***************************************************************** 04/12/04 **** RADIATION BULLETIN(RADBULL) **** VOL 12.88 ***************************************************************** RADBULL IS PRODUCED BY THE ABALONE ALLIANCE CLEARINGHOUSE ***************************************************************** Send News Stories to news@energy-net.org with title on subject line and first line of body NUCLEAR POLICY 1 US: Harbus: Dr. David Kay, Chief Weapons Inspector in Iraq: "We Got 2 Guardian Unlimited: U.N. Nuclear Inspectors Arrive in Iran 3 Daily Times: Iran suspends centrifuge programme as UN nuclear team a 4 Xinhuanet: S.Korean FM on nuclear issue 5 US: [southnews] US Sinking in their own spin 6 US: PRN: Robert McNamara and Theodore Sorensen to Discuss National 7 [progchat_action] Actress to greet whistleblower 8 update about Vanunu release 9 Bellona: Russia: a region of extremes 10 FT: China poised to join nuclear supplier group 11 Hi Pakistan: --> Nuclear confidence building measures - 12 Hi Pakistan: Pakistan wants nuclear restraint accord with India NUCLEAR REACTORS 13 US: Tuscaloosa News: Problem halts second restart try at Farley nucl 14 US: NRC: NRC Staff Proposes $60,000 Civil Penalty Against Duke Energ 15 CS Monitor: Driving through Chernobyl 16 US: PRN: Constellation Energy's Shattuck Elected Board Member of the 17 US: NRC: NRC to Meet with Duke Energy Officials to Discuss Safety Pe 18 US: NRC: NRC to Meet with Duke Energy Officials to Discuss Safety Pe 19 Payvand: Iran's Heavy Water Reactor NUCLEAR SAFETY 20 [du-list] Uranium Weapons Cover-ups - a Crime against Humankind 21 [du-list] Depleted Uranium exposure Gulf War Veterans Thermal 22 US: [DisabledGreensNews] Morris, NY School District Bans Irradiated 23 Daily Yomiuri: Control nuclear hazards via risk management 24 US: Editorial: The war at home/Underfunding domestic security 25 AU ABC: More Ranger contamination incidents emerge 26 The Age: Aborigines drank uranium water - NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE 27 Las Vegas SUN: Editorial: What money can't buy 28 NMBW: State officials to tour Dutch uranium enrichment facility - 29 U.S. Newswire: Yucca Mountain Workers in Danger, Suit Alleges; 30 US: Salt Lake Tribune: N-waste relabeling worries some NUCLEAR WEAPONS 31 BBC: Peace protesters march on Faslane 32 BBC: Marchers protest at US DEPT. OF ENERGY 33 Seattle Post-Intelligencer: DOE pulling a fast one at Hanford 34 Tri-City Herald: Hanford parents fight plan to end day care subsidy 35 baltimoresun.com - Lab in Md. puts neutrons to work 36 Daily Camera: Voices grow against Flats use 37 Pahrump Valley Times: Do your homework (Yucca) 38 U.S. Newswire: DOE Cites Westinghouse Savannah River Company for Pri 39 Oak Ridger: 'Key' review complete 40 Oak Ridger: EPA's talk on Y-12 report delayed 41 New York City BROOKHAVEN: Lab may dismantle reactor 42 DOE: Sunshine Act; Notice of Meeting, Notice of Vote, Explanation of OTHER NUCLEAR 43 [du-list] "friendly fire" newsletter #1 44 Google News Alert - nuclear ***************************************************************** ***************************************************************** FULL NEWS STORIES ***************************************************************** ***************************************************************** 1 Harbus: Dr. David Kay, Chief Weapons Inspector in Iraq: "We Got It Very Wrong." - Harvard - The Harbus Online [http://www.harbus.org/harbuspoll] By Mike Worosz (OB), Contributing Writer Published: Monday, April 12, 2004 The most destructive element of a totalitarian regime goes far beyond the tragic deaths of an untold number of people; it is the constant perpetuation of fear, for this destroys any willingness for a state's people to cooperate or exhibit trust, resulting in the most depraved level of corruption. This downward spiral was evident in Iraq throughout the 1990's, embodied by Saddam Hussein's constant lying, cheating and stealing in the face of United Nations (U.N.) inspections. These and other revealing insights were delivered by Dr. David Kay, the Former Chief U.S. Weapons Inspector in Iraq, who spoke to a packed audience at the Kennedy School's Forum on Monday, March 22. The failure of U.S. troops to locate any significant stockpiles of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in the aftermath of the recent war led the Bush Administration to name Kay as the head of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG). The ISG was charged with the task of finding credible evidence of these weapons or weapons development programs. In a report issued in October 2003, the ISG concluded that it was unable to locate any stockpiles of actual Weapons of Mass Destruction anywhere in Iraq. Kay revealed that under the porous umbrella of twelve years of U.N. sanctions, Saddam had amassed some $6.5B in illicit funds through the oil-for-food program. But rather than put this money to use to improve the lives of his populace by constructing new hospitals and schools, he chose to tighten his stranglehold by simply building more palaces. But why didn't Saddam use these funds to advance his nuclear weapons program? The answer to this fundamental question, according to Kay, was that he never had to. Saddam proved his wanton cruelty and demonstrated his willingness to use WMDs by attacking the Kurds of Northern Iraq with chemical weapons in 1988. He did everything he could to infect downtown Tel Aviv with a chemically-tipped SCUD missile during the opening hours of the 1991 Gulf War. So it is not surprising that the Iraqi dictator's long list of enemies, from the Kurds to the Shia factions from within, and of course the U.S., became as infected by Saddam's deceit as the Iraqi people. Even when Saddam may have been telling the truth in claiming he had discarded his illegal arms, these different parties refused to believe those claims; we became wedded to our own deep mistrust. As clear and articulate a speaker as he was, Dr. Kay seemed to concentrate most on whether or not Iraq had nuclear weapons capability, with little mention of the other components of a WMD program. In addition to nuclear weapons, weapons of mass destruction include chemical arms like mustard gas and nerve agents like SARIN and VX. Any discussion of WMDs also assesses the capability to manufacture and "weaponize" biological toxins like botulism, smallpox and anthrax. Many of these poisons can be fabricated in a standard university biology lab. Along these lines, Dr. Kay related a comical tale that hints at the absurd climate of fear that Saddam's lackeys worked in. With the U.N. hot on its heels, Iraqi soldiers chose to dump a 500-liter drum of anthrax in the only place it could quickly find--right alongside one of the Iraqi dictator's many presidential palaces. Rather than inform Saddam that they disposed of the deadly toxins in his own backyard, they kept this secret and only revealed it under the hot glare of American interrogators. This anecdote hints at an underlying problem: did Saddam and his top generals, in the words of Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, "fully know what they didn't know?" Perhaps the organizational mess was so pervasive, that certain weapons programs existed without Saddam's full knowledge. True to the spirit of any effective HBS case discussion, Dr. Kay back-stopped his analysis with a list of implications and an action plan for the U.S. intelligence community. He invoked the failed Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba during the Kennedy Administration as an example of a public admission of poor decisions from the highest echelons of government. President Kennedy and his most senior advisors engaged in an open "mea culpa" to restore domestic credibility. Because intelligence assessments are only useful when they are believable in the eyes of decision-makers, America's ability to warn other countries of legitimate, impending threats and enlist their support for war will be constrained without a similar public inquiry into what went wrong in estimating Iraq's WMD program. Kay mentioned the chilling reality in Iran to underscore this point. Iran has already been caught producing enriched uranium by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Iranians are far along the path towards developing a long-range missile. But the C.I.A.'s claims are quickly discarded by key constituents when Iran claims American agents may have planted the illicit material. David Kay's remarks and the ongoing search for truth emphasized that this self-criticism is both useful and necessary. According to Kay, there is no denying that President Bush and his administration made a dangerous gambit in going ahead with the war, and it increasingly appears as if the justification for such action is questionable. But when intelligence is uncertain, as it so frequently is, Kay believes that the prudent leader will err on the worst possible assumption. In this case, the assumption is that Saddam Hussein would have possessed stockpiles of deadly weapons had he been left in place, and the consequences of not removing Saddam would have been catastrophic. ***************************************************************** 2 Guardian Unlimited: U.N. Nuclear Inspectors Arrive in Iran Monday April 12, 2004 1:16 PM By ALI AKBAR DAREINI Associated Press Writer TEHRAN, Iran (AP) - Five U.N. nuclear inspectors arrived Monday to try to confirm whether Iran has stopped suspicious nuclear activities - including the building of centrifuges for uranium enrichment. Mohammad Saeedi, a top Iranian nuclear official, told The Associated Press the experts from the United Nation's International Atomic Energy Agency arrived for a series of meetings and inspections. The visit coincides with a call by Iranian radicals that their government should defy the U.N. nuclear agency, expel U.N. inspectors and resume uranium enrichment. The Iranian government, though, appears determined to stick to a more moderate approach in hopes of avoiding international isolation. The United States and other nations accuse Iran of having a covert nuclear weapons program and are pushing the United Nations to impose sanctions. Tehran insists its nuclear activities are peaceful and for the purpose of generating electricity. Saeedi said that to win ``greater international trust,'' Iran stopped building and assembling centrifuges Friday, as it promised during a one-day visit last week by IAEA chief Mohamed ElBaradei. It was the second such promise: Iran said March 29 that it had already stopped building centrifuges for uranium enrichment. ElBaradei had welcomed the centrifuge announcement and said the inspectors who arrived Monday would try to verify that all uranium enrichment activities have stopped. During ElBaradei's visit, Iran also committed to meeting deadlines on disclosing the source of traces of weapons-grade uranium found here and answering questions on its recently discovered program to make advanced P-2 centrifuges to enrich uranium, possibly to weapons grade. Iranian hard-liners have accused ElBaradei of being ``America's agent'' and say that by giving in to the IAEA, Iran is giving in to U.S. demands to surrender nuclear technology. ``The only logical option is to resume uranium enrichment, expel IAEA inspectors and withdraw from (the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty) if the (IAEA) continues to illegally deny Iran its rights,'' hard-liner Hossein Shariatmadari wrote in an editorial last week in his newspaper, Kayhan. Shariatmadari is close to Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who has the final say on all state matters. Iran says it's losing its patience and wants the IAEA to remove Iran's nuclear dossier from its agenda by June. Tehran's top nuclear negotiator, Hasan Rowhani, said last week Iran will ``definitely react'' if its nuclear dossier is not closed by then, but said, ``I don't think the reaction will be to withdraw from NPT.'' Guardian Unlimited © Guardian Newspapers Limited 2004 ***************************************************************** 3 Daily Times: Iran suspends centrifuge programme as UN nuclear team arrives Tuesday, April 13, 2004 TEHRAN: Five UN nuclear inspectors arrived on Monday to try to confirm whether Iran has stopped building and assembling centrifuges and get answers to a number of outstanding questions that have raised concerns about the Persian’s nuclear programme. Mohammad Saeedi, a top Iranian nuclear official said the experts from the International Atomic Energy Agency arrived for a series of meetings and inspections. The inspectors’ visit coincides with a hardening of position by Iranian radicals who have called on their government to defy the UN nuclear agency, expel UN inspectors and resume uranium enrichment. The Iranian government, though, appears determined to stick to a more moderate approach in hopes of avoiding international isolation. The United States and other nations accuse Iran of having a covert nuclear weapons programme and are pushing the United Nations to impose sanctions. Tehran insists it has only a peaceful nuclear energy programme. Saeedi said that to win “greater international trust”, Iran stopped building and assembling centrifuges on Friday, as it promised during a one-day visit last week by IAEA chief Mohamed ElBaradei. It was the second such promise: Iran said on March 29 that it had already stopped building centrifuges for uranium enrichment. ElBaradei had welcomed the centrifuge announcement and said the inspectors who arrived on Monday would try to verify that all uranium enrichment activities have stopped. During ElBaradei’s visit, Iran also committed to meeting deadlines on disclosing the source of traces of weapons-grade uranium found here and answering questions on its recently discovered programme to make advanced P-2 centrifuges to enrich uranium, possibly to weapons grade. Iranian hard-liners have accused ElBaradei of being “America’s agent” and say that by giving in to the IAEA, Iran is giving in to US demands to surrender nuclear technology. “The only logical option is to resume uranium enrichment, expel IAEA inspectors and withdraw from (the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty) if the IAEA continues to illegally deny Iran its rights,” hard-liner Hossein Shariatmadari wrote in an editorial last week in his newspaper, Kayhan. Shariatmadari is close to Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who has the final say on all state matters. Iran says it’s losing its patience and wants IAEA to remove Iran’s nuclear dossier from its agenda by June. Iran’s top nuclear negotiator Hasan Rowhani said last week Iran will “definitely react” if its nuclear dossier is not closed by then, but said, “I don’t think the reaction will be to withdraw from NPT.” Daily Times - All Rights Reserved Site developed and hosted by WorldCALL Internet Solutions [http://www.wcis.com.pk] ***************************************************************** 4 Xinhuanet: S.Korean FM on nuclear issue www.xinhuanet.com www.chinaview.cn 2004-04-12 15:07:45 SEOUL, April 12 (Xinhuanet) -- South Korean foreign minister said on Monday here that after the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) makes full commitment on the issue of nuclear program,compensations can be discussed. "In the context of such a commitment, other issues, including security assurances, energy assistance and other corresponding measures can be discussed," said Ban to a press conference. The foreign minister also said in last week's trilateral consultations held in San Francisco, South Korea, the US and Japanre affirmed their commitment to an expeditious and effective resolution to the issue. "We hope the working group meeting can be held as soon as possible by the end of April or in early May," said Ban. "Concerning parties in the second round six-party talks agreedto hold the third round before June. The DPRK also agreed to this.I hope after one or two working group meetings, the date of the third round will be fixed." The minister also praised the mechanism of the six-way talks. "We have taken important first steps on the path towards a solution, having attained meaningful and positive outcomes throughthe two rounds of six-party talks." "I expected more positive results in the third round six-partytalks," said Ban. China, the DPRK, the United States, Russia, South Korea and Japan held first and second round six-nation talks aiming to solvethe nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula in last August and February, 2004. Enditem Copyright ©2003 Xinhua News Agency. All rights reserved. ***************************************************************** 5 [southnews] US Sinking in their own spin Date: Mon, 12 Apr 2004 01:06:23 -0500 (CDT) ------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor ---------------------~--> Buy Ink Cartridges or Refill Kits for your HP, Epson, Canon or Lexmark Printer at MyInks.com. Free s/h on orders $50 or more to the US & Canada. http://www.c1tracking.com/l.asp?cid=5511 http://us.click.yahoo.com/mOAaAA/3exGAA/qnsNAA/7gSolB/TM ---------------------------------------------------------------------~-> According to a new book by Paul Rutherford, Weapons of Mass Persuasion, there are 20,000 more public relations experts in the United States doctoring the news than there are journalists trying to write it. Sinking in their own spin By MICHAEL HARRIS Ottawa Sun Fri, April 2, 2004 According to a new book by Paul Rutherford, Weapons of Mass Persuasion, there are 20,000 more public relations experts in the United States doctoring the news than there are journalists trying to write it. Information straight out of the spin dryer is bad news for democracy. When citizens get their take on reality from fiendishly choreographed news conferences, press releases, slick videos, and other one-sided tools of mass-marketing, truth is usually the first casualty. The measure of success is not whether the spin conveys good information, but whether it makes a sale, a convert, a self-interested point. As Hemingway liked to say, it would be pretty to think that journalists are at least something of an antidote to the Gospel according to Madison Avenue -- whether it is trying to sell hydrogen cars or a world-view in a presidential speech. And to be sure, some are. But the truth is, journalism, or should I say the new norms of the business, particularly in the dead zones of television, has become a big part of the problem. In his book, just released by University of Toronto Press, Rutherford notes that up to 40% of what appears in American newspapers consists of items produced by press agents and public relations firms, which is then regurgitated by the "objective" news organs. News conferences which were once a mere clue to the real story are the story. Events are dutifully reported verbatim even when the party giving the press conference refuses to take questions -- as President Bush did this week when he portrayed himself as a person anxious to have his national security adviser testify before the 9/11 commission. The man who had spent months stonewalling his own commission came off as a leader with a deep commitment to a public search for the truth about that awful September day. The new objectivity. Quite a word, "objective." The Oxford English Dictionary is filled with the biographies of individual words that have changed their meanings over centuries of use. Objectivity used to mean an unbiased and independent search for the facts -- the touchstone of a free press. The new "objectivity" of the mass media is a mantra of equal time and no reality check, a free ride for those who would spin the news legitimized by the dubious proposition that insiders in a field like politics know best. In Canada, the typical network television political panel now looks something like this: One talking head from each of the political parties given more or less equal time by a mellowed out moderator who rarely does more than start and click a stop-watch and buddy up to his guests. That type of panel, (and that type of info-spin) is duplicated by the political insider panel, in which moderators defer to party hacks for their sense of what is really happening. In fact, these hosts often act as if they have the cultural memory of a fruit fly. We have moved from a profession where the handmaidens and spin doctors of politicians were the last people we turned to for our insights into public affairs to one in which we have made them the new stars. George Stephanopolous stepped straight out of his role as a political adviser to Bill Clinton into a network public affairs show. George may have been connected in Washington, but it's a long way from Woodward and Bernstein. Nor is he alone. The television networks are awash with administration or former administration figures telling the public exactly what their former political masters want to hear. Their views are rarely challenged with independent facts. Though it is the most shameless culprit of promoting partisan cant as the inside scoop, television is by no means the only "news" organ that has started sleeping with the enemy. The National Post recently handed over its front page to New Brunswick Premier Bernard Lord to explain the historic watershed that the Conservative party was about to reach at its leadership convention. The Globe and Mail gave a column to Brian Tobin, a man who managed the media while in politics the way promoter Don King handles boxers. And the Toronto Star features Rick Anderson, Rasputin to former Reform leader Preston Manning and political adviser to a slew of conservative politicians. Newspapers used to know what was happening inside political parties from their own sources; now the party mouthpieces are not only the sources, they are the employees. Could that be one of the reasons that the United States, for example, has become the Gridlock Nation, a populace so bombarded with partisan perversions of the facts they just can't decide which spin doctor, if any, is telling the truth? Journalists used to play, with varying degrees of success, the honest broker in that dilemma. But now that so much political journalism has either become entertainment (the mouse ears don't become Peter Jennings) or political agendas disguised as news, it's not a question of the guy with the best case winning the day, but the one with the best ad agency or kept network. Instead of making the case, politicians these days largely make it up -- with a very expensive and sophisticated technology that will probably put a $200 million pricetag on running for president. And all those polls? They are not so much to allow politicians to find out what the public is thinking but how that thinking might be shaped. Again, not good for democracy. But there is a hint at least that the public may be fed up. According to the latest Nielsen ratings, CNN has lost 52% of its viewing audience for the first quarter of 2004. In fact, only one of CNN's news shows made the Top 12 cable broadcasts in the U.S. Over the same period, viewership of the Fox News Channel fell by 36%. Since these networks are the Big Daddies of passing off spin as news, of allowing their stations to be used as the informational sinks of the White House, it might be that Americans are ready to ask a lot more of their journalists. After all, it's not about face-time, right? http://www.canoe.ca/NewsStand/Columnists/Ottawa/Michael_Harris/2004/04/02/pf-405262.html ____________________________________ US rebukes Latham for alliance jibe By Marian Wilkinson in Washington and Paul McGeough in Baghdad April 12, 2004 The Bush Administration has hit back at the Labor leader, Mark Latham, saying his attacks on the state of the American alliance are "neither well informed nor well based". In a rare rebuke of an Opposition leader, the State Department issued a critical response to Mr Latham's speech last week in which he attacked the Howard Government for its unequal and compliant role in the alliance. After several days of debate inside the State Department over whether to react, officials decided to counter Mr Latham's claims with a formal response. "The alliance between Australia and the United States is a partnership of equals in principle and in reality," an official told the Herald. "Characterisations to the contrary are neither well informed nor well based." He added: "American governments have always respected Australia's right to its own decisions with regard to its national, regional and international interests." The rift between Mr Latham and Washington has widened over his pledge to pull Australian forces out of Iraq after the handover of political power to a new interim Iraqi government. His only reply was: "I will always maintain that Australia should be an equal partner in the alliance. I'm glad the official from the State Department agrees." John Howard has been critical of the Latham policy, but the Herald has been told that the Prime Minister and the British leader, Tony Blair, have been given legal advice that their military forces will need to be covered by a new UN Security Council resolution if they stay in Iraq after the handover of sovereignty on June 30. As mounting bloodshed and the hostage crisis challenge the US-led occupation, a Washington official said both Mr Howard and Mr Blair had been advised that, contrary to US assurances, there may not be a basis in international law for American and coalition troops to remain after June 30 without a new mandate. That must come either from the UN or the new interim Iraqi government, or both, says a lawyer advising the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC), Noah Feldman. The US has argued that the interim constitution signed by the council and the US Ambassador, Paul Bremer, allows the coalition forces to remain in charge of security after June 30. But this is disputed in Baghdad and at the UN. The most important Shiite leader in Iraq, the Grand Ayotollah Ali al-Sistani, has rejected the claim. Mr Feldman said if the US refused to acknowledge that it needed a fresh agreement with the interim government allowing the coalition to continue to exercise military control, "it raises some serious questions about what the hell is sovereignty". A spokesman for the Attorney-General, Philip Ruddock, said he knew of no legal advice suggesting that Australian forces could not legitimately stay in Iraq after June 30. "To the contrary," he said, "UN resolution 1511 gives international forces authority to remain for security purposes until early 2005." There were also moves for a resolution to go before the UN before June 30. Amid the dispute over the troops remaining, the US-appointed IGC has strongly confronted the Americans for the first time over what it condemned as the "collective punishment" of the people of Falluja during the search for the killers of four security contractors in the town, Individual IGC members warned the US that military solutions would not work. One member has resigned in protest, two suspended their membership and others have threatened to do so. Plans for the June 30 handover have been further set back by the angry response of ordinary Iraqis to the death toll in Falluja and a planned US campaign this week to "eliminate" the Shiite imam Moqtada al-Sadr and his Mehdi Army militia. This story was found at: http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2004/04/11/1081621839049.html The archives of South News can be found at http://southmovement.alphalink.com.au/southnews/ Yahoo! Groups Links <*> To visit your group on the web, go to: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/southnews/ <*> To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to: southnews-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com <*> Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to: http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/ ***************************************************************** 6 PRN: Robert McNamara and Theodore Sorensen to Discuss National Security Issues [http://www.prnewswire.com/] WASHINGTON, D.C. -- Former Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, the subject of the Academy Award-winning documentary "The Fog of War," and Theodore Sorensen, the former special counsel and adviser to President Kennedy, will discuss their experiences in dealing with international conflict at an American Bar Association program in New York City on April 16. McNamara and Sorensen will assess how their experiences apply to present issues in nuclear proliferation and national security. McNamara and Sorensen will begin the discussion at 9:00 a.m. in the Grand Ballroom at the Plaza Hotel. There is no charge for members of the press, although reservations are required. The program is one of many dealing with foreign policy, corporate governance and international business transactions that will take place during the ABA Section of International Law and Practice Spring Meeting from April 14-17. For a complete list of programs go to http://www.abanet.org/intlaw [http://www.abanet.org/intlaw] . WHO: Robert McNamara, secretary of defense during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations Theodore Sorensen, former counsel to President John F. Kennedy WHAT: ABA International Law Section program: Applying Lessons of the 20th Century to the 21st Century WHERE: Grand Ballroom, The Plaza Hotel Fifth Avenue and Central Park South New York, NY WHEN: April 16 9-10:40 a.m. Contact: Robert Snoddy Phone: 202/662-1093 E-mail: snoddyr@staff.abanet.org [ snoddyr@staff.abanet.org] SOURCE American Bar Association Web Site: http://www.abanet.org [http://www.abanet.org] http://www.abanet.org/intlaw [http://www.abanet.org/intlaw] ***************************************************************** 7 [progchat_action] Actress to greet whistleblower Date: Sun, 11 Apr 2004 23:52:26 -0500 (CDT) Actress to greet whistleblower From correspondents in Jerusalem AP 31mar04 BRITISH actress Susannah York will lead a delegation of demonstrators greeting Israeli nuclear whistle blower Mordechai Vanunu when he is released from an Israeli prison, a spokesman for the group said today. On April 21 Vanunu is to be freed from a prison in the southern city of Ashkelon after serving 18 years for treason and espionage. Israel's Mossad spy agency captured him in Europe in 1986, after he disclosed details and photos of Israel's top-secret nuclear plant and the country's reputed nuclear weapons arsenal to The Sunday Times of London. Vanunu, who worked at the plant, served more than a decade in solitary confinement after being convicted in an Israeli court. He has become a hero of anti-nuclear weapons activists during his years in prison and has been nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize. Ernest Rodker, a spokesman for the Free Vanunu Committee in London, said York and more than 70 other protesters plan to gather in Israel to celebrate Vanunu's release. "These are people who want to be in Israel when Mordechai is freed," he said. Rodker said York would be joined by Nobel Peace Prize winner Mairead Maguire from Northern Ireland, two members of the British parliament and anti-nuclear demonstrators from Europe, Japan and the United States. He said the group would apply for a permit to wait outside Ashkelon's Shikma prison in the hours before Vanunu is freed. "We would hope that we will have the opportunity to meet him," he said. "We don't want a confrontation with Israeli authorities, but we believe that Israel is a democracy and as a released prisoner Mordechai ... should have the right to meet with whoever he wants." Israeli officials say Vanunu may still possess information that could harm Israeli security and are taking steps to limit his freedom of movement, possibly confiscating his passport. Vanunu recently issued a statement through his brother saying he has no more nuclear secrets to disclose. Based partly on photographs that Vanunu provided the British newspaper, it is widely believed Israel has the sixth largest stockpile of nuclear weapons in the world. The CIA recently estimated Israel has between 200-400 nuclear weapons. Israel has an official policy of "nuclear ambiguity", saying only that it will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East. ------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor ---------------------~--> Buy Ink Cartridges or Refill Kits for your HP, Epson, Canon or Lexmark Printer at MyInks.com. Free s/h on orders $50 or more to the US & Canada. http://www.c1tracking.com/l.asp?cid=5511 http://us.click.yahoo.com/mOAaAA/3exGAA/qnsNAA/XgSolB/TM ---------------------------------------------------------------------~-> Yahoo! Groups Links <*> To visit your group on the web, go to: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/progchat_action/ <*> To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to: progchat_action-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com <*> Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to: http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/ ***************************************************************** 8 update about Vanunu release Date: Mon, 12 Apr 2004 01:13:21 -0500 (CDT) In 1986 Mordechai Vanunu blew the whistle on the Israeli manufacture of nuclear weapons by supplying information to the Sunday Times of London. He was enticed to Rome, and was there kidnapped, placed on a crate and transported therein, under "diplomatic immunity", to an Israeli ship and then to Israel. There he was tried - in a secret proceeding - and sentenced to 18 years in jail. For 11 of those years he was kept in isolation. His release is set for April 21 -BUT the US Campaign to Free Vanunu has just released the following: 1. Restrictions on VanunuUs release announced 2. Action to Take 3. Recent articles & links of interest ----------------- 1. Restrictions on VanunuUs release announced On Thursday, April 8, a letter was given to Mordechai Vanunu detailing the restrictions the government intends to enforce following his release from prison April 21. Vanunu will have one week to appeal. An Israeli civil rights group is prepared to argue for his complete freedom, because he will have completed his entire sentence behind bars. Press reports say that the document, signed by Minister of the Interior Avraham Poraz, remind Vanunu that he is still bound by the secrecy agreement that he signed when he went to work at Dimona, and that if he violates this agreement he will be prohibited from using telephone/internet and might lose his freedom. He would reportedly be prohibited to go within 100 meters of a foreign embassy, or within 300 meters of Israel's international borders or the Occupied Territories. Also, an order prohibiting him from leaving the country will soon be delivered to Mordechai. As soon as details of the restrictions are confirmed, we will post an alert to this list and ask you to protest by phone, fax or e-mail to appropriate offices of the Israeli government. ----------------- 2. Action to Take In the meantime, please telephone the Israeli Embassy in your country. Tell them that you are concerned about Mordechai Vanunu and watching the situation closely, and demand he be set free without restriction by April 21. Washington, DC Political Department Tel: (202)364-5581, 5582 Fax: (202)364-5490 Press Office Tel: (202) 364-5538 Fax: (202) 364-5610 Ottawa, Canada Tel. (613)567-6450 Fax: (613)237-8865 E-mail: embisrott@cyberus.ca London, United Kingdom Tel: 0207 957 9500 Fax: 0207 957 955 E-mail: info-assist@london.mfa.gov.il The Hague, The Netherlands Tel: 070-3760500 Fax: 070-3760555 E-mail: ambassade@israel.nl ----------------- 3. Recent articles & links of interest >From the Spring 2004 issue of I Am Your Spy, newsletter of the U.S. Campaign to Free Mordechai Vanunu: "I won. I'll be free. The gates and the locks will be opened. They didn't succeed in breaking me..." - Mordechai Vanunu, to his brother Meir, February 2004 After almost 18 years behind bars - nearly 12 of those in solitary confinement - Mordechai Vanunu will walk out of Israel's Ashkelon Prison on April 21, his conscience still whole, his motive still urgent. In a recent letter to the U.S. Campaign, Mordechai wrote: RWe've succeeded in overcoming this long time of silence. Thanks to all the campaigners and supporters in many states. You were my voice, my conscience - you kept all these issues of secret nuclear weapons in the center and followed my path. RVery soon I'll be free. I'll be glad to meet you and to share with you my experiences, my views and work to continue that first act - for the abolition of nuclear weapons in all the world [several words censored out of the letter]. That is our mission and future target. We'll not rest until we see a new international agreement to ban, abolish all kinds of nuclear weapons. RThank you for all the help and encouragement you sent me for the past 18 years. The reward you will get is to see me free, alive and very firm, strong in our way for peace and for the abolition of nuclear weapons. We believe it is possible and we can witness it in our lifetime, exactly as we celebrate the end of the cold war. ROur message is - The end of nuclear weapons is possible.S More stories from this issue and links can be found at http://www.nonviolence.org/vanunu ================ Whistleblower Drops Israeli Citizenship By Jason Keyser Saturday April 3, 2004 JERUSALEM (AP) - Israeli nuclear whistleblower Mordechai Vanunu has formally asked to renounce his citizenship as a way to prevent the government from confining him to the country after his release from prison, Israel's Channel Two TV reported Saturday. On April 21, Vanunu is to be freed from a prison in the southern city of Ashkelon after serving 18 years for treason and espionage. Israel's Mossad spy agency captured him in Europe in 1986 after he disclosed details and photos of Israel's top-secret nuclear plant and the country's reputed nuclear weapons arsenal to The Sunday Times of London. Israeli officials say Vanunu might still possess information that could harm Israeli security and are taking steps to limit his freedom of movement after his release, possibly confiscating his passport. Vanunu denies having any more secrets to spill. The TV report said that Vanunu, 50, has sent a letter from prison to the Interior Ministry formally asking to give up his citizenship. A ministry spokeswoman declined to comment. Vanunu's brother, Meir, told The Associated Press on Saturday night that he hadn't spoken to his brother in several weeks and wasn't aware of the letter. He said his brother wants to go abroad and live with a Minnesota couple who adopted Vanunu in 1997 thinking that doing so would entitle the man to U.S. citizenship. But only adoptees under age 16 are allowed to receive U.S. citizenship. RI know that for years he has been trying to renounce his citizenship,S Meir Vanunu said. RI don't know if he has recently sent a letter to the ministry of interior.S Vanunu, who was a technician at the nuclear plant in the desert town of Dimona, served more than a decade in solitary confinement after being convicted in an Israeli court. Vanunu has become a hero of anti-nuclear weapons activists during his years in prison and has been nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize. Based partly on photographs that Vanunu provided the British newspaper, it is widely believed Israel has a large stockpile of nuclear weapons. The CIA recently estimated Israel has 200-400 nuclear weapons. Israel has an official policy of ``nuclear ambiguity,'' saying only that it will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East. Guardian Unlimited ) Guardian Newspapers Limited 2004 ================= Mordechai Vanunu's Meaning for the Nuclear Age by Daniel Ellsberg http://www.nonviolence.org/vanunu/20040309ellsberg.html The Man Who Knew Too Much by Robert Fisk http://www.nonviolence.org/vanunu/20040326independent.html ***************************************************************** 9 Bellona: Russia: a region of extremes Commentary MOSCOW—A seminar late last month on the handling spent nuclear fuel, or SNF, and radioactive waste on the Kola Peninsula—home to Russia’s Northern Fleet and civilian nuclear-powered icebreaker base—produced equal measures of bureaucratic pomposity and surprise announcements of much needed cash and help. Head of the Russian State Duma's Environmental Committee Vladimir Grachev. Grigory Pasko/Bellona Grigory Pasko, 2004-04-12 19:53 First to the cash and the help. The British firm Crown Agents announced that it would donate $19m for the unloading of the “Lotta” floating maritime SNF storage facility and build on-shore temporary storage facilities for the waste, where it will remain until it is shipped the Urals Mayak Chemical Combine for reprocessing. The contribution from Crown Agents is a major step in alleviating radioactive threats from floating SNF storage facilities on the Kola Peninsula. The Lotta, a dilapidated service ship, was employed for SNF storage when on-shore storage began to grow scarce. The contribution may also draw greater attention to the ‘Lepse,’ another Kola Peninsula based service vessel loaded with damaged spent nuclear fuel and which presents an even greater radioactive hazard. There is, as yet, no word as to when the Lotta is set to begin or be completed. Now for the bureaucrats and what they had to say—including a warm endorsement of the Soviet proliferation of nuclear weapons. Chairman of the Russian State Duma’s Committee on the Environment Vladimir Grachev presided over the March 29th seminar. Opening the meeting, Vladimir Grachev noted that the problem of radiation and nuclear safety in the whole was very pressing for Russia and for the whole world. “Expanding military might, many countries, including Russia, adhered to the principle “might is right, we’ll see about the rest later.” ”We are forced to accumulate nuclear weapons,” says Grachev. “And I do not blame [Russia] for that. I am proud of my motherland. We did well [to accumulate nuclear weapons]. Otherwise we would have been conquered, or something else, long ago.” Onward and upward. According to Grachev, western countries are simply obliged to fund Russian programmes to dispose of nuclear powered submarine and radioactive waste since it was, really, you know, the West’s fault that the former USSR and, later, Russia continued to arm itself to the teeth with nuclear weapons. A great country asks for a great pile of waste Russia’s nuclear might, as Grachev said, is “the only factor” that will “preserve a great one sixth of the country.” Such a great territory, said Grachev, needs to be used effectively: Russia, after all, is big enough to find a place to find space for radioactive waste disposal. What difference would contributing one sixth of its space to that purpose make? Concerning the use of the one sixth of enormously huge Russia as a nuclear waste repository, Grachev mentioned that “the environmental situation in this part [of Russia] is critical”. The reason for environmental deterioration is that 114 nuclear powered submarines have been withdrawn from service. “Naturally”, the Grachev summed up, “we have a backlog of problems that need to be solved. And this is a global task, a task for all neighboring countries.” Looking ahead, I would like to note that after the seminar I asked Grachev to give an interview to me for “Environment and Rights” the St.Petersburg, which I edit and is run by the environmental and human rights organization Bellona. Reluctantly, Vladimir Grachev agreed—I was insisting, I must admit. “I will tell all the truth about you, traitors,” he said. “You have various sordid gains and write what you are ordered to write.” Grachev noted he regularly read “Environment and Rights,” and clearly was aware of who was ordering which articles “to the detriment of our motherland.” I immediately asked Grachev to order an article from me about him and asked him for money to fund the journal. Looking at me with disbelief, he called for his aide and said, “Pencil in Pasko. When he calls, don’t give him the brush-off.” And with a proud look he headed toward a news camera crew. I will tell the readers of “Environment and Rights” and Bellona Web about the interview and how it proceeded when the time comes. Deputy head of the Murmansk Region Economics Department Alexander Ruzankin. Grigory Pasko/Bellona Nineteen seconds and ten years Deputy Head of Economics Department of the Murmansk Region Alexander Ruzankin told the seminar participants about the critical condition of SNF storage facilities in Andreyeva Bay, on the Northwest part of the Kola Peninsula 60 kilometers from the Norwgian border, where radiation levels in some facilities reach 3,000 micro sieverts per hour. At present the true situation with SNF casks at Andreyeva Bay is unknown. If a yearly radiation exposure norm of 2 roentgen equivalent men, or rems, is observed, the exposure time of the staff in these facilities during nuclear fuel operations is, by the former Ministry of Atomic Energy, or Minatom’s estimates, now a maximum of 19 seconds a day within a 24 hour period. (A March 9th presidential reform order reduced the status of Minatom to the Federal Agency for Atomic Energy, or FAAE, answerable to the new Ministry for Industry and Development.) The evacuation of SNF from Andreyeva Bay to the Mayak Chemical Combine for reprocessing will require 23 trains. But because SNF can be transported only in the summer months, when a maximum of three trains with SNF can be shipped, the complete SNF transfer could take more than a decade. The storage facilities at a technical facility at the Gremikha Naval Base on the eastern coast of the Kola Peninsula are in a better condition, although they have less spent fuel and an accumulation of 600 fuel assemblies. SevRAO, a nuclear cleanup division on the Kola Peninsula run by the former Minatom, could annually handle—technically and financially—a maximum of 600 cubic meters of radioactive waste. Rehabilitating the Gremikha base and dismantling the decommissioned nuclear submarines it houses requires 48 billion rubles, or $1.6 billion. According to Ruzankin, international aid constitutes 6 to 7 percent of the Minatom nuclear clean-up spending. Later, Deputy Atomic Energy Minister Sergei Antipov corrected Ruzankin saying that the sum is much higher, sometimes equaling half of Russia’s spending on radioactive waste disposal. Ruzankin said he believed that foreign aid will be provided but not immediately. At a December donor nation conference held in the United Kindom, donor countries asked Russia to provide environment impact assessments on nuclear remediation programmes they are funding. This, said Ruzankin, will affect programme deadlines, as Russia is unable to quickly prepare environmental impact assessments. But it is Bellona’s position that the absence of comprehensive risk assessment could cause exactly the kind of nuclear accidents such donations are meant to finance. Without proper risk assessments, Bellona considers, donor nations may as well keep their money. Deputy Minister of Atomic Energy Sergei Antipov. Grigory Pasko/Bellona West will give money anyway Among the major problems connected with radioactive waste disposal in Murmansk and the Kola Peninsula, Antipov also mentioned the problem of on-shore engineering bases. The overall radioactivity of accumulated waste at Andreyev Bay alone, he said, exceeds the activity of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant’s contamination after it exploded in 1986. Over the last three years, $60m has been annually allocated from the Russian state budget for an all-inclusive radioactive waste disposal programme. However, Russia is unable to deal with the problem alone, and, fortunately, the West is well aware of that. Of course, the West will be funding radioactive waste disposal—but only if the expenses can be justified. According to Antipov, $4 billion is needed to resolve all the radioactive waste problems in the Kola peninsula region over a ten-year period, to which Grachev responded: “So we have got some work to do.” Among Russia’s major projects currently underway, Antipov named the construction of a storage facility for submarine reactor compartments in Sayda Bay. Germany has already allocated part of the EUR300m it promised in October. Great Britain and Italy have also offered help. Antipov stressed that Norway regularly decent good money— “without fuss and muss,” as former Commander of the Northern Fleet Vyacheslav Popov put it. He did, however, note that this money is allocated against a complicated background of internecine government quarrels in Norway, where some political parties are demanding stricter relations with Russia. Speaking about SNF handling at prospective on-shore facilities, Antipov underlined that such facilities were impossible without special robotic technologies to handle the highly active SNF. Analysis has shown that the transportation of the entire volume of SNF on the Kola Peninsula to Mayak is impossible for many reasons. As an alternative, the construction of a long-term storage facility in the Murmansk Region has been offered. (One minister’s ambiguous statements draw one to the conclusion that such a storage facility will turn out to be not only long-term, but a final disposal facility, or geologic repository. In either case, we shall hardly live to see this problem solved completely.) Appeal by the seminar to all levels of government After a seminar entitled “Spent Nuclear Fuel and Radioactive Waste Handling and Storage in the Kola Peninsula,” its participants voted to adopt an appeal to the State Duma of the Russian Federation, government ministries, federal departments, and scientists.  Read on » [http://www.bellona.no/en/international/russia/navy/northern_flee t/decommissioning/33298.html] The “Lepse,” the “Lotta”... and elsewhere Oleg Bogorodsky of the Murmansk Shipping Company described the situation at radioactively hazardous sites in the Murmansk Region. He noted that more than 70 ships requiring nuclear technological maintenance are concentrated in Russia’s Northwest. Most of them have past their engineering lifespans and are in unsatisfactory technical condition. SNF and radioactive waste have been accommodated in such ships. But the designs of these ships, he notes, do not provide for proper shielding against radiation leaks. An accident aboard such a ship in the Kola Bay could lead to an ecological catastrophe in the Kola Peninsula area, with grave radiological consequences for the entire population. The residents of neighboring Scandinavian countries might also be affected as a result of a trans-border spread of radionuclides. Bogorodsky also said that Russia’s former had been Minatom commissioned to devise the “Concept of Nuclear Power Submarine Dismantling.” According to this document, separate concepts of the dismantlement of nuclear powered surface ships need to be developed. An integrated solution to this problem should also allow for dismantling atomic ice-breakers and further handling and storage of irradiated compartments of decommissioned ice-breakers. The government plans to decommission nuclear ice-breakers that have exceeded their engineering lifespan beginning in 2008. Bogorodsky said that SNF was currently handled and transported to the Mayak Combine for further reprocessing according to a special transportation and technological scheme that involves SNF storage and handing by the Lotta and Imandra enterprises, and the Murmansk Shipping Company. Atomflot, where the civilian nuclear powered ice-breaker fleet is based, puts the SNF aboard Mayak-bound trains. Atomflot is one of two enterprises in Russia’s Northwest from which SNF is shipped and where submarines are decommissioned. The floating Lotta base has the only location in Northwest Russia capable of putting SNF in transportation packaging. Thee Northern Fleet’s ships and on-shore bases are not so equipped. The Lotta’s engineered lifespan expires in 2006, and then its SNF will have to be taken from the ship’s storage facility. As a result it will be necessary to create a new on-shore complex at Atomflot allowing for the temporary storage of SNF in containers, as well as a facility capable of packaging regular SNF shipments to Mayak for reprocessing. To resolve this problem, Atomflot and the British company Crown Agents—on the initiative and participation of the Murmansk Shipping Company—concluded an agreement to modernize the on-shore SNF storage facility and upgrade it with necessary infrastructure, as well as to build twenty casks for SNF storage and transportation. The $19m project is to be funded by Crown Agents. The unloading the Lotta’s entire volume of SNF alone will require approximately 70 containers at a cost of $17.5m alone. At the seminar a documentary film by Murmansk journalist Sergey Filippov about the intense radioactive hazards of the Lepse was shown. Filippov, who also works at Bellona’s Murmansk office, told the participants about the documentary’s filiming and thanked Bellona’s Oslo office office for its assistance in completing the project. Publisher: Bellona Foundation [bellona@bellona.no] , President: Frederic Hauge [frederic@bellona.no] Information: info@bellona.no [info@bellona.no] , Technical contact: webmaster@bellona.no [webmaster@bellona.no] Telephone: +47 23 23 46 00 Telefax: +47 22 38 38 62 * P.O.Box 2141 Grunerlokka, 0505 Oslo, Norway ***************************************************************** 10 FT: China poised to join nuclear supplier group By Richard McGregor in Shanghai Published: April 12 2004 22:01 | Last Updated: April 12 2004 China is poised to join the multilateral group controlling the export of nuclear materials and technology next month, the government has said. Beijing's expected entry into the Nuclear Suppliers Group coincides with the visit to Beijing on Tuesday by Dick Cheney, the vice-president of a US administration that has long pressed China to curb exports of weapons technology. China also attended as an observer for the first time a meeting in Paris this February of the Missile Technology Control Regime, another global institution aimed at preventing exports to countries outside the group's safeguards. China's application to join the 40-nation NSG and its discussion on entry into the MTCR reflect a sea change in thinking in Beijing about where its national interests lie with regards to proliferation, foreign policy experts said. For years, China saw the two groups as supplier cartels, dominated by the US, which were used to restrict the availability of technology to developing countries. Beijing has a long history of missile and missile-related sales overseas, and in the 1980s provided Pakistan with enriched uranium and a working bomb design, which was later sold to Libya and possibly North Korea and Iran. But China has changed its thinking because of its need to harness all potential sources of energy, including nuclear power, and its desire for good relations with the US, Japan and Europe to maintain economic growth. China's diplomatic co-operation with the US and Japan on the North Korean nuclear threat has been driven by similar concerns. "China recognises that its interests in non-proliferation are increasingly aligned with those of the major powers," says Evan Medeiros, of the Rand Corporation, a think-tank. He Yafei, a Chinese foreign ministry official, said in a briefing before Mr Cheney's visit that China was in discussions with the US about importing its technology for nuclear power stations. "We need to build many nuclear power stations, and the US side has advanced technology in this area," he said. China is negotiating the sale of a new nuclear reactor to Pakistan, a country not covered by NSG rules. However, under NSG rules, the sale of the reactor to Pakistan can be "grandfathered" into China's membership acceptance. China is unlikely to face any barriers to joining the NSG at its annual May meeting in Sweden but it might be more difficult to join the MTCR. Phillip Saunders, an arms- control expert at the National Defence University in Washington, said while China's 2002 regulations to control missile sales were "pretty good, implementation and enforcement are critical". © Copyright The Financial Times Ltd 2004. "FT" and "Financial Times" are trademarks of the Financial Times. Privacy ***************************************************************** 11 Hi Pakistan: --> Nuclear confidence building measures - By Kamal Matinuddin April 12 2004 Soon after the series of atomic detonations in 1998 India and Pakistan realised the necessity of entering into a dialogue on nuclear issues. In the joint statement of Prime Minister Vajpayee and Prime Minister Sharif on 21 February 1999 it was stated that the two foreign ministers would meet periodically to discuss all matters of mutual concern, including nuclear-related issues. The Memorandum of Understanding signed by the Indian Foreign Secretary K. Raghunath and the Pakistan foreign secretary Shamshad Ahmad Khan also mentioned that "the two sides shall engage in bi-lateral consultations on security concepts, and nuclear doctrines, with a view to developing measures for confidence building in the nuclear and conventional fields, aimed at avoidance of conflicts. The two sides are fully committed to undertaking national measures to reducing the risks of accidental or unauthorised use of nuclear weapons under their respective control". Including it in the Lahore declaration reinforced this agreement. The two nations have indeed taken some nuclear confidence building measures already. Both have agreed not to attack each other’s nuclear installations; both continue to exchange the list of their nuclear installations. Islamabad and New Delhi have decided to abide by their respective unilateral moratorium on conducting further nuclear tests. GHQ and Army Headquarters India are to undertake a review of the existing communications links between the respective Director General Military Operations with a view to upgrading and improving these links and to provide for failsafe and secure communications. Nuclear doctrines have been enunciated. Nuclear Command Authority has been established on both sides. Nuclear force commanders have been nominated. Nuclear Export Regulating Authority had been put in place by Pakistan. Unfortunately the need for a sustained and comprehensive dialogue on nuclear-related issues had not commenced so far. It is only after the two leaders took the bold step of renouncing the use of force to solve our disputes that a congenial atmosphere was created, which enabled the foreign secretaries, on 15 February, to agree on entering into a composite dialogue on nuclear issues as well. Consequently it is encouraging to note that progress is being made to make this region nuclear-safe if not nuclear-free. A firm date has now been proposed for a meeting between the experts of both nations to discuss nuclear confidence building measures. Hopefully India will respond positively to this initiative by Pakistan. Though it is a period of unprecedented harmony between the two adversaries the possibility of a conflict cannot be wholly ruled out. A low intensity conflict by either side could erupt once more. Religious extremists could reverse present trends of peace and friendship. The line of control could heat up again, if a serious and meaningful dialogue on Kashmir does not take place. It is, therefore, imperative for the two nations to reduce the danger of an unintentional or accidental nuclear exchange. Even if both countries sign a no war pact or a treaty of peace and friendship nuclear accident can still occur. exchanging views on how to ensure that a nuclear holocaust does not take place unintentionally or by accident is absolutely necessary. What are some of the issues, which need to be discussed to have greater confidence in each other’s ability to handle our respective strategic assets? First and foremost both should discuss the status of each other’s nuclear weapons. Both countries can agree on a very low state of nuclear operational readiness. The aim being to separate the various nuclear components from each other so that there is a time lag between the decision to use nuclear weapons and the actual nuclear strike. But what is absolutely necessary is not to have the atomic devices and their delivery means close to each other lest some emotionally charged individual, who has the authority to press the nuclear button does so without weighting all the consequences. Secondly: the nuclear doctrines needs to be examined by the experts to see if some elements in them can be done away with or modified in order to reduce the danger of a nuclear exchange. The two-man-rule, adopted by the recognised nuclear powers, whereby two persons in authority and not one should have the codes to punch into the computer, before steps are activated to launch a nuclear strike, should also be the procedure in both of our case. Thirdly: India and Pakistan may want to clarify the term minimum nuclear deterrent. What could be the lowest level of deterrence needed in the region keeping in mind the threat to each other’s country? This will not be easy as it is not just a bi-lateral issue, but also a tri-lateral one. Our nuclear neighbour would include the China factor in such a discussion. Perhaps trying to limit the talks to Pakistan-specific missiles may help in moving forward on this aspect of nuclear CBMs as well. The number of short-range nuclear capable missiles held by India and Pakistan beyond their genuine needs can be a subject for examination at these regular meetings. The issue, which Pakistan can take up with their Indian counterpart, is the acquisition of the Phalcon airborne early warning control systems and the arrow anti-ballistic missile system by India. This is likely to enhance the nuclear arms race, as Pakistan will have to find a suitable response to these force multipliers. This needs to be analysed more deeply by both sides. Will it add or reduce the security of our respective nations? The miniaturisation of nuclear weapons and working on producing ‘suitcase’ bombs can also be a subject of discussion between them. Views on the danger of such weapons falling into the hands of militants or extremist can be exchanged. Misunderstanding or a wrong assessment of an incoming missile could lead to an unintended holocaust. What steps or sophisticated hardware is needed to ensure that such a misunderstanding does not take place can be examined. An item, which will certainly be taken up by India will be the question of nuclear proliferation. The assurance given by the President to the garrison officer, recently, that the nuclear capability was in safe institutional and custodial control notwithstanding, the Pakistani delegation will find it hard to convince the Indian side that everything now has been buttoned up. Steps taken by the super powers to reduce nuclear danger can be adapted by India and Pakistan as well. As per the INF Treaty The United States and the Soviet Union agreed to eliminate a certain class of nuclear weapons. Both have reduced their nuclear arsenals and efforts are being made to cut the size of nuclear stockpiles even further. There is no reason why this matter should also not be taken up. Both countries could adopt a common approach in international foray on nuclear disarmament and on issues of CTBT, FMCT and even MTCR as both have the same view that the recognized nuclear powers must also work towards eliminating their nuclear weapons before they ask the newly emerged nuclear powers to destroying what they have achieved. Nuclear powers must pay a great deal of attention to ensuring the safety of their nuclear plants even those being used for peaceful purposes. Accidents have taken place in India Leaks have occurred even in the United States and in Japanese nuclear power plants. There is, therefore, a need to address this question seriously between India and Pakistan. I doubt if India and Pakistan have emergency sirens, which can be heard within several Kilometres from the nuclear plant. Both can mutually explore this requirement. At some later date the disposal of nuclear waste will have to be considered. What are the difficulties both will face in this regard can be a topic for discussion between their nuclear experts. The subject of nuclear assets management is too serious an issue to be given a low priority. Hopefully the forthcoming dialogue will be the harbinger of a continuous process at the official and academic level with the aim of reducing the nuclear danger in the subcontinent. Copyright 1996-2002 . Hi Pakistan. All rights reserved. ***************************************************************** 12 Hi Pakistan: Pakistan wants nuclear restraint accord with India --> April 12 2004 ISLAMABAD - Pakistan wants to strike an agreement on “Nuclear Restraint Regime” with India and it was out of this strong desire that Islamabad proposed talks to New Delhi on nuclear CBMs. Islamabad early this month invited India to hold talks on nuclear Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) on May 25-26. The purpose of this invitation for a bilateral dialogue was to discuss measures to minimise nuclear risk, as announced by Pakistan’s foreign office. However, official sources told The Nation that the main purpose of Pakistan’s offer was to enter into an agreement with India on ‘Nuclear Restraint Regime’ to lower the threat of war between the South Asian nuclear states. According to the sources, Islamabad wished to discuss nuclear risk reduction measures to avert any miscalculation or accidental nuclear conflict. “New Delhi has yet to respond to Pakistan’s offer but Pakistani government hoped for a positive response from New Delhi, they added. Talks on nuclear CBMs was part of the joint press statement issued in Islamabad on February 18 after the crucial talks between foreign secretaries of the two nuclear states. “With an offer of talks on nuclear CBMs in May Islamabad had also conveyed its desire of agreement on Nuclear Restraint Regime,” the sources said. Pakistan believed there was a strong need for nuclear risk reduction measures in the sub-continent since India and Pakistan were having geographical proximity, they said. Islamabad had also expressed its desire to have an agreement on Strategic Restraint Regime during the February talks between top Pakistani and Indian diplomats but at that time India did not come up with any reaction. But this time, Pakistani authorities were optimistic that dialogue on the agreement would take place when bilateral talks on nuclear CBMs would be held for which the Indian response was being awaited, said a senior government official in Islamabad. He said that it was our hope that Indian authorities would show interest in the nuclear pact as they were well aware of the dangers involved if there was no restraint regime in the South Asian region. He said any accidental or unlawful use of nuclear weapons would be disastrous for the peace of the whole region let alone the two neighbouring states. Pakistan and India already had an MoU on some nuclear and missile CBMs. Under these CBMs, both the countries annually exchange information about the locations of nuclear installations through diplomatic channels. The information is exchanged to prohibit attacks on each other nuclear installations. However, analysts believe that Pakistan and India need advanced communication system on the lines of one that existed between US and former Soviet Union so as to avert any accidental nuclear conflict. Moreover, they should also discuss no first nuclear strike during the course of talks on nuclear CBMs, they said. Copyright 1996-2002 . Hi Pakistan. All rights reserved. ***************************************************************** 13 Tuscaloosa News: Problem halts second restart try at Farley nuclear plant tuscaloosanews.com The Associated Press April 12, 2004 Workers at the Southern Co.'s Farley Nuclear Plant failed on Monday in a second attempt to restart the Unit 2 reactor, which had been idled for refueling. Company and nuclear regulatory officials said safety systems were operating properly and the public was not at risk. The reactor, located in southeast Alabama along the Georgia line, was shut down for refueling and maintenance. Workers attempted to restart the unit Sunday morning, but a circuit breaker tripped and stopped the process, according to a report issued by the Nuclear Regulator Commission. A similar problem occurred during a restart attempt early Monday. Southern Nuclear spokeswoman Regina Waller said workers were trying to figure out what was causing the problem. "`They're taking a look at it and preparing to restart," she said. Regulators said the reactor was stable. About The Tuscaloosa News | Contact Us | Help | Advertise | Copyright © 2002 The Tuscaloosa News ***************************************************************** 14 NRC: NRC Staff Proposes $60,000 Civil Penalty Against Duke Energy for Violation of NRC Requirements at Oconee Nuclear Power Plant News Release - Region II - 2004-02 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Office of Public Affairs, Region II No. II-04-026 April 9, 2004 CONTACT: Ken Clark (404) 562-4416 Roger D. Hannah (404) 562-4417 E-mail: opa2@nrc.gov [opa2@nrc.gov] The Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff has proposed a $60,000 civil penalty against Duke Energy Corporation for violation of NRC safety requirements at the Oconee Nuclear Station near Seneca, South Carolina. NRC inspectors found that the licensee revised an analysis of a hypothetical steam or feedwater pipe break accident scenario in May 2001 without first obtaining NRC review and approval. The revised analysis postponed the initiation time of required safety systems, which the NRC considers to be a change to the Oconee Final Safety Analysis Report that requires prior NRC approval. NRC officials said the change may involve an increase in risk, and the NRC was not afforded an adequate opportunity to perform its regulatory oversight function by reviewing the change. The NRC said no problems occurred at Oconee as a result of the unauthorized changes and that the company is in the process of implementing corrective actions. The company has 30 days in which to either pay the civil penalty or to protest its imposition. A copy of an NRC letter to Duke which outlines details of the civil penalty is available from the NRC Office of Public Affairs in Atlanta and will be available through the NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) on the NRC's Web Site at www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. Help in using ADAMS is available from the NRC Public Document Room at 301-415-4737 or 1-800-397-4209. Last revised Monday, April 12, 2004 ***************************************************************** 15 CS Monitor: Driving through Chernobyl | csmonitor.com posted April 13, 2004 By Jim Regan | csmonitor.com HALIFAX, NOVA SCOTIA  You don't always need eye-catching graphics, expert design, or a full complement of plug-ins to create a compelling website. Sometimes all you need is "a story about a town that one can ride through with no stoplights, no police, and no danger of hitting any living thing." Ghost Town is a photographic record of today's Chernobyl - and a tour of this 20th century Pompeii is more than enough to draw visitors by the thousands. Ghost Town is very probably the most basic website ever reviewed in this space, yet it may make more of an impact on its visitors than productions costing tens of thousands of dollars. One can get a sense of that impact from the fact that Ghost Town was a ghost itself for a while - a victim of its own success as it blew past its host's bandwidth limits. Back in operation with the addition of new photos taken this Spring, the counter on the current home page seems to climb as fast as the national debt clock, but new arrangements should keep the site operational in spite of its popularity. (If not - in another measure of the site's influence - mirror sites were popping up like mushrooms before the first collapse, and there's now also a sanctioned mirror of the current project.) With grey backgrounds, default text, and looking like it could have been made in the early 90s, Ghost Town is all about content. Created by a Russian motorcyclist (Elena) who was a child during the reactor disaster, and now likes to ride through Chernobyl's 'dead zone,' this photojournal offers a 27-page tour with a handful of large images on each page. Beginning with a map of the area around the nuclear plant (complete with current radiation levels), a text introduction includes such helpful tidbits as the facts that it takes 2.5 times as much radiation to kill a chicken as a human being (100 times as much for a cockroach), that radiation on the middle of the road is lower than that on either side, and that it's best to ride alone - so you're not riding through someone else's radioactive dust. (Sound like fun? In fact, Elena - whose father is a nuclear physicist - is well prepared to judge and manage her risk level, but this is definitely not your typical Sunday ride.) A brief recap of the Chernobyl disaster follows, and the 'travel photos' begin - opening with the ironic observation that the roads get better the closer one gets to the dead zone. What follows is an amazing collection of abandoned farms, buildings, and entire towns. While some images could be of any deserted building almost anywhere in the world, others have a definite post-apocalyptic (in the real sense of the word) feel to them. Grass overgrowing city streets, and a tree growing through an interior floor speak to the total abandonment since the 1986 disaster, while laundry still hanging from a balcony, and personal belongings (photographs, uncollected mail) bear witness to the urgency of the eventual evacuation. Wide shots paint a different, but no less poignant, picture. Photographs taken from the roof of the tallest building in the town reveal sweeping views of an intact, but empty, settlement. A series of shots of government vehicles left in nearby fields is made even more sobering with the knowledge that every crew member of every fire truck and helicopter died within hours or days. (Incredibly, there are a handful of people that still live in the zone and eat produce grown in the region. Of 3,500 who refused to leave in 1986, 400 survive.) Elena also includes a reminder of the potential for fresh disaster, with images of the deteriorating 'sarcophagus' built around the crippled power plant. She then closes the collection with snapshots from the town's kindergarten. And that's it. Some pictures and a bit of text. And if you're like most visitors, you'll be e-mailing the URL to your friends as soon as you leave. www.csmonitor.com | Copyright © 2004 The Christian Science Monitor. All rights reserved. ***************************************************************** 16 PRN: Constellation Energy's Shattuck Elected Board Member of the (INPO) Institute of Nuclear Power Operators [http://www.prnewswire.com/] BALTIMORE, April 12 /PRNewswire-FirstCall/ -- Constellation Energy (NYSE: CEG [http://alliance.marketwatch.com/custom/alliance/interactivechart .asp?symb=CEG&astyle=0,0,0,0,0,0,0,10,0,0&c=179&urlpull=&logourl= &post=0] ) today announced that Mayo A. Shattuck III, chairman, president, and chief executive officer of Constellation Energy Group was recently elected to the board of directors of the Institute of Nuclear Power Operators (INPO), a nonprofit corporation that promotes the highest levels of safety and reliability in the operation of nuclear generating stations. "I'm extremely pleased by the opportunity to join the INPO board, and look forward to working with my colleagues in promoting the many benefits that nuclear power has to offer," said Shattuck. "From a public policy perspective, Constellation Energy believes it absolutely imperative that nuclear power remain a key element of America's long-term energy portfolio. Our challenge is to continue to demonstrate nuclear power's value as a safe, clean, affordable and environmentally friendly fuel for the future." Established in 1979 by the nuclear electric utility industry in 1979, INPO's board is comprised of a chief executive officer and 11 executives elected from the organization's membership, which encompasses all U.S. commercial nuclear operating organizations. "INPO is privileged to have a person with Mayo Shattuck's leadership skills join our board," said Alfred Tollison, Jr., CEO of INPO. "He brings solid financial and operational credentials -- areas where Constellation Energy excels -- to our organization, assets that will help INPO to fulfill its mission." Constellation Energy owns and operates a diversified fleet of power plants throughout the United States. Among them are the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Generating Station in Oswego, N.Y., and Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant in Lusby, Md., the first commercial nuclear generating station in the United States to be granted a 20-year operating license extension by Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The company is in the process of buying R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant in Ontario, N.Y., from Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation. Prior to joining Constellation in 2001, Shattuck was with Deutsche Bank where he served as chairman of the board of Deutsche Banc Alex. Brown, chief executive officer of the Private Client and Asset Management Group, Americas and Global Head of the Private Banking Division. Shattuck serves on the board of directors for the Nuclear Energy Institute, Edison Electric Institute, Capital One Financial Corporation, and Gap Inc. He is a member of the Advisory Council of Stanford's Graduate School of Business, serves on the Board of Trustees of the Johns Hopkins University and Hospital and of the Noble & Greenough School, and is a member of the Board of Visitors of the University of Maryland, Baltimore County. Constellation Energy Group (http://www.constellation.com [http://www.constellation.com] ), a Fortune 500 company based in Baltimore, is the nation's leading competitive supplier of electricity to large commercial and industrial customers and one of the nation's largest wholesale power sellers. Constellation also manages fuels and energy services on behalf of energy intensive industries and utilities. It owns and operates a diversified fleet of power plants throughout the United States. The company delivers electricity and natural gas through the Baltimore Gas and Electric Company (BGE), its regulated utility in Central Maryland. In 2003, the combined revenues of the integrated energy company totaled $9.7 billion. SOURCE Constellation Energy Web Site: http://www.constellation.com [http://www.constellation.com] Company News On Call: Company News On-Call: ***************************************************************** 17 NRC: NRC to Meet with Duke Energy Officials to Discuss Safety Performance at Oconee Nuclear Power Plant News Release - Region II - 2004-02 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Office of Public Affairs, Region II No. II-04-027 April 9, 2004 CONTACT: Ken Clark (404) 562-4416 Roger D. Hannah (404) 562-4417 E-mail: opa2@nrc.gov [opa2@nrc.gov] The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff will meet with Duke Energy officials on Tuesday, April 13, to discuss the results of NRC's annual assessment of safety performance at the Oconee nuclear power plant near Seneca, South Carolina. The meeting will be held at 1:00 p.m in the Auditorium of the Complex Building at the Oconee Nuclear Station, located at 155 East Pickens Highway (Highway 183) near Seneca. The public is invited to observe the meeting, and NRC officials will be available before the conclusion of the meeting to answer any questions. The NRC said that all three Oconee reactors were operated safely during the evaluation period from January 1 through December 31, 2003. As a result, Units 1 and 2 will undergo only routine, scheduled inspections during 2004, but Unit 3 will undergo a supplemental inspection in addition to those done normally. The Unit 3 supplemental inspection is due to problems of low to moderate safety significance involving inadequate installation of electrical connectors on an emergency power supply cable and pressurizer heat losses in excess of regulatory requirements. A letter from the NRC to Duke Energy outlining the results of the most recent evaluation is available from Region II Public Affairs and on the NRC web site at www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/ASSESS/LETTERS/oco_2003q4.pdf [PDF Icon] . The NRC staff will also conduct inspections at Oconee (not specifically related to the plants prior performance) related to planned reactor vessel head and steam generator replacements, operator licensing examinations, the dry cask spent fuel storage installation and safety issues concerning reactor pressure vessel lower head penetration nozzles. The agency will also continue to monitor plant actions in response to any new security orders and any newly developed portions of the plant security program. Current performance indicators for the three units at the Oconee plant are available at www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/ASSESS/OCO1/oco1_chart.html, www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/ASSESS/OCO2/oco2_chart.html and www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/ASSESS/OCO3/oco3_chart.html . Last revised Monday, April 12, 2004 ***************************************************************** 18 NRC: NRC to Meet with Duke Energy Officials to Discuss Safety Performance at McGuire Nuclear Power Plant News Release - Region II - 2004-02 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Office of Public Affairs, Region II No. II-04-028 April 9, 2004 CONTACT: Ken Clark (404) 562-4416 Roger D. Hannah (404) 562-4417 E-mail: opa2@nrc.gov [opa2@nrc.gov] The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff will meet with Duke Energy officials on Thursday, April 15, to discuss the results of NRC's annual assessment of safety performance at the McGuire nuclear power plant near Huntersville, North Carolina. The meeting will be held at 1:00 p.m in the Office Complex Building at the McGuire Nuclear Station, located at 12700 Hagers Ferry Road near Huntersville. The public is invited to observe the meeting, and NRC officials will be available before the conclusion of the meeting to answer any questions. The NRC said both McGuire reactors were operated safely and met all objectives during the evaluation period which covered the calendar year 2003. As a result, the NRC plans to conduct only routine inspections at the McGuire plant in 2004. A letter from the NRC to Duke Energy outlining the results of the most recent evaluation is available from Region II Public Affairs and on the NRC web site at www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/ASSESS/LETTERS/mcg_2003q4.pdf [PDF Icon] . The NRC staff will also conduct inspections this year at McGuire (not specifically related to the plants performance) related to operator licensing examinations, routine inspections of the plants spent nuclear fuel storage installation, and safety issues concerning reactor pressure vessel lower head penetration nozzles and the reactor containment sump. The agency will also continue to monitor plant actions in response to NRC security orders and any newly developed portions of the plant security program. Current performance indicators for the two units at the McGuire plant are available at www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/ASSESS/MCG1/mcg1_chart.html and www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/ASSESS/MCG2/mcg2_chart.html. Last revised Monday, April 12, 2004 ***************************************************************** 19 Payvand: Iran's Heavy Water Reactor Iran News [http://www.payvand.com/news] 4/12/04 Source: Voice of America [http://www.voanews.com] The following is an editorial reflecting the views of the United States Government: In about two months, Iran is planning to start construction of a heavy-water nuclear reactor in the city of Arak. Heavy-water reactors provide the best means of producing plutonium for use in nuclear weapons. Iran has told the International Atomic Energy Agency, the I-A-E-A, that its nuclear program is intended for peaceful purposes. But the I-A-E-A has been investigating Iran’s program since March 2003 and has already confirmed numerous clandestine nuclear activities that Iran undertook for more than eighteen years. Kenneth Brill is the U.S. representative to the I-A-E-A. He says that Iran’s long history of deceit gives plenty of reason to doubt its claims: “The classic example of why people are concerned about the Iran nuclear program is the Kalaye Electric Company plant which was originally portrayed by the most senior Iranian officials as a simple watch factory or a simple warehouse, and over time its true use and purpose was conveyed to the I-A-E-A. It was a place where centrifuge experiments had been done.” Centrifuges can be used to make nuclear-weapons-grade uranium. And this is just one of many deceptions and broken promises by Iran concerning its nuclear program. Adam Ereli is the deputy spokesman for U.S. State Department: “On October 21st, Iran told the foreign ministers of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom that it would, quote, ‘suspend all enrichment -- uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities as defined by the I-A-E-A,’ end quote. Then they later went on and said, ‘Okay, but that doesn’t include domestic manufacture and assembly of centrifuges.’ Then again, on November 10th, Iran sent a letter to the I-A-E-A saying that it had decided to suspend, quote, ‘all [uranium] enrichment-related reprocessing activities in Iran.’ Then, again, on February 23rd, it [Iran] said it would suspend assembly and testing of centrifuges. So we’ve heard this before.” Mr. Ereli said it would be “great” if Iran would live up to its promises to the I-A-E-A. But so far, Iran has not done so. The I-A-E-A board meets again in June. High on the agenda will be the question of whether Iran is meeting its promises to the I-A-E-A and its obligations under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. If the I-A-E-A finds that Iran is not doing so, its noncompliance could be reported to the United Nations Security Council.
The Poetry of Nizami Ganjavi: Knowledge, Love, and Rhetoric [http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0312228104/netnative] © Copyright 2004 NetNative [http://www.netnative.com] (All Rights ***************************************************************** 20 [du-list] Uranium Weapons Cover-ups - a Crime against Humankind Date: Mon, 12 Apr 2004 16:09:43 -0700 Uranium Weapons Cover-ups - a Crime against Humankind Piotr Bein, Ph.D., M.A.Sc., P.Eng., Karen Parker, J.D., Diplome (Strasbourg) Paper prepared in January 2003, for a monograph Politics and Environmental Policy in the 21st Century, Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Belgrade …They are no more All powerful. As their secrets Are unfolded… - Afon Claerwen, 28 November 2002 http://www.uraniumweaponsconference.de/background.htm Munitions that contain low-grade uranium 235 ­ insufficient to trigger nuclear explosion ­ are chemical-radiological weapons. They contain other toxic-radioactive elements and have indiscriminate effects. They are illegal by virtue of international conventions, laws and customs of war. When used in populated areas or in the presence of numerous troops (enemy or friendly), they become weapons of delayed but mass destruction (WMD). Fatal consequences of depleted uranium (DU) armour-piercing ammunition emerged in veterans and civilians after wars in the Persian Gulf and the Balkans. While the victims remain neglected, hundreds of tons of uranium from weapons developed in recent years against hard and buried targets have polluted Afghanistan. Up-coming war scenarios involve larger chemical-radiological contamination potential. The military, governments, and nuclear and weapon industries fail to or inadequately disclose the effects of uranium weapons, and manipulate inquiries of international health organizations. The media act as a propaganda outlet for these groups. The purpose of Information Operations behind the propaganda is to influence perceptions and actions of foreign and domestic public, governments, and intelligence. A spiraling group self-deception perpetuates the propaganda for fear of liability and criminal responsibility. Covering up information on war crimes and crimes against humanity, and military and foreign policy based on such information, are crimes themselves. Independent researchers urge priority actions to reverse the cycle of deception and human suffering ecause of deception on uranium weapons: (i) weapon inspections to determine which ones contain uranium, (ii) target inspection to identify those hit and contaminated by uranium weapons, (iii) health monitoring and support for target communities in uranium-contaminated areas, and (v) fundamental review of all research that was so far restricted to DU instead of uranium weaponry in general. The weapons clearly violate humanitarian law, even in the absence of a specific treaty barring their use. The violations related to the use of the weapons are sufficiently grave to be classified war crimes or crimes against humanity, which would impose legal liability and criminal sanctions on the users as well as fair compensation and other remedies for the victims of these weapons. A treaty banning uranium weaponry is not necessary, but preparations for one could be exploited to duck responsibility. Even beginning the process to draft a treaty could be used by the US to argue that any ban on uranium weaponry in light of existing customary law is null and void. The US uses public pressure for an anti-DU treaty to bolster its position and to argue against the existing ban. Unsuspecting activists play into the US position and seriously undermine all anti-uranium initiatives. Introduction The concept of toxic-radioactive warfare dates back to World War II when air attacks with uranium oxide aerosols were considered a realistic threat. Since then, the US has developed depleted uranium (DU) ammunition (for example, the bibliography of Loewenstein [1992]). Depleted uranium (DU) became a contentious political-environmental issue after US, UK and other countries’ involvement in wars in the Persian Gulf and the Balkans. Leading scientists in the area of radiation and its consequences have joined with an increasing number of victims of DU weaponry (including former combatants and civilians), and have squared off against the governments that have developed and used, or sanctioned the use of, these weapons. The “Kosovo” DU scandal in 2000/2001 saw tools of information warfare employed to cover-up use of uranium non-atomic weapons, including intimidation of vocal victims of DU, independent researchers, and activists in the West and former Soviet block countries. A consequential information warfare and the politics regarding DU is tracked by the growing number of concerned groups, including, for example, DU-Watch (www.du-watch.org). Contributed to by many individuals, this material precipitated propaganda analyses presented to international conferences in Manchester in November 2000 [Bein] and in Prague a year later [Bein and Zoric]. A recent article describes information warfare in the context of war propaganda constructed around the ”Osama-WMD” theme [Chossudovsky, 2003]. UK researcher Dai Williams, who substantially expanded the understanding of uranium weapons and their political cover-up, has posted a number of essential materials at www.eoslifework.co.uk. For example, in 1997, a US Air Force mission plan indicated a new generation of hard target guided weapons with warheads from 120 kg to 10 t that would use "dense metal" to double their penetration effect. Misinformation and cover-ups of these weapons exhibit patterns similar to those employed for DU armour-piercers. Williams writes: “The principle that uranium (depleted or not) is used in some guided weapons, as well as anti-tank penetrators, is now established by statements from Jane's, [US secretary of defense] Donald Rumsfeld and the UK Ministry of Defence. The question now is not ‘Has Uranium been used in guided weapons?’ but ‘Which ones, how many, when and where?’” The findings of research into the effects or DU and other weaponry containing radiation but not causing nuclear explosions (which as a whole can be referred to as radiological weaponry) are indisputable. Even a cursory review of existing norms of the laws and customs of war (humanitarian law) supports the conclusion that uranium weaponry of any type is so patently illegal that the discussion should really focus on bringing to justice those who have used it and redirecting action towards the victims of these weapons. But the international community still confronts the “denial and deflect” policies of the users. Why this quest to cover-up uranium weapons and misrepresent their health and environmental effects? The paper seeks to answer the question step-by-step. Part 1 briefly sets out the science of radiological weapons, and summarizes their hazards. It then sets out a digest of official documents proving that the authorities responsible for uranium contamination knew about the risks involved ­ the principal reason they suppressed the evidence. Part 2 overviews humanitarian law relating to weaponry and the consequences of violations, including the duty to condemn such weaponry, the duty to compensate victims (redress), and the duty to clean up. Understanding of this clearly shows why those responsible think they have to cover-up that they knowingly developed and used "illegal" weapons. Rather than face those consequences, they misstate, mislead, and misinform. Part 3 analyses the details of the cover-ups with a view on exposing the methods and tactics and providing a way to counter the damage caused by the cover-ups. Part 1: Uranium weapons and their hazards Uranium properties and military non-nuclear applications Counting only uranium isotopes, uranium ore contains 99.3% U-238, 0.7% U-235 and traces of U-234. DU metal is depleted of U-235 down to about 0.2%, hence the name. The rest is U-238 and traces of U-234. The combined radioactivity of DU is about 40% less than in the natural mix of uranium isotopes. References on DU weapons describe physical properties of the metal as if other metallic forms of uranium differed. This is true for uranium alloyed with other metals that can significantly alter the original properties, but not for the uranium isotopes. For example, a mix of 99.3% U-238, 0.7% U-235 and trace quantity of U-234 would have the same physical properties as DU, but would be difficult to detect, since the ratio of uranium isotopes, the prime detection parameter for DU, would be similar to that in nature. At 19.1 g/cm3, uranium has an advantage over slightly denser tungsten, which is not as abundant and very expensive. The nuclear industry has hundreds of thousands tons of waste DU to dispose of after U-235 has been extracted. For the US arms makers, who obtain enrichment byproduct uranium free of charge, DU opened an opportunity. The first non-atomic weapon that employed DU was the “silver bullet”. At a high speed of impact, bullet’s density, hardness and flammability enable penetration into heavily armoured targets. Tungsten does not ignite as easily and is 1.75 times harder, which together with a much higher melting point, makes it more difficult to work with, compared to DU. Alloying with 0.75% titanium increases hardness of DU anti-tank penetrators. Manufacturing processes e.g. heat treatment and forging, determine DU's strength and fragmentation qualities. The applications of armour-piercers range from 20 mm Phalanx gun in the navy for piercing attacking missiles, through 30 mm gun in A-10 aircraft, to 105 mm and larger tank barrels. Tank armour and removable armour of combat vehicles are hardened with DU plate. Many countries, industrialized and poor, make and use the DU bullets and armour. Significantly more uranium than in DU bullets would be used in weapons developed under a Hard or Deeply Buried Target Defeat Capability (HDBTDC) programme launched by the US military in the mid 1990s [www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/smart/hdbtdc.htm]. The weapons must be able to penetrate targets in hardened buildings, or underground. This can be accomplished with a high density penetrating warheads with smart fuses that delay detonation until the weapon is in the desired space, for example, on the lowest level of a multi-level concrete building. The weapons also need to neutralize chemical and biological agents before they escape into the environment, by using incendiary warheads. Owing to its density, uranium ­ depleted or not ­ can double the penetration power relative to older weapons. Currently, over 20 weapon systems against hard and buried targets, stocked for imminent “wars on terror”, are most likely made of uranium. New versions are under development and testing. The biggest of them, Big BLU, contains several tons of a “dense metal” in the penetrator alone. The mysterious metal must be uranium, since as dense and harder tungsten would be prohibitively expensive, less workable and not readily ignitable. Dr. Asaf Durakovic measured very significantly higher levels of uranium in Afghanis near targets hit by penetrating bombs and missiles. His team noticed the weapons punched through several concrete floors and walls, then buried 3 to 4 meters in the earth before exploding. [www.umrc.net]. Were they used in foreseeable war scenarios, the weapons would produce contamination levels significantly higher than from DU bullets in the Gulf War. For its pyrophoric properties, i.e. spontaneous burning in air when in fine form (swarfs, metallic dust), uranium in an incendiary warhead could be effective in neutralizing biological or chemical weapons facilities hidden underground or in concrete structures. Powdered uranium could be the incendiary agent in the last stage of a warhead in a penetrating weapon cased or ballasted with uranium. The incendiary warhead would add its mass to the weapon’s penetrating impact. The shaped charge technology also employs uranium. By focusing explosives in one direction e.g. by containing them with a conical or concave hemisphere metal liner, detonation compresses and squeezes the liner forward, forming a jet of molten metal traveling as fast as 10 km/s. Jane's website indicated some time ago that DU was used as "liners in shaped charge warheads". Guided weapons ranging from Maverick and Hellfire missiles to torpedoes, sub-munitions in cluster bombs and the first stage of BROACH MWS warheads use this technology. At his website Williams provides an in-depth, up-to-date review of both the HDBTDC and shaped charge weaponry. DU is used in counterweights of military aircraft. Civilian aircraft gradually abandon the use of DU weights in favour of safer tungsten, after a number of crashes in which DU weights burned in the fire and contaminated populated areas. Some helicopters have DU weights in the rotor blades, for example, Apache A64 has 100 kg. DU weights would be logical in guided missiles and in other weapons that employ, like aircraft, flight control surfaces. Small quantities of uranium may be in navigational equipment in aircraft, vessels and land vehicles. During the “Kosovo DU” scandal, U-236, plutonium, americum and other transuranic elements turned out to be in DU, contrary to industry specifications. Although these extremely toxic and radioactive substances were present only in trace quantities, their high power significantly increases the toxicity and radioactivity of the 30 mm DU bullets shot in Operation Allied Force. The substances are spent nuclear fuels and nuclear waste recycled into DU stock. Uranium alloy in weapons has a composition and toxic-radioactive properties depending on what other materials in what quantities have been blended in. It is, of course, convenient to dispose of very hazardous nuclear waste far away from the producer’s country. Much testing of DU weaponry took place outside the national territory of the United States: Okinawa, Puerto Rico (Vieques), Panama (whose government found out about it after the fact) and on lands legally considered to be the lands of Indigenous Peoples in the United States. According to Williams’s compilation of industry and military sources, other radiological weapons were most likely tested in Iraq (Operation Desert Storm 1991, Desert Fox 1998), in air raids in Iraq’s no-fly zone since 1992) and the Balkans (Bosnia 1994-1995, Kosovo 1999). Most recently in Afghanistan, the use of these weapons was confirmed by high contamination of residents near sites hit by hard-target weapons. Use outside a states’ territory brings in a whole body of international prohibitions related to “exporting” hazardous materials. As will be set out in Part II, responsible authorities are liable under a wide range of international law beyond humanitarian law. Fate of uranium in radiological weapons Upon impact, the high kinetic energy of an armour-piercing DU projectile ignites it and helps it penetrate the armour, self-sharpening fashion. Part of DU metal vaporizes into a very fine dust (aerosol) of uranium oxides. About two-thirds are dark brown and black insoluble particles,. Those oxygen-rich are soluble in water, and yellow and orange in colour. The dust covers the target area, is readily re-suspended, and can travel with wind for at least tens of km. Fire consuming DU ammunition and DU armour also turns the metal into oxide particles. Depleted uranium rounds that miss the target may corrode in soil or water, producing fine material that disperses with air movements and washes away. Uranium oxide residue includes unnatural, sharp-edged ceramic particles that pose a special hazard inside the body. About 50 - 70% of the particles in the dust are respirable, i.e. less than 10 ?m in size. Soldiers who survive an attack by DU ammunition may have DU metal and dust in the wounds. They will likely have inhaled or ingested far more DU dust than recommended limits on intake. Civilians may also inhale or ingest DU dust or collect fragments of DU metal. Several US Bradley fighting vehicles were buried in Saudi Arabia due to “substantial non-removable depleted uranium contamination.” The remaining vehicles and tanks were shipped to a decontamination facility in the USA, where workers in protective suits cleaned up some vehicles, but the more heavily contaminated equipment was buried in a radioactive waste dump The Kuwaiti government hired foreign contractors to gather destroyed Iraqi equipment in its territory, including vehicles contaminated with DU [US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, 1995]. A 1995 article in the US Army magazine Armor gave advice on minimizing exposure to DU: “If you find radioactive DU contamination on a vehicle, move the vehicle to a site away from water sources, food storage or eating areas, and occupied bivouac sites [...] always keep personnel away from contaminated equipment or terrain unless required to complete the mission.” DU particles still fly around DU battlefields and beyond. With a half-life of 4.5 billion years, U-238 particles contaminate practically forever. Elevated radioactivity levels (from U-235 and decay products of U-238 in DU, from transuranics, and U-236 contained in "dirty" DU, or from other uranium non-nuclear weapons used in the Gulf War) were measured in Bulgaria, when the wind blew from the Persian Gulf. A decade after the Gulf War, Dr. Chris Busby measured ?-activity on the battlefields in southern Iraq at 20 times higher level than in Baghdad, and in the populated Basrah region adjacent to the battlefields ­ at 10 times higher level. In November 2002, UN Environmental Program (UNEP) investigators of the fate of DU ammunition used in 1994-1995 in Bosnia recommended evacuation and cleanups of contaminated buildings and grounds in Hadžici (Sarajevo) and Han Pijesak (Republika Srpska). Hadžici refugees in Bratunac and elsewhere have died of radiation exposure, but a report from a local health professional Dr. Slavica Jovanovic has not been published yet. In Kosovo, Montenegro and Southern Serbia, DU-sites were previously marked, fenced off, and contaminated soil was removed to storage at the Yugoslav nuclear institute in Vinca. Soldiers bring DU particles home on clothing and on “souvenirs” collected from the battlefields. Many of non-combat military, civilians at the ports receiving Gulf War soldiers and equipment, as well as families of the combatants contracted Gulf War syndrome, without ever being near DU battlefields, and without receiving vaccinations that were administered to the combatants. In October 2002, vice chairman of the US veterans coalition Denise Nichols stated in her critique of the government’s analysis of Gulf War casualties: “Civilians ­ meaning service personnel wives and children ­ have reported in ill but no data has been provided on that! These service personnel sent home items from the Gulf and then returned, themselves and more equipment after the war. Members of the same units, who did not go to the war but dealt with returning equipment from the Gulf have reported ill. Civilians at the port sites that work with the equipment returning from the Gulf have reported in ill. Their families have also experienced health problems.” The combat fate of uranium in the other munitions is similar to that in DU bullets and armour. The energy of impact of uranium penetrators might ignite the metal, or else uranium would burn in the explosion. If uranium remained as fragments, it would eventually corrode. Uranium lining of shaped charges likely turns partially into uranium oxide dust with a high proportion of ceramic particles. Production, testing, and disposal of uranium weapons create similar hazards as combat use. To date, most of the states in the US have hosted these activities. Data is scarce on similar problems in over 30 other countries that produce and use uranium non-nuclear weapons. Many people exposed in uranium mining, nuclear industry processes, DU weapons manufacturing, testing ranges and disposal sites show significant increases in slow onset cancers, compared to less exposed communities and occupations See reports of the Military Toxics Project [www.miltoxproj.org]. The cleanup bill for DU fine particles, shrapnel and unexploded ammunition at just one of many such places around the world, the Jefferson Proving Ground in Indiana, would be $7.8 billion, so the area was not cleaned up but closed. Disposal of expired uranium weapons can release an order of magnitude more contamination than uranium battles. The Sierra Army Depot in Northern California has burned tens of times more DU munitions than all DU wars have used [The Chugoku Shimbun, May 19, 2000]. In a fire at a DU munitions plant near New York in the 1970s, DU dust was carried downwind 41 km from the site of the fire. More recent fires at the UK Royal Ordnance factory in Featherstone in 1996 and 1999 sent plumes tens of km away from the source. In 1999, a plume of smoke reached 50 km out, exposing thousands of local residents to uranium dust for at least several weeks. The fire released 200-500 kg of DU, the mass of uranium in a medium-sized penetrating bomb. The fallout fell down on unknown locations. A 1991 fire at the US Army base in Doha, Kuwait, destroyed 300 high caliber DU tank rounds, an unknown number of small caliber DU rounds, and four tanks with DU armour and 111 rounds of 120 mm ammunition. Thousands of soldiers were exposed to airborne uranium oxide. The amount of uranium released would be a few tons ­ as much as in the largest hard-target guided weapon. This information was leaked to the media from the US Army's CHPPM report that has not been released to the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Illnesses. US troops are still stationed at Doha. Smaller-scale incidents are also hazardous. One involving pulverization of metallic DU occurred at the Robins Air Force Base, Georgia. The following note was sent to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission on July 27, 1999: "A technician was found using a hammer and chisel to remove installed depleted uranium counterweights from the aileron. This process produced dust and debris that was scattered by a nearby fan. The technician using a hammer and chisel on the depleted uranium was in violation of several rules [...] The area has been secured and decontamination procedures initiated." Hazards of uranium The main hazards of uranium are fire, toxicity, and radioactivity. Uranium in larger chunks ignites at 500 deg C, while in finer form it self-ignites and burns spontaneously in the air. Heavy metal uranium forms oxides that are as toxic as arsenic compounds, particularly affecting the renal system. Inhaling and swallowing a high dose of uranium oxides entering nose and throat could pose a serious risk, as could happen in an acute exposure to explosion dust and debris from a uranium weapon. Prolonged exposure in a contaminated environment would lead to similar effects. As in the toxic hazard, radioactive risks arise by inhaling uranium dust in the air and ingesting it from dust in the mouth, water, or food. Inhaled particles under 2.5 ?m enter deep into the lungs. The body removes insoluble uranium oxides very slowly, halving their amount in 10 to 20 years. Some particles may move from the lung to the lymph nodes and bone. U-238 emits mainly ?-particles - high energy but ranging only a few millimeters in the air, and ?-particles and ?-rays from its products of decay. Hence the radiological insult from a microscopic speck of U-238 oxide inside the body is focused on the surrounding tissue within a radius of about 30 microns. “Impurities” added to DU in the recycling process add other “hot “ micro-particles to the hazards of pure DU. Uranium radiation hazards are covered-up and misrepresented. The total radiological dose inside a person over years severely exceeds safe limits. Limits set by the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) derive from empirically invalid assumptions due to secrecy and distortions around the effects of Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs, then around Cold War developments of nuclear power and weapons. The ICRP risk model was based on studies of bomb survivors, which overlooked the effects from an internal radiation source and ignored cancers that take decades to appear. Physicists instead of biologists developed the ICRP model before DNA was known, yet it purports to represent cell damage processes. ICRP model spreads a dose over a large mass of tissue instead of considering biophysical and biochemical damage mechanisms at the cellular level. A critique was just published by the European Committee on Radiation Risk (ECRR). It shows ICRP models of risk from internal particles underestimate empirical mortality and morbidity by a factor of 100 to 1000. Long before the ECRR critique, standard textbooks on radioactivity have been stating that if ?-particles enter the body with inhalation, food or through open wounds, they become exceptionally dangerous, since they emit much energy to each cell. The standard texts are also clear that long-term effects of accumulated small exposures transfer to future generations. Every dose is harmful and can cause cancer or genetic changes after years, therefore one must always avoid unnecessary exposure and maintain doses in smallest quantities possible. The hazard of ?-particles is large despite their short range in a tissue, for example, 30 microns in the lungs. Although ?-particles penetrate tissue to the depth of several centimeters, the resulting biological damage is significantly smaller compared to that of ?-particles. The tissue weakens ?- and X-rays only to a small degree. The biological effect of one absorbed quantum of ?- and X-ray radiation in the tissue is the same as from one quantum of ?-radiation. External exposure by contact with DU metal can be hazardous; over less than a few hours one can get annual allowable dose. DU contaminated by nuclear waste blended into it is more risky. Many military and civilians got sick from wearing “DU jewellery” or keeping DU fragments in the pockets. One mg of U-238 emits per year the equivalent of over one billion high energy, ionizing particles and rays that can produce extensive biological damage. The mass of inhalable particles is typically a few nanograms (one billionth of a gram), so a typical one may emit about a thousand particles per year, or one every few hours. The energy of each ?-particle exceeds the damage threshold of vital cell-building molecules. Novel chemical reactions take place, which alter or destroy the shape, organisation and function of these molecules. A particle of uranium oxide lodged in the tissue damages a cell beyond repair [www.llrc.org/health/healthpage.htm]. The radiological insult triggers biological damage mechanisms, which extend the initial damage. ECRR attributes a 1000 more damaging power to a U-238 particle lodged in the tissue, compared to other forms of ingested and inhaled U-238. Health effects of uranium exposure The health effects depend on the quantity of uranium oxide dust inhaled or ingested, frequency, and duration of exposure. A high initial dose can cause acute respiratory failure and poisoning, leading to death within a few days. Smaller doses cause hair loss, reduced regeneration of skin and nails, physical weakness, fatigue, flu-like symptoms, diarrhea, and immune and peripheral nervous system damage manifested up to a few months after the initial exposure. After a year and longer, medium to high doses may cause birth defects in infants of pregnant women, leukemia, and rapid-onset cancers, followed later by slower cancers. Smaller initial doses longer-term may produce multiple physical and mental symptoms, and nervous debilitation. Damage of immune system in exposed population could be a major mortality factor in Afghanistan, where several hundred tons of uranium was released from hard-target weapons. Plagued by winter cold and starvation, uranium casualties with reduced immunity would have greatly reduced chances of surviving common diseases. Many could have died without being diagnosed with uranium exposure. The same factor could increase morbidity and mortality in Iraq and Yugoslavia ­ both countries under international embargo, and consequent impoverishment of the population coupled with reduced ability of local authorities to care for the sick. A team from the Uranium Medical Research Center (UMRC) reported after a visit to hard-target bomb sites in Afghanistan [www.umrc.net]: "The UMRC field team was shocked by the breadth of public health impacts coincident with the bombing. Without exception, at every bombsite investigated, people are ill. A significant portion of the civilian population presents symptoms consistent with internal contamination by Uranium." The acute symptoms above have been reported by Gulf War veterans, including post-conflict military personnel exposed to targets contaminated by DU. The slower onset illness and disorders have been reported by Gulf veterans, and doctors and health researchers who have worked with civilians exposed to DU in Iraq. Leukemia, cancers and birth deformities are on an increase among international soldiers and policemen who served in Bosnia, and among local population exposed to DU ammunition. The rates of all cancers in Sarajevo between 1995 and 2000 increased from 46 to 264 per 100,000 according to a Sarajevo registry report of January 2001 [www.llrc.org]. As the contaminants spread over the years, so will the health problems. Low but chronic exposure risks may arise from air, water or food contamination in areas surrounding a population. The contaminants could build up and bio-accumulate over years from the initial fallout. Local terrain, ecosystem, meteorological conditions, agricultural practice and food habits are some of the factors that would determine the secondary exposures and doses. Most DU research to date has assumed healthy, young male soldiers and low-dose initial exposure from 30 to 120 mm armour-piercers (mass of DU 0.3 to 4.5 kg per bullet). If uranium is used in warheads having a mass of up to several tons, then humans surviving the explosion will suffer acute health effects from much higher doses. Being unprecedented, these exposures require a new analysis of uranium fate-effect relationships. The closest analogy would be fires of DU ammunition as at the Doha base, UK Royal Ordnance factory fires, or the burning of DU counterweights in jet crashes, but no medical reports are available. Wider area residents are vulnerable to initial small doses from the fallout from large uranium weapons, and to ongoing, indirect exposure to contamination of air, water and food. Exposures in Iraq’s Basrah region could be analogous. Government and industry documents on uranium hazards The hazards of DU are similar to those from other uranium metals suspected in new non-nuclear weapons. Official US and UK government documents have been warning about toxic-radioactive risks of DU as follows. A 1983 literature study by the Batelle Pacific Nothwest Laboratory for the US Department of the Army, clearly discerns the two types of DU hazards: "The chemical toxicity is the critical limit for soluble uranium compounds, and the critical organ is the kidney. Insoluble compounds present a [radiological] hazard primarily to the lungs […] The exposure limits for toxicity are more conservative than most of the radiological limits and thus protect from either type of insult." [Mishima et al., 1983] A 1984 US Federal Aviation Agency document cautions the investigators of aircraft crashes against the hazard from DU in counterweights of civilian airplanes: particles inhaled or ingested are toxic and can cause long-term irradiation of the internal tissue. Six months before the Gulf War, a Science Applications International Corporation report wrote, "Short-term effects of high doses can result in death, while long-term effects of low doses have been implicated in cancer." Shortly after the Gulf War in March 1991, a memo from the US Defence Nuclear Agency stated that alpha particles emitted from DU dust created from exploded DU ammunition pose a health risk, but beta particles from DU shrapnel and from intact DU bullets are a serious hazard to health. In the early nineties, the UK Atomic Energy Authority warned that if all of the DU fired by tanks in the Gulf War was inhaled, "there could be half a million deaths as a result by 2000." Tanks fired only about 8% of all DU used in that war. A 1993 US General Accounting Office report GAO/NSIAD-93-90 stated, "Inhaled insoluble [DU] oxides stay in the lungs longer and pose a potential cancer risk due to radiation. Ingested DU dust can also pose both a radioactive and toxicity risk." A 1995 US Army Environmental Policy Institute report warned, "Toxicologically, DU poses a health risk when internalized. Radiologically, the radiation emitted by DU results in health risks from both external and internal exposures [...] If DU enters the body, it has the potential to generate significant medical consequences.“ A January 2001 leak revealed that the UK Ministry of Defense was secretly testing for radiation poisoning among British soldiers just months before it sent troops to Kosovo. At the time the ministry was refusing screening for Gulf War veterans. The disclosure went much further than an earlier leak that showed only that officers knew 4 years earlier about the risk of developing lung, lymph and brain cancers from DU shells. The industry is also well aware of the risks from airborne contamination by DU. Paul Loewenstein, vice president of Nuclear Metals Inc. (now Starmet Corporation, the prime US supplier of DU metal and related products) wrote: “The main hazard to health occurs in those fabrication steps where finely divided particles (dust or oxides) can become airborne. In operations such as melting and casting, machining, grinding, pickling and heating without using a protective atmosphere or vacuum, it is essential to provide extensive ventilation and to monitor worker’s breathing zones. Vents and fume hoods that protect workers are exhausted through carefully monitored filter systems. Workers must change footwear and clothing when leaving areas where finely divided uranium is present." [Loewenstein, 1992] The Boeing Corporation safety guide for DU counterweights in aircraft and missiles advises: ”Most heavy metals, such as uranium, are toxic to humans depending on the amount introduced into the body. For short-term (acute) exposures, the toxicological effects are the primary concern, and acute exposures to significant amounts of uranium may result in kidney damage.“[Section 4.1.2]. Section 4.1.3 spells out the radiological hazard: “The principal radiological hazard associated with uranium is due to high linear energy transfer of the alpha particles its radionuclides and daughters emit. A chronic exposure to these radionuclides result in an increased risk of cancer, typically in the bones, kidney, and lungs, since these are the organs where uranium is deposited.” Section 6.2.5 concerns airborne contamination with uranium fine particles: “Failure to control airborne contamination could result in inhalation of the contamination and spread of contamination to other areas.” To this end, Section 12.2.3 commands: “Wear a respirator […] whenever entering areas with airborne DU dust particles." [Boeing, 2001] Part 2: Humanitarian law relating to weaponry and the consequences of violations of this law A weapon may be determined to be illegal two ways: (i) by adoption of a specific treaty banning it; and (ii) because its use would necessarily violate existing law and customs of war (humanitarian law). A weapon made illegal only because there is a specific treaty banning it is only illegal for countries that ratify such a treaty. A weapon that is illegal by operation of existing law is illegal for all countries. This is true even if there is also a treaty on this weapon and a country has not ratified that treaty. Evaluating whether DU weaponry (or any other type of weaponry) is legal or illegal, requires analysis under this law. Humanitarian law: the basics The laws and customs of war (humanitarian law) includes all treaties governing military operations, weapons and protection of victims of war as well as all customary international law on these subjects. The main treaties relating to military operations are The Hague Convention of 1899 (186 Parry’s T.S. 429) and The Hague Convention (IV) and Regulations of 1907 (1 Bevans 631), providing a legal framework governing war. Yet some of the most basic rules of war are not found in existing treaties, in part because they were considered widely known and part of the universally understood customary rules of war. One of these basic rules is the obligation to carry out military operations only in the field of battle ­ understood to be operations against enemy combatants who are not hors de combat and against territory and objects of the enemy that are deemed legal targets. Article 25 of The Hague 1907 (Regulations) partially addresses this by prohibiting operations by any means against “undefended towns, villages, dwellings or buildings.” Another basic rule requires that all military operations must cease upon cessation of hostilities. Still other customary international rules includes the duty to warn of dangerous materials or weapons and its corollary rule the duty to clean up such material. The duty to warn rule was set out clearly by the International Court of Justice in its famous Corfu Channel case (1949 International court of Justice Reports, 4). The Court in Corfu Channel emphasized the concept of “elementary considerations of humanity” -- echoing the language of the Martens Clause, set out below. As will be seen below, certain provisions of humanitarian law relating to victims of armed conflict also contain limitations on military operations. The 1899 The Hague Convention banned all weapons and material that cause superfluous injury. Article 23 of the 1907 The Hague Convention, Regulations, specifically recognizes that not all weapons are subject to a “banning” treaty but may be nonetheless banned by operation of existing humanitarian law. The International Court of Justice recognizes this rule in its decision Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (1996 International Court of Justice Reports). In paragraph 87 of that Decision, the Court found that the principles and rules of humanitarian law apply to all weapons, including nuclear ones. In other parts of the opinion the Court stresses the duty to evaluate legality or illegality prior to use in military operations. Article 23 of the 1907 The Hague Regulations sets out further prohibitions of certain types of weapons and materials to add to those found in existing treaties, especially use of poison or poisoned weapons or weapons or materials causing “unnecessary suffering”. Both the 1899 and 1907 conventions set out what is universally called the Martens Clause (the 8th preambular paragraph in The Hague 1907) which states that in situations not addressed in the Conventions or Regulations, combatants and civilians are protected by “the principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity and the dictates of the public conscience.” This rule is repeated in the subsequent treaties relating to victims of armed conflict, and clearly establishes that civil society alone can, by its own initiative, effectively ban a weapon if there is no specific treaty banning it. Other treaties and instruments prohibiting specific weapons date from the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration Renouncing the Use, in time of War, of Explosive Projectiles under 400 Grammes Weight. The 1899 The Hague conference issued declarations prohibiting projectiles launched from balloons, projectiles diffusing poisons and “dum-dum” bullets. Since that time there have been many treaties relating to specific weapons or types of weapons such as those containing hazardous chemicals, bacteriological material and the like. A recent addition has been the banning of any type of military action that would result in undue environmental damage. In addition to a treaty on this issue, the United Nations General Assembly, in its resolution 47/37 of 25 November 1992, affirmed that “destruction of the environment, not justified by military necessity and carried out wantonly, is clearly contrary to existing international law.” The United Nations Centre for Disarmament Affairs has compiled a list of all weapons-banning treaties and it was annexed to United Nations Document E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/27. Humanitarian law relating to victims of armed conflict is generally called “Geneva law”, the name taken from the Geneva Conventions since 1864 on this topic. The current Geneva Conventions include the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 (75 UNTS 31, 75 UNTS 85, 75 UNTS 135 and 75 UNTS 267), Protocol Additional I (1125 UNTS 3) and Protocol Additional II (1125 UNTS 609). The overriding principles of humanitarian law from Geneva law is that sick and wounded combatants, prisoners of war and the civilian population, as well as material essential to the survival of them may not be targets of military operations. The two protocols strongly set out prohibitions of military operations that would unleash hazardous forces (such as an attack on a nuclear power facility or a dam) or would damage the natural environment or water supply. Consulting all of humanitarian law -- both treaty-based and customary -- four fundamental rules are clearly discernable regarding weapons: (1) Weapons may only be used in the legal field of battle, defined as legal military targets of the enemy in the war. Weapons may not have an adverse effect off the legal field of battle. (The "territorial" test). (2) Weapons can only be used for the duration of an armed conflict. A weapon that is used or continues to act after the war is over violates this criterion. (The "temporal" test). (3) Weapons may not be unduly inhumane. This rule incorporates the “causing superfluous injury”, “unnecessary suffering” and Martens Clause limitations of The Hague conventions and regulations as well as the “elementary considerations of humanity” from the Corfu Channel case. (The "humaneness" test). (4) Weapons may not have an unduly negative effect on the natural environment. (The "environmental" test). Humanitarian law violations and UN action on radiation weaponry Evaluating the effects of radiation (DU) weaponry set out in Part I of this paper, it is clear that this weaponry fail all four tests of humanitarian law: (1) It cannot be "contained" to legal fields of battle and thus fails the territorial test. Evidence is overwhelming that uranium particles in dust or smoke can travel far afield from a legal military target. The particles can reach bordering countries that are not part of the armed conflict. Winds can blow particles into places that are near battlefields, but off-limits of legal military operations. In fact, DU can injure far more due to airborne travel than it does against legal targets. DU can also be transported by surface and underground water, carrying damage far beyond the legal field of battle. DU dust can adhere to military personnel and vehicles and travel as vehicles and personnel move about. (2) The weaponry continues to act after hostilities are over and thus fails the temporal test. More than a decade after the cessation of hostilities in the Persian Gulf war, uranium from DU weaponry is still excreted from the bodies of contaminated veterans, and will continue to injure their bodies. The bodies of local residents and other persons within the reach of the spreading contamination will continue to be injured for many years to come. The effects of these weapons cannot be turned off when the war is over; (3) Radiation weaponry is inhumane and thus fails the humaneness test, not only because of how it can kill -- by cancer, kidney disease, and other serious conditions -- but also because these injuries can occur long after the hostilities are over and to persons that are not the “enemy”. Uranium from these weapons is also inhumane because it damages the immune system of those exposed, who then suffer from miscellaneous diseases, which, aggravated by harsh war and after-war conditions may lead to death. DU is also inhumane because it causes birth and genetic defects, thus effecting children (who must never be a military target) and who are born years after the war is over. In this sense, the use of DU weapons may be characterized as genocidal because it burdens gene pools of future generations. DU can also be considered “poison” and thus banned by The Hague Convention. (4) Radiation weapons cannot be used without unduly damaging the natural environment, thus failing the environment test. This aspect of the effects of DU was conceded by several international agencies looking into the DU crisis. The issue of the incompatibility of DU weapons with existing international norms has been taken up at both the United Nations Commission on Human Rights and its Sub-Commission on Promotion and Protection of Human Rights since 1996. While the Commission has not yet issued a resolution on the matter, the Sub-Commission, in its resolution 1996/16 of 29 August 1996, found that use of such weaponry is “incompatible” with existing humanitarian and human rights law. In the same resolution the Sub-Commission began a process to further elaborate on these weapons in light of existing norms by requesting the Secretary-General to look into the issue and report back to the Sub-Commission in 1997. In reply, the Secretary-General issued his report (UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/27 and Add.1) containing a number of replies from governments, specialized agencies and non-governmental organizations ­ all supporting the view of the Sub-Commission on the illegality of these weapons. In its resolution 1997/36 the Sub-Commission continued its investigation of these weapons and appointed one of its members to prepare a paper on the topic. In 2001, following the failure of the first appointed person to submit a paper, the Sub-Commission authorized Justice Y.K.J. Yeung Sik Yuen (Mauritius) to prepare the paper, submitted as UN Document E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/38. The Sik Yuen paper gives a comprehensive overview of the law and facts of a number of troubling weapons. DU weaponry is addressed separately, but Sik Yuen states that all the weapons addressed in the paper can be classified as weaponry of a nature to cause superfluous injury (WSI) and weaponry causing unnecessary suffering (WUS). (Sik Yuen also discusses fission/fusion nuclear weapons, “mini-nukes” such as the B61-11 “bunker busters”, fuel-air bombs (“daisy cutters”), cluster bombs, and chemical and biological weapons, and indicates that the current generation of fuel-air bombs use uranium powder). The present authors maintain that DU and other radiation weaponry can be proven to be weaponry of mass destruction (WMD) when used in populated areas or in the presence of large numbers of enemy or friendly troops, a position supported by the fact that an unacceptable percentage the US veterans of the Gulf War have some serious health complication that can be attributed to DU weaponry. In any case, uranium (depleted or not) weaponry is “poison” in terms of The Hague Convention and even that definition is sufficient. Justice Sik Yuen points out a number of issues surrounding the DU controversy that we take up in this paper: the issue of what Sik Yuen refers to as “secrets”, the issue of seriously compromised “research” and the issue of the public outcry against DU in light of the Martens Clause. Regarding secrecy he points out two claims made by critics: (1) that the US purposely tries to cover up the true nature and effects of DU weapons because it does not want to be held liable; and (2) that the US knew of the serious consequences of DU before it was used, but for purposes of military expediency it deliberately sent its own troops into DU-corrupted battlefields (and, of course, injured countless Iraqi soldiers and civilians). Regarding compromised studies, he presents a Rand Corporation report and a report by the Royal Society (UK). The Royal Society was subsequently forced into revising its position on the safety of DU. Regarding the invocation of the Martens Clause, Sik Yuen comments that he was surprised by the number of anti-DU groups and that their actions are an aspect of the Martens Clause. The 2002 Sub-Commission authorized a second paper by Sik Yuen that is being prepared to submit to the Sub-Commission at its August 2003 session. The fact that the Sub-Commission agrees with the analysis here and has made such a commitment to review of the issue indicates both its understanding that weapons may be banned by operation of existing law, that DU weaponry is that type of weaponry, and that the use of these weapons is very grave. The Sub-Commission also acknowledges that the issue of weapons in light of existing human rights and humanitarian law is an appropriate subject for the UN human rights bodies. It did this because the United States tried to argue that weapons may only be discussed in the "disarmament" forums, where, of course, the focus is on "treaty-drafting" rather than on confirmation that existing law may condemn a weapon. Arguments against seeking a DU-banning treaty Some opponents of DU weaponry have proposed work on an anti-DU treaty. This can be very risky because a new “trick” of the US (and a few other governments) is to use treaty processes to try to weaken, if not completely undermine, existing customary law. The United States tries to assert that if there is a treaty on a subject, then any pre-existing customary international law on the subject is terminated. Thus, even beginning the process to draft a treaty would be used by the US to argue that any ban on uranium weaponry in light of existing customary law is terminated. This would be devastating in the US because Courts in the US are likely to be persuaded on this point even though the International Court of Justice categorically rejects this line of reasoning in the Nicaragua case (Military and Paramilitary Activity In and Against Nicaragua, 1986 International Court of Justice Reports). Note the US also "declined jurisdiction" of the Court in the Nicaragua case although the US is not legally allowed to do so. Neither the US Congress nor its Courts took up this matter. The United States then, uses public pressure for an anti-DU treaty to bolster its position and to argue against the existing ban under customary law and The Hague Conventions. Thus, unsuspecting activists can actually play into the US position and seriously undermine all anti-uranium initiatives. Even if an anti-DU treaty were drafted, neither the US nor the UK would be likely to ratify it regardless of the language of the treaty -- which for sure the US would seek to control. However, the US would still argue that the existence of the treaty subsumes the customary international law banning DU. This would clearly make it more difficult for Gulf War veterans to take their issues directly to the Veteran's Administration as the VA would be taking the position that no illegality was involved. So we must emphasize most strongly, a treaty banning uranium weapons is not necessary, but preparations for one could be exploited to duck responsibility. Further, any treaty could be broken anyway, especially by US and other NATO countries, as history has proven. Consequences of uranium weapons use As uranium weaponry is already illegal under existing humanitarian law, countries that have used them are responsible for military and civilian victims and for environmental pollution throughout the life cycle of the weapons, from development to disposal of unused munitions. The Geneva Conventions require all Parties to “search for persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed […] grave breaches, and shall bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own courts.” (Article 49 in the First Geneva Convention. There is an identical provision in the other three conventions of 1949). Thus uses of DU weaponry place their own military and commanders at serious legal risk. Hopefully, wider understanding of this will constrain the nearly 30 other countries that have or plan to develop, produce and stock radiological munitions. The US has exported known and suspected uranium weapons to over 20 countries. It does this in part to militate against the “customary” prohibition of these weapons, presumably to be able to argue that if a large number of countries have DU and other radiological weaponry in their arsenals, it weighs against a ban by operation of customary humanitarian law. However, it is likely that many of the countries having DU weaponry supplied by the US in their arsenals did not know what it was. And it appears that most of these countries have not used these weapons in military operations. And further, these countries in aggregate cannot re-write The Hague Conventions, the Geneva Conventions and all other instruments or customary rules of humanitarian law. To do so would require large-scale denunciation of the treaties ­ which no country is prepared to do. Further, governments that manufacture or have purchased uranium weapons are likely to be compromised into maintaining US secrecy over the extent of non-nuclear uranium weapons proliferation, and may face serious legal and political consequences of chronic illnesses or deaths on former and future battlefields due to uranium contamination. The duty to compensate victims of humanitarian law violations has long been a rule of customary humanitarian law. In treaty-based humanitarian law this rule is found in Article 3 of the 1907The Hague Convention. Evolution of the right to compensation of victims and the duty to compensate by violators has been a prominent feature of human rights law, beginning with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, whose Article 8 requires an effective remedy for victims of violations. Other human rights instruments have comparable provisions for compensation for violations. The UN human rights forum’s prolific studies of this issue began with the “van Boven” study: van Boven’s final paper on the right to restitution, compensation and rehabilitation for victims of gross violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms (UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/8) culminates work that began in 1989. The Commission on Human Rights carried on with the appointment of Cherif Bassiouni as first an independent expert and then a Special Rapporteur. The van Boven “Guidelines” for remedies, derived from long-existing treaty-based and customary laws were included, with modifications, in Bassiouni’s final report, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2000/62, Annex. A minimum requirement of the duty to remedy from use of illegal weaponry is compensation for all victims. This can include, for example, military and civilian victims from uranium wars and civilian victims of uranium weapon use at military ranges. Part of the minimum remedy is the duty to fully disclose all facts about the weapons and their development and deployment. Regarding environmental damages, users of these weapons are obligated to carry out an effective clean-up. When lands and water resources cannot be effectively cleaned up, the State causing the damage must pay damages equal to the loss of those lands and waters from the national patrimony. In US dollars, the cost of legal claims and environmental cleanup for the Gulf War alone would be staggering. The chief prosecutor of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Carla del Ponte, initially refused to prosecute NATO for contaminating Bosnia and Kosovo with uranium due to use of DU weaponry in the Balkans. But on January 14, 2001, she said her tribunal would act “if coherent results emerge directly linking the use of DU ammunition with health problems.” This statement of a theoretical willingness to open the tribunal to prosecution and potential damage claims is a key factor in the continued “artificial” controversy about what DU and other radiation weapons actually do. As more and more evidence surfaces that the developers of the weaponry knew how lethal it was, even before the Gulf War, it will become more and more difficult for the Tribunal to keep this issue out. Compensation and clean-up costs in Bosnia-Hercegovina and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia would also be staggering, more so if hard-target weapons, cluster bombs and other weaponry made with uranium were deployed in substantial numbers. Taking on the issue of consequences of the use of DU weaponry and fashioning adequate remedies for the victims of these weapons would go a long way to dispelling increased international consternation over the appearance of bias in the operation of the tribunal ­ with to date not one warrant for a member of the NATO forces and relatively few for non-Serbian participants. In addition to the elaboration of remedies under humanitarian law and for gross violations of human rights, there has been a necessary evolution in the concept of international environmental law, especially arising from the Sub-Commission’s incorporation of a right to a healthy environment as part of its mandate. The seminal work was done by the Sub-Commission’s Special Rapporteur Fatma-Zohra Ksentini (now Fatma-Zohra Ouhachi-Vesely), culminating in final report UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/9. Ouhachi-Vesely was subsequently appointed as Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights to address the issue of toxics and toxic dumping ­ a mandate that continues today. Her work involves investigating allegations of damage due to toxic materials (such as DU) and trying to work out appropriate remedies. This mandate may prove a fruitful vehicle to heighten international concern over uranium weapons and to elaborate the legal consequences and obligations of users. Part 3: Anatomy of cover-ups Group-think The US and UK governments claim they deploy DU ammunition because for a lower cost compared to tungsten, it can havean advantage over enemy armour, reduce their own casualties and utilize industrial waste. The claims are not justified. The additional expense on tungsten would be negligible in the total military spending. The DU weapons are not effective compared to alternatives [Venik’s Aviation, 2001]. DU ammunition and armour do not utilize significant quantities of the total nuclear waste. As to protecting own soldiers, the victims of “friendly fire” suffer from acute poisoning and radiation sickness, instead of ordinary wounds, while longer-term casualties are substantial. A US study of 10,000 Gulf War Veterans indicated that 80% could have been exposed to DU, i.e. more than half a million. Of the tens of thousands of coalition soldiers serving after the war’s end, only about 30 specialists knew how to identify equipment contaminated by DU and were aware of the need to wear protective clothing. September 2002 Gulf War report on US veterans shows 0.1% casualty rate in combat, but a 36% post-combat rate. Uranium is one of several major causes of the syndrome, so a casualty rate of several percent would be attributable to DU. Official reports in the West ignore civilian casualties of uranium weapons in Iraq, the Balkans, and recently in Afghanistan. Iraqis and Serbs were subject to economic sanctions when they most needed medical supplies, fuel and food. Sick Afghanis with weakened immune resistance due to uranium contamination died of cold and starvation, without being recorded as victims of uranium weapons. Given that the US and other NATO governments knew about the consequences for civilians, it seems likely that the severe imposition of sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Iraq is meant to cover-up damage due to radiological weaponry. Ignoring military and civilian casualties, placing serious obstacles on humanitarian aid, and failing to disclose the truth about uranium effects is a serious violation of humanitarian law. For this reason alone, the sanctions regime against Iraq could be characterized as a crime against humanity. Yet the US has indicated that it would militarily attack any country that tries to bring American military to the International Criminal Court or to courts in their own countries, notwithstanding the provision of the Geneva Conventions set out above. Pro-uranium propaganda has seriously compromised scientific reports, even by international organizations, all subject to military-government funding and control. It was also verbalized in statements from government, military and arms and nuclear industry. It is of great concern that political representatives were unable to obtain information from alternative sources. That the propaganda was accepted by decision makers despite unverifiable contents points to a fundamental flaw in how these countries address military issues and weapons. Countless journalists, researchers, professors and persons in responsible positions help in NATO deception and misinformation. Those individuals break professional ethics of primary allegiance to public good, and have willingly or unwillingly, knowingly or unknowingly, colluded in the crimes by spreading lies and distortions about fatal effects of uranium. The propaganda has led to an absurd situation where national leaders and parliaments justify attacking Iraq because it might have potential in the future to deploy WMD ­ but plan themselves to use equally lethal uranium weapons of indiscriminate or mass effect against Iraq. Uranium weapons likely persist due to institutional pressures that, once started to defend an effective DU bullet, escalated to a point of no return. Switching to other types of weapons would indirectly admit the hazards, while ample evidence incriminates those responsible because they knew the potential dangers from the beginning. In an extreme case scenario, war-mongers and ethnic-haters in high positions may have discovered an effective toxic-radioactive terrorist tool in uranium weapons. With it, they can damage present and future generations of the “enemy” without public stigma of WMD, though with some ‘collateral damage” to own civilians and troops over the lifecycle of the weapons. Williams [2002] considered that civilian and military decision makers responsible for propagation and use of uranium weapons may be caught up in a “group think” ­ a self-justifying logic that generates illusory morality, demands conformity, accepts high risk strategies and demonizes enemies and dissenters. The phenomenon led to the Bay of Pigs fiasco. Some Western governments seem to be following the group-think in the US wars with “Saddam”, “Milosevic” and recently the "Wars on Terrorism". Group-think in authoritarian organizations would explain why the health risks of uranium weapons have been downplayed or outright ignored by the military, and why those responsible chose to cover up their criminal position, rather than relinquish uranium weapons. Indirect evidence exists that cover-up was desired. In 1947 a secret memo from the US Atomic Energy Commission had this self-incriminating statement about medical experiments on human subjects: "It is desired that no document be released which refers to experiments with humans and might have adverse affects on public opinion or result in legal suits. Documents covering such work field should be classified 'secret.'" Following the Gulf War’s “full scale low-radiation experiment with DU bullets, a memo dated March 1, 1991, from Lt. Col. Ziehmn of Los Alamos National Laboratory apparently defined future US military policy regarding DU weapons: "It is believed that du penetrators were very effective against Iraqi armor; however, assessments of such will have to be made. There has been and continues to be a concern regarding the impact of du on the environment. Therefore, if no one makes a case for the effectiveness of du on the battlefield, du rounds may become politically unacceptable and thus, be deleted from the arsenal. If du penetrators proved their worth during our recent combat activities, then we should assure their future existence (until something better is developed) through Service/DoD proponency. If proponency is not garnered, it is possible that we stand to lose a valuable combat capability. I believe we should keep this sensitive issue at mind when after action reports are written." A few years later, as hard-target weapons came on the development, testing and combat use stream, the philosophy must have been extended to the newer military applications of uranium waste. Logically, similar cover-up approach would govern next weapons that leave low-level radiation behind, for many future generations to deal with. Information warfare Information warfare is one of the instruments of power, beside combat, diplomacy, and economic sanctions. PsyOp (Psychological Operations) are among its most conspicuous tools. Information warfare is effective and inexpensive compared to combat, and would fit the needs of “Service/DoD proponency” named in Ziehmn’s memo above. The military specifies the structure and methods of Information Operations that engage behavioural science, mass media and high technology [Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1987; Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1996]. US Department of Defense (DoD) targets foreign nations and groups, including foreign governments. DoD actions "convey and/or deny selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, and objective reasoning; and to intelligence systems and leaders at all levels." DoD management of the foreign perceptions, "combines truth projection, operation security, cover and deception, and psychological operations." According to NATO [Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1996], their PsyOp target "enemy, friendly and neutral audiences in order to influence attitudes and behavior affecting the achievement of political and military objectives." NATO countries’ military and media act like clones of Pentagon. Critique comes mainly from outside the Pact. It seems that the only audiences that yielded to Pentagon and NATO DU propaganda were allies in the North Atlantic Pact. Information Warfare integrates several types of special services when needed. A joint command of US Special Operations is then engaged to assemble teams of experts in different fields and services to suit a mission. Attacks on anti-DU activist, Dr. Doug Rokke, former Pentagon expert on DU, were likely steered by US Special Operations in a broader campaign of "fighting" the truth about DU. The military and government authorities forged death certificates of Balkan DU military victims. In March 2001, “unknown criminals” broke into the home of Mrs. Riordan, the widow of a Canadian veteran of the Gulf War, destroyed her computer and stole medical certificates of uranium presence in the body of her husband. Police refused to investigate, because the criminals “did not leave any traces.” With the emergence of uranium weapon issues into the public arena, the propaganda applies simple, often ridiculous, ideas and phrases that nevertheless have public appeal. The process exploits two rules: (i) a repeated lie becomes accepted truth; (ii) the public accepts outrageous lies more readily. Propaganda plays with words bred in PsyOp bureaus. The words, phrases and contexts are then uttered by authoritative persons, proving the speakers and their controllers are either criminally negligent or are consciously contravening humanitarian and war laws. Former NATO political chief Javier Solana perhaps broke a record of DU nonsense. While heading an ad hoc “investigation” to prove Kosovo DU was no danger, he stated, “The evidence points in the other direction.” “Is DU a health benefit?", wondered a reader in a January 22, 2001, letter to Washington Times. Lord Robertson, supposedly an educated man, defended the "proven [DU] technology that has been independently tested […] We cannot possibly act on the perceptions of people or on the view of a word such as 'uranium'.” Bein and Zoric [2001] assembled other statements, deceptive nomenclature and phrases concerning DU and uranium. Some countries exploited NATO DU propaganda for their own agendas. For example, Switzerland has played a role in suppressing information about DU. Operation Allied Force brought many Albanians from Kosovo to a sizable community of compatriots in Switzerland, at a time when Swiss immigration policy tightened up. Swiss scientific contractor AC Laboratorium-Spiez (ACLS), a firm known to work for NATO, was sent to probe Kosovo and southern Serbia with the best equipment, and found, to no surprise, hazardous radioactivity. Fearing that detection of uranium contamination in Kosovo would deter immigrants from returning home, the Swiss government suppressed reports about unsafe radioactivity levels in Kosovo and instead declared it would fund additional studies by international organizations ­ perhaps in order to control the results. ACLS became a research contractor in all DU studies in the Balkans. In another cynical move the Swiss government offered money to Albanian émigrés if they would return to Kosovo. David and Goliath The scale, tools employed and pervasiveness of information warfare regarding radiation weaponry indicate substantial resources invested. Doubtless, the funds come from tax revenues. Debunking the propaganda feels like a struggle with a Goliath, yet great strides have been achieved with relatively infinitesimal resources, as can be gauged by the growing multitude of anti-DU groups, the quality of their publications, and steadily rising public sensitivity to the issue. Dissemination and campaigning is usually done by volunteers, many of whom have been marginalized, if not intimidated, as being a threat to the establishment. Predictably (but not for the perpetrators), intimidation had the opposite effect, and further eroded the trust of the public, particularly the sick veterans, spilling over onto recruits and staff soldiers .being prepared for next wars. Upon seeing how NATO disrespected their health in Kosovo, many KFOR troops mutinied, while volunteers stepped back. Several countries withdrew from their NATO obligation in Kosovo because of contamination. Post-war aid organizations are reluctant to go to Afghanistan for the radiation-toxicity risk. With the arrival of dates for statutory disclosures of secrets from the atomic era, coincidental with surfacing of predictably ever more numerous victims of recent “safe” radiation weapons, the public suspicion, mistrust and mutiny would grow, creating an additional major stressor in already unstable Western societies. Abroad, the rising public conscience about the aftermath of uranium weapons would contribute to general animosity and terrorism against the West, particularly the US and UK. Propagandizing uranium weapons ­ that terrorize innocents ­ against “terrorism” (however naïve the approach seems in case of an enemy who is best taken out covertly) or “evil states” (as if neutralization of secret WMD with like weapons justified the end), looks counterproductive on all counts. Two scenarios are plausible from now on: either the perpetrators step up intimidation of the discoverers of the truth (which proved futile so far), or they start backing away from their criminal activity. Because the US and UK are in the focus of proliferation and use of radiation weapons, it is up to the governments of these countries to take a lead. Continuation on the destructive course must inevitably lead to a major confrontation between society and those at power, if not to international conflicts. Since radiation issues are emotionally charged regardless of nationality, religion and ethnicity (rightly so, for at stake is a human’s continuation in the gene pool), those in power and their information warfare are playing with fire. Despite large resources expended, PsyOp are easily identified by amateurs. In 1999, Bein predicted in a Polish article [www.eco.pl/zb/147/] the following techniques for cover-up of Balkan DU, based on post-Gulf War experience: Deny information and delay its release; understate the quantity of DU weapons used. Belittle harmful effects of DU, change emphasis and dilute scientific information. Manipulate reports and scientific evidence, including those from previous DU wars. Censor DU information in mass media. Blame other causes, such as pre-war or general pollution. Coerce old and new Yugoslav government to withhold the truth. Blame "Milosevic’s” secret weapons, and DU deployed by Yugoslav forces. All of the above points came true. Evidently, NATO coerced old and new Yugoslav governments to suppress DU casualty information. Yugoslav de-contamination units operated during NATO bombing, while the government likely concealed DU casualties in military hospitals. After a new Yugoslav foreign minister visited Lord Robertson in the beginning of 2001, the Western media reported that Yugoslavia tested soldiers for DU “negative,” as in all NATO member and candidate countries. Were Yugoslav decoys in Kosovo so effective that no DU bullets ignited against armour, rock and concrete? Implemented by a military-bureaucratic machine, information warfare inadvertently produces mistakes and blunders. PsyOp then attempt to cover the blunders up with more blunders. An imperative to hide the truth drives the perpetrators and their operatives ­ Special Operations, PsyOp, spokesmen, official media, pseudo-scientists ­ into thought contraptions and staged events designed to convince the audience. The Kosovo DU case had several obvious blunders. Those responsible failed to warn and protect NATO and UN forces, foreign workers, and local civilians (for whom they supposedly bombed “Milosevic”), including no warning about dirty DU. Stalinist-like special operations to silence those with evidence were objectionable to the public. The cover-ups further clouded the risks of civilian applications of uranium (for example, in aircraft counterweights), increasing the risks to NATO country populations. Behind the scenes Public Affairs (PA) of Information Warfare "provides objective reporting without intent to propagandize" and disseminates information internationally. PA involves press releases, media briefings and statements by the military that "are based on projection of truths and credible message [that serve to discredit] adversary propaganda or misinformation against the operations of US/coalition forces [which] is critical to maintaining favorable public opinion." PA use propaganda - white (telling the truth), gray (ambiguous) or black (lying) - often through Public Relations (PR). NATO spokesman Jamie Shea said "he won the war" in Kosovo by carrying out daily briefings in a PR style. A deep control of the global media by Information Operations to demonize the Serbs was perhaps the most “successful” aspect of that war. Public Affairs units prepare information for news brokers, who send it to TV, radio, and the press. Independent journalists do not have a chance to publish in mainstream media, since NATO information operations subtly control chief editors. The structures of media seem corrupted top to bottom. The former president of CBS News Richard Salent said, "Our job is to give people not what they want, but what we decide they ought to have." John Swinton, the former New York Times Chief of Staff, whom colleagues named "The Dean of His Profession", confessed candidly before the New York Press Club: "I am paid weekly for keeping my honest opinions out of the paper I am connected with. Others of you are paid similar salaries for similar things, and any of you who would be so foolish as to write honest opinions would be out on the streets looking for another job […] We are the tools and vassals of the rich men behind the scenes." The media, reduced to a handful of conglomerates by deregulation, mold public’s minds, profoundly affecting interpretation of reality. The largest conglomerates are growing even bigger by consuming competition, almost tripling in size during the 1990s. With the consolidation of the media empires, TV stations, newspapers and radio broadcasting are no longer independent. Only a handful are large enough to maintain independent reporters. The rest must depend on the chains for all of national and international news. It is also unsettling that one ethnic group dominates North American media ownership and staff, without reflecting the ethnic profiles of big business owners, officers and employees. The group refutes criticisms by intimidating the critic, based on historical prosecution of a radical part of the ethnic group [The National Alliance, 2002]. TV, radio, newspapers, magazines, books, motion pictures speak with a single voice, reinforcing each other. Despite apparent diversity, there are no alternative sources of information. The most prestigious and influential newspapers in the USA, New York Times, Wall Street Journal, and Washington Post illustrate the ability of the media masters to use the press as an unopposed instrument of policy. The papers set the trends and the guidelines for nearly all the others, and originate the news for the others to copy. In a joint venture with the New York Times, the Post publishes the International Herald Tribune, the most widely distributed English-language daily in the world. The Washington Post has an inside track on news involving the federal government. Reference to “military sources”, “senior administration officials”, or “Pentagon analysts” reveal relations between media outlets and the military. Another clue of a single source of information for international press agencies are standard phrases, beginnings and endings in all reports, in accord with Pentagon position. A November 10, 2002, Washington Post article provided an insight into media­Pentagon relations: “This article was discussed extensively in recent days with several senior civilian and military Defense Department officials.” Military censors at PA vetted the article, then the supposedly independent newspaper as a propaganda conduit published it. Major news corporations manufacture opinion polls to meet government specifications, which usually combine plans of the administration, the Pentagon and the business. The media lend themselves to what White House aides themselves have described as a campaign to “sell” the war to the American people, as was seen during 2002 preparations for war with Iraq. Military control of the media extends to the battlefields, based on lessons from the Vietnam War, when coverage of atrocities against civilians and of US soldiers in body bags contributed to anti-war protests. A “pool system” would select daily a few out of hundreds of journalists, and would escort them to scenes deemed fit for the public. The coverage would then be “pooled” with their colleagues, so that the same controlled story comes from every major news outlet. Under this system an objective reporting from the scene about victims of acute exposure to uranium weapons would not be possible. Any incriminating leaks from independent war correspondents would be blacked out or distorted by Pentagon press briefings that blame any carnage on the “enemy”. Should independent media sources fail to observe this imposed censorship (as was the case with the Serb TV in 1999) their facilities are targeted with US precision-guided munitions, consistent with Special Operations integration of services to suit Information Warfare needs. Cover-ups of chronic exposure and effects of uranium would be managed by a different set of information operations, including pressures on the executives of international organizations conducting studies of contaminated sites and victims. Deny, delay, deceive Covering up the effects of controversial weapons by the governments has a history. For example, US Newswire reported on October 30, 2002, that former defense secretary Robert S. McNamara and 10 others were defendants named in two first-of-their-kind class action lawsuits for allegedly covering up medical records without which several hundred thousands of veterans of atomic, biological and chemical warfare testing, and families of deceased, cannot receive benefit for the long-term health effects. Selected organizations play a key role in covering up the radiological risk. ICRP is responsible for prevalence of invalid models of risk to human health from internal, low-level radiation sources like uranium fine particles. Since 1959, IAEA, the only UN agency serving a private sector (nuclear industry) has a monopoly on dealing with radiation aspects of uranium health effects, leaving to WHO the toxic aspect. This is a deliberate institutional tool of control and cover-up of irradiation issues around the world. DU propaganda tactics follow 3 d’s: deny, delay, deceive. Neither a NATO country nor the World Health Organization (WHO) have carried out any epidemiological studies of either soldiers or civilians exposed in uranium wars. This guarantees no confirmation or discovery of the health effects of uranium weapons. Several governments in the UN must have joined to prevent a post-Gulf War DU study in Iraq. The Iraqi government formally invited WHO to investigate uranium contamination and health effects, but the US put serious pressure on the WHO to cancel a full-fledged study. When a draft resolution passed through a committee at the General Assembly that would have mandated a specific investigation, the US secured enough (but barely enough) “no” votes to cancel the initiative. A planned visit by Justice Sik Yuen in 2002 was delayed by a heavy increase in bombings in the southern “no fly” zone. Attempts by the UN Balkans Task Force to include DU in its post-conflict assessments were also subverted by delay and deception before the UNEP study could start, and reports were manipulated by the director, Klaus Töpfer, on instructions from his Pentagon handlers [Parsons, 2001]. A WHO health study in Bosnia began concurrently with a UNEP DU-site study in 2002, i.e. 8 years after DU weapons were first used there. As in previous uranium wars, the risk of DU in “Kosovo” was absolutely denied at first, although in July 1999 a NATO document warned KFOR countries about the toxicity of DU weapons. Even that warning was late, as KFOR and UN personnel entered Kosovo 2nd week of June 1999. Efforts by the UN deputy high commissioner for refugees, Frederick Barton, to make the civilian population aware of the risks of contamination met with resistance from Kosovo Albanian politicians, NATO and the UN Mission in Kosovo. NATO released Operation Allied Force DU-site data well over a year late, understating the tonnage of DU. NATO delayed for 16 months the necessary target information and access for monitors of the “Kosovo” sites (which included Montenegro and southern Serbia). Still, there were typing mistakes and ambiguities for several locations in the NATO data [Bein and Zoric, 2001]. For Bosnia, NATO DU-site data, also incomplete, appeared 5 to 6 years after the fact. UNEP measured radioactivity at 14 sites in Bosnia, but only at 2 of the 8 sites around Sarajevo marked “unknown” on NATO list. Sarajevo medical professional Dr.Trifko Guzina revealed the domicile of hundreds of Bosnian patients ­ those already dead and those fighting cancer seven years after the bombing [Patriot, July 22, 2002]. Was there a correlation with the “unknown” locations. Dr. Guzina said that Sarajevo suburbs were bombed in NATO exercises. UNEP could determine the locations, if they wanted to. NATO did not let UNEP visit some sites in Kosovo and Bosnia. UNEP teams only went to NATO-approved sites and were banned from some important sites.. The sites may be in drop areas of cluster bombs and other weapons that contained uranium. Pentagon admitted that their specialists visited the approved sites a number of times before UNEP was let in. It is plausible that UNEP discovered only low contamination levels because Pentagon carried out some cleanups in advance. Observers believe that uranium hard-target weapons were dropped against deeply buried Yugoslav defenses in Kosovo [Parsons, 2001]. Despite a warning from Williams, UNEP did not test bomb or missile targets in their second study in Serbia and Montenegro in the fall of 2001. At one “DU” site in Montenegro NATO indicated shelling an old bunker with 30 mm rounds twice. The bunker was demolished in one of the attacks. UNEP discovered widespread, high-level radioactive contamination, unlike at any other DU site. DU shells alone would not be able to ruin a concrete bunker. A trial of a uranium bunker-buster is suspected. Yugoslav authorities excavated the soil and shipped it to nuclear waste storage at Vinca. After NATO finally admitted the use of DU munitions in Kosovo, a barrage of lies, half-truths and nonsense attempted to defend the toxic-radioactive substance. Similar phases could be traced on the issue of U236, plutonium, and other extremely hazardous, illegal contents in DU. However, very few independent observers and NGO’s knew about different uranium weapons under continuous development and use since the Gulf War, if not earlier. We observe the “deny” phase regarding radiological uranium weapons other than DU armour-piercers. Access for investigators in Afghanistan has been delayed for 10 months, and then it was limited, as on DU battlefields. The UNEP started planning environmental surveys in Afghanistan in December 2001. Despite earlier reports from Williams, on August 28, 2002, survey co-ordinator Peter Zahler (who joined UNEP in May from the USA) said UNEP had no specific plans to investigate uranium contamination. Bomb and missile targets are conspicuously absent from both UNEP Balkans DU studies. Formal queries in the UK parliament returned a denial. No monitoring of US and UK weapons dropped on Iraq’s no-fly zone was done, while at the same time, under US pressure, the “international community” demanded access for weapons inspectors to Iraq. The integrity of UNEP environmental monitoring for uranium contamination appears to be compromised by external pressures. The US military, on the other hand, hinted discovery of “some uranium warheads” in al-Qaeda caves, but without indicating the source of the weapons. It seems that a campaign of denials regarding uranium non-nuclear weapons is underway within a broader campaign for acceptability of weapons that contaminate with low-level radiation. Statements by US government about plans to develop nuclear penetrating bombs, threats of terrorist radiological bombs, and recent warning of potential first strike nuclear attacks by the US and UK play down potential hazards of "conventional" uranium weapons. The rhetoric may be aimed at altering the threshold of acceptability for radiological weapons systems, since nuclear “bunker busters" (the B61-11’s) were tested in 1997. A nuclear strike makes little sense when existing systems can destroy deeply buried WMD, unless the goal is to shake underground installations with a nuclear blast. Service to humankind Official “investigations” suppress evidence of uranium-induced illness and death. In those “studies” Pentagon and other military authorities co-opt research institutes, universities, and international health and safety organizations: UNEP, ICRP, World Health Organization (WHO), International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA), and other. From the precautionary principle of environmental and health sciences, uncertain but potentially harmful effects should be prevented. Even if there were “no proofs” of a link from DU to illness and death, it behooved the decision makers to discontinue the use of any uranium weapons out of the precautionary principle, given Gulf veteran complaints and scientific uncertainty. Normally, scientific assessment of the effects of DU and other uranium metals follows a standard risk analysis chain: Products of combat or accidental use of uranium > Fate in a place over time > Exposure to people and environment > Dose received > Morbidity and mortality effects of uranium. NATO “scientists” manipulate every step of the analysis. To criticisms, pseudo-science replies, "No evidence exists". Sufficient evidence does exist, as published by independent researchers. The precautionary principle should govern in cases of ambiguous evidence. In summary, the reports have numerous serious flaws because they: Fail to mention that the concentration of uranium metals used in munitions is orders of magnitude more hazardous than “naturally occurring” uranium that is mixed with other minerals in the ground in a chemical and radiological equilibrium. Dr. Busby counters such argument from the UK Ministry of Defense: “MoD's argument is like saying it's OK to throw pellets of arsenic around for children to play with, just because trace quantities of arsenic arise commonly and naturally in soil, vegetation and drinking water.” Excuse “natural” uranium as harmless. Even “natural” uranium metal (an alloy of 99.8% U-238, 0.2% U-235 and traces of U-234) turns into deadly fine particles under combat use conditions and in fires. Concentrate on the toxic aspects of DU and on the "clean" DU while actual DU comprises extremely toxic-radioactive U-236, plutonium, and other transuranics. Lack early identification and medical monitoring of uranium casualties, and ignore illness due to eroded immunity following exposure, and acute to chronic effects from long-term exposure to small amounts of uranium contamination. Focus on "healthy soldiers" and relatively weak external radiation from DU metal or the effects of uranium shrapnel in the body, instead of ingested or inhaled particles of soluble uranium oxides (short-term toxic agents) and insoluble ones (long-term toxic and radioactive), also in ceramic form alien to nature. Calculate the exposure to DU over areas much larger than actually contaminated, while doses -- over volume of internal organs, instead of affected cells. Adopt the optimistic picture of DU passing from the body and ignore an activity in the lungs, which moves particles into the lymph glands. Ignore the fact that elimination of soluble uranium overwhelms the kidneys. Insoluble uranium oxide and ceramic uranium oxide may move through the kidney slowly and not cause serious renal toxicity. Do not emphasize that just one dose on a DU battlefield is bad for the lymph nodes, but a veteran may be present at many such events. Project morbidity and mortality from ICRP curves that are invalid for internal doses of radiation and insoluble uranium oxide particles. Conceal the fact that in addition to direct cancers, internal uranium radiation promotes cancers from other factors (the early Balkan cancers could be radiation-promoted). Prudent scientists do not make mistakes and omissions on known facts. “Epidemiological study” deceptions are plentiful, more so that epidemiology, like statistical analysis, can be manipulated to prove desired results. Apologists of uranium effects compare erroneously estimated incidence of cancers among veterans to statistics for general population. The latter is an incomparable group. Besides, official epidemiological statistics are biased downwards, since “background” radiation includes gradual accumulation of global radioactive pollution. As another example, WHO expeditiously compared DU-like illness incidence in Kosovo before and after NATO bombing. Statistics are incomparable, because of different population base: 300 or 400 thousand opponents of Albanian extremism left Kosovo, but many more immigrants came from Albania. Pre-1999 Kosovo Albanians boycotted the Yugoslav state health care system, so the statistics quoted by WHO are fragmentary at best. US government has admitted that 50 years of uranium fuel manufacturing has not led to serious epidemiological studies. Previous studies focused on cancer death as a biological endpoint, while ignoring chronic illnesses, deformed children, and other medical problems. Internal radiation dose was never calculated in the A-bomb studies, hence it cannot inform on the biochemical pathways of a particle in the body. Yet, ICRP analytical apparatus relies solely on the false data. NATO “scientists” apply ICRP estimates concerning uranium dust from nuclear industrial processes, and not from aerosols (including ceramic) produced from uranium weapons. Analogies of uranium particles from military use to nuclear industry situations encoded into official data are invalid, because of cover-ups in the industry. Inhalation of uranium dust in nuclear processing is not biochemically equivalent to inhalation of ceramic uranium particles. The other factor NATO “science” emphasizes the “other factor” of Gulf and Balkan syndromes. A 1999 RAND "report" released concurrently with Operation Allied Force absolved DU and blamed drugs that Gulf War soldiers received against chemical weapons. In the “Kosovo DU” scandal, NATO cited chemicals in wood handled by the soldiers, and benzene with which they supposedly cleaned guns. Soldiers denied the use of benzene. The media also cited natural asbestos deposits and lead contamination of Kosovo to divert attention from DU. Amidst the Balkan DU debate, Associated Press dispatch from Kosovo named lead, untreated sewage, dust from a cement plant, and toxins from neglected factories. US Army Col. David Lam announced, "I think we need to look at all possible causes, such as other pollutants and hazards, and not focus only on DU." Dr. Milan Orlic, president of the Nuclear Sciences Society at Vinca Institute, said at a January 2001conference in Athens that Balkan syndrome was more likely correlated with other agents than DU. One article blamed kidney diseases in the Balkans on well water contamination by toxins from coal deposits. After the Gulf War, which saw a cocktail of poisons used and released ­ from destroyed stocks of Iraqi chemical-biological weapons, to DU ammunition ­ the "other factor" was adopted in DU cover-ups. It would likely be pursued for the Balkans and other areas, once cancers from the use of uranium weapon take a higher toll. Vaccines given to the soldiers could not be a cause of the syndrome among residents, neither there was smoke from burning oil wells in the Balkans, nor chemical weapons used by “Milosevic” against his own people. Apologists of Gulf War syndrome in Iraqi population cited the two latter factors, though no independent epidemiological study was done. After reporting in April 2002 of a claim about a direct link between DU shells and a 20-fold increase in child cancer in southern Iraq, BBC was accused of peddling Hussein’s propaganda. Dr. Richard Guthrie, an expert in chemical warfare at Sussex University, said that it was far more likely that any childhood cancers were caused by Saddam's use of mustard gas against his own people in 1986. Prof. Brian Spratt, who chaired the UK Royal Society inquiry into DU said: "Claims that there is an increase in birth defects and childhood cancers in Iraq are impossible to measure as there is no comparable data from before the war.” Dr Michael Clark, a spokesman for the National Radiology Protection Board in London (connected to ICRP), thought the report was "not exactly objective," since it was difficult to get proper information from Iraq. Those who look, however, do find the information. Dr. Chris Busby (www.llrc.org) found leukemia clusters in Iraqi children born after the Gulf War (i.e. aged 5 to 9 years) while normally the disease dwells in 0 to 4 years olds. The “Hussein’s mustard gas” theory and other counter-arguments of the authorities quoted above thus don’t hold water. Busby also found a correlation between the increases in child leukemia and the districts where DU ammunition was used. He measured a 20-fold increase in ?-activity in the air around the Desert Storm battlefields, compared to the air in Baghdad. In Basra, it was 10 times higher than in Baghdad. [Al Ahram, October 3-9, 2002]. Captive science Radiation at DU sites is measured with the Geiger counter, which is insensitive to ?-particles. Portugal science minister Dr. Mariano Gago told reporters DU was a "false problem." His team did not find “the smallest shred of radioactivity in any part of Kosovo.” Dr. Fernando Carvalho, waving a Geiger counter, told the reporters that no radiation at all was found. The politicians spoke before scientific results were in. First UNEP study was unable to detect any wider area of contamination because the team was not adequately equipped to measure ?-radiation. NATO “experts” in a study for European Commission were “unable to observe” the health effects below 100 mSv, a low-level, but dangerous effect of a DU particle in the tissue. Dr Bertell commented, “It should be obvious that one changes instruments as measurements become more fine [...] One uses a micrometer to measure the width of a piece of paper, not a metre stick.” The NATO website [www.nato.int/kosovo/010110du.htm] indicates corruption at international organizations, research and strategic studies institutes, and universities that were enlisted by Pentagon and NATO to misinform about DU. The Pentagon’s “objective” reports are found on many websites that are linked to from independent websites, but looking for them at the NATO website is futile. NATO “research” fails to promptly test the exposed military and civilians. When “testing” is instituted, it is controlled by the military. Former secretary-general of NATO, later EU foreign and security policy chief, Javier Solana was heading NATO ad hoc investigation to prove that DU was safe. Before investigating began, Solana stated there was “no evidence of a link between the illnesses reported by NATO personnel and the use of DU ammunition.” A meeting of the ad hoc committee comprising top medical experts could not identify “any increase in disease or mortality in soldiers who have deployed to the Balkans as compared to those soldiers who have not been deployed.” With a lightning speed, the committee “examined” thousands of soldiers who served in IFOR, SFOR and KFOR, and not a trivial number of policemen sent to the Balkans. The European Commission asked a “group of independent experts” whether "hundreds, if not thousands" of EU personnel and contract employees who have worked in the Balkans might face health risks from exposure to DU "slight radioactivity". The report was published on March 6, 2001. The “experts” turned out to be theoretical physicists who knew how to apply recommendations of ICRP, but little about toxicology or biophysiology. The “experts” concluded that “radiological exposure to DU could not result in a detectable effect on human health,” and “there was no evidence to support” a hypothesis that exposure to toxic and carcinogenic chemicals could combine with radiation. Scientists S. Kaiser and R. Bertell assessed the EU “expert” opinion to be “useless for the protection of either the veterans or the public, contrary to the expressed intent” and concluded that it “added little to the concerned dialogue about DU.” At the same time, results of independent tests are concealed. The Portuguese defense ministry refused to hand over Hugo Paulino's body who died from leukemia. The ministry deliberately camouflaged his death, citing "herpes of the brain" and refused to allow his family to commission a post-mortem examination. This practice brings to mind cover-ups of Gulf syndrome among US, UK, and allied troops. The veterans have self-organized to defend their rights. Out of about 750 000 Gulf War veterans in the US and UK, reportedly over 200 thousand suffer of the syndrome and over 10 thousand have died. The authorities push the sick veterans around, deny them proper medical care and compensation. The military doctors diagnose “post-combat” stress. Sick and disabled, they are left without means to survive. Desperation drives many to suicide and assaults on the bureaucracy. A 1990 revision by the ICRP cut the permitted low-level radiation dose by a factor of five. The US has not accepted that revision, so they claim their soldiers received "safe" doses during the Gulf War. In the US, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), a civilian agency headed up by the military. with no interest in exploring the hazards, control the subject of ionising radiation. Each of the four most distinguished scientists who worked for the AEC, John Gofman, Karl Morgan, Thomas Mancuse and Alice Stewart, was intimidated for proving that low-level radiation causes cancer. A US study of Gulf War veterans has examined just 60 persons since 1993. At least two veterans had cancer. One veteran, believed to have had a heavy exposure to DU, fathered two children born with health problems since the war, but was excluded from the study. Pentagon’s website confirms cancer among the study group, but, in an effort to downplay public concerns, military spokesman, Dr. Michael Kilpatrick have lied to North Atlantic Council ambassadors and NATO press corps in January 2001: “We have seen no cancers or leukemia in this group, which has been followed since 1993.” In June 2001, Col. Francis O’Donnell told scientists from European governments that there have been no cancers among the 60 veterans examined. In October 2002, vice chairman of US Gulf War veterans Denise Nichols criticized the US administration and the Congress for “lack of accountability” and for a failure “to apply lessons learned” to improve medical care of veterans. Nichols pointed out that the civilians are also unprepared because lessons from the military are ignored: “Doctors and researchers that have seen the reality of Gulf War Illness have desperately tried to help but have been ignored and attacked professionally.” Nichols also referred to Pentagon’s documented practice to sabotage veterans records to hide the real effect of Gulf War, and charged that the government’s control of research funding prevents dissemination of knowledge. At the same time Pentagon do not educate their physicians on Gulf War illness, nor participate in true research, nor provide true treatment options to sick veterans. In 2002, US veterans protested that samples of their blood and tissue are kept by the military authorities out of reach of independent testing. Testing of veterans authorized by NATO does not measure the right things. DU can be detected in urine - some soluble form of DU always accompany insoluble one, but somehow government tests cannot detect it. Normal levels of uranium in urine do not mean absence of danger and disease, either. Chemical analysis of lymph nodes from dead victims could confirm the lymphatic cause, but there are no government reports of such autopsies. On October 30, 2001, the Pentagon released a paper on Balkan DU [http://deploymentlink.osd.mil/du_balkans/index.html], after Italian and Spanish soldiers fell to leukemia and lymphoma. As if posed to fend critics of possible use of uranium weapons in Afghanistan, the paper has “not found any connections between DU exposure in the Balkans and negative health effects.” Dr. Busby found invalid reference groups in the Italian statistics. His re-analysis indicated 11 times the expected rate. The Pentagon paper cited “work” of the UK Royal Society, WHO, UNEP and ACLS. The second Royal Society report (2002) recognized lethal toxicity following an acute exposure to uranium oxide, but remained oblivious to low doses and radiological consequences. Hard target bombs and missiles were most likely used in Western Kosovo ­ the sector of Italian, Portuguese and Spanish troops. A new survey should investigate targets omitted in UNEP Balkan studies. Conclusion Pro-uranium weapons propaganda operates within the cover-up system of the nuclear complex. At its core is a basically flawed model of the International Commission on Radiological Protection, according to which low-level internal radiation from fine uranium particles is not a hazard. Proponents of uranium power and weapons use the model instead of empirical evidence, which they suppress with a sophisticated misinformation and fact-distortion web reaching as far as international organizations responsible for public health. Recognizing the harm done, Williams, for example, urges priority actions to reverse the cycle of deception and human suffering because of uranium weaponry: (i) weapon inspections to determine which ones contain uranium, (ii) target inspection to identify those hit and contaminated by uranium weapons, (iii) health monitoring and support for target communities in uranium-contaminated areas, and (v) fundamental review of all research that was so far restricted to DU instead of uranium weaponry in general. Observers believe that DU cover-ups serve to ease public acceptability of present non-nuclear uranium weapons against hard targets, present small nuclear warheads, and future pure fusion nuclear weapons. All of these weapons contaminate with low level radiation. A future combat scenario using fusion micro-weapons translates into a low-level radioactive input comparable to that on DU battlefields [Gsponer et al., 2002]. Elimination of uranium radiological and fission weapons in the 21st century would not terminate the health and environmental problems of low-level radiation battles. Unless the legal thresholds of acceptability of so-called low-level radiation are removed, the perpetrators of non-nuclear but still radiological uranium weapons would continue to contravene humanitarian law and place increasing parts of the planet at risk. Ultimately, massive long-term human catastrophe might result, far beyond the borders of radioactive wars. Thus, the authors see the only solution is a complete and universal termination of the development, testing, production and use of these weapons of indiscriminate effect and delayed mass destruction. A beginning of that termination is H. R. 3155, introduced at the US Congress. References Piotr Bein and Peda Zoric, Propaganda for Depleted Uranium - a Crime against Humankind, International Conference Facts on Depleted Uranium, Praha, November 24-25, 2001, http://groups.yahoo.com/group/du-watch/files/DUPraha.doc Michel Chossudovsky, War Propaganda, Centre for Research on Globalisation, 16 January 2003, http://globalresearch.ca/articles/CHO301A.html Boeing Corporation, Safety, Health and Environmental Affairs (SHEA) Guide RJ-028G: Depleted Uranium Counterweights, September 18, 2001 Asaf Durakovic, New Concepts in CBRN Warfare in the Light of the Gulf War Experience and Current Reality of Global Terrorism, Uranium Medical Research Centre, Proc. The Third GCC Conference of Military Medicine and Protection Against Weapons of Mass Destruction, Doha, Qatar, October 20th-23rd, 2002 www.umrc.net European Committee on Radiation Risk, Recommendations of the ECRR: Health Effects of Ionising Radiation Exposure at Low Doses for Radiation Protection Purposes, Green Audit, Brussels, 2003 A. Gsponer, J. Hurni and B. Vitale, A comparison of delayed radiobiological effects of depleted-uranium munitions versus fourth-generation nuclear weapons, Proceedings 4th International Conference of the Yugoslav Nuclear Society, 2002, http://arXiv.org/abs/physics/0210071 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-6: Information Operations, USGPO, Washington DC, 27 August 1996 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense, JCS Publication 1, Glossary Department of Defense Military and Associated Terms, 1987 Paul Loewenstein, Industrial Uses of Depleted Uranium, American Society for Metals, 1992 J. Mishima, M.A. Parkhurst, R.I. Sherpelz and D.E. Hadlock, Potential Behaviour of Depleted Uranium Penetrators under Shipping and Bulk Storage Accident Conditions, Batelle Pacific Northwest Laboratory for the US Department of the Army, Richland, Washington 99352, March 1983 The National Alliance, Who Rules America? The Alien Grip on Our News and Entertainment Media Must Be Broken, National Vanguard Books, P.O. Box 330, Hillsboro, West Virginia 24946, USA, www.natall.com/who-rules-america/ [posted to the Internet in November 2002] Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-53, Joint Doctrine for Psychological Operations, USGPO, Washington DC, 10 July 1996 Karen Parker, Depleted Uranium at the United Nations, proceedings CADU international conference in Manchester, November 2000 Karen Parker, Written statements at UN Human Rights forums on behalf of IED/HLP: UN Docs. E/CN.4/1997/NGO/49; E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/NGO/19; E/CN.4/Sub.2/1998/NGO/25; E/CN.4/1999/NGO/119 Karen Parker, Memorandum on Weapons and the Laws and Customs of War, International Educational Development/Humanitarian Law Project (IED/HLP), 1997, excerpted in Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/27 Robert J. Parsons, UN-backed Cover Up: Deafening silence on depleted uranium, Le Monde Diplomatique, February 2001 US Army Environmental Policy Institute, Health and Environmental Consequences of Depleted Uranium Use by the US Army, Atlanta, 1995 US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, Fort Detrick, MD, 8 May 1995 Venik's Aviation, Health Risks of Using Depleted Uranium, Philadelphia, November 03, 2001, www.aeronautics.ru/venik.way.to Dai Williams, Depleted Uranium weapons in 2001-2002: Mystery Metal Nightmare in Afghanistan? www.eoslifework.co.uk/du2012.htm Dai Williams, US Patents confirm Uranium warheads, www.eoslifework.co.uk/u23.htm#USpatreport Dr. Piotr Bein holds a master’s degree from the Technical University of Denmark and a doctorate in applied decision and risk analysis from the University of British Columbia. A member of the Institute for Risk Research, University of Waterloo, he served as a consultee on a recent report from the European Committee on Radiation Risk. His 30-year career of a licensed civil engineer, risk analyst, ecological economist, and researcher of socio-economic impacts of atmospheric change switched to an interest in information warfare after NATO attack on Yugoslavia. Dr. Karen Parker received a Juris Doctor degree (honors) from the University of San Francisco School of Law and a Diplome (cum laude) from the International Institute of Human Rights (Strasbourg, France). Much of her work in her twenty-year career specializing in human rights and humanitarian law has been at the United Nations and Organization of American States human rights forums. In 1996 she found out about the use of DU weaponry in the Gulf War, and ever since has spoken up and written on the illegality of these weapons at the United Nations and elsewhere. (c) Copyright Piotr Bein and Karen Parker, 2003. All rights reserved. Permission is granted to post this text on non-commercial community internet sites, provided the source and the URL are indicated, the paper remains intact and the copyright note is displayed. To publish this text in printed and/or other forms, including commercial internet sites and excerpts, contact Piotr Bein at piotr.bein@imag.net and Karen Parker at ied@igc.org -- Posted for educational and research purposes only, ~ in accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. section 107 ~ NucNews Links and Expanded Archives - http://nucnews.net ------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor ---------------------~--> Buy Ink Cartridges or Refill Kits for your HP, Epson, Canon or Lexmark Printer at MyInks.com. Free s/h on orders $50 or more to the US & Canada. http://www.c1tracking.com/l.asp?cid=5511 http://us.click.yahoo.com/mOAaAA/3exGAA/qnsNAA/FGYolB/TM ---------------------------------------------------------------------~-> To unsubscribe from this groups send a message to du-list-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com. In the body of the message type unsubscribe and send. Yahoo! Groups Links <*> To visit your group on the web, go to: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/du-list/ <*> To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to: du-list-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com <*> Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to: http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/ ***************************************************************** 21 [du-list] Depleted Uranium exposure Gulf War Veterans Thermal Date: Mon, 12 Apr 2004 16:11:52 -0700 Urine is next to feces the right medium for measuring DU The use of the righit instruments and techniques (Thermal Ionization Mass Spectrometer a.o.) will for sure result in finding depleted uranium in urine of contaminated persons. (http://www.xs4all.nl/~stgvisie/VISIE/atlanticlab.html) The wrong instrument will not find it! The military commonly uses on purpose an insufficient instrument to measure uranium isotopes in low concentrations. Low concentrations DU in urine means a source of DU particles in lungs, lymphenodes and other tissues which causes significant damage by internal alpha radiation. With regards, Hans de Jonge http://depleteduranium.tk http://www.xs4all.nl/~stgvisie/VISIE/du-iraq-2.html ------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor ---------------------~--> Buy Ink Cartridges or Refill Kits for your HP, Epson, Canon or Lexmark Printer at MyInks.com. Free s/h on orders $50 or more to the US & Canada. http://www.c1tracking.com/l.asp?cid=5511 http://us.click.yahoo.com/mOAaAA/3exGAA/qnsNAA/FGYolB/TM ---------------------------------------------------------------------~-> To unsubscribe from this groups send a message to du-list-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com. In the body of the message type unsubscribe and send. Yahoo! Groups Links <*> To visit your group on the web, go to: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/du-list/ <*> To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to: du-list-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com <*> Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to: http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/ Subject: [du-list] Small Study Finds Uranium in Gulf War Vets Date: Wed, 11 Sep 2002 09:20:29 +0200 From: uranium@t-online.de To: du-list@yahoogroups.com The VISIE Foundation [Reuters] Small Study Finds Uranium in Gulf War Vets Tue Sep 10, 5:25 PM ET By Merritt McKinney NEW YORK (Reuters Health) - A small study of British, Canadian and US veterans with Gulf War (news - web sites) illness found that just over half tested positive for depleted uranium. Whether exposure to depleted uranium--used in munitions fired in the Persian Gulf War as well as in conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo--is a factor in Gulf War illness is uncertain, but the findings highlight the need for more research on its health effects, Leonard Dietz, a co-author of the study, told Reuters Health. "This is the first measurement of Gulf War veterans for depleted uranium using the best current scientific analytical methodology," Dietz said. Although he noted that it would be premature to say that depleted uranium is a factor in Gulf War illness, he added, "this limited sample of veterans isn't even the tip of the iceberg." It is possible that many soldiers were exposed to depleted uranium during the Gulf War, but the study does not provide enough information on the extent of this exposure, according to Dr. Brian G. Spratt of Imperial College in London, who led a Royal Society expert panel that drafted a report on the health risks of depleted uranium. "If the data in the paper are reliable, they are telling us that a substantial proportion of veterans from the Gulf War were exposed to depleted uranium," Spratt told Reuters Health. "This may be politically important to the veterans, but the key question is not whether they were exposed, but to how much were they exposed." He noted that the study did not include a "control" group of people who were not veterans of the Gulf War. "It is therefore not clear whether people who never went to the Gulf sometimes show signs of depleted uranium in urine," he said. "There are those who claim that depleted uranium is increasingly in the environment, and this makes a control group important." The health effects of exposure to depleted uranium, a heavy metal used in armor-piercing munitions, is a hotly debated topic. Depleted uranium emits low levels of radiation, and there are concerns that exposure to the metal may increase the risk of leukemia, lung cancer and other illnesses. According to the Royal Society panel led by Spratt, soldiers or civilians who breathe in or are otherwise exposed to high levels of depleted uranium may be at increased risk of kidney damage. Exposure may also lead to a small increase in the risk of lung cancer, but not leukemia, the panel notes. The panel recommended continued study of the health effects of depleted uranium, but concluded that the health risks were very low for most soldiers. In the new study, led by Col. Asaf Durakovic of the Uranium Medical Research Center in Washington, DC, researchers analyzed the urine of 27 British, Canadian and US Gulf War veterans. According to a report in the August issue of the journal Military Medicine, all of the participants had Gulf War illness and all had inhaled depleted uranium during their service in the Persian Gulf 8 to 9 years before. Fourteen of the urine samples tested positive for depleted uranium. The researchers also detected depleted uranium in the lung and bone of one Gulf War veteran who had died. The results underscore the need for further study on how exposure to uranium dust may be harmful to human health, the authors conclude. In his comments to Reuters Health, Dietz said that the extent of exposure to depleted uranium during the Gulf War has not been well examined. "Many tens of thousands of veterans were exposed to depleted uranium aerosol fallout particles during the 4 days of ground battles in Kuwait and Iraq," Dietz stated. "Additional tens of thousands were exposed because they entered, crawled on, sat on, touched or kicked up dust by walking around Iraqi tanks and other vehicles destroyed by depleted uranium metal penetrators used in cannon rounds." SOURCE: Military Medicine 2002;167:620-627. Copyright © 2002 Reuters Limited. All rights reserved. Republication or redistribution of Reuters content is expressly prohibited without the prior written consent of Reuters. Reuters shall not be liable for any errors or delays in the content, or for any actions taken in reliance thereon. Copyright © 2002 Yahoo! Inc. All rights reserved. ---------------------------------------------------------------- MEDLINE: IS - 0026-4075 VI - 167 IP - 8 DP - 2002 Aug TI - The quantitative analysis of depleted uranium isotopes in British, Canadian, and U.S. Gulf War veterans. PG - 620-7 AB - The purpose of this work was to determine the concentration and ratio of uranium isotopes in allied forces Gulf War veterans. The 27 patients had their 24-hour urine samples analyzed for 234U, 235U, 236U, and 238U by mass spectrometry. The urine samples were evaporated and separated into isotopic dilution and concentration fraction by the chromatographic technique. The isotopic composition was measured by a thermal ionization mass spectrometer using a secondary electron multiplier detector and ion-counting system. The uranium blank control and SRM960 U isotopic standard were analyzed by the same procedure. Statistical analysis was done by an unpaired t test. The results confirm the presence of depleted uranium (DU) in 14 of 27 samples, with the 238U:235U ratio > 207.15. This is significantly different from natural uranium (p < 0.008) as well as from the DU shrapnel analysis, with 22.22% average value of DU fraction, and warrants further investigation. AD - Department of Earth Sciences, Memorial University of Newfoundland, St. Johns, Canada. horan@morgan.ucs.mun.ca FAU - Horan, Patricia AU - Horan P FAU - Dietz, Leonard AU - Dietz L FAU - Durakovic, Asaf AU - Durakovic A LA - eng PT - Journal Article CY - United States TA - Mil Med JID - 2984771R SB - IM EDAT- 2002/08/22 10:00 MHDA- 2002/08/22 10:00 PST - ppublish SO - Mil Med 2002 Aug;167(8):620-7. TI-MS - Thermal Ionization Mass Spectrometer LITERATURE The quantitative analysis of depleted uranium isotopes in British, Canadian, and U.S. Gulf War veterans. Horan P, Dietz L, Durakovic A. Dutch: depleted uranium in Amsterdam The Major Cause of Cancer Depleted Uranium Watch A Cancerous Web of Deception Gulf War Veterans Resource Links - DU LINK DU: Cancer as a Weapon Campaign Against Depleted Uranium CADU Wings of Death + second event theory - Chris Busby 1,3 billion victims by the nuclear nightmare Rosalie Bertell http://www.antenna.nl/wise/uranium/index.html#DU ECOLOGICAL CATASTROPHE & HEALTH HAZARDS OF THE NATO BOMBINGS: AN ANNOTATED URL REFERENCED LIST OF INTERNET ARTICLES, NEWS, PRESS RELEASES. [ PART 5 ] [Compiled by Dr. Janet M. Eaton, June 13, 1999 ] The VISIE Foundation ***************************************************************** 22 [DisabledGreensNews] Morris, NY School District Bans Irradiated Date: Mon, 12 Apr 2004 15:27:25 -0500 (CDT) Morris, NY School District Bans Irradiated Food! On February 11, 2004, the Morris Central School District of Morris, NY passed a policy banning irradiated meat from their school lunches! The district Food Service Manager, Jenn Jacobsen, worked with the school board to pass this policy to protect the district's 500 students, 71% of which receive lunches from the National School Lunch Program each day. Jacobsen has also instituted many forward-thinking policies to cut back waste. They have a bulk milk machine for the students, bulk cereal, and non-disposable dishware, which cuts down on large volumes of packaging and waste. The choice of whether or not to serve irradiated food to students is a yearly decision for every single school district nationwide. The only way to ensure that school children in your district won't be served irradiated food is to pass a ban for your district. If you are interested in working with your school board to pass a resolution banning irradiated foods, call 202-454-5185. Click on the following link to read the text of the Morris resolution: http://www.citizen.org/documents/morrisresolution.pdf Go to www.safelunch.org for more information on irradiated food in school lunches or to download a copy of our National School Lunch Program Organizing Kit. If you would like to be removed from the radfood list, send an email to listserv@listserver.citizen.org with the words "unsubscribe radfood" in the message. If you would like to be added to the radfood list, send an email to listserv@listserver.citizen.org with the words "subscribe radfood" in the message. To learn more about food irradiation, visit our website at www.citizen.org/cmep/ Questions about the radfood list can be directed to RADFOOD- request@LISTSERVER.CITIZEN.ORG -Public Citizen's Critical Mass Energy and Environment Program Yahoo! Groups Links <*> To visit your group on the web, go to: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/DisabledGreensNews/ <*> To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to: DisabledGreensNews-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com <*> Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to: http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/ ***************************************************************** 23 Daily Yomiuri: Control nuclear hazards via risk management Yomiuri Shimbun In 2001, when nuclear facilities in the country experienced a series of accidents and failures, the Nuclear Safety Commission issued a statement saying "Nobody can ensure the complete safety of nuclear energy." How safe is atomic energy, and how can safety at nuclear facilities be improved? The annual white paper compiled by the nation's nuclear safety watchdog tried to answer this difficult question in a special examination of measures to control the safety of nuclear energy by making use of risk management. Risk management in this case refers to calculating the potential dangers at nuclear facilities and carefully acting on such observations to reduce the hazards associated with nuclear energy. As the first step in such efforts, the annual white paper for the first time set safety goals for nuclear facilities in the country. The white paper called for reducing the risks faced by residents living around nuclear facilities, setting as a goal a maximum of one out of a million people dying from exposure to radiation. By comparison, the number of people who die in traffic accidents in the nation stands at about one in 10,000 a year. Given the relatively sparse population around nuclear facilities, the practical goal is zero deaths from radiation. === Evaluation essential The central government and nuclear plant operators must evaluate the risks at individual nuclear facilities in line with this goal and take necessary measures to solve any problem. It also is essential for them to make public the results of such evaluations and make efforts to gain understanding from a wide range of people. Risk evaluation at nuclear facilities started in the United States in the 1970s out of the need for nonlife insurers to calculate premiums for nuclear-powered generating stations. Based on the probability of breaks occurring in parts such as pipes and pumps, insurers calculated the risk of a chain of events resulting in a major accident. After comparing a variety of scenarios, insurers recognized as a by-product of their study the vulnerability of nuclear power plants. They also realized that there were some wasteful regulations. In the 1990s, the United States introduced this method to control safety at nuclear facilities, believing that if they took detailed measures based on risk management evaluations, they would be able to improve the safety of nuclear plants in a rational manner. === Improved operating rate Thanks to this risk evaluation method, operating rates of nuclear reactors in the United States have steadily increased from 60 percent in the 1980s to around 90 percent. Due partly to declining operating costs, there are moves to build new nuclear power stations in the United States after a hiatus of more than 20 years. European countries followed suit. However, Japan lagged behind the United States and Europe in fully introducing the system because nuclear power plant operators in this country were hesitant to openly discuss the danger of nuclear power stations for fear of giving ammunition to the antinuclear movement. There also are other problems, including the lack of reliable data on the probability of failures of individual parts, which is essential for proper risk management evaluations. The Nuclear Safety Commission plans to set up a special task force to collect and study necessary data as well as to draw up guidelines aimed at speeding the introduction of the system. They must expedite efforts to tackle the goal. (From The Yomiuri Shimbun, April 13) Copyright 2004 The Yomiuri Shimbun ***************************************************************** 24 Editorial: The war at home/Underfunding domestic security [http://www.startribune.com April 11, 2004 at 7:04 PM As the 2004 presidential race takes shape, the White House is seeking to cast President Bush as a bold and consistent leader in the battle against global terrorism -- and opinion polls show that Americans generally agree. So members of Congress were understandably troubled last month when the Bush administration sent them a budget that underfunds domestic security, reneges on several antiterrorism agreements struck between Congress and the White House and leaves the Department of Homeland Security in a disturbing state of disarray. It's as if the Richard Clarke scenario -- a distracted president neglecting the war on terror -- is playing out all over again. In the budget that Bush sent Congress two months ago, the president promised to hold the line on government spending and trim the massive federal deficit. But no one expected him to shortchange homeland security. Yet that's exactly what seems to be happening now that congressional committees are getting a good look at the White House proposal. Funding for "first responders" such as firefighters and police officers, for example, would drop by nearly 20 percent next year under the president's budget. That means one of two things: Washington is shifting a costly responsibility to cash-strapped local governments, or the president isn't serious about defending domestic targets such as nuclear power plants and transportation hubs. The number of federal air marshals on commercial airline flights -- probably the most effective single safeguard against future hijackings -- has actually fallen since the White House created the Department of Homeland Security. Meanwhile, the department has placed a freeze on hiring of customs guards for the Canadian border, leaving their numbers 40 percent below the level ordered by Congress. Overall, the budget for the Department of Homeland Security would actually go down next year, after you adjust for inflation and exclude a "bio-shield" program added by Congress. "There's a long list of important things where they are still just scratching the surface," says Rep. Martin Sabo of Minnesota, ranking Democrat on the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security. Sabo has proposed a $13.5 million increase in the federal air marshal program this year, financed with savings in administrative vacancies at the department, and that seems like one promising step. It's not clear whether these lapses reflect mismanagement at the Department of Homeland Security or a budget squeeze created by the president's ongoing tax cuts. But it is a disturbing trend for a nation that promised never to forget the horrors of Sept. 11, 2001. Return to top © Copyright 2004 Star Tribune. All rights ***************************************************************** 25 AU ABC: More Ranger contamination incidents emerge 7.30 Report - 12/04/2004: [http://www.abc.net.au/] Australian Broadcasting Corporation 7.30 Report MAXINE MCKEW: The Ranger uranium mine in the Northern Territory has been working again for the past week, having been shut down for a fortnight after contaminated water was connected to the mine's drinking water system. Twenty-four workers reported symptoms of nausea and skin irritation and the Territory Government has yet to decide if it will prosecute the mine's owner, Energy Resources of Australia (ERA). And tonight there's more bad news for ERA and the Office of Supervising Scientist, the Commonwealth agency which oversees the mine's impact in the surrounding Kakadu National Park. The 7:30 Report's investigations reveal two more embarrassing incidents. A week ago, staff of the Supervising Scientist and two Aboriginal people were able to drink contaminated water from a system which should have been shut down. And a local Aboriginal organisation has complained that machinery has been allowed to leave the mine even though it was still contaminated with radioactive material. Murray McLaughlin reports from Darwin. MURRAY MCLAUGHLIN: Tourists who take a sightseeing flight over Kakadu National Park still can't use running water at the Jabiru Airport's terminal. The water was turned off after an accident nearly three weeks ago at the nearby Ranger uranium mine, when processed water contaminated with uranium and other metals was fed into the mine's drinking water system. The same drinking water system feeds a small district called Jabiru East, which contains the airport, and across the road, the field station used by staff at the Environmental Research Institute of the Office of Supervising Scientist. Known for short as ERIOSS, it's the Commonwealth agency which monitors the impact of the Ranger mine. The Supervising Scientist says neither tourists at the airport nor his staff had a chance to drink the contaminated water. ARTHUR JOHNSTON, SUPERVISING SCIENTIST: It happened during the night. And so that when this incident was discovered in the morning, ERA staff came down to our institute about 9:30 and said, "We've switched off the water. Don't even consume what's already there". MURRAY MCLAUGHLIN: And no-one at all those premises before 9:30am had turned on a tap? For the past 2.5 weeks, tourists at Jabiru Airport have had to use portable toilets and scientists at ERIOSS have been drinking bottled water. ARTHUR JOHNSTON: Systems were in place to prevent consumption, primarily the lines connecting into our storage tanks had been physically disconnected and in addition staff had been given written instructions that at no stage should they consume water from the taps until formal written approval was given that clearance on the water was OK. MURRAY MCLAUGHLIN: That clearance has still not been given, but last Monday alarm bells rang again for the Office of Supervising Scientist. A party of scientists and two Aboriginal traditional owners drank the forbidden water during a day's field work because a contractor had left a valve open at the ERIOSS premises. ANDY RALPH, GUNDJEHMI ABORIGINAL CORPORATION: Prior to them boarding the helicopter to go out in the field they filled up several water containers full of water which was not supposed to be used at Jabiru East, and they took off in the chopper and consumed that water during the field trip. ARTHUR JOHNSTON: They assumed that the all clear had definitely been given so they filled their water bottles from the tap. During the day our staff and two Aboriginal assistants consumed some of that water. So, that was what happened, but, again, the quality of the water we know was very good. MURRAY MCLAUGHLIN: But five days before the water was drunk, its uranium content was nudging the maximum allowed by the Australian standard for drinking water. When it was tested again a day after the accident, the uranium content had dropped because the system was being flushed out. Aboriginal traditional owners have been assured that the health of members of the scientific party was not endangered, but they remain unimpressed. YVONNE MARGARULA, ABORIGINAL TRADITIONAL OWNER: I felt bad about the staff and our members working there who drank the water and I'm worried myself. MURRAY MCLAUGHLIN: The 7:30 Report can also reveal that there's yet more embarrassment in store for the Supervising Scientist and ERA, the owners of the Ranger uranium mine. Before any machinery leaves the mine site, it has to be scrupulously cleaned and issued with a decontamination certificate. But a bobcat machine which had worked in uranium tailings at the mine last year was returned in the new year without a certificate to this yard in the nearby township of Jabiru. It was clogged with about 50 kilograms of dried, contaminated mud. The bobcat had been worked at the mine by the local Aboriginal Community Development Employment Project, a work-for-the-dole scheme known in short as CDEP. Early in February, CDEP management reported the problem to ERA. BOB KELLY, CHIEF EXECUTIVE, DJABULUKGU ASSOCIATION: They brought out their radiation inspectors and went over the machine and established that, in fact, the machine had higher radiation levels above the normal background level expected for that area. ARTHUR JOHNSTON: It's quite clear that a vehicle did leave the site in a form in which it shouldn't and it was not, it did not go through the proper clearance processes. So it's clear that ERA will certainly have to look at those clearance processes and make sure they have better systems in place. MURRAY MCLAUGHLIN: In a statement to the 7:30 Report today, ERA said it's already improved its clearance procedures. But after a public meeting in Jabiru nearly two weeks ago, the mine manager seemed to have only just heard about the bobcat incident. SIMON PREBBLE, OPERATIONS MANAGER RANGER MINE: I've just had the circumstances put in front of me tonight. I'll be following that up and making sure we understand fully what's happened. I think that's enough. MURRAY MCLAUGHLIN: ERA's efforts have not been enough for the CDEP. CDEP's administration manager said she pestered the company for seven weeks before she got from them an unsigned and unsatisfactory report about the bobcat. TINA HOLLAND, CDEP ADMINISTRATION MANAGER: It does not explain how any equipment can leave their site without being cleared by an inspector, radiation officer, and that the guard can actually, you know, lift the gate up and let somebody take a piece of equipment out of their site without any kind of paperwork. MURRAY MCLAUGHLIN: Children have played in the CDEP machinery yard. And dust was blown around when the CDEP mechanic used a compressed air gun to clean the dirty bobcat. Tina Holland says people who worked in the yard are left feeling worried. TINA HOLLAND: They're exposed to the uranium material and we all feel, why should we be exposed to something that, you know, we did not want to be exposed. ARTHUR JOHNSTON: I understand the fear that people have about radiation. It's one of these things that you can't feel, can't see, can't smell. MURRAY MCLAUGHLIN: After the Ranger mine was shut down last month, it fell to the Federal Government's Supervising Scientist to placate public concerns. That job's just got tougher, because after this new series of mishaps traditional owners are demanding action. They say they'll be in trouble under their law because the mishaps have occurred on their land. YVONNE MARGARULA: I'm worried about me and my organisation getting blamed. All we need is for the staff at ERISS and the mine itself to look after our members working there because otherwise we'll have problems with our own people and other clans. MAXINE MCKEW: Murray McLaughlin reporting from Darwin. &] [http://www.abc.net.au] [http://www.abc.net.au/privacy.htm] ***************************************************************** 26 The Age: Aborigines drank uranium water - National - www.theage.com.au By Lindsay Murdoch Darwin April 13, 2004 Aborigines in the Kakadu National Park drank water from a tap that should have been shut off after last month's leak of 150,000 litres of uranium-contaminated water at the controversial Ranger mine. The mine also left machinery contaminated with uranium in a community yard where children often play. Kakadu's traditional owners, the Mirrar people, last night renewed calls for an urgent overhaul of laws governing uranium mining, saying they deserved better from Energy Resources Australia, the mine operator, and government regulators. Andy Ralph, executive officer of the Gundjehmi Aboriginal Corporation, which represents the Kakadu community, said: "With what's happened over the past few weeks you wouldn't put ERA and the government regulators in charge of a sandpit in your local playground." The incidents, revealed on the ABC's 7.30 Report, come only days after government regulators allowed ERA to resume full operations at the mine, 230 kilometres east of Darwin. The switch of processing water into fresh water supplies forced the mine's closure last month and intensified pressure on the Federal Government to tighten regulations on uranium mining. ERA has since confirmed that 24 workers have reported symptoms of ill-health after the incident, including three contractors who have suffered aches, lethargy, headaches and diarrhoea. No doctor can tell them what the long-term effects of drinking several litres of water containing 400 times the legal limit of uranium because no one else in the world has consumed anywhere near that amount of uranium. Dr Arthur Johnston, the Commonwealth's supervising scientist who last week approved the mine's return to full operation, confirmed that members of his staff and two Aborigines drank contaminated water during a field trip last Monday. Nonetheless, he said the quality of the water was good. But Mr Ralph said it remained uncertain exactly what levels of uranium were in the water. "What is evident is that this water was not cleared by authorities and was not meant for human consumption," he said. He said the traditional owners were concerned that the focus of ERA's attention in the days after the leak was on the drinking water contamination at the mine instead of areas off the mine site. Full operations resumed at the mine on April 6 after Dr Johnston said he was satisfied the mine was now meeting environmental and health standards. But environmental groups and some politicians in Canberra and the Northern Territory are calling for an overhaul of laws under which the mine operates. [http://www.theage.com.au/newsletters/subscription.html] Copyright © 2004. The Age Company ***************************************************************** 27 Las Vegas SUN: Editorial: What money can't buy LAS VEGAS SUN Last week the Nevada Legislature's Interim Finance Committee approved spending $2 million for the state's legal defense to prevent a proposed nuclear waste dump from being built in Southern Nevada. But the committee's chairman, Assemblyman Morse Arberry, D-Las Vegas, said that while he doesn't want a dump built, he questioned whether the state shouldn't have a backup plan to get compensation from the federal government in case the state's opposition isn't successful. It seems about every other year a state official pops up to wonder if the state should consider seeking money from the federal government in exchange for the dump, but these musings quickly die. It's easy to see why they don't go anywhere. First, the state shouldn't send any signal that it is giving up -- and that's exactly what negotiating for benefits would constitute. Any concession would embolden the federal government to keep going forward with this dangerous dump that would threaten the safety of Nevadans and endanger the environment. Second, you have to be delusional to believe the federal government, which already has budget deficits in the trillions of dollars, will suddenly let federal funds flow into Nevada. The federal government, which wants to bury 77,000 tons of nuclear waste just 90 miles northwest of Las Vegas, is a powerful foe. That is why it's so important that Nevada state government do everything it can to stop the dump from happening, including funding legal challenges. Any kind of concession is out of the question. Period. ***************************************************************** 28 NMBW: State officials to tour Dutch uranium enrichment facility - 2004-04-12 - New Mexico Business Weekly NMBW Staff Up to 18 New Mexico officials will travel to a uranium enrichment facility in the Netherlands later in April to learn more about the Dutch facility and how they can apply lessons learned there to a similar facility that is being proposed for southeastern New Mexico. The Urenco Nederland plant, located in the Dutch city of Almelco, is involved with the same industry consortium that is trying to establish the enrichment facility in New Mexico -- Louisiana Energy Services (LES). The consortium features three major nuclear facilities in Europe. LES has several partners including nuclear utility companies in North Carolina, Illinois and several other states. Taking the trip will be four members of Gov. Bill Richardson's staff as well as Pat Lyons, State Land Commissioner; state Rep. John Heaton, D-Carlsbad, who is the chairman of the state's Radioactive and Hazardous Materials Committee; and members of the Eunice and Hobbs city governments. The trip is scheduled for April 21-25. LES is proposing a uranium enrichment facility in southeast New Mexico near Eunice. Several groups have voiced their objections to the proposed facility and the issue has led to minor sparring between Richardson and Sen. Pete Domenici, R-N.M. The proposed LES facility will produce uranium for commercial power atomic reactors. Previously, LES tried building the same plant in Louisiana and Tennessee, with locals in both states killing the proposal. During the one-day tour of the Urenco plant, the New Mexico visitors will meet with the managing director of the plant and attend a presentation given by the safety and safeguards adviser. Following the tour, the group will travel to Amsterdam for a free day. © 2004 American City Business Journals Inc. ***************************************************************** 29 U.S. Newswire: Yucca Mountain Workers in Danger, Suit Alleges; Developers Knowingly Exposed Workers to Cancer-Causing Dust http://www.usnewswire.com 4/12/2004 5:04:00 PM To: National Desk, Energy Reporter Contact: Kris Phillips, 202-744-3599 WASHINGTON, April 12 /U.S. Newswire/ -- Citing safety concerns, Gene Griego, a technician who worked at the proposed Yucca Mountain nuclear waste repository site in the mid-1990s, has filed a class-action lawsuit against the site's developers. Among the counts, the suit charges Yucca developers with wanton misconduct, gross negligence, and fraudulent concealment. Plaintiffs are seeking compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive relief to ensure that all workers in and visitors to the tunnels are provided with adequate personal protection, and a court order for the developers to install, operate, and maintain efficient dust removal systems to reduce the toxic dust levels to recognized acceptable minimum levels. Griego charges that the developers knowingly exposed Yucca Mountain workers and visitors to highly carcinogenic hazards without providing them with proper protection. Though contractors knew the levels of toxic dust exceeded regulatory limits, they are accused of deliberately doctoring field readings of particulate levels in the Yucca tunnels to avoid the added costs, schedule impacts, and inconvenience of providing adequate respiratory protection and protective clothing. Worksite workers and visitors may have exposed family members and others to the poisonous dust by carrying it on their clothing from the worksite into their homes. The dust can lead to incurable silicosis, lung danger, autoimmune disorders, increased risk of tuberculosis, and chronic renal disease among other problems. According to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) contractors have had access to Yucca Mountain's volcanic rock that is laced with silica, erionite, and mordenite -- all minerals that are highly carcinogenic when airborne. This danger is only heightened by the contractors' decision to dry drill instead of using water or other precautions to minimize dust. "The dust at the Yucca Mountain Project is so toxic that it amounts to a deadly time bomb; exposure increases the risk of latent and potentially fatal diseases that will manifest in up to 20 years or more after inhalation," stated Mark Hutton a Nevada attorney involved with the case. http://www.usnewswire.com/ [http://www.usnewswire.com/] ***************************************************************** 30 Salt Lake Tribune: N-waste relabeling worries some April 12, 2004 By Judy Fahys The U.S. Energy Department is once again asking Congress to relabel its contaminated waste from old bomb-making factories to make disposal easier and cheaper. But unlike last year, this time the agency insists it's not angling to send its highly radioactive rubbish to Utah. Energy Department spokesman Joe Davis said Envirocare of Utah, a commercial radioactive and hazardous waste landfill in Tooele County, is not eligible to accept waste from three cleanups that his agency is pushing Congress to rename. "The waste reclassification issue deals with high-level waste cleanup," Davis said. "High-level waste cannot be sent to Utah." The controversy last year over plans to dispose of reclassified waste in Utah was but the tip of the huge problem faced by the United States after years of producing radioactive waste as part of the nation's nuclear weapons program. Now, the Energy Department has renewed its drive for more flexibility in waste disposal, but the effort faces galvanized resistance from states and environmental groups that are concerned public safety is being sacrificed. Last year, the Energy Department enlisted Congress to change the label applied to highly concentrated uranium-processing waste from defunct plants in Fernald, Ohio, and Niagara Falls, N.Y., that made fuel for government nuclear weapons factories. By renaming it, Congress cleared the way for disposal of the cleanup sludge at Envirocare even though its radioactive radium concentrations exceeded Utah's state limits. Faced with strong public opposition, the Utah company ultimately backed away from the lucrative disposal contract. Now the Fernald waste, which contains radium roughly 100 times more concentrated than currently allowed in Utah, is headed to the government-owned Nevada Test Site while government cleanup officials continue to study the Niagara cleanup. And Gov. Olene Walker has signed a law intended to bar more hazardous forms of waste from Utah unless the governor and the Legislature specifically allow it. Still, the failure of the effort to ship some of that waste to Utah underscores the dilemma of the Energy Department left to deal with a problem of enormous dimensions -- the cleanup, estimated to cost as much as $300 billion, of tons of deadly waste languishing at hundreds of sites. Trouble spots include tanks of reprocessing waste at former bomb-making sites in Washington state, Idaho and South Carolina. Those three have joined forces with other states concerned about the relabeling, and with environmental groups, to block the Energy Department, which says it can save as much as $29 billion by separating out some of the 88 million gallons of lethally radioactive tank waste for disposal as "low-level" waste. Opponents complained that relabeling the tank wastes to cut costs puts expedience before health and safety. They also said high-level waste -- no matter what the name -- should not be disposed of at sites suited for less concentrated forms but in an underground repository, such as the planned Yucca Mountain Project in Nevada. A federal court agreed last summer and blocked the reclassification. Then, when the Energy Department attempted to override that ruling through a specially requested provision of last year's failed Energy Bill, the opponents rallied a bipartisan group of congressmen and senators to derail the plan. Now the issue has been revived with the 2005 budget. In testimony before the Senate Strategic Forces Subcommittee in late February, Jesse Roberson, assistant secretary for environmental management, threatened to withhold $350 million in cleanup funds unless Congress allows the reclassification. Documents detailing her agency's $7.43 billion budget request for 2005 also make a mysterious statement about waste eligible for other facilities, ones like Envirocare that the Energy Department now uses for "low activity waste." "The benefits of performing the activities in this [tank-waste reclassification] program are accelerated cleanup of the Idaho, Hanford and Savannah River sites, and a significant reduction in cost to the taxpayer by disposing of low activity waste forms in approved facilities other than [Yucca Mountain]." Davis, the Energy Department spokesman, declined several requests to clarify the statement and verify that the department does not have other waste relabeling plans that might affect Envirocare, one of only three nongovernment sites approved for low-level cleanup disposal. He only noted that the Envirocare is not licensed for "high-level" radioactive waste. "I don't see waste involved from these projects being part of Envirocare's waste stream," Davis said. Tim Barney, a vice president for Envirocare, said he was not aware of plans to send any of the tank wastes to Utah. "We have not been able to tell how that [proposed reclassification] impacts us," he said. "We are not directly involved." The states affected by the high-level waste reclassification are continuing to resist the Energy Department's request, which the agency has appealed to the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals in San Francisco. Jeremy Maxand, director of the Snake River Alliance, a Boise-based environmental group, said 88 people representing those who live near the Energy Department cleanup sites traveled to Capitol Hill recently to argue against accelerating cleanups. The Energy Department feels lots of pressure from Congress to speed cleanups, he said, but lawmakers from the affected states don't like the idea of relabeling the waste -- without regard to the dangers it might pose -- just to save time and money. "This plan is not reducing risk," Maxand said. "It's putting more people and more of the environment at risk." [fahys@sltrib.com] The U.S. Energy Department's Problem Cleaning up sites contaminated by the nation's Cold War nuclear program has a price tag estimated at $225 billion to $300 billion, making it one of the federal government's largest liabilities, according to the Energy Department's Office of Environmental Management. The "problem" includes: * 25 tons of plutonium * 108 tons of plutonium residues * 88 million gallons of radioactive liquid waste * 2,500 tons of spent nuclear fuel * 178,100 cubic yards of transuranic waste, a specific type of radioactive waste * 1.69 million cubic yards of low-level waste * 324 nuclear facilities * 3,300 industrial facilities * Hundreds of radiological facilities Source: U.S. Energy Department "> Copyright Salt Lake City Tribune ***************************************************************** 31 BBC: Peace protesters march on Faslane Last Updated: Monday, 12 April, 2004 Protesters are marching on Faslane Naval Base A large number of peace protesters have been staging a demonstration outside the Trident nuclear weapons submarine base at Faslane on the Clyde. The Easter Monday demo has been resurrected by Scottish CND to coincide with a new anti-Trident campaign by British CND. The march started at the Faslane Peace Camp at 1300BST on Monday and will end with a rally outside the base. Speakers from the SNP, SSP and CND have been taking part. Nuclear fears The march and rally coincided with a similar protest being staged at Aldermaston in Berkshire. On Friday about 400 protesters set off from London for the Atomic Weapons Establishment Friday as part of the CND-inspired campaign. The organisation fears the possibility of the UK joining the US in building a new generation of nuclear weapons, the current expansion of facilities at Aldermaston and its recruitment of new scientists. Nuclear weapons are illega They breach humanitarian law because they cannot distinguish between military targets and civilian populations Chris Ballance Green Party MSP The Faslane event forms part of this and a specific protest against the continued presence of Trident missiles at the base near Helensburgh. Scottish CND chair Alan McKinnon said: "It is vital to highlight the fact Britain continues to flout international law and its own treaty obligations by maintaining Trident. "While Tony Blair is busy congratulating Libya for abandoning its WMD programme we deploy Trident round the clock ready at any time to kill millions of innocent people." Scottish CND secretary Allison Hunter added: "Britain has confirmed its dependence on Trident and is engaged with the US in planning the next generation of these appalling weapons. This hypocrisy must be exposed." 'Redundant dinosaurs' Green Party MSP Chris Ballance, SNP leader John Swinney and SSP leader Tommy Sheridan were adding their political weight to the proceedings and were being joined by author A L Kennedy and Osama Saeed, of the Muslim Association of Britain, in voicing their protests. Mr Ballance said: "These weapons are irrelevant to modern needs. "They are as immoral, offensive and objectionable as they have been for the last 50 years but they are also now redundant dinosaurs of a previous age. "How can the UK Government justify spending vast amounts of taxpayers' money on weapons of mass destruction especially when British troops have just fought a war in order to reduce and control these very kinds of weapons? "Nuclear weapons are illegal. They breach humanitarian law because they cannot distinguish between military targets and civilian populations - there is no place for them in Scotland." ***************************************************************** 32 BBC: Marchers protest at Last Updated: Monday, 12 April, 2004 [Opening rally in Trafalgar Square] Marchers staged a "treasure hunt for weapons of mass destruction" Hundreds of peace campaigners have protested at the headquarters of Britain's nuclear weapons programme at the end of a four-day, 52-mile march. Some 400 demonstrators set off from London on Friday for the plant in the village of Aldermaston in Berkshire. Another 500 joined on the way or gathered at Aldermaston, in a rerun of the first peace march there in 1958. They want to stop what they call a new generation of arms being developed at the Atomic Weapons Establishment. We were stepping out with t aim of sending a message that we don't want new nuclear weapons in Britain Kate Hudson, CND Simultaneous protest at Faslane Marchers blew whistles and banged saucepans while forming a six-mile human chain around the base as the final part of their protest. The day also included speeches, outdoor theatre and a so-called treasure hunt for weapons of mass destruction. The protesters' epic journey had taken them from Trafalgar Square to Southall on Good Friday, Slough on Saturday and Reading on Sunday, before arriving at their destination on Easter Monday. They had spent Friday night in a Sikh temple, Saturday in a Methodist hall and Sunday in a leisure centre. [Route of the Aldermaston march] Marchers set off on Good Friday and arrived on Easter Monday Meanwhile, 200 people protested in solidarity at the Faslane nuclear submarine base on the Clyde in Glasgow. Kate Hudson, head of CND, said the march had been a "great success". She said: "We were stepping out with the aim of sending a message that we don't want new nuclear weapons in Britain and we feel we are well on the way to doing that," she said. Thames Valley Police praised the conduct of the demonstrators and said there had been no arrests. The force had earlier criticised organisers as "irresponsible" for failing to apply for road closures, which cost thousands of pounds. [The first Aldermaston march] Some 10,000 people joined the 1958 march to Aldermaston A Ministry of Defence spokesman refused to comment on CND's outrage over the weapons programme at Aldermaston, saying only: "We acknowledge the right to peaceful and lawful demonstration." Some 10,000 people marched from London to Aldermaston in protest at Britain's first hydrogen bomb tests 46 years ago. Speaking at the opening rally at Trafalgar Square on Friday, campaigner Bruce Kent said: "This event is to wake up a sleeping population that is unaware of the dangers of nuclear weapons." Veteran Labour politician Tony Benn, also speaking at the rally, said: "Fifty-nine years ago Hiroshima and Nagasaki were destroyed by the most terrifying weapons ever devised and tens of thousands were killed." Aldermaston pictures were provided to BBC News Online courtesy of BECTU History Project. ***************************************************************** 33 Seattle Post-Intelligencer: DOE pulling a fast one at Hanford [seattlepi.com] [OPINION] Monday, April 12, 2004 SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER EDITORIAL BOARD For the Bush administration's Department of Energy, power makes for arrogance in the handling of nuclear waste issues. If the administration can push around workers, communities and the states, it most certainly will. Rather than accept a federal court ruling, the administration is trying to force a change in the law by withholding nuclear cleanup funds. If Congress, Washington and other states fail to stand firm, the administration will get away with its Alice in Wonderland plan to have Hanford considered clean because the Energy Department says it is. The administration is engaged in what amounts to massive subterfuge, trying to save on cleanup expenses by reclassifying dangerous wastes as safe enough to leave at Hanford and several other sites. After having those claims dismissed by a federal judge in an Idaho case, the administration last year tried to negotiate a rewrite of the law with a few members of Congress. That was short-circuited when the U.S. House of Representatives approved a resolution from Rep. Jay Inslee, D-Bainbridge Island, that expressed opposition. Now, the administration is letting it be known it has no intention of carrying out $350 million of cleanup work unless the law is changed. That's little better than old-fashioned bullying, intended to force the states and their representatives into submission. The states and Congress should stand firm, relying on another time-honored notion: the law. Back to top [Seattle Post-Intelligencer] 101 Elliott Ave. W. Seattle, WA 98119 (206) 448-8000 Send comments to [newmedia@seattlepi.com] ©1996-2004 Seattle ***************************************************************** 34 Tri-City Herald: Hanford parents fight plan to end day care subsidy This story was published Monday, April 12th, 2004 By Annette Cary Herald staff writer Parents and staff of a day care center subsidized by the Department of Energy have turned to Washington's congressional delegation to save the center's federal funding. DOE has said it plans to end the subsidy for Learning Landscape, in part because it is underused. But 62 parents and other supporters signed a letter sent to congressional leaders that says there is a waiting list of 20 children of federal and Hanford employees who want one of the approximately 60 slots at the center. DOE had provided a subsidy of $150,000 for the day care annually, according to the letter. DOE puts that figure at $132,000. The money was used to improve services, including providing ratios of caretakers to children that were better than required by the state. In addition, fees were lower than at other private day cares in the area, said Jan Taylor, executive director of Kids and Company, which has operated the day care since 1999. Plans had been made to replace the leased facility with a federally owned facility. The Government Services Administration, or GSA, already had sought and received bids on the project. "Without warning or, we believe, adequate research, last month DOE pulled both its annual operations funding of the day care and its support for the new building," said the letter. "It cited its desire to focus solely on Hanford cleanup." DOE said it could not commit to a 30-year payment schedule for the new building, which the GSA had requested. DOE is projecting that 30 years from now only a few hundred workers will continue to work on Hanford cleanup. But supporters of Learning Landscape believe a compromise could be reached. "We understand that GSA is willing to discuss different terms and conditions," they wrote. "We urge you to encourage DOE to negotiate with GSA." Benefits for Hanford employees have become a sore issue since the first of the year, with the proposed change in the day care subsidy and reduced retirement benefits proposed for new contracts. Supporters pointed out that they knew of no other DOE site in the nation, including DOE headquarters, that has withdrawn the employee day care benefit. Day care can be tough to find in Richland, according to the Benton-Franklin Community Action Committee, which tracks child care trends. "The demand is a lot higher than the supply of licensed care," said Jennifer Martinez-Tyndall, deputy director for child care resources and referrals for the agency. Because care for babies and toddlers is particularly scarce, the agency has advised parents to get on the waiting list of a day care when they know they're expecting a baby. Pasco has more day care available, but parents who work in contractor and federal offices near the Learning Landscape on Jadwin Avenue like being able to drop in on their children during breaks and at lunch. Supporters of the day care are asking Sens. Maria Cantwell and Patty Murray and Rep. Doc Hastings to push for $150,000 per year at least for fiscal years 2005 and 2006. That would give them time to develop new partnerships and resources in the community, if DOE sticks with its decision to end the benefit. In response to the letter, DOE pointed out that the federal subsidy was intended to allow better child-to-teacher ratios, not to pay basic expenses of the day care. By giving parents notice now that DOE does not plan to continue the subsidy past fall, they have time to look for another agency to help, according to DOE. © 2004 Tri-City Herald, Associated Press &Other Wire Services ***************************************************************** 35 baltimoresun.com - Lab in Md. puts neutrons to work By Dennis O'Brien Sun Staff Originally published April 12, 2004 GAITHERSBURG -- NASA might have rockets and telescopes that serve as windows to the heavens, but some earthbound technology is probing the origins of the universe, too. In a cavernous hall the size of a college gym, researchers with the National Institute of Standards and Technology are using the neutron to probe an array of scientific mysteries -- including the way that matter formed at the dawn of time. In NIST's Neutron Research Center, scientists use a 20-megawatt nuclear reactor to create the atomic particles, fire them through glass and steel-reinforced pipes, then monitor their behavior with 29 spectrometers and other instruments. The center looks a bit like an indoor power plant, with elevated observation decks, banks of computer monitors and an array of steel pipes that branch out from the reactor and run the length of a football field. Those leaving the facility must pass through a detector that monitors radiation exposure levels. About 1,700 researchers from around the country use the center each year. Current projects include the search for a more durable highway cement and efforts to build a portable hydrogen fuel cell. There are neutron research centers in New Mexico and Illinois, too, with a fourth under construction in Tennessee. But each has different capabilities, said John J. Rush, a longtime NIST administrator. The nation's official arbiter of measurement and technology standards has been conducting neutron research since the 1960s. In a tour last week, Rush estimated the lab and its equipment would cost $800 million if built today. "People come from all over the world to research here," he said. Neutrons make excellent test subjects. They have neither a positive nor a negative charge, but when they break free from the nucleus of an atom, they behave in strange ways. They can make particles recoil on contact, set them into motion and act like microscopic magnets, and that can be measured. Free-roaming neutrons also quickly decay and form protons and other types of matter. That makes them ideal for probing how the elements that make up the building blocks of the universe -- such as helium and hydrogen -- were created. "You can look up at planets and see back in time, or you can look at the various elements of what the stars are made of," said Paul Huffman, a nuclear physicist at North Carolina State University working with NIST researchers. Under what is known as the standard model theory, the universe was created with a huge explosion known as the "big bang." Within a minute or so after the big bang, neutrons and protons began to collide, and many neutrons quickly decayed into protons. In this scenario, the life span of the neutron is widely accepted to be about 887 seconds. By measuring the rate of neutron decay, researchers hope to determine the accuracy of theories about the big bang, the events that followed it and why the universe holds together. "We hope we can either prove or maybe even disprove theories about the formation of the universe," said Muhammed Arif, an NIST researcher. Although scientists have been studying neutron decay since the 1950s, this work is the most precise ever using neutron beams. Results of experiments so far, published last fall in Physical Review of Letters, showed previous estimates were right about neutron life span. More complete results are not expected for at least two years. "They're not easy experiments in general," Huffman said. "The experiments we do, we basically build from the ground up. There's no standard set of instruments you can use." > Copyright © 2004, The Baltimore Sun ***************************************************************** 36 Daily Camera: Voices grow against Flats use [newsroom@dailycamera.com] . Local governments' opinions vary on accessibility to site By Greg Avery, Camera Staff Writer April 12, 2004 Boulder County governments are adding their voices to the opinions of local activists who say the site of the former Rocky Flats nuclear weapons factory is no place for widespread public recreation. At least not yet. The city of Boulder has challenged the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service's position in favor of public access once the 6,200-acre site just south of Boulder County is cleaned of most radioactive contaminants and transformed into a wildlife refuge. And with an approaching April 26 deadline for public comment, Boulder County and Superior have joined the chorus against broad public use. Boulder's City Council voted Thursday to send a letter recommending a cautious approach, an option that would make ecological restoration the top priority at Rocky Flats for 15 years while allowing limited public access in the form of guided tours along a 3,500-foot trail to an old ranch barn. "We think it makes little sense to open the wildlife area to public access, given what's there," said Boulder City Councilman Shaun McGrath, who represents Boulder on the Rocky Flats Coalition of Local Governments. "It's not to say that we think it's unsafe, but when you consider that there's some very potentially harmful contamination up there, it makes sense to move slowly," he said. A total of four options, ranging from no public access to far-flung access on 19 miles of trails, have been proposed for the first 15 years of the site's new life as a federal wildlife refuge. If the current cleanup of radioactive contamination meets its schedule, the area could open as a wildlife refuge in 2007. Boulder County Commissioner Paul Danish, the county's representative to the coalition, said the county and the town of Superior favor a restrictive approach to public use, similar to Boulder's position. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service should not be authorized to operate the site as if it were a run-of-the-mill nature preserve on land that has always been in a pristine state, Danish said. "Rocky Flats has a 50-year history of less-than-perfect safety and environmental management," he said. "It also has a 50-year history of less-than-perfect disclosure of what's out there." Representatives of the other four other coalition member-governments — Arvada, Westminster, and Broomfield and Jefferson counties — voted in favor a plan allowing recreational access on foot, horseback or bicycle to at least 16 miles of trails. That alternative is also what the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service favors. The Department of Energy is expected to hand over control of all but about 1,000 acres of the site to the wildlife service when cleanup is finished in 2006. That core area of the site, where plutonium triggers for bombs were produced for more than three decades, would remain off limits in any of the alternatives being considered. The coalition itself has not officially endorsed one proposal over another, but it sent a letter to the wildlife service this week reiterating that it supports public access if post-cleanup soil levels meet standards set to ensure public safety on the property. Cleanup is supposed to leave a maximum of 50 picocuries of plutonium per gram of soil. The local government coalition officially says that level is safe, according to the best available science. But critics warn that it's possible that small amounts of plutonium could harm visitors if soil on the site is disturbed, and that is enough risk to warrant not allowing weekend recreationists in for walks and rides. Camera Staff Writer Greg Avery can be reached at (303) 473-1307 or averyg@dailycamera.com. ***************************************************************** 37 Pahrump Valley Times: Do your homework (Yucca) April 9, 2004 I read Bill Vasconi's editorial dated April 7th 2004. I take exception to his commentary. If he did his homework he would have realized that I sold my company to a Fortune 500 company June 2003. Additionally, if my memory serves me, Mr. Vasconi has tirelessly advocated the DOE's position without fail. I believe that he lacks the proper judgment, perhaps from working at the Nevada Test site his whole life. I would suggest that in the future he do his homework, not just in this case, but perhaps on the entire Yucca Mountain issue. He would then realize that there are many questions that should be answered before any of us could make this decision on Yucca Mountain. Hey - Bill, forget about lining your pockets and think about the folks that could perish due to greed. STEPHEN J. CLOOBECK LAS VEGAS For comment or questions, please e-mail webmaster@pahrumpvalleytimes.com [webmaster@pahrumpvalleytimes.com] Copyright © Pahrump Valley Times, 1997 - 2003 ***************************************************************** 38 U.S. Newswire: DOE Cites Westinghouse Savannah River Company for Price-Anderson Violations 4/12/2004 1:59:00 PM To: National Desk, Energy Reporter Contact: Jeff Sherwood of the U.S. Department of Energy, 202-586-5806 WASHINGTON, April 12 /U.S. Newswire/ -- The Department of Energy (DOE) has issued a Preliminary Notice of Violation to Westinghouse Savannah River Company (WSRC), the primary contractor for the Savannah River Site, for violations of nuclear safety rules involving the unnecessary radiation exposure of three WSRC personnel and the subsequent falsification of radiation dose records. The violations did not result in radiation exposures to personnel in excess of regulatory limits. However, DOE took this action because of the number of personnel protective barriers that were overcome and the potential this had for more significant radiation exposure levels to personnel. In addition, WSRC failed to adequately sustain corrective actions associated with a 1999 event at the same facility. In both the 1999 event and the current event, similar deficiencies were observed. DOE also took this action because two of the workers involved with the event intentionally recorded radiation doses below that which was actually received. This falsification of radiation dose records was done at the urging of a WSRC supervisor. To emphasize the importance of maintaining a quality program for DOE activities, DOE is issuing a proposed civil penalty to WSRC in the amount of $206,250. Some mitigation of the civil penalty was granted to WSRC for recently implemented corrective actions. The Price-Anderson Amendments Act of 1988 authorized DOE to undertake regulatory actions against contractors for violations of its nuclear safety requirements. The enforcement program is designed to have contractors correct procedural violations to prevent more serious events from occurring. Additional details on this and other enforcement actions are available on the Internet at http://www.eh.doe.gov/enforce [http://releases.usnewswire.com/redir.asp?ReleaseID=28658&Link=ht tp://www.eh.doe.gov/enforce] http://www.usnewswire.com/ [http://www.usnewswire.com/] ***************************************************************** 39 Oak Ridger: 'Key' review complete Story last updated at 11:32 a.m. on April 12, 2004 RESULTS: Official said a report will likely be issued, but it's unknown how much - if any - of the document will be made public. By: Paul Parson | Oak Ridger Staff [paul.parson@oakridger.com] Federal officials have apparently wrapped up a review of how the nation's weapons facilities manage keys. All the weapons sites, including the Y-12 National Security Complex, were visited as part of the review earlier this year, according to Bryan Wilkes, spokesman for the National Nuclear Security Administration - the quasi-independent agency within the Department of Energy that oversees the nuclear weapons complex. "We have not received any documentation from the visit," said Bill Wilburn, a Y-12 spokesman. "It would be premature at this point to comment." The review stemmed from reported incidences of missing keys at Y-12, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California and Sandia National Laboratory in New Mexico. Somewhere between 200 to 250 keys turned up missing from Oak Ridge's nuclear weapons facility last year. Officials said Y-12's missing keys fall into two categories of uses, with the largest number pertaining to "administrative, non-sensitive functions" like filing cabinets and closets. In addition, around 40 keys reportedly were associated with two so-called minimum security buildings; neither contained nuclear materials nor nuclear operations. Wilkes said this review on the management of keys should result in some kind of report. However, he did not know if that would be available to the general public, including the media. "I would look for something over the next couple of weeks," the NNSA spokesman said. Not only does Y-12 produce and refurbish weapons components, but the facility is also the nation's principal storehouse for bomb-grade uranium. The plant is also involved in efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. ***************************************************************** 40 Oak Ridger: EPA's talk on Y-12 report delayed Story last updated at 11:33 a.m. on April 12, 2004 REPORTING ON Y-12: Public health agency also looking at mercury releases from Oak Ridge facility. By: Paul Parson | Oak Ridger Staff paul.parson@oakridger.com [paul.parson@oakridger.com] Citing location of the event as the "official" reason, the Environmental Protection Agency's opportunity to publicly address its concerns about a health assessment on uranium releases from Oak Ridge's nuclear weapons plant has been scrapped from a Tuesday meeting. EPA officials were originally scheduled to discuss the issue during the Oak Ridge Reservation Health Effects Subcommittee's public meeting in Kingston. However, The Oak Ridger initially learned from a concerned citizen Friday that EPA's portion of the meeting has been nixed. Jennifer Sarginson, who handles media inquiries for the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, cited the Kingston location of the meeting as a reason for EPA's talk being postponed. Consisting of around 20 community members, the Health Effects Subcommittee essentially serves as an advisory group to ATSDR - a federal public health agency involved with hazardous waste issues. "Basically, EPA, ATSDR, the subcommittee and the community all got together and talked about this and agreed that the best thing to do would be to present this portion of the agenda at the June 8 meeting," Sarginson responded when asked about the EPA issue. "And, that one actually takes place in Oak Ridge - which is why it seems more pertinent." The ATSDR document - called a public health assessment - states that past and current off-site exposures to uranium released from the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant pose "no apparent health hazard." What this means is people could've been or were exposed, but the estimated doses weren't at levels expected to cause adverse health effects. The health assessment focuses heavily on the Scarboro neighborhood, located just over a ridge from the weapons plant now known as the Y-12 National Security Complex. EPA's Office of Radiation and Indoor Air indicated it did not agree with ATSDR's final conclusion regarding past uranium exposures - voicing concern over health evaluation criteria used by ATSDR and suggesting the health assessment underestimated some radiation doses, among other things. While some people questioned why a talk on an Oak Ridge issue would take place in Kingston, ATSDR officials said the meeting was scheduled before the agency found out EPA would be coming. When The Oak Ridger asked Sarginson how many community members were involved in the decision to postpone EPA's talk, she responded: "There were a couple of community members who were originally trying to get EPA to come to the meeting. It's those community members who were concerned about making sure that EPA got to the meeting." The Oak Ridger also learned some community members were trying to arrange a non-subcommittee meeting for Monday night to allow EPA officials to discuss their concerns about the health assessment in Oak Ridge. Attempts to schedule this Monday night meeting apparently didn't sit well with some people involved with the subcommittee. "The official meeting is scheduled for Tuesday," said Sarginson. "There was supposedly a meeting in the works for Monday, and it was an unofficial meeting. "But, that's been canceled to my knowledge. And, that was not an official meeting. That was not something we coordinated - meaning ATSDR," she said. Regardless of what EPA planned to say, ATSDR has already issued the "final version" of the public health assessment of Y-12 uranium releases. According to ATSDR officials, the document is available at the Oak Ridge, Harriman, Kingston and Rockwood public libraries in addition to the ATSDR field office, located at 197 S. Tulane Ave. Minus the EPA portion, Tuesday's Health Effects Subcommittee meeting is still scheduled to take place, starting at noon in the Kingston Community Center, 201 Patton Ferry Road, Kingston. The meeting is open to the public. Although ATSDR did not provide an updated agenda for Tuesday's meeting, a press release for the meeting stated that an "introductory presentation" on past Y-12 mercury releases would take place from 1:30 to 2:30 p.m. The mercury releases are the topic of another public health assessment that ATSDR is doing. ***************************************************************** 41 New York City BROOKHAVEN: Lab may dismantle reactor Monday, Apr 12, 2004, 9:38 PM EDT NEW YORK NOW NEWS [http://www.nynewsday.com] BY ANN GIVENS STAFF WRITER The radioactive Graphite Research Reactor at Brookhaven National Laboratory may be taken apart by robots and disposed of at a nuclear waste dump so toxic that even bugs can't leave once they've entered. Along the way, lab and Department of Energy officials will take precautions to make sure no radioactive material escapes into the environment, where it could harm humans or wildlife. Lab officials and environmentalists agree that, in spite of some risks, removing the reactor is the best choice. "We were persuaded that the dangers associated with dismantling the reactor wouldn't even come close to the danger of keeping it in place," said Richard Amper, executive director of the Long Island Pine Barrens Society and a member of the lab's Community Advisory Council. The proposal to remove the reactor, which is still preliminary, was a major turnaround for the Department of Energy, which earlier had floated a plan to "entomb" it for up to 87,000 years. Environmentalists and several legislators praised the new plan, which lab officials say will eliminate 99 percent of the reactor's radioactive material. But they said care must be taken in doing the work. "It's a slow, painstaking job because the material is radioactive," said Gordon Thompson, a nuclear engineer who recently completed a report on decommissioning the reactor for the Long Island environmental group Standing for Truth About Radiation Foundation . The reactor, which operated from 1950 to 1969, was the world's first peacetime nuclear research reactor. Its cleanup, along with the removal of mercury and other pollutants from the Peconic River, is among the final steps in the federal process aimed at removing contamination at Brookhaven National Lab. If the plan goes forward, it will cost about $97 million, and take between two and four years. The process will be regulated through the Department of Energy, officials said. Details of the dismantling are still subject to change. Fred Petschauer, the project manager for the reactor, said that, while a graphite research reactor exactly like this one has never been dismantled before, similar ones, and many that are much larger and more dangerous, are taken apart all the time. He said there have been no major accidents dismantling nuclear reactors in recent years. The uranium fuel itself was removed from the reactor core shortly after it was shut down. What remains are the graphite "pile" that the uranium was filtered through, the concrete bioshield that covered the pile, and the underground canal that received the spent fuel. All of these are radioactive, but far less concentrated than the fuel itself, Petschauer said. Petschauer said the lab and Department of Energy will probably leave the bioshield, which is essentially a 5,000-ton concrete and steel wall around the reactor, in place while they remove the "pile" at the center. That way, he said, the bioshield can seal the graphite from the outside environment in case radioactive particles are released while it's being taken apart. In addition, he said a "tent" would be placed over the bioshield as an additional layer of protection against any radioactive material becoming airborne. He said the "pile" consists of 68,000 graphite blocks and measures 25 square feet, standing 25 feet high. The fact that it is already divided into blocks would make it easier to take apart, and less dangerous, since the graphite won't need to be cut. Petschauer said one possibility is to have robots remove the graphite. Scientists man the robots using joysticks and television monitors, he said, and can do everything from pick up material to cut it. The material would then be loaded into special containers and moved by truck or train to a nuclear waste disposal site - possibly the DOE's Hanford site in Washington state, a site so toxic that flies that go into the contaminated areas are trapped so they can't carry radiation to the outside world. He said the containers protect against leaking or fires in the event of an accident. It remains to be seen whether the dismantling of the reactor will concern residents. Huge protests preceded the removal of fuel from the Shoreham nuclear power plant in 1993. But for now, many civic leaders and environmentalists say they're glad the lab is removing the reactor - and they hope it will do it carefully. "This is the beginning of a long and complicated process," said Robert Alvarez, executive director of the Standing for Truth About Radiation Foundation and former senior policy adviser to the U.S. secretary of energy. "They should take their time and do this right and safely." Copyright © 2004, Newsday, Inc. [http://www.nynewsday.com] ***************************************************************** 42 DOE: Sunshine Act; Notice of Meeting, Notice of Vote, Explanation of FR Doc 04-8310 [Federal Register: April 12, 2004 (Volume 69, Number 70)] [Notices] [Page 19177] From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr12ap04-38] [[Page 19177]] Action Closing Meeting and List of Persons To Attend April 7, 2004. The following notice of meeting is published pursuant to Section 3(a) of the Government in the Sunshine Act (Pub. L. No. 94-409), 5 U.S.C. 552b: Agency Holding Meeting: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. Date and Time: April 14, 2004 (Within a relatively short time after the regular Commission Meeting). Place: Room 3M 4A/B, 888 First Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426. Status: Closed. Matters to be Considered: Non-Public Investigations and Inquiries, Enforcement Related Matters, and Security of Regulated Facilities. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Magalie R. Salas, Secretary, Telephone (202) 502-8400. Chairman Wood and Commissioners Brownell, Kelliher and Kelly voted to hold a closed meeting on April 14, 2004. The certification of the General Counsel explaining the action closing the meeting is available for public inspection in the Commission's Public Reference Room at 888 First Street, NW., Washington, DC 20426. The Chairman and the Commissioners, their assistants, the Commission's Secretary and her assistant, the General Counsel and members of her staff, and a stenographer are expected to attend the meeting. Other staff members from the Commission's program offices who will advise the Commissioners in the matters discussed will also be present. Magalie R. Salas, Secretary. [FR Doc. 04-8310 Filed 4-8-04; 11:10 am] BILLING CODE 6717-01-P ***************************************************************** 43 [du-list] "friendly fire" newsletter #1 Date: Mon, 12 Apr 2004 16:11:01 -0700 "FRIENDLY FIRE" NEWSLETTER#1 Newsletter of the International Coalition to Ban Uranium Weapons (ICBUW) ICBUW Website: http://www.bandepleteduranium.org April 12, 2004 In this issue: 1. EDITORIAL 2. THE BILL MC DERMOTT BILL 3. GAO STUDY 4. LET'S GET THE STORY STRAIGHT 5. DUTCH MILITARY IN IRAQ DELAYS TROOP TRANSFER FROM SUSPECTED DU CONTAMINATED AREA The Newsletter can also be viewed at the ICBUW Website. See: http://www.bandepleteduranium.org/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=120 1. EDITORIAL At the moment of writing this editorial, the situation of the Japanese hostages in Iraq still remains unclear. A group named the "Saraya al-Mujahidin" kidnapped three Japanese civilians. One of them, Noriaki Imai, 18 years old, works on the Depleted Uranium (DU) issue. The NO DU Hiroshima Project and five other Japanese organisations against the military use of DU have done an emergency appeal to save Noriaki Imai and the other two hostages. As a journalist, Noriaki went to Iraq to investigate cases of radiation sickness due to DU contamination. He has planned to publish a picture collection revealing the damage caused by DU. He is working from a sincere desire to let as many people as possible know the reality of the damage. We call on everyone to use their personal contacts to try to free the hostages. A recent release of a Dutchman held hostage in Dagestan was mediated by a speed skate coach and a soccer trainer! Meanwhile, the New York Daily News on April 3 reported that DU was found in the urine of 4 out of 9 US soldiers coming back home from Iraq with health problems. The GI's were stationed in As Samawah, the capital of Iraq's province Al Muthanna, which is also the area where currently Dutch, Japanese and Moldavian troops are staying. Apparently realizing that this news reveals a serious situation, no one less than Senator Hillary Clinton immediately demanded health checks for all returnees from Iraq. The list of grassroots and other non-governmental organisations, politicians and institutes that demand a clean up of affected areas and to investigate DU poisoning has steadily grown over the years. Even the British Royal Society and the US General Accounting have joined the list. However, nothing has happened so far. Because of this, ICBUW is zealous for an immediate ban on the military use of DU in weapons. The international office has started and coordinates a wide range of studies. For example, an assessment is currently carried out to determine the most appropriate sponsor state, which will bring the draft Convention for the prohibition on the military use of DU in weaponry into the United Nations, and other states, which would be willing to serve as a co- sponsor. We keep you posted on developments after a May ICBUW meeting with the founding organisations. Decisions have to be made, for instance, about the membership criteria. Meanwhile, in Belgium, a National Coalition is set up which has already met twice. Such National Coalitions are a means to lobby governments, and to organise public actions and meetings to influence the opinion makers. This first issue of FRIENDLY FIRE features contributions from Maarten H.J. van den Berg (RISQ) on developments in As Samawah, Dan Bishop (IDUST) on necessity to publish correct information on DU, and Gretel Munroe (Grassroots Actions for Peace) on the US McDermott Bill and the US General Accounting Office. Lizzy Bloem, Henk van der Keur, ICBUW Secretariat: Website: http://www.bandepleteduranium.org Amsterdam, 12 April, 2004 ______________________________ 2. THE BILL MC DERMOTT BILL By Gretel Munroe Grassroots Actions for Peace Website: http://www.grassrootsconcord.org Representative Bill McDermott, one of Washington State's elected representatives to the US Congress, who is also a medical doctor, has been concerned about Gulf War veterans' illnesses for some time. He personally has been to Iraq to evaluate reported medical anomalies. He talked with pediatricians and learned of their concerns about increased cancer rates in children and increases in congenital abnormalities in infants. These are the same health problems that are observed in other parts of the world where DU munitions are fabricated and tested (e.g. Concord, MA; Jonesborough, TN; Socorro, NM). Immediately on his return in spring, 2003, he initiated a bill in the US Congress calling for a moratorium on DU use in military weaponry Specifically the bill asks for studies of the health effects of DU to be done jointly by the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry and the Center for Disease Control and Prevention. In addition, the bill would require the Environmental Protection Agency to identify sites in the U.S. where DU munitions had been manufactured or used as in test firing, and would study the air, water and soil/vegetation at these sites for possible DU contamination. The bill also requires clean up of contaminated sites. At the present time the McDermott Bill is in three committees: the House Subcommittee on Health, the Committee on Energy and Commerce and the Committee on Armed Services. Initially the McDermott Bill had six co-sponsors in Congress. My congressman, Edward Markey, (Democrat, Massachusetts) was one of the original co-sponsors. There are now 31. McDermott's office would like to have at least 50 co-sponsors. Grassroots Actions for Peace intends to work on this issue and increase the number of co-sponsors in conjunction with other grassroots groups. There is a movement in progress to ask different Senators such as Senator Hilary Clinton and Senator Edward Kennedy to work towards having a companion bill in the Senate. Such a bill would essentially ask for studies of the health effects of depleted uranium and an environmental clean-up of sites in the U.S. contaminated by DU. However, it might be a somewhat different bill. Several years ago, Congresswoman Cynthia McKinney (Democrat, Georgia) introduced a bill in the House of Representatives asking in addition for a ban on DU munitions, including manufacture and use of DU weapons until it could be proved that DU was harmless. Congresswoman McKinney lost in the primaries (before the 2002 elections) and consequently the bill died. A possible Senate bill would probably not go this far. The McDermott Bill, H.R. 1483, can be viewed at the following here: http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/C?c108:./temp/~c108lOEj0S ______________________________ 3. GAO STUDY by Gretel Munroe, Grassroots Actions for Peace Website: http://www.grassrootsconcord.org The General Accounting Office (GAO) is doing a study of the health effects of exposure to DU in veterans of the 1991 Gulf War as well as policies of the Departments of Defense and Veterans Affairs in identifying and medically treating veterans exposed to DU. Congressmen Robert Filner (Democrat of California) and Ciro Rodriquez, (Democrat, Texas) persuaded the GAO to take on this study. Results of the study will be available by June. ______________________________ 4. LET'S GET THE STORY STRAIGHT by Dan Bishop, IDUST Website: http://www.idust.net Once again I find myself cringing at an op-ed piece about depleted uranium written by a well-meaning but misinformed activist. Don't get me wrong. I'm more than pleased to see another article presenting the hazards and problems associated with DU brought before the public. We can't get enough publicity, to be sure. Minor misstatements here and there probably don't hurt our cause too much, but over time they could undermine our credibility. We don't need to provide our opponents with ammunition.... To read the article online, go to: http://www.bandepleteduranium.org/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=118 DU or DU coating? In this specific case, the author used the phrase "depleted uranium coated bullets" in one place and "depleted uranium tipped weapons" in another. The words "coated" and "tipped" are entirely wrong, and tend to leave the impression that not very much DU is involved. After all, take a bullet, paint it with a DU coating, and how much DU have you really used? In fact, a 30mm DU bullet (those used by the A-10A Thunderbolt II aircraft) is almost SOLID depleted uranium (a small amount of titanium (1%) or molybdenum (2%) is added to make for a stronger alloy). Each shell contains 300 grams of DU. That's 2/3 of a pound! These are the bullets fired from the 7-barrel GAU8A cannon in the A-10A's nose. A 4 second burst from this gun delivers between 140 and 280 rounds, depending on the firing rate. 140 rounds spread approximately 93 pounds (42 kg) of DU into the environment. If a fully loaded gun, with its ammunition capacity of 1350 rounds, were fired till empty, 891 pounds (405 kg) of DU munitions will have been expended. 105mm and 120mm tank penetrators used by the US and UK armies in their Abrams and Challenger tanks are much larger. Each of these shells contains a long rod of SOLID depleted uranium alloy. Imagine a fat broom handle made out of DU. The DU rod in a 120mm penetrator is 27 inches (68 cm) long. The 105mm shells contain between 7.41 and 8.08 pounds (3.36 kg to 3.67 kg) of DU, and the 120mm shells contain between 6.90 and 8.69 pounds (3.13 kg and 3.95 kg) of DU. As you can see, using the terms "tipped" and "coated" in a description of these munitions totally misrepresents the amount of environmental contamination from DU weapons. Military spokespersons are more than happy to let this error slip by. Alpha, beta, gamma... Another misconception is one that is perpetrated (purposely) by military spokespersons and is seldom corrected by the anti-DU activists debating them. "Depleted uranium is an alpha emitter," they will say, "and alpha particles are the least penetrating type of radiation." Everything in that statement is 100% correct. But the statement itself tells only half of the story - the half the military would like you to believe. The nature of radioactive decay is such that alpha or beta emission from a radioactive atom results in that atom's being transformed into a new and different element. When an atom of U- 238 (the 99.8% component of DU) emits an alpha particle, it decays into an atom of thorium, Th-234, which is also radioactive, but which is a BETA emitter. Furthermore, with a half life of only 24.1 days, this thorium atom will soon decay, emitting its beta particle, and transforming itself into an atom of protactinium, Pa- 234, which is ALSO a beta emitter, and has a half life of 6.75 hours. So within hours, that atom also decays and emits its beta particle. Both of these beta decays are accompanied by strong GAMMA ray emission as well. A gamma ray is a very high-energy X-ray, and is extremely penetrating. To make a long story short, a sample of DU fresh out of the processing plant where it has just been purified, emits only alpha particles. But within days, testing that same sample will reveal beta and gamma radiation as well. After the sample is five or six months old, the concentrations of Th-234 and Pa-234 will have built up enough so that the amount of beta and gamma radiation from the sample will each be TWICE the amount of alpha radiation. Thus external exposure to DU entails exposure to alpha, beta and gamma radiation. Although the skin will block alpha particles, beta and gamma radiation can penetrate beyond the dead outer skin layers and create damage to living tissue. Beta particles can penetrate up to 2 cm, while gamma radiation (which, through a process called the Compton effect) generates beta particle radiation all along its track through the body. Not all external exposure to alpha radiation is harmless, either. Cataracts, for example, can be caused by exposure to alpha radiation. Just how radioactive is DU? I read a transcript the other day of a radio interview with a well known and widely traveled anti-DU activist. When her host asked if DU was radioactive, she replied, "Oh, yes. It is very radioactive." Once again I cringed. I could only assume that she misspoke accidentally under the pressure of the microphone. I've been there, so I understand. Most of the substances with which we come into contact every day are not radioactive at all. But of the substances that are radioactive, depleted uranium is one of the least radioactive substances known to man. The military has that fact right on the money. Generally, the longer a substance 's half-life, the lower its specific activity. U-238, with a 4.5 billion year half life, thus ranks near the bottom of the scale for radioactivity. One milligram of U- 238 has a specific activity of 14.4 Becquerel, which means it emits 14.4 alpha particles every second. For comparison, it is not uncommon for a particular radioactive substance to have a specific activity of several millions of Becquerels. Now before you rip me to shreds for daring to say the truth about DU's radioactivity, let's remember that the important issue is NOT "how radioactive is DU", but rather "how is DU's radioactivity dispensed?" If DU shells merely shattered into fragments when striking a target, the larger pieces could be picked up and stored in a repository. Only a tiny fraction of the DU would remain behind as smaller fragments dispersed into the environment. Although this would increase the background radiation levels, the observable health effects on the exposed population would be difficult to measure. (Note, however, that the presence of radioactive transuranics in the DU, such as plutonium, neptunium and americium, totally nullifies this last statement.) However, this is not how a DU shell behaves. When the penetrator strikes a hard object, its kinetic energy is converted to heat. The heat causes the DU to ignite. Military studies report that from 10% to 70% of the DU in the penetrator is converted to micron-sized aerosol particles of DU-oxide. Other studies show that over 50% of these particles are smaller than 5 microns in diameter. Particles that small, when inhaled, become permanently lodged into the deepest recesses of one's lungs. Inside the lungs, these particles are in intimate contact with living cells. No layer of dead skin stands between the particle and live tissue. Every alpha, beta and gamma ray that is not absorbed internally by the particle itself slices a path of destruction through living tissue. Over a year's time, 1 mg of DU undergoes over 450 million alpha decays, and the decay products (thorium and protactinium) produce over 900 million beta decays and release over 900 million gamma rays. Because the DU-oxide particles are so small, it can be assumed that a significant fraction of that radiation actually makes it into the victim's body tissue. Dr. Durakovic has been able to estimate the initial DU-oxide body burden of several 1991 Gulf War veterans by measuring the levels of DU in their urine nine and ten years after the war (a fact that in itself proves how long-lasting DU can be when absorbed into body tissues). He determined that these veterans had absorbed an average of 0.34 mg of DU that became permanently incorporated into their bodies. (Their initial actual exposure may have been much greater.) If this is the case, then over 750 million total radiation events (1/3 of the total given in the previous paragraph) have taken place in these veteran's bodies every year, year after year, since 1991. Even if you assume that only a very small fraction of this radiation exits the particle, say 0.2%, this still results in 3.3 damaging radiation events every minute, or 1.7 million damaging events each year from the 0.34 mg of DU dispersed throughout the lungs in the form of 4.3 million 2.5 micron diameter particles. Most scientists now believe that there is no safe level of exposure to ionizing radiation. This comes from a realization that cancer and genetic damage begins with unrepaired damage to crucial molecules (such as DNA) within a single cell. Molecular damage is exactly what takes place when alpha, beta or gamma radiation passes through a cell. Electrons are ripped from molecules as the ionized particles zip by. Each radiation event leaves a wake of disrupted molecules behind it, most in the form of free radicals. Alpha particles, being much larger and more massive than beta particles, can actually destroy whole cells. Although the body maintains a marvelous system for DNA repair and cell replacement, over time, with so many assaults, it is completely illogical to assume that no permanent damage takes place. Atomicity A new term was introduced in October, 2003 at the Hamburg World Uranium Weapons Conference. That term was "atomicity". Dr. Yagasaki of Japan showed that the number of radioactive atoms produced from 800 tons of DU is equivalent to 83,000 Nagasaki sized atom bombs. Since that conference, this statistic was quoted on the radio during the aforementioned interview, and I have seen it appear in print as well. Unfortunately, the comparison between DU contamination and the Nagasaki atom bomb explosion is very misleading. Over 100,000 residents of Nagasaki were killed in the atomic blast, either instantly or shortly afterwards due to exposure to the intense radiation, which included neutrons as well as alpha, beta and gamma radiation. Over 18,000 buildings were destroyed. Comparing the atomic bomb blast and its effects to those of depleted uranium is dramatic and delivers a strong emotional appeal, but the comparison based on number of radioactive particles released (atomicity) is quite meaningless. Second, no effort is made to qualify the different types of "atomicity" involved. The U-238 atoms in that 392 tons of DU have a half-life of 4.5 billion years. In other words, their radioactive decay is spread out over such a long period of time that only half of them will have decayed by the time this Earth comes to its end in the Sun's expanding corona. On the other hand, the majority of radioactive atoms dispersed over Nagasaki had much shorter half- lives. Many are essentially no longer radioactive, having progressed through 25 or 30 half-lives since 1945. But remember, the shorter the half-life, the more intense the radiation. Thus the Nagasaki victims who survived the initial blast were exposed to much more radiation in a very short period of time than the civilians in Iraq who have been exposed to depleted uranium, while the problem facing civilians where DU has been used is long term (read "forever") and chronic. Third, the Nagasaki blast produced a tremendous mixture of radioactive substances, each having its own unique biological impact on survivors. Strontium-90 replaces calcium in bone tissue; iodine-131 becomes concentrated in the thyroid; cesium-137 is a natural replacement for potassium in the body. With DU, the principal isotopes of concern are those of uranium, with very small amounts of thorium, protactinium, and contaminants such as plutonium. I say this not to understate the significance of exposure to DU, but merely to point out that the effects can be expected to be very different from exposure to elements resulting from an atomic bomb explosion. Finally, the area significantly affected by direct DU contamination is much more wide-spread than that of a single atomic explosion. True, radioactive fallout from any nuclear test ultimately affects the entire earth, but with decreasing concentration the further one moves from the blast site. In a military conflict where DU munitions are used, every battle site throughout the entire country becomes contaminated with DU. And with the frequent sand storms that blanket wide areas, there is virtually no escape, no place to hide. So although it is true that there are far more radioactive atoms in the 392 tons of DU than there were resulting from the explosion of a single atom bomb over Nagasaki, there can be no meaningful comparison between the two. To attempt to do so merely clouds the issue and strains credibility, something we can ill afford to allow happen. The Truth is Out Sometimes those who lie become entangled in their own web of deceit. Last summer a van which contained several pounds of DU was stolen from a city street in Essex, UK. Authorities were particularly anxious to recover the vehicle and its contents. They publicly expressed the fear that terrorists might use the DU to create a "dirty bomb", that is, a bomb that could spread harmful radioactivity into an urban environment. If DU were as harmless as they wish us to believe, how could it be of any use in a "dirty bomb"? On the other hand, if it can be used effectively in that way, how can the USA and UK justify their use of DU weaponry in Iraq, Afghanistan, Kosovo and Serbia? Every 30mm shell and 105/120 mm penetrator clearly becomes a miniature "dirty bomb". Their cumulative effect easily exceeds that of a dozens of large bombs. Would someone tell me why the use of such dirty bombs does not constitute a crime against humanity? ______________________________ 5. DUTCH MILITARY IN IRAQ DELAYS TROOP TRANSFER FROM SUSPECTED DU CONTAMINATED AREA by Maarten H.J. van den Berg RISQ | Review of International Social Questions Website: http://www.risq.org When Dutch marines arrived in a base camp near the town of As Samawah, Iraq, to replace American troops last summer, they measured unacceptably high levels of radioactivity. Yet troop transfer from the area was delayed by three weeks, putting both Dutch and American troops at risk of exposure to depleted uranium (DU)... To read the article online, go to: http://www.bandepleteduranium.org/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=119 On July 24th last year, Dutch troops arrived in 'Camp Smitty', a base set up by the Americans in an abandoned train depot near the town of As Samawah. Located along the railway track from Basra to Baghdad, and consisting of several concrete buildings big enough to lodge both troops and their vehicles, the location seemed a perfect outpost. Set to replace the 442nd US Military Police Brigade stationed in the depot since early June, the Dutch troops put up their field beds inside, granting them at least some shelter from the ever-present desert heat and sand storms in the area, even though the buildings were dirty, dusty, vermin-infested and most windows were broken. Meals and other collective gatherings were held outside on the yard along the railway tracks amidst abandoned train engines and carriages, wrecked Iraqi tanks, unexploded ordnance, and other remnants of war. Settled all right thus by military standards, the Dutch troops could have made Camp Smitty their 'home', just as the Americans had done for months. Yet shortly after their arrival, they made an alarming discovery, which according to Sgt. Juan Vega, senior medic with the US 442nd, led the Dutch "to pitch camp in the desert instead". As Mr Vega told the New York-based Daily News "the Dutch swept the area around the train depot with Geiger counters and their medics confided to [me] they had found high radiation levels". According to Mr Vega and other soldiers interviewed by the paper, the radiation may have come from the remains of DU shells scattering the compound or one of the wrecked Iraqi tanks, which had been hauled onto railroad cars just outside the depot. Yet, since DU can take the form of a very fine, toxic and radiocative dust that easily spreads, a much greater part of the compound may have been contaminated. As quite a few of the American troops who were based in Camp Smitty, are still suffering from chronic nausea, skin rashes and migraines, they suspect they may have inhaled a toxic dosis of DU dust during their stay. Already, four out of nine veterans who volunteered for a test, were found to have higher than normal levels of uranium in their urine. While the US Department of Defence has recently announced it will investigate the case of the veterans from Camp Smitty, military personnel representatives in the Netherlands have raised concerns about the health of Dutch troops that have stayed there. Yesterday, a spokesperson of the Dutch Military of Defence merely conceded that "upon arrival, the marines declared part of the compound off-limits", assuring that "all necessary precautionary measures were taken". A source in one of the military personnel unions confirmed that they were informed by the Ministry about "certain measurements, which led the troops to close off a building on the compound". However, the source said, "no reference was made to the possibility of DU contamination there". As the new camp out in the desert was still under construction, the Dutch troops stayed in the train depot at least until mid August. Pictures archived on the website of the Ministry of Defence show marines resting on field beds set up inside one of the buildings and sharing meals on the yard outside as late as 6 August 2003. By that time, they had been on the compound for over two weeks, even as 90 of them fell ill - some so much so that they had to be IV-fed. According to the Ministry they had contracted a virus, "due to the high temperatures, the change in food and lifestyle, and the higher concentration of viruses in the air of hot countries such as Iraq". Note: All over Iraq, the remains of spent DU shells and DU-contaminated debris have been found littering the streets in urban areas. Some wrecked vehicles have been towed away, and the most obvious contaminated sites are marked. However, most locations have not even been identified let alone cleaned, even though there is a widely shared consensus that DU contamination can be a potential health hazard. To minimize the risk of exposure, foreign troops have been instructed to stay away from potentially contaminated areas as much as possible or to wear, at least, respiratory protection and gloves when it is inevitable to enter such sites. As for Iraqi civilians, there is no indication that the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) has properly informed the population about DU contamination. The British Ministry of Defence merely affirms that Iraqi locals have been warned "that they should not go near or touch any debris they find on the battlefield" Perhaps this would have sufficed, were it not for the fact that quite a few battles have been fought in densely populated areas, where it is virtually impossible for residents to avoid all remnants of war. For earlier RISQ reports on DU and links to external resources, please refer to the DU Dossier at RISQ. See: http://www.risq.org/link-61.html To unsubscribe from this groups send a message to du-list-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com. In the body of the message type unsubscribe and send. ---------- Yahoo! Groups Links * To visit your group on the web, go to: * http://groups.yahoo.com/group/du-list/ * * To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to: * du-list-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com * * Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to the Yahoo! Terms of Service. ***************************************************************** 44 Google News Alert - nuclear Date: Mon, 12 Apr 2004 13:16:44 -0700 (PDT) JOY as nuclear marchers hit base BBC News - London,England,UK It has taken protesters more than 50 miles to turn the clock back nearly 50 years and complete this Easter's revival of the Aldermaston anti-nuclear march. ... See all stories on this topic: UN Nuclear Inspectors Arrive, Iran Says Centrifuge Building ... KOTV - Tulsa,OK,USA TEHRAN, Iran (AP) _ Five UN nuclear inspectors arrived Monday to try to confirm whether Iran has stopped suspicious nuclear activities _ including the building ... 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See all stories on this topic: SUPPLIERS Readying for Asia Nuclear Power Planet Ark - New York,NY,USA SINGAPORE - From India to China, energy-deficient Asia is spending billions of dollars to build nuclear power plants, sparking fierce competition among global ... See all stories on this topic: DUKE Power faces fine in nuclear plant dispute Raleigh Triangle Business Journal - Raleigh,NC,USA The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission has proposed a $60,000 fine against Duke Power Co. for violating safety requirements at the ... 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