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                         NUCLEAR POLICY
 
1 [NYTr] Solana: military strike on Iran would be a 'mistake'
2 [southnews] Solana warns against Iran strike
3 [southnews] WMD official cautions US over Iran
4 Guardian Unlimited: Rice warns Iran against provoking Israel
5 Xinhua: Iran criticizes US for sabotaging nuclear talks   
6 CNN International: Can the U.S. defuse Iran?
7 Scoop: Hans Blix - Iran Has Legal Right To Enrich Uranium
8 US: KR: Proposed budget focuses on security, would cut domestic prog
9 US: KR: Budget includes funds for study of nuclear bunker buster
10 US: CNN: The other nuke nightmare
11 US: Las Vegas SUN: Defense Budget Would Buy Fewer Weapons
12 US: Progressive News: The Military's Dirty Munitions 
13 Guardian Unlimited: Pakistan Denies New Allegations Over Nukes
14 Guardian Unlimited: Russia Gets U.S. Money to Destroy Weapons
15 Pakistan News: Pak denies missing of uranium cylinders
16 Pakistan News: Pak has eliminated black market nuclear proliferation
 
                         NUCLEAR REACTORS
 
17 Chernobyl Scrap Equipment Up for Sale As 7 Million Suffer Rad Induce
18 [NukeNet] Chernobyl Scrap Equipment Up for Sale As 7 Million
19 US: NRC: Nuclear Management Company; Notice of Consideration of Issu
20 US: NRC: Notice of Availability of Environmental Assessment and Find
21 Daily Yomiuri: 'Dream-come-true' reactor 
22 US: Platts: NRC's 2006 budget request higher than 2005
23 BBC: Aid for closed nuclear plant area
24 FT.com: China to pioneer pebble bed N-reactor 
25 US: NBCSandiego.com: San Onofre Nuclear Plant May Be Forced To Shut 
26 Las Vegas SUN: Chernobyl Scrap Equipment Up for Sale
27 US: NRC: Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards; Revised
 
                          NUCLEAR SAFETY
 
28 [DU-WATCH] Urgent message on radioactive munitions from Doug
29 US: Star-Telegram: Hazardous cargo raises safety concerns
30 US: Des Moines Register: Hearing set on ammunition plant illness
31 US: UCLA International Institute: Memoirs of an Atomic Bomb Survivor
32 US: Hawk Eye: Officials unable to pinpoint radiation absorption 
33 Scotsman.com: Nuclear Submarine Repaired and Ready to Leave the Rock
 
                         NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE
 
34 US: [CMEP] NRC Ruling Doesn't Solve Waste Problem
35 US: [shundahaialerts] Latest on the PFS/ Skull Valley Nuclear Dump
36 NRC: United States Enrichment Corporation, Paducah Gaseous Diffusion
37 US: NRC: Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste; Notice of Meeting
38 Daily Yomiuri: Operator must rebuild public trust in Monju
39 Bellona: Bulgarian spent nuclear fuel – new source of Mayak plant’s 
40 Las Vegas SUN: Editorial: Hope, peril await foes of Yucca
41 Las Vegas SUN: $651 million requested for Yucca
42 RGJ: Yucca cutbacks create time to strategize
43 Salt Lake Tribune: Yucca Mountain spent nuclear fuel waste
44 US: Salt Lake Tribune: Moving N-waste no easy, or fast, task 
45 Las Vegas SUN: Budget has less money for Yucca Mountain, targets
 
                         NUCLEAR WEAPONS
 
46 US: APS: Underestimating the Consequences of Use of Nuclear Weapons
47 US: Independent: US nuclear upgrade may violate test ban 
 
                        US DEPT. OF ENERGY
 
48 ABQjournal: LANL Workers Will Get Benefits 
49 Las Vegas SUN: Glance on Energy Department Budget
50 LA TIMES: An Idyllic Scene Polluted With Controversy 
 
                          OTHER NUCLEAR
 
51 [du-list] DU in the news - 8th Feb 05
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                         FULL NEWS STORIES
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 1 [NYTr] Solana: military strike on Iran would be a 'mistake'
 
Date: Mon, 7 Feb 2005 17:06:55 -0600 (CST)

 
Via NY Transfer News Collective  *  All the News that Doesn't Fit
 
sent by Simon McGuinness

EU Observer - Feb 7, 2005
http://euobserver.com/?aid=18344&rk=1

Solana: military strike on Iran would be a 'mistake'

By Marit Ruuda

A military strike on Iran's nuclear facilities would be "a mistake" and
would enormously complicate the situation, the EU's foreign policy chief
Javier Solana has warned.

Speaking on Britain's ITV television network on Sunday (6 February), Mr
Solana said that such unilateral action would be counter-productive.

Asked about US Vice President Dick Cheney's statement last month that
Israel might attack Irans nuclear facilities without warning, EU's
foreign policy chief replied, "I think that would be something I would
not like to see taking place".

"That would be a mistake. That will complicate enormously the
situation", he added. 

Asked his views on UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw's comments that US
military action against Iran is "inconceivable", Mr Solana replied, "I
think at this point in time military action ... is very difficult to
conceive".

"I don't think that the United States has at this point of time the wish
or the will or the capability to do that", he continued. 

Mr Solana's comments come as US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice is
continuing her first major European and Middle East tour since taking up
the job. 

Last week in London Ms Rice claimed that a strike on Iran was "not on
the agenda at this point".

The US has been urging a tougher stance against Tehran, while Germany,
France and the UK are trying to persuade Tehran to drop its nuclear
programme through diplomatic channels.
       
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 2 [southnews] Solana warns against Iran strike
 
Date: Mon, 7 Feb 2005 17:45:47 -0600 (CST)

 
A military strike on Iran's nuclear facilities would be "a mistake", the 
European Union's foreign policy chief, Javier Solana, has warned.

Asked about US Vice-President Dick Cheney's warning last month that 
Israel might attack Iran's nuclear facilities without warning, Mr Solana 
said: "I think that would be something I would not like to see taking place.

Solana warns against Iran strike

BBC NEWS:  2005/02/06 02:40:50 GMT

A military strike on Iran's nuclear facilities would be "a mistake", the 
European Union's foreign policy chief, Javier Solana, has warned.

"That will complicate enormously the situation," he told Britain's ITV 
television network.

US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said last week a strike on Iran 
was "not on the agenda at this point".

Ms Rice also urged Europe to show "unity of purpose" with Washington in 
opposing Iran's nuclear programme.

The US accuses Tehran of trying to develop nuclear weapons. Iran has 
repeatedly denied the charge, insisting that its nuclear programme is 
for civilian use.

The EU has been negotiating with Tehran over its nuclear activities, but 
the US has urged a tougher stance.

France, Germany and Britain are trying to persuade Iran to turn a freeze 
on its nuclear enrichment activities into abandonment.

'Difficult to conceive'

Mr Solana was interviewed on ITV's Jonathan Dimbleby programme, to be 
for broadcast on Sunday.

Asked about US Vice-President Dick Cheney's warning last month that 
Israel might attack Iran's nuclear facilities without warning, Mr Solana 
said: "I think that would be something I would not like to see taking place.

"That would be a mistake. That will complicate enormously the situation."

"Unilateral action of that nature I don't think will contribute to what 
is the aim of everybody... I don't think at this point in time that it 
is worth thinking about that".

Asked if he agreed with UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw that a US 
military action against Iran was "inconceivable", Mr Solana replied: "I 
think at this point in time military action... is very difficult to 
conceive.

"I don't think that the United States has at this point of time the wish 
or the will or the capability to do that," Mr Solana said.

He was speaking as Ms Rice continued her first major European and Middle 
East tour since being confirmed as the new US secretary of state.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/europe/4240261.stm

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 3 [southnews] WMD official cautions US over Iran
 
Date: Mon, 7 Feb 2005 19:01:35 -0600 (CST)

 
The US Government's former chief weapons inspector, David Kay, has 
warned the Bush administration not to repeat the mistakes it made with 
Iraq in Iran.

Mr Kay says there is an eerie similarity between discussion of Iran now 
and events before the Iraq war.

"Now is the time to pause and recall what went wrong with the assessment 
of Iraq's WMD [weapons of mass destruction] program and try to avoid 
repeating those mistakes in Iran," Mr Kay wrote in today's Washington Post.

He recommends the Bush administration involve outside experts in its 
assessment of Iran, but not Iranian expatriates in the way it relied on 
Iraqi expatriates.

________________________

Bush administration warned not to repeat Iraq mistakes in Iran
2/7/2005 10:03:00 PM GMT

David Kay, the American official who declared the White House's hunt for 
weapons of mass destruction in Iraq to be a failure based on faulty 
intelligence, warned the Bush administration on Monday against repeating 
Iraqi mistakes in Iran.

In an opinion piece in The Washington Post on Monday, Mr. Kay, who led 
the U.S. search for WMD in postwar Iraq, said: "there is an eerie 
similarity to the events preceding the Iraq war".

Yet Mr. Kay said that he doubts  "the ability (of) the U.S. government 
to honestly assess Iran's nuclear status and to craft a set of measures 
that will cope with that threat short of military action by the United 
States or Israel".

In March 2003, the United States launched its war on Iraq, with 
President Bush justifying the illegal invasion by saying that the 
countrys former leader Saddam Hussein posed a great threat to the world 
with his possession of stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons, 
which were later proved to be no existent.

Last year, Mr. Kay told the Senate Armed Services Committee that the 
U.S. intelligence was "almost all wrong," and then called for the 
reorganization of the U.S. intelligence services.

Washington accuses Tehran of using a civilian nuclear energy program as 
a cover to hide its preparations to build a nuclear bomb, claims that 
have been repeatedly denied by Iran, affirming that the Islamic 
Republics nuclear program is solely used for peaceful purposes.

Recently, several U.S. officials including Vice President Dick Cheney 
recently raised the possibility of launching a military strike on Iran, 
which Bush has called the "world's primary state sponsor of terror."

"Now is the time to pause and recall what went wrong with the assessment 
of Iraq's WMD program and try to avoid repeating those mistakes in 
Iran," Kay said in the Post, stressing that Bushs administration should 
accept the fact that it cannot prevent Iran from possessing the 
scientific knowledge for developing a nuclear weapon.

"It is nonsense to talk about eliminating Iran's nuclear capabilities 
short of war and occupation," said Kay, who urged Washington to rely on 
weapons inspectors from the UN to uncover any future weapons violations.

"The goal ... is to craft a set of tools and transparency methods to tie 
Iran's nuclear activities to the larger world of peaceful nuclear 
activities that any attempt to push ahead on the weapons front would be 
detectable."

Mr. Kay, moreover, suggested that Bushs administration should enhance 
the quality of its intelligence on Iran by involving respected outside 
experts in its assessment.

Mr. Kay also warned that the U.S. would only invite international 
derision by relying Iranian exiles for material to support its case, 
same as it did with the Iraqi expatriates in 2003.

Russia-Iran nuclear deal

Meanwhile, Alexander Rumyantsev, Russia's atomic energy chief announced 
he will visit Iran later this month to sign a nuclear fuel supply deal 
with Iranian officials, as well as hold talks on future contracts with 
the Islamic republic, an Iranian official said Monday.

Mohammad Saeedi, a senior official in Iran's national atomic energy 
organisation, told the ISNA news agency that Rumyantsev is to arrive in 
Tehran on February 25.

Iran and Russia agreed to sign a key deal under which Iran will return 
to Russia the spent fuel that will enable Moscow launch the Islamic 
republic's first nuclear power plant.

The Russian-built plant at Bushehr was set to go on line last year, but 
because of the U.S. pressure to abandon the 800 million dollar project 
altogether, Moscow set the condition that all spent fuel be returned, 
fearing that Iran could reprocess it by upgrading it through centrifuges.

In the past, Iran refused to sign this deal with Russia, saying that the 
material was too dangerous to transport back to Russia, and that Moscow 
was charging too much.

Also during his three-day visit, Rumyantsev will start negotiations on 
the second phase of Bushehr, visit the plant itself, and the set a date 
for it to go on stream.

Both, the U.S. and Israel launched an international campaign against 
Russia's Bushehr project but Moscow insisted to go ahead with the 
project, asserting that it will ensure the plant remains harmless to 
protect its own security interests.

Russian diplomats have also admitted that the Bushehr deal is playing a 
key role in keeping Russia's atomic energy industry afloat.

Last month, the U.S. President George W. Bush said he wouldnt rule out 
the use of military action against Iran if it didnt drop nuclear ambitions.

http://www.aljazeera.com/cgi-bin/news_service/middle_east_full_story.asp?service_id=6953
Let's Not Make the Same Mistakes in Iran

By David Kay
Monday, February 7, 2005; Page A21

One year ago I told the Senate Armed Services Committee that I had 
concluded "we were almost all wrong" at the time of the Iraq war about 
that country's activities with regard to weapons of mass destruction -- 
and never more wrong than in the assessment that Iraq had a resurgent 
program on the verge of producing nuclear weapons. I testified about 
what I saw as the major reasons we got it so wrong, and I urged the 
establishment of an independent commission to examine this failure and 
begin the long-overdue process of adjusting our intelligence 
capabilities to the new national security environment we face. It is an 
environment dominated by too-easy access to weapons of mass destruction 
capabilities and to the means of concealing such capabilities from 
international inspection and national intelligence agencies.

A year later we are still awaiting the independent commission's report. 
The discussion of intelligence reform has focused on reordering and 
adding structure on top of an eroded intelligence foundation. And now we 
hear the drumrolls again, this time announcing an accelerating nuclear 
weapons program in Iran.

There is an eerie similarity to the events preceding the Iraq war. The 
International Atomic Energy Agency has announced that while Iran now 
admits having concealed for 18 years nuclear activities that should have 
been reported to the IAEA, it is has found no evidence of a nuclear 
weapons program. Iran says it is now cooperating fully with 
international inspections, and it denies having anything but a peaceful 
nuclear energy program.

Vice President Cheney is giving interviews and speeches that paint a 
stark picture of a soon-to-be-nuclear-armed Iran and declaring that this 
is something the Bush administration will not tolerate. Iranian exiles 
are providing the press and governments with a steady stream of new 
"evidence" concerning Iran's nuclear weapons activities. Secretary of 
State Condoleezza Rice has warned that Iran will not be allowed to use 
the cover of civilian nuclear power to acquire nuclear weapons, but says 
an attack on Iran is "not on the agenda at this point." U.S. allies, 
while saying they share the concern over Iran's nuclear ambitions, 
remain determined to pursue diplomacy and say they cannot conceive of 
any circumstance that would lead them to use military force. And the 
press is beginning to uncover U.S. moves that seem designed to lay the 
basis for military action against Iran.

Now is the time to pause and recall what went wrong with the assessment 
of Iraq's WMD program and try to avoid repeating those mistakes in Iran. 
Five steps are essential.

First, accept the fact that the past cannot be undone. Iran has, by its 
own admission, engaged for at least 18 years in clandestine nuclear 
activities that now give it the basis, if it chooses, to pursue nuclear 
weapons. That knowledge cannot be eliminated, so it is nonsense to talk 
about eliminating Iran's nuclear capabilities short of war and 
occupation. The goal, and one that is reachable, is to craft a set of 
tools and transparency measures that so tie Iran's nuclear activities to 
the larger world of peaceful nuclear activities that any attempt to push 
ahead on the weapons front would be detectable and very disruptive for Iran.

Second, acknowledge that dissidents and exiles have their own agenda -- 
regime change -- and that before being accepted as truth any "evidence" 
they might supply concerning Iran's nuclear program must be tested and 
confirmed by other sources. And those other sources should not be, as 
they often were in the case of Iraq, simply other exiles, or the same 
information being recycled among intelligence agencies.

Third, acknowledge what inspections by the IAEA can do, and do not 
denigrate the agency for what it cannot do. International inspection, 
when it works, is best at confirming whether a state is complying with 
its international obligations. It is not equipped to uncover clandestine 
weapons programs. When Mohamed ElBaradei says his IAEA has found no 
evidence of an Iranian nuclear weapons program, he is speaking honestly 
as to the limitations of the powers of his inspectors. Rather than 
ridiculing him and the IAEA, we should acknowledge what they have 
accomplished in determining that Iran has not lived up to its 
obligations and concentrate how we can use international inspections to 
uncover -- more quickly, one hopes -- any future violations.

Fourth, understand that overheated rhetoric from policymakers and senior 
administration officials, unsupported by evidence that can stand 
international scrutiny, undermines the ability of the United State to 
halt Iran's nuclear activities. Having gone to the Security Council on 
the basis of flawed evidence to "prove" Iraq's WMD activities, it only 
invites derision to cite unsubstantiated exile reports to "prove" that 
Iran is developing nuclear weapons.

Fifth, a National Intelligence Estimate as to Iran's nuclear activities 
should not be a rushed and cooked document used to justify the threat of 
military action. Now is the time for serious analysis that genuinely 
tries to pull together all the evidence and analytical skills of the 
vast U.S. intelligence community to reach the best possible judgment on 
the status of that program and the gaps in our knowledge. That 
assessment should not be led by a team that is trying to prove a case 
for its boss. Now is the time to reach outside the secret brotherhood 
and pull in respected outsiders to lead the assessment.

Nuclear weapons in the hands of Iran would be a grave danger to the 
world. That is not what is in doubt. What is in doubt is the ability to 
the U.S. government to honestly assess Iran's nuclear status and to 
craft a set of measures that will cope with that threat short of 
military action by the United States or Israel.

The writer was the first leader of the Iraq Survey Group searching for 
weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. He resigned a year ago.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A3601-2005Feb6.html

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 4 Guardian Unlimited: Rice warns Iran against provoking Israel
 
Julian Borger in Washington
Monday February 7, 2005
The Guardian [http://www.guardian.co.uk]  		
 		
Condoleezza Rice turned Washington's rhetoric on Iran up another 
notch yesterday, telling Iranians they would have to "live up to 
their international obligations" to avoid a conflict with Israel. 

But back in Washington, the secretary of defence, Donald 
Rumsfeld, struck a more dovish note, saying the estimates he had 
seen said Iran was "years away" from building a nuclear bomb, and 
that the White House had meanwhile opted for diplomacy. 

"The president handles Iran policy, he's decided on a diplomatic 
route ... They're on a diplomatic path," he said. 

The Bush administration has sent mixed signals to Tehran in the 
past week, mixing bellicose and reconciliatory remarks, amid 
reports that the Pentagon is already sending special operations 
teams into Iran to spot potential targets. 

In an interview on BBC's Breakfast with Frost, recorded on Friday 
but broadcast yesterday, Ms Rice was asked about remarks last 
month by Vice-President Dick Cheney, who warned of a possible 
pre-emptive strike against Iran by Israel - which already has a 
nuclear arsenal - if the latter felt threatened. 

In response, Ms Rice put the onus on Iran, saying: "Obviously, 
anything that would lead to conflict in this region would be a 
terrible, terrible thing. And the Iranians need to live up to 
their international obligations so we don't face any such point." 

Ms Rice, who holds talks with Israeli and Palestinian leaders 
today, has said that the US will not take part in European 
negotiations with Iran over its nuclear programme, reflecting the 
Bush administration's distaste for dealing with Tehran, and its 
belief that Iran will use such discussions as a cover to buy time 
to work secretly on a bomb. 

But Ms Rice said in yesterday's interview: "We believe that this 
is a time for diplomacy. This is a time to muster our 
considerable influence ... our considerable power, if you will, 
to bring great changes in the world." 

She added: "Iran is a destabilising force in the international 
system and we need unity of purpose, unity of message to Iran to 
stop those activities." 

Reacting to earlier remarks by Ms Rice criticising "the loathed" 
Tehran regime of "unelected mullahs", Iran's foreign ministry 
spokesman, Hamid Reza Asefi, said yesterday that the war of words 
would not affect its nuclear talks with Europe. 

"Negotiations have not reached a deadlock and still continue," he 
said, but he added: "We think the Europeans must be more serious 
and show more dynamism." 

However, Time magazine reported yesterday that the International 
Atomic Energy Agency had discovered that Iran was still doing 
maintenance on a uranium-enrichment plant in southern Iran, in 
apparent violation of an agreement with Britain, France and 
Germany to suspend all activities related to uranium enrichment. 

Time also reported that Iran may have acquired centrifuges for 
enriching uranium and weapons designs from the smuggling network 
operated by Abdul Qadeer Khan, a Pakistani nuclear scientist 
under house arrest in Islamabad. 

The report quoted unnamed IAEA investigators as saying that 
Tehran had privately confirmed at least 13 meetings with 
representatives of Mr Khan's network from 1994 to 1999. US and 
IAEA officials cannot question Mr Khan directly, but have to 
submit questions to Pakistani interrogators. 

More information about the extent of the network is beginning to 
emerge, according to Washington and the IAEA. One US official 
examining the extent of its ties to Tehran, told Time: "You're 
dealing with a supplier who didn't appear to have any qualms." 

The network's other customers may also have included Saudi Arabia 
and other Arab states, the Time report said, although there is no 
evidence that any has begun work on a nuclear weapons programme. 

Middle East analysts have warned that Iran's suspected efforts to 
produce a nuclear weapon could provoke Saudi Arabia into 
acquiring one itself, although most predict that in such a 
situation the Saudi monarchy would try to buy a ready-made bomb, 
rather than attempt to build one. 

George Bush, in his state of the union address last week, offered 
encouragement to Saudi Arabia and Egypt, another regional ally, 
to develop democracy in their countries, but he directed pointed 
warn ings at Syria and Iran, offering Iranians American support 
for achieving democracy. 

Ms Rice, on being asked in the BBC interview whether the 
administration would support regime change, said: "All of us 
would have to agree that the behaviour of this Iranian regime in 
supporting terrorism, in sowing instability in the Middle East, 
in the way it treats its own people, is not a regime to be 
admired and certainly the Iranian people deserve the same 
opportunities for freedom and liberty that are beginning to take 
hold in other parts of the Middle East."
 	
[UP] 

Guardian Unlimited © Guardian Newspapers Limited 2005
*****************************************************************
 5 Xinhua: Iran criticizes US for sabotaging nuclear talks   

  www.xinhuanet.com

  www.chinaview.cn 2005-02-08 01:38:52   

    TEHRAN, Feb. 7 (Xinhuanet) -- Iran on Monday dismissed the
US threat to Tehran as an attempt to sabotage the ongoing
nuclear talks between Iran and the European Union (EU), the
official IRNA news agency reported. 

    "Washington is willing to sabotage Iran-EU negotiations, but
of course it will depend on the European partners whether or not
to beinfluenced by Washington," government spokesman Abdollah
Ramezanzadeh was quoted as saying. 

    "The language of threat is not acceptable to us. We are
ready tohold dialogue and ready to defend our country. Our
nation proved that it never allowed any aggressors to benefit
from aggression on Iran," Ramezanzadeh added. 

    US President George W. Bush have refused to rule out
military strikes on Iran over its alleged attempt to develop
nuclear weapons, though it expressed support for diplomatic
efforts made bythe EU to persuade Iran to give up its nuclear
program. 

    Iran and the EU have held two rounds of negotiations on on
Iran's disputed nuclear program since Tehran suspended uranium
enrichment activities on Nov. 22, 2004. 

    However, it was reported recently that the negotiations had
reached a deadlock and that the EU hardened its attitudes by
askingIran to stop all nuclear activities. 

    Ramezanzadeh said Iran is keen to speed up the negotiations
withthe EU. 

    "Iran does not want to see prolongation of the timetable,"
he said. 

    The two sides are to kick off the third round of talks on
Tuesday in Geneva. 

    Iran has always denied the US charge that it is seeking
nuclear weapons, insisting that its nuclear program is for
peaceful purposes. Enditem        

  Copyright ©2003 Xinhua News Agency. All rights reserved.
*****************************************************************
 6 CNN International: Can the U.S. defuse Iran?

[http://www.cnn.com/]    		   			

By DANIEL EISENBERG
 
George W. Bush has staked his presidency on his reputation as a
straight shooter, the kind of leader who presents a clear,
decisive message to the nation's adversaries in the war on
terrorism. 

But as the U.S. tries to persuade Iran to give up its nuclear
ambitions, the White House can't seem to make up its mind. 

First the President said he could not rule out future military
action against Iran. Then Vice President Dick Cheney, just hours
before the Inauguration, told radio host Don Imus that "the
Israelis might well decide to act [militarily] first and let the
rest of the world worry about cleaning up the diplomatic mess
afterward." 

The intrigue deepened last week. In his State of the Union
address, Bush cheered hawks pushing for regime change in Tehran,
declaring that "as [Iranians] stand for your own liberty,
America stands with you." 

But in the same breath, he offered something to the
pro-diplomacy camp, stating that "we are working with European
allies" who are at the negotiating table with Iran. Two days
later, as she began her first trip as Secretary of State,
Condoleezza Rice said, "The Iranian regime's human-rights
behavior is something to be loathed." 

But then she stressed that "the question [of attacking Iran] is
simply not on the agenda." Really? Well, at least not "at this
point." Confused? That could be the intended effect, part of a
psychological game to keep the Iranians off balance. 

The problem is that the Iranians?who deny they are pursuing
nuclear weapons and insist that they have a sovereign right to
enrich uranium for peaceful, civilian purposes?seem quite adept
at playing their own games. As it drags out the third round of
negotiations with Britain, France and Germany with no hint of a
resolution, Iran is doing little to build confidence in its good
intentions. 

The country's top nuclear negotiator, Hossein Moussavian,
reiterated late last month Tehran's refusal to agree to a
permanent cessation of its uranium-enrichment program. 

Meanwhile, the IAEA has discovered that despite its agreement to
temporarily suspend all activities related to uranium
enrichment, Iran was continuing to do maintenance work on a
uranium-enrichment plant in southern Iran. At the same time, the
Iranians have allegedly finished designing a prototype of a
detonator for a nuclear bomb, according to an opposition group
based in Paris. 

Taking their cue from North Korea, the Iranians have seen "that
you can extend a negotiating process and still build nukes,"
says Bruno Tertrais, senior research fellow at the Foundation
for Strategic Research in Paris. 

Despite repeated entreaties from European government officials,
the U.S. has so far refused to join the multilateral talks,
which center on persuading Iran to shut down its
uranium-enrichment work in exchange for a package of economic
and political goodies. 

"You have to have a good cop and a bad cop [on every issue],"
Mohamed el-Baradei, director of the IAEA, told TIME. "But they
should share the same objective." In this case, however, the
U.S. has little interest in getting too involved. It firmly
believes that the Iranians have already made up their mind to go
nuclear, and no amount of cajoling is going to change that
belief. 

And the U.S. wants to avoid doing anything to bolster the
legitimacy of Iran's ruling theocrats. As Rice said while
embarking on her trip, "I don't think the unelected mullahs who
run that regime are a good thing for either the Iranian people
or for the region, [which] is going in quite a different
direction." 

Iran's refusal to agree to put an end to its uranium-enrichment
activities could in time persuade Europe to take the entire
matter to the U.N. Security Council, where the U.S. hopes to
push for a gradual phase-in of multilateral sanctions. 

Although it is true that Russia and China, as two of Iran's key
trading partners (and weapons suppliers), could pose formidable
obstacles to passing any kind of resolution, Washington knows it
has few good alternatives. 

For all the recent talk of U.S. commandos secretly staking out
potential targets deep inside Iran, many experts question
whether military strikes could be assured of taking out all the
country's dispersed, well-hidden nuclear facilities.
Intelligence on Iran's programs is inadequate, and the White
House is mindful of violent reprisals against U.S. forces in
Iraq by Iranian-backed militia. 

Israel, too, is reluctant to resort to the kind of pre-emptive
blow it used to take out Saddam Hussein's Osirak reactor in
1981. A similar strike against Iran would invite retaliation by
the Iranian-backed terrorist group Hizballah, which can rain
missiles on Tel Aviv from its perch in southern Lebanon. 

As a last resort, the Administration continues to hold out hope
that regime change will come to Iran before a nuclear bomb does.
Barring that, the U.S. may finally have to consider cutting a
deal, accepting anything from a nonaggression pact or an end to
its long-standing sanctions to Iran's entry into the World Trade
Organization. 

That, of course, may not make the hard-liners in the White House
very happy. But as the Bush Administration is slowly learning,
dealing with Iran may be one of those cases in which accepting a
messy compromise, rather than sticking to a firmly held
conviction, is the wisest course of action. 

?Reported by Elaine Shannon/ Washington, James Graff/ Paris,
Helen Gibson/ London and Nahid Siamdoust/Tehran

Copyright © 2005 Time Inc.

*****************************************************************
 7 Scoop: Hans Blix - Iran Has Legal Right To Enrich Uranium

[http://www.scoop.co.nz/]     

Tuesday, 8 February 2005, 10:57 am

by Richard S. Ehrlich

BANGKOK, Thailand -- Iran has ''a legal right'' to enrich
uranium for peaceful purposes, but an attack by the U.S. or
Israel would probably push the Iranians to build a nuclear bomb,
former top U.N. weapons inspector Dr. Hans Blix said.

"When the U.S. says that it is unacceptable for Iran to have
enrichment capacity, well I don't think that quite squares with
the Non-Proliferation Treaty that permits it," Dr. Blix said in
an interview.

Iran "may have enriched some very small quantities, but I can't
be sure about that. They have very few centrifuges mounted," he
said.

"They know that they are in a tense region of the world, and
that tensions will go higher if they continue to mount and build
these centrifuges, and if indeed they produce the highly
enriched uranium. But I wouldn't say that is prohibited. They
are within a legal right to do so. And they assert it is for
peaceful purposes."

Iran secretly imported centrifuges and were constructing a
heavy-water research reactor to build up their capability to
enrich uranium, he said.

"I can understand those who are suspicious because they did hide
what they did. They didn't abide or respect their safeguard
agreements that they have with the IAEA (International Atomic
Energy Agency)," he said.. 
[http://www.scoop.co.nz/mason/link-out?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.yes2w
ind.co.nz%2F] "I don't know how many centrifuges they have, but
to have a real capability -- not only technological but a
practical, industrial one -- they would need thousands of
centrifuges. They have not come to that stage at all. But they
could produce them," Dr. Blix said.

An attack by America or Israel would probably aim at "destroying
any nascent enrichment capability, perhaps also hexofloride
production capability," the former Swedish diplomat said.

"If the Iranians are suspecting a strike -- whether to punish or
pre-empt -- surely they would have tried to find someplace where
they can hide [their uranium enrichment capability], where they
can make more," he said.

"If anything would make them more determined to go ahead with a
nuclear weapons program, I suppose it would be an attack," Dr.
Blix said.

Iran signed the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty which allows
mining and enrichment of uranium, and development of nuclear
technology for peaceful purposes, such as energy or medical
research, under IAEA monitoring.

"They have the capability to produce hexofloride, which is the
feed material that you put into the centrifuges and obtain
enriched uranium," said Dr. Blix, currently chairman of an
international weapons of mass destruction commission, financed
by the Swedish government.

"They do need enriched uranium for their two light-water
reactors, which they built in Bushehr along the Persian Gulf,
but that enrichment need not go any further than around five
percent.

"However, if you can enrich to five percent, you can also enrich
to 85 percent, that's a weapons grade. It is permitted, entirely
permitted, under the Non-Proliferation Treaty to enrich uranium,
but it is not permitted to do it in order to make nuclear
weapons," he said.

For example, Japan, Brazil and South Africa signed the
Non-Proliferation Treaty, enriched uranium for peaceful
purposes, and "there are no objections raised to them," Dr. Blix
said.

"So I don't think one should tell the Iranians that 'You cannot
do this for the same purpose as these three'."

Dr. Blix was interviewed on Sunday (Feb. 6), hours after
arriving in Bangkok where he will address various forums about
peace and disarmament, on a trip sponsored by the International
Peace Foundation.

"Today, Iran remains the world's primary state sponsor of
terror, pursuing nuclear weapons while depriving its people of
the freedom they seek and deserve," U.S. President George W.
Bush said in his State of the Union speech on Feb. 2.

"We are working with European allies to make clear to the
Iranian regime that it must give up its uranium enrichment
program, and any plutonium reprocessing, and end its support for
terror," Mr. Bush said.

Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Shimon Peres, who is "widely
regarded as the father of Israel's secretive nuclear deterrent,
dampened suggestions that Israel was planning pre-emptive
strikes against Iran," the British Broadcasting Corporation
(BBC) reported on Jan. 24.

"The party that will decide is the United States," Mr. Peres
told Israel's Army Radio.

"If we go it alone, we will remain alone. Everyone knows our
potential, but we also have to know our limits," Mr. Peres said,
according to the BBC's monitoring of Israel's Army Radio.

American reporter Seymour Hersh, in the New Yorker magazine,
reported in January that U.S. special forces conducted secret
reconnaissance missions inside Iran to identify and target
nuclear and other facilities.

                          *************


 Richard S. Ehrlich, a freelance journalist who has reported
news from Asia for the past 26 years, is co-author of the
non-fiction book, "HELLO MY BIG BIG HONEY!" -- Love Letters to
Bangkok Bar Girls and Their Revealing Interviews. His web page
is=  [http://www.geocities.com/glossograph/] 

-ENDS-


 [http://www.scoop.co.nz/welcome.htm] | 
*****************************************************************
 8 KR: Proposed budget focuses on security, would cut domestic programs

Monday, Feb 07, 2005  
   
 
By Ron Hutcheson

 Knight Ridder Newspapers

	WASHINGTON - President Bush on Monday sent Congress a nearly
$2.6 trillion federal budget that would boost spending for
defense and national security while scaling back or eliminating
hundreds of domestic programs. 

        The 2006 spending plan calls for the biggest cuts in 
domestic expenditures since the Reagan years, but would still 
result in a $390 billion federal deficit. Many Americans would 
feel a direct impact from the president's proposed cuts. 

        Airline passengers would pay $3 to $5 more each way to 
help cover the cost of improved airport security. Train 
passengers would face higher ticket prices or reduced service 
because Bush would end federal subsidies for Amtrak. Farmers 
would lose about $587 million in agriculture subsidies. Military 
veterans would pay more for prescription drugs. 

        Agencies targeted for some of the biggest cuts include 
the Environmental Protection Agency, the Education Department, 
the Health and Human Services Department, and the Housing and 
Urban Development Department. 

        The president called his spending proposal a "lean 
budget" that funnels tax dollars to the most vital government 
programs. 

        Overall spending for discretionary government programs 
covered by the annual budget process would increase by about 2.1 
percent - slightly below the projected 2.3 percent inflation rate 
- but the money would be allocated unevenly. Programs that aren't 
related to defense or homeland security would get a 1 percent 
cut. 

        About 150 programs would be eliminated or dramatically 
reduced, but administration officials declined to list them, and 
Congress is sure to have different ideas. Bush targeted 65 
programs for elimination last year; all but four survived. 

        However, expenditures for Social Security, Medicare, 
Medicaid and other so-called mandatory "entitlement" programs 
that are essentially outside the annual budget process - and that 
constitute about half of all federal spending - would continue to 
grow at rates well above most other government programs. 

        "Our priorities are winning the war on terror, protecting 
our homeland, growing our economy. It's a budget that focuses on 
results," the president said at a White House meeting with his 
Cabinet. "I fully understand that sometimes it's hard to 
eliminate a program that sounds good." 

        Although Bush said he was on track to cut the deficit in 
half by the time he leaves office, his projections don't include 
spending in Iraq and Afghanistan beyond this year, the long-term 
cost of extending his tax cuts or any costs of his plan to let 
workers divert some of their Social Security taxes to personal 
investment accounts, which alone is projected to cost trillions. 

        Congressional Democrats called the president's budget a 
hoax that masks the true outlook for federal deficits. 

        "This budget continues the wrong choices and misplaced 
priorities that have created record deficits and rising debt over 
the last four years," said Rep. John Spratt of South Carolina, 
the top Democrat on the House Budget Committee. "By any realistic 
accounting, the president's policies make the deficit problem 
worse, not better." 

        Bush, who inherited a $236 billion surplus and a 
declining economy when he took office in 2001, hopes to put the 
government on a path to a $207 billion deficit by fiscal 2010. 
The government expects to end the current fiscal year $427 
billion in the red. 

        That's a record in dollar terms, but not as a percentage 
of the economy, which is considered a more important gauge of the 
government's financial health. 

        The budget would accelerate the shift in federal 
priorities that began with the terrorist attacks on Sept. 11, 
2001. Four years later, the threat of terrorism has become a fact 
of life that influences federal spending across the board. 

        Bush's plan to increase defense spending by about 5 
percent next year would bring the total increase since 2001 to 41 
percent. The $419.3 billion defense budget for 2006 would consume 
about half the money that Congress has available for programs 
covered by the annual budget process. 

        Funding for homeland security, which already has tripled 
since 2001, would increase by 8 percent next year, to nearly $50 
billion. About $34.2 billion would go to the Homeland Security 
Department, but more than two dozen other agencies also have 
responsibility for homeland-security programs. 

        The fear of a chemical, biological or nuclear attack is a 
recurring theme in the president's budget. The FBI would get $5.7 
billion - an 11 percent increase - to help pay for more 
translators, intelligence analysts and overseas agents. 

        Despite a 6 percent cut in overall spending at the 
Environmental Protection Agency, the EPA would get a 73 percent 
increase - to $185 million - for programs related to homeland 
security. The EPA is responsible for decontaminating any sites 
that are hit by weapons of mass destruction. 

        Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid and other so-called 
mandatory programs would continue to consume about half of all 
the tax dollars that Americans send to Washington. In addition, 
interest on the federal debt would take a $211 billion bite out 
of the budget, more than twice the combined amount allocated for 
the EPA, the Energy Department, federal law enforcement and 
foreign aid. 

        Bush offered no new details on his plans for overhauling 
Social Security, but said he hoped to save $45 billion over the 
next 10 years in Medicaid, a federal-state health care program 
for the poor. Even with the changes the president advocates, 
Medicaid spending would increase by about 7.2 percent a year. 

        The proposed savings would put new burdens on state 
governments while many of them are struggling to avoid deficit 
spending. The National Governors Association said Bush's plan 
could force cuts in Medicaid services to the elderly and people 
with disabilities, which receive the biggest share of Medicaid 
spending. 

        "The Medicaid program is growing rapidly because health 
care inflation is running two to three times the general 
inflation rate and the case load has grown 33 percent over the 
last four years," the association said in a statement responding 
to the president's budget. "Governors have little control over 
these two cost drivers, and do not want to be in the position of 
having to choose between funding health-care programs for 
grandparents or programs for their grandchildren." 

        The administration's refusal to provide a list of 
programs slated for elimination was a tacit acknowledgement of 
the political difficulties that Bush's budget faces in Congress. 
And this will take months; Congress rarely completes work on tax 
and spending bills flowing from a president's budget before the 
new fiscal year begins on Oct. 1. 

        "Are we going to get everything we ask for? No," said 
Josh Bolten, Bush's budget director. "Are we going to get all the 
program cuts we wanted? No. Are we going to get all the spending 
increases we asked for? No, I don't expect that. But I think we 
will get a lot of them." 

About KRWashington.com |
*****************************************************************
 9 KR: Budget includes funds for study of nuclear bunker buster

      Posted on Mon, Feb. 07, 2005  
   
By Jonathan S. Landay

 Knight Ridder Newspapers

        WASHINGTON - The Bush administration is trying to 
resurrect a controversial study into whether a nuclear weapon 
could be designed to burrow deep into the earth and destroy 
underground bunkers. 

        Congress killed the study last year, partly out of 
concern that it undercut U.S. efforts to curb other countries' 
development of nuclear weapons. 

        Under the administration's proposed 2006 federal budget, 
the Department of Energy would spend $4 million on the so-called 
Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator study, while the Department of 
Defense would contribute $4.5 million. 

        The Energy Department, the builder and caretaker of the 
nation's nuclear arsenal, would spend another $14 million in 
2007, the final year of the study, while the Defense Department 
would spend $3.5 million, according to budget documents and 
officials. 

        While the amounts are small compared with proposed 
overall defense spending in 2006 of about $440 billion, which 
includes the Department of Energy's nuclear weapons budget, the 
attempt to restart the study could ignite a bruising fight with 
Congress. 

        "Congress clearly rejected the Bush administration's 
request for bunker busters and other nuclear weapons last year," 
said Rep. Edward Markey, D-Mass., a leading critic of the study, 
which started in May 2003. 

        The drive last year to cancel the study's funding was led 
by Rep. David Hobson, R-Ohio, who was then the chairman of a 
House of Representatives subcommittee that oversees the 
Department of Energy's nuclear weapons budget. He's expected to 
retain the post in the new Congress. 

        At the time, Hobson contended that the study and other 
administration nuclear-weapons initiatives undermine U.S. 
security by encouraging other countries to pursue nuclear 
arsenals. 

        He and other opponents of the bunker-busting bomb argued 
that the money would be better spent ensuring that the nation's 
existing nuclear weapons remain safe and reliable as they get 
older. 

        Hobson declined at a conference last week to say how he 
would treat an administration attempt to restore the money for 
the study. 

        An aide, speaking on condition of anonymity, said only 
that Hobson would "give the president's budget serious and fair 
consideration." 

        Administration officials have expressed concerns about 
growing numbers of deeply buried underground bunkers in countries 
such as North Korea, which they contend could be used to develop 
or store nuclear, biological or chemical weapons. 

        The bunker-buster study is aimed at determining whether 
the nuclear explosive packages of two existing warheads - the 
B-61 and the B-83 - could be housed in a casing capable of 
burrowing deep into earth and rock before exploding. 

        Proponents argue that the shockwaves would destroy 
underground facilities but the explosions deep underground 
wouldn't release large amounts of radioactivity that could kill a 
lot of civilians. 

        Opponents respond that it's impossible to limit such 
fallout or build a bomb casing that could withstand the impact of 
being dropped from high altitudes. 

        They contend that conventional precision-guided bombs 
could be used to seal the entrances and ventilation systems of 
deeply buried bunkers. 

        The proposed DOE funds for 2006 and 2007 would go to the 
Sandia National Laboratory for tests in which bomb cases on 
high-speed sleds would ram into concrete targets, according to 
Anson Franklin, a DOE spokesman. 

        The Defense Department would use its proposed funds for 
tests in which bomb cases would be dropped from aircraft, 
according to congressional officials. 

About KRWashington.com 
*****************************************************************
 10 CNN: The other nuke nightmare

[http://www.cnn.com/]                                           

Worst case scenario, al-Qaeda detonating a nuclear bomb in a
U.S. city

By MASSIMO CALABRESI
 
Among U.S. counterterrorism officials, it is the ultimate
nightmare scenario: al-Qaeda detonating a nuclear bomb in a U.S.
city. 

Osama bin Laden says it is a religious duty to obtain a bomb,
and most experts believe that if al-Qaeda were to succeed, the
group wouldn't hesitate to use it. 

Though building even a crude nuclear weapon is time consuming,
the wide availability of raw material and scientific expertise
means that it is plausible for terrorists someday to get their
hands on one. 

"The simplest nuclear bomb," says Ivan Oelrich, director of the
security project at the Federation of American Scientists, "is
very simple indeed." The biggest hurdle is getting the material
that causes the nuclear explosion. 

For a basic nuclear weapon, terrorists would need about 100 lbs.
of highly enriched, weapons-grade uranium (HEU). Fortunately,
manufacturing HEU is extremely difficult. Refining it requires
vast industrial facilities, top-flight engineers and the kinds
of resources available to a government but not to rogue
terrorist groups. 

Unfortunately, many states have already done the hard work,
creating 1,800 tons of HEU that is housed at research
facilities, weapons depots and other storage sites in as many as
24 countries, according to William Potter, director of
nonproliferation studies at the Monterey Institute of
International Studies. 

Of greatest concern is the more than 300 tons of HEU in the
former Soviet Union. Some of the material may have already gone
missing: since 1991, there have been seven attempted thefts
reported of small amounts of bomb-grade material and more than
700 reported thefts of unrefined nuclear material. 

In Chelyabinsk, Russia, in 1998, Russian intelligence uncovered
a plot by employees at a nuclear facility in the region to
smuggle out 40 lbs. of HEU for sale on the black market. With
sufficient fissile material in hand, a trained engineer could
build a crude device without too much difficulty. 

The most basic design is that of the Hiroshima bomb, which fired
two pieces of HEU at each other from opposite ends of an
artillery tube. The bomb could be assembled at a basic machine
shop and would fit in the back of a truck. If smuggled into the
U.S. and detonated in a major metropolitan area, such a weapon
could kill hundreds of thousands. Not everyone believes the
danger is imminent. 

Last August, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov dismissed
concerns about the security of Russian HEU as "just a myth."
However big the threat, critics say President Bush has yet to
tackle it head-on. 

"The Bush Administration has failed to declare war on nuclear
terrorism," says nuclear expert Graham Allison, a former Clinton
official. The Bush Administration is expected to earmark about
$400 million this year for securing nuclear material in the
former Soviet Union. 

Over the past two and a half years, international teams of
nuclear experts have retrieved more than 230 lbs. of bomb-grade
uranium from such countries as Uzbekistan, Bulgaria, Romania,
Libya and the Czech Republic. But at its current pace, Allison
charges, the effort to secure all Russian nuclear weapons and
fissile material will not be complete until 2020. 

Critics of the Administration say the U.S. should pressure
Russian President Vladimir Putin to get more aggressive about
securing nuclear material in his country. "We're in a race
between cooperation and catastrophe," says former Senator Sam
Nunn, who helped create the 13-year-old U.S.-Russian program to
destroy Russia's surplus HEU before it falls into the wrong
hands. 

The world may not have much time. In the months before Sept. 11,
bin Laden and associates met in Afghanistan with a Pakistani
nuclear scientist, Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmoud. 

At one meeting, according to an account made public by the White
House, a bin Laden associate indicated he had nuclear material
and wanted to know how to use it to make a weapon. 

Mahmoud provided information about nuclear-weapons programs, the
White House said. In an interview with the Associated Press,
Mahmoud's son said his father had rebuffed bin Laden. 

The bad news is that he is surely still trying. 

--With reporting by Timothy J. Burger and Elaine
Shannon/Washington, Tim McGirk/Islamabad and Andrew Purvis/Vienna

Copyright © 2005 Time Inc.

*****************************************************************
 11 Las Vegas SUN: Defense Budget Would Buy Fewer Weapons
 
 By ROBERT BURNS
 ASSOCIATED PRESS 

WASHINGTON (AP) - 

The $419 billion defense budget that President Bush submitted to
Congress on Monday would buy fewer planes, ships and submarines
than the Pentagon previously planned, but it puts extra emphasis
on anti-terror commandos and expands the Army and Marine Corps. 

Spending for the budget year that starts Oct. 1 would be 4.8
percent higher than the current defense budget, although neither
year's budget includes the billions spent for war operations in
Iraq and Afghanistan. Iraq is expected to cost $100 billion this
year and a similar amount in 2006; that money is authorized and
spent through a separate budgeting process. 

"This budget represents the latest installment in the resident's
strong commitment to transforming this department to face the
challenges of the 21st century," Defense Secretary Donald H.
Rumsfeld said in a written statement. "We continue our
transition to a more agile, deployable, and lethal force." 

The defense budget under President Bush has grown rapidly since
the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, which led to the U.S.
invasion of Afghanistan to topple the Taliban and hunt down
leaders of the al-Qaida terrorist network, but the Iraq war has
been the more costly enterprise. 

In order to make room for the extra costs of warfighting, the
Pentagon has cut billions from planned spending on the Air
Force's high-priority fighter jet program, the F/A-22, as well
as Navy shipbuilding. The F/A-22 program will be halted in 2008
after 179 planes are built - 96 short of the Air Force's goal,
and the Navy will get only four new vessels - one submarine and
three ships - instead of the six that the Pentagon had said a
year ago it would fund in the 2006 budget. 

Military personnel would get a 3.1 percent pay raise, and pay
for Pentagon civilians would rise 2.3 percent. 

Rep. Ike Skelton, D-Mo., the ranking Democrat on the House Armed
Services Committee, called the 3.1 percent pay raise a "bare
minimum," and said the budget as a whole does too little for the
troops. 

Steven Kosiak, a budget expert at the private Center for
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, said it is unlikely that
Congress will make any net reductions to Bush's budget proposal
for 2006. 

"However, over the longer term, once a decision is made to
address the ballooning federal deficit, history strongly
suggests that cuts in defense spending - or at a minimum slower
rates of growth in defense spending - will be part of the
solution adopted," Kosiak said. 

The budget includes $1.9 billion to begin paying for a new round
of military base closings. Pentagon recommendations on which
bases to close will be presented to an independent commission in
May. The Pentagon expects to spend another $5.7 billion on this
process in 2007, although at a future point the closures are
expected to save billions of dollars. 

The budget does not include funds to pay the estimated $286
million it will cost to retroactively increase death payments,
known as "gratuities," to the families of military personnel
killed in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. Those payments will
rise from $12,420 to $100,000 per family. The money will come
from a supplemental budget request to be submitted later. 

Among other highlights of Bush's proposed $419 billion in
defense spending: 

- Special operations forces, including Navy, Air Force and Army
commandos, get $4.1 billion, in part to pay for hiring an extra
200 civilians and 1,200 military personnel, including four
platoons of Navy SEAL commandos. More also will be spent on
developing foreign language capabilities. 

- The weapons buying budget shrinks by $100 million, to $78
billion. Last year at this time the Pentagon said it intended to
increase the procurement budget by $2 billion, rather than
shrink it. The Army would take the biggest cut, about $2.7
billion, while the Navy would get a $1.2 billion increase. 

- Spending on defenses against attack by chemical or biological
agents would be $1.6 billion in 2006 and $9.9 billion over the
2006-2011 period covered by the Pentagon budget plan. That's
$2.1 billion more than the Pentagon had previously planned. 

-- 



*****************************************************************
 12 Progressive News: The Military's Dirty Munitions 

by Bob Nichols

February 7, 2005     

by Bob Nichols

In Viet Nam it was the deadly chemical poison Agent Orange. In 
Iraq it is plain old processed uranium. The military must think 
uranium is better, because it is permanent. Uranium is 
radioactive. It kills people and contaminates their land - 
forever.                                        


by Bob Nichols

published by Axis of Logic 

The Military's Dirty Munitions

The US Military's genocidal operation in Iraq is trucking off
whole destroyed cities and acres of dirt to dumps in the desert.
This is to obscure the tell-tale and eternal radiation and the
chemical residues from the use of banned and illegal weapons by
our kids and friends in the US Military.
The Empire's tactics

They are the same as they have been for 40 years. Does anybody
remember the "elections" in Saigon, Viet Nam? You are maybe
expecting the Empire to not change or alter it's lethal methods
and procedures?

In Viet Nam it was the deadly chemical poison Agent Orange. In
Iraq it is plain old processed uranium. The military must think
uranium is better, because it is permanent. Uranium is
radioactive. It kills people and contaminates their land -
forever.

If anybody thinks the Empire will change this voluntarily
because uranium dust contaminates our troopers, you might as
well believe that the earth is flat. The military will have to
be forced away from their perverted sub-human addiction to
genocidal weapons. Anybody who thinks uranium weapons are used
without Presidential approval is sadly naïve, or a White
House-bribed "journalist."

The only way the military will be forced away from this
psychotic criminal behavior is by a President and energized
Congress who order them to "Destroy the uranium munitions! All
of them! Now! And don't make any more."

 

It's either that, or the rest of the world will punish the
United States until the last dog dies. It is easy enough to do.
Just destroy the American economy and laugh all the way to the
bank. Trading Middle East and Venezeulan oil in euros should do
the trick nicely. The Chinese could sell off just a few US
Treasury bonds and cause a stock market panic and crash. It is
simple. Really!

 

Yes, our kids and friends in the US Military are guilty of
dispersing millions of pounds of weaponized radioactive and
poisonous ceramic uranium oxide gas and dust in Iraq with
impunity. A war crime. That is the official name for it.

 

This is just wrong and everybody all over the world knows it.
This human knowledge about uranium is universal, and has been
since we Americans nuked Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the end of
World War II.

 

Are you shocked? Surprised that the compassionate United States
government of George Bush would do this? This is genocide by
Americans, by the book. It's what the Nazis did in WWII, but
different. It's been improved! Yes! We've improved the all
important Kill Factor.

 

There is a tricky public relations "issue" with it, though:
American Troopers are just as likely to breathe the radioactive
uranium dust as the "enemy" Iraqis. Then they are truly
"throwaway soldiers," abandoned by the military as they
painfully die. As they are dying, they all request service
connected Medical Disability. That costs money. More than
President Bush wants to pay.

 

Eleven thousand of the Gulf War I Era Vets are dead. A half
million Gulf Vets are on Medical Disability; but the government
refuses to acknowledge they have radiation poisoning, hoping
they will go ahead and die to reduce costs.

 

This is not a problem, though, for George W. Bush and the
fascist neo-cons running the Great American War Machine. None
other than Henry Kissinger, former National Security Advisor,
explains the proper imperial outlook for troubled Americans who
may not quite understand the "big picture" yet.

 

Kissinger sagely informs us mere peasants in America that
"Military men are dumb, stupid animals to be used" [as pawns in
foreign policy.] Try telling that to dead vets’ families and
parents and families of the walking dead.

 
The easy solution just slipped away in 2004

 

The only people in the World (that would be us, the 300 million
citizens of the almighty American Empire) capable of, maybe,
peacefully stopping the genocidal onslaught are more concerned
with watching bizarre "reality" TV shows and making sure
homosexuals don't get too uppity; according to recent polls and
elections in the US.

 

Americans are not deceiving anybody in the world but themselves.
Okies (Oklahomans) are especially oblivious to the utterly
simple fact that Oklahoma is the major shipping point for
millions of pounds of genocidal and illegal weapons to Iraq. Up
to 3.2 million pounds a day. That is up to 96 million pounds of
radioactive uranium a month!

 

Okies are more interested in an annual series of football games
played by an ADHD group of adolescent boys at the University of
Oklahoma. It is so much easier to bravely scream out "Go, Big
Red Sooners, Kill 'em all!" than to tell the government their
uranium munitions are wrong, banned, and illegal.

 

Okies are moral cowards. Okie politicians and preachers,
bankers, doctors, lawyers, managers and workers are deathly
afraid of merely even hinting that they would do anything other
than totally support the illegal War on Iraq. Why, what would
people say at the Country Club or at the Church? Conformism is
enforced by what is socially acceptable.

 

What's more, there are 22 million pounds of lethal, radioactive
uranium fashioned into shells, land mines and bombs not 90 miles
from Oklahoma City. There, Okies mindlessly make Oklahoma's
deadly contribution to the "war effort" on Iraq: An
impoverished, thoroughly destroyed little country of 25 million
people that never had any nuclear weapons at all! Ever. Even
President Bush said so!

 

Literally "all" the munitions like that come from Southeastern
Oklahoma, the same way most of the lead for good old fashioned
bullets came from Northeastern Oklahoma in WWI.

 
War Crimes

 

Does that make Oklahomans' war crime guilt greater than that of
other states in the War Crimes Index of Horror? If so, rest
assured that the fascist loving "Mussolini's favorite" American
newspaper, The Daily Oklahoman and the corporatism dedicated
Oklahoma Chamber of Commerce will dutifully find a tax
payer-funded way to build a museum or hold a celebration for
"Genocidal Weapons of the Iraq Wars Era. - Oklahoma is No 1."

 

The poor "native" writer Dahr Jamail (born in Alaska, referenced
below) in Fallujah cannot conceive of the horror actually
delivered by our American kids in the military to Fallujah,
Iraq. The American Army, the Marines and their video game
playing speed freak buddies in the air bombing everything to
smithereens at 1400 mph just recently leveled this beautiful
city of 300,000 very religious people.

 

Jamil's InterNet scribblings are the numb face of an
extinguished, dead race walking in the radiation poisoned
birthplace of civilization. This is thanks to obedient,
compliant Okies shipping the weaponized poisonous uranium gas
and dust to Iraq.

 

It is not easy work shipping millions of pounds of "ordnance"
from the McAlester (Ok) Army Ammunition Plant to Iraq. It takes
a brave forklift driver to load railroad cars with pallets full
of six 2,000 pound bombs. The bomb pallet plus the forklift are
actually longer than will fit and turn through the railroad car
door.

 

The simple everyday workman like solution is to get the forklift
up to speed and brake hard while turning the wheels over all the
way, thus skidding the forklift and "throwing" the loaded bomb
pallet into the railroad car.

 

The 12,000 pound pallet hits the other side of the railroad car
and bounces down the inside of the car facing the right
direction. Then the bombs can be pushed to the back of the car
in a normal manner. It's just like shooting pool.

 

Yet, these physically brave souls are abject cowards when it
comes to telling the government that employs them "No, this is
wrong, just flat-out wrong." They look to their "betters" to do
that, the "suits" who are supposed to speak for them.

 

The politicians, preachers and various other parasites who
represent them. It will be a cold day in Hell before any of
these heartless, lazy, irresponsible sociopaths ever speak up.

 

Oklahoma is the State where teachers are 50th, dead last, in pay
among the States and the State that imprisons more of its women
than any other. Worse than such memorably medieval states as
Mississippi or Alabama. No wonder the capacity for thinking past
today is so rare in Oklahoma. You can't trust Oklahoma.

 

The American Military, currently leveling cities in Iraq for no
reason at all except that we want their oil, has a 229-year
record of achievement that includes many learning episodes in
the brutal, crushing art of genocide.

 

For the past fifteen years now an unbroken string of millions of
pounds of uranium-based genocidal weapons has nourished a
prosperous and lethal business in the great fly-over, red neck,
Red State of Oklahoma. This is where 20% of the people over 18
years old can't even read; but, the Okies eagerly voted for
their Beloved Leader George Bush in record numbers in the 2004
election.

 
Shocking Auschwitz Similarities

 

January 27 is the 60th Anniversary of the liberation of the
Auschwitz Death Camp WWII. Zyklon B was the poison gas of choice
of the German fascist regime. Uranium gas is the poisonous and
radioactive gas of choice of the American fascists.

 

The cruel 1930s German fascists were not as sophisticated as
their American Neo-Con fascist counterparts. They wore Brown
Shirts. Ours wear Dockers(c) and use focus groups to develop
their propaganda. Other than that, they are the same, Fascists
are fascists.

 

George Bush's grandfather, Prescott Bush, was Hitler's banker in
America and scrounged together the family nest egg from slave
labor. Bush's long time sidekick and buddy Karl Roves's
grandfather was a Nazi with a more "hands on" assignment in
Germany.

 
The American Liberal's Decline in Moral Courage

 

The precipitous decline in morale courage among liberals; and,
the spectacular rise in the Fascist Theocracy running America
occurred simultaneously. One can not exist without the other.

 

Among Democrats, so-called liberals and others of the silent
American Left, mum is the word as a reckless right wing
government seeks to return America to the legal state that
existed before the New Deal and Franklin D. Roosevelt. That is,
before the first Child Labor laws in New York!

 

Scared to death, "if I get fired, how will we make the house
payment," weak-kneed, liberals are absolutely required for the
rise of a strong, united, fascist theocratic form of government.
Liberals and Democrats of all stripes talk a good line; but they
are not dependable in confronting the fascists and theocrats.

 

The rest of the world realizes now that they are going to have
to sit up and take on the American War Machine because there is
no way of telling what country is next. They will have to move
now to destroy the American economy. So be it. We simply brought
it on ourselves by not speaking up when we had the chance.
Oklahomans are first among the guilty.

 

Darla, a long time Oklahoma resident, says "I have been told
that scientists have means for tracking the dust as it is blown
from the battle grounds of the East onto air currents which
float from continent to continent on jet streams and such. So,
folks, we aren't just insuring horrible, lingering deaths to our
military in the East and the citizens (men, women and children)
of those countries where we've used this stuff." 



Darla added "We may be the recipients, in the future, of the
uranium dust raining out of the skies onto our loved ones here
at home. Among my many concerns is that these types of
devastating ammunitions will leave a legacy for which history
will condemn my country. It could cause my grandchildren's
children to question why we did nothing while our government
knowingly operated in this unforgivable manner. Did the
Holocaust teach us nothing?"

 

Darla concluded "I hope everyone I know and who knows me will
feel as morally outraged over the idiocies of our so-called
leaders as I am. This is criminal, and when we don't rise up in
righteous anger as a people against the practice and against our
leaders who ordain this practice........well, we deserve the
horrible poisoning of our people. We cannot justify our own
existence as human beings if we continue to look away and say we
can't do anything about these things."

 
Conclusion

 

Truly, the use of millions of pounds of radioactive uranium
oxide in Iraq is a war crime and a crime against humanity for
which all Oklahomans bear responsibility. Silence on this point
is agreement with the American fascist Neo-Cons. All Oklahomans
who do not speak out are guilty of assisting in the commission
of war crimes in Iraq by our kids and friends in the US
Military. They represent us. They work for us. They are
following orders.

 

"Individuals have international duties which transcend the
national obligations of obedience…therefore have the duty to
violate domestic laws to prevent crimes against peace and
humanity from occurring."

-Nuremberg Tribunal, 1950

 

When the history of the Gulf War Era is written there will be no
difference between the guilt of the Nazis in WWII, the Okies,
and fascist Neo-Con Americans in the Gulf War Era. This fascist
government cannot be allowed to exist. Every day it continues to
exist is a day of shame for America that Americans will regret a
hundred times over.

 

Notes:

 

The McAlester (Oklahoma) Army Ammunition Plant brags that if it
hasn't made it or disassembled it, it doesn't exist. Here is a
list of Depleted Uranium munitions:

 

U.S Ordnance That Contain DU DODIC Munition Nomenclature:

 

A675 CARTRIDGE, 20 MM LINKED, DS, MK 159-1,

A676 CARTRIDGE, 20 MM LINKED, DS, MK 149-2

A986 CARTRIDGE, 25 MM , APFSDS-T, M919

A983 CARTRIDGE, 25 MM , API, PGU-20/U

B103 CARTRIDGE, 30 MM , API-T/HEI, PGU-14/B &

PGU-13/B

C523 CARTRIDGE, 105 MM APFSDS-T M774, W/M13 TRACER

C524 CARTRIDGE, 105 MM , APFSDS-T, M833

C543 CARTRIDGE, 105 MM , APFSDS-T, M900

C786 CARTRIDGE, 120 MM , APFSDS-T, M829

C380 CARTRIDGE, 120 MM , APFSDS-T, M829A1

D501 PROJECTILE, 155 MM APERS, M692, W/O FZ, W/M67

APERS MINES ADAM-L,

D502 PROJECTILE, 155 MM APERS, M692, W/O FZ, W/M67

APERS MINES ADAM-L,

K152 MINE, AP, PDM M86

 

The following sources were consulted for this article.

1. Nichols - "There Are No Words"

http://www.dissidentvoice.org/Mar04/Nichols0327.htm

 

2. Nichols - "My God! My Country Is Using Poison Gas In Iraq"

http://www.dissidentvoice.org/Aug04/Nichols0807.htm

 

3. Russell Hoffman "Poison Fire, USA"

http://www.animatedsoftware.com/poifu/poifu.swf

 

4. Moret - Depleted uranium: Dirty bombs, dirty missiles, dirty
bullets

 http://www.sfbayview.com/081804/Depleteduranium081804.shtml

 

5. World Depleted Uranium Weapons Conference:
http://www.uraniumweaponsconference

 

6. International Criminal Tribunal for Afghanistan written
opinion of Judge N. Bhagwat: also at
http://www.traprockpeace.org/tokyo_trial_13march04.doc

 

7. Gsponer and Hurni "Fourth Generation Nuclear Weapons: The
Physical Principles Of Thermonuclear Explosives, Inertial
Confinement Fusion, And The Quest For Fourth Generation Nuclear
Weapons" http://www.inesap.org/publ_tech01.htm

 

8. Christopher Bollyn, American Free Press, Depleted Uranium:
U.S. Commits War Crime Against Iraq, Humanity

http://www.americanfreepress.net/html/depleted_uranium.html

 

9. Parker, K., “Weapons and the Laws and the Customs of War,”
International Education Development/Humanitarian Law Project,
San Francisco, California, May 1997.

 

10. The Nuremburg Trials, 1945 - 1949.
http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/nuremberg/nuremb
erg.htm

 

11. Memorandum To Brigadier General L. R. Groves from Drs.
Conant, Compton and Urey.
http://www.mindfully.org/Nucs/Groves-Memo-Manhattan30oct43.htm

 

12. "Heavy Metal or Death Metal," IDUST Archives.
http://www.idust.net/Docs/Docs002.htm

 

13. "Poisoned? Special Investigation," by Juan Gonzales, New
York Daily News.
http://www.nydailynews.com/front/story/180333p-156685c.html

 

14. Dr. Asaf Duracovic, a nuclear medicine expert who has
conducted extensive research on depleted uranium, Uranium
Medical Research Center.

http://www.umrc.net/

 

15. "Three Questions from Doug Rokke, Ph.D. to the Department of
Defense concerning its use of radioactive weapons." Traprock
Peace Center, September 13, 2004.
http://traprockpeace.org/rokke_du_3_ques.html

 

16. "The Real Dirty Bombs: Depleted Uranium," by Christopher
Bollyn, August 4, 2004, WagingPeace.org.
http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2004/08/06_bollyn_real-dirty-
bombs.htm

 

17. "Dahr Jamil's Iraq Dispatches."
http://dahrjamailiraq.com/index.php

 

18. "Living Under Fascism," Davidson Loehr, First UCC Church of
Austin, 11/07/04. http://207.44.245.159/article7478.htm

19. Kissinger's quote regarding military men comes from Chapter
14, which extensively discusses Al Haig, Kissinger and other
Nixon staff advisors' negotiations and differences over national
security issues during the 1969-1974 period. The exact, direct
quote marks begin with the word 'dumb' and terminates after the
word 'used'. SOURCE: Bob Woodward &Carl Bernstein, The Final
Days, second Touchstone paperback edition (1994), Chapter 14,
pp. 194-195.

Bob Nichols is a Project Censored Award Winner and lives in
Oklahoma.newspaper. Nichols is a former employee of the
McAlester Army Ammunition Plant.

					
© website copyright 2003, 2004
www.ProgressiveTrail.Org
*****************************************************************
 13 Guardian Unlimited: Pakistan Denies New Allegations Over Nukes
 
From the Associated Press        

[UP] 
 	 
Monday February 7, 2005 2:01 PM

AP Photo ISL102 

By SADAQAT JAN 

Associated Press Writer 

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan (AP) - Pakistan on Monday rejected a report
that an international black market in weapons technology, run by
disgraced Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan, may have sold equipment
to Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries. 

Information Minister Sheikh Rashid Ahmed described as
``baseless'' the allegations printed in this week's edition of
Time magazine, but he did not rule out that Khan could have sold
technology to more countries than initially thought. 

``We don't know of any other country that he gave nuclear
technology to. But if there is another country, we will
investigate,'' Ahmed told The Associated Press. ``If there are
any questions (for Khan), we will ask them.'' 

Khan, once regarded as a national hero for his role in
developing Pakistan's nuclear deterrent against rival India, has
lived under virtual house since he confessed in February 2004 to
selling sensitive technology to Iran, Libya and North Korea. 

President Gen. Pervez Musharraf has pardoned Khan, and says the
scientist's international network has been dismantled. The
government denies any official involvement in the
multimillion-dollar illicit trade that earned Khan a fortune -
estimated by Time at up to $400 million. 

The United States has submitted questions to Pakistan to ask
Khan about whether North Korea and Iran sold nuclear equipment
to third parties, but authorities have apparently not allowed
U.S. agents to interview Khan themselves. 

The Time report cited an unidentified Pakistani Defense Ministry
official as saying that U.S. officials were investigating
whether Khan's network might have sold nuclear technology to
Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries, such as Egypt. 

Foreign Ministry spokesman Masood Khan also denied the Time
report. He also denied that Khan's network supplied Saudi Arabia
with nuclear technology. 

``The international black market network as far as it was
related to Pakistan has been dismantled. It has been
neutralized,'' he said at a news briefing in Islamabad. 

Khan blamed unnamed ``constituencies who launch and sustain this
kind of disinformation campaign. Pakistan is a nuclear state and
this is one of the risks that is involved in this status.'' 

Ahmed, the information minister, said that Pakistan remained in
contact with the Vienna-based U.N. nuclear watchdog, the
International Atomic Energy Agency, but reiterated that it would
not hand over the scientist for questioning by non-Pakistanis. 

``We have inquired as much as we can, if somebody has more
questions, we are ready to satisfy IAEA,'' he said. ``But there
is no way to deliver A.Q. Khan to anyone.'' 

He denied that Khan's network was still operating and one
specific allegation in the report that 16 cylinders of uranium
hexafluoride gas - a critical ingredient for uranium enrichment
for weapons - had gone missing from Pakistan's leading nuclear
lab, the Khan Research Laboratories, named after the scientist. 

``There are no cylinders missing from KRL. The inventory is
complete,'' Ahmed said. 

Last week, U.S. Ambassador Ryan Crocker told reporters that
investigations into the full scope of Khan's network were
continuing, and that the United States was looking forward to
hearing the full results of Pakistan's inquiries. 

Khan, the foreign ministry spokesman, said Pakistan has shared
the results of its investigations ``transparently and candidly''
with the international community. 

``I think it's a joint responsibility of the international
community, all key actors to act against proliferation,'' he
said. ``That's why our investigations are continuing and if
fresh leads emerge, we would like to check them out, and if
fresh evidence is furnished to us, we would like to look into
that.'' 
  
      Guardian Unlimited © Guardian Newspapers Limited 2005
*****************************************************************
 14 Guardian Unlimited: Russia Gets U.S. Money to Destroy Weapons
 
From the Associated Press        

[UP] 

Monday February 7, 2005 12:01 PM

By WILLIAM C. MANN 

Associated Press Writer 

WASHINGTON (AP) - A U.S. arms-control organization agreed Monday
to supply the money for a railroad bridge necessary for Russia
to destroy nearly 2 million chemical munitions stored in
desolate southeastern Siberia. 

Once completed, the project will involve the United States,
Canada, Britain and Russia. Mainly Russian experts will handle
the destruction, getting rid of weapons ranging from artillery
shells the size and shape of wine bottles to warheads for Scud
missiles. Most are armed with the nerve agents Sarin, Soman and
VX. 

The $1 million grant from the Nuclear Threat Initiative, or NTI,
is the first contribution by a non-governmental entity to a
2-year-old undertaking by the Group of Eight leading industrial
nations to fight the spread of weapons of mass destruction. 

``The real key here is issue of global cooperation,'' said Laura
Holgate, a chemical weapons specialist and NTI vice president.
``Dealing with threats of mass destruction, the threat is to
everyone, and no individual nation can handle the threat
alone.'' 

The weapons to be destroyed are considered among Russia's most
lethal chemical weapons and prone to proliferation because,
unlike nuclear weapons, they lack serial numbers. 

Michael Kergin, Canada's ambassador, who signed the agreement
with NTI, said this and other projects under the G-8 and
Nunn-Lugar destruction programs are critical to keeping weapons
``out of the hands of terrorists and those who would harbor
them.'' 

Canada is pooling the initiative's money with $25 million of its
own to build an 11-mile rail spur between a massive Russian
chemical weapons storage depot at Planovy and a U.S.-financed
destruction facility at Shchuch'ye - sparsely populated towns in
Siberia near Kurgan, just north of the Kazakhstan border. NTI's
money is to pay for a trestle across the Miass River. 

The United States is financing construction of the destruction
facility at a cost of about $1 billion, money from the 1991
Nunn-Lugar program for dismantling weapons of mass destruction.
Canada is building the railroad because Congress has refused to
allow Nunn-Lugar money to be used for infrastructure projects.
Overall management of the project will be by the British Defense
Ministry. 

Former Sen. Sam Nunn, D-Ga., who cosponsored the project, said,
``These dangerous weapons need to be destroyed as quickly as
possible, and I am pleased that we could partner with the
Canadian government on this important project.'' 

Weapons such as those being destroyed at Shchuch'ye are banned
under the Chemical Weapons Convention, which the United States
and Russia ratified in the 1990s. The earliest chemical weapons
convention, in the late 1920s, banned only their use on the
battlefield, not their possession. 

Russia's declared stockpile of 40,000 tons of chemical weapons,
mainly modern nerve agents, is the world's largest. They are
dispersed among seven sites. 

It's an expensive operation to get rid of them. 

Eliminating the Russian caches is expected to require at least
$10 billion, probably more. The United States has been
destroying its chemical weapons since the 1970s, so far is rid
of only one-third of them, and already has spent $16 billion. 
  
Guardian Unlimited © Guardian Newspapers Limited 2005
*****************************************************************
 15 Pakistan News: Pak denies missing of uranium cylinders

PakTribune.Com
 
ZilHaj 28, 1425 Hijri February 08, 2005	         
  
   		
Monday February 07, 2005 (1626 PST)
 		 		 		
ISLAMABAD: Pakistan has emphatically denied that 16 cylinders of
uranium hexafluoride gas - a critical ingredient for uranium
enrichment, have gone missing from the Khan Research
Laboratories. 

Sheikh Rashid Ahmad, the information minister, told a private
television channel on Monday that there is absolutely no truth
in the claim because a strong and foolproof command and control
mechanism is there to safeguard country's nuclear assets. 
He said nothing had been brought out of the laboratories
secretly and "we have facts to prove our claim." 

He said the US based magazine report was wrong and misleading
and the magazine had tried to sensitize its report that had been
presented in wrong perspective. 

Time Magazine quoted sources close to the KRL as claiming Dr. A
Q Khan's network of suppliers and middlemen is still operational
and the hardware is still available, and the network hasn't
stopped. 

The minister said Pakistan would not hand over to any country
Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, the father of country's nuclear
programme, and would continue denying access to Dr. Khan, who
had been found guilty of nuclear proliferation to Iran, Libya
and North Korea. 

He said Pakistan was a declared atomic power and was facing no
pressure whatsoever to rollback its programme. 

He said Pakistan was in touch with International Atomic Energy
Agency and the concerned quarters on proliferation issue.  

Pakistan News Service © PakTribune.com Pvt Ltd
2003-2004   
*****************************************************************
 16 Pakistan News: Pak has eliminated black market nuclear proliferation network

PakTribune.Com
 
ZilHaj 28, 1425 Hijri February 08, 2005	         
  
Monday February 07, 2005 (1626 PST)
 
ISLAMABAD: Pakistan claimed Monday that it had cut the roots of
Black Market Net Work involved in the nuclear proliferation and
also denied transferring of nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia
and the missing of sixteen uranium gas cylinders from Kahota
Research Laboratories (KRL). 

Foreign Office spokesman Masood Khna in his weekly press
briefing denied the news item published in the Time Newspaper
that the net work involved in the transfer of nuclear technology
had again reactivated. He said that all the news linked with the
missing of gas cylinders and the transferring of nuclear black
marketing regarding Pakistan were baseless and had no proof. 

"Pakistan had informed the world community on the issue of
nuclear black marketing and had also demanded for joint-efforts
to abolish such chances in the future", he said. 

He also expressed deep concern on the Indian refusal of not
attending the Saarc summit, and added that India repeated
pretexts had weakened this regional body. Being the chairman of
Saarc Pakistan was ready to end all conflicts on the table,
adding that Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz would carve out another
appropriate date for the meeting. 

He also urged India to disclose its posture on the Pak-Iran gas
pipeline project. India had expedited its work on the Baglihar
Dame but Pakistan had asked WB for a neutral expert as the being
the broker of the Indus Water Treaty 1960, he maintained. 

An invitation had been sent to the Indian Premier Manmohan Singh
to visit Pakistan who had accepted it and the date of his visit
would be fixed at the time of Indian foreign minister Natwar
Singh visit to Pakistan, the foreign spokesman disclosed. 

Responding to a question, Masood Khan said Kashmir was the
integral part of Pakistan and the government couldn't compromise
on its principle stand. The Kashmiris would be given due share
in the solution of Kashmir and their will would be assigned
great importance, Masood said. 

He said one may not be ascertained about the involvement of
foreign hand in the Balochistan issue but it may not be
excluded, however any word in this regard would be prior of
time, and added that the government was collecting all
information regarding the peace torn province.  
     
Pakistan News Service © PakTribune.com Pvt Ltd
2003-2004   
*****************************************************************
 17 Chernobyl Scrap Equipment Up for Sale As 7 Million Suffer Rad Induced Health Problems
 
Date: Mon, 7 Feb 2005 14:48:27 -0500

 

  An estimated 7 million people suffer
radiation-related health problems from the
disaster at the Chernobyl's reactor No. 4, which
exploded and burned in 1986.


http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/international/AP-Ukraine-Chernobyl-Sale.html?oref=login

Chernobyl Scrap Equipment Up for Sale
By THE ASSOCIATED PRESS

Published: February 7, 2005


Filed at 1:40 p.m. ET

KIEV, Ukraine (AP) -- Officials at the site of the
world's worst nuclear accident announced plans
Monday to sell scrap and other equipment from the
Chernobyl nuclear plant, saying the government was
not giving it enough money to continue operating.

Plant spokesman Viktor Kapusta said authorities
hoped to raise the funds by selling things like
pumps to maintain the ongoing operations such as
monitoring radiation levels. He called the
decision a ``forced measure,'' saying the federal
government owes the plant $3.2 million.

About 30 workers are sorting out the equipment and
estimating its value, Kapusta said. He said the
equipment being sold was ``clean, safe and
environmentally friendly.''

He refused to say how much the plant operators
were hoping to bring in.

``We shouldn't be sitting around twiddling our
thumbs,'' he said. ``We should try to make money
ourselves.''

An estimated 7 million people suffer
radiation-related health problems from the
disaster at the Chernobyl's reactor No. 4, which
exploded and burned in 1986. The radioactive
fallout affected vast parts of Ukraine, Russia,
Belarus and much of northern Europe.

The destroyed reactor was entombed in a hastily
built concrete-and-steel shelter, which Ukrainian
experts say is in need of urgent repairs. The last
reactor at the plant was shut for good in 2000,
but many call the plant a ticking atomic time
bomb.

Ukrainian authorities have repeatedly warned that
the previously estimated figure of $758 million
was far from enough to build a new protective
shelter for reactor No. 4 by the end of 2008.
Officials have asked for an additional $350
million.





*****************************************************************
 18 [NukeNet] Chernobyl Scrap Equipment Up for Sale As 7 Million
 
Date: Mon, 07 Feb 2005 15:15:28 -0800

 
<x-flowed>
NukeNet Anti-Nuclear Network (nukenet@energyjustice.net)


   An estimated 7 million people suffer
radiation-related health problems from the
disaster at the Chernobyl's reactor No. 4, which
exploded and burned in 1986.


http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/international/AP-Ukraine-Chernobyl-Sale.html?oref=login

Chernobyl Scrap Equipment Up for Sale
By THE ASSOCIATED PRESS

Published: February 7, 2005


Filed at 1:40 p.m. ET

KIEV, Ukraine (AP) -- Officials at the site of the
world's worst nuclear accident announced plans
Monday to sell scrap and other equipment from the
Chernobyl nuclear plant, saying the government was
not giving it enough money to continue operating.

Plant spokesman Viktor Kapusta said authorities
hoped to raise the funds by selling things like
pumps to maintain the ongoing operations such as
monitoring radiation levels. He called the
decision a ``forced measure,'' saying the federal
government owes the plant $3.2 million.

About 30 workers are sorting out the equipment and
estimating its value, Kapusta said. He said the
equipment being sold was ``clean, safe and
environmentally friendly.''

He refused to say how much the plant operators
were hoping to bring in.

``We shouldn't be sitting around twiddling our
thumbs,'' he said. ``We should try to make money
ourselves.''

An estimated 7 million people suffer
radiation-related health problems from the
disaster at the Chernobyl's reactor No. 4, which
exploded and burned in 1986. The radioactive
fallout affected vast parts of Ukraine, Russia,
Belarus and much of northern Europe.

The destroyed reactor was entombed in a hastily
built concrete-and-steel shelter, which Ukrainian
experts say is in need of urgent repairs. The last
reactor at the plant was shut for good in 2000,
but many call the plant a ticking atomic time
bomb.

Ukrainian authorities have repeatedly warned that
the previously estimated figure of $758 million
was far from enough to build a new protective
shelter for reactor No. 4 by the end of 2008.
Officials have asked for an additional $350
million.






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 19 NRC: Nuclear Management Company; Notice of Consideration of Issuance 
 
                         FR Doc 05-2242 
[Federal Register: February 7, 2005 (Volume 70, Number 24)] 
[Notices] [Page 6466-6468] From the Federal Register Online via 
GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr07fe05-105]                         
 
of Amendments to Facility Operating License, Proposed No 
Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity 
for a Hearing The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the 
Commission) is considering issuance of an amendment to Facility 
Operating License Nos. DPR-24 and DPR-27 issued to Nuclear 
Management Company (the licensee) for operation of the Point 
Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, located in Two Rivers, 
Wisconsin.
 
The proposed amendment would revise the Point Beach Nuclear Plant 
(PBNP), Units 1 and 2, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report to 
reflect the Commission staff's approval of the WCAP-14439-P, 
Revision 2 analysis entitled, ``Technical Justification for 
Eliminating Large Primary Loop Pipe Rupture as the Structural 
Design Basis for the Point Beach Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 for 
the Power Uprate and License Renewal Program.'' Before issuance 
of the proposed license amendment, the Commission will have made 
findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended 
(the Act), and the Commission's regulations.
 
The Commission has made a proposed determination that the 
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration. 
Under the Commission's regulations in Title 10 of the Code of 
Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Section 50.92, this means that 
operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed 
amendment would not (1) involve a significant increase in the 
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; 
or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of 
accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a 
significant reduction in a margin of safety. As required by 10 
CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue 
of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented 
below: 1. Operation of PBNP in accordance with the proposed 
amendments does not result in a significant increase in the 
probability or consequences of any accident previously evaluated.
 
The proposed change revises the analysis supporting the PBNP 
dynamic effects design basis for primary loop piping. The 
proposed change does not adversely affect accident initiators or 
precursors nor alter the design assumptions, conditions, or the 
manner in which the plant is operated and maintained. The 
proposed change does not alter or prevent the ability of 
structures, systems, and components from performing their 
intended function to mitigate the consequences of an initiating 
event within the assumed acceptance limits. The proposed change 
does not affect the source term, containment isolation, or 
radiological release assumptions used in evaluating the 
radiological consequences of an accident previously evaluated. 
Further, the proposed change does not increase the types or 
amounts of radioactive effluent that may be released offsite, nor 
significantly increase individual or cumulative 
occupational/public radiation exposures. The proposed change is 
consistent with safety analysis assumptions and resultant 
consequences. Therefore, it is concluded that this change does 
not significantly increase the probability of occurrence of an 
accident previously evaluated.
 
2. Operation of PBNP in accordance with the proposed amendments 
does not result in a new or different kind of accident from any 
accident previously evaluated.
 
The proposed change revises the analysis supporting the PBNP 
dynamic effects design basis for primary loop piping. The changes 
do not impose any new or different requirements or eliminate any 
existing requirements. The changes do not alter assumptions made 
in the safety analysis. The proposed changes are consistent with 
the safety analysis assumptions and current plant operating 
practice. Therefore, the proposed change does not create the 
possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any 
previously evaluated.
 
3. Operation of PBNP in accordance with the proposed amendments 
does not result in a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
 
The proposed change revises the analysis supporting the PBNP 
dynamic effects design basis for primary loop piping. All the 
recommended margins regarding leak-before-break conditions 
(margin on leak rate, margin on flaw size, and margin on loads) 
are satisfied for the primary loop piping. The proposed change 
does not alter the manner in which safety limits, limiting safety 
system settings or limiting conditions for operation are 
determined.
 
The setpoints at which protective actions are initiated are not 
altered by the proposed changes. Sufficient equipment remains 
available to actuate upon demand for the purpose of mitigating an 
analyzed event.
 
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 
50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to 
determine that the amendment request involves no significant 
hazards consideration.
 
The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed 
determination. Any comments received within 30 days after the 
date of publication of this notice will be considered in making 
any final determination.
 
 
[[Page 6467]] Normally, the Commission will not issue the 
amendment until the expiration of 60 days after the date of 
publication of this notice. The Commission may issue the license 
amendment before expiration of the 60- day period provided that 
its final determination is that the amendment involves no 
significant hazards consideration. In addition, the Commission 
may issue the amendment prior to the expiration of the 30- day 
comment period should circumstances change during the 30-day 
comment period such that failure to act in a timely way would 
result, for example in derating or shutdown of the facility. 
Should the Commission take action prior to the expiration of 
either the comment period or the notice period, it will publish 
in the Federal Register a notice of issuance. Should the 
Commission make a final No Significant Hazards Consideration 
Determination, any hearing will take place after issuance. The 
Commission expects that the need to take this action will occur 
very infrequently.
 
Written comments may be submitted by mail to the Chief, Rules and 
Directives Branch, Division of Administrative Services, Office of 
Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, 
DC 20555-0001, and should cite the publication date and page 
number of this Federal Register notice. Written comments may also 
be delivered to Room 6D59, Two White Flint North, 11545 Rockville 
Pike, Rockville, Maryland, from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. Federal 
workdays. Documents may be examined, and/or copied for a fee, at 
the NRC's Public Document Room, located at One White Flint North, 
Public File Area O1 F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), 
Rockville, Maryland.
 
The filing of requests for hearing and petitions for leave to 
intervene is discussed below.
 
Within 60 days after the date of publication of this notice, the 
licensee may file a request for a hearing with respect to 
issuance of the amendment to the subject facility operating 
license and any person whose interest may be affected by this 
proceeding and who wishes to participate as a party in the 
proceeding must file a written request for a hearing and a 
petition for leave to intervene. Requests for a hearing and a 
petition for leave to intervene shall be filed in accordance with 
the Commission's ``Rules of Practice for Domestic Licensing 
Proceedings'' in 10 CFR Part 2. Interested persons should consult 
a current copy of 10 CFR 2.309, which is available at the 
Commission's PDR, located at One White Flint North, Public File 
Area 01F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, 
Maryland. Publicly available records will be accessible from the 
Agencywide Documents Access and Management System's (ADAMS) 
Public Electronic Reading Room on the Internet at the NRC Web 
site, http://www.nrc.gov/ 
[http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/leaving.cgi?from=leaving 
FR.html&log=linklog&to=http://www.nrc.gov/] 
reading-rm/doc-collections/cfr/. If a request for a hearing or 
petition for leave to intervene is filed by the above date, the 
Commission or a presiding officer designated by the Commission or 
by the Chief Administrative Judge of the Atomic Safety and 
Licensing Board Panel, will rule on the request and/or petition; 
and the Secretary or the Chief Administrative Judge of the Atomic 
Safety and Licensing Board will issue a notice of a hearing or an 
appropriate order.
 
As required by 10 CFR 2.309, a petition for leave to intervene 
shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner 
in the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the 
results of the proceeding. The petition should specifically 
explain the reasons why intervention should be permitted with 
particular reference to the following general requirements: (1) 
The name, address and telephone number of the requestor or 
petitioner; (2) the nature of the requestor's/petitioner's right 
under the Act to be made a party to the proceeding; (3) the 
nature and extent of the requestor's/petitioner's property, 
financial, or other interest in the proceeding; and (4) the 
possible effect of any decision or order which may be entered in 
the proceeding on the requestors/petitioner's interest.
 
The petition must also identify the specific contentions which 
the petitioner/requestor seeks to have litigated at the 
proceeding.
 
Each contention must consist of a specific statement of the issue 
of law or fact to be raised or controverted. In addition, the 
petitioner/requestor shall provide a brief explanation of the 
bases for the contention and a concise statement of the alleged 
facts or expert opinion which support the contention and on which 
the petitioner intends to rely in proving the contention at the 
hearing. The petitioner/requestor must also provide references to 
those specific sources and documents of which the petitioner is 
aware and on which the petitioner intends to rely to establish 
those facts or expert opinion. The petition must include 
sufficient information to show that a genuine dispute exists with 
the applicant on a material issue of law or fact. Contentions 
shall be limited to matters within the scope of the amendment 
under consideration. The contention must be one which, if proven, 
would entitle the petitioner to relief. A petitioner/requestor 
who fails to satisfy these requirements with respect to at least 
one contention will not be permitted to participate as a party.
 
Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding, 
subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to 
intervene, and have the opportunity to participate fully in the 
conduct of the hearing.
 
If a hearing is requested, the Commission will make a final 
determination on the issue of no significant hazards 
consideration. The final determination will serve to decide when 
the hearing is held. If the final determination is that the 
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration, 
the Commission may issue the amendment and make it immediately 
effective, notwithstanding the request for a hearing. Any hearing 
held would take place after issuance of the amendment. If the 
final determination is that the amendment request involves a 
significant hazards consideration, any hearing held would take 
place before the issuance of any amendment.
 
Nontimely requests and/or petitions and contentions will not be 
entertained absent a determination by the Commission or the 
presiding officer of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that 
the petition, request and/or the contentions should be granted 
based on a balancing of the factors specified in 10 CFR 
2.309(a)(1)(I)-(viii). A request for a hearing or a petition for 
leave to intervene must be filed by: (1) First class mail 
addressed to the Office of the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, 
Attention: Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff; (2) courier, 
express mail, and expedited delivery services: Office of the 
Secretary, Sixteenth Floor, One White Flint North, 11555 
Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland, 20852, Attention: Rulemaking 
and Adjudications Staff; (3) E-mail addressed to the Office of 
the Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
HEARINGDOCKET@NRC.GOV [HEARINGDOCKET@NRC.GOV] ; or (4) facsimile 
transmission addressed to the Office of the Secretary, U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC, Attention: 
Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff at (301) 415-1101, 
verification number is (301) 415-1966. A copy of the request for 
hearing and petition for leave to intervene should also be sent 
to the Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, and it is requested that 
copies be
 
[[Page 6468]] transmitted either by means of facsimile 
transmission to 301-415-3725 or by email to OGCMailCenter@nrc.gov 
[OGCMailCenter@nrc.gov] . A copy of the request for hearing and 
petition for leave to intervene should also be sent to Jonathan 
Rogoff, Esquire, Vice President, Counsel & Secretary, Nuclear 
Management Company, LLC, 700 First Street, Hudson, WI 54016, 
attorney for the licensee.
 
For further details with respect to this action, see the 
application for amendment dated November 5, 2003, which is 
available for public inspection at the Commission's PDR, located 
at One White Flint North, File Public Area O1 F21, 11555 
Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland. Publicly 
available records will be accessible from the Agencywide 
Documents Access and Management System's (ADAMS) Public 
Electronic Reading Room on the Internet at the NRC Web site, 
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html 
[http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/leaving.cgi?from=leaving 
FR.html&log=linklog&to=http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html] 
. Persons who do not have access to ADAMS or who encounter 
problems in accessing the documents located in ADAMS, should 
contact the NRC PDR Reference staff by telephone at 
1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or by e-mail to pdr@nrc.gov 
[pdr@nrc.gov] . Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 31st day of 
January 2005.
 
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
 
Deirdre W. Spaulding, Project Manager, Section 1, Project 
Directorate III, Division of Licensing Project Management, Office 
of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
 
[FR Doc. 05-2242 Filed 2-4-05; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590-01-U

 
*****************************************************************
 20 NRC: Notice of Availability of Environmental Assessment and Finding
 
                         FR Doc 05-2244 
[Federal Register: February 7, 2005 (Volume 70, Number 24)] 
[Notices] [Page 6469-6470] From the Federal Register Online via 
GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr07fe05-107]                         
 
of No Significant Impact for License Amendment for Exxonmobil 
Biomedical Sciences, Inc.'s Facility in Annandale, NJ AGENCY: 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
 
ACTION: Notice of availability.
 
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Betsy Ullrich, Commercial and R 
Branch, Division of Nuclear Materials Safety, Region I, 475 
Allendale Road, King of Prussia, Pennsylvania, 19406, telephone 
(610) 337-5040, fax (610) 337-5269; or by email: EXU@NRC.GOV 
[EXU@NRC.GOV] .
 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: I. Introduction The Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC) is issuing a license amendment to Exxonmobil 
Biomedical Sciences, Inc. for Materials License No. 29-19396-01, 
to authorize release of its facility in Annandale, New Jersey for 
unrestricted use. NRC has prepared an Environmental Assessment 
(EA) in support of this action in accordance with the 
requirements of 10 CFR Part 51. Based on the EA, the NRC has 
concluded that a Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI) is 
appropriate.
 
The amendment will be issued following the publication of this 
Notice.
 
II. EA Summary The purpose of the action is to authorize the 
release of the licensee's Annandale, New Jersey facility for 
unrestricted use. Exxonmobil Biomedical Sciences, Inc. was 
authorized by NRC from December 14, 1999, to use radioactive 
materials for research and development purposes at the site. On 
October 25, 2004, Exxonmobil Biomedical Sciences, Inc. requested 
that NRC release the facility for unrestricted use. Exxonmobil 
Biomedical Sciences, Inc. has conducted surveys of the facility 
and provided information to the NRC to demonstrate that the site 
meets the license termination criteria in Subpart E of 10 CFR 
Part 20 for unrestricted use.
 
The NRC staff has prepared an EA in support of the license 
amendment. The facility was remediated and surveyed prior to the 
licensee requesting the license amendment. The NRC staff has 
reviewed the information and final status survey submitted by 
Exxonmobil Biomedical Sciences, Inc. Based on its review, the 
staff has determined that there are no additional remediation 
activities necessary to complete the proposed action. Therefore, 
the staff considered the impact of the residual radioactivity at 
the facility and concluded that since the residual radioactivity 
meets the requirements in Subpart E of 10 CFR Part 20, a Finding 
of No Significant Impact is appropriate.
 
III. Finding of No Significant Impact The staff has prepared the 
EA (summarized above) in support of the license amendment to 
terminate the license and release the facility for unrestricted 
use. The NRC staff has evaluated Exxonmobil Biomedical Sciences, 
Inc.''s request and the results of the surveys and has concluded 
that the completed action complies with the criteria in Subpart E 
of 10 CFR Part 20. The staff has found that the environmental 
impacts from the action are bounded by the impacts evaluated by 
NUREG- 1496, Volumes 1-3, ``Generic Environmental Impact 
Statement in Support of Rulemaking on Radiological Criteria for 
License Termination of NRC- Licensed Facilities'' (ML042310492, 
ML042320379, and ML042330385). On the basis of the EA, the NRC 
has concluded that the environmental impacts from the action are 
expected to be insignificant and has determined not to prepare an 
environmental impact statement for the action.
 
IV. Further Information Documents related to this action, 
including the application for the license amendment and 
supporting documentation, are available electronically at the 
NRC's Electronic Reading Room at 
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html 
[http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/leaving.cgi?from=leaving 
FR.html&log=linklog&to=http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html] 
.
 
From this site, you can access the NRC's Agencywide Document 
Access and Management System (ADAMS), which provides text and 
image files of NRC's public documents. The ADAMS accession 
numbers for the documents related to this Notice are: 
Environmental Assessment Related to an Amendment of U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission Materials License No. 29-19396-01 
ML050280058; and the Radiological Decommissioning Report, 
ExxonMobil Biomedical Sciences, Inc., 1545 Route 22 East, 
Annandale, New Jersey, October 24, 2004 (ML043100336). Please 
note that on October 25, 2004, the NRC terminated public access 
to ADAMS and initiated an additional security review of publicly 
available documents to ensure that potentially sensitive 
information is removed from
 
[[Page 6470]] the ADAMS database accessible through the ADAMS web 
site.
 
Interested members of the public may obtain copies of the 
reference documents for review and or copying by contacting the 
Public Document Room pending resumption of public access to 
ADAMS. The NRC Public Documents Room is located at NRC 
Headquarters in Rockville, Maryland, and can be contacted at 
(800) 397-4209 or (301) 415-4737, or by email to

 
pdr@nrc.gov [ pdr@nrc.gov] . The PDR reproduction contractor will 
copy documents for a fee. The PDR is open from 7:45 a.m. to 4:15 
p.m., Monday through Friday, except on Federal holidays.
 
Dated at King of Prussia, Pennsylvania, this 28th day of January, 
2005.
 
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
 
James Dwyer, Chief, Commercial and R Branch, Division of Nuclear 
Materials Safety, Region I.
 
[FR Doc. 05-2244 Filed 2-4-05; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590-01-P

 
*****************************************************************
 21 Daily Yomiuri: 'Dream-come-true' reactor 

Takeshi Abe and Kenji Fujito / Yomiuri Shimbun Staff Writers 

Fukui Gov. Issei Nishikawa's approval Sunday of a plan to modify
the Monju fast-breeder nuclear reactor in Tsuruga in the
prefecture was welcomed by the central government and the Japan
Nuclear Cycle Development Institute (JNC), the reactor's
operator. 

The governor's decision also supports the prefectural
government's efforts to make the prefecture a center for nuclear
power research and development. 

Yoshikazu Kato, head of the Education, Science and Technology
Ministry's nuclear cycle development division, was with Minister
Nariaki Nakayama when the minister discussed the reactor with
the Fukui governor on Sunday. 

Kato said, "The nine years in which the Monju reactor was out of
operation were so long, but we have finally seen the nuclear
cycle become a reality." 

The government has promoted nuclear fuel cycle policies because
of the nation's limited natural resources. The cycle involves
effectively using plutonium, extracted by reprocessing spent
nuclear fuel, as mixed uranium and plutonium oxide (MOX) fuel. 

The Monju research reactor has been central to the policies. 

It is called a dream-come-true reactor because it can produce
more plutonium than it uses as fuel. Practical use of the
reactor has been a long goal, but a sodium leak accident in 1995
put a stop to the project. 

The plutonium-thermal energy projects that have been seen as
another important pillar of nuclear cycle policies will use MOX
fuel at ordinary nuclear reactors. 

However, the projects planned by Tokyo Electric Power Co. and
Kansai Electric Power Co. have been halted or postponed due to
scandals and accidents. 

In 2002, it was discovered that TEPCO had failed to report
damaged reactor shrouds to the central government in the 1980s
and 1990s, and damaged cooling pipes at KEPCO's Mihama Nuclear
Power Plant's No. 3 reactor in Mihamacho, Fukui Prefecture,
killed five workers last year. 

While the projects have been idle, the nation's plutonium, which
mainly has been extracted by processing facilities abroad,
increased to about 40 tons by the end of 2003. 

The resumption of the Monju operation has attracted attention as
Japan has been required to comply with international commitments
that limit the use of plutonium, which can be used to produce
nuclear weapons. 

According to a decision made during the recent Cabinet
Office-affiliated conference on long-term nuclear policy, Japan
will maintain its nuclear cycle policies and promote R&D into a
fast-breeder reactor. 

In December, Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd. began tests at its plant in
Rokkashomura, Aomori Prefecture, to reprocess spent nuclear fuel
by using depleted uranium. If full- scale operation of the plant
begins, about five tons of plutonium would be recovered
annually. 

Therefore, the central government and others hope that the
approval from the Fukui governor will help promote the nuclear
cycle policies. 

About 7 billion yen has been spent each year on maintaining the
idle Monju reactor, which requires the circulation of sodium
coolant. Workers at the reactor have also been involved in
routine maintenance checks and trained to handle sodium. 

Public disclosure of information concerning the reactor has been
expanded in response to criticism of covered-up video footage of
the sodium leak accident in 1995. More than 80,000 people have
toured the reactor plant since 1996. JNC officials have
explained the reactor and nuclear cycle projects in about 450
meetings to locals. 

Takehide Deshimaru, deputy chief of the planning department at
JNC's Tsuruga head office, said: "The years seemed very long,
but I believe the governor's approval will boost the morale of
our workers. We're determined that we'll never make the mistakes
again and have the projects halted." 

=== 

Public trust sought 



After a meeting between Nishikawa and Nakayama on Sunday
afternoon, Nishikawa told reporters, "It's of the utmost
importance that Fukui residents understand the safety (of
modifying the reactor)." 

In exchange for the modification approval, the prefecture has
taken a step toward becoming the Tokaimura of western Japan. The
village in Ibaraki Prefecture is the country's center of nuclear
R&D. 

There has been some dissatisfaction in Fukui Prefecture, where
15 nuclear reactors are located. When the cooling pipes of
KEPCO's Mihama Nuclear Power Plant's No. 3 reactor burst, the
Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute (JAERI) in Tokaimura made
inquiries. An official of the Fukui prefectural government said,
"Although there are many reactors in the prefecture, we can't
carry out any inquiries on accidents that occur at reactors in
the prefecture." 

Nishikawa has also said that the nuclear industry and other
local industrial sectors are still not collaborating, closely
and technology transfers have not been carried out. He added
that the nuclear industry's contribution to the prefecture's
sustainable development would help the industry gain public
trust. 

By using the restart of Monju as a bargaining chip, the
prefectural government has sought the central government's
support behind the scenes to turn the prefecture into a center
for atomic energy R&D. 

As a result, the prefectural government persuaded the central
government to include 1.9 billion yen for the projects in the
fiscal 2005 budget. 

The allotment will support the prefectural government's future
development of a local industry related to the decommissioning
of nuclear reactors. 

It is believed that the construction of the planned Hokuriku
Shinkansen's Fukui Station was allowed in exchange for the
governor's approval for the Monju modification. A new
independent administrative agency is to be launched in October
as a result of the integration of JNC and JAERI. Nishikawa has
urged the central government to establish facilities that will
have functions similar to the new agency's headquarters, which
will be located in Tokaimura. 

JNC has said that it will not reduce personnel at the Tsuruga
head office, even after the integration, adding that the office
will be used for joint projects among industrial, governmental
and academic sectors in western Japan.   

Copyright 2005 The Yomiuri Shimbun 
*****************************************************************
 22 Platts: NRC's 2006 budget request higher than 2005
 
  [The McGraw-Hill Companies]   
    
 
+ NRC is requesting nearly $701.7-million for its fiscal 2006 
budget, up from the $669-million allocated for FY-05. 

The agency's authority to recoup most of its operating costs 
(currently about 90%) through fees charged to its licensees 
expires Sept. 30, the end of FY-05. 

Unless Congress acts to renew the provision, NRC's fee recovery 
requirement will drop to 33%. The difference would have to be 
made up through congressional appropriations from the general 
U.S. Treasury. 

The $32-million increase in NRC's FY-06 budget reflects an 
increase in anticipated reactor safety and licensing activities 
and the rising costs of employee salaries and benefits. 

Regulatory costs associated with homeland security efforts are 
expected to increase slightly, from about $43.5-million in FY-05 
to $44.6-million in FY-06. 

Washington (Platts)--7Feb2005
 
Copyright © 2005 - Platts, All Rights Reserved
 [The McGraw-Hill Companies]       
*****************************************************************
 23 BBC: Aid for closed nuclear plant area
 
  Last Updated: Monday, 7 February, 2005
 
[Chapelcross nuclear power station]                             

Chapelcross closed after 45 years                                                           

An £8m package aimed at regenerating the economy of part of 
Dumfries and Galloway has been announced. 

It follows the closure and decommissioning of the Chapelcross 
nuclear power station, near Annan. 

Dumfries and Galloway Enterprise said the cash could generate an 
additional £50m of private sector investment and create 2,500 
jobs over the next decade. 

The nuclear plant, one of Britain's first, stopped producing 
electricity last year after 45 years in operation. 

Regeneration cash 

Chief executive of Dumfries and Galloway Enterprise, Colin 
Williamson, said it was necessary to address the challenges of 
losing Chapelcross. 

Before the closure, it had about 430 employees and generated £20m 
a year for the triangle bounded by Annan, Lockerbie and Gretna. 

Many of the Chapelcross workforce were kept on for defuelling and 
decommissioning after production ceased. 

The regeneration cash will be used to invest in projects which 
provide a return, rather than giving grant aid. 

A company will be set up to oversee the process, concentrating on 
developments in the Annan, Lockerbie and Gretna corridor. 

The enterprise company said the first tangible announcements 
about potential jobs and inward investment could come in the next 
couple of months. 

		 	 		 	 



*****************************************************************
 24 FT.com: China to pioneer pebble bed N-reactor 

By Mure Dickie in Beijing 

Published: February 7 2005 18:43 | Last updated: February 7 2005

[Image] China is poised to develop the world's first commercially 
operated â€œpebble bedâ€ nuclear reactor after a Chinese energy 
consortium chose a site in the eastern province of Shandong to 
build a 195MW gas-cooled power plant. 

An official representing the consortium, led by Huaneng, one of
China's biggest power producers, said the proposed reactor could
start producing electricity within five years.

If successfully commercialised, the pebble bed reactor would be
the first radically new reactor design for several decades. It
would push China to the forefront of development of a technology
that researchers claim offers a new â€œmeltdown-proofâ€
alternative to standard water-cooled nuclear power stations.


  High-temperature gas-cooled reactors have for decades offered
the theoretical promise of cheap, safe and easily scalable
nuclear power and Chinaâ€™s bold try at making them work will be
closely watched.
Click here   

China and South Africa have led efforts to develop â€œpebble
bedâ€ reactors, so called because they are fuelled by small
graphite spheres the size of billiard balls, with uranium cores.
The reactor's proponents say its small core and the dispersal of
its fuel among hundreds of thousands of spheres prevents a
meltdown.

 Advocates of â€œmodularâ€ pebble bed reactors argue they offer
the hope of cheap, safe and easily expandable nuclear power
stations a potent appeal for China, which is struggling to meet
huge growth in energy demand while avoiding environmental
disaster.

 Pebble bed reactors are small, which suits remote and rural
areas and makes them easy to expand.

 The reactor's supporters also argue that the technology is
secure from proliferation. The low-enriched uranium fuel
consists of half-millimetre-sized particles of uranium dioxide
encased in graphite and silicon carbide, which in turn is
encased in a graphite ball. Experts say it is expensive and
difficult to process such spent fuel. Plans for a rival pilot
plant near Cape Town, developed by Eskom, the South African
power utility, US-based Exelon and British Nuclear Fuels, have
been stalled by environmental challenges.

 The Institute of Nuclear and New Energy Technology at Beijing's
Tsinghua University, which has links with the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, operates the world's only test pebble
bed reactor outside Beijing and is providing the technology for
the planned power station.

 The Chinese consortium, which includes Huaneng, Tsinghua and
China Nuclear Engineering and Construction (CNEC), has
identified the city of Weihai on Shandong's northeastern coast
as their preferred site for the plant and is preparing to apply
for government approval.

 Huaneng, one of China's biggest electricity generators, plans
to take a 50 per cent stake in the joint venture that will build
the plant. CNEC would own 35 per cent and Tsinghua 5 per cent.
The remaining 10 per cent may be offered to other investors.

 South Africa's President Thabo Mbeki had said his country was
seeking co-operation with China for the development of the
nuclear technology. The Eskom-led joint venture was hoping to
build its test commercial pebble bed reactor within 10 years. 

Â© Copyright The Financial Times Ltd 2005. "FT"
and "Financial Times" are trademarks of the Financial Times.
*****************************************************************
 25 NBCSandiego.com: San Onofre Nuclear Plant May Be Forced To Shut Down

Customers May Have To Pay $829M In Repairs

POSTED: 11:56 am PST February 7, 					 					2005
UPDATED: 12:00 pm PST February 7, 					 					2005

SAN ONOFRE, Calif. -- The San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station 
could be forced to shut down as soon as 2009 unless regulators 
decide that energy customers should pay for $829 million in 
repairs.

[San Onofre] 

 Southern California Edison, the plant's majority owner, has 
asked the California Public Utilities Commission to approve a 2 
percent rate increase for the utility's 4.3 million customers in 
order to cover the costs, according to a report in The North 
County Times. Following hearings underway on the proposal, an 
administrative law judge is expected to rule on the question. The 
public utility commission then would vote on whether to accept 
the judge's decision.

 San Onofre is licensed to operate until 2022, but Edison says
the plant will not reach that date without replacing cracked
steam generators.

 San Onofre spokesman Ray Golden said Friday that if the
generators aren't replaced, then the plant, which supplies
enough electricity for 2.75 million homes, would have to shut
down much earlier than planned.

 The repair project is opposed by consumer groups who say it's
an unwise expense for taxpayers and anti-nuclear organizations
who object to the storage of radioactive waste at the site.

Previous Stories: 
  + February 4, 2005: San Onofre Reactor Shuts Down Unexpectedly
[http://www.nbcsandiego.com/news/4165772/detail.html] 

Copyright 2005 by The Associated Press. All rights reserved.
This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or
redistributed. 

*****************************************************************
 26 Las Vegas SUN: Chernobyl Scrap Equipment Up for Sale

 By ANNA MELNICHUK ASSOCIATED PRESS 

KIEV, Ukraine (AP) - Officials at the site of the world's worst
nuclear accident announced plans Monday to sell scrap and other
equipment from the Chernobyl nuclear plant, saying the
government was not giving it enough money to continue operating. 

Plant spokesman Viktor Kapusta said authorities hoped to raise
the funds by selling things like pumps to maintain the ongoing
operations such as monitoring radiation levels. He called the
decision a "forced measure," saying the federal government owes
the plant $3.2 million. 

About 30 workers are sorting out the equipment and estimating
its value, Kapusta said. He said the equipment being sold was
"clean, safe and environmentally friendly." 

He refused to say how much the plant operators were hoping to
bring in. 

"We shouldn't be sitting around twiddling our thumbs," he said.
"We should try to make money ourselves." 

An estimated 7 million people suffer radiation-related health
problems from the disaster at the Chernobyl's reactor No. 4,
which exploded and burned in 1986. The radioactive fallout
affected vast parts of Ukraine, Russia, Belarus and much of
northern Europe. 

The destroyed reactor was entombed in a hastily built
concrete-and-steel shelter, which Ukrainian experts say is in
need of urgent repairs. The last reactor at the plant was shut
for good in 2000, but many call the plant a ticking atomic time
bomb. 

Ukrainian authorities have repeatedly warned that the previously
estimated figure of $758 million was far from enough to build a
new protective shelter for reactor No. 4 by the end of 2008.
Officials have asked for an additional $350 million. 

-- 



*****************************************************************
 27 NRC: Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards; Revised
 
                         FR Doc 05-2241 
[Federal Register: February 7, 2005 (Volume 70, Number 24)] 
[Notices] [Page 6471] From the Federal Register Online via GPO 
Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr07fe05-109]                         
 
The 519th ACRS meeting scheduled to be held for three days, 
February 10-12, 2005, has been changed to a two-day meeting, 
February 10-11, 2005. The agenda for the meeting on Thursday, 
February 10, 2005 has been modified as noted below.
 
The discussion of Waterford Nuclear Plant power uprate, 
previously scheduled between 8:35 and 10:30 a.m., is now 
scheduled between 8:35 and 12 noon.
 
The item on Technical Basis for Potential Revision of the 
Pressurized Thermal Shock (PTS) Screening Criteria in the PTS 
Rule, scheduled between 10:45 and 12:30 p.m., has been postponed 
to a future ACRS meeting due to the unavailability of draft NUREG 
document being prepared by the NRC staff.
 
The Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility discussion scheduled 
between 1:30 and 4:30 p.m., is now scheduled between 1 and 4 p.m. 
All the other items remain the same as previously published in 
the Federal Register on Monday, January 24, 2005 (70 FR 3399).
 
For further information, contact Mr. Sam Duraiswamy (telephone 
301- 415-7364), between 7:30 a.m. and 4:15 p.m., e.d.t. Dated: 
February 1, 2005.
 
Andrew L. Bates, Advisory Committee Management Officer.
 
[FR Doc. 05-2241 Filed 2-4-05; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590-01-P

 
*****************************************************************
 28 [DU-WATCH] Urgent message on radioactive munitions from Doug
 
Date: Mon, 7 Feb 2005 23:19:01 -0600 (CST)

 
An urgent message on depleted uranium from
Dr. Doug Rokke and Damacio Lopez.

Dear Friends, 

We have a proposal for those individuals and organizations who wish to stop
the use of depleted uranium in weapons, ensure that medical care is
provided, and ensure that all environmental contamination is cleaned up.

Please join us in a world-wide campaign in demanding that the Pentagon of
the United States follow it's own directive requiring thorough environmental
remediation and that medical care is provided to all individuals
contaminated by depleted uranium and/or other low level radioactive
materials.

These legal mandates are prescribed in Army Regulation 700-48,* with
specific maximum exposure criteria in US Army Technical Bulletin 9-1300-278.
These require thorough environmental remediation and that medical care is
provided to all casualties.

The responsible person to uphold this regulation is

Dr. Michael Kilpatrick
The Special Assistant, Deployment Health Support
Four Skyline Place - Suite 901
5113 Leesburg Pike
Falls Church, VA 22041
Ph 1-800-497-6264.
e-mail: special.assistant@deploymenthealth.osd.mil

Let's encourage Dr. Kilpatrick to uphold these legal requirements.

LT. General Ronald Peake, then Surgeon General of the U.S. Army, also
appointed Colonel Robert Eng, Ph.D. (telephone 210-221-6612, email:
Robert.Eng@amedd.army.mil, Fort Sam Houston, Texas) as his representative to
ensure medical care is provided to all DU casualties when he issued his
medical order dated April 29, 2004.

Please get this message to as many people as possible; this might be the
straw that breaks the camels back. Past environmental remediation costs
alone would be in the billions of dollars.

In Solidarity 

Damacio Lopez and Doug Rokke, Ph.D.

Web sites for additional information include:
www.idust.net    www.traprockPeace.org

references:

http://www.traprockpeace.org/twomemos.html
http://www.traprockpeace.org/rokke_du_3_ques.html
http://www.traprockpeace.org/du_dtic_wakayama_Aug2002.html

Also, read Doug Rokke's paper -
http://www.traprockpeace.org/wuwc_reader3_veterans.pdf
and hear his presentation -
http://www.traprockpeace.org/depleted_uranium_hamburg03.html#veterans
to the World Uranium Weapons Conference, Hamburg, 2003.

The conference reader is available for free download at
http://www.traprockpeace.org/depleted_uranium_hamburg03.html

*URL's of cited US Army regulation and documents:

US Army Regulation 700-48 - http://www.traprockpeace.org/r700_48.pdf
US Army Technical Bulletin 9-1300-278 -
http://www.traprockpeace.org/tb_9-1300-278_1996.pdf
US Army, Pamphlet 700-48 - Handling Procedures for Equipment Contaminated
with Depleted Uranium or Radioactive Commodities -
http://www.traprockpeace.org/p700_48.pdf

Charles Jenks, attorney at law
President of the Core Group
Traprock Peace Center
103A Keets Road
Deerfield, MA 01342
413-773-5188; Fax 413-773-7507
charles@mtdata.com
http://traprockpeace.org

[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]

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 29 Star-Telegram: Hazardous cargo raises safety concerns

| 02/07/2005 | 

By JEFF CLAASSEN 

Fort Worth (Texas) Star-Telegram

Almost half the people in Tarrant County live close enough to
railroad tracks to be at risk if a derailment spilled hazardous
cargo, yet there is no way for residents to know what trains
carry through their neighborhoods. 

Soon, even less information could be available. Worried about
terrorism, federal officials are considering stripping the large
toxic-chemical warning labels from cargo trains, which would
remove the only indicator available to the general public. 

At the same time, officials are considering plans to reroute
trains carrying hazardous cargo around metropolitan areas. The
cost, however, could run to billions of dollars. 

"You can have 24 trains going through some crossings every day,
one an hour," said state Rep. Mike Krusee, R-Taylor, who has
worked on possible rail relocations in and near Austin. "You're
mixing a high density of freight rail capacity and people living
right next to the tracks. You get bad accidents, and humans
don't win." 

A January derailment in South Carolina that killed nine people
and prompted a mile-wide evacuation, as well as two that killed
four people last year in San Antonio, have revived a national
discussion about rail safety. 

Spokesmen for the railroads point to the advantage of using
trains: Trucks are more expensive for hauling cargo long
distances and are 16 times more likely to have an accident that
spills chemicals or other hazardous cargo. 

Tarrant County has not had a fatal derailment in at least 30
years, according to the Federal Railroad Administration. But
activists and officials worried about cargo trains say that rail
cars are dangerous because one can carry as much material as
three or four trucks. 

Trucks carrying deadly chemicals and other hazardous cargo must
use specific freeways when moving through metro areas. But no
such limits exist for train shipments, according to officials
with emergency-response departments and other agencies. 

Chemicals accounted for about 10 percent of train cargo, or 160
million tons, in 2003, according to the Association of American
Railroads. Trains carry a wide range of chemicals, including
chlorine and ammonia, which can be deadly when released into the
air. 

Federal laws require hazardous cargo to be carried in fortified
container cars, with the strictest requirements for radioactive
waste, emergency-response officials said. Engineers must also
carry lists, or manifests, of what is on each train. 

Local worries 

About 324 miles of tracks run through Tarrant County, and about
650,000 people -- or 45 percent of the population -- live within
a mile of them. Even a small spill could affect thousands: More
than 26,000 people live within 100 yards of tracks, according to
a Star-Telegram analysis. 

Several Tarrant residents living near tracks said the recent
news reports created at least momentary anxiety. 

"I wonder what is on those trains," said Mark Jones, who has
lived near the Union Pacific railroad tracks off Oakland
Boulevard in east Fort Worth for about 10 years. 

Others said they don't worry at all. 

"I've lived in the same spot for 56 years," said Traci Hubbard,
who lives near Jones. "We've grown up with the trains, and so
have our kids." 

In Colleyville, the Tarantula Train's vintage engine and rail
cars roll past Michael Leathers' house, sharing the tracks with
cargo trains and the right-of-way with joggers and bicyclists,
who use a nearby concrete path. 

"We assume it's OK and that the railroad companies take the
precautions they have to," Leathers said. "I'm sure they're
inspected on a regular basis." 

Until last year, cargo trains were also a largely overlooked
part of the landscape in San Antonio and surrounding Bexar
County. 

In June, a train carrying chlorine gas, which is crucial for
water purification, derailed south of the city. A conductor and
two people in a nearby neighborhood died from inhaling the
fumes. 

In November, a train careered out of control in an industrial
area near downtown, burst through the wall of a storage building
and killed an office worker. 

The death toll from those accidents and others has prompted
officials in San Antonio and elsewhere to look for new ways to
deal with cargo trains. 

"We have a $500,000 study with the Texas Department of
Transportation looking at moving train traffic, looping it
around the city," said Nelson Wolff, the Bexar County judge. "It
will take a combination of state, federal and local money to do
it. The government really needs to step up and be part of the
solution." 

Rerouting trains 

In the fall, Wolff and other politicians from the San Antonio
area lobbied officials in Washington, D.C., for tougher safety
enforcement and federal funds for rail relocation. 

That debate hit home in Washington just a few months later. The
deadly South Carolina derailment, which spilled chlorine gas,
led to the realization that cargo trains pass within four blocks
of Congress. 

Last week, the D.C. City Council banned hazardous shipments
through the city for three months. The council may vote on a
permanent ban, which requires congressional approval. 

Rail lines through cities remain busy, but many rural lines have
been sold or abandoned because they didn't generate enough
revenue to compete with the trucking industry, said
transportation and railroad officials. 

Now Wolff and other officials hope some of those old lines can
be put to use -- or that new ones can be constructed. 

"It has been 150 years since new rail lines were built," said
Krusee, the Taylor lawmaker. "Our cities have grown around the
railroads. All these railroad crossings have been added. It can
take more than a day for a cargo train to get through a major
city, and a week to cross the state." 

Officials in North Texas are also studying ways to route
long-distance cargo trains around the metro area. Officials in
Austin expect rail relocation to be discussed during this
legislative session. 

The solution carries its own problem: a huge price tag.
Advocates of rail relocation, such as Robert Nichols, a member
of the Texas Transportation Commission, point to the Alameda
Corridor in Los Angeles. It cost $2.4 billion to replace grade
crossings with overpasses, consolidate some rail lines and run
the tracks underground in some areas. 

"Where is the money going to come from?" said Tom White, a
spokesman for the Association of American Railroads. 

It won't come from the railroads, which are facing stiff
competition from truckers, White said. 

Uncertain future 

Some Texas officials say rail relocation could be a key part of
the Trans-Texas Corridor, a network of new highways and other
transportation lines that would run from border to border and
bypass cities, easing truck traffic on interstates. 

Gov. Rick Perry has lobbied hard for the extensive project,
which would be built by a Spanish contractor and other companies
that would collect tolls for 50 years to pay for it. The
contractors, however, have no substantial plans for new rail
until 2020. 

And at the rate North Texas is growing, by the time the tracks
are built, new neighborhoods might have already spread out to
meet them, said Juan Ortiz, emergency management coordinator for
Tarrant County and Fort Worth. 

"We might find ourselves moving railroads fairly often," Ortiz
said. "Would we have to keep moving rail lines every 10 or 20
years?" 

In the meantime, residents will have to take it on faith that
the railroads and the government are protecting them. 

Before 9-11, government and railroad officials said disclosure
would force shippers to reveal sensitive information to business
rivals. 

Since the attacks, officials have said that releasing details
about hazardous shipments exposes trains and trucks to
terrorists. 

"It does not make any sense to make that kind of information
public," said White, of the railroad association. 

But sealing off information can hide a lack of action by the
government, said Rick Blum, whose organization,
OpenTheGovernment.org, provides an online search of pollution
records. 

Secrecy also prevents the public from taking part in the debate
on how to make cargo trains safer, he said. 

"The public has to be part of this discussion," Blum said.
"Instead, we're seeing a very tall brick wall being put up
between the government and the public. We're afraid that wall is
only hiding inaction and embarrassment." 

IN THE KNOW 

Trains and Tarrant County 

Tarrant has long been a busy rail hub. Some facts about the
local traffic: 

• Lots of track: Tarrant County has 324 miles of rail lines. The
county's freeways and highways, by comparison, span 422 miles. 

• Heavy traffic: Most Tarrant County rails are busy. The
busiest, with 21 to 30 trains a day, are tracks that run from
the Dallas County border through central Arlington to downtown
Fort Worth, and north and south from downtown Fort Worth to the
county border. 

• Accidents: Seventy-seven derailments from January 2003 to
October 2004 injured four railroad workers and caused $5 million
in damage. Most were at low speeds in rail yards or other
places. Twelve were at 20 mph or faster. 

• Collisions: Thirty-five trains hit vehicles at crossings from
January 2003 to October 2004, killing one motorist and injuring
nine others. Five of the crashes came when drivers went around
the safety gates. 

SOURCE: Federal Railroad Administration; Star-Telegram research 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Jeff Claassen, (817) 390-7710 jclaassen@star-telegram.com
[jclaassen@star-telegram.com]   

MontereyHerald.com | 

*****************************************************************
 30 Des Moines Register: Hearing set on ammunition plant illness
 
 [http://www.desmoinesregister.com]     
           
By THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
 
	 February 7, 2005 	 	 	

Burlington, Ia. — Former workers at the Iowa Army Ammunition
Plant remain in limbo after federal safety officials said they
could not determine the amount of radiation the workers absorbed
on the job without the release of additional classified
documents.

 In a 35-page report, officials with the National Institute of
Occupational Safety and Health acknowledged they were unable to
pinpoint the absorption. They say, however, accurate dose
reconstruction are possible with the classified information.

 A program created by Congress three years ago aims to
compensate the nation’s former nuclear weapons workers who say
they contracted cancer or other serious illnesses.

 About 4,000 workers assembled and tested nuclear weapons
components at the 19,000-acre plant in Middletown, just west of
Burlington, from 1947 to the mid-1970s.

 The workers’ have petitioned for special consideration, based
on the inadequacy of the so-called dose reconstruction. They
hope to become automatically eligible for $150,000 payments.

 The NIOSH Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker Health is
slated to take up the IAAP petition on Wednesday in St. Louis.
The board could recommend scrapping the dose reconstruction and
granting the worker petition. The board also could suggest
opening the classified documents, which would allow the dose
reconstruction process to continue.

 So far, IAAP workers’ requests for compensation under the
government program have been stalled.

 Laurence Fuortes, a University of Iowa physician overseeing
health screenings of the workers, said there is another cause
for concern.

 Fuortes, who helped draft the petition to NIOSH, said the issue
is not only the information’s availability, but also its
quality. He said the Iowa research team does not believe the
classified documents contain enough data for fair dose
reconstruction.

 The advisory board could side with the IAAP workers and
recommend creation of the Special Exposure Cohort. That
recommendation would go U.S. Health and Human Services Secretary
Mike Leavitt, who would pass his decision onto Congress.

 Should Congress decline to act, the secretary’s designation
would take effect in 30 days.

 In a letter last week to NIOSH Director John Howard, Sen.
Charles Grassley, R-Iowa, said the plant workers have proven
repeatedly that they handled radioactive materials on the job.

 ‘‘Based on the compelling information provided by the
petitioners and the finding by NIOSH,’’ Grassley wrote, ‘‘I
strongly encourage the Advisory Board to swiftly recommend to
Health and Human Services Secretary Leavitt that the class of
workers at the IAAP be added to the Special Exposure Cohort.’’

 	 	   
    
      Copyright © 2004, The Des Moines Register.
*****************************************************************
 31 UCLA International Institute: Memoirs of an Atomic Bomb Survivor - Shigeko Sasamori
                             
UCLA Professor James Yamazaki speaks with Shigeko Sasamori, one 
of the "Hiroshima Maidens," who survived the atomic bombing and 
were brought to the US for reconstructive surgery in 1955 by 
Norman Cousins and the readers of Saturday Review. 

Interview with Shigeko Sasamori
Interviewed by James N. Yamazaki, M.D.
Transcription by James N. Yamazaki, M.D. and Carl Wakamoto 

(A video version of the interview will be available shortly.) 

James N. Yamazaki, M.D.: 18 years ago I first heard about the
Hiroshima Maidens and your name. Could you please tell me about
the Hiroshima Maidens and your name? 

Shigeko Sasamori: My name is Shigeko Sasamori. I came to America
in 1955 together with 25 girls. 

JY: Where did you come from? 

SS: Hiroshima. I came to America in 1955 with 25 other girls. 

JY: Why did you come to this country? 

SS: Well, we are coming for plastic surgery operation,
reconstruction of, arms and hands and face to Mt. Sinai Hospital
in New York City. 

JY: To repair some problems you had? 

SS: Yes. 

JY: I first heard about you from Norman Cousins. He was
responsible in a very prominent way to arrange your visit here.
Could you tell me how this happened? 

SS: Yes, that was in 1953, I think…Mr. Cousins and Rev.
Tanimoto, Hiroshi Tanimoto, they had already started a sort of
peace center to help Japanese orphaned children. One day Norman
Cousins came over to Mr. Tanimoto’s church. 

JY: When was that? 

SS: That was 1953. I think. They said it took two years to
establish the Hiroshima Project. So he came over in 1953.
Before, he came to Hiroshima often. But anyway I met him at
Tanimoto’s church and that night all the girls got together
talking with Mr. and Mrs. Cousins at the church. And that is how
we met. Then Mr. Cousins felt we he have to do something about
it. He went back to America, then raised money, and people
donated money, and arranged the proceeds for the project. Then
two years later the girls, 25 girls, came to his country. That’s
what happened. 

JY: This is an amazing story and you continued your relationship
with the Norman Cousins. That alone is a very interesting story.
Could you tell us a little more about that? 

SS: Yes. After all the girls finished the operations and before
going back to Japan, he interviewed the girls, asking, “When you
return to Japan,” “What you wanted to do?” “What are you going
to do?” So those questions he asked the girls individually. I
said to him I was already established to go to nursing school in
Hiroshima. I was going to study to be a nurse. So he said, would
I like to come back to America to study nursing. I came back
later about 1958, I think, I came back and stayed with Cousins
Family and became one of the members of Cousins’ family ever
since then. 

JY: Yes, I think it was about that time I heard about you
studying for nursing at Cedars-Sinai Hospital. Many people have
been interested in your story, among them Burt Lancaster and I
was told that he became interested in what happened to you and
then became interested in the peace movement and what happened
in Hiroshima. Could you say a little more about him? 

SS: At first when I met him I didn’t know he was a famous movie
star. I thought he was another interviewer, interviewing
me…Later on, I found out that he was a big star. He was a very
kind and very warm person. Unfortunately I only met him twice.
Later on, at a showing of his film when I saw him again, he was
very kind to me that day. 

JY: One of my favorite actors is Jack Lemmon. And you said that
he became very interested in your story. I understand you became
acquainted with him. 

SS: Oh yes. Jack Lemmon…No one introduced him to me. It just
happened at a party. He introduced himself to me, and ever since
has been very kind and good friend. I asked him, as a favor to
me, to go to Japan and Hiroshima, needing a celebrity to speak
to a peace group. He very kindly said, yes, and he came to
Hiroshima. And ever since he a became a good friend. 

I have met some very very wonderful people all this time. 

-- 

JY: Your story is very remarkable. And I was wondering, if you
could tell us, where you were on August 6, 1945? And tell me
what happened that day to you? 

SS: Well, I was in Hiroshima City. I was junior high, first
year. That was the time most of most of the people are working
for the government. Men, of course, went to the war. The older
people helping the city, breaking down houses, makes big street
in case bomb dropped so people could run away. At that time we
did not know anything about atomic bombs. But we knew about the
fire bombs that happened all the time in big cities like Tokyo
and Osaka – big cities having big fire bombs. But Hiroshima
never had (fire) bombs dropped. But the city people thought they
needed wide streets in case bomb dropped. So people could run
away. So they’re breaking houses. So young students like us were
mobilized. Students cleared the rubble to make nice streets. On
August 6 for the first time we went to work. 

JY: You were working outside? 

SS: Yes. First time, outside. I heard one airplane and I looked
up and saw the plane “going.” Such a beautiful blue sky. Looks
like such a beautiful scenes I said to my girl friend next to
me, schoolmate, told her, “Look up. The sky so beautiful” “The
airplane flying such a nice way.” So we just looked at it. 

Then I saw something drop, a white thing…Later I heard that it
was a parachute. Soon as I saw the white thing coming down
then…boom…and knocked me down. I don’t know how long I was
unconscious or I have no idea. But when I myself came up I
couldn’t see anything or couldn’t hear anything…right - just
pitch black. And no noise. Then for awhile just sitting, then
stood up. Looked around then pretty soon – like a heavy fog go
away and you can see things coming up what I had seen before.
Something coming back up. Right? Like that. Blackness going
away. Just like a heavy fog going away. 

Then, I saw a completely different scene from before…People
coming out from center. Hurt people…But no noise. Still I just
couldn’t hear anything. I just followed the people nearby going
down to riverside. I went by the river and followed them down to
the river’s edge…The people, so many people burnt and naked. No
skin, some skin coming off. I can’t explain. How horrible it
was. Then in my mind – so white. I couldn’t think straight. I
couldn’t think. What happened? 

Then later I first heard a baby cry. Then I looked aside…hurt
burned baby. Mother was also burned too; mother tried to nurse
the baby but baby was crying and crying. But that opened my ear
and mind. And everything came back to myself. 

And I said, oh the bomb dropped on top of us. Just like a
regular fire bomb. 

Then I tried to go home or go back to school. But I couldn’t go
back that way. Many people coming out pushing out very slowly.
Pushing. People so horrible looking. 

Then one of the men said go to the other side of the river and
run away in case another bomb drops. So I followed the people.
Very slowly, maybe a little over mile or so away. Finally got to
a place where the damage was not so great and some of the houses
were barely standing. 

JY: Because I was assigned by the United States Government to go
to Japan to study the survivors of the Bomb. I had some
understanding about how people survived the Bomb. You’re one of
them. And a…Please tell me just about what distance from the
explosion you were at? 

SS: I was within a circle about 1.5 kilometers from the
explosion. 

JY: That’s about a little over a mile. 

SS: I was inside the 1.5 kilometer circle. So probably 1
kilometer (.62 mile) away. 

JY: That’s very intriguing to me because the people who survived
that I interviewed when I was in Japan after the bombing were
all beyond that distance. 

And the only reason…I thought they were the closest to the Bomb.
And the only reason they survived was because they were in a
concrete building. 

But you told us you were outside. So you were one of the few who
survived outside without any protection from the Bomb? 

SS: That’s right. 

JY: So tell me what happened to you afterwards? 

SS: Well, you see, you know my friend who was at my side that I
told you who was next to me when we looked into the sky? She
died. We couldn’t find her. And many classmates who there died.
Some of course survived, like me. One third of my body was
burned. All my face, neck, back, half of my chest, shoulders,
arms and both hands. It’s a miracle to me. That I walked and run
away, over a mile…amazing. 

JY: So…When you became a Hiroshima Maiden that’s 10 years later.
Can you tell me what happened? How the doctors treated you since
that time? 

SS: Well before I came to America I had some operations…quite a
few operations. In Tokyo. Rev. Tanimoto also helped us to go to
Tokyo for the operations. My hands were opened. Before all stick
together. My fingers stick together. So they were opened in
Tokyo. 

JY:  That was your first surgery. 

SS: Yes. Then I came to America. My skin, chin, neck and chest
were stuck together. So they opened…my lips and things operated
around here…skin grafts…in stages. 

JY: So how many surgeries have you had since then? 

SS: All together, I’m sure over thirty times. In the operating
room. 

JY: Oh-my! 

SS: Skin grafts…is the first stage…many operations. 

See transfer of skin grafts…moving normal skin tubes to repair
sites-so many times I went to the operating room. 

JY: As you know the big Pika-Don, the big flash, was this
intense heat from the Bomb of electronic radiation, infra red
rays just like the sunlight – like a heat lamp coming right to
you. So you survived all that and all those operations. 

One of the earliest things that we noticed in Japan, was what
happened to the children was that they developed leukemia early.
And then later, the older you are, you develop…cancer…later on,
so the children were the most sensitive. Can you tell me if you
encountered any of those problems? 

SS: Fortunately, I have not been sick for a long time. But last
year I developed cancer of my intestine. And I had an
operations. 

JY: The intestine? 

SS: Intestine cancer. They found three tumors. They burned up
two tumors. Then they removed twenty inches of my intestines.
Then they also found a lesion in my CT Scan of thyroid. They
have elected to just watch the lesion. 

JY: The thyroid is a very sensitive structure to radiation. And
both in Japan and in the Marshall Islands from the big Bomb. 

SS: Many survivors have this this thyroid problem. In Japan. 

JY: Yes. 

To hear your story is a very unique story to see someone still
alive today, and been so close to the Bomb. 

I think is a story that other people should hear. 

SS: I feel it is important for people to know. So many people do
not know what happened at that time. And I feel it is
everybody’s responsibility to make a good world. So I therefore,
not using nuclear weapons and not making war. Therefore, we need
to stop making nuclear weapons. 

JY: I certainly will want to join in effort. But…I’m also very
impressed by the fact that you went into nursing. 

SS: Because when I’m in the hospital, to the patient how
important is a good kind nurse and kind doctors. That is very
important to the patient that I learned. So I like to help
people, especially to the patient, what kind of people that
suffer if I can help a little bit it would make me very happy. 

JY: To be able to have someone who experienced the Atomic Bomb,
and still caring for people, and wanting to help others so they
won’t have this experience again. Thank you Sasamori-san. 

SS: Thank you.

Asia Institute
Posted: 2/7/2005 			 		 		 		 		
Recent News Stories

  + Memoirs of an Atomic Bomb Survivor: Shigeko Sasamori
UCLA Professor James Yamazaki speaks with Shigeko Sasamori, one
of the "Hiroshima Maidens," who survived the atomic bombing and
were brought to the US for reconstructive surgery in 1955 by
Norman Cousins and the readers of Saturday Review. 
  + Larry Diamond on What Went Wrong in Iraq and Prospects for
Democracy and Stability
Former senior advisor to L. Paul Bremer looks at the players in
Iraq's new political lineup, strategies for defusing the
insurgency, and some of the serious mistakes the U.S. has made
and continues to make.
  + Arafat's Legacy and the 2005 Palestinian Election
Kenneth W. Stein (Emory University) puts the recent Palestinian
election in perspective 		 		 		 		[Email this page] Email this
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Stories Icon]  Most Popular Stories 
		 		 		 		 		 		   

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info@international.ucla.edu [info@international.ucla.edu]  

© 2005. The Regents of the University of California. All rights
reserved. 
*****************************************************************
 32 Hawk Eye: Officials unable to pinpoint radiation absorption 

[http://archive.thehawkeye.com] 

Sunday, February 6, 2005 Site updated daily at 11 a.m. CST   
      
IAAP workers remain in limbo. 

By KILEY MILLER 

kmiller@thehawkeye.com 

Former Iowa Army Ammunition Plant nuclear weapons workers got
some terrific news Thursday ... maybe. 

Officials from the National Institute of Occupational Safety and
Health acknowledged in a 35–page document that they are unable
to determine the amount of radiation the weapons workers
absorbed on the job without the release of additional classified
documents. 

That would seem to justify the workers' petition for special
consideration under a government compensation program. They want
to be automatically eligible for $150,000 from the government
should they develop any of a number of cancers, based on the
inadequacy of the so–called dose reconstructions. 

However, NIOSH officials insist accurate dose reconstructions
are possible with the classified information. 

The issue will come to a head Wednesday in St. Louis when the
Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker Health discusses the IAAP
petition and the review by NIOSH. 

Should the advisory board recommend scrapping the dose
reconstructions and granting the worker petition, it could
reverberate far into the future in claims by other affected
energy workers. 

On the flip side, the board may suggest opening the secret
documents to public scrutiny. That would allow the dose
reconstruction process to continue. 

The process has been unkind to IAAP workers and their families.
Thus far, all of their requests for compensation under the
government program have been denied. 

There is another cause for concern, according to Laurence
Fuortes, a University of Iowa physician overseeing health
screenings of the workers. 

Fuortes helped draft the petition to NIOSH. He said the issue is
not only the information's availability, but also its quality.
Specifically, he said, the Iowa research team does not believe
the classified documents contain enough data for fair dose
reconstructions. 

The petition was filed on behalf of all workers on Line 1 of the
plant, a list that includes technicians, production workers,
engineers and inspectors, as well as safety, security and
maintenance personnel. 

It will be the radiation advisory board's job to sift through
the mess. 

The board could side with the workers and recommend creation of
the Special Exposure Cohort. That recommendation would go Health
and Human Services Secretary Mike Leavitt, who would, in turn,
pass his decision onto Congress. 

Should Congress decline to act, the secretary's designation
would take effect in 30 days. 

Clear as mud? 

Well, it's easy to figure out where Iowa's two senators stand.
In a letter Thursday to NIOSH head John Howard, Republican Sen.
Charles Grassley said the plant workers have proven repeatedly
that they handled radioactive materials on the job. 

"Based on the compelling information provided by the petitioners
and the finding by NIOSH," Grassley wrote, "I strongly encourage
the Advisory Board to swiftly recommend to Health and Human
Services Secretary Leavitt that the class of workers at the IAAP
be added to the Special Exposure Cohort." 

Both Grassley and Democratic Sen. Tom Harkin have the megaphones
out, urging folks from southeast Iowa to make the trip to St.
Louis next week for the advisory board meeting at the Adam's
Mark Hotel. 

The meeting begins Monday morning, but the IAAP discussion is
limited to Wednesday afternoon. The Adam's Mark is at Fourth and
Chestnut streets in downtown St. Louis. Reservations can be made
online at www.adamsmark.com or by calling (314) 241–7400.   
  

The Hawk Eye 800 S. Main St., Burlington, Iowa 52601 319-754-8461 
· 1-800-397-1708 · FAX 319-754-6824 · webmaster@thehawkeye.com 
[webmaster@thehawkeye.com] 
*****************************************************************
 33 Scotsman.com: Nuclear Submarine Repaired and Ready to Leave the Rock
 
[http://www.scotsman.com/]                                             
 		   		   			
Mon 7 Feb 2005   			 			

"PA" 

The British nuclear submarine that brought rare
Spanish-Gibraltarian unity has undergone repairs at The Rock and
is ready to leave, a military official said today.
 
HMS Sceptre arrived in Gibraltar on Thursday for repairs to what
Britain called a faulty diesel generator.
 
Spain lodged a diplomatic protest with Britain, saying it had
known for a week the attack submarine was heading for the
British colony at its southern tip but had been led to believe
the problem was less serious than it actually was.
 
Spain urged Britain not to send any more nuclear subs to
Gibraltar.
 
Gibraltarâ€™s chief minister complained he had been left in the
dark by the British.
 
British military spokeswoman Katherine Purdhoe said some of the
repairs the submarine needed have been completed, and the vessel
is now scheduled to leave on Wednesday.
 
That was the deadline set by Spanish authorities, failing which
they would seek permission to inspect the ship themselves.
 
The spat revived memories of a dispute over another nuclear
submarine, the HMS Tireless, that docked in Gibraltar for most
of 2000 for repairs to the cooling system of its nuclear reactor.
 
Spain and Britain are friends although the 300-year-old
sovereignty dispute over Gibraltar is a sore spot.   		  [

[http://www.scotsman.com/]  
*****************************************************************
 34 [CMEP] NRC Ruling Doesn't Solve Waste Problem
 
Date: Mon, 7 Feb 2005 23:26:05 -0600 (CST)

 
*** P R E S S    R E L E A S E ***

PUBLIC CITIZEN
NUCLEAR INFORMATION AND RESOURCE SERVICE

For Immediate Release: Feb. 2 2005
Contact: Michael Mariotte, NIRS (202) 328-0002; Michele Boyd, PC (202)
454-5134

Nuclear Company's Waste Disposal Plan Still Inadequate, Despite
Ruling

Citizens' Groups Charge that NRC's Waste Classification Decision on
Depleted Uranium Does Not Solve Waste Problems of LES

WASHINGTON, D.C. -- The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC)
recent order categorizing depleted uranium as "low-level" radioactive
waste does not solve the waste disposal problems of a multinational
consortium that wants to build a nuclear fuel plant in southeastern New
Mexico, said citizens' groups Public Citizen and the Nuclear
Information and Resource Service (NIRS).  The groups today filed a
motion in their pending case against Louisiana Energy Services (LES) --
the company seeking a license to build the plant -- maintaining that the
U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) does not have the capacity to accept
LES's waste for processing and disposal.

NRC rules require LES to come up with a "plausible strategy" for the
disposition of the depleted uranium waste that would be produced by its
plant.  One of the disposal strategies identified by LES is transfer to
the DOE.  But U.S. law requires depleted uranium to be classified as
"low-level" radioactive waste by the NRC as a necessary condition for
DOE to take the waste.

"Simply calling this waste 'low-level' does not change the fact
that the DOE has its hands full with its own waste -- more than 700,000
metric tons of it that will take at least 25 years to process," said
Wenonah Hauter, director of Public Citizen's energy program.  "LES
still has no plausible strategy to dispose of this waste."

The groups further allege that the DOE has a poor track record when it
comes to radioactive waste disposal, citing the department's failure
to meet the terms of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, which require it to
establish a national high-level waste repository and accept utilities'
irradiated nuclear fuel for disposal.  The DOE has yet to even submit an
application to the NRC for a proposed repository at Yucca Mountain,
Nevada.

"The uncertainties of a DOE option are such that it could not be
considered a credible or plausible strategy," assert Public Citizen and
NIRS in today's filing.  The motion also charges that LES's cost
estimates for waste disposal and decommissioning of its facility are
insufficient and unsupported.

"The unique hazards presented by depleted uranium waste and the strong
likelihood of licensing difficulties and delays could drastically
inflate decommissioning and disposal costs," said Michael Mariotte,
executive director of NIRS.  "LES has failed to adequately account for
these factors."

Included in the motion is a discussion of the uniquely harmful toxic
and radioactive properties of depleted uranium, a waste the groups
assert is most comparable to transuranic or Greater-Than-Class C wastes,
which generally are not suitable for shallow land disposal.

Public Citizen and NIRS argue that uranium should be seen as a kind of
"radioactive lead" in which the damage from alpha radiation may occur
"in conjunction with heavy metal induced damage to produce various
health problems at low levels of exposure" -- especially in children.
The groups suggest that the possibility of near-surface disposal of the
waste is unacceptably risky.

"A facility on the scale and of the kind of the Waste Isolation Pilot
Plant in New Mexico would be required to properly contain the disposed
waste," said Hauter.  "The NRC should evaluate the site-specific
conditions of such a disposal scenario."

While the Commission, in its recent ruling, argues that depleted
uranium is low-level radioactive waste, it does not base this
classification on the physical properties or dangers of depleted uranium
-- in fact, the Commission admits that depleted uranium may need to be
disposed of "by methods more stringent that near-surface disposal,"
which may dramatically increase the disposal costs projected by LES.
They agree with Public Citizen and NIRS that a definitive conclusion on
the proper disposal pathway cannot be determined at this time and may
require "further environmental or safety analysis."

"The NRC has clearly shown in this ruling how arbitrary its categories
of radioactive waste classification are," said Mariotte.  "It seems that
the Commission can decide willy-nilly -- and at the convenience of
industry -- what category it wants to put depleted uranium waste in.
Merely applying labels to waste does nothing to change the fact that
this company has no solid plan for disposing of its waste."

Public Citizen and NIRS maintain that LES has not presented a plausible
strategy to dispose of its depleted uranium waste, and the groups will
argue this point at a formal evidentiary hearing before an Atomic Safety
and Licensing Board scheduled for October.  The groups will argue their
environmental contentions before the Board this February in Hobbs, New
Mexico.

###

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To learn more about this and other Public Citizen Critical Mass Energy and Environment Program campaigns, visit our website at http://www.citizen.org/cmep/

-Public Citizen's Critical Mass Energy and Environment Program
*****************************************************************
 35 [shundahaialerts] Latest on the PFS/ Skull Valley Nuclear Dump
 
Date: Mon, 07 Feb 2005 15:15:30 -0800

 
<x-flowed>
Dear friends,

Apologies for cross postings-- Also, for folks who have asked to be removed 
from the list, please forgive us, we're working on it.

In the meantime, here is the latest Salt Lake Tribune article on the PFS 
high-level nuclear waste dump proposed for the Skull valley Goshute 
Reservation in Utah. Tribal opponents to this dump need your continued 
attention and support.

You can contact our office, via the information included in this email, or 
simply reply to this email for information about supporting the people in 
Skull Valley who need help.

Also, we will be updating our website this afternoon with additional 
information. The licensing process for this dump is in a critical stage- it 
may be decided by the end of this month, after seven years of delays.

Peace,
Pete Litster
Executive Director
Shundahai Network


==================================================================

Moving N-waste no easy, or fast, task
PFS: Even if the storage license is approved, other hurdles remain
By Patty Henetz
The Salt Lake Tribune

		
	The Skull Valley Goshute Reservation is 32 miles of desert away from a 
rail line that could bring spent nuclear fuel to be stored there. (Leah 
Hogsten/Tribune file photo) 	
By the end of this month, Private Fuel Storage, a consortium of eight 
out-of-state nuclear power utilities, could be granted a federal license to 
store 44,000 tons of highly radioactive nuclear waste on concrete pads in a 
windswept valley 45 miles southwest of Salt Lake City.
    The Atomic Safety Licensing Board hasn't signaled to its parent body, 
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, what it will do; in fact, it has taken 
far longer to make a decision on the application - more than seven years - 
than anyone expected.
    But even if the NRC approves the license, there remains a significant 
and costly logistical problem: PFS must haul the 720-ton containers of 
spent nuclear fuel across 32 miles of desert between the Union Pacific rail 
line and the 820-acre parcel the Skull Valley Goshute tribe has leased to 
the consortium.
    It's here the project could lose traction, caught in a 
military-political-wilderness dragnet cast five years ago in Congress by 
former 1st Congressional District Rep. Jim Hansen and pulled in by his 
successor, Rep. Rob Bishop.
    To get the 4,000 containers to the storage facility, designed to be an 
interim stop for the waste on the way to a permanent repository at Yucca 
Mountain, Nev., PFS will either build a rail spur or rebuild the two-lane 
state highway that cuts through the reservation from an Interstate 80 
off-ramp. The rail option is PFS' preferred alternative.
    Right now, both options look like roads to nowhere, detoured 
inadvertently but indefinitely by a moratorium on wilderness studies on the 
Utah Test and Training Range, the largest such Defense Department range in 
the nation.
    That's because the moratorium prevents the Bureau of Land Management 
from approving the necessary right-of-way for the rail spur. Without that 
BLM approval, the rail spur can't be built.
    PFS lawyer Jay Silberg said Friday that the facility construction 
doesn't necessarily have to wait for the rail spur.
    "Right now, it's not affecting us. It has not held up anything," he said.
    Spokeswoman Sue Martin said PFS can't start construction until it has 
service agreements with consortium members and other customers. She 
declined to comment on how the rail spur hang-up might affect the 
facility's   plans.
    But Bishop sees it as a major impediment, aides said. And he plans to 
exploit it until he finds another way to stop the project.
     "It's one of the many arrows in our quiver," said Steve Petersen, 
Bishop's senior policy adviser and counsel.
    The moratorium started after then-Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt's 
inventory of potential wilderness study areas included land near the Hill 
Air Force training range. Completing the wilderness study area process 
would have required the BLM to amend its land-use plan for the region.
     Seeking to halt the process, Hansen inserted a provision in the 2000 
National Defense Authorization Act that first required the Air Force to 
assess how wilderness study might affect the training range. Until then, no 
changes to the land-use plan are allowed.
     The Air Force never has gotten from Congress the money it says it 
needs for the study. And if Bishop has his way, it won't, said Petersen, 
formerly an aide to Hansen.
     It might seem a contradictory position for the Republican congressman, 
who recently
	
Advertisement
Click to learn more...
	
   backed a bipartisan bill that sought to create a wilderness area on BLM 
property next to the test range. The proposal would have allowed fighter 
jet overflights but blocked rail shipments of waste to the Goshute facility.
    The bill died in the Senate in December, the victim, Bishop says, of 
Nevada senators still angry over Utah senators' votes in favor of the Yucca 
Mountain project. Bishop has said he will reintroduce the legislation in 
the next Congress.
     Meanwhile, the moratorium is the next best thing, Petersen said.
     Bishop "is going to throw everything at it that is legally and 
ethically permissible to block PFS," which is "right in the driveway of the 
Utah Test and Training Range," Petersen said. "If nuclear waste goes in 
there, a third of the usable range is toast. . . . To some degree, [the Air 
Force] is taken out of this whole debate because of high-level nuclear 
politics."
    While those who oppose the PFS proposal - including Utah's 
congressional delegation, the state Legislature and governor and an 
overwhelming number of Utah residents - may cheer anything that thwarts the 
PFS plan, there is collateral   damage.
    The moratorium has been interpreted to prevent any land-use changes on 
more than 5 million acres in Box Elder, Tooele and Juab counties, said Don 
Banks, spokesman for the BLM Salt Lake City office.
    The agency's inability to approve rights-of-way also has blocked other 
project proposals, including fiber optics, wind energy, sagebrush 
restoration, bighorn sheep introduction, off-highway vehicle recreation and 
livestock grazing.
     "This is having major adverse impacts on our ability to do business," 
Banks said. "It's not only stopped us from moving forward, taking actions. 
In many instances it's been the catalyst for litigation."
    Dianne Nielson, executive director of the state Department of 
Environmental Quality, noted PFS can choose the alternate route of trucking 
the waste casks.
    But that would require a wholesale overhaul of the state highway that 
connects I-80 with the reservation and building some kind of transfer point 
near the rail line, where the spent nuclear fuel containers would be lifted 
onto heavy-haul trucks. Because the I-80 overpass isn't high enough to 
allow the trucks   to pass, that would have to be rebuilt, too.
    Then, PFS would have to apply to the state for a permit to run the 
trucks on the highway.
     "If they met the requirements of the law, we would eventually have to 
issue them a permit," Nielson said.
    Silberg, the PFS attorney, said he didn't foresee PFS applying any 
pressure on the Air Force to get their study done so the moratorium can be 
lifted and the rail right-of-way approved.
     "We assume that if the Air Force has been told to do a study, they 
will do a study," he said.


   	  	

RETURN TO TOP


~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
SHUNDAHAI NETWORK--Dedicated to Breaking the Nuclear Chain

Shundahai is a Newe (Western Shoshone) word meaning  "Peace and Harmony 
with all Creation"

Shundahai Network
PO Box 1115
Salt Lake City, UT 84110
Office: 801.533.0128
Fax: 801.533.0129


mailto:Shundahai@shundahai.org
http://www.Shundahai.org

========================================================
It's in our back yard... it's in our front yard. This nuclear contamination 
is shortening all life. We are going to have to unite as a people and say 
no more! We, the people, are going to have to put our thoughts together to 
save our planet here. We only have One Water...One Air...One Mother Earth."

Corbin Harney -Newe (Western Shoshone) Spiritual leader, Founder & Chairman 
of the Board of The Shundahai Network

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</x-flowed>
*****************************************************************
 36 NRC: United States Enrichment Corporation, Paducah Gaseous Diffusion 
 
                         FR Doc 05-2243 
[Federal Register: February 7, 2005 (Volume 70, Number 24)] 
[Notices] [Page 6468-6469] From the Federal Register Online via 
GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr07fe05-106]                         
 
Plant, Paducah, KY; Confirmatory Order Modifying License 
(Effective Immediately) The United States Enrichment Corporation 
(USEC or Corporation) is the holder of NRC Certificate of 
Compliance No. GDP-1 issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(NRC or Commission) pursuant to 10 CFR Part 76. The certificate 
authorizes USEC to receive, and licensees shall be authorized to 
transfer to the Corporation, byproduct material, source material, 
or special nuclear material to the extent permitted under the 
Certificate of Compliance. The certificate was issued November 
26, 1996, was most recently amended on June 30, 2004, and is due 
to expire on December 31, 2008.
 
On December 16, 2002, the NRC's Office of Investigations (OI) 
started an investigation to determine whether a Quality Control 
(QC) Manager at USEC's Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant (PGDP) was 
discriminated against by being suspended and later terminated for 
raising safety concerns. On May 12, 2003, OI expanded its 
investigation to determine whether the same QC Manager was 
discriminated against, in retaliation for the previously raised 
safety concerns, by not being considered for a position with a 
contractor performing work for USEC at PGDP. OI, in OI report No. 
3-2002-040, did not substantiate that the QC Manager was 
suspended or terminated because of raising safety concerns. 
However, based on the facts and circumstances described in OI 
Report Number 3-2002-040, the NRC was concerned that the former 
QC Manager may have been discriminated against by not being 
considered for a contract position. By letter dated September 29, 
2004, the NRC identified to USEC the NRC's concern. The September 
29th letter offered USEC the opportunity either to attend a 
predecisional enforcement conference (PEC) or to request 
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) in which a neutral mediator 
with no decision-making authority would facilitate discussions 
between the NRC and USEC and, if possible, assist the NRC and 
USEC in reaching an agreement on resolving the concern. USEC 
chose to participate in ADR. On November 22, 2004, the NRC and 
USEC met at USEC headquarters in Bethesda, Maryland in an ADR 
session mediated by a professional mediator, arranged through 
Cornell University's Institute on Conflict Resolution.
 
By letter dated December 6, 2004, USEC enumerated the actions it 
has already taken and additional actions it agreed to take in 
order to enhance its Safety Conscious Work Environment at the 
PGDP. The agreed- upon additional actions noted in Section IV of 
this Confirmatory Order focus on Safety Conscious Work 
Environment training for managers of USEC contractors at the PGDP 
and USEC managers who are principal points of contact for USEC 
contractors at the PGDP.
 
On January 24, 2005, USEC consented to the NRC issuing this 
Confirmatory Order with the commitments, as described in Section 
IV below. USEC further agreed in its January 24, 2005, letter 
that this Confirmatory Order is to be effective upon issuance and 
that it has waived its right to a hearing. The NRC has concluded 
that its concerns can be resolved through effective 
implementation of USEC's commitments.
 
I find that USEC's commitments as set forth in Section IV are 
acceptable and necessary and conclude that with these commitments 
the public health and safety are reasonably assured. In view of 
the foregoing, I have determined that the public health and 
safety require that USEC's commitments be confirmed by this 
Order. Based on the above and USEC's consent, this Order is 
immediately effective upon issuance. USEC is required to provide 
the NRC with a letter summarizing its actions when all of the 
Section IV requirements have been completed.
 
Accordingly, pursuant to Sections 81, 161b, 161i, 161o, 182, 186 
and 1710 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the 
Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 2.202 and 10 CFR Part 76, it 
is hereby ordered, effective immediately, that Certificate of 
Compliance No. GDP-1 is modified as follows: 1. By no later than 
March 31, 2005, USEC shall develop and conduct initial Safety 
Conscious Work Environment training for: (a) Managers of USEC 
contractors at the PGDP; and (b) USEC personnel who are principal 
points of contact for USEC contractors at the PGDP.
 
2. By no later than June 30, 2005, USEC shall develop Safety 
Conscious Work Environment refresher training for the managers of 
USEC contractors at the PGDP and revise its training program 
requirements to conduct on-going refresher training at a 
frequency consistent with USEC's General Employee Training at the 
PGDP.
 
3. By no later than June 30, 2005, USEC shall revise its training 
program requirements to conduct initial Safety Conscious Work 
Environment training for: (a) New managers of USEC contractors at 
the PGDP; and (b) USEC personnel who become principal points of 
contact for USEC contractors at the PGDP, within ninety day of 
their assumption of these duties.
 
The Director, Office of Enforcement, may relax or rescind, in 
writing, any of the above conditions upon a showing by USEC of 
good cause.
 
Any person adversely affected by this Confirmatory Order, other 
than the Certificate holder, may request a hearing within 20 days 
of its issuance. Where good cause is shown, consideration will be 
given to extending the time to request a hearing. A request for 
extension of time must be made in writing to the Director, Office 
of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, 
DC 20555, and include a
 
[[Page 6469]] statement of good cause for the extension. Any 
request for a hearing shall be submitted to the Secretary, U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Rulemakings and 
Adjudications Staff, Washington, DC 20555. Copies also shall be 
sent to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, to the Assistant 
General Counsel for Materials Litigation and Enforcement at the 
same address, to the Regional Administrator, NRC Region II, 61 
Forsyth Street, SW., Suite 23T85, Atlanta, Georgia, 30303-8931, 
and to the Certificate Holder. Because of continuing disruptions 
in delivery of mail to United States Government offices, it is 
requested that answers and requests for hearing be transmitted to 
the Secretary of the Commission either by means of facsimile 
transmission to 301-415-1101 or by e-mail to 
hearingdocket@nrc.gov [hearingdocket@nrc.gov]  and also to the 
Office of the General Counsel either by means of facsimile 
transmission to 301-415-3725 or by e-mail to 
OGCMailCenter@nrc.gov [OGCMailCenter@nrc.gov] . If a person other 
than the licensee requests a hearing, that person shall set forth 
with particularity the manner in which his interest is adversely 
affected by this Order and shall address the criteria set forth 
in 10 CFR 2.309(d) and (f). If a hearing is requested by a person 
whose interest is adversely affected, the Commission will issue 
an Order designating the time and place of any hearing. If a 
hearing is held, the issue to be considered at such hearing shall 
be whether this Confirmatory Order should be sustained.
 
In the absence of any request for hearing, or written approval of 
an extension of time in which to request a hearing, the 
provisions specified in Section IV above shall be final 20 days 
from the date of this Order without further order or proceedings. 
If an extension of time for requesting a hearing has been 
approved, the provisions specified in Section IV shall be final 
when the extension expires if a hearing request has not been 
received. An answer or a request for hearing shall not stay the 
immediate effectiveness of this order.
 
Dated this 27th day of January 2005.
 
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
 
Frank J. Congel, Director, Office of Enforcement.
 
[FR Doc. 05-2243 Filed 2-4-05; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590-01-U

 
*****************************************************************
 37 NRC: Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste; Notice of Meeting
 
                         FR Doc 05-2245 
[Federal Register: February 7, 2005 (Volume 70, Number 24)] 
[Notices] [Page 6470-6471] From the Federal Register Online via 
GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr07fe05-108]                         
 
The Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste (ACNW) will hold its 
157th meeting on February 23-25, 2005, Room T-2B3, 11545 
Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland. The date of this meeting was 
previously published in the Federal Register on Wednesday, 
December 8, 2004 (69 FR 71084).
 
The schedule for this meeting is as follows: Wednesday, February 
23, 2005 10:30 a.m.-10:40 a.m.: Opening Statement (Open)--The 
ACNW Chairman will open the meeting with brief opening remarks, 
outline the topics to be discussed, and indicate items of 
interest.
 
10:40 a.m.-11:20 a.m.: ACNW 2005 Action Plan (Open)--The ACNW 
Committee will discuss changes to the 2005 Action Plan resulting 
from COMSECY-04-0077, dated January 19, 2005.
 
11:20 a.m.-12:20 p.m.: Time-of-Compliance for a Proposed 
High-Level Waste (HLW) Repository (Open)--The Committee will 
continue its discussions on time-of-compliance for a proposed HLW 
and determine the need and timing of a possible Working Group 
Meeting on this subject.
 
1:20 p.m.-3 p.m.: Low-Level Radioactive Waste (LLW) Issues 
(Open)-- The Committee will be briefed by the Chairman on the 
current status of LLW management in the U.S. and LLW issues faced 
by the industry, regulators and stakeholders.
 
3 p.m.-5:30 p.m.: Preparation for Meeting with the NRC 
Commissioners (Open)--The Committee will discuss the proposed 
presentation topics for its meeting with the NRC Commissioners, 
which is scheduled to be held between 9:30 a.m. and 11:30 a.m. on 
Wednesday, March 16, 2005.
 
Thursday, February 24, 2005 8:30 a.m.-8:35 a.m.: Opening 
Statement (Open)--The ACNW Chairman will make opening remarks 
regarding the conduct of today's sessions.
 
8:35 a.m.-9:25 a.m.: Status of High-Significance Agreements 
Associated with the Proposed High-Level Waste Repository 
(Open)--The Committee will be briefed by an NRC representative on 
the status of high-significance agreements between NRC and DOE 
concerning the proposed HLW repository at Yucca Mountain.
 
9:25 a.m.-10:15 a.m.: Preparation of ACNW Reports (Open)--The 
Committee will discuss proposed ACNW reports on the Agreement 
State Program and Resolution of High-Significance Agreements.
 
10:30 a.m.-12 Noon: Discussion with Commissioner Merrifield 
(Open)--The Committee will interact with Commissioner Merrifield 
on areas of mutual interest in the waste management area.
 
1 p.m.-5:30 p.m.: Center for Nuclear Waste Regulatory Analyses 
(CNWRA) Report--Accomplishments and Future Projects (Open)--The 
Committee will be briefed by NMSS and the CNWRA representatives 
regarding recent technical accomplishments and future project 
plans of NRC's technical assistance contractor.
 
Friday, February 25, 2005 8:30 a.m.-8:35 a.m.: Opening Statement 
(Open)--The ACNW Chairman will make opening remarks regarding the 
conduct of today's sessions.
 
8:35 a.m.-9:45 a.m.: Preparation of ACNW Reports (Open)--The 
Committee will continue its discussion of proposed ACNW reports 
on the Agreement State Program and Resolution of 
High-Significance Agreements.
 
9:45 a.m.-12 Noon: Miscellaneous (Open)--The Committee will 
discuss matters related to the conduct of Committee activities 
and matters and specific issues that were not completed during 
previous meetings, as time and availability of information 
permit. Discussions may include forthcoming meeting with 
Commissioners (Agenda Item 5).
 
Procedures for the conduct of and participation in ACNW meetings 
were published in the Federal Register on October 18, 2004 (69 FR 
61416). In accordance with these procedures, oral or written 
statements may be presented by members of the public. Electronic 
recordings will be permitted only during those portions of the 
meeting that are open to the public. Persons desiring to make 
oral statements should notify Mr. Michael P. Lee, (Telephone 
301-415-6887), between 7:30 a.m. and 4 p.m. ET, as far in advance 
as practicable so that appropriate arrangements can be made to 
schedule the necessary time during the meeting for such 
statements. Use of still, motion picture, and television cameras 
during this meeting will be limited to selected portions of the 
meeting as determined by the ACNW Chairman. Information regarding 
the time to be set aside for taking pictures may be obtained by 
contacting the ACNW office prior to the meeting. In view of the 
possibility that the schedule for ACNW meetings may be adjusted 
by the Chairman as necessary to facilitate the conduct of the 
meeting, persons planning to attend should notify Mr. Lee as to 
their particular needs. Further information regarding topics to 
be discussed, whether the meeting has been canceled or 
rescheduled, the Chairman's ruling on requests for the 
opportunity to present oral statements and the time allotted, 
therefore can be obtained by contacting Mr. Lee. ACNW meeting 
agenda, meeting transcripts, and letter reports are available 
through the NRC Public Document Room at pdr@nrc.gov [pdr@nrc.gov] 
, or by calling the PDR at 1-800-397-4209, or from the Publicly 
Available Records System (PARS) component of NRC's document 
system (ADAMS) which is accessible from the NRC Web site at 
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html 
[http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/leaving.cgi?from=leaving 
FR.html&log=linklog&to=http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html] 
or http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/ 
[http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/leaving.cgi?from=leaving 
FR.html&log=linklog&to=http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collecti 
ons/]  (ACRS & ACNW Mtg schedules/agendas).
 
Video Teleconferencing service is available for observing open 
sessions of ACNW meetings. Those wishing to use this service for 
observing ACNW meetings should contact Mr. Theron Brown, ACNW 
Audiovisual Technician (301-415-8066), between 7:30 a.m. and 3:45 
p.m. e.t., at least 10 days before the meeting to ensure the 
availability of this service. Individuals or organizations 
requesting this service will be responsible for telephone line 
charges and for providing the equipment and facilities that they 
use to establish the video teleconferencing link. The
 
[[Page 6471]] availability of video teleconferencing services is 
not guaranteed.
 
Dated: February 1, 2005.
 
Andrew L. Bates, Advisory Committee Management Officer.
 
[FR Doc. 05-2245 Filed 2-4-05; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590-01-P

 
*****************************************************************
 38 Daily Yomiuri: Operator must rebuild public trust in Monju
 
Yomiuri Shimbun 

The troubled Monju prototype fast-breeder reactor in Tsuruga,
Fukui Prefecture, has finally taken a step toward resuming
operations. 

Modification of the Monju nuclear reactor, which has been shut
down for more than nine years since a 1995 sodium leak accident,
has been given the go-ahead to commence soon. 

Fukui Gov. Issei Nishikawa on Sunday approved a government plan
to modify the reactor after accepting the government's
confirmation of the reactor's safety and offer to revitalize the
prefecture. 

The reactor will resume operations in 2008 if construction and
tests by the state-run Japan Nuclear Cycle Development
Institute--its operator--proceed as scheduled. 

=== 

Accident mismanaged 



The reactor has been idle for too long. One of the major reasons
is the Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corp., the
institute's predecessor, failed to regain the trust of local
residents after the 1995 accident. 

The corporation failed to fully explain what happened and hid a
videotape recording of the scene of the accident. 

This should never happen again. 

According to the government construction plan for Monju, a
temperature gauge that sparked the sodium coolant leakage will
be modified, with safety measures against such leakages to be
enhanced. The institute should aim to gradually resume
operations, spelling out to the public details of the
modification process and the tests. 

Sodium reacts with water in an explosive manner. This was one of
the reasons the safety of the Monju reactor was questioned, but
the modification work should address this concern. 

Needless to say, priority must be placed on securing the safe
research and development of atomic energy. Consistent efforts to
improve safety are required to gain public understanding. 

=== 

Eyes of the world on reactor 



Not only domestic, but also international attention is focused
on the resumption of the Monju reactor because it will become a
R&D base for the nuclear fuel cycle, maximizing the use of
uranium resources. 

Fast-breeder reactors like Monju are supposed to produce more
nuclear fuel than they consume. They also produce less nuclear
waste due to their improved efficiency. 

Japan, which has few natural resources, is promoting the
development of a nuclear fuel cycle as a national policy from a
viewpoint of energy security. The Monju reactor is expected to
play a central role in this strategy. 

Scientists around the world have predicted that next-generation
nuclear reactors will be fast-breeder reactors like Monju, and
multinational cooperation in this area has already started. 

Although various types of fast-breeder reactors have been
designed overseas, the Monju reactor, which aims to produce
electricity for commercial purposes, is reputedly the most
technologically advanced. France reportedly wants to cooperate
with Japan in its R&D. 

Since uranium resources are still considered abundant, many
countries have decided to focus on development and modification
of light-water nuclear reactors for the time being. 

However, some countries, including China and India, are speeding
up development of fast-breeder nuclear reactors to secure energy
resources for the future. 

The Monju reactor should be fully utilized for R&D in nuclear
fuel cycle technology to pave the way for its commercialization
in the future. 

(From The Yomiuri Shimbun, Feb. 8)   

Copyright 2005 The Yomiuri Shimbun 
*****************************************************************
 39 Bellona: Bulgarian spent nuclear fuel – new source of Mayak plant’s revenues
 
Mayak reprocessing plant in Chelyabinsk region received a train 
with spent nuclear fuel from Bulgarian Kozloduy nuclear power 
plant, daily Chelyabinsky Rabochiy reported in the end of 
January. 

2005-02-08 00:03

The spent fuel is placed into the plant’s storage facility and 
should be soon reprocessed. 

The spent nuclear fuel from Bulgaria is a new source of hard 
currency income for Mayak. Earlier Mayak lost the contracts for 
spent nuclear fuel reprocessing with Hungary and Finland, i.e. 
about $50m annual income. The price-tag for the contract with 
Bulgaria is classified. According to UralPolitRu, the average 
world price for one ton spent fuel reprocessing is from $500,000 
to $1.5m. 
  
  Publisher: Bellona Foundation [bellona@bellona.no] ,
President: Frederic Hauge [frederic@bellona.no] 
Information: info@bellona.no [info@bellona.no] , Technical
contact: webmaster@bellona.no [webmaster@bellona.no] 
Telephone: +47 23 23 46 00 Telefax: +47 22 38 38 62  * P.O.Box
2141 Grunerlokka, 0505 Oslo, Norway
*****************************************************************
 40 Las Vegas SUN: Editorial: Hope, peril await foes of Yucca

 LAS VEGAS SUN

 The Nevada Commission on Nuclear Projects believes that our
state is in its best position ever to defeat the Energy
Department's plan to bury 77,000 tons of nuclear waste at Yucca
Mountain, just 90 miles away from Las Vegas. The annual report
by the commission, which advises the governor and the
Legislature on nuclear waste issues, cites last year's important
legal victory by the state over the federal government as reason
for optimism. In that case, a federal appeals court ruled that
the Environmental Protection Agency's current radiation standard
for a dump at Yucca Mountain -- that radiation from the dump
would have to be contained at low levels for 10,000 years --
wasn't stringent enough to meet the standards set by the
National Academy of Sciences. President Bush, at the time, said
he would respect the court's ruling.

 "The commission believes it is only a matter of time before
Congress and even the nuclear industry recognize the futility of
continuing to invest money and resources in a project that has
no chance of succeeding and that has become a financial,
technical, legal and environmental black hole instead of a
viable solution to the nuclear waste problem," wrote Commission
Chairman Brian McKay, a former Nevada attorney general. In light
of this finding, it was interesting to read last week's New York
Times story that reported nuclear energy advocates are backing
away from their previous position that a nuclear waste dump at
Nevada's Yucca Mountain needs to be opened before new nuclear
reactors can be built. Some of the industry's supporters, the
Times noted, believe that it was a mistake to tie its future to
that of the dump. So the nuclear power industry is looki ng at
near-term alternatives to Yucca Mountain, such as sending some
of the nuclear waste to an Indian reservation in Utah,! where it
would be kept in above-ground storage facilities.

 James Muckerheide, an official who monitors federal safety
regulation of reactors in Massachusetts, wrote a recent e-mail
to his colleagues acknowledging that the problem facing the
states with nuclear power is one mostly of the industry's own
doing. "If the industry simply shut up about Yucca Mountain,
instead of dishonestly claiming that on-site spent fuel storage
is an unacceptable hazard, the issue could have been largely
diffused," Muckerheide wrote. In a nutshell, Muckerheide has
reminded the nation of one of the more salient points too
frequently lost in the debate over Yucca Mountain: Nuclear waste
can be safely stored where nuclear power is generated. There is,
quite simply, no need to rush a decision on Yucca Mountain.

 Nevertheless, the reality is that the nuclear power industry
isn't backing off its push to get Yucca Mountain approved. And
the industry's government mouthpiece, the Energy Department,
isn't showing signs that it is giving up on Yucca Mountain. It
is significant that Spencer Abraham, just one day after he left
office as secretary of the Energy Department last week, said
that Congress, not the EPA (relying on the recommendation of the
National Academy of Sciences), should set Yucca Mountain's
radiation standard.

 We're concerned that this could be part of some wink-and-nod
game that goes like this: President Bush, during the 2004
campaign, publicly declares that he will abide by the federal
court ruling on Yucca Mountain's radiation standard and not ask
the U.S. Supreme Court to overturn it. The Republican-controlled
Congress, however, interprets Abraham's remarks last week as a
signal that the president, in actuality, is willing to go along
with legislation that would overrule the appeals court decision
and weaken the existing radiation standard. Congress passes the
legislation and Bush signs it into law, paving the way for work
at Yucca Mountain to continue.

 The fact that Yucca Mountain has become increasingly partisan
-- with nearly all Republicans in Congress supporting it and
most Democrats opposing it -- also is troubling as the year
unfolds. Although Senate Democratic Leader Harry Reid, D-Nev.,
has considerable clout to potentially block pro-Yucca Mountain
legislation, if the Republican majorities in both houses of
Congress make undoing the appeals court's decision a priority --
and remember that Republicans made significant gains in Congress
last year -- this could spell real trouble for Nevada. 

*****************************************************************
 41 Las Vegas SUN: $651 million requested for Yucca

By Suzanne Struglinski < [suzanne@lasvegassun.com] > SUN 
WASHINGTON BUREAU

 WASHINGTON -- President Bush today asked Congress for $651
million in the coming fiscal year for Yucca Mountain, far less
than his $880 million request last year.

 The 2006 fiscal year request is about $73 million more than
what Congress approved for the current budget year. The 2006
fiscal year starts Oct. 1.

 Energy Department officials need the money to keep working
toward the creation of a nuclear waste repository at Yucca, 90
miles northwest of Las Vegas.

 In the proposed budget, the department has designated roughly
$85 million for transportation, including rail cask designs and
the new rail line in Nevada, as well as $427 million for the
repository itself.

 Energy Department spokesman Joe Davis today acknowledged there
were numerous challenges facing the nuclear dump but said the
budget request was a "responsible request to move forward." He
said the money would be used for transportation planning and to
complete the license application.

 The department had aimed to submit that application to the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission by the end of last year, but now
expects to do it by the end of 2005.

 Davis would not specify why the proposed 2006 budget is lower
than the $880 million the department wanted for 2005, but just
reiterated the $651 million was the money it believes it can
"responsibly spend moving forward."

 In a separate budget request for the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Bush requested $69 million for the NRC to begin
reviewing the license, to hold hearings and to conduct
full-scale testing of a high-level nuclear waste rail shipping
container. The commission said it expects a license application
in December and would begin its review work next year.

 Yucca critics argue that the department's smaller budget
request shows that the Energy Department is well behind in
meeting its longtime goal of opening Yucca by 2010.

 "It's certainly a shocking admission that from the DOE that
they are seriously behind and that the project is in serious
trouble," said Michele Boyd, an analyst for consumer watchdog
group Public Citizen, who tracks Yucca issues. "They need to
stop saying that they could open in 2010. It's incredibly
unrealistic."

 Critics point to huge hurdles ahead for the Energy Department,
including: developing a comprehensive waste-transportation plan
and constructing a $1 billion rail line in Nevada; overcoming
complex licensing issues that could take at least four years to
resolve; and actual construction of the repository -- roughly 40
miles of underground tunnels, as well as surface facilities.

 They also point to a federal court ruling last year that threw
out a 10,000-year radiation standard rule. The ruling stalled
the project, delaying it indefinitely. The Environmental
Protection Agency may work on setting a new standard this year,
unless Congress passes a law to keep the 10,000-year standard in
place.

 The smaller budget could mean that the Energy Department is
even further behind in its license application preparation than
the department acknowledges, said Bob Loux, executive director
of the Nevada Agency for Nuclear Projects. Or perhaps past
budget requests have been inflated, he added.

 Also part of the Bush request is $3.5 million for the state's
oversight work on the repository and $7 million for eight Nevada
counties and Inyo County, Calif. Nevada got $2 million last year
and the counties received about $8 million.

 Loux said state officials need about $5 million a year for
their oversight work until the license application is filed and
about $13 million after it is filed.

 Nevada's congressional delegation continues to criticize the
nuclear dump.

 "I think it is irresponsible to continue to waste millions upon
millions of dollars on a project that is unsafe and in no way
will solve our nation's nuclear waste problem," Rep. Jim
Gibbons, R-Nev., said.

 Rep. Shelley Berkley, D-Nev., slammed Bush's priorities.

 "President Bush is calling for cuts in programs important to
Southern Nevada families, yet he manages to find $650 million
more to waste on Yucca Mountain," Berkley said. "Clearly the
president is more focused on helping his friends in the nuclear
industry than he is on helping to meet the needs of seniors,
kids, veterans, small businesses, parents, schools and our
communities."

 Rep. Jon Porter, R-Nev., said he does not believe the Yucca
repository is a "done deal" and that the "scientific studies are
still incomplete."

 "I will continue to remain an active participant to oppose any
funding or legislation that would require the transportation and
storage of high-level nuclear waste to Nevada," Porter said.

 Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid, D-Nev., who is also the top
Democrat on the Senate energy and water appropriations
subcommittee that writes the Yucca budget bill, vowed, as he
does every year, to use his influence to slow the program.

 Sen. John Ensign, R-Nev., aims to use his positions on the
Senate Budget Committee and Senate Armed Services Committee,
which oversees the Defense Department's involvement with the
project, to argue for lower Yucca funding. Some waste bound for
Yucca would be Defense Department waste, such as spent fuel from
nuclear submarines.

 Notably absent from the 2006 budget is a legislative request
made in recent years to give the Energy Department direct access
to a $16 billion national Nuclear Waste Fund, which
nuclear-generated electricity ratepayers have paid into for
years.

 The administration still strongly supports allowing about $750
million a year to go toward the project. Bush included what
Davis called a "policy statement" in the main budget documents
expressing the administration's desire to make the change, but
it is not tying any of the $651 million request to it.

 "I think it is a really good approach," said John Kane, senior
vice president for congressional affairs for the Nuclear Energy
Institute, the nuclear power industry's top lobby group. "It's
win-win for everyone."

 In its 2005 request, the department asked Congress for $880
million, but tied $749 million of it to a controversial change
in the budget rules that would have taken Yucca out of the
competition for funds and funneled Nuclear Waste Fund money
directly to it.

 The change did not pass, leaving the House only able to approve
$131 million.

 The Senate never passed its own energy spending bill, but a
deal made at the end of the year gave $577 million to the
program, the same amount it received in 2004. 



*****************************************************************
 42 RGJ: Yucca cutbacks create time to strategize
 
[online@rgj.com] RENO GAZETTE-JOURNAL

2/6/2005 10:39 pm 

Most Nevadans still don’t want the federal government to build a
repository and store nuclear waste at Yucca Mountain. So the
spending cutback to the proposed project really is nothing to
cheer about. 

It just means there may be more time to try bringing the plan to
a halt.

A federal court slowed progress when it decided the proposal
didn’t meet radiation safety standards and violated
congressional intent. Combined with a budgeting error the faux
pas slowed progress but didn’t stop it. The feds still expect to
complete and stock it with spent reactor fuel rods and other
waste from plants around the country even though they won’t meet
the 2010 deadline.

Another concern should be to ensure that the cuts don’t mean
that any draft plans don’t call for work to be done on the
cheap, building additional safety issues.

While the new Energy secretary is trying to figure out how to
get the licensing procedure to the next step for submission
later this year, Nevadans have new opportunities to work on
their strategy. 

[http://www.gannettfoundation.org/] © Copyright Reno
Gazette-Journal, a Gannett Co. Inc. [http://www.gannett.com]
Newspaper.
*****************************************************************
 43 Salt Lake Tribune: Yucca Mountain spent nuclear fuel waste
repository license proposal date pushed back 

Article Last Updated: 02/07/2005 01:56:32 AM 

By Patty Henetz The Salt Lake Tribune 

The federal Energy Department has once again pushed back its 
expected date to file a license proposal for the Yucca Mountain 
spent nuclear fuel waste repository, a project increasingly in 
doubt as scientific and political problems multiply. 

Officials now say they hope to complete the license 
application by the end of the calendar year and to push the 
opening of the repository past 2015. 

That uncertainty, along with growing interest in storing 
spent fuel on or near nuclear reactor sites, in turn weigh on 
Private Fuel Storage's proposal for interim spent nuclear fuel 
storage on the Skull Valley Goshute Reservation in Utah. 

Utilities increasingly are turning to building dry cask 
storage facilities of their own on or near reactor sites because 
they no longer are confident Yucca will be built. 

The ambitious Private Fuel Storage (PFS) plan to transport 
and store up to 44,000 tons of highly radioactive waste on a 
100-acre parcel 45 miles southwest of Salt Lake City would be 
attractive only if it were cheaper than storing spent fuel near 
the reactors, said Bob Loux, executive director of the 
anti-Yucca Nevada Nuclear Projects Agency. 

"If you have the option of just leaving it at reactor sites, 
the [Nuclear Regulatory Commission] has said as a rule that's as 
safe as a repository for the next 150 years," Loux said. It 
would be cheaper for utilities to store waste on site than send 
it to PFS because they wouldn't have to pay for transportation, 
he said. 

Loux said the Energy Department's announcement a week ago 
that it would renew its proposal for above-ground spent fuel 
storage at the Yucca Mountain site - albeit scaled back - 
signaled to utilities that Yucca is in deep trouble. 

"My own view is it's over," he said. 

Tim Holeman, spokesman for the Western Interstate Energy 
Board, a subagency of the Western Governors Association, said if 
the Energy Department can't make Yucca Mountain work, "onsite 
storage is the solution. 

"Some will say it's safer consolidated, some will say it's 
safer decentralized. It's a political question as much as a 
scientific question." 

According to the Nuclear Energy Institute, an industry 
organization, building a dry storage facility at a plant site 
requires an initial investment of $10 million to $20 million, 
with ongoing annual operating costs ranging anywhere from 
$5 million to $7 million. 

The PFS facility would cost an estimated $3.1 billion over 
its 40-year lifetime, PFS spokeswoman Sue Martin says. 

Spent fuel currently is being kept in dry cask storage at 25 
power plants, one decommissioned plant site, six plants in the 
process of decommissioning and two federal interim storage 
facilities in Idaho. 

The Surry nuclear reactor on the James River in Virginia has 
always taken that path. Facility spokesman Richard Zuercher says 
ultimately the waste should go to a federal repository, but for 
now, it's safe where it is. 

Dry cask storage involves packaging spent fuel rods 
underwater, where they have cooled for several years, into 
storage casks, then pumping out the water and replacing it with 
inert gas. The casks, typically steel cylinders, are either 
welded or bolted closed, then encased in additional steel, 
concrete or other material to provide radiation shielding. 

The Surry plant was the first to use the technology, 
receiving a 20-year license for on-site storage in 1986. The 
plant now is applying for a 40-year extension, which it is 
expected to receive. 

"This 40-year license will be suitable to get us to end of 
life for storage of fuel," Zuercher said. 

The technology, he said, is safe. 

The National Commission on Energy Policy agrees. In a report 
issued in December, the commission urged completion of a 
national underground repository, but said the government should 
also move ahead on a parallel path of building at least two 
centralized dry cask storage facilities. 

On Wednesday, a Nevada congresswoman spoke in favor of a 
bill that would take money intended for Yucca and route it to 
nuclear waste technology development and dry cask storage at 
reactor sites. 

Â© Copyright 2005, The Salt Lake Tribune. 
*****************************************************************
 44 Salt Lake Tribune: Moving N-waste no easy, or fast, task 
storage license is approved, other hurdles remain 

Article Last Updated: 02/07/2005 07:53:20 AM 

By Patty Henetz The Salt Lake Tribune 

The Skull Valley Goshute Reservation is 32 miles of desert 
away from a rail line that could bring spent nuclear fuel to be 
stored there. (Leah Hogsten/Tribune file photo) 

By the end of this month, Private Fuel Storage, a consortium of 
eight out-of-state nuclear power utilities, could be granted a 
federal license to store 44,000 tons of highly radioactive 
nuclear waste on concrete pads in a windswept valley 45 miles 
southwest of Salt Lake City. 

The Atomic Safety Licensing Board hasn't signaled to its 
parent body, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, what it will do; 
in fact, it has taken far longer to make a decision on the 
application - more than seven years - than anyone expected. 

But even if the NRC approves the license, there remains a 
significant and costly logistical problem: PFS must haul the 
720-ton containers of spent nuclear fuel across 32 miles of 
desert between the Union Pacific rail line and the 820-acre 
parcel the Skull Valley Goshute tribe has leased to the 
consortium. 

It's here the project could lose traction, caught in a 
military-political-wilderness dragnet cast five years ago in 
Congress by former 1st Congressional District Rep. Jim Hansen 
and pulled in by his successor, Rep. Rob Bishop. 

To get the 4,000 containers to the storage facility, designed 
to be an interim stop for the waste on the way to a permanent 
repository at Yucca Mountain, Nev., PFS will either build a rail 
spur or rebuild the two-lane state highway that cuts through the 
reservation from an Interstate 80 off-ramp. The rail option is 
PFS' preferred alternative. 

Right now, both options look like roads to nowhere, detoured 
inadvertently but indefinitely by a moratorium on wilderness 
studies on the Utah Test and Training Range, the largest such 
Defense Department range in the nation. 

That's because the moratorium prevents the Bureau of Land 
Management from approving the necessary right-of-way for the 
rail spur. Without that BLM approval, the rail spur can't be 
built. 

PFS lawyer Jay Silberg said Friday that the facility 
construction doesn't necessarily have to wait for the rail spur. 

"Right now, it's not affecting us. It has not held up 
anything," he said. 

Spokeswoman Sue Martin said PFS can't start construction 
until it has service agreements with consortium members and 
other customers. She declined to comment on how the rail spur 
hang-up might affect the facility's plans. 

But Bishop sees it as a major impediment, aides said. And he 
plans to exploit it until he finds another way to stop the 
project. 

"It's one of the many arrows in our quiver," said Steve 
Petersen, Bishop's senior policy adviser and counsel. 

The moratorium started after then-Interior Secretary Bruce 
Babbitt's inventory of potential wilderness study areas included 
land near the Hill Air Force training range. Completing the 
wilderness study area process would have required the BLM to 
amend its land-use plan for the region. 

Seeking to halt the process, Hansen inserted a provision in 
the 2000 National Defense Authorization Act that first required 
the Air Force to assess how wilderness study might affect the 
training range. Until then, no changes to the land-use plan are 
allowed. 

The Air Force never has gotten from Congress the money it 
says it needs for the study. And if Bishop has his way, it 
won't, said Petersen, formerly an aide to Hansen. 

It might seem a contradictory position for the Republican 
congressman, who recently backed a bipartisan bill that sought to
create a wilderness area on BLM property next to the test range. 
The proposal would have allowed fighter jet overflights but 
blocked rail shipments of waste to the Goshute facility. 

The bill died in the Senate in December, the victim, Bishop 
says, of Nevada senators still angry over Utah senators' votes 
in favor of the Yucca Mountain project. Bishop has said he will 
reintroduce the legislation in the next Congress. 

Meanwhile, the moratorium is the next best thing, Petersen 
said. 

Bishop "is going to throw everything at it that is legally 
and ethically permissible to block PFS," which is "right in the 
driveway of the Utah Test and Training Range," Petersen said. 
"If nuclear waste goes in there, a third of the usable range is 
toast. . . . To some degree, [the Air Force] is taken out of 
this whole debate because of high-level nuclear politics." 

While those who oppose the PFS proposal - including Utah's 
congressional delegation, the state Legislature and governor and 
an overwhelming number of Utah residents - may cheer anything 
that thwarts the PFS plan, there is collateral damage. 

The moratorium has been interpreted to prevent any land-use 
changes on more than 5 million acres in Box Elder, Tooele and 
Juab counties, said Don Banks, spokesman for the BLM Salt Lake 
City office. 

The agency's inability to approve rights-of-way also has 
blocked other project proposals, including fiber optics, wind 
energy, sagebrush restoration, bighorn sheep introduction, 
off-highway vehicle recreation and livestock grazing. 

"This is having major adverse impacts on our ability to do 
business," Banks said. "It's not only stopped us from moving 
forward, taking actions. In many instances it's been the 
catalyst for litigation." 

Dianne Nielson, executive director of the state Department of 
Environmental Quality, noted PFS can choose the alternate route 
of trucking the waste casks. 

But that would require a wholesale overhaul of the state 
highway that connects I-80 with the reservation and building 
some kind of transfer point near the rail line, where the spent 
nuclear fuel containers would be lifted onto heavy-haul trucks. 
Because the I-80 overpass isn't high enough to allow the trucks 
to pass, that would have to be rebuilt, too. 

Then, PFS would have to apply to the state for a permit to 
run the trucks on the highway. 

"If they met the requirements of the law, we would 
eventually have to issue them a permit," Nielson said. 

Silberg, the PFS attorney, said he didn't foresee PFS 
applying any pressure on the Air Force to get their study done 
so the moratorium can be lifted and the rail right-of-way 
approved. 

"We assume that if the Air Force has been told to do a 
study, they will do a study," he said. 

Â© Copyright 2005, The Salt Lake Tribune. 
*****************************************************************
 45 Las Vegas SUN: Budget has less money for Yucca Mountain, targets
land sales

Today: February 07, 2005 at 15:26:20 PST 

 By ERICA WERNER ASSOCIATED PRESS 

WASHINGTON (AP) - The $2.57 trillion budget President Bush
proposed Monday acknowledges delays in completing a national
nuclear waste repository by asking for about half the funding
projected for Yucca Mountain. It also proposes diverting
significant revenue from southern Nevada federal land sales into
the U.S. treasury, a concept that's infuriated Nevada lawmakers. 

Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid, D-Nev., and other lawmakers
vowed to fight the plan to allocate 70 percent of the money
raised under the Southern Nevada Public Land Management Act for
other federal programs. 

The money is now used by the Interior Department for
environmental purposes in Nevada, including acquiring
environmentally sensitive land and making improvements at Lake
Tahoe. 

"This is an outrageous plan, and a slap in the face to people of
Nevada," Reid said in a statement, promising to join with Sen.
John Ensign, R-Nev., to try to block it. 

"Any change would need to be legislated, and I have every
expectation Sen. Ensign and I will be able to stop this
proposal," he said. 

Bush justified the proposal by noting that the 1998 act has
raised far more money than anticipated. While the Congressional
Budget Office anticipated $70 million in sales each year,
proceeds for 2005 will top $1 billion. 

The budget document contends the act is raising more money than
can be spent on land acquisition and says excess funds are being
spent on local projects, including a recreational shooting
range, "which do not reflect the highest priorities of the
nation." 

"This proposal serves the general taxpaying public while still
providing roughly four times the level of spending in Nevada
than originally anticipated in 1998," the budget says. 

Nevada lawmakers also criticized the $651 million requested for
the Yucca Mountain nuclear waste repository, even though it was
significantly lower than the $1.2 billion the Energy Department
projected a year ago. The government wants to bury 77,000 tons
of radioactive waste in the repository planned 90 miles
northwest of Las Vegas. 

"I think it is irresponsible to continue to waste millions upon
millions of dollars on a project that is unsafe and in no way
will solve our nation's nuclear waste problem," said Rep. Jim
Gibbons, R-Nev. 

"Clearly the president is more focused on helping his friends in
the nuclear industry than he is on helping to meet the needs of
seniors, kids, veterans, small businesses and our communities,"
said Rep. Shelley Berkley, D-Nev. 

The lower spending reflects delays caused, in part, by an
unfavorable court decision last year. A federal court rejected
proposed radiation safety standards for the waste dump, and new
standards are being developed. 

Last year the administration sought $880 million for Yucca
Mountain and hoped to submit a formal license application to the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission by December 2004. Congress
provided only $577 million, and the license was not submitted. 

The budget document indicates the Energy Department expects to
submit the license application this year. The budget increases
the funding request for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission from
$670 million in 2005 to $702 million in 2006 so the commission
can process the license request. 

The budget also criticizes the delays in the project, which the
government hoped to open in 2010. Officials have acknowledged
that schedule will not be met. 

The government initially promised the industry it would begin
accepting nuclear waste for long-term disposal by 1998. The
budget notes the Justice Department settled a lawsuit with a
utility for $80 million last year over the government's failure
to receive nuclear waste as scheduled. 

"Similar lawsuits with over 60 other utilities could require
taxpayers to make enormous future payments to these utilities
for the costs of delay," the budget says. 

Overall, Bush's budget for the 2006 fiscal year that begins next
Oct. 1 seeks deep spending cuts across a wide swath of
government, including cutting health care payments for poor
people and veterans and trimming spending on the environment and
education. 

-- 



*****************************************************************
 46 APS: Underestimating the Consequences of Use of Nuclear Weapons


APS:  Physics and Society Newsletter - January 2005 - 

F O R U M O N P H Y S I C S &S O C I E T Y
of The American Physical Society 
January 2005   
  
Articles
 Underestimating the Consequences of Use of Nuclear Weapons:
Condemned to Repeat the Past’s Errors? 
Lynn Eden

This article draws on Lynn Eden, Whole World on Fire:
Organizations, Knowledge, and Nuclear Weapons Devastation
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2004)

Seriously studied for almost sixty years, nothing would seem
better understood than the effects and terrible consequences of
the use of nuclear weapons.[i] Yet, surprisingly, for decades,
one far-reaching effect—the mass fire damage caused by
“firestorms”—was neither examined in depth nor widely
understood. This matters because, for modern nuclear weapons,
under almost all conditions and for many targets of interest,
the range of devastation from mass fire substantially exceeds
that of damage from blast. Once mass fire began to be studied
analytically and through reanalysis of empirical experience, the
quite well-developed findings were not widely accepted. There
may be somewhat greater acceptance now, but, when it comes to
nuclear operations, understanding by physicists is not enough.
Knowledge has to be incorporated into organizational procedures,
specifically, the algorithms used in strategic nuclear war
planning. 

There is currently a low level of effort to develop a
methodology to predict collateral fire damage, but as of
mid-October, 2004, fire damage prediction is still not
incorporated into the U.S. strategic nuclear war plan --that is,
as a mechanism of destruction for deliberately targeted forces
and installations. There is no program underway to do so.[ii]

Underestimating the damage caused by nuclear weapons is an
important part of the historical explanation for the inflated
force requirements—“overkill”—that led the United States and
Soviet Union to build nuclear arsenals in the tens of thousands
of warheads. But underestimating damage matters importantly now
as well. To paraphrase George Santayana, those who do not
understand the past may well be condemned to repeat its errors. 

Particularly salient today are regional conflicts in which a
decision or threat to use nuclear weapons would in all
likelihood be based on a severe underestimate of the damage that
could result. Indeed, in the South Asian crisis of May 2002, the
United States specifically sought to warn the leaders of India
and Pakistan of the consequences of a nuclear exchange. However,
a U.S. defense intelligence assessment prepared for that purpose
was based on blast effects alone. The study estimated that
twelve million people would be killed, but it did not include
deaths from mass fire.[iii] If it had, the estimate would
undoubtedly have been much higher.

Beyond the very important possibility of underestimating damage
and death from nuclear weapons in the event of use, there are
similar kinds of phenomena in which important aspects of the
physical world are not well understood or, if understood, are
not incorporated into political decisions and organizational
procedures. Such phenomena are more common than might at first
be thought.

In what follows, I first explain what I mean by mass fire. I
then make some bald assertions, much more fully argued and
documented in Whole World on Fire, about the predictability and
range of mass fire. I very briefly summarize why predictions of
mass fire damage were not developed for many years. I also
briefly summarize how a small team, led by physicist Harold
Brode at Pacific Sierra- Research, developed a methodology to
predict nuclear fire damage. I explain what happened to that
work. And I close by drawing out some implications for other
areas of policy.

Mass fire is roughly synonymous with the more common term
“firestorm”—though physicists tend to prefer the former term. A
nuclear mass fire can occur in an area containing a fuel load
typical of a city or suburb. A nuclear detonation would first
cause myriad simultaneous ignitions over this large area. These
fires would begin to coalesce and to heat an enormous volume of
air that would rise. Like a gigantic bonfire, this rising hot
air would cause cooler air near the surface to be sucked in from
the periphery. This air would move at hurricane force toward the
center, become superheated, and rise—causing additional
hurricane winds to rush in from the periphery and further
intensifying the mass fire. No one within the area would
survive.[iv]

Such mass fires are fundamentally different from the famous
fires that destroyed London, Chicago, and San Francisco, the
vast forest fires of the late nineteenth century that swept the
Great Lakes states, and the Cerro Grande fire that nearly
destroyed Los Alamos National Laboratory in 1999. These were not
mass fires, simultaneously set over vast areas, but large
propagating “line fires.” Such line fires are highly
destructive, but do not occur in the same time frame, nor with
the scale and intensity, of a mass fire. The mass fire set at
Hiroshima by a 15 kiloton atomic bomb, for example, completely
burned out an area of 4.4 square miles within hours, not
days.[v] 

Some have argued that although nuclear mass fires could be
highly destructive, they would be subject to weather and other
conditions, and therefore cannot be reliably predicted. It has
also been argued that the probability and range of such fires is
not as predictable as damage from nuclear blast. Finally, it has
been argued that for the specific targets of interest to war
planners, the range of fire damage is not greater than the range
of blast damage. However, the work of Harold Brode and his
collaborators, as well as that of M.I.T. professor Theodore
Postol, establishes that mass fire creates its own environment,
and therefore is highly predictable. (Think of a piece of the
sun being brought to earth.) Mass fire and extensive fire damage
would occur in almost every circumstance in which nuclear
weapons were detonated in a suburban or urban area. The
circumstances in which mass fire damage would not occur—for
example, during torrential rainstorms—are rare, and their
probabilities are calculable in advance. Although weather can
affect the range at which fires will occur, this variation can
be reasonably well predicted. Nuclear fire damage is, in fact,
as accurately predictable as blast damage: The uncertainties in
the range at which mass fire would cause damage are no greater
than the uncertainties associated with blast.[vi] Finally, many
targets of interest to war planners, such as military, command,
industrial, and political targets, are co-located in urban or
suburban areas, and for nuclear weapons of approximately 100
kilotons or more, the range of severe damage from fire is likely
to be significantly greater than the range of severe damage from
blast. Under most circumstances, damage from mass fire would
extend two to five times farther than blast damage.[vii] 

Why were predictions of fire damage not developed for many
years? The answer goes back to before World War II.
Fundamentally, organizations can only solve the problems they
set out to solve. Those involved in air target intelligence
focused on being able to destroy specific installations with
high-explosive blast weapons. Despite excursions into incendiary
operations in World War II, the emphasis remained on precision
targeting with high-explosive bombs. The emphasis on blast
damage can vividly be seen in the end-of-the-war U.S. Strategic
Bombing Survey. According to a careful reading by Harold Brode,
the multi-volume reports on Hiroshima and Nagasaki concentrated
on structural damage due to blast. “[F]ire, although fully
reported, was viewed as interfering with their objective of
identifying and quantifying blast damage.”[viii] 

Despite the inevitable area damage caused by nuclear weapons,
the emphasis on precision targeting and blast damage carried
over after the war into the early development of blast damage
prediction in what became known as the VNTK system—the main tool
for predicting damage, that is, blast damage from nuclear
weapons for use in U.S. strategic nuclear targeting. There was
no comparable development of fire damage prediction for many
years following. Further, those involved in developing blast
damage prediction—including such outstanding civil engineers as
Nathan Newmark, a University of Illinois professor—were not
intellectually equipped to predict fire damage. The whole
process became self-reinforcing: what could be predicted seemed
to those involved as inherently more predictable; what could not
be predicted seemed inherently unpredictable.

 This is not to say that some physicists were unaware of nuclear
fire damage. Indeed, President Eisenhower’s science adviser,
George Kistiakowsky, wrote that because U.S. nuclear war
planners “used blast effect as the only criterion of damage and
neglected thermal radiation [and the] fires which will be caused
by it . . . the question may be raised as to whether [it
results] in overkill and will create unjustified additional
force requirements.’”[ix] Nonetheless, this insight was not used
within the government to build expertise and develop knowledge
about nuclear fire damage.
Beginning in the late 1970s, the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) and then the Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA), began
to fund exploratory work for a small team led by Harold Brode at
Pacific-Sierra Research to develop a methodology to predict fire
damage for use in strategic nuclear targeting. Why did the
government decide to fund this work—at Brode’s initiative? In
fact, it was not unusual for DNA to fund exploratory work. The
question might better be asked as to why Brode did not choose to
work on the problem earlier. In any case, the interest generated
by the “nuclear winter” controversy beginning in late 1983
resulted in further funding for Brode’s efforts—since where
there’s smoke, there’s fire. By the early 1990s, Brode and his
colleagues had teamed up with DNA, and also the Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA) and nuclear war planners from the
Joint Strategtic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS) to predict
combined fire and blast damage to 50 and then 300 example
targets. By the end of this process, they had demonstrated a
method not only for predicting fire damage, but for
incorporating those predictions into the government’s VNTK
system for predicting blast damage. Indeed, in early 1991, the
government came close to incorporating fire damage predictions
into nuclear war planning. However, the post-Cold War
environment and an ultimate inability to persuade high-level
military officers of necessity and feasibility led to the
shelving of the project by year’s end.[x] Although interest in
predicting fire damage was revived in the mid-1990s, work is no
longer being done to develop a combined method to predict fire
and blast damage for use in strategic nuclear war
planning—although some interest continues in predicting
collateral fire damage.[xi]  

It is consequential that U.S. nuclear war planning does not take
full account of the physical devastation that would occur were
nuclear weapons to be used. Yet the implications of Whole World
on Fire are broader than this. Like the VNTK system based only
on blast damage, the representation of the physical world in
documents, routines, and technologies may be inaccurate or
incomplete. Many examples abound, from the construction of the
Titanic (shipbuilders did not understand just how brittle was
the steel plate used), to the failed design of the Tacoma
Narrows bridge, to the lack of anticipation that a jet aircraft
flying into the World Trade Center could also ignite fire from
the thousands of gallons of jet fuel released into the building.
Such situations probably cannot be altogether avoided, but the
immediate correction of serious design errors in the Citicorp
Center in New York and the John Hancock Tower in Boston (both
built in the 1970s), points to the general solution: democratic
accountability and open professional oversight.

Lynn Eden, Ph.D., is associate director for research and senior
research scholar at the Center for International Security and
Cooperation, Stanford Institute for International Studies,
Stanford University. Eden has written on U.S. foreign and
military policy, arms control, and Cold War history. She was an
editor of The Oxford Companion to American Military History
(Oxford University Press, 2000). Whole World on Fire received
the Robert K. Merton award for best book in science, knowledge,
and technology from the American Sociological Association, 2004.
Eden can be reached at  [lynneden@stanford.edu] , (650)- 725-
5369. See also  [http://www.wholeworldonfire.com] 
-----------------------------------------------------------------



[i] See for example Samuel Glasstone and Philip J. Dolan, eds.,
The Effects of Nuclear Weapons, 3d edition (Washington, D.C.:
USGPO, 1977) and earlier editions dating from 1950. 
[ii] Personal communication with author, October 19-20, 2004.
[iii] Thom Shanker, “12 Million Could Die at Once in an
India-Pakistan Nuclear War,” New York Verdana,Arial, May 27,
2002; Elisabeth Bumiller and Thom Shanker, “Bush Presses
Pakistan on Kashmir and Orders Rumsfeld to Region,” New York
Verdana,Arial, May 31, 2002; Todd S. Purdum with Seth Mydans,
“U.S. Envoys Ready to Press Two Foes in Kashmir Crisis,” New
York Verdana,Arial, June 3, 2002.
[iv] An extended discussion of mass fire can be found in Lynn
Eden, Whole World on Fire: Organizations, Knowledge, and Nuclear
Weapons Devastation (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004),
chap. 1. 
[v] Eden, Whole World on Fire, p. 20.
[vi] See Eden, Whole World on Fire, chap. 1. Also, Gilbert
Binninger, Roger Craver, and Suzanne Wright, Staff Officers’
Guide for Targeting Uncertainties, DNA-TR-89-115, prepared for
Director, Defense Nuclear Agency, Washington, D.C. (n.p.,
January 1990), p. 47, argues that range predictions for airblast
under free-field conditions “can be in error by as much as ±
30%.” 
[vii] Ashton B. Carter, “Assessing Command System
Vulnerability,” in Carter, John D. Steinbruner, and Charles A.
Zraket, eds., Managing Nuclear Operations (Washington, D.C.:
Brookings Institution, 1987), pp. 561-563, 571-572. The specific
targets of interest may be different today, but similar targets
are to be found in urban and suburban areas. Regarding range of
damage, see Binninger, Craver, and Wright, Staff Officers’
Guide, p. ix, discussed in Eden, Whole World on Fire, p. 246.
[viii] Comments by H.L. Brode on the United States Strategic
Bombing Survey (1947), September 2004, enclosed in Harold Brode
letter to author, 30 September 2004.
[ix] Kistiakowsky quoted in Eden, Whole World on Fire, p. 1. 
[x] See the detailed narrative in Eden, Whole World on Fire,
chaps. 9-10.
[xi] Eden, Whole World on Fire, chap. 10; personal
communication, October 19-20, 2004.

 
Another View of the Role of Nuclear Power 
Richard L. Garwin

I begin with a comment on a recent paper in P.1 In their paper,
the authors argue that U.S. energy problems would be largely
solved by the deployment of "proliferation-resistant fast
reactors". In support of this argument, they make a number of
serious errors in their discussion of the utility of
reactor-grade plutonium (R-G Pu) in the fabrication of nuclear
explosives:

"... weapons made from R-G Pu have a yield that is highly
unpredictable-- they would be very likely to 'fizzle,' producing
no mushroom cloud at all." (p. 10.2.8)

"... even as a terrorist weapon that will definitely fizzle ..."
(p. 10.2.8)

It is not true that a terrorist weapon will "definitely fizzle"
nor that a "fizzle" will produce no mushroom cloud at all. In a
report of which both Michael M. May and I were coauthors2 (see
pp. 33-34), the Committee on International Security and Arms
Control notes,

"While this yield is referred to as the 'fizzle yield,' a
1-kiloton bomb would still have a radius of destruction roughly
one-third that of the Hiroshima weapon, making it a potentially
fearsome explosive. Regardless of how high the concentration of
troublesome isotopes is, the yield would not be less. With a
more sophisticated design, weapons could be built with R-G Pu
that would be assured of having higher yields."

The report refers to a classified study of 1994 done for the
Committee by LLNL3 What a 1-kt weapon would do if detonated in
Manhattan is detailed in a recent paper.4 In sum, hundreds of
thousands of people would die within minutes of the 1-kt
explosion-- the minimum "fizzle" yields that could occur either
with weapon grade Pu or R-G Pu. It would be a nuclear explosion
with all its characteristics -- blast, fire, radiation, and
severe fallout.

Surely the authors of (1) do not wish us to explain precisely
how to make an even more effective weapon with R-G Pu.

My correction of these overstatements has more to do with the
urgency of enhancing protection of separated R-G Pu (of which
tens of tons-- enough to make thousands of nuclear weapons-- now
exist in the UK, France, and Japan), than with the normal
in-process characteristics of the pyro-processed material that
is the subject of the Forum article.

There, though, the question is not what would be normal
operation, but whether the line, in general, could be configured
to separate purer Pu, thus reducing the challenge to building a
nuclear weapon from the Pu in process or in storage. A 1-GWe
reactor fissions about a ton of Pu (or U-235) per year, and so
any prudent cycle would have a ton or more of Pu in readiness
for fueling-- enough for 100 nuclear weapons.

Here, too, the authors overreach, quoting an emphatic judgment,

"... that the transuranic impurities render the material far too
hot (thermally and radioactively), and far too many spontaneous
neutrons, to make it at all feasible." (p. 11.1.6)

Despite the fact that this material has almost 1000 times the
spontaneous neutron emission rate as R-G Pu (2 x 105 compared
with 200 neutrons/sec/gram) the fizzle yield in an implosion
device would not be reduced below that obtained with R-G PU--
that is, in Mark's illustration, 1-2 kilotons.

The thermal power is a greater problem. An R-G Pu implosion
weapon core would give off less heat than a 100-W light bulb,
whereas the pyro-processed core would deliver on the order of
seven times that. This would make it unsuitable for the usual
approach to construction, but, unfortunately, would by no means
make it impossible to construct.

The Integral Fast Reactor (IFR) Pu ingot (as configured to feed
a light water reactor (LWR) fuel-fabrication line) would provide
some 50 R/hr at 0.5 m distance, in comparison with 100 times
less radiation flux at that distance from R-G Pu. This would
certainly add difficulties in the fabrication, and would make
the core more readily detectable in case of attempted
clandestine delivery.

I agree that it is "very much easier to make a bomb with highly
enriched uranium than with R-G Pu [or, I add, with weapon-grade
Pu) But "That route would surely be taken by any organization
that did not have access to weapons-grade plutonium." would be
true only if they did have access to HEU and not to R-G Pu.

The authors note that pyro processing in the form of
electrochemical methods has had considerable development and
demonstration and poses less proliferation hazard than does
aqueous reprocessing. Still, with the electrochemical system
they wrote that "... this threat, however remote, is
justification for rigid safeguards on electrochemical separation
facilities." (p. 10.2.4) Indeed, the chosen proliferation path
in recent years appears to be the acquisition of "peaceful"
nuclear technologies in the guise of a nuclear power system, and
the covert or explicit denunciation of the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) nonproliferation regime, converting those
materials and facilities for enrichment or reprocessing to the
production of weapons. This is the route followed by North
Korea, and apparently begun by Iran.

Other statements in the article are also misleading, as

"The most credible nuclear terrorist threat, a dirty bomb,
requires only access to spent nuclear fuel, and the controls on
this material in various parts of the world are minimal." (p.
9.1.8)

Nuclear fuel is unlikely to be involved in a dirty bomb, because
there are more conveniently available intense radioactive
sources of Co-60 or Cs-137 used in industrial radiography
devices or systems for sterilization of food.

A widely available and authoritative report on reprocessing
technologies is available on the web.5 The STATS report (pp.
440-441) addresses Argonne National Laboratories (ANL) estimates
of cost for pyro processing of LWR spent fuel, with a target of
$350/kg HM (per kilogram of heavy metal contained in the spent
fuel). Although such a number would require that pyro processing
be six times cheaper than large-scale aqueous reprocessing,
STATS quotes an estimate that "unit reprocessing cost for an
investor-owned plant for pyrochemical processing of LWR spent
fuel would be, instead, 57% greater than that for an aqueous
reprocessing facility of the same throughput." Furthermore, the
electrochemical pyro processing system has a great deal of
flexibility so that it could very probably be operated to
produce quite pure Pu, with little of the contaminating
transuranics-- hence the need for "rigid safeguards."

Moving beyond nonproliferation, what is the cost of the advanced
fast-reactors that would be required not only to produce
electricity at acceptable cost, but also do this with the added
burden of burning LWR spent fuel? Let me point the reader to two
books that discuss these matters broadly.6,7

My own judgment is that fast reactors have a great deal to offer
in the long-term future. But we will get there only with rigor
in the development and evaluation of the reactor technology,
cost, and safety-- and only if nonproliferation requirements are
part of the design for any future reactor.

A great friend of nuclear power, Edward Teller, wrote,

"For the fast breeder to work in its steady-state breeding
condition you probably need something like half a ton of
plutonium. In order that it should work economically in a
sufficiently big power-producing unit, it probably needs quite a
bit more than one ton of plutonium. I do not like the hazard
involved. I suggested that nuclear reactors are a blessing
because they are clean. They are clean as long as they function
as planned, but if they malfunction in a massive manner, which
can happen in principle, they can release enough fission
products to kill a tremendous number of people. 

...But, if you put together two tons of plutonium in a breeder,
one tenth of one percent of this material could become critical.

I have listened to hundreds of analyses of what course a nuclear
accident can take. Although I believe it is possible to analyze
the immediate consequences of an accident, I do not believe it
is possible to analyze and foresee the secondary consequences.
In an accident involving a plutonium reactor, a couple of tons
of plutonium can melt. I don't think anybody can foresee where
one or two or five percent of this plutonium will find itself
and how it will get mixed with some other material. A small
fraction of the original charge can become a great hazard."8

All these questions must be faced honestly and resolved
collectively to the satisfaction of all technically capable,
open-minded participants. They are not now being so addressed.

I agree that aqueous reprocessing has no place in the current
commercial nuclear power industry. It is uneconomical compared
with the once-through cycle and adds to the proliferation
hazard. But if it were commercially viable, even with the
increased costs that would be associated with effective
nonproliferation measures, and if it were accompanied by
political commitments on the part of those who have developed
commercial nuclear power in conjunction with the IAEA, to return
those facilities to their suppliers in case of denunciation of
the IAEA, I would support even aqueous reprocessing for an
economy that would ultimately involve both once-through reactors
and breeders.

COMMENTS ON THE CURRENT SCENE.9 Nuclear power is in the news in
the United States these days primarily because of controversy
about shipment of spent fuel, storage of spent fuel in pools at
the reactor, and dry-cask storage.

I have studied these questions not only for my book, but also
for the National Research Council in conjunction with a book on
terrorism,10 and I believe that there is no significant hazard
for transport of spent fuel in approved U.S. dry casks.
Experiments done by Sandia National Laboratories show that even
with large shaped-charge explosive systems, it is difficult to
volatilize and disseminate any significant amount of
radioactivity. Dry casks are durable against being struck by an
aircraft and, to my mind, are a far safer form of storage than
are spent-fuel pools.

I believe that some independent analyses11 of possible
vulnerability of spent-fuel pools to terrorist attacks are quite
reasonable, and that neither the industry nor the NRC has
provided anything better. As a result, I have long advocated
taking this threat seriously and not only protecting pools
against attack, but also maintaining on site and at centralized
locations expedient repair kits and equipment that could stanch
leaks of coolant and provide substantial coolant inflow in order
to maintain the shielding and cooling of the spent fuel in case
of explosive attack.

In "Making the Nation Safer," the National Research Council
Committee writes, "... emergency cooling of the fuel in case of
attack could probably be accomplished using 'low tech' measures
that could be implemented without significant exposure of
workers to radiation." The Nuclear Regulatory Commission states
that it "agrees with this statement," and notes that its
February 25, 2002 Order directed licensees to develop guidance
and strategies to maintain or restore spent fuel cooling
capabilities using existing or available resources." But unless
the Commission and the industry acknowledge the vulnerability
and its nature, it will be a very long time before effective
post-attack spent-fuel cooling will be implemented.

As for attack on reactors by large aircraft or by light aircraft
carrying explosives, I have published my judgment that
explosives carried by light aircraft can be a considerable
threat and that, too, should be taken seriously, with largely
passive close-in protection against this specific threat.12

I have visited reprocessing plants in France and in the UK, and
find them more serious potential sources of dispersed
radioactivity than is an individual reactor. Then, too, there is
opportunity for insider terrorist attack as well, a threat that
need to be addressed with imagination. 

As for the Yucca Mountain repository for commercial spent fuel,
I believe that the decision procedure has proceeded at a glacial
pace, and that engineering design of the emplacement lags far
behind what is possible. At this late date, it is still not
clear as to whether there will be backfill around the
containers, or whether there will be "drip caps",or,if drip
caps, whether they would be made of titanium alloy or (as I
advocate) the equivalent of a tile roof, with overlapping,
small, durable rock plates supported by coarse gravel. The
benefit of tile over a fabricated drip cap is that it is
redundant, and that water coming in is reliably shunted out,
without vulnerability to single-point failure.

In sum, Yucca Mountain should be completed and storage begun,
with provision for surveillance of the integrity of the entombed
waste and reemplacement if necessary.

Successful civil nuclear electricity requires acceptable levels
of cost, accident risk, proliferation hazard, and vulnerabilty
to terrorism. "Cost" includes that of raw uranium, enrichment
services, fabrication, waste disposal, and decommissioning. A
useful current study on nuclear power, its technology, impact,
and economics has recently been published by MIT.13 A 1-GWe
plant (a million kW) operating at 90% capacity factor produces
some 7.9TWh of electrical energy per year, that it can sell at
about $0.06/kWh-- a gross income of $470 M. It pays a fee of 1
mill/kWh for a decommissioning sinking fund, and another 1
mill/kWh for the U.S. government to accept and dispose of the
spent fuel-- $8 M/yr for each charge.

The fuel-cycle cost, including supply and disposal is typically
6 mill/kWh. But most of the cost of nuclear electricity is
capital cost. Quite the opposite is true for natural gas, widely
used in the United States for "peaking power," because the
capital component of cost is small compared with the cost of
fuel.

If instead of the current $30/kg for uranium in the form of
"yellow cake," the cost rose to $130/kg, this would add about
$1000 to the cost of a kilogram of reactor fuel. Since the yield
of electrical energy is about 20 megawatt days per kg, the cost
of the fuel would rise by about 2 mill/kWH, by any account
affordable, even if not competitive, at some sites, with
electricity from coal without a substantial carbon tax.

Since the "reserve" of terrestrial uranium is about 3 million
tons at current prices (and 20-200 million tons at prices up to
about $200/kg), and since each GWe reactor consumes about 200
tons of raw uranium per year (or 12,000 tons over its 60-year
life), those interested in expanding nuclear energy ought to
urge governments to support R into acquiring uranium from
seawater, where there is a total of about 4 billion tons. Japan
has a small program on seawater uranium, with costs projected
somewhere between $100 and $1000/kg. It is clearly in the public
interest to have a better understanding of the future supply.

In the meantime, with 300 1-GWe reactor equivalents operating in
the world, the cost and supply of uranium is no problem.

As for "normal accidents," it is my judgment that any of the
well-designed and widely deployed reactor systems operating in
the world is adequately safe, when properly operated. The major
assumption of proper operation is often not warranted, as is
evident from the discovery in February 2002 that the Davis-Besse
reactor (near Toledo, Ohio) had over the years developed a large
hole penetrating substantially through the forged steel pressure
vessel head, to the thin stainless-steel liner.

Terrorism is, unfortunately, a fact of modern life with the
purpose of, and the potential for, targeting entire societies.
It is no longer acceptable for the NRC to disclaim a
responsibility in this area, with the statement, "the
possibility of a terrorist attack ... is speculative and simply
too far removed from the natural or expected consequences of
agency action [ellipsis in original]".

Terrorism must be taken seriously not only for the civil nuclear
establishment but also for various other elements of civil
infrastructure. But that would take me too far afield in this
article. We can talk about the future of nuclear power on the
assumption that the NRC and other regulatory bodies worldwide
take seriously the terrorist threat and implement adequate
measures to prevent and respond to it (including capability for
near instantaneous central response).

As indicated, there is no shortage of uranium at affordable
prices, and therefore reprocessing of any type has no role in
commercial light-water reactor systems. Nor does reprocessing
substantially reduce the amount of heat in the spent fuel nor
the cost of disposal. Yucca Mountain is designed to hold only
76,000 tons of spent fuel, which would accommodate only the
output of existing reactors. Evidently a substantial expansion
of world reactor capacity would require much more in the way of
mined geologic repository capacity, which is needed in any case
for the disposition of the vitrified fission product waste from
reprocessing as practiced in France. Such repositories are
planned there, as well.

The near-term solution is to remove the restrictions on
transfer, between nations, of properly conditioned spent fuel,
either from the once-through cycle or the vitrified fission
product waste, so that one can enter an era of competitive,
commercial, mined geologic repositories. The repository and the
spent fuel forms would be approved by the IAEA, and backup to
security would need to be provided by a consortium of nations
under the authority of the United Nations.

Future reactors should be deployed underground to provide
greater protection against terrorist attack. Robust types with
enhanced protection against release of radioactive materials in
case of accident or terrorist attack include the helium-cooled
graphite reactors such as the high-temperature gas-turbine
reactor (HTGR) and the pebble-bed reactor.

I am entirely open-minded about breeder reactors, or
near-breeders coupled with accelerators, or (for the near-term)
near-breeders whose neutron economy is enriched by feeding
excess plutonium removed from nuclear weapons. Any breeders must
be designed with a compatible fuel reprocessing and fabrication
system, in which non-proliferation and robustness against
accident and terrorism are important components.

In agreement with the authors of (1), I recognize that
reprocessing is essential for such reactors, and I add that it
offers, in principle, the possibility of lower costs than that
for reprocessing of LWR fuel. This is because about 5 kg of
spent LWR fuel must be reprocessed to substitute for 1 kg of
fresh LWR fuel, whereas for a breeder, the ratio is much closer
to 1:1. And the separation of fission products need not be the
factor 107 achieved by the PUREX process, but a mere 100:1.

In conclusion, I judge that nuclear power has much to offer for
the U.S. energy future, but industry and government the world
over have much to do to protect reactors and other facilities
against accident and terrorist attack, and to provide enhanced
barriers so that nuclear power does not contribute to
proliferation of nuclear weapons.

 ----------------

1 "Purex and Pyro are Not the Same," by Hannum, W.H. Marsh,
G.E., Stanford, G.S. Physics &Society, July 2004, pp. 8-11.

2 "Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium,"
Report of the National Academy of Sciences, Committee on
International Security and Arms Control, W.K.H. Panofsky, Chair,
National Academy Press, Washington, DC, January 1994.

3 The footnote on p. 33 of (2) reads: “See W.G. Sutcliffe and
T.J. Trapp, eds., ’Extraction and Utility of Reactor-Grade
Plutonium for Weapons,’ Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory,
UCRL-LR-115542, 1994 (S/RD). For unclassified discussions, see
J. Carson Mark, (’Explosive Properties of Reactor- Grade
Plutonium,’ Science and Global Security, 4:11-128, 2003).” The
footnote continues: “The Pu-240 content even in weapons-grade
plutonium is sufficiently large that very rapid assembly is
necessary to prevent preinitiation. Hence the simplest type of
nuclear explosive, a 'gun type,' in which the optimum critical
configuration is assembled more slowly than in an ’implosion
type’ device, cannot be made with plutonium, but only with
highly enriched uranium, in which spontaneous fission is rare.
(This) makes HEU an even more attractive material than plutonium
for potential proliferators with limited access to sophisticated
technology. Either material can be used in an implosion device.”

4 "Nuclear and Biological Megaterrorism," by R.L. Garwin,
presented at 27th Session of the International Seminars on
Planetary Emergencies, Erice, Sicily, August 19-24, 2002, see 
[http://www.fas.org/RLG] (A shorter version was published in
MIT's Sept. 2002 Technology Review, titled "The Technology of
Megaterror" at 
[http://www.technologyreview.com/articles/garwin0902.asp] ) 

5 "Nuclear Wastes: Technologies for Separations and
Transmutation," Committee on Separations Technology and
Transmutation Systems (STATS), N.C. Rasmussen, Chair, National
Academy Press, Washington, DC, 1996. (
[http://books.nap.edu/catalog/4912.html] ) 

6 "Megawatts and Megatons: The Future of Nuclear Power and
Nuclear Weapons," by R.L. Garwin and G. Charpak, The University
of Chicago Press, January 2003. (Note errata at 
[http://www.fas.org/RLG] ) 

7 "Nuclear Energy: Principles, Practices, and Prospects," Second
Edition, by David Bodansky (Springer-Verlag; November 30, 2004). 

8 Edward Teller, "Fast Reactors: Maybe." Nuclear News (August
21, 1967). 

9 "Science, Technology, Fission, and the Future," by R.L.
Garwin, Keynote Speech presented at the American Nuclear Society
Banquet, November 19, 2002. 10 "Making the Nation Safer: The
Role of Science and Technology in Countering Terrorism," by L.M.
Branscomb (Co-chair) and R.D. Klausner (Co-chair), et al,
National Research Council of the National Academies, National
Academies Press, Washington, DC, 2002. 

11 "Reducing the Hazards from Stored Spent Power-Reactor Fuel in
the United States," by R. Alvarez, et al, April 21, 2003
(Published in Science and Global Security, 11:1-51,2003. See
also NRC response in ibid, 11:203-211, 2003, and reply by R.
Alvarez, et al, in ibid, 11:213-223,2003. 

12 "Science,Technology, Fission, and the Future," by R.L.
Garwin, Keynote Speech presented at the American Nuclear Society
Banquet, November 19, 2002. 13 "The Future of Nuclear Power," J.
Deutch and E.J. Moniz, Co-chairs, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, 2003.  [http://web.mit.edu/nuclearpower/] 
Richard L. Garwin is IBM Fellow Emeritus at the IBM Thomas J.
Watson Research Center, Yorktown Heights, NY. He is a physicist,
member of the National Academy of Sciences, National Academy of
Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine. Since 1950 he has
consulted with the Los Alamos National Laboratory on nuclear
weapons technology and testing. He contributed to the early
thermonuclear weapon design and has received from the US
Government the Enrico Fermi Award, the National Medal of
Science, and the R.V. Jones Foreign Intelligence Award. His
biography and many papers are at  [http://www.fas.org/RLG] .
 Response to Garwin’s Paper 
In his paper Another View of the Role of Nuclear Power, Dr.
Garwin comments on the potential use of reactor-grade plutonium
(R-G Pu) for nuclear explosives. We agree, of course, that one
should keep in mind potential misuse of materials associated
with nuclear power as well as with nuclear weapons. His remarks
underscore the thrust of our previous paper, PUREX and PYRO Are
Not the Same: if a technology can reduce the threat of nuclear
terrorism or improve our energy posture or environment without
increasing the threat of nuclear terrorism or nuclear- weapons
proliferation, it should be pursued as a matter of urgent
priority. Pyrometallurgical recycling can reduce the threat of
nuclear terrorism, improve our energy posture, and address
constructively the issue of nuclear waste.
“My own judgment,” Dr. Garwin states, “is that fast reactors
have a great deal to offer in the long-term future. But we will
get there only with rigor in the development and evaluation of
reactor technology, cost, and safety—and only if
nonproliferation requirements are part of the design for any
future reactor.” We concur. Dr. Garwin recognizes that the
material from pyro recycle is a far greater challenge to a
would-be bomb maker than what we now think of as R-G Pu, and
that is important. Only very innovative people with extensive
weapons-design experience would have a chance of effectively
using this highly complex material. 
And we fully agree that international safeguards of nuclear
operations are essential, to prevent the “[conversion of] those
materials and facilities for enrichment or reprocessing to the
production of weapons.” The fast-reactor fuel cycle, however,
requires neither enrichment nor pure plutonium—so development of
either process would be ipso facto evidence of intention to
proliferate.  
In discussing the relative economics of the pyro cycle, Dr.
Garwin quotes the “authoritative” STATS report—whose pessimistic
economic projections are based on obsolete data (see the
detailed critique by Boardman et al1). We also note that
Garwin’s discussion of the cost of nuclear power barely
acknowledges the “externalities” associated with other forms of
energy—hidden subsidies like the health effects of burning coal,
or the impact on home heating costs when natural gas is used to
produce electricity. Inclusion of those costs would make nuclear
power look very good indeed.
Dr. Garwin notes that spent fuel is not likely to be the
material of choice for a dirty bomb. This may or may not be the
case, but he later expresses concern over the possible
vulnerability of spent-fuel pools. Some would consider an attack
on a spent-fuel pool as a form of a “dirty bomb.”
Missing from his comments is a sense of urgency. The nation
needs to deal more effectively with the surfeit of
weapons-usable materials and the accumulating spent fuel, while
using nuclear power to help meet growing world-wide energy
demands. An aggressive program to complete the demonstration of
pyrometallurgical recycle technologies, including safeguards,
offers the potential to move forward on all these issues. Doing
nothing is not acceptable.
William H. Hannum has been a senior official with the Department
of Energy; Gerald E. Marsh, retired from Argonne National
Laboratory, is a physicist who served with the U.S. START
delegation and was a consultant to the Office of the Chief of
Naval Operations on strategic nuclear policy and technology for
many years; George S. Stanford is a nuclear reactor physicist,
now retired from Argonne National Laboratory after a career of
experimental work pertaining to power-reactor safety.
1. Boardman, C. E., C. E. Walter, M.L. Thompson, and C. S.
Ehrman, “The Separations Technology and Transmutation Systems
(STATS) Report: Implications for Nuclear Power Growth and Energy
Sufficiency.” On the Internet at
<http://www.nationalcenter.org/NPA396.html>. 
 Richard Garwin again: 
I noted that the authors erred in their statements that weapons
made from reactor-grade Pu (or, for that matter, from
pyro-processed Pu) would have yields that were highly
unpredictable and that a fizzle would produce "no mushroom cloud
at all." In contrast, if such a weapon were detonated, it would
produce a yield of at least one kiloton and in an urban
environment immediately kill no fewer than 100,000 people. I
judge that the authors now agree, since they took no issue with
this point.
Similarly, I judge that the authors now apparently understand
and agree that the highly enhanced neutron emission from normal
pyro-processed Pu would not further reduce the yield of an
implosion weapon below that from R-G Pu. It is false comfort to
assume that weapon-design experience is helpful in this regard.
The authors have not replied to my question as to what it would
take to reconfigure the pyroprocess line "to separate purer Pu,
thus reducing the (heat)challenge to building a nuclear weapon
from the Pu in process or in storage." Why not?
To classify an attack on a spent-fuel pool or nuclear reactor
"as a form of a dirty bomb," confuses the situation and diverts
attention from something that sorely needs to be addressed-- the
reduction of hazard from (portable) radiological dispersal
devices that might be explosive in nature but that might equally
well simply be nebulizers or other means of dispersing
radioactive materials.
I am not negative on the cost of pyro processing in the fuel
cycle of a fast reactor itself that can itself be shown to be
both safe and economical. I do believe that reprocessing of the
spent fuel that already exists from lightwater reactors would
add significantly to the cost of disposal. The authors counter
with an approving reference to a February 2002 paper by C.E.
Boardman, et al, which criticizes the STATS report estimate of
reprocessing cost; Boardman, et al, argue that the lessons
learned from development of three plants (the Japanese plant at
Rokkasho-Mura being the latest) "would result in significantly
lower unit reprocessing costs." But STATS in 1996 assumed for
Rokkasho a range from $5.2 to $6.2 billion, and the 2004
official Japanese estimate is now 2.2 trillion yen or $20.5
billion. It is difficult to project a cost lower than the
estimate based on $6 billion capital cost if the plant will now
cost more than $20 billion for the same throughput.
I urge the reader to read the STATS report on the web (and to
search it with the search engine provided there by the National
Academies Press) and to access also the February 2002 Boardman
reference. The urgency is to get the facts straight and to do
the analyses that can be done with existing data, and then to do
the needed experimental work on pyroprocessing and reactor
design (not construction) until we find an approach that can
lead to competitive energy supply, with consistent attention to
all required costs and benefits.
  Oil, CO2, and the Potential of Nuclear Energy

 Robert W. Albrecht and David Bodansky

1. The relevance of nuclear power

          Hannan, Marsh, and Stanford (HMS) argued in the July
2004 issue of this newsletter for using nuclear energy in a fuel
cycle based upon fast reactors and pyroprocessing.[1] We
elaborate here on the potential of nuclear energy to address our
key energy problems in a sustainable fashion.[2]

          The first of these problems is dependence on oil.
Despite talk of conservation and “energy independence,” U.S. oil
consumption has risen from 17.3 mbd (millions of barrels per
day) in 1973 to 20.0 mbd for 2003 and net petroleum imports rose
from 35% of consumption to 56%, for a cost in 2003 of $122
billion.[3] Without dramatic change, the situation will continue
to worsen. World dependence on oil from limited
areas---primarily the Persian Gulf region---is particularly
dangerous because it spawns conflict and transfers wealth to
politically problematic oil producers. 

          A major challenge is to develop alternatives to oil,
which is uniquely easy to store, transport and use in
transportation. A second major challenge is to restrain
emissions into the atmosphere of CO2 and pollutants. Here, the
easiest target is coal-fired electricity generation, which is
the source of about one-third of U.S. CO2 emissions. A harder
target is oil in transportation----the source of another third
of CO2 emissions. While many other approaches can and
undoubtedly will contribute to addressing these global
challenges, the focus of this article is on the contribution
that nuclear fission power could make in the United States. 

          The most straightforward contribution is in
electricity generation. Nuclear power, with 104 reactors and a
capacity of 99 gigawatts-electric (GWe), now provides about 20%
of U.S. electricity. Coal-fired generation provides about 50%.
It could be replaced by the addition of 250 GWe of nuclear
capacity.[4] 

          Replacing oil addresses both the oil consumption and
CO2 problems. The share of petroleum used in the various sectors
in 2003 was: electricity--3%, residential &commercial--6%,
industrial--25%, and transportation---66%. By ill chance, the
replacement difficulty rises as the sector share rises.[5]
Possible ways for nuclear power to substitute for oil in
transportation include: powering electrified mass transit,
freeing natural gas for use in vehicles,[6]  powering electric
or hybrid vehicles, and providing energy to produce hydrogen[7]
or hydrocarbons (e.g., methanol)[8] for use as a vehicular fuel. 

          None of these possibilities is likely to make an
immediate major contribution and most require significant
modifications to vehicles and their supporting infrastructure.
For the next decade or two the most effective approach to
reducing oil consumption is to switch to fuel-efficient
“conventional” vehicles including hybrid vehicles. Over longer
times, the cumulative impact of the above-cited substitutions
could be great. Consider the eventual replacement of 10 mbd of
oil.[9] This might be accomplished with an additional generation
capacity in the neighborhood of 230 GWe.[10]  

          Together, coal and oil replacements yield a ballpark
figure of 500 GWe for the scale of a major “meaningful”
expansion of U.S non-fossil-fuel generating capacity (ignoring
the growth in electricity demand that is likely to occur aside
from these initiatives). The practicality of nuclear power
providing the major share of such an expansion, over perhaps 50
years, will be considered in Section 4. 

2. Weapons proliferation and terrorism 

          Arguments against nuclear power have traditionally
emphasized four issues: safety, waste disposal, economics, and
weapons proliferation. A quarter century of accident free
operation of nuclear plants outside the USSR has mitigated
safety concerns, and “precursor” analyses of reactor operations
have confirmed dramatic safety improvements.[11] Technically
sound solutions exist for the disposal of today’s wastes, and
planned sustainable fuel cycles could hold down future waste
volumes. The economics of nuclear power are improving, given
projected reactor construction economies, increasing oil and
natural gas costs, and a growing awareness of the external costs
of fossil fuel use. These three issues are no longer Achilles’
heels. We concentrate here on the most serious of the concerns:
proliferation, including terrorism. 

          Historically, civilian nuclear power has played almost
no role in the development of nuclear weapons.[12] Nonetheless,
it can contribute to a weapons program by creating a cadre with
relevant training and providing a cover for obtaining equipment,
including uranium enrichment or fuel reprocessing facilities.
The most sensitive material for weapons proliferation is highly
enriched uranium (HEU). Civilian nuclear power plants do not use
HEU, but HEU might be obtained by proliferators from cascades of
centrifuges or by diversion from stockpiles in weapon states.
Especially with the threat of bomb development by terrorists or
sub-national groups, safeguarding HEU is the highest priority
anti-proliferation task (other than the protection of bombs from
nuclear stockpiles).[13]

A great deal of attention has been given to the possibility that
plutonium from civilian reactors might be stolen or diverted for
bomb production. In the U.S. once-through fuel cycle, the
intense radioactivity of the fission products in the spent fuel
and the containment of the fuel pellets in discrete fuel rods
make diversion and subsequent plutonium extraction impossible
without elaborate equipment beyond the plausible range of a
terrorist group. With reprocessing, the separated plutonium
loses this protection.   However, this “reactor grade” plutonium
contains significant quantities of 240Pu and 242Pu and, as
discussed in HSM, is a very difficult material to use for bomb
manufacture with any reprocessing method.   With pyroprocessing,
bomb manufacture is even more difficult.[14] Further, in the
fuel cycle contemplated for use with the fast reactors discussed
below, the pyroprocessing plants and the reactors are parts of
integrated facilities, or nuclear parks, with reactors and fuel
processing co-located. With little or no material crossing the
boundaries, nuclear parks greatly reduce accessibility to
sensitive material. Nonetheless, a diversion might be
accomplished by a rogue element in the nuclear establishment or
by a government that suddenly decides to obtain weapons. Such
possibilities, and the fear that we would be setting a bad
example, contributed to the abandonment of the U.S. reprocessing
and breeder reactor programs.[15] 

          With or without reprocessing, HEU remains the dominant
proliferation route. It is likely to be easier to obtain uranium
and enrichment equipment than to obtain useful plutonium.
Further, a uranium bomb is by far the easier to build. Thus,
uranium is most likely the material of choice for a nuclear
terrorist and it is becoming a favored choice in the national
programs of “aspiring” countries.[16] For terrorist groups, the
greatest danger is that they will obtain a finished bomb by
theft in a country with poor security or by gift (or purchase)
from a terror-friendly country. Next best for them would be to
obtain HEU and use it to construct a weapon. More difficult
would be to use enrichment equipment to produce their own HEU. 

          With many paths to nuclear proliferation, no
restraints on nuclear power in “peaceful” countries can prevent
weapons development elsewhere. A more promising approach,
admittedly with no assurance of success, is a rigorous
international framework of material controls and inspections,
presumably spearheaded by an invigorated IAEA. Substantial
nuclear power programs of their own might better enable the
“peaceful” countries to assist the IAEA in establishing strong
and comprehensive anti-proliferation programs as well as give
them greater ability to supplement the IAEA’s efforts with their
own economic carrots and sticks. 

3. Future reactors

          Today’s 104 U.S. light water reactors (LWRs) were all
ordered by 1973.[17] Reactor performance has improved
dramatically in recent years, with the average capacity factor
increasing from 62% in 1989 to 88% in 2003. The NRC has approved
20-year license extensions (from 40 years to 60 years) for 26
units and many more extensions are expected. The reactors all
use a once-through fuel cycle, where spent fuel is not
reprocessed and the “waste” consists of intact fuel assemblies. 
   

          The U.S. DOE undertook new nuclear initiatives in the
late 1990s with two main components: (a) a near-term program
with the goal of deploying a new reactor by 2010 and (b) a
longer term program, the Generation IV (GEN-IV) program for
nuclear units that were originally targeted to come on-line in
about 2025.[18] 

          The ABWR (advanced boiling water reactor) is the only
advanced reactor now on the U.S. market that has received a
standard design certification from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission.[19] Several are operating in Japan and others are
being built in Japan and Taiwan. It is an example of an
“evolutionary” BWR. An evolutionary PWR has been ordered by
Finland.[20] These reactors are similar in concept to existing
LWRs. They are large, about 1300-MWe to 1600-MWe, benefiting
from economies of scale.  

          Another option is offered by so-called “innovative”
reactors, which depart from the evolutionary reactors by
incorporating greater design changes and more explicit reliance
on passive features to provide for safety against reactor
accidents. Often, but not always, they are smaller. Altogether,
in addition to the ABWR, the NRC is considering seven power
plant designs that have been proposed by manufacturers in this
country and abroad.[21] 

          In the GEN-IV plan, the main thrust for the decade
2004-2013 is the Next Generation Nuclear Plant (NGNP), presently
planned to be the Very High Temperature Reactor (VHTR), with a
target deployment date of 2016. This is a small gas-cooled
reactor prototype designed to reach the high temperatures
required for efficient hydrogen production. It operates with a
once-through fuel cycle and thus does not itself meet the
sustainability goals of the GEN-IV program. The GEN-IV plan
includes two other thermal spectrum reactors[22] and three
fast-spectrum reactors.         

          Each of the three fast-reactor systems is capable, in
principle, of meeting the sustainability and anti-proliferation
goals that are key stated features of the GEN-IV program.
Sustainability looks to the very long-term and requires
effective utilization of fissile fuel resources and the
reduction of “the long-term stewardship burden” of nuclear waste
handling. The anti-proliferation goal seeks to make the nuclear
materials used or produced in nuclear power operations
“unattractive” and inaccessible for use in weapons.

        The fast reactor systems are defined by their primary
coolants: helium in the gas-cooled fast reactor (GFR), sodium in
the sodium-cooled fast reactor (SFR), and lead or lead bismuth
eutectic in the lead-cooled fast reactor (LFR). The projected
sizes range from 10 MWe to 1700 MWe. For example, the LFR, in
factory-made units for small markets, may generate as little as
10 MWe although a full sized plant with an output greater than
1000 MWe is feasible. The SFR may generate as much as 1700 MWe.
The GFR and the LFR have the capability of reaching maximum
coolant temperatures of 800 to 850 0C and could be used for
thermochemical hydrogen production.[23] One of the major
development challenges is to design and test fuel that is
tailored to each reactor type, especially as the fast neutron
energy spectra are different in the different reactors.[24]

            All three reactor types are breeder designs. This
means that after a few fueling generations the only new fuel
introduced to the system is depleted or natural uranium.    

4. Achievability and sustainability

          There is no clear indication that a new U.S. nuclear
power plant will be ordered in the near future, and the DOE’s
near-term deployment target of 2010 almost surely will be
missed.  One possible incentive for a utility order would be the
extension to nuclear energy of the 1.8 cents/kWh production tax
credit that is now given to forms of renewable energy.

          For a sustainable long-term program an eventual switch
to GEN-IV fast reactors will be needed.   The FY04 budget for
the GEN-IV program was only $27.7 million. The lion’s share was
for the NGNP (i.e., the VHTR), with only $1.4 million for the
three fast reactors together. Even assuming contributions from
other countries, this is an astonishingly trivial effort to
devote toward research whose purpose is to address critical
national needs. (It is less than the annual gross revenue intake
of a single well-performing McDonald’s franchise.[25]) Given a
more substantial budget the DOE schedule can be accelerated. If
it is not, then there will be no substantial contribution from
fast reactors before mid-century (considering the time delay
between prototype completion and large-scale construction). An
accelerated development schedule would help to reduce waste
problems, conserve uranium, and increase our flexibility to make
corrections as the need is seen.  

            We already hypothesized a 500-GWe target for
additional U.S. generating capacity. If a nuclear expansion of
this magnitude proceeded from 2015 to 2055, on average the
equivalent of about 15 1000-MWe reactors would have to be added
annually (allowing 100-GWe for replacement of existing
reactors). The history of U.S. reactor orders in the 1966-1974
period---in the heyday of nuclear optimism---and even more the
example of the buildup in France, suggests that this rate is
achievable.[26] 

          There are probably at least 20 million tonnes of
uranium available at a cost of under $260 per kg of uranium.[27]
This would be adequate for about 100,000 GWyr of reactor
operation at present rates of uranium utilization. Worldwide,
this would suffice for 60 years of operation of 1700 1000-MWe
reactors at present rates, and close to 3000 reactors with
reprocessing of spent fuel.[28] The supply of fissile material
could be augmented by going to more expensive terrestrial ores,
by using thorium in a 232Th-233U fuel cycle, and perhaps by
drawing upon the 4 billion tonnes of uranium in the oceans.
Thus, there is no immediate resource problem. For the further
future, the fissile resources would become quasi-infinite in a
breeder reactor fuel cycle, because one then obtains about 100
times the energy per tonne of uranium and more dilute and much
more plentiful ores become affordable.[29] 

          The Yucca Mountain repository is designed to receive
63,000 tonnes of commercial spent fuel, equivalent to the output
from 2100 GWyr of operation.   For a U.S. total of 600 reactors,
a new “Yucca Mountain” could be needed every four years. This is
extremely unlikely to happen. Alternatives, such as deep
borehole disposal[30] could help substantially, but, as stressed
by HSM, a fast reactor fuel cycle with pyroprocessing provides a
more fundamental long-term solution. In pyroprocessing, the
spent fuel is reduced to a melt and an electrochemical
separation is made between the fission products and the heavy
metals. Fission products are waste, but their mass is small.[31]
The heavy metals, which contain most of the long-lived
activities, are returned to a fast reactor, to be consumed in
fission. 

          The large-scale utilization of nuclear fission power
(or “clean” alternatives) could help achieve important goals,
including the reduction of oil imports, the conservation of oil
and natural gas for “higher” applications, the reduction of
emissions of CO2 and other pollutants, the production of
hydrogen, and the desalination of ocean water.[32] It would
probably take in the neighborhood of 50 years to develop the new
electrical generating capacity and to implement the needed
changes in the transportation systems and building
characteristics. However, acceptance of gradual progress fits in
with the building of near-term reactors now, while laying the
foundation for building Generation IV reactors later as they are
developed and qualified for commercial deployment.

          The long-term potential of electrification should not
blind us to the more immediate potential of less ambitious
approaches, such as the improvement of the efficiency of
gasoline-powered cars. Further, other energy sources, including
solar, wind, “clean” coal, and fusion power might in principle
provide the electricity. However, there is little present danger
that these other options will be forgotten. The greater danger
is that the opportunities offered by nuclear energy will be
inadequately exploited.
Robert W. Albrecht
Department of Electrical Engineering 
 [bob@ee.washington.edu] 
David Bodansky
Department of Physics
 [bodansky@phys.washington.edu] 

Robert W. Albrecht is Professor Emeritus of both Electrical
Engineering and Nuclear Engineering at the University of
Washington. He has been at the University of Washington since
1961. He is a fellow of the American Nuclear Society. He has
published many papers on nuclear reactor dynamics and served as
a consultant to laboratories in the US, Germany,  France,
Brazil, and Japan.

David Bodansky is Professor Emeritus of Physics at the
University of Washington. He has been with the Physics
Department since 1954, serving as Chairman from 1976 to 1984. He
was a member of the APS Panel on Public Affairs during 1985-87
and 1992-96 and was POPA Chair in 1995. He is the author of
Nuclear Energy: Principles, Practices, and Prospects (2nd
edition: Springer-Verlag/AIP Press, 2004).



-----------------------------------------------------------------


   [1] William H. Hannum, Gerald E. Marsh, George S. Stanford,
“PUREX and PYRO Are Not The Same,” Physics and Society, 32, no.
3, July 2004: 8-11.

   [2] In our discussion here we focus on the U.S. situation. Of
course, the problems are global but the problems and approaches
discussed here are applicable, at least in part, to many other
countries---especially the OECD countries. 

   [3] U.S. Department of Energy, Annual Energy Review 2003,
Energy Information Administration Report DOE/EIA-0384(2003),
September 2004.  [AER03]

   [4] Coal-fired electricity generation in 2003 was 224
gigawatt-years (GWyr). At a 90% capacity factor this electrical
output could be provided with a capacity of 249 GWe. [AER03, op.
cit., Table 8.2a.] We here ignore the increased electricity use
with time, although we recognize that the effects of economic
and population growth and technological changes are likely to
outstrip the reductions achieved from higher efficiency.

   [5]  In some cases, the replacement of oil could be
facilitated by a switch in which nuclear power replaces some of
the natural gas used in electricity generation, and the freed
natural gas substitutes for oil in other sectors.

   [6] The natural gas could be used directly as compressed
natural gas (or liquefied natural gas) or it could be used to
produce methanol which can substitute for gasoline.  

   [7] Hydrogen, now used extensively in the chemical industry,
is most economically produced by the steam reforming of natural
gas, resulting in both natural gas consumption and CO2
production. It can also be produced by electrolysis of water,
using nuclear power or any other electricity source. A more
efficient production approach with nuclear energy is to use a
thermochemical cycle at very high temperatures (above 800  °C).
A study prepared for the Panel on Public Affairs of the American
Physical Society suggested that a hydrogen fuel cell automobile
could have an energy efficiency equivalent to a gasoline mileage
of 82 mpg, compared to an average of 22 mpg in conventional
automobiles [Craig Davis, Bill Edelstein, Bill Evenson, Aviva
Brecher, and Dan Cox, “Hydrogen Fuel Cell Vehicles” (June 2003);
at 
[http://www.aps.org/public_affairs/popa/reports/fuelcell.pdf] ].
At the gasoline heat content of 5.21 million BTU (5.50 x 109 J)
per barrel [AER03, op. cit., Table A3], 1 mbd corresponds to an
annual energy of 2.0 EJ, and motor gasoline consumption at the
2003 rate of 8.9 mbd therefore corresponds to an annual energy
of about 18 EJ. Hydrogen, in the above model, would be used at
an energy rate that is only about 27% (i.e. 22/82) as great. If
the hydrogen is produced by electrolysis with a 75% efficiency
for conversion from electrical energy, the total electrical
energy requirement would be about 18 x 0.27 *1.33 = 6.5 EJ, or
slightly over 200 GWyr. (For electricity generated with a 33%
thermal efficiency, the primary energy input is about 19.5
EJ---quite close to the 18 EJ of gasoline that is being
replaced.)  

   [8] In an intriguing if still highly speculative scheme,
methanol (CH3OH) would be produced using CO2 extracted from the
air as the carbon feedstock. Thus, there would be no net CO2
production and the only important inputs and outputs would be
uranium and methanol. The latter is an attractive automotive
fuel, unlike hydrogen. 

   [9] This is a somewhat arbitrary target, lying between the
2003 rate for consumption of motor gasoline (8.8 mbd) and the
2003 net petroleum imports (i.e., petroleum products and crude
oil) (11.2 mbd). 

  [10] As in Note 7, 1 mbd of motor gasoline corresponds to an
annual energy of 2.0 EJ. Without knowing the specific
“substitution” method, one cannot calculate the electrical
energy required.  As a rough guide, we assume that the primary
energy required for electricity generation is about the same as
the energy of the oil replaced---in this case 20 EJ for 10 mbd.
(It was seen in Note 2 that this energy equivalence holds
reasonably well for hydrogen production by electrolysis, with
the hydrogen used in energy-efficient cars.)  At a 33% thermal
efficiency, 20 EJ of primary energy corresponds to an annual
generation of about 210 GWyr and to an additional nuclear
capacity of roughly 230 GWe at a 90% capacity factor.    

  [11]A “precursor” in this usage is a reactor mishap which, if
followed by other possible mishaps, could lead to reactor core
damage. Nuclear Regulatory Commission analyses find that the
average value of the calculated annual “accident sequence
precursor” index has improved (was reduced) by more than a
factor of 100 since the Three Mile Island accident in 1979, as
seen by comparing averages for the pre-TMI (1969-1978) and
post-TMI periods (1993-2000).

  [12] The original weapons states (China, France, the USSR, the
United Kingdom, and the United States) all had nuclear weapons
before they had civilian nuclear power. For the countries that
developed weapons more recently, India may have drawn to some
extent on civilian power facilities, Israel has no nuclear
power, and Pakistan relied on uranium enrichment in facilities
that had nothing to do with the civilian program. Among weapons
aspirants, Iraq and Libya have had no civilian power and North
Korea obtained its plutonium from special purpose “research”
reactors. Iran may prove to be an exception by coordinating a
civilian power program with possible weapons aspirations.

 [13] The importance of terrorist dangers from uranium is
reflected in a paper put out under the auspices of the Weapons
of Mass Destruction Commission, an international commission
initiated by the Swedish Government and chaired by Hans Blix
[Charles D. Ferguson and William C. Potter, Improvised Nuclear
Devices and Nuclear Terrorism; at 
[http://www.wmdcommission.org] ].

  [14] The difficulty with reactor grade plutonium arises from
the spontaneous neutrons emitted from 240P and other Pu
isotopes. It is generally accepted that a highly expert group
could make a bomb with reactor-grade plutonium, albeit one that
“fizzles”. The rationale for this conclusion is discussed at
length by Carson Mark [Science and Global Security, vol. 4, no.
1 (1993): 111-124]. The reactor-grade plutonium is assumed to
have 1.3 % 238Pu, 24% 240Pu, and 5% 242Pu, along with 60% 239Pu
and 9% 241Pu. In a companion paper, Frank von Hippel and Edwin
Lyman estimate the probable yield from such a bomb to be of the
order of 1 kiloton [Science and Global Security, vol. 4, no. 1
(1993): 125-12]. The difficulty of building such a bomb and the
skill level required appears to be somewhat controversial. Thus,
HMS appear to believe that the difficulty is greater than
suggested by Mark. In any case, the material from pyroprocessing
contains other actinides beside uranium and plutonium (Np, Am,
and Cm). If these “minor actinides” are not removed from the
plutonium no bomb can be produced. Removing them would add to
the difficulties, most likely putting the task still further
beyond the capabilities of a terrorist group.  

  [15] In the earliest days of nuclear power, it was recognized
that to use uranium and thorium resources fully it is necessary
to breed the fertile material (238U and 232Th) into fissile
material (239Pu and 233U). Uranium and thorium were believed to
be relatively rare. So, the very first nuclear reactor to
generate electricity was a fast experimental breeder reactor
(EBR-I), early experiments were conducted using heavy metals for
the coolant (mercury), and one of the earliest reactors built by
a utility (Fermi reactor built by Detroit Edison) was a fast
breeder reactor. The first two naval reactors were the Nautilus
(a PWR) and the Seawolf (a sodium-cooled reactor). LWRs became
the norm after the Nautilus proved to be superior to the
Seawolf. Nuclear optimism unleashed a swarm of explorers who
found unexpectedly large deposits of uranium and thorium. Thus,
the urgency to breed was tempered. The U.S. nevertheless went
ahead with EBR-II. The commercialization of the breeder reactor
was slated to begin with the Clinch River Breeder Reactor
(CRBR). To support CRBR development, the Fast Flux Test Facility
was constructed and operated. All of these breeder reactors were
sodium cooled. A fuel blockage accident in the Fermi reactor
dampened enthusiasm for fast breeder reactors. Then, the fear of
proliferation together with an apparent abundance of uranium
caused the US to adopt the once-through fuel cycle in the 1970s,
and the once-through fuel cycle became the favored approach of
many energy policy makers. Although U.S. officials hoped that
other countries would follow its lead, this has not occurred.
The commitment to the once-through fuel cycle and the
abandonment of breeding and reprocessing eventually caused the
cancellation of the CRBR and, later, the termination of the
Integrated Fast Reactor and Fast Flux Test Facility development
programs. However, the once-through fuel cycle uses uranium
resources inefficiently and creates a need for large waste
repositories like Yucca Mountain, limiting our ability to
sustain a large long-term nuclear program. 

  [16] Of the eight countries known to have nuclear weapons,
Pakistan used only uranium, China started with uranium, and the
United States used uranium and plutonium almost simultaneously.
The remaining countries (France, the UK, the USSR, India and
Israel) all used plutonium initially. The three countries that
abandoned their weapon programs, before or after building bombs
(South Africa, Argentina, and Brazil), all depended on uranium
as did the fledgling Libyan program. North Korea started its
proliferation efforts with plutonium but may be attempting to
enrich uranium. Iran is suspected of following both routes. Iraq
appeared to have a plutonium program initially, but this was
terminated by an Israeli bombing raid in 1981 and a subsequent
uranium program was terminated in 1991 in the aftermath of the
Gulf War. 

  [17]Between 1953 and 1978, US utilities ordered 259 nuclear
power reactors. Between 1972 and 1995, 127 orders were cancelled
or construction was halted. Between 1964 and 1998, 28 reactors
were shut down. No new orders have been placed in the US since
1978, and the orders placed in the 1974-1978 period have all
been cancelled. 

  [18] The GEN-IV program has since been broadened into the
Generation IV International Forum to include R contributions
from many other countries. It focuses on six reactor types,
including three fast reactors. For descriptions of this program
see: A Technology Roadmap for Generation IV Nuclear Energy
Systems, Report GIF-002-00 (December 2002) [at 
[http://gif.inel.gov/roadmap] ] and Generation IV Nuclear Energy
Systems, Ten Year Program Plan, Fiscal Year 2004  (DOE, February
27, 2004) [at 
[http://neri.inel.gov/program_plans/pdfs/gen_iv_program_plan.pdf]
 ].

  [19] The NRC has also certified the System 80+ and AP600
reactors, but the System 80+ is no longer being marketed in the
United States and the AP600 is being supplanted by the AP1000 in
the marketing by its manufacturer, Westinghouse. 

  [20] Finland has ordered a 1600-MWe version of the European
Pressurized Water Reactor (EPR). The EPR has been developed in a
long-standing French-German collaboration. More recently, the
French utility, Electricité de France has announced plans to
order an EPR that is to be built at Flaminville (Normandy) at
the location of existing nuclear plants.

  [21] The candidates for near-term deployment in the United
States include: 

          1. The ABWR, as discussed in text. 

          2. The Westinghouse “advanced passive” AP1000. It is
the design successor to the AP600 which received NRC standard
design certification in 1999 but is being supplanted in
Westinghouse’s marketing efforts because economies of size make
the AP1000 (about 1000 MWe) a more economical reactor than the
AP600 (about 600 MWe). These reactors are PWRs that rely heavily
on passive safety features---especially for emergency cooling in
case of an accident---and are built with far fewer requirements
for materials (pumps, valves, piping, electrical cabling) than
previous PWRs. The AP1000’s application for design certification
is now progressing through the NRC review process. 

          3. Six reactors that are now involved in
“pre-application” discussions with the NRC, prior to formal
application for design certification. These are the so-called
ESBWR, ACR-700, GT-MHR, SWR 1000, IRIS, and PBMR. 

          4. The EPR developed in Europe. Although it is not now
under NRC review and it may be difficult at the moment to get
U.S. acceptance of a French-German design, it may soon have the
advantage of having been built and demonstrated in Finland and
probably in France.

  [22] These are the Supercritical Water-Cooled Reactor (SCWR)
and the Molten Salt Reactor.

  [23] The stated “primary mission” of the SFR is “the
management of high level-wastes, and in particular, management
of plutonium and other actinides” [DOE, Feb. 2004, op. cit., p.
43]. The reason for this primary mission is that the SFR will
not be able to reach the high coolant temperatures required for
thermochemical hydrogen production. It has a fast enough
spectrum to be capable of burning actinides, although its
spectrum is softer than the spectra of the GFR and LFR and
therefore has the least favorable breeding ratio of the trio. Of
course, the SFR can generate electricity.

  [24] Because fuel properties over long exposures to neutrons
change as the fuel burns, it is mandatory that very detailed
irradiation studies of fuel elements be carried out before the
deployment of any new reactor type that has a neutron energy
spectrum that is substantially different from earlier
experience. This testing must be carried out with a neutron flux
that has an energy spectrum (after degradation by scattering)
characteristic of the reactor type being considered. The spatial
profile of the fission rate in the fuel---and, equivalently, the
power generation distribution---depends upon the neutron
spectrum and the geometry of the core, including the fuel rod
diameter. The spectrum is different for different coolants and
the associated differences in fuel element design and core
geometry. The tests are important to evaluating the ability of
the fuel to stand up under high burnup (i.e., high energy output
per unit mass) and to evaluating the negative feedbacks that
should come into play in case of reactor transients.

  [25] See, e.g., McDonald’s Franchise Equity Bulletin (November
20, 2003). Typical sales are $1.6 million per store. (High
performers may double this average.)

  [26] Nuclear capacity in France increased from 2.9 GWe in 1975
to 55.9 GWe in 1990, corresponding to an average annual capacity
increase of 3.5 GWe per year. France in 1973 (before any of the
reactors that are still operating had been completed) had a
population less than 1/5 of the U.S. population in 2002, a GDP
about 1/10 of the 2002 U.S. GDP (in constant dollars), and (as a
rough surrogate measure of industrial potential) an electricity
output less than 1/20 of the U.S. 2002 output [Energy Balances
of OECD Countries, 2001-2002 (OECD, 2004)]. Thus an increase of
15 GWe per year is a comparatively modest goal for the United
States, for reactor deployment that does not start until about
2015.  

  [27] There have been no pressures on uranium supplies to date,
and therefore little incentive to develop comprehensive surveys
of world uranium resources over the full range of potentially
affordable prices. Therefore, any number such as 20,000,000
tonnes is very imprecise and useful only for approximate
orientation A price of $260 per kg of uranium corresponds to an
electricity cost of 0.6 cents/kWh for a standard LWR in a
once-through fuel cycle).

  [28] An MIT study describes a “balanced” reprocessing
(non-breeding) fuel cycle that uses 166,460 tonnes of U per year
to support a 1500-GWe fleet operating at a 90% capacity factor.
This is equivalent to 10,000,000 tonnes for a 60-year lifetime
for these reactors. [The Future of Nuclear Power, An
Interdisciplinary MIT Study, John Deutch and Ernest J. Moniz,
co-chairs (MIT, 2003); at: 
[http://web.mit.edu/nuclearpower/pdf/nuclearpower-full.pdf] ]

  [29] With breeders, the energy derived per kg of uranium is
increased by roughly a factor of 100. In addition, with this
efficient use of uranium, both seawater and low-grade
terrestrial sources become affordable, making it possible to
generate essentially unlimited amounts of electricity for tens
of thousands of years.  For example, extraction of 10% of the
uranium from the oceans would increase the uranium resource by a
factor of 20, and the energy resource with breeders by a factor
of 2000. At present uranium use rates, this would allow for 2 x
108 GWyr, equivalent to an annual output of 10,000 GWyr (30
times the present world rate) for 20,000 years. A still larger
increase would be available by going to ores with a lower
concentration of uranium. An analysis by Deffeyes and MacGregor
concludes that there is “a 300-fold increase in the estimated
amount of recoverable uranium for every tenfold decrease in the
ore grade ” [Kenneth S. Deffeyes and Ian D. MacGregor “World
Uranium Resources,” Scientific American 242, no. 1, January
1980: 66-76.]  Thus, with ore that is 10 times as dilute in
uranium the energy resource is increased by a factor of 30,000.

  [30] Deep borehole disposal is recommended in the MIT study
(op. cit.) as providing a quicker and safer solution to waste
handling than waste reduction through reprocessing (see pp.
60-61). However, it is not as open-ended in terms of a large
long-term nuclear program.

  [31] The fission product mass is about 1.1 tonne per GWyr.
This is less than 4% of the mass of the spent fuel in present
once-through LWR fuel cycles. The activity of the fission
products reaches near-negligible levels by 600 years, although
some relatively weak emitters remain (e.g., 99Tc and 131I).

  [32] The desalination of seawater in a reverse osmosis plant
costs about $1 per cubic meter and requires about 6 kWh per
cubic meter [Introduction to Nuclear Desalination, A Guidebook
(IAEA, 2000)]. Supplying about 10% of current U.S. water by
desalination (i.e. 10% of 2000 m3 per person per year) would
require about 40 GWyr of electric power per year. At present,
the need for desalination is greater in other countries, where
nuclear power may be less affordable or accessible.  
  
azwicker@pppl.gov 

*****************************************************************
 47 Independent: US nuclear upgrade may violate test ban 

By Andrew Buncombe in Washington 

[http://www.independent.co.uk] 

08 February 2005

As it accuses Iran of trying to develop nuclear weapons, America
is preparing to upgrade and renew parts of its own ageing
nuclear arsenal. Critics believe the upgrades could lead the US
to breach the treaty banning the testing of nuclear weapons. 

Since the project will probably involve replacing technology
that originated in the Sixties, watchdogs are concerned the US
might be inclined to test the newer systems and, therefore,
breach the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. 

Of more concern to watchdogs is President George Bush's
dedication to developing a new breed of "bunker-buster" nuclear
weapon, designed to penetrate toughened underground defences.
Critics say the plan reveals the administration's hypocrisy and
undermines international efforts to persuade other countries not
to develop weapons. 

Last week, it was revealed that the Defence Secretary, Donald
Rumsfeld, had sent the Department of Energy a memo requesting
that it set aside funds to resume a study to examine the
development of a bunker-buster bomb. The study had been halted
last year after Congress removed its funding. 	           


[http://www.independent.co.uk/story.jsp?story=55123] 

*****************************************************************
 48 ABQjournal: LANL Workers Will Get Benefits 

Albuquerque Journal newspaper. 

Sunday, February 6, 2005 

LANL Workers Will Get Benefits 

Albuquerque Journal--> By C.S. "Tyler" Przybylek 

NNSA attorney and chairman of the Source Evaluation Board in 
the Los Alamos management contract competition 

OTHER VOICES: The government's recent draft Request for 
Proposal (RFP) that competes the Los Alamos National Laboratory 
management and operating contract has created some concerns on 
the part of current and retired laboratory employees of the 
University of California (UC), the laboratory's only contractor 
since it was created in 1943. 

The laboratory is vitally important to the security of our 
nation and we recognize that the people who work at the 
laboratory are its greatest asset. To this end, it is our intent 
to ensure quality pay and benefits to match the high caliber of 
the laboratory's employees. 

Right now none of us know who will be selected as the next 
contractor. At this point in the process, the National Nuclear 
Security Administration's (NNSA) Source Evaluation Board (SEB), 
which I chair, has received hundreds of pages of public, 
academia and industry questions and comments on the draft RFP. 
We are analyzing those questions and comments for possible use 
in developing the final RFP. But while we're doing that, I want 
to address some concerns that laboratory employees and retirees 
alike have expressed about pension and retiree health benefits 
and set the record straight. 

+ Equivalency of benefits: Under the new contract, whether the 
winner of the competition is a new contractor organization or 
whether it continues to be UC, should they bid and win, there 
will be no requirement for an automatic reduction in benefits. 
The new contract will have a requirement for substantially 
equivalent benefits for employees who transfer to the successor 
contract. 

+ Retiree pensions and medical benefits: Retirees will continue 
to receive their pensions from the University of California 
Retirement Plan (UCRP). Although, as the UC Retiree Handbook 
states, there is no vested right to retiree medical benefits, 
retirees will continue to enjoy medical benefits administered by 
either the new contractor or UC, with the costs being reimbursed 
by NNSA. 

+ Alleged siphoning of pension funds: The government has no 
intention of siphoning off pension funds. We have a contract 
obligation to reimburse UC for any contributions it makes. The 
government will not permit any contractor to siphon off pension 
funds— that's illegal. 

+ Continuity of service credit: If a new contractor is selected, 
current laboratory employees who decide to transfer to the new 
contractor will receive full service credit and have their 
portion of UCRP assets and liabilities transferred to the new 
contractor's site-specific pension plan. 

+ Fiscal status of the UC retirement plan: Laboratory employees 
know that UCRP currently enjoys an excess of assets over 
liabilities and many feel that the government has no role to 
play concerning UCRP. 

After all, no contributions have been needed since 1990 due 
to the healthy funding status of the plan. However, the most 
recent Actuarial Valuation Report prepared by the Segal Company 
for the UC Trustees suggests that contributions will have to be 
made in the next few years, possibly as soon as 2007. 

These employer contributions will continue to be reimbursed 
by the government. 

+ Opportunity to evaluate a new benefits package: The SEB is 
examining what needs to be done to design an appropriate 
extension to the transition period under the new contract that 
will provide employees sufficient time to evaluate the benefits 
package offered by the new contractor while they are still UC 
employees, in the event that an entity other than UC is selected 
and, in that light, make their own employment decisions. 

Should headquarters approval be received to extend the new 
contract's transition period, we would need to negotiate such an 
extension to the current contract with UC. 

Having made these points, I would ask employees of the 
laboratory to withhold judgment on the future of the laboratory 
and not make any career decision until they have had an 
opportunity to review the benefits package to be offered under 
the new contract, to consider their options under the existing 
pension plan, and to have a few months of experience with the 
contractor that will operate the laboratory under the new 
contract. 

I invite everyone who is following this process to 
regularly monitor its status through our Web site, 
http://www.doeal.gov/ [http://www.doeal.gov/] 
lanlcontractrecompete. 

Przybylek is an NNSA attorney and chairman of the Source 
Evaluation Board in the Los Alamos management contract 
competition. 

Copyright Albuquerque Journal 

Steve@abqjournal.com 
*****************************************************************
 49 Las Vegas SUN: Glance on Energy Department Budget

Glance on Energy Department Budget
 
ASSOCIATED PRESS 

Agency: Department of Energy 

Spending: $23.4 billion 

Percentage change from 2005: -2 percent 

Highlights: 

-Would increase spending for nuclear waste disposal by $79
million, to $651 million. 

-Would cut spending for cleaning up large amounts of radioactive
contamination and hazardous waste at 114 sites in 31 states and
one U.S. territory by $779 million, to $6.5 billion 

President Bush would spend $651 million toward completing the
license application process and constructing a national
repository for nuclear waste at Nevada's Yucca Mountain. He
wants to spend $56 million to build what would be the first new
nuclear power plant in the United States in three decades.
Spending to secure nuclear material in Russia and newly
independent states of the former Soviet Union would be $246
million. 

-- 



*****************************************************************
 50 LA TIMES: An Idyllic Scene Polluted With Controversy 

  [Los Angeles Times - latimes.com]

  February 7, 2005     E-mail story   Print   Most E-Mailed   

DISPATCH FROM ROCKY FLATS NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE, COLO. An
Idyllic Scene Polluted With Controversy 

+ A 6,000-acre refuge set to open in two years faces protest
from critics who say nuclear weapons production has left the
site contaminated.
 

By David Kelly, Times Staff Writer

 ROCKY FLATS NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE, Colo.  These rolling 
grasslands and foothills would seem a hiker's dream. The valleys 
are deep, the deer docile and the snowy mountain backdrop 
dazzling.
 
"The wildlife is really abundant here," said Mark Sattelberg, a 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service biologist. "It's been pretty much 
undisturbed for 40 or 50 years."
 
But critics say the Rocky Flats National Wildlife Refuge site
has been disturbed plenty.
 
To them, the land is synonymous with government secrecy,
widespread environmental violations and pollution from nuclear
weapons production done here throughout the Cold War.
 
They say the soil and water on the 6,000-acre refuge, scheduled
to open in two years, remain contaminated and that recent tests
found plutonium and uranium in deer living there. Federal
officials said the levels were acceptable.
 
"Are you going to eat a deer from out there?" asked Wes
McKinley, a Democratic state legislator and former foreman of a
grand jury that investigated pollution violations at Rocky
Flats. "What if you read a label on your hamburger that said it
had an acceptable amount of E. coli bacteria?"
 
McKinley, who held a news conference last month to protest going
ahead with the refuge, has proposed legislation requiring
visitors to be warned of the risks of entering the sanctuary.
 
"I wouldn't go there. What if you breathe in a particle of
plutonium or are exposed to gamma radiation and get cancer
later?" he said. "I think the whole thing is irresponsible."
 
Congress has ordered the refuge be opened after the cleanup is
completed in 2006. Federal wildlife and Energy Department
officials noted that the refuge was not on the actual site where
weapons had been made and that critics hadn't visited to learn
about the testing being done to ensure the place was safe.
 
"We are trying to separate fact from legend," said John Rampe,
an Energy Department environmental scientist. "We have done a
million environmental samples on the refuge."
 
Some have turned up problems.
 
"We find occasional plutonium or other contaminants that don't
meet state standards," Rampe said. "When we find it, we remove
it. We have removed dozens of miles of soil, scraped off the top
layers and sent them to waste facilities."
 
From 1952 to 1989, Rocky Flats made plutonium triggers for
hydrogen bombs  leaving behind polluted water, earth and air.
 
The plant, 16 miles northwest of Denver, once housed 14.2 tons
of plutonium and 7.3 tons of uranium. Much of the waste was
buried in barrels that rusted out, allowing contaminants to
leach into the soil.
 
At least one building here was dubbed the most dangerous
structure in the country by the Energy Department.
 
Most of the plant was shut down in 1989, and the remaining
metalworking operations closed in 1992, officials said. Rocky
Flats was owned by the federal government and operated by
Rockwell International Corp., which eventually was fined $18.5
million for environmental violations.
 
Jon Lipsky, the FBI agent who led a raid on the facility in
1989, said recently that the investigation ended prematurely,
leaving questions about the extent of pollution at Rocky Flats.
 
"How can they let children go to that site when they know they
haven't cleaned it up?" he asked. "The less people know, the
less they are required to clean up."
 
The Rocky Mountain Peace and Justice Center, an activist group
in Boulder, Colo., plans to sue to keep the refuge from opening.
 
"I don't think a plutonium-contaminated site is a good place for
people to engage in recreation," said LeRoy Moore, one of the
organization's founders. "I don't believe there is an acceptable
level of plutonium; it remains dangerous in even minuscule
quantities. The whole thing is a risky concept."
 
None of the controversy surrounding the refuge site surprises
Steve Gunderson of the state Department of Public Health and
Environment.
 
As coordinator of the Rocky Flats cleanup operation, Gunderson
spends most of his waking moments dealing with the site.
 
"Rocky Flats hits all of the quintessential hot buttons 
radioactivity, nuclear weapons, hazardous waste," he said. "It
has all the buzzwords, and it's hard to separate emotion from
objectivity. This was a place where the government did things in
a whole lot of secrecy for many, many years, but the cleanup is
basically being done in a fishbowl. Rocky Flats has had more
environmental sampling than any other place in the country."
 
The presence of radioactive elements in the soil and in the deer
at the refuge, Gunderson said, unfortunately was normal.
 
"There has been plutonium in the environment ever since
atmospheric nuclear testing was conducted," he said. "What you
are seeing is consistent with background levels of radiation."
 
The refuge, scheduled to partially open in 2007 and be in full
operation about 2012, will have hiking trails, interpretive
signs and limited hunting. It surrounds the area where the
actual nuclear production went on, which will remain closed.
Hundreds of workers carrying out cleanup operations are in easy
view of the refuge. Radioactive waste is trucked out in
stainless steel vats measuring 8 feet around and 10 feet high;
it is being disposed of in Carlsbad, N.M.
 
Yet a few hundred yards away, herds of deer graze in tall
prairie grass. Kestrels soar overhead, scanning the frozen
ground for rodents. Elk wander through the meadows, and the
occasional mountain lion slinks in for the ample venison.
 
Sattelberg, of the Fish and Wildlife Service, gunned his sport
utility vehicle up the steep snowy hills, past an abandoned
homestead, stopping to look at a few deer that stared back but
didn't budge.
 
An expert on how contaminants affect wildlife, Sattelberg said
he had seen no evidence of animals being hurt by pollution here.
 
"There is absolutely no reason to warn people about this place.
The refuge is safe; it would only scare people," he said. "But
if the law requires it, we will follow the law. We want to tell
people what went on here, the history of the place."
 
Rampe said the odds of getting cancer from visiting the refuge
was about 5 in 1 million.
 
"That would be if they made 100 visits a year, spending 2.5
hours per visit for 30 years," he said. "There is a calculable
risk, but it's so small that it makes you wonder if there is any
risk at all." 

 [TMS Reprints] 
 
Copyright 2005 Los Angeles Times
*****************************************************************
 51 [du-list] DU in the news - 8th Feb 05
 
Date: Mon, 07 Feb 2005 15:15:27 -0800

 
<x-flowed>

Daily Yomiuri Online, Mon, 07 Feb 2005 10:34 AM PST
'Dream-come-true' reactor http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/newse/20050208wo33.htm
Fukui Gov. Issei Nishikawa's approval Sunday of a plan to modify the Monju 
fast-breeder nuclear reactor in Tsuruga in the prefecture was welcomed by 
the central government and the Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute 
(JNC), the reactor's operator.

Stanford Daily, Mon, 07 Feb 2005 2:47 AM PST
Panel discusses Iraq war 
http://daily.stanford.edu/tempo?page=content&id=15986&repository=0001_article
A panel called Cost of War: The Humanitarian Crisis in Iraq, met last night 
to discuss public health concerns related to the U.S. invasion of Iraq.

Axis of Logic, Mon, 07 Feb 2005 3:49 AM PST
World News http://www.axisoflogic.com/artman/publish/article_15534.shtml
Is the US Military guilty of war crimes in Iraq? Some people believe it is 
unpatriotic even to ask this question, which may be why the issue has been 
largely ignored by American news media.

Green Left Weekly, Sun, 06 Feb 2005 5:08 PM PST
On the box http://www.greenleft.org.au/back/2005/614/614p22c.htm
Message Stick: Crossing the Line â?" Two non-Indigenous medical students 
work in a remote Aboriginal community where their precepts and ideas are 
deeply challenged. ABC, Friday, February 11, 6pm.

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