| Subject: | [NukeNet] Better Alternative to the MOX Scheme |
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| Date: | Sun, 30 Jan 2005 11:57:44 -0800 |
| From: | Dennis F. Nester <theroyprocess@cox.net> |
| To: | <nukenet@energyjustice.net> |
NukeNet Anti-Nuclear Network (nukenet@energyjustice.net)
- Recycling plutonium from warheads into MOX nuclear
reactor fuel only perpetuates the security and environmental problems of bomb
grade elements
- There is a better way which will completely transmute
plutonium and other high level nuclear waste known as the Roy
Process
It was the TMI partial meltdown that moved Dr. Roy to spend the summer school break proving calculations to see if it was possible to transmute high level nuclear waste cost effectively. He found it could be done with existing infrastructure, commercially available machinery and current supporting technology.
Estimated cost to build a pilot facility was $80 million dollars. A newspaper editor persuaded Dr. Roy to release his Roy Process to the press which was published in November of 1979. (see article on web site below).
The Roy Process Brief Description
from the
web site: http://members.cox.net/theroyprocess
Is there a safe process to get rid of nuclear waste? Maybe! One possible solution is a process invented by Dr. Radha R. Roy, former professor of Physics at Arizona State University, and designer and former director of the nuclear physics research facilities at the University of Brussels in Belgium and at Pennsylvania State University.
Dr. Roy is an internationally known nuclear physicist, consultant, and the author of over 60 articles and several books. He is also a contributing author of many invited articles in a prestigious encyclopedia. He is cited in American Men and Women of Science, Who`s Who in America, Who`s Who in the World and the International Biographical Centre, England. He has spent 52 years in European and American universities researching and writing recognized books on nuclear physics. He has supervised many doctoral students.
Roy invented a process for transmuting radioactive nuclear isotopes to harmless, stable isotopes. This process is viable not only for nuclear waste from reactors but also for low-level radioactive waste products.
In 1979, Roy announced his transmutation process and received international attention. The Roy process does not require storage of radioactive materials. No new equipment is required. In fact, all of the equipment and the chemical separation processes needed are well known.
What`s the basis for the Roy Process? If you examine radioactive elements such as strontium 90, cesium 137 and plutonium 239, you will see that they all have too many neutrons. To put it very simply, the Roy process transmutes these unstable isotopes to stable ones by knocking out the extra neutrons. When a neutron is removed, the resulting isotope has a considerably shorter half-life which then decays to a stable form in a reasonable amount of time.
How do we knock out neutrons? By bombarding them with photons (produced as x-rays) in a high- powered electron linear accelerator. Before this process, the isotopes must be separated by a well-known chemical process.
It is feasible that portable units could be built and transported to hazardous sites for on-site transmutation of nuclear wastes and radioactive wastes.
To give an example, cesium 137 with a half-life of 30.17 years is transformed into cesium 136 with a half-life of 13 days. Plutonium 239 with a half-life of 24,300 years is transformed into plutonium 237 with a half-life of 45.6 days. Subsequent radioactive elements which will be produced from the decay of plutonium 237 can be treated in the same way as above until the stable element is formed.
The Roy Process could be developed in three distinct phases, according to Roy. Phase I consists of a theoretical feasibility study of the process to obtain needed parameters for the construction of a prototype machine. Phase II will involve the construction of a prototype machine and supporting facilities for demonstrating the process. Phase Ill will consist of the construction of large scale commercial plants based on the data obtained from Phase II.
Cost estimates for Phase I and II are in the neighborhood of $10 million. For Phase Ill, Roy estimates a cost of $70 million. Says Roy, `It will be interesting to do a cost analysis of eliminating nuclear waste by using my process and by burying it for 240,000 years - ten half-lives of plutonium - under strict scientific control. There is also an ethical question: can we really burden the thousands of generations yet to come with problems which we have created? There is no God among human beings who can guarantee how the geological structure of waste burial regions will change even after ten thousand years, not to mention 240,000 years."
If you are interested in finding out more about this process, please contact Dennis Nester, Roy`s agent, whose address is listed below.
A final note
To those who say that a process for transforming nuclear wastes is an invitation to keep making them, I ask, when we find a cure for cancer, shall we say it`s okay to continue to eat, drink and breathe carcinogens?
"There is no way one can change nuclear structure other than by nuclear reaction. Burial of nuclear waste is not a solution." Radha Roy, Ph.D. Professor Emeritus
"Do not be surprised if you learn that the nuclear industry makes billions of dollars by being a part of government`s policy of burial of nuclear wastes. It is not in their financial interest to try any other process. They are not idealists. Radha R. Roy, Ph.D. Professor Emeritus
The below includes the Patent application claim.....describing other uses for the Roy Process transmutation method
http://members.cox.net/theroyprocess/additional-uses-royprocess.html
| Subject: | [NukeNet] US Gov't Moves Closer To MOX Implementation |
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| Date: | Sat, 29 Jan 2005 16:21:51 -0500 |
| From: | Bill Smirnow <smirnowb@ix.netcom.com> |
| To: | Bill Smirnow <smirnowb@ix.netcom.com> |
NukeNet Anti-Nuclear Network (nukenet@energyjustice.net) Mothersalert: http://www.mothersalert.org http://www.mothersalert.org/moreinfo.html Tom Clements, an adviser to Greenpeace International on nuclear issues, called the NRC staff report ``woefully inadequate'' and criticized its dismissal of health and environmental risks should there be a release of radiation. ``They have to plan for the eventuality that there is some kind of accident,'' said Clements. ``Basically the have just waved it off as something being acceptable.'' http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/national/AP-Plutonium-Plant.html?oref=login Plutonium Plant Nears Agency's Approval By THE ASSOCIATED PRESS Published: January 28, 2005 Filed at 5:01 p.m. ET WASHINGTON (AP) -- The government moved a step closer Friday to gaining approval to dispose of 34 tons of weapons-grade plutonium by turning it into a less dangerous fuel for commercial power reactors. The staff of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission recommended that the commission approve licenses for building a plant at the federal Savannah River complex in South Carolina where the plutonium would be processed into a mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel. Advertisement Some environmentalists and nuclear nonproliferation advocates have opposed the conversion plans, arguing plutonium should not be used to make commercial reactor fuel and that, instead, the weapons-grade material should be encased in glass and buried. While the NRC staff acknowledged a severe accident at the proposed facility could cause additional latent cancer fatalities among workers and the public, it said ``the likelihood of such an accident occurring is expected to be very low, highly unlikely.'' ``The overall benefits of the proposed MOX facility outweigh its disadvantages and cost,'' the NRC staff concluded in a final environmental impact report on the proposed project. The commission is expected to decide in the coming months whether to issue a construction license -- and later, an operating permit -- for the facility. The conversion to mixed-oxide fuel is a key part of the Bush administration's effort to safeguard the tons of excess weapons-grade plutonium held by both the United States and Russia and reduce the risks of the material being obtained by terrorists or a rogue state. Under an agreement with Russia, the United States plans to blend 34 tons of U.S. plutonium no longer needed for warheads with depleted uranium so it can no longer be used in a bomb and can be used in a commercial power reactor. Russia would also build a conversion plant for 34 tons of its excess plutonium. The Energy Department had hoped to begin building the conversion plant at Savannah River later this year, but construction has been held up because of complications that have delayed construction of a facility in Russia. Tom Clements, an adviser to Greenpeace International on nuclear issues, called the NRC staff report ``woefully inadequate'' and criticized its dismissal of health and environmental risks should there be a release of radiation. ``They have to plan for the eventuality that there is some kind of accident,'' said Clements. ``Basically the have just waved it off as something being acceptable.'' The NRC staff report said the primary benefit of the conversion program would be the reduction in the amount of excess plutonium under storage. It concluded that converting the material to a reactor-suitable mixed-oxide fuel is safer than continued storage of surplus plutonium. The report said the routine operation of a conversion plant and proposed support facilities would pose virtually no radiological risk to people or the environment within 50 miles of the complex. But it acknowledged an accidental release of radioactive tritium from a plutonium disassembly facility to be built as part of the project could cause between three and 100 additional latent cancer fatalities, with higher estimates if contaminated food is eaten. ``However, it is regarded as highly unlikely that such an accident would occur and the risk to any population, including low-income and minority communities, is considered to be low,'' concluded the NRC staff report. ------ On the Net Nuclear Regulatory Commission http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1767/ _______________________________________________________________________ Subscribe/Unsubscribe Here: http://www.energyjustice.net/nukenet/ Change your settings or access the archives at: http://energyjustice.net/mailman/listinfo/nukenet_energyjustice.net
| Subject: | Nevada Test Site to expand for aerospace satellites? |
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| Date: | Sun, 30 Jan 2005 07:09:26 -0800 (PST) |
| From: | Sheila Baker <shebikes4@sbcglobal.net> |
| To: | rogerh@energy-net.org, shundahai@shundahai.org, sschwartz@afsc.org |
| Subject: | Safety Problems Shut Down Livermore Plutonium Facility |
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| Date: | Sun, 30 Jan 2005 12:34:01 -0700 |
| From: | marylia@earthlink.net (marylia) |
| To: | marylia@earthlink.net |
Dear colleagues: The following article (below) contains a lot of Livermore Lab spin. But, all the spin in the world won't erase the facts. Livermore Lab's plutonium facility is shutting down for at least the third time in recent years due to on-going safety problems. Note that three separate federal agencies, including the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, have filed reports citing a variety of safety problems in the Lab's plutonium facility. It's not one thing, it's a bunch. Note, too, Livermore Lab's admission that nuclear weapons programs take priority over safety. In the late 1980s, the Dept. of Energy and Livermore Lab said that production used to take priority over safety, but that it wouldn't in the future. Well, it's the future now and here is evidence that bomb development still takes priority over safety. This shut down comes at a time, too, when Livermore Lab is proposing to MORE THAN DOUBLE the plutonium storage limit in this very facility, increasing it from 1,540 pounds to 3,300 pounds. At the end of this email, I have typed in a link that will lead you to a simple letter you can send the Dept. of Energy and elected officials asking them to reduce -- not increase -- plutonium at Livermore Lab. Thanks for you attention -- and for your help! Read on... --Marylia Kelley Plutonium facility shut for review Livermore lab closes superblock facility to address federal safety concerns By Ian Hoffman, STAFF WRITER Inside Bay Area/Tri-Valley Herald Executives at Lawrence Livermore nuclear-weapons laboratory have shut down work at the lab's plutonium facility so managers can attend to an accumulation of safety problems raised in three recent federal reports. Sizing up those problems for the sprawling, fortress-like facility known as Superblock, and devising millions of dollars in a fix are expected to halt day-to-day work with plutonium and uranium for several weeks. But the chief of the lab's weapons program said there was little alternative. No accident or government order triggered the shutdown. Rather, the same experienced managers who ensure ordinary plutonium operations are safe are needed for a comprehensive safety review of Superblock, one of only two comprehensive plutonium-handling labs in the nation. "They are establishing the way we need to go. How do you know that until you've done what you're supposed to do?" said Bruce Goodwin, associate lab director for defense and nuclear technologies. "We could have kept working," he said, "but it wasn't the right thing to do." In quick succession, three groups of federal safety officials found multiple safety deficiencies at the 40-year-old Superblock. None suggested that the plutonium facility was unsafe. But the number of safety deficiencies gave rise to worries that a large-scale disaster, such as an earthquake, could trigger an unforeseen chain failure and put workers or the public at risk. "They did us a very big favor because they said, 'If you do this and this and this, you'll be good to go,'" Goodwin said. To understand potential risks, Superblock managers are undertaking the fullest review of safety equipment and operations since 2000. Not keeping an eye on the bigger safety picture has been one of the lab's failings, according to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, an independent oversight agency with the power to warn the president if a federal nuclear-defense plant is unsafe. In recent letters, both the chairman of the DNFSB and the Livermore office of the National Nuclear Security Administration raised serious concern over the apparent lack of what the nuclear-safety industry calls a "configuration management program." "The failure to implement an adequate configuration management program would appear to increase the likelihood of future occurrences involving the operation of safety systems," DNFSB chairman John T. Conway wrote federal weapons executives in November. Lab weapons officials since 1999 have made millions of dollars of upgrades to Superblock's 16 safety systems, all tied in one way or another to keeping plutonium locked inside the facility. These upgrades range from new power transformers to backup generators to backup pressure tanks that drive the facility's sprinkler system to vast, new air-handling systems for the sealed, leaded "hot boxes" where plutonium handlers work with the quirky metal. But Superblock officials made many of those changes piecemeal, without carefully evaluating the impact on the overall safety of the facility. "At some point, you want to do the whole thing from scratch," Goodwin said. Federal auditors found that some "hot boxes" and pressured-gas pipes that feed Superblock's backup fire-suppression system were not seismically anchored. In theory, a large earthquake could crack a hot box and cause breaks in the primary and backup sprinkler systems, including the misting system that would preserve the facility's air-filtering system in the event of a fire. Small pieces of plutonium ignite in air, and enough hot air could create holes in the filters, allowing plutonium to escape. Small particles of radioactive plutonium dust, if inhaled or ingested, can cause cancer. In a rare interview inside the highly classified Superblock, lab and federal weapons officials also acknowledged that some safety work had been neglected over the years as weapons research or other work took higher budget priority. Goodwin said nuclear-safety standards were in flux during the 1980s and 90s. "And to be frank, it wasn't clear the facility would continue operating," he said. Richard Mortensen, head of defense programs for NNSA's Livermore office, said, "They were on the list of things to do but they were down the list." The safety study at Superblock will cost millions of dollars in staff time and is expected to generate a costly to-do list, as well as pressure on the government to pay for the upgrades. If those upgrades are made, Superblock's working life would be extended by at least 10 years. "This is good news for us," Goodwin said of the federal audits. "It's shined a light on us and made it easier for us to do it." Contact Ian Hoffman at ihoffman@angnewspapers.com TO SEND A LETTER TO THE DEPT. OF ENERGY AND ELECTED OFFICIALS ASKING THEM TO DECREASE -- NOT INCREASE -- PLUTONIUM ACTIVITIES AT LIVERMORE LAB, GO TO EITHER: 1. http://capwiz.com/wagingpeace/mail/oneclick/_compose/?alertid=6718276 2. www.californiapeaceaction.org/?a=37 Thanks. Peace, Marylia Marylia Kelley Executive Director Tri-Valley CAREs (Communities Against a Radioactive Environment) 2582 Old First Street Livermore, CA USA 94551 <http://www.trivalleycares.org> - is our web site address. Please visit us there! (925) 443-7148 - is our phone (925) 443-0177 - is our fax