***************************************************************** 04/18/05 **** RADIATION BULLETIN(RADBULL) **** VOL 13.88 ***************************************************************** RADBULL IS PRODUCED BY THE ABALONE ALLIANCE CLEARINGHOUSE ***************************************************************** Send News Stories to news@energy-net.org with title on subject line and first line of body NUCLEAR POLICY 1 Korea Herald: N. Korea offers to halt nuke programme 2 US: [du-list] America's nuclear secrets 3 US: Johns Hopkins Gazette: Carnegie Mellon President Jared L. Cohon 4 [du-list] Events in NYC around the opening of the NPT Treaty 5 In Israel, Vanunu's Allies Call for Nuclear Disarmament and NUCLEAR REACTORS 6 US: Why we should shut San Onofre now; unpublished letters to NC 7 US: [NukeNet] Correction On Nuke Power As Problem, Not Solution By 8 US: [epa-impact] AP1000 Design Certification 9 US: NRC: NRC to Discuss 2004 Performance Assessment for Callaway Nuc 10 US: The Nation: Nelson talks tax cuts and nuclear power 11 US: Sioux City Journal: Reaction to nuclear plant sale differs from 12 US: NRC: NRC to Discuss 2004 Performance Assessment for Clinton Nucl 13 Interfax: Chernobyl NPP's debt totals 30 Mln hryvni 14 Bellona: Kola NPP’s reactor no.4 shut down for repairs 15 BBC: Parties will (Sizewell) 16 BBC: Indonesia approves nuclear plant 17 US: NRC: NRC to Discuss 2004 Performance Assessment for D.C. Cook Nu 18 Korea: Digital Chosunilbo: N.K. Has Shut Down Reactor, Seoul Confirm 19 INSIDE JoongAng Daily: Seoul confirms North's reactor is shut down 20 CBC News: Fire leads to shutdown of Bruce nuclear reactor - Cameco 21 Slovak Spectator: Slovakia will ask for more money to close its nucl 22 Xinhua: DPRK to talk with KEDO on nuclear reactor plant 23 Xinhua: Sanmen nuke power station ready for construction 24 US: NRC: NRC Monitoring Event at Millstone 3 25 AFP: Endesa, E.ON, Electrabel, EDF, Enel plan 3 bln eur nuclear reac 26 The Globe and Mail: Cameco shuts down reactor 27 US: St. Cloud Times: Briefly: Meeting scheduled for nuclear plant 28 US: TheDay.com, New London, CT: Millstone 3 Shut Down By Malfunction 29 AFP: EU research chief sees deal with Japan on nuclear reactor by Ju 30 US: NRC: Agency Information Collection Activities: Proposed Collecti 31 US: NRC: Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impa NUCLEAR SECURITY 32 Bolton means a nuclear war 33 [EMMAS] ADL Poll: Americans Want to Kill Iranians? 34 Guardian Unlimited: North Korea Nuke Shutdown Raises Concerns 35 Korea Herald: [EDITORIAL] N.K. contingency plan 36 Interfax: State Duma delegation to discuss cooperation, nuclear prob 37 Bellona: Russia invites other nations to dismantle subs on its terri 38 BBC: N Korea 'shuts' nuclear facility 39 US: washington post: The Costs of Secrecy 40 Mos News: Russia Wants to Dismantle Foreign Nuclear Submarines - NUCLEAR SAFETY 41 [du-list] Sunnyside Hosts Documentary On Depleted Uranium 42 [du-list] Gen. Myers: 'No current DU use in Iraq or 43 [DU-WATCH] Military pollution (including DU) by Lucinda 44 [DU-WATCH] Veteran Advocates & Activists Needed To Unite 45 US: [DU-WATCH] URANIUM WEAPONS: Depleted Uranium - Air Force 46 [du-list] Conventional genocide and DU genocide goes on, 47 [du-list] 'Gulf War syndrome' final review 48 US: [du-list] Congress OKs Funds for WMD Analysis Lab in Maryland 49 US: DHHS: CDC: Designation of a Class of Employees for Addition to t 50 US: NRC: Advisory Committee on the Medical Uses of Isotopes: Meeting NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE 51 US: [du-list] APG facilities for analyzing hazardous materials may 52 US: AU ABC: WA resists pressure to mine uranium 53 US: Las Vegas SUN: Editorial: So this is sound science? 54 RGJ: Senator’s clout helps Nevada 55 US: Get Underground: 'Orphaned Waste' 56 Grist: Kaisha Atakhanova fought to keep nuclear waste out of Kazakhs PEACE 57 [NukeNet] NPT and Rokkasho US DEPT. OF ENERGY 58 Seattle Post-Intelligencer: Hanford Cleanup: A federal obligation 59 lamonitor.com: Coping with change in Los Alamos 60 DOE: Environmental Management Site-Specific Advisory Board, Rocky ***************************************************************** ***************************************************************** FULL NEWS STORIES ***************************************************************** ***************************************************************** 1 Korea Herald: N. Korea offers to halt nuke programme 2005.04.19 The Nation's No.1 English Newspaper North Korea has suggested one possible way to reach an accord with the United States over its nuclear weapons programme. If the US promises to respect its sovereignty and does not try to overthrow its government, North Korea said it will agree to freeze the production of nuclear material. That means it will not make any more nuclear bombs. The offer, however, came with a chilling qualification. If Washington refuses to make that promise, Pyongyang will start unloading fuel rods from its Yongbyon nuclear reactor over the next three months. Those rods can then be reprocessed into plutonium for nuclear weapons. The offer of a freeze was made to Mr Selig Harrison, a veteran Korean expert who directs the Asia programme at Washington's Centre for International Policy. Mr Harrison spent five days in Pyongyang earlier this month and spoke to several high-ranking ministers and military officials who oversee the nation's nuclear programme. It was his ninth visit to the country since 1972. He returned to Washington last week and told The Straits Times that North Korea is setting a three-month deadline for the US to start direct bilateral talks. But so far President George W. Bush has insisted that the US will not meet the North Koreans directly. Instead, he wants to reconvene the six-party talks that include China, South Korea, Japan and Russia. On Friday, Mr Harrison met Ambassador Joseph DeTrani, the US envoy to the six-party talks, to brief him about his meetings with the North Koreans. Previous multilateral talks have proved unproductive and the North has refused to attend any more such gatherings since last June. But now they have told Mr Harrison they will consider returning to the six-party talks if separate direct talks with the US take place first. Ironically, Washington has set a similar three-month deadline of its own, that is, deciding to wait until June when a full year will have passed since the last six-party talks. By that time, if Pyongyang still refuses to return to the table, the US has said it will consider other options, which may include seeking an economic blockade of North Korea. But Mr Harrison said that if the US agrees to make a verbal promise to respect the North's sovereignty, then the way is open to halt Pyongyang's nuclear programme. He said: 'The freeze must be negotiated in direct talks and the US must give the North a credible statement that it is not pursuing regime change. 'The ball is in the US court, they told me. They even said that direct talks can be held in secret in New York.' That was viewed as significant because it would avoid any embarrassment that the US might feel if its direct communication with the North became public knowledge. But the North also told Mr Harrison that it has no intention of destroying its existing nuclear weapons. The offer of a freeze applies only to any future programme. The North probably has already reprocessed enough fissile material to make six to eight nuclear bombs. If the US does not agree to direct talks and instead opts for harsher measures, the North has a stern warning. Said Mr Harrison: 'They told me that if the US imposes any kind of naval quarantine or blockade, they would be entitled to respond militarily. It would be the beginning of a war.' ***************************************************************** 2 [du-list] America's nuclear secrets Date: Mon, 18 Apr 2005 14:25:02 -0700 America's nuclear secrets By Colin Megill, The Daily Campus - Commentary Issue: 4/13/05 http://www.dailycampus.com/news/2005/04/13/Commentary/Americas.Nuclear.Secrets-922764.shtml Massive government denial makes it difficult to discern the details of Gulf War Syndrome, but what we do know is thousands upon thousands upon thousands of Gulf War I veterans have been permanently debilitated and we have no idea to what extent the sickness will repeat itself this war. The numbers are truly staggering. The United States lost 147 troops in combat during Gulf War I, of the 592,561 discharged veterans. Now, a decade later, the death toll is 11,000 and hundreds of thousands of veterans are on permanent disability. And Gulf War Sickness doesn't even stop with our troops. Strange illnesses from cancer to birth defects have been affecting the citizens of Kuwait and Iraq. Afghanis are suffering sicknesses with all the characteristics of radiation poisoning. The sickness affected troops from all NATO nations who supported the United States in military operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, as well as our troops and the citizens there. What is the link? Why do these seemingly unrelated American wars all connect on a single point, a mysterious illness? The answer: because we have used nuclear weapons against Iraq in 1991 and Bosnia during the Kosovo conflict and continue to use them extensively in the War on Terror. Depleted uranium (DU) is used in U.S. bombs, tank munitions and aircraft armaments. It is an incredibly effective weapon in its capacity to penetrate armor of virtually any thickness. Specifically, it is the byproduct of nuclear enrichment process and "experts say the Department of Energy has 100 million tons of DU and using it in weapons saves the government money on the cost of its disposal. Rather than disposing of the radioactive waste, it is shaped into penetrator rods used in the billions of rounds being fired in Iraq and Afghanistan." The U.S. government as well as the British government has systematically denied any and all negative effects of DU weapons. However, evidence and rationality is to the contrary. Leuren Moret, an ex-researcher at the Livermore nuclear weapons lab, is currently an activist lobbying for the United States to stop using DU weapons. In a speech, she describes the science and health behind the weapons: "Uranium metal burns ... when it heats to 170° C. So, as soon as they shoot them, and the surface of the weapon heats up to 170° C, it starts burning. And you can see them. They look like tracers going through the air on the battlefield. They are creating billions and billions and billions of superfine particles. These did not settle out by gravity. Gravitational forces do not pull them out of the air. They stay suspended. They act like a radioactive gas. And we know - I work with eight independent scientists - we've measured depleted uranium, which after it burns, is very very insoluble. It forms oxides that will almost not dissolve. And because they will not dissolve, they will not dissolve in body fluids. And so, the body cannot excrete them through the kidneys in the urine. These particles are like fairy dust. They go everywhere that a red blood cell or a white blood cell will go. And they stay in the body - millions and billions of them. These alpha particles tear through the cell. They tear through the membrane, which damages the immune system. They tear through the mitochondria, which is your energy system. They tear through the DNA, causing mutations." The human consequence of employing DU munitions is catastrophic. Though there are multiple sources confirming our recent wars have radiated the civilian populations of Afghanistan and Iraq, Moret again eloquently summarizes: "Drab-stricken Afghanistan's underground water supply is now contaminated by these nuclear weapons. Experts with the Uranium Medical Research Center reports that urine samples of Afghanis show the highest level of uranium ever recorded in a civilian population. Afghani soldiers and civilians are reported to have died after suffering intractable vomiting, severe respiratory problems, internal bleeding, and other symptoms consistent with radiation poisoned." The irony is palpable. We invaded a country on the premise it might have weapons of mass destruction and in all stages of the war, used weapons of mass destruction. Make no mistake that we have waged nuclear war. Use of DU weapons are against all international laws and treaties. The Uranium Medical Research Center and the Radiological Society of North America have both done testing of citizens in Iraq and Afghanistan to determine exactly how much radiation they have absorbed. In a report published by the RSNA, they concluded, "Our results demonstrate the presence of depleted uranium in the civilians of Baghdad and Basra after Operation Iraqi Freedom. The cause of the urinary presence of depleted uranium may be consistent with our previously reported findings of DU contamination of the Allied Forces veterans in Gulf War I, by inhalation of DU containing aerosols." It's there, it's everywhere and it's hurting a ton of innocent people and the government knows. As a matter of fact, they've known uranium in aerosol form was harmful since the Manhattan Project when they were considering using uranium ground to a size smaller than bacteria to radiate large areas of Germany. Check out the declassified government document now on the Internet. Here's why this is relevant now and to America since, if you follow the Warrior's logic, it doesn't matter if we radiate close to the entirety of two countries as long as they contain brown people. Many of the veterans who returned home from Gulf War I now have permanent disabilities. The government denied there was anything wrong with them even after Gulf War Syndrome became a household term. The veterans, those still alive, continue to suffer from a host of symptoms too plentiful to list here. We have used five times as much Depleted Uranium munitions in Operation Iraqi Freedom. The next homecoming may be worse, if not a complete catastrophe. Though, given the corporate media sitting squarely in the pocket of government, they will probably suffer in silence. If CNN and company didn't have the clout to publish the fact the Iraq war has rendered over 10,000 American amputees, I doubt the corporations will inform the populace about our current nuclear war. Tests by independent scientists of soldiers who have come back from the current war in Iraq have shown some of them to be heavily irradiated with DU. America will feel the consequences of its current nuclear war. It is harming its own soldiers and the innocent citizens of countries it invaded and has a responsibility to protect. The past three administrations have been horrifically irresponsible. They have broken international laws and treaties, they have broken foreign societies which will now pass down mutated genes (the pictures of children in Iraq born mutated because of their parent's exposure to DU are, in a word, sickening) and they have broken their own soldiers. The government will continue to do this until we demand it stopped. Angry veterans aren't enough to right the wrongs of war; the way they were treated after Gulf War I demonstrated that. Only an informed populace can change this. -- Posted for educational and research purposes only, ~ in accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. section 107 ~ NucNews Links and Expanded Archives - http://nucnews.net ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Need a home for your web domain? We recommend our provider, Hosting Direct https://support.hostingdirect.net/cgi-bin/affiliates/clickthru.cgi?id=nucnews ------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor --------------------~--> Has someone you know been affected by illness or disease? Network for Good is THE place to support health awareness efforts! http://us.click.yahoo.com/RzSHvD/UOnJAA/79vVAA/FGYolB/TM --------------------------------------------------------------------~-> To unsubscribe from this groups send a message to du-list-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com. In the body of the message type unsubscribe and send. Yahoo! Groups Links <*> To visit your group on the web, go to: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/du-list/ <*> To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to: du-list-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com <*> Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to: http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/ ***************************************************************** 3 Johns Hopkins Gazette: Carnegie Mellon President Jared L. Cohon to Give Wenk Lecture | April 18, 2005 | Vol. 34 No. 30 By Phil Sneiderman Homewood Jared L. Cohon, president of Carnegie Mellon University and a former Johns Hopkins faculty member, will deliver the Carolyn and Edward Wenk Jr. Lecture in Technology and Public Policy on Friday, April 22, on the Homewood campus. Cohon's talk, "Technology and Politics: The Case of Nuclear Waste in America," will begin at 3 p.m. in 110 Hodson Hall. Cohon chaired the U.S. Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board from 1997 to 2002, a crucial period in the federal government's effort to create a nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain, Nev. In his lecture, Cohon plans to use this hotly debated project as a case study to examine the challenges of analyzing and representing technically complex problems in a political decision-making process. A highly regarded authority on environmental and water resource systems analysis, Cohon began his teaching and research career at Johns Hopkins in 1973. He was a faculty member in the Department of Geography and Environmental Engineering for 19 years. He also served Johns Hopkins as assistant and associate dean of engineering and vice provost for research. Prior to his appointment as president of Carnegie Mellon in 1997, Cohon was dean of the School of Forestry and Environmental Studies at Yale. He holds a bachelor's degree in civil engineering from the University of Pennsylvania and a doctorate in civil engineering from MIT. The Wenk Lecture is the result of a 1988 contribution to the Whiting School of Engineering made by Edward Wenk Jr. and his wife, Carolyn Wenk. Their goal was to "contribute to the education of engineers through understanding the crucial influence of technology in our culture and the importance of public policy and politics in steering technology toward socially satisfactory outcomes." Edward Wenk received a bachelor's degree from Johns Hopkins in 1940 and a doctorate from the university in 1950, both in civil engineering. He was known as the father of deep-diving submarine prototypes and served as a leading federal science adviser. Carolyn Wenk served as a volunteer in hospitals and mental health facilities and on behalf of the homeless. She died last October, and this year's lecture is dedicated to her memory. Each year, a different Whiting School of Engineering department hosts the Wenk lecture and chooses the speaker. This year's event will be presented by the Department of Geography and Environmental Engineering. A reception will take place after the lecture. The Gazette | The Johns Hopkins University | Suite 540 | 901 S. Bond St. | Baltimore, MD 21231 | 443-287-9900 | gazette@jhu.edu ***************************************************************** 4 [du-list] Events in NYC around the opening of the NPT Treaty Date: Mon, 18 Apr 2005 14:28:30 -0700 http://www.abolitionnow.org/may1.html "This May, world leaders and citizens from many countries will converge at the United Nations in New York City to discuss the fate of the endangered Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). While ignoring their own NPT disarmament obligations, the nuclear weapons states are selectively and hypocritically accusing other nations of seeking nuclear arms. Inspired by the aging "hibakusha" - the survivors of "hell on earth" in their cities, the Mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki have launched an Emergency Campaign to Ban Nuclear Weapons, enrolling Mayors around the world to come to New York to demand immediate negotiations to eliminate all nuclear weapons under strict and effective international control." "On Sunday, May 1, 2005, the day before the NPT Review Conference begins, United for Peace and Justice and Abolition Now! are calling for a massive demonstration for global nuclear disarmament, culminating in a rally in New York City 's Central"Park. We urge you to join us and help build the May 1st mobilization for a nuclear weapon free world: a.. Endorse the May 1 demonstration for global nuclear disarmament, e-mail monika@abolitionnow.org or call (212) 726-9161 b.. Get involved in planning and outreach: join the May Day 2005 committee by sending a blank e-mail to MayDay2005-subscribe@yahoogroups.com c.. Visit www.abolitionnow.org and www.unitedforpeace.org for updates d.. Organize buses from your region; go to New York May 1 March and Rally Details We will assemble on 1st Ave. from 50th St. north between 11 AM and 12 noon. The march kicks off at 12 noon. The rally will begin at 2 PM at the Heckscher Ballfields in Central Park and conclude by 6 PM. ---------FCNL dates in NYC aroun 1 May ----------------------- We encourage readers to copy and distribute the Nuclear Calendar. When doing so, please include the following credit: "Reprinted from the Nuclear Calendar, published by the Friends Committee on National Legislation and the FCNL Education Fund." April 29-30 Global Network Against Weapons and Nuclear Power in Space, "Full Spectrum Resistance: An International Space Organizing Conference." Church Center, 777 United Nations Plaza, New York (April 29), and Musicians Union Hall, 322 W. 48th St., New York (April 30) http://www.globenet.free-online.co.uk/actions/GN Conference Broc 2005.pdf April 30-May 8 Senate recess May 1 Defense Department reports to Congress on counterproliferation programs (22 U.S. Code Sec. 2751 note). http://uscode.house.gov/uscode-cgi/fastweb.exe?getdoc+uscview+t21t25+2568+0++%28%27REPORTS%20COUNTERPROLIFERATION%20ACTIVITIES%20PROGRAMS%27%29%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20#hit0000 Previous reports are posted on the Defense Department web site. http://www.acq.osd.mil/cp/reports.html May 1 11 a.m.-6 p.m., United for Peace and Justice and Abolition Now, march and demonstration for nuclear disarmament. Central Park, New York www.abolitionnow.org/may1.html May 2 9 a.m.-6 p.m., City University of New York, "From Ground Zero to Safe Ground: The Growing Nuclear Threat and Its Eradication." http://web.gc.cuny.edu/cepp/courses/exploring.html#7 365 Fifth Ave., New York. RSVP ($25, $15 students) to continuinged@gc.cuny.edu or (212) 817-8215. Published by the Friends Committee on National Legislation (FCNL) and the FCNL Education Fund. Address: 245 Second Street, N.E., Washington, D.C. 20002-5795. Phone: (202) 547-6000. Fax: (202) 547-6019. E-mail: fcnl@fcnl.org. Web site: http://www.fcnl.org. We urge you to join us and help build the May 1st mobilization for a nuclear weapon free world: a.. Endorse the May 1 demonstration for global nuclear disarmament, e-mail monika@abolitionnow.org or call (212) 726-9161 b.. Get involved in planning and outreach: join the May Day 2005 committee by sending a blank e-mail to MayDay2005-subscribe@yahoogroups.com c.. Visit www.abolitionnow.org and www.unitedforpeace.org for updates d.. Organize buses from your region; go to New York May 1 March and Rally Details We will assemble on 1st Ave. from 50th St. north between 11 AM and 12 noon. The march kicks off at 12 noon. The rally will begin at 2 PM at the Heckscher Ballfields in Central Park and conclude by 6 PM. ------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor --------------------~--> In low income neighborhoods, 84% do not own computers. At Network for Good, help bridge the Digital Divide! http://us.click.yahoo.com/EA3HyD/3MnJAA/79vVAA/FGYolB/TM --------------------------------------------------------------------~-> To unsubscribe from this groups send a message to du-list-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com. In the body of the message type unsubscribe and send. Yahoo! Groups Links <*> To visit your group on the web, go to: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/du-list/ <*> To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to: du-list-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com <*> Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to: http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/ ***************************************************************** 5 In Israel, Vanunu's Allies Call for Nuclear Disarmament and Date: Mon, 18 Apr 2005 14:25:05 -0700 Free Mordechai Vanunu - Info & Action Alert #57 - April 16, 2005 From the U.S. Campaign to Free Mordechai Vanunu http://www.vanunu.com and http://www.nonviolence.org/vanunu/ ** PLEASE FORWARD WIDELY TO SYMPATHETIC LISTS ** In Israel, Vanunu's Allies Call for Nuclear Disarmament and Whistleblower's Freedom A delegation of international anti-nuclear and human rights activists are now gathering in Israel to support nuclear whistleblower Mordechai Vanunu, and join his call for nuclear disarmament. Over three dozen activists from the United States, England, Scotland, Ireland, Japan, Sweden, Belgium, and Norway will join Israelis for a series of events on the first anniversary of Vanunu's release from prison, where he served nearly 18 years for confirming the existence Israel's nuclear arsenal in a 1986 article published by the London Sunday Times. Vanunu is forbidden to leave Israel or talk to foreigners under post-sentence restrictions imposed by the Israeli government and due to be renewed next week. Vanunu now faces prosecution for violating these restrictions by giving numerous interviews to the foreign press and refusing to surrender his human rights of free speech and association. Among the international activists taking part in the delegation are Vanunu's adoptive parents, Nicolas and Mary Eoloff (USA); Felice Cohen-Joppa, Coordinator of the US Campaign to Free Mordechai Vanunu; Ernest Rodker, chair of the Campaign to Free Vanunu and for a Nuclear Free Middle East (UK); and actress Susannah York (UK). Following is the English version of a statement the international delegation will be distributing in Hebrew and Arabic during the events of this coming week; and the announcement of a press conference next Monday in East Jerusalem. U.S. Campaign to Free Mordechai Vanunu =========== 1) Mordechai Vanunu is Being Silenced - The Nuclear Danger Just Increases (Statement of the International Delegation) 2) Invitation to Press Conference =========== 1) Mordechai Vanunu is Being Silenced - The Nuclear Danger Just Increases (Statement of the International Delegation) The State of Israel is investing immense resources in the attempt to silence and restrict nuclear whistleblower Mordechai Vanunu - surveillance, arrests, the use of British Mandate State of Emergency regulations, conducting a fabricated trial and a system of incitement and slander against him, all in the name of maintaining security. Who maintains our security from radioactive pollution that contaminates the air, the water and the land? Who maintains our security from a second Chernobyl in the Negev? Who maintains our security from an old and dangerous reactor that has never been inspected by an external authority? Who maintains our security from the nuclear arms race in the Middle East, that endangers us and all peoples in the region? No one. The government of Israel refuses to inform the citizens about Israel's nuclear program and tells us to "trust" anonymous authorities that operate in the dark. The Knesset refuses to discuss the nuclear program, its impact on our lives, on the economy, on the arms race, on the future of the residents of the Negev and the entire country. Mordechai Vanunu, who acted out of concern and responsibility and exposed the truth, was imprisoned for 18 years, including 11 and a half years in solitary confinement, and even after he completed his full sentence, the state refuses to let him go free. How much does it cost to produce and maintain a nuclear arsenal? What dangerous materials are already in the land, the water and the air in the Negev? How many disasters have already taken human lives? How many reactor employees have become ill and died due to exposure to dangerous materials? Where is the radioactive waste buried? Who is authorized to instruct the use of nuclear weapons? The government refuses to answer these questions. Instead, it silences and restricts the only person who challenged the policy of ambiguity. We say: nuclear weapons cannot be hidden from the citizens of this country and from the world. It is our right to know about the existence and the condition of a nuclear installation that endangers our country and the region. It is our right to decide, whether we want weapons of mass destruction, or do we choose life and peace. Peace activists from Israel and from the world are currently acting in Israel, calling for a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction, for peace, for safety from nuclear disaster and for the freedom of Mordechai Vanunu. We say to the citizens of Israel and of the region: we know, that weapons of mass destruction are unsafe for those who possess them and devastating to their victims. The only outcomes from possessing nuclear weapons are: Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the legacy of deadly cancers and the scandal of further impoverishment of the world's poor. This is not peace nor security. Join us in demanding from the government of Israel: - Open all nuclear installations to civilian and international inspection - Close the Dimona reactor - Halt the Israeli nuclear program - Free Mordechai Vanunu The International Campaign to Free Mordechai Vanunu and for a Middle East Free of Nuclear Weapons Tel. 050-7368236 www.vanunu.com www.vanunu.co.uk =========== 2) Invitation to Press Conference The International Campaign to Free Mordechai Vanunu Invitation to Press Conference Tuesday, April 19, 2005, 14:30 Ambassador Hotel, Nablus Road, Sheikh Jerrah, East Jerusalem "The [restriction] order does not have to be reasonable, it is legal" (prosecutor at hearing in Vanunu's trial, April 12, 2005) An international delegation, organized by the International Campaign to Free Mordechai Vanunu, will be in Israel from April 18 to 22, to protest the threatened renewal of the restrictions imposed on Mordechai Vanunu and his trial for speaking with the media. Together with Israeli activists, the delegation will conduct activities in Jerusalem, Tel-Aviv and Dimona. On April 19, the Knesset Constitution, Law and Judiciary Committee will finally convene to discuss the issue of Mordechai Vanunu's status under the restrictions, after an earlier meeting was canceled and after the security establishment has already decided Vanunu's fate. Adv. Dan Yakir (Israel), Adv. Michael Ellman (U.K.), Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Mairead Maguire, and Nuclear Physicist Colman Altman (Israel), will be among the participants in this discussion. Supporters of Mordechai Vanunu will call for his freedom at a vigil in the rose garden adjacent to the Knesset from 10:00 a.m. until 1:00 p.m. Following the discussion at the Knesset, the International Campaign to Free Mordechai Vanunu will hold a press conference featuring: Adv. Michael Ellman (U.K.), Solicitors International Human Rights Group, FIDH, ICJ Ms. Mairead Maguire (Ireland), Nobel Peace Prize Laureate 1976 Knesset Member Issam Makhoul Jakob von Uexkull (Sweden), Founder and Chair of the Right Livelihood Award (the "Alternative Nobel Prize") Ms. Lucy Mair (U.S.A.), Human Rights Watch Mordechai Vanunu Mordechai Vanunu will be presented with the Right Livelihood Award, the first prize he was awarded, in 1987, but was not allowed to receive in prison. The press conference will be held in English. Contact information: In Israel: Rayna Moss: Tel. 972-50 -7368236, email: legalese@netvision.net.il In the USA: Tel/Fax 520-323-8697, email: freevanunu@mindspring.com In Britain: Tel. +44 20 8808 7568, e-mail: campaign@vanunu.freeserve.co.uk In Norway: Fredrik Heffermehl, Tel. +47-2244 8003 Fax: +47-2244 7616 email: fredpax@online.no www.vanunu.com, www.vanunu.co.uk ======== -end- Felice Cohen-Joppa Coordinator U.S. Campaign to Free Mordechai Vanunu POB 43384 Tucson, AZ 85733 Phone/Fax 520-323-8697 freevanunu@mindspring.com www.vanunu.com ***************************************************************** 6 Why we should shut San Onofre now; unpublished letters to NC Date: Mon, 18 Apr 2005 14:25:36 -0700 From: Russell D. Hoffman, Concerned Citizen; Date: April 18th, 2005 (1) List of problems at San Onofre Nuclear Waste Generating Station since 2001 (2) This letter was censored by the North County Times (3) ...And this one was censored by the New York Times (4) Contact information for the author of this newsletter ========================================================== (1) List of problems at San Onofre Nuclear Waste Generating Station since 2001 ========================================================== Below is a list I have compiled of problems that have occurred at San Onofre over the past few years, with some related data. Despite anything some ivory-tower dreamer might claim, or anything some pro-nuker who has made a living off of other people's misery might say, nuclear power IS a crime against humanity -- nothing less. The spent fuel at San Onofre is pushing -- or perhaps has already passed -- 4,000,000 pounds. One gram of that would be enough for a dandy "dirty bomb". Around the country, there are 80,000 tons of used reactors cores, with NO PLACE TO PUT THEM. Yucca Mountain is a boondoggle, sharply opposed by people in Nevada and along the transportation routes. This high level radioactive waste is EXTREMELY deadly, can catch fire spontaneously, and is kept OUTSIDE the containment domes at each reactor. If there is an accident, act of nature, or terrorist attack, it will cost society trillions of dollars and tens of thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, of lives. Every part of San Onofre is aging rapidly. There is no reason to believe SCE's estimate that the steam generator upgrade will save $1 billion dollars for their customers. I'm sure there are enormous accounting tricks to come up with any such figure and it is utter garbage. They won't show us the figures, of course, just their summation. In reality, SCE simply wants to keep the nuclear facility open at ANY cost, in the expectation that future generations of nuclear reactors will be more profitable for them -- in other words, to simply keep the SITE LICENSES GOING because Geo. Bush & Company has promised BILLIONS AND BILLIONS to restart America's nuclear program -- and SCE wants a BIG piece of that pie! Every day we keep the facility open and refuse to switch to renewable energy solutions we are incurring an additional debt to society which future generations will curse us for. Steam generator leaks send poisonous "primary coolant" at 2200 PSI into the secondary coolant loop which is at a much lower pressure. From there, the radiation is released in dribs and drabs directly into the environment, as that coolant loop's chemical broth is changed over time. So this isn't just a matter of money or politics -- nuclear power releases deadly radiation all day, every day. Sincerely, Russell Hoffman Concerned Citizen Carlsbad, CA --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- From: "Russell D. Hoffman" Subject: UPDATED: San Onofre Incidents, Accidents, and news, 2001-current (April, 2005) (version 4) ------------------------------------------------------------ SCE is the second-largest investor-owned electric utility, and subsidiary of Edison International. ------------------------------------------------------------ According to the IAEA, the "Annual Time On Line" for Unit 2 was: 2000: 89% 2001: 97.47% 2002: 86.96% 2003: 98.98% 2004: 82.68% Since beginning operation in 1982, Unit 2 has had 7 years with below 70% ATOL (through 2004, and not including 1982), and 2 more years with identical 70.74% ATOLs. The ATOL for Unit 3 during the same period was: 2000: 100% 2001: 59.02% 2002: 98.84% 2003: 88.37% 2004: 72.22% Since beginning operation in 1983, Unit 3 has had 3 years below 60% ATOL (including 1984 and 1985, the first two years of what was supposed to be full operation), 4 below 70%, and 10 years below 80%. ------------------------------------------------------------ February 3, 2001: Just 12 hours after going back "into service" after repairs, Unit 3 was shut down because of "a fire in an electrical switching room". A 20-year-old circuit breaker "failed to close, creating a 4000-volt arc and fire that cut power to coolant control systems, drowned emergency switching valves and shut down emergency oil pumps, destroying the [turbine] shaft. Currently, 150 identical breakers remain in service at the plant." Here's the lead paragraph from an "early" SD U-T report. At this point one assumes they hadn't yet realized the turbine shaft was bent, so their estimate of the repair time is wildly optimistic: February 6, 2001: "A small fire last weekend that triggered the shutdown of one of two reactors at the nuclear power plant in San Onofre will keep the reactor shut down for several weeks, a plant spokesman said." This was no "small fire' and required professional help from the San Clemente Fire Department to put out (there was an argument about how to put it out, and the SCFD finally won). There's a special name for a turbine shaft that runs off it's clamps and bearings and whatnot that's holding it, and gallops across the land, sort of like a steamroller gone mad. That almost happened at San Onofre. I believe one of the turbines would roll towards the control room area, and the other would head towards the puny little tsunami wall. but I'm not sure which turns which way. --------------------------------------------------------------- May 30th. 2001: Ray Golden, spokesperson for San Onofre Nuclear (Waste) Generating Station, accuses the opposition of being "completely misinformed and they don't understand the laws of physics". That very day, San Onofre drops an 80,000 lb load (a crane) when a strap breaks. This leads to a reported $5,000,000 expense in lift training, strap replacement, etc. etc.. The same month the crane incident is reported (June, 2001), the EPA approves a power up-rate for San Onofre Units 2 and 3. --------------------------------------------------------------- June 6, 2001: Workers overfill a 300-gallon steel bin with hydrazine, a toxic chemical used to purify water in the plant's cooling systems, spilling about 20 gallons. (SD U-T) ------------------------------------------------------------------ June 26, 2001: Flames and smoke shoot suddenly skyward, pieces of silvery material were fluttering through the air and drifting toward the freeway. Glass falls on the nearby railroad tracks and on the freeway. When the fireball occurred, traffic began speeding up. "Everybody sort of saw it and thought, 'Oh my God, have we just been irradiated or what?' " (SD U-T) In fact, the explosion was a transformer in the switchyard, which is also old and poorly maintained, just like the rest of the plant. it was one of 54 similar "potential transformers" which "step down" the voltage to 115 for "sampling". Electricity normally goes out the transmission lines which cross I-5 (and thus are targets for terrorists!) at 238,000 volts. In 1994 the same thing happened. "Plant workers discovered that corrosion caused by ocean air rusted the transformer's carbon-steel casing, allowing water to enter and contaminate the insulation oil." After the 1994 incident, inspections led to 4 transformers being replaced, and 3 being repaired. ------------------------------------------------------ September 11th, 2001: San Onofre and the nation's 102 other nuclear power plants are NOT shut down during the attack that day, despite planes on the loose being smashed into multiple buildings. ------------------------------------------------------ September 26th, 2001: On the front page of the NC Times, Ray Golden, spokesperson for San Onofre Nuclear (Waste) Generating Station, says he, "had always been taught that we were designed specifically for large plane crashes...That was incorrect." In another paper, he is reported to have said, "The plant was never designed for the impact from a commercial airplane." ------------------------------------------------------ September 26th, 2001: Breck Henderson of the NRC is quoted saying activists aren't facing reality. He claims the plants are safe against tsunamis, earthquakes, tornados and "other natural or man-made disasters". (NC Times) ------------------------------------------------------ Letter to NC Times following shutdown October 2001 "for repairs": Date: October 13th, 2001 Subject: San Onofre nuclear reactor, Unit II, shut down for approx. 20 days for repairs; x-rays should be done for circular cracks in the reactor vessel By: Russell D. Hoffman To The Editor: Yesterday it was reported that San Onofre Nuclear (Waste) Generating Station's Unit II reactor has been shut down for repairs lasting about three weeks. Last August, San Onofre's operators, Southern California Edison, refused to shut their two operational reactors down in order to do x-rays of their reactor vessels for circular cracks around the approximately 100 nozzles which enter each vessel, choosing to wait, instead, until the regular repair schedule dictated a shutdown. Circular cracks have been identified as a potentially catastrophic, inherent design flaw in Pressurized Water Reactors. The problem has been found in French and Japanese PWRs, and last spring, in PWRs in two out of three reactors on the Oconee (South Carolina) generating station. San Onofre's reactors are about 20% larger than the Oconee reactors (more heat, more liquid, more vibration, etc.). I have previously described the circular cracking problem in detail in several essays and letters to the editor which I posted online here: http://www.animatedsoftware.com/environm/onofre/nct2001h.htm Now that the reactor is shut anyway, is San Onofre doing the x-rays? My guess is no, because I believe if they were, it would have been reported. The decision not to shut the reactors down in August for an x-ray inspection was yet another flagrant violation of the spirit of safety which they claim to have at San Onofre. To not shut them down following the September 11th attacks is even crazier. But in any event, if they don't x-ray the welds on the Unit II reactor vessel while the reactor is shut down right now anyway, it's definitely nothing less than criminal negligence. Sincerely, Russell D. Hoffman Concerned Citizen Carlsbad, CA -------------------------------------------------------- October 24th, 2001: "...mock attack teams staged four assaults on the plant, and three were repelled. During the final drill, the attackers were closing in on a target when the exercise was suddenly called off. It is far from certain that plant managers have taken the necessary steps to ensure that a real attack would be less successful." (SD U-T) ------------------------------------------------------- Christmas Day, 2001: A Cessna 172 crashes into the ocean just south of San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station. First reported to have crashed 3 miles south of the reactor and 1/2 mile out to sea, in fact it was probably less than 1/4 mile way. ------------------------------------------------------- January 8th, 2002: San Juan Capistrano (CA) police arrest a man who had threatened to shoot up the San Onofre Nuclear Power Station and his former coworkers etc. at the plant. He had an arsenal of almost 300 weapons, including illegal assault rifles, 5,000 rounds of ammunition, an antitank rocket launcher, four live hand grenades, tear gas, survivalist material, etc. etc.. ------------------------------------------------------- February 27, 2002: Unit 3 goes offline after a backup connection trips. One of the main electrical connections had been out of service for a week for "maintenance and repairs to key equipment" when the backup tripped. To prevent an uncontrollable blackout in the San Diego area, power was cut to over 200,000 SDG&E customers. ------------------------------------------------------- June 21-27, 2002: "Five families of San Onofre workers who have died of rare forms of cancer have sued SCE for failing to disclose radiation leaks at the plant." About this time, the U.S. Government begins distributing Iodine (KI) pills within a pitiful 10-mile radius around the plant." (OC Weekly) ------------------------------------------------------- July 4, 2002: Unit 2 is returned to service, concluding a 43-day "routine" shutdown for "refueling and maintenance." Operators had intended to start several days earlier, but a malfunction of steam bypass valves automatically shut the reactor down shortly after operators had started it. During the outage, workers repaired 170 tubes and plugged an additional 150 ­ "fewer than they expected". Edison had hired 1,400 contract workers to supplement the 1,800 regular workers at the plant. (SD U-T) ------------------------------------------------------- September 27, 2002: Its reported in World Net Daily that an airplane flying a standard route (known as "Victor 23") can fly DIRECTLY over San Onofre at about 17,000 feet. Jets on "V23" could descend at well over 5,000 feet per minute in a "quick but normal descent" -- much faster if deliberately sent into a nosedive. Every jet departing San Diego on V23 is, in fact, heading for San Onofre. V25 also runs very close, about 15 miles offshore. A jet traveling at 600 miles per hour covers 15 miles in less than two minutes. ------------------------------------------------------- February, 2003: Plans to haul away Unit 1's 900-ton reactor pressure vessel ("as heavy as two fully loaded Boeing 747s", as one article put it) get so close that a 192-wheel tractor-trailer is expected to haul it away to a barge, which would then transport the reactor about 20,000 miles, including around Cape Horn, to Barnwell County, South Carolina. Cape Horn, the most deadly passage on Earth, is referred to as "the tip of South America" in one AP report, rather than being named explicitly. Rail shipment and the Panama Canal had both already been eliminated, the former because it would "disrupt regular shipping" and the latter because PC officials found it PC to "not accept" the cargo. They apparently have a "150 ton limit on radioactive cargo," perhaps not understanding that it's Curie content that matters, not raw weight. In this case, both (the utility says it's equal to one dental x-ray per hour if you are right next to it). Travel the long way around the globe has still not been ruled out as yet another alternative, but leaving it sit on the beach seems to be the actual plan. ------------------------------------------------------ May, 2003: Don May, the president of California Earth Corp, points out that there is a major fault line about two miles away from San Onofre that is "overdue for an earthquake." Mark Massara of the Sierra Club's coastal program describes San Onofre as: "an unequivocal environmental and economic disaster with no redeeming features whatsoever." It's reported in local media that several former employees of the plant who have developed cancer have sued plant owner Southern California Edison and its suppliers (such as Bechtel) for exposure to radiation. ------------------------------------------------------- September 26 - October 2nd, 2003: San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station ranked THIRD among the U.S. facilities "most likely to suffer a meltdown" according to the Union of Concerned Scientists. The risk is in part due to design defects in the sump pump system, according to the group. There is potential for debris to clog the screen on the containment-vessel sump. Such a clog could prevent water from being pumped through the reactor core, causing the reactor’s fuel rods to overheat and melt down. On August 1st, 2003 the utility promised to have workers trained by November 30th, 2003 to clean the drains. Scott Burnell, public affairs officer for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), describes the containment sump-pump issue "a credible one". (OC Weekly) ------------------------------------------------------- December 31st, 2003: SCE's favorable Incremental Cost Incentive Pricing (ICIP) structure ends (a "generation incentive mechanism"). ------------------------------------------------------- January 29, 2004: Reactor (Unit ?) leaks 144 gallons per day for "two or three days"; leak described as "tiny": The leak was in a 2-inch-diameter steel pipe that was part of a system of pipes that "purifies and recycles" water. The "pinhole" leak was to have been repaired and the reactor brought on line that weekend, and fully operational by the next week. The reactor spokesperson said the reactor was shut down at 8 p.m. Saturday, two or three days after operators first saw the leak. Note that 3 days X 144 gallons per day = almost 500 gallons of liquid! .That's no small leak! ------------------------------------------------------- March 31st, 2004: NC Times: "Two failed water temperature sensors have forced operators to shut down San Onofre's Unit 2 reactor before it could reach full power after a 45-day refueling and maintenance outage, a plant spokesman said Wednesday." Some facts about San Onofre from that article: Each steam generator is 66 feet tall, 25 feet in diameter, weighs 750 tons and contains 9,350 metal tubes. All day every day, 560-degree reactor coolant is pumped through the tubes under 2,250 pounds of pressure per square inch. San Onofre's steam generators were designed to last 40 years. However, inspectors began detecting cracks in the thin coolant tubes only 10 years after units 2 and 3 came into service in 1983 and 1984. Edison had to plug 1,899 of Unit 2's tubes and another 534 have been repaired by inserting protective metal sleeves. All told, 10 percent of Unit 2's steam generator tubes are out of service. Unit 3 has a total of 1,227 ---- or 6.5 percent ---- of its tubes plugged. ------------------------------------------------------ April 3rd, 2004: "Incident" at SONWGS Unit II (see below) ------------------------------------------------------- Monday, April 12, 2004 A short circuit at the San Onofre Nuclear Generation station Saturday shut down the plant's Unit 2 reactor just as it was about to reach full power after a "routine 45-day refueling outage" (NC Times). Routine? 45 days? Not either! "Saturday's emergency shutdown was the second since Edison finished a biannual refueling process that was supposed to last only 45 days. The refueling outage was scheduled to last until Feb. 25, but operators detected two faulty coolant temperature sensors that forced a shutdown." (NC Times) --------------------------------------------------------- November. 19, 2004: From an NC Times report Nov. 23, 2004: An aluminum plate called a "deionization plate" fell off due to unexpected amounts of vibration from the nearby turbine shaft (which rotates at 1,800 rpm), caused Unit II to shut down at 8:07 PM Friday (Nov. 19th, 2004). Unit II was running "without incident" since April 4th, 2004. Several of these aluminum plate had just been installed during the refueling outage. Unit III was out of service at the time for refueling, so there was ZERO power being generated at the plant during the outage. ------------------------------------------------------- December 2, 2004: At 2200 PSI, there is no such thing as a "tiny" crack: But here's a typical report, anyway: Unit 3 to remain shut down through mid-January after tiny cracks are discovered in two of its water heaters. Unit 3 was off line since Sept. 26th, 2004 for a 55-day refueling when microscopic cracks were found in water heater sleeves attached to the pressurizers. The 30 heaters "regulate the nuclear reactor's coolant to ensure the water inside the reactor's coil does not boil." ------------------------------------------------------- December 26th, 2004: Tsunami devastates Indonesia, India, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Sumatra and other countries. Waves more than 50 feet high are reported to crash into the shores. 300,000 people killed. San Onofre claims their 30 foot (possibly 35 foot) sea wall is adequate to contain all possible tsunamis. Tsunamis caused by underwater earth slides have reached 1,800 feet! ------------------------------------------------------- December 29th, 2004: Tornado touches down 50 miles from San Onofre. The plant is not properly protected against tornado strikes. Numerous vital portions of the plant are vulnerable to this and asteroid strikes as well, not to mention terrorists with Rocket-Propelled Grenades (RPGs). ------------------------------------------------------- February 3rd, 2005: Unit 2 shut itself off for another electrical problem -- this time a "digital fault recorder" tripped. SCE could not decide if the $50,000 device was working properly or not, so they replaced it. There are three such devices on site. (SD U-T) ------------------------------------------------------- February 7, 2005: According to AP, "The San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station could be forced to shut down as soon as 2009 unless regulators decide that energy customers should pay for $829 million in repairs." ------------------------------------------------------- February 16, 2005: "For the third time in three months, a reactor at the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station has shut down." (Unit 2) This shutdown was initiated due to a "faulty water valve". The valve was 18 inches in diameter and original equipment (1982). It fed "non-radiated" water to various pumps for cooling. There are many valves like it (and just as old) at SONWGS. In July, 1997 another valve's failure to open properly during "startup testing" caused Unit 3 to remain shut down at least 5 days longer than originally planned. The "identical valve" in Unit 2 was tested and determined to ALSO need "repairs". My guess is that "repair" really means "replace". ------------------------------------------------------- March 10, 2005: Environmentalists object to the proposed renewal of a state permit that allows Southern California Edison to use 2.4 billion gallons of seawater each day to cool the San Onofre nuclear power plant. (SD U-T) ------------------------------------------------------- From an ex-SONWGS worker's email to me: Another event that could have been prevented was reported to the NRC by LER (I was the author) when a SONGS technician closed a breaker on an emergency bus, causing a direct ground through the switch yard. The ground caused the breaker supplying power to the emergency bus to open and resulted in a loss of power to the shutdown cooling pumps. The emergency diesel generators started but could not power the bus because the control power to the inadvertently closed breaker had been removed. Therefore, [the] breaker would not open (clearing the bus) during the emergency diesel sequencing. The reactor, shut down for refueling, was without cooling for a few minutes before the operators could align another pump. This event occurred because the technician did not fully understand the operation of the break he was sent to repair. Present at the time were the System Engineer and the Operations Supervisor and several other "lookers." I thought that it was significant that none of the people present realized the consequences of the technician's plans. Nor did any of them halt the work because they were not sure what would happen. Also, it was unrecognized by those planning the work that the temporary ground in the switch yard would prevent the emergency diesel generators from performing their intended safety function. ------------------------------------------------------- In another email to me, the same ex-San Onofre employee (who still believes in the dream of nuclear power, by the way), talking about a different LER (Licensee Event Report), stated: "I believe the report contained statements that were designed to deliberately deceive the NRC. Two days after I raised that concern with the NSC [Nuclear Safety Concerns] office, I was reassigned to other projects . . . The work environment became so hostile, I retired in August 2003." ----------------------------------------------------------- UNIT 1 was a failure, too: And let's not let them forget about how things went with Unit 1, which was a loosing proposition from DAY ONE and from which we now have enormous piles of deadly "spent fuel" radioactive reactor cores. Here's an actual quote from a scholarly report available online: REACTORS;SEMIMETALS;SHUTDOWNS;THERMAL REACTORS;VAPOR GENERATORS;WATER COOLED REACTORS;WATER MODERATED REACTORS Description/ Abstract Few nuclear reactors have been shut down for periods on the order of several years - and then restarted. Those that have experienced this type of history are sources of a great deal of information concerning reactivity changes and in-core power redistributions due to nuclide decay. This paper discusses the core reactivity changes due to this nuclide decay and presents actual data illustrating the net effect of these changes on the critical boron concentration (CBC) rundown curve and the in-core power distribution at the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Unit 1 (SONGS-1). ### ======================================================= (2) This letter was censored by the North County Times: ======================================================= To: "Editor, NC Times" Subject: 20% is not so hard to find... Cc: "Gig Conaughton" , "Mary Rowe" , "Phil Diehl" , "Erin Walsh" , "Paul Sisson" April 8th, 2005 To The Editor, Today's article ("Report Concerns Nuclear Activists") ended with an unattributed comment stating that it would be difficult to replace San Onofre's energy. SCE claims "SONWGS" delivers 20% of our local electricity, but one has to factor in numerous prolonged outages. And you should also factor in the costs of evacuations, meltdowns, subsequent permanent loss of real estate, and hundreds of thousands of deaths. What's THAT going to cost? Our state government believes we can cut our usage by 20% -- they have offered us rebates to do it. So why can't we? In one 14-month period recently, California added 4,000 megawatts of new generating capacity -- enough to replace all four nukes in the state. Let's do that again, but this time, add renewable energy and CLOSE THE NUKES! Once a nuclear power plant is shut down, the danger begins to subside. Once the control rods are dropped for the last time, the chance of a meltdown becomes many orders of magnitude less. Once the fuel has cooled for 5 years or more, the chance of a catastrophic spent fuel fire dramatically decreases. It's still not safe, but it's safer. Shutting the plants is the only logical thing to do. Sincerely, Russell Hoffman Concerned Citizen Carlsbad, CA ================================================= (3) ... And this one was censored by the New York Times: ================================================= To: "Letters Editor" Subject: Another New York Times Op_Ed smacks of pronuclear bias... Cc: "Nicholas D. Kristof'" To The Editor: Nicholas D. Kristof's Op-Ed piece in your paper was absurd, and his conclusions are illogical. It would have fit perfectly in a Nuclear Energy Institute publication, but not in the New York Times. Real environmentalists should be given a chance to respond! First of all, wind power, which Kristof scoffs at because the wind doesn't blow all the time (he calls it "one big problem"), works PERFECTLY when used in conjunction with other renewable energy resources, and is the cheapest energy source available today. And what about nuclear power's frequent, sudden, and prolonged outages? Why doesn't he consider THAT "one big problem"? Not to mention the constant threat of industry-wide shutdowns due to as-yet undiscovered (or unadmitted) flaws. Sudden shutdowns of dozens of one type of nuke or another have previously occurred in Japan, France, and elsewhere. Similarly, his complaint about solar energy's lack of penetration is self-serving, not based on science or economics, but on historic corporate and federal neglect of a useful technology. Kristof is sure we should rip out all the hydroelectric dams because they might be impacting some salmon runs. Chernobyl affects the wildlife for hundreds -- nay, thousands -- of miles around. Hanford, Washington poisons the Columbia River and way out to sea with its effluent from nuclear bomb and nuke power plant production work done there during the past 50 years. The Yucca Mountain project has been found to be full of fraud, and after 50 years, it is still unworkable, decades away at the earliest, and Nevadans hate it. The nation's spent fuel pools are dangerously overfilled and susceptible to an attack or an accident that would poison more fish in the first day than all the dams in history have ever killed. There are far more clean energy choices, none of which are good enough for Kristof, but he doesn't go into detail about his complaints regarding ocean thermal energy conversion ("OTEC"), wave power (and all its many variations), tide power, biomass, geothermal, space-based mirrors, the benefits of an intercontinental electrical energy grid, or anything else. He just plugs nukes as the solution to everything. His entire discussion of the dangers of terrorism consists of telling us that "there are also risks from terrorist attacks" after mentioning the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl accidents, but without mentioning Davis-Besse's near-meltdown in 2002 (probably far closer to a catastrophe than TMI was, in reality), San Onofre's 100 million dollar fire in 2001, or any of the other numerous nearly-catastrophic failures at nuclear power plants throughout the world. The truth is, we've been lucky. Nuclear power's image could easily be a lot more soiled than it already is. Green energy is possible and necessary. Nuclear power is neither green nor necessary and by choosing nukes we are giving our enemies a powerful weapon to use against us. Sincerely, Russell Hoffman Concerned Citizen Carlsbad, CA Below are some URLs this author has created which you can visit to learn more about nuclear power: How does a nuclear power plant work? (Flash animation based on industry drawings): http://www.animatedsoftware.com/environm/nukequiz/nukequiz_one/nuke_parts/reactor_parts.swf or try: http://www.animatedsoftware.com/environm/nukequiz/nukequiz_one/nuke_parts/reactor_parts.html POISON FIRE USA: An animated history of all major U.S. nuclear activities: www.animatedsoftware.com/poifu/poifu.swf or try: www.animatedsoftware.com/poifu/poifu.html ONE BAD DAY AT SAN ONOFRE: Southern California Edison memo, December 2004 about this author (sent to all employees of the plant): http://animatedsoftware.com/environm/onofre/2005/sce_memo/sce_memo_2004.swf or try: http://animatedsoftware.com/environm/onofre/2005/sce_memo/sce_memo_2004.html Internet Glossary of Nuclear Terminology / "The Demon Hot Atom": http://www.animatedsoftware.com/hotwords/index.htm List of every nuclear power plant in America, with history, activist orgs, specs, etc.: http://www.animatedsoftware.com/environm/no_nukes/nukelist.htm List of ~300 books and videos about nuclear issues in my collection (donations welcome!): http://www.animatedsoftware.com/environm/no_nukes/mybooks.htm SHUT SAN ONOFRE!: http://www.animatedsoftware.com/environm/onofre/index.htm Learn about The Effects of Nuclear War here: http://www.animatedsoftware.com/environm/no_nukes/tenw/nuke_war.htm For affiliation purposes only: The author of the above web sites and of this letter is also the author of ALL ABOUT PUMPS and co-author of STATISTICS EXPLAINED and THE HEART: THE ENGINE OF LIFE (educational software programs). He is the owner and chief programmer for The Animated Software Company, Carlsbad, CA ( www.animatedsoftware.com ). Contact information appears below. ========================================================= (4) Contact information for Russell Hoffman: ========================================================= ************************************************* ** THE ANIMATED SOFTWARE COMPANY ** Russell D. Hoffman, Owner and Chief Programmer ** P.O. Box 1936, Carlsbad CA 92018-1936 ** (800) 551-2726 ** (760) 720-7261 ** Fax: (760) 720-7394 ** Visit the world's most eclectic web site: ** http://www.animatedsoftware.com ************************************************* IF YOU RECEIVED THIS EMAIL IN ERROR AND/OR DO NOT WISH TO RECEIVE ANY MORE EMAILS FROM US FOR ANY REASON, PLEASE CONTACT RUSSELL HOFFMAN AT: rhoffman@animatedsoftware.com MailTo:rhoffman@animatedsoftware.com?Subject=Unsubscribe-me-please . Please be sure that "Unsubscribe-me-please" appears in the subject line. ***************************************************************** 7 [NukeNet] Correction On Nuke Power As Problem, Not Solution By Date: Mon, 18 Apr 2005 14:25:29 -0700 NukeNet Anti-Nuclear Network (nukenet@energyjustice.net) There was a mistake with the original version of this article posted recently re tritium. It has now been corrected: Nuclear power is the problem, not a solution Helen Caldicott 13apr05 THERE is a huge propaganda push by the nuclear industry to justify nuclear power as a panacea for the reduction of global-warming gases. At present there are 442 nuclear reactors in operation around the world. If, as the nuclear industry suggests, nuclear power were to replace fossil fuels on a large scale, it would be necessary to build 2000 large, 1000-megawatt reactors. Considering that no new nuclear plant has been ordered in the US since 1978, this proposal is less than practical. Furthermore, even if we decided today to replace all fossil-fuel-generated electricity with nuclear power, there would only be enough economically viable uranium to fuel the reactors for three to four years. The true economies of the nuclear industry are never fully accounted for. The cost of uranium enrichment is subsidised by the US government. The true cost of the industry's liability in the case of an accident in the US is estimated to be $US560billion ($726billion), but the industry pays only $ US9.1billion - 98per cent of the insurance liability is covered by the US federal government. The cost of decommissioning all the existing US nuclear reactor s is estimated to be $US33billion. These costs - plus the enormous expense involved in the storage of radioactive waste for a quarter of a million years - are not now included in the economic assessments of nuclear electricity. It is said that nuclear power is emission-free. The truth is very different. In the US, where much of the world's uranium is enriched, including Australia's, the enrichment facility at Paducah, Kentucky, requires the electrical output of two 1000-megawatt coal-fired plants, which emit large quantities of carbon dioxide, the gas responsible for 50per cent of global warming. Also, this enrichment facility and another at Portsmouth, Ohio, release from leaky pipes 93per cent of the chlorofluorocarbon gas emitted yearly in the US. The production and release of CFC gas is now banned internationally by the Montreal Protocol because it is the main culprit responsible for stratospheric ozone depletion. But CFC is also a global warmer, 10,000 to 20,000 times more potent than carbon dioxide. In fact, the nuclear fuel cycle utilises large quantities of fossil fuel at all of its stages - the mining and milling of uranium, the construction of the nuclear reactor and cooling towers, robotic decommissioning of the intensely radioactive reactor at the end of its 20 to 40-year operating lifetime, and transportation and long-term storage of massive quantities of radioactive waste. . Contrary to the nuclear industry's propaganda, nuclear power is therefore not green and it is certainly not clean. Nuclear reactors consistently release millions of curies of radioactive isotopes into the air and water each year. These releases are unregulated because the nuclear industry considers these particular radioactive elements to be biologically inconsequential. This is not so. These unregulated isotopes include the noble gases krypton, xenon and argon, which are fat-soluble and if inhaled by persons living near a nuclear reactor, are absorbed through the lungs, migrating to the fatty tissues of the body, including the abdominal fat pad and upper thighs, near the reproductive organs. These radioactive elements, which emit high-energy gamma radiation, can mutate the genes in the eggs and sperm and cause genetic disease. Tritium, another biologically significant gas, which is also routinely emitted from nuclear reactors is a radioactive isotope of hydrogen composed of two neutrons and one proton with an atomic weight of 3. The chemical symbol for tritium is H3. When one or both of the hydrogen atoms in water is displaced by tritium the water molecule is then called tritiated water. Tritium is a soft energy beta emitter, more mutagenic than gamma radiation, that incorporates directly into the DNA molecule of the gene. Its half life is 12.3 years, giving it a biologically active life of 246 years. It passes readily through the skin, lungs and digestive system and is distributed throughout the body. The dire subject of massive quantities of radioactive waste accruing at the 442 nuclear reactors across the world is also rarely, if ever, addressed by the nuclear industry. Each typical 1000-megawatt nuclear reactor manufactures 33tonnes of thermally hot, intensely radioactive waste per year. Already more than 80,000 tonnes of highly radioactive waste sits in cooling pools next to the 103 US nuclear power plants, awaiting transportation to a storage facility yet to be found. This dangerous material will be an attractive target for terrorist sabotage as it travels through 39 states on roads and railway lines for the next 25 years. But the long-term storage of radioactive waste continues to pose a problem. The US Congress in 1987 chose Yucca Mountain in Nevada, 150km northwest of Las Vegas, as a repository for America's high-level waste. But Yucca Mountain has subsequently been found to be unsuitable for the long-term storage of high-level waste because it is a volcanic mountain made of permeable pumice stone and it is transected by 32 earthquake faults. Last week a congressional committee discovered fabricated data about water infiltration and cask corrosion in Yucca Mountain that had been produced by personnel in the US Geological Survey. These startling revelations, according to most experts, have almost disqualified Yucca Mountain as a waste repository, meaning that the US now has nowhere to deposit its expanding nuclear waste inventory. To make matters worse, a study released last week by the National Academy of Sciences shows that the cooling pools at nuclear reactors, which store 10 to 30 times more radioactive material than that contained in the reactor core, are subject to catastrophic attacks by terrorists, which could unleash an inferno and release massive quantities of deadly radiation -- significantly worse than the radiation released by Chernobyl, according to some scientists. This vulnerable high-level nuclear waste contained in the cooling pools at 103 nuclear power plants in the US includes hundreds of radioactive elements that have different biological impacts in the human body, the most important being cancer and genetic diseases. The incubation time for cancer is five to 50 years following exposure to radiation. It is important to note that children, old people and immuno-compromised individuals are many times more sensitive to the malignant effects of radiation than other people. I will describe four of the most dangerous elements made in nuclear power plants. Iodine 131, which was released at the nuclear accidents at Sellafield in Britain, Chernobyl in Ukraine and Three Mile Island in the US, is radioactive for only six weeks and it bio-concentrates in leafy vegetables and milk. When it enters the human body via the gut and the lung, it migrates to the thyroid gland in the neck, where it can later induce thyroid cancer. In Belarus more than 2000 children have had their thyroids removed for thyroid cancer, a situation never before recorded in pediatric literature. Strontium 90 lasts for 600 years. As a calcium analogue, it concentrates in cow and goat milk. It accumulates in the human breast during lactation, and in bone, where it can later induce breast cancer, bone cancer and leukemia. Cesium 137, which also lasts for 600 years, concentrates in the food chain, particularly meat. On entering the human body, it locates in muscle, where it can induce a malignant muscle cancer called a sarcoma. Plutonium 239, one of the most dangerous elements known to humans, is so toxic that one-millionth of a gram is carcinogenic. More than 200kg is made annually in each 1000-megawatt nuclear power plant. Plutonium is handled like iron in the body, and is therefore stored in the liver, where it causes liver cancer, and in the bone, where it can induce bone cancer and blood malignancies. On inhalation it causes lung cancer. It also crosses the placenta, where, like the drug thalidomide, it can cause severe congenital deformities. Plutonium has a predisposition for the testicle, where it can cause testicular cancer and induce genetic diseases in future generations. Plutonium lasts for 500,000 years, living on to induce cancer and genetic diseases in future generations of plants, animals and humans. Plutonium is also the fuel for nuclear weapons -- only 5kg is necessary to make a bomb and each reactor makes more than 200kg per year. Therefore any country with a nuclear power plant can theoretically manufacture 40 bombs a year. Nuclear power therefore leaves a toxic legacy to all future generations, because it produces global warming gases, because it is far more expensive than any other form of electricity generation, and because it can trigger proliferation of nuclear weapons. Helen Caldicott is an anti-nuclear campaigner and founder and president of the Nuclear Policy Research Institute, which warns of the danger of nuclear energy. _______________________________________________________________________ Subscribe/Unsubscribe Here: http://www.energyjustice.net/nukenet/ Change your settings or access the archives at: http://energyjustice.net/mailman/listinfo/nukenet_energyjustice.net ***************************************************************** 8 [epa-impact] AP1000 Design Certification Date: Mon, 18 Apr 2005 11:21:18 -0400 (EDT) http://epa.gov/EPA-IMPACT/2005/April/Day-18/ ======================================================================= [Federal Register: April 18, 2005 (Volume 70, Number 73)] [Proposed Rules] [Page 20062-20080] From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr18ap05-11] ======================================================================= ----------------------------------------------------------------------- NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 10 CFR Part 52 RIN 3150-AH56 AP1000 Design Certification AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission. ACTION: Proposed rule. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or Commission) proposes to amend its regulations to certify the AP1000 standard plant design. This action is necessary so that applicants or licensees intending to construct and operate an AP1000 design may do so by referencing the AP1000 [[Page 20063]] design certification rule (DCR). This proposed DCR is nearly identical to the AP600 DCR in the current regulations. The applicant for certification of the AP1000 design is Westinghouse Electric Company LLC (Westinghouse). The public is invited to submit comments on this proposed DCR and the AP1000 design control document (DCD) that would be incorporated by reference into the DCR. The NRC also invites the public to submit comments on the environmental assessment for the AP1000 design. DATES: Submit comments on the rule by July 5, 2005. Submit comments specific to the information collections aspects of this rule by May 18, 2005. Comments received after the above dates will be considered if it is practical to do so, but assurance of consideration cannot be given to comments received after these dates. ADDRESSES: You may submit comments by any one of the following methods. Please include the following number (RIN 3150-AH56) in the subject line of your comments. Comments on rulemakings submitted in writing or in electronic form will be made available for public inspection. Because your comments will not be edited to remove any identifying or contact information, the NRC cautions you against including personal information such as social security numbers and birth dates in your submission. Mail comments to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attn: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff. E-mail comments to: SECY@nrc.gov. If you do not receive a reply e- mail confirming that we have received your comments, contact us directly at (301) 415-1966. You may also submit comments via the NRC's rulemaking Web site at http://ruleforum.llnl.gov. Address questions about our rulemaking Web site to Carol Gallagher (301) 415-5905; e-mail cag@nrc.gov. Comments can also be submitted via the Federal eRulemaking Portal http://www.regulations.gov. Hand deliver comments to: 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852, between the hours of 7:30 a.m. and 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays (telephone (301) 415-1966). Fax comments to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission at (301) 415-1101. Publicly available documents related to this rulemaking may be viewed electronically on the public computers located at the NRC's Public Document Room (PDR), O1 F21, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland. The PDR reproduction contractor will copy documents for a fee. Selected documents, including comments, can be viewed and downloaded electronically via the NRC rulemaking Web site at http://ruleforum.llnl.gov. Publicly available documents created or received at the NRC after November 1, 1999, are available electronically at the NRC's Electronic Reading Room at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. From this site, the public can gain entry into the NRC's Agencywide Document Access and Management System (ADAMS), which provides text and image files of NRC's public documents. If you do not have access to ADAMS or if there are problems in accessing the documents located in ADAMS, contact the NRC PDR Reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, (301) 415-4737, or by e-mail to pdr@nrc.gov. You may submit comments on the information collections by the methods indicated in the Paperwork Reduction Act Statement. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Lauren Quinones-Navarro or Jerry N. Wilson, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; telephone (301) 415-2007 or (301) 415-3145; e-mail: lnq@nrc.gov or jnw@nrc.gov. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Table of Contents I. Background II. Technical Evaluation of the AP1000 Design III. Section-by-Section Discussion A. Introduction (Section I) B. Definitions (Section II) C. Scope and Contents (Section III) D. Additional Requirements and Restrictions (Section IV) E. Applicable Regulations (Section V) F. Issue Resolution (Section VI) G. Duration of this Appendix (Section VII) H. Processes for Changes and Departures (Section VIII) I. Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC) (Section IX) J. Records and Reporting (Section X) IV. Availability of Documents V. Plain Language VI. Voluntary Consensus Standards VII. Finding of No Significant Environmental Impact: Availability VIII. Paperwork Reduction Act Statement IX. Regulatory Analysis X. Regulatory Flexibility Certification XI. Backfit Analysis List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 52 I. Background The NRC added 10 CFR part 52 to its regulations to provide for the issuance of early site permits (ESPs), standard design certifications, and combined licenses (COLs) for nuclear power plants. Subpart B of 10 CFR part 52 established the process for obtaining design certifications. On March 28, 2002 (67 FR 20845), Westinghouse tendered its application for certification of the AP1000 standard plant design with the NRC. Westinghouse submitted this application in accordance with subpart B and appendix O of 10 CFR part 52. The NRC formally accepted the application as a docketed application for design certification (Docket No. 52-006) on June 25, 2002 (67 FR 43690). The pre-application information submitted before the NRC formally accepted the application can be found under Project No. 711. II. Technical Evaluation of the AP1000 Design As stated above, the procedure for certifying a standard design is performed under 10 CFR part 52, subpart B, and is carried out in two stages (technical and administrative). The technical review stage is initiated by an application filed in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 52.45, ``Filing of Applications.'' This stage continues with reviews by the NRC staff and the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards and ends with the issuance of a final safety evaluation report (FSER) that discusses the staff's conclusions related to the acceptability of the AP1000 design. The NRC staff issued the AP1000 FSER in September 2004 (NUREG-1793). The FSER provides the bases for issuance of a final design approval under appendix O to part 52, which is a prerequisite to a design certification. The final design approval for the AP1000 design was issued on September 13, 2004, and published in the Federal Register on September 17, 2004 (69 FR 56101). The administrative review stage begins with the publication of a Federal Register notice that initiates rulemaking, in accordance with 10 CFR 52.51, ``Administrative Review of Applications,'' and includes a proposed design certification rule. The rulemaking culminates with the denial of the application or the issuance of a design certification rule. III. Section-By-Section Discussion The following discussion sets forth the purpose and key aspects of each section and paragraph of the proposed AP1000 DCR. All section and paragraph references are to the provisions in the proposed appendix D to 10 CFR part 52. The proposed DCR for the AP1000 standard plant design is nearly identical to the AP600 DCR, which the NRC [[Page 20064]] previously codified in 10 CFR part 52, appendix C (Design Certification Rule for the AP600 Design, 64 FR 72015, December 23, 1999). Many of the procedural issues and their resolutions for the AP600 DCR (e.g., the two-tier structure, Tier 2*, the scope of issue resolution) were developed after extensive discussions with public stakeholders, including Westinghouse. Also, Westinghouse requested that policy resolutions for the AP600 design review be applied to the AP1000. Accordingly, the NRC has modeled the AP1000 DCR on the existing DCRs, with certain departures. These departures are necessary to account for differences in the AP1000 design documentation, design features, and environmental assessment (including severe accident mitigation design alternatives). A. Introduction The purpose of Section I of proposed appendix D to 10 CFR part 52 (this appendix) would be to identify the standard plant design that is approved by this DCR and the applicant for certification of the standard design. Identification of the design certification applicant is necessary to implement this appendix, for two reasons. First, the implementation of 10 CFR 52.63(c) depends on whether an applicant for a COL contracts with the design certification applicant to provide the generic design control document (DCD) and supporting design information. If the COL applicant does not use the design certification applicant to provide this information, then the COL applicant must meet the requirements in 10 CFR 52.63(c). Also, X.A.1 of this appendix would impose a requirement on the design certification applicant to maintain the generic DCD throughout the time period in which this appendix may be referenced. B. Definitions During development of the first two design certification rules, the Commission decided that there would be both generic (master) DCDs maintained by the NRC and the design certification applicant, as well as individual plant-specific DCDs, maintained by each applicant and licensee who reference the appendix. This distinction is necessary in order to specify the plant-specific requirements applicable to applicants and licensees referencing the appendix. The generic DCDs would reflect generic changes to the version of the DCD approved in this design certification rulemaking. The generic changes would occur as the result of generic rulemaking by the Commission, in accordance with the change criteria in section VIII of this appendix. In addition, the Commission understood that each applicant and licensee referencing this appendix would be required to submit and maintain a plant-specific DCD. This plant-specific DCD would contain (not just incorporate by reference) the information in the generic DCD. The plant-specific DCD would be updated as necessary to reflect the generic changes to the DCD that the Commission may adopt through rulemaking, any plant-specific departures from the generic DCD that the Commission imposed on the licensee by order, and any plant-specific departures that the licensee chooses to make in accordance with the relevant processes in section VIII of this appendix. Thus, the plant-specific DCD would function like an updated Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) because it would provide the most complete and accurate information on a plant's licensing basis for that part of the plant within the scope of this appendix. Therefore, this appendix would define both a generic DCD and a plant- specific DCD. Also, the Commission decided to treat the technical specifications (TS) in section 16.1 of the generic DCD as a special category of information and to designate them as generic TS in order to facilitate the special treatment of this information under this appendix. A COL applicant must submit plant-specific TS that consist of the generic TS, which may be modified under paragraph VIII.C of this appendix, and the remaining plant-specific information needed to complete the TS. The FSAR that is required by Sec. 52.79(b) will consist of the plant- specific DCD, the site-specific portion of the FSAR, and the plant- specific TS. The terms Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 2*, and COL action items (license information) are defined in this appendix because these concepts were not envisioned when 10 CFR part 52 was developed. The design certification applicants and the NRC used these terms in implementing the two-tiered rule structure that was proposed by representatives of the nuclear industry after issuance of 10 CFR part 52. Therefore, appropriate definitions for these additional terms are included in this appendix. The nuclear industry representatives requested a two-tiered structure for the design certification rules to achieve issue preclusion for a greater amount of information than was originally planned for the design certification rules, while retaining flexibility for design implementation. The Commission approved the use of a two- tiered rule structure in its staff requirements memorandum (SRM), dated February 14, 1991, on SECY-90-377, ``Requirements for Design Certification Under 10 CFR Part 52,'' dated November 8, 1990. This document and others are available in the Regulatory History of Design Certification (see section IV, Availability of Documents). The Tier 1 portion of the design-related information contained in the DCD would be certified by this appendix and, therefore, be subject to the special backfit provisions in paragraph VIII.A of this appendix. An applicant who references this appendix would be required to incorporate by reference and comply with Tier 1, under paragraphs III.B and IV.A.1 of this appendix. This information consists of an introduction to Tier 1, the system based and non-system based design descriptions and corresponding inspections, tests, analyses, and acceptance criteria (ITAAC), significant interface requirements, and significant site parameters for the design. The design descriptions, interface requirements, and site parameters in Tier 1 were derived from Tier 2, but may be more general than the Tier 2 information. The NRC staff's evaluation of the Tier 1 information is provided in section 14.3 of the FSER. Changes to or departures from the Tier 1 information must comply with section VIII.A of this appendix. The Tier 1 design descriptions serve as commitments for the lifetime of a facility referencing the design certification. The ITAAC verifies that the as-built facility conforms with the approved design and applicable regulations. Under 10 CFR 52.103(g), the Commission must find that the acceptance criteria in the ITAAC are met before authorizing operation. After the Commission has made the finding required by 10 CFR 52.103(g), the ITAAC do not constitute regulatory requirements for licensees or for renewal of the COL. However, subsequent modifications to the facility must comply with the design descriptions in the plant-specific DCD unless changes are under the change process in section VIII of this appendix. The Tier 1 interface requirements are the most significant of the interface requirements for systems that are wholly or partially outside the scope of the standard design. Tier 1 interface requirements were submitted in response to 10 CFR 52.47(a)(1)(vii) and must be met by the site-specific design features of a facility that references this appendix. The Tier 1 site parameters are the most significant site parameters, [[Page 20065]] which were submitted in response to 10 CFR 52.47(a)(1)(iii). An application that references this appendix must demonstrate that the site parameters (both Tier 1 and Tier 2) are met at the proposed site (refer to paragraph III.D of this statement of consideration [SOC]). Tier 2 is the portion of the design-related information contained in the DCD that would be approved by this appendix but not certified. Tier 2 information would be subject to the backfit provisions in paragraph VIII.B of this appendix. Tier 2 includes the information required by 10 CFR 52.47 (with the exception of generic TS, conceptual design information, and the evaluation of severe accident mitigation design alternatives) and the supporting information on inspections, tests, and analyses that will be performed to demonstrate that the acceptance criteria in the ITAAC have been met. As with Tier 1, paragraphs III.B and IV.A.1 of this appendix would require an applicant who references this appendix to incorporate Tier 2 by reference and to comply with Tier 2, except for the COL action items, including the investment protection short-term availability controls in section 16.3 of the generic DCD. The definition of Tier 2 makes clear that Tier 2 information has been determined by the Commission, by virtue of its inclusion in this appendix and its designation as Tier 2 information, to be an approved sufficient method for meeting Tier 1 requirements. However, there may be other acceptable ways of complying with Tier 1. The appropriate criteria for departing from Tier 2 information would be specified in paragraph VIII.B of this appendix. Departures from Tier 2 would not negate the requirement in paragraph III.B to reference Tier 2. A definition of ``combined license action items'' (COL information), which is part of the Tier 2 information, would be added to clarify that COL applicants who reference this appendix are required to address COL action items in their license application. However, the COL action items are not the only acceptable set of information. An applicant may depart from or omit COL action items, provided that the departure or omission is identified and justified in the FSAR. After issuance of a construction permit or COL, these items would not be requirements for the licensee unless they are restated in the FSAR. For additional discussion, see section D. The investment protection short-term availability controls, which are set forth in section 16.3 of the generic DCD, would be added to the information that is part of Tier 2. These requirements were added to Tier 2 to make it clear that the availability controls are not operational requirements for the purposes of paragraph VIII.C of this appendix. Rather, the availability controls are associated with specific design features. The availability controls may be changed if the associated design feature is changed under paragraph VIII.B of this appendix. For additional discussion, see section C. Certain Tier 2 information has been designated in the generic DCD with brackets and italicized text as ``Tier 2*'' information and, as discussed in greater detail in the section-by-section explanation for section H, a plant-specific departure from Tier 2* information would require prior NRC approval. However, the Tier 2* designation expires for some of this information when the facility first achieves full power after the finding required by 10 CFR 52.103(g). The process for changing Tier 2* information and the time at which its status as Tier 2* expires is set forth in paragraph VIII.B.6 of this appendix. Some Tier 2* requirements concerning special preoperational tests are designated to be performed only for the first plant or first three plants referencing the AP1000 DCR. The Tier 2* designation for these selected tests would expire after the first plant or first three plants complete the specified tests. However, a COL action item requires that subsequent plants shall also perform the tests or justify that the results of the first-plant-only or first-three-plants-only tests are applicable to the subsequent plant. In an earlier rulemaking (64 FR 53582; October 4, 1999), the Commission revised 10 CFR Sec. 50.59 to incorporate new thresholds for permitting changes to a plant as described in the FSAR without NRC approval. For consistency and clarity, the Commission proposes to use these new thresholds in the proposed AP1000 DCR. Inasmuch as Sec. 50.59 is the primary change mechanism for operating nuclear plants, the Commission believes that future plants referencing the AP1000 DCR should utilize thresholds as close to Sec. 50.59 as is practicable and appropriate. Because of some differences in how the change control requirements are structured in the DCRs, certain definitions contained in Sec. 50.59 are not applicable to 10 CFR part 52 and are not being included in this proposed rule. One definition that the Commission is including is the definition from the new Sec. 50.59 for a ``departure from a method of evaluation,'' (paragraph II.G), which is appropriate to include in this rulemaking so that the eight criteria in paragraph VIII.B.5.b of the proposed rule will be implemented as intended. C. Scope and Contents The purpose of section III of this DCR would be to describe and define the scope and contents of this design certification and to set forth how documentation discrepancies or inconsistencies are to be resolved. Paragraph A is the required statement of the Office of the Federal Register (OFR) for approval of the incorporation by reference of Tier 1, Tier 2, and the generic TS into this appendix. Paragraph B requires COL applicants and licensees to comply with the requirements of this appendix. The legal effect of incorporation by reference is that the incorporated material has the same legal status as if it were published in the Code of Federal Regulations. This material, like any other properly-issued regulation, has the force and effect of law. Tier 1 and Tier 2 information, as well as the generic TS, have been combined into a single document called the generic DCD, in order to effectively control this information and facilitate its incorporation by reference into the rule. The generic DCD was prepared to meet the requirements of the OFR for incorporation by reference (10 CFR part 51). One of the requirements of the OFR for incorporation by reference is that the design certification applicant must make the generic DCD available upon request after the final rule becomes effective. Therefore, paragraph III.A of this appendix would identify a Westinghouse representative to be contacted in order to obtain a copy of the generic DCD. Paragraphs A and B would also identify the investment protection short-term availability controls in Section 16.3 of the generic DCD as part of the Tier 2 information. During its review of the AP1000 design, the NRC determined that residual uncertainties associated with passive safety system performance increased the importance of non-safety- related active systems in providing defense-in-depth functions that back-up the passive systems. As a result, Westinghouse developed administrative controls to provide a high level of confidence that active systems having a significant safety role are available when challenged. Westinghouse named these additional controls ``investment protection short-term availability controls.'' The Commission included this characterization in section III to ensure that these availability controls are binding on applicants and licensees that reference this appendix and will be enforceable by the NRC. The NRC's [[Page 20066]] evaluation of the availability controls is provided in chapter 22 of the FSER. The generic DCD (master copy) for this design certification will be accessible electronically in ADAMS and at the OFR. Copies of the generic DCD will also be available at the NRC's PDR. Questions concerning the accuracy of information in an application that references this appendix will be resolved by checking the master copy of the generic DCD in ADAMS. If a generic change (rulemaking) is made to the DCD by the change process provided in section VIII of this appendix, then at the completion of the rulemaking the NRC would request approval of the Director, OFR, for the changed incorporation by reference and change its copies of the generic DCD and notify the OFR and the design certification applicant to change their copies. The Commission would require that the design certification applicant maintain an up-to-date copy under paragraph X.A.1 of this appendix because it is likely that most applicants intending to reference the standard design would obtain the generic DCD from the design certification applicant. Plant-specific changes to and departures from the generic DCD would be maintained by the applicant or licensee that references this appendix in a plant-specific DCD under paragraph X.A.2 of this appendix. In addition to requiring compliance with this appendix, paragraph B would clarify that the conceptual design information and Westinghouse's evaluation of severe accident mitigation design alternatives are not considered to be part of this appendix. The conceptual design information is for those portions of the plant that are outside the scope of the standard design and are contained in Tier 2 information. As provided by 10 CFR 52.47(a)(1)(ix), these conceptual designs are not part of this appendix and, therefore, are not applicable to an application that references this appendix. Therefore, the applicant is not required to conform with the conceptual design information that was provided by the design certification applicant. The conceptual design information, which consists of site-specific design features, was required to facilitate the design certification review. Conceptual design information is neither Tier 1 nor Tier 2. Section 1.8 of Tier 2 identifies the location of the conceptual design information. Westinghouse's evaluation of various design alternatives to prevent and mitigate severe accidents does not constitute design requirements. The Commission's assessment of this information is discussed in section VII of this SOC on environmental impacts. Paragraphs C and D would set forth the manner in which potential conflicts would be resolved. Paragraph C establishes the Tier 1 description in the DCD as controlling in the event of an inconsistency between the Tier 1 and Tier 2 information in the DCD. Paragraph D would establish the generic DCD as the controlling document in the event of an inconsistency between the DCD and the FSER for the certified standard design. Paragraph E would clarify that design activities that are wholly outside the scope of this design certification may be performed using site-specific design parameters, provided the design activities do not affect Tier 1 or Tier 2, or conflict with the interface requirements in the DCD. This provision would apply to site-specific portions of the plant, such as the administration building. Because this statement is not a definition, this provision has been located in section III of this appendix. D. Additional Requirements and Restrictions Section IV of this appendix would set forth additional requirements and restrictions imposed upon an applicant who references this appendix. Paragraph IV.A would set forth the information requirements for these applicants. This appendix would distinguish between information and/or documents which must actually be included in the application or the DCD, versus those which may be incorporated by reference (i.e., referenced in the application as if the information or documents were included in the application). Any incorporation by reference in the application should be clear and should specify the title, date, edition, or version of a document, the page number(s), and table(s) containing the relevant information to be incorporated. Paragraph A.1 would require an applicant who references this proposed DCR to incorporate by reference this DCR in its application. The legal effect of such an incorporation by reference is that this appendix would be legally binding on the applicant or licensee. Paragraph A.2.a would require that a plant-specific DCD be included in the initial application. This would ensure that the applicant commits to complying with the DCD. This paragraph also would require that the plant-specific DCD uses the same format as the generic DCD and reflects the applicant's proposed departures and exemptions from the generic DCD as of the time of submission of the application. The Commission expects that the plant-specific DCD would become the plant's FSAR, by including information such as site-specific information for the portions of the plant outside the scope of the referenced design, including related ITAAC, and other matters required to be included in an FSAR by 10 CFR 50.34 and 52.79. Integration of the plant-specific DCD and remaining site-specific information into the plant's FSAR, would result in an application that is easier to use and should minimize ``duplicate documentation'' and the attendant possibility for confusion. Paragraph A.2.a would also require that the initial application include the reports on departures and exemptions as of the time of submission of the application. Paragraph A.2.b would require that an application referencing this proposed DCR include the reports required by paragraph X.B of this appendix for exemptions and departures proposed by the applicant as of the date of submission of its application. Paragraph A.2.c would require submission of plant-specific TS for the plant that consists of the generic TS from section 16.1 of the DCD, with any changes made under paragraph VIII.C of this appendix, and the TS for the site- specific portions of the plant that are either partially or wholly outside the scope of this design certification. The applicant must also provide the plant-specific information designated in the generic TS, such as bracketed values. Paragraph A.2.d would require the applicant referencing this proposed DCR to provide information demonstrating that the proposed site falls within the site parameters for this appendix and that the plant-specific design complies with the interface requirements, as required by 10 CFR 52.79(b). If the proposed site has a characteristic that exceeds one or more of the site parameters in the DCD, then it would be unacceptable for this design unless the applicant seeks an exemption under section VIII of this appendix and provides adequate justification for locating the certified design on the proposed site. Paragraph A.2.e would require submission of information addressing COL action items, identified in the generic DCD as COL information in the application. The COL information identifies matters that need to be addressed by an applicant who references this appendix, as required by subpart C of 10 CFR part 52. An applicant may depart from or omit these items, provided that the departure or omission is identified and justified in its application (FSAR). Paragraph A.2.f would require that the application include the information specified by 10 CFR 52.47(a) that is not within the [[Page 20067]] scope of this rule, such as generic issues that must be addressed, in whole or in part, by an applicant that references this rule. Paragraph A.3 would require the applicant to physically include, not simply reference, the proprietary and safeguards information referenced in the DCD, or its equivalent, to ensure that the applicant has actual notice of these requirements. Paragraph IV.B would reserve the right to determine to the Commission in what manner this DCR may be referenced by an applicant for a construction permit or operating license under 10 CFR part 50. This determination may occur in the context of a subsequent rulemaking modifying 10 CFR part 52 or this design certification rule, or on a case-by-case basis in the context of a specific application for a 10 CFR part 50 construction permit or operating license. This provision is necessary because the previous DCRs were not implemented in the manner that was originally envisioned at the time that 10 CFR part 52 was promulgated. The Commission's concern is with the way ITAAC were developed and the lack of experience with design certifications in license proceedings. Therefore, it is appropriate that the Commission retain some discretion regarding the way this DCR could be referenced in a 10 CFR part 50 licensing proceeding. E. Applicable Regulations The purpose of section V of this appendix is to specify the regulations that would be applicable and in effect if this proposed design certification is approved. These regulations would consist of the technically relevant regulations identified in paragraph A, except for the regulations in paragraph B that would not be applicable to this certified design. Paragraph A would identify the regulations in 10 CFR parts 20, 50, 73, and 100 that are applicable to the AP1000 design. The Commission's determination of the applicable regulations would be made as of the date specified in paragraph V.A of this appendix, which would be the date that this appendix is approved by the Commission and signed by the Secretary. In paragraph V.B of this appendix, the Commission would identify the regulations that do not apply to the AP1000 design. The Commission has determined that the AP1000 design should be exempt from portions of 10 CFR 50.34, 50.62, and appendix A to part 50, as described in the FSER (NUREG-1793) and/or summarized below: (1) Paragraph (f)(2)(iv) of 10 CFR 50.34--Plant Safety Parameter Display Console. Under 10 CFR 52.47(a)(ii), an applicant for design certification must demonstrate compliance with any technically relevant Three Mile Island (TMI) requirements in 10 CFR 50.34(f). The requirement in 10 CFR 50.34(f)(2)(iv) states that an application must provide a plant safety parameter display console that will display a minimum set of parameters defining the safety status of the plant, be capable of displaying a full range of important plant parameters and data trends on demand, and be capable of indicating when process limits are being approached or exceeded. Westinghouse addresses this requirement, in Section 18.8.2 of the DCD, with an integrated design rather than a stand-alone, add-on system, as is used at most current operating plants. Specifically, Westinghouse integrated the safety parameter display system (SPDS) requirements into the design requirements for the alarm and display systems. The NRC staff has determined that the function of a separate SPDS may be integrated into the overall control room design. Therefore, the Commission has determined that the special circumstances for allowing an exemption as described in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) exist because the requirement for an SPDS console need not be applied in this particular circumstance to achieve the underlying purpose because Westinghouse has provided an acceptable alternative that accomplishes the intent of the regulation. On this basis, the Commission concludes that an exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 50.34(f)(2)(iv) is authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to public health and safety, and is consistent with the common defense and security. (2) Paragraph (c)(1) of 10 CFR 50.62--Auxiliary feedwater system. The AP1000 design relies on the passive residual heat removal system (PRHR) in lieu of an auxiliary or emergency feedwater system as its safety-related method of removing decay heat. Westinghouse requested an exemption from a portion of 10 CFR 50.62(c)(1), which requires auxiliary or emergency feedwater as an alternate system for decay heat removal during an anticipated transient without scram (ATWS) event. The NRC staff concluded that Westinghouse met the intent of the rule by relying on the PRHR system to remove the decay heat and, thereby, met the underlying purpose of the rule. Therefore, the Commission has determined that the special circumstances for allowing an exemption described in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) exist because the requirement for an auxiliary or emergency feedwater system is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of 10 CFR 50.62(c)(1). This is because Westinghouse has adopted acceptable alternatives that accomplish the intent of this regulation, and the exemption is authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to public health and safety, and is consistent with the common defense and security. (3) Appendix A to 10 CFR part 50, GDC 17--Offsite Power Sources. Westinghouse requested a partial exemption from the requirement in General Design Criteria (GDC) 17 for a second offsite power supply circuit. The AP1000 plant design supports an exemption to this requirement by providing safety-related ``passive'' systems. These passive safety-related systems only require electric power for valves and the related instrumentation. The onsite Class 1E batteries and associated dc and ac distribution systems can provide the power for these valves and instrumentation. In addition, if no offsite power is available, it is expected that the non-safety-related onsite diesel generators would be available for important plant functions. However, this non-safety-related ac power is not relied on to maintain core cooling or containment integrity. Therefore, the Commission has determined that the special circumstances for allowing an exemption as described in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) exist because the requirement need not be applied in this particular circumstance to achieve the underlying purpose of having two offsite power sources. This is because the AP1000 design includes an acceptable alternative approach to accomplish safety functions that do not rely on power from the offsite system and, therefore, accomplishes the intent of the regulation. On this basis, the Commission concludes that a partial exemption from the requirements of GDC 17 is authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to public health and safety, and is consistent with the common defense and security. F. Issue Resolution The purpose of section VI of this appendix would be to identify the scope of issues that are resolved by the Commission in this rulemaking and; therefore, are ``matters resolved'' within the meaning and intent of 10 CFR 52.63(a)(4). The section is divided into five parts: (A) The Commission's safety findings in adopting this appendix, (B) [[Page 20068]] the scope and nature of issues which are resolved by this rulemaking, (C) issues which are not resolved by this rulemaking, (D) the backfit restrictions applicable to the Commission with respect to this appendix, and (E) the availability of secondary references. Paragraph A would describe the nature of the Commission's findings in general terms and make the finding required by 10 CFR 52.54 for the Commission's approval of this DCR. Furthermore, paragraph A would explicitly state the Commission's determination that this design provides adequate protection of the public health and safety. Paragraph B would set forth the scope of issues that may not be challenged as a matter of right in subsequent proceedings. The introductory phrase of paragraph B clarifies that issue resolution as described in the remainder of the paragraph extends to the delineated NRC proceedings referencing this appendix. The remainder of paragraph B describes the categories of information for which there is issue resolution. Specifically, paragraph B.1 would provide that all nuclear safety issues arising from the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, that are associated with the information in the NRC staff's FSER (NUREG-1793), the Tier 1 and Tier 2 information (including the availability controls in section 16.3 of the generic DCD), and the rulemaking record for this appendix are resolved within the meaning of Sec. 52.63(a)(4). These issues include the information referenced in the DCD that are requirements (i.e., ``secondary references''), as well as all issues arising from proprietary and safeguards information which are intended to be requirements. Paragraph B.2 would provide for issue preclusion of proprietary and safeguards information. Paragraphs B.3, B.4, B.5, and B.6 would clarify that approved changes to and departures from the DCD which are accomplished in compliance with the relevant procedures and criteria in section VIII of this appendix continue to be matters resolved in connection with this rulemaking. Paragraphs B.4, B.5, and B.6, which would characterize the scope of issue resolution in three situations, use the phrase ``but only for that plant'' (emphasis added). Paragraph B.4 would describe how issues associated with a design certification rule are resolved when an exemption has been granted for a plant referencing the design certification rule. Paragraph B.5 would describe how issues are resolved when a plant referencing the design certification rule obtains a license amendment for a departure from Tier 2 information. Paragraph B.6 would describe how issues are resolved when the applicant or licensee departs from the Tier 2 information on the basis of paragraph VIII.B.5, which would waive the requirement to get NRC approval. In all three situations, after a matter (e.g., an exemption in the case of paragraph B.4) is addressed for a specific plant referencing a design certification rule, the adequacy of that matter for that plant would not ordinarily be subject to challenge in any subsequent proceeding or action for that plant (such as an enforcement action) listed in the introductory portion of paragraph IV.B. There would not, by contrast, be any issue resolution on that subject matter for any other plant. Paragraph B.7 would provide that, for those plants located on sites whose site parameters do not exceed those assumed in Westinghouse's evaluation of severe accident mitigation design alternatives (SAMDAs), all issues with respect to SAMDAs arising under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 associated with the information in the environmental assessment for this design and the information regarding SAMDAs in appendix 1B of the generic DCD are also resolved within the meaning and intent of Sec. 52.63(a)(4). In the event an exemption from a site parameter is granted, the exemption applicant has the initial burden of demonstrating that the original SAMDA analysis still applies to the actual site parameters but; if the exemption is approved, requests for litigation at the COL stage must meet the requirements of Sec. 2.309 and present sufficient information to create a genuine controversy in order to obtain a hearing on the site parameter exemption. Paragraph C would reserve the right of the Commission to impose operational requirements on applicants that reference this appendix. This provision would reflect that operational requirements, including generic TS in section 16.1 of the DCD, were not completely or comprehensively reviewed at the design certification stage. Therefore, the special backfit provisions of Sec. 52.63 do not apply to operational requirements. However, all design changes would be controlled by the appropriate provision in section VIII of this appendix. Although the information in the DCD that is related to operational requirements was necessary to support the NRC's safety review of this design, the review of this information was not sufficient to conclude that the operational requirements are fully resolved and ready to be assigned finality under Sec. 52.63. As a result, if the NRC wanted to change a temperature limit and that operational change required a consequential change to a design feature, then the temperature limit backfit would be controlled by section VIII (paragraph A or B) of this appendix. However, changes to other operational issues, such as in-service testing and in-service inspection programs, post-fuel load verification activities, and shutdown risk that do not require a design change would not be restricted by Sec. 52.63 (see VIII.C of this appendix). Paragraph C would allow the NRC to impose future operational requirements (distinct from design matters) on applicants who reference this design certification. Also, license conditions for portions of the plant within the scope of this design certification, e.g., start-up and power ascension testing, are not restricted by Sec. 52.63. The requirement to perform these testing programs is contained in Tier 1 information. However, ITAAC cannot be specified for these subjects because the matters to be addressed in these license conditions cannot be verified prior to fuel load and operation, when the ITAAC are satisfied. Therefore, another regulatory vehicle is necessary to ensure that licensees comply with the matters contained in the license conditions. License conditions for these areas cannot be developed now because this requires the type of detailed design information that will be developed during a combined license review. In the absence of detailed design information to evaluate the need for and develop specific post-fuel load verifications for these matters, the Commission is reserving the right to impose license conditions by rule for post- fuel load verification activities for portions of the plant within the scope of this design certification. Paragraph D would reiterate the restrictions (contained in section VIII of this appendix) placed upon the Commission when ordering generic or plant-specific modifications, changes or additions to structures, systems, or components, design features, design criteria, and ITAAC (VI.D.3 would address ITAAC) within the scope of the certified design. Paragraph E would provide the procedure for an interested member of the public to obtain access to proprietary or safeguards information for the AP1000 design, in order to request and participate in proceedings identified in paragraph VI.B of this appendix, viz., proceedings involving licenses and applications which reference this appendix. Paragraph E, [[Page 20069]] would specify that access must first be sought from the design certification applicant. If Westinghouse refuses to provide the information, the person seeking access shall request access from the Commission or the presiding officer, as applicable. Access to the proprietary or safeguards information may be ordered by the Commission, but must be subject to an appropriate non-disclosure agreement. G. Duration of This Appendix The purpose of section VII of this appendix would be in part, to specify the period during which this design certification may be referenced by an applicant for a COL, under 10 CFR 52.55. This section would also state that the design certification would remain valid for an applicant or licensee that references the design certification until the application is withdrawn or the license expires. Therefore, if an application references this design certification during the 15-year period, then the design certification would be effective until the application is withdrawn or the license issued on that application expires. Also, the design certification would be effective for the referencing licensee if the license is renewed. The Commission intends for this appendix to remain valid for the life of the plant that references the design certification to achieve the benefits of standardization and licensing stability. This means that changes to or plant-specific departures from information in the plant-specific DCD must be made under the change processes in section VIII of this appendix for the life of the plant. H. Processes for Changes and Departures The purpose of section VIII of this appendix would be to set forth the processes for generic changes to or plant-specific departures (including exemptions) from the DCD. The Commission adopted this restrictive change process in order to achieve a more stable licensing process for applicants and licensees that reference this design certification rule. Section VIII is divided into three paragraphs, which correspond to Tier 1, Tier 2, and operational requirements. The language of Section VIII distinguishes between generic changes to the DCD versus plant-specific departures from the DCD. Generic changes must be accomplished by rulemaking because the intended subject of the change is the design certification rule itself, as is contemplated by 10 CFR 52.63(a)(1). Consistent with 10 CFR 52.63(a)(2), any generic rulemaking changes are applicable to all plants, absent circumstances which render the change [``modification'' in the language of Sec. 52.63(a)(2)] ``technically irrelevant.'' By contrast, plant-specific departures could be either a Commission-issued order to one or more applicants or licensees; or an applicant or licensee-initiated departure applicable only to that applicant's or licensee's plant(s), similar to a Sec. 50.59 departure or an exemption. Because these plant-specific departures will result in a DCD that is unique for that plant, section X of this appendix would require an applicant or licensee to maintain a plant-specific DCD. For purposes of brevity, this discussion refers to both generic changes and plant-specific departures as ``change processes.'' Section VIII of this appendix and section XI of this SOC refer to an ``exemption'' from one or more requirements of this appendix and the criteria for granting an exemption. The Commission cautions that when the exemption involves an underlying substantive requirement (applicable regulation), then the applicant or licensee requesting the exemption must also show that an exemption from the underlying applicable requirement meets the criteria of 10 CFR 50.12. Tier 1 Information The change processes for Tier 1 information would be covered in paragraph VIII.A. Generic changes to Tier 1 are accomplished by rulemaking that amends the generic DCD and are governed by the standards in 10 CFR 52.63(a)(1). This provision provides that the Commission may not modify, change, rescind, or impose new requirements by rulemaking except when necessary either to bring the certification into compliance with the Commission's regulations applicable and in effect at the time of approval of the design certification or to ensure adequate protection of the public health and safety or common defense and security. The rulemakings must provide for notice and opportunity for public comment on the proposed change, as required by 10 CFR 52.63(a)(1). Departures from Tier 1 may occur in two ways: (1) The Commission may order a licensee to depart from Tier 1, as provided in paragraph A.3; or (2) an applicant or licensee may request an exemption from Tier 1, as provided in paragraph A.4. If the Commission seeks to order a licensee to depart from Tier 1, paragraph A.3 would require that the Commission find both that the departure is necessary for adequate protection or for compliance, and that special circumstances are present. Paragraph A.4 would provide that exemptions from Tier 1 requested by an applicant or licensee are governed by the requirements of 10 CFR 52.63(b)(1) and 52.97(b), which provide an opportunity for a hearing. In addition, the Commission would not grant requests for exemptions that may result in a significant decrease in the level of safety otherwise provided by the design. Tier 2 Information The change processes for the three different categories of Tier 2 information, namely, Tier 2, Tier 2*, and Tier 2* with a time of expiration, would be set forth in paragraph VIII.B. The change process for Tier 2 has the same elements as the Tier 1 change process, but some of the standards for plant-specific orders and exemptions would be different. As stated in section III of this preamble, it is the Commission's intent that this appendix would emulate appendix C to 10 CFR part 52. However, the Commission has revised the Sec. 50.59-like change process in paragraph VIII.B.5 of this appendix to be commensurate with the new 10 CFR 50.59 (64 FR 53613, October 4, 1994). The process for generic Tier 2 changes (including changes to Tier 2* and Tier 2* with a time of expiration) tracks the process for generic Tier 1 changes. As set forth in paragraph B.1, generic Tier 2 changes would be accomplished by rulemaking amending the generic DCD and would be governed by the standards in 10 CFR 52.63(a)(1). This provision would provide that the Commission may not modify, change, rescind, or impose new requirements by rulemaking except when necessary, either to bring the certification into compliance with the Commission's regulations applicable and in effect at the time of approval of the design certification or to ensure adequate protection of the public health and safety or common defense and security. If a generic change is made to Tier 2* information, then the category and expiration, if necessary, of the new information would also be determined in the rulemaking and the appropriate change process for that new information would apply. Departures from Tier 2 would occur in five ways: (1) The Commission may order a plant-specific departure, as set forth in paragraph B.3; (2) an applicant or licensee may request an exemption from a Tier 2 requirement as set forth in paragraph B.4; (3) a licensee may make a departure without prior NRC approval under paragraph B.5 [the ``Sec. 50.59-like'' process]; (4) the licensee may request NRC approval for proposed departures which do not meet the requirements in [[Page 20070]] paragraph B.5 as provided in paragraph B.5.d; and (5) the licensee may request NRC approval for a departure from Tier 2* information under paragraph B.6. Similar to Commission-ordered Tier 1 departures and generic Tier 2 changes, Commission-ordered Tier 2 departures could not be imposed except when necessary either to bring the certification into compliance with the Commission's regulations applicable and in effect at the time of approval of the design certification or to ensure adequate protection of the public health and safety or common defense and security, as set forth in paragraph B.3. However, the special circumstances for the Commission-ordered Tier 2 departures would not have to outweigh any decrease in safety that may result from the reduction in standardization caused by the plant-specific order, as required by 10 CFR 52.63(a)(3). The Commission determined that it was not necessary to impose an additional limitation similar to that imposed on Tier 1 departures by 10 CFR 52.63(a)(3) and (b)(1). This type of additional limitation for standardization would unnecessarily restrict the flexibility of applicants and licensees with respect to Tier 2 information. An applicant or licensee would be permitted to request an exemption from Tier 2 information as set forth in proposed paragraph B.4. The applicant or licensee would have to demonstrate that the exemption complies with one of the special circumstances in 10 CFR 50.12(a). In addition, the Commission would not grant requests for exemptions that may result in a significant decrease in the level of safety otherwise provided by the design. However, the special circumstances for the exemption do not have to outweigh any decrease in safety that may result from the reduction in standardization caused by the exemption. If the exemption is requested by an applicant for a license, the exemption would be subject to litigation in the same manner as other issues in the license hearing, consistent with 10 CFR 52.63(b)(1). If the exemption is requested by a licensee, then the exemption would be subject to litigation in the same manner as a license amendment. For plant-specific Tier 2 information, the change process in the existing DCRs would be commensurate with the change process in the former 10 CFR 50.59. The proposed rule would revise paragraph VIII.B.5 to conform the terminology in the Sec. 50.59-like change process to that used in the revised Sec. 50.59. This amendment would delete references to unreviewed safety question and safety evaluation, and would conform to the evaluation criteria concerning when prior NRC approval is needed. Also, a definition would be added (paragraph II.G) for ``departure from a method of evaluation'' to support the evaluation criterion in paragraph VIII.B.5.b(8). Paragraph B.5 would allow an applicant or licensee to depart from Tier 2 information, without prior NRC approval, if the proposed departure does not involve a change to, or departure from, Tier 1 or Tier 2* information, TS, or does not require a license amendment under paragraphs B.5.b or B.5.c. The TS referred to in B.5.a of this paragraph are the TS in section 16.1 of the generic DCD, including bases, for departures made prior to issuance of the COL. After issuance of the COL, the plant-specific TS would be controlling under paragraph B.5. The bases for the plant-specific TS would be controlled by the bases control procedures for the plant-specific TS (analogous to the bases control provision in the Improved Standard Technical Specifications). The requirement for a license amendment in paragraph B.5.b would be similar to the definition in the new 10 CFR 50.59 and apply to all information in Tier 2 except for the information that resolves the severe accident issues. The Commission believes that the resolution of severe accident issues should be preserved and maintained in the same fashion as all other safety issues that were resolved during the design certification review (refer to SRM on SECY-90-377). However, because of the increased uncertainty in severe accident issue resolutions, the Commission has proposed separate criteria in paragraph B.5.c for determining if a departure from information that resolves severe accident issues would require a license amendment. For purposes of applying the special criteria in paragraph B.5.c, severe accident resolutions would be limited to design features when the intended function of the design feature is relied upon to resolve postulated accidents when the reactor core has melted and exited the reactor vessel, and the containment is being challenged. These design features are identified in section 1.9.5 and appendix 19B of the DCD, with other issues, and are described in other sections of the DCD. Therefore, the location of design information in the DCD is not important to the application of this special procedure for severe accident issues. However, the special procedure in paragraph B.5.c would not apply to design features that resolve so-called ``beyond design basis accidents'' or other low probability events. The important aspect of this special procedure is that it would be limited to severe accident design features, as defined above. Some design features may have intended functions to meet ``design basis'' requirements and to resolve ``severe accidents.'' If these design features are reviewed under paragraph VIII.B.5, then the appropriate criteria from either paragraphs B.5.b or B.5.c would be selected depending upon the function being changed. An applicant or licensee that plans to depart from Tier 2 information, under paragraph VIII.B.5, would be required to prepare an evaluation which provides the bases for the determination that the proposed change does not require a license amendment or involve a change to Tier 1 or Tier 2* information, or a change to the TS, as explained above. In order to achieve the Commission's goals for design certification, the evaluation would need to consider all of the matters that were resolved in the DCD, such as generic issue resolutions that are relevant to the proposed departure. The benefits of the early resolution of safety issues would be lost if departures from the DCD were made that violated these resolutions without appropriate review. The evaluation of the relevant matters would need to consider the proposed departure over the full range of power operation from startup to shutdown, as it relates to anticipated operational occurrences, transients, design-basis accidents, and severe accidents. The evaluation would also have to include a review of all relevant secondary references from the DCD because Tier 2 information, which is intended to be treated as a requirement, would be contained in the secondary references. The evaluation would consider Tables 14.3-1 through 14.3-8 and 19.59-18 of the generic DCD to ensure that the proposed change does not impact Tier 1 information. These tables contain cross-references from the safety analyses and probabilistic risk assessment in Tier 2 to the important parameters that were included in Tier 1. Although many issues and analyses could have been cross-referenced, the listings in these tables were developed only for key analyses for the AP1000 design. A party to an adjudicatory proceeding (e.g., for issuance of a COL) who believes that an applicant or licensee has not complied with paragraph VIII.B.5 when departing from Tier 2 information, would be permitted to petition to admit such a contention into the proceeding under paragraph B.5.f. This provision has been proposed because an incorrect departure from the requirements of this appendix [[Page 20071]] essentially would place the departure outside of the scope of the Commission's safety finding in the design certification rulemaking. Therefore, it follows that properly founded contentions alleging such incorrectly implemented departures could not be considered ``resolved'' by this rulemaking. As set forth in paragraph B.5.f, the petition would have to comply with the requirements of 10 CFR 2.309 and show that the departure does not comply with paragraph B.5. Any other party would be allowed to file a response to the petition. If on the basis of the petition and any responses, the presiding officer in the proceeding determines that the required showing has been made, the matter would be certified to the Commission for its final determination. In the absence of a proceeding, petitions alleging nonconformance with paragraph B.5 requirements applicable to Tier 2 departures would be treated as petitions for enforcement action under 10 CFR 2.206. Paragraph B.6 would provide a process for departing from Tier 2* information. The creation of and restrictions on changing Tier 2* information resulted from the development of the Tier 1 information for ABWR design certification (appendix A to part 52) and the ABB-CE System 80+ design certification (appendix B to part 52). During this development process, these applicants requested that the amount of information in Tier 1 be minimized to provide additional flexibility for an applicant or licensee who references these appendices. Also, many codes, standards, and design processes, which would not be specified in Tier 1 that are acceptable for meeting ITAAC, were specified in Tier 2. The result of these actions would be that certain significant information only exists in Tier 2 and the Commission would not want this significant information to be changed without prior NRC approval. This Tier 2* information would be identified in the generic DCD with italicized text and brackets (See Table 1-1 of AP1000 DCD Introduction). Although the Tier 2* designation was originally intended to last for the lifetime of the facility, like Tier 1 information, the NRC determined that some of the Tier 2* information could expire when the plant first achieves full (100 percent) power, after the finding required by 10 CFR 52.103(g), while other Tier 2* information must remain in effect throughout the life of the facility. The factors determining whether Tier 2* information could expire after the first full power was achieved were whether the Tier 1 information would govern these areas after first full power and the NRC's determination that prior approval was required before implementation of the change due to the significance of the information. Therefore, certain Tier 2* information listed in paragraph B.6.c would cease to retain its Tier 2* designation after full-power operation is first achieved following the Commission finding under 10 CFR 52.103(g). Thereafter, that information would be deemed to be Tier 2 information that would be subject to the departure requirements in paragraph B.5. By contrast, the Tier 2* information identified in paragraph B.6.b would retain its Tier 2* designation throughout the duration of the license, including any period of license renewal. Certain preoperational tests in paragraph B.6.c would be designated to be performed only for the first plant or first three plants that reference this appendix. Westinghouse's basis for performing these ``first-plant-only'' and ``first-three-plants-only'' preoperational tests is provided in section 14.2.5 of the DCD. The NRC found Westinghouse's basis for performing these tests and its justification for only performing the tests on the first plant or first three plants acceptable. The NRC's decision was based on the need to verify that plant-specific manufacturing and/or construction variations do not adversely impact the predicted performance of certain passive safety systems, while recognizing that these special tests would result in significant thermal transients being applied to critical plant components. The NRC believes that the range of manufacturing or construction variations that could adversely affect the relevant passive safety systems would be adequately disclosed after performing the designated tests on the first plant, or the first three plants, as applicable. The COL action item in Section 14.4.6 of the DCD states that subsequent plants shall either perform these preoperational tests or justify that the results of the first-plant-only or first-three- plant-only tests are applicable to the subsequent plant. The Tier 2* designation for these tests would expire after the first plant or first three plants complete these tests, as indicated in paragraph B.6.c. If Tier 2* information is changed in a generic rulemaking, the designation of the new information (Tier 1, 2*, or 2) would also be determined in the rulemaking and the appropriate process for future changes would apply. If a plant-specific departure is made from Tier 2* information, then the new designation would apply only to that plant. If an applicant who references this design certification makes a departure from Tier 2* information, the new information would be subject to litigation in the same manner as other plant-specific issues in the licensing hearing. If a licensee makes a departure from Tier 2* information, it would be treated as a license amendment under 10 CFR 50.90 and the finality would be determined in accordance with paragraph VI.B.5 of this appendix. Any requests for departures from Tier 2* information that affects Tier 1 would also have to comply with the requirements in paragraph VIII.A of this appendix. Operational Requirements The change process for TS and other operational requirements in the DCD would be set forth in paragraph VIII.C. This change process has elements similar to the Tier 1 and Tier 2 change process in paragraphs VIII.A and VIII.B, but with significantly different change standards. Because of the different finality status for TS and other operational requirements (refer to paragraph III.F of this SOC), the Commission decided to designate a special category of information, consisting of the TS and other operational requirements, with its own change process in proposed paragraph VIII.C. The key to using the change processes proposed in section VIII is to determine if the proposed change or departure would require a change to a design feature described in the generic DCD. If a design change is required, then the appropriate change process in paragraph VIII.A or VIII.B would apply. However, if a proposed change to the TS or other operational requirements does not require a change to a design feature in the generic DCD, then paragraph VIII.C would apply. The language in paragraph VIII.C would also distinguish between generic (Section 16.1 of DCD) and plant-specific TS to account for the different treatment and finality accorded TS before and after a license is issued. The process in proposed paragraph C.1 for making generic changes to the generic TS in section 16.1 of the DCD or other operational requirements in the generic DCD would be accomplished by rulemaking and governed by the backfit standards in 10 CFR 50.109. The determination of whether the generic TS and other operational requirements were completely reviewed and approved in the design certification rulemaking would be based upon the extent to which an NRC safety conclusion in the FSER is being modified or changed. If it cannot be determined that the TS or operational requirement was comprehensively [[Page 20072]] reviewed and finalized in the design certification rulemaking, then there would be no backfit restriction under 10 CFR 50.109 because no prior position was taken on this safety matter. Generic changes made under proposed paragraph VIII.C.1 would be applicable to all applicants or licensees (refer to paragraph VIII.C.2), unless the change is irrelevant because of a plant-specific departure. Some generic TS contain values in brackets [ ]. The brackets are placeholders indicating that the NRC's review is not complete, and represent a requirement that the applicant for a combined license referencing the AP1000 DCR must replace the values in brackets with final plant-specific values. The values in brackets are neither part of the design certification rule nor are they binding. Therefore, the replacement of bracketed values with final plant-specific values does not require an exemption from the generic TS. Plant-specific departures may occur by either a Commission order under proposed paragraph VIII.C.3 or an applicant's exemption request under paragraph VIII.C.4. The basis for determining if the TS or operational requirement was completely reviewed and approved for these processes would be the same as for proposed paragraph VIII.C.1 above. If the TS or operational requirement is comprehensively reviewed and finalized in the design certification rulemaking, then the Commission must demonstrate that special circumstances are present before ordering a plant-specific departure. If not, there would be no restriction on plant-specific changes to the TS or operational requirements, prior to the issuance of a license, provided a design change is not required. Although the generic TS were reviewed by the NRC staff to facilitate the design certification review, the Commission intends to consider the lessons learned from subsequent operating experience during its licensing review of the plant-specific TS. The process for petitioning to intervene on a TS or operational requirement would be similar to other issues in a licensing hearing, except that the petitioner must also demonstrate why special circumstances are present (paragraph VIII.C.5). Finally, the generic TS would have no further effect on the plant- specific TS after the issuance of a license that references this appendix. The bases for the generic TS would be controlled by the change process in paragraph VIII.C of this appendix. After a license is issued, the bases would be controlled by the bases change provision set forth in the administrative controls section of the plant-specific TS. I. Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC) The purpose of section IX of this appendix would be to set forth how the ITAAC in Tier 1 of this design certification rule would be treated in a license proceeding. Paragraph A would restate the responsibilities of an applicant or licensee for performing and successfully completing ITAAC, and notifying the NRC of such completion. Paragraph A.1 would clarify that an applicant may proceed at its own risk with design and procurement activities subject to ITAAC, and that a licensee may proceed at its own risk with design, procurement, construction, and preoperational testing activities subject to an ITAAC, even though the NRC may not have found that any particular ITAAC has been successfully completed. Paragraph A.2 would require the licensee to notify the NRC that the required inspections, tests, and analyses in the ITAAC have been completed and that the acceptance criteria have been met. Paragraphs B.1 and B.2 would reiterate the NRC's responsibilities with respect to ITAAC as set forth in 10 CFR 52.99 and 52.103(g).\1\ Finally, paragraph B.3 would state that ITAAC do not, by virtue of their inclusion in the DCD, constitute regulatory requirements after the licensee has received authorization to load fuel or has been granted a renewal of its license. However, subsequent modifications to the terms of the COL would have to comply with the design descriptions in the DCD unless the applicable requirements in 10 CFR 52.97 and section VIII of this appendix have been met. As discussed in paragraph III.D of this SOC, the Commission would defer a determination of the applicability of ITAAC and its effect in terms of issue resolution in 10 CFR part 50 licensing proceedings to such time that a part 50 applicant decides to reference this appendix. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ For discussion of the verification of ITAAC, see SECY-00- 0092, ``Combined License Review Process,'' dated April 20, 2000. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- J. Records and Reporting The purpose of section X of this appendix would be to set forth the requirements that would apply to maintaining records of changes to and departures from the generic DCD, which would be reflected in the plant- specific DCD. Section X also would set forth the requirements for submitting reports (including updates to the plant-specific DCD) to the NRC. This section of the appendix would be similar to the requirements for records and reports in 10 CFR part 50, except for minor differences in information collection and reporting requirements. Paragraph X.A.1 of this appendix would require that a generic DCD and the proprietary and safeguards information referenced in the generic DCD be maintained by the applicant for this rule. The generic DCD was developed, in part, to meet the requirements for incorporation by reference, including availability requirements. Therefore, the proprietary and safeguards information could not be included in the generic DCD because they are not publicly available. However, the proprietary and safeguards information was reviewed by the NRC and, as stated in proposed paragraph VI.B.2 of this appendix, the Commission would consider the information to be resolved within the meaning of 10 CFR 52.63(a)(4). Because this information is not in the generic DCD, the proprietary and safeguards information, or its equivalent, would be required to be provided by an applicant for a license. Therefore, to ensure that this information will be available, a requirement for the design certification applicant to maintain the proprietary and safeguards information was added to proposed paragraph X.A.1 of this appendix. The acceptable version of the proprietary and safeguards information would be identified (referenced) in the version of the DCD that would be incorporated into this rule. The generic DCD and the acceptable version of the proprietary and safeguards information would be maintained for the period of time that this appendix may be referenced. Paragraphs A.2 and A.3 would place recordkeeping requirements on the applicant or licensee that references this design certification so that its plant-specific DCD accurately reflects both generic changes to the generic DCD and plant-specific departures made under proposed section VIII of this appendix. The term ``plant-specific'' would be added to paragraph A.2 and other sections of this appendix to distinguish between the generic DCD that would be incorporated by reference into this appendix, and the plant-specific DCD that the applicant would be required to submit under proposed paragraph IV.A of this appendix. The requirement to maintain the generic changes to the generic DCD would be explicitly stated to ensure that these changes are not only reflected in the generic DCD, which would be maintained by the applicant for design certification, but that the [[Page 20073]] changes would also be reflected in the plant-specific DCD. Therefore, records of generic changes to the DCD would be required to be maintained by both entities to ensure that both entities have up-to- date DCDs. Paragraph X.A of this appendix would not place recordkeeping requirements on site-specific information that is outside the scope of this rule. As discussed in paragraph III.D of this SOC, the FSAR required by 10 CFR 52.79 would contain the plant-specific DCD and the site-specific information for a facility that references this rule. The phrase ``site-specific portion of the final safety analysis report'' in paragraph X.B.3.c of this appendix would refer to the information that is contained in the FSAR for a facility (required by 10 CFR 52.79) but is not part of the plant-specific DCD (required by proposed paragraph IV.A of this appendix). Therefore, this rule would not require that duplicate documentation be maintained by an applicant or licensee that references this rule, because the plant-specific DCD would be part of the FSAR for the facility. Paragraph X.B.1 would require applicants or licensees that reference this rule to submit reports, which describe departures from the DCD and include a summary of the written evaluations. The requirement for the written evaluations would be set forth in paragraph X.A.1. The frequency of the report submittals would be set forth in paragraph X.B.3. The requirement for submitting a summary of the evaluations would be similar to the requirement in 10 CFR 50.59(d)(2). Paragraph X.B.2 would require applicants or licensees that reference this rule to submit updates to the DCD, which include both generic changes and plant-specific departures. The frequency for submitting updates would be set forth in paragraph X.B.3. The requirements in paragraph X.B.3 for submitting the reports and updates would vary according to certain time periods during a facility's lifetime. If a potential applicant for a combined license who references this rule decides to depart from the generic DCD prior to submission of the application, then paragraph B.3.a would require that the updated DCD be submitted as part of the initial application for a license. Under proposed paragraph B.3.b, the applicant may submit any subsequent updates to its plant-specific DCD along with its amendments to the application provided that the submittals are made at least once per year. Because amendments to an application are typically made more frequently than once a year, this should not be an excessive burden on the applicant. Paragraph B.3.b would also require that the reports required by paragraph X.B.1 be submitted semi-annually. This increase in reporting frequency during the period of construction and application review is consistent with Commission guidance. Also, more frequent reporting of design changes during the period of detailed design and construction is necessary to closely monitor the status and progress of the facility. In order to make the finding under 10 CFR 52.103(g), the NRC must monitor the design changes made under proposed section VIII of this appendix. Frequent reporting of design changes would be particularly important in times when the number of design changes could be significant, such as during the procurement of components and equipment, detailed design of the plant before and during construction, and during preoperational testing. After the facility begins operation, the frequency of reporting would revert to the requirement in paragraph B.3.c, which is consistent with the requirements for plants licensed under 10 CFR 50.57. IV. Availability of Documents The NRC is making the documents identified below available to interested persons through one or more of the following: Public Document Room (PDR). The NRC's Public Document Room is located at 11555 Rockville Pike, Public File Area O-1 F21, Rockville, MD 20082. Copies of publicly available documents related to this rulemaking can be viewed electronically on public computers in the PDR. The PDR reproduction contractor will make copies of documents for a fee. Rulemaking Web Site (Web). The NRC's interactive rulemaking Web site is located at http://ruleforum.llnl.gov. Selected documents may be viewed and downloaded electronically via this Web site. Public Electronic Reading Room (ADAMS). The NRC's public Electronic Reading Room is located at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. Through this site, the public can gain access to ADAMS, which provides text and image files of NRC's public documents. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Document PDR Web ADAMS ------------------------------------------------------------------------ AP1000 Design Certification x x ML043230006 Proposed Rule SECY paper. AP1000 Environmental x x ML043230023 Assessment. AP1000 Design Control x .......... ML050750293 Document. NUREG-1793, ``AP1000 Final x .......... ML043570339 Safety Evaluation Report''. SECY-99-268, ``Final Rule-- x .......... ML003708259 AP600 Design Certification''. Regulatory History of Design x .......... ML003761550 Certification. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ V. Plain Language The Presidential memorandum entitled ``Plain Language in Government Writing'' (63 FR 31883; June 10, 1998), directed that the Government's writing be in plain language. The NRC requests comments on the proposed rule specifically with respect to the clarity and effectiveness of the language used. Comments should be submitted using one of the methods detailed under the ADDRESSES heading of the preamble to this proposed rule. VI. Voluntary Consensus Standards The National Technology and Transfer Act of 1995 (Act), Public Law 104-113, requires that Federal agencies use technical standards that are developed or adopted by voluntary consensus standards bodies unless using such a standard is inconsistent with applicable law or is otherwise impractical. In this proposed rule, the NRC proposes to approve the AP1000 standard plant design for use in a combined license (COL) application under 10 CFR part 52 or possibly for a construction permit (CP) application under 10 CFR part 50. Design certifications \2\ are not generic rulemakings establishing a generally applicable standard with which all parts [[Page 20074]] 50 and 52 nuclear power plant licensees must comply. Design certifications are Commission approvals of specific nuclear power plant designs by rulemaking. Furthermore, design certification rulemakings are initiated by an applicant for rulemaking, rather than by the NRC. For these reasons, the NRC concludes that the act does not apply to this proposed rule. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \2\ The regulatory history of the NRC's design certification reviews is a package of 100 documents that is available in NRC's (PERR) and in the PDR. This history spans a 15-year period during which the NRC simultaneously developed the regulatory standards for reviewing these designs and the form and content of the rules that certified the designs. estimated core damage frequencies for the AP1000 are very low on an absolute scale. These issues are considered resolved for the AP1000 design. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- VII. Finding of No Significant Environmental Impact: Availability The Commission has determined under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, as amended (NEPA), and the Commission's regulations in 10 CFR part 51, subpart A, that this proposed design certification rule, if adopted, would not be a major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment and, therefore, an environmental impact statement (EIS) is not required. The basis for this determination, as documented in the environmental assessment, is that this amendment to 10 CFR part 52 would not authorize the siting, construction, or operation of a facility using the AP1000 design; it would only codify the AP1000 design in a rule. The NRC will evaluate the environmental impacts and issue an EIS as appropriate under NEPA as part of the application(s) for the construction and operation of a facility. In addition, as part of the environmental assessment for the AP1000 design, the NRC reviewed Westinghouse's evaluation of various design alternatives to prevent and mitigate severe accidents in appendix 1B of the AP1000 DCD Tier 2. Based upon review of Westinghouse's evaluation, the Commission finds that: (1) Westinghouse identified a reasonably complete set of potential design alternatives to prevent and mitigate severe accidents for the AP1000 design; (2) none of the potential design alternatives are justified on the basis of cost-benefit considerations; and (3) it is unlikely that other design changes would be identified and justified in the future on the basis of cost-benefit considerations, because the estimated core damage frequencies for the AP1000 are very low on an absolute scale. These issues are considered resolved for the AP1000 design. The environmental assessment (EA), upon which the Commission's finding of no significant impact is based, and the AP1000 DCD are available for examination and copying at the NRC Public Document Room, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland. The NRC has sent a copy of the EA and this proposed rule to every State Liaison Officer and requests their comments on the EA. Single copies of the EA are also available from Lauren M. Quinones-Navarro, Mailstop O- 4D9A, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555. VIII. Paperwork Reduction Act Statement This proposed rule contains amended information collection requirements that are subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq). This rule has been submitted to the Office of Management and Budget for review and approval of the information collection requirements. Type of Submission, New or Revision: Revision. The Title of the Information Collection: Appendix D to 10 CFR part 52, AP1000 Design Certification, Proposed Rule. Current OMB Approval Number: 3150-0151. The Form Number if Applicable: Not applicable. How Often the Collection is Required: Semi-annually. Who Will be Required or Asked to Report: Applicant for a combined license. An Estimate of the Number of Annual Responses: 2 (1 response plus 1 recordkeeper). The Estimated Number of Annual Respondents: 1. An estimate of the total number of hours needed annually to complete the requirement or request: Approximately 39 additional burden hours (5 hours reporting plus 34 hours recordkeeping). Abstract: The NRC is proposing to amend its regulations to certify the AP1000 standard plant design under subpart B of 10 CFR part 52. This action is necessary so that applicants or licensees intending to construct and operate an AP1000 design may do so by referencing the AP1000 design certification rule (DCR). This proposed DCR, as set out in appendix D, is nearly identical to the AP600 DCR in appendix C of 10 CFR part 52. The information collection requirements for part 52 were based largely on the requirements for licensing nuclear facilities under 10 CFR part 50. The applicant for certification of the AP1000 design is Westinghouse Electric Company LLC. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission is seeking public comment on the potential impact of the information collection contained in this proposed rule and on the following issues: 1. Is the proposed information collection necessary for the proper performance of the functions of the NRC, including whether the information will have practical utility? 2. Is the estimate of burden accurate? 3. Is there a way to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the information to be collected? 4. How can the burden of the information collection be minimized, including the use of automated collection techniques? A copy of the OMB clearance package may be viewed free of charge at the NRC Public Document Room, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Room O-1 F21, Rockville, MD 20852. The OMB clearance package and rule are available at the NRC worldwide Web site: http://www.nrc.gov/ public-involve/doc-comment/omb/index.html for 60 days after the signature date of this notice and are also available at the rule forum site, http://ruleforum.llnl.gov. Send comments on any aspect of these proposed information collections, including suggestions for reducing the burden and on the above issues, by May 18, 2005 to the Records and FOIA/Privacy Services Branch (T-5 F52), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by Internet electronic mail to INFOCOLLECTS@NRC.GOV and to the Desk Officer, John A. Asalone, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0151), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. Comments received after this date will be considered if it is practical to do so, but assurance of consideration cannot be given to comments received after this date. You may also e- mail comments to John_A._Asalone@omb.eop.gov or comment by telephone at (202) 395-4650. Public Protection Notification The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a request for information or an information collection requirement unless the requesting document displays a currently valid OMB control number. IX. Regulatory Analysis The NRC has not prepared a regulatory analysis for this proposed rule. The NRC prepares regulatory analyses for rulemakings that establish generic regulatory requirements applicable to all licensees. Design certifications are not generic rulemakings in the sense that design certifications do not establish standards or requirements with which all licensees must comply. Rather, design [[Page 20075]] certifications are Commission approvals of specific nuclear power plant designs by rulemaking, which then may be voluntarily referenced by applicants for COLs. Furthermore, design certification rulemakings are initiated by an applicant for a design certification, rather than the NRC. Preparation of a regulatory analysis in this circumstance would not be useful because the design to be certified is proposed by the applicant rather than the NRC. For these reasons, the Commission concludes that preparation of a regulatory analysis is neither required nor appropriate. X. Regulatory Flexibility Certification Under the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C. 605(b), the Commission certifies that this proposed rulemaking will not have a significant economic impact upon a substantial number of small entities. This proposed rule provides for certification of a nuclear power plant design. Neither the design certification applicant, nor prospective nuclear power plant licensees who reference this design certification rule, fall within the scope of the definition of ``small entities'' set forth in the Regulatory Flexibility Act, or the Small Business Size Standards set out in regulations issued by the Small Business Administration in 13 CFR part 121. Thus, this rule does not fall within the purview of the act. XI. Backfit Analysis The Commission has determined that this proposed rule does not constitute a backfitting as defined in the backfit rule, 10 CFR 50.109 because this design certification does not impose new or changed requirements on existing 10 CFR part 50 licensees, nor does it impose new or change requirements on existing DCRs in appendices A-C of part 52. Therefore, a backfit analysis was not prepared for this rule. List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 52 Administrative practice and procedure, Antitrust, Backfitting, Combined license, Early site permit, Emergency planning, Fees, Incorporation by reference, Inspection, Limited work authorization, Nuclear power plants and reactors, Probabilistic risk assessment, Prototype, Reactor siting criteria, Redress of site, Reporting and record keeping requirements, Standard design, Standard design certification. For the reasons set out in the preamble and under the authority of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended; the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended; and 5 U.S.C. 553; the NRC is proposing to adopt the following amendment to 10 CFR part 52. PART 52--EARLY SITE PERMITS; STANDARD DESIGN CERTIFICATIONS; AND COMBINED LICENSES FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS 1. The authority citation for 10 CFR part 52 continues to read as follows: Authority: Secs. 103, 104, 161, 182, 183, 186, 189, 68 Stat. 936, 948, 953, 954, 955, 956, as amended, sec. 234, 83 Stat. 444, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2133, 2201, 2232, 2233, 2236, 2239, 2282); secs. 201, 202, 206, 88 Stat. 1242, 1244, 1246, as amended (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5842, 5846); sec. 1704, 112 Stat. 2750 (44 U.S.C. 3504 note). 2. In Sec. 52.8, paragraph (b) is revised to read as follows: Sec. 52.8 Information collection requirements: OMB approval. * * * * * (b) The approved information collection requirements contained in this part appear in Sec. Sec. 52.15, 52.17, 52.29, 52.35, 52.45, 52.47, 52.51, 52.57, 52.63, 52.75, 52.77, 52.78, 52.79, 52.89, 52.91, 52.99, and appendices A, B, C, and D to this point. 3. A new appendix D to 10 CFR part 52 is added to read as follows: Appendix D To Part 52--Design Certification Rule for the AP1000 Design I. Introduction Appendix D constitutes the standard design certification for the AP1000 \3\ design, in accordance with 10 CFR part 52, subpart B. The applicant for certification of the AP1000 design is Westinghouse Electric Company LLC. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \3\ AP1000 is a trademark of Westinghouse Electric Company LLC. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- II. Definitions A. Generic design control document (generic DCD) means the document containing the Tier 1 and Tier 2 information and generic TS that is incorporated by reference into this appendix. B. Generic technical specifications means the information required by 10 CFR 50.36 and 50.36a for the portion of the plant that is within the scope of this appendix. C. Plant-specific DCD means the document maintained by an applicant or licensee who references this appendix consisting of the information in the generic DCD as modified and supplemented by the plant-specific departures and exemptions made under section VIII of this appendix. D. Tier 1 means the portion of the design-related information contained in the generic DCD that is approved and certified by this appendix (Tier 1 information). The design descriptions, interface requirements, and site parameters are derived from Tier 2 information. Tier 1 information includes: 1. Definitions and general provisions; 2. Design descriptions; 3. Inspections, tests, analyses, and acceptance criteria (ITAAC); 4. Significant site parameters; and 5. Significant interface requirements. E. Tier 2 means the portion of the design-related information contained in the generic DCD that is approved but not certified by this appendix (Tier 2 information). Compliance with Tier 2 is required, but generic changes to and plant-specific departures from Tier 2 are governed by section VIII of this appendix. Compliance with Tier 2 provides a sufficient, but not the only acceptable, method for complying with Tier 1. Compliance methods differing from Tier 2 must satisfy the change process in section VIII of this appendix. Regardless of these differences, an applicant or licensee must meet the requirement in Paragraph III.B to reference Tier 2 when referencing Tier 1. Tier 2 information includes: 1. Information required by 10 CFR 52.47, with the exception of generic TS and conceptual design information; 2. Information required for a final safety analysis report under 10 CFR 50.34; 3. Supporting information on the inspections, tests, and analyses that will be performed to demonstrate that the acceptance criteria in the ITAAC have been met; and 4. COL action items (COL information), which identify certain matters that shall be addressed in the site-specific portion of the FSAR by an applicant who references this appendix. These items constitute information requirements but are not the only acceptable set of information in the FSAR. An applicant may depart from or omit these items, provided that the departure or omission is identified and justified in the FSAR. After issuance of a construction permit or COL, these items are not requirements for the licensee unless such items are restated in the FSAR. 5. The investment protection short-term availability controls in section 16.3 of the DCD. F. Tier 2* means the portion of the Tier 2 information, designated as such in the generic DCD, which is subject to the change process in paragraph VIII.B.6 of this appendix. This designation [[Page 20076]] expires for some Tier 2* information under paragraph VIII.B.6. G. Departure from a method of evaluation described in the plant- specific DCD used in establishing the design bases or in the safety analyses means: 1. Changing any of the elements of the method described in the plant-specific DCD unless the results of the analysis are conservative or essentially the same; or 2. Changing from a method described in the plant-specific DCD to another method unless that method has been approved by the NRC for the intended application. H. All other terms in this appendix have the meaning set out in 10 CFR 50.2, 10 CFR 52.3, or section 11 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, as applicable. III. Scope and Contents A. Tier 1, Tier 2 (including the investment protection short-term availability controls in section 16.3), and the generic TS in the AP1000 DCD (Revision 14) are approved for incorporation by reference by the Director of the Office of the Federal Register on [date of approval] under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. Copies of the generic DCD may be obtained from Ronald P. Vijuk, Manager, Passive Plant Engineering, Westinghouse Electric Company, P.O. Box 355, Pittsburgh, PA 15230-0355. A copy of the generic DCD is also available for examination and copying at the NRC Public Document Room, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland. Copies are available for examination at the NRC Library, 11545 Rockville, Maryland, telephone (301) 415-5610, e-mail LIBRARY@NRC.GOV or at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of this material at NARA, call (202) 741-6030 or go to http://www.archives.gov/federal_register/code_of_federal_regulations/ ibr_locations.html. B. An applicant or licensee referencing this appendix, in accordance with section IV of this appendix, shall incorporate by reference and comply with the requirements of this appendix, including Tier 1, Tier 2 (including the investment protection short-term availability controls in Section 16.3 of the DCD), and the generic TS except as otherwise provided in this appendix. Conceptual design information in the generic DCD and the evaluation of severe accident mitigation design alternatives in appendix 1B of the generic DCD are not part of this appendix. C. If there is a conflict between Tier 1 and Tier 2 of the DCD, then Tier 1 controls. D. If there is a conflict between the generic DCD and either the application for design certification of the AP1000 design or NUREG- 1793, ``Final Safety Evaluation Report Related to Certification of the AP1000 Standard Design,'' (FSER), then the generic DCD controls. E. Design activities for structures, systems, and components that are wholly outside the scope of this appendix may be performed using site-specific design parameters, provided the design activities do not affect the DCD or conflict with the interface requirements. IV. Additional Requirements and Restrictions A. An applicant for a license that wishes to reference this appendix shall, in addition to complying with the requirements of 10 CFR 52.77, 52.78, and 52.79, comply with the following requirements: 1. Incorporate by reference, as part of its application, this appendix. 2. Include, as part of its application: a. A plant-specific DCD containing the same information and utilizing the same organization and numbering as the AP1000 DCD, as modified and supplemented by the applicant's exemptions and departures; b. The reports on departures from and updates to the plant-specific DCD required by paragraph X.B of this appendix; c. Plant-specific TS, consisting of the generic and site-specific TS that are required by 10 CFR 50.36 and 50.36a; d. Information demonstrating compliance with the site parameters and interface requirements; e. Information that addresses the COL action items; and f. Information required by 10 CFR 52.47(a) that is not within the scope of this appendix. 3. Physically include, in the plant-specific DCD, the proprietary and safeguards information referenced in the AP1000 DCD. B. The Commission reserves the right to determine in what manner this appendix may be referenced by an applicant for a construction permit or operating license under part 50. V. Applicable Regulations A. Except as indicated in paragraph B of this section, the regulations that apply to the AP1000 design are in 10 CFR parts 20, 50, 73, and 100, codified as of [date final rule signed], that are applicable and technically relevant, as described in the FSER (NUREG-1793). B. The AP1000 design is exempt from portions of the following regulations: 1. 10 CFR 50.34(f)(2)(iv)--Plant Safety Parameter Display Console; 2. 10 CFR 50.62(c)(1)--Auxiliary (or emergency) feedwater system; and 3. 10 CFR part 50, appendix A, GDC 17--Offsite Power Sources. VI. Issue Resolution A. The Commission has determined that the structures, systems, components, and design features of the AP1000 design comply with the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the applicable regulations identified in section V of this appendix; and therefore, provide adequate protection to the health and safety of the public. A conclusion that a matter is resolved includes the finding that additional or alternative structures, systems, components, design features, design criteria, testing, analyses, acceptance criteria, or justifications are not necessary for the AP1000 design. B. The Commission considers the following matters resolved within the meaning of 10 CFR 52.63(a)(4) in subsequent proceedings for issuance of a COL, amendment of a COL, or renewal of a COL, proceedings held under to 10 CFR 52.103, and enforcement proceedings involving plants referencing this appendix: 1. All nuclear safety issues, except for the generic TS and other operational requirements, associated with the information in the FSER, Tier 1, Tier 2 (including referenced information, which the context indicates is intended as requirements, and the investment protection short-term availability controls in section 16.3 of the DCD), and the rulemaking record for certification of the AP1000 design; 2. All nuclear safety and safeguards issues associated with the information in proprietary and safeguards documents, referenced and in context, are intended as requirements in the generic DCD for the AP1000 design; 3. All generic changes to the DCD under and in compliance with the change processes in sections VIII.A.1 and VIII.B.1 of this appendix; 4. All exemptions from the DCD under and in compliance with the change processes in sections VIII.A.4 and VIII.B.4 of this appendix, but only for that plant; 5. All departures from the DCD that are approved by license amendment, but only for that plant; 6. Except as provided in paragraph VIII.B.5.f of this appendix, all [[Page 20077]] departures from Tier 2 under and in compliance with the change processes in paragraph VIII.B.5 of this appendix that do not require prior NRC approval, but only for that plant; 7. All environmental issues concerning severe accident mitigation design alternatives (SAMDAs) associated with the information in the NRC's EA for the AP1000 design and appendix 1B of the generic DCD, for plants referencing this appendix whose site parameters are within those specified in the SAMDA evaluation. C. The Commission does not consider operational requirements for an applicant or licensee who references this appendix to be matters resolved within the meaning of 10 CFR 52.63(a)(4). The Commission reserves the right to require operational requirements for an applicant or licensee who references this appendix by rule, regulation, order, or license condition. D. Except under the change processes in section VIII of this appendix, the Commission may not require an applicant or licensee who references this appendix to: 1. Modify structures, systems, components, or design features as described in the generic DCD; 2. Provide additional or alternative structures, systems, components, or design features not discussed in the generic DCD; or 3. Provide additional or alternative design criteria, testing, analyses, acceptance criteria, or justification for structures, systems, components, or design features discussed in the generic DCD. E.1. Persons who wish to review proprietary and safeguards information or other secondary references in the AP1000 DCD, in order to request or participate in the hearing required by 10 CFR 52.85 or the hearing provided under 10 CFR 52.103, or to request or participate in any other hearing relating to this appendix in which interested persons have adjudicatory hearing rights, shall first request access to such information from Westinghouse. The request must state with particularity: a. The nature of the proprietary or other information sought; b. The reason why the information currently available to the public in the NRC's public document room is insufficient; c. The relevance of the requested information to the hearing issue(s) which the person proposes to raise; and d. A showing that the requesting person has the capability to understand and utilize the requested information. 2. If a person claims that the information is necessary to prepare a request for hearing, the request must be filed no later than 15 days after publication in the Federal Register of the notice required either by 10 CFR 52.85 or 10 CFR 52.103. If Westinghouse declines to provide the information sought, Westinghouse shall send a written response within ten (10) days of receiving the request to the requesting person setting forth with particularity the reasons for its refusal. The person may then request the Commission (or presiding officer, if a proceeding has been established) to order disclosure. The person shall include copies of the original request (and any subsequent clarifying information provided by the requesting party to the applicant) and the applicant's response. The Commission and presiding officer shall base their decisions solely on the person's original request (including any clarifying information provided by the requesting person to Westinghouse), and Westinghouse's response. The Commission and presiding officer may order Westinghouse to provide access to some or all of the requested information, subject to an appropriate non- disclosure agreement. VII. Duration of This Appendix This appendix may be referenced for a period of 15 years from [date 30 days after publication of the final rule in the Federal Register], except as provided for in 10 CFR 52.55(b) and 52.57(b). This appendix remains valid for an applicant or licensee who references this appendix until the application is withdrawn or the license expires, including any period of extended operation under a renewed license. VIII. Processes for Changes and Departures A. Tier 1 Information 1. Generic changes to Tier 1 information are governed by the requirements in 10 CFR 52.63(a)(1). 2. Generic changes to Tier 1 information are applicable to all applicants or licensees who reference this appendix, except those for which the change has been rendered technically irrelevant by action taken under paragraphs A.3 or A.4 of this section. 3. Departures from Tier 1 information that are required by the Commission through plant-specific orders are governed by the requirements in 10 CFR 52.63(a)(3). 4. Exemptions from Tier 1 information are governed by the requirements in 10 CFR 52.63(b)(1) and Sec. 52.97(b). The Commission will deny a request for an exemption from Tier 1, if it finds that the design change will result in a significant decrease in the level of safety otherwise provided by the design. B. Tier 2 Information 1. Generic changes to Tier 2 information are governed by the requirements in 10 CFR 52.63(a)(1). 2. Generic changes to Tier 2 information are applicable to all applicants or licensees who reference this appendix, except those for which the change has been rendered technically irrelevant by action taken under paragraphs B.3, B.4, B.5, or B.6 of this section. 3. The Commission may not require new requirements on Tier 2 information by plant-specific order while this appendix is in effect under Sec. Sec. 52.55 or 52.61, unless: a. A modification is necessary to secure compliance with the Commission's regulations applicable and in effect at the time this appendix was approved, as set forth in section V of this appendix, or to ensure adequate protection of the public health and safety or the common defense and security; and b. Special circumstances as defined in 10 CFR 50.12(a) are present. 4. An applicant or licensee who references this appendix may request an exemption from Tier 2 information. The Commission may grant such a request only if it determines that the exemption will comply with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.12(a). The Commission will deny a request for an exemption from Tier 2, if it finds that the design change will result in a significant decrease in the level of safety otherwise provided by the design. The grant of an exemption to an applicant must be subject to litigation in the same manner as other issues material to the license hearing. The grant of an exemption to a licensee must be subject to an opportunity for a hearing in the same manner as license amendments. 5.a. An applicant or licensee who references this appendix may depart from Tier 2 information, without prior NRC approval, unless the proposed departure involves a change to or departure from Tier 1 information, Tier 2* information, or the TS, or requires a license amendment under paragraphs B.5.b or B.5.c of this section. When evaluating the proposed departure, an applicant or licensee shall consider all matters described in the plant-specific DCD. b. A proposed departure from Tier 2, other than one affecting resolution of a [[Page 20078]] severe accident issue identified in the plant-specific DCD, requires a license amendment if it would: (1) Result in more than a minimal increase in the frequency of occurrence of an accident previously evaluated in the plant-specific DCD; (2) Result in more than a minimal increase in the likelihood of occurrence of a malfunction of a structure, system, or component (SSC) important to safety and previously evaluated in the plant-specific DCD; (3) Result in more than a minimal increase in the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the plant-specific DCD; (4) Result in more than a minimal increase in the consequences of a malfunction of an SSC important to safety previously evaluated in the plant-specific DCD; (5) Create a possibility for an accident of a different type than any evaluated previously in the plant-specific DCD; (6) Create a possibility for a malfunction of an SSC important to safety with a different result than any evaluated previously in the plant-specific DCD; (7) Result in a design basis limit for a fission product barrier as described in the plant-specific DCD being exceeded or altered; or (8) Result in a departure from a method of evaluation described in the plant-specific DCD used in establishing the design bases or in the safety analyses. c. A proposed departure from Tier 2 affecting resolution of a severe accident issue identified in the plant-specific DCD, requires a license amendment if-- (1) There is a substantial increase in the probability of a severe accident such that a particular severe accident previously reviewed and determined to be not credible could become credible; or (2) There is a substantial increase in the consequences to the public of a particular severe accident previously reviewed. d. If a departure requires a license amendment under paragraph B.5.b or B.5.c of this section, it is governed by 10 CFR 50.90. e. A departure from Tier 2 information that is made under paragraph B.5 of this section does not require an exemption from this appendix. f. A party to an adjudicatory proceeding for either the issuance, amendment, or renewal of a license or for operation under 10 CFR 52.103(a), who believes that an applicant or licensee who references this appendix has not complied with paragraph VIII.B.5 of this appendix when departing from Tier 2 information, may petition to admit into the proceeding such a contention. In addition to compliance with the general requirements of 10 CFR 2.309, the petition must demonstrate that the departure does not comply with paragraph VIII.B.5 of this appendix. Further, the petition must demonstrate that the change bears on an asserted noncompliance with an ITAAC acceptance criterion in the case of a 10 CFR 52.103 preoperational hearing, or that the change bears directly on the amendment request in the case of a hearing on a license amendment. Any other party may file a response. If, on the basis of the petition and any response, the presiding officer determines that a sufficient showing has been made, the presiding officer shall certify the matter directly to the Commission for determination of the admissibility of the contention. The Commission may admit such a contention if it determines the petition raises a genuine issue of material fact regarding compliance with paragraph VIII.B.5 of this appendix. 6.a. An applicant who references this appendix may not depart from Tier 2* information, which is designated with italicized text or brackets and an asterisk in the generic DCD, without NRC approval. The departure will not be considered a resolved issue, within the meaning of section VI of this appendix and 10 CFR 52.63(a)(4). b. A licensee who references this appendix may not depart from the following Tier 2* matters without prior NRC approval. A request for a departure will be treated as a request for a license amendment under 10 CFR 50.90. (1) Maximum fuel rod average burn-up. (2) Fuel principal design requirements. (3) Fuel criteria evaluation process. (4) Fire areas. (5) Human factors engineering. (6) Small-break loss-of-coolant (LOCA) Analysis Methodology. c. A licensee who references this appendix may not, before the plant first achieves full power following the finding required by 10 CFR 52.103(g), depart from the following Tier 2* matters except under paragraph B.6.b of this section. After the plant first achieves full power, the following Tier 2* matters revert to Tier 2 status and are subject to the departure provisions in paragraph B.5 of this section. (1) Nuclear Island structural dimensions. (2) American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code (ASME Code), Section III, and Code Case-284. (3) Design Summary of Critical Sections. (4) American Concrete Institute (ACI) 318, ACI 349, American National Standards Institute/American Institute of Steel Construction (ANSI/AISC)-690, and American Iron and Steel Institute (AISI), ``Specification for the Design of Cold Formed Steel Structural Members, Part 1 and 2,'' 1996 Edition and 2000 Supplement. (5) Definition of critical locations and thicknesses. (6) Seismic qualification methods and standards. (7) Nuclear design of fuel and reactivity control system, except burn-up limit. (8) Motor-operated and power-operated valves. (9) Instrumentation and control system design processes, methods, and standards. (10) Passive residual heat removal (PRHR) natural circulation test (first plant only). (11) Automatic depressurization system (ADS) and core make-up tank (CMT) verification tests (first three plants only). (12) Polar Crane Parked Orientation. (13) Piping design acceptance criteria. (14) Containment Vessel Design Parameters. d. Departures from Tier 2* information that are made under paragraph B.6 of this section do not require an exemption from this appendix. C. Operational Requirements 1. Generic changes to generic TS and other operational requirements that were completely reviewed and approved in the design certification rulemaking and do not require a change to a design feature in the generic DCD are governed by the requirements in 10 CFR 50.109. Generic changes that require a change to a design feature in the generic DCD are governed by the requirements in paragraphs A or B of this section. 2. Generic changes to generic TS and other operational requirements are applicable to all applicants or licensees who reference this appendix, except those for which the change has been rendered technically irrelevant by action taken under paragraphs C.3 or C.4 of this section. 3. The Commission may require plant-specific departures on generic TS and other operational requirements that were completely reviewed and approved, provided a change to a design feature in the generic DCD is not [[Page 20079]] required and special circumstances as defined in 10 CFR 2.335 are present. The Commission may modify or supplement generic TS and other operational requirements that were not completely reviewed and approved or require additional TS and other operational requirements on a plant- specific basis, provided a change to a design feature in the generic DCD is not required. 4. An applicant who references this appendix may request an exemption from the generic TS or other operational requirements. The Commission may grant such a request only if it determines that the exemption will comply with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.12(a). The grant of an exemption must be subject to litigation in the same manner as other issues material to the license hearing. 5. A party to an adjudicatory proceeding for either the issuance, amendment, or renewal of a license or for operation under 10 CFR 52.103(a), who believes that an operational requirement approved in the DCD or a TS derived from the generic TS must be changed may petition to admit such a contention into the proceeding. The petition must comply with the general requirements of 10 CFR 2.309 and must demonstrate why special circumstances as defined in 10 CFR 2.335 are present, or demonstrate compliance with the Commission's regulations in effect at the time this appendix was approved, as set forth in section V of this appendix. Any other party may file a response to the petition. If, on the basis of the petition and any response, the presiding officer determines that a sufficient showing has been made, the presiding officer shall certify the matter directly to the Commission for determination of the admissibility of the contention. All other issues with respect to the plant-specific TS or other operational requirements are subject to a hearing as part of the license proceeding. 6. After issuance of a license, the generic TS have no further effect on the plant-specific TS. Changes to the plant-specific TS will be treated as license amendments under 10 CFR 50.90. IX. Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC) A.1 An applicant or licensee who references this appendix shall perform and demonstrate conformance with the ITAAC before fuel load. With respect to activities subject to an ITAAC, an applicant for a license may proceed at its own risk with design and procurement activities. A licensee may also proceed at its own risk with design, procurement, construction, and preoperational activities, even though the NRC may not have found that any particular ITAAC has been satisfied. 2. The licensee who references this appendix shall notify the NRC that the required inspections, tests, and analyses in the ITAAC have been successfully completed and that the corresponding acceptance criteria have been met. 3. If an activity is subject to an ITAAC and the applicant or licensee who references this appendix has not demonstrated that the ITAAC has been satisfied, the applicant or licensee may either take corrective actions to successfully complete that ITAAC, request an exemption from the ITAAC under Section VIII of this appendix and 10 CFR 52.97(b), or petition for rulemaking to amend this appendix by changing the requirements of the ITAAC, under 10 CFR 2.802 and 52.97(b). Such rulemaking changes to the ITAAC must meet the requirements of paragraph VIII.A.1 of this appendix. B.1 The NRC shall ensure that the required inspections, tests, and analyses in the ITAAC are performed. The NRC shall verify that the inspections, tests, and analyses referenced by the licensee have been successfully completed and find that the prescribed acceptance criteria have been met. At appropriate intervals during construction, the NRC shall publish notices of the successful completion of ITAAC in the Federal Register. 2. Under 10 CFR 52.99 and 52.103(g), the Commission shall find that the acceptance criteria in the ITAAC for the license are met before fuel load. 3. After the Commission has made the finding required by 10 CFR 52.103(g), the ITAAC do not, by virtue of their inclusion within the DCD, constitute regulatory requirements either for licensees or for renewal of the license; except for specific ITAAC, which are the subject of a section 103(a) hearing, their expiration will occur upon final Commission action in such a proceeding. However, subsequent modifications must comply with the Tier 1 and Tier 2 design descriptions in the plant-specific DCD unless the licensee has complied with the applicable requirements of 10 CFR 52.97 and section VIII of this appendix. X. Records and Reporting A. Records 1. The applicant for this appendix shall maintain a copy of the generic DCD that includes all generic changes to Tier 1 and Tier 2. The applicant shall maintain the proprietary and safeguards information referenced in the generic DCD for the period that this appendix may be referenced, as specified in section VII of this appendix. 2. An applicant or licensee who references this appendix shall maintain the plant-specific DCD to accurately reflect both generic changes to the generic DCD and plant-specific departures made under section VIII of this appendix throughout the period of application and for the term of the license (including any period of renewal). 3. An applicant or licensee who references this appendix shall prepare and maintain written evaluations which provide the bases for the determinations required by section VIII of this appendix. These evaluations must be retained throughout the period of application and for the term of the license (including any period of renewal). B. Reporting 1. An applicant or licensee who references this appendix shall submit a report to the NRC containing a brief description of any departures from the plant-specific DCD, including a summary of the evaluation of each. This report must be filed in accordance with the filing requirements applicable to reports in 10 CFR 50.4. 2. An applicant or licensee who references this appendix shall submit updates to its DCD, which reflect the generic changes to and plant-specific departures from the generic DCD made under section VIII of this appendix. These updates shall be filed under the filing requirements applicable to final safety analysis report updates in 10 CFR 50.4 and 50.71(e). 3. The reports and updates required by paragraphs X.B.1 and X.B.2 must be submitted as follows: a. On the date that an application for a license referencing this appendix is submitted, the application shall include the report and any updates to the generic DCD. b. During the interval from the date of application for a license to the date the Commission makes its findings under 10 CFR 52.103(g), the report must be submitted semi-annually. Updates to the plant- specific DCD must be submitted annually and may be submitted along with amendments to the application. c. After the Commission has made its finding under 10 CFR 52.103(g), the reports and updates to the plant-specific DCD must be submitted, along with updates to the site-specific portion of the final safety analysis report for the facility, at the intervals required by 10 CFR 50.59(d)(2) and 50.71(e)(4), respectively, or at shorter intervals as specified in the license. [[Page 20080]] Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 12th day of April, 2005. For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Annette L. Vietti-Cook, Secretary of the Commission. [FR Doc. 05-7658 Filed 4-15-05; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590-01-P ------------------------------------------ http://www.epa.gov/fedrgstr/EPA-IMPACT/index.html Comments: http://www.epa.gov/fedrgstr/comments.htm Search: http://epa.gov/fedreg/search.htm EPA's Federal Register: http://epa.gov/fedreg/ ------------------------------------------ You are currently subscribed to epa-impact as: NEWS@energy-net.org To unsubscribe, send a blank email to leave-epa-impact-46782Y@lists.epa.gov OR: Use the listserver's web interface at https://lists.epa.gov/read/all_forums/ to manage your subscription. For problems with this list, contact epa-impact-Owner@lists.epa.gov ------------------------------------------ ***************************************************************** 9 NRC: NRC to Discuss 2004 Performance Assessment for Callaway Nuclear Plant News Release - Region IV - 2005-01 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Office of Public Affairs, Region IV No. IV-05-013 April 18, 2005 CONTACT: Victor Dricks Phone: 817-860-8128 E-mail: REVISED TO ADD TIME OF MEETING ******************* The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff will meet with representatives of Union Electric Co. on April 21 to discuss the results of the agencys assessment of safety performance at the Callaway nuclear plant during 2004. The plant is located near Jefferson City, Mo. The meeting will be held at 6:30 p.m. at the Capitol Plaza Hotel and Convention Center, 415 West McCarty Street, Jefferson City. Before the session is adjourned, NRC staff will be available to answer questions from the public on the plants safety performance, as well as the agencys role in ensuring safe operation of the facility. Each year the NRC staff evaluates the performance of each of the nations commercial nuclear plants, said Region IV Administrator Bruce S. Mallett. This meeting gives us a chance to discuss our assessment with the company, local officials and residents near the plant. We want to make this information available to the public and answer any questions people may have about the plant. Overall, Callaway operated safely during 2004. The NRC uses color-coded inspection findings and performance indicators to assess nuclear plant performance. The colors start with green and increase to white, yellow and red, according to the safety significance of the issues involved. According to the assessment, the number of unplanned reactor shutdowns exceeded a performance threshold during the first quarter of 2004. A supplemental inspection last November concluded that the company had successfully evaluated the associated conditions and events. Additionally, the NRC staff has identified deficiencies in the area of human performance where failure to follow plant procedures resulted in increased challenges to plant equipment from preventable transients and operating events. As part of its baseline, or routine inspection program, the NRC staff intends to focus attention on this area during 2005. Routine inspections are performed by the NRC Resident Inspectors assigned to the plant and by inspection specialists from the Region IV office and the agencys headquarters in Rockville, Md. A letter sent from the NRC Region IV Office in Arlington, Texas, to plant officials will serve as the basis for the meeting. It is available on the NRC web site at: http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/ASSESS/LETTERS/call_2004q4.pdf [PDF Icon] . Current information for Callaway is available on the NRC web site at: http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/ASSESS/CALL/call_chart.html. Last revised Monday, April 18, 2005 ***************************************************************** 10 The Nation: Nelson talks tax cuts and nuclear power News 24/7 - NEWS.com.au (19-04-2005) By Samantha Maiden April 19, 2005 EDUCATION Minister Brendan Nelson has broken ranks with cabinet colleagues by offering a bold policy prescription for Australia to embrace nuclear energy and tax and welfare reform. Regarded as a future leadership contender, Dr Nelson's decision to roam outside his portfolio with radical policy prescriptions sparked a mixed response from colleagues yesterday. Describing tax reform as the Howard Government's greatest challenge, Dr Nelson urged that the top marginal income rate, now 47 cents in the dollar, be brought in line with the corporate rate of 30 cents in the dollar. In the Dame Pattie Menzies Oration in Sydney, Dr Nelson called for a debate on "environmentally friendly" nuclear energy and warned there was no community mood to reignite the republic debate. He also outlined welfare reforms, including allowing Aborigines to pool welfare payments in the bush to buy food and shelter and introduce limits to the alcohol sales. Backing tax reform within the decade, Dr Nelson said it was a goal every Liberal MP would support. "Our medium to long-term objective should be a lowering of the top marginal rate and closer alignment with the corporate tax rate," he said. "Apart from simplification of the 10,000-page tax act, arguably our greatest challenge will be a further round of reform in this area. "One proposal is that marginal tax rates be indexed to inflation as a means of boosting productivity. Consistent with Liberal principles, the (Productivity) Commission puts the case for incentives for working Australians to work harder by not penalising them with static marginal tax thresholds in an environment of real wages growth." Dr Nelson said Australia had rightly refused to sign the Kyoto Protocol but should now consider embracing nuclear energy because it produced less greenhouse gas. "Although much hysteria surrounds global warming, it pales into insignificance compared to that surrounding nuclear power," he said. "The Government has no plans whatsoever in this regard, but do we not at least owe it to our future to maturely canvass all our options?" A spokeswoman for Environment Minister Ian Campbell said last night the Government had "no plans" to examine the domestic use of nuclear energy. Despite significant investment and some improvement in health and education for Aboriginal communities over the past five years, Dr Nelson said radical reforms were needed. "Too much money goes too quickly on alcohol, gambling, fast food and tobacco. The diseases and events killing Aboriginal people are consequences of obesity, diabetes, tobacco, alcohol and, I would add, illiteracy," he said. "Pooling ... payments in some communities to ensure food, clothing and shelter is provided, is an initiative worthy of expansion." On the republic, Dr Nelson said: "Although symbolism is important, an Australian republic is not our most urgent need ... Australia will inevitably return to the issue at some point, but let us hope they look beyond the soap-opera antics of some members of the royal family to the system of government that serves us so well." PolicyCopyright 2005 News Limited. All times AEST ***************************************************************** 11 Sioux City Journal: Reaction to nuclear plant sale differs from inception Monday, April 18, 2005 Sioux City, Iowa PALO, Iowa (AP) -- Plans to sell Iowa's nuclear power plant apparently aren't creating any major reactions. Interstate Power and Light Co., a subsidiary of Madison, Wis.-based Alliant Energy Corp., owns 70 percent of the Duane Arnold Energy Center near Palo. The plant produces enough power to serve about 432,000 homes. Central Iowa Power Cooperative, of Marion, owns a 20 percent share and Corn Belt Power Cooperative, of Humboldt, owns 10 percent. Alliant announced in January that it would auction the plant to a buyer will to seek a 20-year extension of its operating license, which expires in 2014. Some neighbors are still mindful of a plant failure, but times -- and worries -- have changed. Bob Lam remembers the day in 1974 when the plant began generating power. From his farm north of Springville, Lam could see the vapor plume rising from the plant 20 miles west. "I can look out my window and see the evaporated water almost every day, and the first time I saw that, I thought it looked like a mushroom cloud," he said. But Lam saw firsthand how interested the public has become in the plant last October. He was one of only two private citizens to speak at a Nuclear Regulatory Commission meeting to evaluate a test of the readiness of the plant and nearby communities to deal with a radiation release. "I'm not worried right away that it's going to be like Three Mile Island or Chernobyl," he said Environmentalists who once targeted nuclear plants have other concerns on their plate. "There are other things we need to focus on, and we can't do it all," said Sierra Club member Wallace Horan of Marion. He said, for example, fighting utilities to win rights for small wind-power developers is just one of the issues he considers equally important to fighting for nuclear safety. The Iowa Environmental Council has no plans to take a stand on the sale or license extension, said Executive Director Rich Leopold. One critic of the sale Tom Snyder of Dyersville, a renewable energy advocate. "Everybody's become very blase in accepting nuclear power," Snyder said. "It scares me." One reason environmental activists aren't more concerned is Duane Arnold's improved operating record in recent years, said David Osterberg, associate professor of occupational and environmental health at the University of Iowa. "The people out there have been running the plant pretty well, and we should be happy about that," Osterberg said. Duane Arnold Plant Manager Dean Curtland said the plant's operators closely monitor the condition of the plant. The owners are not selling the plant because they think it will become less safe or reliable, Curtland said, but because of the financial risk. With the plant fully depreciated, he said the owners do not know how much of a return on future plant investments regulators would allow. Copyright © 2005 Sioux City Journal Tel: (712) 293-4250 ***************************************************************** 12 NRC: NRC to Discuss 2004 Performance Assessment for Clinton Nuclear Power Plant News Release - Region III - 2005-01 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Office of Public Affairs, Region III No. III-05-018 April 15, 2005 CONTACT: Jan Strasma (630) 829-9663 Viktoria Mitlyng (630) 829-9662 E-mail: representatives of Exelon Generation Company on Thursday, April 21, to discuss the agencys assessment of safety performance last year at the Clinton Nuclear Power Plant. The plant is located near Clinton, Ill. The meeting, which will be open to public observation, is scheduled to begin at 6 p.m. at Vespasian Warner Public Library District, 310 N. Quincy St., Clinton. Before the meeting is adjourned, NRC staff will be available to answer questions from the public on the safety performance of the Clinton plant, as well as the role of the NRC in ensuring safe plant operation. The NRC continually reviews the performance of the Clinton plant and the nations other commercial nuclear power facilities, NRC Region III Administrator James Caldwell said. This meeting will provide an opportunity for a discussion of our annual assessment of safety performance with the company and with local officials and residents who live near the plant. Our goal is to explain the NRC oversight process and make as much information as possible available to the public regarding our regulation of these facilities. The NRCs assessment concluded that the Clinton plant operated safely during the period. The NRC uses color-coded inspection findings and performance indicators to assess nuclear plant performance. The colors start with green and then increase to white, yellow or red, commensurate with the safety significance of the issues involved. All of the inspection findings and performance indicators for Clinton during 2004 were determined to be green. As a result of this performance, the NRC will conduct the normal, baseline level of inspections during the upcoming year. Routine inspections are performed by two NRC Resident Inspectors assigned to the plant and by inspection specialists from the Region III Office in Lisle, Ill., and the agencys headquarters in Rockville, Md. Among the areas of plant operations to be inspected this year by NRC specialists are safety system design and performance, transportation and processing of radioactive waste, problem identification and resolution, and modifications. A letter sent from the NRC Region III Office to plant officials addresses the performance of the plant during the period and will serve as the basis for the meeting discussion. It is available on the NRC web site at: http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/ASSESS/LETTERS/clin_2004q4.pdf [PDF Icon] . Current performance information for Clinton is available on the NRCs web site at: http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/ASSESS/CLIN/clin_chart.html. Last revised Monday, April 18, 2005 ***************************************************************** 13 Interfax: Chernobyl NPP's debt totals 30 Mln hryvni Updated: Apr 18 2005 9:41PM (MSK) Ðóññêàÿ âåðñèÿ Interfax.com Text version Site map Apr 18 2005 9:41PM KYIV. April 18 (Interfax) - Ukraine's Chernobyl nuclear power plant owes 8.3 million hryvni worth of wage arrears as of April 14. The facility's other debts included 4.2 million hryvni for electricity and 0.7 million hryvni for gas. It also owes 1.6 million hryvni to the country's railways companies, a power plant spokesman said. The plant's total debt amounted to 30 million hryvni. The facility has already received letters notifying it that all the gas and electricity supplies and rail services may soon be stopped. © 1991-2005 Interfax All rights reserved News and other data on this web site are provided for information purposes only, and are not intended for republication or redistribution. Republication or redistribution of Interfax content, including by framing or similar means, is expressly prohibited without the prior written consent of Interfax. ***************************************************************** 14 Bellona: Kola NPP’s reactor no.4 shut down for repairs Unit ¹ 4 was shut down for the planned preventive maintenance service on March 19 in accordance with the schedule. 2005-04-18 19:07 The repairs should take 40 days and finish on April 27. The reactor should receive fresh nuclear fuel during the maintenance. The equipment inside the reactor and the turbines will be also inspected, RIA-Novosti reported. The other three units at the Kola NPP remain in operation. Publisher: , President: Information: , Technical contact: Telephone: +47 23 23 46 00 Telefax: +47 22 38 38 62 * P.O.Box 2141 Grunerlokka, 0505 Oslo, Norway ***************************************************************** 15 BBC: Parties will (Sizewell) Last Updated: Monday, 18 April, 2005 [Sizewell B (BBC)] Sizewell B was the last station to be built in the UK None of the UK's three main parties will take the lead in the debate on building new nuclear power stations. Many energy experts say the issue must be raised soon if Britain is to start construction of new plants to meet its power production and climate targets. But the parties do not believe the next government will have a responsibility to promote the nuclear argument. Labour and the Tories say that it is down to industry to make a case - which the Lib Dems think is unwinnable. "This is about industry coming forward with proposals," said Lord Sainsbury, who has held the science and innovation ministerial brief under Labour. "We have said we will keep the nuclear option open; we're putting the money in to make certain we have the research and trained people available if there is a change in the situation, but, in the first instance, it is for industry to come forward and then we will have that public debate." Skills need He was speaking with his party opposites at a briefing for science journalists ahead of the 5 May general election. Labour has made great play of a coming climate crisis and intends to make the issue an ever-present one if it is returned to power. The new government will take up the UK presidency of both the EU and the G8 group of industrial nations, and will be well placed to influence international energy policy. UK NUCLEAR WASTE VOLUMES [Storage container for vitrified waste Image: BNFL] High-level waste - 2,000 cubic metres Intermediate-level waste - 350,000 cubic metres Low-level waste - 30,000 cubic metres Spent fuel - 10,000 cubic metres Plutonium - 4,300 cubic metres Uranium - 75,000 cubic metres But Labour's position - shared by the other two parties - is that nuclear is currently off the agenda because the high costs of decommissioning stations (allied to still unresolved questions about what to do with radioactive waste) make new-builds uneconomic. The 2003 White Paper on energy recognised the urgent need for new sources of power to be developed. With the move away from coal and the reduction in North Sea oil and gas, the UK will become a big net importer of energy unless it can find alternatives. An aspirational electricity-generation target from renewables of 20% by 2020 has been set - a goal some energy analysts doubt can be met. Robert Key, the Conservative shadow on science and innovation, says his party is acutely aware of the energy security issue but feels it should not be the government's position to promote nuclear as a solution. "I am unhappy at the prospect of 60% or more of our electricity generation coming from imported gas over the next 10-20 years, so we have to address this problem of whether we have nuclear or not," Mr Key explained. "There is also the problem of de-skilling in the nuclear technology workforce. We are hardly going to have enough people to decommission our nuclear stations as they currently exist because the generation that built them is now retiring." Funding pledge For the Lib Dems, there is no future for nuclear in the UK's energy portfolio. "The answer is 'no'; the economic case is not adequate because of the problem of dealing with the waste," said Evan Harries, who sat on the Commons Science and Technology committee in the parliament just ended. "We're the party most concerned about non-carbon generating forms of energy. "Our manifesto calls for massive increases in funding for alternative energy, including a form of nuclear energy I want to see get invested in - which is fusion." The UK, as a member of the European Union, is part of an international effort to build an experimental reactor that would harness atomic energy by fusing nuclei rather than splitting them - as in the current fission reactors. But although fusion technology is likely to produce substantially less high-level radioactive waste, its commercial application may be many decades away. Britain's 12 nuclear power stations currently provide a little over 20% of the nation's electricity. The last station to come on stream was Sizewell B in 1994 after one of the biggest public inquiries ever undertaken in Britain. Unless the ageing stations are replaced with new ones, there are likely to be only three left operating by 2020, producing perhaps just 7% of the country's requirements. Lord May, the outgoing president of the Royal Society, the UK's academy of science, recently called for a public debate on nuclear new-build, arguing the dangers of climate change demanded an urgent move away from fossil fuels and their carbon dioxide emissions. ***************************************************************** 16 BBC: Indonesia approves nuclear plant Last Updated: Monday, 18 April, 2005 The Indonesian government has decided to build the country's first nuclear power station. A spokesman for the Atomic and Nuclear Energy Agency, Deddy Harsono, said construction would start in 2010. The plant will be built on the Muria peninsula in central Java, and will have four reactors, each able to produce 1,000 megawatts of electricity. Mr Harsono told the French news agency AFP that the site had been chosen for its tectonic stability. There are regular earthquakes and volcanic eruptions in Indonesia, due to its position on the Pacific "Ring of Fire". Ideas of building the power plant have been on the drawing board for a long time. Indonesia currently relies on coal-generated electricity as well as hydroelectric power and imported fuel to meet its energy needs. But the rapid growth in energy consumption has put increasing strain on the nation's resources. ***************************************************************** 17 NRC: NRC to Discuss 2004 Performance Assessment for D.C. Cook Nuclear Power Plant News Release - Region III - 2005-01 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Office of Public Affairs, Region III No. III-05-019 April 15, 2005 CONTACT: Jan Strasma (630) 829-9663 Viktoria Mitlyng (630) 829-9662 E-mail: representatives of American Electric Power Company on Thursday, April 21, to discuss the agencys assessment of safety performance last year at the D.C. Cook Nuclear Power Plant. The plant is located near Bridgman, Mich. The meeting, which will be open to public observation, is scheduled to begin at 6:00 p.m. at the Lake Charter Township Hall, 3220 Shawnee Road, Bridgman. Before the meeting is adjourned, NRC staff will be available to answer questions from the public on the safety performance of the D.C. Cook plant, as well as the role of the NRC in ensuring safe plant operation. The NRC continually reviews the performance of the D.C. Cook plant and the nations other commercial nuclear power facilities, NRC Region III Administrator James Caldwell said. This meeting will provide an opportunity for a discussion of our annual assessment of safety performance with the company and with local officials and residents who live near the plant. Our goal is to explain the NRC oversight process and make as much information as possible available to the public regarding our regulation of these facilities. The NRCs assessment concluded that, overall, the D.C. Cook plant operated safely during the period. The NRC uses color-coded inspection findings and performance indicators to assess nuclear plant performance. The colors start with green and then increase to white, yellow or red, commensurate with the safety significance of the issues involved. A letter sent from the NRC Region III Office to plant officials addresses the performance of the plant during the period and will serve as the basis for the meeting discussion. It is available on the NRC web site at: http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/ASSESS/LETTERS/cook_2004q4.pdf [PDF Icon] . During 2004, D.C. Cook had one white inspection finding, which affected Units 1 and 2, and two white performance indicators for Unit 2. The white inspection finding was issued for the failure to properly prepare a package of radioactive material for shipment. The white performance indicators had to do with the number of times the plant had to shut down unexpectedly and with the number of times the plant lost its capability for normal heat removal. Routine inspections are performed by two NRC Resident Inspectors assigned to the plant and by inspection specialists from the Region III Office in Lisle, IL, and the agencys headquarters in Rockville, Md. Among the areas of plant operations to be inspected this year by NRC specialists are reactor vessel head penetration nozzles, radiological access control, fire protection, and transportation and processing of radioactive waste. Current performance information for D.C. Cook is available on the NRCs web site at: http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/ASSESS/COOK1/cook1_chart.html and http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/ASSESS/COOK2/cook2_chart.html. Last revised Monday, April 18, 2005 ***************************************************************** 18 Korea: Digital Chosunilbo: N.K. Has Shut Down Reactor, Seoul Confirms Home> National/Politics Updated Apr.18,2005 20:24 KST Seoul has had confirmation "through several channels" that North Korea has shut down a 5 §Ó nuclear reactor in Yongbyon, an official said Monday. Kim Sook, the head of the Foreign Ministry's North America desk, was confirming claims by U.S. expert Selig Harrison, who recently warned Pyongyang could double its nuclear capacity if it starts reprocessing spent fuel rods from the reactor. "Only if you shut down the reactor can you extract the nuclear fuel rods, and if you remove the fuel rods, you can turn them into nuclear weapons through reprocessing," another official said. "That the reactor's operation has been suspended probably means that the North has started making nuclear weapons." North Korea recently declared it would increase its nuclear stockpile. Experts say that if a 5 §Ó reactor operates normally, it produces the basis for six or seven kg of plutonium annually. The reactor went into operation in February 2003, meaning North Korea could get more than 12 kg of plutonium -- the raw material needed to build perhaps one or two more nuclear weapons. Harrison said Sunday he was told during a recent visit to North Korea that the country would start replacing fuel rods from the Yongbyon reactor starting in April, and that the process would take about three months. Pyongyang made it clear it planned to reprocess the spent fuel rods to extract plutonium for nuclear weapons, he said. But a government official in Seoul said, "I'm concerned that the move is part of brinkmanship tactics to win better conditions from the U.S. rather than an attempt by North Korea to arm itself with more nuclear weapons." (englishnews@chosun.com ) ***************************************************************** 19 INSIDE JoongAng Daily: Seoul confirms North's reactor is shut down April 19, 2005 KST 12:44 (GMT+9) April 19, 2005 ¤Ñ The South Korean government confirmed yesterday that North Korea has shut down a reactor at the country's main nuclear facility in a possible indication that Pyongyang has been preparing to gather more material in order to make nuclear arms. "Through various channels, we have confirmed that the five-megawatt reactor in Yongbyon has been shut down," Kim Sook, director-general of North American affairs at Seoul's Foreign Ministry, said in an interview with KBS radio. "We are seeking more information." Through a variety of intelligence, the United States had recently concluded the reactor was shut down, another senior South Korean official said. The indications included movements in and around the Yongbyon nuclear complex detected by spy satellites, the temperature of the walls of the reactor and water vapor from the boiler at the nuclear facility. The official said the United States believes that the shutdown took place this month. North Korea began construction of the five-megawatt Yongbyon reactor in 1976 and has operated it since 1986. The plant has generated two nuclear crises, one in 1994 and the other in 2002. After expelling the inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency from its nuclear facility in 2002, North Korea restarted the reactor. In the meantime, North Korea claims it has completed reprocessing 8,000 spent nuclear fuel rods, which had been taken from the reactor. In February, North Korea announced that it now possesses nuclear arms. Reprocessing the used fuel rods would yield up to 18 kilograms (40 pounds) of plutonium, enough to build two to three bombs. The reason for this month's shutdown is unclear. Possibilities include a malfunction of the reactor or a step toward removing spent fuel rods for reprocessing. But Seoul officials suspect that the shutdown is a diplomatic bluff. Foreign Ministry officials said the North acts predictably, adding that Seoul has been preparing for the possibility that Pyongyang would take additional steps in its nuclear brinkmanship. According to The New York Times, Selig Harrison, a North Korea specialist at the Center for International Policy in Washington, said North Koreans told him during his recent visit to Pyongyang that the country had a plan "to unload the reactor to create a situation" more favorable to North Korea in nuclear disarmament talks. Mr. Harrison visited Pyongyang earlier this month. North Korea wants to use the removal of the reactor fuel to pressure the United States to accept a freeze of Pyongyang's new nuclear activities rather than complete dismantlement, the Times reported. by Park Shing-hong myoja@joongang.co.kr> Copyright by Joins.com, Inc. Terms of Use | ***************************************************************** 20 CBC News: Fire leads to shutdown of Bruce nuclear reactor - Cameco Last Updated Mon, 18 Apr 2005 19:02:14 EDT CBC News TORONTO - Cameco Corp. said a reactor at its Bruce Power nuclear generating station near Kincardine, Ont., was shut down following a brief fire at a transformer outside the station. The station's unit 6 was safely shut down at 7:45 p.m. on Friday. Bruce Power is determining how long it will take to repair the transformer and get the reactor back into service. The fire caused the release of mineral oil which is used as an insulator in the transformer. "Efforts continue to recover the mineral oil, which is biodegradable and contains no PCBs or radioactive material," the company said. The station's units 3, 5, 7 and 8 remain at high power while Bruce Power continues the planned inspection of unit 4 that began on March 12. Saskatoon-based uranium producer Cameco indirectly holds a 31.6 per cent interest in Bruce Power Limited Partnership, which leases the Bruce nuclear plants in Ontario. Shares of Cameco gained $1.65, closing at $46.95 on the TSX. Copyright © CBC 2005 ***************************************************************** 21 Slovak Spectator: Slovakia will ask for more money to close its nuclear reactors at Jaslovské Bohunice on schedule Nuclear delays foiled by treaty Volume 11, Number 15 April 18 - April 24, 2005 By Beata Balogová Spectator staff SLOVAKIA must close down reactors 1 and 2 of the V1 nuclear power plant at Jaslovské Bohunice by 2006 and 2008, respectively, in line with the EU Accession agreement. After talks with European Energy Commissioner Andris Piebalgs on April 8, Economy Minister Pavol Rusko admitted that his efforts to delay the closure of one of the reactors failed. Rusko had hoped to close down both blocks simultaneously in 2008. Commissioner Piebalgs said the exact terms of the EU accession treaty were legally binding. Rusko started lobbying for a simultaneous shut down of the reactors last year. He argued that closing the blocks at the same time was a safer option than closing them in subsequent years. "We did not succeed despite the fact that the commissioner understands that subsequent closure will heighten the safety risk. He assumes that delaying the closure of one block would merit a violation of the accession treaty. Evidently we came too late with the proposal," Rusko told news wire SITA. He added that the ministry would have succeeded if it had initiated the step two or three years ago. Rusko responded to the commissioner's news by saying that Slovakia must now focus on obtaining the necessary funds to support the initial closure of the blocks, and then later, decommissioning. "The commissioner promised to place this problem on his agenda, which gives us space to demand higher financial support," stated Rusko. Last year the European Commission proposed to give Slovakia €237 million (Sk9.21 billion) over the 2007 to 2013 period to close and decommission the blocks at Bohunice. Slovak officials, however, say the sum is too low and want it increased. EU members do not yet agree on how address Slovakia's financial concerns. Some of them prefer to save and cut expenditures, news wire TASR wrote. European Commissioner Ján Fige¾ says that Slovakia is entitled to further assistance for the decommissioning of its nuclear blocks. "The Slovak government should negotiate with member states very specifically and intensively because, at this stage, member states are entitled to decide on the financial programme," said Fige¾. Just as Commissioner Piebalgs communicated his take on the issue, Slovenské elektrárne, the country's major power producer, announced that shutting down the reactors in subsequent years would increase the safety risks. "The safety risk would be lower if both blocks were decommissioned together in 2008," Slovenské elektrárne spokesperson Rastislav Petrech told The Slovak Spectator. "One needs to be aware that the reactors are constructed as twins and there are many interconnections between the two. We certainly will take all the necessary measures to secure the safe switch-off of the reactors," Petrech added. According to Petrech, the safety of the V1 nuclear power plant has been gradually increased through a series of reconstruction projects starting in 1996 and ending in 2001. "We have lifted the power plant to European standards, which means that we have also increased the probability of the plant's safety by 10 times. However, during this period of reconstruction, interconnections between the blocks were created to increase the safety levels. It means that when one of the blocks is turned off, the functioning reactor assumes some of the safety mechanisms for the halted one," Petrech explained. "We are certainly not considering closing down both blocks in 2006," said Petrech. "In the same way as there are interconnections between the reactors there are so-called umbilical cords between the two nuclear power plants (V1 and V2), for example, electricity and steam. When both blocks of V2 are turned off, we can supply steam from V1. We would lose this comfort zone if we switched off all of V1 in 2006. We need to prepare to reliably run the V2 nuclear power plant without the V1 reactor," Petrech told The Slovak Spectator. Petrech confirmed that Slovenské elektrárne started preparations for closing the blocks two years ago. The additional security risk that subsequent closure presents was confirmed by a study conducted by the Relko agency. Renowned international institutes such as the British Nuclear Group, Austrian Enconet and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) concurred with study's findings. Slovakia's Nuclear Safety Supervisory Office had invited IAEA to review the study. In late March, Slovakia declared that it would not pursue any change to its accession treaty with the EU in order to modify plans to close the nuclear reactor later than originally agreed. On March 15, Rusko assured his Austrian counterpart Martin Bartenstein that Slovakia would not breach the EU accession treaty with new nuclear policies. Slovakia's environment-conscious neighbour has been concerned that Slovakia would not meet the nuclear closedown deadline. "The accession treaty is crystal clear on this issue: Slovakia commits to the closure of unit 1 of the Bohunice V1 nuclear power plant by 31 December 2006 and unit 2 of this plant by 31 December 2008 at the latest, and to subsequent decommissioning of these units," Deputy Ambassador of the Austrian Embassy Marian Wrba told The Slovak Spectator in March. According to Wrba, the Accession Treaty has the status of EU Primary Law, which means that no party of the accession treaty is in the position of accepting changes unilaterally, bilaterally or even multilaterally without opening the accession treaty as a whole in a new intergovernmental conference. "The provisions of the accession treaty, however, stipulate deliberately that December 31, 2006 and December 31, 2008 are final deadlines 'at the latest', which explicitly allows Slovakia to close the reactors together before December 31, 2006, if it prefers. For the subsequent decommissioning process, no deadline is set," Wrba said. (Magdalena MacLeod contributed to the report.) [4/18/2005] Copyright © 1998-2003 The Rock spol. s r.o. All rights ***************************************************************** 22 Xinhua: DPRK to talk with KEDO on nuclear reactor plant www.xinhuanet.com www.chinaview.cn 2005-04-18 19:37:51 BEIJING, April 18 -- Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization will meet North Korean officials to talk the frozen nuclear plant project. The meeting will be held in Hyangsan County in North Pyongan Province of North Korea from Tuesday to Wednesday. The talks will focus on whether to continue implementing a memorandum on the nuclear power plant that states KEDO and North Korea should cooperate during construction and guarantee workers' safety. The deal was agreed in 1994 when KEDO promised to provide North Korea with reactors, which produce much less weapons-grade plutonium and heavy oil. However, KEDO has frozen the project since the deadlock of the Six-Party talks. (Source: CRIENGLISH.com) Copyright ©2003 Xinhua News Agency. All rights reserved. ***************************************************************** 23 Xinhua: Sanmen nuke power station ready for construction www.xinhuanet.com www.chinaview.cn 2005-04-18 09:42:42 BEIJING, April 18 -- China has begun work on a Chinese-made nuclear power project in Sanmen County, in East China's Zhejiang Province. Experts say the first phase of the project will involve the construction of two sets of 1000 megawatt pressure-tube reactors. China will also invite tenders for the reactor technology from international companies. In this way can China absorb and improve its own nuclear power technology. So far, bids from the United States, Russia and France have been submitted for appraisal. The first phase of the nuclear power station shall, as planned, come into commercial operation around 2012. (Source: CRIENGLISH.com) Copyright ©2003 Xinhua News Agency. All rights reserved. ***************************************************************** 24 NRC: NRC Monitoring Event at Millstone 3 News Release - Region I - 2005-02 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Office of Public Affairs, Region I No. I-05-021 April 17, 2005 CONTACT: Diane Screnci (610) 337-5330 Neil A. Sheehan (610) 337-5331 E-mail: opa1@nrc.gov The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is monitoring activities at Millstone Unit 3 nuclear power plant in Waterford, Conn., following the declaration of an "Alert" at the plant at 8:42 a.m. today (4/17/05). The plant is operated by Dominion Nuclear. Just before 8:30 this morning, the plant automatically shut down and a steam generator safety relief valve lifted and failed to close, causing the company to declare an Alert. The safety relief valves are located on each steam line and are used to control pressure on the lines. The main steam lines carry steam from the steam generators to the turbine to produce electricity. The main steam line safety valves are designed to release steam to the environment. The plant is stable. Radiological monitoring by the company to this point indicates there have been no detectable releases of radioactivity from the plant. An "Alert" is the second lowest emergency action level in the NRC required emergency response plan for nuclear power plants. In response to the "Alert," the NRC has staffed its incident response center in the Region I office in King of Prussia, Pa., and is following developments from its operations center in Rockville, Md. The NRC Resident Inspectors responded rapidly to the plant, where they are monitoring Dominions response to this event. Wayne Lanning, who is coordinating the NRCs response from the Region I Incident Response Center is King of Prussia, PA., said, The NRC is following this event closely. There has been no impact on public health and safety. Neither Millstone Unit 1 nor Unit 2 were affected by this event. Unit 2 is in a refueling outage and Unit 1 is permanently shut down. The States of Connecticut and New York have been notified. Last revised Monday, April 18, 2005 ***************************************************************** 25 AFP: Endesa, E.ON, Electrabel, EDF, Enel plan 3 bln eur nuclear reactor - report Messenger Monday April 18, 08:03 AM MADRID (AFX) - Endesa SA (Madrid: ELE.MC- news) , E.ON.AG, Electrabel SA (Brussels: ELCBt.BR- news) and Enel SpA have formed a group to study a 3 bln eur investment in a nuclear reactor headed by EDF, Expansion reported without citing a source. Expansion cited French energy department head Dominique Maillard as saying that EDF plans to offer energy companies from around Europe to opportunity to participate in its 1,600 megawatt atomic reactor in Flamanvile, in northern France. Expansion said that foreign companies will be allowed to each hold 5-10 pct of the project, with EDF maintaining a controlling stake, adding that the companies will form a joint venture to manage the project in the next few weeks. COPYRIGHT Copyright AFX News Limited 2005. All rights reserved. ***************************************************************** 26 The Globe and Mail: Cameco shuts down reactor theglobeandmail.com Monday, April 18, 2005 Updated at 7:27 AM EST CANADIAN PRESS SASKATOON — Cameco Corp. confirmed that one of its Bruce Power nuclear reactors at Kincardine, Ont., has been shut down because of a fire Friday night. Unit 6 at the Bruce B generating station was safely shut down after a brief transformer fire outside the nuclear generating station, Cameco said in a release. No one was injured by the incident and Bruce Power is investigating the cause of the fire, which was quickly extinguished by an automatic sprinkler system. The incident caused the release into Lake Huron of mineral oil used as an insulator in the transformer. Efforts continue to recover the mineral oil, which is biodegradable and contains no PCBs or radioactive material, Cameco said. Bruce Power is determining how long it will take to repair the transformer and return unit 6 to service. Units 3, 5, 7 and 8 at the generating station remain at high power while Bruce Power continues the planned inspection of unit 4 that began on March 12. On April 7, seven of Ontario's 15 functioning reactors were out of commission, removing more than 5,000 megawatts of generating capacity from service. Unit 6 near Kincardine was out of service then because of problems with the heat transport system. Saskatoon-based Cameco, the world's biggest uranium producer, indirectly holds a 31.6-per-cent interest in Bruce Power Limited Partnership, which leases the Bruce nuclear plants in Ontario. Its partners are TransCanada Corp., the Ontario Municipal Employees Retirement System and the plant's unions. + © Copyright 2005 Bell Globemedia Publishing Inc. All Rights Reserved. Globeandmail.com: ***************************************************************** 27 St. Cloud Times: Briefly: Meeting scheduled for nuclear plant www.sctimes.com Times staff report MONTICELLO  The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission will have a public meeting Wednesday about a request to extend the operating license of the nuclear power plant at Monticello. The meeting will be at 7 p.m. at the Monticello Community Center, 505 Walnut St. Nuclear Management Co., which operates the plant, applied for a 20-year license extension. Its current license expires in 2010. Xcel Energy owns the plant. The license application is available online at www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/licensing/renewal/applications/mon ticello.html. © 2005 St. Cloud Times. All Rights Reserved ***************************************************************** 28 TheDay.com, New London, CT: Millstone 3 Shut Down By Malfunction Problem Comes As Plant's Other Reactor Off-line For Refueling By PATRICIA DADDONA Day Staff Writer, Waterford Published on 4/18/2005 Waterford A computer detected low pressure in the steam system of the Millstone 3 reactor at Millstone Power Station Sunday, forcing the plant into automatic shutdown, plant and federal officials said. The cold manual shutdown that followed led to a second complication when a safety relief valve wouldn't close properly, said Pete Hyde, spokesman for Millstone owner Dominion Nuclear Connecticut. The shutdown of the Millstone 3 reactor means that all three of the nuclear complex's reactors are closed and not generating any electricity. The older reactors, Millstone 1 and 2, were not affected by Sunday's incident. Unit 1 is closed and in the process of being decommissioned. Unit 2 is temporarily shutdown for refueling which takes several weeks. It is unknown when Millstone 3 could begin operating again. We're going to do an extensive investigation of all the systems involved, Hyde said. We have to fix the problem and we're not going to bring (Millstone 3) back online until we're sure we've fixed the problem. It's a little more serious than some of the things we've been through in the past and it requires a higher level of scrutiny. The plant was stable when the incident first occurred at 8:29 a.m. and throughout the day, said Diane Screnci, a spokeswoman for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The company monitored the steam released when the safety valve failed to close properly and found no detectable releases of radioactivity, beyond normal emissions, she said. Unit 3, a 19-year-old, 1,150-megawatt reactor, was in the process of being completely shut down Sunday, a process expected to be completed sometime this morning, Hyde said. There has been no impact on public health and safety, said Wayne Lanning, who is coordinating the NRC's response from the Region I Incident Response Center in King of Prussia, Pa. The federal regulator is nonetheless following this event closely, he said. In a nuclear reactor, fission produces heat in the plant's core that makes steam that turns turbines to generate electricity. The safety relief valves on each steam line are used to control pressure on the lines, and are designed to release steam to the environment. When a reactor is shut down, steam is diverted into the atmosphere to cool the plant down, Screnci and Hyde said. By automatically shutting down, the system worked as designed, Hyde said. The challenge going forward is the detective work to find out what happened and make the repairs. Dominion staff and NRC inspectors so far have found no obvious breaks in the lines between the steam generator and the turbine that would have prompted the computer's low pressure reading, Hyde said. That means that either the computer malfunctioned or there are miniscule breaks that may be very hard to find, he said. The company also has to evaluate why the safety valve malfunctioned and fix it, Hyde said. A similar safety valve malfunction occurred at Millstone 2 a few years ago, he said. If the safety valve had not malfunctioned, the computer's reading and automatic shutdown would have been deemed an unusual event, a less severe notice, Hyde said. The problems that did occur never rose to higher alert levels used to denote an emergency, he said. At 8:42 a.m., Dominion notified federal, state, and local officials, put additional emergency personnel on standby and sent Hyde as the public spokesman to the Armory in Hartford to answer questions from the media. At the nuclear complex, the Emergency Operations Facility was activated, and town officials took similar measures, First Selectman Paul B. Eccard said. Having both Millstone 2 and 3 shut down at the same time is a difficult situation, Hyde acknowledged, but he would not comment on the economic implications. Safety is Dominion's primary concern right now, he said. What we're interested in now is what happened and why it happened and that they take the proper corrective action to find the root cause' of the problem, said Screnci of the NRC. When Millstone 3 can resume operations is going to depend on what they find, she said. They need to troubleshoot it and take however long it takes. p.daddona@theday.com Day staff writers Megan Bard and Karin Crompton contributed to this story. [The Day Publishing Co.] 1998-2005 The Day Publishing Co. ***************************************************************** 29 AFP: EU research chief sees deal with Japan on nuclear reactor by July Tuesday April 19, 03:52 AM LUXEMBOURG (AFP) - European Union (EU) research commissioner Janez Potocnik voiced optimism that a deal could be struck with Tokyo by a July deadline over a multibillion-dollar project to build a revolutionary nuclear reactor. "I'm optimistic concerning the final talks and possibility of reaching an agreement with the six parties," said Potocnik, who was in Tokyo last week for talks on the subject. The EU wants to build the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) in France and has threatened to go it alone unless Japan drops its rival bid, leaving the six-party talks in deadlock for months. The United States and South Korea support Japan's offer to build ITER in Rokkasho-mura, a northern Japanese village near the Pacific Ocean, while the EU, China and Russia back the bid of the southern French town of Cadarache. After the talks last week in Tokyo, Potocnik said the two sides had agreed to break the stalemate by July. Potocnik said that the talks with Japanese Science and Technology Minister Nariaki Nakayama had taken place in "a constructive, honest and positive atmosphere". He said that they had agreed that "the ideas of the European Union and Japan are converging towards a common understanding of the roles of the host and non host countries". "We agreed that we would accelerate our discussions ... and that we will aim at reaching an agreement ... with the six parties before July 2005," he added. Copyright © 2005 AFP. All rights reserved. All information ***************************************************************** 30 NRC: Agency Information Collection Activities: Proposed Collection; FR Doc 05-7656 [Federal Register: April 18, 2005 (Volume 70, Number 73)] [Notices] [Page 20183-20184] From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr18ap05-103] Comment Request AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). ACTION: Notice of pending NRC action to submit an information collection request to OMB and solicitation of public comment. SUMMARY: The NRC is preparing a submittal to OMB for review of continued approval of information collections under the provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. Chapter 35). Information pertaining to the requirement to be submitted: 1. The title of the information collection: 10 CFR part 54, ``Requirements for Renewal of Operating Licenses for Nuclear Power Plants''. 2. Current OMB approval number: 3150-0155. 3. How often the collection is required: One-time submission with application for renewal of an operating license for a nuclear power plant and occasional collections for holders of renewed licenses. 4. Who is required or asked to report: Commercial nuclear power plant licensees who wish to renew their operating licenses. 5. The number of annual respondents: 17 respondents. 6. The number of hours needed annually to complete the requirement or request: Approximately 148,000 hours (128,000 hours one-time reporting burden and 20,000 hours recordkeeping burden). 7. Abstract: 10 CFR Part 54 of the NRC regulations, ``Requirements for Renewal of Operating Licensees for Nuclear Power Plants,'' specifies the procedures, criteria, and standards governing nuclear power plant license renewal, including information submittal and recordkeeping requirements, so that the NRC may make determinations that extension of the license term will continue to ensure the health and safety of the public. Submit, by June 17, 2005, comments that address the following questions: 1. Is the proposed collection of information necessary for the NRC to properly perform its functions? Does the information have practical utility? 2. Is the burden estimate accurate? 3. Is there a way to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the information to be collected? 4. How can the burden of the information collection be minimized, including the use of automated collection techniques or other forms of information technology? A copy of the draft supporting statement may be viewed free of charge at the NRC Public Document Room, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Room O-1 F21, Rockville, MD 20852. OMB clearance requests are available at the NRC worldwide Web site: http://www.nrc.gov/public-involve/doc-comment/omb/index.html. The document will be available on the NRC home page site for 60 days after the signature date of this notice. Comments and questions about the information collection requirements may be directed to the NRC Clearance Officer, Brenda Jo. Shelton (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, by telephone at 301-415-7233, or by Internet electronic mail to INFOCOLLECTS@NRC.GOV. Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 12th day of April 2005. [[Page 20184]] For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Brenda Jo. Shelton, NRC Clearance Officer, Office of Information Services. [FR Doc. 05-7656 Filed 4-17-05; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590-01-P ***************************************************************** 31 NRC: Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact FR Doc 05-7657 [Federal Register: April 18, 2005 (Volume 70, Number 73)] [Notices] [Page 20184-20187] From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr18ap05-104] Related to Exemption of Material for Proposed Disposal Procedures for the Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company License DPR-061, East Hampton, CT AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission. ACTION: Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Theodore Smith, Division of Waste Management and Environmental Protection, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Mail Stop T7E18, Washington, DC 20555-00001. Telephone: (301) 415-6721; e-mail tbs1@nrc.gov. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: I. Introduction The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff is considering a September 16, 2004, request by the Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company (CYAPCO or Licensee), License DPR-61, to dispose of demolition debris from decommissioning the Haddam Neck Plant (HNP) in East Hampton, Connecticut. The request was submitted pursuant to Section 20.2002 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR 20.2002), ``Method of Obtaining Approval of Proposed Disposal Procedures.'' The licensee proposes to demonstrate that the material is acceptable for burial at a Subtitle C, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) hazardous waste disposal facility in accordance with 10 CFR 20.2002. The RCRA facility is regulated by the State of Idaho Department of Environmental Quality, and any disposal must comply with State requirements. This action, if approved, would also exempt the slightly contaminated material from further Atomic Energy Act (AEA) and NRC licensing requirements. The NRC has prepared an Environmental Assessment (EA) in support of this proposed action in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 51. Based on the EA, the NRC has determined that a Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI) is appropriate. II. Environmental Assessment Background The waste material (the demolition debris) intended for disposal includes flooring materials, concrete, rebar, roofing materials, structural steel, soils associated with digging up foundations, and concrete and/or pavement or other similar solid materials. Soils remediated for the purpose of meeting the final status survey requirements of the HNP License Termination Plan (LTP) (i.e., exceed the Derived Concentration Guideline Levels [DCGL] in the LTP) are not included in this action. CYAPCO intends to scabble off surface concrete where contamination or activation levels are high, and to dispose of this material at radioactive waste disposal facilities. The demolition debris will originate from the destruction and removal of structures and paved surfaces at the HNP site, after the structure/surface has been decontaminated to remove areas that are highly contaminated. The underlying soil will be surveyed in accordance with CYAPCO's LTP. The physical form of this demolition debris will be that of bulk material of various sizes ranging from the size of sand grains up to occasional monoliths with a volume of several cubic feet. The material will be dry solid waste containing no absorbents or chelating agents. The mass of demolition debris originating from the decommissioning of the HNP is estimated to be approximately 45,000 metric tons (50,000 tons). After compaction, the estimated volume of material to be disposed of is approximately 30,500 cubic meters (40,000 cubic yards). The licensee has demonstrated by calculation that the potential dose consequence is less than 30 microsieverts per year ([mu]Sv/y) (3.0 millirem per year [mrem/y]), as a result of the proposed burial of demolition debris in a RCRA facility. Proposed Action The proposed action would approve the removal of approximately 45,000 metric tons (50,000 tons) of demolition debris from the HNP, transportation of the debris, and disposition of the debris at the U.S. Ecology facility in Grand View, Idaho. The proposed action also would exempt the low-contamination material from further Atomic Energy Act and NRC licensing requirements. The licensee has conservatively assumed a radionuclide inventory for the demolition debris and calculated the potential dose as less than 30 microsieverts per year ([mu]Sv/y) (3.0 millirem per year [mrem/y]), if all the material were disposed of in such a facility. The proposed action is in accordance with the licensee's application dated September 16, 2004, and supplements dated December 17, 2004, March 1, 2005, and March 29, 2005, requesting approval. Need for Proposed Action The licensee needs to dispose of 45,000 metric tons (50,000 tons) of demolition debris since the HNP site is currently undergoing licensed decontamination and decommissioning in accordance with the LTP. Characterization and conservative modeling of the material to be included as demolition debris have been used to develop overall averages for radionuclide concentrations. These averages are listed below in Table 1. The licensee proposes to dispose of 45,000 metric tons (50,000 tons) of demolition debris at U.S. Ecology, Idaho, which is a Subtitle C, RCRA hazardous waste disposal facility. This proposed action, would also require NRC to exempt the slightly contaminated material authorized for disposal from further AEA and NRC licensing requirements. Table 1.--Overall Radionuclide Concentrations ----------------------------------------------------------------- ------- Average Average concentration concentration Radionuclide in becquerel in picoCuries per gram per gram (pCi/ (Bq/g) g) ----------------------------------------------------------------- ------- H-3....................................... 9.7e+00 2.6e+02 C-14...................................... 3.6e-01 9.7e+00 Mn-54..................................... 6.3e-05 1.7e-03 Fe-55..................................... 5.2e-03 1.4e-01 Co-60..................................... 1.0e-02 2.8e-01 Ni-63..................................... 6.3e-02 1.7e+00 Sr-90..................................... 1.1e-03 3.0e-02 Nb-94..................................... 4.8e-05 1.3e-03 Tc-99..................................... 2.4e-04 6.5e-03 Ag-108m................................... 7.4e-05 2.0e-03 Cs-134.................................... 1.8e-04 4.9e-03 Cs-137.................................... 3.6e-02 9.7e-01 Eu-152.................................... 1.9e-04 5.0e-03 Eu-154.................................... 1.4e-04 3.8e-03 Eu-155.................................... 1.4e-04 3.9e-03 Pu-238.................................... 1.4e-04 3.7e-03 Pu-239.................................... 4.4e-05 1.2e-03 Pu-241.................................... 1.9e-03 5.1e-02 Am-241.................................... 2.4e-04 6.6e-03 Cm-243.................................... 4.1e-05 1.1e-03 ----------------------------------------------------------------- ------- Alternatives to the Proposed Action Alternatives to the proposed action include: (1) Taking no action, (2) [[Page 20185]] decontaminating the buildings and structures before demolition, or decontaminating the debris, (3) decontaminating and conducting final status surveys of the buildings, and (4) handling demolition debris as low-level radioactive waste and shipping it to a low-level waste facility. CYAPCO has determined that disposal of these demolition wastes in a Subtitle C, RCRA hazardous waste disposal facility is less costly than alternatives 2, 3 and 4. Disposal of the demolition debris in the manner proposed is protective of public health and safety, and is the most cost-effective alternative. Environmental Impacts of the Proposed Action The 45,000 metric tons (50,000 tons) of demolition debris will come from the HNP containment building, residual heat exchanger facility, the waste disposal building, the auxiliary building, the spent fuel pool and building, the service building, and facility soils, asphalt and other small structures. The HNP is located in the Town of Haddam, Middlesex County, Connecticut, on the east bank of the Connecticut River at a point 21 miles south-southeast of Hartford, Connecticut and 25 miles northeast of New Haven, Connecticut. The reactor was permanently shutdown on December 5, 1996, and the site is currently undergoing active decommissioning. The current site is approximately 430 acres. The distance between the HNP and U.S. Ecology, Idaho, is approximately 2,500 miles. The driving time would be approximately 50 hours (assuming average speed of 50 miles per hour). The NRC has completed its evaluation of the proposed action and concludes there are no significant radiological environmental impacts associated with the disposal of 45,000 metric tons (50,000 tons) of demolition debris to U.S. Ecology, Idaho, which is a Subtitle C, RCRA hazardous waste disposal facility. The licensee's analysis used conservative estimates of the average radionuclide concentrations based on ongoing site characterization. The licensee analyzed the dose to a transport driver, loader, disposal facility worker, and long-term impacts to a resident. Each of the analyses conservatively estimated the exposure to less than 30 [mu]Sv (3.0 mrem) total dose per year. The proposed action will not significantly increase the probability or consequences of accidents and there is no significant increase in occupational or public radiation exposures. With regard to potential non-radiological impacts, the HNP is considered to be a potentially historically significant site. Potential impacts from site decommissioning and dismantlement were previously considered as part of the HNP LTP review. Site decommissioning is being conducted in accordance with mitigation measures established by the State Historical Preservation Office, which included documentation of HNP facility in accordance with the professional standards of the National Park Service's Historic American Engineering Record. There is no additional impact to historic archaeological resources resulting from alternate disposal location for demolition debris. The disposal of demolition debris does not affect non-radiological plant effluents. There may be a slight decrease in air quality and slight increase in noise impacts during the loading and transportation the demolition debris. However, there are no expected adverse impacts to air quality as a result of the loading and transportation of the demolition debris. CYAPCO estimates that transportation of the demolition debris will require between 2,500-3,000 truck shipments. CYACPO is engaging the local community and government officials for awareness and coordination of the shipping activities in the area immediately surrounding the HNP. There is no anticipated overall impact from the alternate disposal as the shipping effort represents a small fraction of the national commercial freight activity. The total tonnage to be shipped represents 0.0005 percent of the total U.S. annual commercial freight trucking activity (based on 2002 data). Similarly, the total ton-miles for the alternate disposal represents 0.0087 percent of the total U.S. annual commercial freight trucking activity in the same time period. Additionally, these activities will be short in duration and minimal as compared to other activities at the HNP. Therefore, there are no significant non-radiological environmental impacts associated with the proposed action. The proposed action and attendant exemption of the material from further AEA and NRC licensing requirements will not significantly increase the probability or consequences of accidents. In addition, no changes are being made in the types of any effluents that may be released off site, and there is no significant increase in occupational or public radiation exposure. Environmental Impacts of the Alternatives to the Proposed Action As an alternative to the proposed action, the staff considered denial of the proposed action (i.e., the ``no-action'' alternative). The result of the no-action alternative is that the demolition debris would remain on site until disposition sometime in the future. Therefore, the impacts therefore be limited to the site, and there would be no transportation impacts and no disposal considerations or impacts until sometime in the future. Two of the alternatives to the proposed action would be to decontaminate the buildings and structures prior to demolition or final status survey. The environmental impacts as a result of these alternatives would decrease air quality, and increase the noise and water usage, as necessary, during the decontamination process. Additionally, there would be an increase in occupational exposure as a result of the decontamination process. Disposing of the demolition debris in a low-level waste disposal facility is another alternative to the proposed action. This alternative has similar environmental impacts as the proposed action, but is more costly. Agencies and Persons Consulted This EA was prepared by Theodore B. Smith, M.S., Environmental Engineer, Decommissioning Directorate, Division of Waste Management and Environmental Protection (DWMEP). NRC staff determined that the proposed action is not a major decommissioning activity and will not affect listed or proposed endangered species, nor critical habitat. Therefore, no further consultation is required under Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act. Likewise, NRC staff determined that the proposed action is not the type of activity that has the potential to cause previously unconsidered effects on historic properties, as consultation for site decommissioning has been conducted previously. There are no additional impacts to historic properties associated with the disposal method and location for demolition debris. Therefore, no consultation is required under Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act. The NRC provided a draft of its Environmental Assessment (EA) to the following individuals: Mike Firsick, Supervisor, Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection, Radiological Health Section, 79 Elm Street, Hartford, CT 06106-5127. Doug Walker, Senior Health Physicist, State INEEL Oversight Program, 900 North Skyline, Suite B, Idaho Falls, ID 83402-1718. [[Page 20186]] The State of Connecticut questioned the basis for the conclusion that impacts to air quality and noise were minimal, and expressed concern about operation of diesel fuel trucks in the state, since the state is in non-attainment (i.e. out of compliance with the Environmental Protection Agency standards) for ozone pollution. NRC staff considered the state's comment, and provides the following clarifying information: Transportation impacts for decommissioning nuclear facilities were considered in NUREG-0586, Generic Environmental Impact Statement on Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities, Supplement 1, dated November 2002, and determined to be not significant. The 2,500-3,000 shipments scheduled to occur is a very small fraction of the total number of operating diesel vehicles in the state of Connecticut. Ninety-nine percent of Connecticut school buses run on diesel. Discounting the approximately 360 buses which have had some form of emission reducing equipment retrofit, this still represents 5,680 buses a day operating for 9 months a year. This figure does not include city mass transit systems or other commercial shipping. The operation of unmodified diesel engine school buses in the State of Connecticut represents over one million vehicle days of operation annually. The proposed CYAPCO action represents 0.27 percent of the unmodified diesel school bus traffic in a year in the State of Connecticut, and therefore, is not considered significant. Further, for the ``moderate'' non-attainment classification of the Haddam Neck and surrounding area, EPA has established an attainment date of June 2010. Due to the relatively quick breakdown of the ozone affecting chemicals compounds in diesel exhaust, the proposed shipping campaign will have no impact on ozone attainment in Connecticut in 2010. On February 14, 2005, several comments were received from the State of Idaho Department of Environmental Quality. In response to Idaho's comments and requests, statements have been added to the Introduction to clarify that waste disposal at the U.S. Ecology RCRA C facility must comply with their state issued RCRA C permit, and to identify the proposed exemptions in the Need for Proposed Action section. Idaho also requested NRC to identify the exemption criteria, and to identify when and where the exemption takes effect. This information will be included in the Safety Evaluation Report and response to CYAPCO. Idaho requested NRC to clarify how the proposed action relates to regulation of transuranic elements in waste from NRC-licensed facilities. There are five transuranic radionuclides identified in CYAPCO's proposal; three isotopes of plutonium, americium-241, and curium-243. The plutonium isotopes are considered special nuclear material, subject to 10 CFR Part 70, while the americium and curium isotopes are byproduct materials subject to 10 CFR Part 30. As such, all the transuranic materials in the proposed action would be subject to specific exemption under either 10 CFR 30.11 or 10 CFR 70.17. Idaho requested NRC staff to identify to what extent NRC's evaluation relied upon U.S. Ecology's current performance assessment, waste acceptance criteria and verification, health and safety plan, post-closure requirements, radiation monitoring, and waste handling procedures. NRC staff's dose assessment relied only upon general RCRA facility operating practices and did not require detailed information about U.S. Ecology's facility as part of our analysis. Finally, the U.S. Ecology site currently accepts other non-NRC licensed radiological material, in accordance with their acceptance criteria. Idaho identified that if NRC determines that the CYAPCO decommissioning waste is exempt from its regulation, Idaho would have to assess the cumulative effects of this additional waste stream, and evaluate regulatory and permitting changes that may apply to U.S. Ecology's RCRA license. State licensing requirements notwithstanding, NRC staff have concluded that, since the conservatively modeled dose contribution from demolition debris is small (less than 30 [mu]Sv/y (3.0 mrem/y)), it would not constitute a significant increase in the cumulative dose at a RCRA C or other facility. III. Finding of No Significant Impact On the basis of the environmental assessment, the NRC concludes that the proposed action will not have a significant effect on the quality of the human environment. Accordingly, the NRC has determined not to prepare an environmental impact statement for the proposed action. Sources Used --Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company letter CY-04-168, dated September 16, 2004, Request for Approval of Proposed Procedures in Accordance with 10 CFR 20.2002 for alternate disposal at the U.S. Ecology Hazardous Waste Treatment and Disposal Facility in Idaho. (ML042800489). --Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company letter CY-04-252, dated December 17, 2004, Supplemental Information. (ML043570446). --Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company letter CY-05-057, dated March 1, 2005, Supplemental Information. (ML050680216). --Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company letter CY-05-090, dated March 29, 2005, Supplemental Information (ML050960492). --NRC 10 CFR 20.2002, ``Method of Obtaining Approval of Proposed Disposal Procedures'' --NUREG-1640, ``Radiological Assessment for Clearance of Materials from Nuclear Facilities.'' --NUREG-1748, ``Environmental Review Guidance for Licensing Actions Associated with NMSS Programs.'' --US DOT, Bureau of Transportation Statistics, ``Transportation Statistics Annual Report,'' September 2004. --US DOT, Bureau of Transportation Statistics, ``Freight Shipments in America,'' April 2004. --US EPA Health Assessment Document for Diesel Engine Exhaust. --US EPA Designation for 8-Hour Nonattainment Areas in New England Questions and Answers. --Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection Diesel Risk Reduction Strategies. --Evaluation of Test Data Collected in 2001 and 2002 from Connecticut's Inspection/Maintenance Program, July 2004. --NUREG -0586, Supplement 1, Generic Environmental Impact Statement of Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities, November 2002. --State of Idaho Department of Environmental Quality letter dated February 7, 2005. IV. Further Information Documents related to this action, including the application for amendment and supporting documentation, are available electronically at the NRC's Electronic Reading Room at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. From this site, you can access the NRC's Agencywide Document Access and Management System (ADAMS), which provides text and image files of NRC's public documents. The ADAMS accession numbers for the documents related to this notice are: (1) ML042800489 for the licensee's exemption request letter of September 16, 2004, (2) ML043570446 for the licensee's supplement of [[Page 20187]] December 17, 2004, (3) ML050680216 for the licensee's supplement of March 1, 2005 and (4) ML050960492 for the licensee's supplement of March 29, 2005. If you do not have access to ADAMS or if there are problems in accessing the documents located in ADAMS, contact the NRC's Public Document Room (PDR) Reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415- 4737, or by e-mail to pdr@nrc.gov. These documents may also be viewed electronically on the public computers located at the NRC's PDR, O 1 F21, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD 20852. The PDR reproduction contractor will copy documents for a fee. Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 8th day of April, 2005. For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Daniel M. Gillen, Deputy Director, Division of Waste Management and Environmental Protection, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards. [FR Doc. 05-7657 Filed 4-15-05; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590-01-P ***************************************************************** 32 Bolton means a nuclear war Date: Mon, 18 Apr 2005 14:25:33 -0700 HE WILL LEAD TO A NUCLEAR CONFLICT The deliberate purpose of the submission of John Bolton as ambassador to the U.N is to PROVOKE a military conflict with Iran, to to ensure that all possibilities for diplomacy fail. The identical diplomatic "skills" he has demonstrated in abusing every dedicated underling who ever attempted to get him the truth will be employed to wreck any possibility for making peace. All this is now coming to light IN SPITE OF the extreme strictures of secrecy with which the intelligence groups usually operate. If you believe the unending occupation of Iraq is a disaster party you will JUST LOVE our war with the whole entire remainder of the world's Muslims. In the long term there is absolutely nothing we can do militarily to prevent other nations, even hostile ones, from getting decades old nuclear technology. These components are largely on the loose already. But why do we have to FORCE other actors to employ them for military ends? And there's only one force on this planet that can prevent it . . . our voices to speak out to our Congress on the nomination of Bolton. (1) Constituent info: Email: Mr. Mrs. Ms. Miss Dr. First Name: Last Name: Addr: Apt/Ste: City: State: AK AL AR AS AZ CA CO CT DC DE FL GA GU HI ID IA IL IN KS KY LA MA MD ME MI MN MO MS MT NC ND NE NH NJ NM NV NY OH OK OR PA PR RI SC SD TN TX UT VT VA VI WA WI WV WY Zip: Phone: (2) Next add your own personal message to your Congress: The question is "Should John Bolton be U.N. Ambassador?" This petition will submit your "No" vote. If you want to compose a long message, please make a copy of the text for yourself before submitting form, or paste in from a text editor (3) Submit the email addresses of friends to invite to vote: (4) Now send your messages If you need help with the form or to email in your comments directly This email is a one click page that sends your personal message to all of your members of Congress at one time. It's easy, it's quick and it costs nothing. Isn't this THE SAME John Bolton who played such a key part in cooking up the very "intelligence" that tricked us into the debacle in Iraq in the first place? Isn't there even one more qualified, shrewd diplomat that could be proposed for this post who ISN'T objected to in written statement by 60 of their most prominent peers? Please do something NOW on this and forward this message everywhere you can and to everyone you can. If you want to get no more, just use our Off function Powered by The People's Email Network © 2005, Patent pending, All rights reserved ***************************************************************** 33 [EMMAS] ADL Poll: Americans Want to Kill Iranians? Date: Mon, 18 Apr 2005 00:57:11 -0500 (CDT) http://www.kurtnimmo.com/blog/ April 17, 2005 ADL Poll: Americans Want to Kill Iranians Polls are curious things. You can achieve the desired result if you word questions a certain way. Consider the following paragraph: A majority of the American people support military action by the United States and Israel to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons as a last resort, according the Anti-Defamation Leagues 2005 American Attitudes Toward Israel and the Middle East, a public opinion survey of 1,600 American adults conducted March 18-25 by the Marttila Communications Group. (Emphasis added.) No indication of how exactly the question was phrased, however the inclusion of the words last resort are indicative. No doubt the operating premise here is that Iran is pulling out the stops to develop nuclear technology and would nuke Israel and the United States on the day after successfully building a nuclear bomb. Both of these assumptions are highly suspect, that is unless you consider the mullahs of Iran raving and suicidal lunatics. When asked, Do you think America should take military action to stop Iran from developing or trying to develop a nuclear weapons program, 53% said yes; 37% said no. When asked whether Israel should take military action to stop the Iranian nuclear program, 51% said yes, 34% said no. I seriously doubt 53% of all Americans believe the United States should get itself involved in another Iraq quagmire over the dubious at best assertion that Iran is working on building nukes. For some reason the fact that attacking Iran would not be surgical and there would be big time ramificationsi.e., the Iranians would most assuredly respond against the United States in Iraq and against Israelare not worked into the results of this absurdly transparent poll. The findings are important, less for its prescription for any particular policy than for the recognition by the public of the serious danger inherent in Irans Islamic regime achieving nuclear capability, said Abraham H. Foxman, ADL National Director. This is a clear message from the American public that strong action is imperative in this matter. It should inform the Europeans that this is no time for procrastination, that UN sanctions against an uncooperative regime are needed, and that a military option, while only a last resort, is an acceptable option. Translation: Most Americans are religious bigots who believe Muslims will go on a nuking spree. No explanation here why Pakistan, a nuclear-armed (since the mid-80s) Muslim nation, has not gone on a nuking spree. Of course, Pakistan is an ally in Bushs war on terrorism, so this is irrelevant. Also irrelevant is the fact the late General Zia-ul-Haq, the former dictator of Pakistan, said in 1986: It is our right to obtain the technology. And when we acquire this technology, the Islamic world will possess it with us. Pakistan is not interested in nuking infidels. It simply was responding to the fact its sworn enemy India conducted a peaceful nuclear explosion in 1974. India decided to develop a nuclear bomb after China developed and tested one in 1964 (two years before this India had lost a war with China). As long as the world is constituted as it is, every country will have to devise and use the latest scientific devices for its protection, declared Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, Indias first prime minister, in 1946. I have no doubt India will develop her scientific researches and I hope Indian scientists will use the atomic force for constructive purposes. But if India is threatened, she will inevitable try to defend herself by all means at her disposal. (See The Indian Nuclear BombLong in the Making, M. V. Ramana.) Abe Foxman, a long time advocate of all things Zionist, believes it is imperative the United States confront the serious danger that Iran may one day possess nuclear bombs (the same way the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, China, India, Pakistan, and Israel now possess them) and there is no time for procrastination when it comes to imposing UN sanctions against an uncooperative regime (read: against the people of Iran, the same way they were imposed with devastating results against the people of Iraq), that is short of a military option, an acceptable option (for killing thousands of people, especially Iranians and Arabs, is always acceptable, as history demonstrates). Naturally, left unsaid is the fact Foxman and his Likudite and Strausscons buddies in Israel and Washington expect sanctions to fail. In fact, they want them to fail and will work diligently to make sure they fail, thus underscoring the acceptable option of mass murder. Last week the war criminal leader of Israel, Ariel Sabra and Shatila Sharon, did not get what he came forconsensus on using the U.S. military to preemptively attack Iranafter visiting Dubya at his fake cowboy ranch in Texas. After his Crawford Ranch visit to Bush, even Ariel Sharon appears to be a bit chastised, when CNN interviewer asked him if, Israel plans to attack Iran, the way it unilaterally attacked Iraqs nuclear weapons facilities back in 1981, reports al-Jazeera. Sharon replied, it is not Israels sole lookout to ensure the security of the region, Europe and the US. In other words, since the United States has more or less told the tiny outlaw nation that it cannot expect the U.S. military to come to its rescue after it pulls off an Osirak II (or expect U.S. assistance in such an attack on Iran, at least not for the moment), Israel will chill and wait for the appropriate moment to once again call for the slaughter of Iranians. It will stand-down temporarily and allow the issue to go before the United Nations Security Council, a forum reviled by both Israel and the United States. Meanwhile, it is the duty of Abe Foxman and the ADL to make it appear the American people support the idea of bunker-busting neighborhoods in Tehran. In the wake of the disaster in Iraq, it will take a lot of careful two-stepping to get the appropriate consensus on the part of the American people and the Likudites, Strausscons, and their allies like the ADL (and PNAC, JINSA, AEI, et al) have their work cut out for them. It may take monthsas it did before Bush invaded the sovereign nation of Iraqbefore the U.S. is anywhere near bombing the hell out of Iran. It is and shall remain the stated goal of the Likudite-Strausscon mafia to rub out all Islamic resistance in the Middle East. Iran is the crown jewel of that resistance. In the meantime, the axis of Zionism, locked in a marriage of convenience with the neolibs, will go after far less ambitious targets in Syria and Lebanon, efforts not requiring a massive influx of troops and hardware. ============== ***NOTICE: In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. Section 107, this material is distributed without profit to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving the included information for research and educational purposes.*** ============== ################################################################# " Social and economic well-being will become a reality only through the zeal, courage, the non-compromising determination of intelligent minorities, and not through the mass." Emma Goldman To SUBSCRIBE/UNSUBSCRIBE to the emmasdance list send email to with the message subscribe/unsubscribe emmasdance. [No subject is needed.] "If I can not dance, I want no part in your revolution." Emma Goldman ################################################################# ***************************************************************** 34 Guardian Unlimited: North Korea Nuke Shutdown Raises Concerns From the Associated Press [UP] Monday April 18, 2005 9:01 PM By BARRY SCHWEID AP Diplomatic Writer WASHINGTON (AP) - The apparent shutdown of a nuclear reactor in North Korea is raising concerns among Bush administration officials that Pyongyang has finished producing spent fuel rods laced with weapons-grade plutonium. A U.S. official familiar with the situation said there could be at least two other possibilities, neither of which was troubling: that the reactor had run into mechanical trouble or that North Korea was bluffing to raise anxieties. In the past, North Korea has claimed to have taken major steps in its pursuit of a nuclear weapons arsenal, but U.S. analysts say only some of those claims are genuine. Even so, North Korea is believed to have already produced at least one atom bomb, and the United States, China, Japan, South Korea and Russia are trying through so-called six-nation talks to negotiate elimination of the nuclear weapons program. North Korea had agreed to return to the bargaining table last September after a three-month hiatus but since then has refused to resume the talks. Reflecting growing impatience, White House spokesman Scott McClellan said the administration would consult with its partners about taking the issue to the U.N. Security Council if the talks remain sidetracked. ``That's one possibility,'' McClellan said, ``If they refuse to come back to the talks, then we will have to consult with our partners and look at the next steps,'' he said, without offering any timetable for action. At the State Department, spokesman Richard Boucher said, ``They need to come back to talks if they are going to solve their problems, and that's where our focus remains.'' Responding to North Korea's persistent call for direct talks with the United States, Boucher said, ``We are willing to go back to the talks without preconditions'' and the United States had a ``direct dialogue'' with North Korea in past rounds. The shutdown of the reactor in North Korea's main nuclear complex at Yongbyon was detected by what U.S. analysts refer to as ``overhead imagery,'' which could involve spy satellites. The idea is to look for cessation of smoke or for significant changes in the readings of thermal or radar counts, said a U.S. official, who spoke on condition of anonymity. ``This is entirely feasible, but for us to know for sure, we'd have to be physically there ourselves and this is no longer the case,'' said Melissa Fleming, a spokeswoman for the International Atomic Energy Agency. She confirmed that the reactor would have to be shut down for the fuel rods to be extracted. In Seoul, meanwhile, Kim Sook, director-general of North American affairs at South Korea's Foreign Ministry, told KBS Radio that a shutdown of a nuclear reactor at the Yongbyon complex had been confirmed. Yongbyon houses a 5-megawatt reactor that generates spent fuel rods laced with plutonium, but they must be removed and reprocessed to extract the plutonium for use in an atomic weapon. They can be removed only if the reactor has been shut down. North Korea restarted the reactor after expelling U.N. monitors at the end of 2002. ``We have to wait and see the intentions and the measures North Korea takes in the future,'' Kim said. North Korea's persistent refusal to resume negotiations has provoked behind-the-scenes quibbling among the United States and its partners over bargaining tactics. But there is a consensus on offering North Korea economic incentives and international acceptance if it would agree to stop developing nuclear weapons. A U.S. scholar who recently visited North Korea said earlier this month that officials there told him they were preparing to unload fuel rods from the Yongbyon reactor during the next two months, adding to the urgency of resuming nuclear talks. ``They will have more plutonium unless there is a freeze,'' Selig Harrison, a Washington-based researcher, told reporters in Beijing after his trip. --- On the Net: State Department: http://www.state.gov White House: http://www.whitehouse.gov CIA factbook on North Korea: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/kn.html Guardian Unlimited © Guardian Newspapers Limited 2005 ***************************************************************** 35 Korea Herald: [EDITORIAL] N.K. contingency plan 2005.04.19 The Nation's No.1 English Newspaper It was somewhat unusual that the National Security Council announced last week it had rejected a U.S.-drafted contingency plan for the collapse of the North Korean regime because it could limit the Republic of Korea's exercise of its sovereignty. NSC and Defense Ministry officials did not elaborate but it is known that the updated "OPLAN 5029-05" called for the U.S. commander-in-chief of the Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC) to exercise operational control over both Korean and U.S. forces if and when the Pyongyang regime collapses in mass defections to the South or a military coup. The U.S. military authorities reportedly explained U.S. forces should be able to take quick action in North Korea to prevent sensitive materials, possibly including nuclear weapons, from being seized by terrorists and to ensure public safety. Korean officials are known to have insisted North Korea remains a part of the Republic of Korea territory and any collapse of the regime there does not warrant a shift of command authority. The argument boils down to whether the imagined collapse of the North Korean regime constitutes a war situation or not because a 1994 arrangement recognizes U.S. operational control only in the event of war on the peninsula, keeping ROK forces under Korean control in peacetime. Discussion will have to continue between Korean and U.S. officials on this rather academic problem, which can however have some political ramifications. The background of the NSC's announcement on its rejection is not clear but we hope that the episode will not be seen to sensitive observers as yet more evidence of the strain in relations between the two allies. The top security panel is just too kind to brief the public about the latest exchange between Korean and U.S. authorities at this time when the shape of the alliance draws much attention. And it looks more than a simple coincidence that the NSC statement came just hours after President Roh Moo-hyun remarked during his European tour that South Korea will not seek a regime change in the North. ***************************************************************** 36 Interfax: State Duma delegation to discuss cooperation, nuclear problem in Pyongyang Interfax.com Apr 18 2005 5:03PM MOSCOW. April 18 (Interfax) - A delegation of the State Duma International Committee led by Committee Chairman Konstantin Kosachyov will visit Pyongyang on May 5-7 at the rquest of North Korean parliamentarians. Kosachyov told Interfax that the delegation would first visit Vladivostok and Nakhodka to consider trans-border cooperation projects, which might be of interest for North Korea. He said they would try "to encourage the resumption of six-nation negotiations on the nuclear problem." © 1991-2005 Interfax All rights reserved News and other data on this web site are provided for information purposes only, and are not intended for republication or redistribution. Republication or redistribution of Interfax content, including by framing or similar means, is expressly prohibited without the prior written consent of ***************************************************************** 37 Bellona: Russia invites other nations to dismantle subs on its territory In an apparent play for nuclear industry cash, Russian Agency for Atomic Energy (Rosatom) chief Alexander Rumyantsev has invited the United States, Great Britain, Japan, France and other EU and G-8 member states to dismantle their decommissioned nuclear submarines at Russian shipyards, Russia’s nuclear authorities said in a statement Sunday. Rosatom chief Alexander Rumyantsev. Bellona Archive Charles Digges, 2005-04-18 16:45 "This is, for now, merely my own political initiative,” said Rumyantsev in a statement he released to the Russian media on Sunday. “Our overseas partners can save huge amounts if they use Russia's available infrastructure instead of setting up their own." Under Rumyantsev’s current initiative, interested countries would remove equipment sensitive to their national security from vessels to be dismantled in Russia. They would also remove the vessels’ nuclear fuel, and send the hull on to Russia for complete dismantlement. Dismantling Russian submarines like the K-159, which sank in August 2003 while being towed to dismantlement, should be Rosatom’s first priority. ksf.ru/Bellona Eventual SNF storage But the storage of fuel in the country of origin, said Rumyantsev, would only be the plan at the outset. Further along the line, he said in the statement, Russia would eventually offer full service dismantlement—including storage of spent nuclear fuel. Rumyantsev’s statement gave short shrift to this eventual development and raised the hackles of Russian Environmentalists. "When submarines are dismantled, their radioactive waste will most likely be kept in Russia for good," Aleksei Yablokov , head of the Centre for Ecological politics, said. "We do not need additional radioactive problems," Bellona is also strongly opposed to Rumyantsev’s notion and will work through its Russian offices to nip the plan in the bud. Russia’s own problems are too much for it to handle. No vacancy for extra radwaste The key difficulty in the dismantling Russian submarines is dealing with their fuel. Most fuel once removed from a decommissioned Russian vessel prior to dismantlement is sent to the Mayak Chemical. But when one of the frequent shipping bottlenecks occurs, the fuel is stored in specially designed containers in ports that are not always as secure as could be hoped. The bulk of these containers, designed by the Arctic Military Environmental Co-operation (AMEC), and is comprised of Norway, the United States, Russia and the UK, have a maximum engineered life span of about 60 years. It is therefor imperative, in Bellona’s opinion, that a deep geologic repository, perhaps on the Kola Peninsula where Russia’s Northern Fleet is stationed, be researched and built. Invited countries surprised by suggestion Officials reached at the US Embassy in Moscow said they had heard nothing of Rumyantsev’s offer and thus would not comment further or say whether they would take Russia up on such an offer. UK officials at the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), which handles bilateral decommissioning efforts with Russia, also said they knew nothing of the plan. High level DTI officials could not be reached for further comment. French officials were likewise caught off guard by the statement and refused comment until they could investigate the suggestion further. At present, Russia is receiving approximately $100m annually from overseas donors to dismantle its own nuclear submarines, some of which are rusted through, barely afloat, and still carrying their spent nuclear fuel. Some $70 million from the Russian budget goes toward the same purpose, Rumyantsev said. Close on 120 submarines have been disposed of and there are roughly another 80 to dispose of at a projected rate of fifteen submarines a year, said Rumyantsev. Russia would therefor conceivably need another five to six years to dismantle its own Cold War submarine legacy before it could begin taking on foreign contracts. Bellona Position Paper: Import of spent nuclear fuel to Russia The Russian State Duma, the lower house of the Russian parliament, approved three bills favouring the import of spent nuclear fuel in summer 2001. In July 2001, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed the bills. Borders open for nuclear waste Rumyantsev’s statement failed to discuss in any detail the eventual storage of spent nuclear waste from foreign submarines, but the plan corresponds to Russia’s desire to boost income on its currently foundering initiative, under which the Duma, in 2001, legalised the import and storage of foreign radioactive waste. This initiative was ramroded through the Duma by then Minister of Atomic Energy Yevgeny Adamov, who, it was later revealed bribed and coerced approving votes from many Duma members. Though the Ministry of Atomic Energy was reinvented as the less-powerful Rosatom during a government shake-up last summer, Adamov reportedly still has the ear of Rosatom’s upper brass and plays the role of an informal but powerful advisor. An official for Rosatom, who requested anonymity, said that Rumyantsev’s plan for foreign submarines “had been spoken of in [Rosatom] corridors,” but that “plans still need to be worked out and there have been no official invitations to other countries or other plans issued,” by the Rosatom, which is Russia’s central contractor for submarine dismantlement. He did concede that an eventual plan to offer foreign submarines full dismantlement services, down to the storage of their spent nuclear fuel, was a part of the development of Rumyantsev’s plan. “In 2001, the Duma adopted laws allowing for the import and storage of radioactive waste. This could very well be an extension of that policy if it comes to fruition,” the source said. Former Minister of Atomic Energy Yevgeny Adamov. Bellona Archive Import initiative’s failure According to Adamov at the time the radioactive waste import legislation was adopted, importing and storing foreign radioactive waste would bring $20 billion to Russia’s state coffers over 20 years. But Adamov’s initiative, as he presented it to the Duma, did not take into account that the United States has proprietary rights over an estimated 70 percent of the world’s spent nuclear fuel, meaning it doesn’t go anywhere Washington doesn’t want it to. As a consequence, import of spent nuclear fuel to Russia has so far been limited to former Soviet bloc nations such as Bulgaria and Hungary, falling far below Adamov’s forecasted boom crop. He and his successor have nonetheless lobbied the US government hard for rights to US produced spent fuel. But Washington has been reluctant to ease these restrictions because of Russia’s nuclear co-operation with Iran, where Moscow is building a 1000 megawatt light water reactor in the port town of Bushehr. IAEA Chief Calls for Iran to ‘Unconditionally' Accept Stricter Inspections The UN's chief nuclear inspector Mohamed ElBaradei last year called for Iran to drop objections to stiffer nuclear oversight and "unconditionally" sign on to a protocol that would allow more intrusive inspections of its facilities and convince the world that it was not developing nuclear weapons. Matters have become even more complicated as Iranian dissident groups and the International Atomic Energy Agency have revealed ostensible traces of a nuclear weapons effort directed by Tehran. Washington has taken a stick and carrot approach to Russia’s co-operation with Iran, offering Moscow limited supplies of US controlled fuel in exchange for Russia breaking of relations with Iran. But Iran pays cash up front, and has further reactor contracts to offer Russia—which pales in comparison to the United States’ limited spent fuel offers. Russia, in the end, turned Washington down. Russian nuclear industry looking abroad for cash Russia currently has several money-spinning operations running abroad to keep it afloat. Among them are the HEU-LEU agreement with the United Stated under which weapons suitable highly enriched uranium (HEU) is down-blended to low enriched uranium (LEU) and sold to the United States for use in commercial reactors there. This programme has netted Russia’s nuclear industry some $7.5 billion since its inception in 1995 Additionally, Russia has reactor building contracts, on credit, with China and India—both of which could net Russia more money in spent nuclear fuel storage should these countries buy their fuel from Russia. The fuel import programme could actually begin to make money if this is the case. Another income source, until the unlikely event that EU countries and the US ship their submarines, loaded with spent fuel, to Russia for dismantlement, is precious metals. Rumyantsev’s statement failed to mention what will happen with the non-irradiated metals that come of dismantling a nuclear submarine, such as titanium from bulkheads. Will they be sent back to their country of origin, or will they remain in Russia where they would fetch a hefty price on Russia’s metals trading market? But Rumyantsev gave no indication on the disposition of the metals, and, were they to remain in Russia, how that money would be spent. If the international community takes Rumyantsev’s bait, it will add to the already uncontrollable nuclear woes in Russia. Publisher: , President: Information: , Technical contact: Telephone: +47 23 23 46 00 Telefax: +47 22 38 38 62 * P.O.Box 2141 Grunerlokka, 0505 Oslo, Norway ***************************************************************** 38 BBC: N Korea 'shuts' nuclear facility Last Updated: Monday, 18 April, 2005 [Satellite image of North Korea's Yongbyon Nuclear Centre] The Yongbyon reactor has been at the centre of the nuclear row South Korea believes its northern neighbour has suspended operations at its nuclear power plant in Yongbyon, an official in Seoul has said. "We are treating this matter very seriously," said Kim Sook, a spokesman for the South Korean Foreign Ministry. If the plant has indeed been closed, analysts warn that spent nuclear fuel could be removed and reprocessed into weapons-grade plutonium. North Korea warned in February that it had already developed nuclear weapons. It also said it would not return to multi-lateral talks aimed at ending its nuclear programmes unless the US changed its "hostile" attitude towards Pyongyang. Kim Sook, director-general of North American affairs at South Korea's Foreign Ministry, said Seoul was trying to work out the purpose of the recent shutdown. "We'll have to see what North Korea's intention or its future actions will be," Mr Kim told a local radio station on Monday. Controversial reactor The five-megawatt facility at Yongbyon was ostensibly designed to provide nuclear energy to fuel-hungry North Korea. It was shut down under a 1994 pact with the US, but Pyongyang reopened it in late 2002 amid escalating bilateral tensions. In October 2003 the North said it had reprocessed 8,000 nuclear fuel rods at Yongbyon - a claim which, if correct, would have produced enough plutonium to make a handful of nuclear bombs. North Korea is also suspected of running a separate nuclear development programme based on the enrichment of uranium. Since 2002, three rounds of discussions involving the US, Russia, the two Koreas, Japan and China have sought to ease tensions on the peninsula, with little success. A potential fourth round was cancelled earlier this year after the North Korea said it was furious that US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice had branded the nation an "outpost of tyranny". ***************************************************************** 39 washington post: The Costs of Secrecy [Editorial] Monday, April 18, 2005; Page A16 "THE PRESUMPTION ought to be that citizens ought to know as much as possible about decision making," President Bush told the convention of the American Society of Newspaper Editors last week when asked about his administration's tight controls on information. "I know there is a feeling that we are too security-conscious. I think we are becoming balanced." The assumption underlying this remark is that secrecy and security go hand in hand and that openness in government carries risks. This is certainly often true; yet what's less recognized is that secrecy can be harmful, not only to democratic values but to national security as well, because it can impede the flow of information to those who need it. Recently the National Academy of Sciences, as part of a report on the security of spent fuel at nuclear plants, provided an example, noting that "security restrictions on sharing of information and analyses are hindering progress in addressing potential vulnerabilities." The body of this report is a sober assessment of the threat to nuclear facilities and an analysis of how security for their highly dangerous waste products can be improved. The last chapter, however, details how tight controls on information are inhibiting security improvements. Representatives of the nuclear industry, the blue-ribbon panel noted, have been frustrated by a lack of information available from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which has not been sharing data that could help with "early actions to address identified vulnerabilities." In two instances the report cites, restrictions on information prevented studies from being shared among analysts for different organizations examining related questions. The panel itself "was unable to examine several important issues" related to the security of spent fuel, in part "because it was unable to obtain needed information from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission." Nuclear regulators are hardly unusual in hoarding information so closely that they undermine the very security they seek to enhance. This is, rather, a norm in government. A federal court in Washington recently ordered the CIA to disclose budget data from as far back as 1963; the agency has, generally speaking, successfully resisted releasing such absurdly remote historical data, and it fought over the 1963 figures even after it turned out to have already made the information public. It is hardly a surprise that a government that cannot distinguish such matters from real state secrets -- that is classifying more and more every year, and spending billions to do it -- also cannot figure out what information must be shielded from the companies on the front lines of nuclear security and what information should be given to them. Somehow, a more rational approach to secrecy must take hold. © Copyright1996- The Washington Post Company | User ***************************************************************** 40 Mos News: Russia Wants to Dismantle Foreign Nuclear Submarines - MOSNEWS.COM [Dismantling of a U.S. nuclear submarine / Photo from www.mimer.no] Created: 18.04.2005 15:59 MSK (GMT +3), Updated: 15:59 MSK Russia will be ready to dismantle foreign nuclear submarines in five years, the head of the Federal Agency for Nuclear Power, Alexander Rumyantsev, was quoted by Gazeta daily as saying. He told reporters that Russian specialists will be able to work with U.S., British and French submarines, and stressed that co-operation with Russia will save foreign states a considerable amount of money. This offer has been made in a bid not to close down the dismantling facilities that are used to scrap vessels built between 1960 and 1970. Currently Russia dismantles only its own nuclear submarines, and it is only able to do so with the help of foreign partners. Russia receives $100 million from the U.S., Canada, Japan and the EU for these purposes annually. $70 million is also set aside in the Russian state budget. Some 200 submarines have already been dismantled, and another 80 Russian submarines will be scrapped in six years, Rumyantsev promised. But since the dismantling plants were built with foreign assistance, the interested countries may demand a hefty discount when it comes to scrapping their submarines, experts say. As Rumyantsev says, initially spent fuel from foreign submarines will be unloaded in the countries of origin. But ecologists are sure that the nuclear fuel will end up in Russia, because in 2001 the country adopted a law allowing spent nuclear fuel to be stored inland. “Russia does not need an excess radiation load,” Alexei Yablokov, head of the Center for Ecological Policy says, expressing concern that it would be the first step towards turning Russia into a global nuclear dump. Nevertheless, the utilization of spent nuclear fuel is a very profitable business, and Russia would earn at least $20 billion a year from it, the Gazeta newspaper writes. At the moment it only refines fuel from its reactors built abroad. Write us: info@mosnews.com Copyright © 2004 MOSNEWS.COM ***************************************************************** 41 [du-list] Sunnyside Hosts Documentary On Depleted Uranium Date: Mon, 18 Apr 2005 14:25:04 -0700 Sunnyside Hosts Documentary On Depleted Uranium Exposure Janice Matthew believes her daughter’s birth defect was a result of her husband’s exposure to depleted uranium while serving in Iraq. by Neille Ilel, Western Queens Editor April 14, 2005 http://www.zwire.com/site/news.cfm?newsid=14347700&BRD=1865&PAG=461&dept_id=152944&rfi=6 In January 2003, some 30 years after the Vietnam War, the Institute of Medicine found a link between the herbicide Agent Orange and chronic lymphatic leukemia, a gradually spreading and often fatal cancer. It was the latest in a long list of ailments blamed on the infamous herbicide used to deforest the jungles of Vietnam. For years the military denied the harmfulness of Agent Orange. Only after decades of relentless lawsuits and public haranguing by veterans groups did the government admit that the substance was to blame for myriad ailments in hundreds of thousands of Vietnam veterans and their children. A new documentary put out by the People’s Video Network, “Poison Dust,” accuses the defense department of a similar crime with respect to depleted uranium exposure—willful ignorance. The movie will screen in Sunnyside at All Saint’s Church at 43-12 46th Street on Tuesday, April 19th at 7 p.m. After the screening, the film’s editor, Sue Harris and Raymond Ramos, a veteran from Springfield Gardens interviewed in the film, will speak and take questions. “We’ve known about the cancer-producing and death-producing qualities of depleted uranium since the 1850s,” Harris said. She accuses the United States government of hiding the facts related to the harmfulness of this substance because the weapons it produces are so effective. “It’s just not cost-effective to be open about this.” Is depleted uranium the Agent Orange of this generation of soldiers? “Poison Dust” seems to think so. Uranium is an extremely heavy metal, making it ideal for munitions casings as it can pierce very heavy armor. It is also radioactive. When a uranium shell punches through another metal, like a tank, the casing vaporizes into dust. It is this dust that critics say is harming soldiers, their families and exposed civilians. Soldiers interviewed in the film report being covered in dust from morning until night, even shaking it out of their beds in the morning. They complain of symptoms from headaches to swelling to chronic fatigue. One Bronx soldier’s daughter, conceived shortly after his return, has a severely deformed hand from a birth defect. He was convinced of the involvement of depleted uranium when he saw photographs of similar deformities in Iraqi children. Another soldier featured in the film, Ramos from Springfield Gardens, claims exposure to the metal while serving in Iraq. He speaks of working out following his return hoping to feel more like his old self, only to find that he was weaker and more tired. In addition, there is extensive footage of a conference on the issue, featuring testimony from scientists and Daily News columnist Juan Gonzalez, who has written several expose stories on the issue. One of the most interesting techniques Harris uses in the film is weaving in the military’s history of denying the harm of environmental pollutants in wartime. An especially riveting scene in the film shows several hundred soldiers in 1945 sitting cross legged on the desert ground in New Mexico, watching a nuclear test. As the mushroom cloud erupts, the soldiers gape at it with glee, and the viewer is shocked at how ignorant everyone is of the terrible danger they’re in. It’s an effective reminder that government doesn’t always know best. And when it comes to coming clean during wartime, the military’s track record is full of blemishes. While the movie will reinforce the beliefs of those convinced about the dangers of depleted uranium exposure, it might not fully sway the undecided viewer. Throughout the film there is no rebuttal or explanation by the government or manufacturers of the substance. There are no comments from the Department of Veterans Affairs. It’s unclear in the film if these groups refused to participate, or if they were never asked. Either way, the one-sidedness of the coverage chips away at the film’s credibility. The experts that Harris interviews are certainly impressive, but there is a whiff of propaganda to the endeavor. “I think they have plenty of time on the air,” Harris said of her decision not to interview any government representatives. “I feel like it’s more important to get the information out.” -- Posted for educational and research purposes only, ~ in accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. section 107 ~ NucNews Links and Expanded Archives - http://nucnews.net ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Need a home for your web domain? We recommend our provider, Hosting Direct https://support.hostingdirect.net/cgi-bin/affiliates/clickthru.cgi?id=nucnews ------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor --------------------~--> What would our lives be like without music, dance, and theater? Donate or volunteer in the arts today at Network for Good! http://us.click.yahoo.com/TzSHvD/SOnJAA/79vVAA/FGYolB/TM --------------------------------------------------------------------~-> To unsubscribe from this groups send a message to du-list-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com. In the body of the message type unsubscribe and send. Yahoo! Groups Links <*> To visit your group on the web, go to: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/du-list/ <*> To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to: du-list-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com <*> Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to: http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/ ***************************************************************** 42 [du-list] Gen. Myers: 'No current DU use in Iraq or Date: Mon, 18 Apr 2005 14:25:07 -0700 Following is an unequivocal statement, now a few months old, from the very top of the Pentagon command. Any unembedded reporters or activists remaining on the ground in Iraq or Afghanistan (!) might be well positioned to confirm or prove false this nugget, snipped from the rest of the "Information Paper": "munitions containing DU are not being used in the current stability and support operations in Iraq or Afghanistan." This certainly brings a few more questions to mind. Such as - "Since when?" and "Who told the commanders in the field who pick ordnance not to use it now?" and "Why not?" and "What are the A-10s loading?" And if "Munitions containing DU are carefully controlled and tracked and are not used unless necessary," then perhaps General Myers can tell the Iraqi government just where the stuff has been used, because to date the Pentagon has not. Jack Cohen-Joppa ===== CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999 27 January 2005 Ms. Sandy Silver, President Women's International League for Peace and Freedom United States Section 1 213 Race Street Philadelphia, PA 19107-1691 Dear Ms. Silver, Thank you for the letter concerning depleted uranium (DU). I respect the league's opinion of opposing the use of DU munitions. Enclosed is a detailed response to your organizations's concerns. Independent researchers worldwide have studied the risks of DU extensively. The US military is committed to protecting human health and the environment from scientifically verified hazards associated with DU. With best wishes, s/ RICHARD B. MYERS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Enclosure ENCLOSURE 10 January 2005 INFORMATION PAPER Subject: Depleted Uranium (DU) Information Summary and Response 1. Purpose. To provide information on DU to the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom. 2. Key Points . Introduction: DU is a very dense metal (1.7 times as dense as lead) that is 40 percent less radioactive than naturally occurring uranium. DU is a critical component in the armor of certain vehicles, providing superior protection against enemy attack. It is also found in certain munitions that enable US forces to engage enemy vehicles such as tanks and armored fighting vehicles at greater distance--therefore reducing risks from returning fire. Many US military personnel and their allies are alive today because--in the Gulf War, Balkan Conflicts and the major combat operations phase of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM--they were able to engage enemy targets at longer range with DU munitions. In addition, in some cases, vehicles survived hits that would have destroyed others without DU armor. The scientific consensus is that routine handling of undamaged DU munitions is not hazardous. During fires and explosions, DU can enter the human body and present some hazards similar to other types of heavy metals. Extensive information on this topic is available at http://www.deploymentlink.osd.mil. * The first request in your letter was to "Halt any further uses of Depleted Uranium weapons; isolate it as the radioactive waste it is, in appropriate waste facilities." As noted above, DU armor and munitions provide an advantage to US forces that saves American and allied lives in combat. Munitions containing DU are only used when the threat requires it, such as when confronted with enemy armored vehicles. Munitions containing DU are carefully controlled and tracked and are not used unless necessary. For example, munitions containing DU are not being used in the current stability and support operations in Iraq or Afghanistan. * The second request in your letter was to "Provide protective measures wherever used (in local languages) .and provide for the cleanup in areas of its use or areas where it was tested." Many independent organizations have studied extensively most locations where DU munitions have been used. This includes: (1) the UN Environmental Programme reports: "Depleted Uranium in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Post-Conflict Environmental Assessment," "Depleted Uranium in Serbia and Montenegro" and "Depleted Uranium in Kosovo: Post-Conflict Environmental Assessment"; and (2) studies by the United Kingdom Royal Society and by the Health Council of the Netherlands (references available at Web site listed above). The scientific consensus is that remediation of sites where DU munitions were used is generally unnecessary and technically unfeasible. In some unique cases, limited remediation is called for and will be accomplished when required by lawful authorities. Regarding training facilities, the Department of Defense complies with Environmental Protection Agency requirements for the management on DU waste on domestic sites and complies with all government-to-government agreements with allies regarding the use, storage and handling of DU materials. * The third request in your letter was to "Require definitive medical tests by objective specialists, to determine the true extent of health effects of exposure to DU oxide and derivatives." DOD policies already comply with this action. Numerous international and US studies have been accomplished to establish the extent of health effects of DU. Among these are the World Health Organization April 2001 report entitled "Depleted Uranium: Sources, Exposure and Health Effects - Full Report," and "Depleted Uranium Aerosol Doses and Risks: Summary of U.S. Assessments, Battelle Memorial Institute," October 2004. The European Parliament and the governments of Sweden, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom have also studied this extensively. DOD policy, issued 30 May 2003 for military personnel exposed to DU either in combat operations or accidents, specifies detailed medical follow-up procedures for clinicians. * The fourth request in your letter was to "Provide health care for all victims of DU contamination." As stated in the previous paragraph, numerous international and US authorities have studied the health effects of DU. DOD policy provides for detailed medical follow-up procedures for clinicians to follow for military members exposed in combat operations and accidents. Injured enemy combatants, if captured and while in US custody, are provided medical care at the same level as provided to US personnel, in accordance with international law and DOD policy. US military medical personnel routinely provide medical care to civilians who are accidentally injured by US munitions, which would include injuries accidentally sustained from DU munitions. * Your letter also asserts that DU munitions "constitute a weapon of mass destruction." The US military employs DU munitions solely to defeat armored or hardened targets that present a threat to US or allied forces. It does not use these weapons against noncombatants, and, by design and by policy, these weapons are not used indiscriminately. There is no internationally accepted definition of a "weapon of mass destruction" that includes DU-containing projectiles used for their intended purpose. DU-containing munitions do not violate the US-ratified Chemical Weapons Convention prohibitions against chemical and toxic weapons. [end] _____________________________________ the Nuclear Resister "a chronicle of hope" P.O. Box 43383 Tucson AZ 85733 - information about and support for imprisoned anti-nuclear and anti-war activists - Jack & Felice Cohen-Joppa, editors phone/fax (520)323-8697 email: nukeresister@igc.org US$15/year/US$20 Canada/US$25 overseas - selections from recent issues - updated prisoner addresses - & archived issues can be read at: http://www.nonviolence.org/nukeresister * FREE SAMPLE ISSUE ON REQUEST * (please supply a postal address for samples) _____________________________________ ------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor --------------------~--> What would our lives be like without music, dance, and theater? Donate or volunteer in the arts today at Network for Good! http://us.click.yahoo.com/TzSHvD/SOnJAA/79vVAA/FGYolB/TM --------------------------------------------------------------------~-> To unsubscribe from this groups send a message to du-list-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com. In the body of the message type unsubscribe and send. Yahoo! Groups Links <*> To visit your group on the web, go to: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/du-list/ <*> To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to: du-list-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com <*> Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to: http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/ ***************************************************************** 43 [DU-WATCH] Military pollution (including DU) by Lucinda Date: Mon, 18 Apr 2005 00:29:20 -0500 (CDT) World News Military Pollution: The Quintessential Universal Soldier By Lucinda Marshall Mar 30, 2005, 00:43 Email this article Printer friendly page Dirty wars: Military toxicity and pollution As children, we were taught that the military protected us in times of war. We learned about soldiers being killed and wounded by 'the enemy', and how people died if they got shot or if a bomb landed on them. Sometimes innocent people got killed during a war, but the fact that most victims were civilians was carefully hidden from us by our elders. They knew that children are smart enough to understand that there is a big moral difference between killing other soldiers and killing ordinary people. That a significant number of deaths were caused not by a weapon's impact, but by its toxicity and by military pollution, was never mentioned. We did not learn that military toxins know no boundaries, that they don't just kill the enemy, they kill our military personnel and people living near military bases, that they pollute the water, land and air. We were not taught and still aren't told today that military toxins go anywhere and kill everything, that they are in fact the quintessential universal soldier. We Have Met The Enemy The U.S. Department of Defense is the largest polluter in the world, producing more hazardous waste than the five largest U.S. chemical companies combined1. The types of hazardous wastes used by the military include pesticides and defoliants like Agent Orange. It includes solvents, petroleum, perchlorate (a component of rocket fuel) lead and mercury. And most ominously, depleted uranium. The health problems that have been documented as being attributable to these various toxins in military use include miscarriages, low birth weight, birth defects, kidney disease and cancer. Military pollution most directly affects those who are targeted by our weapons, soldiers and anyone living near a military base, both in the U.S. and abroad. In the U.S., one out of every ten Americans lives within ten miles of a military site that has been listed as a Superfund priority cleanup site2. Given where chemical and nuclear weapons are used, tested, manufactured, stored and disposed of, the burden of health impacts and environmental destruction falls disproportionately on poorer communities, people of color and indigenous communities. Women face particularly severe problems because of their sensitive reproductive tissues and children because their immune systems are not yet fully developed3. Way Off Base The number of health problems and environmental problems that have been reported near military installations throughout the world is truly staggering. The following are only a few of the many examples. The U.S. Navy is the largest polluter in the San Diego, California area, having created 100 toxic sites during the last 80 years. Environmental damage caused by the Navy includes spilling over 11,000 gallons of oil into the San Diego Bay in 1988. Fish in the Bay contain high levels of mercury and radioactive compounds that are attributable to Navy pollution of the Bay4. Near the Naval Air Station in Fallon, NV high rates of cancer and rare diseases have probably been linked to the dumping of jet fuel, radio and electronic emissions and the contamination of groundwater with radioactive materials. Fallon has the highest per capita rate of childhood leukemia in the nation5. It is important to note that the contamination of military bases is also a problem overseas where significant toxic pollution has impacted the areas near U.S. military bases in countries such as South Korea, the Philippines and Panama. Pollution from the manufacturing of military weapons is equally horrific. The soil near a plant that manufactured depleted uranium rounds in Colonie, New York was found to have 500 times the amount of uranium that one could normally expect to find in soil6. Military waste disposal sites also pose significant problems. Recently, evidence of contamination from the Diamond Alkali plant which manufactured Agent Orange that was used in Vietnam was found in the Newark Bay in New Jersey. Bottom dwellers in the Bay contain the highest levels of dioxins ever recorded in aquatic animals, high enough to guarantee cancer at the same levels in humans. Many low income, immigrant and homeless residents of the area rely on the Bay for subsistence fishing and thus face the considerable risks of exposure and ingestion of Agent Orange7. At Rocky Flats, a former nuclear weapons plant site in Colorado, Jon Lipsky, a former FBI agent, has recently come forward to expose the contamination of the land that he says the EPA and FBI and Department of Justice are suppressing. Lipsky and other plaintiffs in a case against the DOJ are concerned about plans to turn Rocky Flats into a wildlife refuge without adequately cleaning up the contamination. As Lipsky and others point out, disguising a toxic dump as a tourist attraction to be visited by schoolchildren is unacceptable8. The cleanup of sites such as these have slowed considerably since President George W. Bush took office. EPA inspections at military sites have dropped by 10%. The number of fines has dropped by 25% and the dollar amount of fines has been smaller. Overall spending on the cleanup of military sites has dropped 20% since 2001. Military spending on the cleanup of hazardous sites amounts to only 1% of the military budget9. As is the case with many pollutants, the effects of perchlorate, a toxic rocket fuel component, knows no bounds. New research has found perchlorate, in women's breast milk in eighteen states. It can also be found in ground water, crops such as lettuce and dairy milk. Perchlorate can cause mental retardation, loss of hearing and speech and motor skill problems10. Like other pollutants that are now finding their way into breastmilk, perchlorate puts mothers in the untenable position of simultaneously nurturing and (many times unknowingly) poisoning their children. Testing, 1, 2, 3 Nuclear testing is responsible for particularly hazardous pollution. Amchitka Island, off the coast of Alaska was the site of three nuclear weapons tests in a mile-deep shaft on the island in the late 1960's and early 1970's. The last bomb tested was the equivalent of 400 bombs the size of the one that was dropped on Hiroshima. At the time the tests were conducted, wildlife populations in the area dropped off dramatically. Afterwards, when workers started reporting health problems, their claims were initially dismissed but eventually they were awarded compensation for "occupational illness". Doctors now say Amchitka workers will develop cancer at twice the rate of other Americans. More ominously, in the late 1990's Greenpeace conducted tests that showed radioactive substances including plutonium in the waters near Amchitka. Scientists have also found that geological forces in the island chain are producing movements that may at some point in the future allow nuclear materials in the test shaft to leak into the surrounding land and water11. In "The Clan of the One-Breasted Woman", Terry Tempest Williams shares her poignant realization that the breast cancer that struck her mother, aunts and grandmothers was in all probability due to the radiation they were exposed to during the atomic testing that took place in Utah (where they lived) between 1951-196212. Despite assurances that the tests posed no danger, clearly the testing of bombs that were hundreds of times larger than those used at Hiroshima and Nagasaki would certainly pose a danger. And a report from the Breast Cancer Fund has recently concluded that ionizing radiation is the "best established environmental cause of breast cancer13." >From Here To Eternity It is the military's use of Depleted Uranium that should cause the most alarm. Not only is the evidence of irreparable harm becoming undeniable, it is also quite clear that the U.S. government has been aware of the lethality of these weapons for quite some time. Despite denials of health risks, a 1950 Army pamphlet states, "Although there is negligible danger from uranium and plutonium outside the body, it is possible for dangerous amounts of these elements to enter the body through the lungs, the digestive system, or breaks in the skin14." An FAA Advisory Circular written in 1984 stated, "if particles are inhaled or ingested, they can be chemically toxic and cause a significant and long-lasting irradiation of internal tissue." In 1990, U.S. Army Armaments, Munitions and Chemical Command (AMCCOM) reported that depleted uranium is a "low level alpha radiation emitter, which is linked to cancer when exposures are internal." AMCCOM's radiological task group also pointed out that the "long term effects of low doses [of DU] have been implicated in cancer.there is no dose so low that the probability of effect is zero." The risk to our own military personnel was spelled out in a 1993 letter from the U.S. Army Surgeon General stating that, "When soldiers inhale or ingest DU dust, they incur a potential increase in cancer risk." And in 1995, a U.S. Army U.S. Army Environmental Policy Institute report to Congress says that depleted uranium has the potential to generate "significant medical consequences15." The impact of depleted uranium on Gulf War veterans is so staggering that it is incomprehensible that the U.S. government persists in denying the damage done. The numbers tell the obvious story. During the three-week war in 1990-91, 467 U.S. personnel were reported injured. Since then, more than 11,000 Gulf War veterans have died and more than 600,000 are on permanent disability due to their exposure to depleted uranium, or what we euphemistically call Gulf War Syndrome. But U.S. military personnel are of course not the only victims of depleted uranium. Many returning soldiers brought it home to their families as well. Wives and girlfriends have been contaminated through sperm, causing a variety of gynecological problems, including cancer and the need for hysterectomies. Children born to Gulf Veterans have a much higher than normal incidence of birth defects, cancer and other diseases16. And of course, the same problems that have plagued our own citizens have also taken place in the countries where depleted uranium has been used, including the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq. In Basra, Iraq, cancer rates have leapt from 11/100,000 in 1988 to 123/100,000 in 2002. Cancer in children under the age of fifteen has tripled at the Basra Maternity and Children's hospital since 1990. Children under five years of age now make up 56% of the reported cancer cases, in 1990, they were 13% of the total. There were several cases of babies born with multiple congenital birth defects in 1990. In the last three years there have been more than 200 such cases. This scenario is being played out wherever depleted uranium has been used17. The Ultimate Crime As human rights attorney Karen Parker explains, the use of depleted uranium is illegal in four ways: It fails the territorial test because it can't be contained on the battlefield. The impact of depleted uranium continues to be felt after the battle is over. It is illegal because it causes inhumane death and injury. Depleted uranium irreparably damages the environment. For all these reasons, the use of depleted uranium is in violation of the Geneva Convention and constitutes a war crime18. Writing Our Collective Epitaph The impetus to write this article came from my own history. When I was only a baby my grandmother, Lenore G. Marshall, was one of the early leaders in the effort to stop nuclear testing. A co-founder of The Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE), she worked tirelessly to stop nuclear testing in Nevada and Amchitka. In the fullness of time, it is abundantly clear that her instincts were correct, and the peril we face today is many times greater. Why then are we still persisting in our use of toxic weaponry in the face of such overwhelming danger to our environment and health? There is no justification for our military killing us to protect us. And as the founding of SANE foretold, it is truly insane to think that we can justify permanently damaging the earth and endangering the future of humanity in the pursuit of global empire, even if one thought that was an admirable goal. In the process of killing everything in sight, we seem oblivious to the fact that we are also committing suicide. Our continued ignorance and silence will become our collective epitaph. Lucinda Marshall is a feminist artist, writer and activist. She is the Founder of the Feminist Peace Network, www.feministpeacenetwork.org which publishes Atrocities, a bulletin documenting violence against women throughout the world. She blogs at http://blog.zmag.org/bloggers/?blogger=marshall. Notes: 1 "War on Earth" by Bob Feldman, Dollars and Sense, March/April 2003. Also see the Military Toxics Project, www.miltoxproj.org. 2 "Pollution cleanups pit Pentagon against regulators" by Peter Eisler, USA Today, October 14, 2004. 3 "Health and Environmental Costs of Militarism" by Rosalie Bertell, presented in Barcelona, June 24, 2004. 4 "War on Earth" by Bob Feldman, Dollars and Sense, March/April 2003. 5 "The Fallon, NV Cancer Cluster And A US Navy Bombing" by Jeffrey St. Clair, Counterpunch, August 10, 2002. 6 "War on Earth" by Bob Feldman, Dollars and Sense, March/April 2003. 7 "Activists Oppose Plan to Dredge Up Agent Orange Residue in NJ Bay" by F. Timothy Martin, New Standard News, January 27, 2005. 8 "The Rocky Flats Horror Picture Show" by Amanda Griscom Little, Grist Magazine, January 21, 2005. 9 "Pollution cleanups pit Pentagon against regulators" by Peter Eisler, USA Today, October 14, 2004. 10 "Rocket Fuel Chemical Found in Breast Milk of Women in 18 States" by Robert Roy Britt, Live Science, February 24, 2005. 11 "Amchitka Nuclear Tests", December 23, 2001. 12 "The Clan of One-Breasted Women" by Terry Tempest Williams, Awakened Woman, March 1, 2005. 13 "State of the Evidence: What Is the Connection Between the Environment and Breast Cancer?", Third Edition, Edited by Nancy Evans, Health Science Consultant, Breast Cancer Fund, 2004. 14 "What Does The U.S. Govt. Know about DU?" by Leuren Moret, International Criminal Tribunal for Afghanistan, Traprock Peace Center, November 25, 2003. 15 "Some of the U.S. Government's Documentation of Harmful Effects of D.U.", Nukewatch.com, January 31, 2003. 16 "Depleted uranium: Dirty bombs, dirty missiles, dirty bullets" by Leuren Moret, SF Bay View, February 23, 2005. 17 "Iraq: High levels of radioactive pollution seen in the south", Axis of Logic, November 19, 2004. 18 "The Illegality of DU Weaponry" by Karen Parker, JD, paper prepared for the International Uranium Weapons Conference in Hamburg, Germany October 16-19, 2003. http://www.gnn.tv/headlines/1708/Military_Pollution_The_Quintessential_Universal_Soldier ------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor --------------------~--> Help save the life of a child. Support St. Jude Children's Research Hospital's 'Thanks & Giving.' http://us.click.yahoo.com/0iazvD/5WnJAA/xGEGAA/Sj.0lB/TM --------------------------------------------------------------------~-> [Brought to you by HTTP://WWW.STOPNATO.ORG.UK] Yahoo! Groups Links <*> To visit your group on the web, go to: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/du-watch/ <*> To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to: du-watch-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com <*> Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to: http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/ ***************************************************************** 44 [DU-WATCH] Veteran Advocates & Activists Needed To Unite Date: Mon, 18 Apr 2005 00:31:14 -0500 (CDT) UNIFIED VETERANS COALITION Special Links For Agent Orange, Gulf War Illness JP-8 Jet Fuel Toxicity Studies, Secret Government Testing Political Action, Womens Vet Issues & Bible Studies http://xsorbit27.com/users5/unifiedveteranscoalition/ VERPA PETITION TO STOP HUMAN TESTING ON SOLDIERS http://www.petitiononline.com/fd1950/ DEATHS CAUSED BY ANTHRAX VACCINEhttp://www.anthraxvaccine.net/articles/91.shtml VACCINE A HOMEPAGE - A BOOK BY CNN SPECIAL REPORTER GARY MATSUMOTO http://www.vaccine-a.com/ HOMELAND SECURITY POLICY GROUP http://search.yahoo.com/search?p=Dr.+Pamela+Asa&btn=Search&ei=UTF-8&fr=sbc-web&b=21 AUTOIMMUNE TECHNOLOGIES : TULANE UNIVERSITY SQUALENE ANTIBODY TESTING FOR GULF WAR ILLNESS http://www.autoimmune.com/ UNIFIED VETERANS COALITION FOR U.S., AUSTRALIAN, AND U.K. VETS Special Links For Agent Orange, Gulf War Illness Depleted Uranium Research, Ionized Radiation Articles JP-8 Jet Fuel Toxicity Studies, Secret Government Testing Political Action, Womens Vet Issues & Bible Studies http://xsorbit27.com/users5/unifiedveteranscoalition/ [Non-text portions of this message have been removed] ------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor --------------------~--> In low income neighborhoods, 84% do not own computers. At Network for Good, help bridge the Digital Divide! http://us.click.yahoo.com/V_qgJD/3MnJAA/xGEGAA/Sj.0lB/TM --------------------------------------------------------------------~-> [Brought to you by HTTP://WWW.STOPNATO.ORG.UK] Yahoo! Groups Links <*> To visit your group on the web, go to: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/du-watch/ <*> To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to: du-watch-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com <*> Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to: http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/ ***************************************************************** 45 [DU-WATCH] URANIUM WEAPONS: Depleted Uranium - Air Force Date: Mon, 18 Apr 2005 00:33:35 -0500 (CDT) FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE CONTACT: Bob Nichols Writers&Warriors bobnichols@cox.net LTC Roger Helbig, United States Air Force: A Bully Pushing Around Civilians Air Force Colonel Abuses American Citizens over Uranium Weapons Coverup Rokke: "Helbig! Yes or No?" by Dr. Doug Rokke, US Army Ret., and Bob Nichols, Project Censored Award Winner (Oklahoma City) "Individuals on web sites throughout the United States have complained over a period of months about the abusive and aggressive actions of an Air Force Lieut. Colonel named Roger Helbig," stated Project Censored Award Winning writer Bob Nichols. "Col. Helbig has consistently misrepresented himself and his participation, voluntarily or on a paid basis, as a 'minder' or enforcer for the DOD 'lie' about Uranium Munitions in direct contravention of US Army Regulations and Orders," Nichols stated. "Col. Helbig apparently is fervently following the Secret Los Alamos Memo about Uranium Weapons (UW), aka so-called 'Depleted Uranium,' instructing personnel to lie about Uranium Weapons to maintain the political viability of the continued use of the Genocidal Weapons: 'weaponized radioactive and poisonous ceramic uranium oxide gas and dust' in Iraq and throughout Central Asia," added Nichols. http://traprockpeace.org/twomemos.html Nichols stated "Dr. Doug Rokke, Ph.D., is the former Army Officer in charge of the Pentagon's Depleted Uranium Project. Dr Rokke is a career officer, loyal to the Constitution of the United States of America, not to any political party. He is the man the people of the United States can turn to for 'on the level information' about the true nature of Uranium Weapons (UW )" Dr. Rokke commented "LTC Roger Helbig, United States Air Force: I would suggest that since you claim to be so knowledgeable about DU and my specific activities during Gulf War 1 and while I was the Director of the U.S. Army Depleted Uranium that you produce the actual official documents, not some comments by Bob Cherry or Ed Battle or Mike Kilpatrick, your bosses up the line, verifying your comments." Rokke added "Unless you can do so, please cease and go away. But before you go away you still have not answered; why you, as an United States Air Force officer, refuse to support my / our actions to ensure that United States Department of Defense officials provide medical care to all DU casualties and clean up all environmental contamination as required by AR 700-48 and TB 9-1300-278; and, that medical care is provided to all DU casualties as required by Lt General Ron Peake's April 29, 2004 order." http://traprockpeace.org/depleted_uranium_regs.html Will you provide us a public endorsement supporting full compliance of these mandatory actions? "Yes" or "No"? Dr. Rokke concluded "It is time for you to decide. The question is not about me; but, whether or not United States Department of Defense personnel comply with their own requirements to provide medical care and clean up all environmental contamination as specified in AR 700-48, TB 9-1300-278, and all of the orders mandating medical care for DU casualties." More news as it develops on Uranium Weapons. [End.] [Non-text portions of this message have been removed] ------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor --------------------~--> Give the gift of life to a sick child. Support St. Jude Children's Research Hospital's 'Thanks & Giving.' http://us.click.yahoo.com/3iazvD/6WnJAA/xGEGAA/Sj.0lB/TM --------------------------------------------------------------------~-> [Brought to you by HTTP://WWW.STOPNATO.ORG.UK] Yahoo! Groups Links <*> To visit your group on the web, go to: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/du-watch/ <*> To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to: du-watch-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com <*> Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to: http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/ ***************************************************************** 46 [du-list] Conventional genocide and DU genocide goes on, Date: Mon, 18 Apr 2005 14:30:40 -0700 http://www.buzzflash.com/interviews/05/03/int05016.html Riverbend: Many cities are assaulted by the military without proper press coverage. The latest is Qaim, for example. There has been a siege and assault that has lasted several days already. Last week it was Haditha and Mash'had. We know things are not going well in these areas when we get refugees in Baghdad -- often women and children of men who have been detained for no reason or killed. Very few media sources are actually covering it, and the only casualties discussed are the deaths of 'insurgents' and 'terrorists.' Very few media outlets report about the deaths of women and children -- only when they are caused by roadside bombs or terrorists. Even Arab news networks aren't reporting casualties like before. and Riverbend: I'm sure more than 100,000 people have died in the last two years. Everyone literally knows more than one person who died -- often a relative or a friend. We have people dying of bombs, dying under torture, dying of malnutrition, a lack of shelter, missiles, attacks, abductions, etc. We have illnesses emerging that Iraqis hadn't even heard of in the past -- cancer rates have gone up drastically and in some areas we hear about cholera or typhoid. It's difficult to know just how many people have died because the Ministry of Health was given explicit instructions about not keeping tabs. ---------- No virus found in this outgoing message. Checked by AVG Anti-Virus. Version: 7.0.308 / Virus Database: 266.9.12 - Release Date: 4/15/05 [Non-text portions of this message have been removed] ------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor --------------------~--> In low income neighborhoods, 84% do not own computers. At Network for Good, help bridge the Digital Divide! http://us.click.yahoo.com/EA3HyD/3MnJAA/79vVAA/FGYolB/TM --------------------------------------------------------------------~-> To unsubscribe from this groups send a message to du-list-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com. In the body of the message type unsubscribe and send. Yahoo! Groups Links <*> To visit your group on the web, go to: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/du-list/ <*> To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to: du-list-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com <*> Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to: http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/ ***************************************************************** 47 [du-list] 'Gulf War syndrome' final review Date: Mon, 18 Apr 2005 14:25:00 -0700 'Gulf War syndrome' final review 08:34am 12th April 2005 UK Daily Mail http://www.dailymail.co.uk/pages/live/articles/health/thehealthnews.html?in_article_id=344580&in_page_id=1797 http://news.scotsman.com/latest.cfm?id=4386172 The chair of the UK's public inquiry into so-called Gulf War syndrome is set to address a final review of research into the condition. Evidence from both sides of the Atlantic will be put before the hearing, in the Queen's Robing Room at the House of Lords. The UK's independent public inquiry, headed by Lord Lloyd of Berwick, said in its final report last year that there was "every reason" to accept the existence of Gulf War syndrome. Lord Lloyd's inquiry concluded that health problems suffered by an estimated 6,000 veterans were a direct result of their service in the 1991 conflict. It found that illnesses suffered by the veterans were likely to be due to a combination of causes. These included multiple injections of vaccines, the use of organophosphate pesticides to spray tents, low level exposure to nerve gas, and the inhalation of depleted uranium dust. The inquiry called on the MoD to set up a special fund to make compensation payments to those veterans who had suffered because of their service in the war to liberate Kuwait from Saddam Hussein. But a Ministry of Defence review of more than 100 previously rejected claims for a war pension from veterans of the first Gulf conflict later found irregularities in only six cases. James Binns, who chaired the US Research Committee inquiry into the Gulf War veterans' illnesses, will put evidence uncovered in the US before the hearing. -- Posted for educational and research purposes only, ~ in accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. section 107 ~ NucNews Links and Expanded Archives - http://nucnews.net ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Need a home for your web domain? We recommend our provider, Hosting Direct https://support.hostingdirect.net/cgi-bin/affiliates/clickthru.cgi?id=nucnews ------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor --------------------~--> What would our lives be like without music, dance, and theater? Donate or volunteer in the arts today at Network for Good! http://us.click.yahoo.com/TzSHvD/SOnJAA/79vVAA/FGYolB/TM --------------------------------------------------------------------~-> To unsubscribe from this groups send a message to du-list-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com. In the body of the message type unsubscribe and send. Yahoo! Groups Links <*> To visit your group on the web, go to: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/du-list/ <*> To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to: du-list-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com <*> Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to: http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/ ***************************************************************** 48 [du-list] Congress OKs Funds for WMD Analysis Lab in Maryland Date: Mon, 18 Apr 2005 14:24:55 -0700 Congress OKs Funds for WMD Analysis Lab in Maryland Friday, April 8, 2005 Global Security Newswire http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2005_4_8.html Congress has authorized $13 million for the construction of a 30,000-square-foot facility at the Aberdeen Proving Ground in Maryland that would consolidate work at the U.S. Army site involving testing of hazardous materials, the Baltimore Sun reported yesterday (see GSN, March 18). The new Sample Receipt Center would conduct chemical, biological and radiological testing, but "no nuclear things come here," said Joan Michel, a spokeswoman for the Edgewood Chemical Biological Center at Aberdeen. Analysis on such materials is now conducted at several buildings on the base, she said. Demand for these services has increased since the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, Michel said. "This is not new work," she said. "It is work that we have been doing here for more than three decades." While much of the Army's work in chemical and biological analysis is classified, Ray Mastnjak, manager of chemical biological support at Edgewood, offered one example of its efforts. The center determined that a small metal can found by U.S. troops in Afghanistan contained the radioactive material "red mercury," which can cause liver damage or death if inhaled, Mastnjak said. "We believe it was somebody's attempt to make a dirty bomb," he added (Ted Shelsby, Baltimore Sun, April 7 - http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/local/harford/bal-md.ha.center07apr07,1,2469889.story?coll=bal-local-harford&ctrack=1&cset=true ). -- Posted for educational and research purposes only, ~ in accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. section 107 ~ NucNews Links and Expanded Archives - http://nucnews.net ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Need a home for your web domain? We recommend our provider, Hosting Direct https://support.hostingdirect.net/cgi-bin/affiliates/clickthru.cgi?id=nucnews ------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor --------------------~--> In low income neighborhoods, 84% do not own computers. 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Groups is subject to: http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/ ***************************************************************** 49 DHHS: CDC: Designation of a Class of Employees for Addition to the Special Exposure Cohort FR Doc 05-7697 [Federal Register: April 18, 2005 (Volume 70, Number 73)] [Notices] [Page 20123] From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr18ap05-59] DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Designation of a Class of Employees for Addition to the Special Exposure Cohort AGENCY: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). ACTION: Notice. SUMMARY: The Department of Health and Human Services (``HHS'') gives notice of a decision to designate a class of employees at the Mallinckrodt Chemical Company, Destrehan Street Plant, in Saint Louis, Missouri as an addition to the Special Exposure Cohort (SEC) under the Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act of 2000. On April 11, 2005, the Secretary of HHS designated the following class of employees as an addition to the SEC: Employees of the Department of Energy (DOE) or DOE contractors or subcontractors employed by the Uranium Division of Mallinckrodt Chemical Works, Destrehan Street Facility, during the period from 1942 through 1948 and whom were employed for a number of work days aggregating at least 250 work days either solely under this employment or in combination with work days within the parameters (excluding aggregate work day requirements) established for other classes of employees included in the SEC. This designation will become effective on May 12, 2005, unless Congress provides otherwise prior to the effective date. After this effective date, HHS will publish a notice in the Federal Register reporting the addition of this class to the SEC or the result of any provision by Congress regarding the decision by HHS to add the class to the SEC. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Larry Elliott, Director, Office of Compensation Analysis and Support, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, 4676 Columbia Parkway, MS C-46, Cincinnati, OH 45226, Telephone 513-533-6800 (this is not a toll-free number). Information requests can also be submitted by e-mail to OCAS@CDC.GOV. Dated: April 13, 2005. John Howard, Director, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. [FR Doc. 05-7697 Filed 4-15-05; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4160-17-P ***************************************************************** 50 NRC: Advisory Committee on the Medical Uses of Isotopes: Meeting FR Doc 05-7655 [Federal Register: April 18, 2005 (Volume 70, Number 73)] [Notices] [Page 20187] From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr18ap05-105] Notice AGENCY: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. ACTION: Updated notice of meeting. SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission will convene a meeting of the Advisory Committee on the Medical Uses of Isotopes (ACMUI) on April 20 and 21, 2005. Although the dates of the ACMUI public meeting remain April 20 and 21, as originally published in the February 28, 2005 notice (see 70 FR 9611), this notice is meant to alert interested parties that the time for the ACMUI's briefing to the Commission has changed. See heading below entitled ``Date and Time for Commission Briefing'' for details. A sample of agenda items to be discussed during the public sessions includes: (1) Status of Rulemaking: Pt. 35 Training and Experience; (2) Status and Update: Redefining Medical Events; (3) Case Experience in Using I-125 Seeds as Markers; (4) FDA Radiation Dose Limits for Human Research Subjects Using Certain Radiolabeled Drugs, and (5) Establishing Guidance on Exceeding Dose Limits for Members of the Public who would serve as Caregivers to Persons undergoing Radiopharmaceutical Therapy. To review the agenda, see http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/acmui/agenda/ or contact arm@nrc.gov. Purpose: Discuss issues related to 10 CFR 35, Medical Use of Byproduct Material. Date and Time for Closed Session Meeting: April 21, 2005, from 8 a.m. to 10 a.m. This session will be closed so that NRC staff can brief the ACMUI on sensitive information regarding protective security measures, and so that the ACMUI can discuss internal personnel matters. Dates and Times for Public Meetings: April 20, 2005, from 8 a.m. to 5 p.m.; and April 21, 2005, from 10 a.m. to 5 p.m. Address for Public Meetings: Bethesda North Marriott Hotel, 5701 Marinelli Road, North Bethesda, MD 20552-2785. Date and Time for Commission Briefing: April 20, 2005, from 3:15 to 4:45 p.m. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Angela R. McIntosh, telephone (301) 415-5030; e-mail arw@nrc.gov of the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001. Conduct of the Meeting Leon S. Malmud, M.D., will chair the meeting. Dr. Malmud will conduct the meeting in a manner that will facilitate the orderly conduct of business. The following procedures apply to public participation in the meeting: 1. Persons who wish to provide a written statement should submit a reproducible copy to Angela R. McIntosh, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Two White Flint North, Mail Stop T8F5, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD 20852-2738. Submittals must be postmarked by April 1, 2005, and must pertain to the topics on the agenda for the meeting. 2. Questions from members of the public will be permitted during the meeting, at the discretion of the Chairman. 3. The transcript and written comments will be available for inspection on NRC's Web site (http://www.nrc.gov) and at the NRC Public Document Room, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD 20852-2738, telephone (800) 397-4209, on or about July 20, 2005. This meeting will be held in accordance with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (primarily Section 161a); the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App); and the Commission's regulations in Title 10, U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, Part 7. 4. Attendees are requested to notify Angela R. McIntosh at (301) 415-5030 of their planned attendance if special services, such as for the hearing impaired, are necessary. Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 12th day of April, 2005. For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Andrew L. Bates, Advisory Committee Management Officer. [FR Doc. 05-7655 Filed 4-17-05; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590-01-P ***************************************************************** 51 [du-list] APG facilities for analyzing hazardous materials may Date: Mon, 18 Apr 2005 14:24:58 -0700 APG facilities for analyzing hazardous materials may grow By Ted Shelsby The Baltimore Sun Staff Originally published April 7, 2005 http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/local/harford/bal-md.ha.center07apr07,1,2469889.story?coll=bal-local-harford&ctrack=1&cset=true The Army wants to expand and upgrade facilities at Aberdeen Proving Ground where it receives and analyzes unknown and potentially hazardous items, such as chemicals found in roadside bombs in Iraq. Congress has authorized $13 million for the proposed construction of the Sample Receipt Center at Aberdeen. When the facility is completed in 2007, the military, FBI and other government agencies would have more capacity to have suspicious items tested to determine their threat to public safety. "This is not new work," said Joan Michel, a spokeswoman for the Army's Edgewood Chemical Biological Center (ECBC), which would operate the facility. "It is work that we have been doing here for more than three decades." Officials from ECBC held a public meeting last night at the Edgewood Senior Center to brief area residents on the center's plans. Seven people attended, including a county councilman, and none expressed opposition to the project. Councilman Dion F. Guthrie, a Democrat who represents Joppa and Edgewood, said after the meeting that he supports the Edgewood plans. "This is good for the security of our country," he said. Before the meeting, Ray Mastnjak, manager of chemical biological support at ECBC, said the new center would combine work scattered among half a dozen buildings on the base into a "one-stop shop" that would speed up the Army's work. Plans are to construct the 30,000-square-foot facility in the Aberdeen Proving Ground Edgewood Area. Mastnjak said much of the Army's work in chemical and biological analysis is classified. But he offered one example of such work. It involved receiving a small metal can with strange markings, found by the Army in Afghanistan. The center determined that it contained red mercury which, if inhaled, can cause liver damage or death. "We believe it was somebody's attempt to make a dirty bomb," Mastnjak said. Michel said that items coming to the facility would go through chemical, biological and radiological testing, but added that "no nuclear things come here." She said there has been a big increase in demand for these services since the Sept. 11 attacks. -- Posted for educational and research purposes only, ~ in accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. section 107 ~ NucNews Links and Expanded Archives - http://nucnews.net ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Need a home for your web domain? We recommend our provider, Hosting Direct https://support.hostingdirect.net/cgi-bin/affiliates/clickthru.cgi?id=nucnews ------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor --------------------~--> What would our lives be like without music, dance, and theater? Donate or volunteer in the arts today at Network for Good! http://us.click.yahoo.com/TzSHvD/SOnJAA/79vVAA/FGYolB/TM --------------------------------------------------------------------~-> To unsubscribe from this groups send a message to du-list-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com. In the body of the message type unsubscribe and send. Yahoo! Groups Links <*> To visit your group on the web, go to: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/du-list/ <*> To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to: du-list-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com <*> Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to: http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/ ***************************************************************** 52 AU ABC: WA resists pressure to mine uranium Australian Broadcasting Corporation Online"> Monday, 18 April 2005. 13:32 (AEST)Monday, 18 April 2005. 13:32 The head of a Federal Government inquiry into the nation's uranium resources believes Western Australia has the potential to participate in the industry. Federal MP Geoff Prosser says Australia has about 45 per cent of the world's known uranium deposits. WA has two uranium reserves, one in the northern goldfields and another at Kintore, in the far east Pilbara. The State Government banned the mining of uranium in 2002. However, Mr Prosser says given the high prices for the mineral he would be surprised if the Government did not change its stance. "What the State Government of Western Australia does is up to them, but I would think that given the price of yellowcake at present, it would be hard to resist a sensible argument that the product should be mined and exported," he said. A spokeswoman for Energy Minister Alan Carpenter says there will be no uranium mining under a Gallop-led State Government. ***************************************************************** 53 Las Vegas SUN: Editorial: So this is sound science? Today: April 18, 2005 at 9:11:58 PDT LAS VEGAS SUN The Energy Department had for years been planning a design for Yucca Mountain that it could pass off as being safe for 10,000 years. But a federal court last year threw out that standard for the mountain 90 miles northwest of Las Vegas that is being built to hold the nation's high-level nuclear waste. The court deferred to a recommendation by the National Academy of Sciences, which said Yucca Mountain should be designed to safely contain radiation for hundreds of thousands of years. The Environmental Protection Agency is working on a design that would meet the court's ruling, a task that we are not alone in believing is impossible. Because it's impossible, we have been expecting attempts to circumvent the court's ruling. A 132-page report by the Electric Power Research Institute is one such attempt. Its conclusion is that the 10,000-year radiation standard should be retained, and that the federal government should allow heavier leaks of radiation after that time has elapsed. This institute, funded by the majority of the power companies in the United States, is a strong supporter of nuclear power. Its conflicts of interest should be enough to destroy the credibility of its report. But we believe its conclusion will do the job. Essentially, it's saying that it doesn't matter if we contaminate the Nevadans who will be here 10,000 years from now. Heaven help us all if this is an example of the type of "sound science" President Bush says he wants applied to Yucca Mountain. ***************************************************************** 54 RGJ: Senator’s clout helps Nevada [Reno Gazette-Journal] Doug AbrahmsRENO GAZETTE-JOURNAL 4/17/2005 11:14 pm WASHINGTON — Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid’s nomination of a former Nevada congressman to the commission that will recommend U.S. military base closings initially was blocked by the White House. The Bush administration said that Las Vegas attorney Jim Bilbray had criticized the president and therefore shouldn’t be allowed on the commission. So Reid went to U.S. Sen. John Warner, Armed Services Committee chairman, and threatened to stop the commission if Bilbray wasn’t included. “To make a long story short, he’s on,” Reid said. For Nevadans, Reid’s elevation to Senate Democratic leader allows him to combine his knowledge of Senate procedures with additional clout. Because of his new position, he was able to nominate Bilbray to the base closing commission to better protect Fallon Naval Air Station, Nellis Air Force Base and other Nevada facilities from being shuttered. When U.S. Rep. Jon Porter, R-Henderson, put together a hearing on falsified documents related to Yucca Mountain, he acknowledged help from Reid’s staff. And Reid was able to secure $500,000 for a desalination plant at the University of Nevada, Reno and an oral history project at the university. Reid’s new position probably won’t lead to a lot of new federal spending into the state in the short term; for years he has been earmarking money for Nevada projects, said Eric Herzik, a political analyst at UNR. “(Reid’s new position) provides visibility to the state that we’ve never had in the past,” Herzik said. align="right">© Copyright Reno Gazette-Journal, a Gannett Co. Inc.Newspaper. ***************************************************************** 55 Get Underground: 'Orphaned Waste' by David Biddle - - 04.18.05 April 22nd marks the thirty-fifth anniversary of the first Earth Day. While few Americans pay much attention to this date anymore, it is certainly a time for reflection on all the big screw ups in the history of the Great American Economy. Nuclear powers a good one. Nuclear power plants get so "hot" after about forty or fifty years that they have to be moth-balled (meaning they are covered in concrete two-feet thick and the property they rest on is cordoned off for at least 300 years). The plan is also to bury existing waste from these plants under Yucca Mountain in Nevadatrucking spent fuel rods and such thousands of miles for the next several decades. Or take mining precious metals, one of the most polluting and energy intensive activities ever conceived. To make one wedding ring out of raw gold requires 20 tons of mining waste. Then theres the war in Iraquntold hundreds of billions of dollars so that the United States of America can maintain a strategic foothold in the middle of an Arab world that supplies us with 46% of our petroleum. However, Earth Day-35 is also time to think about something a bit more mundane: those little TVs you have strategically placed in your kitchen, living room, bedroom, and den. Youre probably going to be getting rid of them very soon. The original plan was that by the end of 2006 all of the countrys 1,240-plus TV stations are required to begin giving back the analog signals they were loaned by the federal government beginning in the 1940s. They will be purchasing the rights to new digital signals. The timetable has been adjusted a bit since 1999 when this plan was promulgated (an 85% market penetration clause was recently put in place and they are still working the bugs out of big medias concerns about movie pirating). Rest assured, though, in effect, the move is on to force us all to deal with digital TVwhether we like it or not. © 2001-4 Get Underground ... ***************************************************************** 56 Grist: Kaisha Atakhanova fought to keep nuclear waste out of Kazakhstan | By Michelle Nijhuis | Grist Magazine | Main Dish | 18 Apr 2005 Out of the Lab, Into the Fire By Michelle Nijhuis 18 Apr 2005 [Kaisha Atakhanova.] Kaisha Atakhanova. Photo: Goldman Environmental Prize. The Republic of Kazakhstan bears the scars of its Soviet past. Intensive agriculture has drastically shrunk the inland Aral Sea, creating one of the world's worst ecological disasters, while decades of nuclear testing have poisoned the landscape and its people. The country -- which is dominated by vast stretches of steppe grassland, and underlain by rich oil and mineral deposits -- currently harbors some 237 million tons of nuclear waste. Kaisha Atakhanova, a biologist from Karaganda, Kazakhstan, has dedicated herself to repairing this damage. The founder of the Karaganda Ecological Center, or EcoCenter, Atakhanova recently helped defeat legislation that would have allowed even more nuclear waste to be commercially imported into the country. She and her allies argued that Kazakhstan's mineral wealth made it unnecessary for the country to earn money from waste disposal, and pointed out that contamination would discourage international tourism. EcoCenter's broad and well-orchestrated campaign led the national parliament to drop the legislation in late 2003, and the victory has encouraged the growth of a grassroots environmental movement in Kazakhstan. Atakhanova, 47, continues to direct the EcoCenter, and has helped to develop a nationwide network of more than 100 activist groups. Kaisha Atakhanova was awarded one of six 2005 Goldman Environmental Prizes in a ceremony in San Francisco on April 18. Atakhanova plans to invest her $125,000 prize in educational and environmental projects in Kazakhstan. She spoke to Grist through a translator. [question] How has the Soviet nuclear legacy affected the people of Kazakhstan? [answer] Over 100 tests were done openly in Kazakhstan, and many more were done underground. Together, the radiation was more than 100 times that of the Hiroshima bomb. Many millions of people were affected by it. The nuclear testing site was closed by the president of Kazakhstan in 1990, but he was not able to stop the radiation. That will continue for years to come. And the worst effects were not with the first and second generations of people -- the worst will come with the third, fourth, and fifth generations. [question] What inspired you to found the EcoCenter? [Kaisha Atakhanova, 2005 Goldman Environmental Prize Winner, Asia (Kazakhstan), with petition for nuclear rights, Sarzhal.] Atakhanova circulates a petition as part of her anti-nuclear efforts. Photo: Will Parrinello. [answer] I used to do a lot of scientific research [on the genetic effects of radiation exposure], but I realized that it was only useful for me, not for doing anything good for the people around me. I needed to make a change, to work with the people who had been exposed to radiation. EcoCenter has [operated] for 12 years, and many biologists and former students now work with me. Our purpose is to provide information to people so they can understand the conditions they are living in, and how to change them. [question] Who have your strongest allies been? [answer] It's really hard to do the work we do by ourselves. There were a total of 15 organizations that started our campaign, and now there are 100 of us [in a network called EcoForum]. We've also gotten a lot of support from our Russian colleagues -- from environmental groups in Russia -- and from other international colleagues and donor organizations. [question] Tell me how you stopped legislation that would have allowed nuclear waste to be commercially imported into Kazakhstan. [answer] It was a two-year-long campaign. We did not do a public protest on the street with banners. Instead, we had long conversations with scientists, with people in politics, and we did a "fax attack." People put together letters and sent them to parliament by fax. A kids' organization wrote letters to the president's wife, and youth groups organized debates on the issue -- everybody had a role, everybody, on their level, contributed to the campaign. So the government received a very well-thought-out campaign. Sometimes it's not very productive to yell and scream -- we had a very strong argument, with very good background on the issue. [Kaisha Atakhanova.] A local memorial pays tribute to victims of Soviet-era nuclear testing. Photo: Will Parrinello. [question] What do you think convinced the government to listen to you? [answer] They realized that we had a very strong backbone and a lot of expertise, and that there were a lot of people supporting us -- that this was bigger than the territory of Kazakhstan. [question] How has this victory affected the environmental movement in Kazakhstan? [answer] It was very important to have this victory, very important for the movement to realize that we could make this happen. Our experience was used by other organizations in their campaigns -- environmental organizations fighting deforestation used our strategy. We even put together a brochure about our strategies. This campaign was also very important in getting the government to acknowledge us. We've become like partners for the government -- now, they turn to us as experts. [question] What do you consider the most serious environmental problem facing the country today? [answer] The majority of our problems are coming from our use of natural resources -- gas, oil, uranium. A lot of problems are coming from the fact that we're seen as a resource country, that people are taking resources from the land without thinking of the environmental impacts. When we have economic, political, and environmental issues involved, the political and economic issues usually swing over the environmental issues. We hope the environment will become a bigger part of our decision-making process. Spend Your $.02 Discuss this storyin our blog, Gristmill. [question] What do you hope Kazakhstan looks like in 20 years? [answer] I hope that in 20 years, there will be a stable government with stable politics, and a clear policy on environmental impacts. I hope we will have a sustainable and truly democratic state. [ Michelle Nijhuis] Michelle Nijhuis is a freelance writer living outside of Paonia, Colo. Grist Magazine: Environmental News and Commentary ***************************************************************** 57 [NukeNet] NPT and Rokkasho Date: Mon, 18 Apr 2005 14:25:31 -0700 NukeNet Anti-Nuclear Network (nukenet@energyjustice.net) Call for a Moratorium on the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant Rokkasho. The name might not be well known outside of the anti-nuclear movement, but we hope it will become better known during the NPT Review Conference. Rokkasho is the site of a huge reprocessing plant being constructed on the northern tip of Honshu, the largest island in Japan. In December last year it began uranium trials (testing the processes using depleted uranium). Active trials using spent nuclear fuel are scheduled to begin in December this year and the plant is due to start operations in May 2007. It will then become the first commercial-scale reprocessing plant outside of the nuclear weapons states, extracting 8 tons of plutonium per year from the spent fuel produced in Japan's nuclear reactors. That is enough to build 1,000 Nagasaki-type bombs per year. If that isn't reason enough for it to be placed high on the agenda of the NPT Review Conference, what is? George Bush might not often agree with Mohamed ElBaradei and Kofi Annan, but he agrees that facilities for reprocessing spent nuclear fuel and for uranium enrichment present a nuclear proliferation risk. Though the fine points of their proposals differ, over the last year or so all three of them have called for a moratorium on these facilities. They have all also studiously avoided mentioning Rokkasho. George Bush much prefers to talk about Iran and North Korea, but, dangerous though the nuclear developments in those two countries are, he can't expect the world to take him seriously when he ignores Japan's enrichment and reprocessing facilities. If 'non-nuclear weapons state' Japan is allowed to operate Rokkasho, other non-nuclear weapons states will inevitably feel discriminated against if they can't have such facilities too. It sets a bad precedent for would-be proliferators, regardless of whether Japan plans to build nuclear weapons itself. So Rokkasho should be the first candidate for a moratorium. ElBaradei has said that the moratorium idea will be raised at the NPT Review Conference, but at the moment the proposal doesn't seem to have the support of most of the key players. Japan, the US and Iran have all rejected it on the grounds of narrowly defined 'national interests'. They don't want any of their pet projects to be jeopardized. A broad view of the 'national interests' of these countries would recognize that the unraveling of the non-proliferation regime is about as dangerous a development as could be imagined. Measured against this greater 'national interest', sacrificing new reprocessing and enrichment projects, the benefits of which are highly dubious anyway, shouldn't be too difficult a decision. But lack of vision seems to be a common problem amongst the world's leaders these days, so we don't expect them to shift without some pressure from below. NGOs must take the lead on this issue. Even though a few national governments are determined to kill the moratorium idea, NGOs must not lose sight of the main issue. The moratorium idea was proposed to respond to a real danger. That danger is that if weapons-usable material continues to be produced, and if more and more countries develop the technology to produce this material, nuclear weapons will be acquired by more and more countries, and the chance of these weapons finding their way into the hands of terrorists increases. If governments won't focus on this danger in a non-discriminatory way, NGOs must continue to bring their attention back to this issue. We can give credit to Mohamed ElBaradei for putting the issue on the NPT Review Conference agenda, but we can't leave it to him to take the running on the debate. He and his organization, the IAEA, are committed to promoting nuclear energy, so they have linked the moratorium proposal to the perverse idea of internationalizing reprocessing and uranium enrichment services. We must continue to point out the flaws in this proposal. Let us raise the issue of Rokkasho and other related issues at, among others, the following event: Thursday, May 5 A moratorium on uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing? Implications for the NPT Where: UN Conference Room E When: 11 am - 1 pm Philip White International Liaison Officer Citizens' Nuclear Information Center (Tokyo) Aileen Mioko Smith Director, Green Action (Kyoto, Japan) Citizens' Nuclear Information Center 3F Kotobuki Bdg, 1-58-15, Higashi-Nakano, Nakano-ku, Tokyo 164-0003 Phone: 81-3-5330-9520 Fax: 81-3-5330-9530 http://cnic.jp/english/ cnic@nifty.com _______________________________________________________________________ Subscribe/Unsubscribe Here: http://www.energyjustice.net/nukenet/ Change your settings or access the archives at: http://energyjustice.net/mailman/listinfo/nukenet_energyjustice.net ***************************************************************** 58 Seattle Post-Intelligencer: Hanford Cleanup: A federal obligation [seattlepi.com] [OPINION] Monday, April 18, 2005 SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER EDITORIAL BOARD Good intentions won't clean up the Hanford Nuclear Reservation. Removing a horrendous amount of atomic trash requires real money. The Bush administration talks a reasonably good game, at least when it isn't trying to rewrite regulations to weaken the federal cleanup commitment. But its budget proposals for Hanford and other nuclear waste sites fail when it counts most. Granted, the mismanagement that led to soaring budget deficits requires prudence in fiscal matters. And the administration and its predecessors have put a lot of effort into dealing with waste, especially at Hanford. But the administration's proposals to cut a quarter-billion dollars from Hanford's cleanup in fiscal year 2006 show a dangerous amount of complacency about the serious environmental problems there. And, as the Tri-City Herald recently reported, Washington state officials are worried that cuts envisioned for the following year will lead to breaking federal commitments to meet legal deadlines for work. That's wrong when the cleanup is so far from done. Hanford's problems are the result of its role in supporting national security, which merits extra attention of the needs there. Plus, the loss of skilled, experienced people could make it harder to gear up again. Adding to the difficulties, both the EPA and a recent inspector general's report have questioned the Energy Department's cleanup priorities. The federal government needs to spend more and do so wisely to meet its obligations at Hanford. [SEATTLEPI.COM POLL] Can America afford to scale back spending on the clean-up of the Hanford Nuclear Reservation? Yes. The budget and other needs require cuts No. The feds must clean up the mess they made [Seattle Post-Intelligencer] 101 Elliott Ave. W. Seattle, WA 98119 (206) 448-8000 Send comments to newmedia@seattlepi.com ©1996-2005 Seattle Post-Intelligencer ***************************************************************** 59 lamonitor.com: Coping with change in Los Alamos The Online News Source for Los Alamos ROGER SNODGRASS, , Monitor Assistant Editor Los Alamos is the home of a national flagship nuclear laboratory that has endured some controversy for more than two years. Now, in various ways, people are starting to confront the situation. For most of the last year the employees of Los Alamos National Laboratory and the people who live within the lab's sphere of influence have watched the approach of a transformation on an unpredictable scale. On one side of the scale, the change might upset their expectations, their livelihoods, their domestic tranquility and personal peace of mind. On the other hand, maybe it wouldn't be such a big deal. When the Department of Energy, the source of most of the laboratory's $2 billion-plus annual budget decided two years ago, to open LANL's contract to any qualified bidder, most people had no choice as individuals but to wait to see what would happen. Then, in July 2004, something happened that ratcheted up the tension - the lab suspended operations. In parts of the lab, the shutdown was in effect for seven months. Another momentous event happened in December. The National Nuclear Security Administration released a draft Request for Proposal, tentatively specifying for the first time what its intentions were. Several different responses have emerged to meet these challenges. For Doug Roberts, a computer software engineer at LANL, a decisive moment came during Christmas holidays at the end of 2004. "Many of us were frustrated at how the shutdown was handled. There was no place to bring issues to light," he said during an interview. He had tried to post a letter on the "Public Forum" of the laboratory's internal website, but grew impatient after several weeks of waiting for it to appear. Somebody suggested that he start an alternative web page. Determined to give it a try, he found some generic software for a web log (or "blog") and two hours later, he had a page (http://lanl-the-real-story.blogspot.com/), and within a few more weeks, a readership. It grew fairly rapidly, he said, helped along by stories in the press. The laboratory, to nobody's surprise, is made up of many intelligent and credible people who are actively curious and have advanced communication skills. The blog deals in "hot issues" - mostly critical of current managers at the lab. It includes anonymous rants and open disclosures, along with news stories, unclassified memos and thoughtful attempts to analyze problems and pose solutions. Roberts said there are only two requirements - that the post be about LANL and that it be "presented in a professional fashion." Lately, the blog has seen fewer original posts and more community involvement in discussing the postings. Some articles attract many comments, leading to comments on the comments. For bloggers the form provides a chance to participate personally in important issues; and those who are interested in the bloggers and their issues get instant information and feedback about topics that can be relatively taboo. Roberts spends more than five hours a day of his own time managing the Web site these days. The main problem now is what he calls "trolls" or "spoilers." These are visitors to the site who want to stir things up and incite a "flame war." Reluctant to censor, Roberts said he has only in the last few weeks been forced to delete comments, because they were inflammatory or profane, or because of requests from other participants. He finds the blog to be self-regulating, with the readers themselves doing their job of processing, approving or discounting information. Roberts said the laboratory, while critical at first, has supported his rights to work on the blog on his own time, and he even has a letter from the laboratory spelling that out. Over all, he is not trying to influence the outcome of the management competition as much as he is trying to create an uncensored environment in which real needs can be identified and unmentionable problems can be aired out. Coalition for excellence On a much cooler level, the Coalition for LANL Excellence arose from an appreciation for the unusual complications surrounding laboratory issues. A coalition of organizations and individuals, CLE remarkably unites both the Democratic and Republican parties of Los Alamos County, and includes representatives of the Laboratory Retiree Group, the Retired Public Employee Association, and the University Professional and Technical Employees Union. They came together, also at the end of 2004, in response to the draft RFP, as an alarm was sounded throughout the community about potentially damaging provisions and omissions in the document, particularly with respect to employee and retirement benefits. The group's influence helped put the brakes on the competition, as they asked for and received a delay, along with a visit by Tyler Przybylek, chairman of the source evaluation board in charge of the management competition. The group's comments also appeared to have an influence on the congressional delegation, which expressed similar concerns. At a meeting this week, the Executive Committee said it was not as hard as it seemed for them to be united. "It's in our common interest," said former County Councilor Robert Gibson. By focusing on excellence as the goal, the group seeks the high ground, well above partisanship. "We want to know who has influence on what, so we can promote an excellent outcome." Spurred to respond to the deficiencies they saw in the RFP, the group saw an ongoing role. "The issue of benefits was there, but we have devoted our professional careers to the lab," said Charles Mansfield, a LANL retiree and chairman of the Laboratory Retiree Group. Now they are looking at ways to make a difference and to improve the prospects for LANL, regardless of who wins the contract. The group is methodical and studious, taking more of a white paper approach to the issues. CEL's self-descriptions, findings and relevant new information are posted at http://groups.yahoo.com/group/COALITIONforLANLEXCELLENCE/. Time Is of the Essence A new organization composed of some very familiar Los Alamos Institutions, Time Is of the Essence, started meeting about a month ago. TIE is made of representatives from major community organizations, Los Alamos County, the public schools, the medical center, UNM-LA, the Chamber of Commerce and Los Alamos Commerce and Development Center, as well as the retiree groups. Another non-partisan group, TIE's constituent organizations are monitoring the competition carefully, and looking for ways to leverage their own influence in a larger group. "We're not about protecting the status quo," said Denise Lane, the group's chair. "We're trying to be proactive, as a catalyst for change. We see this as an opportunity to make some good things happen that really help the laboratory." While TIE is still in the formative stages, its emphasis is on the reciprocal relationship between the lab and the community. "It's fair to say, a number of people feel that relationship needs to be stronger, higher level of communication," Lane said. "There's a lot of room for improvement." © 2003 Los Alamos Monitor All Rights Reserved. ***************************************************************** 60 DOE: Environmental Management Site-Specific Advisory Board, Rocky FR Doc 05-7695 [Federal Register: April 18, 2005 (Volume 70, Number 73)] [Notices] [Page 20117] From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr18ap05-51] Flats AGENCY: Department of Energy. ACTION: Notice of open meeting. SUMMARY: This notice announces a meeting of the Environmental Management Site-Specific Advisory Board (EMSSAB), Rocky Flats. The Federal Advisory Committee Act (Pub. L. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770) requires that public notice of this meeting be announced in the Federal Register. DATES: Thursday, May 5, 2005, 6 p.m. to 9 p.m. ADDRESSES: College Hill Library, Room L-107, Front Range Community College, 3705 W. 112th Avenue, Westminster, Colorado. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ken Korkia, Executive Director, Rocky Flats Citizens Advisory Board, 10808 Highway 93, Unit B, Building 60, Room 107B, Golden, CO 80403; telephone (303) 966-7855; fax (303) 966- 7856. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Purpose of the Board: The purpose of the Board is to make recommendations to DOE in the areas of environmental restoration, waste management, and related activities. Tentative Agenda: 1. Presentation and Discussion on the Draft Rocky Flats Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study Report. 2. Update on the Independent Validation and Verification of Rocky Flats Cleanup. 3. Discussion of Comments on the Memorandum of Understanding between the Departments of Energy and Interior for the Rocky Flats National Wildlife Refuge. 4. Other Board business may be conducted as necessary. Public Participation: The meeting is open to the public. Written statements may be filed with the Board either before or after the meeting. Individuals who wish to make oral statements pertaining to agenda items should contact Ken Korkia at the address or telephone number listed above. Requests must be received at least five days prior to the meeting and reasonable provisions will be made to include the presentation in the agenda. The Deputy Designated Federal Officer is empowered to conduct the meeting in a fashion that will facilitate the orderly conduct of business. Individuals wishing to make public comment will be provided a maximum of five minutes to present their comments. Minutes: The minutes of this meeting will be available for public review and copying at the office of the Rocky Flats Citizens Advisory Board, 10808 Highway 93, Unit B, Building 60, Room 107B, Golden, CO 80403; telephone (303) 966-7855. Hours of operations are 7:30 a.m. to 4 p.m., Monday through Friday. Minutes will also be made available by writing or calling Ken Korkia at the address or telephone number listed above. Board meeting minutes are posted on RFCAB's Web site within one month following each meeting at: http://www.rfcab.org/Minutes.HTML. Issued at Washington, DC on April 13, 2005. Rachel M. Samuel, Deputy Advisory Committee Management Officer. [FR Doc. 05-7695 Filed 4-15-05; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 6450-01-P ***************************************************************** NOTE: In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. section 107 this material is distributed without profit or payment to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving this information for non-profit research and educational purposes only. For more information go to: *****************************************************************