***************************************************************** 11/24/04 **** RADIATION BULLETIN(RADBULL) **** VOL 12.281 ***************************************************************** RADBULL IS PRODUCED BY THE ABALONE ALLIANCE CLEARINGHOUSE ***************************************************************** Send News Stories to news@energy-net.org with title on subject line and first line of body NUCLEAR POLICY 1 BBC: UN to assess Iran nuclear freeze 2 Daily Times: ‘Iran will never dismantle N-plan’ 3 Las Vegas SUN: Iran Seeks to Amend Nuclear Freeze Deal 4 BBC: China stresses N Korea 'stable' 5 [NukeNet] CIA Report Says Al Qaeda, Others May Attack Nuclear 6 US: IPS-English POLITICS-U.S.: Pre-emption Denied New Nukes 7 US: Help us stop new nuclear weapons, dangerous bio-warfare 8 US: Spectrum: Congress excludes funding for nuclear weapon studies 9 BBC: Brazil claims backing on uranium NUCLEAR REACTORS 10 US: NRC: NRC to Discuss Performance Improvement Actions at Salem and 11 Bellona: US Energy giant Westinghouse to supply nuclear fuel to Ukra 12 BBC: Lithuania to close nuclear plant 13 CNEWS - Canada: Bruce Power offered aging reactor deal 14 US: Platts: Two NRC recess appointments expected in January 15 US: NRC: NRC Increases Civil Monetary Penalties to Reflect Inflation 16 US: Rutland Herald: More Yankee issues coming 17 US: Salt Lake Tribune: Opinion Consider nuclear 18 US: TheChamplainChannel: NRC Panel Grants Hearing On Yankee Power Bo 19 US: NRC: Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards; Meeting Notice 20 US: Keene Sentinel: A first: Hearing ordered on Vt. Yankee 21 US: NRC: Agency Information Collection Activities: Proposed Collecti 22 US: NRC: St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2; Notice of Considerat NUCLEAR SAFETY 23 US: Quad-City Times: U of Iowa gets $300,000 to test former IAAP wor 24 US: BoiseWeekly.com: Downwinders request help from attorney general 25 US: PISJ: Downwinders keep pressure on in battle for recognition 26 US: Harwich Oracle: Cape Downwinders aim to be prepared for the wors 27 US: NRC: Notice of Opportunity To Comment on Model Safety Evaluation NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE 28 [NukeNet] Yucca Foe's Aide Gets Nuclear Panel Post 29 Las Vegas RJ: Guessingbegins onSandovalsuccessor 30 RGJ: Yucca Mountain will solve a national concern 31 Daily Times: Iran and uranium enrichment — What the controversy is a NUCLEAR WEAPONS US DEPT. OF ENERGY 32 DOE: Notice of Intent To Prepare an Environmental Impact Statement OTHER NUCLEAR 33 [du-list] DU in the news - 25th Nov. 04 34 Physics News Update 710: Mercator of the Nuclear World 35 MSNBC: Europeans will back deal with Japan for fusion facility 36 Elko Daily Free Press: Trails center gets $1.5 million ***************************************************************** ***************************************************************** FULL NEWS STORIES ***************************************************************** ***************************************************************** 1 BBC: UN to assess Iran nuclear freeze Last Updated: Thursday, 25 November, 2004 [Iranian worker adjusts his hat at Iran's Isfahan nuclear facility] Iran denies claims that it wants to build nuclear weapons The UN nuclear agency is set to meet in Vienna on Thursday to review Iran's controversial nuclear programme. The board of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will learn if Iran is abiding by an agreement to suspend its uranium enrichment programme. Iran agreed to the freeze last week in a bid to avoid referral to the United Nations Security Council. On Wednesday, diplomats said Tehran had asked for an amendment to the terms of the deal to allow continued research. France, Germany and Britain - the three EU countries that helped bring about the suspension - reportedly refused the request. IAEA inspectors have spent the last few days verifying whether Iran is abiding by the suspension agreement. The agency's chief Mohamed ElBaradei will report his findings to the 35-nation board later on Thursday. 'Sheer lie' Meanwhile, the EU three are expected to submit a draft IAEA resolution calling on Iran to "sustain the suspension" of uranium enrichment at nuclear facilities in the cities of Isfahan and Natanz. The motion also proposes that Mr ElBaradei should "report immediately" to the agency's board if there is any evidence of incomplete suspension". [A worker inside Iran's Isfahan nuclea facility] Iranians' nuclear views Viewpoints: US' foreign challenges Diplomats who have seen the resolution say it is unlikely to satisfy the US, which is thought to prefer a tougher stance whereby any lapse would immediately trigger Iran's referral to the UN Security Council. The US has led calls for the IAEA to refer Iran to the Security Council, which has the power to impose sanctions. Last week, diplomats said Tehran was rushing through production of uranium hexafluoride gas - a form of uranium that is fed into centrifuges during the enrichment process - before Monday's freeze. Tehran denounced the accusation as a "sheer lie". It has always maintained its nuclear programme is entirely peaceful. Two days after the suspension came into effect, diplomats were quoted as saying that Tehran had asked that more than 24 centrifuges be exempted for "research purposes". Centrifuges purify uranium to fuel power plants or weapons by spinning at supersonic speeds, Reuters news agency reports. "The Iranians asked to be allowed to continue conducting research and development with centrifuges during the freeze, but the Europeans told them no," a Western diplomat told Reuters on condition of anonymity. ***************************************************************** 2 Daily Times: ‘Iran will never dismantle N-plan’ Thursday, November 25, 2004 BEIJING: Iran will never dismantle its nuclear programs but is ready to give assurances that its uranium enrichment activities will not be diverted for weapons technology, a senior Iranian negotiator said on Wednesday. “Iran is prepared to give all assurances that uranium enrichment activities will never be diverted,” Seyev Hossein Mousavian, the chief Iranian negotiator with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), said in an interview. “That’s why we should have the right for peaceful nuclear technology and that this right should be exercised with no discrimination. That’s why dismantlement is out of the question.” Mousavian is in Beijing to drum up support after Tehran was accused by the United States of using a civilian atomic energy programme to secretly develop nuclear weapons. Mousavian Wednesday denied the US accusations. “Definitely not,” he said, pointing out that Iran has opened all its nuclear sites and even its military sites to international inspectors. He argued Tehran had done all it could to cooperate and the Americans should not raise additional demands or it could “weaken international conventions.” “Iran has shown transparency for confidence building during the past year. The maximum cooperation has been done,” Mousavian said. He accused Washington of practicing a double standard in the Middle East — turning a blind eye to Israel’s nuclear weapons program. “We expect the Americans to leave their dual policy in the Middle East and their oppression against Iran,” Mousavian said. The United States has been pressing for the IAEA to refer the matter to the UN Security Council for possible sanctions. IAEA chief Mohamed ElBaradei is to present a report on Iran’s compliance to the IAEA governing board when it meets in Vienna on Thursday and has said his team should be able to verify suspension by then. Mousavian left Beijing Wednesday morning for Vienna, confident that the issue would not be taken up by the UN Security Council. He had been consulting with close ally Beijing since his arrival in China on Tuesday. afp Daily Times - All Rights Reserved ***************************************************************** 3 Las Vegas SUN: Iran Seeks to Amend Nuclear Freeze Deal Today: November 24, 2004 at 13:29:08 PST By GEORGE JAHN ASSOCIATED PRESS VIENNA, Austria (AP) - Iran sought on Wednesday to partially roll back its commitment to freeze all uranium enrichment programs, demanding the right to run some equipment that can be used to produce nuclear arms. Iran's push to operate 24 centrifuges for what it said were research purposes did not seem to represent a major move because thousands of centrifuges must operate for months to produce enough enriched uranium for a nuclear warhead. Still, coming on the eve of a key meeting of the U.N. nuclear watchdog agency, the demand was likely to strengthen perceptions that Iran's government is not interested in easing fears it is trying to develop atomic arms in violation of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Britain, which helped negotiate the enrichment suspension on behalf of the European Union, rejected the demand. A British official, speaking to The Associated Press on condition of anonymity, said the Nov. 7 agreement would stand. Citing the official EU stance, an EU diplomat accredited to the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency said all centrifuge activity had to remain stopped under the agreement. The deal committed the Iranian regime to full suspension of enrichment and all related activities while the two sides discuss a pact meant to provide Iran with EU technical and economic aid and other concessions. Iran announced Monday that it had ceased enrichment, while repeating its position that the enrichment program is intended only to produce fuel for generating electricity. It denies it is working on atomic weapons. The suspension was clearly timed to coincide with the Thursday meeting of the U.N. agency's 35-nation board and met a key demand of the last board meeting in September. It deprived the United States of arguing that Iran was defying the agency and weakened Washington's attempt to refer the matter to the U.N. Security Council for possible sanctions against Iran. U.S. officials accuse Iran of secretly developing nuclear weapons. "Many nations agree with us. Many nations do not - they think we are overreacting," Secretary of State Colin Powell said Tuesday. But he noted the European Union nations felt concerned enough to pressure Iran into stopping enrichment. The agency's board will also discuss past secret South Korean experiments in plutonium separation and uranium enrichment. Diplomats said South Korea's government would likely be reprimanded, but any decision on referring it to the Security Council would be deferred until agency investigations were complete. The South Korean government claims it was unaware of experiments that it says were run by renegade scientists - a contention questioned by some diplomats accredited to the agency and familiar with South Korea's file. By seeking to exempt some centrifuges from the freeze it agreed to, Iran appeared to reinforce its stance that suspension would be only temporary. It is not prohibited by the Nonproliferation Treaty from enriching uranium. Even before the demand, Iran had cast doubt on its interest in reducing international distrust by continuing enrichment activities until shortly before Monday's freeze deadline. The head of the nuclear agency, Mohamed ElBaradei, said he believed the Iranians processed about two tons of raw uranium into a gas used as feedstock for enrichment. A diplomat said the centrifuges Iran wanted exempted were at the central city of Natanz - where Iran says it ultimately plans to run 50,000 centrifuges. Tehran says that facility is meant to meet the fuel requirements of a nuclear reactor for an electricity-generating plant being built with Russian help that is expected to be finished next year. For now, Iran is far short of that goal, possessing less than 1,000 centrifuges - most bought secretly through the black market network of Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Kahn and the rest made domestically. But experts estimate the Iranians are not far from being able to run 1,500 centrifuges, which could process enough enriched uranium for one warhead a year. --- On the Net: www.iaea.org -- ***************************************************************** 4 BBC: China stresses N Korea 'stable' Last Updated: Wednesday, 24 November, 2004 [Pictures from August (top) and May (bottom) of the People's Culture Centre in Pyongyang, showing portrait of Kim Il-sung (top, and bottom left) and Kim Jong-il] Some portraits of Kim Jong-il have reportedly been removed A senior Chinese official has taken the unusual step of commenting on the internal affairs of ally North Korea. Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei stressed the country was politically "stable". His comments follow unconfirmed reports that some portraits of the North's leader Kim Jong-il were missing, and of Chinese border troop movements. Analysts say that verifying the situation in the secretive North is very difficult, and China's priority is to see its neighbour remain stable. Mr Wu said he saw huge positive changes in the North during a visit in September. "The politics are stable, the economy is developing, and the leaders are thinking seriously about economic reform," he told a press briefing in Beijing. The minister denied South Korean media reports that 10,000 Chinese troops were preparing for a long deployment along the North Korean border, possibly to guard against an increase in North Korean refugees. The life of the North Kore people have been improved markedly. From what I saw and heard, I was deeply impressed Wu Dawei, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister "Such reports are completely groundless. After reading these reports people will think it's true and this is extremely dangerous," he said. Mr Wu's comments came as speculation continued over potential changes in the North, first sparked by reports from diplomats in Pyongyang that some portraits of North Korean leader Kim Jong-il had been taken down. Some analysts said the move, if true, could simply indicate an attempt by Mr Kim to scale back the cult of personality which surrounds him. North Korea's official media has denied the reports, calling them a US plot to overthrow its government. Economic changes Mr Wu added that he witnessed the effects of economic reforms, saying they had made the average North Korean much better off. "The life of the North Korean people have been improved markedly. From what I saw and heard, I was deeply impressed," he said. His comments contradicted a UN report on Tuesday that said the changes, under which farmers' markets have been allowed to start operating privately, have led to skyrocketing prices, depriving most North Koreans of enough to eat. The international community is continuing to press Pyongyang to rejoin diplomatic talks on its controversial nuclear weapons programme. Mr Wu, who is China's negotiator in the six-party talks, expressed cautious optimism about the talks' future. The South Korean Unification Ministry also said on Wednesday that a UN official - Gabon Foreign Minister Jean Ping - who has just visited Pyongyang, received a "very positive message" from North Korea's leadership regarding talks. The talks have been stalled since August. ***************************************************************** 5 [NukeNet] CIA Report Says Al Qaeda, Others May Attack Nuclear Date: Wed, 24 Nov 2004 14:42:32 -0800 http://www.tmia.com/sabter.html ``In addition, we are alert to the very real possibility that al Qaeda or other terrorist groups might also try to launch conventional attacks against the chemical or nuclear industrial infrastructure of the United States to cause panic and economic disruption,'' the CIA report said. http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/news/news-security-wmd.html CIA Says Iran, Qaeda Pursued Nuclear Weapons By REUTERS Published: November 23, 2004 Filed at 5:16 p.m. ET WASHINGTON (Reuters) - Iran ``vigorously'' pursued programs to produce nuclear, chemical and biological weapons during the latter part of 2003 and was working to improve delivery systems, a CIA report said on Tuesday. Al Qaeda was also engaged in rudimentary nuclear research, the CIA said, and the network's stated willingness to launch an unconventional attack was a major concern. Advertisement The unclassified semi-annual report to Congress on the acquisition of technology relating to weapons of mass destruction from July 1 through Dec. 31, 2003, was posted on the intelligence agency's Web site www.cia.gov. ``Iran's nuclear program received significant assistance in the past from the proliferation network headed by Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan,'' the CIA report said. Khan's network provided Iran with designs for Pakistan's older centrifuges and for more advanced and efficient models, and components, the report said. Iran was trying to improve delivery systems and sought foreign materials, training and equipment from Russia, China, North Korea, and Europe, it said. Last week Iran denied allegations by an exiled opposition group that it obtained weapons-grade uranium and a nuclear bomb design from Khan, the father of Pakistan's atomic bomb. The United States believes Iran has been pursuing a secret nuclear weapons program and has tried to convince the international community of those concerns. TERRORISM THREAT HIGH ``One of our highest concerns is al Qaeda's stated readiness to attempt unconventional attacks against us,'' the report said. Osama bin Laden and other leaders have said it was al Qaeda's religious duty to acquire nuclear weapons, the CIA said. Documents recovered in Afghanistan showed that al Qaeda ``was engaged in rudimentary nuclear research, although the extent of its indigenous program is unclear,'' it said. Pakistani nuclear engineer Bashir al-Din Mahmood, who reportedly met with bin Laden, ``may have provided some assistance to al Qaeda's program,'' the report said. ``In addition, we are alert to the very real possibility that al Qaeda or other terrorist groups might also try to launch conventional attacks against the chemical or nuclear industrial infrastructure of the United States to cause panic and economic disruption,'' the CIA report said. Several groups associated with al Qaeda planned attacks in Europe with easily produced chemicals and toxins best suited to assassination and small-scale scenarios, the CIA said. Documents recovered in Afghanistan show al Qaeda has crude procedures for making mustard agent, sarin, and VX nerve agent, and had conducted research on biological agents. ``We believe al Qaeda's BW (biological warfare) program is primarily focused on anthrax for mass casualty attacks,'' the report said. The CIA report also said that information from 2003 detailed the construction of a ``terrorist cyanide-based chemical weapon'' that could be made with easily available items and required little training to assemble and deploy. ``Such a device could produce a lethal concentration of poisonous gases in an enclosed area,'' the CIA said. The proliferation behavior of Chinese companies remained of ``great concern'' but China had taken some positive steps, the report said. In September 2003, China stopped a shipment of chemicals at the China-North Korea border that could have been used in North Korea's nuclear program, the report said. North Korea had approached Western European entities for assistance with its uranium enrichment program, and ``a shipment of aluminum tubing -- enough for 4,000 centrifuge tubes -- was halted by German authorities,'' the report said. _______________________________________________________________________ Subscribe/Unsubscribe Here: http://www.energyjustice.net/nukenet/ Change your settings at: http://energyjustice.net/mailman/listinfo/nukenet_energyjustice.net ***************************************************************** 6 IPS-English POLITICS-U.S.: Pre-emption Denied New Nukes Date: Wed, 24 Nov 2004 14:36:00 -0800 ROMAIPS NA WD IP POLITICS-U.S.: Pre-emption Denied New Nukes By Jim Lobe WASHINGTON, Nov 24 (IPS) - A cost-conscious U.S. Congress has denied funding to Bush administration projects to develop new nuclear weapons designed to target rogue states or terrorists developing weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Critics who said the new "bunker buster" weapons risked blurring the lines between conventional and unconventional warfare hailed the move, which was led by a member of President George W Bush's Republican Party. Over White House objections, members of both the House of Representatives and the Senate decided against approving 27.6 million dollars for the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator ("bunker buster") designed to destroy command-and-control facilities or WMDs buried deep underground. The proposed funding was part of the mammoth 388-billion-dollar government spending bill approved Saturday. Members of Congress also cut a suggested nine million dollars for what is called advanced-concepts research on new weapons designs, a programme that could have funded new, lower-yield nuclear weapons -- so-called "mini-nukes" -- for use as tactical battlefield weapons. Politicians also denied the administration 30 million dollars it had requested to shorten the lead-time needed to resume nuclear weapons testing at the Nevada Test Site. "This is the biggest victory that arms-control advocates in Congress have had since 1992, when we were able to place limits on nuclear testing," said Massachusetts Representative Edward Markey from the opposition Democratic Party. "If we are to convince other countries to forgo nuclear weapons, we cannot be preparing to build a whole new generation of nuclear weapons here in the U.S," he added. The decisions were also hailed by arms-control activists, who gave much of the credit for the outcome to Republican Rep David Hobson, the chairman of the House of Representatives Appropriations Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development. "This proves both how one person in a key position can make a major difference and that opposition to new nuclear weapons extends across party lines," said John Isaacs, the director for the Council for a Liveable World (CLW), a grassroots organisation that had lobbied against the new weapons, in a statement. Hobson himself warned the administration that it "should read this as a clear signal from Congress" that any new effort to revive the funding in 2005 "would get the same reaction." The Bush government had made the new weapons a top priority beginning in 2002, as an integral part of its "pre-emption" strategy to be employed against terrorists and rogues states suspected of having or building WMD. Advocates of them have long argued that nuclear weapons, if precisely targeted and designed in a way that would limit their destructive impacts, could be used effectively for conventional purposes, particularly in Bush's "war on terrorism." They also contended that such weapons would help deter attacks ordered by foreign leaders or terrorists who believed they could escape retaliation by building hardened, underground shelters. "The problem is the public -- and the Congress reflects this -- just doesn't understand the role of nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War world," David Smith, chief operating officer of the National Institute for Public Policy (NIPP), a think tank that has long lobbied for developing more advanced nuclear weapons, told the 'San Francisco Chronicle' on Tuesday. But opponents have argued that developing new nuclear weapons could spark an arms race with other nuclear powers and make countries that have not yet crossed the nuclear threshold more determined to acquire WMD and the ability to deliver them. In a speech last August, Hobson said he saw the administration's proposals, particularly for the "bunker buster," the "mini-nukes" and cutting the time needed to resume nuclear testing as "very provocative and overly aggressive policies that undermine our moral authority to argue that other nations should forgo nuclear weapons." "We cannot advocate for nuclear non-proliferation around the globe and pursue more useable nuclear weapons options at home," he added. Daryl Kimball, director of the Washington-based Arms Control Association (ACA) praised Hobson's "enormous courage" in defying the White House. He said Congress' action showed "that not only are Democrats convinced, but key Republicans are convinced we don't need new nuclear weapons capabilities." According to CLW's Isaacs, the politicians' rebuff to the administration was aided by the growing concern over the unprecedented budget deficit piled up under Bush, currently more than 400 billion dollars annually, or roughly the same amount as the defence budget. In negotiating the omnibus spending bill, the House and Senate agreed that budgets for all executive departments, except Defence and Homeland Security, would be subject to strict ceilings for fiscal year (FY) 2005. The National Nuclear Security Administration, which runs nuclear programmes, is administered by the Energy Department. Congress also cut another administration request for 29.8 million dollars to build plutonium pits -- or nuclear triggers -- for new nuclear weapons to seven million dollars. "This is not winning the war by a long shot," said California Senator Dianne Feinstein, one of the principal foes of the administration's proposed nuclear programmes. "But it is a consequential step that should send a very loud message to the administration." ***** +Council for a Liveable World (http://www.clw.org) +Arms Control Association (http://www.armscontrol.org) +POLITICS-IRAN: Doubts Persist as Tehran Makes Nuclear Commitment (http://www.ipsnews.net/dominologin.asp?Db=ips\eng.nsf&wView=vwWebMainView&DocID=CE9B232071812DD7C1256F5400296914) (END/IPS/NA/WD/IP/JL/ML/04) = 11241613 ORP006 NNNN ***************************************************************** 7 Help us stop new nuclear weapons, dangerous bio-warfare Date: Wed, 24 Nov 2004 17:24:06 -0800 Dear Friends and Supporters of Tri-Valley CAREs, As 2004 draws to a close and we look forward to 2005, we're cautiously optimistic despite the continued aggressive nature of the Bush Administration's nuclear policies. As many of you are aware, the recent omnibus budget bill contained significant victories for those of us working to restrain the Department of Energy's new nuclear weapons. And, here at Tri-Valley CAREs, we have a strong team of staff and volunteers ready to stand up to the DOE at every turn. However, passion and commitment are only one piece of the puzzle - we also need financial resources to move our programs forward. We are writing today to ask for your financial support to carry out our mission. There is a great deal of work to be done in 2005, and we face several important challenges. Most immediate among these challenges is our need to stop the bio-warfare agent facility from moving forward at Livermore Lab without an in-depth environmental review or public hearings. As Jay Coghlan and I pointed out in the September/October 2003 issue of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, putting an advanced bio-warfare research lab behind the fences of a secret nuclear lab is an extremely bad idea - for numerous reasons! Earlier this year, we succeeded in obtaining a "stay" preventing importation of dangerous biological agents to the new facility (such as live anthrax, plague, botulism and Q fever). However, in September, a judge in Oakland ignored reams of significant evidence we submitted in the case, and ruled that DOE could proceed with its plans based, essentially, on the agency's vague promises to obey the law and not have any accidents. (Yeah, right -- Livermore Lab's main site and site 300 are both Superfund cleanup sites due to numerous past accidents, spills and leaks with toxic and radioactive materials.) We have now filed papers to appeal this ruling, and are confident that we will prevail on the merits of our case. However, we are also now tasked with finding the funding to support the court costs and expenses associated with this appeal - can we count on your support to help us? We have set up our website to enable online donations, and hope that you'll take a moment right now to visit http://www.trivalleycares.org/donate.asp and send in a gift of any size. Tri-Valley CAREs relies on contributions from individuals such as you to support our effective grassroots work. We're extremely cost-conscious and count on a cadre of wonderful volunteers for a huge part of everything we do, but our programs and effective advocacy cannot happen without financial support as well. You may be thinking, well, what's in it for me? We're happy to answer that question. When you give to Tri-Valley CAREs: - You're helping prevent radioactive and toxic pollution of our environment. - You're taking action to affirm your belief that the world needs fewer nuclear weapons, not more, and that the U.S. should become a leader in nuclear disarmament, not a rogue state. - You're helping to rein in the DOE, one of the most powerful, wasteful, and unaccountable agencies of the federal government. - You're helping us publish our Citizens Watch newsletter, with up-to-date, accurate, insider information on the latest and greatest DOE blunders. - You can count yourself as a supporter of one of the most effective grassroots watchdogs of the DOE nuclear weapons complex. - Your gift is tax-deductible -- and it will "offset" the piece of your federal taxes that funds the nuclear weapons programs we are working to stop. We hope you'll take just a couple minutes to visit our website at http://www.trivalleycares.org/donate.asp and demonstrate your support for what we do. We'll keep you informed of our progress, and invite you to celebrate all of our successes as your own in 2005. For those of you who have already sent in your donations in response to our mailed appeal, we say THANK YOU!! Your contributions make everything we do possible - we deeply appreciate it. For Peace, Justice and a Healthy Environment, Marylia Kelley Marylia Kelley Executive Director Tri-Valley CAREs (Communities Against a Radioactive Environment) 2582 Old First Street Livermore, CA USA 94551 - is our web site address. Please visit us there! (925) 443-7148 - is our phone (925) 443-0177 - is our fax ***************************************************************** 8 Spectrum: Congress excludes funding for nuclear weapon studies - Local News - thespectrum.com Wednesday, November 24, 2004 By FRANK OLIVERI Gannett News Service WASHINGTON -- Congress excluded funding for two nuclear weapons research programs, but it will compensate cancer victims of past nuclear testing as part of a massive spending bill. A $388 billion spending bill Congress passed this weekend did not have funding for the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator and new advanced-concept weapons designs. Those who opposed the research, including residents of Southern Utah living downwind of the Nevada nuclear weapons testing facility, consider the lack of funding for these programs a significant victory. The massive spending bill will pay for programs in 13 government departments and numerous agencies in fiscal 2005, except for defense, homeland security and military construction. The Senate voted 65-30 on Saturday to pass the bill, while the House voted 344-51 in favor. The bill does include money to close a shortfall in a program that compensates cancer victims who suffered from radiation exposure in the 1950s and 1960s from nuclear testing. More than 5,000 Utahns have sought compensation for radiation exposure from the government. "Utahns have paid dearly for government deception about the safety of nuclear weapons testing," said Rep. Jim Matheson, D-Utah, who opposed the studies. "I am determined to resist that at every turn because this fight is not over." Matheson said his father, Scott, a former three-term governor of Utah, died in 1990 from cancer he believes resulted from fallout exposure. Some scientists contend that radiation from testing in the 1950s and 1960s spread as far west as Oregon and as far east as Vermont. Planners sought a nuclear bunker-busting weapon to improve the military's ability to destroy deep bunkers. The nuclear penetrator study would have cost about $486 million over five years, according to Department of Energy documents. Opponents feared the weapon would lower the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons in the future. Proponents of the so-called bunker-buster program could seek funding again next year. Sen. Dianne Feinstein, D-Calif., a staunch opponent of the nuclear studies, lauded Rep. David Hobson, R-Ohio, chairman of the House panel that oversees Energy Department funding, for fighting efforts to include money for these tests in the bill. She called the vote "a consequential victory for those of us who believe the United States sends the wrong signal to the rest of the world by reopening the nuclear door and beginning testing and development of a new generation of nuclear weapons." Sen. Robert Bennett, R-Utah, said the bill also included $27.8 million for the Radiation Exposure Compensation Act. The amount closes a shortfall in the program. "The funds mean Utah downwinders won't receive another IOU from the government this year," Bennett said. "This is an obligation the government must meet." About 5,163 Utahns have filed claims under the law. About 266 are under review, with 3,400 completely paid out. The federal government has paid nearly $195.2 million in compensation to Utahns, according to Department of Justice figures. Originally published Wednesday, November 24, 2004 Copyright ©2004 The Spectrum. All rights reserved. ***************************************************************** 9 BBC: Brazil claims backing on uranium Last Updated: Wednesday, 24 November, 2004 [Brazil's Resende nuclear plant ] Full production may not begin until summer of 2005 Brazil has announced it will begin enriching uranium officially, saying it has received the approval of the United Nations' nuclear watchdog. International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors paid a "successful" visit to the Resende enrichment plant in October, a minister told reporters. Science and Technology Minister Eduardo Campos said production of enriched uranium would start within months. However, an IAEA official told the BBC no final agreement had been reached. The spokesman told the BBC the IAEA was still completing its assessment of Resende. The BBC's Steve Kingstone reports from Sao Paulo that the agency is conscious of the need for consistency in its work at a time when it is also dealing with Iran on the same issue. Privately, agency officials say a deal with Brazil is close and could be announced in the next fortnight but it seems that in its excitement the Brazilian government may have jumped the gun, our correspondent notes. Espionage fears Mr Campos said on Wednesday that an IAEA team had visited Resende to verify information on work at the closely guarded plant. "The visit was considered completely successful by both sides," he said. "It means that from the point of view of international safeguards, the plant can start working." He added that tests could start "immediately" though it could be eight months before production of fuel for nuclear reactors would begin. The government had been refusing to show all of its centrifuge technology responsible for enrichment. It had argued that its hardware was more advanced than that of other countries and must be protected from industrial espionage. Brazil has two nuclear power reactors - Angra I and Angra II - and is considering constructing of a third. There was speculation earlier in the week that visiting Russian President Vladimir Putin might offer some nuclear deal but nothing was announced. However, Mr Putin did pledge help for Brazil's oil sector, its space programme and its bid for a seat on the UN Security Council. ***************************************************************** 10 NRC: NRC to Discuss Performance Improvement Actions at Salem and Hope Creek Nuclear Power Plants News Release - Region I - 2004-05 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Office of Public Affairs, Region I No. I-04-053 November 24, 2004 CONTACT: Diane Screnci (610) 337-5330 Neil A. Sheehan (610) 337-5331 E-mail: opa1@nrc.gov Managers from Public Service Electric and Gas (PSEG), the operator of the Salem and Hope Creek nuclear power plants, will meet with Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff on Dec. 2 to review the companys ongoing efforts to improve the work environment at the site. The plants are located in Hancocks Bridge (Salem County), N.J. The meeting is scheduled to begin at 7 p.m. at the Bridgeview Inn (formerly a Ramada Inn), at 1612 N. DuPont Highway in New Castle, Del. The hotel is located adjacent to the intersection of Interstate 295 and U.S. 13 North. Directions are available at: http://www.bridgeviewinnde.com/Maps_Directions.htm[exit icon] . Members of the public are invited to attend the meeting. Following the discussion of issues between NRC staff and PSEG representatives, NRC staff will answer questions posed by the public. Among the areas to be discussed at the meeting are: the fostering of a safety conscious work environment, or an environment conducive to the raising and addressing of safety issues; problem identification and resolution; adherence to procedures and other elements of human performance; the quality of engineering products, particularly as they relate to the evaluation of degraded equipment and associated operational decision-making; and the role and function of quality assurance at the site. These areas were specifically identified in a July 30th letter from the NRC to PSEG regarding work environment issues at the Salem and Hope Creek plants, as well as in an Aug. 30th letter from the NRC to the company addressing the agencys mid-year assessment of performance at the facility. The Dec. 2nd meeting is consistent with a commitment made by PSEG earlier this year to keep the NRC updated on its performance improvement initiatives and their results. The NRC has conducted numerous on-site reviews and continues to closely track progress toward resolving work environment issues at the Salem and Hope Creek plants, NRC Region I Administrator Samuel Collins said. This meeting provides us with an opportunity for a public update on the status of the efforts being made to address these concerns. Background information on the Salem and Hope Creek work environment issues was previously available on the NRC web site in the ADAMS electronic document system, under Accession Number ML040610856. The web address for the ADAMS system is www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. That system is temporarily unavailable to the public while the agency reviews publicly available documents to ensure that potentially sensitive information is removed from the web site. However, the Salem and Hope Creek documents will be accessible through the system upon its restoration. In addition, hard copies of the documents will be available at the Dec. 2 meeting. The NRC staff plans to conduct a separate meeting with PSEG to discuss its review of, and corrective actions for, a steam line failure and shutdown with complications that occurred at Hope Creek on Oct. 10, as well as other issues that have emerged during the current refueling and maintenance outage for that unit. That meeting will take place prior to the restart of Hope Creek. Once that meeting is formally scheduled, details will be provided in an NRC press release and on the agencys web site at www.nrc.gov. Last revised Wednesday, November 24, 2004 ***************************************************************** 11 Bellona: US Energy giant Westinghouse to supply nuclear fuel to Ukraine next year The Yuzhna Nuclear Power Station in southern Ukraine will begin experimental use of six Westinghouse-supplied nuclear fuel cartridges at reactor no. 3 next summer. 2004-11-24 15:11 The Interfax news agency reported about that on October 28. The fuel will be delivered not before the next summer when the third reactor will undergo repairs. The Westinghouse representatives completed installation of the nuclear assemblies monitoring system. This system is necessary, as the American nuclear fuel assemblies are different from the Russian ones. The tests of the American monitoring system will undergo at the same time with the operating Russian nuclear fuel monitoring system. Currently, the Russian Corporation TVEL supplies all the fuel used by all the 15 Ukrainian reactors. Ukraine is considering the USA as alternative nuclear fuel supplier. It was planned to test US fuel last year, but the project was dragged out. Publisher: Bellona Foundation, President: Frederic Hauge Information: info@bellona.no, Technical contact: webmaster@bellona.no Telephone: +47 23 23 46 00 Telefax: +47 22 38 38 62 * P.O.Box 2141 Grunerlokka, 0505 Oslo, Norway ***************************************************************** 12 BBC: Lithuania to close nuclear plant Last Updated: Wednesday, 24 November, 2004 By Steven Paulikas BBC News, Vilnius [Ignalina nuclear reactor] Campaigners are worried about the safety of Ignalina The Lithuanian government has decided to close one of two reactors at its controversial Chernobyl-style nuclear power plant. The government said it would close the first reactor at the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant by 31 December. Some say the plant, a key source of electricity in the region, is a major disaster waiting to happen. The decision makes good on a promise Lithuania made when it originally negotiated to join the European Union. Lithuania claims the plant, which supplies almost 80% of the country's electricity, is safe. But European experts warn it could cause widespread destruction in case of an accident, because of its Soviet-era design. Tensions heated up earlier this month when Prime Minister Algirdas Brazauskas hinted at keeping the first reactor running well into next year. His announcement came despite a promise of almost two billion euros (Ł1.3bn) from the EU, to help Lithuania close the plant. A second reactor is scheduled for decommissioning in 2009. In the meantime, Lithuania and its neighbours will have to find an alternative source of electricity in this highly nuclear-dependent region. ***************************************************************** 13 CNEWS - Canada: Bruce Power offered aging reactor deal November 24, 2004 By CHRIS MORRIS Monday, a group of activists and afflicted Idahoans wrote Idaho Attorney General Lawrence Wasden, asking for his help."> Rickards also suggested a constitutional amendment could be introduced to protect states from future nuclear testing. "If you can change the Constitution for Arnold Schwarzenegger to run (for president), you can change the Constitution for this," he said. Dan Boydcovers higher education, politics and natural resource issues for the Journal. He can be reached at 239-3168 or by e-mail at dboyd@journalnet.com. Copyright © 2004 Pocatello Idaho State Journal P O Box 431 Pocatello, ID 83204-0431 ***************************************************************** 26 Harwich Oracle: Cape Downwinders aim to be prepared for the worst TownOnline.com - By Douglas Karlson/ dkarlson@cnc.com Wednesday, November 24, 2004Do you have a supply of potassium iodide pills to take in case there's an emergency at the Pilgrim nuclear reactor in Plymouth? Dr. Milton Hirshberg of Harwich does, and he thinks you should, too. For several years, Hirshberg, who belongs to Cape Downwinders, has advocated for the government to provide and distribute potassium iodide (also called KI), which can prevent thyroid cancer, one of many serious dangers posed by radiation leaks following a nuclear reactor mishap. Now, perhaps due to post 9/11 security concerns, the state is responding, and it looks like the Downwinders will soon get what they want. According to Nicole St. Peter, director of public affairs for the Massachusetts Department of Public Health, her department is reaching out to a couple of towns in the region that haven't told the state how many pills they need. "Once we have the numbers we're going to place the order," said St. Peter. "Then we would begin the distribution process." Lessons from Russia According to David Agnew, a Chatham resident and coordinator for the Cape Downwinders, "After Chernobyl... people [in Russia] did not receive KI. They now have a thyroid cancer epidemic." The cancer rate, he said, is more than 100 times greater than it was before the accident. People in a similarly exposed area in Poland, however, received 11 million doses of KI, generally about one dose per person, he said. For the Poles, said Agnew, there was no increase in the rate of thyroid cancer, and there were only two allergic reactions to the medication. Just having a stockpile of pills at the local board of health isn't the answer, explained Agnew. The pills must be distributed in advance. That's because the pills work by saturating the thyroid gland so it doesn't absorb radioactive iodide when radioactive gas from a reactor leak wafts into town. It's therefore essential that the pills be taken before the radioactive cloud passes over. "It's not a panacea," said Agnew. In the event of a nuclear melt down, "a whole host of radio nuclides or radioactive isotopes" would be released into the air. But the largest component in that cloud would be radioactive iodine. In gas form, this would affect a particularly vulnerable organ, the thyroid gland. What it costs Potassium iodide pills are not expensive. Individually foil wrapped, Agnew estimated, they cost about $1 each. In a bottle, he says the cost is closer to 10 cents per pill. Agnew estimated that one dose for every child on Cape Cod would cost less that $6,000. "We could run a bake sale" and pay for them, said Hirshberg. But it's not simply a question of cost, there's a need for government to be involved to organize the medicine's distribution. "I think the most important thing is to have it in schools," said Agnew, because children are more susceptible to all forms of radiation. Through an organized effort by schools and local government, parents could be educated and the necessary consent forms could be signed in advance. While many countries, including the U.K.'s England, Scotland and Wales, Japan, South Africa, and, now, Russia, have distributed potassium iodide as a precaution for years, it hasn't been U.S. policy, said Agnew. But during the past few years opinion began to change. According to Agnew, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission now favors the distribution of potassium iodide pills, having reversed its earlier position. The law The Downwinders were supported in their cause by the Massachusetts Medical Society. In 2002, Hirshberg, a retired physician, petitioned the society to adopt a resolution calling for the state to distribute KI to Cape towns to protect against injury from radio-iodine. Hirshberg said the society went one step farther and called on the state to offer the pills to all towns in Massachusetts. In 2002, a Massachusetts state law was enacted, providing potassium iodide pills to all Massachusetts towns that request them. In response, most Cape towns voted overwhelmingly for resolutions to request the pills. The process, however, has been slow. "Naively, I thought when the law was passed we were set," said Agnew. "From my perspective the state has been dragging its feet on this." He attributes the delays to "bureaucratic sluggishness." Agnew said that Duxbury decided not to wait for the state to supply potassium iodide and obtained a supply on its own. Chatham, said Agnew, was "poised to do the same thing." He said the town then decided to wait since it appeared the state would provide the pills free of charge. Practical matters According to Harwich health director Paula Champagne, "there's more to it than requesting pills." She said she and the health directors of other Cape towns meet regularly at the county level. One of the topics they've been discussing is a distribution plan for KI pills, how schools should participate, how the pills will be packaged, and what their shelf life is. "We were asked to fill out a survey, and that generated a lot of questions on our part," Champagne explained. She said earlier this year there was some miscommunication between the state Department of Health and town health offices. Some surveys were sent to boards of selectmen in February and not forwarded to health officials. Later, duplicate surveys were sent to health departments. According to FDA, the shelf life for the pills is five years. But studies suggest it might be twice that, reported Hirshberg. According to the label on Hirshberg's bottle, adverse reaction may occur in one out of 10 million children. People who are allergic to iodine shouldn't take the pill, said Agnew. Those people know they're allergic because they can't eat table salt or fish, he explained. An adult would take one pill a day for the period of exposure to fallout. "Hopefully, it would be a short time, a day or two," said Agnew. By then either the danger would have passed or the people would have been evacuated. In addition to lobbying for the distribution of KI pills, the Cape Downwinders are concerned about the lack of an emergency plan for the Cape in the event of the a disaster at Pilgrim. (Pilgrim is seeking to extend its operating license for 20 years after its current license expires in 2012.) Any government's first responsibility, whether it be at the local level or federal level, is for the protection of its citizens, said Agnew. Otherwise, he asked, "what's the purpose of a government?... It seems to us a no-brainer." © Copyright of CNC and Herald Interactive Advertising Systems, ***************************************************************** 27 NRC: Notice of Opportunity To Comment on Model Safety Evaluation on FR Doc 04-26008 [Federal Register: November 24, 2004 (Volume 69, Number 226)] [Notices] [Page 68412-68420] From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr24no04-116] Technical Specification Improvement To Modify Requirements Regarding the Addition of LCO 3.0.8 on the Inoperability of Snubbers Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission. ACTION: Request for comment. SUMMARY: Notice is hereby given that the staff of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has prepared a model safety evaluation (SE) relating to the impact of inoperable non-technical specification snubbers on supported systems in technical specifications (TS). The NRC staff has also prepared a model no-significant-hazards-consideration (NSHC) determination relating to this matter. The purpose of these models is to permit the NRC to efficiently process amendments that propose to add an LCO 3.0.8 that provides a delay time for entering a supported system TS when the inoperability is due solely to an inoperable snubber, if risk is assessed and managed. Licensees of nuclear power reactors to which the models apply could then request amendments, confirming the applicability of the SE and NSHC determination to their reactors. The NRC staff is requesting comment on the model SE and model NSHC determination prior to announcing their availability for referencing in license amendment applications. DATES: The comment period expires December 27, 2004. Comments received after this date will be considered if it is practical to do so, but the Commission is able to ensure consideration only for comments received on or before this date. ADDRESSES: Comments may be submitted either electronically or via U.S. mail. Submit written comments to Chief, Rules and Directives Branch, Division of Administrative Services, Office of Administration, Mail Stop: T-6 D59, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001. Hand deliver comments to: 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland, between 7:45 a.m. and 4:15 p.m. on Federal workdays. Copies of comments received may be examined at the NRC's Public Document Room, 11555 Rockville Pike (Room O-1F21), Rockville, Maryland. Comments may be submitted by electronic mail to CLIIP@nrc.gov. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Tom Boyce, Mail Stop: O-12H4, Division of Inspection Program Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, telephone 301-415-0184. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Background Regulatory Issue Summary 2000-06, ``Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process for Adopting Standard Technical Specification Changes for Power Reactors,'' was issued on March 20, 2000. The consolidated line item improvement process (CLIIP) is intended to improve the efficiency of NRC licensing processes by processing proposed changes to the standard technical specifications (STS) in a manner that supports subsequent license amendment applications. The CLIIP includes an opportunity for the public to comment on a proposed change to the STS after a preliminary assessment by the NRC staff and a finding that the change will likely be offered for adoption by licensees. This notice solicits comment on a proposed change that allows a delay time for entering a supported system TS when the inoperability is due solely to an inoperable snubber, if risk is assessed and managed. The CLIIP directs the NRC staff to evaluate any comments received for a proposed change to the STS and to either reconsider the change or announce the availability of the change for adoption by licensees. Licensees opting to apply for this TS change are responsible for reviewing the staff's evaluation, referencing the applicable technical justifications, and providing any necessary plant- specific information. Each amendment application made in response to the notice of availability will be processed and noticed in accordance with applicable rules and NRC procedures. This notice involves the addition of LCO 3.0.8 to the TS which provides a delay time for entering a supported system TS when the inoperability is due solely to an inoperable snubber, if risk is assessed and managed. This change was proposed for incorporation into the standard technical specifications by the owners groups participants in the Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) and is designated TSTF-372. TSTF-372 can be viewed on the NRC's Web page at http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/licensing/techspecs.html . Applicability This proposal to modify technical specification requirements by the [[Page 68413]] addition of LCO 3.0.8, as proposed in TSTF-372, is applicable to all licensees who have adopted or will adopt, in conjunction with the proposed change, technical specification requirements for a Bases control program consistent with the TS Bases Control Program described in Section 5.5 of the applicable vendor's STS. To efficiently process the incoming license amendment applications, the staff requests that each licensee applying for the changes proposed in TSTF-372 include Bases for the proposed TS consistent with the Bases proposed in TSTF-372. In addition, licensees that have not adopted requirements for a Bases control program by converting to the improved STS or by other means are requested to include the requirements for a Bases control program consistent with the STS in their application for the proposed change. The need for a Bases control program stems from the need for adequate regulatory control of some key elements of the proposal that are contained in the proposed Bases for LCO 3.0.8. The staff is requesting that the Bases be included with the proposed license amendments in this case because the changes to the TS and the changes to the associated Bases form an integral change to a plant's licensing basis. To ensure that the overall change, including the Bases, includes appropriate regulatory controls, the staff plans to condition the issuance of each license amendment on the licensee's incorporation of the changes into the Bases document and on requiring the licensee to control the changes in accordance with the Bases Control Program. The CLIIP does not prevent licensees from requesting an alternative approach or proposing the changes without the requested Bases and Bases control program. However, deviations from the approach recommended in this notice may require additional review by the NRC staff and may increase the time and resources needed for the review. Public Notices This notice requests comments from interested members of the public within 30 days of the date of publication in the Federal Register. After evaluating the comments received as a result of this notice, the staff will either reconsider the proposed change or announce the availability of the change in a subsequent notice (perhaps with some changes to the safety evaluation or the proposed no significant hazards consideration determination as a result of public comments). If the staff announces the availability of the change, licensees wishing to adopt the change must submit an application in accordance with applicable rules and other regulatory requirements. For each application the staff will publish a notice of consideration of issuance of amendment to facility operating licenses, a proposed no significant hazards consideration determination, and a notice of opportunity for a hearing. The staff will also publish a notice of issuance of an amendment to an operating license to announce the modification of requirements for mode change limitations for each plant that receives the requested change. Proposed Safety Evaluation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Consolidated Line Item Improvement, Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) Change TSTF-372; The Addition of Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.0.8 on the Inoperability of Snubbers 1.0 Introduction On April 23, 2004, the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) Risk Informed Technical Specifications Task Force (RITSTF) submitted a proposed change, TSTF-372, Revision 4, to the standard technical specifications (STS) (NUREGs 1430-1434) on behalf of the industry (TSTF-372, Revisions 1 through 3 were prior draft iterations). TSTF-372, Revision 4, is a proposal to add an STS Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.0.8, allowing a delay time for entering a supported system technical specification (TS), when the inoperability is due solely to an inoperable snubber, if risk is assessed and managed. The postulated seismic event requiring snubbers is a low-probability occurrence and the overall TS system safety function would still be available for the vast majority of anticipated challenges. This proposal is one of the industry's initiatives being developed under the risk-informed technical specifications program. These initiatives are intended to maintain or improve safety through the incorporation of risk assessment and management techniques in TS, while reducing unnecessary burden and making technical specification requirements consistent with the Commission's other risk-informed regulatory requirements, in particular the Maintenance Rule. The proposed change adds a new limiting condition of operation, LCO 3.0.8, to the TS. LCO 3.0.8 allows licensees to delay declaring an LCO not met for equipment, supported by snubbers unable to perform their associated support functions, when risk is assessed and managed. This new LCO 3.0.8 states: When one or more required snubbers are unable to perform their associated support function(s), any affected supported LCO(s) are not required to be declared not met solely for this reason if risk is assessed and managed, and: a. The snubbers not able to perform their associated support function(s) are associated with only one train or subsystem of a multiple train or subsystem supported system or are associated with a single train or subsystem supported system and are able to perform their associated support function within 72 hours; or b. The snubbers not able to perform their associated support function(s) are associated with more than one train or subsystem of a multiple train or subsystem supported system and are able to perform their associated support function within 12 hours. At the end of the specified period the required snubbers must be able to perform their associated support function(s), or the affected supported system LCO(s) shall be declared not met. 2.0 Regulatory Evaluation In 10 CFR 50.36, the Commission established its regulatory requirements related to the content of TS. Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.36, TS are required to include items in the following five specific categories related to station operation: (1) Safety limits, limiting safety system settings, and limiting control settings; (2) limiting conditions for operation (LCOs); (3) surveillance requirements (SRs); (4) design features; and (5) administrative controls. The rule does not specify the particular requirements to be included in a plant's TS. As stated in 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(i), the ``Limiting conditions for operation are the lowest functional capability or performance levels of equipment required for safe operation of the facility. When a limiting condition for operation of a nuclear reactor is not met, the licensee shall shut down the reactor or follow any remedial action permitted by the technical specification * * *.'' TS Section 3.0, on ``LCO and SR Applicability,'' provides details or ground rules for complying with the LCOs. Snubbers are chosen in lieu of rigid supports in areas where restricting thermal growth during normal operation would induce excessive stresses in the piping nozzles or other equipment. Although they are classified as component standard supports, they are not designed to provide any transmission of force during normal plant operations. However, in the presence of dynamic transient loadings, which are induced by seismic events as well as by plant accidents and transients, a snubber functions as a rigid support. The location and size of the [[Page 68414]] snubbers are determined by stress analysis based on different combinations of load conditions, depending on the design classification of the particular piping. Prior to the conversion to the improved STS, TS requirements applied directly to snubbers. These requirements included: A requirement that snubbers be functional and in service when the supported equipment is required to be operable, A requirement that snubber removal for testing be done only during plant shutdown, A requirement that snubber removal for testing be done on a one-at-a-time basis when supported equipment is required to be operable during shutdown, A requirement to repair or replace within 72 hours any snubbers, found to be inoperable during operation in Modes 1 through 4, to avoid declaring any supported equipment inoperable, A requirement that each snubber be demonstrated operable by periodic visual inspections, and A requirement to perform functional tests on a representative sample of at least 10% of plant snubbers, at least once every 18 months during shutdown. In the late 1980s, a joint initiative of the NRC and industry was undertaken to improve the STS. This effort identified the snubbers as candidates for relocation to a licensee-controlled document based on the fact that the TS requirements for snubbers did not meet any of the four criteria in 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) for inclusion in the improved STS. The NRC approved the relocation without placing any restriction on the use of the relocated requirements. However, this relocation resulted in different interpretations between the NRC and the industry regarding its implementation. The NRC has stated, that since snubbers are supporting safety equipment that is in the TS, the definition of Operability must be used to immediately evaluate equipment supported by a removed snubber and, if found inoperable, the appropriate TS required actions must be entered. This interpretation has in practice eliminated the 72-hour delay to enter the actions for the supported equipment that existed prior to the conversion to the improved STS (the only exception is if the supported system has been analyzed and determined to be Operable without the snubber). The industry has argued that since the NRC approved the relocation without placing any restriction on the use of the relocated requirements, the licensee controlled document requirements for snubbers should be invoked before the supported system's TS requirements become applicable. The industry's interpretation would, in effect, restore the 72-hour delay to enter the actions for the supported equipment that existed prior to the conversion to the improved STS. However, prior to the conversion to the improved STS, the delay was applicable only to snubbers found to be inoperable (i.e., to emergent conditions only). The industry's interpretation would allow a time delay for all conditions, including snubber removal for testing at power, that was not allowed prior to the conversion to the improved STS. The option to relocate the snubbers to a licensee controlled document, as part of the conversion to improved STS, has resulted in non-uniform and inconsistent treatment of snubbers. On the one hand, plants that have relocated snubbers from their TS are allowed to change the TS requirements for snubbers under the auspices of 10 CFR 50.59, but they are not allowed a 72-hour delay before they enter the actions for the supported equipment. On the other hand, plants that have not converted to improved STS have retained the 72-hour delay if snubbers are found to be inoperable, but they are not allowed to use 10 CFR 50.59 to change TS requirements for snubbers. It should also be noted that a few plants that converted to the improved STS chose not to relocate the snubbers to a licensee-controlled document and, thus, retained the 72-hour delay. In addition, it is important to note that unlike plants that have not relocated, plants that have relocated can perform functional tests on the snubbers at power (as long as they enter the actions for the supported equipment) and at the same time can reduce the testing frequency (as compared to plants that have not relocated) if it is justified by 10 CFR 50.59 assessments. Some potential undesirable consequences of this inconsistent treatment of snubbers are: Performance of testing during crowded time period windows when the supported system is inoperable with the potential to reduce the snubber testing to a minimum since the relocated snubber requirements are controlled by the licensee, Performance of testing during crowded windows when the supported system is inoperable with the potential to increase the unavailability of safety systems, and Performance of testing and maintenance on snubbers affecting multiple trains of the same supported system during the 7 hours allotted before entering MODE 3 under LCO 3.0.3. To remove the inconsistency in the treatment of snubbers among plants, the TSTF proposed a risk-informed TS change that introduces a delay time before entering the actions for the supported equipment, when one or more snubbers are found inoperable or removed for testing, if risk is assessed and managed. Such a delay time will provide needed flexibility in the performance of maintenance and testing during power operation and at the same time will enhance overall plant safety by: Avoiding unnecessary unscheduled plant shutdowns and, thus, minimizing plant transition and realignment risks, Avoiding reduced snubber testing, and thus increasing the availability of snubbers to perform their supporting function, Performing most of the required testing and maintenance during the delay time when the supported system is available to mitigate most challenges and, thus, avoiding increases in safety system unavailability, and Providing explicit risk-informed guidance in areas in which that guidance currently does not exist, such as the treatment of snubbers impacting more than one redundant train of a supported system. The proposed TS change is described in Sections 1.0 and 2.0. The technical evaluation and approach used to assess its risk impact is discussed in Section 3.0. The results and insights of the risk assessment are presented and discussed in Section 3.1. Section 3.2 summarizes the staff's conclusions from the review of the proposed TS change. 3.0 Technical Evaluation The industry submitted TSTF-372, Revision 4, ``Addition of LCO 3.0.8, Inoperability of Snubbers'' in support of the proposed TS change. This submittal (Ref. 1) documents a risk-informed analysis of the proposed TS change. Probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) results and insights are used, in combination with deterministic and defense-in- depth arguments, to identify and justify delay times for entering the actions for the supported equipment associated with inoperable snubbers at nuclear power plants. This is in accordance with guidance provided in Regulatory Guides (RGs) 1.174 and 1.177 (Refs. 2 and 3, respectively). The risk impact associated with the proposed delay times for entering the TS actions for the supported equipment can be assessed using the same approach as for allowed completion time (CT) extensions. Therefore, the risk [[Page 68415]] assessment was performed following the three-tiered approach recommended in RG 1.177 for evaluating proposed extensions in currently allowed CTs: The first tier involves the assessment of the change in plant risk due to the proposed TS change. Such risk change is expressed (1) by the change in the average yearly core damage frequency ([Delta]CDF) and the average yearly large early release frequency ([Delta]LERF) and (2) by the incremental conditional core damage probability (ICCDP) and the incremental conditional large early release probability (ICLERP). The assessed [Delta]CDF and [Delta]LERF values are compared to acceptance guidelines, consistent with the Commission's Safety Goal Policy Statement as documented in RG 1.174, so that the plant's average baseline risk is maintained within a minimal range. The assessed ICCDP and ICLERP values are compared to acceptance guidelines provided in RG 1.177, which aim at ensuring that the plant risk does not increase unacceptably during the period the equipment is taken out of service. The second tier involves the identification of potentially high-risk configurations that could exist if equipment in addition to that associated with the change were to be taken out of service simultaneously, or other risk-significant operational factors such as concurrent equipment testing were also involved. The objective is to ensure that appropriate restrictions are in place to avoid any potential high-risk configurations. The third tier involves the establishment of an overall configuration risk management program (CRMP) to ensure that potentially risk-significant configurations resulting from maintenance and other operational activities are identified. The objective of the CRMP is to manage configuration-specific risk by appropriate scheduling of plant activities and/or appropriate compensatory measures. A simplified bounding risk assessment was performed to justify the proposed addition of LCO 3.0.8 to the TS. This approach was necessitated by (1) the general nature of the proposed TS changes (i.e., they apply to all plants and are associated with an undetermined number of snubbers that are not able to perform their function), (2) the lack of detailed engineering analyses that establish the relationship between earthquake level and supported system pipe failure probability when one or more snubbers are inoperable, and (3) the lack of seismic risk assessment models for most plants. The simplified risk assessment is based on the following major assumptions, which the staff finds acceptable, as discussed below: The accident sequences contributing to the risk increase associated with the proposed TS changes are assumed to be initiated by a seismically-induced loss-of-offsite-power (LOOP) event with concurrent loss of all safety system trains supported by the out-of- service snubbers. In the case of snubbers associated with more than one train (or subsystem) of the same system, it is assumed that all affected trains (or subsystems) of the supported system are failed. This assumption was introduced to allow the performance of a simple bounding risk assessment approach with application to all plants. This approach was selected due to the lack of detailed plant-specific seismic risk assessments for most plants and the lack of fragility data for piping when one or more supporting snubbers are inoperable. The LOOP event is assumed to occur due to the seismically- induced failure of the ceramic insulators used in the power distribution systems. These ceramic insulators have a high confidence (95%) of low probability (5%) of failure (HCLPF) of about 0.1g, expressed in terms of peak ground acceleration. Thus, a magnitude 0.1g earthquake is conservatively assumed to have 5% probability of causing a LOOP initiating event. The fact that no LOOP events caused by higher magnitude earthquakes were considered is justified because (1) the frequency of earthquakes decreases with increasing magnitude and (2) historical data (References 4 and 5) indicate that the mean seismic capacity of ceramic insulators (used in seismic PRAs), in terms of peak ground acceleration, is about 0.3g, which is significantly higher than the 0.1g HCLPF value. Therefore, the simplified analysis, even though it does not consider LOOP events caused by earthquakes of magnitude higher than 0.1g, bounds a detailed analysis which would use mean seismic failure probabilities (fragilities) for the ceramic insulators. Analytical and experimental results obtained in the mid- eighties as part of the industry's ``Snubber Reduction Program'' (References 4 and 6) indicated that piping systems have large margins against seismic stress. The assumption that a magnitude 0.1g earthquake would cause the failure of all safety system trains supported by the out-of-service snubbers is very conservative because safety piping systems could withstand much higher seismic stresses even when one or more supporting snubbers are out of service. The actual piping failure probability is a function of the stress allowable and the number of snubbers removed for maintenance or testing. Since the licensee controlled testing is done on only a small (about 10%) representative sample of the total snubber population, it is not expected to have more than a few snubbers supporting a given safety system out for testing at a time. Furthermore, since the testing of snubbers is a planned activity, licensees have flexibility in selecting a sample set of snubbers for testing from a much larger population by conducting configuration-specific engineering and/or risk assessments. Such a selection of snubbers for testing provides confidence that the supported systems would perform their functions in the presence of a design-basis earthquake and other dynamic loads and, in any case, the risk impact of the activity will remain within the limits of acceptability defined in risk-informed RGs 1.174 and 1.177. The analysis assumes that one train (or subsystem) of all safety systems is unavailable during snubber testing or maintenance (an entire system is assumed unavailable if a removed snubber is associated with both trains of a two-train system). This is a very conservative assumption for the case of corrective maintenance since it is unlikely that a visual inspection will reveal that one or more snubbers across all supported systems are inoperable. This assumption is also conservative for the case of the licensee-controlled testing of snubbers since such testing is performed only on a small representative sample. In general, no credit is taken for recovery actions and alternative means of performing a function, such as the function performed by a system assumed failed (e.g., when LCO 3.0.8b applies). However, most plants have reliable alternative means of performing certain critical functions. For example, feed and bleed (F) can be used to remove heat in most pressurized water reactors (PWRs) when auxiliary feedwater (AFW), the most important system in mitigating LOOP accidents, is unavailable. Similarly, if high pressure makeup (e.g., reactor core isolation cooling) and heat removal capability (e.g., suppression pool cooling) are unavailable in boiling water reactors (BWRs), reactor depressurization in conjunction with low pressure makeup (e.g., low pressure coolant injection) and heat removal capability (e.g., shutdown cooling) can be used to cool the core. A 10% failure probability for recovery actions to provide core cooling using alternative means is assumed for Diablo Canyon, the only West Coast PWR plant [[Page 68416]] with F capability, when a snubber impacting more than one train of the AFW system (i.e., when LCO 3.0.8b is applicable) is out of service. This failure probability value is significantly higher than the value of 2.2E-2 used in Diablo Canyon's PRA. Furthermore, Diablo Canyon has analyzed the impact of a single limiting snubber failure, and concluded that no single snubber failure would impact two trains of AFW. No credit for recovery actions to provide core cooling using alternative means is necessary for West Coast PWR plants with no F capability because it has been determined that there is no single snubber whose non-functionality would disable two trains of AFW in a seismic event of magnitude up to the plant's safe shutdown earthquake (SSE). It should be noted that a similar credit could have been applied to most Central and Eastern U.S. plants but this was not necessary to demonstrate the low risk impact of the proposed TS change due to the lower earthquake frequencies at Central and Eastern U.S. plants as compared to West Coast plants. The earthquake frequency at the 0.1g level was assumed to be 1E-3/year for Central and Eastern U.S. plants and 1E-1/year for West Coast plants. Each of these two values envelop the range of earthquake frequency values at the 0.1g level, for Eastern U.S. and West Coast sites, respectively (References 5 and 7). The risk impact associated with non-LOOP accident sequences (e.g., seismically initiated loss-of-coolant-accident (LOCA) or anticipated-transient-without-scram (ATWS) sequences) was not assessed. However, this risk impact is small compared to the risk impact associated with the LOOP accident sequences modeled in the simplified bounding risk assessment. Non-LOOP accident sequences, due to the ruggedness of nuclear power plant designs, require seismically- induced failures that occur at earthquake levels above 0.3g. Thus, the frequency of earthquakes initiating non-LOOP accident sequences is much smaller than the frequency of seismically-initiated LOOP events. Furthermore, because of the conservative assumption made for LOOP sequences that a 0.1g level earthquake would fail all piping associated with inoperable snubbers, non-LOOP sequences would not include any more failures associated with inoperable snubbers than LOOP sequences. Therefore, the risk impact of inoperable snubbers associated with non- LOOP accident sequences is small compared to the risk impact associated with the LOOP accident sequences modeled in the simplified bounding risk assessment. The risk impact of dynamic loadings other than seismic loads is not assessed. These shock-type loads include thrust loads, blowdown loads, waterhammer loads, steamhammer loads, LOCA loads and pipe rupture loads. However, there are some important distinctions between non-seismic (shock-type) loads and seismic loads which indicate that, in general, the risk impact of the out-of-service snubbers is smaller for non-seismic loads than for seismic loads. First, while a seismic load affects the entire plant, the impact of a non-seismic load is localized to a certain system or area of the plant. Second, although non-seismic shock loads may be higher in total force and the impact could be as much or more than seismic loads, generally they are of much shorter duration than seismic loads. Third, the impact of non-seismic loads is more plant specific, and thus harder to analyze generically, than for seismic loads. For these reasons, licensees will be required to perform an engineering assessment every time LCO 3.0.8 is used and show that at least one train of each system that is supported by the inoperable snubber(s) would remain capable of performing their required safety or support functions for postulated design loads other than seismic loads. 3.1 Risk Assessment Results and Insights The results and insights from the implementation of the three- tiered approach of RG 1.177 to support the proposed addition of LCO 3.0.8 to the TS are summarized and evaluated in the following sections 3.1.1 to 3.1.3. 3.1.1 Risk Impact The bounding risk assessment approach, discussed in section 3.0, was implemented generically for all U.S. operating nuclear power plants. Risk assessments were performed for two categories of plants, Central and East Coast plants and West Coast plants, based on historical seismic hazard curves (earthquake frequencies and associated magnitudes). The first category, Central and East Coast plants, includes the vast majority of the U.S. nuclear power plant population (Reference 7). For each category of plants, two risk assessments were performed: The first risk assessment applies to cases where all inoperable snubbers are associated with only one train (or subsystem) of the impacted safety systems. It was conservatively assumed that a single train (or subsystem) of each safety system is unavailable. It was also assumed that the probability of non-mitigation using the unaffected redundant trains (or subsystems) is 2%. This is a conservative value given that for core damage to occur under those conditions, two or more failures are required. The second risk assessment applies to the case where one or more of the inoperable snubbers are associated with multiple trains (or subsystems) of the same safety systems. It was assumed in this bounding analysis that all safety systems are unavailable to mitigate the accident, except for West Coast PWR plants. Credit for using F to provide core cooling is taken for plants having F capability (e.g., Diablo Canyon) when a snubber impacting more than one train of the AFW system is inoperable. Credit for one AFW train to provide core cooling is taken for West Coast PWR plants with no F capability (e.g., San Onofre) because it has been determined that there is no single snubber whose non-functionality would disable two trains of AFW in a seismic event of magnitude up to the plant's safe shutdown earthquake (SSE). The results of the performed risk assessments, in terms of core damage and large early release risk impacts, are summarized in Table 1. The first row lists the conditional risk increase, in terms of CDF (core damage frequency), [Delta]RCDF, caused by the out-of- service snubbers (as assumed in the bounding analysis). The second and third rows list the ICCDP (incremental conditional core damage probability) and the ICLERP (incremental conditional large early release probability) values, respectively. The ICCDP for the case where all inoperable snubbers are associated with only one train (or subsystem) of the supported safety systems, was obtained by multiplying the corresponding [Delta]RCDF value by the time fraction of the proposed 72-hour delay to enter the actions for the supported equipment. The ICCDP for the case where one or more of the inoperable snubbers are associated with multiple trains (or subsystems) of the same safety system, was obtained by multiplying the corresponding [Delta]RCDF value by the time fraction of the proposed 12- hour delay to enter the actions for the supported equipment. The ICLERP values were obtained by multiplying the corresponding ICCDP values by 0.1 (i.e., by assuming that the ICLERP value is an order of magnitude less than the ICCDP). This assumption is conservative since containment bypass scenarios, such as steam generator tube rupture accidents and interfacing system loss-of-coolant accidents, would not be [[Page 68417]] uniquely affected by the out-of-service snubbers. Finally, the fourth and fifth rows list the assessed [Delta]CDF and [Delta]LERF values, respectively. These values were obtained by dividing the corresponding ICCDP and ICLERP values by 1.5 (i.e., by assuming that the snubbers are tested every 18 months, as was the case before the snubbers were relocated to a licensee-controlled document). This assumption is reasonable because (1) it is not expected that licensees would test the snubbers more often than what used to be required by the TS, and (2) testing of snubbers is associated with higher risk impact than the average corrective maintenance of snubbers found inoperable by visual inspection (testing is expected to involve significantly more snubbers out of service than corrective maintenance). The assessed [Delta]CDF and [Delta]LERF values are compared to acceptance guidelines, consistent with the Commission's Safety Goal Policy Statement as documented in RG 1.174, so that the plant's average baseline risk is maintained within a minimal range. This comparison indicates that the addition of LCO 3.0.8 to the existing TS would have an insignificant risk impact. Table 1.--Bounding Risk Assessment Results for Snubbers Impacting a Single Train and Multiple Trains of a Supported System ----------------------------------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------------- Central and east coast plants West coast plants ----------------------------------------------------------------- ------------ Single train Multiple train Single train Multiple train ----------------------------------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------------- [Delta]RCDF/yr.................... 1E-6 5E-6 1E-4 5E-4 ICCDP............................. 8E-9 7E-9 8E-7 7E-7 ICLERP............................ 8E-10 7E-10 8E-8 7E-8 [Delta]CDF/yr..................... 5E-9 5E-9 5E-7 5E-7 [Delta]LERF/yr.................... 5E-10 5E-10 5E-8 5E-8 ----------------------------------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------------- The assessed [Delta]CDF and [Delta]LERF values meet the acceptance criteria of 1E-6/year and 1E-7/year, respectively, based on guidance provided in RG 1.174. This conclusion is true without taking any credit for the removal of potential undesirable consequences associated with the current inconsistent treatment of snubbers (e.g., reduced snubber testing frequency, increased safety system unavailability and treatment of snubbers impacting multiple trains) discussed in Section 1 above, and given the bounding nature of the risk assessment. The assessed ICCDP and ICLERP values are compared to acceptance guidelines provided in RG 1.177, which aim at ensuring that the plant risk does not increase unacceptably during the period the equipment is taken out of service. This comparison indicates that the addition of LCO 3.0.8 to the existing TS meets the RG 1.177 numerical guidelines of 5E-7 for ICCDP and 5E-8 for ICLERP. The small deviations shown for West Coast plants are acceptable because of the bounding nature of the risk assessments, as discussed in section 2. The risk assessment results of Table 1 are also compared to guidance provided in the revised section 11 of NUMARC 93-01, Revision 2 (Reference 8), endorsed by RG 1.182 (Reference 9), for implementing the requirements of paragraph (a)(4) of the Maintenance Rule, 10 CFR 50.65. Such guidance is summarized in Table 2. Guidance regarding the acceptability of conditional risk increase in terms of CDF (i.e., [Delta]RCDF) for a planned configuration is provided. This guidance states that a specific configuration that is associated with a CDF higher than 1E-3/year should not be entered voluntarily. Since the assessed conditional risk increase, [Delta]RCDF, is significantly less than 1E-3/year, plant configurations including out of service snubbers and other equipment may be entered voluntarily if supported by the results of the risk assessment required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4), by LCO 3.0.8, or by other TS. Table 2.--Guidance for Implementing 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) ----------------------------------------------------------------- ------- [Delta]RCDF Guidance ----------------------------------------------------------------- ------- Greater than 1E-3/year................. Configuration should not normally be entered voluntarily. ----------------------------------------------------------------- ------- ICCDP Guidance ICLERP ----------------------------------------------------------------- ------- Greater than 1E-5............. Configuration should Greater than 1E- not normally be 6. entered voluntarily. 1E-6 to 1E-5.................. Assess non- 1E-7 to 1E-6. quantifiable factors. Establish risk management actions.. Less than 1E-6................ Normal work controls.. Less than 1E-7. ----------------------------------------------------------------- ------- Guidance regarding the acceptability of ICCDP and ICLERP values for a specific planned configuration and the establishment of risk management actions is also provided in NUMARC 93-01. This guidance, as shown in Table 2, states that a specific plant configuration that is associated with ICCDP and ICLERP values below 1E-6 and 1E-7, respectively, is considered to require ``normal work controls.'' Table 1 shows that for the majority of plants (i.e., for all plants in the Central and East Coast category) the conservatively assessed ICCDP and ICLERP values are over an order of magnitude less than what is recommended as the threshold for the ``normal work controls'' region. For West Coast plants, the conservatively assessed ICCDP and ICLERP values are still within the ``normal work controls'' region. Thus, the risk contribution from out of service snubbers is within the normal range of maintenance activities carried out at a plant. Therefore, plant configurations involving out of service snubbers and other equipment may be entered voluntarily if supported by the results of the risk assessment required by 10 CFR [[Page 68418]] 50.65(a)(4), by LCO 3.0.8, or by other TS. However, this simplified bounding analysis indicates that for West Coast plants the provisions of LCO 3.0.8 must be used cautiously and in conjunction with appropriate management actions, especially when equipment other than snubbers is also inoperable, based on the results of configuration- specific risk assessments required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4), by LCO 3.0.8, or by other TS. The staff finds that the risk assessment results support the proposed addition of LCO 3.0.8 to the TS. The risk increases associated with this TS change will be insignificant based on guidance provided in RGs 1.174 and 1.177 and within the range of risks associated with normal maintenance activities. In addition, LCO 3.0.8 will remove potential undesirable consequences stemming from the current inconsistent treatment of snubbers in the TS, such as reduced frequency of snubber testing, increased safety system unavailability and the treatment of snubbers impacting multiple trains. 3.1.2 Identification of High-Risk Configurations The second tier of the three-tiered approach recommended in RG 1.177 involves the identification of potentially high-risk configurations that could exist if equipment, in addition to that associated with the TS change, were to be taken out of service simultaneously. Insights from the risk assessments, in conjunction with important assumptions made in the analysis and defense-in-depth considerations, were used to identify such configurations. To avoid these potentially high-risk configurations, specific restrictions to the implementation of the proposed TS changes were identified. For cases where all inoperable snubbers are associated with only one train (or subsystem) of the impacted systems (i.e., when LCO 3.0.8a applies), it was assumed in the analysis that there will be unaffected redundant trains (or subsystems) available to mitigate the seismically initiated LOOP accident sequences. This assumption implies that there will be at least one success path available when LCO 3.0.8a applies. Therefore, potentially high-risk configurations can be avoided by ensuring that such a success path exists when LCO 3.0.8a applies. Based on a review of the accident sequences that contribute to the risk increase associated with LCO 3.0.8a, as modeled by the simplified bounding analysis (i.e., accident sequences initiated by a seismically- induced LOOP event with concurrent loss of all safety system trains supported by the out of service snubbers), the following restrictions were identified to prevent potentially high-risk configurations: For PWR plants, at least one AFW train (including a minimum set of supporting equipment required for its successful operation) not associated with the inoperable snubber(s), must be available when LCO 3.0.8a is used For BWR plants, one of the following two means of heat removal must be available when LCO 3.0.8a is used: --At least one high pressure makeup path (e.g., using high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) or reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) or equivalent) and heat removal capability (e.g., suppression pool cooling), including a minimum set of supporting equipment required for success, not associated with the inoperable snubber(s), or --At least one low pressure makeup path (e.g., low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) or containment spray (CS)) and heat removal capability (e.g., suppression pool cooling or shutdown cooling), including a minimum set of supporting equipment required for success, not associated with the inoperable snubber(s). For cases where one or more of the inoperable snubbers are associated with multiple trains (or subsystems) of the same safety system (i.e., when LCO 3.0.8b applies), it was assumed in the bounding analysis that all safety systems are unavailable to mitigate the accident, except for West Coast plants. Credit for using F to provide core cooling is taken for plants having F capability (e.g., Diablo Canyon) when a snubber impacting more than one train of the AFW system is inoperable. Credit for one AFW train to provide core cooling is taken for West Coast PWR plants with no F capability (e.g., San Onofre) because it has been determined that there is no single snubber whose non-functionality would disable more than one train of AFW in a seismic event of magnitude up to the plant's safe shutdown earthquake (SSE). Based on a review of the accident sequences that contribute to the risk increase associated with LCO 3.0.8b (as modeled by the simplified bounding analysis) and defense-in-depth considerations, the following restrictions were identified to prevent potentially high-risk configurations: LCO 3.0.8b cannot be used at West Coast PWR plants with no F capability when a snubber whose non-functionality would disable more than one train of AFW in a seismic event of magnitude up to the plant's safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) is inoperable (it should be noted, however, that based on information provided by the industry, there is no plant that falls in this category). When LCO 3.0.8b is used at PWR plants, at least one AFW train (including a minimum set of supporting equipment required for its successful operation) not associated with the inoperable snubber(s), or some alternative means of core cooling (e.g., F, fire water system or ``aggressive secondary cooldown'' using the steam generators) must be available. When LCO 3.0.8b is used at BWR plants, it must be verified that at least one success path exists, using equipment not associated with the inoperable snubber(s), to provide makeup and core cooling needed to mitigate LOOP accident sequences. 3.1.3 Configuration Risk Management The third tier of the three-tiered approach recommended in RG 1.177 involves the establishment of an overall configuration risk management program (CRMP) to ensure that potentially risk-significant configurations resulting from maintenance and other operational activities are identified. The objective of the CRMP is to manage configuration-specific risk by appropriate scheduling of plant activities and/or appropriate compensatory measures. This objective is met by licensee programs to comply with the requirements of paragraph (a)(4) of the Maintenance Rule (10 CFR 50.65) to assess and manage risk resulting from maintenance activities, and by the TS requiring risk assessments and management using (a)(4) processes if no maintenance is in progress. These programs can support licensee decision making regarding the appropriate actions to manage risk whenever a risk- informed TS is entered. Since the 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) guidance, section 11 of NUMARC 93-01, does not currently address seismic risk, implementation guidance must be developed by licensees adopting this change to ensure that the proposed LCO 3.0.8 is considered with respect to other plant maintenance activities and integrated into the existing 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) process whether the process is invoked by a TS or (a)(4) itself. 3.2 Summary and Conclusions The option to relocate the snubbers to a licensee controlled document, as part of the conversion to Improved STS, has resulted in non-uniform and inconsistent treatment of snubbers. Some potential undesirable [[Page 68419]] consequences of this inconsistent treatment of snubbers are: Performance of testing during crowded windows when the supported system is inoperable with the potential to reduce the snubber testing to a minimum since the relocated snubber requirements are controlled by the licensee. Performance of testing during crowded windows when the supported system is inoperable with the potential to increase the unavailability of safety systems. Performance of testing and maintenance on snubbers affecting multiple trains of the same supported system during the 7 hours allotted before entering MODE 3 under limiting condition of operation (LCO) 3.0.3. To remove the inconsistency among plants in the treatment of snubbers, licensees are proposing a risk-informed TS change which introduces a delay time before entering the actions for the supported equipment when one or more snubbers are found inoperable or removed for testing. Such a delay time will provide needed flexibility in the performance of maintenance and testing during power operation and at the same time will enhance overall plant safety by (1) avoiding unnecessary unscheduled plant shutdowns, thus, minimizing plant transition and realignment risks; (2) avoiding reduced snubber testing, thus, increasing the availability of snubbers to perform their supporting function; (3) performing most of the required testing and maintenance during the delay time when the supported system is available to mitigate most challenges, thus, avoiding increases in safety system unavailability; and (4) providing explicit risk-informed guidance in areas in which that guidance currently does not exist, such as the treatment of snubbers impacting more than one redundant train of a supported system. The risk impact of the proposed TS changes was assessed following the three-tiered approach recommended in RG 1.177. A simplified bounding risk assessment was performed to justify the proposed TS changes. This bounding assessment assumes that the risk increase associated with the proposed addition of LCO 3.0.8 to the TS is associated with accident sequences initiated by a seismically-induced LOOP event with concurrent loss of all safety system trains supported by the out of service snubbers. In the case of snubbers associated with more than one train, it is assumed that all affected trains of the supported system are failed. This assumption was introduced to allow the performance of a simple bounding risk assessment approach with application to all plants and was selected due to the lack of detailed plant-specific seismic risk assessments for most plants and the lack of fragility data for piping when one or more supporting snubbers are inoperable. The impact from the addition of the proposed LCO 3.0.8 to the TS on defense-in-depth was also evaluated in conjunction with the risk assessment results. Based on this integrated evaluation, the staff concludes that the proposed addition of LCO 3.0.8 to the TS would lead to insignificant risk increases, if any. Indeed, this conclusion is true without taking any credit for the removal of potential undesirable consequences associated with the current inconsistent treatment of snubbers, such as the effects of avoiding a potential reduction in the snubber testing frequency and increased safety system unavailability. To be consistent with the staff's approval, licensees interested in implementing LCO 3.0.8 must, as applicable, operate in accordance with the following stipulations: 1. Appropriate plant procedures and administrative controls will be used to implement the following Tier 2 Restrictions. (a) At least one AFW train (including a minimum set of supporting equipment required for its successful operation) not associated with the inoperable snubber(s), must be available when LCO 3.0.8a is used at PWR plants. (b) At least one AFW train (including a minimum set of supporting equipment required for its successful operation) not associated with the inoperable snubber(s), or some alternative means of core cooling (e.g., F, fire water system or ``aggressive secondary cooldown'' using the steam generators) must be available when LCO 3.0.8b is used at PWR plants. (c) LCO 3.0.8b cannot be used by West Coast PWR plants with no F capability when a snubber, whose non-functionality would disable more than one train of AFW in a seismic event of magnitude up to the plant's safe shutdown earthquake (SSE), is inoperable. (d) BWR plants must verify, every time the provisions of LCO 3.0.8 are used, that at least one success path, involving equipment not associated with the inoperable snubber(s), exists to provide makeup and core cooling. (e) Every time the provisions of LCO 3.0.8 are used licensees will be required to perform a risk assessment, and an operability assessment to show that at least one train (or subsystem) of systems supported by the inoperable snubbers would remain capable of performing their required safety or support functions for postulated design loads other than seismic loads. The operability assessment, consistent with the plants licensing design basis, must be documented and available for inspection by the staff. 2. Should licensees implement the provisions of LCO 3.0.8 for snubbers, which include delay times to enter the actions for the supported equipment when one or more snubbers are out of service for maintenance or testing, it must be done in accordance with an overall configuration risk management program (CRMP) to ensure that potentially risk-significant configurations resulting from maintenance and other operational activities are identified and avoided, as discussed in the proposed TS Bases. This objective is met by licensee programs to comply with the requirements of paragraph (a)(4) of the Maintenance Rule, 10 CFR 50.65, to assess and manage risk resulting from maintenance activities or when this process is invoked by LCO 3.0.8 or other TS. These programs can support licensee decision making regarding the appropriate actions to manage risk whenever a risk-informed TS is entered. Since the 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(4) guidance, Section 11 of NUMARC 93-01, does not currently address seismic risk, implementation guidance must be developed by licensees adopting this change to ensure that the proposed LCO 3.0.8 is considered in conjunction with other plant maintenance activities and integrated into the existing 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(4) process. 4.0 State Consultation In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the [ ] State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had [(1) no comments or (2) the following comments--with subsequent disposition by the staff]. 5.0 Environmental Consideration The amendments change a requirement with respect to the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR part 20 and change surveillance requirements. [For licensees adding a Bases Control Program: The amendment also changes record keeping, reporting, or administrative procedures or requirements.] The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts and no significant change in the types of any effluents that may be [[Page 68420]] released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no-significant-hazards considerations, and there has been no public comment on the finding [FR ]. Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9) [and (c)(10)]. Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments. 6.0 Conclusion The Commission has concluded, on the basis of the considerations discussed above, that (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public. 7.0 References 1. TSTF-372, Revision 4, ``Addition of LCO 3.0.8, Inoperability of Snubbers,'' April 23, 2004. 2. Regulatory Guide 1.174, ``An Approach for Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Risk-Informed Decision Making on Plant Specific Changes to the Licensing Basis,'' USNRC, August 1998. 3. Regulatory Guide 1.177, ``An Approach for Plant Specific Risk- Informed Decision Making: Technical Specifications,'' USNRC, August 1998. 4. Budnitz, R. J. et al., ``An Approach to the Quantification of Seismic Margins in Nuclear Power Plants,'' NUREG/CR-4334, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, July 1985. 5. Advanced Light Water Reactor Utility Requirements Document, Volume 2, ALWR Evolutionary Plant, PRA Key Assumptions and Groundrules, Electric Power Research Institute, August 1990. 6. Bier V. M. et al., ``Development and Application of a Comprehensive Framework for Assessing Alternative Approaches to Snubber Reduction,'' International Topical Conference on Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Risk Management PSA '87, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, Zurich, August 30-September 4, 1987. 7. NUREG-1488, ``Revised Livermore Seismic Hazard Estimates for Sixty-Nine Nuclear Power Plant Sites East of the Rocky Mountains,'' April 1994. 8. NEI, Revised Section 11 of Revision 2 of NUMARC 93-01, May 2000. 9. Regulatory Guide 1.182, ``Assessing and Managing Risk Before Maintenance Activities at Nuclear Power Plants,'' May 2000. Proposed No-Significant-Hazards-Consideration Determination Description of Amendment Request: A change is proposed to the standard technical specifications (STS)(NUREGs 1430 through 1434) and plant specific technical specifications (TS), to allow a delay time for entering a supported system technical specification (TS) when the inoperability is due solely to an inoperable snubber, if risk is assessed and managed consistent with the program in place for complying with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4). LCO 3.0.8 will be added to individual TS providing this allowance. Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), an analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration is presented below: Criterion 1--The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant Increase in the Probability or Consequences of an Accident Previously Evaluated The proposed change allows a delay time for entering a supported system technical specification (TS) when the inoperability is due solely to an inoperable snubber if risk is assessed and managed. The postulated seismic event requiring snubbers is a low-probability occurrence and the overall TS system safety function would still be available for the vast majority of anticipated challenges. Therefore, the probability of an accident previously evaluated is not significantly increased, if at all. The consequences of an accident while relying on allowance provided by proposed LCO 3.0.8 are no different than the consequences of an accident while relying on the TS required actions in effect without the allowance provided by proposed LCO 3.0.8. Therefore, the consequences of an accident previously evaluated are not significantly affected by this change. The addition of a requirement to assess and manage the risk introduced by this change will further minimize possible concerns. Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. Criterion 2--The Proposed Change Does Not Create the Possibility of a New or Different Kind of Accident From Any Previously Evaluated The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of the plant (no new or different type of equipment will be installed). Allowing delay times for entering supported system TS when inoperability is due solely to inoperable snubbers, if risk is assessed and managed, will not introduce new failure modes or effects and will not, in the absence of other unrelated failures, lead to an accident whose consequences exceed the consequences of accidents previously evaluated. The addition of a requirement to assess and manage the risk introduced by this change will further minimize possible concerns. Thus, this change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from an accident previously evaluated. Criterion 3--The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant Reduction in the Margin of Safety The proposed change allows a delay time for entering a supported system TS when the inoperability is due solely to an inoperable snubber, if risk is assessed and managed. The postulated seismic event requiring snubbers is a low-probability occurrence and the overall TS system safety function would still be available for the vast majority of anticipated challenges. The risk impact of the proposed TS changes was assessed following the three-tiered approach recommended in RG 1.177. A bounding risk assessment was performed to justify the proposed TS changes. This application of LCO 3.0.8 is predicated upon the licensee's performance of a risk assessment and the management of plant risk. The net change to the margin of safety is insignificant. Therefore, this change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. Based upon the reasoning presented above and the previous discussion of the amendment request, the requested change does not involve a no-significant-hazards consideration. Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 18th day of November, 2004. For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Thomas H. Boyce, Section Chief, Technical Specifications Section, Operating Improvements Branch, Division of Inspection Program Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. [FR Doc. 04-26008 Filed 11-23-04; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590-01-P ***************************************************************** 28 [NukeNet] Yucca Foe's Aide Gets Nuclear Panel Post Date: Wed, 24 Nov 2004 14:42:30 -0800 Mothersalert Home: http://www.mothersalert.org Nuclear Winter, It's Cover Up & Ongoing Threat: http://www.mothersalert.org/nuclearwinter.html http://www.mothersalert.org/nuclearwinter2.html http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/national/AP-Yucca-Appointments.html Yucca Foe's Aide Gets Nuclear Panel Post By THE ASSOCIATED PRESS Published: November 23, 2004 ARTICLE TOOLS E-Mail This Article Printer-Friendly Format Most E-Mailed Articles 1. Many Women Say Airport Pat-Downs Are a Humiliation 2. New Tools to Help Patients Reclaim Damaged Senses 3. Editorial: Rolling Back Women's Rights 4. Americans Show Clear Concerns on Bush Agenda 5. Op-Ed Contributor: Food Without Fear Go to Complete List Filed at 8:23 a.m. ET WASHINGTON (AP) -- In a deal to let 175 of President Bush's nominees take office, an adviser to new Democratic leader Harry Reid, the Senate's staunchest opponent of a nuclear waste dump in Nevada, will be named to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. For months Senate Republicans had refused to take up, or even hold a hearing, on the nomination of Gregory Jaczko, Reid's adviser on nuclear issues. In turn, Reid, who has pledged to try to kill the Yucca Mountain nuclear waste project 90 miles northwest of Las Vegas, had blocked the Bush nominations. In negotiations just before Congress recessed during the weekend, an agreement was worked out: the White House promised Jaczko would be appointed to a limited two-year term while Congress was in recess, and Reid lifted his hold on the package of Bush nominations, which zipped through the Senate. Also, it was agreed that a Republican nominee to the NRC, retired Navy Vice Admiral Albert H. Konetzni, would be put on the commission and probably would become its chairman late next year. The White House already had sent Konetzni's nomination to the Senate this month hoping to resolve an impasse that had kept the president's nominations in congressional limbo. Among them were senior positions across the executive branch and at such entities as Amtrak, the Social Security Administration and the judiciary. Some Republicans and executives in the nuclear industry had opposed Jaczko's nomination bitterly, fearing that he would work to further Reid's desire to kill the Yucca Mountain nuclear waste project. The NRC is expected to begin considering a license for the facility next year. Under the compromise reached on the NRC nominations, Jaczko agreed not to participate in any Yucca Mountain related matters for the first year of his two-year term. The licensing process is expected to take at least three years once an application is received from the Energy Department next year. Margaret Chu, director of the DOE office that heads the Yucca program, recently informed regulators the department would not meet a Dec. 31 target to submit a license application, officials said Monday. It had been widely believed the target would be missed because of financing problems and adverse court decisions involving radiation standards. Sen. Pete Domenici, R-N.M., who opposed Jaczko's nomination, said he was comfortable with the arrangement after, he said, the White House assured him Jaczko would not be renominated by the president after his two years. A Reid spokeswoman, Tessa Hafen, said that the agreement ``in no way prohibits (Jaczko) from being renominated.'' By law three of the five commissioners at the NRC must be of the same party as the president. The commission currently has two Republican and one Democratic member. Jaczko, a physicist who joined Reid's staff in 2001 as a nuclear adviser, did not return telephone calls to his office Monday. ``Greg is eminently qualified to serve as a commissioner. He is a scientist first and has the background and experience necessary to evaluate information objectively,'' Reid said in a statement. Domenici and 15 other Republican senators informed Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist that it would be impossible to confirm Jaczko without senators first having the opportunity to question him at a formal hearing. ``A nominee as controversial as Greg Jaczko will not be confirmed ... for the sake of political expedience,'' said Domenici. An appointment to a post while Congress is in recess does not require Senate confirmation but is good for only the length of the congressional session, which is two years. A normal NRC appointment is for five years. ^------ On the Net: Nuclear Regulatory Commission: http://www.nrc.gov Yucca Mountain Project: http://www.ymp.gov Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management: http://www.state.nv.us/nucwaste NIRS: http://www.nirs.org _______________________________________________________________________ Subscribe/Unsubscribe Here: http://www.energyjustice.net/nukenet/ Change your settings at: http://energyjustice.net/mailman/listinfo/nukenet_energyjustice.net ***************************************************************** 29 Las Vegas RJ: Guessingbegins onSandovalsuccessor Wednesday, November 24, 2004 Guinn looking forsomeone who plansto run for election By ERIN NEFF REVIEW-JOURNAL Gov. Kenny Guinn said the state's fight against the proposed nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain is too important to place a "caretaker" at the helm of Nevada's legal efforts. Thus, Guinn said Tuesday he intends to appoint an attorney general next spring who will stand for election in 2006. "We need consistency," Guinn said in an interview. "Having someone come in just for one year wouldn't work." Guinn probably will get to appoint an attorney general next spring, when first-term Republican Brian Sandoval is expected to win a federal judgeship. Sandoval has been nominated by Sens. Harry Reid, D-Nev., and John Ensign, R-Nev. Sandoval has the support of President Bush and has been cleared through Homeland Security investigations. Guinn, who with Sandoval co-chaired Bush's campaign in Nevada, said he intends to appoint a fellow Republican to the post. "The people voted a Republican in the last time," Guinn said of Sandoval's 2002 election. "This time around I'll appoint a Republican. Certainly, I'm a Republican, and it's my obligation to my party." Guinn said he is not in a hurry to consider potential appointees, because he does not expect Sandoval will leave office until April or later. The governor said one person has already called his office to inquire about the position. He wouldn't name that person. The list of potential replacements for Sandoval dwindled with Guinn's assertion he will nominate a Republican. Democrats had suggested Assembly Majority Leader Barbara Buckley, D-Las Vegas, would have served well in the role had Guinn opened the appointments to those of other parties. Joe Brown, Nevada's Republican National Committeeman, said one logical candidate that springs to mind is Gaming Control Board member Scott Scherer. A former chief of staff to Guinn, Scherer made an unsuccessful bid for the office in 1998, losing to Democrat Frankie Sue Del Papa. He has close ties to the state's gaming industry and probably could mount a successful fund-raising drive, Brown said. "It's something I would consider," Scherer said. "After '98, I sort of moved on and got the politics out of my blood. So to meet the governor's criteria of running for the position, I'd have to talk to my family about it." One person who has expressed interest to party leaders about the position is Las Vegas attorney Stan Parry. He is a partner in Curran &Parry and is a former legal adviser to the Clark County Commission. Others being touted for the job are state Sen. Mark Amodei, R-Carson City, and former state Assemblyman Greg Brower. Amodei is an attorney with Kummer Kaempfer Bonner and Renshaw in Carson City, and Brower is now the inspector general for U.S. Printer Bruce James, a Nevada Republican appointed by President Bush. Clark County District Attorney David Roger, a Republican, also is being touted in Southern Nevada as a potential appointee. "I think the governor's going to get a lot of names," Brown said. "But I also think Brian might recommend some of his talented deputies for the position." Another attorney with ties to Guinn, his general counsel Keith Munro, probably would not be interested in running for office, the governor said. "We need Keith here," Guinn added. Copyright Las Vegas Review-Journal ***************************************************************** 30 RGJ: Yucca Mountain will solve a national concern THE RENO GAZETTE-JOURNAL 11/22/2004 09:48 pm Nevadans should consider the storage facility at Yucca Mountain to be of national concern and an opportunity to help solve a conflict which can be an economic asset via the state’s labor pool. This installation would alleviate the need for hundreds of small repositories now located near operating nuclear plants in the eastern United States, each of which is a potential target for terrorists. The need for protecting only one storage site should simplify security requirements. The population density in the Great Basin is minuscule compared to that in the eastern states where more than half of the country’s residents live within 70-75 miles of operating nuclear plants and their attendant spent fuel storage. These people are constantly in harm’s way under Nevada politicians’ criteria for radiation risk. The power generated there is part of the national grid and contributes to the electrical needs of hundreds of factories and other industrial activities which produce goods for the entire country. Great Basin residents should appreciate the advantages of extensive “wasteland” and the absence of large perennial streams. These features are providing elbow room and low density human recreational activity. Acceptance of the spent fuel would be a small sacrifice in return for a lifestyle blessed with little factory pollution and no nuclear plants. The spent fuel is not waste and at some future time could be recycled and used. Only two or three percent of the latent energy in the fuel rods has been exhausted. Of valid concern is the stability of the shipping canisters. This is a tangible problem that can be solved with proper engineering techniques. Solutions to canister design and their manufacture locally could be of economic value to the state. The emphasis on the hazards of transporting radioactive material has affected negative reactions in several states. The few recorded incidents involving spent fuel have reported no fatalities. Hazards in transporting and storing radioactive material have been equated with active reactors and exploding bombs, but it is a misleading concept. Risks pale in comparison with the thousands of deaths annually from highway accidents, social conflicts, and health-related illnesses nationwide. It is illogical to consider hypothetical accidents or contamination during the next 10,000 or 100,000 years hence being more serious than those already existent in the same general area as a result of hundreds of previous atom bomb tests. After the expenditure of billions of dollars, it seems improbable that additional scientific studies would be productive. The state refused to accept millions in federal funds with which to conduct its own technical appraisal of the area at a time when it would have been economically expedient. A separate State-sponsored study might have opposed the feds conclusions, but probably have had no effect on their decision. Spreading fear and panic by continuing with a 50-year old political football game is no solution. There are other problems within the state, such as overdevelopment and the currently active diminution of the groundwater resource, which deserve more immediate attention than an impalpable radiation hazard. Ed Rugg is a 28-year Reno resident, mining engineer and consultant, and concerned citizen. Copyright Reno Gazette-Journal, a Gannett Co. Inc.Newspaper. Use ***************************************************************** 31 Daily Times: Iran and uranium enrichment — What the controversy is about | Thursday, November 25, 2004 By Richard Ingham ENRICHMENT, at the heart of the storm surrounding Iran’s nuclear programme, takes low-grade uranium and refines it, turning it into a material that can power civilian reactors - or an atomic explosion. Uranium atoms are not born equal. The element has different isotopes, a term referring to the weight of the atoms. When raw uranium ore is dug out of the ground, more than 99 percent of it comprises the “heavyweight” isotope, U-238, which is stable, and just 0.7 percent is the “lightweight” isotope, U-235. It is the U-235 which interests scientists because it is fissile - its nucleus can release energy by splitting into smaller fragments, which then smash into other atoms and so on. The goal, therefore, is to beef up the percentage of U-235 so that there is enough of it to induce a chain reaction. The first step is to mine and mill the ore into a concentrate called yellowcake. This is converted into uranium hexafluoride gas (UF6) ahead of enrichment processing. One of the two methods of enrichment is that chosen by Iran, which is gas centrifuge. The UF6 is put in a cylinder which is then spun at high speed. The rotation causes a centrifugal force that pushes the heavier atoms, the U-238 isotopes towards the outside of the cylinder, while the lighter ones, the U-235 isotopes, congregate at the centre. The stream that is slightly enriched in U-235 is then drawn off and fed into the next enrichment stage. Eventually, when about five percent of the UF6 comprises U-235, the material is enriched enough to be turned into fuel for a civilian nuclear plant. The gas is allowed to cool and solidify before it is turned into fuel assemblies to be placed in reactors. To reach weapons-grade material, the enrichment level has to reach more than 90 percent. Around 50 kilos (60 pounds) of weapons-grade uranium is needed to make an atomic bomb. However, a bomb can also be made from as little as six kilos (13.2 pounds) of plutonium, a byproduct from burning uranium. Enrichment using the centrifugal method is half a century old. But it requires thousands of centrifuges, interconnected to form cascades, to concentrate the level of U-235 to military standards. These machines and their components are highly specialised. So when a country starts to buy large numbers of them on the black market - as Iran has reportedly done - that is widely viewed as a telltale of its ambitions to develop a nuclear weapon. Iran has told the IAEA it plans to convert 37 tons of yellowcake into UF6 for a civilian enrichment programme - enough, experts have said, to make one to several atomic bombs. An IAEA official has said that Iran had made 15 percent of the amount of highly-enriched uranium needed to make an atomic bomb before it purportedly suspended the process last Monday. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the UN’s atomic watchdog, is to meet on Thursday to verify whether that suspension has taken effect as promised. There are several other important hurdles to overcome before a country is considered nuclear-capable. They include the electronic trigger, whose split-second timing is essential for unleashing the chain reaction, and weaponisation - putting the device into a missile or bomb that can be delivered to a target. Iran is a major exporter of oil and has vast reserves of natural gas. It contends it needs nuclear power to provide power for its citizens when its fossil-fuel reserves run out. afp Home | Daily Times - All Rights Reserved Site developed and hosted by WorldCALL Internet Solutions ***************************************************************** 32 DOE: Notice of Intent To Prepare an Environmental Impact Statement FR Doc 04-26035 [Federal Register: November 24, 2004 (Volume 69, Number 226)] [Notices] [Page 68327] From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr24no04-47] for the Proposed Consolidation of Nuclear Operations Related to Production of Radioisotope Power Systems; Correction AGENCY: Department of Energy. ACTION: Notice of Intent; correction. SUMMARY: The Department of Energy published a notice of intent in the Federal Register on November 16, 2004, (69 FR 67139) announcing its intent to prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS), for the proposed consolidation of nuclear activities related to production of radioisotope power systems required for Government national security and space exploration missions at a single, highly secure DOE site. The document contained an incorrect telephone number and an incorrect street address for a public meeting. Corrections In the Federal Register of November 16, 2004, in FR Doc. 04-25406, on page 67140, the following corrections should be made: First column, first paragraph, Twin Falls, ID: 1586 Blue Lakes Blvd. North, Second column, under ADDRESSES heading, first paragraph, You may leave a message at (800) 919-3706. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Timothy A. Frazier, Document Manager, NE-50/Germantown Building, Office of Space and Defense Power Systems, Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology, U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20585-1290, telephone 301-903-9420, or submitted via e-mail to . Issued in Washington, DC on November 18, 2004. Carol M. Borgstrom, Director, Office of NEPA Policy and Compliance. [FR Doc. 04-26035 Filed 11-23-04; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 6450-01-P ***************************************************************** 33 [du-list] DU in the news - 25th Nov. 04 Date: Wed, 24 Nov 2004 14:43:35 -0800 Axis of Logic, Tue, 23 Nov 2004 6:08 PM PST World News http://www.axisoflogic.com/artman/publish/article_13857.shtml Los Angeles-based Humanitarian Law Project/International Educational Development (HLP/IED and San Francisco-based Association of Humanitarian Lawyers (AHL), submitted a petition to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of American States on behalf of "unnamed, unnumbered patients and medical staff both living and dead" at the medical facilities in Falluja. See more news stories that match your keyword at: http://search.news.yahoo.com/search/news/?c=&p=depleted+uranium [Non-text portions of this message have been removed] ------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor --------------------~--> Make a clean sweep of pop-up ads. Yahoo! Companion Toolbar. Now with Pop-Up Blocker. Get it for free! http://us.click.yahoo.com/L5YrjA/eSIIAA/yQLSAA/FGYolB/TM --------------------------------------------------------------------~-> To unsubscribe from this groups send a message to du-list-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com. In the body of the message type unsubscribe and send. Yahoo! Groups Links <*> To visit your group on the web, go to: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/du-list/ <*> To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to: du-list-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com <*> Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to: http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/ ***************************************************************** 34 Physics News Update 710: Mercator of the Nuclear World [AIP home] Number 710 #1, November 24, 2004 by Phil Schewe and Ben Stein The medieval alchemists tried in vain to create new elements in their crucible-based experiments out of just a few ingredients such as lead and mercury and some common acids. In the 20th century nuclear physicists not only finally succeeded in transmuting one element into another but were able to create new elements. A new experiment at the Gesellschaft fur Schwerionenforschung (GSI) in Darmstadt does not create new elements (although in previous experiments GSI discovered 6 elements: 107-112) but it has created and analyzed the largest number of elements (from nitrogen up to uranium) and the largest number of subsidiary isotopes (1400) ever seen in a single nuclear research effort. The only ingredients: uranium and hydrogen. The crucible in which the elements were warmed up: a particle accelerator. The GSI physicists did not, as you might guess, smash a beam of protons (bare hydrogen nuclei) into a stationary uranium target but rather the other way around. The reason for slamming energetic U-238 nuclei into a stationary liquid-hydrogen target is that fragment nuclei of all sizes, flying away from the collision point, don't glom together (as they might if emerging from a uranium target) and, furthermore, can be more accurately identified since they are free of bound electrons whose electrical charge might confuse the task of measuring the number of protons in the detected particle. What comes out of this meticulous and comprehensive of nuclear experiment is a set of cross sections---each a measure of the likelihood for creating that particular nuclide (that is, each stable element and its complement of isotopes, variations on the same nucleus but containing differing numbers of neutrons). The GSI work, in other words, not only enumerates a chart of the nuclides (the sort of thing on the wall of every nuclear lab in the world) but produces a chart of cross sections for producing those nuclides in a collision (see figure at http://www.aip.org/png/2004/228.htm). This information is valuable for a number of reasons: for planning a future accelerator of rare isotopes, for studying how to break down nuclear waste in sub-critical reactors, and for studying fundamental aspects of nuclear fission and nuclear viscosity. (Armbruster et al., Physical Review Letters, 19 Nov 2004; lab website at www-w2k.gsi.de/charms/; contact Karl-Heinz Schmidt, k.h.schmidt@gsi.de) Back to Physics News Update ***************************************************************** 35 MSNBC: Europeans will back deal with Japan for fusion facility EU would pay Tokyo to drop its bid to host ITER project, clearing the way for French site This illustration shows a cutaway view of the nuclear fusion reactor planned for ITER. The main vacuum vessel would be 100 feet (30 meters) high. The tokamak-style reactor would begin operations around 2014. Updated: 2:09 p.m. ET Nov. 24, 2004 BRUSSELS, Belgium - European Union ministers will support a proposal to offer compensation to Japan in return for an agreement to build the world’s first thermonuclear reactor in France, officials said Wednesday. Nuclear fusion has been touted as a long-term solution to the world’s energy problems, as it would be low on pollution and use limitless sea water as fuel. But 50 years of research have so far failed to produce a commercially viable fusion reactor. The European Commission, the executive body of the European Union, last week offered Japan a package of incentives to persuade it to give up its bid to host the fusion reactor, allowing a site in Cadarache, France, to win instead. EU industry ministers will discuss the issue at a meeting Friday and are expected to unanimously endorse the commission’s proposal. They will also charge the commission to continue negotiations, diplomats said. “All of the delegations were in favor of the recommendations,” an EU official said, referring to a discussion among the 25-nation bloc’s ambassadors to the EU. The EU prefers to seek agreement with all six parties in the project — the EU, Japan, China, Russia, the United States, and South Korea — but is ready to go ahead and build the reactor with its European partners in case of a blockage. According to a diplomat, the EU offer could include the creation of an institute for fusion in Japan worth $1.3 billion (1 billion euros) that would be charged with pre-research activity linked to the ITER project, on condition that Japan raises its financial contribution. The Commission said last week it would offer Japan a “privileged partner role.” ITER’s construction is currently forecast to cost $6 billion (4.57 billion euros). The EU intends to cover 40 percent of that from the European Community budget, while France has proposed doubling its contribution to 20 percent of the costs. The United States and South Korea have previously supported the site at Rokkasho, a Japanese fishing village, but EU sources believe they would back Cadarache if Tokyo steps aside. Japan has pressed for compensation if its bid fails and has accused the EU of being high-handed in the negotiations.Copyright 2004 Reuters Limited. All rights reserved. Republication or redistribution of Reuters content is expressly prohibited without the prior written consent of Reuters. © 2004 MSNBC.com ***************************************************************** 36 Elko Daily Free Press: Trails center gets $1.5 million By ADELLA HARDING, Free Press Staff Writer ELKO - The final funding package Congress passed late last week contains $1.5 million for the California Trail center planned for Elko, U.S. Rep. Jim Gibbons, R-Nev., announced. Gibbons said he was pleased the bill contained significant funding for Nevada programs, but he had voted against it because the bill "continues to fund the misguided Yucca Mountain Project." Sen. Harry Reid, D-Nev., had earlier announced that the Senate had approved the funding, but the trails money later became part of the omnibus appropriations bill. The $1.5 million is part of an allocation of up to $12 million that Congress approved for the $15 California National Historic Interpretive Center, which will be built at the Hunter exit off Interstate 80. The center also is receiving $6 million in state and local contributions for the project, including $3 million from the Nevada Legislature, $2 million from the city of Elko and $1 million from Elko County. The county is constructing the road to the site as an in-kind contribution, and the work had been scheduled to start last month while U.S. Bureau of Land Management Director Kathleen Clarke was in Elko for a trail center ceremony. But the work has been delayed, David Jamiel, the assistant California Trail center manager for the BLM's Elko office, said today. BLM is managing construction of the project and will operate the center. "They hope to do it in the spring," Jamiel said. He said plans are still on track for letting construction bids for the facility in August 2005, with work to begin shortly after a contractor is chosen. "The opening date will be late spring or early summer of 2007," Jamiel said. He also said he and Dale Porter would be updating the Elko City Council on the trail center project this evening. Porter is one of the local residents who spearheaded the effort to build a trail center in this area. ***************************************************************** NOTE: In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. section 107 this material is distributed without profit or payment to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving this information for non-profit research and educational purposes only. For more information go to: *****************************************************************