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                         NUCLEAR POLICY
 
1 UN Atomic Watchdog Urges Iran's Accelerated Cooperation On Nuclear P
2 [NukeNet] Bush, USA To Attack Iranian Nuke Facilities?
3 Guardian Unlimited: U.N. Nuclear Agency Meets to Discuss Iran
4 Las Vegas SUN: U.N. Nuclear Agency Meets to Discuss Iran
5 BBC: IAEA mulls Iran atomic resolution
6 Las Vegas SUN: Report: N.Korea Says Explosion Was Planned
7 BBC: IAEA concern at S Korea research
8 Guardian Unlimited: North Korea denies nuclear blast
9 JoongAng Daily: 6-nation talks appear unlikely, officials say 
10 US: Charleston.Net: Protest against plutonium takes to the air 
11 US: DOT: Compatibility regulations with IAEA - Final Rule 
12 PolitInfo: New Challenges Appear in Effort to Limit Spread of Nuclea
13 TIME Asia Magazine: Radioactive Slips 
 
                         NUCLEAR REACTORS
 
14 US: NIRS/Public Citizen take NRC to court over public
15 US: PA nuclear plants out of compliance
16 US: San Luis Obispo Tribune: Preparing for the worst
17 AU ABC: Lucas Heights reactor license bid made » 
18 US: NRC: NRC Issues Final Safety Evaluation Report and Final Design 
19 US: NRC: Foster Wheeler Environmental Corporation; Issuance of 
20 US: NRC: Foster Wheeler Environmental Corporation; Issuance of 
 
                          NUCLEAR SAFETY
 
21 US: [epa-impact] Example Exposure Scenarios
22 US: [FOODIRRADIATIONCA] AB 1988 still on the Governor's Desk!
23 US: [DU-WATCH] Pentagon Brass Rattled by Uranium Munitions article
24 [DU-WATCH] DU: A death sentence here and abroad
25 US: [du-list] NRC License to Army for DU
26 US: Epstein asks for EP upgrades; Wal-Mart dealt setback
27 US: [NukeNet] 3 Mile Island: Health Study Meltdown
28 US: Rep. Strickland: STRICKLAND ASKS SECRETARY OF ENERGY TO BLOCK AN
29 US: Paducah Sun: Decision coming on sick worker program home 
30 US: Paducah Sun: Sick workers' shift supported
31 US: PittsburghLIVE.com: Help sought for victims of radiation cancers
 
                         NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE
 
32 Las Vegas SUN: Where I Stand -- Brian Greenspun: A missed opportunit
33 US: AU ABC: Greens seek uranium mine review release » 
34 US: AU ABC: Ranger audits begin today » 
35 NEWS.com.au: Green challenge on N-dump 
 
                         NUCLEAR WEAPONS
 
 
                        US DEPT. OF ENERGY
 
36 Re: A matter of national security! and THE BIG LIE ("NUKES ARE
37 Paducah Sun: First hearing set in Lockheed whistleblower suits 
 
                          OTHER NUCLEAR
 
38 [du-list] the word "atomicity"
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                         FULL NEWS STORIES
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 1 UN Atomic Watchdog Urges Iran's Accelerated Cooperation On Nuclear Programme
 
Date: Mon, 13 Sep 2004 12:01:30 -0400

 

 
UN ATOMIC WATCHDOG URGES IRAN’S ACCELERATED COOPERATION ON NUCLEAR 
PROGRAMME
New York, Sep 13 2004 12:00PM
The head of the United Nations atomic watchdog agency charged with 
preventing the spread of nuclear weapons today called on Iran to 
suspend all uranium enrichment activities “in light of serious 
international concerns” about the nature of its nuclear programme. 


The International Atomic Energy Agency’s <"http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/2004/ebsp2004n006.html">(IAEA) 
Director-General, 
Mohamed ElBaradei, also reported that he could give not assurances 
about the non-diversion of nuclear material in the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), which “continues to pose a 
serious challenge” to non-proliferation since it has not allowed 
verification activities for nearly two years. 

He also stressed that, while the Agency’s efforts to prevent nuclear 
terrorism have continued to accelerate and expand, “clearly, 
the circumstances that first led to a plan for protection against 
nuclear and radiological terrorism have not diminished.” 

While voicing satisfaction over progress in understanding the nature 
of Iran’s nuclear programme in connection with its legal obligations 
under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Mr. ElBaradei 
noted that in June the country reversed its decisions to suspend 
some enrichment related activities undertaken as a confidence 
building measure. 

“I have continued to stress to Iran that, during this delicate phase 
while work is still in progress to verify its past nuclear programme, 
and in light of serious international concerns surrounding 
that programme, it should do its utmost to build the required 
confidence through the Agency,” he said in his introductory statement 
to the opening of the Agency’s Board of Governors meeting in 
Vienna. 

“I would urge Iran, therefore, to continue to accelerate its cooperation, 
pursuing a policy of maximum transparency and confidence 
building, so that we can bring the remaining outstanding issues 
to resolution within the next few months and provide assurance to 
the international community,” he added. 

Enriched uranium can be used to make nuclear weapons and the IAEA 
has strongly deplored Iranian breaches of the NPT, which included 
a long-running failure to disclose past activities. Mr. ElBaradei 
has repeatedly said the Agency had no proof Iran’s activities 
were linked to a nuclear weapons programme and Tehran has consistently 
denied any such intention. 

Today he noted that no additional undeclared Iranian activities had 
come to light since his last report to the Board in June. Iran 
has also provided new information in response to Agency requests, 
although in certain instances the process needed to be accelerated, 
he said. 

Progress was also made towards ascertaining the source of high enriched 
uranium (HEU) found at the Kalaye Electric Company and Natanz, 
in part due to the cooperation provided by other States, and 
it appears plausible that this HEU contamination may not have resulted 
from enrichment by Iran at these locations. But the IAEA is 
continuing to pursue the identification of sources and reasons 
for such contamination. 

On Libya, which in December renounced all programmes leading to the 
production of internationally proscribed weapons, Mr. ElBaradei 
reported that the North African country had provided prompt access 
to locations requested, made senior personnel available and taken 
corrective actions as required by its NPT safeguards agreement. 
Verification activities confirmed that for many years Libya had 
pursued a clandestine programme of uranium conversion and enrichment, 
he added. 

On the Republic of Korea (ROK), which last month told the IAEA that 
scientists had produced a minute amount of enriched uranium without 
government knowledge during vapour laser isotope separation 
experiments, Mr. ElBaradei said the Agency would continue its investigations 
and had received full cooperation. 

But, he added: “It is a matter of serious concern that the conversion 
and enrichment of uranium and the separation of plutonium were 
not reported to the Agency as required by the ROK safeguards agreement.” 


On the Middle East he regretted that there had been no progress in 
consultations with the various states on the application of full 
scope safeguards to all nuclear activities there. 
 2004-09-13 00:00:00.000 

________________

For more details go to UN News Centre at http://www.un.org/news

To change your profile or unsubscribe go to:
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*****************************************************************
 2 [NukeNet] Bush, USA To Attack Iranian Nuke Facilities?
 
Date: Mon, 13 Sep 2004 14:21:07 -0700

 
<x-flowed>
 >From Ack Malten:
  Useful links on the Illegality of Nuclear Weapons
are:

The International Court of Justice [ICJ] Advisory
Opinion
on Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,
**including ALL the Separate Opinions of ALL the
Judges**,
the Canberra Report, the CTBT Text and Protocol,
the NPT text and the 1925 Gas Protocol,
the Nuremberg Principles and
the MODEL Nuclear Weapons Convention can be found
at
my website under the Documents Index:

http://www.cornnet.nl/~akmalten/docs.html


U.S. Undersecretary of State John Bolton,
President Bush's top official on nuclear
non-proliferation, said on Sunday when asked,
during a brief visit to Israel, whether Washington
would consider attacking Iran's nuclear
facilities:

``President Bush is determined to try and find a
peaceful and diplomatic solution to the problem of
Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons,'' he said.
``But we are determined that they are not going to
achieve a nuclear weapons capability.''



http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/international/international-nuclear-iran.html

Iran Says It Won't Halt Nuclear Technology Drive
By REUTERS

Published: September 12, 2004


Filed at 9:08 a.m. ET

TEHRAN (Reuters) - Iran Sunday rejected European
demands it abandon sensitive nuclear activities
but reiterated its readiness to provide assurances
that its atomic ambitions are entirely peaceful.

Western diplomats say Britain, France and Germany
have demanded Iran halt all parts of the atomic
fuel cycle, particularly uranium enrichment, that
can be used to make bombs.

      Advertisement


The European Union trio have proposed a draft
resolution for a meeting of the International
Atomic Energy Agencystarting in Vienna Monday
which gives Iran until November to dispel doubts
about its nuclear program.

Asked about the EU trio's stance, Foreign Ministry
spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi reiterated that Iran
had no intention of abandoning its efforts to
master the nuclear fuel cycle.

``If the Europeans and the international community
  want assurances that nuclear technology will be
for peaceful purposes, we are ready to give
assurances,'' Asefi told a weekly news conference.

``But if the issue is that we cannot master
nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, that is
out of the question because we have already
reached that point,'' he said.

The trio's draft does not order Tehran to be
automatically reported to the U.N. Security
Council if it does not meet the deadline, as
Washington wishes.

It says the IAEA board will ``probably'' consider
whether further steps are needed after receiving
IAEA chief Mohamed ElBaradei's next report on Iran
in November.

BOLTON: IRAN CAN'T HAVE NUKES

U.S. Undersecretary of State John Bolton,
President Bush's top official on nuclear
non-proliferation, said on Sunday when asked,
during a brief visit to Israel, whether Washington
would consider attacking Iran's nuclear
facilities:

``President Bush is determined to try and find a
peaceful and diplomatic solution to the problem of
Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons,'' he said.
``But we are determined that they are not going to
achieve a nuclear weapons capability.''

Washington has accused Iran of developing nuclear
weapons under cover of a peaceful atomic energy
program, a charge Iran vehemently denies. The IAEA
has found many previously concealed nuclear
activities in Iran but no ``smoking gun'' backing
the U.S. view.

Iran insists its nuclear facilities will be used
only to generate electricity. It says that as a
signatory of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
it has the right to develop nuclear technology for
peaceful purposes under IAEA supervision.

Eager to prevent its case being sent to the
Security Council, Iran has again offered to
temporarily suspend enrichment-related activities,
European officials have said.

Iran made a similar promise in a deal struck with
Britain, Germany and France in October 2003, but
it never fully suspended enrichment activities and
in June said it had abandoned the pledge.

Bolton said sending Iran's case to the U.N.
Security Council would not necessarily lead to
sanctions being imposed on Iran.

``The most important reason to take Iran to the
Security Council is to heighten political
pressure,'' he said.

Asefi said Iran was exploring a broader deal with
the EU which would address other areas of EU
concern such as terrorism, human rights and Middle
East violence.

``We think it is a pity that Iran and Europe's
huge potentials are focused on only one issue ...
We are thinking of a comprehensive cooperation
with Europe and negotiations covering those
subjects are part of it.''






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</x-flowed>
*****************************************************************
 3 Guardian Unlimited: U.N. Nuclear Agency Meets to Discuss Iran
 
From the Associated Press [UP] 

Monday September 13, 2004 1:46 PM

AP Photo JRL107 

By GEORGE JAHN 

Associated Press Writer 

VIENNA, Austria (AP) - The U.N. atomic watchdog agency began a 
key meeting Monday that will consider a European draft resolution 
on Iran's nuclear program, with the United States lobbying its 
allies to have Tehran hauled before the Security Council. 

Russia said it was opposed to the U.S.-proposed move, at least 
for now. 

``We think it is premature for the U.N. Security Council to 
discuss this issue,'' Yury Fedotov, a deputy Russian foreign 
minister, told the Interfax news agency in Moscow. 

A key point of contention was Iran's refusal to fully give up 
uranium enrichment - and banish suspicions it is interested in 
nuclear arms. 

Tehran appeared ready to compromise as the meeting of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency's board opened. Hossein 
Mousavian, Iran's chief delegate, said that ``at the moment'' a 
partial freeze on assembling and making parts for centrifuges - a 
key part of the enrichment process - was in effect. 

But IAEA chief Mohamed ElBaradei said Iran had not delivered on 
any such commitment, although talks with Tehran continued on the 
issue. 

The IAEA board of governors meeting also heard brief comments on 
South Korea's clandestine uranium enrichment and plutonium 
extraction experiments from agency chief Mohamed ElBaradei. The 
issue of Iran was not expected to be discussed before Tuesday at 
the earliest. 

ElBaradei said South Korea's failure to report its experiments as 
required by agreements it had with the IAEA were a ``matter of 
serious concern.'' He said he would have a fuller report on 
Seoul's clandestine nuclear activities by the next board meeting 
in November. 

Repeating his government's stance, South Korean delegate Cho 
Chang-Bom told reporters the experiments involved only minute 
quantities of enriched uranium and plutonium and were performed 
by a small group of renegade scientists ``without the knowledge 
and authorization of the government.'' He said that - with the 
revelations now public - South Korea harbored no more nuclear 
secrets. 

Washington appeared to soften its rhetoric on Iran before the 
opening session in apparent recognition that it might not get its 
way immediately. But its case was bolstered over the longer term 
after key European allies agreed to set a November deadline for 
Iran to meet demands meant to banish concerns over its possible 
pursuit of nuclear weapons. 

In a confidential draft resolution prepared by France, Germany 
and Britain and made available to The Associated Press, the three 
European powers warned of possible ``further steps'' by November, 
the next time the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency 
convenes a meeting of its board of governors. 

Diplomats defined that phrase as shorthand for referral of Iran's 
case to the U.N. Security Council if Tehran hinders the IAEA's 
nuclear investigation or refuses to suspend uranium enrichment - 
which can be used to generate power or make nuclear weapons. 

ElBaradei suggested he did not consider November a deadline. 

``It's an open process and we will finish when I believe we are 
finished,'' he told reporters. 

Still the European warning did not go far enough for the United 
States. 

A U.S. official, speaking on condition of anonymity as the 
meeting opened, told the AP Washington was looking to more 
tightly define what would set off the ``trigger'' that would lead 
to Security Council referral. 

He did not elaborate, but a diplomat familiar with the draft said 
the Americans were not happy with the word ``probably'' in the 
text, which said the board will ``probably'' make a ``definite 
determination on whether or not further steps are required.'' 

Speaking in the Iranian capital Sunday, Foreign Ministry 
spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi said his country would not abandon 
uranium enrichment. He repeated that Iran was willing to provide 
guarantees that it was not seeking nuclear arms, assurances that 
the United States and key allies have dismissed in the past as 
inadequate. 

Mousavian, the chief Iranian delegate in Vienna, said any 
suspension ``would not last forever.'' 

Asked about Iran on Sunday, Undersecretary of State John Bolton, 
Washington's point-man on nuclear nonproliferation, said Security 
Council sanctions were ``not inevitable,'' but suggested they 
were likely. He said President Bush is ``determined to try to 
find a peaceful and diplomatic solution,'' but hinted that all 
options remain open. 

``We're determined that they're not going to achieve a 
nuclear-weapons capability,'' said Bolton, describing the United 
States and Europe as close to agreement on what steps to take at 
the upcoming IAEA meeting. 

--- 

On the Net: www.iaea.org	 
  
Guardian Unlimited © Guardian Newspapers Limited 2004
*****************************************************************
 4 Las Vegas SUN: U.N. Nuclear Agency Meets to Discuss Iran

 By GEORGE JAHN ASSOCIATED PRESS 

VIENNA, Austria (AP) - 

0912iran-nuclear The U.N. atomic watchdog agency began a key
meeting Monday that will consider a European draft resolution on
Iran's nuclear program, with the United States lobbying its
allies to have Tehran hauled before the Security Council. 

Russia said it was opposed to the U.S.-proposed move, at least
for now. 

"We think it is premature for the U.N. Security Council to
discuss this issue," Yury Fedotov, a deputy Russian foreign
minister, told the Interfax news agency in Moscow. 

A key point of contention was Iran's refusal to fully give up
uranium enrichment - and banish suspicions it is interested in
nuclear arms. 

Tehran appeared ready to compromise as the meeting of the
International Atomic Energy Agency's board opened. Hossein
Mousavian, Iran's chief delegate, said that "at the moment" a
partial freeze on assembling and making parts for centrifuges -
a key part of the enrichment process - was in effect. 

But IAEA chief Mohamed ElBaradei said Iran had not delivered on
any such commitment, although talks with Tehran continued on the
issue. 

The IAEA board of governors meeting also heard brief comments on
South Korea's clandestine uranium enrichment and plutonium
extraction experiments from agency chief Mohamed ElBaradei. The
issue of Iran was not expected to be discussed before Tuesday at
the earliest. 

ElBaradei said South Korea's failure to report its experiments
as required by agreements it had with the IAEA were a "matter of
serious concern." He said he would have a fuller report on
Seoul's clandestine nuclear activities by the next board meeting
in November. 

Repeating his government's stance, South Korean delegate Cho
Chang-Bom told reporters the experiments involved only minute
quantities of enriched uranium and plutonium and were performed
by a small group of renegade scientists "without the knowledge
and authorization of the government." He said that - with the
revelations now public - South Korea harbored no more nuclear
secrets. 

Washington appeared to soften its rhetoric on Iran before the
opening session in apparent recognition that it might not get
its way immediately. But its case was bolstered over the longer
term after key European allies agreed to set a November deadline
for Iran to meet demands meant to banish concerns over its
possible pursuit of nuclear weapons. 

In a confidential draft resolution prepared by France, Germany
and Britain and made available to The Associated Press, the
three European powers warned of possible "further steps" by
November, the next time the Vienna-based International Atomic
Energy Agency convenes a meeting of its board of governors. 

Diplomats defined that phrase as shorthand for referral of
Iran's case to the U.N. Security Council if Tehran hinders the
IAEA's nuclear investigation or refuses to suspend uranium
enrichment - which can be used to generate power or make nuclear
weapons. 

ElBaradei suggested he did not consider November a deadline. 

"It's an open process and we will finish when I believe we are
finished," he told reporters. 

Still the European warning did not go far enough for the United
States. 

A U.S. official, speaking on condition of anonymity as the
meeting opened, told the AP Washington was looking to more
tightly define what would set off the "trigger" that would lead
to Security Council referral. 

He did not elaborate, but a diplomat familiar with the draft
said the Americans were not happy with the word "probably" in
the text, which said the board will "probably" make a "definite
determination on whether or not further steps are required." 

Speaking in the Iranian capital Sunday, Foreign Ministry
spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi said his country would not abandon
uranium enrichment. He repeated that Iran was willing to provide
guarantees that it was not seeking nuclear arms, assurances that
the United States and key allies have dismissed in the past as
inadequate. 

Mousavian, the chief Iranian delegate in Vienna, said any
suspension "would not last forever." 

Asked about Iran on Sunday, Undersecretary of State John Bolton,
Washington's point-man on nuclear nonproliferation, said
Security Council sanctions were "not inevitable," but suggested
they were likely. He said President Bush is "determined to try
to find a peaceful and diplomatic solution," but hinted that all
options remain open. 

"We're determined that they're not going to achieve a
nuclear-weapons capability," said Bolton, describing the United
States and Europe as close to agreement on what steps to take at
the upcoming IAEA meeting. 

--- 

On the Net: www.iaea.org 

-- 



*****************************************************************
 5 BBC: IAEA mulls Iran atomic resolution
 
  Last Updated: Monday, 13 September, 2004
 
[A general view of Iran's first nuclear reactor, being built in 
Bushehr] Critics ask why fuel-rich Iran wants nuclear energy too                                                                

The UN's nuclear watchdog is to decide on a draft resolution 
offering Iran a deadline to show it does not have a nuclear 
weapons programme. 

Germany, France and the UK want to give Iran until November to 
prove it is not lying about its nuclear intentions. 

Iran insists its nuclear programme is solely for peaceful 
purposes. 

But UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw has warned Tehran its recent 
actions have "undermined confidence" in assurances it was not 
building atomic weapons. 

"They cannot turn the issue of confidence on and off like a tap," 
he said at a meeting of EU foreign ministers in Brussels. 

Nuclear fatwa 

Germany, France and UK have expressed alarm that Tehran has 
stepped back from a promise it gave last year to stop its uranium 
enrichment efforts. 

They want the IAEA to give Iran until November to dispel 
suspicions about its nuclear intentions - but IAEA chief, Mohamed 
ElBaradei, has said there was no time limit for completing the 
investigation. 

On his way into the meeting in Vienna, he said it was an "open 
process". 

Iran says abandoning uranium enrichment is "out of the question" 
but it is prepared to give assurances that it will not build 
nuclear weapons. 

Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has meanwhile 
issued an edict saying Islam forbids the use of nuclear bombs, 
according to Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman, Hamid 
Reza-Asafi. 

However, as the text of the edict, or fatwa, has not been 
published, it is not clear if the Ayatollah has expressly 
forbidden the building of nuclear weapons, says the BBC's 
regional analyst, Sadeq Saba. 

Open ended 

The draft resolution submitted to the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) gives Iran until November to dispel doubts over its 
programme, at which stage Mr ElBaradei would decide what further 
action is needed, if any. 

The European trio which prepared the draft has already been 
involved in delicate negotiations to persuade Iran to abandon its 
nuclear ambitions. 

The United States has led concerns that the Islamic Republic is 
developing a nuclear industry which could be used to build 
weapons. 

On a visit to Israel on Sunday, US Under Secretary of State John 
Bolton said the US was "determined that they [Iran] are not going 
to achieve a nuclear weapons capability". 

He said the US sought a peaceful solution, but hinted that all 
options remained open. 

Washington wants the issue to go to the UN Security Council which 
has the power to impose sanctions. 



*****************************************************************
 6 Las Vegas SUN: Report: N.Korea Says Explosion Was Planned

 By CHRISTOPHER TORCHIA ASSOCIATED PRESS 

SEOUL, South Korea (AP) - 

0912nkorea-explo North Korea said Monday that a huge cloud
caused by an explosion near its border with China several days
ago was the planned demolition of a mountain for a hydroelectric
project, British media reported. 

North Korean Foreign Minister Paek Nam Sun said the blast was
intentional, responding to a request for information from
British Foreign Office minister Bill Rammell, who is visiting
the North, the British Broadcasting Corp. quoted Rammell as
saying. 

North Korea told Britain's ambassador in Pyongyang, David Slinn,
that he can visit the blast site as soon as Tuesday to verify
its claims that the explosion was part of a construction
project, the Press Association of Britain reported. Rammell had
asked that ambassadors be allowed to visit the site. 

A mammoth explosion Thursday in the isolated, communist North
reportedly produced a mushroom cloud more than two miles across. 

South Korean and U.S. officials had said Sunday they were trying
to ascertain the cause of the huge cloud. The size of the
reported explosion on the 56th anniversary of the foundation of
North Korea had raised speculation that it might be a nuclear
test. U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell said there was no
indication it was. 

In an interview with the BBC, Rammell said Paek told him "that
it wasn't an accident, that it wasn't a nuclear explosion, that
it was a deliberate detonation of a mountain as part of a
hydroelectric project." 

Rammell said he welcomed the explanation because North Korea is
so secretive. 

"If this is genuinely a deliberate detonation as part of a
legitimate construction project then the North Koreans have
nothing to fear and nothing to hide and should welcome the
international community actually verifying the situation for
themselves," Rammell said. 

The Chinese news agency Xinhua quoted an unidentified North
Korean official also as saying the blast was part of a power
plant project. 

"We will closely look into whether that area is an area for
constructing a hydroelectric power plant," South Korean
Unification Minister Chung Dong-young said at the National
Assembly in Seoul, according to the news agency Yonhap. 

Chung said the large cloud near the North Korean-Chinese border
was confirmed by satellite pictures, but that overcast skies
made it difficult to tell what caused it. 

China's government, which has the closest relations with North
Korea, had no immediate comment about the reported explosion. 

Yonhap said the blast was stronger than an April explosion that
killed 160 people and injured an estimated 1,300 at a North
Korean railway station when a train carrying oil and chemicals
apparently hit power lines. North Korea invited international
aid workers to visit the site, an unusual move for the reclusive
regime. 

On "Fox News Sunday," Powell expressed skepticism North Korea
would stage a nuclear test explosion. But another senior U.S.
administration official, speaking on condition of anonymity,
said the United States has received indications North Korea
might be trying to test an atomic weapon. 

The United States, Russia, Japan, China and the two Koreas have
held talks on North Korea's suspected nuclear weapons
development, and agreed to hold another round of negotiations in
Beijing this month. No date has been set. 

The United States has pushed for North Korea to fully disclose
all of its nuclear activities and allow outside monitoring
before it receives any assistance. North Korea wants energy aid,
lifting of economic sanctions and to be removed from
Washington's list of state sponsors of terrorism. 

On Saturday, North Korea said recent revelations that South
Korea conducted secret nuclear experiments involving uranium and
plutonium made the communist state more determined to pursue its
own nuclear programs. 

South Korea said the experiments, conducted in 1982 and 2000,
did not reflect an interest in developing weapons. 

-- 



*****************************************************************
 7 BBC: IAEA concern at S Korea research
 
  Last Updated: Monday, 13 September, 2004
 
[South Korean workers dismantle experimental reactor at a former 
research centre in Seoul ]                                  
Seoul's nuclear revelations shocked the region                                                          

The UN's nuclear watchdog says that South Korea's failure to 
report secret nuclear research is "a matter of serious concern". 

International Atomic Energy Agency chief Mohamed ElBaradei said 
he would continue to investigate Seoul over its uranium and 
plutonium experiments. 

South Korea admitted last week that some of its scientists had 
conducted clandestine nuclear experiments. 

The US had already chastised Seoul for its failure to report the 
infringement. 

Mr ElBaradei told a meeting of IAEA governors that he would 
report on the investigation by the board's next meeting, in 
November. 

"I would ask the Republic of Korea to continue to provide active 
cooperation and maximum transparency in order for the agency to 
gain full understanding and scope" of the research, Mr ElBaradei 
said. 

Secret experiments 

South Korea - a strong ally of the US in its continuing quest to 
get North Korea to give up its nuclear ambitions - stunned the 
region on 2 September when it revealed that, like its neighbour, 
it too had fallen foul of international nuclear accords. 

A small number of South Korean scientists had conducted secret 
tests to produce 0.2g of enriched uranium in 2000, the government 
admitted. 

It said the experiments were not authorised by the authorities, 
and were conducted for South Korea's civilian nuclear power 
industry. 

Last week Seoul also admitted extracting a small amount of 
plutonium - a key ingredient in nuclear bombs - in secret 
research conducted in the early 1980s. 

An official from South Korea's science and technology ministry, 
Kim Young-shik, said scientists had conducted the experiment out 
of academic curiosity, and that South Korean officials had 
already held talks with the IAEA about the issue. 

South Korea's ambassador to the IAEA, Cho Changbeon, insisted on 
Monday that there would be no further revelations of illicit 
nuclear tests. 

"I think I can safely say that, according to the investigations 
the South Korean government has conducted, there are no other 
such similar experiments on enrichment or processing," Cho 
Changbeon told the French news agency AFP. 

*****************************************************************
 8 Guardian Unlimited: North Korea denies nuclear blast

Agencies
Monday September 13, 2004 		
 		
North Korea today invited a British diplomat to visit the site of 
a massive mushroom-cloud explosion that sparked fears the regime 
may have carried out a nuclear weapons test.

The North Koreans denied the blast was a nuclear test, insisting 
that it was part of the planned destruction of a mountain for a 
hydroelectric project. But Foreign Office minister Bill Rammell, 
on a visit to the secretive communist country, asked the 
authorities in the capital, Pyongyang, if British officials could 
see for themselves. 

Responding to the request, North Korea's vice-foreign minister 
for Europe, Kung Sok-ung, said Britain's ambassador to Pyongyang, 
David Slinn, could go to the site as early as tomorrow. 

Mr Rammell said: "Having asked the vice-foreign minister this 
morning for our ambassador and other ambassadors to be allowed to 
visit the scene of the explosion, I am very pleased the North 
Koreans have agreed to the request." 

The blast near the Chinese border on Thursday caused a two-mile 
wide cloud of dust, which was picked up by satellite. A South 
Korean news agency said the blast was stronger than an April 
explosion that killed 160 people and injured an estimated 1,300 
at a North Korean railway station when a train carrying oil and 
chemicals apparently hit power lines.

In talks with Mr Rammell today, North Korea's foreign minister 
Paek Nam-sun said the blast was a controlled explosion that had 
nothing to do with nuclear weapons testing. He told Mr Rammell 
claims that it was a nuclear test or an accident similar to the 
train disaster were "lies". 

Earlier today, Mr Rammell told the BBC: "If this is genuinely a 
deliberate detonation as part of a legitimate construction 
project then the North Koreans have nothing to fear and nothing 
to hide and should welcome the international community actually 
verifying the situation for themselves." 

China's government, which has the closest diplomatic relations 
with communist North Korea, made no immediate comment about the 
explosion. 

The remote border region of Ryanggang, where the latest blast 
happened, is understood to contain a secret missile base - 
prompting speculation in South Korea that it was a 
weapons-related accident. 

Kim Tae-woo, an analyst at the Korea Institute for Defence 
Analysis, told Reuters: "Rodong missile bases are located in the 
blast area, and extremely explosive liquid fuel which is also 
very flammable is used in production and in operation of 
missiles. I believe it was a mere accident triggered by 
mishandling." 

South Korean officials are analysing satellite images and other 
data to determine the cause of the explosion.

US officials, including the secretary of state, Colin Powell, 
have played down the possibility of a nuclear test. But the 
Democratic presidential candidate, Senator John Kerry, accused 
the Bush administration of letting a "nuclear nightmare" develop 
in North Korea, telling the New York Times that President George 
Bush was preoccupied with Iraq.
 	
Interactive
The history of North Korea

Weblog special
North Korea

In pictures
The Korean war

Timelines
12.02.2003: North Korea's nuclear programme
North Korea - 1991 to the present

Graphic
Map of North and South Korea
[http://www.guardianunlimited.co.uk/graphic/0,5812,331538,00.html
] 

World news guide
20.12.2001: North Korea
South Korea

Useful links
Korea Herald (South) [http://www.koreaherald.co.kr/] 
North Korean Central News                                       
               Agency [http://www.kcna.co.jp] 
World Food Programme [http://www.wfp.org/index2.html] 
History of the Korean war - tcsaz.com
[http://www.tcsaz.com/koreanwar.html] 
CIA factbook: North Korea
[http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/kn.html] 
CIA factbook: South Korea
[http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/ks.html] 

[UP] 

Guardian Unlimited © Guardian Newspapers Limited 2004
*****************************************************************
 9 JoongAng Daily: 6-nation talks appear unlikely, officials say 

A series of reports in the last week unveiling South Korea's 
past nuclear activities has dimmed the outlook for another round 
of six-party talks on North Korea's nuclear weapons program, 
U.S. and North Korean officials say. 

Through its state-run news media Saturday, North Korea issued 
its first official reaction to revelations Seoul conducted a 
uranium enrichment experiment in 2000. 
"There is strong suspicion that the disclosed experiments might 
be conducted at the instruction of the United States as they 
assume military nature," Pyeongyang's Foreign Ministry spokesman 
said in an interview with the North Korea's Central News Agency. 
South Korea has said its experiment, unauthorized at the time, 
was purely academic. 

"We cannot but link these cases to the issue of resuming the 
six-party talks," the ministry spokesman said, referring to the 
Seoul, Beijing, Tokyo, Washington and Moscow's efforts to 
conclude long-running negotiations to end Pyeongyang's nuclear 
arms development. 
The fourth round of the six-nation talks had been tentatively 
set for this month. 

Reacting to the North's statement, South Korea made clear that 
it would still push for the talks. 
Despite Seoul's position, U.S. and North Korean officials had 
expressed increasing skepticism whether the negotiations would 
take place. In a weekend meeting in Japan with Seoul and Tokyo 
officials, James Kelly, chief U.S. negotiator for the talks, 
said holding the meeting during September would be difficult. 
Still, Chung Dong-young, South Korea's head of the National 
Security Council and Unification Ministry, urged Pyeongyang 
yesterday not to link the resumption of the stalled talks to 
South Korea's past nuclear activities. "If the North has 
anything to say, it should come to to the six-nation talks," Mr. 
Chung said. 

In a phone interview, North Korean diplomat in Austria also 
presented a gloomy forecast. 
Ri Song-chol, a North Korean representative in Vienna, said 
another round of negotiations is unlikely to take place before 
the end of this year. 

by Ser Myo-ja, Ryu Kwon-ha myoja@joongang.co.kr> 

2004.09.12 
*****************************************************************
 10 Charleston.Net: Protest against plutonium takes to the air 

09/13/04
 
Group flies kites on Sullivan's to call attention to upcoming 
shipment through Charleston 

BY ADAM FERRELL Of The Post and Courier Staff 

About 200 yards of thin cord strung through a series of bright 
yellow kites arched some 50 feet in the air Sunday morning above 
the beach at Sullivan's Island. 

Beneath gray clouds, a black letter on each kite spelled out 
S-T-O-P P-L-U-T-O-N-I-U-M.

 On one end of the cord, a man and two women staggered about on 
wet sand in a tug-of-war with the wind. Gripping the cord tight 
with their eyes on the sky, they explained why they were there.

 They said they want people to think about why it's a bad idea to 
ship loads of powdered plutonium, Cold War leftovers, through 
Charleston Harbor to be processed into fuel for nuclear power 
plants in the United States.

 The protesters said the containers are susceptible to sabotage 
or accidents that could disburse harmful contaminants into the 
environment. Among other things, they also argue that because the 
fuel is unproven in our nuclear reactors, its use is dangerous.

 "It's like playing Russian roulette with all five chambers 
filled," said Marcella Guerriero of Charleston.

 Two armed ocean freighters from Great Britain are scheduled to 
arrive at Charleston Naval Weapons Station later this week. The 
protesters, who call themselves Citizens Against Plutonium, are 
planning a protest flotilla at 5 p.m. Wednesday in Charleston 
Harbor. 

The freighters will pick up the plutonium here and head to France 
where the load is to be converted into reactor fuel. Then the 
fuel will be shipped back through Charleston and trucked to Duke 
Energy's Catawba reactor in York County for testing.

 If the fuel works, the Department of Energy plans to dispose of 
34 metric tons of surplus plutonium at a plant to be built at the 
Savannah River Site near Aiken.

Adam Ferrell covers downtown. Contact him at 937-5521 or at 
aferrell@postandcourier.com.     
	 	   	   		
border=] [http://www.charleston.net/home_finder/] 

Copyright © 2004, The Post and Courier, All Rights Reserved.
[webmaster@postandcourier.com]                     
*****************************************************************
 11 DOT: Compatibility regulations with IAEA - Final Rule 

FR Doc 04-20549 

[Federal Register: September 13, 2004 (Volume 69, Number 176)] 
[Rules and Regulations] [Page 55113-55119] From the Federal 
Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] 
[DOCID:fr13se04-10] 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Research and Special Programs 
Administration 49 CFR Parts 171, 172, and 173 [Docket No. 
RSPA-99-6283 (HM-230)] RIN 2137-AD40 

Hazardous Materials Regulations; Compatibility With the 
Regulations of the International Atomic Energy Agency; 
Correction; Final Rule 

AGENCY: Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA), DOT.
ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: RSPA is correcting errors in its final rule in this 
docket, published in the Federal Register on January 26, 2004, 
that amended requirements in the Hazardous Materials Regulations 
(HMR) pertaining to the transportation of radioactive materials 
based on changes contained in the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) publication, entitled ``IAEA Safety Standards 
Series: Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive 
Material,'' 1996 Edition, No. TS-R-1. 

DATES: Effective Date: This final rule is effective on October 1,
2004. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dr. Fred D. Ferate II, Office of 
Hazardous Materials Technology, (202) 366-4545, or Charles E. 
Betts, Office of Hazardous Materials Standards, (202) 366-8553; 
Research and Special Programs Administration, U.S. Department of 
Transportation, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC 
20590-0001. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Background 

On January 26, 2004, the Research and Special Programs 
Administration (RSPA, we) published a final rule under Docket 
HM-230 (69 FR 3632) amending requirements in the HMR pertaining 
to the transportation of radioactive materials based on changes 
contained in the IAEA publication entitled ``IAEA Safety 
Standards Series: Regulations for the Safe Transport of 
Radioactive Material,'' 1996 Edition, No. TS-R-1. Specifically, 
the final rule: 

Adopted the nuclide-specific exemption activity concentrations 
and the nuclide-specific exemption consignment activities listed 
in TS-R-1 to assure continued consistency between domestic and 
international regulations for the basic definition of radioactive 
material; 

Provided an exception in the HMR that certain naturally occurring 
radioactive materials would not be subject to the requirements of 
the HMR so long as their specific activities do not exceed 10 
times the activity concentration exemption values; 

Incorporated the TS-R-1 changes in the A1 and A2 values into the 
HMR; 

Adopted the new proper shipping names and UN identification 
numbers, except for those referring to Type C packages, for 
fissile LSA material and for fissile SCOs; 

Required, if customary units are used, that the appropriate 
quantity and customary units be placed within parentheses 
positioned after the original quantity expressed in the 
International System of Units (SI units); 

Adopted the use of the Criticality Safety Index (CSI) to refer to 
what was formerly the criticality control transport index, and to 
restrict the use of the concept of transport index (TI) to a 
number derived purely from the maximum radiation level at one 
meter from the package; 

Required that the new fissile label be placed on each fissile 
material package, and that the CSI for that package be noted on 
the fissile label; 

Adopted the requirement that excepted packages must be marked 
with the UN identification number, that industrial packagings be 
marked with the package type, and that Type IP-2 and IP-3 
industrial packages and Type A packages be marked with the 
international vehicle registration code of the country of origin 
of packaging design; 

Removed former requirements which became redundant upon adoption 
of the new proper shipping names, such as the requirement that 
the shipping description contain the words ``Radioactive 
Material'' unless those words are included in the proper shipping 
name; 

Removed plutonium-238 from the definition of fissile material. 
Removed the reference to Pu-238 in the list of fissile 
radionuclides for which the weight in grams or kilograms may be 
listed instead of or in addition to the activity, in the shipping 
paper or radioactive label description of the radioactive 
contents of a package; 

Adopted a definition of contamination, and included an authority 
to transport unpackaged LSA material and SCO, and an authority to 
use qualified tank containers, freight containers and metal 
intermediate bulk containers as industrial packagings, types 2 
and 3 (IP-2 and IP-3); 

Adopted a new class of LSA-I material, consisting of radioactive 
material in which the activity is distributed throughout and the 
estimated average specific activity does not exceed 30 times the 
activity concentration exemption level, and removed the present 
category referring to mill tailings, contaminated earth, 
concrete, rubble, other debris, and activated material that is 
essentially uniformly distributed, with specific activity not 
exceeding 10-\6\ A2/g. 

Incorporated the TS-R-1 changes for packagings containing more 
than 0.1 kg of uranium hexafluoride (UF6); 

Required UF6 packagings to meet the pressure, drop and thermal 
test requirements, prohibited the use of pressure relief devices, 
and require that packagings be certified in accordance with 
TS-R-1 requirements; 

Removed the definition of ``fissile material controlled 
shipment;'' revised Sec. 173.453 to reflect the NRC ``fissile 
material exemption provisions,'' and revised Sec. Sec. 173.457 
and 173.459 to remove the references to ``fissile material, 
controlled shipment'' and to base requirements for non-exclusive 
use and exclusive use shipments of fissile material packages on 
TS-R-1 package and conveyance CSI limits; 

Accepted the IAEA transitional requirements and begin the 
phase-out of packages satisfying the 1967 IAEA requirements, 
including DOT specification packages; 

Prohibited the manufacture of all Type B specification packages 
conforming to Safety Series No. 6 (1967) as of the effective date 
of this rule; the use of these packages would be allowed for four 
years after the effective date of this rule; and 

Added a requirement that the active material in an instrument or 
article intended to be transported in an excepted package be 
completely enclosed by the non-active components. 

This document corrects editorial and technical errors which have 
come to our attention following publication of the rule. II. 
Section-by-Section Review Part 171 Section 171.7 

In paragraph (a)(3), in the ``Table of material incorporated by 
reference,'' we are correcting the table heading to read ``49 CFR 
reference.'' [[Page 55114]] Section 171.11 

In the January 26, 2004 final rule, the shipping paper 
requirements for highway route controlled quantities of 
radioactive material were moved from Sec. 172.203(d)(4) to Sec. 
172.203(d)(10); however, the reference in Sec. 171.11(d)(6)(i) 
was not changed. Therefore, we are correcting Sec. 
171.11(d)(6)(i) by replacing the reference to Sec. 
172.203(d)(4)'' with ``Sec. 172.203(d)(10).'' Additionally, we 
are correcting Sec. 171.11(d)(6)(iv) to remove the reference to 
Sec. 173.428, because this was not intended nor proposed in the 
notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM). Part 172 Section 172.101 
Hazardous Materials Table (HMT). 

The HMT is corrected as follows: --For the entry ``Radioactive 
material, excepted package-instruments or articles'' the 
applicable packaging authorizations are added to column 8C of the 
HMT. --The entry ``Radioactive material, surface contaminated 
objects (SCO-I or SCO-II) non fissile or fissile-excepted'' is 
corrected to italicize the words ``non fissile or 
fissile-excepted.'' --For the entry ``Radioactive material, 
transported under special arrangement, fissile'' in column 4 of 
the HMT, ``UN331'' is corrected to read ``UN3331.'' --The entry 
``Radioactive material, Type A package, fissile non- specdial 
form'' is corrected to read ``Radioactive material, Type A 
package, fissile non-special form.'' Section 172.203 

In paragraphs (d)(1) and (d)(5), a typographical error is 
corrected. Section 172.403 

An incorrect section reference is corrected in paragraph (g)(1) 
and paragraph (h)(4) is corrected to indicate that the category 
of Class 7 label for an overpack is to be determined from the 
table in Sec. 

172.403(c) using the transport index (TI) derived according to 
Sec. 172.403(h)(3). Part 173 Section 173.403 

In Sec. 173.403, in the definitions for ``Low Specific Activity 
(LSA) material'' and ``Radiation level,'' several typographical 
errors are corrected. Section 173.411 

Section 173.411 is corrected to add language authorizing the use 
of certain tank containers, freight containers, and metal 
intermediate bulk containers as IP-2 or IP-3 containers. Although 
proposed in the NPRM, this language was inadvertently omitted in 
the final rule. Section 173.415 

Paragraph (d) is corrected to clarify that any 
foreign-manufactured Type A package meeting the standards in the 
``IAEA Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material 
No. TS-R-1,'' and bearing the marking ``Type A,'' may be used for 
domestic and export shipments of Class 7 (radioactive) materials 
provided the offeror obtains and maintains the applicable test, 
documentation and engineering evaluations. Section 173.417 

In paragraph (a)(2), typographical errors are corrected in 
``Table 2--Allowable Content of Uranium Hexafluoride (UF6 
``Heels'' in a Specification 7A Cylinder).'' Section 173.420 

Paragraph (a)(2)(ii) is corrected by inserting the word ``or'' 
immediately after the semi-colon. Section 173.427 

Section 173.427 is corrected as follows: --In paragraph (a), a 
duplicative phrase ``, unless excepted by paragraph (d) of this 
section,'' is removed. --In paragraph (b)(3), a reference to 
``Type B'' is removed. --Paragraph (b)(4) is corrected to specify 
that for domestic transportation, an exclusive use shipment of 
LSA material and SCO may not exceed an A2 quantity when in a 
packaging which meets the requirements of Sec. Sec. 173.24, 
173.24a, and 173.410. This language was omitted in the final 
rule. --In paragraph (e), Table 6 is reformatted to dispel the 
appearance that the SCO entries are a subset of LSA-III. Section 
173.433 

In paragraph (d)(6), the left side of the equation is corrected 
to read ``Exempt activity concentration limit for mixture.'' 
Section 173.435 

In the ``Table of A1 and A2 values for radionuclides'', several 
typographical errors are corrected. In addition, in the January 
26, 2004 final rule, the Curie values in the A1/A2 table were 
rounded to two significant figures. As a result, the Curie 
values, when converted back to Terabequerels, are sometimes 
higher and sometimes lower than the original values, by as much 
as 3.6%. Since, some individuals are inputting the Curie values 
into their computer programs, and this would result in some A1 
and A2 values being higher than the authorized amounts a footnote 
``b'' is added to the A1/ A2 table to clarify that the Curie 
values are for information only and the Terabecquerel values are 
the regulatory standard. The Curie values in the A1/A2 table will 
be corrected in a future rulemaking. Section 173.443 

In paragraph (a), we are correcting an incorrect reference to 
``Table 11'' to read ``Table 9''. III. Regulatory Analyses and 
Notices A. Executive Order 12866 and DOT Regulatory Policies and 
Procedures 

This final rule is not a significant action under section 3(f) of 
Executive Order 12866 and was not reviewed by the Office of 
Management and Budget. This final rule is not a significant 
action under the Regulatory Policies and Procedures of the 
Department of Transportation. The revisions adopted in this final 
rule do not alter the cost-benefit analysis and conclusions 
contained in the Regulatory Evaluation prepared for the January 
26, 2004 final rule. The regulatory Evaluation is available for 
review in the public docket for this rulemaking. B. Executive 
Order 13132 

This final rule has been analyzed in accordance with the 
principles and criteria contained in Executive Order 13132 
(``Federalism''). This final rule preempts State, local and 
Indian tribe requirements, but does not propose any regulation 
that has direct effects on the States, the relationship between 
the national government and the States, or the distribution of 
power and responsibilities among the various levels of 
government. Therefore, the consultation and funding requirements 
of Executive Order 13132 do not apply. 

The Federal hazardous material transportation law, 49 U.S.C. 
5101- 5127, contains an express preemption provision (49 U.S.C. 
5125(b)) that preempts State, local, and Indian tribe 
requirements on certain covered subjects. Covered subjects are: 

(1) The designation, description, and classification of hazardous 
material; 

(2) The packing, repacking, handling, labeling, marking, and 
placarding of hazardous material; 

(3) The preparation, execution, and use of shipping documents 
related to hazardous material and requirements related to the 
number, contents, and placement of those documents; [[Page 
55115]] 

(4) The written notification, recording, and reporting of the 
unintentional release in transportation of hazardous material; or

(5) The design, manufacturing, fabricating, marking, maintenance, 
reconditioning, repairing, or testing of a packaging or container 
represented, marked, certified, or sold as qualified for use in 
transporting hazardous material. 

This final rule addresses the classification, packaging, marking, 
labeling, and handling of hazardous material, among other covered 
subjects and preempts any State, local, or Indian tribe 
requirements not meeting the ``substantively the same'' standard. 
This rule is necessary to incorporate changes already adopted in 
international standards. If the amendments adopted in this final 
rule were not made, U.S. companies, including numerous small 
entities competing in foreign markets, will be at an economic 
disadvantage. These companies would be forced to comply with a 
dual system of regulation. The amendments are intended to avoid 
this result. 

Federal hazardous materials transportation law provides at 49 
U.S.C. 5125(b)(2) that, if the Secretary of Transportation issues 
a regulation concerning any of the covered subjects, the 
Secretary must determine and publish in the Federal Register the 
effective date of Federal preemption. The effective date may not 
be earlier than the 90th day following the date of issuance of 
the final rule and not later than two years after the date of 
issuance. The effective date of our January 26, 2004 final rule, 
including the effective date of Federal preemption is October 1, 
2004. Because this final rule makes editorial corrections, the 
effective date of Federal preemption of this final rule is also 
October 1, 2004. C. Executive Order 13175 

This final rule has been analyzed in accordance with the 
principles and criteria contained in Executive Order 13175 
(``Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal 
Governments''). Because this final rule does not have tribal 
implications, does not impose substantial direct compliance costs 
on Indian tribal governments, and does not preempt tribal law, 
the funding and consultation requirements of Executive Order 
13175 do not apply and a tribal summary impact statement is not 
required. D. Regulatory Flexibility Act, Executive Order 13272, 
and DOT Procedures and Polices 

The Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.) requires an 
agency to review regulations to assess their impact on small 
entities unless the agency determines a rule is not expected to 
have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of 
small entities. The corrections contained in this final rule will 
have little or no effect on the regulated industry. Based on the 
assessment in the regulatory evaluation, to the January 26, 2004 
final rule, I hereby certify that, while this rule applies to a 
substantial number of small entities, there will not be a 
significant economic impact on those small entities. A detailed 
Regulatory Flexibility analysis is available for review in the 
docket. 

This final rule has been developed in accordance with Executive 
Order 13272 (``Proper Consideration of Small Entities in Agency 
Rulemaking'') and DOT's procedures and policies to promote 
compliance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act to ensure that 
potential impacts of draft rules on small entities are properly 
considered. E. Paperwork Reduction Act 

This final rule imposes no new information collection 
requirements. F. Regulation Identifier Number (RIN) 

A regulation identifier number (RIN) is assigned to each 
regulatory action listed in the Unified Agenda of Federal 
Regulations. The Regulatory Information Service Center publishes 
the Unified Agenda in April and October of each year. The RIN 
number contained in the heading of this document can be used to 
cross-reference this action with the Unified Agenda. G. Unfunded 
Mandates Reform Act 

This final rule does not impose unfunded mandates under the 
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995. It does not result in costs 
of $120.7 million or more to either State, local, or tribal 
governments, in the aggregate, or to the private sector, and is 
the least burdensome alternative that achieves the objectives of 
the rule. H. Environmental Assessment 

The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), as amended 
(42 U.S.C. 4321-4347), requires Federal agencies to consider the 
consequences of major Federal actions and prepare a detailed 
statement on actions significantly affecting the quality of the 
human environment. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) 
prepared an environmental assessment (EA) of Major Revision to 
Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Material 
Regulations'', Final Report, March 2002, on its proposed rule 
which addresses issues also raised in this rulemaking. On the 
basis of this EA, we find that there are no significant 
environmental impacts associated with this final rule. A copy of 
the environmental assessment prepared by the NRC is available for 
review in the docket. I. Privacy Act 

Anyone is able to search the electronic form of all comments 
received into any of our dockets by the name of the individual 
submitting the comment (or signing the comment, if submitted on 
behalf of an association, business, labor union, etc.). You may 
review DOT's complete Privacy Act Statement in the Federal 
Register published on April 11, 2000 (Volume 65, Number 70; Pages 
19477-78) or you may visit 

[http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/leaving.cgi?from=leaving 
FR.html&log=linklog&to=http://dms.dot.gov] . List of Subjects 49 
CFR Part 171 

Exports, Hazardous materials transportation, Hazardous waste, 
Imports, Incorporation by reference, Reporting and recordkeeping 
requirements. 49 CFR Part 172 

Education, Hazardous materials transportation, Hazardous waste, 
Labeling, Markings, Packagings and containers, Reporting and 
recordkeeping requirements. 49 CFR Part 173 

Hazardous materials transportation, packaging and containers, 
Radioactive materials, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, 
Uranium. 0 In consideration of the foregoing, we are making the 
following corrections to FR Doc. 04-67, appearing on page 3632 in 
the Federal Register of Monday, January 26, 2004: PART 
171--[CORRECTED] 0 1. On page 3665, in Sec. 171.7, in paragraph 
(a)(2), in the Table of material incorporated by reference, 
correct the table heading entry ``9 CFR reference'' to read ``49 
CFR reference''. 0 2. On page 3665, in Sec. 171.11, correct 
paragraph (d)(6) to read as follows: Sec. 171.11 Use of ICAO 
Technical Instructions. * * * * * 

(d) * * * 

(6) For radioactive materials: 

(i) Shipping papers for highway route controlled quantity 
radioactive [[Page 55116]] materials shipments must meet the 
requirements of Sec. 173.203(d)(10) of this subchapter. 

(ii) Competent authority certification and any necessary 
revalidation for Type B, Type B(U), Type B(M), and fissile 
materials packages must be obtained from the appropriate 
authorities as specified in Sec. Sec. 173.471, 173.472 and 
173.473 of this subchapter, and all requirements of the 
certificates and revalidations must be met. 

(iii) Except for limited quantities of Class 7 (radioactive) 
material, the provisions of Sec. Sec. 172.204(c)(4), 173.448(e), 
(f) and (g)(3) of this subchapter apply. 

(iv) Excepted packages of radioactive material, instruments or 
articles, or articles containing natural uranium or thorium, must 
meet the provisions of Sec. 173.421, 173.424, or 173.426 of this 
subchapter, as appropriate. 

(v) Type A package contents shall be limited in accordance with 
Sec. 173.431 of this subchapter. 

(vi) The definition for ``radioactive material'' in Sec. 173.403 
of this subchapter applies to radioactive materials transported 
under the provisions of this section. * * * * * PART 
172--[CORRECTED] 0 3. On page 3666, in the Hazardous Materials 
Table, correct the following entries to read as follows: Sec. 
172.101 Purpose and use of hazardous materials table. * * * * * 0 
a. For the entry Radioactive material, excepted 
package--instruments or articles'', the entries ``422, 424'' are 
added in column 8C. 0 b. The entry ``Radioactive material, 
surface contaminated objects (SCO- I or SCO-II) non fissile or 
fissile-excepted'' in column 2 is removed, and the entry 
``Radioactive material, surface contaminated objects (SCO-I or 
SCO-II) non fissile or fissile-excepted'' is added in its place. 
0 c. For the entry ``Radioactive material, transported under 
special arrangement, fissile'' in column 4, the entry ``UN331'' 
is corrected to read ``UN3331''. 0 d. The entry ``Radioactive 
material, Type A package, fissile non- specdial form'' in column 
2 is removed, and the entry ``Radioactive material, Type A 
package, fissile non-special form'' is added in its place. 0 4. 
On page 3668, in the first column, correct paragraphs (d)(1) and 
(d)(5) of Sec. 172.203 to read as follows: Sec. 172.203 
Additional description requirements. * * * * * 

(d) * * * 

(1) The name of each radionuclide in the Class 7 (radioactive) 
material that is listed in Sec. 173.435 of this subchapter. For 
mixtures of radionuclides, the radionulides that must be shown 
must be determined in accordance with Sec. 173.433(g) of this 
subchapter. Abbreviations, e.g., ``\99\Mo,'' are authorized. * * 
* * * 

(5) The transport index assigned to each package in the shipment 
bearing RADIOACTIVE YELLOW-II or RADIOACTIVE YELLOW-III labels. * 
* * * * 0 5. On page 3669, in the second and third columns, 
correct paragraphs (g)(1) and (h)(4) of Sec. 172.403 to read as 
follows: Sec. 172.403 Class 7 (radioactive) materials. * * * * * 

(g) * * * 

(1) Contents. Except for LSA-1 material, the names of the 
radionuclides as taken from the listing of radionuclides in Sec. 

173.435 of this subchapter (symbols which conform to established 
radiation protection terminology are authorized, i.e., \99\Mo, 
\60\Co, etc.). For mixtures of radionuclides, with consideration 
of space available on the label, the radionuclides that must be 
shown must be determined in accordance with Sec. 173.433(g) of 
this subchapter. For LSA-I material, the term ``LSA-I'' may be 
used in place of the names of the radionuclides. * * * * * 

(h) * * * 

(4) The category of Class 7 label for the overpack must be 
determined from the table in Sec. 172.403(c) using the TI derived 
according to paragraph (h)(3) of this section, and the maximum 
radiation level on the surface of the overpack. * * * * * PART 
173--[CORRECTED] 0 6. On pages 3671 and 3672, in Sec. 173.403, 
correct the definitions for ``Low Specific Activity (LSA) 
material'' and ``Radiation level'' to read as follows: Sec. 
173.403 Definitions. * * * * * 

Low Specific Activity (LSA) material means Class 7 (radioactive) 
material with limited specific activity which satisfies the 
descriptions and limits set forth below. Shielding materials may 
not be considered in determining the estimated average specific 
activity of the package contents. LSA material must be in one of 
three groups: 

(1) LSA-I: 

(i) Uranium and thorium ores, concentrates of uranium and thorium 
ores, and other ores containing naturally occurring radionuclides 
which are intended to be processed for the use of these 
radionuclides; or 

(ii) Solid unirradiated natural uranium or depleted uranium or 
natural thorium or their solid or liquid compounds or mixtures; 
or 

(iii) Radioactive material other than fissile material, for which 
A2 value is unlimited; or 

(iv) Other radioactive material, excluding fissile material in 
quantities not excepted under Sec. 173.453, in which the activity 
is distributed throughout and the estimated average specific 
activity does not exceed 30 times the values for activity 
concentration specified in Sec. 173.436, or 30 times the default 
values listed in Table 8 of Sec. 173.433. 

(2) LSA-II: 

(i) Water with tritium concentration up to 0.8 TBq/L (20.0 Ci/L); 
or 

(ii) Other radioactive material in which the activity is 
distributed throughout and the average specific activity does not 
exceed 10-4 A2/g for solids and gases, and 10-5 A2/g for liquids. 

(3) LSA-III. Solids (e.g., consolidated wastes, activated 
materials), excluding powders, that meet the requirements of Sec. 
173.468 and in which: 

(i) The radioactive material is distributed in a solid compact 
binding agent (such as concrete, bitumen, ceramic, etc.): 

(ii) The radioactive material is a relatively insoluble material, 
so that, even under loss of packaging, the loss of Class 7 
(radioactive) material per package by leaching when placed in 
water for seven days would not exceed 0.1 A2; and 

(iii) The estimated average specific activity of the solid, 
excluding any shielding material, does not exceed 2 x 10-3 A2/g. 
* * * * * 

Radiation level means the radiation dose-equivalent rate 
expressed in millisieverts per hour or mSv/h (millirems per hour 
or mrem/h). Neutron flux densities may be converted into 
radiation levels according to Table 1: [[Page 55117]] 

Table 1.--Neutron Fluence Rates to be Regarded as Equivalent to a 

Radiation Level of 0.01 mSv/h (1mrem/h) \1\ 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
------- 

Flux density 

equivalent to 

0.01 mSv/h (1 

mrem/h) neutrons 

Energy of neutron per square 

centimeter per 

second (n/cm \2\/ 

s) 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
------- Thermal (2.510E-8) MeV............................... 

272.0 1 keV................................................ 

272.0 10 keV............................................... 

281.0 100 keV.............................................. 

47.0 500 keV.............................................. 

11.0 1 MeV................................................ 

7.5 5 MeV................................................ 

6.4 10 MeV............................................... 

6.7 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
------- \1\Flux densities equivalent for energies between those 
listed in this 

table may be obtained by linear interpolation. * * * * * 0 7. On 
page 3673, in the second column, in Sec. 173.411, paragraph (b) 
is corrected to read as follows: Sec. 173.411 Industrial 
packagings. * * * * * 

(b) Industrial packaging certification and tests. (1) Each IP-1 
must meet the general design requirements prescribed in Sec. 
173.410. 

(2) Each IP-2 must meet the general design requirements 
prescribed in Sec. 173.410 and when subjected to the tests 
specified in Sec. 173.465(c) and (d) or evaluated against these 
tests by any of the methods authorized by Sec. 173.461(a), must 
prevent: 

(i) Loss or dispersal of the radioactive contents; and 

(ii) A loss of shielding integrity which result in more than a 
20% increase in the radiation level at any external surface of 
the package. 

(3) Each IP-3 packaging must meet the requirements for an IP-1 
and an IP-2, and must meet the requirements specified in Sec. 
173.412(a) through (j). 

(4) Tank containers may be used as Industrial package Types 2 or 
3 (Type IP-2 or Type IP-3) provided that: 

(i) They satisfy the requirements for Type IP-1 specified in 
paragraph (b)(1); 

(ii) They are designed to conform to the standards prescribed in 
Chapter 6.7, of the United Nations Recommendations on the 
Transport of Dangerous Goods, (IBR, see Sec. 171.7 of this 
subchapter), ``Requirements for the Design, Construction, 
Inspection and Testing of Portable Tanks and Multiple-Element Gas 
Containers (MEGCs),'' or other requirements at least equivalent 
to those standards; 

(iii) They are capable of withstanding a test pressure of 265 kPa 
(37.1 psig); and 

(iv) They are designed so that any additional shielding which is 
provided shall be capable of withstanding the static and dynamic 
stresses resulting from handling and routine conditions of 
transport and of preventing a loss of shielding integrity which 
would result in more than a 20% increase in the radiation level 
at any external surface of the tank containers. 

(5) Tanks, other than tank containers, including DOT 
Specification IM 101 or IM 102 steel portable tanks (Sec. Sec. 
178.270, 178.271, 178.272 of this subchapter), may be used as 
Industrial package Types 2 or 3 (Type IP-2) or (Type IP-3) for 
transporting LSA-I and LSA-II liquids and gases as prescribed in 
Table 6, provided that they conform to standards at least 
equivalent to those prescribed in paragraph (b)(4). 

(6) Freight containers may be used as Industrial packages Types 2 
or 3 (Type IP-2) or (Type IP-3) provided that: 

(i) The radioactive contents are restricted to solid materials; 

(ii) They satisfy the requirements for Type IP-1 specified in 
paragraph (b)(1); and 

(iii) They are designed to conform to the standards prescribed in 
the International Organization for Standardization document ISO 
1496-1: ``Series 1 Freight Containers--Specifications and 
Testing--Part 1: General Cargo Containers; excluding dimensions 
and ratings (IBR, see Sec. 171.7 of this subchapter). They shall 
be designed such that if subjected to the tests prescribed in 
that document and the accelerations occurring during routine 
conditions of transport they would prevent: 

(A) Loss or dispersal of the radioactive contents; and 

(B) Loss of shielding integrity which would result in more than a 
20% increase in the radiation level at any external surface of 
the freight containers. 

(7) Metal intermediate bulk containers may also be used as 
Industrial package Type 2 or 3 (Type IP-2 or Type IP-3), provided 
that: 

(i) They satisfy the requirements for Type IP-1 specified in 
paragraph (b)(1); and 

(ii) They are designed to conform to the standards prescribed in 
Chapter 6.5 of the United Nations Recommendations on the 
Transport of Dangerous Goods, (IBR, see Sec. 171.7 of this 
subchapter), ``Requirements for the Construction and Testing of 
Intermediate Bulk Containers,'' for Packing Group I or II, and if 
they were subjected to the tests prescribed in that document, but 
with the drop test conducted in the most damaging orientation, 
they would prevent: 

(A) Loss or dispersal of the radioactive contents; and 

(B) Loss of shielding integrity which would result in more than a 
20% increase in the radiation level at any external surface of 
the intermediate bulk containers. * * * * * 0 8. On page 3673, in 
the third column, correct paragraph (d) of Sec. 173.415 to read 
as follows: Sec. 173.415 Authorized Type A packages. * * * * * 

(d) Any foreign-made packaging that meets the standards in ``IAEA 
Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material No. 
TS-R-1'' (IBR, see Sec. 171.7 of this subchapter) and bears the 
marking ``Type A''. Such packagings may be used for domestic and 
export shipments of Class 7 (radioactive) materials provided the 
offeror obtains the applicable documentation of tests and 
engineering evaluations and maintains the documentation on file 
in accordance with paragraph (a) of this section. These 
packagings must conform [[Page 55118]] with requirements of the 
country of origin (as indicated by the packaging marking) and the 
IAEA regulations applicable to Type A packagings. 0 9. On page 
3674, correct paragraph (a)(2) introductory text of Sec. 173.417 
to read as follows: Sec. 173.417 Authorized fissile materials 
packages. 

(a) * * * 

(2) A residual ``heel'' of enriched solid uranium hexafluoride 
may be transported without a protective overpack in any metal 
cylinder that meets both the requirements of Sec. 173.415 and 
Sec. 178.350 of this subchapter for Specification 7A Type A 
packaging, and the requirements of Sec. 173.420 for packagings 
containing greater than 0.1 kg of uranium hexafluoride. Any such 
shipment must be made in accordance with Table 2, as follows: * * 
* * * 

Table 2.--Allowable Content of Uranium Hexafluoride (UF6 ``Heel'' 
in a Specification 7A Cylinder) 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
----------------------------------------------- 

Maximum cylinder Cylinder volume Maximum 

Maximum ``Heel'' weight per cylinder 

diameter ---------------------------- Uranium 235- 
-------------------------------------------- 
------------------------- enrichment UF6 Uranium-235 

Liters Cubic feet (weight) 
-------------------------------------------- Centimeters Inches 
percent 

kg lb kg lb 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
----------------------------------------------- 12.7 5 8.8 0.311 
100.0 0.045 0.1 0.031 0.07 20.3 8 39.0 1.359 12.5 0.227 0.5 0.019 
0.04 30.5 12 68.0 2.410 5.0 0.454 1.0 0.015 0.03 76.0 30 725.0 
25.64 5.0 11.3 25.0 0.383 0.84 122.0 48 3,084.0 \1\ 108.9 4.5 
22.7 50.0 0.690 1.52 122.0 48 4,041.0 \2\ 142.7 4.5 22.7 50.0 
0.690 1.52 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
----------------------------------------------- \1\ 10 ton. \2\ 
14 ton * * * * * 0 10. On page 3675, in the first column, correct 
paragraph (a)(2)(ii) of Sec. 173.420 to read as follows: Sec. 
173.420 Uranium hexafluoride (fissile, fissile excepted and non- 
fissile). 

(a) * * * 

(2) * * * 

(ii) Specifications for Class DOT-106A multi-unit tank car tanks 
(see Sec. Sec. 179.300 and 179.301 of this subchapter); or * * * 
* * 0 11. On pages 3676 and 3677, correct paragraphs (a), (b)(3), 
(b)(4) and (e) to read as follows: Sec. 173.427 Transport 
requirements for low specific activity (LSA) Class 7 
(radioactive) materials and surface contaminated objects (SCO). 

(a) In addition to other applicable requirements specified in 
this subchapter, LSA materials and SCO, unless excepted by 
paragraph (c) or (d) of this section, must be packaged in 
accordance with paragraph (b) of this section and must be 
transported in accordance with the following conditions: * * * * 
* 

(b) * * * 

(3) In any Type B(U) or B(M) packaging authorized pursuant to 
Sec. 173.416; 

(4) In a packaging which meets the requirements of Sec. Sec. 

173.24, 173.24a, and 173.410, but only for domestic 
transportation of an exclusive use shipment that does not exceed 
an A2 quantity. * * * * * 

(e) Tables 5 and 6 are as follows: 

Table 5.--Conveyance Activity Limits for LSA Material and SCO 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
------- 

Nature of material Activity limit for conveyances 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
------- 1. LSA-I............................... No limit. 2. 
LSA-II and LSA-III; Non-combustible No limit. solids. 3. LSA-II 
and LSA-III; Combustible 100 A2 solids and all liquids and gases. 
4. SCO................................. 100 A2 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
------- Table 6.--Industrial Package Integrity Requirements for 
LSA Material and 

SCO 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
------- 

Industrial packaging type 

--------------------------------------- 

Contents Exclusive use Non exclusive use 

shipment shipment 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
------- 1. LSA-I: 

Solid....................... IP-1.............. IP-1 

Liquid...................... IP-1.............. IP-2 2. LSA-II: 

Solid....................... IP-2.............. IP-2 

Liquid and gas.............. IP-2.............. IP-3 3. 
LSA-III...................... IP-2.............. IP-3 4. 
SCO-I........................ IP-1.............. IP-1 5. 
SCO-II....................... IP-2.............. IP-2 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
------- [[Page 55119]] 0 12. On page 3678, correct paragraph 
(d)(6) of Sec. 173.433 to read as follows: Sec. 173.433 
Requirements for determining basic radionuclide values, and for 
the listing of radionuclides on shipping papers and labels. * * * 
* * 

(d) * * * 

(6) The exempt activity concentration for mixtures of nuclides 
may be determined as follows: [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 
TR13SE04.013 Where: f(i) is the fraction of activity 
concentration of nuclide i in the mixture; and [A](i) is the 
activity concentration for exempt material containing nuclide i. 
* * * * * 0 13. In Sec. 173.435, the Table of A1 and A2 values is 
corrected by adding a footnote ``b'' to the table headings of 
columns 4 and 6 and correcting pages 3679, 3680 and 3683, in the 
Table of A1 and A2 values for radionuclides to read as follows: 
Sec. 173.435 Table of A1 and A2 values for radionuclides. 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
---------------------- 

Specific activity 

Symbol of radionuclide Element and atomic number A1 (TBq) A1 (Ci) 
b A2 (TBq) A2 (Ci) b ------------------------- 

(Tbq/g) (Ci/g) 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
---------------------- 

* * * * * * * Bi-205..................................... Bismuth 
(83)................. 7.0 x 10- 1.9 x 10\1\ 7.0 x 10- 1.9 x 10\1\ 
1.5 x 10\3\ 4.2 x 10\4\ 

\1\ \1\ 

* * * * * * * Cm-248..................................... 
............................. 2.0 x 10- 5.4 x 10- 3.0 x 10- 8.1 x 
10- 1.6 x 10- 4.2 x 10- 

\2\ \1\ \4\ \3\ 

\4\ \3\ 

* * * * * * * Eu-150 (long lived)........................ 
............................. 7.0 x 10- 1.9 x 10\1\ 7.0 x 10- 1.9 
x 10\1\ 6.1 x 10\4\ 1.6 x 10\6\ 

\1\ \1\ 

* * * * * * * Te-132 (a)................................. 
............................. 5.0 x 10- 1.4 x 10\1\ 4.0 x 10- 1.1 
x 10\1\ 1.1 x 10\4\ 3.0 x 10\5\ 

\1\ \1\ 

* * * * * * * 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
---------------------- * * * * * * * b The values of A1 and A2 in 
curies (Ci) are approximate and for information only; the 
regulatory standard units are Terabecquerels (TBq), (see Sec. 

171.10). * * * * * 0 14. On page 3691, in the first column, in 
Sec. 173.443, paragraph (a) introductory text is corrected to 
read as follows: Sec. 173.443 Contamination control. 

(a) The level of non-fixed (removable) radioactive contamination 
on the external surfaces of each package offered for transport 
must be kept as low as reasonable achievable. The level of 
non-fixed radioactive contamination may not exceed the limits set 
forth in Table 9 and must be determined by either: * * * * * 

Issued in Washington, DC, on September 1, 2004, under authority 
Delegated in 49 CFR Part 1. Samuel G. Bonasso, Deputy 
Administrator, Research and Special Programs Administration. [FR 
Doc. 04-20549 Filed 9-10-04; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4910-60-P 
*****************************************************************
 12 PolitInfo: New Challenges Appear in Effort to Limit Spread of Nuclear 
Weapons in Asia - 

Sep 13, 2004 Hong Kong
 
[http://www.politinfo.com]           
        
For decades, there was just one Asian nuclear power: China. But 
in the past several years, three other Asian countries either 
have developed nuclear bombs or began trying to, posing new 
challenges for efforts to stop nuclear proliferation. 

In Asia, China had long been the only nuclear power. During the 
height of Cold War animosities with the United States, it began 
building a nuclear armory of about 450 missiles and bombs.
 
But in 1998, Beijing's neighbors - India and Pakistan - joined 
the elite club of nuclear-armed nations, when both tested nuclear 
devices. They now are thought to have between 30 and 80 nuclear 
bombs or missiles each.
 
The two South Asian nations have been foes since independence 
from Britain in 1947, and their new weapons raise the specter of 
a nuclear holocaust on the subcontinent.
 
However, Uday Bhaskar, director of India's Institute for Defense 
Studies and Analysis, a government-funded agency, says it would 
be wrong to think the countries went nuclear only to threaten 
each other. He says nuclear weapons give a nation a new degree of 
diplomatic and scientific clout, and a broader overall defense 
policy.
 
"Neither (for) India, or that matter, Pakistan, … the suggestion 
that nuclear capability is either targeted or aimed at only one 
person may sound very dramatic, but I think it would be 
misleading in terms of strategic reality."
 
In the past year, as relations between New Delhi and Islamabad 
have improved, the fear of a nuclear war between the two has 
receded. Another fear, however, remains: that their nuclear 
secrets might be shared with other countries - either as official 
policy, or through the work of rogue scientists.
 
Indeed, earlier this year, Pakistan dismissed the head of its 
nuclear program, Abdul Qadeer Khan, for selling technology to 
other countries, and he now lives essentially under house arrest.
 
That case created a problem for the United States, which is 
trying to push North Korea to give up its efforts to build 
nuclear weapons. While the United States condemned Mr. Khan's 
activities, it did not impose new sanctions on Pakistan. 

Alexander Lennon is an expert on weapons proliferation at the 
Center for Strategic and International Studies, an independent 
research organization in Washington. He says that in the Khan 
case, the Bush administration had to avoid putting too much 
pressure on Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf, who has been a 
close ally in the war on terror.
 
Still, Mr. Lennon says, Washington must be even-handed. That is 
particularly important, he says, regarding recent revelations 
that South Korea conducted secret nuclear tests as recently as 
2000. 

"If it doesn't take the South Korean investigation seriously … 
then there are concerns that are raised about the U.S. approaches 
to North Korea as well as Iran and the Middle East, about whether 
the United States is unfairly discriminating against these 
countries or whether it is actually treating all potential 
proliferators equally."
 
South Korea says the tests were scientific, and insists it is not 
building weapons. The United States has criticized Seoul for 
conducting the tests, but praised it for allowing the 
International Atomic Energy Agency to investigate.
 
While the United States has been restrained in its response to 
the South Korean revelations, nearby Japan has been concerned. 
Japan, the only nation to have suffered an atomic bomb attack, is 
fiercely anti-nuclear. 

Choi Jin Wook is a senior researcher at the government-run Korean 
Institute of National Unification in Seoul. He talks about 
Tokyo's response to the South Korean nuclear experiments.
 
"They clearly oppose to the South Korean nuclear program, and 
they probably would try to pressure the United States to take 
tougher action, even though the United States does not take it 
very serious."
 
One Japanese politician has said it would be understandable if 
South Korea built nuclear weapons to fend off North Korea. But 
experts in Japan and other countries say a nuclear-armed Korean 
Peninsula would cause concerns. Katsuya Kodama heads Japan's 
private International Peace Research Association.
 
"In that case, Japan will also have such a project. That will be 
possible. So this means the entire area may be nuclearized."
 
South Korea's nuclear tests could be the latest obstacle to 
pressuring North Korea to give up its nuclear ambitions.
 
There have been three big concerns about North Korea's efforts to 
build nuclear weapons: the first is that the isolated Stalinist 
state might use them. The second is that Pyongyang could sell the 
technology to other countries or terrorist groups. And finally, a 
nuclear North Korea would set off an arms race in North Asia.
 
The United States and other governments trying to limit the 
spread of nuclear weapons are still coming to grips with the 
reality of a nuclear Asia. While many experts say there is little 
likelihood that either Seoul or Tokyo will go nuclear in the next 
several years, they warn that possibility complicates 
non-proliferation efforts. 

This article uses material from VOA.
 
© Copyright 2001-2004, PolitInfo.com. All rights reserved.   
*****************************************************************
 13 TIME Asia Magazine: Radioactive Slips 

-- Sep. 20, 2004
 		 		 						 		 						 		 		 		 
South Korea's nuclear research  											 																				
													
BY  [mail@web.timeasia.com] 												 

Monday, Sep. 13, 2004

In the 1970s, South Korea ran a program to develop technology to 
reprocess spent nuclear fuel. By 1976, it was in the final stages 
of buying a reprocessing plant from France when the U.S. 
pressured Seoul to end the program. Washington suspected Korea 
wouldn't merely reprocess the fuel for power generation, but was 
planning to use the technology to make plutonium for atomic 
weapons. For Kim Chul, the nuclear expert who headed the project, 
the reprocessing dream never died. Kim keeps the only known copy 
of the project blueprints on a shelf in his study. "We should own 
that technology," says Kim. "We were stopped by international 
society." 

Apparently, not completely, as revelations pouring out of Seoul 
this month have revealed. One centers around an idle TRIGA Mark 
III research reactor located in a dilapidated building in a 
residential suburb of Seoul. In the 1970s and '80s, the TRIGA 
Mark III was used by Korean nuclear scientists to test nuclear 
fuel and study isotopes. In April or May 1982, scientists took an 
irradiated test fuel rod from the reactor and placed it in one of 
the research installation's "hot cells," a room clad with lead to 
block radioactivity. Using robotic arms and peering through a 
leaded window, the scientists sliced open the rod and dissolved 
it. That process separated a small quantity of the plutonium that 
had been produced when the fuel was burned inside the reactor. 

South Korea is not allowed to make plutonium or enriched uranium, 
the two fuels for nuclear bombs, under its nonproliferation 
commitments, and the procedure carried out in 1982 would have had 
few other purposes. "It is something which is pretty exclusively 
reserved for finding out about plutonium," says a Geneva-based 
diplomat. It's also a procedure that's hard to cover up—although 
South Korea appears to have tried. The Ministry of Science and 
Technology says it reported the experiment to the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1983, but its report had a 
significant error. South Korea told the IAEA its scientists had 
dissolved fuel from a fresh rod, not a spent one. Plutonium 
cannot be extracted from a fresh uranium fuel rod. The IAEA had 
no reason to be alarmed until 1997, when an inspection of the 
facility by the IAEA turned up traces of plutonium. 

Last week, South Korea confessed to the 1982 plutonium experiment 
just a week after admitting its scientists had enriched a small 
amount of uranium in 2000 at a different facility in the city of 
Taejon, 120 km south of Seoul. The government went into strenuous 
spin mode, especially when accused of covering up the nuclear 
fiddling, a charge that was "groundless and unsubstantiated," 
according to the Foreign Ministry. But official explanations for 
how the nuclear materials got produced became more threadbare 
through the week. The uranium experiment in 2000 was supposedly 
carried out by a small group of very junior scientists in Taejon. 
But last week, a Geneva-based diplomatic source disclosed that 
senior scientists were also involved. The government maintains 
that the small amount of uranium produced was extremely weak; 
diplomats close to the investigation tell TIME South Korea has 
admitted to the IAEA it was of near weapons-grade potency. With 
regard to the plutonium production in 1982, the government said 
the misreporting to the IAEA in 1983 was a "mistake," that the 
final report on the experiment was lost and the leader of the 
group had died. Therefore, the government said, it had no record 
of how much plutonium was produced—or, ominously, where the 
material ended up. 

South Korea relies on atomic energy for 40% of its electricity, 
which translates into a vast industry of power plants, 
government-run research labs—and a whole lot of hot fuel rods. 
But it is also a major player in the six-nation talks that are 
trying to arm-twist North Korea into shuttering its own uranium- 
and plutonium-based nuclear-weapon programs. After hearing the 
South's explanations, Pyongyang quickly trumpeted a "double 
standard." Then came news that the South had noticed an enormous 
explosion in North Korea last week, though the source was 
unclear. 

But one thing is clear: this story isn't over. Earlier this 
month, an IAEA team left Seoul after taking more samples at the 
TRIGA Mark III reactor. According to the Geneva-based diplomat, 
"There is more to come." 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        —With reporting
by Kim Yooseung and Kyungsun Lee/Seoul 

Copyright © 2004 Time Inc. All rights reserved.
*****************************************************************
 14 NIRS/Public Citizen take NRC to court over public
 
Date: Mon, 13 Sep 2004 19:32:04 -0700

 
<x-flowed>

Public Citizen

Nuclear Information and Resource Service



News Release



For Immediate Release                           Contact: Michele Boyd, 
Public Citizen (202) 454-5134

Sept. 13, 
2004                                                                Michael 
Mariotte, NIRS (202) 328-0002



Groups Charge Nuclear Agency with Illegally

Eliminating Public Participation



1st U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals Hears Arguments Today in Boston



WASHINGTON, D.C. New rules issued by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(NRC) violate the public interest and should be overturned, Public Citizen 
and the Nuclear Information and Resource Service (NIRS) will tell a court 
today. Judges in the 1st U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in Boston are 
scheduled to hear oral arguments today in a case brought by the two 
Washington-based public interest groups, which charge that the new rules 
are illegal because they do not require an on-the-record, public hearing 
during reactor licensing proceedings, as called for by federal law.



             Early this year, the NRC modified agency regulations, under 10 
C.F.R. Part 2, with the stated goal of injecting added certainty and 
efficiency into the licensing process.  But Public Citizen and NIRS say the 
new Part 2regulations, as they are commonly called, violate the Atomic 
Energy Act by eliminating the right to an on-the-record hearing in most 
agency adjudicatory proceedings.  Further, the groups charge that the NRC 
acted arbitrarily and capriciously in crafting the rules because: (1) it 
did so without adequate basis or explanation; (2) the NRC chose to preserve 
the right to an on-the-record hearing in certain cases for reasons that 
apply equally to reactor licensing proceedings where hearings were dropped; 
and (3) the agency eliminated the right to discovery and cross-examination 
on the unsupported assumption that such procedures are unimportant.



This is another example of the NRC acting to minimize public participation 
in and scrutiny of agency actions,said Wenonah Hauter, director of Public 
Citizens Critical Mass Energy and Environment Program. The ultimate effect 
is a reduction in NRC accountability and public safety.



Even though the new Part 2 rules did not become effective until Feb. 13, 
2004, their effects already are being felt because they have been applied 
to several cases filed before that date.  The new exclusionary rules are 
being applied in three separate challenges to applications for early site 
permits for potential nuclear reactors, filed by the energy companies 
Dominion, Exelon and Entergy in Virginia, Illinois and Mississippi, 
respectively.  Although the applications were submitted in the fall of 
2003, the cases are to be heard under the new Part 2 rules, based on 
direction from the NRC commissioners.  And in a challenge to a proposed 
uranium enrichment facility in New Mexico, the application for which was 
filed in early February 2004, the NRC again mandated that the case proceed 
under the new Part 2 rules to the extent possible (on-the-record hearings 
for uranium enrichment facility licensing are required by law).



  The new rules are not just illegal, theyre unreasonably burdensome,said 
Michael Mariotte, executive director of NIRS.  NRCs stated goal of making 
the licensing process more efficientis a thinly veiled disguise for making 
it impossible for the public to effectively raise legitimate safety concerns.



The new rules also require intervenors to submit legal arguments 
simultaneously with their petitions if they want to challenge the licensing 
proceedings, giving them a mere 60 days from the NRCs initial notice of 
hearing to pore through thousands of pages of a license application, 
identify issues of contention, hire legal counsel, contract expert 
witnesses and craft arguments.  Under the old rules, petitioners were 
allowed up to two months to draft and submit their arguments after the 
initial filing to intervene.



Nonprofit public interest groups are not the only victims of the new 
rules.  The state of New Mexico, potentially home to a uranium enrichment 
plant, has been barred from raising important radioactive waste management 
issues in legal proceedings concerning the proposed plant, after submitting 
what the NRC considered to be an incomplete petition under the new, 
compressed timeline.



During a public comment period on a draft version of the rules in 2001, 
1,422 people expressed opposition to the new rules while only nine 
generally supported NRCs efforts.  Still, the draft rules were adopted with 
little substantive change.



Other interveners in this case include Citizens Awareness Network and the 
National Whistleblowers Center. Attorneys general from Massachusetts, New 
York, California, New Hampshire, Wisconsin and Connecticut filed amicus 
briefs in support of the lawsuits.



###

Public Citizen is a national, nonprofit consumer advocacy organization 
based in Washington, D.C. For more information, please visit 
<http://www.citizen.org/>www.citizen.org. NIRS is the information and 
networking center for citizens and environmental organizations concerned 
about nuclear power, radioactive waste, radiation, and sustainable energy 
issues.  For more information, please visit 
<http://www.nirs.org/>www.nirs.org.

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*****************************************************************
 15 PA nuclear plants out of compliance
 
Date: Mon, 13 Sep 2004 14:21:49 -0700

 
<x-flowed>

State plan to handle nuke crisis challenged
Preschools, hospitals and nursing homes are unprepared, 2 residents say
Sunday, September 12, 2004

BY GARRY LENTON
Of The Patriot-News

State and federal authorities are investigating allegations that
Pennsylvania is unprepared to evacuate preschool children and nursing home
and hospital patients during a nuclear accident.

The federal government requires that the state have a plan for moving people
who cannot care for themselves and live within 10 miles of a nuclear plant.
Two Harrisburg area residents allege that the state has been out of
compliance with federal safety requirements for nearly two decades.
Shop Central PA


Gov. Ed Rendell's office and the Federal Emergency Management Agency took on
the review of the state's plan after receiving a letter last week from Larry
Christian and Eric Epstein, chairman of the watchdog group Three Mile Island
Alert, detailing these issues. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission also
received the letter.

If the accusations are deemed true, it would call into question the validity
of the operating licenses for the five nuclear power stations in
Pennsylvania. Federal law requires the NRC to determine that the public will
be protected in a radiological emergency before it grants a license to open
a nuclear plant.

The disparity in the region's evacuation plans is evident in how two
midstate institutions, both within 10 miles of TMI, would handle a nuclear
emergency.

At Frey Village in Middletown, buses from other nursing homes would be sent
to evacuate the facility's 240 residents. It's all prearranged, said Amy
Young, executive director of the Diakon Lutheran Social Ministries facility.

But a few miles away, the 461-bed Penn State Milton S. Hershey Medical
Center would scatter patients to any of 16 hospitals outside the emergency
zone, but the hospital does not have a fleet of buses reserved for an
evacuation. Lee Groff, chairman of the hospital's disaster committee, said
the medical center would call the Dauphin County Emergency Management Agency
for vehicles to move equipment and up to 6,000 patients and staff.

"On the day we have a mass evacuation all hell is going to be breaking
loose. A phone call from Hershey ... asking for 50 vehicles is going to be a
tall order to fill," Harrisburg Mayor Stephen R. Reed said. "They will be
loading people in the private vehicles of staff people."

Dauphin County has vehicles reserved for evacuations, said Nick DiFrancesco,
Dauphin County commissioner who oversees emergency management operations,
but he acknowledged that "there is always room for improvement."

The violations alleged:

Christian, of New Cumberland, discovered last year that the state's
emergency management plans did not protect preschool children in day care or
nursery schools. In response, a state law was passed in July requiring
emergency plans for some child care facilities, but not all.

In their recent letter, Christian and Epstein allege that Pennsylvania is in
violation of federal law because:
*    It failed to prepare emergency plans for nursery schools and day care
centers.


*    A law passed in July to provide emergency planning for day care centers
exempts nonprofit operations.


*    Pennsylvania puts responsibility for emergency planning on the
operators of the center, rather than state and local government agencies.



"There are large segments of our population that are not covered in the
event of an emergency," Epstein said. "The reality is these people need to
be moved in an emergency, and we need to have plans in place."

The alleged failures take on added weight in light of the Sept. 11, 2001,
attacks. Terrorist documents captured in Afghanistan included diagrams and
surveillance reports of U.S. nuclear plants, including TMI.

FEMA officials were scheduled to meet Thursday with staff from Pennsylvania
to discuss the allegations, said W. Craig Conklin, director of FEMA's
technological services division. And NRC spokeswoman Sue Gagner said the
agency had received the letter but could not comment on it. "We will take
time to carefully review it," she said.

After reviewing the allegations, U.S. Rep. Todd Platts, R-York, on Friday
asked the House Energy and Commerce Committee Subcommittee for
Investigations and Oversight to conduct hearings or an investigation of the
allegations.

"I believe that we are in compliance," said David M. Sanko, chairman of the
Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency. Improvement is possible, he said,
but the state has provisions for special-needs populations.

If the NRC determines that the state is out of compliance with federal
regulations, it could order the plants shut down if the problems are not
corrected within four months. Such a move is unlikely, however.
Pennsylvania's nuclear stations provide 36 percent of the electricity
consumed in the state.

Ralph DeSantis, a spokesman for Exelon Nuclear, owner of TMI, said the
allegations do not question the company's emergency planning. He said,
however, that exhaustive emergency planning has been carried out since the
1979 accident, and since the Sept. 11 attacks.

Who's responsible?:

The Rendell Administration also has questioned the state's ability to
evacuate so-called special populations.

"We need to look more closely at what already exists in all-hazards
planning," said Adrian King, deputy chief of staff for Gov. Rendell. "As we
identify holes ... you will see this administration order planning for those
facilities as well."

The official view of the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency, outlined
by Sanko, in a July 30 letter to Christian, is that day care and nursing
home operators, not the government, are responsible for arranging
transportation for an evacuation and other tasks.

But that view was contradicted by Michael Jamgochian, a senior nuclear
engineer with the NRC and author of the regulations.

"[Transportation] falls under the state and local government's
responsibility," Jamgochian said. "They would provide the bus."

Jamgochian cast doubt on a law passed in July that requires for-profit day
care centers and nursery schools to develop emergency plans but exempts
nonprofit centers.

"There are no such distinctions in our regulations," Jamgochian said. "Our
regulations don't care whether you are in a private school or a public
school ... everybody has to have protection."

GARRY LENTON: 255-8264 or glenton@patriot-news.com


» Send This Page | » Print This Page
Copyright 2004 The Patriot-News. Used with permission.
  

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*****************************************************************
 16 San Luis Obispo Tribune: Preparing for the worst

| 09/13/2004 | 

The security at Diablo Canyon nuclear power plant is constantly 
being evaluated to protect it from attack.

 Patrick S. Pemberton

 The Tribune

Inside a glass booth, a trainer speaks into a microphone, 
reciting the drill: Each shooter will fire five rounds from a 
prone position at a target 100 yards away. 

Four shooters, dressed in black uniforms, position themselves on 
their stomachs, eyes lined up with their gun sights. 

“Ready!” the trainer announces. When he triggers a buzzer, the 
shooters begin firing AR-15s — the equivalent of the military’s 
M-16 rifles. After each shot, spent bullet shells spurt out of 
their magazines and onto the ground. Directly behind the hillside 
targets, clouds of dirt rise into the air and evaporate as 
bullets imbed in the earth. 

What seems like a military combat exercise is actually a 
quarterly training drill for security guards at the Diablo Canyon 
nuclear power plant. 

Efforts like this, Diablo officials say, will help keep the 
facility safe from terrorists. 

“Unfortunately, nuclear opponents try to portray that nothing’s 
been done to enhance security since 9/11,” said Jeff Lewis, a 
spokesman for Pacific Gas and Electric Co., which operates the 
Avila Beach plant. “It’s just not true.” 

Three years after the tragic attacks on U.S. soil, the energy 
company has reportedly spent $15 million to enhance physical 
security at its plant, in addition to beefing up its armed force 
by 30 percent. 

“Almost everywhere you look, there are signs of new activity 
related to security,” Lewis said. 

In some ways, the plant — surrounded by concrete barriers, fences 
and armed guards — seems like a fortress. Still, not everyone 
feels safe from terror. 

“They’re not taking it seriously,” said Rochelle Becker, an 
activist for the San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace. 

The organization, backed by state and county officials, filed a 
lawsuit in March claiming the Nuclear Regulatory Agency illegally 
held hearings on nuclear security at Diablo without public input. 

“If our community is being forced to be a radioactive waste dump 
— and it’s not likely to go anywhere — then it ought to be as 
secure as it possibly can be,” Becker said. “And it’s not.” 

The issue of security at nuclear plants was highlighted this past 
summer, when the Sept. 11 commission revealed that Osama bin 
Laden’s terror network considered using 10 planes to attack the 
United States in 2001. Possible targets included nuclear power 
plants. 

Victor Dricks, a spokesperson for the Nuclear Regulatory Agency — 
which oversees the nation’s 104 commercial nuclear reactors that 
generate electricity — said no plants were ever specified. 
However, plants across the country were prepared for an attack 
even before Sept. 11, and measures have been strengthened since 
then, he said from his Arlington, Texas, office. 

With input from law enforcement, the intelligence community and 
the military, Dricks said, the NRC has prepared for numerous 
terrorist scenarios, though he declined to specify what those 
scenarios are. 

Around Diablo, guards seem omnipresent. Each one is armed with 
pepper spray, a .40-caliber pistol and an assault rifle strapped 
across the chest. Many of the guards are former police officers 
and military veterans, said security manager Ron Todaro. 

He said the law prohibits him from revealing how many guards are 
employed there or what their response times are, but each guard 
undergoes six to seven weeks of initial training, followed by 
regular testing. 

The NRC requires guards to be prepared for multiple defense 
situations including shooting on the run, shooting while wearing 
a gas mask, shooting from a tower (a 55-foot-tall practice tower 
will soon replace a 25-foot-tall scaffolding now in use) and 
shooting at moving targets. During each drill, the shooting must 
be 80 percent accurate. 

The NRC also requires what it calls force-on-force drills. 

“That’s where we use a group of mock terrorists who attempt to 
gain entry to the plant and sabotage it,” Dricks said. 

Though the Diablo security guards are not licensed as officers 
like police or sheriff’s deputies, they can shoot to stop an 
assault, Todaro pointed out. To reinforce that fact to the 
public, the plant will soon add signs to the plant, declaring: 
“Deadly Force May Be Used to Protect This Facility.” 

And protection for the facility is crucial. Situated in a cove 
some seven miles from the main gate are two nuclear reactors and 
two spent fuel storage pools. Because nuclear energy is created 
with uranium, nuclear opponents fear a terrorist organization 
could attack the plant, causing deadly radiation to leak into the 
community. 

“The administration doesn’t want to let the public know that 
we’re sitting by these ticking time bombs because they want to 
build more of them,” Becker charged. 

The Diablo plant provides energy to 2 million homes in northern 
and central California. The state has one other active plant, in 
San Onofre, along with five plants no longer in operation. 

Preventing penetration 

After the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, locals feared that terrorists 
could fly planes into the Diablo reactors. But Jearl Strickland, 
program manager for used fuels storage, said even a large 
commercial plane, such as a 767, couldn’t penetrate the reactors. 

The reactors are located inside two massive, dome-shaped 
containment structures at the edge of the Pacific Ocean. The 
containment structures are made of 31/2-foot-thick solid 
concrete, which covers six layers of weaved rebar, with each 
rebar 21/2 inches thick. The concrete and rebar form a dense 
protective blanket that officials believe could not be penetrated 
by bombs or aircraft, unlike New York’s airy glass and steel 
World Trade Center. 

Less powerful than the reactors are the plant’s spent fuel 
storage pools, made of concrete and steel, located in a storage 
building behind the containment structures. Currently, PG is 
considering storing waste temporarily in cement-encased, 
stainless steel casks that would be located behind the reactors. 
Eventually officials hope to remove its spent fuel to another 
site, though that possibility is dimming with growing opposition 
to the proposed Yucca Mountain nuclear waste facility in Nevada. 

To ensure both the reactors and spent fuel don’t pose a risk, 
Diablo officials say they have considered all possible scenarios, 
including terrorists, earthquakes, tsunamis, propane explosions 
and even unlikely events, like a tornado in California. To that 
end, tornado barriers were built in one area to protect the plant 
from flying shrapnel. 

Overall, the key to keeping the plant safe, Todaro said, is 
protecting the perimeter. To do so, there are layers of security. 
Armed guards are posted at the initial entrance, a gate located 
nearly six miles from the plant. Closer to the plant, guards 
await at a vehicle inspection station. All autos approaching the 
station are subject to an examination for explosives and a random 
check by guards. Meanwhile, concrete and steel barriers block 
entry until the vehicles are approved. 

Identification and admission 

At the main entrance to the plant itself, employees and visitors 
go through several more checks. At first, they walk through a 
personal explosives detector, a metal detector and an X-ray 
machine similar to ones used at airports. 

From there, they approach a locked turnstile. To get past the 
turnstile, they must first insert a card containing data about 
the shape and size of their right hand into a device called a 
Recognition System. Then they place their hand in the device, 
which compares the data on the card with the hand. If there’s a 
match, the turnstiles unlock and the employee enters. 

In addition to that, cameras are located throughout the plant, 
providing around-the-clock surveillance, and shielded gun ports 
have been added around the facility for guards to take shooting 
positions. 

Assuming a terrorist organization might infiltrate from the 
inside, Lewis said, employees are now given more rigorous 
background checks, which might include information about finances 
(financially troubled employees might be more likely to be lured 
by terrorist money) and in some cases, psychological exams. 

The security measures are ongoing, Lewis said (larger barriers 
are currently being added closer to the reactors). And thus far, 
Dricks added, the plant is secure. 

“They have a very rigorous and effective security program,” he 
said, “and the NRC is confident that they are able to defend that 
plant from a terrorist attack.” 

Becker, who recently toured the plant, is still not satisfied. 
The underground spent fuel pools, she said, are only located in a 
metal storage unit, the plant should be guarded by military 
personnel and the government should issue a no-fly zone around 
all nuclear plants. 

“If there’s a no-fly zone at the Pentagon and the White House and 
Disneyland, there ought to be one at nuclear power plants,” she 
said.   

*****************************************************************
 17 AU ABC: Lucas Heights reactor license bid made » 

ABC Sydney » Local News
 
"Australian Broadcasting Corporation Online">

[http://abc.net.au/]

Monday, 13 September 2004 

The Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation 
(ANSTO) has applied for an operating license for the replacement 
research reactor at Lucas Heights, which is currently under 
construction. 

The license needs to be approved by ARPANSA, Australia's 
radiation safety agency, before the operation can go ahead. 

But before the license is granted, ANSTO needs to conduct several 
tests on the new reactor's performance systems. 

The results of international peer reviews and public submissions 
will also be taken into account. 

Testing is not due to begin until mid-next year. [ more news ] 
Last Updated: 12:28:00 PM (AEST)                 

[http://www.abc.net.au/privacy.htm]

*****************************************************************
 18 NRC: NRC Issues Final Safety Evaluation Report and Final Design Approval for Westinghouse
AP1000 Advanced Reactor Design

News Release - 2004-11 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Office 
of Public Affairs     Telephone: 301/415-8200 Washington, DC 
20555-0001     E-mail: opa@nrc.gov No. 04-112     September 13, 
2004   

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued a final safety 
evaluation report and final design approval for the Westinghouse 
AP1000 advanced reactor design. The approval is good for five 
years. 

NRC staff spent more than two years carefully reviewing the 
design for the plant, which is capable of producing approximately 
1,000 megawatts of electricity and features enhanced systems to 
safely shut down the reactor or mitigate the effects of an 
accident. It is designed for a 60-year operating life. 

The staff at the NRC has conducted an extensive technical 
evaluation on this next-generation reactor design and recommended 
its approval, said James Dyer, director of NRCs Office of 
Nuclear Reactor Regulation. The final step in the process is to 
incorporate the design into NRCs regulations, using a 
rule-making process that includes a public comment period. 

Such a certification, if granted by the commission on staff 
recommendation, would allow a utility to reference the design in 
an application for a nuclear power plant license. 

NRC has certified three other standard reactor designs: an 
Advanced Boiling Water Reactor, System 80+ and AP600. NRC has 
long sought standardization of nuclear power plant designs and 
the enhanced safety and licensing reform that standardization 
could make possible. 

The Final Safety Evaluation Report can be accessed electronically 
on Sept. 20, 2004, through the NRC Agencywide Documents Access 
and Management System (ADAMS) by going to: 
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams/web-based.html, and entering 
accession number ML042540268. For help in using ADAMS, call 
800/397-4209 or 301/415-4737. More information about the AP1000 
review can be found on the NRCs Web site, 
http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-licensing/license-reviews/design- 
cert/ap1000.html.   



  


 	Last revised Monday, September 13, 2004 	   
*****************************************************************
 19 NRC: Foster Wheeler Environmental Corporation; Issuance of 
 
                        FR Doc 04-20590 
[Federal Register: September 13, 2004 (Volume 69, Number 176)]
[Notices]               
[Page 55198-55199]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access
[wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr13se04-78]                         
 
Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact
Regarding 
a Proposed Exemption
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or the
Commission) is 
considering issuance of an exemption, pursuant to 10 CFR 72.7,
from the 
provisions of 10 CFR 72.102(f)(1) to Foster Wheeler
Environmental 
Corporation (FWENC or applicant). The requested exemption would
allow 
FWENC to use a probabilistic approach along with considerations
of risk 
to establish the design earthquake (DE) ground motion levels at
the 
Idaho Spent Fuel (ISF) Facility, instead of the deterministic 
methodology of 10 CFR 100, Appendix A. FWENC submitted the
exemption 
request as part of its November 19, 2001, license application
for the 
ISF Facility, an independent spent fuel storage installation
(ISFSI) to 
be located at the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental 
Laboratory (INEEL).
 
Environmental Assessment (EA)
Identification of Proposed Action: The applicant requested
an 
exemption from the requirement in 10 CFR 72.102(f)(1) which
states 
that, ``The design earthquake (DE) for use in the design of
structures 
must be determined as follows: (1) For sites that have been
evaluated 
under the criteria of Appendix A of 10 CFR Part 100, the DE must
be 
equivalent to the safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) for a nuclear
power 
plant.'' The regulation at 10 CFR 72.102(b) requires that, for
sites 
west of the Rocky Mountains, such as the ISF Facility site,
seismicity 
must be evaluated using the techniques of 10 CFR Part 100,
Appendix A. 
The requested exemption would allow the applicant to calculate
the DE 
for the proposed facility using an alternate method.
 
The proposed action before the Commission is whether to
grant this 
exemption pursuant to 10 CFR 72.7.
Need for the Proposed Action: The applicant has requested a
license 
to construct and operate the ISF Facility, as described in its
license 
application, dated November 19, 2001, on behalf of the
Department of 
Energy (DOE). FWENC will be the license holder for the ISF
Facility, 
which would be the second NRC-licensed ISFSI at the INEEL. The
proposed 
facility will be adjacent to the existing ISFSI for the TMI-2
fuel 
debris, and close to the DOE facilities currently storing the
spent 
fuel to be moved to the ISF Facility. The ISF Facility
represents an 
additional milestone in the 1995 settlement agreement among DOE,
the 
U.S. Navy, and the State of Idaho regarding the disposition of
spent 
nuclear fuel at INEEL.
 
The exemption would allow the applicant to use risk-informed 
methods including a probabilistic seismic hazards analysis
(PSHA) to 
define the design earthquake for the ISF Facility. This DE is a 
critical assumption for the design of the facility structures,
systems, 
and components (SSCs) important to safety. These SSCs must be
designed 
to withstand the effects of natural phenomena, including
earthquakes, 
without impairing their capability to perform their safety
functions. 
For sites west of the Rocky Mountains, including the ISF
Facility site, 
10 CFR 72.102(b) requires that seismicity be evaluated using
techniques 
set forth in Appendix A of 10 CFR Part 100 for nuclear power
plants. In 
applying that appendix, the applicant would be required to
define the 
DE as the most significant earthquake postulated to occur at
that site, 
irrespective of its frequency, or the estimated time the
facility would 
be operational. This would result in unwarranted conservatism in
the 
design and construction of the facility, placing an unnecessary
burden 
on the applicant, increasing overall project costs and delaying 
implementation of this phase of the settlement agreement between
DOE 
and the State of Idaho.
 
The NRC staff has evaluated the proposed exemption in its 
preliminary safety evaluation report (SER) for the ISF Facility,
dated 
July 29, 2004. In the SER, the staff concludes that there are 
sufficient technical and regulatory bases to grant an exemption
to 10 
CFR 72.102(f) at the time a license is issued for the ISF
Facility. 
These bases are that: (i) The probability and risk-informed
analyses 
performed by the applicant demonstrate that the SSCs important
to 
safety will maintain their capability to protect public health
and 
safety, even considering earthquake ground motions more severe
than the 
proposed DE; (ii) the applicant's exemption request is similar
to 
previous exemption requests found acceptable by the NRC staff
for the 
TMI-2 ISFSI and the Private Fuel Storage Facility; and (iii) the 
applicant's methods and analyses are consistent with the
probabilistic 
approach and corresponding design earthquake values allowed
under the 
recently added regulations in 10 CFR 72.103, as described in the 
associated regulatory guidance in NRC Regulatory Guide 3.73.
Environmental Impacts of the Proposed Action: The NRC staff 
previously evaluated the environmental impacts resulting from
the 
construction, operation and decommissioning of the ISF Facility,
and 
determined that such impacts would be acceptably small. The
staff's 
conclusions are documented in the ``Environmental Impact
Statement for 
the Proposed Idaho Spent Fuel Facility at the Idaho National 
Engineering and Environmental Laboratory in Butte County, Idaho
(Final 
Report), NUREG-1773,'' issued in
 
[[Page 55199]]
January 2004. In that environmental impact statement (EIS), and
in the 
preliminary SER, the staff considered the design earthquake for
the 
site based on the applicant's methods, and concluded that
earthquake 
events would not result in unacceptable consequences or
significant 
radiation releases from the proposed ISF Facility. Therefore,
the staff 
finds that the proposed exemption, involving the use of an
acceptable 
analytical method, will not have any significant environmental
impact.
 
Alternative to the Proposed Action: As an alternative to the 
proposed action, the staff considered denial of the proposed
exemption 
(i.e., the ``no-action'' alternative). Denial of the exemption
request 
would require the applicant to perform additional analyses and
possibly 
revise the design of the ISF Facility, but these changes would
not 
affect the conclusions of the EIS. Neither the proposed action
nor the 
alternative to the proposed action will have a significant 
environmental impact. Therefore, the environmental impacts of
the 
proposed action and the alternative action are similar.
 
Agencies and Persons Consulted: On August 2, 2004, Mr. Doug
Walker, 
Senior Health Physicist with the State of Idaho INEEL Oversight 
Program, was contacted regarding the environmental assessment
for the 
proposed exemption and had no comments. The NRC staff previously 
evaluated the environmental impacts of the ISF Facility in the
final 
EIS issued in January 2004 and has determined that additional 
consultation under Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act is
not 
required for this specific exemption which involves the use of
an 
alternative analytical method and will not affect listed species
or 
critical habitat. The NRC staff has similarly determined that
the 
proposed exemption is not a type of activity having the
potential to 
cause effects on historic properties. Therefore, no further 
consultation is required under Section 106 of the National
Historic 
Preservation Act.
 
Finding of No Significant Impact
The environmental impacts of the proposed action have been
reviewed 
in accordance with the requirements set forth in 10 CFR Part 51.
 
Based 
upon the foregoing EA, the Commission finds that the proposed
action of 
granting the exemption from 10 CFR 72.102(f), so that FWENC may
employ 
alternative methods for determining the design earthquake for
the ISF 
Facility, will not significantly impact the quality of the human 
environment. Accordingly, the Commission has determined that a
Finding 
of No Significant Impact is appropriate, and that an
environmental 
impact statement for the proposed exemption is not necessary.
 
For further details with respect to this exemption request,
see the 
FWENC license application for the ISF Facility, and the
accompanying 
Safety Analysis Report, dated November 19, 2001. The request for 
exemption was docketed under 10 CFR Part 72, Docket No. 72-25.
These 
documents are available for public inspection at the
Commission's 
Public Document Room, One White Flint North Building, 11555
Rockville 
Pike, Rockville, MD, or from the publicly available records
component 
of NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
(ADAMS). 
These documents may be accessed through the NRC's Public
Electronic 
Reading Room on the Internet at
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html
[http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/leaving.cgi?from=leaving
FR.html&log=linklog&to=http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html]
.
 
If there are problems in accessing the documents located in 
ADAMS, contact the NRC Public Document Room (PDR) Reference
staff at 1-
800-397-4209, 301-415-4737 or by e-mail at pdr@nrc.gov
[pdr@nrc.gov] .
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 2nd day of September,
2004.
 
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
 
James R. Hall,
Senior Project Manager, Spent Fuel Project Office, Office of
Nuclear 
Material Safety and Safeguards.
 
[FR Doc. 04-20590 Filed 9-10-04; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P

 
*****************************************************************
 20 NRC: Foster Wheeler Environmental Corporation; Issuance of 
 
                        FR Doc 04-20591 
[Federal Register: September 13, 2004 (Volume 69, Number 176)] 
[Notices] [Page 55199-55200] From the Federal Register Online via 
GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr13se04-79]                         
 
Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact 
Regarding a Proposed Exemption The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC or the Commission) is considering issuance of an 
exemption, pursuant to 10 CFR 72.7, from the provisions of 10 CFR 
72.30(c) to Foster Wheeler Environmental Corporation (FWENC or 
applicant). The requested exemption would allow FWENC to rely on 
the Statement of Intent from the Department of Energy (DOE) to 
satisfy the requirements for financial assurance for 
decommissioning of the Idaho Spent Fuel (ISF) Facility. FWENC 
submitted the exemption request on April 2, 2003, in support of 
its November 19, 2001, license application for the ISF Facility, 
an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) to be 
located at the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental 
Laboratory (INEEL).
 
Environmental Assessment (EA) Identification of Proposed Action: 
The applicant requested an exemption from the requirement in 10 
CFR 72.30(c) which states that financial assurance for 
decommissioning must be provided by one or more of the following 
methods, including: (1) Prepayment; (2) a surety method, 
insurance, or other guarantee method; (3) an external sinking 
fund; or (4) in the case of Federal, State, or local government 
licensees, a statement of intent containing a cost estimate for 
decommissioning, and indicating that funds for decommissioning 
will be obtained when necessary. FWENC, a private entity, will be 
the licensee for the ISF Facility, and the provisions of 10 CFR 
72.30(c)(4) do not explicitly allow such a non-government entity 
to meet the decommissioning financial assurance requirements 
through reliance on a statement of intent. The requested 
exemption would allow the applicant to rely on the statement of 
intent provided by DOE for decommissioning funding assurance. DOE 
has contracted with FWENC for the licensing, construction, and 
operation of the ISF Facility, which will repackage and store 
spent fuel possessed by DOE, in partial fulfillment of the 1995 
settlement agreement among DOE, the U.S. Navy, and the State of 
Idaho.
 
The proposed action before the Commission is whether to grant 
this exemption pursuant to 10 CFR 72.7. Need for the Proposed 
Action: The applicant has requested a license to construct and 
operate the ISF Facility, as described in its license 
application, dated November 19, 2001, on behalf of the Department 
of Energy (DOE). FWENC will be the license holder for the ISF 
Facility, which would be the second NRC-licensed ISFSI at the 
INEEL. The proposed facility will be adjacent to the existing 
ISFSI for the TMI-2 fuel debris, and close to the DOE facilities 
currently storing the spent fuel to be moved to the ISF Facility. 
The ISF Facility represents an additional milestone in the 1995 
settlement agreement among DOE, the U.S. Navy, and the State of 
Idaho regarding the disposition of spent nuclear fuel at INEEL.
 
The exemption would allow the applicant to rely on DOE's 
statement of intent to provide decommissioning funding for the 
ISF Facility when needed, instead of using one or more of the 
other methods specified in 10 CFR 72.30(c). These other methods 
would require the applicant to contribute substantial funds into 
one of these other
 
[[Page 55200]] financial instruments well in advance of 
decommissioning. This facility will be designed and operated 
exclusively for the interim storage of DOE spent fuel, and the 
licensing, construction, and operational costs will be paid 
directly or indirectly by DOE. DOE has also committed to obtain 
sufficient funding for the decommissioning of the facility from 
the U.S. Congress, when needed, so funding for all phases of the 
ISF Facility will ultimately be provided by DOE. To preclude 
FWENC from relying on the method in 10 CFR 72.30(c)(4) to meet 
the decommissioning financial assurance requirements for this 
facility would result in an unnecessary financial burden on the 
applicant, increasing overall project costs.
 
The NRC staff has evaluated the proposed exemption in its 
preliminary safety evaluation report (SER) for the ISF Facility, 
dated July 29, 2004. In the SER, the staff concludes that the 
intent of 10 CFR 72.30(c)(4) is met and that the commitments 
identified in the requested exemption are consistent with the 
requirements of the regulation. The staff finds the exemption 
request acceptable and will impose appropriate license conditions 
to ensure that the decommissioning funding commitments will be 
met.
 
Environmental Impacts of the Proposed Action: The NRC staff 
previously evaluated the environmental impacts resulting from the 
construction, operation and decommissioning of the ISF Facility, 
and determined that such impacts would be acceptably small. The 
staff's conclusions are documented in the ``Environmental Impact 
Statement for the Proposed Idaho Spent Fuel Facility at the Idaho 
National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory in Butte 
County, Idaho (Final Report), NUREG-1773,'' issued in January 
2004. In that environmental impact statement (EIS), the staff 
performed a cost-benefit analysis, and concluded that the 
benefits of the facility outweigh the associated impacts and 
costs. This conclusion was based on the assumption that DOE would 
obtain the necessary decommissioning funding, as described in the 
exemption request. On this basis, and the fact that the proposed 
exemption deals with financial matters that will not affect the 
physical design or operation of the ISF Facility, the staff finds 
that the proposed exemption will not have any significant 
environmental impact.
 
Alternative to the Proposed Action: As an alternative to the 
proposed action, the staff considered denial of the proposed 
action (i.e., the ``no-action'' alternative). Approval or denial 
of the exemption request would result in no change in the 
environmental impacts described in the staff's final EIS. 
Therefore, the environmental impacts of the proposed action and 
the alternative action are similar.
 
Agencies and Persons Consulted: On August 2, 2004, Mr. Doug 
Walker, Senior Health Physicist with the State of Idaho INEEL 
Oversight Program, was contacted regarding the environmental 
assessment for the proposed exemption and had no comments. The 
NRC staff previously evaluated the environmental impacts of the 
ISF Facility in the final EIS issued in January 2004, and has 
determined that additional consultation under Section 7 of the 
Endangered Species Act is not required for this specific 
exemption which involves financial assurance mechanisms and will 
not affect listed species or critical habitat. The NRC staff has 
similarly determined that the proposed exemption is not a type of 
activity having the potential to cause effects on historic 
properties. Therefore, no further consultation is required under 
Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act.
 
Finding of No Significant Impact The environmental impacts of the 
proposed action have been reviewed in accordance with the 
requirements set forth in 10 CFR Part 51.
 
Based upon the foregoing EA, the Commission finds that the 
proposed action of granting the exemption from 10 CFR 72.30(c), 
so that FWENC may rely on DOE's statement of intent for the 
decommissioning financial assurance for the ISF Facility, will 
not significantly impact the quality of the human environment. 
Accordingly, the Commission has determined that a Finding of No 
Significant Impact is appropriate, and that an environmental 
impact statement for the proposed exemption is not necessary.
 
For further details with respect to this exemption request, see 
the FWENC license application for the ISF Facility, and the 
accompanying Safety Analysis Report, dated November 19, 2001, and 
the request for exemption, dated April 2, 2003, which were 
docketed under 10 CFR Part 72, Docket No. 72-25. These documents 
are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public 
Document Room, One White Flint North Building, 11555 Rockville 
Pike, Rockville, MD, or from the publicly available records 
component of NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management 
System (ADAMS). These documents may be accessed through the NRC's 
Public Electronic Reading Room on the Internet at 
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html 
[http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/leaving.cgi?from=leaving 
FR.html&log=linklog&to=http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html] 
. If there are problems in accessing the documents located in 
ADAMS, contact the NRC Public Document Room (PDR) Reference staff 
at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737 or by e-mail at pdr@nrc.gov 
[pdr@nrc.gov] . Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 2nd day of 
September, 2004.
 
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
 
James R. Hall, Senior Project Manager, Spent Fuel Project Office, 
Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.
 
[FR Doc. 04-20591 Filed 9-10-04; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590-01-P

 
*****************************************************************
 21 [epa-impact] Example Exposure Scenarios
 
Date: Mon, 13 Sep 2004 12:01:15 -0400 (EDT)

 
 

http://epa.gov/EPA-IMPACT/2004/September/Day-13/index.html


[Federal Register: September 13, 2004 (Volume 69, Number 176)]
[Notices]
[Page 55160]
>From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr13se04-40]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
[FRL-7812-1]
 
Example Exposure Scenarios

AGENCY: Environmental Protection Agency.
ACTION: Notice of availability of a final document.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This notice announces the availability of a final report 
titled, Example Exposure Scenarios (EPA/600/R-03/036, April 2004), 
which was prepared by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) 
National Center for Environmental Assessment (NCEA) of the Office of 
Research and Development (ORD).

ADDRESSES: The document will be made available electronically through 
the NCEA Web site (<A HREF="http://www.epa.gov/ncea">http://www.epa.gov/ncea</A>). A limited number of paper 
copies will be available from the EPA's National Service Center for 
Environmental Publications (NSCEP), P.O. Box 42419, Cincinnati, OH 
45242; telephone: 1-800-490-9198 or 513-489-8190; facsimile: 513-489-
8695. Please provide your name, your mailing address, the title and the 
EPA number of the requested publication.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: The Technical Information Staff, 
National Center for Environmental Assessment/Washington Office (8623D), 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW., 
Washington, DC 20460. Telephone: 202-564-3261; fax: 202-565-0050; e-
mail: <A HREF="mailto:nceadc.comment@epa.gov">nceadc.comment@epa.gov</A>.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Exposure scenarios are a tool to help the 
assessor develop estimates of exposure, dose, and risk. An exposure 
scenario generally includes facts, data, assumptions, inferences, and 
sometimes professional judgment about how the exposure takes place. The 
human physiological and behavioral data necessary to construct exposure 
scenarios can be obtained from the Exposure Factors Handbook ( EPA/600/
P-95/002Fa-Fc, 1997). The Exposure Factors Handbook provides data on 
drinking water consumption, soil ingestion, inhalation rates, dermal 
factors including skin area and soil adherence factors, consumption of 
fruits and vegetables, fish, meats, dairy products, homegrown foods, 
breast milk, activity patterns, body weight, consumer products, and 
life expectancy.
    The purpose of the Example Exposure Scenarios is to outline 
scenarios for various exposure pathways and to demonstrate how data 
from the Exposure Factors Handbook may be applied for estimating 
exposures. The example scenarios have been selected to best demonstrate 
the use of the various key data sets in the Exposure Factors Handbook 
and represent commonly encountered exposure pathways. An exhaustive 
review of every possible exposure scenario for every possible receptor 
population would not be feasible and is not provided. Instead, readers 
may use the representative examples provided here to formulate 
scenarios that are appropriate to the assessment of interest, and apply 
the same or similar data sets and approaches as shown in the examples.

    Dated: August 11, 2004.
P.W. Preuss,
Director, National Center for Environmental Assessment.
[FR Doc. 04-20598 Filed 9-10-04; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6560-50-P

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 22 [FOODIRRADIATIONCA] AB 1988 still on the Governor's Desk!
 
Date: Mon, 13 Sep 2004 19:32:08 -0700

 
<x-flowed>
(please forward to concerned Californians!)

Keep the pressure on Gov Schwarzenegger to support AB 1988, and protect
parents' right to know what their kids eat at school!

AB 1988, the landmark California legislation that requires school board
approval and parental notification, passed the legislature and now waits
action by Governor Schwarznegger.  We have been bombarding Gov.
Schwarzenegger with postcards, faxes, and calls, but we need to keep the
pressure on.  The Governor has until the end of September to take action
on AB 1988.

PLEASE KEEP CALLING AND WRITING THE GOVERNOR AND URGE HIM TO SUPPORT AB
1988!
You can send a FREE FAX from our website by clicking on this link:
http://www.citizen.org/fax/background.cfm?ID=364&source=56
Or call 916-445-2841 and press 7 (between 9 and 5) or press 2 (after
5pm or before 9am).

Sample Phone Rap:  Hi, I am calling to urge the Governor to support AB
1988 which protects parents' right to know if their children are eating
irradiated foods at school.  This bill is extremely important, as
irradiated foods have been rejected by the public and the safety of
consuming them is unknown.  Parents must have all the information
available so that they can make the best decision for their family.
Thank you.

For background on this issue visit
http://www.citizen.org/california/food or visit
http://www.safelunch.org
To read the text of the bill, visit http://www.leginfo.ca.gov


~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Tracy Lerman
Senior Organizer
Public Citizen, California Office
1615 Broadway, 9th Floor
Oakland, CA 94612
ph: 510-663-0888 x 103  f: 510-663-8569
tlerman@citizen.org
http://www.citizen.org/california

Keep irradiated food out of your child's lunch!
Visit http://www.safelunch.org to find out more.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

**********
If you do not wish to recieve these emails in the future, please send a 
email to tlerman@citizen.org with "unsubscribe foodirradiationca" in the 
subject line. 

</x-flowed>
*****************************************************************
 23 [DU-WATCH] Pentagon Brass Rattled by Uranium Munitions article
 
Date: Mon, 13 Sep 2004 23:24:24 -0500 (CDT)

 
For Immediate Release Contact: Bob Nichols bobnichols@cox.net

The article about the use of depleted uranium being a war crime is
the head line story in American Free Press.  This will open some
eyes at the Pentagon

http://www.americanfreepress.net/html/pentagon_brass.html

The front page on-line is currently at:

http://www.americanfreepress.net/

Regards,

Bob __________________________________________________________

American Free Press (AFP) America's Last Real Newspaper

Pentagon Brass Suppresses Truth About Toxic Weapons

Poisonous Uranium Munitions Threaten World

By Christopher Bollyn

The use of weapons containing uranium violates existing laws and
customs of war and constitutes a war crime or crime against humanity,
according to a leading U.S. expert on humanitarian law.

Karen Parker, a San Francisco-based expert in armed conflict law,
told American Free Press that the use of radioactive uranium weapons
violates the Hague and Geneva Conventions as well as the Conventional
Weapons Convention of 1980.

Although no treaty specifically bans DU weapons, they are illegal
de facto and de jure, Parker said. However, a class action lawsuit
by victims of DU weapons will probably be required for a court to
ban their use, she said.

ILLEGAL FOR ALL COUNTRIES A weapon made illegal only because there
is a specific treaty banning it is only illegal for countries that
ratify such a treaty, Parker wrote in a paper, The Illegality of
DU Weaponry, presented at the International Uranium Weapons Conference
in Hamburg, Germany last October. However, a weapon that is illegal
by operation of existing law is illegal for all countries.

Parker, a delegate to the UN Commission on Human Rights since 1982,
provides legal advice to the UN on DU weapons and other matters of
humanitarian law.

DU weaponry cannot possibly be legal in light of existing law,
Parker said

In evaluating whether a particular weapon is legal or illegal when
there is not a specific treaty, the whole of humanitarian law must
be consulted, Parker wrote.

According to humanitarian law, the illegality of DU weapons is based
on four criteria:

The first is the territorial test. Weapons may only be used in the
legal field of battle. Weapons may not have an adverse effect off
the legal field of battle.

The second is the temporal test, meaning that weapons may only be
used for the duration of an armed conflict. A weapon that continues
to act after the war violates this criterion.

The territorial and temporal criteria are meant to prevent weapons
from being indiscriminate in their effect.

The third rule is that a weapon cannot be unduly inhumane. The Hague
Convention of 1907 prohibits poison or poisoned weapons. Because
DU weapons are radioactive and chemically toxic, as the military
knows, they fit the definition of poisonous weapons banned under
the Hague Convention.

WHAT THE MILITARY KNOWS The Defense Department is well aware of the
toxic effects of DU. In an official presentation by U.S. Army Reserve
Col. J. Edgar Wakayama at Fort Belvoir, Va. on Aug. 20, 2002, the
dangers of exposure to DU were clearly spelled out:

Inhalation exposure has a major effect on the lungs and thoracic
lymph nodes, Wakayama read from a slide. The alpha particle taken
inside the body in large doses is hazardous, producing cell damage
and cancer. Lung cancer is well documented, he noted.

Urine samples containing uranium are mutagenic [capable of producing
mutation] and the cultured human stem bone cell line with DU also
transformed the cells to become carcinogenic, Wakayama read.

DU deposited in the bone causes DNA damage because of the effects
of the alpha particles, Wakayama stressed. One gram of DU emits
12,000 high-energy alpha particles per second.

The fourth rule for weapons, the environmental test, says that
weapons cannot have an unduly negative effect on the natural
environment.

Wakayama advised, Heavily contaminated soil should be removed if
the area is to be populated with civilians.

Wakayama described the dangers to children playing in contaminated
soil and the leaching of DU into local water and food supplies.

DU FAILS ALL LEGAL CRITERIA DU weaponry fails all four tests, Parker
says. Because it cannot be contained to the battlefield, it fails
the territorial test. Airborne DU particles are carried far from
the battlefield affecting distant civilian populations and neighboring
countries.

Because the uranium dispersed on the ground and in the air cannot
be turned off when the war is over, DU fails the temporal test.

The airborne particles have a half-life of billions of years and
have the potential to keep killing . . . long after the war is over,
Parker wrote.

The status of DU as nuclear, radiological, poison or conventional
does not change its illegality. When the weapons test is applied
to DU weaponry, it fails, she concluded.

DU weapons fail the humaneness test because of how they kill, Parker
says, by cancer, kidney disease etc, long after the hostilities are
over.

DU is inhumane because it can cause birth defects such as cranial
facial anomalies, missing limbs, grossly deformed and non-viable
infants and the like, thus affecting children . . . born after the
war is over, Parker said

The teratogenic [interfering with normal embryonic development]
nature of DU weapons and the possible burdening of the gene pool
of future generations raise the possibility that the use of DU
weaponry is genocide, she wrote.

Willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or
health of civilians constitutes a grave breach of the fourth Geneva
Convention, and this is exactly what DU weapons do.

Finally, because DU weapons cannot be used without unduly damaging
the natural environment, they fail the fourth rule for weapons, the
environmental test.

No available technology can significantly change the chemical and
radiological toxicity of DU, the Army Environmental Policy Institute
reported to Congress in 1994. These are intrinsic properties of
uranium.

Regarding environmental damages, users of these weapons are obligated
to carry out an effective cleanup, Parker wrote. The cost of legal
claims and environmental cleanup for the gulf wars alone could be
staggering.

Use of DU weaponry necessarily violates the grave breach provision
of the Geneva Conventions, and hence its use constitutes a war crime
or crime against humanity, Parker concluded.

Questions regarding the legality of DU weapons were sent in writing
to the Pentagons appointed spokesman on DU matters, James Turner.

Turner told AFP that he was not qualified to answer such questions.

By press time the Pentagon had not responded to repeated requests
for information.

American Free Press 2004

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 24 [DU-WATCH] DU: A death sentence here and abroad
 
Date: Mon, 13 Sep 2004 23:23:09 -0500 (CDT)

 
Leuren Moret released this story to the American press August 18,
2004.

Please note the number of American Trooper declared "disabled" by
the Veterans Administration. This is the first time that such a
high number has been reported in the American press.

I suspect that this bombshell story will last one news cycle of 24
hours in a hostile mainstream press. Exactly the opposite of what
a reasonable person would expect.

Regards

Bob Nichols

>From the San Francisco Bay View August 18, 2004

http://www.sfbayview.com/081804/Depleteduranium081804.shtml

Depleted uranium: Dirty bombs, dirty missiles, dirty bullets

A death sentence here and abroad by Leuren Moret

At an April press conference, a group of New York Army National
Guard vets raised their hands when asked if they have health problems.
The soldiers, all from the 442nd Military Police Company, are
complaining of headaches and fatigue after what they think is
exposure to depleted uranium during their recent tour in Iraq.

Photo: www.american freepress.net Military men are just dumb stupid
animals to be used as pawns in foreign policy. - Henry Kissinger,
quoted in Kiss the Boys Goodbye: How the United States Betrayed Its
Own POWs in Vietnam Vietnam was a chemical war for oil, permanently
contaminating large regions and countries downriver with Agent
Orange, and environmentally the most devastating war in world
history. But since 1991, the U.S. has staged four nuclear wars using
depleted uranium weaponry, which, like Agent Orange, meets the U.S.
government definition of Weapons of Mass Destruction. Vast regions
in the Middle East and Central Asia have been permanently contaminated
with radiation.

And what about our soldiers? Terry Jemison of the Department of
Veterans Affairs reported this week to the American Free Press that
Gulf-era veterans now on medical disability since 1991 number
518,739, with only 7 035 reported wounded in Iraq in that same
14-year period.

This week the American Free Press dropped a dirty bomb on the
Pentagon by reporting that eight out of 20 men who served in one
unit in the 2003 U.S.

military offensive in Iraq now have malignancies. That means that
40 percent of the soldiers in that unit have developed malignancies
in just 16 months.

Since these soldiers were exposed to vaccines and depleted uranium
(DU) only this is strong evidence for researchers and scientists
working on this issue, that DU is the definitive cause of Gulf War
Syndrome. Vaccines are not known to cause cancer. One of the first
published researchers on Gulf War Syndrome, who also served in 1991
in Iraq, Dr. Andras Korinyi-Both, is in agreement with Barbara
Goodno from the Department of Defenses Deployment Health Support
Directorate, that in this war soldiers were not exposed to chemicals,
pesticides, bioagents or other suspect causes this time to confuse
the issue.

This powerful new evidence is blowing holes in the cover-up perpetrated
by the Pentagon and three presidential administrations ever since
DU was first used in 1991 in the Persian Gulf War. Fourteen years
after the introduction of DU on the battlefield in 1991, the long-term
effects have revealed that DU is a death sentence and very nasty
stuff.

Scientists studying the biological effects of uranium in the 1960s
reported that it targets the DNA. Marion Fulk, a nuclear physical
chemist retired from the Livermore Nuclear Weapons Lab and formerly
involved with the Manhattan Project, interprets the new and rapid
malignancies in soldiers from the 2003 war as spectacular  and a
matter of concern.

This evidence shows that of the three effects which DU has on
biological systems - radiation, chemical and particulate  the
particulate effect from nano-size particles is the most dominant
one immediately after exposure and targets the Master Code in the
DNA. This is bad news, but it explains why DU causes a myriad of
diseases which are difficult to define.

In simple words, DU trashes the body. When asked if the main purpose
for using it was for destroying things and killing people, Fulk was
more specific: I would say that it is the perfect weapon for killing
lots of people.

Soldiers developing malignancies so quickly since 2003 can be
expected to develop multiple cancers from independent causes. This
phenomenon has been reported by doctors in hospitals treating
civilians following NATO bombing with DU in Yugoslavia in 1998-1999
and the U.S. military invasion of Iraq using DU for the first time
in 1991. Medical experts report that this phenomenon of multiple
malignancies from unrelated causes has been unknown until now and
is a new syndrome associated with internal DU exposure.

Just 467 U.S. personnel were wounded in the three-week Persian Gulf
War in 1990-1991. Out of 580,400 soldiers who served in Gulf War
I, 11,000 are dead and by 2000 there were 325,000 on permanent
medical disability. This astounding number of disabled vets means
that a decade later, 56 percent of those soldiers who served now
have medical problems.

The number of disabled vets reported up to 2000 has been increasing
by 43 000 every year. Brad Flohr of the Department of Veterans
Affairs told American Free Press that he believes there are more
disabled vets now than even after World War II.

They brought it home Not only were soldiers exposed to DU on and
off the battlefields, but they brought it home. DU in the semen of
soldiers internally contaminated their wives, partners and girlfriends.
Tragically, some women in their 20s and 30s who were sexual partners
of exposed soldiers developed endometriosis and were forced to have
hysterectomies because of health problems.

In a group of 251 soldiers from a study group in Mississippi who
had all had normal babies before the Gulf War, 67 percent of their
post-war babies were born with severe birth defects. They were born
with missing legs, arms, organs or eyes or had immune system and
blood diseases. In some veterans families now, the only normal or
healthy members of the family are the children born before the war.

The Department of Veterans Affairs has stated that they do not keep
records of birth defects occurring in families of veterans.

How did they hide it?

Before a new weapons system can be used, it must be fully tested.
The blueprint for depleted uranium weapons is a 1943 declassified
document from the Manhattan Project.

Harvard President and physicist James B. Conant, who developed
poison gas in World War I, was brought into the Manhattan Project
by the father of presidential candidate John Kerry. Kerrys father
served at a high level in the Manhattan Project and was a CIA agent.

Conant was chair of the S-1 Poison Gas Committee, which recommended
developing poison gas weapons from the radioactive trash of the
atomic bomb project in World War II. At that time, it was known
that radioactive materials dispersed in bombs from the air, from
land vehicles or on the battlefield produced very fine radioactive
dust which would penetrate all protective clothing, any gas mask
or filter or the skin. By contaminating the lungs and blood, it
could kill or cause illness very quickly.

They also recommended it as a permanent terrain contaminant, which
could be used to destroy populations by contaminating water supplies
and agricultural land with the radioactive dust.

The first DU weapons system was developed for the Navy in 1968, and
DU weapons were given to and used by Israel in 1973 under U.S.
supervision in the Yom Kippur war against the Arabs.

The Phalanx weapons system, using DU, was tested on the USS Bigelow
out of Hunters Point Naval Shipyard in 1977, and DU weapons have
been sold by the U S. to 29 countries.

Military research report summaries detail the testing of DU from
1974-1999 at military testing grounds, bombing and gunnery ranges
and at civilian labs under contract. Today 42 states are contaminated
with DU from manufacture, testing and deployment.

Women living around these facilities have reported increases in
endometriosis, birth defects in babies, leukemia in children and
cancers and other diseases in adults. Thousands of tons of DU weapons
tested for decades by the Navy on four bombing and gunnery ranges
around Fallon, Nevada, is no doubt the cause of the fastest growing
leukemia cluster in the U.S. over the past decade. The military
denies that DU is the cause.

The medical profession has been active in the cover-up - just as
they were in hiding the effects from the American public - of low
level radiation from atmospheric testing and nuclear power plants.
A medical doctor in Northern California reported being trained by
the Pentagon with other doctors, months before the 2003 war started,
to diagnose and treat soldiers returning from the 2003 war for
mental problems only.

Medical professionals in hospitals and facilities treating returning
soldiers were threatened with $10,000 fines if they talked about
the soldiers or their medical problems. They were also threatened
with jail.

Reporters have also been prevented access to more than 14,000
medically evacuated soldiers flown nightly since the 2003 war in
C-150s from Germany who are brought to Walter Reed Hospital near
Washington, D.C.

Dr. Robert Gould, former president of the Bay Area chapter of
Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR), has contacted three
medical doctors since February 2004, after I had been invited to
speak about DU. Dr. Katharine Thomasson, president of the Oregon
chapter of the PSR, informed me that Dr.

Gould had contacted her and tried to convince her to cancel her
invitation for me to speak about DU at Portland State University
on April 12. Although I was able to do a presentation, Dr. Thomasson
told me I could only talk about DU in Oregon and nothing overseas
nothing political.

Dr. Gould also contacted and discouraged Dr. Ross Wilcox in Toronto,
Canada, from inviting me to speak to Physicians for Global Survival
(PGS), the Canadian equivalent of PSR, several months later. When
that didnt work, he contacted Dr. Allan Connoly, the Canadian
national president of PGS, who was able to cancel my invitation and
nearly succeeded in preventing Dr. Wilcox, his own member, from
showing photos and presenting details on civilians suffering from
DU exposure and cancer provided to him by doctors in southern Iraq.

Dr. Janette Sherman, a former and long-standing member of PSR,
reported that she finally quit some time after being invited to
lunch by a new PSR executive administrator. After the woman had
pumped Dr. Sherman for information all through lunch about her
position on key issues, the woman informed Dr. Sherman that her
last job had been with the CIA.

How was the truth about DU hidden from military personnel serving
in successive DU wars? Before his tragic death, Sen. Paul Wellstone
informed Joyce Riley, R.N., B.S.N., executive director of the
American Gulf War Veterans Association, that 95 percent of Gulf War
veterans had been recycled out of the military by 1995. Any of those
continuing in military service were isolated from each other,
preventing critical information being transferred to new troops.
The next DU war had already been planned, and those planning it
wanted no skunk at the garden party.

The US has a dirty (DU) little (CIA) secret A new book just published
at the American Free Press by Michael Collins Piper, The High Priests
of War: The Secret History of How Americas Neo-Conservative Trotskyites
Came to Power and Orchestrated the War Against Iraq as the First
Step in Their Drive for Global Empire, details the early plans for
a war against the Arab world by Henry Kissinger and the neo-cons
in the late 1960s and early 1970s. That just happens to coincide
with getting the DU show on the road and the oil crisis in the
Middle East, which caused concern not only to President Nixon. The
British had been plotting and scheming for control of the oil in
Iraq for decades since first using poison gas on the Iraqis and
Kurds in 1912.

The book details the creation of the neo-cons by their godfather
and Trotsky lover Irving Kristol, who pushed for a war against
terrorism long before 9/11 and was lavishly funded for years by the
CIA. His son, William Kristol, is one of the most influential men
in the United States.

Both are public relations men for the Israeli lobbys neo-conservative
network, with strong ties to Rupert Murdoch. Kissinger also has
ties to this network and the Carlyle Group, who, one could say,
have facilitated these omnicidal wars beginning from the time former
President Bush took office. It would be easy to say that we are
recycling World Wars I and II, with the same faces.

When I asked Vietnam Special Ops Green Beret Capt. John McCarthy,
who could have devised this omnicidal plan to use DU to destroy the
genetic code and genetic future of large populations of Arabs and
Moslems in the Middle East and Central Asia - just coincidentally
the areas where most of the worlds oil deposits are located - he
replied: It has all the handprints of Henry Kissinger.

In Zbignew Brzezinskis book The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy
and Its Geostrategic Imperatives, the map of the Eurasian chessboard
includes four regions strategic to U.S. foreign policy. The South
region corresponds precisely to the regions now contaminated
permanently with radiation from U S. bombs, missiles and bullets
made with thousands of tons of DU.

A Japanese professor, Dr. K. Yagasaki, has calculated that 800 tons
of DU is the atomicity equivalent of 83,000 Nagasaki bombs. The
U.S. has used more DU since 1991 than the atomicity equivalent of
400,000 Nagasaki bombs. Four nuclear wars indeed, and 10 times the
amount of radiation released into the atmosphere from atmospheric
testing!

No wonder our soldiers, their families and the people of the Middle
East, Yugoslavia and Central Asia are sick. But as Henry Kissinger
said after Vietnam when our soldiers came home ill from Agent Orange,
Military men are just dumb stupid animals to be used for foreign
policy.

Unfortunately, more and more of those soldiers are men and women
with brown skin. And unfortunately, the DU radioactive dust will
be carried around the world and deposited in our environments just
as the smog of war from the 1991 Gulf War was found in deposits in
South America, the Himalayas and Hawaii.

In June 2003, the World Health Organization announced in a press
release that global cancer rates will increase 50 percent by 2020.
What else do they know that they arent telling us? I know that
depleted uranium is a death sentence  for all of us. We will all
die in silent ways.

To learn more Sources used in this story that readers are encouraged
to consult:

American Free Press four-part series on DU by Christopher Bollyn.
Part I:

Depleted Uranium: U.S. Commits War Crime Against Iraq, Humanity,
www americanfreepress.net/depleted_uranium.html; Part II: Cancer
Epidemic Caused by U.S. WMD: MD Says Depleted Uranium Definitively
Linked, www americanfreepress.net/html/cancer_epidemic_.html August
2004 World Affairs Journal. Leuren Moret: Depleted Uranium: The
Trojan Horse of Nuclear War, www.mindfully
org/Nucs/2004/DU-Trojan-Horse1jul04.htm August 2004 Coastal Post
Online. Carol Sterrit: Marin Depleted Uranium Resolution Heats Up
GIs Will Come Home To A Slow Death, www.coastalpost com/04/08/01
World Depleted Uranium Weapons Conference, Hamburg, Germany, October
16-19, 2004: www.worlduraniumweaponsconference.de/speakers/speakers.htm
International Criminal Tribunal for Afghanistan. Written opinion
of Judge Niloufer Baghwat: www.mindfully
org/Reform/2004/Afghanistan-Criminal-Tribunal10mar04.htm Discounted
Casualties: The Human Cost of Nuclear War by Akira Tashiro, foreword
by Leuren Moret, www.chugoku-np.co.jp/abom/uran/index_e.html Leuren
Moret is a geoscientist who has worked around the world on radiation
issues, educating citizens, the media, members of parliaments and
Congress and other officials. She became a whistleblower in 1991
at the Livermore Nuclear Weapons Lab after experiencing major science
fraud on the Yucca Mountain Project. An environmental commissioner
in the City of Berkeley, she can be reached at leurenmoret@yahoo.com.

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 25 [du-list] NRC License to Army for DU
 
Date: Mon, 13 Sep 2004 14:21:16 -0700

 
<x-flowed>
DearAll,

Link below is to PDF file of the NRC License to Army for storage of DU 
which includes Blue Grass Army Depot and many others.

Elaine
http://www.osc.army.mil/dm/dmwweb/Lic%20pdf%20etc/SUC1380.PDF



[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]



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*****************************************************************
 26 Epstein asks for EP upgrades; Wal-Mart dealt setback
 
Date: Mon, 13 Sep 2004 14:21:18 -0700

 
<x-flowed>

State plan to handle nuke crisis challenged
Preschools, hospitals and nursing homes are unprepared, 2 residents say
Sunday, September 12, 2004

BY GARRY LENTON
Of The Patriot-News

State and federal authorities are investigating allegations that
Pennsylvania is unprepared to evacuate preschool children and nursing home
and hospital patients during a nuclear accident.

The federal government requires that the state have a plan for moving people
who cannot care for themselves and live within 10 miles of a nuclear plant.
Two Harrisburg area residents allege that the state has been out of
compliance with federal safety requirements for nearly two decades.
Shop Central PA


Gov. Ed Rendell's office and the Federal Emergency Management Agency took on
the review of the state's plan after receiving a letter last week from Larry
Christian and Eric Epstein, chairman of the watchdog group Three Mile Island
Alert, detailing these issues. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission also
received the letter.

If the accusations are deemed true, it would call into question the validity
of the operating licenses for the five nuclear power stations in
Pennsylvania. Federal law requires the NRC to determine that the public will
be protected in a radiological emergency before it grants a license to open
a nuclear plant.

The disparity in the region's evacuation plans is evident in how two
midstate institutions, both within 10 miles of TMI, would handle a nuclear
emergency.

At Frey Village in Middletown, buses from other nursing homes would be sent
to evacuate the facility's 240 residents. It's all prearranged, said Amy
Young, executive director of the Diakon Lutheran Social Ministries facility.

But a few miles away, the 461-bed Penn State Milton S. Hershey Medical
Center would scatter patients to any of 16 hospitals outside the emergency
zone, but the hospital does not have a fleet of buses reserved for an
evacuation. Lee Groff, chairman of the hospital's disaster committee, said
the medical center would call the Dauphin County Emergency Management Agency
for vehicles to move equipment and up to 6,000 patients and staff.

"On the day we have a mass evacuation all hell is going to be breaking
loose. A phone call from Hershey ... asking for 50 vehicles is going to be a
tall order to fill," Harrisburg Mayor Stephen R. Reed said. "They will be
loading people in the private vehicles of staff people."

Dauphin County has vehicles reserved for evacuations, said Nick DiFrancesco,
Dauphin County commissioner who oversees emergency management operations,
but he acknowledged that "there is always room for improvement."

The violations alleged:

Christian, of New Cumberland, discovered last year that the state's
emergency management plans did not protect preschool children in day care or
nursery schools. In response, a state law was passed in July requiring
emergency plans for some child care facilities, but not all.

In their recent letter, Christian and Epstein allege that Pennsylvania is in
violation of federal law because:
*    It failed to prepare emergency plans for nursery schools and day care
centers.


*    A law passed in July to provide emergency planning for day care centers
exempts nonprofit operations.


*    Pennsylvania puts responsibility for emergency planning on the
operators of the center, rather than state and local government agencies.



"There are large segments of our population that are not covered in the
event of an emergency," Epstein said. "The reality is these people need to
be moved in an emergency, and we need to have plans in place."

The alleged failures take on added weight in light of the Sept. 11, 2001,
attacks. Terrorist documents captured in Afghanistan included diagrams and
surveillance reports of U.S. nuclear plants, including TMI.

FEMA officials were scheduled to meet Thursday with staff from Pennsylvania
to discuss the allegations, said W. Craig Conklin, director of FEMA's
technological services division. And NRC spokeswoman Sue Gagner said the
agency had received the letter but could not comment on it. "We will take
time to carefully review it," she said.

After reviewing the allegations, U.S. Rep. Todd Platts, R-York, on Friday
asked the House Energy and Commerce Committee Subcommittee for
Investigations and Oversight to conduct hearings or an investigation of the
allegations.

"I believe that we are in compliance," said David M. Sanko, chairman of the
Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency. Improvement is possible, he said,
but the state has provisions for special-needs populations.

If the NRC determines that the state is out of compliance with federal
regulations, it could order the plants shut down if the problems are not
corrected within four months. Such a move is unlikely, however.
Pennsylvania's nuclear stations provide 36 percent of the electricity
consumed in the state.

Ralph DeSantis, a spokesman for Exelon Nuclear, owner of TMI, said the
allegations do not question the company's emergency planning. He said,
however, that exhaustive emergency planning has been carried out since the
1979 accident, and since the Sept. 11 attacks.

Who's responsible?:

The Rendell Administration also has questioned the state's ability to
evacuate so-called special populations.

"We need to look more closely at what already exists in all-hazards
planning," said Adrian King, deputy chief of staff for Gov. Rendell. "As we
identify holes ... you will see this administration order planning for those
facilities as well."

The official view of the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency, outlined
by Sanko, in a July 30 letter to Christian, is that day care and nursing
home operators, not the government, are responsible for arranging
transportation for an evacuation and other tasks.

But that view was contradicted by Michael Jamgochian, a senior nuclear
engineer with the NRC and author of the regulations.

"[Transportation] falls under the state and local government's
responsibility," Jamgochian said. "They would provide the bus."

Jamgochian cast doubt on a law passed in July that requires for-profit day
care centers and nursery schools to develop emergency plans but exempts
nonprofit centers.

"There are no such distinctions in our regulations," Jamgochian said. "Our
regulations don't care whether you are in a private school or a public
school ... everybody has to have protection."

GARRY LENTON: 255-8264 or glenton@patriot-news.com


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Copyright 2004 The Patriot-News. Used with permission.


L. Paxton Wal-Mart project hits snag
Developers file lawsuit after missed deadline triggers denial of plan
Friday, September 10, 2004

BY KELLY BOTHUM
Of The Patriot-News

Wal-Mart's effort to build a supercenter in Lower Paxton Twp. appears headed
to court although township supervisors last month conditionally approved
plans for a 223,806-square-foot store.

When supervisors voted in favor of building a supercenter on Route 22 at the
site of the Holy Name of Jesus Roman Catholic Church and School, Wal-Mart
had 15 days to accept the terms of the agreement.

Wal-Mart never signed off on any of the terms in the required time, township
manager George Wolfe said.
Shop Central PA


That meant the plan for the supercenter was automatically denied, Wolfe
said.

"It's a self-executing function of the ordinance," Wolfe said. "We're very
surprised it happened this way."

In response, developers have filed a suit in Dauphin County Court asking for
reversal of the denial.

The plan approved last month contained nine conditions, most requiring
approvals from local and state government agencies.

Wal-Mart officials objected to a condition requiring a fence on the site
abutting another property. The township said the fence must be acceptable to
the adjacent property owners, something developers opposed.

According to Lower Paxton Twp. officials, Wal-Mart representatives never
contacted the township to accept the conditions of the agreement as required
by the township's land development ordinance.

A letter to the township from the engineering firm representing Wal-Mart
said developers would be willing to accept the conditions of the plan once
the fence requirement was removed.

The letter also stated developers would be willing to add a 6-foot vinyl
fence adjacent to the property.

In their lawsuit, the developers argue that the fencing requirement is not
mandated by any township ordinance and is invalid.

Developers also say they were not properly contacted about the denial, and
the decision did not cite the requirements of the township ordinance.

Attorney Ron Lucas, who represents the developers, did not return a call for
comment.

If its attempt to reverse the decision fails, Wal-Mart can resubmit its
plan, but it would fall under more restrictive commercial zoning regulations
adopted by the township since the plan was submitted last spring. The new
restrictions could reduce the size of the planned store.

The denial was good news for attorney Steve Snyder, who represents Lower
Paxton Residents for Responsible Growth, a group opposed to the Wal-Mart
plans.

Snyder heard about the denial while researching the group's lawsuit
appealing the supervisors' approval of Wal-Mart last month.

Their suit alleges township supervisors had the authority to deny Wal-Mart's
plan in the public's best interest but violated their public responsibility.

Snyder said the group filed its suit to preserve its appeal, since Wal-Mart
could win reversal of its plan denial.

Snyder said members of the group were pleased with the denial, though they
don't think this is the end.

"This gives us time to try to turn the heat up on the township," Snyder
said.

KELLY BOTHUM: 255-8440 or kbothum@patriot-news.com


» Send This Page | » Print This Page
Copyright 2004 The Patriot-News. Used with permission.

MORE TOP NEWS

MORE STATEHOUSE/POLITICS NEWS
  

</x-flowed>
*****************************************************************
 27 [NukeNet] 3 Mile Island: Health Study Meltdown
 
Date: Mon, 13 Sep 2004 14:21:45 -0700

 
<x-flowed>



http://www.thebulletin.org/issues/2004/so04/so04mangano.html



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 28 Rep. Strickland: STRICKLAND ASKS SECRETARY OF ENERGY TO BLOCK ANTI-WORKER
PROVISIONS IN DOE PROPOSALS 

March 2, 2004 
  
WASHINGTON – In a letter yesterday Congressman Ted Strickland 
asked Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham to personally step in 
and protect workers and their pensions at the Portsmouth Gaseous 
Diffusion Plant as DOE selects a new contractor for the site. 
  
“DOE’s new requirements for contractors scrap promises and 
agreements made with workers,” said Strickland.  “It jeopardizes 
already negotiated labor agreements and threatens the pensions of 
workers at the plant.” 
  
The Department of Energy is currently accepting new bids for 
Infrastructure and Remediation contracts at its former Portsmouth 
and Paducah , KY sites.  In its guidelines for bids, DOE has left 
out requirements that contractors adhere to conditions of 
contracts between the union that represents workers at the sites, 
PACE, and Bechtel Jacobs which currently oversees infrastructure 
and remediation operations at the sites. 
  
In addition, the proposal outlines include loopholes that could 
leave hundreds of workers at the Portsmouth and Paducah sites 
without pension continuity.  DOE is almost exclusively requiring 
that only Bechtel Jacobs employees or its 1st and 2nd tier 
contractors who have worked with them for five years receive 
pension continuity.  
  
In his letter, Strickland asks that Secretary Abraham step into 
the requirement process and force amendments to the contract bids 
that will correct these two problems. 
  
“It has been brought to my attention that the equitable treatment 
of the workforce at DOE nuclear sites is and has been assured by 
every Secretary of Energy without regard to political party,” 
Strickland said in his letter.  “I am sure you share my desire to 
see to it that these Cold War workers are not left out in the 
cold simply because DOE is changing contractors.  Mr. Secretary, 
please revisit these issues once again and do right by this 
dedicated workforce.” 
  
### 
*****************************************************************
 29 Paducah Sun: Decision coming on sick worker program home 

[http://www.paducahsun.com/] 
 
A congressional committee begins meeting Monday on the bill that 
will declare who handles compensation for sick nuclear workers.
 
By Joe Walker jwalker@paducahsun.com 270.575.8656

Owens 

Wednesday, September 08, 2004 

Having lost about a fourth of his liver function from chemical 
exposure at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant, Larry Wagner has 
a valid workers' compensation claim but may never get paid. 

"They say I've had damage from my work and am entitled to money," 
said Wagner, a Farley resident who will turn 51 next month. "But 
there's nobody there to pay it." 

Wagner is among tens of thousands of sick nuclear workers 
nationwide caught in a massive Department of Energy claims 
backlog. As of the end of July, DOE had paid 31 toxic-exposure 
claims out of about 25,000 filed, for an average benefit of about 
$22,500. 

Even if DOE eliminates the backlog by the 2006 target, there is 
no way to force insurance companies or self-insured employers to 
pay claims. Leon Owens of Paducah is in Washington, D.C., this 
week asking for House support for a measure to fix the program by 
transferring it to the Department of Labor and have that agency 
pay claims. The Labor Department has paid about $900 million — 
including $154 million at Paducah — to nuclear workers sickened 
from exposure to radiation, beryllium and silicon. 

Owens, former president of the Paducah nuclear workers' union, 
wants Kentucky's five other U.S. representatives to sign a letter 
from 1st District Rep. Ed Whitfield of Hopkinsville lobbying for 
the change. The letter bears the names of 40 respresentatives who 
have signed or promised to sign, including 4th District Rep. Ken 
Lucas of Kentucky and Reps. John Shimkus and Jerry Costello of 
southern Illinois. The letter will go to the House-Senate 
Conference Committee, which starts work Monday. 

Whitfield is seeking support for a Defense Authorization Bill 
amendment by Sen. Jim Bunning that the Bush administration 
opposes. The letter points to the huge backlog despite DOE's 
having received $90 million from Congress for administrative 
costs over the past four years. It also says that half the 
workers filing claims will wind up without a "willing" payer. 

The Energy Department has submitted legislation to try to hold 
onto its program by reimbursing current or former DOE contractors 
and subcontractors, state workers´ compensation agencies or 
anyone else who would pay claims voluntarily. 

Instead of supporting legislation by Whitfield to transfer claims 
to the Labor Department, the House amended the defense bill to 
eliminate a pay cap for DOE physician panelists in hopes of 
accelerating claims. Conferees must work out the differences in 
the two amendments. 

While Whitfield and Bunning have been publicly outspoken for the 
Senate amendment, Sen. Mitch McConnell has not. McConnell is 
married to Labor Secretary Elaine Chao, whose department follows 
the Bush administration stance. 

"Sen. McConnell hasn't taken a lead position for various 
reasons," Owens said. "But he continues to work quietly behind 
the scenes in support of the legislation." 

Wagner hopes the efforts by Whitfield and Owens are successful. 
He filed a claim in 2001 and was notified a few months later that 
he did not qualify for $150,000 lump-compensation from the Labor 
Department. 

His claim then went to the Energy Department, where it remained 
for about 2 years until last spring when the panel informed him 
his liver disease was consistent with exposure to the now-banned 
solvent trichloroethylene (TCE). A 30-year plant employee, Wagner 
said he used TCE many times, briefly as a janitorial worker and 
then for the bulk of his career in power operations. 

"They (panelists) suggested I file a workers' compensation claim 
for permanent disability, which I'm doing," he said. "But what 
the state workers' compensation people tell me is there is no 
willing payer." 

Wagner said the exposure apparently occurred while he worked for 
government contractors who ran the plant until USEC Inc. took 
over in 1994. Bechtel Jacobs, an environmental firm that 
succeeded the last of the plant contractors, wrote Wagner that it 
was awaiting documents from DOE to see if the claim merited 
payment by Bechtel Jacobs' insurer, he said. 

Wagner said he has no idea how much he would be paid, but the 
amount would be based on his percentage of total disability. 
Although he has mild chronic lung disease and has been exposed to 
radiation, the panel finding was solely because of liver 
dysfunction, he said. 

The liver trouble showed up several years ago from a battery of 
tests stemming from enzyme problems. His physician wrote the 
panel that Wagner wasn't undergoing major treatment, but might 
have to later if the problem worsened. 

"My doctor told me a long time ago that it's not something that's 
going to heal up," Wagner said. 
*****************************************************************
 30 Paducah Sun: Sick workers' shift supported
 
 [http://www.paducahsun.com/] 

Paducah, Kentucky 

Saturday, September 11, 2004 

All six U.S. representatives from Kentucky are backing a letter 
urging the House-Senate conference committee to approve 
legislation to fix a backlogged claims program for sick nuclear 
workers. 

The five other congressmen and woman from Kentucky have signed 
the letter from 1st District Rep. Ed Whitfield, said Leon Owens, 
former president of the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant nuclear 
workers' union. Owens was in Washington, D.C., this week to 
garner support for the letter, expected to be signed by at least 
40 representatives. 

It asks conferees to accept an amendment from Sen. Jim Bunning to 
move the program from the Department of Energy to the Department 
of Labor, and have DOL pay the claims. 

The committee is expected to start work Tuesday or Wednesday, 
Owens said. "Senator Bunning will continue meeting with other 
House members to ensure a favorable outcome. We've done what we 
set out to do, and now we'll just have to wait and see." 
*****************************************************************
 31 PittsburghLIVE.com: Help sought for victims of radiation cancers -

Monday, September 13, 2004   

[Pittsburgh Tribune-Review] Back to headlines
 
 By Jonathan Szish TRIBUNE-REVIEW NEWS SERVICE

Government officials are trying to make it easier for people who
worked during the Cold War at nuclear fuels processing plants in
Parks and Apollo in Armstrong County to get $150,000 in
compensation for their radiation-related cancers. 

U.S. Rep. John Murtha, D-Johnstown, has decried the "snail's
pace" of the compensation process under the Energy Employees
Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act of 2000. Murtha
said he is pursuing other avenues to help former employees skip
the arduous paperwork process and jump right to compensation,
which includes paid medical expenses, if records about their
employment are missing. 

Four years after its passage, the federal act to compensate
former nuclear fuels processing plant workers for their cancers
is grinding forward. 

The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health has
interviewed more than 80 of the 129 workers who have filed
claims from former facilities in Parks and Apollo, according to
Murtha. 

These 129 former workers claim they have developed
radiation-related cancers and worked at either NUMEC or its
successors. 

The Nuclear Materials and Equipment Corp., in Apollo and Parks,
produced nuclear fuel for submarines and other uses during the
Cold War. Its successors were ARCO and Babcock &Wilcox. 

The majority of the workers who have filed claims -- 103 of them
-- worked at the Apollo site. The other 26 claimants worked at
the Parks site. 

Working case by case, NIOSH agents are asking former employees
about how much radiation exposure they suffered, where they
worked and in what capacity, said NIOSH spokesman Fred Blosser. 

Institute officials also are trying to piece together how much
overall radiation exposure workers might have suffered at either
the Parks or Apollo facilities. In federal jargon, this is
called "site reconstruction." 

These investigative steps, which require people or their
survivors to produce extensive paperwork about their medical and
work history, could be eliminated if the government grants
"special cohort status" to the Parks and Apollo sites. 

So far, the government has given it only to former workers in
Oak Ridge, Tenn., Paducah, Ky., Portsmouth, Ohio, and Amchitka,
Alaska. 

"All these hoops are unacceptable," said Patty Ameno, a
long-time environmental activist from Leechburg, who supports
getting "cohort status" for the Apollo and Parks sites. "They
cannot get this compensation to these workers fast enough. These
people have waited and waited." 

Brad Clemenson, Murtha's district director, said groups or
individuals can apply for special cohort status if records are
missing. 

But getting blanket cohort status for both the Apollo and Parks
sites -- similar to the other four already granted elsewhere --
appears to be an uphill battle. There are hundreds of former
nuclear facilities in the country, and everyone would want that,
Clemenson said. 

"(Murtha) does support it, but it's going to be very difficult
to do," Clemenson said. "There's a great deal of resistance in
Congress to granting new special cohort statuses." 

However, Murtha is pursuing other avenues, such as trying to
encourage NIOSH to designate Apollo and Parks as a special
cohort rather than to do it legislatively, Clemenson said. 

Across the country, about 58,000 people have filed energy
employee compensation claims with the Department of Labor, which
is in charge of the compensation program. 

The Department of Labor has made nearly 12,000 payments totaling
$889 million. About 20,000 people have been denied so far,
according to the Department of Labor Web site. 

"Although we can never fully repay these workers or their
families, they deserve recognition and compensation for the
sacrifices they made while doing work related to our national
security during the Cold War," Murtha said. 

Jonathan Szish can be reached at jszish@tribweb.com 
[jszish@tribweb.com] or (724) 226-4675. Back to headlines   

Images and text copyright © 2004 by The Tribune-Review
Publishing Co.
*****************************************************************
 32 Las Vegas SUN: Where I Stand -- Brian Greenspun: A missed opportunity
 
September 10, 2004 

Brian Greenspun is editor of the Las Vegas Sun.

 WEEKEND EDITION

 September 11 - 12, 2004

 Some apolitical thoughts in the middle of a political maelstrom.

 Nevada's attorney general, Brian Sandoval, has responded quite 
eloquently to a column I wrote last week in which I criticized 
him, specifically, and other Nevada Republicans in leadership 
positions, generally, for not standing up for Nevadans on the 
Yucca Mountain issue, choosing instead to give President George 
W. Bush a political pass after he decided -- and he was the only 
human being on the planet who could make such a decision -- to 
put the high-level nuclear waste bull's-eye on the backs of every 
man, woman and child living in this state.

 I was critical because Brian Sandoval, most likely because he is 
a pretty face with a good mind and a much-needed Hispanic name, 
was given four minutes at the Republican National Convention to 
give a speech. He gave one, but it was not the one that should 
have been given by the chief law enforcement officer of the 
Silver State.

 Sandoval had a captive audience of Republicans in the hall and a 
nationwide audience in the millions of people who would have been 
far more interested in learning about Yucca Mountain -- the 
violation of state's rights, the abdication of scientific 
discovery and the pure political power playing exhibited by the 
nuclear power industry and its puppets in the Department of 
Energy -- than they would about whatever piling on he was doing 
in the name of the Bush re-election effort.

 After all, wouldn't it have been interesting if our attorney 
general had told the American people -- as "60 Minutes" did a few 
weeks earlier -- that the deadliest substances known to man would 
be trucked and trained through the major cities across America?

 Wouldn't it have been helpful to Nevadans if the man we elected 
to represent our interests told his fellow Americans how wrong it 
was for the federal government to force this down our throats and 
how muddle-headed it was for them to put such a plank in the 
Republican Party platform so everyone who worries about the dump, 
its travel schedule, and the terrorist activities it invites, 
would know which party and which party leader -- that would be 
President Bush -- is to blame for their troubles?

 Those are rhetorical questions because everyone in this state 
above the voting age knows the answer, and it is not the one that 
Brian Sandoval came up with when he allowed his party to 
manipulate his obligation to the people who elected him. That, in 
short, is the message I wrote last week.

 This week you can read below what Sandoval responded with, 
which, I am happy to say, is some good news and, potentially, 
some better news if the courts uphold the lower court decision. 
And, if the DOE and the EPA are not forced to change the rules by 
a president hellbent to shove that stuff down our mountain and 
into our lives for thousands and thousands of years.

 It is interesting reading and I commend all readers to pay 
attention to what is happening on the legal side of the ledger. 
But, with all due respect to Sandoval, who knows exactly what he 
is doing, you did not respond to my criticism!

 You did not explain to the people of this state why you 
squandered four minutes of prime national television time and 
didn't even once mention Yucca Mountain or the great fear in 
which every Nevada family lives, concerned that the first and 
worst nuclear accident will happen in our backyard.

 You didn't share one idea with the American public about 
alternatives to burying that poison in our back yard -- or 
anyone's back yard -- and the few extra dollars it might take to 
accomplish that 21st century solution.

 You didn't because you couldn't. Instead, Brian, you allude to 
the difficulty of discussing such a grave concern in the middle 
of a political year and let it go at that.

 Sorry, sir, but a political year is exactly the time when the 
American people should hear as much as they can about all matters 
which affect their lives and their well-being. And a political 
year and your political opportunity was the time for you to have 
stood up for this state and the people who placed their faith in 
you.

 Unless I have this thing all wrong, you are a Republican to be 
sure. But, first, Brian you are a Nevadan. And you didn't act 
like it in New York.

 And now, much closer to home.

 I couldn't help thinking back to the rough and tumble days of 
Las Vegas while listening to Mayor Oscar Goodman's little press 
briefing earlier this week.

 I think about those early days a lot, partly because it is 
easier to remember 50 years ago than it is to recount what I had 
for breakfast this morning but, mostly, because much of what is 
happening in 2004 has already happened to us before. The old 
saying that if we don't learn from history we are doomed to 
repeat it is as true today as it was when first uttered.

 Our good mayor was being questioned -- far more politely than 
his self-defensive and agitated answering deserved -- about one 
of his son's activities in buying land next to some land 
earmarked by the city of Las Vegas for redevelopment dollars. The 
effect of such a designation would be to drive land values up all 
around the designated area, which would make the young Mr. 
Goodman a handsome penny or two for his troubles.

 The questions, of course, centered on the propriety of a member 
of the mayor's family taking advantage of a city action with 
which his father would obviously play a part. They were 
legitimate questions and unworthy of Oscar's short and 
smart-alecky answers that basically said his son is his own man 
and there is nothing the mayor could do about his offspring being 
smarter than most and taking advantage of a good deal when he 
sees it.

 Maybe Oscar is right. Maybe there is nothing wrong with the 
actions of his son who, incidentally, is suing an 85-year-old 
woman who won't get out of the way of Goodman the Younger's 
growth plans. But, in this day and age, I think the people of 
this city who elected Oscar as a reformist of sorts who promised 
to make government transparent and work for the people not just 
the moneyed few, deserve better answers to the legitimate 
questions raised.

 As for the rough and tumble days? The whole episode reminded me 
of the time when someone involved in city government teamed up 
with a businessman of renown and purchased much of the land 
tracts that just happened to be bordered by the new roads and 
infrastructure that was going to be approved by the city fathers 
but which had not become public. The two in question had, what 
you would call it, a leg up on the competition.

 I remember my father writing about those two fellows. He called 
them, for obvious reasons, the Gold Dust Twins. There is probably 
no connection between those times and today and the hundreds of 
acres tied up for pennies 50 years ago that today are worth 
millions. In fact, I am almost certain there is no connection.

 But, just the same, don't you think, Mr. Mayor, whether legal or 
not, either you or your son should be more sensitive to the 
lessons of history? It sure would make those press conferences go 
a little easier and it would go a long way in making the public 
think they are getting a fair shake under your steady hand.

 It's just a thought from a guy who loves this city, loves your 
family and loves the storied history of Las Vegas.
*****************************************************************
 33 AU ABC: Greens seek uranium mine review release » 

   [http://abc.net.au/]

Monday, 13 September 2004 

There has been a call for the release of an inquiry into uranium 
mining, with the Greens saying delays could be responsible for 
ongoing pollution. 

Greens' nuclear issues spokesman Dr Dennis Matthews says the 
South Australian Government promised the inquiry into the 
controversial in-situ leach technology used at the Beverley mine 
in the state's north. 

Dr Matthews says a lack of action by state Labor goes against its 
rhetoric on uranium. 

"Those certain things have been more showcase than actual 
anything happening and, as I say, in effect they're implementing 
Liberal government policy rather than Labor government policy," 
he said. 

"The mines that the Liberal government gave the green light to, 
Beverley in particular, are still going ahead, still producing 
uranium, still polluting the groundwater with their waste." 

But a State Government spokesman says the review was commissioned 
in November of last year, and was expected to take a year to 
complete. 

He says it is on target to be released within the anticipated 
time-frame. [ more news ] Last Updated: 11:54:00 AM (ACST)                 

  [ABC Online]  [http://www.abc.net.au/common/copyrigh.htm] | 
[http://www.abc.net.au/privacy.htm]
*****************************************************************
 34 AU ABC: Ranger audits begin today » 

Australian Broadcasting Corporation Online">
[http://abc.net.au/]

Monday, 13 September 2004 

The Northern Territory's Ranger Uranium Mine will undergo the 
first of three independent audits today. 

The audits were ordered by the Federal Government after two 
reports into a contamination incident at the mine. 

In March this year, workers at the mine drank or showered in 
water that was later found to be contaminated with 400 times the 
legal limit of uranium. 

Today's audit will cover the radiation protection procedures and
the water systems at the Ranger site. 

Last Updated: 11:55:00 AM (ACST)                 

[http://www.abc.net.au/privacy.htm]  | Information about the use


*****************************************************************
 35 NEWS.com.au: Green challenge on N-dump 

(September 13, 2004)
 	 	 	 
THE Greens today challenged the major parties to rule out the 
possibility of a national nuclear waste dump in the Northern 
Territory.

The NT Government has introduced legislation into parliament in a 
bid to block a commonwealth nuclear waste dump being placed 
anywhere in the territory.

 Greens NT Senate candidate Mark Wakeham said the Greens were 
committed to keeping the NT free of any nuclear waste dumps.

 "We challenge all politicians to support our anti-dump action 
plan," Mr Wakeham said.

 Nuclear waste is shaping up to be one of the issues in the 
October 9 federal poll for the seat of Solomon - Australia's most 
marginal seat.

 Country Liberal Party MP David Tollner - who holds the seat by 
just 88 votes - has said the NT would have an obligation to take 
the waste if it was deemed the safest place for it.

 The Federal Government is searching commonwealth land for a 
suitable place to house a dump to contain medium and low level 
nuclear waste produced by federal agencies, with the states to 
dispose of their own waste.                                                                     

AAP
 				 							 				 					 	 						
About us [http://www.news.com.au/
*****************************************************************
 36 Re: A matter of national security! and THE BIG LIE ("NUKES ARE
 
Date: Mon, 13 Sep 2004 19:32:07 -0700

 
<x-flowed>
To: <the.secretary@hq.doe.gov>
cc: ibc@comby.org, "Office of Public Affairs/NRC" <opa@nrc.gov>

September 13th, 2004

To: Department of Energy

To Whom It May Concern,

It is generally agreed that, despite decades of small-step improvements in 
things like ergonomics, software graphical user interfaces, control room 
display design, training and simulation, and the like, the so-called "human 
factor" is STILL one of the "weakest links" in nuclear power plant safety.

Terrorism is a danger at nuclear power plants.  So are failed 25 and 
30-year-old welds.  So is "Mother Nature."  But still, humans must make 
virtually instantaneous life-and-death decisions (life and death for 
perhaps a million people at once, like being Brig. Gen. Paul Tibbets in the 
cockpit of the Enola Gay, carrying that responsibility and even a thousand 
times more, and even against your own people, your community, your family, 
every moment of every day of your entire worklife).  Such stress takes its 
toll.  Pilots have had to retire because of the stress from difficult 
landings with all that responsibility on board.  The souls who entrusted 
their safety to them.

But everyone loves pilots.  Especially retired pilots, who can no longer fail.

The same cannot and never will be said for nuclear plant engineers.  The 
world, generally, despises them.  Oh sure, most people don't have a clue 
one way or the other, but the more people know about nuclear power, the 
more they -- the "outside world" that is (not DOE employees) -- despises 
these people.  That's the reality.  Nuclear power is feared not because it 
is misunderstood, but precisely because it IS understood.  So the world 
fears its staunchest supporters and most experienced workers.  It fears 
them and mistrusts them, because it knows there is a "BIG LIE" about 
nuclear power.  The world can see the paltry, pretend-attempts at using 
renewable energy to solve our energy problems -- the investments that get 
lots of time from the Presidential Podium (i.e., lip service) but mere 
millions where nuclear got -- and gets -- tens and even hundreds of 
BILLIONS of dollars in research and development funding.  We know a BIG LIE 
when we see one -- and it doesn't go unnoticed that in Russia, where BIG 
LIES are so common as to be much more common than the truth, nuclear power 
is at least as decrepit and dangerous as here, and as well supported by 
their government as it is here by ours.  Communism isn't dead, it just 
became radioactive.

DOE LIES.  That's unAmerican.  The whole nuclear industry lies, and the 
public -- from the creators of "The Simpsons" on down -- knows it.  And it 
follows that the public is going to suspect that individual nuclear 
engineers lie, too.

I'm sure that being despised by the general public is very 
stressful.  Being ashamed to admit what you do, afraid to state your 
corporate affiliations, for fear of questions, NOT from ignoramuses, but 
from well-educated, thoughtful, concerned citizens who, it turns out, don't 
have a ax to grind, they just want the truth, is stressful.

Indeed, on a personal basis, nuclear workers have my sympathy.  Aside from 
the dangers they face from increased risks of cancer, leukemia, birth 
defects in their children, and other medical problems, it must be an awful 
burden to bear, not understanding, for example, anything about the medical 
aspects of why some types of radiation can be as much as 100 or even 1000 
times more dangerous than official government estimates, especially for 
microscopic, "aerosolized" particles, alpha emitters perhaps (for example 
Plutonium 238), which lodge in various parts of the body, or merely are 
passed through it on a random journey from lung to bloodstream to kidneys 
to bladder and out, or some other pathway.  Many radioactive particles 
chemically mimic natural, non-radioactive particles the body needs and 
gathers.  Higher concentrations of these radioactive particles form in 
various organs and bones of children, or in the spines of infants, or the 
brains of fetuses.  Plutonium 238 gathers, among other places, in men's 
scrotum.  (I hope that word is not banned by your "sophisticated" email 
scanning system.  If it is, all I can say is, "NUTS!".)

Perhaps instead their understanding of metallurgy is weak, allowing things 
like Davis Besse to occur.  After all, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
pretty much flat out stated that they don't understand how Davis-Besse 
could have occurred physically, although they blame the operators for 
failing to notice the rust that was gathering in the filters.  Rust in the 
filters to the extent where they were changing them daily instead of on the 
quarterly schedule that those same filters normally were changed!  That's 
nearly two "orders of magnitude" difference, but yet, no one 
"noticed."  Not the guy ordering filters, not the guy sending them to the 
dump to be hosed down or whatever they do with the "quap" (H. G. Wells' 
term for radioactive material) after they've collected it.  The guys 
changing the filters didn't consider the need for constant replacement to 
be any big deal.  They were not, after all, metallurgists.

Or perhaps the mathematics behind the statistical computer modeling of 
failure rates in complex systems baffles them.  And why shouldn't 
it?  After all, it's hard enough to lay out a "scientific" study using 
controlled environments.  Sophisticated statistical techniques with names 
like "Analysis of Variance" (one-way, two-way, three-way, etc.) have been 
designed to evaluate the role of "chance" and improper scientific 
methodologies in carefully controlled experiments.  Progress is slow in all 
fields because of the need for accuracy, for no progress is made on 
incorrect data (poor readings), or inaccurate calculations, or inaccurate 
interpretations.  In the "real world" -- in a nuclear power plant, for 
instance -- it is impossible to isolate all possible "causes" and 
"effects."  The systems are too complicated.  Mathematical models break 
down when checked against reality.  That's why we haven't automated the 
control rooms completely (yet?).  Dr. Stanley Thompson, one of the nuclear 
industry's earliest authors of technical books for the industry, has shown 
mathematically that there is a possibility that nuclear power plants can, 
under some circumstance, oscillate themselves into oblivion in a hurry -- 
run away, as it were.  Galloping Gerty on Steroids.  This has a statistical 
probability of less than 100% but more than 0%.  In other words, NO ONE can 
say it won't happen, and YOU -- the DOE -- can't disprove his assertions, 
but in the control room, they simply assume the DOE is right not to worry 
about it.  Case closed.  The math is very complicated, I'm sure.  But the 
man asserting these things -- Dr. Thompson --  had already proven his 
competence years before anyone in today's DOE was adding 2 and 2 together 
and getting 4 (at least most of the time).

And so on.  I've yet to meet a pro-nuker who understands all of these 
important areas -- they always claim it's out of their area of expertise to 
talk about at least one of the above.  They then rest their case on that 
which they do not understand!  That's no way to find the whole truth about 
a subject.  That's no way to be sure you're making the right decision when 
you support something.  That's no way to set government policy.  Groves and 
Company at the Manhattan Project were comfortable admitting how little they 
knew about the dangers of plutonium.  But that excuse shouldn't hold water 
anymore. Too much time has past.  Too many people have died.

But instead of seeking truth, for half a century THEY (YOU) have tried to 
ostracize your opponents -- as McNally actually claims pro-nukers try to do 
in his recent emails to me (some of which were sent to you previously).  By 
making honest discourse impossible by flying into a rage every time a 
significant question is raised about the topic, or by simply calling people 
uninformed, regardless of the facts, you have, along with McNally and 
thousands of employees in the nuclear industry, actually succeeded in 
stifling much of the debate this vital topic deserves.

But it's been costly.  It's cost you your reputations.  It's cost the 
public hundreds of billions of dollars, thrown down the nuclear 
rat-hole.  It's cost America our democracy, since democracy is based on 
TRUTH, not THE BIG LIE that nuclear weapons make us safe, that nuclear 
power provides clean, safe energy, that the public supports all these 
ideas, etc..  It's cost lives.  Deaths caused by Three Mile Island were 
carefully concealed from the public.  Billions have been paid out to TMI's 
survivors to silence them (every settlement includes a no-speak clause).

All this takes it's toll on those who do it.  Lying is stressful to the 
liar.  That's the basis of how most "lie detectors" work.

Most control-room jockies have a relatively limited educational experience 
-- it's not what is called "rich," as in wide and varying and distinguished.

I'm sure many of those that do expand their horizons and get a broad 
education then LEAVE the nuclear industry pretty darned quickly.  I'd say 
"wouldn't you?" but I don't know your own personal background, or even, for 
that matter, the name of any specific DOE employee who is reading these 
words.  If there is a broadly educated DOE employee who can respond to this 
letter, I'll be delighted to dialogue with that person.  But I doubt you 
could even put together a committee at DOE that included the properly 
educated experts to respond to the many areas of concern I've touched on 
here, let alone find ONE PERSON to debate these issues before the public.

All this leads me to the purpose of this email, which is to show you a 
letter I received from Bruno Comby, of France.

France is a very pro-nuclear nation, whose armed forces have repeated 
attacked so-called "anti-nuclear activists", even killing them in foreign 
waters.  France has developed nuclear bombs, nuclear power plants (which 
run dreadfully), nuclear reprocessing centers (they poison the English 
Channel daily), a nuclear navy, and they probably use plutonium listening 
devices under OUR harbors, like we use under various other countries' harbors.

In any event, Bruno Comby makes some additional points regarding the 
subject of "Beta Blockers," which I have inquired about for several months 
now, and have yet to receive any reply from DOE.  I wish his additional 
comments to be included in the discussion, and be responded to by the DOE 
along with their/your response to my own comments (shown again, below).

Thank you in advance,

Sincerely,

Russell Hoffman
Concerned Citizen
Carlsbad, CA


At 12:19 PM 9/13/2004 +0200, Bruno Comby wrote:
>Dear Russell,
>
>I'd be interested in the results about beta-blocker consumption in nuclear 
>operators if you get an answer to your request.
>
>The DOE may be embarassed by your request for several reasons : a/ such 
>statistics may not exist - if they do exist, they may not be public 2/ 
>also if they do, the results may be embarassing (beta-blockers are 
>commonly prescribed in the population, and some nuclear operators probably 
>do take some - should they be fired knowing that their behaviour and 
>mental awareness are partially diminished ? 3/ if you have to fire all the 
>nuclear operators that take medications with some neurological 
>side-effects (beta blockers, but also tranquilizers, sleeping pills, etc.) 
>those that smoke, those that have taken drugs at some point in their lives 
>(would they even tell their employer if they did ?), those that drink too 
>much coffee, those that occasionnally drink alcohol, those that are 
>overweight (that also makes you sleepy, diminishes speed of reflexes, and 
>lowers your capacity)... how many will be left to run the nuclear power 
>plants ? 4/ such infos may be difficult to gather (where do you put the 
>limits? would the subjects tell the truth, especially if their job is at 
>risk?) 5/ putting such infos (if they exist and can be considered 
>reliable) in the media may be badly used 6/ but... you're right to ask, 
>and I'd be glad to know the results. Hope they're not too scary !
>
>In fact, a more general medical study including among others, the 
>parameters cited above may be more appropriate than questioning only about 
>beta-blockers (who are commonly prescribed as heart treatment but also for 
>a number of other reasons : as tranquilizers, against hand tremor, etc.).
>
>If I were the DOE, I wouldn't like your question, and I can understand 
>they wouldn't answer you rapidly : it creates extra work for them, it's 
>embarassing, and the results (if any are available, and can be considered 
>reliable) could be mis-interpreted.
>
>Yours sincerely, with kindest regards.
>
>Bruno Comby.
>
>____________________
>
>INSTITUT BRUNO COMBY
>
>Recherche scientifique et sante publique preventive (ass loi 1901)
>Scientific research and promotion of public health (not-for-profit 
>organization)
>
>55 rue Victor Hugo, 78800 Houilles, France
>
>Tel : +33 1 30 86 00 33  -  Fax : +33 1 30 86 00 10
>
>E-mail : ibc@comby.org
>Web : http://www.comby.org (choose your language)
>__________________
>
>
>
>Russell D. Hoffman wrote:
>>To:  "MMS Staff, DOE" <"MMS Notifier" <mms-notifier@hq.doe.gov>
>>cc: <the.secretary@hq.doe.gov>, "Bryan McNally" <qmacker@yahoo.com>
>>September 12th, 2004
>>To Whom It May Concern:
>>Thank you for informing me of the inclusion of banned content in the 
>>message I sent to DOE last night.  Sorry 'bout that!
>>The "bad word" was in the letter to me by one of your (DOE's) most rabid 
>>(so to speak) supporters.  I had tried to remove all the baddies like 
>>that from his message before sending it, but, being human, I must have 
>>missed one.
>>I will reclean his potty-mouth trash and resend the message forthwith, 
>>along with the current "round" with the person who has been flaming me on 
>>your behalf.
>>Thank you again for the notification -- I have removed the banned word 
>>from the copy of your letter to me (shown below) so that this one can 
>>make it past the electronic smothering system at your end.
>>I would suggest, in the future, you send two separate emails when there 
>>is a problem like this -- one WITH the banned words (like yours, shown 
>>below, modified) and one without.  This will help ensure that the person 
>>sending the email is notified because it will allow the message to get 
>>through THEIR system regardless of their settings.  After all, after 
>>getting Mr. McNally's letters (which contained the banned words) I was 
>>sorely tempted to reset my settings so such words couldn't get through!
>>But unfortunately, out here in the real world, such a thing is much more 
>>difficult to do than at the DOE, because a lot of otherwise very good 
>>writers do use such words from time to time, and it would be a shame (out 
>>here in the real world) to lose those essays.  It's good to know how 
>>people really feel.  Some have to resort to vulgarities to express 
>>themselves, but that doesn't mean their opinions are irrelevant.
>>Also, people do not necessarily set their outgoing flame-checking the 
>>same as their incoming one (they may not even be able to set an outgoing 
>>filter, for example), and they sometimes change their settings.  By 
>>sending a non-offensive response you would help ensure that your message 
>>got through to the other party.
>>It may, after all, be a matter of vital national security, like this one is.
>>BTW I'm still waiting for a DOE/NRC response to my inquiry earlier this 
>>year about how many nuclear reactor operators are currently on the heart 
>>medication known as "Beta Blockers", if any.  Could you please see what 
>>is taking so long to get a simple count from each nuclear power plant?
>>I would also like to know what the rules are for the use of "Beta 
>>Blockers" while working in the nuclear industry.  These drugs have been 
>>tied to numerous problems some of which might directly impact their 
>>performance on the job, including hallucinations, confusion, convulsions, 
>>blurred vision, heart attacks, difficulty breathing, ringing in ears 
>>(might think it's an alarm), increased need to visit therapists, and 
>>worsening of depression, possibly caused by sexual dysfunction. If the 
>>use of "Beta Blockers" is banned, when did the ban take effect and how 
>>many workers have had to retire in order to take their heart medication 
>>since the ban took effect?
>>Sincerely,
>>Russell Hoffman
>>Concerned Citizen
>>Carlsbad, CA
>>At 03:52 AM 9/12/2004 -0400, "MMS Notifier" <mms-notifier@hq.doe.gov> wrote:
>>
>>>Your message contained inappropriate language which is unacceptable at
>>>the U.S. Department of Energy.  Please make the appropriate changes and
>>>resubmit your message.
>>>
>>>Thank you.
>>>
>>>Date: 09/12/2004, 03:52:06 AM
>>>Subject: Re: Stop Cassini (follow-up)
>>>Policy: Obscene Word - Return to Sender (Recipient)
>>>Recipients: <the.secretary@hq.doe.gov>
>>>Reason:
>>>List:Obscene Word - Return To Sender
>>>Found the expression "........" 1 times, at 1 points each, for an
>>>expression score of 1 points.
>>>=============================================================
>>>Total Message Score: 1 points.
>>
>>*************************************************
>>** THE ANIMATED SOFTWARE COMPANY
>>** Russell D. Hoffman, Owner and Chief Programmer
>>** P.O. Box 1936, Carlsbad CA 92018-1936
>>** (800) 551-2726
>>** (760) 720-7261
>>** Fax: (760) 720-7394
>>** Visit the world's most eclectic web site:
>>** http://www.animatedsoftware.com
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>>Please be sure that "Unsubscribe-me-please" appears in the subject line.

================================================================
Most recent related correspondence (a letter to Mr. Bryan McNally):
================================================================

Subject: Re: Stop Cassini (another follow-up)

To: Bryan McNally <qmacker@yahoo.com>
cc: "James Lovelock" <nuc-en@ecolo.org>, "Office of Public Affairs/NRC" 
<opa@nrc.gov>

At 07:06 PM 9/12/2004 -0700, Bryan McNally <qmacker@yahoo.com> wrote (clip):
>I don't know if this is some lame attempt at
>intimidating me, or not. I suspect it is.

==================================================

Mr. McNally,

If you are intimidated by the truth, then yes, that's exactly what it 
is.  If you're intimidated by facing the facts about what incredible 
potential terrorist targets nuclear power plants are, then yes, you should 
consider yourself intimidated.  If honest discourse scares you, be very afraid.

WHY do you find space-based mirrors, offshore wind farms, or OTEC 
impractical?  Because they haven't been done, you say, so therefore they 
must be uneconomical?  Nukes received hundreds of billions of dollars in 
federal investment, while these ideas get perhaps 10s of millions (less 
than 1/1000th of the investment) and you call the playing field level?  You 
are no economist, that's for sure.

Proper "pilot programs" could produce enough CLEAN ENERGY to replace 
California's nukes, at far less danger to the public and probably much 
lower cost.

As for space-based mirrors, they could provide extended evening and dawn 
light to downtown metropolises, extending winter daylight, for example, by 
several hours.  Of course, you say I'm supposed to pardon your ignorance. 
Why?  Because you've never heard of a practical space-based energy system 
in your life that didn't involve nuclear power?

I've met real, bona-fide inventors in all sorts of fields, and I trust them 
a heck of a lot more than I'll ever trust you to have done the research on 
what is practical and what isn't.  Not everything practical becomes 
popular.  Inefficient pumps rob society of energy -- but will the pump 
industry change?  Not on your life!  Why try to get millions of people to 
change for a 1% energy savings, when they've been buying your "slightly" 
less efficient pump for literally 100 years?  Why indeed?  Because America 
and the world has to work together to find clean and efficient energy 
solutions.  A 1% savings on every pump in the world would be very 
substantial.  Shall I name a few innovative pumps so you can try to 
disprove their efficiency scores, or do you get the idea?

Despite your assertions, I have no "church," but if loving humanity is a 
religion, you are certainly a sinner:   You agree that San Onofre is old 
and withered, yet you don't call for it to be shut down -- you just blame 
ME for that, saying it's because I don't allow the industry to build new 
plants!  But the industry, not ME -- wants the licenses extended on those 
decades-old deadbeat plants -- you have completely confused the issues and 
will probably blame "antinuclear" activists when there (finally?) is a 
meltdown, because, after all, we either complained too loudly, or not 
loudly enough!

Similarly, all your other arguments for nuclear power are flawed, but you 
don't question them.  You have done so little research into the opposition 
arguments as to have failed to come across the name of Dr. John Gofman -- 
and you say you've tried to study both sides!  Ha!

If I'm "ostracised" (sic), it's because people like you are arrogant and 
unrelentless in your pursuit of those who might question the current 
dogma.  "Coal! Coal! Coal!  Look at all the coal!" is certainly the 
pronuker's most typical response -- right down to the line about the 
reactors having to be properly operating for your equation to make sense -- 
those that are within Federal guidelines meet your silly test -- all others 
get stricken from the record.

You call me a hypocrite for calling SCE "terrorists" for threatening to 
kill hundreds of thousands of people.  Sorry, but if the shoe fits, they 
have to wear it.

Sincerely,

Russell Hoffman
Concerned Citizen
Carlsbad, CA

P.S. Bucky Fuller was a futurist, although I never met him.  He was also a 
scientist with about 60 degrees.  What are you?

P.P.S. In an earlier letter to me you included "www.ecolo.org" under your 
name and city.  There was no reason not to assume you were affiliated with 
that oddball organization whose views you mimic, and I'm not at all sure 
you're now saying you are not.  Your repeated vile attacks (last March you 
wrote to call me names, too, for instance) do make the issue rather 
important since they could lose their tax-free status (if they have one) 
from one of their officers carrying on with such rude and illegal behavior 
(yes, Mr. McNally, libel is still illegal in America). [Note: Mr. McNally 
has assured us in further emails that he is NOT an officer of "EFN" ( 
www.ecolo.org ). -- rdh]



===============================================================



*************************************************
** THE ANIMATED SOFTWARE COMPANY
** Russell D. Hoffman, Owner and Chief Programmer
** P.O. Box 1936, Carlsbad CA 92018-1936
** (800) 551-2726
** (760) 720-7261
** Fax: (760) 720-7394
** Visit the world's most eclectic web site:
** http://www.animatedsoftware.com
*************************************************

IF YOU RECEIVED THIS EMAIL IN ERROR AND/OR DO NOT WISH TO RECEIVE ANY MORE 
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</x-flowed>
*****************************************************************
 37 Paducah Sun: First hearing set in Lockheed whistleblower suits 
  
[http://www.paducahsun.com/] 

Paducah, Kentucky 

After five years and many delays, lawsuits concerning the
Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant will be discussed in court. 

By Bill Bartleman bbartleman@paducahsun.com 270.575.8651 

Saturday, September 11, 2004 

The first court hearing regarding whistleblower lawsuits against 
former Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant operator Lockheed Martin 
will be held Tuesday in U.S. District Court in Paducah. 

Judge Joseph McKinley Jr. will hear arguments by Lockheed that 
three suits be dismissed. Those suits accuse the firm of 
submitting false claims regarding the storage and handling of 
radioactive and hazardous waste. 

The judge also will consider motions to consolidate the suits 
filed by the U.S. Department of Justice, three current and former 
plant workers, and former plant worker John Tillson. The 
plaintiffs have agreed to the consolidation to speed litigation, 
according to Joe Egan, the Washington, D.C.-based attorney for 
the three current and former workers. 

Hundreds of pages of documents have been filed regarding the 
motions, Egan said. 

If the judge does not dismiss the suits, additional hearings will 
be held soon to establish a trial date and a timetable for filing 
pleadings. 

The suits claim that the false documents were filed to hide 
contamination at the plant that is costing more than $1 billion 
to clean up. It also asks that Lockheed, which has denied the 
allegations, be ordered to repay hundreds of millions of dollars 
in operating bonuses that were based on the false claims. 

The whistleblower allegations have lingered in federal court 
since 1999 when the first suit was filed by Egan on behalf of 
Ronald B. Fowler, Charles F. Deuschle and Garland Jenkins, and 
the Natural Resources Defense Council, a Washington-based 
environmental group. 

The case was dormant while the Department of Justice conducted 
its own investigation to determine if there was merit to the 
allegations. The investigation, which cost more than $1 million, 
included a review of hundreds of thousands of pages of records, 
digging into old landfills, testing soil and testing hazardous 
materials stored at the plant. 

In May 2003, the Department of Justice said it found merit to the 
allegations and filed a notice that it was intervening in the 
case. 

Tillson's suit, filed in 2000, contained allegations similar to 
those in the 1999 suit. 

If Lockheed is ordered to repay the fees, the current and former 
employees could receive up to 25 percent of the proceeds. The 
rest would go to the federal government and could be used to help 
pay for cleanup at the plant where nuclear fuel has been produced 
for more than 50 years. 
*****************************************************************
 38 [du-list] the word "atomicity"
 
Date: Mon, 13 Sep 2004 14:21:47 -0700

 
<x-flowed>
Like Jack, I've been bothered by the use of the word "atomicity" for I've 
read much in scientific literature regarding nuclear issues and had never 
seen the word before it appeared in writing from Leuren Moret.  Apparently 
she was quoting someone else, yet it behooves a writer on nuclear issues to 
ask for clarification if an interviewee uses an inappropriate word.

While science is not the be-all and end-all all of reality, in this case 
science is being discussed.  Challenging the use of a word such as 
"atomicity" is nit-picking, yet doing real science is about as nit picking 
as you can get.

A cursory search on the internet for the word "atomicity" reveals that it 
IS a real scientific term.  However, it has nothing to do with describing 
nuclear weapon yield.

Below is the definition I found, and there are also various research 
articles in which the word "atomicity" is used.  Again, it has nothing to 
do with describing nuclear  weapons yield.   Knowing this defintion renders 
is use even more meaingless in the context mentioned.

Webster's 1913 Dictionary

At`o`mic´i`ty


n.

1.

(Chem.) Degree of atomic attraction; equivalence; valence; also (a later 
use) the number of atoms in an elementary molecule. See Valence.





However another thought I have about unsubstantiated claims that get out 
into the press is that it may result in what I'd call the "Hollywood 
Effect" i.e., any press good, bad, accurate or not is actually good 
press,just because it gets attention to the subject matter.  I took a 
journalism in college in which we learned that in newspapers, one must 
write to the level of junior high comprehension--sad thought, that.  Most 
people who have graduated from college, even with PhD have not been 
prepared to understand nuclear issues.

[A side note:  when, 21years after starting, I finally graduated from 
college.  At graduation ceremonies there were two catagories of PhD which 
drew spontaneous boos when recognized: 1.  those in business 
administration; 2. those in nuclear engineering]







Below is a quotefrom recent post by Jack Cohen-Joppa:
 ><>  <>< Further study about the source of this extreme comparison
reveals that the unit measured is "atomicity", an intellectual construct 
coined by a Japanese scientist.  It is simply the calculated number of 
radioactive atoms involved, with no regard for the type of radiation 
present and its relative biological impact, method of dispersal, etc.   The 
comparison is meaningless at least, misleading at worst. ><>  <><



Elaine

"I am quaking in my genes knowing the mayhem men manufacture"



Felice & Jack Cohen-Joppa <nukeresister@igc.org> wrote:

DU Disinfo Dupes Project Censored.
(~2300 words)
by Jack Cohen-Joppa

Background:
Project Censored picked "High Uranium Levels Found in Troops and
Civilians" as the #4 most-censored story this year, citing the
following:
* "Uranium Medical Research Centers Preliminary Findings from
Afghanistan and Operation Enduring Freedom" and "Afghan

< < < SNIP


[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]



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