iraq and from our troops, and the
research findings of such experts, have been ignored may be no
accident. A US report, leaked in late 1995, allegedly says, 'The
potential for health effects from DU exposure is real; however
it must be viewed in perspective... the financial implications
of long-term disability payments and healthcare costs would be
excessive.'[3]
Clearly, with hundreds of thousands gravely ill in Iraq and
at least a quarter of a million UK and US troops seriously ill,
huge disability claims might be made not only against the
governments of Britain and America if the harm done by DU were
acknowledged. There might also be huge claims against companies
making DU weapons and some of their directors are said to be
extremely close to the White House. How close they are to
Downing Street is a matter for speculation, but arms sales makes
a considerable contribution to British trade. So the massive
whitewashing of DU over the past 12 years, and the way that
governments have failed to test returning troops, seemed to
disbelieve them, and washed their hands of them, may be purely
to save money.
The possibility that financial considerations have led the
governments of Britain and America to cynically avoid taking
responsibility for the harm they have done not only to the
people of Iraq but to their own troops may seem outlandish. Yet
DU weapons weren't used by the other side and no other
explanation fits the evidence. For, in the days before Britain
and America first used DU in war its hazards were no secret.[4]
One American study in 1990 said DU was 'linked to cancer when
exposures are internal, [and to] chemical toxicity-causing
kidney damage'. While another openly warned that exposure to
these particles under battlefield conditions could lead to
cancers of the lung and bone, kidney damage, non-malignant lung
disease, neuro-cognitive disorders, chromosomal damage and birth
defects.[5]
A Culture of Denial
In 1996 and 1997 UN Human Rights Tribunals condemned DU
weapons for illegally breaking the Geneva Convention and classed
them as 'weapons of mass destruction' 'incompatible with
international humanitarian and human rights law.' Since then,
following leukemia in European peacekeeping troops in the
Balkans and Afghanistan (where DU was also used), the EU has
twice called for DU weapons to be banned.
Yet, far from banning DU, America and Britain stepped up
their denials of the harm from this radioactive dust as more and
more troops from the first Gulf war and from action and
peacekeeping in the Balkans and Afghanistan have become
seriously ill. This is no coincidence. In 1997, while citing
experiments, by others, in which 84 percent of dogs exposed to
inhaled uranium died of cancer of the lungs, Dr. Asaf Durakovic,
then Professor of Radiology and Nuclear Medicine at Georgetown
University in Washington was quoted as saying, 'The [US
government's] Veterans Administration asked me to lie about the
risks of incorporating depleted uranium in the human body.' He
concluded, 'uranium does cause cancer, uranium does cause
mutation, and uranium does kill. If we continue with the
irresponsible contamination of the biosphere, and denial of the
fact that human life is endangered by the deadly isotope
uranium, then we are doing disservice to ourselves, disservice
to the truth, disservice to God and to all generations who
follow.' Not what the authorities wanted to hear and his
research was suddenly blocked.
During 12 years of ever-growing British whitewash the
authorities have abolished military hospitals, where there could
have been specialized research on the effects of DU and where
expertise in treating DU victims could have built up. And, not
content with the insult of suggesting the gravely disabling
symptoms of Gulf veterans are imaginary they have refused full
pensions to many. For, despite all the evidence to the contrary,
the current House of Commons briefing paper on DU hazards says
'it is judged that any radiation effects from possible exposures
are extremely unlikely to be a contributory factor to the
illnesses currently being experienced by some Gulf war
veterans.' Note how over a quarter of a million sick and dying
US and UK vets are called 'some.'
The Way Ahead
Britain and America not only used DU in this year's Iraq
war, they dramatically increased its use-from a minimum of 320
tons in the previous war to at minimum of 1500 tons in this one.
And this time the use of DU wasn't limited to anti-tank
weapons-as it had largely been in the previous Gulf war-but was
extended to the guided missiles, large bunker busters and big
2000-pound bombs used in Iraq's cities. This means that Iraq's
cities have been blanketed in lethal particles-any one of which
can cause cancer or deform a child. In addition, the use of DU
in huge bombs which throw the deadly particles higher and wider
in huge plumes of smoke means that billions of deadly particles
have been carried high into the air-again and again and again as
the bombs rained down-ready to be swept worldwide by the winds.
The Royal Society has suggested the solution is massive
decontamination in Iraq. That could only scratch the surface.
For decontamination is hugely expensive and, though it may
reduce the risks in some of the worst areas, it cannot fully
remove them. For DU is too widespread on land and water. How do
you clean up every nook and cranny of a city the size of
Baghdad? How can they decontaminate a whole country in which
microscopic particles, which cannot be detected with a normal
geiger counter, are spread from border to border? And how can
they clean up all the countries downwind of Iraq-and, indeed,
the world?
So there are only two things we can do to mitigate this
crime against humanity. The first is to provide the best
possible medical care for the people of Iraq, for our returning
troops and for those who served in the last Gulf war and,
through that, minimize their suffering. The second is to
relegate war, and the production and sale of weapons, to the
scrap heap of history-along with slavery and genocide. Then, and
only then, will this crime against humanity be expunged, and the
tragic deaths from this war truly bring freedom to the people of
Iraq, and of the world.
References
[1] The Lancet volume 351, issue 9103, 28 February 1998.
[2] Rosalie Bertell's book Planet Earth the Latest Weapon of
War was reviewed in Caduceus issue 51, page 28.
[3] TAB L_Research Report Summaries
[4] The secret official memorandum to Brigadier General L.R.
Groves from Drs Conant, Compton and Urey of War Department
Manhattan district dated October 1943 is available at the
website.
[5] TAB L_Research Report Summaries
Further Information
The Low Level Radiation Campaign hopes to be able to arrange
a limited number of private urine tests for those returning from
the latest Gulf war. It can be contacted at: The Knoll,
Montpelier Park, Llandrindod Wells, LD1 5LW. 01597 824771. Web:
LLRC.org.
James Denver writes and broadcasts internationally on
science and technology.
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21 DallasNews.com: Midlothian: Facing possible suit, industry denies link to illnesses
10:13 PM CDT on Thursday, May 12, 2005
By JIM GETZ / The Dallas Morning News
From Hinkley, Calif., to Plant City, Fla., Erin Brockovich and
the law firm that employs her have sued those industries they
contend are polluters who are poisoning or even killing nearby
residents.
Next up: Midlothian.
Masry & Vititoe, the California firm for which she works as a
researcher and community liaison, is teaming up with Arlington
law firm McCurdy & McCurdy to determine whether a case can be
built to link pollution from cement plants and other Midlothian
industries to cancers and ill health reported by residents.
And Jim Ross, the lead attorney on the case for McCurdy, knows
how difficult that task will be under Texas law, which requires
plaintiffs to show cause-and-effect links between a person, a
disease, the chemicals and the industry for each person.
"It's a huge project," he admitted Thursday. "We have the
expertise, but we may never be able to prove it. We'll do the
best we can."
Ms. Brockovich agreed, saying that sometimes "you get in there
and find something has gone wrong, but you can't prove it. But I
like to keep a positive attitude."
Mr. Ross and Ms. Brockovich say they have just begun to
investigate. They have talked to about a dozen residents so far
and have started to request every state and federal document and
study under the sun regarding Midlothian's air emissions. A town
hall meeting is planned for June.
Although some studies have noted elevated rates of breathing
diseases or Down syndrome in Midlothian or Ellis County,
industry representatives such as Randy Jones of Texas Industries
Inc. point out that studies by state and federal agencies have
never linked the emissions and diseases.
"That's not TXI saying that, and it's not something said
lightly," Mr. Jones said Thursday. "It's made after thousands of
tests on air and soil and so on. Whatever comes out of somebody
saying, 'We're from California and we want to represent you,'
hopefully [residents] will look at the facts.
"You have to remember that we employ 1,300 people at this
plant," he added. "We're not going to do anything that would
harm them or harm the community. That's the position we've
always taken, and it's served us well."
Longtime environmental activist Jim Schermbeck of Downwinders At
Risk is guardedly optimistic about the involvement of Ms.
Brockovich and two law firms.
"They've made it hard in Texas to do these kinds of lawsuits
specifically because they were working so well around the
state," Mr. Schermbeck said. "I'm kind of skeptical anybody
would be able to go through all the hoops needed to make it
happen. But if it ever is to happen, it needs to have a larger
law firm with the resources needed to do it."
E-mail jgetz@dallasnews.com This text is invisible on the page,
but this text is affected by the invisible item's flow. This
text is invisible on the page, but this text is affected by the
invisible item's flow. More Headlines
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22 NRC: Nuclear Management Company, LLC; Notice of Consideration of
FR Doc E5-2378
[Federal Register: May 13, 2005 (Volume 70, Number 92)] [Notices]
[Page 25619-25621] From the Federal Register Online via GPO
Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr13my05-92]
Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating License, Proposed No
Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity
for a Hearing The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the
Commission) is considering issuance of an amendment to Facility
Operating License No. DPR-43 issued to Nuclear Management
Company, LLC (the licensee), for operation of the Kewaunee
Nuclear Power Plant located in Kewaunee County, Wisconsin.
The proposed amendment would change the Technical Specifications
to modify the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pump suction protection
requirements and change the design basis as described in the
Updated Safety Analysis Report to revise the functionality of the
discharge pressure switches to provide pump runout protection,
which requires operator actions to restore the AFW pumps for
specific post-accident recovery activities.
Before issuance of the proposed license amendment, the Commission
will have made findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of
1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's regulations.
The Commission has made a proposed determination that the
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
Under the Commission's regulations in Title 10 of the Code of
Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Section 50.92, this means that
operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed
amendment would not (1) involve a significant increase in the
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated;
or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of
accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a
significant reduction in a margin of safety. As required by 10
CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue
of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented
below: 1. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated? Response: No.
The proposed amendment does not involve a significant increase in
the probability of an accident previously evaluated. The proposed
changes are associated with the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system,
which is not an initiator of any accident previously evaluated.
The proposed amendment does not involve a significant increase in
the consequences of an accident previously evaluated. The
mitigation functions assumed in the accident analyses will
continue to be performed. Operator actions may be required to
assure the AFW pumps are aligned for post-accident recovery
operations. With these actions additional consequences are not
incurred.
Therefore, operation of the facility in accordance [with] the
proposed amendment would not involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of any accident previously
evaluated.
2. Does the proposed amendment create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated? Response: No.
The AFW system is being modified by adding suction pressure
switches to protect the AFW pumps from damage due to a loss of
normal suction. The addition of the suction pressure switches and
the associated circuitry does not introduce new failure modes or
effects. The evaluation of the new suction pressure trip circuit
design concluded the new suction pressure trip circuit is similar
to the existing discharge pressure trip circuit design and
therefore, no new failure modes or effects are introduced. In
addition, the AFW system is being modified by altering the
function of the discharge pressure trip channel to provide pump
runout protection.
Operator actions may be required to assure the AFW pumps are
aligned for post-accident recovery operations. With these
actions, the accident recovery operations can be performed and a
new or different kind of accident is not
[[Page 25620]] created. The proposed amendment ensures that the
AFW system continues to performs its intended safety function.
Therefore, operation of the facility in accordance with the
proposed amendment does not create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.
3. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction in
a margin of safety? Response: No.
The modifications to the AFW System and the associated Technical
Specifications will ensure that the AFW system is capable of
performing its intended safety function. In addition, the margin
of safety in the accident analyses is not affected by the
proposed changes. The manual actions that may be required to
restart an AFW pump and throttle AFW flow during the
cooldown/recovery phase of the event do not significantly impact
the margin of safety.
Therefore, the proposed amendment does not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR
50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to
determine that the amendment request involves no significant
hazards consideration.
The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed
determination. Any comments received within 30 days after the
date of publication of this notice will be considered in making
any final determination.
Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendment until the
expiration of 60 days after the date of publication of this
notice. The Commission may issue the license amendment before
expiration of the 60- day period provided that its final
determination is that the amendment involves no significant
hazards consideration. In addition, the Commission may issue the
amendment prior to the expiration of the 30- day comment period
should circumstances change during the 30-day comment period such
that failure to act in a timely way would result, for example in
derating or shutdown of the facility. Should the Commission take
action prior to the expiration of either the comment period or
the notice period, it will publish in the Federal Register a
notice of issuance. Should the Commission make a final No
Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, any hearing will
take place after issuance. The Commission expects that the need
to take this action will occur very infrequently.
Written comments may be submitted by mail to the Chief, Rules and
Directives Branch, Division of Administrative Services, Office of
Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington,
DC 20555-0001, and should cite the publication date and page
number of this Federal Register notice. Written comments may also
be delivered to Room 6D59, Two White Flint North, 11545 Rockville
Pike, Rockville, Maryland, from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. Federal
workdays. Documents may be examined, and/or copied for a fee, at
the NRC's Public Document Room (PDR), located at One White Flint
North, Public File Area O1 F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first
floor), Rockville, Maryland.
The filing of requests for hearing and petitions for leave to
intervene is discussed below.
Within 60 days after the date of publication of this notice, the
licensee may file a request for a hearing with respect to
issuance of the amendment to the subject facility operating
license and any person whose interest may be affected by this
proceeding and who wishes to participate as a party in the
proceeding must file a written request for a hearing and a
petition for leave to intervene. Requests for a hearing and a
petition for leave to intervene shall be filed in accordance with
the Commission's ``Rules of Practice for Domestic Licensing
Proceedings'' in 10 CFR Part 2. Interested persons should consult
a current copy of 10 CFR 2.309, which is available at the
Commission's PDR, located at One White Flint North, Public File
Area O1F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville,
Maryland. Publicly available records will be accessible from the
Agencywide Documents Access and Management System's (ADAMS)
Public Electronic Reading Room on the Internet at the NRC Web
site, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/cfr/. If a
request for a hearing or petition for leave to intervene is filed
by the above date, the Commission or a presiding officer
designated by the Commission or by the Chief Administrative Judge
of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel, will rule on the
request and/or petition; and the Secretary or the Chief
Administrative Judge of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
will issue a notice of a hearing or an appropriate order.
As required by 10 CFR 2.309, a petition for leave to intervene
shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner
in the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the
results of the proceeding. The petition should specifically
explain the reasons why intervention should be permitted with
particular reference to the following general requirements: (1)
The name, address and telephone number of the requestor or
petitioner; (2) the nature of the requestor's/petitioner's right
under the Act to be made a party to the proceeding; (3) the
nature and extent of the requestor's/petitioner's property,
financial, or other interest in the proceeding; and (4) the
possible effect of any decision or order which may be entered in
the proceeding on the requestor's/petitioner's interest. The
petition must also identify the specific contentions which the
petitioner/requestor seeks to have litigated at the proceeding.
Each contention must consist of a specific statement of the issue
of law or fact to be raised or controverted. In addition, the
petitioner/requestor shall provide a brief explanation of the
bases for the contention and a concise statement of the alleged
facts or expert opinion which support the contention and on which
the petitioner intends to rely in proving the contention at the
hearing. The petitioner/requestor must also provide references to
those specific sources and documents of which the petitioner is
aware and on which the petitioner intends to rely to establish
those facts or expert opinion. The petition must include
sufficient information to show that a genuine dispute exists with
the applicant on a material issue of law or fact. Contentions
shall be limited to matters within the scope of the amendment
under consideration. The contention must be one which, if proven,
would entitle the petitioner to relief. A petitioner/requestor
who fails to satisfy these requirements with respect to at least
one contention will not be permitted to participate as a party.
Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding,
subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to
intervene, and have the opportunity to participate fully in the
conduct of the hearing.
If a hearing is requested, the Commission will make a final
determination on the issue of no significant hazards
consideration. The final determination will serve to decide when
the hearing is held. If the final determination is that the
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration,
the Commission may issue the amendment and make it immediately
effective, notwithstanding the request for a hearing. Any hearing
held would take place after issuance of the amendment. If the
final determination is that the amendment request involves a
significant hazards consideration, any hearing held would take
place before the issuance of any amendment.
[[Page 25621]] Nontimely requests and/or petitions and
contentions will not be entertained absent a determination by the
Commission or the presiding officer of the Atomic Safety and
Licensing Board that the petition, request and/or the contentions
should be granted based on a balancing of the factors specified
in 10 CFR 2.309(c)(1)(i)-(viii). A request for a hearing or a
petition for leave to intervene must be filed by: (1) First class
mail addressed to the Office of the Secretary of the Commission,
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001,
Attention: Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff; (2) courier,
express mail, and expedited delivery services: Office of the
Secretary, Sixteenth Floor, One White Flint North, 11555
Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland, 20852, Attention: Rulemaking
and Adjudications Staff; (3) E-mail addressed to the Office of
the Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
HEARINGDOCKET@NRC.GOV; or (4) facsimile transmission addressed to
the Office of the Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC, Attention: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff at
(301) 415-1101, verification number is (301) 415-1966. A copy of
the request for hearing and petition for leave to intervene
should also be sent to the Office of the General Counsel, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, and it
is requested that copies be transmitted either by means of
facsimile transmission to 301-415-3725 or by email to
OGCMailCenter@nrc.gov. A copy of the request for hearing and
petition for leave to intervene should also be sent to Bradley D.
Jackson, Esq., Foley and Lardner, P.O. Box 1497, Madison, WI
53701-1497, attorney for the licensee.
For further details with respect to this action, see the
application for amendment dated May 5, 2005, which is available
for public inspection at the Commission's PDR, located at One
White Flint North, File Public Area O1 F21, 11555 Rockville Pike
(first floor), Rockville, Maryland. Publicly available records
will be accessible from the Agencywide Documents Access and
Management System's (ADAMS) Public Electronic Reading Room on the
Internet at the NRC Web site,
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. Persons who do not have
access to ADAMS or who encounter problems in accessing the
documents located in ADAMS, should contact the NRC PDR Reference
staff by telephone at 1- 800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or by e-mail
to pdr@nrc.gov. Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 9th day of
May, 2005.
Carl F. Lyon, Project Manager, Section 1 Project Directorate III
, Division of Licensing Project Management, Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. E5-2378 Filed 5-12-05; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
*****************************************************************
23 NRC: Nuclear Management Company, LLC; Notice of Consideration of
FR Doc E5-2379
[Federal Register: May 13, 2005 (Volume 70, Number 92)] [Notices]
[Page 25621-25622] From the Federal Register Online via GPO
Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr13my05-93]
Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating License and
Opportunity for a Hearing The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(the Commission) is considering issuance of an amendment to
Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-24 and DPR-27, issued to
Nuclear Management Company, LLC (NMC or the licensee), for
operation of the Point Beach Nuclear Plant (PBNP), Units 1 and 2
located in Two Rivers, WI.
The proposed amendment would alter the PBNP Final Safety Analysis
Report (FSAR) to include a reactor vessel head drop event.
Before issuance of the proposed license amendment, the Commission
will have made findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of
1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's regulations.
Within 60 days after the date of publication of this notice, the
licensee may file a request for a hearing with respect to
issuance of the amendment to the subject facility operating
license and any person whose interest may be affected by this
proceeding and who wishes to participate as a party in the
proceeding must file a written request for a hearing and a
petition for leave to intervene. Requests for a hearing and a
petition for leave to intervene shall be filed in accordance with
the Commission's ``Rules of Practice for Domestic Licensing
Proceedings'' in 10 CFR part 2. Interested persons should consult
a current copy of 10 CFR 2.309, which is available at the
Commission's PDR, located at One White Flint North, Public File
Area 01F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville,
Maryland. Publicly available records will be accessible from the
Agencywide Documents Access and Management System's (ADAMS)
Public Electronic Reading Room on the Internet at the NRC Web
site, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/cfr/. If a
request for a hearing or petition for leave to intervene is filed
by the above date, the Commission or a presiding officer
designated by the Commission or by the Chief Administrative Judge
of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel, will rule on the
request and/or petition; and the Secretary or the Chief
Administrative Judge of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
will issue a notice of a hearing or an appropriate order.
As required by 10 CFR 2.309, a petition for leave to intervene
shall set forth with particularity the interest of the
petitioner/ requestor in the proceeding, and how that interest
may be affected by the results of the proceeding. The petition
should specifically explain the reasons why intervention should
be permitted with particular reference to the following general
requirements: (1) The name, address and telephone number of the
requestor or petitioner; (2) the nature of the
requestor's/petitioner's right under the Act to be made a party
to the proceeding; (3) the nature and extent of the requestor's/
petitioner's property, financial, or other interest in the
proceeding; and (4) the possible effect of any decision or order
which may be entered in the proceeding on the
requestor's/petitioner's interest. The petition must also
identify the specific contentions which the petitioner/requestor
seeks to have litigated at the proceeding.
Each contention must consist of a specific statement of the issue
of law or fact to be raised or controverted. In addition, the
petitioner/requestor shall provide a brief explanation of the
bases for the contention and a concise statement of the alleged
facts or expert opinion which support the contention and on which
the petitioner intends to rely in proving the contention at the
hearing. The petitioner must also provide references to those
specific sources and documents of which the petitioner is aware
and on which the petitioner intends to rely to establish those
facts or expert opinion. The petition must include sufficient
information to show that a genuine dispute exists with the
applicant on a material issue of law or fact. Contentions shall
be limited to matters within the scope of the amendment under
consideration. The contention must be one which, if proven, would
entitle the petitioner/requestor to relief. A petitioner/
requestor who fails to satisfy these requirements with respect to
at least one contention will not be permitted to participate as a
party.
Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding,
subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to
intervene, and have the opportunity to
[[Page 25622]] participate fully in the conduct of the hearing.
Nontimely requests and/or petitions and contentions will not be
entertained absent a determination by the Commission or the
presiding officer of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that
the petition, request and/or the contentions should be granted
based on a balancing of the factors specified in 10 CFR
2.309(a)(1)(i)-(viii). A request for a hearing or a petition for
leave to intervene must be filed by: (1) First class mail
addressed to the Office of the Secretary of the Commission, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001,
Attention: Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff; (2) courier,
express mail, and expedited delivery services: Office of the
Secretary, Sixteenth Floor, One White Flint North, 11555
Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852, Attention: Rulemaking
and Adjudications Staff; (3) E-mail addressed to the Office of
the Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
HEARINGDOCKET@NRC.GOV; or (4) facsimile transmission addressed to
the Office of the Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC, Attention: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff at
(301) 415-1101, verification number is (301) 415-1966. A copy of
the request for hearing and petition for leave to intervene
should also be sent to the Office of the General Counsel, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, and it
is requested that copies be transmitted either by means of
facsimile transmission to 301-415-3725 or by e-mail to
OGCMailCenter@nrc.gov. A copy of the request for hearing and
petition for leave to intervene should also be sent to Jonathan
Rogoff, Esquire, Vice President, Counsel & Secretary, Nuclear
Management Company, LLC, 700 First Street, Hudson, WI 54016,
attorney for the licensee.
For further details with respect to this action, see the
application for amendment dated April 29, 2005, which is
available for public inspection at the Commission's PDR, located
at One White Flint North, Public File Area O1 F21, 11555
Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland. Publicly
available records will be accessible electronically from the
Agencywide Documents Access and Management System's (ADAMS)
Public Electronic Reading Room on the Internet at the NRC Web
site, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. Persons who do
not have access to ADAMS or who encounter problems in accessing
the documents located in ADAMS, should contact the NRC PDR
Reference staff by telephone at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or
by e-mail to
pdr@nrc.gov. Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 9th day of May
2005.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Harold K. Chernoff, Project Manager, Section 1, Project
Directorate 3, Division of Licensing Project Management, Office
of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. E5-2379 Filed 5-12-05; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
*****************************************************************
24 USATODAY.com: 'Downwinders' case finally goes to court
Posted 5/12/2005 11:04 PM
By Laura Parker, USA
TODAY SPOKANE, Wash. — Dolores Hein never thought much about the
winds that sweep across the rolling wheat fields in eastern
Washington until 1980, when the eruption of Mount St. Helens, 300
miles to the west, dropped nine truckloads of ash on her family's
farm just south of here.
Curtesy U.S. Department of Energy via AP
That led Hein to wonder whether any radioactive material had
drifted over to the farm from the Hanford nuclear research site,
which is only 145 miles west of the farm. Could that explain her
husband's thyroid cancer and two daughters' thyroid disease?
In 1986, after the U.S. government made public files documenting
the secret releases of radioactive emissions from Hanford during
World War II and the Cold War, Hein joined more than 2,300 other
"downwinders" in the region in suing the companies that built
and operated Hanford for the government during those years.
After 15 years of pretrial wrangling, the first six of those
cases will be decided soon by a 12-member jury in a federal
court here. Hein will watch the outcome closely because the
jury's decision likely will help U.S. District Judge Frem
Nielsen determine how to resolve the remaining claims
including Hein's.
'Last chapter'
The first six plaintiffs include five women and a man who were
youngsters living in eastern Washington when radioactive
iodine-131 (I-131) was released into the air from the plant,
which for 50 years was the nation's largest producer of
plutonium. Three of the plaintiffs have thyroid cancer; the
others have thyroid disorders.
The plaintiffs allege that I-131, which is a byproduct of
nuclear weapons production and concentrates in the thyroid when
absorbed, caused their illnesses. They believe they were made
ill by drinking milk from cows that grazed in pastures
contaminated by I-131.
The trial focuses only on the six plaintiffs, but it represents
one of the final rounds of legal disputes over how thousands of
Americans were affected by this nation's super-secret pursuit of
The Bomb, that continued through the Cold War.
"The last chapter in coming to terms with the human legacy of
the nuclear arms race are the people who live near these nuclear
plants," says Bob Alvarez, a top official in the Energy
Department in the Clinton administration and a critic of the
nuclear industry.
The trial also is playing out with the nation at a crossroad in
the nuclear age. The Bush administration is proposing, over the
next five years, to halve the $2 billion cleanup budget at
Hanford, which is the most contaminated nuclear site in the
country. At the same time, the administration is proposing to
spend $6 billion to develop a new class of nuclear weapons that
would require testing, albeit underground and presumably safer.
The U.S. government already has spent millions of dollars to
compensate thousands of people in Utah, Arizona, Nevada and the
Marshall Islands who were exposed to radiation in areas where
atomic bombs were built or tested.
The Hanford plaintiffs represent the largest group from the
World War II and Cold War years whose exposure to radioactive
material has not been addressed by the government.
What's at stake
If the jury sides with the plaintiffs, the financial awards
could run to tens of millions of dollars. Any awards would be
paid by the U.S. government, because its agreement with its
contractors, DuPont and General Electric, protects the companies
from liability. The government is paying the contractors' legal
fees. The (Spokane) Spokesman Review, citing government
documents, reported in 2000 that those fees had topped $60
million. The report could not be independently confirmed.
Attorneys for DuPont and General Electric argue there is no
connection between residents' illnesses and Hanford.
"There is no epidemic of thyroid disease around Hanford. It is
just not there," Kevin Van Wart, the companies' attorney told
the jury.
The plaintiffs with thyroid cancer are Shannon Rhodes, born in
1941, and Gloria Wise and Steve Stanton, born in 1944. The
plaintiffs suffering from hypothyroidism and autoimmune disease
are Kathryn Goldbloom, born in 1941, Wanda Buckner, born in
1945, and Shirley Carlisle, born in 1947.
Hanford played a pivotal role in World War II, and as the Cold
War heated up, it became a source of civic pride. Its scientists
made the plutonium that was used in the bomb that was dropped on
Nagasaki in 1945.
The Richland High School Bombers still feature a mushroom cloud
in their insignia. As a youth, Goldbloom marched in Richland's
Atomic Frontier Days parade.
Emissions revealed
Residents in the region learned of Hanford's radioactive
emissions in 1986, when the U.S. Energy Department released
19,000 pages of previously classified documents detailing the
emissions.
The documents revealed that most of Hanford's releases of I-131
occurred from 1944 to 1947. Some emissions were accidental, some
intentional. The largest single release of radioactive iodine,
known as the Green Run, occurred in December 1949, when 8,000
curies were intentionally released to study the plume, on the
theory that by tracking a similar plume in the Soviet Union,
U.S. scientists could learn the location of Soviet plutonium
factories.
Attorneys for both sides agreed before the trial that a total of
more than 740,000 curies of I-131 were released at Hanford. By
comparison, more than 50 million curies of radioactive material
were released over 10 days in 1986 at the Chernobyl nuclear
power plant in the former Soviet Union, the world's worst
nuclear plant disaster.
The trial has focused on testimony from scientists and medical
analysts and has included estimates of the doses of radiation
the six plaintiffs received. The defense has sought to show that
the doses were not large enough to cause the plaintiffs'
illnesses.
Testimony also dealt with a study by the federal Centers for
Disease Prevention and Control that found the risk of acquiring
thyroid disease to be no greater for people exposed to Hanford
radioactive emissions than for people who were not exposed.
The plaintiffs argue that the Hanford study was flawed, and they
have emphasized other studies, including one about the Chernobyl
accident that links thyroid illness with radioactive emissions.
But Van Wart discounts the comparisons: "Hanford is no
Chernobyl."'Downwinders' get their day5/12/2005 11:04 PMBy Laura
Parker, USA TODAYSPOKANE, Wash. Curtesy U.S. Department of
Energy via AP-->
© Copyright 2005 USA TODAY, a division of Gannett Co. Inc.-->
*****************************************************************
25 Las Vegas RJ: YUCCA MOUNTAIN: Panel adds $10 million to request
Friday, May 13, 2005
Money would be for interim storage of nuclear waste
By TONY BATT STEPHENS WASHINGTON BUREAU
U.S. Rep. David Hobson, R-Ohio, chairs a House subcommittee that
added $10 million Thursday to the White House budget request for
Yucca Mountain in 2006.
THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
WASHINGTON -- A House panel on Thursday added $10 million to the
White House budget request for Yucca Mountain in 2006, and
instructed the Department of Energy to use the additional money
to select one or two sites next year for interim storage of
nuclear waste.
Rep. David Hobson, R-Ohio, the chairman of the House
Appropriations subcommittee on energy and water, said the
interim storage sites should be Energy Department facilities
located outside Nevada, but declined to say where.
"Frankly, it's time to rethink our approach to dealing with
spent (nuclear) fuel," Hobson said. "We need to start moving
spent fuel away from reactor sites to one or more centralized,
above-ground facilities at (Department of Energy) sites."
Foreign nuclear waste already is being stored at Energy
Department sites, Hobson said. "It's time we do the same for our
domestic spent (nuclear) fuel," he said.
Yucca Mountain, 100 miles northwest of Las Vegas, has been
designated to receive 77,000 tons of high-level nuclear waste
from the nation's power plants, but it is uncertain when the
storage will begin.
Hobson said Yucca Mountain cannot store all of the nation's
nuclear waste and interim storage will ease the burden.
The White House has not yet signed off on interim storage.
Energy Department spokeswoman Anne Womack said the
administration is examining the subcommittee's budget
legislation "but moving forward on Yucca Mountain."
The subcommittee approved $661 million next year for Yucca
Mountain, which is an $84 million increase above this year's
budget.
"It's critical we get Yucca Mountain done right and done soon,"
Hobson said.
Beyond interim storage, the subcommittee directed the Energy
Department to develop advanced technology for reprocessing
nuclear spent fuel at one or more DOE sites by 2007.
Critics of reprocessing claim it would make spent nuclear fuel
easier for terrorists to obtain.
The subcommittee also rejected a Bush administration request of
$4 million next year for a study on a new nuclear weapon known
as the robust nuclear earth penetrator, or "bunker buster." If
developed, some observers believe the "bunker buster" might be
tested at the Nevada Test Site, 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas.
Copyright Las Vegas Review-Journal
*****************************************************************
26 Las Vegas SUN: Columnist Jeff German: Gibbons has late awakening
Today: May 13, 2005 at 11:19:01 PDT
Jeff German's column appears Tuesdays, Wednesdays, Fridays and
Sundays in the Sun. Reach him at german@lasvegassun.comor (702)
259-4067.
Is it freezing down below?
No one thought this was possible, but Nevada Rep. Jim Gibbons,
the man who wants to be our next governor, has finally figured
out that the Bush administration is determined to stick us with
Yucca Mountain even if it has to doctor the science.
Gibbons, a Republican in his fifth term, got a chilling dose of
reality after this week's confrontation over Yucca Mountain
between Energy Secretary Samuel Bodman and Nevada's
congressional delegation.
Bodman told the bipartisan delegation that Yucca Mountain isn't
dead in the eyes of the Energy Department, which is moving ahead
full force with the licensing process in the face of damning
allegations that scientific research was rigged.
This didn't come as a surprise to most veteran Yucca Mountain
opponents, who know the Energy Department has invested too much
in the wounded nuclear waste project to let it expire without a
fight.
But according to Gibbons -- who, up to this point, has been a
patsy for the Bush administration on this subject -- what Bodman
said was astonishing.
"It was something of an eye-opening experience to realize they
have an obvious mandate to license Yucca Mountain despite what
the science may say or what they don't know," Gibbons told the
Las Vegas Review-Journal after the tension-filled meeting in
Washington.
Are you kidding me?
Where has Gibbons been during his eight years on Capitol Hill?
"He's been in his own world," says Peggy Maze Johnson, the
executive director of Citizens Alert, an anti-Yucca Mountain
watchdog group. "I don't think he has understood what's been
going on."
Johnson says Gibbons certainly hasn't been listening to his
constituents.
"We've been talking about bad science forever," she says. "He
just hasn't been paying attention."
This opinion is shared by Democrats within Nevada's
congressional delegation.
"For someone who has turned a blind eye for years to the
shortcomings of his own party on this issue, I find it ironic
that he's finally struck with this idea that, wow, they're not
willing to do anything for us," one Democratic congressional
source says.
But now that Gibbons has seen the light -- he said last week
that he's ready to "play hardball" -- we can expect him at long
last to stand up to the Bush administration.
Hopefully, that means no more Yucca Mountain passes for
President Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney and their top
advisers when they come to the state.
As late as two months ago, Gibbons shielded Cheney during the
vice president's visit to Reno from having to answer media
questions about Yucca Mountain.
Gibbons and other top Nevada Republicans pulled this stunt
throughout the 2004 campaign to help re-elect Bush and Cheney.
The duo ended up winning the state's five electoral votes
without ever having to explain how they pushed Yucca Mountain on
us amid so many unanswered questions about its safety.
If Gibbons is serious about wanting to play hardball, it means
his party pandering over Yucca Mountain will have to come to an
end.
Then he can fight like the rest of us.
*****************************************************************
27 Las Vegas SUN: House panel OKs funds for moving nuke waste
Today: May 13, 2005 at 11:19:01 PDT
By Suzanne Struglinski SUN WASHINGTON
BUREAU
WASHINGTON -- The Energy Department may get $10 million to
start moving nuclear waste to an interim storage site as early
as 2006, based on a provision included in a House spending bill
Thursday.
The House Appropriations Energy and Water Subcommittee approved
$661 million for the Yucca Mountain project, fulfilling the
department's budget request while adding an additional $10
million in a vague request to begin moving waste to other
department sites.
"It's time to rethink our approach to dealing with spent fuel,"
Subcommittee Chairman David Hobson, R-Ohio, said. "It's
irresponsible the policies we have now. It delays us."
The bill does not name a site to take the waste or implement a
specific policy but gives the department the ability to start
moving waste to a site as early as next year, Hobson said.
"This stuff is not in the safest place right now," Hobson said.
"This is a vision to move forward."
The Energy Department plans to store 77,000 tons of nuclear
waste at Yucca Mountain, 90 miles northwest of Las Vegas. The
department was supposed to move the waste in 1998 but the
project has suffered a series of delays and setbacks.
Hobson said the effort should not been seen as losing
confidence in the Yucca Mountain project, saying it is
"critical" the government gets the project "done right and done
soon."
"I have 100 percent of the funding in there," Hobson said. "I
will fight to the death for Yucca Mountain just as my opponent
says he will fight against it."
Hobson's "opponent," Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid, D-Nev.,
is the top Democrat on the Senate Appropriations Energy and
Water Development Subcommittee. Reid works to cut the Yucca
budget every year and disagrees with Hobson's effort for it to
move forward.
Reid spokeswoman Tessa Hafen this is an acknowledgement that
the department cannot move forward on Yucca. She noted that the
House usually asks for more than the department's request but
usually gets less after final negotiations with Reid.
She said the ongoing investigations into possibly falsified
data at the project give Reid "added ammunition" in his fight to
lower the funding.
"It's proof that was he has been saying over the years about
this money going down a dark hole," Hafen said.
The additional $10 million can go toward casks or plans to move
waste to a site. It builds on the request the department already
had to buy casks, committee spokesman John Scofield said. It
gives the department the ability to pick a site or sites, make
plans and decide how to move forward.
The subcommittee will not release the exact language in the
bill until the House Appropriations Committee takes it up next
week. The Senate will not begin finalizing its bill at least
until after the Memorial Day recess.
Hobson said he has a site in mind but would not offer details.
He also said it could be more than one site.
"It is not in Nevada," Hobson said. "If one happens to be in
Ohio, OK."
Under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, an interim storage site can
not be in Nevada. Congress killed an effort to amend the law and
have temporary storage at Yucca Mountain five years ago.
Hobson suggested in March that the Nevada Test Site could serve
as a site to store waste for 100 to 500 years as scientists
figured out a better way to store or reprocess fuel.
Sen. John Ensign, R-Nev., spokesman Jack Finn did not want to
comment until had seen a copy of the exact language.
Rep. Jim Gibbons, R-Nev., opposes any funding for Yucca
Mountain, according to spokeswoman Amy Spanbauer. He wants to
see the country invest money on "21st century technology" to
fight the waste problem and keeping waste safe where it is.
David Cherry, spokesman for Rep. Shelley Berkley, D-Nev.,
called the proposal an "absolute non-starter."
"There is nothing in there to be in agreement with," Cherry
said.
He said she would oppose any plan to move waste away from
nuclear power plants. An interim site, with the final
destination still at Yucca, creates a double risk for terrorist
attacks or accidents.
He said there is no plan on how to move it or where it would go.
But Hobson says the Energy Department accepts waste from
foreign reactors already to store at some of its facilities and
nuclear waste is moved around the country all the time.
"Give me a break, we have to get real," Hobson said. "This is
not brain science. This is not inventing a new wheel."
Hobson said the country loses about $500 million every year
Yucca Mountain does not open. He emphasized that other countries
are reprocessing fuel and storing nuclear waste with no
problems. The government has not fulfilled its contract with
nuclear companies to take the waste and legal decisions force
the government to pay damages to some utilities.
The bill also puts an additional $5 million to the Advanced
Fuel Cycle Initiative. The department will have to pick a
process to use to recycle nuclear waste by 2007, according to
the subcommittee.
Hobson included the extra money because it is "time we rethink
our reluctance to reprocessing fuel."
"I don't want to get to 'Yucca Mountain Two' right away,"
Hobson said.
The recycling would be aimed at how to decrease the amount of
existing waste without creating dangerous byproducts or more
waste in the process.
*****************************************************************
28 Platts: US House panel approves funding for interim nuclear waste storage
+ The US House Appropriations energy and water development
subcommittee Thursday approved a $29.7-bil spending measure for
fiscal 2006 that would fund an effort to transfer spent nuclear
fuel from civilian reactors to an "interim" storage facility
located on an Dept of Energy-owned site.
The spending measure also would also provide DOE with new funds
to develop a program for recycling spent nuclear fuel.
Subcommittee Chairman David Hobson (Republican-Ohio) said the
initiatives are necessary to ensure the continued availability of
"cheap energy" in the US.
"The only way to get cheap energy is to significantly expand the
nuclear industry," Hobson said.
"You're not going to do it with fossil fuels or solar or wind."
Hobson would not say where the proposed interim storage facility
would be located, adding only that it won't be in Nevada, the
site of DOE proposed high-level waste repository.
The bill would fund Yucca Mountain at $661-mil, $84-mil above the
fiscal 2005 appropriation and $10-mil over DOE's request. DOE's
share of the $29.7-bil measure is $24.6-bil, $278-mil more than
the department received for FY-05 and $362-mil more than the
department requested. Hobson said the bill would reinstate "not
all, but a lot" of the proposed cuts to oil and natural gas r.
The measure would provide $1.8-bil for DOE's energy supply and
conservation programs, $8-mil above the current level and
$136-mil above the request. The House Appropriations Committee is
slated to mark up the bill next week. This story was originally
published in Platts Electricity Alert
http://www.electricityalert.platts.com
Washington (Platts)--12May2005
Copyright © 2005 - Platts, All Rights Reserved
[The McGraw-Hill Companies]
*****************************************************************
29 Mail & Guardian: 'No final home for nuke waste'
Saturday, May 14, 2005 6:37 AM Africa's first online
Yolandi Groenewald
Despite the government’s R500 million investment in nuclear
technology, South Africa has no final policy to deal with
nuclear waste.
No deep-level depository, the final resting place for waste, has
yet been identified by the government. All waste is currently
stored on-site at Pelindaba and Koeberg.
“No nuclear waste has left Pelindaba since it began
operating,” said Piet Bredell, waste manager at the South
African Nuclear Energy Corporation. “The government has not
yet formulated a final plan of what to do with nuclear waste.
All we can do is store it until then.”
The Department of Minerals and Energy published a draft
radio-active waste management policy for comment in 2003.
Nothing has been heard of the draft since.
Pelindaba is storing nuclear waste from as far back as 1965.
About 45 000 drums of low-level nuclear waste are stored at its
Pelstore facility, used as a uranium-enrichment plan until
decommissioned in 1995.
Bredell also revealed that the facility for storing high-level
nuclear waste, the Thabana trenches, did not comply with
international standards. “It is not that it’s not safe,”
he said. “The international community raised the bar for
high-level storage facilities.”
Thabana was recently renamed after workers dubbed it
“Radiation Hill”.
Bredell said that when the government identified a suitable
site, the high-level waste would be relocated from Thabana to a
deep-level depository, most likely in the Northern Cape.
Earthlife Africa has repeatedly cri-ti-cised the government for
approving and investing in the pebble bed modular reactor (PBMR)
without a plan for dealing with nuclear waste.
Earthlife’s Richard Worthington said there was concern that
the authorities were taking so long to finalise a plan. Industry
favoured underground storage, and the government apparently
leaned towards this option.
“We want an above-ground facility in order to monitor the
waste,” he said. “The corporations who produced the waste
should be its guardian for life — responsibility should not
pass to government.”
Tom Ferreira, the PBMR’s communication manager, insisted the
first 40 years of waste storage would not pose a problem, as the
PMBR plant could store the spent fuel in dry storage tanks for
the power station’s expected lifespan. However, he conceded
that the lack of a final policy had been a “small Achilles
heel”.
The PBMR reactor will generate about 35 tons of spent fuel
pebbles a year, of which 1,5 tons will be depleted uranium.
Meanwhile, nuclear expert Kelvin Kemm shed light on the
government’s recent furious attack on Earthlife during a media
tour of Pelindaba last week. “Irresponsible
rumour-spreading” could adversely affect international
perceptions of South African nuclear technology such as the
PBMR, which could be a huge money-spinner for the country, Kemm
said.
Ferreira said that a “conservative” 2 % share in the
world’s $100-billion power-station market would generate $2
billion (about R12 billion) a year for South Africa, making the
project highly profitable.
The company also planned to bid for the $1,1 billion hydrogen
production project at the Idaho National Environmental and
Energy Laboratory, opening up the United States energy market to
the South Africa.
Repeated attempts to get comment from the goverment failed.
All material copyright Mail&Guardian.
*****************************************************************
30 Salt Lake Tribune: 34 now-closed bases are still toxic despite
being Superfund sites
Article Last Updated: 05/13/2005 01:41:56 AM
Costs in the billions.: As more closures are in the works, the
EPA says it may be a decade before many are completed
By John Heilprin The Associated Press
WASHINGTON - Thirty-four military bases shut down since 1988
are on the Environmental Protection Agency's Superfund list of
worst toxic waste sites - most of them for at least 15 years -
and not one is completely cleaned up.
As the latest base-closing commission begins its work, an
examination by The Associated Press shows EPA concerned with
incomplete pollution cleanups at more than 100 Defense
Department facilities.
Other military-related cleanups are being led solely by
states.
Of the $23.3 billion in costs from four previous rounds of
base closures and realignments, the Pentagon has spent $8.3
billion so far on pollution cleanups and other compliance with
environmental laws, congressional investigators say. EPA
officials say it will be at least a decade before many are
completed - at a cost the government estimates will reach an
additional $3.6 billion.
They anticipate more military facilities will be added to the
Superfund list after the newest round of base closings is
completed. The Pentagon plans to give a list of recommendations
to the Base Realignment and Closure Commission today, the first
major step in the process.
''A large majority of these [Superfund] sites will have all
the remedies in place by 2015,'' said Jim Woolford, head of
EPA's Federal Facilities Restoration &Reuse Office. ''It may
take longer to remove them from the list because of groundwater
contamination or unexploded ordnance.''
However, it is the cleanups still under way that pose the
most frequent obstacles to the Pentagon's ability to cut costs
by converting an installation to other uses.
Hard-to-remove contaminants include trichloroethylene, a
cleaning solvent linked to cancer, as well as asbestos-tainted
soil, radioactive materials and leaded paint.
''The environmental issues, including what type of cleanup
needs to be done, have been the main holdup on all of these
places,'' Pentagon spokesman Glenn Flood said.
''We'll get it done, but it's going to take time in some
cases as we work with the communities.''
For the Air Force, 98 percent of the delays in transferring
24,000 acres from military hands are due to environmental
issues.
For the Army, it's 82 percent of 101,000 acres. For the Navy,
it's 65 percent of almost 13,000 acres, says the General
Accountability Office.
The GAO, Congress' investigative arm, found the Defense
Department has saved $29 billion, and can expect to save $7
billion more, from the closures.
About 72 percent of the property has been unloaded, but 28
percent remains in federal hands ''due primarily to the need for
environmental cleanup,'' the GAO said in a report this month.
The Pentagon insists progress is being made but that it takes
time to involve communities.
''You don't know what you have until you do a thorough
examination, and it can result in some delays,'' Flood said
''It's never going to be fast enough for some communities.''
Flood said the base closures actually speed decontamination.
''We have to clean them up whether they close them or not.
With BRAC, they just move to the head of the line,'' he said.
Since the Superfund program began in 1980 to clean up the
nation's most hazardous waste sites, base closure commissions in
1988, 1991, 1993 and 1995 made recommendations that led Congress
to shut down 97 bases.
Twenty-eight of the 34 closed bases put onto the Superfund
list were added at least 15 years ago, including 11 that went on
a year before the first round of base closings.
Woolford attributed the delays in finishing those cleanups to
the sites' complexity.
''Unlike the typical Superfund private-party sites, these
sites are much larger and will generally have more
contamination, and consequently take longer to clean up,'' he
said.
EPA lists 10 sites where ''groundwater migration'' of
contaminants is not considered to be fully under control yet.
Five are in California; the others are in Arizona, Florida,
Tennessee, Oregon and Utah - the Tooele Army Depot.
Two of the sites, California's Fort Ord near Monterey and the
Memphis Defense Depot in Tennessee, also note ''human exposure''
to possible health risks.
© Copyright 2005, The Salt Lake Tribune.
*****************************************************************
31 Salt Lake Tribune: Panel: Send N-waste to temporary site by '06
Article Last Updated: 05/13/2005 01:20:00 AM
By Robert Gehrke The Salt Lake Tribune
WASHINGTON - A House subcommittee wants the Energy Department
to start sending nuclear reactor waste to an interim storage
site by next year.
The proposal's possible impact on a planned temporary storage
center in Utah, which would be operated by private owners, is
unclear. But the House backers of a new public waste storage
alternative want it in place before the Utah site is scheduled
to be operating.
Rep. David Hobson, R-Ohio, chairman of the House subcommittee
that sets the Energy Department budget, on Thursday added $10
million to the bill, directing DOE to select one or more
above-ground sites that can store spent fuel by 2006.
The temporary site would address the need for storage until a
permanent repository in Yucca Mountain, Nev., can be opened.
Private Fuel Storage, a consortium of electric utilities, has
proposed a privately funded and operated fuel storage site on
the Skull Valley Band of Goshutes Indian reservation. PFS is
awaiting a license from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, but
is not expected to be operating before 2007.
Hobson's language also asks the Energy Department to study
reprocessing spent fuel, and have a reprocessing technology
selected by 2007.
Hobson told The Associated Press he wants to move the waste
before the opening of Yucca Mountain, which would occur in 2012
at the earliest.
"We're incurring a lot of litigation when we don't get the
spent fuel rods out from these power plants like we said we
we're going to do," he said. "This way we could eliminate that,
cut down on the security problems they have, and put them into
some above-ground sites."
PFS spokeswoman Sue Martin said she could not say for certain
how Hobson's proposal might affect the Skull Valley proposal,
assuming Hobson's aggressive schedule could be met.
"It doesn't really change our plans because you see how long
it's taken to plan and go through the licensing process for our
facility and it would probably take DOE just as long. . . . In
the meantime, the [power plants] are continuing to run out of
space," Martin said.
"I think it would be an important thing for Congress to
approve, but it doesn't obviate the need for our facility at
this time."
She said it could mean the Skull Valley site would not be
in operation as long, adding "and that's fine."
The energy spending bill containing Hobson's storage
proposal is still in the early stages. It still would require
approval of the House Appropriations Committee, the full House
and Senate and the president.
Thousands of tons of commercial reactor fuel and defense
waste are scattered around 39 states.
The Bush administration is committed to moving it to Yucca
Mountain, but a string of problems - most recently allegations
that workers falsified scientific data - have delayed the
project.
© Copyright 2005, The Salt Lake Tribune.
*****************************************************************
32 Greenpeace: Leak forces Sellafield to close
Last edited: 13-05-2005
A large leak of highly radioactive liquid nuclear waste in a
Sellafield nuclear waste reprocessing plant has forced British
Nuclear Fuels (BNFL) to shut one of its main facilities.
Earlier this week an estimated 83 cubic metres of liquid, which
contains about 20 tonnes of highly radioactive spent nuclear
waste fuel dissolved in nitric acid, leaked into an enclosed
stainless steel chamber in the Thermal Oxide Reprocessing Plant
(THORP). BNFL says there is no danger to the public, but the
chamber is now too radioactive to enter. Clean-up will cost
millions and may lead to increased risks for those workers who
have to undertake the recovery operation.
There's a clear link. The Sellafield plant, which has a history
of technical problems and financial losses, was built by BNFL,
which also owns Westinghouse - the company that wants to sell
new reactors to the UK.
BNFL has made many claims about how safe, efficient and
cost-effective the Sellafield reprocessing plant would be. BNFL
and Westinghouse are now making the same claims about the new,
untried, untested reactor design that they want built in the UK.
BNFL has already left us with a legacy of radioactive waste
that no one wants and taxpayers are being forced to pay for. The
same company is now asking us to stump up yet more in subsidies
to allow it to build a new fleet of dangerous and
environmentally damaging reactors.
Waste not, want not
At the Sellafield reprocessing plant, intensely radioactive
spent fuel is dissolved and the unused uranium and
weapons-useable plutonium is separated from high level liquid
wastes. The spent fuel is transported from nuclear power
stations in the UK, Europe and Japan, the transport of which
also poses grave security and environmental risks.
The original idea was that the uranium and plutonium separated
in this way would be reused for reactor fuel. But today most
nuclear utilities do not have an economically viable use for the
separated material; leaving reprocessing a pretty much pointless
activity which does nothing to reduce the amount of
radioactivity we have to deal with and which actually increases
the volumes of nuclear waste we have to manage.
The uranium and plutonium separated from British waste fuel is
simply stockpiled. It would be perfectly feasible to store the
spent nuclear waste fuel, rather than reprocess it which incurs
much more risk and cost.
Similarly, there are no contracts by some of BNFL's foreign
customers to reuse the uranium and plutonium recovered through
reprocessing, posing the question of how and when this material
- particularly the weapons-usable plutonium - will be returned.
Who's paying for it?
Charged with cleaning up all of this useless waste is the newly
formed Nuclear Decommissioning Authority which took over
ownership of Sellafield at the beginning of April. The authority
was set up by the government with a remit to clean up the
nuclear industry's radioactive waste legacy. It has a ﾣ2.2
billon cleanup budget for its first year of operation.
However, the authority is also expected to get almost half its
income from operating nuclear facilities like the Sellafield
reprocessing plants which continue to produce nuclear waste. It
was estimated that the income from Sellafield's THORP
reprocessing plant for the coming year would have contributed
ﾣ560m to the authority's coffers.
The accident looking like a financial disaster for the
authority, and the taxpayer, since income from THORP, calculated
to be more than ﾣ1m a day, is supposed to help pay for the
cleanup of redundant nuclear facilities. It might now prove to
be an even bigger drain on the public purse if the government
has to fund the recovery and clean up operations.
BNFL is claiming it cannot give an exact time for how long the
plant is expected to be closed, but it is likely to be four to
six months at the very least. That means approximately
ﾣ120m-ﾣ180m in lost earnings - and doesn't include the
massive costs of clean up!
Because of the Sellafield reprocessing leak, the Nuclear
Decommissioning Authority will now find itself short of cash for
the urgent task of cleaning the nuclear industry's mess, unless
the government bails it out with yet more taxpayers' money.
What should happen now?
The cost of cleaning up and repairing THORP could prove to be
massive. Now is the time for the Nuclear Decommissioning
Authority to review the future of the plant and consider leaving
it closed. This would avoid any more unnecessary reprocessing,
lessen the amount of radioactive waste created and discharged
and also lessen the impact on the public purse.
*****************************************************************
33 Courier-Post: Judge: Let water out of landfill
Friday, May 13, 2005
Officials vow to press EPA on discharge from GEMS
By LAWRENCE HAJNA Staff GLOUCESTER TWP.
A federal judge has ruled that the state and Camden County
Municipal Utilities Authority must comply with a federally
endorsed plan that calls for the discharge of water from the
GEMS Landfill Superfund site to county sewer mains.
The discharge of the water, tainted with low levels of
radionuclides prior to going through a pretreatment plant on the
site, could begin in a little over a month.
But U.S. Rep. Rob Andrews, D-Haddon Heights, a chief critic of
the plan, vows the battle is not over.
"These fights have many, many rounds," he said. "This is a
round we lost. We didn't lose the fight. The fight will
continue."
Andrews said he will encourage the state Department of
Environmental Protection and CCMUA to appeal the plan. He also
hopes to meet with federal Environmental Protection Agency
acting regional administrator Kathleen Callahan to persuade her
to change the agency's position.
Camden County Freeholder-Director Louis Cappelli Jr.
acknowledged the decision is a critical blow to opponents. But
he vowed to keep up political pressure on the EPA to consider
on-site treatment of the water.
"That's really what's in everyone's best interests," he said,
adding county attorneys will review the possibility of appealing
to the U.S. Supreme Court.
State Department of Environmental Protection Commissioner
Bradley M. Campbell said he was disappointed with the decision
but said no decision has been made regarding an appeal.
Plan on hold
The CCMUA discharge plan has been on hold for more than three
years as the result of opposition from environmental groups,
state and federal lawmakers, and citizens.
The EPA and a trust of former landfill users want to clean up
water tainted with conventional contaminants by first treating
it on-site then sending it to the CCMUA for final treatment and
discharge to the Delaware River. The CCMUA balked when uranium
and radium were found in the water.
In 2003, the state Legislature passed a law aimed at banning
the discharge from the federal Superfund site. By the end of the
year, the DEP filed a motion arguing on-site treatment would be
preferable, raising the possibility that radionuclides resulted
from past dumping.
But, in a decision released Thursday, U.S. District Judge
Jerome B. Simandle ruled that state law cannot pre-empt a 1997
federal consent decree that outlined plans for the discharge. He
also found that the DEP did not provide evidence that
radioactive elements resulted from anything but natural mineral
deposits.
He wrote that an "exhaustive" search by the federal Nuclear
Regulatory Commission last year found no evidence of past
nuclear-waste dumping.
"There is simply no basis for concluding that the pretreated
effluent of the GEMS site in general, or the radionuclide
component in particular, will pose any measurable risk to the
residents of Gloucester Township or (to) Camden where the
regional treatment plant is located," Simandle wrote.
Superfund site
GEMS, which stands for Gloucester Environmental Management
Services, is a municipal landfill that shut down around 1980. It
was added to the federal Environmental Protection Agency's list
of Superfund sites two years later.
The EPA, which supports the discharge plan, is reviewing the
decision. "Obviously, we're very pleased," said EPA spokesman
Jim Haklar.
Gary Lesneski, an attorney for the GEMS Phase II Trust made up
of former users paying for the landfill's cleanup, said the
trust was gratified by the judge's decision.
"The trust has always believed that it was acting in the best
interests of all of the parties involved in this matter, and in
full compliance with the law," Lesneski said.
A pretreatment plant the trust built to remove conventional
landfill contaminants as well as the radionuclides before the
water is sent to the CCMUA has been idle since a pilot test
concluded at the end of 2002.
"I can't tell you the specific day that we'll turn the system
back on," Lesneski said. "We're starting the process of making
sure we're ready to go."
Simandle review
The issue, one of the most contentious environmental issues in
South Jersey, has been quiet for more than year, while Simandle
reviewed the DEP suit. He wrote: "It is understandable that the
mention of radionuclides and uranium, whatever the quantities,
provokes sincere concerns for health and well-being of the
communities from Gloucester Township to the CCMUA regional
treatment plant in Camden,
But he added: "Hopefully all citizens are reassured by the
careful study and consideration given to achieve and implement a
suitable, safe and environmentally responsible remedy for a
long-standing environmental problem."
Sharon Finlayson, chairperson of the New Jersey Environmental
Federation and a key opponent of the sewer-discharge plan, fears
the ruling sets a precedent that will allow the EPA to send
polluted water into public sewer systems across the country.
Cindy Rau-Hatton, a Gloucester Township resident who formed
Citizens Against a Radioactive Environment as a result of the
controversy, continued to argue that the trust should build a
full-scale treatment plant at the landfill.
"I don't think the environmental community is going to give up
on this yet," she said.
WHAT'S NEXT
+ The Camden County Municipal Utilities Authority has 30 days to
issue a final permit allowing the discharge of groundwater from
the GEMS Superfund site to its sewer system.
Reach Lawrence Hajna at (856) 486-2466 or
*****************************************************************
34 Las Vegas SUN: Hawthorne Army Depot on proposed base closing list
Today: May 13, 2005 at 12:31:13 PDT
By SANDRA CHEREB ASSOCIATED PRESS
RENO, Nev. (AP) - The Army Ammunition Depot in Hawthorne was
recommended for closure by the Pentagon on Friday, while other
military bases in the state would be realigned or gain personnel
and responsibilities.
The depot, located 90 miles southeast of Reno in economically
depressed Mineral County, is the only Nevada base among the more
than 150 nationwide the Defense Department is recommending be
shuttered.
But the recommendations also include "realigning" the Air
National Guard in Reno. That move would mean the loss of 23
military and 124 civilian positions, Sen. Harry Reid's office
said.
Nellis Air Force Base in southern Nevada stands to gain under
the plan, but Capt. Steven Rolenc, a base spokesman, said Friday
he had no immediate details.
Nellis, just north of Las Vegas, has air warfare, weapons,
ground operations and threat training schools. It hosts regular
Red Flag air combat training exercises, and is home to the Air
Force Thunderbirds aerial demonstration team.
Officials at Naval Air Station in Fallon, 60 miles east of Reno,
weren't immediately available for comment. Fallon is home to the
Navy's elite "Top Gun" fighter school training program.
But it would be Hawthorne that loses the most in Nevada under
the military downsizing proposal.
"It will have a fairly significant impact on the local
population," said Lt. Col. Johnny Summers, commander of the
depot that has been the town's biggest employer for decades.
The ammunition depot opened in 1930. During World War II, it
employed about 3,000 people and remains the town's largest
employer, Summer said.
A private contractor, Day and Zimmermann Hawthorne Corp., has
basically run the deport for the last 25 years and employees 485
people, Summer said.
In addition, there are about 60 government and military
personnel.
More than 1,600 earth-covered concrete bunkers house artillery
shells and bombs.
But high-tech weapons systems and smart bombs have chipped away
at the military's need for such storage sites, officials have
said.
Before closures or downsizings can take effect, the Defense
Department's proposal must be approved or changed by a federal
base closing commission by Sept. 8, and then agreed to by
Congress and President Bush, in a process that will run into the
fall.
--
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35 Bradenton Herald: Tallevast tribute planned
| 05/13/2005 |
View a map of the new estimated pollution plume (PDF
SYLVIA LIM
Herald Staff Writer
MANATEE - After dealing with environmental contamination and
potential health hazards for more than a year, tired Tallevast
residents feel it's time for silent reflection.
A candlelight vigil slated for Saturday evening, "A Tribute to a
Neighborhood Compromised," gives residents a chance to pray and
share their thoughts and troubles, organizers say.
"Basically, we thought we had a future. We no longer see a
future," said Wanda Washington, vice president of Tallevast
advocacy group Family Oriented Community United and Strong.
"We're just asking for prayers, particularly for Tallevast, for
everyone."
Organizers describe a somber atmosphere in Tallevast, where
anxiety mounts about groundwater contamination caused by the
former Loral American Beryllium Co. plant.
Residents cited health problems, depreciating property values
and shelved home and neighborhood improvement plans.
"It's depressing around here," Washington said. "The stories
that you hear are getting sadder and sadder. Everyone's in a
turmoil of what they can do and they can't do."
Residents are also upset that their pleas for information are
falling on deaf ears. They've asked state and local government
officials for answers as to what they could do with their
properties and for information about the boundaries of the
contamination.
"I feel like the county is doing its part to relate to them the
information as we obtained it," said County Administrator Ernie
Padgett. "That being said, I can certainly understand their
feelings."
Scheduled to be held at the Mt. Tabor Missionary Baptist Church
on Tallevast Road, the tribute is expected to draw up to 125
participants, including local, state and federal lawmakers, said
Laura Ward, FOCUS president. Though events for the hour-long
vigil are still being finalized, Ward said the time is ripe for
such a gathering.
"It gives us an opportunity to bring community together, rather
than just in the community meetings every month where you listen
to someone else," she said. "It gives us a chance to sit and
reflect, and give tribute to people in a community who are or
have been affected by the contaminant."
Sylvia Lim, criminal justice reporter, can be reached at
745-7041 or slim@HeraldToday.com.
HeraldToday.com
Find all the background information and a map of the toxic plume
online
If you go
WHAT: 'Paying Tribute to a Neighborhood Compromised,' a
candlelight vigil
WHERE: Mt. Tabor Missionary Baptist Church, 1703 Tallevast Road
WHEN: 7:30 p.m., Saturday
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36 Seattle Post-Intelligencer: Closing arguments heard on Hanford
[seattlepi.com]
Friday, May 13, 2005
THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
SPOKANE -- Federal court jurors are being asked to sort through
expert opinions and decide whether radiation releases from
Hanford plutonium plants sickened people who lived downwind from
the federal nuclear reservation.
The U.S. District Court jury must determine whether the thyroid
diseases of the six plaintiffs were "more likely than not"
caused by Hanford releases and whether any compensation should
be awarded.
Jurors listened to closing arguments yesterday and will begin
deliberations soon.
The plaintiffs were infants or young children in Eastern
Washington when the massive releases of radioactive iodine-131
occurred in the mid-1940s. They are considered representative of
nearly 2,300 people who have filed claims against the early
Hanford contractors.
The outcome of this trial will determine whether other
downwinder trials go forward or new settlement talks start.
Radiation experts called by the plaintiffs testified they
believe the thyroid cancers and thyroiditis of the five women
and one man were caused by iodine-131 from Hanford.
Defense lawyers called epidemiologists who said it is not
possible to link radiation to individual cancers.
The plaintiffs' lawyers called medical and technical experts to
rebut the conclusions of government disease studies. The
plaintiffs also testified.
"They want this case tried on sympathy, and not on science,"
lead defense lawyer Kevin Van Wart told jurors yesterday.
The defense based much of its case on the $22 million Hanford
Thyroid Disease Study, which found no evidence of abnormally
high rates of thyroid disease among downwinders.
Plaintiff lawyer Louise Roselle called the study flawed and
reminded jurors they only have to find just more than 50 percent
probability that Hanford caused the plaintiffs' health problems.
[Seattle Post-Intelligencer] 101 Elliott Ave. W. Seattle, WA
98119 (206) 448-8000
Send comments to newmedia@seattlepi.com
*****************************************************************
37 Tri-City Herald: Panel agrees to restore Hanford budget
This story was published Friday, May 13th, 2005
By Annette Cary, Herald staff writer
The House Armed Services Subcommittee agreed Thursday to restore
$122 million to the Hanford budget for fiscal year 2006, the
first of many steps needed to increase the proposed budget.
However, that still would leave the budget $145 million below
the current year's budget of nearly $2.1 billion. The Department
of Energy has proposed a $267 million cut to the Hanford budget
in the next year.
All 14 U.S. congressional representatives from Oregon and
Washington have joined together to ask that most of that money,
$239 million, be restored to the budget.
Thursday's effort to get the amount DOE proposed increased by
$122 million was led by Rep. Rick Larsen, D-Wash., who serves on
the subcommittee.
The subcommittee's recommendation must go to the full committee
and then to the House floor while a similar process is followed
in the Senate. In addition, appropriations committees also will
be determining how much money should be spent and do not have to
follow the blueprints developed by authorization bills, such as
the one marked up Thursday.
The Armed Services Subcommittee proposal would restore funding
at the vitrification plant to $690 million, according to Heart
of America Northwest.
That's the amount Northwest lawmakers have called for, after DOE
has said that level of funding is needed to complete
construction by 2011. The $5.8 billion plant would turn millions
of gallons of radioactive waste, some of it stored in
underground tanks since World War II, into stable glass logs for
disposal.
Recent difficulties at the construction project, including a new
earthquake study that shows design standards need to be
increased, are expected to increase the cost of the plant and
extend the schedule.
The additional money proposed by the subcommittee also includes
about $45 million for tank waste projects. DOE had proposed an
$89.4 million reduction in spending for managing the underground
tanks, and the Northwest Congressional delegation had asked that
$70 million be restored.
Waste is being retrieved from older tanks and DOE is
investigating alternate processes for treating waste that will
not be handled at the vitrification plant as currently planned.
The remaining $13 million proposed by the subcommittee would
apparently be used for work in central Hanford, although the
committee's intent is unclear, according to Heart of America.
The committee language refers to cleanup work along the Columbia
River corridor, but the line item listed covers the start of
removal of massive processing plants and work to dig up burial
grounds in central Hanford.
The Northwest Congressional delegation called for $40 million to
be restored to the budget for cleanup work along the river and
$65 million to be restored for work in central Hanford.
© 2005 Tri-City Herald, Associated Press &Other Wire Services
*****************************************************************
38 SF Chronicle: BERKELEY / UC has big rival bidding to run Los Alamos lab
University of Texas, Lockheed Martin announce alliance
Keay Davidson, Chronicle Science Writer
Friday, May 13, 2005
The competition facing the University of California as it tries
to hang onto its six-decade management contract of the Los
Alamos National Laboratory grew more formidable Thursday when
Lockheed Martin and the giant University of Texas system joined
arms in a bid to take over running the nuclear weapons lab.
The UT Regents voted Thursday to authorize Chancellor Mark Yudof
to join with the aerospace giant in a joint bid for the next
Energy Department contract for Los Alamos. The regents also
voted to appropriate $1.2 million for preparing the joint
proposal with Lockheed Martin.
The announcement out of Texas came the day after the University
of California announced it would partner with San
Francisco-based Bechtel Corp. in its bid to retain the contract
to run the lab where the atomic bomb was born.
The UC Regents haven't formally voted whether to join the
competition, but Wednesday's announced union with Bechtel
indicated that top university officials hoped to do so. Loss of
the Los Alamos contract could be a blow to the prestige of UC
and the state of California at a time when the Golden State has
no lack of headaches.
The University of Texas move represents "a historic opportunity
for the UT system," James Huffines, chairman of the system's
board of regents, said in a statement. "The work of Los Alamos
is fundamental to our national security. As one of the finest
institutions in the country, we have a duty to pursue this
proposal."
A banker, Huffines was a member of the National Finance
Committee of George W. Bush for President 2000.
Two years ago, after repeated financial, safety and other
scandals at Los Alamos, the Energy Department and Congress
ordered that future Los Alamos contracts be open to competition.
In public at least, University of California officials remained
confident Thursday that Texas' ties to the Bush administration
wouldn't influence the U. S. Energy Department's choice of the
next lab contractor.
"We fully expect that there'll be no politics involved in the
final decision and that the decision will be made on the
scientific and technical merits of the proposals," said UC
spokesman Chris Harrington, adding: "The UC is the largest
public research institution in the world with a very eminent
faculty. The awards and recognition that our faculty have won
are tremendous."
Harrington said he expected the Energy Department to issue its
final specifications for would-be competitors later this month;
applications are likely to be due 90 days later, Harrington
said. The present contract expires in September.
Apparently alluding to reports that Northrop Grumman would join
the competition for Los Alamos, Yudof said in a statement
Thursday that "we believe we (Texas) have the winning
combination to win this bid. We wouldn't be entering if we
didn't think we would be successful."
The move represents some backtracking, however: UT officials
originally considered joining the competition last year but
backed out in January after spending $500,000 exploring the
possibility. At that time, a Yudof spokesman told The Chronicle
the chancellor had made the decision to drop out after "learning
more about what all would be necessary to effectively and
efficiently manage one of the nation's premier national labs."
On Thursday, UT officials rejoined the competition after
Lockheed Martin executives persuaded them to participate in a
dual bid. UT has 15 campuses, an annual budget of $8.5 billion
and more than 180,000 students.
E-mail Keay Davidson at kdavidson@sfchronicle.com.
Page B - 1
San Francisco Chronicle]
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