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NUCLEAR POLICY
1 Xinhua: US nuclear negotiator to visit S.Korea
2 Xinhua: US confirms meetings with DPRK in New York
3 Korea Times: US Nuclear Negotiator to Visit Seoul This Week
4 Guardian Unlimited: Nuclear Inspectors Return to South Korea
5 Guardian Unlimited: U.S., N. Koreans Meet to Restart Talks
6 Korea Herald: [EDITORIAL]Roh's views on the North
7 US: MSNBC: Sen. Harry Reid (D - NV), President Ghazi al-Yawar of the
8 US: ACA: The Nuclear Third Rail: Can Fuel Cycle Capabilities Be Limi
9 Xinhua: Pakistan rules out inspection of nuclear facilities
NUCLEAR REACTORS
10 US: Shut San Onofre down permanently NOW!!! Here's why (please
11 US: [NukeNet] studies on nuclear plant, cancer correlation
12 US: NRC: Notice of Availability of Interim Staff Guidance Documents
13 US: NRC: Firstenergy Nuclear Operating Company; Davis-Besse Nuclear
14 US: Lawyer Group: Herbert Smith racks up 5m in fees on DTIs nuclea
15 US: NRC: Carolina Power & Light Company, Brunswick Steam Electric Pl
NUCLEAR SAFETY
16 BBC: Defence worker's uranium
17 US: Tufts Daily: Number of Mass. towns' water tainted with rocket fu
18 US: Arizona Daily Star: VA starting to take Gulf War ills seriously
19 Scotsman.com: Defence Worker Sues over Uranium Claim
NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
US DEPT. OF ENERGY
20 NRC: NRC to Meet with U. S. Enrichment Corporation to Discuss Perfor
21 SPI: Feds: Show restraint
22 Salt Lake Tribune: Idaho nuke cleanup deal's critics easing back
23 Portsmouth Daily Times: USEC, DOE meet -- Talks center on cleanup -
OTHER NUCLEAR
24 Bellona: Lifetime of nuclear icebreaker Sibir can be extended for 15
25 Harvard Crimson: College To Vet Wind Energy
26 EurekAlert: MIT, Columbia begin new energy experiment
27 Arizona Republic: Hyped on hydrogen
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FULL NEWS STORIES
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1 Xinhua: US nuclear negotiator to visit S.Korea
www.xinhuanet.com
www.chinaview.cn 2004-12-06 15:48:38
SEOUL, Dec. 6 (Xinhuanet) -- A US nuclear negotiator will
visit South Korea this week for discussions on nuclear issue on
the Korean Peninsula, South Korean Foreign Ministry announced
Monday.
Joseph DeTrani, US special envoy for negotiations on the
nuclear issue, will arrive in South Korea on Wednesday for a
two-day visit.
In Seoul, the US diplomat will meet his counterpart, Cho
Tae-yong, who heads the South Korean Foreign Ministry's task
force on the nuclear problem, and Park Chan-bong, deputy
assistant unification minister, the ministry said in a news
advisory.
DeTrani and Cho are both deputy chiefs of their respective
countries' delegations to the nuclear talks.
"This visit...is part of active cooperation that the two
countries have been concentrating on to resolve the nuclear
issue," the ministry said.
The six-party nuclear talks has been stalled since June. The
scheduled fourth round six-way talks failed to be held in
September, and no exact date was fixed for the resumption.
Enditem
Copyright 2003 Xinhua News Agency. All rights reserved.
*****************************************************************
2 Xinhua: US confirms meetings with DPRK in New York
www.xinhuanet.com
www.chinaview.cn 2004-12-07 06:28:07
WASHINGTON, Dec. 6 (Xinhuanet) -- The United States confirmed
on Monday that it had two meetings with the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea (DPRK) in New York on Nov. 30 and Dec. 3 on the
thorny issue of DPRK's nuclear issue.
"The purpose of those meetings was not to negotiate with the
North Koreans. The purpose was to state to the North Koreans that
the United States is ready to resume the six-party talks at an
early date and without preconditions, and that we want to resolve
the nuclear issue diplomatically," State Department deputy
spokesman Adam Ereli said at a briefing.
Ereli said the United States is committed to resolving the
DPRK nuclear issue through the six-party talks.
"We told the North Koreans that the six-party process is the
venue for resolving the nuclear issue, and just as we do
publicly, we called on North Korea to follow through on its
commitment to continue with six-party talks," Ereli said.
"The real substance, the real engagement, the real diplomacy
is conducted in multilateral venue because this is an issue that
needs a multilateral solution," he said.
Ereli said that there will be more meetings "through the New
York channel" in the future, but he is not aware of anything on
schedule.
Three rounds of the six-party talks, hosted by China, have
been held to try to end the nuclear confrontation between the
DPRK and the United States. Enditem
Copyright 2003 Xinhua News Agency. All rights reserved.
*****************************************************************
3 Korea Times: US Nuclear Negotiator to Visit Seoul This Week
Hankooki.com > The Korea Times > Nation
SEOUL (Yonhap) - A U.S. nuclear negotiator will visit South
Korea this week for talks on the stalled process aimed at
resolving the dispute over North Korea's nuclear program, the
Foreign Ministry announced Monday.
Joseph DeTrani, U.S. special envoy for negotiations with North
Korea, will arrive on Wednesday from China for a two-day visit.
After South Korea, he is scheduled to visit Japan, the ministry
said.
In Seoul, the U.S. diplomat will meet his counterpart, Cho
Tae-yong, who heads the Foreign Ministry's task force on the
nuclear problem, and Park Chan-bong, deputy assistant
unification minister, the ministry said.
DeTrani and Cho are both deputy chiefs of their respective
countries' delegations to the nuclear talks.
``This visit...is part of active cooperation that the two
countries have been concentrating on to resolve the North Korean
nuclear issue, the ministry said in a statement.
12-06-2004 17:49
*****************************************************************
4 Guardian Unlimited: Nuclear Inspectors Return to South Korea
From the Associated Press
[UP]
Monday December 6, 2004 4:01 AM
SEOUL, South Korea (AP) - Four inspectors from the U.N. nuclear
watchdog agency began additional investigations Monday into South
Korea's past secret nuclear experiments, officials said.
Last month, the Vienna, Austria-based International Atomic Energy
Agency decided not to refer the issue of South Korea's nuclear
experiments to the U.N. Security Council, which could have
imposed punitive measures.
Still, the IAEA's board of governors criticized South Korea for
conducting plutonium and uranium experiments in 1982 and 2000
without reporting them to the agency.
The government has repeatedly said the experiments were unrelated
to any weapons program and were for scientific research only.
The inspection team, which arrived Sunday, also planned to
participate in a meeting this week between South Korea and the
IAEA to discuss ways to enhance inspections, a South Korea
Science and Technology Ministry official said on condition of
anonymity.
The visit is the fourth by IAEA inspectors since South Korea
revealed experiments earlier this year.
Plutonium and enriched uranium are key ingredients in nuclear
weapons, and revelations about the experiments threatened to
hobble international efforts to persuade the South's rival, North
Korea, to curb its nuclear ambitions.
However, the amounts used in South Korea's experiments were far
below that required to make weapons.
North Korea vowed last week to make the South's past experiments
a top priority for discussion in six-nation nuclear talks, which
include the United States, aimed at ending the North's nuclear
weapons programs. No date has yet been set for resumption of
those meetings, which so far have not led to any breakthroughs.
Guardian Unlimited Guardian Newspapers Limited 2004
*****************************************************************
5 Guardian Unlimited: U.S., N. Koreans Meet to Restart Talks
From the Associated Press
[UP]
Monday December 6, 2004 9:16 PM
WASHINGTON (AP) - U.S officials met twice last week with North
Korean officials in New York to tell them the United States was
ready to resume nuclear negotiations and wanted to resolve the
issue diplomatically, State Department spokesman Adam Ereli said
Monday.
``We told the North Koreans that the six-party process is the
venue for resolving the nuclear issue and we called on North
Korea to follow through on its commitment to the six-party
talks,'' Ereli said.
He said the United States requested the meetings because it was
felt a face-to-face presentation of the U.S. position might be
effective. Ereli said the United States has meetings with North
Korea's U.N. diplomats in New York from time to time when they
serve a useful purpose.
Ereli said he did not know how North Korea responded to the
presentation by Joseph DeTrani, the State Department's special
envoy for North Korea negotiations.
Detrani left Sunday on a trip to China, South Korea and Japan to
continue consultations on restarting the nuclear negotiations,
the spokesman said. Russia also is involved in the talks.
Three rounds of six-nation talks aimed at persuading North
Koreans to halt weapons development have taken place since last
year but without a breakthrough. North Korea boycotted a fourth
round scheduled for September and analysts believed it was
holding out for a change in the White House.
On Saturday, North Korea said after the talks in New York it had
concluded Pyongyang should hold off on nuclear negotiations until
the United States changed its ``hostile'' policy toward the
country.
The report, from Pyongyang's official news agency KCNA, said
officials met Tuesday and Friday.
Guardian Unlimited Guardian Newspapers Limited 2004
*****************************************************************
6 Korea Herald: [EDITORIAL]Roh's views on the North
2004.12.07
: The Nation's No.1 English Newspaper
President Roh Moo-hyun, now on his fourth and last overseas tour
in 2004, has made a series of significant remarks on a wide
range of issues on North Korea in news conferences with the
international media and even in meetings with Korean
expatriates. In a straightforward manner, the president
disclosed how he sees the present and future of the regime in
the North and cautioned against taking hard-line steps to
resolve the nuclear standoff. They can be summarized as follows:
First, the president believes that there is "very remote
possibility" of his holding summit talks with North Korean
leader Kim Jong-il.
Second, even if a summit meeting is held, there will be very
little to gain from it as long as the United States and North
Korea are locked in the framework of the six-way talks to tackle
Pyongyang's nuclear program.
Third, it is not likely that the northern regime will collapse
in the near future. China is trying to prevent the breakdown of
its Communist neighbor since it would dump millions of refugees
across the Amnok (Yalu) River. Seoul does not want such an
eventuality either as it will also cause immense problems to the
south.
Fourth, resolution of the North Korean nuclear question should
not be sought at the sacrifice of South Korea's peace and
prosperity. Any attempt to solve the problem that risks
destruction of the Korean Peninsula is neither conceivable nor
tolerable.
The president's frank words can clear suspicions - among
opposition groups here - that the administration has been making
numerous concessions toward Pyongyang with the sole purpose of
holding an inter-Korean summit as a sequel to the June 2000
meeting of President Kim Dae-jung and Chairman Kim Jong-il. The
ruling Uri Party's persistent efforts to repeal the anti-North
National Security Law and the Defense Ministry's denial of the
North as the "main enemy" of the South were cited as evidence of
the alleged push for a summit.
As President Roh has observed, little can be expected from a
summit besides the repetition of hollow pledges of
reconciliation and cooperation and the reconfirmation of the
"three principles of reunification," i.e. independence, peaceful
process and national concord. Expansion of economic aid in
exchange for an increased number of separated families to visit
the North may be the most substantial outcome.
The president made it clear that resolving the North Korean
nuclear question is the "alpha and omega" of inter-Korean
relations. Domestic political circles as well as foreign
officials should attach as much importance to the presidential
statements overseas as they would to any major policy addresses
at home.
The president's rejection of a hard-line approach that could
jeopardize peace and prosperity in South Korea was also a direct
message to American "neoconservatives" who would continue to
exercise strong influence on the second Bush administration. His
full acceptance of the multilateral process could be seen as
indicating Seoul's willingness to restrain direct dealings with
Pyongyang - virtually abandoning a bilateral summit - as long as
the United States foregoes unilateral action to resolve the
nuclear issue and/or a regime change in the North.
From dispatches on the activities of the president abroad,
including his summit talks with European leaders and press
interviews, we see a maturing of his views on the North Korean
as well as global issues. We have listened to comprehensive
keynote policy from the president during his foreign tour, and
now we hope he will henceforth pay more attention to fostering a
national consensus on the crucial national security agenda,
refraining from making remarks that could cause unnecessary
confusion at home and abroad.
*****************************************************************
7 MSNBC: Sen. Harry Reid (D - NV), President Ghazi al-Yawar of the Interim
Government of Iraq
Transcript for Dec. 5
Transcript for Dec. 5GUESTS:
NBC NewsUpdated: 10:49 a.m. ET Dec. 5, 2004
Copyright 2004, National Broadcasting Company, Inc. All Rights
Reserved.
NBC News MEET THE PRESS
Sunday, December 5, 2004
GUESTS: Sen. Harry Reid (D - NV);
President Ghazi al-Yawar of the Interim Government of Iraq
MODERATOR/PANELIST: Tim Russert - NBC News
MR. TIM RUSSERT: Our issues this Sunday: Iraq. More U.S.
troops on their way as the insurgency rages. And is that
country secure enough to hold national elections? With us, in
an exclusive interview, the president of the interim government
of Iraq, Ghazi al-Yawar.
Then, on November 2, the Democratic leader in the U.S. Senate,
Tom Daschle, lost his bid for re- election. The Democrats have
chosen their new leader, Senator Harry Reid of Nevada. And his
first Sunday morning interview is right here on MEET THE PRESS.
And in our political roundtable, President Bush faces resistance
from his own party on reforming our intelligence system. With
us, David Broder of The Washington Post and David Gregory of NBC
News.
And in our MEET THE PRESS Minute, we salute Tom Brokaw, who
stepped down as anchor of "NBC Nightly News" after 22
extraordinary years.
But first, Iraq, and here with us is the president of that
nation.
Mr. President, welcome back.
PRES. GHAZI AL-YAWAR: Well, thank you.
MR. RUSSERT: Let me show you some news on the wires as we
speak this morning. The "U.N. special envoy to Iraq, Lakhdar
Brahimi, said bluntly, `It is a mess in Iraq.' Asked whether
it was possible to hold elections under current conditions,
Brahimi said, `If the circumstances stay as they are, I don't
think so.'"
Your reaction.
PRES. AL-YAWAR: Well, we still have two months to elections.
We believe in Iraq that the main objective of these people who
are committing these atrocities unjustifiably is to stop us from
having our first chance to taste the harvest of liberating
Iraq. We still have two months. We should still--consistent
and we should keep the schedule according to what it is. That's
the 30th of January.
MR. RUSSERT: But if the United Nations cannot cooperate with
you, can you have elections?
PRES. AL-YAWAR: Well, the date was chartered by the United
Nations Resolution 1546. We are asking the United Nations, the
whole international community, to help us. We do not think
that postponing elections or delaying it will solve the
problem. Actually, it will prolong the agony for Iraqis and
you will have more resentment in the Iraqi society.
MR. RUSSERT: Adnan Pachachi, who is a leader in the Sunni
community, said this. "The first reason to delay the Iraqi
elections is that we should give an opportunity for those who
are still reluctant or unwilling to take part in the elections
in order to have a dialogue with them and to see whether we can
address some of their demands and grievances and also to
persuade them that it's in their interest to join in the
elections. ... The second reason is the security situation,
which...is still rather precarious and uncertain. ...And
therefore, a little" more time "would be much better."
You can't even secure the road from the airport to downtown
Baghdad. How can you possibly have free and fair elections?
PRES. AL-YAWAR: That's been made deliberately by these people
who are fighting, the insurgents, in order to present this
gloomy picture. The challenge is to move ahead and get the
election on time. The problem, it's not the people are
reluctant. Yes, there is a problem in the security
situation. And people are scared of going and registering
their names, of reprisals, atrocities of these armies of
darkness. If we can do something in these areas by enhancing
the security situation, a lot of people are willing to join in
now. We are not talking about people want to be in or not.
Everybody is committed. But the problem is they are fearing
reprisal of these people who are doing these bad actions.
MR. RUSSERT: But the insurgency seems to be very widespread.
We now have more U.S. troops heading for Iraq and in Iraq than
we had before the invasion. Americans were told by many Iraqis
that we would be greeted as liberators, with flowers and
sweets. Could this insurgency be as difficult and strong as it
is without the support of many of the Iraqi people?
PRES. AL-YAWAR: I think it's strong without the support of
Iraqi people. They are frightening people if you see Mosul City
and the destruction and problems to these areas. They fled the
areas after they put the people in the cross-fire. The thing
is: How are we going to talk to these people? They don't
have faces. They don't have leaderships. They don't have
ideologies. They don't have any demands. They are just there,
wanting to bring the old regime back into Iraq. And we are not
going to go back to the time of the prewar era after all. With
all of the ups and downs, it's much better without having the
old regime back.
MR. RUSSERT: But could the insurgents--how could they live off
the land? How could they be as organized as they are without the
Iraqi populous tolerating them or at least not turning them in?
PRES. AL-YAWAR: Well, people are passive, yes, because they
have been held hostage by these people. It's like hoodlums
where they frighten people. People are innocent and law-abiding
citizens, and they are just frightened, scared for their
families, for their children, and these people are--most of them
are kidnapping people and selling them to another gang, a third
gang, then a fourth gang. And this is a slavery. This is
what they are doing right now in Iraq. I mean, the whole
international community should understand that and should help
us stop all these nonsense.
MR. RUSSERT: In October, you said, "Yes, [the election is]
scheduled for Jan. 31, but that date is not sacred. ...If we
see that elections held by that date without security or
conditions favoring a fair and comprehensive vote and that that
in turn will have a negative impact on our country, then we will
not hesitate to change its date." You were concerned and are
concerned about the security.
PRES. AL-YAWAR: Yes.
MR. RUSSERT: How can you hold an election...
PRES. AL-YAWAR: Well...
MR. RUSSERT: ...if vast numbers of Iraqis, like yourself,
Sunnis in the Sunni Triangle, are not allowed to vote or are
incapable of voting because of lack of security?
PRES. AL-YAWAR: Well, what I said before I still believe in.
There is no sacred date, but the thing is this is a challenge
that Iraqis have to take. And after reviewing the situation, I
think the worst thing to do is to postpone elections. This
will give a tactical victory to the insurgents, to the forces of
darkness. That's why I have even established my own political
entity after being reluctant for a long time. This is to
encourage a lot of people from all aspects of Iraq, from all
faiths, to join in, and not to sit because we have a silent
majority in Iraq. We want this silent majority to say their
word and I'm sure they are very capable and very influential.
MR. RUSSERT: Why are they so silent? If they didn't like
Saddam Hussein and they were going to greet us as liberators,
why are they still silent?
PRES. AL-YAWAR: Well, first of all, these people have been
living for 45 years in totalitarian regimes. They are still
rehabilitating out of that. We're telling them your vote is very
valuable. Cast your vote. This is your duty and this is your
right. Don't forfeit it for any reason. This is what we are
trying to do. We are trying to assist the people to come out
of the shell of the totalitarian regimes and the oppressions of
the past and this is very important.
MR. RUSSERT: You said this a month ago. "Whoever fights with
the other on board this boat, will tip it over and make everyone
fall into the river and get eaten up by the alligators. Not a
single passenger will survive."
PRES. AL-YAWAR: Yes, sir. I did say that. That is because
I want all Iraqis to understand that we are one team, we have
one choice. It is to move along in tranquility to reach the
shores of safety and build our prosperous country. And I still
believe in it.
MR. RUSSERT: This is The New York Times today. This
headline: "Sunnis vs. Shiites and Kurds; Mayhem in Iraq is
Starting to Look Like a Civil War." Do you believe that Iraq
is on the verge of a civil war?
PRES. AL-YAWAR: Never ever. Iraq has been--if you look deep
into our history, 7,000 years of history, we never, ever had a
single incident of unrest built on ethnicity or sect or
religion. We never had that. All this has been--all these
stories and scenarios has been imported to Iraq, and it's time
for Iraqis to understand themselves firsthand, not to listen to
others telling them how they should behave. I don't think--I'm
100 percent sure--and this is my intuition--we will never, ever
have civil war or unrest based on ethnicity or belief or
sectarian reasons.
MR. RUSSERT: Saddam Hussein was a Sunni Muslim. You're a
Sunni Muslim. You're a minority in the country. If, in fact,
the Shia elect a majority of the government and control the
national government, can the Sunnis accept minority status?
PRES. AL-YAWAR: Well, first of all, the Sunni Muslims--if we
are talking about Sunni Muslims, Sunni Muslims makes about 50
percent of the Iraqi population, because the Kurds are Sunni
Muslims too, most of them. We do not have a problem. In
Iraq, we have a challenge of sectarian vs. civil-oriented
people. That's people who believe that the religion is more
sacred to be involved in politics. And this is a dimension we
have in Iraq.
MR. RUSSERT: Let me ask you about the--your comments about the
silent majority.
PRES. AL-YAWAR: Yes, sir.
MR. RUSSERT: Americans see their death toll passing 1,000 men
and women; their injured and wounded, over 7,000. And they
say: Why should Americans fight and die for Iraqi people if
they are passive and they're a silent majority? If you
yourself don't want democracy, and aren't willing to fight and
die for it and put down the insurgency and not in any way enable
it, why should Americans stay there and die for you?
PRES. AL-YAWAR: Well, first of all, our thoughts goes for the
families of the people who lost their lives in Iraq. But we in
Iraq appreciate very much all the assistance and all the
sacrifices that the American people are making for us in Iraq.
What we believe in--that by empowering Iraqis and helping us
build our security forces and military on proper technical and
moral backgrounds, this will be the solution for the Iraqi
problem. Myself is 100 percent convinced that the solution for
the security situation is Iraq should be 100 percent Iraqi.
Until then, we need our friends to help us preserve our
security. But we have to work and expedite building Iraqi
security forces from now.
When I mention the silent majority, I mentioned the people who
were, out of fear of reprisals, of oppressive regimes, of the
vicious dictatorship like Saddam--they were hurt. They were
being-- hibernating in caves. And this is a moral and national
and human duty, is to help these people come out of these
caves. And I think the United States, being the superpower, is
destined to be helping all the people in the world to make the
world a free world, really.
MR. RUSSERT: Realistically, how long do you think American
troops are going to have to stay in Iraq?
PRES. AL-YAWAR: As long as we can--I hope it will be as short
as we can build our security forces 100 percent. That is not
impossible. Iraq is very well-known in the Middle East for the
human resources we have. We have extremely qualified people.
We have to start revisiting the issue of the old army and try to
screen of--the people and bring back some of the people who have
never had bloodstained hands in the past.
MR. RUSSERT: But that will take several years.
PRES. AL-YAWAR: No. I don't think it will take several
years.
MR. RUSSERT: You believe American troops...
PRES. AL-YAWAR: It will take months.
MR. RUSSERT: You think American troops could be out of Iraq in
months?
PRES. AL-YAWAR: Well, months--we're talking about months,
probably; I don't know, six months or eight months or a year.
But I don't think it will take years. Definitely not.
MR. RUSSERT: And American troops can come home?
PRES. AL-YAWAR: Yes, but after--when we build our security
forces. I mean, this is a job which has been done, and this
is--America cannot afford to retreat at this time. This will
be bad for Iraq, the Middle East, and to the United States and
the world.
MR. RUSSERT: You will meet with President Bush tomorrow.
What will you tell him?
PRES. AL-YAWAR: I will tell him: "Thank you very much, Mr.
President, for all the help we've had in the past." I will
tell him that we in Iraq are determined to build our own
democracy, own Iraqi-style democracy. But also, "We want you
to help us empowering more Iraqis to assume responsibility,
especially in the security forces arena."
MR. RUSSERT: Mr. President, we thank you for joining us with
and sharing your views
PRES. AL-YAWAR: Thank you very much.
MR. RUSSERT: Coming next, the new leader of the Democrats in
the United States Senate, Senator Harry Reid of Nevada. Then,
insights and analysis: what lies ahead for George W. Bush's
second term. Our roundtable, with David Broder of The
Washington Post and David Gregory, who covers the White House
for NBC News. They're all coming up right here on MEET THE
PRESS.
MR. RUSSERT: The new Democratic leader in the U.S. Senate,
Harry Reid, after this station break.
MR. RUSSERT: And we are back with the new leader of the
Democrats in the U.S. Senate, Harry Reid of Nevada.
Welcome.
SEN. HARRY REID, (D-NV): Thank you very much.
MR. RUSSERT: In 1994, when the Republicans seized control of
both houses of Congress, this is what Senator Harry Reid said.
"We all have to swallow a little bit of our pride and go toward
the middle."
Is that still your advice to the Democrats?
SEN. REID: I think there's no question about it. You know,
we don't accomplish anything on the far right and the far
left. Things are accomplished in the middle. We have to work
toward the middle. And I think that that's clear. I feel no
differently than I did 10 years ago.
MR. RUSSERT: There were a lot of eyebrows raised across the
town when the Las Vegas Review- Journal and The Hill newspaper
reported this. "Harry Reid, the incoming Senate minority
leader, said he is forming a communications `war room' to
promote Democratic messages and respond to Republican
criticism."
Is creating a war room the prescription to try to solve the
partisan problems we face right now?
SEN. REID: Well, I think war room designation is something
that comes from inside Washington. What I've created is a
communications center where we're going to take some of the
resources that are already there and make sure that when someone
comes to the Senate floor to give a speech, that talk radio
stations know what that person had to say. We're going to
communicate with the American people to make sure that they
understand the Democrats are in tune with millions of Americans
across the country. In fact, we represent the people of this
country, and this communications center that we have will
certainly be an indication of how we feel.
MR. RUSSERT: So you're not going to war with Republicans the
first week on your job?
SEN. REID: No. I hope we don't have to go to war. As I
said, Tim, I'd rather dance than fight. But people have to
understand that the president controls the White House, of
course. The House of Representatives, the Senate--if he wants
to get something done, he has to come to us. We are
constitutionally empowered by the Constitution to have certain
powers that are inherent in this body, and we want to work with
the president. But they can't jam things down our throats.
The American people wouldn't want us to do that.
MR. RUSSERT: You're a former boxer. If you're punched,
you'll punch back?
SEN. REID: Sure will.
MR. RUSSERT: When the president talked about Yucca Mountain
and moving the nation's nuclear waste there, you were very,
very, very strong in your words. You said, "President Bush is a
liar. He betrayed Nevada and he betrayed the country."
Is that rhetoric appropriate?
SEN. REID: I don't know if that rhetoric is appropriate.
That's how I feel, and that's how I felt. I think to take that
issue, Tim, to take the most poisonous substance known to man,
plutonium, and haul 70,000 tons of it across the highways and
railways of this country, past schools and churches and people's
businesses is wrong. It's something that is being forced upon
this country by the utilities, and it's wrong. And we have to
stop it. And people may not like what I said, but I said it,
and I don't back off one bit.
MR. RUSSERT: The intelligence bill reforms which were
recommended by the 9-11 Commission; now before the Senate and
the House. Being held up by two Republican congressmen in the
House. And now Senator John Warner, Republican from Virginia,
said he has reservations. Will the intelligence reform bill
pass this week in Congress?
SEN. REID: The Congress of the United States should not leave
this town until we pass this. Governor Kean, Representative
Hamilton were appointed by the president of the United States to
give us some ideas as to what should be done following the
terrorist attacks of 9/11. They told us what should be done.
And we in the Senate and the House passed bills that were in
keeping with what they wanted. Now, it's being held up because
the speaker says he wants a majority--the majority to approve
everything before they will pass it.
This legislation has enough votes in the House and the Senate to
pass overwhelmingly. The president should intercede, as he I
believe has an obligation to this country. We have people that
want to be safe in America today. The secretary of Health and
Human Service, Tommy Thompson, when he announced his
resignation, said that the Americans' food and water supply is
not safe. How can we leave town and not have this most
important legislation passed? It may not be perfect, but no
legislation's perfect. It's something that we need to do, and
the people of America are depending on us to do it.
MR. RUSSERT: Stay through Christmas if necessary?
SEN. REID: Stay through the day before New Year's. We must
pass this legislation. The people in Nevada want to be safe.
MR. RUSSERT: What must...
SEN. REID: The people in this country want to be safe.
MR. RUSSERT: What must the president do?
SEN. REID: The president, who controls both houses of
Congress, should use his power. And he has said that he has
power. He has a mandate. Let him pull a few bucks out of
that pocket of mandate and give it to the House and Senate and
say, "Here's part of my mandate. I want this legislation to
pass."
MR. RUSSERT: Republicans are saying they're concerned about
the intelligence on the ground with our troops and they're
concerned about driver's licenses that there are not a--without
uniform standards, hijackers could easily obtain them from
localities that did not maintain rigid standards.
SEN. REID: Tim, we dealt with immigration in this bill. This
is not an immigration bill. Immigration is covered as
recommended by the commission, and we've done that. This is a
holdup. These are people who have committees, Sensenbrenner
and Hunter, and they want to maintain power. Power--this is
not about power. It's about keeping the American people
safe. And the president, I repeat, should intercede any way
that he can, and there are lots of ways he can. He hasn't even
sent a letter yet. You know, you keep three or days--he hasn't
even sent a letter to the congressional leaders saying he wants
it passed. This should be passed as quickly as possible.
Every day that goes by, the American people are not as safe.
MR. RUSSERT: Private accounts for Social Security--the
president has made that a priority of his domestic agenda.
Will you work with him in privatizing part of Social Security?
SEN. REID: Tim, I can remember as a little boy my widowed
grandmother with eight children. She lived alone, but she felt
independent because she got every month her old age pension
check. That's what this is all about. The most successful
social program in the history of the world is being hijacked by
Wall Street. Yes, Social Security is a good program. And if
the president has some ideas about trying to improve it, I'll
talk to him, and we as Democrats will, but we are not going to
let Wall Street hijack Social Security. It won't happen.
They are trying to destroy Social Security.
MR. RUSSERT: No private accounts?
SEN. REID: They are trying to destroy Social Security by
giving this money to the fat cats on Wall Street, and I think
it's wrong.
MR. RUSSERT: But, Senator, there are now 40 million people on
Social Security. In the next 20 years, there's going to be 80
million. Life expectancy used to be 65 years old. It's
approaching 80. If you have twice as many people on these
programs for 15 years, you've got to restructure them in some
way, shape, or form. What is your solution?
SEN. REID: Tim.
MR. RUSSERT: What is your alternative?
SEN. REID: Tim, all experts say that Social Security
beneficiaries will receive every penny of their benefits that
they're entitled to--100 percent of them--until the year 2055.
After that, if we still do nothing, they'll draw 80 percent of
their benefits. I want those beneficiaries after year 2055 to
draw 100 percent of their benefits. But this does not require
dismantling the program. For heaven's sakes, they're crying
wolf a little too regularly here. There is not an emergency on
Social Security. We can do this. The president should not
try to jam this private accounts in an effort to destroy Social
Security.
In the early--when Social Security came before the Congress, who
opposed it? The Republicans. And they have a long memory.
They've been trying to destroy Social Security for a long time
and now they think they have an opening to do it.
MR. RUSSERT: Would you look at increasing or raising the age
of eligibility? Would you look at means testing? Would you
look at any reform?
SEN. REID: Of course. There are reforms that probably can
happen in Social Security, and we're not, you know, saying don't
even touch it. Let's take a look at it. I said I want people
after the year 2055 to be able to draw all of their benefits.
And, sure, we'll take a look at it, but don't give the ball to
Wall Street.
MR. RUSSERT: No private accounts of any kind?
SEN. REID: Not as far as I'm concerned.
MR. RUSSERT: You also said this back in 1994. "I believe in
a consumption tax. ...The income tax is not working as well as
it should. I think we should do away with it." Is that still
your view?
SEN. REID: Tim, there's no question that the Social Security
system--I'm sorry. I'm sorry. Back-- we're off Social
Security, right. The income tax code, as we know it, is tough,
it's unworkable. You know, we couldn't put the code on this
desk. And I think we should work towards simplifying it. We
had a pretty good program, Bradley-Gephardt, where we had three
tax structures, but, of course, we changed that. Congress
changed that and now it's more complicated than ever.
What I am concerned about that's happening with the talk that's
coming from 17th and Pennsylvania Avenue is that they're talking
about having a consumption tax and an income tax. That's the
worst of all worlds. That's what they have in Europe where you
have an income tax and you add on that the value-added tax.
It's a terrible system. So what I say is if we can figure out
a way to make our tax less burdensome and if we could go to a
consumer based tax, I think it would be wonderful. But the
transition rules of that are very difficult and I have looked
into that. It's extremely difficult.
MR. RUSSERT: But the national sales tax or consumption tax is
very regressive. Poor people get hit very hard with that as...
SEN. REID: No question.
MR. RUSSERT: ...to a progressive income tax.
SEN. REID: No question about it and I've learned a lot since
the statement. I think if it's an ideal world, maybe we could
work something out, but as I've learned in so many different
areas, we...
MR. RUSSERT: You're less enthusiastic about a consumption tax
now.
SEN. REID: Yeah.
MR. RUSSERT: This was the Associated Press about Harry Reid.
"Reid voted with Republicans to ban a procedure that opponents
call partial birth abortion. In 1999, he was one of two Senate
Democrats who voted against an amendment expressing support for
the Supreme Court decision legalizing abortion."
Would you prefer to see the Supreme Court overturn Roe vs. Wade
which allows legal abortions across the country.
SEN. REID: Tim, I have--my views on abortion are very clear.
I've never tried to hide them. I think it's something that
people understand about me. But I also understand that this is a
very complicated issue, very difficult issue. And, you know,
in our caucus, our Democratic caucus, we have wide-ranging
views. My sister, as far--I don't have a sister, but as close
as I have ever had to a sister is Barbara Boxer. Her views and
my views differ. But, you know, we don't have a litmus test in
the Senate with Senate Democrats. We don't do the so-called
Specter test--"You have to agree with us or we won't let you be
a chairman of the committee or subcommittee." We don't do
that.
And so I say that this is an issue that is not likely going to
be resolved in the Congress of the United States. I think what
we should do is all work toward reducing the number of unwanted
pregnancies, unintended pregnancies. I think we should do
that. That would, of course, lead to fewer abortions. That
should be a goal we all have. And I think that this matter
will be resolved, as--the Supreme Court has wrestled with this
for years and years. And, as you know, they're having a
difficult time coming up with what should or shouldn't be done.
MR. RUSSERT: But why did you vote against something that would
express support for Roe vs. Wade? Do you believe that Roe vs.
Wade was incorrectly decided?
SEN. REID: You know, you're asking me--I don't want to give
you the Clarence Thomas decision here, but Roe vs. Wade is--I
clearly oppose abortion. And this was a Senate resolution.
It had no standing in law if it had even passed. So I think
that my views are clear, and I think that I have worked very
hard with groups all over America to reduce the number of
unwanted pregnancies, and I'll continue to do that.
MR. RUSSERT: What would happen, do you think, in the country
if Roe vs. Wade was overturned by the Supreme Court?
SEN. REID: Well, I think it would be a little--it would be
pretty difficult for everybody, so I think that's why the
Supreme Court has wrestled with it
MR. RUSSERT: You are a Mormon. The Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints had a statement on marriage: "The Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints favors a constitutional
amendment preserving marriage as the lawful union of a man and a
woman."
Do you accept that message, the statement from your church?
SEN. REID: Tim, we have in America today many, many states--I
don't know the exact number; I think 11 or 13 in this last
election cycle--said there can no--in our state, you have to
have marriage between a man and a woman. That's the law in the
state of Nevada. And within a couple years, even
Massachusetts, that will be the law. And we in Congress
recognized there would be some controversy over this, so we
passed the Defense of Marriage Act that says you do not have to
recognize the marriage laws of another state. That's the law of
the land. And I think that we have to be very, very careful
about how we tamper with the Constitution. I have agreed
reluctantly on several occasions to agree to constitutional
amendments. But frankly, in the history of this country,
there've been over 11,500 attempts to amend the Constitution,
and I want to approach those amendments very, very cautiously. I
do not think it's necessary at this time to have a
constitutional amendment in that regard.
MR. RUSSERT: Will that upset your church leaders?
SEN. REID: You'll have to ask them.
MR. RUSSERT: Let me turn to judicial nominations. Again,
Harry Reid on National Public Radio, November 19: "If
they"--the Bush White House--"for example, gave us Clarence
Thomas as chief justice, I personally feel that would be
wrong. If they give us Antonin Scalia, that's a little
different question. I may not agree with some of his opinions,
but I agree with the brilliance of his mind."
Could you support Antonin Scalia to be chief justice of the
Supreme Court?
SEN. REID: If he can overcome the ethics problems that have
arisen since he was selected as a justice of the Supreme
Court. And those ethics problems--you've talked about them;
every people talk--every reporter's talked about them in
town--where he took trips that were probably not in keeping with
the code of judicial ethics. So we have to get over this. I
cannot dispute the fact, as I have said, that this is one smart
guy. And I disagree with many of the results that he arrives
at, but his reason for arriving at those results are very hard
to dispute. So...
MR. RUSSERT: Why couldn't you accept Clarence Thomas?
SEN. REID: I think that he has been an embarrassment to the
Supreme Court. I think that his opinions are poorly written. I
don't--I just don't think that he's done a good job as a Supreme
Court justice.
MR. RUSSERT: The Republicans have said that the Democrats have
been obstructionist in terms of judicial nominations. And one
of the things that's being considered is the so-called nuclear
option, where Vice President Cheney would preside over the
Senate, and there would be a motion to say that a Democratic
filibuster against a judicial nominee violates the
constitutional duty of senators to advise and consent on the
issue of nominations, and a majority, 51 senators, could uphold
the ruling of the chair and, in effect, do away with the
filibuster when it comes to judicial nominations. What will
you do if the Republicans exercise that option?
SEN. REID: George Will wrote in last week's Newsweek magazine
that he had originally thought it was a good idea. He thinks
it's a bad idea. I agree with George Will. We have a
situation where during the four years that President Bush has
been president, we've approved 207 federal judges and turned
down 10. We have an obligation under the Constitution to give
advise and consent to the nominations of the president of the
United States.
If you look at Orrin Hatch's autobiography, in that he talks
about what President Clinton did. He says that President
Clinton came to him and said "Give me some suggestions as to who
you think could be approved." And he suggested--Orrin Hatch,
chairman of the Judiciary Committee--he suggested Breyer and
Ginsburg. And sure enough, they were submitted by President
Clinton. And with no problem, they were approved. That's the
same model that President Bush should follow, if in fact we have
Supreme Court nominees come before us. In the meantime, the
president should be happy with what he's gotten, 207-to-10.
That's a pretty good record for him.
MR. RUSSERT: You have written President Bush and asked him to
consult with you about Supreme Court nominees before he
nominates individuals?
SEN. REID: Just like Clinton did with Orrin Hatch. I wrote
the letter Friday. I'm not sure the president has it yet. I
hope he has. But I think that's the model he should follow.
That would solve so many problems for us. We don't need a
knockdown, drag-out fight on who should be approved on the
Supreme Court. It should be approved as easy as Breyer and
Ginsburg.
MR. RUSSERT: What if the president says, "Harry, I'm sorry.
I'm the president. I was re-elected by this country. I get
to appoint--to nominate Supreme Court justices, and you don't
have a right of veto."
SEN. REID: Well, of course, if you read the Constitution,
that's absolutely wrong. We do have a right of advise and
consent. And I say to the president, he should follow what
President Clinton did. President Clinton didn't have Orrin
Hatch approve who he wanted. I mean, he gave him some
suggestions and the suggestions were good. Orrin Hatch should
be commended for that.
MR. RUSSERT: Are you going to be able to work with Senator
Bill Frist, the Republican, and actually achieve anything?
SEN. REID: I think Bill Frist is one of the finest persons
I've met. Here is a man how gave up a career in medicine--he
was a transplant surgeon--to come here and spend some time in
public service. He's doing his very best. His caucus is so
much more difficult to deal with than mine. I'm going to have
a much easier time with my Democrats than he is with his
Republicans. But I look forward to working with him. We have
a good relationship now, and I think it will get better during
the next couple years.
MR. RUSSERT: But you're down to only 45. That's very few
Democrats.
SEN. REID: Well, we have three less than we had last time. I
think we have a pretty strong group of people, and we're going
to do what we're entitled to do under the Constitution because
we represent the American people.
MR. RUSSERT: Harry Reid, senator from Nevada, the new minority
leader of the Democrats in the Senate. We thank you for
sharing your views.
SEN. REID: Tim, thanks for allowing me to be on your show.
It was such a breeze.
MR. RUSSERT: Our roundtable is next with David Broder of The
Washington Post and David Gregory who covers the White House for
NBC News. Then our MEET THE PRESS MINUTE. Tom Brokaw on MEET
THE PRESS 50 times. Some highlights coming up right here on
MEET THE PRESS.
MR. RUSSERT: And we are back.
The Davids are here, Broder and Gregory. Welcome both. The
intelligence reform bill, Mr. Broder. Robert Novak in the
Chicago Sun-Times wrote this: "Loyal Bushites are newly
candidate in criticizing the president's performance on intel
reform. They say a word from the White House is no longer
sufficient because Bush's political fate no longer is paramount
for them," meaning members of Congress. "He never again must
be tested by the voters, even as House members undergo that
ordeal" every two years, "biennially. The 22nd Amendment to
the Constitution has rendered Bush a lame duck."
Is that what's going on here?
MR. DAVID BRODER: It's partly what's going on here. But I
think there are also some real policy differences. I think the
president still has the opportunity to get this bill passed.
If he's willing to do what he has not done up to this point,
which is to say directly to the Republican members of the House,
"I'm saying to you as the commander in chief that I think our
troops are as safe or safer under this plan as they are today,"
if he does that, I've been told by conservative Republicans he
can still pass this bill.
MR. RUSSERT: David Gregory, Chris Shays, Republican from
Connecticut, said, "When President Bush wants something, he gets
it done. It's a mystery to me why we haven't seen a more
forceful presentation to the public."
This is a Republican. What's going on?
MR. DAVID GREGORY: It's a mystery to some of the president's
allies in his conservative caucus in the House as well, that
they appeared at the White House to be flat-footed on this.
The president didn't use his political capital that he talked
about having after re-election. Indeed, it's House Republicans
who feel they've got some political capital to spend as well.
And more important than the president, I've been told by some
conservatives on Capitol Hill that it's Secretary Rumsfeld who
really must carry the ball over the line now and convince those
wavering Republicans that this is a bill that he can live with
and, therefore, they can live with. And that hasn't happened
up until now.
MR. RUSSERT: Last week on this program, I had Lee Hamilton,
the co-chair, and Tom Kean, the chairman, of the September 11th
Commission. Governor Kean, former Republican governor of New
Jersey, said something that got a lot of attention. Let me
share it with our viewers again.
(Videotape, last Sunday):
FMR. GOV. TOM KEAN, (R-NJ): This bill will pass. The
question is whether it will pass now or after a second attack.
(End videotape)
MR. RUSSERT: Pretty strong, David.
MR. BRODER: It is. And, you know, the point that David makes
about Rumsfeld is fascinating, because, I mean, Don Rumsfeld, as
we have all known, is a skilled bureaucratic infighter. He
does not want to lose any of the control that he now has over
this intelligence budget. But he works for the president.
And the president just this week said, "I'm going to keep
Rumsfeld." You have to believe that when they had that meeting
that produced that comment from the president, the president
certainly had an opportunity and presumably said to him, "Don,
you've got to get on board, really get on board, on this
proposal of mine."
MR. GREGORY: What I think is interesting is how hard the
president wants to fight for this before the term end, so he's
only got a couple of days, or whether they want to start from
scratch, as some Republicans want to do, come January. The
problem, you heard Senator Reid say, "We've got to stay through
Christmas to get this done." This is a campaign issue. The
president embraced these reforms because he didn't want Senator
Kerry to have an issue. He felt he had to embrace the 9/11
findings. And so it's a real question whether he wants to let
it go that far to have a bill redrawn. That could cost him
politically.
MR. RUSSERT: You saw Senator Reid saying the president should
spend some of that political capital. Is the White House
sensitive to the criticism that the president's not doing
enough?
MR. GREGORY: They are sensitive to it. Karl Rove was
dispatched to a GOP retreat this week to lobby for this bill,
and he did so very aggressively. But they're also sensitive
about rolling the Republicans on this issue. A top
conservative in the House, who's very tight with the White
House, said to me they don't want to use Democrats to get this
bill done right out of the gate. It would really imperil some of
the other reforms, Social Security, tax reform, where they're
going to need conservatives down the line.
MR. BRODER: I think that's right, but it's this last point
that makes this so intriguing. Because up to now, the
president has not had to take on the conservatives in his own
party on any major issue. And this time, to get it done
without depending on the Democrats, he would have to take on
those conservatives.
MR. RUSSERT: Let me turn to Social Security. You heard the
leader of the Democrats in the Senate just say no private
accounts when it comes to Social Security. It looks like the
president is going to have one big fight if he tries to reform
Social Security in that direction.
MR. BRODER: Clearly so. And he's going to be searching for
somebody or somebodies on the Democratic side who might be
willing to take a more flexible attitude than Senator Reid.
This is--if--I mean, I think if the president is serious about
Social Security reform, and he certainly appears to be, that
will drive his tactics in terms of Supreme Court appointments
and many other things where he will have to be prepared to give
something to the Democrats in return.
MR. GREGORY: He's also got to campaign for this around the
country. Newt Gingrich has been outspoken on this point,
saying, "You can't just make deals with Congress on this. You
have to take this to the people." There's a lot of people out
there, including my own mother, who lives out in California, who
wonders what's going to happen to her Social Security checks.
People are worried. They don't understand what private
accounts would mean for their benefits today. Even younger
workers don't really understand what Social Security means for
them down the line, so he's got some education to do, and he's
got to make the case that you brought up with Senator Reid,
which is the case of many, which is: Is no reform more costly
than reform?
MR. RUSSERT: You also heard Senator Reid talk about judicial
nominations, particularly Supreme Court nominations, David
Gregory. He has written a letter to the president, he
disclosed, saying you should consult with us, the Democrats,
before you send a name to the Senate for the Supreme Court.
What do you think the reaction of the White House will be?
MR. GREGORY: Not very good. I think that the president has
got a real choice to make here. Whether he--if he looks at the
landscape and says, "Well, I perhaps have a few nominations to
make in the course of the second term. What do I want to do
off the bat? Do I really want to take the wood to the
Democrats and nominate a conservative, which is going to be
important to my base, or do I want to try to get somebody
through initially?" It's a choice I don't have a clear answer
to what he'll do on, but it's going to be a tough one he's going
to have to make as to whether he really wants to work with
Democrats on this.
MR. BRODER: And it also depends on what kind of--I mean, this
country is full of conservative lawyers, able people, men and
women, who could be easily confirmed...
MR. GREGORY: Absolutely.
MR. BRODER: ...for the Supreme Court? The question is:
Does he pick one of them who already has such a clearly stated
position on abortion and other social issues that he guarantees
himself a fight? This is like the war in Iraq. This is an
option for him.
MR. GREGORY: Right.
MR. BRODER: It's not a necessity for him to have this fight at
the beginning.
MR. GREGORY: But also bear in mind that Democrats know this is
the one area where they can wield some real power, and it
matters to their loyal supporters how they handle this
particular issue.
MR. RUSSERT: The Reverend Jerry Falwell was on MEET THE PRESS
saying he has every expectation that this president must
nominate someone to the Supreme Court who has advocated
overturning Roe vs. Wade.
MR. BRODER: That's Reverend Falwell. We'll see whether
that's also the president and Karl Rove.
MR. RUSSERT: It was interesting to hear Senator Reid say that
he thought it would be very difficult if Roe vs. Wade was
overturned even though he himself opposes abortion.
MR. GREGORY: That's right. And it's not all together clear
to me how hard the president is going to fight for a nominee for
whom Roe v. Wade is a top priority. The president has made it
very clear, despite his stance as being anti-abortion, that he
does not think the country is prepared for that. He said that
back to you in 2000, and he hasn't changed his view. So as I
say, as David points out, this is a real choice as to how the
president wants to define this fight when it comes to his
doorstep.
MR. RUSSERT: Iraq: David Broder, elections going forward.
The president says we must have them. You heard the president
of Iraq this morning say we must have them. Although the
president of Iraq acknowledges a silent majority that exists in
Iraq, how patient are the American people going to be until the
Iraqis begin to take control of their own country and their own
destiny?
MR. BRODER: I don't know the answer to that, but this daily
reports of increasing violence in the cities across Iraq, I
mean, we are dealing with something that is much more than a
small band of insurgents as we first thought. This is
approaching the dimensions of a civil war. And I'm afraid that
even if we're able to have the election on January 31 that we
will still be required to have large numbers of troops there
just to keep the level of violence down to a halfway tolerable
degree.
MR. RUSSERT: What's your say on this?
MR. GREGORY: I think it's important even if Iraqis want
freedom, do they have the wherewithal and the institutions in
place to pull off a new country.
MR. RUSSERT: And the president's aware of that.
MR. GREGORY: Yes.
MR. RUSSERT: David Gregory, David Broder, thanks very much.
Next up, a special MEET THE PRESS Minute: Tom Brokaw. He
retired this week after 22 years as anchor of "NBC Nightly
News," but he'll still be doing reports for the Peacock Network.
MR. RUSSERT: And we are back.
After 22 extraordinary years as the anchor of "NBC Nightly
News," our friend and colleague Tom Brokaw signed off for the
last time Wednesday night.
(Videotape, "NBC Nightly News," December 1):
MR. TOM BROKAW: ...for this Wednesday night. I'm Tom
Brokaw. You'll see Brian Williams here tomorrow night, and
I'll see you along the way.
(End videotape)
MR. RUSSERT: Tom has appeared on MEET THE PRESS more than 50
times as an astute questioner, guest moderator and trusted
analyst. Let's look.
(Videotape, October 21, 1973):
Unidentified Man: We'll have the first questions now from Tom
Brokaw of NBC News.
MR. BROKAW: Mr. Laird, Let me briefly summarize all that has
happened this weekend.
(End videotape)
(Videotape, January 6, 1974):
MR. BROKAW: Mr. Vice President, did you agree with President
Nixon's decision not to release presidential documents to the
Senate Watergate Committee to reject the subpoena?
(End videotape)
(Videotape, September 13, 1981):
MR. BROKAW: Mr. Prime Minster, Egyptian President Sadat
appears to be in some considerable political trouble at home.
If you were to lose President Sadat of Egypt as a negotiator for
Israel, would you consider that an irreversible blow to the
chances for peace in the Middle East?
(End videotape)
(Videotape, December 22, 1985):
MR. BROKAW: Mr. Speaker, let's talk a little politics. It
seems to me that about half of Massachusetts is lined up to run
fur your congressional seat when you decide to retire at the end
of this term.
(End videotape)
(Videotape, September 27, 1987):
Unidentified Announcer: This is the first one-on-one interview
that Premier Zhou has ever given to American television.
MR. BROKAW: Premier Zhou, your election as the general
secretary of the Communist Party of China is widely anticipated
at the party congress in October. Tell us, will the pace of
change in China accelerate? Will it stay the same? Or will
it slow down after the party congress?
(End videotape)
(Videotape, August 12, 1990):
MR. BROKAW: Good morning. I'm Tom Brokaw, and welcome to
MEET THE PRESS: the crisis in the Persian Gulf.
Mr. Ambassador, welcome, first of all. It does appear that
Saddam Hussein is prepared for a long siege. Do you agree with
Egyptian President Mubarak that there can be no peaceful
solution to this crisis?
(End videotape)
(Videotape, January 17, 1993):
MR. BROKAW: Senator, Bill Clinton was asked who he would like
to have in the room, the one person, if there's a major decision
to be made, and he said Hillary. Does that mean when that big
decision is made and her advice is in one direction and yours is
the other, she wins?
(End videotape)
(Videotape, November 7, 1993):
MR. BROKAW: Mr. President, do you think that there has been
enough dialogue within the black community about this whole
issue of families without fathers?
(End videotape)
(Videotape, June 5, 1994):
MR. BROKAW: And they came back to America to build the
greatest economy known to man and the greatest political system
known to man without whining, without complaining, and now, 50
years later, they're coming back here to visit the graves of
their fallen friends, to bring their family back as well. I
think we owe them so much more than just D-Day.
(End videotape)
(Videotape, June 6, 2004):
MR. RUSSERT: Tom Brokaw, you are the author of "The Greatest
Generation." How has that book changed your life?
MR. BROKAW: Oh, it's changed it profoundly, Tim. You and I
have talked about that at length. I think at the end of my
professional career, which has been spent mostly in television,
I will look back and say that book and the two subsequent books
are the works that I'm most proud of as a professional
journalist. And with Tom Hanks and with Steven Spielberg, I
think the three of us have our own little band of brothers here,
because our lives have been changed so much by our experience
with these veterans.
(End videotape)
(Videotape, August 29, 2004):
MR. RUSSERT: If, in fact, New Hampshire and West Virginia
switched to Kerry, New Hampshire being his neighbor, West
Virginia having voted...
MR. BROKAW: Right.
MR. RUSSERT: ...Democrat three of the last four times, it
would be 269-to-269, dead even in the Electoral College. The
election would go to the House of Representatives. And you
couldn't retire.
MR. BROKAW: Oh, yes, I could. This election does not hinge
on me stepping down. I'm not—you know, we have to kind of
restate that. I'm not going off to the old anchorman's home
with a lap robe and a drool cup, as I keep saying. I'm going to
continue to be in the hunt, doing long-form programming and so
on. But it's time for a new generation.
(End videotape)
MR. RUSSERT: And you will not see Tom every night, but he, in
fact, will travel the world and bring us special reports for NBC
News.
MR. RUSSERT: Start your day tomorrow on "Today" with Katie and
Matt, then the "NBC Nightly News" with Brian Williams.
That's all for today. We'll be back next week. If it's
Sunday, it's MEET THE PRESS.
© 2004 MSNBC Interactive
*****************************************************************
8 ACA: The Nuclear Third Rail: Can Fuel Cycle Capabilities Be Limited?
Arms Control Association:
Arms Control Today
Jon B. Wolfsthal
In U.S. politics, some issues are so controversial that they are
known as third railstouching them risks political electrocution.
Social Security, for example, has often been likened to the third
rail of U.S. domestic politics. In the nuclear security world,
the third rail has been the nuclear fuel cycle, that is, what
restrictions if any should be placed on the ability of states to
produce and use fissile materials (enriched uranium and
especially plutonium), which have civilian purposes but also can
be used to make nuclear weapons. Past attempts to alter the
status quo on these issues have produced many political
headaches, but few tangible results.
On Feb. 11, President George W. Bush delivered a major
nonproliferation address that approached the nuclear third rail.
In addressing a long-standing concern, he stated that, under the
nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), states were allowed to
produce nuclear material that can be used to build bombs under
the cover of civilian nuclear programs and proposed to close this
treatys loophole. The president said the world must create a
safe, orderly system to field civilian nuclear plants without
adding to the danger of weapons proliferation.
The following month, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei told the agencys Board of
Governors that the wide dissemination of the most
proliferation-sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cyclethe
production of new fuel, the processing of weapons-usable
material, and the disposal of spent fuel and radioactive
wastecould be the Achilles heel of the nuclear nonproliferation
regime.
These comments echo those ElBaradei made in September 2003 when
he urged states to consider the merits of limiting the use of
weapons-usable material (plutonium and highly enriched uranium
[HEU]) in civilian nuclear programs, by permitting it only under
multilateral control. At that time, he also proposed limiting to
international centers the production of new fissile material
through reprocessing and enrichment. It is clear that
strengthened control of weapons-usable material is key to our
efforts to strengthen nonproliferation and enhance security, he
said.
Both of these leaders focused on a central issue:
whether the current nuclear nonproliferation system, or the
global security architecture for that matter, is capable of
preventing states fromor punishing states formaking use of civil
facilities for weapons purposes if at some point they decide to
abandon the NPT or related commitments. This breakout scenario,
where a state could acquire virtually all of the weapons-related
capabilities it needs under the NPTs protection, is an increasing
concern. Already, the fabric of the global nonproliferation
regime is weakening with a chronic crisis over North Koreas
nuclear program and continuing concerns over Irans nuclear
future. Whether the regime rips apart or will be sown back
together is an open question.
The answer will have much to do with how the Iranian
crisis in particular is resolved. A successful resolution will
shore up a security system based on a small and eventually
shrinking number of nuclear-weapon states. A failure could help
pave the way to widespread proliferation, with many states
looking for a nuclear insurance policy by acquiring civil
capabilities that provide a base for weapons development. They
could add to the 12 countries already known to possess enrichment
or reprocessing facilities for either nuclear or civilian
purposes. Although a recently announced agreement by Iran to
suspend its enrichment activities while negotiations with three
European Union countries proceed is a good first step, it is far
too early to know if the proposed nuclear deal with Iran is a
model or a mirage.
Technological Realities At the crux of this challenge is the fact
that nuclear weapons and nuclear power plants depend on the same
basic raw materialsenriched uranium and plutoniumto provide their
essential energy. Most civilian nuclear power plants, for
example, use low-enriched uranium (LEU), which is uranium that
has gone through a process to increase the percentage of
uranium-235 by 3 percent to 5 percent for use in civilian power
reactors. However, the same facilities that produce LEU can also
produce the much higher concentrations of U-235 needed for the
production of nuclear weapons.
Moreover, all nuclear energy reactors produce plutonium,
albeit some more than others. Some countries treat this material
as waste, leaving it encased in radioactive spent fuel for later
disposal. Other countries such as Russia, France, and Japan
separate out this plutonium and mix it with uranium to use as
so-called mixed oxide fuel, or Mox, in power plants. The
plutonium-separation plants, however, can also produce plutonium
that can be used for a nuclear weapon, creating a weapons
potential under the cover of civilian use.
The challenge then is how to ensure that enrichment and
reprocessing plants do not support weapons activities.
Uranium-enrichment plants, using centrifuge technology to purify
the U-235 isotope, could be reconfigured from producing LEU for
nuclear power plants to produce weapons-grade material within
hours. For plutonium-separation plants, even in countries such as
Japan, where reprocessing facilities are designed to produce
mixtures of plutonium and uranium oxide, the additional
purification to a weapon-usable form is straightforward.
Inspections carried out under IAEA safeguards agreements can
detect changes in plants or the diversion of materials, a
capability further enhanced if the inspections are carried out in
countries that have adhered to variants of the 1997 Model
Additional Protocol, which grants broader rights to inspectors.
Yet, inspectors cannot be everywhere at every time. Additionally,
even under the safeguards, the possession of large stocks of HEU
and separated plutonium is permitted under the NPT as several
legitimate peaceful uses for these materials exist.
Moreover, the world lacks an ironclad system for preventing
defections from the nonproliferation regime or for denying states
who defect access to nuclear capabilities acquired under the
treatys protection. States can acquire enrichment or reprocessing
facilities under the guise of the NPT and then legally withdraw
from the treaty, allowing these peaceful facilities to be used to
advance a weapons program. It does not mean all states with such
capabilities will do so or even think about it, but the potential
exists and must be recognized. It is not surprising, therefore,
that some countries may view these plants as nuclear weapons
insurance or hedging policies.
A Long-standing Problem
The fact that nuclear facilities can be used both for
peaceful and military ends has been known for decades. The 1965
Gilpatric report to President Lyndon Johnson stated starkly that
the world is fast approaching a point of no return in the
prospects of controlling nuclear weapons. Nuclear power programs
are placing within the hands of many nations much of the
knowledge, equipment, and materials for making nuclear weapons.
The report said every effort should be made to ensure that
peaceful atomic energy programs do not unreasonably contribute to
potential proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities.[1]
Yet, three years later, Article IV of the NPT stated
that it is the inalienable right of all the parties to the treaty
to develop research production and use of nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with
Articles I and II of this Treaty.
Developing and many developed countries have long
interpreted Article IV of the NPT as a right for all states to
acquire uranium-enrichment and plutonium-separation capabilities
as long as they are under IAEA safeguards. For just as long,
however, some experts have questioned whether the inherent risk
these facilities pose are consistent with an effective
nonproliferation regime. These concerns have been echoed in U.S.
and international export control policies that have sought to
limit the availability of these capabilities, albeit in some
countries only in the past few years.
For decades, efforts have been made to reconcile the two
positions. In the 1970s and 1980s, for example, these included
the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE), the
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy conference, and the six-year
Committee on Assurances of Supply. Yet, all fell short of
addressing this challenge or making any real adjustments to the
global fuel-supply system due to concerns about the long-term
availability of uranium, potential limits on industry growth, and
conflicts between international security concerns and national
sovereignty.
Countries that have made massive economic and technical
investments in reprocessing and enrichment, such as Japan and
France, have resisted any moves that might restrict their ability
to engage in these activities for domestic or international
export-related purposes. States such as Brazil also are pursuing
enrichment capabilities to advance their own nuclear industries
as well as to claim a position of technical leadership in the
developing world. These institutional, economic, and political
interests combine to make it exceedingly challenging to find
support for major structural adjustments to the international
fuel cycle.
Now, more than 20 years after INFCE, there is growing
awareness that the world faces a long-term choice of either
living with or seeking to adjust a system that enables states to
develop virtual nuclear arsenals under the protection of the NPT
and international safeguards. These issues can be addressed
case-by-case, such as the current situation with Iran, or
strategically to prevent such crises from emerging.
There is a reasonable international debate about the
extent of the risks posed by safeguarded nuclear production
facilities and fissile materials. States such as Japan with
exemplary nonproliferation credentials and fully safeguarded
facilities rightly point out that they have complied with all
norms and should not be restricted now that countries such as
Iran and North Korea have broken the rules. At the same time, as
the nonproliferation regime is challenged, states can and should
be alarmed at the prospect that more and more states will seek
peaceful nuclear production capabilities as an insurance policy
again proliferation by their neighbors. Already, South Koreans
are calling for the development of a domestic enrichment
capability on economic grounds, but with an understanding that it
would also balance the nuclear capabilities in North Korea,
Japan, and China.
In the past, the most effective nonproliferation tools
have been those that reduce the perceived need to acquire nuclear
weapons in the first place. Economic, political, and security
integration of Japan, South Korea, Germany, and other countries
once considered prone to proliferation have been critical to
nonproliferation successes. Moreover, countries highly dependent
on nuclear power are often dependant on outside sources for raw
uranium or technical support from supplier states; and
reorienting civilian nuclear plants to military production in
countries such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan would have to be
seriously weighed against the possible loss of nuclear
cooperation, to say nothing of other issues, with the outside
world. Yet, in the extreme circumstances where states closely
allied with the United States would be actively considering
nuclear options, violating bilateral or international agreements
might be of lesser importance than hard security calculations.
Even if production facilities are not intended for
weapons purposes, they can create tensions. South Korean
officials, for example, are not shy about pointing to the large
civilian stocks in Japan as a potential nuclear arsenal, even
though Japans nonproliferation credentials are impeccable and
relations between the Republic of Korea and Japan are quite
strong. If the number of reprocessing and enrichment plants
worldwide grows, such concerns are likely to grow as well. The
bottom line is that states that do not possess the ability to
produce nuclear materials are obviously less capable of acquiring
nuclear weapons, except by theft or via black market purchases of
material. The central axiom of nonproliferation is no nuclear
materials, no nuclear weapons.
Three Approaches to the Fuel Cycle Dilemma
There are now three basic viewpoints in relation to the
fuel cycle issue. The first school believes that the current
system essentially works and that adjustments are needed to
ensure that no unsafeguarded or illegal transfers of nuclear
production technologies take place. A second group maintains that
the possession of such capabilities by peaceful, integrated, and
nonproliferation-compliant states is perfectly acceptable and
that the focus should be only on states with bad track records,
obvious incentives to proliferate, and poor justifications for
acquiring nuclear production capabilities. A third, more
ambitious approach holds that the national possession of
enrichment and plutonium-separation capabilities undermines the
very basis for nonproliferation and that such activities should
be minimized to the extent possible and exercised only under
international or multinational control to provide additional
assurances that they will only ever be used for peaceful
purposes.
Bush and ElBaradei
Bush and ElBaradei represent the second and third of
these perspectives and have backed up their statements with
explicit proposals. In February, Bush called on the Nuclear
Suppliers Group (NSG), an informal export control organization
made up of the main nuclear exporting states, to deny the
transfer of enrichment or reprocessing technologies to any
country that does not already possess full-scale, functioning
enrichment and reprocessing plants. The Group of Eight, which
brings together the worlds richest countries, has since adopted a
similar position in a one-year moratorium on such transfers, with
the possibility of a longer-term extension. Bush optimistically
stated, [T]his step will prevent new states from developing the
means to produce fissile material for nuclear bombs. It is
questionable whether even the 44-member NSG is comprehensive
enough to prevent the spread of this technology.
Bushs proposals came at the same time that the public
learned of the black-market nuclear network established by Abdul
Qadeer Khan, the father of Pakistans nuclear program. That
network successfully and secretly disseminated enrichment
capabilities to Iran, Libya, and North Korea. Controversy
continues to rage over whether Khans activities were sponsored
and approved by the Pakistani government. If they were, Bushs
proposal would have done little to shut down this network as
Pakistan is not an NSG member.
ElBaradei has voiced his support for stronger export
controls and enforcement but has also formed an experts group
under the direction of former IAEA Deputy Director-General Bruno
Pellaud to consider various alternatives to the current system of
national control of special nuclear material production
capabilities.[2] Some of the issues to be explored by the expert
group are limits on the use of weapons-usable nuclear material in
civilian nuclear programs by permitting it only under
multilateral control and multinational approaches to managing and
disposal of spent fuel and radioactive wastes.
In forming the group, ElBaradei stated, I am aware that
this is a complex issue. But we owe it to ourselves to examine
all possible options. Common sense and recent experience make
clear that the [NPT], which has served us well since 1970, must
be tailored to fit 21st-century realities. Without threatening
national sovereignty, we can toughen the nonproliferation regime.
The group has already met twice and will hold a total of
four meetings before reporting its initial findings to the March
2005 IAEA Board of Governors meeting. The leading nuclear
countries, including the United States, are participating, and
the panel has governmental and nongovernmental representatives
with a broad background in the issue of the nuclear fuel cycle
and nonproliferation.
Some hybrid solutions are also being mentioned in
capitals around the world. Some have suggested that what is
needed is a greater assurance that any misuse of safeguarded
facilities will be challenged and the dangers counteracted.
Openly discussed options include establishing clear obligations
that a state must return any and all material, equipment, and
technology acquired under safeguards if a violation is detected
or a state withdraws from the NPT.[3] The key here, however,
would be the ability and the willingness of states to enforce
such an edict. Any country trying to withdraw from the NPT or
willing to violate its obligations might be equally unwilling to
comply with a request for nuclear materials to be removed. Thus,
states may have to consider military actions to eliminate the
potential nuclear option in such states. That, as can be seen
from the Iraq experience, is no easy step.
Another set of ideas being floated by experts and
officials is an objective set of criteria that might allow the
international community to judge the legitimate need for states
to acquire nuclear production capabilities. These might include
the scope of the nuclear power industry and energy output of a
state, the availability of other natural resources for energy
production, a states nonproliferation credentials, and its
integration into international economic and political
organizations. Some would argue this would make it easy to judge
between states such as North Korea and Iran on the one hand and
Japan and Brazil on the other. It is not clear how such a set of
criteria would be enshrined in international operations or
whether it could be accepted by NPT members, many of who
increasingly express their concern about the discriminatory
nature of the existing regime.
A less legalistic set of approaches in a similar vein
would seek to test the motivations of states seeking to acquire
uranium-enrichment or plutonium- separation capabilities for
civilian power applications.[4] These ideas would, in various
ways, seek to outdo domestic nuclear production facilities
economically by offering legally binding and economically
attractive options to supply fresh fuel and remove spent nuclear
fuel from states with nuclear power programs.
Such arrangements could be provided through the existing
commercial market with groups of existing enrichers providing
fresh fuel at attractive rates and countries agreeing to manage
the spent fuel in their own countries or via international
arrangements such as an IAEA-run fuel bank or internationally
owned and operated consortium such as those being considered by
the IAEA experts group. Refusal of viable and economically
attractive options by a state would call into question its
motives and possibly make it easier to galvanize the potential
international response. Yet, as the Iran case demonstrates, it
the difficult for states and the international community to
muster political will to enforce global standards even in the
face of obvious proliferation risks.
Assessment
The near-term prospects for a new international
fuel-cycle system that limits the national ability of states to
determine their own national capabilities are not bright. The
main focus of nonproliferation efforts for the coming months and
possibly years will be resolving or trying to deal with the
aftermath of the dual nuclear challenges of Iran and North Korea.
In the meantime, procedural adjustments to export controls and
tighter enforcement through multilateral measures including the
Proliferation Security Initiative, an informal coalition of
states working together to enforce national export controls more
effectively through legal and even military interdiction, can
help slow the unsafeguarded acquisition of nuclear production
facilities.
Thus, states concerned with the spread of production
capabilities may be left trying to enforce a new discriminatory
standard where some states are permitted to have
uranium-enrichment and plutonium reprocessing capabilities and
others are not. This system is inherently unstable and threatens
to repeat what many consider to be the main weakness of the NPT
itself.
Moreover, the two issues are intimately linked.
Non-nuclear weapons states are unlikely to consider yielding to
what many see as a basic right under the NPT. They will be
especially resistant as many already question the commitment of
the United States or other nuclear-weapon states to meet their
own treaty obligations. In particular, they claim that the
nuclear-weapon states have not made sufficient progress in
achieving their stated goals of general and complete disarmament
and their 2000 pledge that they were unequivocally committed to
doing so. In other words, it will be difficult to tighten some
portions of NPT implementation without states linking it to other
efforts to enforce other aspects of the agreement.
What is clear is that the way the world succeeds or
fails in addressing Iran will serve as a precedent in the coming
years. In accepting an offer from the United Kingdom, France, and
Germany to suspend and potentially abandon nuclear production
plans in exchange for access to nuclear reactors, energy
assistance, and fuller trade engagement, Iran and its negotiating
partners may be creating a potentially useful model for others to
follow. In the end, however, the choice is between trying to get
ahead of the curve by changing the rules of the international
system or resigning the United States and other major players to
putting out nuclear fires every time a new state attempts to
acquire reprocessing or enrichment technologies.
If the Iran talks fall apart or other states friendlier
to the West decide to pursue nuclear production plans and are not
equally opposed, the discrimination among states will be made
more apparent and the underlying tensions will re-emerge. If, as
many hope, the talks lead to a long-term deal to end Tehrans fuel
cycle ambitions, the United States and its allies should work to
establish Iran as the model for a new norm where no new states
acquire these special capabilities and those that have them move
to operate them in ways that reduce the distinction between the
haves and have-nots. ENDNOTES
1. The White House, A Report to the President by the Committee on
Nuclear Proliferation, January 21, 1965.
2. Miles A. Pomper, ElBaradei Appoints Fuel
Cycle Group, Arms Control Today, September 2004.
3. George Perkovich et al., Universal
Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security, June 2004.
4. Ernest Moniz et al., Making the World Safe
for Nuclear Energy, Survival, Winter 2004.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Jon B. Wolfsthal is an associate and deputy director for
Non-Proliferation at the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace. He is a co-author of Deadly Arsenals: Tracking Weapons of
Mass Destruction (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, June 2002).
The Arms Control Association is a non-profit, membership-based
organization. If you find our resources useful, please consider
joining or making a contribution. Arms Control Today encourages
reprint of its articles with permission of the Editor.
2004 Arms Control Association, 1150 Connecticut Avenue, NW,
Suite 620 Washington, DC 20036 Tel: (202) 463-8270 | Fax: (202)
463-8273
*****************************************************************
9 Xinhua: Pakistan rules out inspection of nuclear facilities
www.xinhuanet.com
www.chinaview.cn 2004-12-06 23:26:44
ISLAMABAD, Dec. 6 (Xinhuanet) -- Pakistan Monday ruled out
inspection of its sensitive nuclear facilities by the inspectors
of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
(OPCW).
Speaking at a weekly news briefing, Foreign Office spokesman
Masood Khan scotched a news report on the training of the
officials from the country's nuclear Kahuta Research Laboratory,
which triggered speculation on the possibility of any inspection
of Pakistan's nuclear sites.
"The misperception that inspectors can or may barge into any
sensitive facility is based on the lack of knowledge of the
provisions of the inspection (under the Chemical Weapon
Convention)," Masood said.
Pakistan signed the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in
1993 as non-weapon possessor status and ratified it in 1997.
Masood said adequate safeguards were built into the
convention and the inspectors were only allowed "managed access
to specific facilities and (are) not allowed entry into any
unrelated facility at their discretion."
The spokesman explained that being signatory to the
convention, Pakistan was obliged to educate the public and was
raising awareness of private chemical industry through seminars,
workshops and training of officials was part of educational
activities. Enditem
Copyright 2003 Xinhua News Agency. All rights reserved.
*****************************************************************
10 Shut San Onofre down permanently NOW!!! Here's why (please
Date: Mon, 06 Dec 2004 20:07:20 -0800
December 6th, 2004
To The Editor:
Right now, San Onofre Nuclear Waste Generating Station is in a bad
way. Nearly everything in the whole facility is cracking apart. It is
embrittled, frail, old. Its bones are hardened. Its arteries are clogged
and stiff. It keeps popping and poofing, bursting and spilling, leaking,
spraying, steaming, venting, dripping, gushing, pouring out poisons into
our environment.
The tritium released from the plant alone is a major environmental concern
for swimmers and surfers in the water up and down the coast from the
plant. Tritium is absorbed by the body everywhere, because chemically, it
is just radioactively altered water. Tritium has a half-life of about 12
years and while it does occur naturally, there is no good reason on earth
to increase the dose to people.
In the course of its daily operation the plant also releases Cesium-137,
Strontium-90, uranium, plutonium (both in a variety of isotopes) and over
200 other radioactive "daughter products" of the nuclear reaction. The
nuclear industry and the lame-duck, industry-flunky "regulators" who watch
it assert that these releases are harmless. It is foolhardy to agree with
them when so many of the mechanisms for damage by radioactivity are
well-known in the scientific community and undeniable to any unbiased observer.
When the nuclear industry started promoting its dogma about how clean
nuclear power was, far fewer of these facts were established, such as the
role of "free-radicals" in the creation of cancer. Now, these things are
much better known, but the entire nuclear industry refuses to acknowledge
these issues. They still try to convince people that a little of their
radiation, scattered into your body randomly through pollution, might even
be good for you. It isn't. One atomic decay inside your body can directly
destroy 20,000 or more chemical bonds -- creating tritium inside your body,
for instance, or breaking apart a delicate protein -- the structure of
life. One damaged DNA strand can lead to fetal deformities or cancer.
San Onofre's "steam generators" need to all be replaced -- two per plant,
two plants -- total cost: estimated conservatively by the company at about
600 million dollars -- it will probably be a lot more. And they'll have to
slice into the uni-body "containment dome" to do the replacement, seriously
and permanently weakening that structure. And the replacement parts,
unlike the originals (which were never supposed to need to be replaced, but
they aged much more rapidly than expected), won't even be made in America,
subject to American inspections, or made to American standards of quality
(what's left of those standards, anyway).
San Onofre's "water heaters" also all need to be replaced (about 30 per
unit). Cost? Just another seven million dollars for each plant, but
there's more:
Pipes have been cracking -- probably they ALL need to be replaced, too
(especially if the recent accident in Japan that killed five workers
teaches us anything). That's a couple more hundred million dollars that
could go to renewable energy solutions instead.
Strapping for crane lifts has gotten old and failed. This reportedly cost
over 5 million dollars to fix.
The plant is a wreck waiting to happen. Radiation ages things (including
humans). Salty air destroys most metals. San Onofre is breaking down far
faster than "industry standards" because many nukes in America use
fresh-water lakes and rivers for coolant. Not San Onofre -- it uses sea water.
But despite San Onofre's accelerated aging, the plant's owners are usually
behind the eight ball when it comes to repairing things. "Let it fail,
then fix it quietly" seems to be their operating motto.
Even fork lift tines have dropped suddenly, due to aging. That should
NEVER happen!
Transformers have exploded because they were old, throwing shards of glass
onto the nearby railway and freeway (they are so close!). Old breakers
have exploded and burned, causing hundred-million dollar outages. (But in
keeping with their motto, the 130-or so similar breakers were NOT replaced.)
Workers have been exposed to radiation. Releases to the public have
occurred, and there have even been threats of domestic sabotage directed
against the plant -- for example, from an extremely well-armed disgruntled
worker who knew the plant intimately because he had broad access privileges
before being demoted and eventually fired.
It's time to SHUT SAN ONOFRE DOWN. Its power is replaceable. Our land and
our lives are not.
The choice to keep San Onofre's twin reactors generating 500 pounds of
extremely toxic waste every day because we are too lazy to build
large-scale renewable energy systems is a deadly sin we should stop committing.
But even if we did not convert to renewable energy, consider this: It's
fairly easy to prove that nuclear power does not generate ANY "net" energy
whatsoever, anyway! That's reason enough right there to get rid of the
plants. This assertion stems from the incredibly energy-intensive
processes need to mine and refine uranium into fuel, as well as
construction costs (and reconstruction costs), and dismantling costs. But
there are even more costs -- for example, the energy that will be needed to
take care of the waste for the next million years, including the dismantled
pieces and the "spent" fuel. Such equations also ignore any energy
expended on caring for the millions of sick and dying that would result
from a serious nuclear accident.
Nuclear energy is a financial rat-hole as well as a terrorist's primary
target. San Onofre makes money only for its immediate owners, who are
practically GIVEN uranium fuel by the U.S. Government, who also promises
(but so far has failed) to take it away after it has been turned into
radioactive waste (at great profit) by Southern California Edison.
San Onofre can and should be shut down NOW. While operating, it is
thousands of times more vulnerable to terrorism or forces of nature than
when it is shut down, even though the fuel will still be there long after
the last watt of electricity is produced, and it will still be a
danger. But it's much more dangerous now, and now is a perfect time to cut
our losses.
Sincerely,
Russell Hoffman
Concerned Citizen
Carlsbad, CA
The author is an independent researcher on nuclear power. He has written
thousands of essays on the subject and his work has been published in
several different languages and in more than a dozen countries. More than
two dozen nuclear activist organizations link to his web site or have
republished his essays or computer-animated tutorials about nuclear power
at their sites. (Some URLs for his material are given below.) He has
been quoted in the Washington Post and several dozen other media
outlets. Please distribute this document to all your California friends
and media. We CAN get San Onofre (and possibly Diablo Canyon) SHUT DOWN
TODAY!)
Please visit these web sites:
SHUT SAN ONOFRE!:
http://www.animatedsoftware.com/environm/onofre/index.htm
POISON FIRE USA: An animated history of major nuclear activities in the
continental United States:
www.animatedsoftware.com/poifu/poifu.swf
Internet Glossary of Nuclear Terminology / "The Demon Hot Atom":
http://www.animatedsoftware.com/hotwords/index.htm
List of every nuclear power plant in America, with history, activist orgs,
specs, etc.:
http://www.animatedsoftware.com/environm/no_nukes/nukelist.htm
List of ~350 books and videos about nuclear issues in my collection
(donations welcome!):
http://www.animatedsoftware.com/environm/no_nukes/mybooks.htm
Learn about The Effects of Nuclear War here:
http://www.animatedsoftware.com/environm/no_nukes/tenw/nuke_war.htm
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11 [NukeNet] studies on nuclear plant, cancer correlation
Date: Mon, 06 Dec 2004 20:07:07 -0800
http://www.app.com/app/story/0,21625,1132688,00.html
Independent studies show cancer, nuclear power plant correlation
Published in the Asbury Park Press 12/04/04
By NICHOLAS CLUNN
MANAHAWKIN BUREAU
Scientists should dedicate more time to studying the connection between
nuclear power plants and cancer, according to authors of two recently
released studies.
The authors, working independently, indicated a positive correlation
between radiation and cancer, but tempered their findings, citing that data
collected lacked statistical significance.
The results were released as many plant owners throughout the country
consider whether to seek permission to extend the lives of their reactors
by 20 years.
Federal regulators have already renewed operating licenses for 30
reactors and expect to consider 38 more applications within the next six
years, according to the Nuclear Energy Institute, an industry advocacy
group. Officials from the Oyster Creek nuclear power plant in Lacey will
submit the plant's application for another 20 years in July 2005.
"Because of the continuing debate over Oyster Creek's future and the
future of other aging plants in the Northeast, it's critical to know as
much as possible before any decisions are made about what to do," said
Joseph Mangano, national coordinator of the Pennsylvania-based Radiation
and Public Health Project, an independent research group.
The health project, in a state-funded study finished last month, linked
cancer with strontium-90, a cancer-causing isotope released from reactors.
Also last month, a leading radiation journal published a Columbia
University study associating higher doses of radiation with increased risk
of leukemia and other kinds of cancer.
But the Columbia study, conducted by the college's Mailman School of
Public Health, also found that people working for commercial reactors are
60 percent less likely to die from cancer than those with jobs elsewhere.
Epidemiologists with the university cited policies requiring on-the-job
wellness and annual medical check-ups as a major reason behind their
finding. The study tracked 53,000 workers at 52 plants for periods up to 18
years between 1979 and 1997.
Mangano and other researchers at the health project, meanwhile, found
higher than normal levels of strontium-90 in the teeth of Ocean County
children with cancer.
The health project tested 52 baby teeth, not enough for the study to be
considered statistically significant, said Mangano, who hopes benefactors
will see the "good start" and support additional studies.
"In a nut shell, more teeth would be very helpful in making this
significant," he said.
A $25,000 grant requested by the Cancer Institute of New Jersey, a state
agency, funded the study. It was the first time the state backed the health
project. Mangano mailed the study to the institute three weeks ago, but he
has not received a reply.
About a month after the state mailed its first check to the health
project in December 2003, a top radiation protection official, in a letter
to former Gov. James E. McGreevey, expressed serious concerns about the
group's legitimacy.
The health project is best known for the Tooth Fairy Project, which
linked cancer deaths in counties around nuclear power plants -- Monmouth
and Ocean included -- and levels of strontium-90. Actor Alec Baldwin and
supermodel Christie Brinkley helped publicize the study when the research
group came to Toms River to announce its results in May 2000.
Those results convinced Brick resident Janet Tauro to oppose license
renewal at Oyster Creek. She later recruited Brick Mayor Joseph C.
Scarpelli, who today is among the plant's toughest critics.
"Those were the figures that jumped out at me and prompted me to get
involved," Tauro said.
The health project's day-to-day business now operates out of Mangano's
home in Norristown, Pa., where he lives with his newlywed wife, Susan. When
he moved there from his Brooklyn apartment earlier this year, Mangano took
with him a collection of 3,000 teeth that he plans to study.
The molars, incisors and cuspids are now stored in the same closet as the
bride's dress, Mangano said.
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12 NRC: Notice of Availability of Interim Staff Guidance Documents for
FR Doc 04-26688
[Federal Register: December 6, 2004 (Volume 69, Number 233)]
[Notices] [Page 70475-70480] From the Federal Register Online via
GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr06de04-64]
Fuel Cycle Facilities AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Notice of availability.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Wilkins Smith, Project manager,
Technical Support Group, Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and
Safeguards, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards,
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20005-0001.
Telephone: (301) 415- 5788; fax number: (301) 415-5370; e-mail: .
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: I. Introduction The Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) plans to issue Interim Staff Guidance (ISG)
documents for fuel cycle facilities. These ISG documents provide
clarifying guidance to the NRC staff when reviewing either a
license application or a license amendment request for a fuel
cycle facility under 10 CFR part 70. The NRC is soliciting public
comments on the ISG documents which will be considered in the
final versions or subsequent revisions.
II. Summary The purpose of this notice is to provide the public
an opportunity to review and comment on a draft Interim Staff
Guidance document for fuel cycle facilities. Interim Staff
Guidance-10 provides guidance to NRC staff relative to
determining whether the minimum margin of subcriticality (MoS) is
sufficient to provide an adequate assurance of subcriticality for
safety to demonstrate compliance with the performance
requirements of 10 CFR 70.61(d). III. Further Information The
document related to this action is available electronically at
the NRC's Electronic Reading Room at .
From this site, you can access the NRC's Agencywide Document
Access and Management System (ADAMS), which provides text and
image files of NRC's public documents. The ADAMS ascension number
for the document related to this notice is ML043290270. If you do
not have access to ADAMS or if there are problems in accessing
the document located in ADAMS, contact the NRC Public Document
Room (PDR) Reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or by
e-mail to .
This document may also be viewed electronically on the public
computers located at the NRC's PDR, O 1 F21, One White Flint
North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD 20852. The PDR
reproduction contractor will copy documents for a fee. Comments
and questions should be directed to the NRC contact listed above
by January 5, 2005. Comments received after this date will be
considered if it is practical to do so, but assurance of
consideration cannot be given to comments received after this
date.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 24th day of November 2004.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Melanie A. Galloway, Chief, Technical Support Group, Division of
Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards, Office of Nuclear Material
Safety and Safeguards.
Draft--Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards Interim Staff
Guidance--10; Justification for Minimum Margin of Subcriticality
for Safety Issue Technical justification for the selection of the
minimum margin of subcriticality (MoS) for safety, as required by
10 CFR 70.61(d) Introduction 10 CFR 70.61(d) requires, in part,
that licensees demonstrate that ``under normal and credible
abnormal conditions, all nuclear processes are subcritical,
including use of an approved margin of subcriticality for
safety.'' To demonstrate subcriticality, licensees perform
validation studies in which critical experiments similar to
actual or anticipated calculations are chosen and are then used
to establish a mathematical criterion for subcriticality for all
future calculations. This criterion is expressed in terms of a
limit on the maximum value of the calculated keff, which will be
referred to in this ISG as the upper subcritical limit (USL). The
USL includes allowances for bias and bias uncertainty as well as
an additional margin which will be referred to hereafter as the
minimum margin of subcriticality (MoS). This MoS has been
variously referred to within the nuclear industry as subcritical
margin, arbitrary margin, and administrative margin.
The term MoS will be used throughout this ISG for consistency,
but these terms are frequently used interchangeably. This MoS is
an allowance for any unknown errors in the calculational method
that may bias the result of calculations, beyond those accounted
for explicitly in the calculation of the bias and bias
uncertainty.
There is little guidance in the fuel facility Standard Review
Plans (SRPs) as to what constitutes an acceptable MoS.
NUREG-1520, Section 5.4.3.4.4, states that the MoS should be
pre-approved by the NRC and that the MoS must ``include adequate
allowance for uncertainty in the methodology, data, and bias to
assure subcriticality.'' However, there is little guidance on how
to determine the amount of MoS that is appropriate. Partly due to
the historical lack of guidance, there have been significantly
different margins of subcriticality approved for different fuel
cycle facilities over time. In addition, the different ways of
defining the MoS and calculating keff limits significantly
compound the potential for confusion. The MoS can have a
significant effect on facility operations (e.g., storage capacity
and throughput) and there has therefore been considerable recent
interest in decreasing the margins of subcriticality below what
has been accepted historically. These two factors--the lack of
guidance and the increasing interest in reducing margins of
subcriticality--make clarification of what constitutes acceptable
justification for the MoS necessary. In general, consistent with
a risk-informed approach to regulation, smaller margins of
subcriticality require more substantial technical justification.
The purpose of this ISG therefore is to provide guidance on
determining whether the MoS is sufficient to provide
[[Page 70476]] an adequate assurance of subcriticality for
safety, in accordance with 10 CFR 70.61(d). Discussion The
neutron multiplication factor of a fissile system (keff) depends,
in general, on many different physical variables. The factors
that can affect the calculated value of keff may be broadly
divided into the following categories: (1) Geometric form; (2)
material composition; and (3) neutron distribution. The geometric
form and material composition of the system determine--together
with the underlying nuclear data (e.g., v, X(E), and the set of
cross section data)--the spatial and energy distribution of
neutrons in the system (i.e., flux and energy spectrum). An error
in the nuclear data or in the modeling of these systems can
produce an error in the calculated value of keff. This difference
between the calculated and true value of keff is referred to as
the bias\1\. The bias is defined as the difference between the
calculated and true values of keff, by the following equation:
[beta] = kcalc - ktrue
-----------------------------------------------------------------
---------- \1\ There are many different ways of computing bias as
used in calculation of the USL. This may be an average bias, a
least-squares fitted bias, a bounding bias, etc., as described in
the applicant's methodology.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
---------- The bias of a critical experiment may be known with a
high degree of confidence because the true (experimental) value
is known a priori (ktrue [ap] 1). Because both the experimental
and the calculational uncertainty are known, there is a
determinable uncertainty associated with the bias. The bias for a
calculated system other than a critical experiment is not
typically known with this same high degree of confidence, because
ktrue is not typically known. The MoS is therefore an allowance
for any unknown errors that may affect the calculated value of
keff, beyond those accounted for explicitly in the bias and bias
uncertainty. An MoS is needed because the critical experiments
chosen will, in general, exhibit somewhat different geometric
forms, material compositions, and neutron spectra from those of
actual system configurations, and the effect of these differences
is difficult to quantify. Bias and bias uncertainty are estimated
by calculating the keff of critical experiments with geometric
forms, material compositions, and neutron spectra similar to
those of actual or anticipated calculations. However, because of
the many factors that can effect the bias, it must be recognized
that this is only an estimate of the true bias of the system; it
is not possible to guarantee that all sources of error have been
accounted for during validation. Thus, use of a smaller MoS
requires a greater level of assurance that all sources of
uncertainty and bias have been taken into account and that the
bias is known with a high degree of accuracy. The MoS should be
large compared to known uncertainties in the nuclear data and
limitations of the methodology (e.g., modeling approximations,
convergence uncertainties). It should be noted that this MoS is
only needed when subcritical limits are based on the use of
calculational methods, including computer and hand calculations.
The MoS is not needed when subcritical limits are based on other
methods, such as experiment or published data (e.g., widely
accepted handbooks or endorsed industry standards).
Because the nuclear industry has employed widely different
terminology regarding validation and margin, it is necessary to
define the following terms as used in this ISG. These definitions
are for clarity only and are not meant to prescribe any
particular terminology.
Bias: The difference between the calculated and true values of
keff for a fissile system or set of systems.
Bias Uncertainty: The calculated uncertainty in the bias as
determined by a statistical method.
Margin of subcriticality (MoS): Margin in keff applied in
addition to bias and bias uncertainty to ensure subcriticality
(also known as subcritical, arbitrary, or administrative margin).
This term is shorthand for ``minimum margin of subcriticality''.
Margin of safety: Margin in one or more system parameters that
represents the difference between the value of the parameter at
which it is controlled and the value at which the system becomes
critical. (This represents an additional margin beyond the MoS.)
Upper Subcritical Limit: The maximum allowable keff value for a
system. Generally, the USL is defined by the equation USL =
1-bias-bias uncertainty-MoS.
Subcritical Limit: The value of a system parameter at which it is
controlled to ensure criticality safety, and at which keff does
not exceed the USL (also known as safety limit).
Operating Limit: The value of a system parameter at which it is
administratively controlled to ensure that the system will not
exceed the subcritical limit.\2\
-----------------------------------------------------------------
---------- \2\ Not all licensees have a separate subcritical and
operating limit. Use of administrative operating limits is
optional, because the subcritical limit should conservatively
take parametric tolerances into account.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
---------- If the USL is defined as described above, then the MoS
represents the difference between the average calculated keff
(including uncertainties) and the USL, thus: MoS = (1-bias-bias
uncertainty)-USL.
There are many factors that can affect the code's ability to
accurately calculate keff and that can thus impact the analyst's
confidence in the estimation of the bias. Some of these factors
are described in detail below.
Benchmark Similarity Because the bias of calculations is
estimated based on critical benchmarks with similar geometric
form, material composition, and neutronic behavior to the systems
being evaluated, the degree of similarity between benchmarks and
actual or anticipated calculations is a key consideration in
determining the appropriate MoS. The more closely the benchmarks
represent the characteristics of systems being validated, the
more confidence exists in the calculated bias and bias
uncertainty.
Allowing a comparison of the chosen benchmarks to actual or
anticipated calculations requires that both the experiments and
the calculations be described in sufficient detail to permit
independent verification of results. This may be accomplished by
submitting input decks for both benchmarks and calculations, or
by providing detailed drawings, tables, or other such data to the
NRC to permit a detailed comparison of system parameters.
In evaluating benchmark similarity, some parameters are obviously
more significant than others. The parameters that can have the
greatest effect on the calculated keff of the system are those
that are most significant. Historically, some parameters have
been used as trending parameters because these are the parameters
that are expected to have the greatest effect on the bias. They
include the moderator-to- fuel ratio (e.g., H/U, H/X, v\m\/v\f\),
isotopic abundance (e.g., \235\U, \239\Pu, or overall
Pu-content), and parameters characterizing the neutron spectrum
(e.g., energy of average lethargy causing fission (EALF), or
average energy group (AEG)). Other parameters, such as material
density or overall geometric shape, are generally considered to
be of less importance. Care should be taken that, when basing
justification for a reduced MoS on the similarity of benchmarks
to actual or anticipated calculations, all important system
characteristics that can affect the bias have been taken into
consideration. There are several ways to demonstrate that the
chosen benchmarks are sufficiently similar to actual or
anticipated calculations:
[[Page 70477]] 1. NUREG/CR-6698, ``Guide to Validation of Nuclear
Criticality Safety Calculational Method,'' Table 2.3, contains a
set of screening criteria for determining benchmark
applicability. As is stated in the NUREG, these criteria were
arrived at by consensus among experienced NCS specialists and may
be considered conservative. The NRC staff considers agreement on
all screening criteria to be sufficient justification for
demonstrating benchmark similarity. However, less conservative
(i.e., broader) screening ranges may be used if appropriately
justified.
2. Use of an analytical method that systematically quantifies the
degree of similarity between benchmarks and design applications,
such as Oak Ridge National Laboratory's TSUNAMI code in the SCALE
5 code package.
TSUNAMI calculates a correlation coefficient indicating the
degree of similarity between each benchmark and calculation in
pair-wise fashion. The appropriate threshold value of the
parameter indicating a sufficient degree of similarity is an
unresolved issue with the use of this method. However, the NRC
staff currently considers a correlation coefficient ck >= 0.95 to
be indicative of a strong degree of similarity. Conversely, a
correlation coefficient eff is highly insensitive to a particular
parameter. In such cases, a significant error in the parameter
will have a small effect on the system bias. One example is when
the number density of certain trace materials can be shown to
have a negligible effect on keff. Another example is when the
presence of a strong external absorber has only a slight effect
on k\eff\. In both cases, such a sensitivity study may be used to
justify why agreement with regard to a given parameter is not
important for demonstrating benchmark similarity.
4. Physical arguments may be used to demonstrate benchmark
similarity. For example, the fact that oxygen and fluorine are
almost transparent to thermal neutrons (i.e., cross sections are
very low) may be used as justification for why the differences in
chemical form between UO2F2 and UO2 may be ignored.
A combination of the above methods may also prove helpful in
demonstrating benchmark similarity. For example, TSUNAMI may be
used to identify the parameters to which keff is most sensitive,
or a sensitivity study may be used to confirm TSUNAMI results or
justify screening ranges. Care should be taken to ensure that all
parameters which can measurably affect the bias are considered
when comparing chosen benchmarks to calculations. For example,
comparison should not be based solely on agreement in the \235\U
fission spectrum if \238\U or \10\B absorption or \1\H scattering
have a significant effect on the calculated keff. A method such
as TSUNAMI that considers the complete set of reactions and
nuclides present should be used rather than relying on a
comparison of only the fission spectra. That all important
parameters have been included can be determined based on a study
of the keff sensitivity, as discussed in the next section. It is
especially important that all materials present in calculations
that can have more than a negligible effect on the bias are
included in the chosen benchmarks. In addition, it is necessary
that if the parameters associated with calculations are outside
the range of the benchmark data, the effect of extrapolating the
bias should be taken into account in setting the USL. This should
be done by making use of trends in the bias. Both the trend and
the uncertainty in the trend should be extrapolated using an
established mathematical method.
Some questions that should be asked in evaluating the chosen
benchmarks include: Are the critical experiments chosen all
high-quality benchmarks from reliable (e.g., peer-reviewed and
widely-accepted) sources? Are the benchmarks chosen taken from
independent sources? Do the most important benchmark parameters
cover the entire range needed for actual or anticipated
calculations? Is the number of benchmarks sufficient to establish
trends in the bias across the entire range? (The number depends
on the specific statistical method employed.) Are all important
parameters that could affect the bias adequately represented in
the chosen benchmarks? System Sensitivity Sensitivity of the
calculated keff to changes in system parameters is a closely
related concept to that of similarity.
This is because those parameters to which keff is most sensitive
should weigh more heavily in evaluating benchmark similarity. If
keff is highly sensitive to a given parameter, an error in the
parameter could be expected to have a significant impact on the
bias. Conversely, if keff is very insensitive to a given
parameter, then an error would be expected to have a negligible
impact on the bias. In the latter case, agreement with regard to
that parameter is not important to establishing benchmark
similarity.
Two major ways to determine the system's keff sensitivity are: 1.
The TSUNAMI code in the SCALE 5 code package can be used to
calculate the sensitivity coefficients for each nuclide-reaction
pair present in the problem. TSUNAMI calculates both an integral
sensitivity coefficient (i.e., summed over all energy groups) and
a sensitivity profile as a function of energy group. The
sensitivity coefficient is defined as the fractional change in
keff for a 1% change in the nuclear cross section. It must be
recognized that TSUNAMI only evaluates the keff sensitivity to
changes in the nuclear data, and not to other parameters that
could affect the bias and should be considered.
2. Direct sensitivity calculations can also be used to perturb
the system and gauge the resulting effect on keff. Perturbation
of the atomic number densities can also be used to confirm the
integral sensitivity coefficients calculated by TSUNAMI (as when
there is doubt as to convergence of the adjoint flux).
The relationship between the keff sensitivity and confidence in
the bias is the reason that high-enriched uranium fuel facilities
have historically required a greater MoS than low-enriched
uranium facilities. High-enriched systems tend to be much more
sensitive to changes in the underlying system parameters, and in
such systems, the effect of any errors on the bias would be
greatly magnified. For this same reason, systems involving
weapons-grade plutonium would also be more susceptible to
undetected errors than low- assay mixed oxide (i.e., a few
percent Pu). The appropriate amount of MoS should therefore be
commensurate with the sensitivity of the system to changes in the
underlying parameters.
Some questions that should be asked in evaluating the keff
sensitivity include: How sensitive is keff to changes in the
underlying nuclear data (e.g., cross sections)? How sensitive is
keff to changes in the geometric form and material composition?
[[Page 70478]] Is the MoS large compared to the expected
magnitude of changes in keff resulting from errors in the
underlying system parameters? Neutron Physics of the System
Another consideration that may affect the appropriate MoS is the
extent to which the physical behavior of the system is known.
Fissile systems which are known to be subcritical with a high
degree of confidence do not require as much MoS as systems where
subcriticality is less certain. An example of a system known to
be subcritical would be a finished fuel assembly. These systems
typically can only be made critical when highly thermalized, and
due to extensive analysis and reactor experience, the flooded
case is known to be subcritical in isolation. In addition, the
thermal neutron cross sections for materials in finished reactor
fuel have been measured with an exceptionally high degree of
accuracy (as opposed to the unresolved resonance region). Other
examples may include systems consisting of very simple geometry
or other idealized situations, in which there is strong evidence
that the system is subcritical based on comparisons with highly
similar systems in published references such as handbooks or
standards. In these cases, the amount of MoS needed may be
significantly reduced.
An important factor in determining that the neutron physics of
the system is well-known is ensuring that the configuration of
the system is fixed. For example, a finished fuel assembly is
subject to tight quality assurance checks and has a form that is
well-characterized and highly stable. A solution or powder
process with a complex geometric arrangement would be much more
susceptible to having its configuration change to one whose
neutron physics is not well-understood.
Experience with similar processes may also be credited.
Some questions that should be asked in evaluating the neutron
physics of the system include: Is the geometric form and material
composition of the system rigid and unchanging? Is the geometric
form and material composition of the system subject to strict
quality assurance? Are there other reasons besides criticality
calculations to conclude that the system will be subcritical
(e.g., handbooks, standards, reactor fuel studies)? How
well-known are the cross sections in the energy range of
interest? Rigor of Validation Methodology Having a high degree of
confidence in the estimated bias and bias uncertainty requires
both that there be a sufficient quantity of well- behaved
benchmarks and that there be a sufficiently rigorous validation
methodology. If either the data or the methodology is not
adequate, a high degree of confidence in the results cannot be
attained. The validation methodology must also be suitable for
the data analyzed. For example, a statistical methodology relying
on the data being normally distributed about the mean keff would
not be appropriate to analyze data that are not normally
distributed. A linear regression fit to data that has a
non-linear bias trend would similarly not be appropriate.
Having a sufficient quantity of well-behaved benchmarks means
that: (1) There are enough (applicable) benchmarks to make a
statistically meaningful calculation of the bias and bias
uncertainty; (2) the benchmarks span the entire range of all
important parameters, without gaps requiring extrapolation or
wide interpolation; and (3) the benchmarks do not display any
apparent anomalies. Most of the statistical methods used rely on
the benchmarks being normally distributed. To test for normality,
there must be a statistically significant number of benchmarks
(which may vary depending on the test employed). If there is
insufficient data to verify normality to at least the 95%
confidence level, then a non-parametric technique should be used
to analyze the data. In addition, the benchmarks should provide a
continuum of data across the entire validated range so that any
variation in the bias as a function of important system
parameters may be observed. Anomalies that may cast doubt on the
results of the validation may include the presence of discrete
clusters of experiments having a lower calculated keff than the
set of benchmarks as a whole, an excessive fluctuation in keff
values (e.g., having a X \2\/N [Gt] 1), or discarding an
unusually high number of benchmarks as outliers (i.e., more than
1-2%). Having a sufficiently rigorous validation methodology
means having a methodology that is appropriate for the number and
distribution of benchmark experiments, that calculates the bias
and bias uncertainty using an established statistical
methodology, that accounts for any trends in the bias, and that
accounts for all apparent sources of uncertainty in the bias
(e.g., the increase in uncertainty due to extrapolating the bias
beyond the range covered by the benchmark data).
In addition, confidence that the code's performance is well-
understood means the bias should be relatively small (i.e., bias
[lap] 2%), or else the reason for the bias should be known, and
no credit must be taken for positive bias. If the absolute value
of the bias is very large (especially if the reason for the large
bias is unknown), this may indicate that the calculational method
is not very accurate, and a larger MoS may be appropriate.
Some questions that should be asked in evaluating the data and
the methodology include: Is the methodology consistent with the
distribution of the data (e.g., normal)? Are there enough
benchmarks to determine the behavior of the bias across the
entire area of applicability? Does the assumed functional form of
the bias represent a good fit to the benchmark data? Are there
discrete clusters of benchmarks for which the overall bias
appears to be non-conservative (especially consisting of the most
applicable benchmarks)? Has additional margin been applied to
account for extrapolation or wide interpolation? Have all
apparent bias trends been taken into account? Has an excessive
number of benchmarks been discarded as statistical outliers?
Performance of an adequate code validation alone is not
sufficient justification for any specific MoS. The reason for
this is that determination of the bias and bias uncertainty is
separate from selection of an appropriate MoS. Therefore,
performing an adequate code validation is not alone sufficient
demonstration that an appropriate MoS has been chosen.
Margin in System Parameters The MoS is a reflection of the degree
of confidence in the results of the validation analysis; the MoS
is a margin in keff to provide a high degree of assurance that
fissile systems calculated to be subcritical are in fact
subcritical. However, there are other types of margin that can
provide additional assurance of subcriticality; these margins are
frequently expressed in terms of the system parameters rather
than keff. It is generally acknowledged that the margin to
criticality in system parameters (termed the margin of safety) is
a better indication of the inherent safety of the system than
margin in keff. In addition to establishing subcritical limits on
controlled system parameters,
[[Page 70479]] licensees frequently establish operating limits to
ensure that subcritical limits are not exceeded. The difference
between the subcritical limit and the operating limit (if used)
of a system parameter represents one type of margin that may be
credited in justifying a lower MoS than would be otherwise
acceptable. This difference between the subcritical limit and the
operating limit should not be confused with the MoS. Confusion
often arises, however, because systems in which keff is highly
sensitive to changes in process parameters may require both: (1)
A large margin between subcritical and operating limits, and (2)
a large MoS. This is because systems in which keff is highly
sensitive to changes in process parameters are highly sensitive
to normal process variations and to any potential errors. Both
the MoS and the margin between the subcritical and operating
limits are thus dependent on the keff sensitivity of the system.
In addition to the margin between the subcritical and operating
limits, there is also usually a significant amount of
conservatism in the facility's technical practices with regard to
modeling. In criticality calculations, controlled parameters are
typically analyzed at their subcritical limits, whereas
uncontrolled parameters are analyzed at their worst-case credible
condition. In addition, tolerances must be conservatively taken
into account. These technical practices generally result in
conservatism of at least several percent in keff. Examples of
this conservatism may include assuming optimum concentration in
solution processes, neglect of neutron absorbers in structural
materials, or requiring at least a 1-inch, tight-fitting
reflector around process equipment. The margin due to this
conservatism may be credited in justifying a smaller MoS than
would otherwise be found acceptable. However, in order to take
credit for this as part of the basis for the MoS, it should be
demonstrated that the technical practices committed to in the
license application will result in a predictable and consistent
amount of conservatism in keff. If this modeling conservatism
will not always be present, it should not be used as
justification for the MoS.
Some questions that should be asked in evaluating the margin in
system parameters include: How much margin in keff is present due
to conservatism in the modeling practices? Will this margin be
present for all normal and credible abnormal condition
calculations? Normal vs. Abnormal Conditions Historically,
several licensees have distinguished between normal and abnormal
condition keff limits, in that they have a higher keff limit for
abnormal conditions. Separate limits for normal and abnormal
condition keff values are permissible but are not required.
There is a certain likelihood associated with the MoS that
processes calculated to be subcritical will in fact be critical.
A somewhat higher likelihood is permissible for abnormal than for
normal condition calculations. This is because the abnormal
condition should be at least unlikely to occur, in accordance
with the double contingency principle. That is, achieving the
abnormal condition requires at least one contingency to have
occurred and is likely to be promptly corrected upon detection.
In addition, there is often additional conservatism present in
the abnormal condition because uncontrolled parameters are
analyzed at their worst-case credible conditions.
As stated in NUREG-1718, the fact that abnormal conditions meet
the standard of being at least unlikely from the standpoint of
the double contingency principle may be used to justify having a
lower MoS than would be permissible for normal conditions. In
addition, the increased risk associated with the less
conservative MoS should be commensurate with and offset by the
unlikelihood of achieving the abnormal condition. That is, the
likelihood that a process calculated to be subcritical will be
critical increases when going from a normal to a higher abnormal
condition keff limit. If the normal condition keff limit is
acceptable, then the abnormal limit will also be acceptable
provided this increased likelihood is offset by the unlikelihood
of going to the abnormal condition because of the controls that
have been established. If a single keff limit is used (i.e., no
credit for unlikelihood of the abnormal condition), then it must
be determined to be acceptable to cover both normal and credible
abnormal conditions.
Statistical Arguments Historically, the argument has been used
that the MoS can be estimated based on comparing the results of
two statistical methods. In the USLSTATS code issued with the
SCALE code package there are two methods for calculating the USL:
(1) The Confidence Band with Administrative Margin Approach,
which calculates USL-1, and (2) the Lower Tolerance Band
Approach, which calculates USL-2. The MoS is an input parameter
to the Confidence Band Approach but is not included explicitly in
the Lower Tolerance Band Approach. Justification that the MoS
chosen in the Confidence Band Approach is adequate has been based
on a comparison of USL-1 and USL-2 (i.e., the condition that
USL-1, including the chosen MoS, is less than USL-2). However,
this justification is not sufficient.
The condition that USL-1 eff that are not handled in the
statistical treatments. Therefore, the NRC does not consider this
an acceptable justification for selection of the MoS.
Regulatory Basis In addition to complying with paragraphs (b) and
(c) of this section, the risk of nuclear criticality accidents
must be limited by assuring that under normal and credible
abnormal conditions, all nuclear processes are subcritical,
including use of an approved margin of subcriticality for safety.
[10 CFR 70.61(d)] Technical Review Guidance Determination of an
adequate MoS is strongly dependent upon the specific processes
and conditions at the facility being licensed, which is largely
the reason that different facilities have been licensed with
different limits. Judgement and experience must be employed in
evaluating the adequacy of the proposed MoS. Historically,
however, an MoS of 0.05 in keff has generally been found
acceptable for a typical low-enriched fuel fabrication facility.
This will generally be the case provided there is a sufficient
quantity of well-behaved benchmarks and a sufficiently rigorous
validation methodology has been employed. For systems involving
high-enriched uranium or plutonium, additional MoS may be
appropriate to account for the increased sensitivity of keff to
changes in system parameters. There is no consistent precedent
for such facilities, but the amount of increased MoS should be
commensurate with the increased keff sensitivity of these
systems. Therefore, an MoS of 0.05 in keff for low-enriched fuel
facilities or an MoS of 0.1 for high-
[[Page 70480]] enriched or plutonium fuel facilities must be
justified but will generally be found acceptable, with the
caveats discussed above\3\.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
---------- \3\ NUREG-1718, Section 6.4.3.3.4, states that the
applicant should submit justification for the MoS, but then
states that an MoS of 0.05 is ``generally considered to be
acceptable without additional justification when both the bias
and its uncertainty are determined to be negligible.'' These
statements are inconsistent. The statement about 0.05 being
generally acceptable without additional justification is in error
and should be removed from the next revision to the SRP.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
---------- For facility processes involving unusual materials or
new process conditions, the validation should be reviewed in
detail to ensure that there are no anomalies associated with
unique system characteristics.
In any case, the MoS should not be reduced below a minimum of
0.02. Reducing the MoS below 0.05 for low-enriched processes or
0.1 for high-enriched or plutonium processes requires substantial
additional justification, which may include: 1. An unusually high
degree of similarity between the chosen benchmarks and
anticipated normal and credible abnormal conditions being
validated.
2. Demonstration that the system keff is highly insensitive to
changes in underlying system parameters, such that the worst
credible modeling or cross section errors would have a negligible
effect on the bias.
3. Demonstration that the system being modeled is known to be
subcritical with a high degree of confidence. This requires that
there be other strong evidence in addition to the calculations
that the system is subcritical (such as comparison with highly
similar systems in published references such as handbooks or
standards).
4. Demonstration that the validation methodology is exceptionally
rigorous, so that any potential sources of error have been
accounted for in calculating the USL.
5. Demonstration that there is a dependable and consistent amount
of conservatism in keff due to the conservatism in modeling
practices.
In addition, justification of the MoS for abnormal conditions may
include: 6. Demonstration that the increased likelihood of a
process calculated as subcritical being critical is offset by the
unlikelihood of achieving the abnormal condition.
This list is not all-inclusive; other technical justification
demonstrating that there is a high degree of confidence in the
calculation of keff may be used.
Recommendation The guidance in this ISG should supplement the
current guidance in the NCS chapters of the fuel facility SRPs
(NUREG-1520 and -1718). In addition, NUREG-1718, Section
6.4.3.3.4, should be revised to remove the following sentence:
``A minimum subcritical margin of 0.05 is generally considered to
be acceptable without additional justification when both the bias
and its uncertainty are determined to be negligible.'' References
NUREG-1520, ``Standard Review Plan for the Review of a License
Application for a Fuel Cycle Facility'' NUREG-1718, ``Standard
Review Plan for the Review of an Application for a Mixed Oxide
(MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility'' NUREG/CR-6698, ``Guide for
Validation of Nuclear Criticality Safety Calculational
Methodology'' NUREG/CR-6361, ``Criticality Benchmark Guide for
Light-Water-Reactor Fuel in Transportation and Storage Packages''
Approved:--------------------------------------------------------
------
Date:------------------------------------------------------------
------ Director, FCSS [FR Doc. 04-26688 Filed 12-3-04; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
*****************************************************************
13 NRC: Firstenergy Nuclear Operating Company; Davis-Besse Nuclear Power
FR Doc 04-26692
[Federal Register: December 6, 2004 (Volume 69, Number 233)]
[Notices] [Page 70473-70475] From the Federal Register Online via
GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr06de04-63]
Station; Amended Exemption 1.0 Background The FirstEnergy Nuclear
Operating Company (the licensee) is the holder of Facility
Operating License No. NPF-3, which authorizes operation of the
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station (DBNPS). The license provides,
among other things, that the facility is subject to all rules,
regulations, and orders of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC, the Commission) now or hereafter in effect.
The facility consists of a pressurized-water reactor located in
Ottawa County, Ohio.
2.0 Request Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR),
Part 50, Section 50.46 provides acceptance criteria for the
emergency core cooling systems (ECCS), including an option to
develop the ECCS evaluation model in conformance with Appendix K
requirements (10 CFR 50.46(a)(1)(ii)). 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix
K, Section 1.D.1, in turn, requires that accident evaluations use
the combination of ECCS subsystems assumed to be operative
``after the most damaging single failure of ECCS equipment has
taken place.'' An exemption issued on May 5, 2000, exempted the
licensee from the single-failure requirement for the two systems
(paths) for preventing boric acid precipitation (boric acid
precipitation control or BPC) during the long-term cooling phase
following a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA). Additionally, the
licensee was exempted from the calculation requirements of
50.46(b)(5) and Appendix K, Section I.A.4 for the second or
backup path for BPC. The proposed action would amend the existing
exemption by approving a new path for BPC. This new path would
become the primary path and the original primary path would
become the backup path. The original backup path would no longer
be credited as part of
[[Page 70474]] the licensing basis, although it would remain as a
third option procedurally. As such, the parts of the exemption
related to the calculation requirements of 50.46(b)(5) and
Appendix K, Section I.A.4 are removed from the exemption as they
only applied to the original backup path and are no longer
needed.
Specifically, DBNPS requested the following amended exemption:
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company, with respect to the
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, is exempt from the
single-failure criterion requirement of 10 CFR 50, Appendix K,
Section I.D.1, with respect to failure of either Motor Control
Center E11B or Motor Control Center F11A and the resulting
inability to initiate an active means of controlling core boron
concentration.
In summary, the licensee has modified the plant to install a
better method of post-LOCA BPC and wants to credit the new method
for use.
3.0 Discussion Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12, the Commission may, upon
application by any interested person or upon its own initiative,
grant exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50 when (1)
the exemptions are authorized by law, will not present an undue
risk to public health or safety, and are consistent with the
common defense and security; and (2) when special circumstances
are present. Special circumstances are present whenever,
according to 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii), ``Application of the
regulation in the particular circumstances would not serve the
underlying purpose of the rule or is not necessary to achieve the
underlying purpose of the rule.'' The requirements of 10 CFR Part
50 apply to the DBNPS request to amend the existing exemption.
The underlying purpose of the single- failure criterion
requirement is to assure long-term cooling performance of the
ECCS in the event of the most damaging single- failure of ECCS
equipment.
As a licensing review tool, the single-failure criterion helps
assure reliable systems as an element of defense in depth. As a
design and analysis tool, it promotes reliability through
enforced redundancy. Since historically only those systems or
components that were judged to have a credible chance of failure
were assumed to fail, the criterion has been applied to such
responses as valve movement on demand, emergency diesel generator
start, short circuit in an electrical bus, and fluid leakage
caused by gross failure of a pump or valve seal during long-term
cooling. Certain types of structural elements, when combined with
other unlikely events, were not assumed to fail because the
probabilities of the resulting scenarios were deemed sufficiently
small that they did not need to be considered.
The single-failure criterion was developed without the benefit of
numerical failure assessments. Regulatory requirements and
guidance consequently were based upon categories of equipment and
examples that must be covered or that are exempt, and do not
allow a probabilistic consideration during routine
implementation. Hence, a single failure that was not judged to be
exempt would need to be addressed, whether or not there is a
substantial impact upon overall system reliability. A result that
does not improve safety is inconsistent with the objective of the
single-failure criterion, which was not intended to force changes
if essentially no benefit would accrue. This is the case with
potential failure of the active means of BPC.
No U.S. plants have encountered LOCA conditions where BPC was of
concern. BPC measures are not needed for hot-leg breaks because
water will flow through the core, thus preventing significant
boric acid buildup. Additionally, BPC measures are not needed if
excore thermocouples indicate an adequate subcooling margin
because there is no boiling to cause concentration of boric acid.
Neither are they needed for many of the remaining pipe breaks
until decay heat is low, because water will flow from the core to
the upper downcomer via the reactor vessel vent valves, thus
providing a mechanism to control accumulation of boric acid in
the core. Active means for BPC are needed in case one of the
above conditions is not satisfied.
In reviewing the proposed BPC ECCS alignments, the NRC staff used
substantial improvement in reliability as its criterion for
acceptance, since the existing BPC ECCS alignments were found
acceptable on a probabilistic basis.
The licensee submitted information that compared the previously
approved BPC alignments with the proposed alignments to show that
the proposed BPC ECCS alignments are more reliable than the
previously approved alignments.
The new proposed primary path takes suction from the ECCS sump
through decay heat pump 1-1 to a newly installed crossover line
to the decay heat removal system hot leg drop line and through
decay heat system valves DH-11 and DH-12 to the reactor coolant
system (RCS) hot leg, and finally to the reactor vessel to
back-flush precipitated boron from the core. The NRC staff
determined that this is an improvement over the previous primary
alignment in that it provides a faster, higher, flushing/diluting
flow to the reactor vessel from the RCS hot leg side. For RCS
cold leg pipe breaks, this alignment would provide the optimal
flow direction for flushing of the core.
The new proposed backup path is the previous primary path through
the pressurizer spray line. This continues to be an acceptable
path as was determined by the staff's review for the exemption
issued on May 5, 2000. Additionally, the new proposed backup path
through the pressurizer spray line does not need additional
exemptions regarding the calculation requirements of 50.46(b)(5)
and Appendix K, Section I.A.4 that the original backup path
needed. The proposed new BPC primary path is significantly more
reliable in terms of capacity and timeliness than the previous
primary path.
As stated above, the proposed new backup path is the previous
primary path and does not need two additional exemptions
regarding calculation requirements that the original backup path
needed. Therefore, the staff concludes that the proposed backup
path is significantly better than the original backup path.
Based on its review, the NRC staff has determined that the
proposed BPC alignment paths are significantly more reliable than
the previously approved paths and, therefore, the staff concludes
that they are acceptable.
For the foregoing reasons, the NRC staff has concluded that
amending the existing exemption to the requirements of Appendix
K, Section I.D.1, and 10 CFR 50.46(a)(1)(ii) with respect to the
revised alignment paths for active means of BPC at DBNPS is
acceptable.
The NRC staff has determined that there are special circumstances
present, as specified in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii), in that
application of the specific regulations is not necessary in order
to achieve the underlying purpose of these regulations to assure
long term cooling performance of the ECCS.
Additionally, the NRC staff has concluded that the parts of the
exemption related to the calculation requirements of 10 CFR
50.46(b)(5) and Appendix K, Section I.A.4 are now withdrawn as
they are no longer needed.
4.0 Conclusion Accordingly, the Commission has determined that,
pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12(a), the amendment to the exemption is
authorized by law, will not
[[Page 70475]] present an undue risk to the public health and
safety, and is consistent with the common defense and security.
Also, special circumstances are present. Therefore, the
Commission hereby grants FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company an
amendment to the exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR
50.46(a)(1)(ii) and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix K, Section 1.D.1 for
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station. Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the
Commission has determined that the granting of this exemption
will not have a significant effect on the quality of the human
environment (69 FR 47469).
This exemption is effective upon issuance and shall be
implemented within 120 days.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 29th day of November 2004.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Ledyard B. Marsh, Director, Division of Licensing Project
Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 04-26692 Filed 12-3-04; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
*****************************************************************
14 Lawyer Group: Herbert Smith racks up 5m in fees on DTIs nuclear clean-up -
6 December 2004
Herbert Smith has reaped around 5m in legal fees for its first
12 months of advising the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI)
on the 48bn nuclear clean-up programme.
The City firm scooped a two-year contract to advise the DTI on
the commercial aspects relating to the creation of the Nuclear
Decommissioning Authority (NDA) after pitching against a number
of rivals in September 2003.
As first revealed in The Lawyer (8 September 2003), Slaughter
and May, which was until last year the Govern-ments principal
adviser on nuclear issues, was not invited to pitch for the NDA
mandate.
Slaughters was excluded from the tender process because it was
already advising the Government on the high-profile British
Energy restructuring. TheDTI was concerned about
over-dependence on a single firm.
A well-placed source said that Herbert Smiths fees were
stacking up at a much faster rate than Slaughters bills on the
two-and-a-half years worth of work on British Energy.
5m is a hell of a lot of money for a years worth of work,
especially as theres no result at the end of it, said the
source.
It was revealed last week that the fees payable to the DTIs
advisers on the British Energy restructuring, including Credit
Suisse First Boston, Deloitte &Touche and Slaughters, total
13.5m.
Meanwhile, in the same week the European Commission (EC)
confirmed that it was going to launch a formal investigation
into whether the Governments plans to give state aid to the NDA
breached EC rules.
Section: National News Date: 6-Dec-2004
Author: Husnara Begum Source: The Lawyer
The Lawyer Group is a division of Centaur Communications Ltd
TheLawyer.com was built by SiftGroup Ltd.
*****************************************************************
15 NRC: Carolina Power & Light Company, Brunswick Steam Electric Plant,
FR Doc 04-26693
[Federal Register: December 6, 2004 (Volume 69, Number 233)]
[Notices] [Page 70471-70473] From the Federal Register Online via
GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr06de04-62]
Units 1 and 2; Notice of Acceptance for Docketing of the
Application and Notice of Opportunity for Hearing Regarding
Renewal of Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-71 and DPR-62 for
an Additional 20-Year Period The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC or Commission) is considering an application for
the renewal of Operating License Nos. DPR-71 and DPR-62, which
authorizes the Carolina Power & Light Company, now doing business
as Progress Energy Carolinas, Inc. (PEC), to operate Brunswick
Steam Electric Plant, at 2,923 megawatts thermal for Unit 1, and
2,923 megawatts thermal for Unit 2. The renewed licenses would
authorize the applicant to operate the Brunswick Steam Electric
Plant, Units 1 and 2, for an additional 20 years beyond the
period specified in the current licenses.
[[Page 70472]] The current operating license for Brunswick Steam
Electric Plant, Unit 1 expires on September 8, 2016, and the
current operating license for Brunswick Steam Electric Plant,
Unit 2 expires on December 27, 2014.
The Commission's staff has received an application dated October
18, 2004, from Carolina Power & Light Company, filed pursuant to
10 CFR Part 54, to renew the Operating License Nos. DPR-71 and
DPR-62 for Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Units 1 and 2,
respectively. A Notice of Receipt and Availability of the license
renewal application, ``Carolina Power & Light Company; Notice of
Receipt of Application for Renewal of Brunswick Steam Electric
Plant, Units 1 and 2; Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-71 and
DPR-62 for an Additional 20-year Period'' was published in the
Federal Register on November 18, 2004 (69 FR 67611).
The Commission's staff has determined that Carolina Power & Light
Company has submitted sufficient information in accordance with
10 CFR 54.19, 54.21, 54.22, 54.23, and 51.53(c) that is
acceptable for docketing. The current Docket Nos. 50-325 and
50-324 for Operating License Nos. DPR-71 and DPR-62,
respectively, will be retained. The docketing of the renewal
application does not preclude requesting additional information
as the review proceeds, nor does it predict whether the
Commission will grant or deny the application.
Before issuance of each requested renewed license, the NRC will
have made the findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,
as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations.
In accordance with 10 CFR 54.29, the NRC will issue a renewed
license on the basis of its review if it finds that actions have
been identified and have been or will be taken with respect to
(1) managing the effects of aging during the period of extended
operation on the functionality of structures and components that
have been identified as requiring aging management review, and
(2) time-limited aging analyses that have been identified as
requiring review, such that there is reasonable assurance that
the activities authorized by the renewed licenses will continue
to be conducted in accordance with the current licensing basis
(CLB), and that any changes made to the plant's CLB comply with
the Act and the Commission's regulations.
Additionally, in accordance with 10 CFR 51.95(c), the NRC will
prepare an environmental impact statement that is a supplement to
the Commission's NUREG-1437, ``Generic Environmental Impact
Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Power Plants,'' dated
May 1996.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.26, and as part of the environmental
scoping process, the staff intends to hold a public scoping
meeting. Detailed information regarding this meeting will be
included in a future Federal Register notice.
Within 60 days after the date of publication of this Federal
Register Notice, the requestor/petitioner may file a request for
a hearing, and any person whose interest may be affected by this
proceeding and who wishes to participate as a party in the
proceeding must file a written request for a hearing and a
petition for leave to intervene with respect to the renewal of
the licenses. Requests for a hearing and a petition for leave to
intervene shall be filed in accordance with the Commission's
``Rules of Practice for Domestic Licensing Proceedings'' in 10
CFR Part 2. Interested persons should consult a current copy of
10 CFR 2.309, which is available at the Commission's Public
Document Room (PDR), located at One White Flint North, 11555
Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland 20852 and is
accessible from the Agencywide Documents Access and Management
System's (ADAMS) Public Electronic Reading Room on the Internet
at . Persons who do not have access to ADAMS or who encounter
problems in accessing the documents located in ADAMS should
contact the NRC's PDR reference staff at 1-800- 397-4209, or by
e-mail at . If a request for a hearing or a petition for leave to
intervene is filed within the 60-day period, the Commission or a
presiding officer designated by the Commission or by the Chief
Administrative Judge of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
Panel will rule on the request and/or petition; and the Secretary
or the Chief Administrative Judge of the Atomic Safety and
Licensing Board will issue a notice of a hearing or an
appropriate order. In the event that no request for a hearing or
petition for leave to intervene is filed within the 60-day
period, the NRC may, upon completion of its evaluations and upon
making the findings required under 10 CFR parts 51 and 54, renew
the licenses without further notice.
As required by 10 CFR 2.309, a petition for leave to intervene
shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner
in the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the
results of the proceeding, taking into consideration the limited
scope of matters that may be considered pursuant to 10 CFR parts
51 and 54. The petition must specifically explain the reasons why
intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the
following factors: (1) The nature of the requestor's/petitioner's
right under the Act to be made a party to the proceeding; (2) the
nature and extent of the requestor's/ petitioner's property,
financial, or other interest in the proceeding; and (3) the
possible effect of any decision or order which may be entered in
the proceeding on the requestor's/petitioner's interest. The
petition must also set forth the specific contentions which the
petitioner/requestor seeks to have litigated at the proceeding.
Each contention must consist of a specific statement of the issue
of law or fact to be raised or controverted. In addition, the
requestor/petitioner shall provide a brief explanation of the
bases of each contention and a concise statement of the alleged
facts or the expert opinion that supports the contention on which
the requestor/ petitioner intends to rely in proving the
contention at the hearing. The requestor/petitioner must also
provide references to those specific sources and documents of
which the requestor/petitioner is aware and on which the
requestor/petitioner intends to rely to establish those facts or
expert opinion. The requestor/petitioner must provide sufficient
information to show that a genuine dispute exists with the
applicant on a material issue of law or fact.\1\ Contentions
shall be limited to matters within the scope of the action under
consideration. The contention must be one that, if proven, would
entitle the requestor/ petitioner to relief. A
requestor/petitioner who fails to satisfy these requirements with
respect to at least one contention will not be permitted to
participate as a party.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
---------- \1\ To the extent that the application contains
attachments and supporting documents that are not publicly
available because they are asserted to contain safeguards or
proprietary information, petitioners desiring access to this
information should contact the applicant or applicant's counsel
to discuss the need for a protective order.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
---------- Each contention shall be given a separate numeric or
alpha designation within one of the following groups and all like
subject- matters shall be grouped together: 1.
Technical--primarily concerns issues relating to technical and/or
health and safety matters discussed or referenced in the
Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Units 1 and 2, safety analysis
for the application (including issues related to emergency
planning and physical security to the extent that such matters
are discussed or referenced in the application).
[[Page 70473]] 2. Environmental--primarily concerns issues
relating to matters discussed or referenced in the Environmental
Report for the license renewal application 3. Miscellaneous--does
not fall into one of the categories outlined above.
As specified in 10 CFR 2.309, if two or more
requestors/petitioners seek to co-sponsor a contention, the
requestors/petitioners shall jointly designate a representative
who shall have the authority to act for the
requestors/petitioners with respect to that contention.
If a requestor/petitioner seeks to adopt the contention of
another sponsoring requestor/petitioner, the requestor/petitioner
who seeks to adopt the contention must either agree that the
sponsoring requestor/ petitioner shall act as the representative
with respect to that contention, or jointly designate with the
sponsoring requestor/ petitioner a representative who shall have
the authority to act for the requestors/petitioners with respect
to that contention.
Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding,
subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to
intervene, and have the opportunity to participate fully in the
conduct of the hearing. A request for a hearing or a petition for
leave to intervene must be filed by: (1) First class mail
addressed to the Office of the Secretary of the Commission, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC, 20555-0001,
Attention: Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff; (2) courier,
express mail, and expedited delivery services: Office of the
Secretary, Sixteenth Floor, One White Flint North, 11555
Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852, Attention: Rulemaking
and Adjudications Staff; (3) E-mail addressed to the Office of
the Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ; or (4)
facsimile transmission addressed to the Office of the Secretary,
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC, Attention:
Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff at 301-415-1101, verification
number is 301-415-1966. A copy of the request for hearing and
petition for leave to intervene must also be sent to the Office
of the General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555-0001, and it is requested that copies be
transmitted either by means of facsimile transmission to
301-415-3725 or by e-mail to . A copy of the request for hearing
and petition for leave to intervene should also be sent to the
attorney for the applicant. Attorney for the Applicant: Mr.
Steven R. Carr, Associate General Counsel--Legal Department,
Progress Energy Service Company, LCC, Post Office Box 1551,
Raleigh, North Carolina, 27602-1551.
Non-timely requests and/or petitions and contentions will not be
entertained absent a determination by the Commission, the
presiding officer, or the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that
the petition, request and/or contentions should be granted based
on a balancing of the factors specified in 10 CFR
2.309(a)(1)(i)-(viii). Detailed information about the license
renewal process can be found under the Nuclear Reactors icon at
on the NRC's Web site. Copies of the application to renew the
operating licenses for Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Units 1
and 2, are available for public inspection at the Commission's
PDR, located at One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike
(first floor), Rockville, Maryland 20852-2738, and on the NRC's
webpage at while the application is under review. The NRC
maintains an Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
(ADAMS), which provides text and image files of NRC's public
documents.
These documents may be accessed through the NRC's Public
Electronic Reading Room on the Internet at under ADAMS accession
number ML043060444. (Note: Public access to ADAMS has been
temporarily suspended so that security reviews of publicly
available documents may be performed and potentially sensitive
information removed. Please check the NRC's Web site for updates
on the resumption of ADAMS access.) Persons who do not have
access to ADAMS or who encounter problems in accessing the
documents located in ADAMS may contact the NRC Public Document
Room (PDR) Reference staff at 1-800- 397-4209, 301-415-4737, or
by e-mail to .
The staff has verified that a copy of the license renewal
application is also available to local residents near the
Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Units 1 and 2, at the North
Carolina University at Wilmington, William Randall Library, 601
South College Road, Wilmington, North Carolina.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 30th day of November, 2004.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Pao-Tsin Kuo, Program Director, License Renewal and Environmental
Impacts Program, Division of Regulatory Improvement Programs,
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 04-26693 Filed 12-3-04; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
*****************************************************************
16 BBC: Defence worker's uranium
Last Updated: Monday, 6 December, 2004
[Richard David]
Mr David claims depleted uranium injuries are not recognised in
the UK
A former defence worker has claimed in the High Court that his
life was made a "living hell" by exposure to depleted uranium at
a British factory.
Richard David is claiming damages against Normalair Garrett - now
owned by Honeywell Aerospace.
It denies depleted uranium was ever used at the plant in Yeovil,
Somerset.
Mr David, 49, who lives in Seaton, Devon, told the hearing that
the use of the metal was an official secret and that was why its
existence was denied.
The last nine years has be a living hell hand-to-mouth existence
Richard David
"The subject matter causing my personal injury is a very
complicated one and extremely controversial," he told the judge
"It may even be classified by the United Nations as an illegal
weapon of mass destruction."
Mr David worked as component fitter on fighter planes and
bombers, but left work through ill health in 1995.
He claimed medical tests had revealed mutations to his DNA and
damage to his chromosomes which could only have been caused by
ionising radiation.
He says he now suffers from a range of debilitating illnesses,
including respiratory problems, kidney defects, bowel conditions
and painful joints.
'Unusual health problems'
Mr David, who is representing himself in court, said radiation
from the uranium isotope had completely ruined his health and
robbed him of the ability to earn a living.
But he said depleted uranium injuries were not recognised in the
UK and had escaped any regulatory control.
"The last nine years has been a living hell hand-to-mouth
existence marked by many GP and hospital consultations for
unusual and even very serious health problems," he said.
He said the factory where he worked was a "totally secure
military programme industrial establishment".
"Because everything is classified as official secrets, workers
are in a no man's land in terms of regulatory protection," he
said.
The case continues.
*****************************************************************
17 Tufts Daily: Number of Mass. towns' water tainted with rocket fuel
ingredient, Water Watch says
Published December 06, 2004
By Taleen Babayan Daily Staff Writer
Massachusetts Community Water Watch chapters, including Tufts',
are informing the public that perchlorate, an ingredient in
propellant fuels, has been found in the drinking water of eight
Massachusetts communities.
"Perchlorate hinders iodide uptake by the thyroid gland," said
Zach Harlow-Nash, Tufts' Water Watch organizer. "Studies have
shown that higher levels of perchlorate can affect the general
population by causing symptoms similar to hyperthyroidism and
thyroid tumors."
Perchlorate is a salt used in rocket fuel, explosives, fireworks
and various other industrial processes.
In lower concentrations, perchlorate can impact the fetus, and
has been linked to developmental problems in children including
lowered IQ, growth problems and attention deficit disorder,
Harlow-Nash said.
Though perchlorate has not been found in water at Tufts or in its
surrounding communities, Tufts' Water Watch is working in concert
with other chapters to educate the public about it.
"As members of Water Watch, we are trying to spread the word and
get facts out to students so they can make their own opinions and
take their own actions about this issue," senior Megan Chaisson
said.
The perchlorate issue is particularly timely because
Massachusetts legislators are working to establish a standard for
how much perchlorate is acceptable in drinking water.
The United States' Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) does not
have a fixed standard for perchlorate levels, but will set one
based on a pending study by the National Academy of Sciences.
According to The Boston Globe, the EPA recommends that
perchlorate levels not exceed 1 parts per billion (ppb) - about
the equivalent of a half-teaspoon in an Olympic-sized swimming
pool. Even such a small amount can affect perchlorate-sensitive
individuals, such as pregnant women, children under 12, and
individuals with thyroid problems.
The Department of Defense has lobbied against the 1 ppb
regulation, which would translate into higher cleanup costs,
since perchlorate contamination is often associated with military
uses.
Massachusetts is currently working to clean up perchlorate at the
Massachusetts Military Reservation, which is a hazardous waste
site that drains into the Cape Cod watershed. The Pentagon has
agreed to finance cleaning the site to whatever standards
Massachusetts eventually establishes.
Some states have set perchlorate standards well above the 1 ppb
level - in California, 6 ppb of perchlorate are acceptable,
though the substance has been found in the state's lettuce and
milk.
Other sources say that healthy adults can withstand 18 ppb of
perchlorate without experiencing negative health effects.
Massachusetts Community Water Watch is a network of student
chapters at campuses across the state. The chapters work with
their communities to improve the water quality of local
watersheds.
--Kat Schmidt contributed to this article.
2004 The Tufts Daily
*****************************************************************
18 Arizona Daily Star: VA starting to take Gulf War ills seriously
Tucson, Arizona | Published: 12.06.2004
A.E. Araiza / Arizona Daily Star
Gulf veteran Chuck Amedia says a new VA report "is basically
saying the same thing that myself and other veterans have been
saying for the last 13 years."
By the numbers 100,339 Number of veterans on the
national Gulf War health registry 846 Number of Gulf War
veterans seen at Tucson's veterans hospital Source: Southern
Arizona VA Health Care System. Figures as of Sept. 30.
By Carol Ann Alaimo ARIZONA DAILY STAR Chuck
Amedia has been trying for years to convince the federal
government that his health problems aren't all in his head.
Now the Tucson veteran is finally getting a chance to say, "I
told you so." For more than a decade, the Department of
Veterans Affairs has been blaming combat stress for the
mysterious ills suffered by Amedia and tens of thousands of
other troops who served in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, including
many from Southern Arizona.
Now the VA says they likely are suffering from exposure to
toxic chemicals during their tours of duty. A new VA report
recommends spending $60 million in the next four years to study
the health effects of the pesticides, anti-nerve-gas pills and
other neurotoxins that military personnel encountered overseas.
It also says the government should stop funding research that
proposes stress as the main cause of Gulf War illness. The
report, released in mid-November by the Research Advisory
Committee on Gulf War Veterans Illnesses, urged the government to
act quickly so that the lessons learned could be used to better
protect the health of troops now serving in Iraq and Afghanistan.
"I don't know how to say it any simpler than 'I told you so,'
" said Amedia, a 50-year-old retired master sergeant from
Davis-Monthan Air Force Base.
The panel was appointed by VA Secretary Anthony Principi in
2002 to review existing research and make recommendations to
improve treatments for Gulf War vets. Principi immediately agreed
to set aside $15 million for a year of new research. Amedia
said the new VA report "is basically saying the same thing that
myself and other veterans have been saying for the last 13
years."
Amedia served in the military from 1974 to 1994, including a
Gulf War stint as a linguist on intelligence-collection aircraft
from D-M's 41st Electronic Combat Squadron. In April, he
appeared on ABC's "Primetime Thursday" with Diane Sawyer,
describing how he sought medical care outside the VA system and
spent more than $5,000 to try to ease his symptoms. Amedia has
long maintained that most of his physical problems - including
fatigue, muscle pain, loss of balance, irritable-bowel syndrome
and short-term memory loss - were caused by toxins in military
vaccinations or in the pesticides used to fumigate warplanes.
Pepe Mendoza, a spokesman for the Southern Arizona VA Health
Care System in Tucson, said the local veterans hospital does all
it can to help the Gulf War veterans in its care. "They get
the best that we have to give them," he said. Since 1991, he
said, nearly 850 Gulf War vets have gone through the doors of the
Tucson facility - many with symptoms linked to Gulf War illness.
He couldn't say exactly how many, because the VA does not have a
special category for those patients. Nationwide, he said, more
than 100,000 veterans have undergone voluntary medical screenings
to become part of the national Gulf War registry, a VA effort
aimed at cataloging their symptoms.
The recent VA report said up to one-third of Gulf War vets
"experience a multisymptom pattern of illness, over and above
rates experienced by veterans who did not serve" in the war.
The 140-page report did not focus on the performance of
individual VA hospitals. It found that both the VA and the
Defense Department have fallen short at the national level.
Among the findings: ● A "substantial proportion" of Gulf War
veterans have symptoms not explainable by stress or psychological
problems.
In fact, blaming combat stress makes little sense because the
Gulf War was so short that most vets didn't see much war-related
death and trauma. ● Many symptoms - such as memory loss,
dizziness and loss of balance - point to damage to the central
nervous system consistent with exposure to hazardous substances.
● Some troops were exposed to multiple toxins during the
war, including pesticides, nerve gas or the anti-nerve-gas pills
the military made them take during deployment. Tens of thousands
of troops likely were exposed to low levels of the nerve gas
sarin when Iraqi weapons stockpiles were destroyed by American
forces.
● Smoke from oil well fires and dust from depleted uranium
weapons also should be investigated further as possible sources
of health problems. ● The fact that some troops got sick and
others didn't may be due to differences in individual tolerances
to toxins or different levels of toxic exposure in different
areas.
● The full impact of toxic exposure may not be known for
years. Gulf veterans - even those who are not sick now - should
be closely monitored over time for cancers and other health
problems, and their children should be watched for birth defects.
The committee also found that the VA and the Defense
Department have hindered the progress of research into Gulf War
illness.
The Defense Department, for example, initially downplayed the
idea that chemical exposure could be making Gulf War veterans
sick, the report noted. And "contrary to regulations," the
military logbooks detailing nuclear, biological and chemical
exposures in the Mideast were destroyed after the war, it said.
The military also was criticized for failing to keep accurate
records of the vaccinations and anti-nerve-gas pills dispensed
during the war. The Pentagon responded that it since has made
strides in improving its record-keeping.
The VA also was faulted for repeatedly doing studies that
focused on combat stress as the likely cause of Gulf War illness
- even after it should have been apparent that such research was
not relevant and was not improving the health of affected
veterans. To Ralph Armijo, a Tucson veterans benefits
counselor who helps local veterans file VA disability claims, the
situation is maddeningly familiar.
"This is déjà vu," he said, recalling the battles Vietnam
veterans faced to have their health problems taken seriously
after exposure to Agent Orange. The U.S. military used the toxic
herbicide in the 1960s to kill tree foliage and farm crops in
order to deprive the enemy of food and hiding places. For
decades, the government said it couldn't prove that Agent Orange,
which contained the cancer-causing chemical dioxin, was making
veterans sick.
Today, the VA recognizes that several forms of cancer, and
some birth defects in the children of Vietnam veterans, are
linked to some degree to Agent Orange exposure. Steve
Robinson, executive director of the National Gulf War Resource
Center, a Maryland-based advocacy group, said the U.S. government
has a history of being slow to respond when troops suffer health
problems after wartime deployments.
"You don't have to be a conspiracy theorist to look back over
the last 50 years and see a pattern of obfuscation when it comes
to telling the truth about what happened" to service members
exposed to radiation, chemicals and other hazards, Robinson said.
"It's incredibly frustrating for these veterans and their
families," he said. "Families can break apart. Some people lose
their livelihoods and become homeless. Some just give up."
Amedia, who draws a disability pension from the VA, said that
even if the agency makes changes, there is no way to adequately
compensate gulf veterans who suffered. "There's been so much
damage done to the bodies of these veterans over the years
because of lack of treatment that there's no way you can go back
and make it right," he said.
"No one can give us back the last 13 years of our lives."
● Contact reporter Carol Ann Alaimo at 573-4138 or .
the Arizona Daily Star
*****************************************************************
19 Scotsman.com: Defence Worker Sues over Uranium Claim
Mon 6 Dec 2004
A former British defence worker from Devon who claims he was
contaminated by depleted uranium at a factory is suing the firm
he worked for in a High Court battle beginning today.
In what is believed to be the first civilian case of its kind,
Richard David is claiming damages against Normalair Garrett –
now owned by Honeywell Aerospace who owned the factory in
Yeovil, Somerset, where he worked as component fitter between
1985 and 1995.
Mr David, also known as Nibby, claims he was affected by
depleted uranium (DU). He said he suffers from respiratory
problems, kidney defects and finds it painful to move his limbs.
The 49-year-old, from Seaton, said medical tests had revealed
mutations to his DNA and damage to his chromosomes. He believes
his illness was caused by exposure to the radioactive waste
product DU.
Mr David worked fitting components for fighter planes and
bombers. He has never served in the armed forces or worked in
the Middle East.
The case could have far reaching implications for many Gulf war
veterans, aerospace workers and civilians in former war zones.
Mr David claims he was forced to give up his job due to ill
health in 1995 and believes that his lung condition will shorten
his life. He said that he “can’t risk” having children
because of damage to his DNA.
He won legal aid to fight the case but has chosen to represent
himself at the hearing, which is due to last 10-days.
DU is believed to be a possible cause of Gulf war syndrome,
which has allegedly left many veterans with health problems. The
radioactive waste product was used in coalition anti-tank
weapons in both Gulf wars.
A spokeswoman for Honeywell said the company has never used DU
in its products or on-site. Elma Peters said it was company
police not to comment on legal cases.
*****************************************************************
20 NRC: NRC to Meet with U. S. Enrichment Corporation to Discuss Performance at Paducah
Gaseous Diffusion Plant
News Release - Region II - 2004-05
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Office of Public Affairs, Region II
No. II-04-056 December 3, 2004
CONTACT: Ken Clark (404) 562-4416
Roger D. Hannah (404) 562-4417 E-mail:
Nuclear Regulatory Commission officials have scheduled a meeting
with officials of the United States Enrichment Corporation in
Paducah, Ky., on Monday, Dec. 13, to discuss the NRCs latest
review of performance at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant.
The meeting is scheduled for 8:30 a.m. (EST) at the Paducah
Information Age Park Resource Center, located at 2000 McCracken
Boulevard in Paducah. Interested members of the public can
attend and observe the discussion, and there will be an
opportunity to ask questions or make comments to the NRC staff
after the business portion but before the meeting is adjourned.
"These meetings give NRC officials a chance to discuss with the
company the overall performance at the plant and any concerns we
might have," said NRC Fuel Facility Branch Chief Jay Henson.
The NRC assessment is called a Licensee Performance Review and
covers the period from January 1, 2003, to September 25, 2004.
The NRC staff evaluated performance at the Paducah plant in four
major areas: Safety Operations, Radiological Controls, Facility
Support and Special Topics. The NRC said the review determined
that the Paducah plant continued to conduct its activities
safely, and the agency will discuss details of the review with
company officials at the meeting.
Interested persons may obtain a copy of the results of the
review from the NRC by writing, calling, or emailing the NRC
Region II Office of Public Affairs in Atlanta using the contact
information listed above.
Immediately following the NRC performance review, a second
meeting is scheduled at the same location to discuss the
companys efforts in ensuring a safety conscious work
environment at the Paducah facility and at a similar plant near
Portsmouth, Ohio. The public is also invited to this meeting and
will have an opportunity to talk with the NRC staff after the
business portion but before the meeting is adjourned.
Last revised Monday, December 06, 2004
*****************************************************************
21 SPI: Feds: Show restraint
[seattlepi.com] Seattle Post-Intelligencer]
[OPINION]
Monday, December 6, 2004
SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER EDITORIAL BOARD
The U.S. Department of Energy should treat the Hanford Nuclear
Reservation as a special kind of zone, one in which no bullying
of the state is allowed. The federal government should act with
great restraint in its maneuvering against the state's
just-approved Initiative 297.
When it comes to Hanford, the public perception of government
even-handedness matters a good deal. The state has experienced a
long history of federal government's reckless irresponsibility.
Hanford is the nation's most contaminated radioactive waste
site.
The past has a lot to do with why Washington voters gave I-297
69 percent approval last month. As backers have noted, the
measure transcended the state's red-blue divide, earning support
east and west of the Cascades.
U.S. District Judge Alan McDonald gave the federal government an
initial victory last week, halting implementation of part of the
initiative. The Department of Energy had asked for the order as
a way to head off any new state permit requirements under the
initiative.
As a practical matter, the order may have little immediate
effect. The state said it had no intention of blocking clean-up
projects. And, as McDonald noted, it's in the public interest to
continue efforts to remedy Hanford's waste hazards.
At the same time, McDonald left in place I-297's prohibition on
more shipments of some nuclear waste from elsewhere in the
country until clean up of existing waste is completed.
The federal attorneys' initial court filing took a restrained
approach focusing on the permit issues. That is more or less the
kind of behavior that can help the public perceive the outcome
of the court dispute as fair even if the state loses.
Initiative 297 supporters, naturally, wanted the federal
government to take no action against the measure. Although the
challenge could well have waited to allow more discussions with
the state, court action was almost inevitable at some point.
State Department of Ecology spokeswoman Sheryl Hutchison said
the state is preparing a vigorous defense. Nothing less should
be expected with the fine record of advocacy by the state
attorney general's office. That must continue when Rob McKenna
takes office in January.
Whether the Evergreen State wins or loses the I-297 case,
federal and state cooperation will remain critical to cleaning
up Hanford. Even without the initiative, the state has strong
standing for negotiating its priorities with the Department of
Energy.
The relationship between state Ecology and federal Energy
officials has had its ups and downs. The Bush administration has
created troubles with its maneuver to reclassify waste to avoid
higher clean-up standards.
But the federal commitment to cleaning up Hanford and other
nuclear sites remains substantial. If the federal position
should prevail in court, the Energy Department will have an
opportunity to show its good faith with a recommitment to
collaboration. Good winners can earn points, even with a state
that has often felt itself on the losing end where Hanford is
concerned.
[Seattle Post-Intelligencer] 101 Elliott Ave. W. Seattle, WA
98119 (206) 448-8000
Send comments to
1996-2004 Seattle Post-Intelligencer
*****************************************************************
22 Salt Lake Tribune: Idaho nuke cleanup deal's critics easing back
Article Last Updated: 12/06/2004 12:14:32 AM
By Bob Fick The Associated Press
BOISE, Idaho - Tons of radioactive waste remain stacked over
eastern Idaho's Snake River Plain Aquifer, where southern Idaho
gets its water. But his staunchest critics now concede some good
came of former Gov. Phil Batt's 1995 nuclear waste cleanup deal.
''I got everything I could get,'' Batt said in a recent
interview.
What Batt got was a commitment by the federal government to
completely remove all radioactive waste from the Idaho National
Engineering and Environmental Laboratory by 2036, while also
restricting new deliveries of nuclear waste to INEEL for
temporary storage.
Even Twin Falls podiatrist Peter Rickards, who was so
outraged by the agreement that he tried unsuccessfully to recall
Batt in 1996, is no longer completely negative.
''There has been a slight amount of progress,'' Rickards
admits, while quickly adding, ''it is the least important
problems that are looming over our water supply that are being
addressed.''
That concern about the aquifer and the overall environment
continues to linger, fueled by the federal government's efforts
in court and Congress to change what state and environmental
groups believe are key provisions of the agreement.
And there have been problems. The U.S. Department of Energy,
which is overseeing the cleanup, was fined in 2002 for allegedly
allowing radioactive material to leach into a nearby aquifer.
Still, officials insist contaminated groundwater has not
migrated beyond the laboratory's boundaries.
''The state is better off today than it was 10 years ago,''
says Jeremy Maxand, director of the Snake River Alliance that
was among the leaders of the failed 1996 attempt to overturn the
Batt agreement at the polls.
''Today, authority to actually go on the site and investigate
and review documents,'' Maxand says. ''But I don't trust government
bureaucrats who live thousands and thousands of miles away from
our state and don't drink our water to make decisions about the
cleanup.''
Batt was only in office four days in 1995 when he was
confronted with the issue. A month earlier, ex-Gov. Cecil Andrus
had refused to let the Navy exceed a 1993 federal court limit
and dump another eight loads of spent reactor fuel at the Idaho
National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory. Batt was
convinced to backtrack.
But the new governor quickly learned to play tough with the
Clinton administration. He drew the national spotlight as he
took advantage of the buildup of federally owned waste across
the nation to force the government to accept the limits and
deadlines in the unprecedented cleanup deal.
Batt and his allies, including Andrus, said it ensured INEEL
would not become a permanent dump. Critics said it guaranteed
the opposite, and they put the agreement to a voter referendum
in 1996. Voters sided with Batt by a nearly 2-to-1 margin.
Copyright 2004, The Salt Lake Tribune.
*****************************************************************
23 Portsmouth Daily Times: USEC, DOE meet -- Talks center on cleanup -
Portsmouth, Ohio December 3, 2004
By Jeff Barron PDT Staff Writer
Piketon
In a meeting highlighted by numerous exchanges between a local
environmentalist and a Department of Energy spokesman, the DOE
talked about its cleanup projects this past year at the
Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant on Thursday.
The DOE owns the plant and leases it to the United States
Enrichment Corp.
You pay no attention to what people tell you or how they feel,
Lucasville resident Vina Colley said to the DOEs Bill Murphie.
Murphie denied Colleys allegation and said the DOE spends $100
million per year cleaning up the plant.
Thats (spending $100 million) not doing nothing, Murphie
said.
In many cases, the DOE uses the Bechtel Jacobs Company for the
cleanup. Bechtel Jacobs Project Manager John Meersman described
some of the cleanup work in 2004, including groundwater cleanup
and scrap metal removal.
According to Meersman, only 170 to 600 tons of scrap metal
remain.
Theres only a couple weeks of work left, he said.
The company is also converting about 19,000 cylinders of
depleted uranium byproducts into a safer compound, including
6,000 the DOE shipped from Oak Ridge, Tenn.
That drew Colleys wrath because the DOE is shipping them before
it builds a conversion plant at the site. The plant is scheduled
for construction next year.
Why not wait until its built before shipping them? she said.
We shouldnt be everyones junkyard.
Murphie said the shipments are based on the fact that the
conversion process will be successful and the cylinders are
stored with the others at the site.
After about 90 minutes, Bechtel Jacobs Public Affairs Director
Jack Williams asked Colley and other audience members to hold
their questions until the end of the presentation.
As the presentation concluded, USEC General Manager Pat Musser
gave an overview of the companys plans for 2005. The plans
include keeping the plant in cold-standby (ready) mode,
beginning construction on the conversion plant and continuing to
remove older, or legacy, nuclear waste from the site.
He said such waste would not occur in the future.
Those problems are problems of the past, he said. Our
standards today are much higher than in the past. We meet or
exceed those standards.
JEFF BARRON can be reached at (740) 353-3101, ext. 236.
*****************************************************************
24 Bellona: Lifetime of nuclear icebreaker Sibir can be extended for 15 years more
Sibir nuclear-powered icebreaker stopped its operation in 1992
due to the faults in the steam generators.
2004-12-06 12:55
The Murmansk Shipping Company, operator of the nuclear
icebreakers, declared this on December 3. The spokesman for the
company explained that in 1992, when operation of Sibir was
suspended, " the methods to replace the inner part of steam
generators did not exist." But now it is possible and the
service lifetime can be prolonged until 175,000 hours, he said.
"The Murmansk Shipping Company has developed such methods and
tested them on the Vaigach nuclear ice-breaker," the interviewee
continued. In expert estimate, the Sibir overhaul will not cost
more than 20 percent of the sum required for construction of a
new nuclear icebreaker. Sibir reactor commissioned in 1978,
operated about 100,000 hours.
Today Russia has six nuclear icebreakers and one nuclear
lighter-carrier in service. The newest icebreaker Yamal, was
commissioned in 1992. The world's first icebreaker Lenin was
taken out of service in 1989. Arktica is undergoing overhaul in
a bid to prolong the service life of its steam-generators to
175,000 hours (initially it was 100,000 hours). Theoretically,
it can be extended to 200,000 hours, increasing the vessel's
life from 25 to 30-35 years. Last February, Vaigach was put to
repairs and its steam-generator was replaced. The Murmansk
Shipping Company believes the experience gained can be used to
put Sibir back on stream. But according to the specialists all
these efforts can retain the icebreakers in operation in the
Arctic region only until 2012 2015, RIA-Novosti reported.
Publisher: , President:
Information: , Technical contact:
Telephone: +47 23 23 46 00 Telefax: +47 22 38 38 62 * P.O.Box
2141 Grunerlokka, 0505 Oslo, Norway
*****************************************************************
25 Harvard Crimson: College To Vet Wind Energy
Published on Monday, December 06, 2004
Students will consider energy on council presidential ballots
By ANTON S. TROIANOVSKI Contributing Writer
In the College-wide vote that begins today, undergraduates will
decide whether the College should start to dump coal, oil, gas
and nuclear fuel in favor of a clean source of energy: wind.
The referendum approved by the Undergraduate Council last night
will ask students whether the College should join the Kennedy
School of Government (KSG) and the School of Public Health
(HSPH) in purchasing a significant amount of renewable energy.
The question, which will appear on the online ballot for council
president, will ask students if they support a new clean energy
fee on their termbill and if so, whether the $10 yearly charge
should be opt-in, opt-out or mandatory.
The Harvard Environmental Action Committee (EAC), which endorses
the opt-out option, estimates that $10 from each of the
College’s 6,559 undergraduates would pay for about 4 million
kilowatt hours (kWh) of renewable energy—roughly 25 percent of
the College dorms’ annual electricity consumption, or the
total yearly production of one state-of-the-art wind turbine.
The purchase would represent taking 482 cars off the road for
one year and equal the annual electricity use of 370 average
American homes, according to the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA).
At issue is the College’s purchase of renewable energy
certificates (RECs)—tradable units that represent the output
of a wind farm somewhere in the country. If the referendum
passes, most of Harvard’s actual electricity would still come
from nuclear and fossil fuel power plants in New England, while
the premium it would pay for the certificates would go to
renewable energy sources in Texas, Colorado and Minnesota, among
other states.
“You’re counterbalancing your own coal use with someone
else’s use of wind,” explains Alexander L. Pasternack ’05,
who helped organize the Harvard Students for Clean Energy group,
which co-sponsored the referendum proposal together with the EAC.
The theory goes that as demand for RECs rises, wind farms become
more lucrative, in turn enticing companies to build more of them
and reducing the nation’s consumption of “dirty” energy.
“The hope in this kind of program is that by making renewable
energy more attractive [for entrepreneurs]—by underwriting
some of the startup costs and so on—it’ll be more attractive
to build more facilities,” says Larry Black, the KSG buildings
manager.
WINDS OF CHANGE
For weeks, members of the EAC have been arguing that renewable
energy is a crucial first step to bringing the environmental
benefits of wind power to Boston.
Among those working the hardest for the campus-wide referendum
have been Pasternack, who is also a Crimson editor, and Allison
I. Rogers ’04.
After graduating in June, Rogers has stayed in Cambridge through
a Harvard University Management Fellowship and has continued her
push for renewable energy, which she began last spring as a
council representative.
Rogers now works for the Harvard Green Campus Initiative, a
University-wide organization to promote environmental
sustainability, and also advises the EAC in its pursuit of clean
energy.
Over the past few weeks, the energy campaign has consumed many
of its supporters’ waking hours, as they lobbied council
representatives in advance of last week’s votes and prepared
an all-out effort to win student support for a new fee.
Before submitting the referendum bill to the Student Affairs
Committee (SAC) last Tuesday, proponents of renewable energy for
the College spent so much time debating the best way to pursue
their goal that they almost ran out of time to push a referendum
onto the presidential ballot, which has historically drawn
higher participation than other campus-wide votes.
The EAC initially considered whether to pass referendum
legislation through the council, to ask the administration
itself to foot the bill, or to solicit donations, as Quincy
House did last April when they powered the House with renewable
energy for one week.
With less than three weeks left before this week’s
presidential vote, the EAC chose the referendum, which they
thought would likely raise more money than a donation drive and
send a signal of student support to Mass. Hall.
“Basically,” Pasternack says, “the administration wants to
see that students really care about this.”
The administration has already proved they were willing to
listen to and act on students’ concerns. In October, the
University announced its own sustainability principles in
response to students’ concerns about the environmental impact
of developing a new campus in Allston.
The first of the six principles, for which University President
Lawrence H. Summers has announced his support, states that
Harvard will “demonstrat[e] institutional practices that
promote sustainability, including measures to increase
efficiency and use of renewable resources.”
“With him endorsing and publicly stating that the University
should adopt these principles, we should really start to see
this movement accelerate,” says Daniel O. Beaudoin, manager of
operations, energy and utilities at HSPH.
In addition, some students and staff have argued that the
University has a duty to buy renewable energy with some of the
money it has saved since 2002 in energy costs thanks to the
Resource Efficiency Program (REP).
“If the [Faculty of Arts and Sciences] is showing dollar
savings one would question why one wouldn’t invest part of
that savings into wind energy,” Beaudoin says.
A GUST OF SUPPORT
The College’s purchase of renewable energy has garnered nearly
unequivocal support among the current candidates for council
leadership, all of whom co-sponsored the legislation for the
referendum.
“I think Harvard should be more environmentally conscious and
serve as an example for other schools in this area,” says
presidential candidate Matthew J. Glazer ’06.
Teo P. Nicolais ’06, who is also running for president, says
the student body and the administration should seriously
consider the prospect of the purchase.
“The key thing to evaluate is that whenever we increase a
service to students, somehow or other we realize the cost,”
Nicolais says, regarding the possibility that administration
might match the student contributions. “One way or another
that’s going to come out of the University’s budget, and
that money could have been used for other services.”
While presidential candidate Tracy T. Moore II ’06 did not
respond to requests for comment, Ian W. Nichols ’06, Moore’s
running mate, has said he views a termbill fee as only a
“temporary solution,” and that the administration should
eventually foot the bill for renewable energy.
Even so, a spring 2003 survey conducted by REP suggests that the
student body is receptive to the idea of a new termbill fee.
About 69 percent of the more than 2,000 undergraduates surveyed
said they would be “willing” to pay an extra $25 in room and
board to allow for one-fifth of their residence’s energy to
come from renewable sources.
A SECOND WIND?
Supporters of the referendum see it as a stepping stone to
eventually deriving all of Harvard’s electricity—about 225
million kWh annually, according to the EAC—from renewable
sources, and to encourage the creation of wind farms closer to
Cambridge.
“I think that in the near future it’d be very feasible to
see Harvard University on 50 or 100 percent wind power, but
it’d be really great if it were local,” Beaudoin says.
To that end, Energy Strategist Mary H. Smith says the University
may purchase a long-term commitment in a New England renewable
energy source such as Cape Wind, a project to build a wind farm
in Nantucket Sound. (The proposal is facing fierce opposition
from many Cape Cod residents, who fear the offshore turbines
would harm their ocean view.)
Looking even further ahead, some clean energy supporters hope to
see the construction of Harvard’s own wind turbine on the new
Allston campus, which is to be developed over the next decade.
In an e-mail, Harvard’s Senior Director of Community Relations
Mary H. Power denied any “specific consideration” of an
Allston turbine.
While the idea is a “cool” one, said Smith, the energy
strategist, “I think at this time it’s a dream.”
Copyright 2004, The Harvard Crimson Inc.
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26 EurekAlert: MIT, Columbia begin new energy experiment
! ]] Public release date: 6-Dec-2004
Contact: Elizabeth Thomson thomson@mit.edu 617-258-5402 MIT News
Office
Alissa Kaplan Michaels am2443@columbia.edu 212-854-9752 Columbia
University
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
MIT, Columbia begin new energy experiment
Half-ton levitating ring is key to work
CAMBRIDGE, Mass. -- MIT and Columbia University students and
researchers have begun operation of a novel experiment that
confines high-temperature ionized gas, called plasma, using the
strong magnetic fields from a half-ton superconducting ring
inside a huge vessel reminiscent of a spaceship. The experiment,
the first of its kind, will test whether nature's way of
confining high-temperature gas might lead to a new source of
energy for the world.
First results from the Levitated Dipole Experiment (LDX) were
presented at a meeting of the American Physical Society the week
of Nov. 15. Scientists and students described more than 100
plasma discharges created within the new device, each lasting
from 5 to 10 seconds. X-ray spectroscopy and visible photography
recorded spectacular images of the hot, confined plasma and of
the dynamics of matter confined by strong magnetic force fields.
A dedication for LDX, the United States' newest approach to
nuclear fusion, was held in late October. Fusion energy is
advantageous because its hydrogen fuel is practically limitless
and the resulting energy would be clean and would not contribute
to global warming as does the burning of fossil fuels.
Scientists using the LDX experiment will conduct basic studies
of confined high-temperature matter and investigate whether the
plasma may someday be used to produce fusion energy on Earth.
Fusion energy is the energy source of the sun and stars. At high
temperature and pressure, light elements like hydrogen are fused
together to make heavier elements, such as helium, in a process
that releases large amounts of energy.
Powerful magnets, such as the ring in LDX, provide the magnetic
fields needed to initiate, sustain and control the plasma in
which fusion occurs. Because the shape of the magnetic force
fields determines the properties of the confined plasma, several
different fusion research experiments are under way throughout
the world, including a second experiment at MIT, the Alcator
C-Mod, and the HBT-EP experiment at Columbia University.
LDX tackles fusion with a unique approach, taking its cue from
nature. The primary confining fields are created by a powerful
superconducting ring about the size of a truck tire and weighing
more than a half-ton that will ultimately be levitated within a
large vacuum chamber. A second superconducting magnet located
above the vacuum chamber provides the force necessary to support
the weight of the floating coil. The resulting force field
resembles the fields of the magnetized planets, such as Earth
and Jupiter. Satellites have observed how these fields can
confine plasma at hundreds of millions of degrees.
###
The LDX research team is led by Jay Kesner, senior scientist at
MIT's Plasma Science and Fusion Center (PSFC) (who earned his
Ph.D. from Columbia University in 1970), and Michael Mauel, a
professor of applied physics at Columbia University (who earned
his degrees from MIT, S.B. 1978, S.M. 1979, Sc.D. 1983).
Kesner and Mauel's colleagues on the experiment include five
graduate students (Alex Boxer, Jennifer Ellsworth, Ishtak Karim
and Scott Mahar of MIT and Eugenio Oritz of Columbia) and two
undergraduates (Austin Roach and Michelle Zimmermann of MIT).
The team also includes Columbia scientists Darren Garnier and
Alex Hansen, as well as Rick Lations, Phil Michael, Joseph
Minervini, Don Strahan and Alex Zhukovsky of the PSFC.
The work is sponsored by the Department of Energy's Office of
Fusion Energy Sciences.
EurekAlert!
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27 Arizona Republic: Hyped on hydrogen
Hyped on hydrogen A breakthrough KOs 1 hurdle to clean-burning
fuels of future
Dec. 6, 2004 12:00 AM
The good environmental news is this: A consortium of government
and private-sector researchers has developed a more
cost-effective method of creating clean-burning hydrogen fuel, a
genuine Holy Grail for those people seeking a means of weaning
the nation from oil dependency.
The bad news? Well, it would require building a whole lot of
new-generation nuclear reactors to make the fuel.
Ah, but it's a start.
Government scientists and a private manufacturer of high-tech
ceramics jointly announced their breakthrough technology a week
ago.
Of the three befuddling hurdles blocking development of an
economy powered by clean-burning hydrogen, the breakthrough
constitutes major headway against Hurdle No. 1: How to produce
the fuel more cheaply.
Hydrogen fuel can be created by splitting the hydrogen in water
from its oxygen molecules, a process well understood for at
least 150 years. But the high-temperature electrolysis that
produces the fuel has proved too costly for creating the vast
amounts of hydrogen fuel needed to power an America-sized
economy.
The process developed by the Department of Energy's Idaho
National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory and Ceramatec
Inc. of Salt Lake City would use water superheated by a new
design of nuclear reactor to vastly reduce the energy costs of
hydrogen-fuel production.
As described by Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham, the new
Generation IV nuclear technology - also developed by the Energy
Department - would improve the efficiency of hydrogen-fuel
production by 50 percent or more.
Of course, implementing the technology would require building
quite a few of those Generation IV reactors. Although such
reactors would - in Abraham's words - "take us to the next level
in terms of efficiency, reliability and safety," few communities
these days are racing to build reactors of any generation.
The appeal of hydrogen is well known. In addition to producing
exhaust no more noxious than water vapor, the fuel burns about
as efficiently as gasoline. And, theoretically, it would be as
abundant as the water used to produce it.
But even assuming a cheaper production method becomes feasible,
the other challenges facing a hydrogen-powered economy remain
daunting, to say the least.
Distribution remains Hurdle No. 2: Thousands of hydrogen-fuel
service stations would be needed to fill those thirsty vehicles.
And, well, there is the matter of the fuel-cell vehicles
themselves. That would be Hurdle No. 3.
What's more, questions remain regarding the safe handling of a
volatile product. In sum, the wall of roadblocks on the highway
to a clean and plentiful energy nirvana remains mighty thick.
Still, progress is progress. Until now, the list of impediments
included stratospheric production costs. That road, at least, is
now a bit clearer.
Copyright 2004, azcentral.com. All rights reserved.
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