***************************************************************** 02/03/04 **** RADIATION BULLETIN(RADBULL) **** VOL 12.28 ***************************************************************** RADBULL IS PRODUCED BY THE ABALONE ALLIANCE CLEARINGHOUSE ***************************************************************** Send News Stories to news@energy-net.org with title on subject line and first line of body NUCLEAR POLICY 1 [southnews] Howard Should be in Dock over WMDs - Brown 2 AU The Age: America confronts a crisis of credibility - 3 BBC: Iraq WMD inquiry details unveiled 4 US: BBC: US intelligence goes under microscope 5 US: BBC: Gulf soldier wins pension fight 6 SunHerald.com: Iraq intelligence efforts led by Cheney magnified err 7 US: Guardian Unlimited: Bush accused of 8 Washington Post: Blair Agrees to Probe of Claims About Iraqi Weapons 9 Washington Post: Intelligence Panel Will Cast Net Beyond Iraq 10 US: Washington Post: Powell Says New Data May Have Affected War Deci 11 Guardian Unlimited: Straw launches WMD intelligence review 12 UK Independent: Blair caves in to calls for WMD inquiry into Iraq fa 13 Scotsman.com: 'Intelligence Bosses Ignored Experts' Doubts over Iraq 14 UK Independent: How the Government's case for war has failed to add 15 Washington Post: Iranians Don't Want To Go Nuclear 16 [NukeNet] Next Six - Way N.Korea Nuclear Talks Set for Feb 25 17 Korea: Digital Chosunilbo: Urgency Brings NK to the Negotiating Tabl 18 Korea: Digital Chosunilbo: U.S. Commission on Intelligence Errors to 19 BBC: N Korea nuclear talks date set 20 Washington Post: North Korea Agrees to New Talks on Nuclear Program 21 Xinhuanet: Chronology of key events in nuke issue on Korean Peninsul 22 US: USA Wants To Test Nuke Weapons Again 23 US: USATODAY.com - Budget summary: Major agencies 24 US: Las Vegas RJ: Assembly speaker endorses Kerry 25 US: TOMPAINE.com: Nothing To Preempt 26 US: toledoblade: Spending plan seeks sacrifices as $2.4T budget redu 27 US: GEM: Bush budget battered from many sides 28 US: The Hill.com: Almost everything wrong 29 US: Boyle: Preventing Nuclear Armageddon 30 Washington Post: Musharraf Named in Nuclear Probe 31 US: Washington Post: U.S. Treads Carefully With Libya 32 Washington Post: Pakistan's Nuclear Hero Defended 33 The Telegraph: Denial twist to Khan confession NUCLEAR REACTORS 34 US: NRC: Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc; Notice of Receipt and 35 US: NRC: Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards; Subcommittee Meet 36 US: NRC: Sunshine Act Meeting 37 US: SignOnSanDiego.com: Edison scuttles San Onofre reactor trip 38 US: JS Online: Nuclear plant up and running 39 US: NCS: Technician Nuclear reactor still cutting edge 40 US: NRC: Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation; R.E. Ginna Nuclear 41 US: The Courier: NRC environmental review meetings set for today 42 Sofia: Bulgaria's N-plant Unit 5 Switched Off Grid over Water Parame NUCLEAR SAFETY 43 [du-list] Veteran wins pensions tribunal over DU 44 US: [du-list] Indiana military areas require hunter education... 45 US: Washington Times: Hazardous safety plans 46 U.S. Newswire: U.S. to Launch Effort to Detect Terrorist 47 Scotsman.com: Gulf Veterans Hail Uranium Poisoning Ruling NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE 48 [CMEP] NRC "EJ" Policy; Bush's Bloated Yucca Budget 49 [NukeNet] NRC "EJ" Policy; Bush's Bloated Yucca Budget [Public 50 US: NRC: Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste; Notice of Meeting 51 US: Salt Lake Tribune: State battles Nevada N-waste plan 52 Las Vegas RJ: DOE request would boost Yucca Mountain budget 53 chillicothe gazette: Piketon plant would benefit from Bush budget - 54 US: Las Vegas SUN: Editorial: Nuke dump study omits real world 55 Las Vegas SUN: DOE earmarks $23 million to study nuke transportation 56 RGJ: Bush administration asks for more Yucca Mountain money 57 US: AP Wire: Edison abandons plan to ship nuclear reactor vessel aro 58 Indymedia/IMC Paris: German Castors rolling to La Hague and Sellafie 59 UK Independent: Company in nuclear waste row has links with BNFL 60 RosBusinessConsulting: Russian atomic ministry and BNFL discuss coop 61 ITAR-TASS: Russia may supply natural, enriched uranium to Europe 62 Advocate: SIDS say no to nuclear shipments 63 US: 64 Public Citizen: Bushs Proposal to Inflate Yucca Mountain Budget 65 US: PRN: Perma-Fix Awarded Contract for Sodium Bearing Wastewater Pr 66 KLAS: Bush Seeks to Pump Up Yucca Mt. Budget 67 KRNV: Nuke dump could be financial boon for Nevada 68 KRNV: DOE seeks $189 million to plan routes to Nevada nuke waste dum 69 KVBC: Bush Budget Would Increase Yucca Spending 70 NRC: NRC Sets Schedule for Review of LES Application; Offers Opportu NUCLEAR WEAPONS 71 Guardian Unlimited: The final reckoning US DEPT. OF ENERGY 72 Knox News: DOE cleanup making progress 73 Las Vegas RJ: DOE won't designate Atlas tailings policy 74 Oakland Tribune: White House seeks more nuke funds 75 Tri-City Herald: $2.07 billion proposed for cleanup 76 Dayton Daily News: Budget boosts amount for Mound cleanup 77 The Shorthorn Online: Lab bid may pose struggle 78 Oak Ridger: SNS maintains funding support in '05 budget 79 Paducah Sun: Bush budget funding cuts for plant cleanup - 80 Oak Ridger: Other Views: TVA should consider nuclear power as a viab OTHER NUCLEAR 81 [DU-WATCH] DU Info Bulletin no 88 82 [du-list] DU in the News 4th feb. 04 83 Google News Alert - nuclear ***************************************************************** ***************************************************************** FULL NEWS STORIES ***************************************************************** ***************************************************************** 1 [southnews] Howard Should be in Dock over WMDs - Brown Date: Tue, 3 Feb 2004 18:23:16 -0600 (CST) ------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor ---------------------~--> Buy Ink Cartridges or Refill Kits for your HP, Epson, Canon or Lexmark Printer at MyInks.com. Free s/h on orders $50 or more to the US & Canada. http://www.c1tracking.com/l.asp?cid=5511 http://us.click.yahoo.com/mOAaAA/3exGAA/qnsNAA/7gSolB/TM ---------------------------------------------------------------------~-> The Australian government acknowledged that pre-war intelligence on Iraq's banned weapons may have been flawed but resisted pressure to follow the US lead in appointing a new inquiry into pre-war intelligence. Prime Minister Howard should be the primary witness in any genuine inquiry into the Weapons of Mass Destruction deception used to justify war on Iraq, Greens Senator Bob Brown said today. "Now that George W. Bush and Tony Blair are moving towards inquires, the Howard government becomes obliged to follow suite. It must be a judicial inquiry with power to call anyone. "The question Mr Howard has to answer is not 'What went wrong with intelligence', but 'Why did you not insist on detailed corroboration of the false WMD claims before sending Australian service people to war?" Senator Brown said. Australia resists pressure to follow US lead by setting up inquiry The Australian government acknowledged that pre-war intelligence on Iraq's banned weapons may have been flawed but resisted pressure to follow the US lead in appointing a new inquiry into pre-war intelligence. Prime Minister John Howard, a staunch US ally, said investigations could prove intelligence agencies wrong about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, but it was wrong to suggest the intelligence was bogus, or that agencies made up material in pre-war assessments. He said he would await the report of a parliamentary inquiry into Australia's intelligence in late February before making any decisions on extra inquiries. His comment followed the announcement by US President George W. Bush of an independent inquiry into its pre-war intelligence. Britain's Prime Minister Tony Blair is expected to follow suit with a similar inquiry into British intelligence. Howard said Australia's intelligence agencies made their assessments on mainly British and US intelligence, obtained through intelligence sharing agreements. While the hunt for weapons had not yet turned up any evidence of the possession of actual weapons, it certainly had turned up evidence of weapons programs, and there was still further work to be conducted by the Iraq survey group, he said. But he added: "Obviously, at the end of the day if it is conclusively and absolutely the case that there were no weapons, then questions might be asked." Defence Minister Robert Hill said there was no doubt that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction. "That's not in dispute, in fact he even used them on his own people and his neighbours," Hill told reporters in Sydney. But he said the issue was what had happened to the weapons. Hill said he still had confidence in the quality of the intelligence on which the government made its decision to join the war. The intelligence community agreed before the war that Saddam had weapons of mass destruction, he said. "All of the major intelligence bodies around the world shared the same view ... they all believed that Saddam Hussein still had his weapons of mass destruction, that he was continuing to develop those weapons and that they were a threat," he said. Former Australian diplomat Richard Butler, who headed the UN weapons inspection team in Iraq from 1997 until 1999, said Tuesday that a US inquiry into failures in intelligence was long overdue. Butler, who is now the queen's representative in Australia's island state of Tasmania, said many people had been deeply puzzled by the failure to find substantial quantities of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. "Naturally, people have wanted to know where are these weapons that were the reason for such an extraordinary action as invading another country," he said. "There is a kind of inquiry already underway in the Australian parliament. I have no expectation that the Australian prime minister will go further than that but, who knows, we might be surprised." ___________________________________________________ *Kevin Rudd: Let's have the truth, Mr Howard* The Australian 04feb04 WHAT a tangled web we weave. In the lead-up to the last election, it was Tampa, children overboard and refugees. In the lead-up to this election it is the unfolding story of John Howard's war with Iraq. Both illustrate a deeply ingrained pattern of behaviour on the part of the Prime Minister. Truth has been the principal casualty. Because whether it's border security or national security, "Honest John" has been loose with the truth. And the Australian people no longer know whether they can take this Prime Minister at his word even on the great questions of war and peace. Let's be clear about Howard's reasons for war. In the legal opinion he tabled last March, the only reason canvassed was to eliminate Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. No humanitarian reason was advanced. "Liberating an oppressed people" has been a rationalisation advanced by the Prime Minister after the WMD argument came unstuck. We have documented 20 occasions when the Government warned Australians of the dangers posed by Iraq's chemical and biological weapons -- not abstract capabilities, capacities or programs but actual completed weapons. Since the "end" of the war, five parliamentary and congressional inquiries have been launched into the accuracy of pre-war WMD claims about Iraq. Many have already been critical. Others have yet to report. In Australia, Howard had to be dragged kicking and screaming into any parliamentary scrutiny of his claims on Iraqi WMD. Howard's preferred strategy on Iraq has been an exit strategy -- as underlined by his famously arrogant remark that on Iraq, Australians had simply "moved on". Howard advances three arguments in his defence. First, the "we didn't exaggerate anything" argument. Howard argues there was nothing in his public case for going to war that was inconsistent with the private intelligence the Government had. He claimed Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear weapons program and as evidence advanced the tale that it had sought to obtain uranium from Africa. But since the war the Government has admitted that before going in it received intelligence casting doubt on this claim. Before the war, Alexander Downer made claims about Iraq's attempted importation of aluminium tubing as evidence it had restarted its nuclear program. We now know that before the war the Government received intelligence casting fundamental doubt on this claim as well. Before the war the Government claimed that attacking Iraq was necessary to reduce the threat of WMD proliferation. What we weren't told was that British intelligence had already warned Australia that attacking Iraq would increase the risk of WMD proliferation -- as well as the terrorist threat. Of course, Howard, Downer and Robert Hill have been desperate to construct some sort of firewall between themselves and their policy and intelligence bureaucracies -- just as they tried to do with the children overboard scandal. Second, the "if there is a problem with Australian intelligence, that's not a problem for which Howard is politically responsible" argument. This makes a mockery of the Westminster system of government - a system in which ministers are responsible for the performance of their departments. In Howard's case, his department includes the Office of National Assessments, which was established with the explicit mandate of testing intelligence assessments received from London and Washington. If that hasn't been done properly, and if Howard and his ministers didn't probe the raw intelligence underpinning final intelligence assessments before deciding to go to war, then Howard is demonstrably responsible. Not to mention the fact that his Government has presided over the intelligence system for eight years and is therefore absolutely responsible for the effectiveness (or lack thereof) of the system. Third, the "don't blame me, it's the fault of the Americans and British" argument. This has been the latest addition to the Howard repertoire. Unfortunately, it falls foul of the Prime Minister's boast in parliament last year that Australia had been a "contributor" to intelligence conclusions that Iraq possessed stockpiles of completed chemical and biological weapons. Then, of course, there's the ONA's vetting job of foreign intelligence. The whole pack of cards tumbled down last week with the extraordinary revelations by former US weapons inspector David Kay that when the coalition went to war in Iraq, there were no stockpiles of Iraqi chemical and biological weapons remaining and that the UN system of containment in the 1990s had been effective. Coming from one of the leading US hawks on Iraq, this set off a chain of events in Washington, London and even Canberra - where Howard yesterday was forced to concede for the first time that he might have got it wrong. So now we have an independent commission of inquiry in the US announced by George W. Bush on Monday and an independent UK inquiry announced by Tony Blair on Tuesday. But John Winston Howard is still running for cover. We on our part will wait until the Australian parliamentary inquiry delivers its report in the coming weeks before making a judgment on the need for an independent inquiry in Australia. But if Howard is admitting to doubts, he should have the decency to front the parliament and tell the Australian people the truth. http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/printpage/0,5942,8575891,00.html The archives of South News can be found at http://southmovement.alphalink.com.au/southnews/ Yahoo! Groups Links To visit your group on the web, go to: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/southnews/ To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to: southnews-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to: http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/ ***************************************************************** 2 AU The Age: America confronts a crisis of credibility - www.theage.com.au February 4, 2004 President Bush must act quickly if the US is to once again earn the trust of its allies, writes Zbigniew Brzezinski. Whether or how the Bush Administration should be held accountable for having inaccurately asserted, at war's outset, that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction is ultimately a matter for the American politicians to debate and the American electorate to resolve. But two consequences with ominous implications call for a more urgent response: US credibility worldwide has been badly hurt by the WMD affair, and US intelligence capabilities have been exposed as woefully inadequate. America is preponderant in the world today, but it is not omnipotent. Thus America must have the capacity, when needed, to mobilise the genuine and sincere support of other countries, particularly of its closest allies. It can do so only if it is trusted. That US credibility has been hurt is indisputable. It is a serious matter when the world's superpower undertakes a war claiming justification that turns out to have been false. Numerous public opinion polls demonstrate there has been a worldwide drop in support for US foreign policy. There is manifest resentment of recent American conduct and a pervasive distrust of America's leaders, even in countries that have participated in the coalition in Iraq. Trust is an essential ingredient of power, and its loss bears directly on America's long-term national security. An America that is preponderant but distrusted is an America internationally weakened. The point of departure for an effective global security policy is reliable and internationally credible US intelligence. The sad fact is that US intelligence was not up to par in the Iraq crisis. There are many reasons for that failure, but the most obvious one is the absence of an effective human clandestine intelligence service, compounded by excessive reliance on foreign intelligence services (the Niger uranium fabrications being a case in point). Over the years the US has been remarkably innovative in technological-scientific intelligence aimed at the Soviet Union, whose arsenal also depended heavily on science and technology. Consequently, the US was well informed about the scale, deployments and even war plans of its most likely strategic opponent. Regarding Iraq, the opposite has been the case. The US, we now know, was uninformed not only about the level of Iraqi military capabilities but also about Iraqi military and political planning. That indicates the means used to define with reasonable accuracy the nature and scale of the Soviet arsenal were not helpful in deciphering Saddam Hussein's relatively backward military capabilities or in penetrating his primitive regime, even though it was hated by significant portions of the Iraqi population. There is no excuse for the inadequacy of the intelligence that provided the background for the decision-making and the articulation of US policy. Though an autocracy, Iraq was a much more porous state than the totalitarian Soviet Union had been. It was certainly much more porous than contemporary North Korea. The misjudgement made and the imprecision of the information provided, based (we now know) largely on extrapolations and hypothetical conclusions, are just not acceptable. The evident shortcomings of US intelligence, if allowed to persist, pose too many risks for the future. Today, in the more diffused post-Cold War circumstances, access to reliable political intelligence derived from high-level human penetration of potential adversaries is the essential requirement of responsible and globally credible strategic policy-making. It is therefore a matter of high urgency that several steps be promptly taken to give American national decision-makers a more reliable basis for shaping policies that command international support: + The Bush Administration should candidly acknowledge that the US was misinformed about the state and level of Iraqi armaments, a fact already evident to much of the world. Continued evasion on this subject is a disservice to America. + A shake-up of leadership in US intelligence services is needed and appropriate; measures to that end should be promptly taken. Accountability is needed to restore credibility. + A small committee of experienced people trusted by the Administration should be asked to present President George Bush with a plan for changing the priorities and the modus operandi of America's intelligence services, with high emphasis on the development of an effective clandestine service. America's national security is too much at risk for the issue to be handled in a traditional fashion. The usual reliance on a comprehensive review by a high-level commission working at a leisurely pace would not be an adequate response. Sweeping the matter under the rug would be even worse. A globally preponderant power, if blind, can only lash out when it senses danger. America's leadership in the world calls for something better than that. For the world at large, America's word should again be America's bond. Zbigniew Brzezinski was national security adviser to former US president Jimmy Carter and is the author of The Choice: Domination or Leadership. This article first appeared in The Washington Post. Copyright 2004. The Age Company Ltd ***************************************************************** 3 BBC: Iraq WMD inquiry details unveiled Last Updated: Tuesday, 3 February, 2004 [Tony Blair faces senior MPs on the Commons liaison committee] Tony Blair was grilled for two-and-a-half hours An independent inquiry is to examine intelligence which led Britain to war over Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. Former cabinet secretary Lord Butler will chair a five-member committee looking at whether the pre-war intelligence was right or wrong. The committee will include two MPs, but the Lib Dems are not taking part - because it will not look at the political judgements on the war. Earlier, Tony Blair said the inquiry would not re-run Lord Hutton's report. "The issue of good faith was determined by the Hutton inquiry," he said. The other members of the committee are: former chief of the defence staff Field Marshal Lord Inge; former senior civil servant Sir John Chilcott; Labour MP Ann Taylor, chairman of the Commons intelligence and security committee; and Conservative MP Michael Mates. Private hearings Foreign Secretary Jack Straw told MPs the committee would work in the same way as the Franks Inquiry into the 1982 Falklands war, which looked at how Britain failed to realise in advance that Argentina planned to invade the islands. That means the committee will meet in private, but its findings will be published by the end of July, without revealing any sensitive intelligence material. While the US inquiry may relatively risk free or even positive for Mr Bush... it is far less straightforward for Tony Blair The BBC's Nick Assinder Analysis: Blair and a WMD inquiry Lord Butler profile But Liberal Democrat Sir Menzies Campbell said his party could not accept the inquiry's remit and urged ministers to think again. "Should not the prime minister and others in the special circumstances of this case be willing to submit to scrutiny of their competence and their judgement in the discharge of their responsibilities," he told MPs. Conservative leader Michael Howard said changes he had suggested to the remit meant the inquiry would address the government's use of the intelligence, not just how it was gathered. That would allow the public to judge for themselves whether the war was justified, he told BBC Radio 4's World At One. Earlier, Mr Blair told the Commons liaison committee of the most senior backbenchers he had wanted consensus. But he argued: "We can't end up having an inquiry into whether the war was right or wrong. That is something that we have got to decide. We are the politicians." US pressure? News of the inquiry follows the announcement of a US inquiry into its Iraq intelligence and Mr Straw said Lord Butler would work closely with the American commission. President George Bush's creation of a bipartisan committee raised the pressure for a similar inquiry in the UK. [UK troops on the al-Faw peninsula during the Iraq war] The intelligence used to send troops to Iraq is under scrutiny Last week Downing Street said it would wait and see whether the Iraq Survey Group turned up evidence of WMD. But Mr Blair denied US pressure had forced a change. An inquiry was needed because it now appeared the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) could take months to produce its final report on the search for banned weapons in Iraq, he said. And former ISG head David Kay had also said he thought there were not stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction. 'Defending the war' Mr Blair stressed that Dr Kay had pointed to evidence of weapons of mass destruction "programmes". If that was right, the legal basis for the war was "entirely secure", he continued. He added: "I think we've done the right thing, not just because Iraq was a dangerous place under Saddam but also because the rest of the world needs to know that this issue will be tackled with firmness." The war in Iraq has possib made terrorist attacks against British nationals and British interests more likely in the short term Commons Foreign Affairs Committee report 'War increased terror threat' On Monday the Commons foreign affairs committee suggested that the "continued failure of the coalition to find weapons of mass destruction" had damaged UK and US credibility in their conduct of the war against terrorism. Tuesday also saw Downing Street publish its response to the Commons intelligence and security committee's report on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. The committee had criticised the way the government presented its claim that Iraq could use some weapons of mass destruction within 45 minutes of an order, saying it allowed for speculation about its exact meaning. Some newspapers suggested the weapons could be fired at British bases in Cyprus. In its response, the government says it understands the committee's reasoning but "notes that the dossier did not say that Iraq could deliver chemical or biological weapons by ballistic missiles within 45 minutes". And responding to a separate report by the Commons foreign affairs committee, it denied the claim had been given "undue prominence". It adds: "The government stands by its interpretation in the dossier of the intelligence which was then available on the 45 minutes claim." ***************************************************************** 4 BBC: US intelligence goes under microscope Last Updated: Tuesday, 3 February, 2004 By Adam Brookes BBC correspondent in Washington The Bush administration had been hinting for days that it might happen. Now the president has confirmed there will be an independent inquiry into US intelligence and its role in the Iraq war. [President Bush, Colin Powell, Donald Rumsfeld] Bush will hope the inquiry only reports after November's elections The announcement follows public pressure on the Bush administration to explain how it concluded that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction, when none have been found there in the wake of the war. "I'm putting together an independent, bipartisan commission to analyse where we stand, what we can do better as we fight this war against terror," he said. Ever since the chief US weapons expert, David Kay, said last week that the intelligence agencies' conclusions on Iraq were almost all wrong, the pressure has been mounting on Mr Bush. Democrats, Republicans and the media have all been clamouring to know what kind of intelligence the president used in making the decision to go to war, how it was arrived at, and why it now seems to have been so misleading. But President Bush indicated that this inquiry won't be only about Iraq. It will look into the activities of US intelligence across the board on issues of proliferation and weapons of mass destruction. "We want to look at our war against proliferation and weapons of mass destruction in a broader context," he said. Spotlight on the spies That seems to mean that the activities of America's intelligence agencies in searching for information about nuclear weapons programmes in North Korea, Iran and Libya might come under the spotlight, too. One commentator with links the CIA told me the atmosphere at the agency's headquarters was 'funereal' This commission will reportedly be made up of nine people - politicians from both parties, and intelligence experts. It's not clear when it will report. But the Bush administration will be hoping that its conclusions will not emerge before next November's presidential elections, for fear of lending the Democrats electoral ammunition. This is probably a very worrying development for the quiet men in Langley and all the other places that the 14 or so American intelligence agencies reside. One commentator with links to the CIA told me the atmosphere at the agency's headquarters was "funereal". The inquiry - depending on the degree of its assertiveness and the breadth of its remit - could portray the intelligence agencies as supplying flawed information to the administration, and allowing America's leaders to go to war without an accurate picture of the situation in Iraq. ***************************************************************** 5 BBC: Gulf soldier wins pension fight Last Updated: Tuesday, 3 February, 2004 [Soldiers] Mr Duncan claims his service in the Gulf is linked to his ill health A former soldier is believed to be the first veteran to win a war pension appeal after suffering depleted uranium poisoning during the first Gulf War. A tribunal in Edinburgh found in favour of Kenny Duncan from Clackmannanshire who became ill after his service in the Middle East. He had helped move tanks destroyed by shells containing depleted uranium. Mr Duncan had been awarded only half the full pension after leaving the Army. Public inquiry call He claimed he was repeatedly exposed to the poisonous dust and, returning home to Scotland became so ill he eventually had to retire. Now his pension will be reassessed after the Pension Appeal Tribunal Service accepted his case against the Ministry of Defence. Mr Duncan also claims his three children, born since the first Gulf War, are suffering symptoms similar to Iraqi children including low immune systems and deformed toes. It is great news for Ken and his wife to at long last have his condition recognised Shaun Rusling NGVFA chairman The National Gulf Veterans and Families Association (NGVFA) said the tribunal's verdict added to its call for a full public inquiry into Gulf War illnesses. Shaun Rusling, chairman of the NGVFA, said the verdict was "justice". He said: "The finding by the Pensions Appeal Tribunal was absolutely tremendous and extremely significant for Kenny Duncan. "It proves that his ill health was due to depleted uranium poisoning and it is great news for Kenny and his wife to at long last have his condition recognised. "We are extremely pleased that justice has been done." Mr Rusling, himself a Gulf War veteran, demanded that the UK Government hold a public inquiry into Gulf War illnesses. "It is now 13 years since the Gulf War and no depleted uranium tests have been made available to former servicemen - this is despicable and unacceptable," he said. "There should be a public inquiry into the ill health suffered by Gulf War veterans." According to the association, 606 Gulf servicemen have died from ill health and a further 5,933 have applied for a war pension due to disablement. ***************************************************************** 6 SunHerald.com: Iraq intelligence efforts led by Cheney magnified errors, officials say Posted on Mon, Feb. 02, 2004 [story:PUB_DESC] BY JONATHAN S. LANDAY, WARREN P. STROBEL AND JOSEPH L. GALLOWAY Knight Ridder Newspapers WASHINGTON - (KRT) - What went wrong with intelligence on Iraq will never be known unless the inquiry proposed by President Bush examines secret intelligence efforts led by Vice President Dick Cheney and Pentagon hawks, current and former U.S officials said Monday. The officials said they feared that Bush, gearing up his fight for re-election, would try to limit the inquiry's scope to the CIA and other agencies, and ignore the key role the administration's own internal intelligence efforts played in making the case for war. The officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the issue, didn't dispute that the CIA failed to accurately assess the state of Iraq's weapons programs. But they said that the intelligence efforts led by Cheney magnified the errors through exaggeration, oversights and mistaken deductions. Those efforts bypassed normal channels, used Iraqi exiles and defectors of questionable reliability, and produced findings on former dictator Saddam Hussein's links to al-Qaida and his illicit arms programs that were disputed by analysts at the CIA, the State Department and other agencies, the officials said. "There were more agencies than CIA providing intelligence ... that are worth scrutiny, including the (Pentagon's now-disbanded) Office of Special Plans and the office of the vice president," said a former senior military official who was involved in planning the Iraq invasion. Some of the disputed findings were presented as facts to Americans as Bush drummed up his case for war. Those findings included charges of cooperation between Saddam and al-Qaida, Cheney's assertion that Iraq had rebuilt its nuclear weapons program and would "soon" have a nuclear bomb, and Bush's contention in his 2003 State of the Union address that Saddam was seeking nuclear bomb-making material from Africa. Senior officials on Monday revealed new details of how Cheney's office pressed Secretary of State Colin Powell to use large amounts of disputed intelligence in a February 2003 presentation to the United Nations Security Council laying out the U.S. case for an invasion. A senior administration official said that during a three-day pre-speech review, Powell rejected more than half of a 45-page assessment on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction compiled by Cheney's chief of staff, I. Lewis Libby, and based on materials assembled by pro-invasion hard-liners in the Pentagon and the White House. Powell also jettisoned 75 percent of a separate report on al-Qaida, said the official. Still, he said, Libby continued pressing Powell unsuccessfully right up until a few minutes before the speech to include dubious information purportedly linking Saddam to the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Bush said Monday he would name an independent bipartisan commission to review intelligence failures in Iraq. It would also look at what is known about efforts by Iran, North Korea and terrorist groups to obtain nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. Two congressional committees, an internal CIA board and a White House advisory panel are already reviewing the Iraq intelligence. Bush's decision to name an independent commission followed assertions by David Kay, who quit last month as chief U.S. weapons inspector in Iraq, that Saddam had not hidden the banned chemical and biological warfare stockpiles. The president had cited such weapons as his prime justification for the March invasion. Bush and GOP leaders in Congress had resisted a demand by Democrats for an independent review of the Iraq intelligence, but calls by Kay and key Republicans last week for such an inquiry forced the president to reconsider. "I want to know all the facts," Bush told reporters after a Cabinet meeting. He insisted, however, that the war and occupation - in which more than 500 U.S. troops have died - were justified because Saddam had failed to halt all illicit weapons activities in violation of numerous U.N. resolutions. "Saddam Hussein had the intent and capabilities to cause great harm," Bush asserted. White House spokesman Scott McClellan said the membership and duration of the independent commission weren't settled. He skirted the question of whether the panel would examine whether Bush and his top aides exaggerated or misrepresented intelligence on Iraq. "I'm not going to get into the scope issues at this point," he said. Top Democratic lawmakers said Bush should allow Congress to appoint the commission and determine the scope and duration of its inquiry. "One of the major questions that needs to be addressed is whether senior administration officials ... misled the Congress and the public about the nature of the threat from Iraq. Even some of your own statements and those of Vice President Cheney need independent scrutiny. A commission appointed and controlled by the White House will not have the independence or credibility necessary to investigate these issues," Senate Minority Leader Tom Daschle (D., S.D.) and four other senior Democrats wrote in a letter to Bush. The former and current officials said that an objective inquiry would require the panel to look at the roles that Cheney, his office and his neoconservative allies at the Pentagon played in collecting and analyzing intelligence on Iraq. Reviewing what the CIA did "is half the picture," said Melvin Goodman, a former senior CIA analyst who teaches at the National Defense University. "What you want is an open-ended, blue-ribbon inquiry of the whole picture, which is what (intelligence) the White House got and how the White House used what it got." Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld have long expressed serious doubts about the CIA's abilities. Cheney, according to a senior U.S. official, began visiting the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency during his first days in office for briefings on Iraq and other pressing national security issues. His staff collected intelligence on Iraq from sources such as newspapers, as well as from regular intelligence channels and from internal Pentagon initiatives directed by Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith. Those efforts, according to the current and former U.S. officials, combined raw intelligence from the CIA and DIA with information from defectors and Iraqi exiles such as Ahmad Chalabi, now a member of the U.S.-installed Iraqi Governing Council. The CIA and State Department saw Chalabi, who is close to neoconservatives inside and outside the administration, as an unreliable source of information with a self-interest in pressing the case for Saddam's ouster. The senior administration official said the assessments on illicit weapons, al-Qaida and human rights in Iraq that Libby pressed on Powell were products of Cheney's office and Feith's efforts. The bulk of the work on illicit weapons and al-Qaida links was rejected after representatives from Cheney's office failed in a 10-hour meeting to show that the materials were from reliable sources, he said. He said that materials rejected as dubious or false included: _Sept. 11 terrorist Mohamed Atta met an Iraqi intelligence agent in Prague, the Czech Republic, five months before the attacks; _Iraqi efforts to purchase software from an Australian company to use for mapping the East Coast of the United States; _Satellite pictures that Libby insisted showed Iraq possessed robot aircraft capable of spraying lethal chemicals; _A chronology of contacts "going back years" between Iraqi officials and al-Qaida. "These pages put the two in contact, but they didn't prove a damn thing," said the senior official, who added that follow-up reports showed that "in meeting after meeting Iraq rebuffed al-Qaida, that Saddam had serious differences reconciling fundamentalist Islam with secular Iraq." Still, Powell included in his U.N. speech charges that Iraq had provided chemical and biological warfare training to several al-Qaida members and that he had helped an al-Qaida-linked group produce crude poisons. --- 2004, Knight Ridder/Tribune Information Services. ***************************************************************** 7 Guardian Unlimited: Bush accused of Suzanne Goldenberg in Washington Tuesday February 3, 2004 The Guardian President George Bush, repeatedly challenged on his prewar certainties about Saddam Hussein's arsenal, yesterday confirmed an outside investigation into intelligence failures on Iraq. But the promise of an independent, bipartisan commission came under immediate attack, with critics accusing the White House of trying to undermine the inquiry from the start. The announcement yesterday marks the last retreat by the White House from its prewar assertions about Saddam, and the abandonment of one of the main justifications for the war. But Mr Bush was unapologetic yesterday. "We do know that Saddam Hussein had the intent and capabilities to cause great harm," he said. "We know he was a danger. And he was not only a danger to people in the free world, he was a danger to his own people. He slaughtered thousands of people, imprisoned people." Mr Bush is facing re-election this year and is necessarily cautious of exposing himself to attacks from his Democratic opponents that he manipulated intelligence to make the case for war. Instead, he told reporters, he favoured a sweeping investigation into the failings of US intelligence agencies on the entire issue of nuclear proliferation, from Iraq to North Korea, Iran and Libya, and as far back in time as the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests in 1998, which the CIA failed to anticipate. "We also want to look at our war against proliferation and weapons of mass destruction, kind of in a broader context," he said. The scale of those ambitions has caused widespread dismay, and led to accusations that the White House had set tasks for the commission so broad as to be unworkable. "This should be an inquiry focused on the intelligence failure to understand what went wrong and how precisely to fix it. The president's proposal tries to bury that as simply an element in a broader effort," said Joseph Cirincione, director of the non-proliferation project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Mr Cirincione's misgivings were given greater voice by Democratic legislators who said they would closely scrutinise the mandate, and the make-up of the commission for signs of Republican bias. "I think that it is important for us to have an independent commission, but it truly should be independent," said Tom Daschle, the Democratic leader in the Senate. "It sounds as if the president is going to call for one where he gets to appoint each of the members and dictate the design and ultimately the circumstances under which they do their work." Mr Cirincione said one test of Mr Bush's sincerity would be the mandate granted to the commission to review data put forward by the offices of the vice-president, Dick Cheney, and the defence secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, in addition to the information gathered by the intelligence services. Analysts will also closely scrutinise the make-up of the commission to see how many national security and non-proliferation experts are among its ranks, and whether the technical experts chosen are known Republicans. Mr Cheney's reported involvement in the formation of the commission has already been the subject of concern. The commission is not expected to report until mid-2005 preventing any political fallout from the inquiry during this election year. It was the CIA weapons inspector David Kay's admission last week that he had found no concrete evidence of any Iraqi nuclear, chemical or biological weapons programme that forced the White House to acknowledge there was no substance to the rationale for the war on Iraq. Guardian Newspapers Limited ***************************************************************** 8 Washington Post: Blair Agrees to Probe of Claims About Iraqi Weapons (washingtonpost.com) By Glenn Frankel Washington Post Foreign Service Tuesday, February 3, 2004; Page A14 LONDON, Feb. 2 -- Prime Minister Tony Blair responded to growing pressure Monday by announcing that he would launch an independent inquiry into why British intelligence overestimated the threat of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq before the war last year. A spokesman said the details would be presented Tuesday in Parliament. The opposition Conservative and Liberal Democrat parties both introduced motions in the House of Commons on Monday demanding an investigation. The announcement marks a reversal of Blair's previous insistence that he would wait to see whether the Iraq Survey Group, a U.S.-led team, turned up evidence of unconventional weapons before launching a probe. Blair's move also came on a day when the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee issued a report concluding that the continued failure of inspectors to find weapons of mass destruction had damaged U.S. and British credibility in the conduct of the war against terrorism. The report also concluded that the war in Iraq had "possibly made terrorist attacks on British nationals and British interests more likely in the short term." Andrew MacKinlay, a committee member from Blair's ruling Labor Party, said at a news conference, "I think clearly there is a crisis of confidence now, both in Parliament and outside, about both the competence of our security and intelligence services and the analysis that was given of the raw intelligence." A report by a retired judge, Lord Brian Hutton, last week cleared the government of exaggerating intelligence in the run-up to the war. The Hutton findings accused the British Broadcasting Corp. of faulty journalism in reporting that Blair and his aides had "sexed up" a September 2002 intelligence dossier on the Iraqi threat. Blair's spokesman cited the Hutton report in explaining why the prime minister was now prepared for a new inquiry. "What's different between last week and this is that the Hutton report has cleared the government of allegations of having politically interfered with, falsified or hyped the intelligence on WMD," a spokesman said, adding that Hutton's report "allows us to address -- hopefully in a more rational way, a more rational context -- the perfectly valid question that people have asked about WMD." The spokesman said that in altering their stance, Blair and his aides had coordinated closely with the White House, which announced its own independent inquiry Monday. But critics said the White House had blindsided the prime minister by shifting its stance during the past week while Blair and his supporters were still insisting that the intelligence verdict on weapons of mass destruction was not complete. "The British people are entitled to know why we went to war on a false prospectus," said former foreign secretary Robin Cook, who resigned to protest the war. In an interview with BBC Radio, Cook suggested that President Bush's turnabout had forced Blair's hand. "Although Tony Blair has been a very reliable ally to the Bush administration, it's very hard to see what he's got in return," Cook said. "When the chips are down, Washington doesn't appear to really give much concern to whether they're turning up the heat on Tony Blair." Britain has more than 10,000 troops in southern Iraq, and Blair remains the Bush administration's closest international ally in the Iraq campaign. But while Bush cited several factors in going to war, Blair insisted before the war that Iraq's alleged possession of weapons of mass destruction was the sole legal justification under international law. The prime minister and his aides have conceded they were stunned that no such weapons were uncovered in the weeks after the war, and until recently they remained hopeful that some would be found. Two elements in the intelligence dossier have proved particularly troubling for the Blair government: an erroneous claim from a single Iraqi source that Iraq could launch weapons of mass destruction within 45 minutes of an order, and an allegation that Saddam Hussein's government had sought to purchase nuclear materials from an unnamed African country. On the former, British officials first said that the 45-minute claim referred only to battlefield munitions rather than long-range missiles; then they said there were no such weapons. On the latter, the CIA has disputed the British claim and the White House has retracted Bush's reference to it in last year's State of the Union address. "No doubt there will be lots of blame-shifting," said Garth Whitty, a former British weapons inspector. "The politicians will try to shift it to the intelligence chiefs, and the intelligence chiefs to their political masters. The reality is everyone probably acted in good faith, but perhaps they were too quick to accept what they wanted to hear." 2004 The Washington Post Company ***************************************************************** 9 Washington Post: Intelligence Panel Will Cast Net Beyond Iraq (washingtonpost.com) By Dana Priest and Dana Milbank Washington Post Staff Writers Tuesday, February 3, 2004; Page A01 The commission that President Bush will appoint to investigate the failures of prewar intelligence on Iraq will also review the CIA's misjudgments about weapons programs in Iran, Libya and North Korea, administration officials said yesterday. Bush said the nine-member panel -- which White House officials said would include current and former officials with experience in intelligence matters -- will "look at our war against proliferation and weapons of mass destruction, kind of in a broader context." Although the secret weapons programs of Iraq, Iran, Libya, North Korea and Pakistan have long been a top concern of U.S. national security officials, the intelligence agencies have missed critical weapons developments in each country. Administration officials have found themselves surprised at recent disclosures about nuclear weapons programs in Iran, Libya and North Korea. And the intelligence community was caught off guard when Pakistan tested a nuclear device in 1998. Stopping the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has become a priority for the administration since Sept. 11, 2001, because of the fear that al Qaeda terrorists will try to acquire such weapons from secretive and sometimes cash-starved states that produce them. Bush conferred yesterday with former chief CIA weapons hunter David Kay, who told Congress last week that the prewar intelligence assessment on Iraq was wrong and that he does not expect anyone to find weapons of mass destruction. The White House said the president will release the names of the commission members later this week when he signs an executive order creating the panel. The group will include some former and current members of Congress, one White House official said. The administration has already contacted some people it hopes will serve, and it is waiting for acceptances, officials said. They declined to provide names but spoke admiringly of former senator Bob Kerrey, a Nebraska Democrat who is president of the New School University, as the sort of nonpartisan statesman they are seeking. He is a member of the commission investigating the Sept. 11 attacks. Other names floated by officials were William H. Webster and James Woolsey, both former CIA directors. Woolsey said in an interview that he had not been contacted. Congressional Democrats, who had demanded an independent commission to assess the prewar claims about Iraq, criticized Bush for deciding to make all the appointments to the panel himself. "A commission appointed and controlled by the White House will not have the independence or credibility necessary to investigate these issues," said a letter signed by Senate Minority Leader Thomas A. Daschle (S.D.), Senate intelligence committee Vice Chairman John D. Rockefeller IV (W.Va.), House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi (Calif.) and other Democratic congressional leaders. "Even some of your own statements and those of Vice President Cheney need independent scrutiny. A commission appointed and controlled by the White House will not have the independence or credibility necessary to investigate these issues." Critics of the war and many congressional Democrats have said it is crucial to know whether White House policymakers cherry-picked the CIA's intelligence on Iraq -- dropping the many caveats and using only the most inflammatory assessments -- in making its case for war. But Democrats on the House and Senate intelligence committees, which have been looking at prewar intelligence for months, have failed to persuade the Republicans who control the committees to ask the administration for this material. Even if they did request it, White Houses typically claim executive privilege, which safeguards communications between the president and other executive offices from outside scrutiny. In an interview yesterday with Washington Post editors and reporters, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell said he expects the panel to look "at the analysts at the bottom all the way up to the policymakers" who rely on that intelligence. Asked whether discussions between CIA Director George J. Tenet and Bush would be an important element in the commission's work, Powell said, "I would assume that the commission will look into this." "My recommendation would be to give [the commission] as much access as you can," he added, "but I have to hold a little hook here because there may be some presidential privileges or executive privilege issues that I'm not aware of that the White House may have." He said he hopes the commission will "see whether or not there are gaps in the kinds of things we're doing and are there things we have overlooked in terms of how to cover these kinds of situations, whether it's North Korea or Libya or Iran." Bush, fielding a question on the commission after a meeting with his Cabinet, carefully avoided an acknowledgment that the Iraq intelligence was wrong. "First of all, I don't know all the facts," he said. "What we don't know yet is what . . . the Iraqi Survey Group has found, and we want to look at that." White House press secretary Scott McClellan said the commission will incorporate the findings of the Iraq Survey Group; the weapons-hunting team is not expected to finish its work for months. "The Iraq Survey Group is doing its work, separately and apart from this commission," he said. "But it's important that their work -- that the commission look at their work as part of this broad assessment of our intelligence capabilities." Sen. John F. Kerry (Mass.), the front-runner in the Democratic primary race, called the investigation "long overdue" and said waiting until after the elections to produce findings is "reflective of the attitude of this administration" to drag its feet on investigations. "We need a president of the United States who isn't slow to the table, slow to the walk, who gets it right the first time," Kerry said. "I hope this will not be an effort to sideline these issues which the American people deserve answers on before the election. We deserve this to be a true bipartisan effort and a rapid effort." Sen. John W. Warner (R-Va.), chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, said Bush "is showing strong leadership once again by establishing a panel of experts to perform a 'no holds barred' review of America's intelligence community to make it stronger and more effective in a post-9/11 world." 2004 The Washington Post Company ***************************************************************** 10 Washington Post: Powell Says New Data May Have Affected War Decision (washingtonpost.com) By Glenn Kessler Washington Post Staff Writer Tuesday, February 3, 2004; Page A01 Secretary of State Colin L. Powell said yesterday that he does not know whether he would have recommended an invasion of Iraq if he had been told it had no stockpiles of banned weapons, even as he offered a broad defense of the Bush administration's decision to go to war. Even without possessing chemical, biological or nuclear weapons, Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein intended to acquire them and tried to maintain the capability of producing them in case international sanctions were lifted, Powell said in an interview. But he conceded that the administration's conviction that Hussein already had such weapons had made the case for war more urgent. Asked if he would have recommended an invasion knowing Iraq had no prohibited weapons, Powell replied: "I don't know, because it was the stockpile that presented the final little piece that made it more of a real and present danger and threat to the region and to the world." He said the "absence of a stockpile changes the political calculus; it changes the answer you get." Powell spoke on the Iraq weapons issue for more than half of the hour-long interview. Throughout the discussion, Powell tried to balance the administration's rationale for going to war with the reality that no weapons of mass destruction have been uncovered in Iraq. Former chief U.S. weapons inspectors David Kay told Congress last week that Hussein did not have such weapons at the time of the U.S. invasion. Nonetheless, Powell said, history will ultimately judge that the war "was the right thing to do." Powell is widely perceived to have placed his credibility on the line last Feb. 5 when he appeared before the United Nations Security Council and offered a forceful and detailed description of the U.S. case that Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction. In that appearance, Powell told the council: "What we are giving you are facts and conclusions based on solid intelligence." In the interview yesterday, Powell said he had "spent much of the weekend" reading Kay's testimony last week before the Senate Armed Services Committee. Powell came to the interview, held at The Washington Post, with an annotated and highlighted transcript, and suggested that Kay's testimony was more supportive of the administration than many news accounts have portrayed. Kay "did say, with respect to stockpiles, we were wrong, terribly wrong," Powell said, flipping through the pages of Kay's transcript and quoting from selected sections. "But he also came to other conclusions that deal, I think, with intent and capability which resulted in a threat the president felt he had to respond to." Powell said, "Saddam Hussein and his regime clearly had the intent -- they never lost it -- an intent that manifested itself many years ago when they actually used such horrible weapons against their enemies in Iran and against their own people." That intent, Powell said, was also demonstrated by Hussein keeping in place the capability to produce weapons. He said Hussein continued to train and employ people who knew how to develop weapons, "and there's no question about that and there's nobody debating that part of the intelligence." Moreover, Powell said, Iraq continued to have the "technical infrastructure, labs and facilities, that will lend themselves to the production of weapons of mass destruction." Such facilities "could produce such weapons at a moment in time, now or some future moment in time," Powell said. "I think there's evidence that suggests that he was keeping a warm base, that there was an intent on his part to have that capability." Powell asserted that Hussein was intent on creating delivery systems, such as longer-range missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles. "If you look at my presentation from last year, I talk about intent," Powell said. "I talk about the capability I think is there, the stockpiles, but a large part of the presentation is also what happened" and the unanswered questions about Iraq's weapons holdings. "He got a chance to answer the questions and he didn't answer the questions." Powell noted that when he was chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the 1991 Persian Gulf War, U.S. troops expected to be hit with chemical weapons. "We weren't hit with chemical weapons but we found chemical weapons," he said. "So it wasn't as if this was a figment of someone's imagination." CONTINUED 1 2 Next > Print This Article 2004 The Washington Post Company ***************************************************************** 11 Guardian Unlimited: Straw launches WMD intelligence review Matthew Tempest, political correspondent Tuesday February 3, 2004 Jack Straw, the foreign secretary, today confirmed that the government had agreed to demands for a new inquiry to review the intelligence build-up to the Iraq war. A committee of five privy councillors will investigate the discrepancies between secret service reports on Iraq's weapons programmes and the lack of actual weapons found after the war. But the Liberal Democrats have refused to participate in the inquiry, with the party's leader, Charles Kennedy, calling it "unacceptable". Thus, although the Labour chairwoman of the intelligence and security committee, Ann Taylor, will be on the team, as will Conservative MP Michael Mates, there will be no representative from the Lib Dems. Following the prime minister's confirmation this morning to the liaison committee that he had authorised such an inquiry - which follows on from similar investigations by the foreign affairs select committee, the intelligence and security committee and Lord Hutton's inquiry - Mr Straw said the terms of reference of the inquiry would be to look at intelligence on WMD programmes and the global trade in WMD, as well as the accuracy of pre-war intelligence on Iraqi WMD and any discrepancies with what was eventually found. The committee will be chaired by former cabinet secretary Lord Butler, and will report back before the Commons summer recess. Mr Straw said the committee would follow precedents set by the Franks inquiry into the Falklands conflict. Its conclusions will be given to the prime minister for publication, but classified parts will be blocked out. Witnesses to the inquiry will give evidence in private, however. Mr Straw said the committee would have access to all intelligence reports, as well as relevant government papers and would work closely with its US counterpart and the Iraq Survey Group. The Tories, who have called for such an inquiry since last June, responded: "For a prime minister who has 'no reverse gear', he can still execute an impressive u-turn." Michael Ancram, the shadow foreign secretary, sarcastically told Mr Straw in the Commons that "perish the thought" that this decision had anything to do with the similar inquiry launched by President Bush. As well as Lord Butler the committee would be made up of Sir John Chilcot and Field Marshal Lord Inge. Mr Ancram demanded that the inquiry investigate if there had been political "cherry-picking" of the intelligence material. He also insisted that statements made by the prime minister outside parliament, such as his remarks in St Petersburg last May, and comments made by his official spokesman, be included in the review. The Lib Dems' foreign affairs spokesman, Sir Menzies Campbell, joked that he "welcomed the government's volte-face - for which President Bush must take some credit..." But he said his party could not endorse the inquiry's remit, saying it was narrower than the case study of the Franks report into the Falklands conflict. He criticised it for excluding consideration of the use the government made of intelligence. Mr Straw's predecessor as foreign secretary, Robin Cook, challenged him to say how the committee would be able to "separate out the judgement of the threat from the political judgment to go to war on the basis of that threat". Tory backbencher Kenneth Clarke said many people in the security and diplomatic world believed that the decision to go to war had been made by President Bush many months before the attack. Tory Angela Browning caused a minor storm in the Commons when she pointed out that one of the committee's members, Ann Taylor, was making audible comments on questions from the government benches - throwing into doubt her objectivity. She also wondered whether the inquiry, as well as taking note of the US intelligence inquiry, would take evidence from Australia, where intelligence official Andrew Wilkie had resigned in protest at the "exaggeration" by the US/UK governments of intelligence evidence. Earlier, under cross-examination by the parliamentary liaison committee, the prime minister admitted that David Kay's testimony at the start of the week had forced his hand on an inquiry. He told MPs: "I think it is right, as a result of what David Kay has said, and the ISG now probably won't report in the very near term its final report, that we have a look at the intelligence we received and whether it was correct or not. "What is true about David Kay's evidence and this is something I have to accept and is one of the reasons why I think we now need a new inquiry - it is true David Kay is saying we have not found large stockpiles of actual weapons," he said. "What is untrue is to say that he was saying there was no weapons of mass destruction programme or capability and that Saddam was not a threat." Mr Blair said he did not want the inquiry to rake over the same material considered by Lord Hutton and indicated that he did not want it to produce a judgment on the integrity of the key figures involved in the decision to go to war. "This should not go back over the same ground as the Hutton inquiry," he said. "Of course the way intelligence is gathered, the way it is evaluated and used by government should be part of what the committee look into. "But we can do that without casting aspersions on people's good faith or honesty. That has been gone into in detail by the Hutton inquiry." Mr Blair also revealed: "I personally would have been very happy for the ISC to have done this inquiry. "I think they would have done it extremely well but because I wanted to proceed by consensus and because others said the Franks committee style is a better way of doing it, I have gone for that option," he said. The terms of reference of the inquiry are: To investigate the intelligence coverage available on WMD programmes of countries of concern and on the global trade in WMD, taking into account what is now known about these programmes As part of this work, to investigate the accuracy of intelligence on Iraqi WMD up to March 2003, and to examine any discrepancies between the intelligence gathered, evaluated and used by the government before the conflict, and between that intelligence and what has been discovered by the Iraq Survey Group since the end of the conflict To make recommendations to the prime minister for the future on the gathering, evaluation and use of intelligence on WMD, in the light of the difficulties of operating in countries of concern Related articles 11.09.2003: Hoon 'potentially misled' committee 11.09.2003: Old-fashioned committee provides a window on Whitehall 'ring of secrecy' Intelligence and security committee report Download the MPs' published report (pdf) 11.09.2003: ISC report: key quotes Foreign affairs committee report Read the MPs' report in full (pdf) 07.07.2003: Conclusions and recommendations The dossiers The government's September dossier on Iraqi WMD (pdf) The government's February dossier on Iraqi WMD (pdf) Explained 03.06.2003: The different government inquiries Political alerts Get daily headlines straight to your mobile Sign up for the Backbencher Our free weekly insider's guide to Westminster What do you think? politics.editor@guardianunlimited.co.uk Guardian Newspapers Limited ***************************************************************** 12 UK Independent: Blair caves in to calls for WMD inquiry into Iraq failures By Andrew Grice, Ben Russell and Andrew Buncombe in Washington 03 February 2004 Tony Blair performed a hasty U-turn yesterday when Downing Street agreed to an inquiry into the intelligence about Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction on which he took Britain to war in Iraq. After months of resisting demands for an investigation despite the failure to find any WMD, the Prime Minister climbed down on the day George Bush confirmed that an independent commission would look into the US intelligence on Saddam's arsenal. In Britain, the inquiry is expected to be conducted by a committee of MPs and peers, with an independent chairman. Last night it was reported that the chairman was likely to be Lord Butler of Brockwell, the former cabinet secretary who became master of University College Oxford after stepping down as head of the civil service in 1998. But there was confusion over the details as MPs waited for the terms of reference. Talks about how the inquiry would work hit a hitch after Charles Kennedy, the Liberal Democrat leader, failed to agree terms with the Government during a telephone call with Mr Blair. Precise details of the disagreement were unclear, but Mr Kennedy had earlier argued that the inquiry should take into account the workings of government and political decisions, as well as the nature of intelligence reports. In a letter to Mr Blair he said that the inquiry should be transparent, and led by someone from outside active party politics. Although ministers said intelligence showed Saddam posed a real and current threat, there were warnings from MPs that intelligence chiefs should not be made scapegoats for a political decision to go to war. Mr Blair has stonewalled in the face of growing all-party demands for an inquiry, saying that people should wait until the Iraq Survey Group, which is hunting for weapons, produces its final report. But with no deadline set, his increasingly untenable line was washed away when Washington made clear the US President was to abandon his opposition to an inquiry. Mr Blair's official spokesman said the decision had been taken after the Hutton report cleared the Government of allegations that it interfered with, falsified or hyped the intelligence on WMD. He said: "That allows us to address ... the perfectly valid question that people have asked about WMD." The inquiry is expected to look at the quality of the intelligence and the assessments based on it. But the Tories and Liberal Democrats said it should also consider the Government's handling of it. Robin Cook, the former foreign secretary who resigned from the Cabinet over the war, said the inquiry should be public and completed quickly. "The British people are entitled to know why we went to war on a false prospectus," he said. "It would be grotesque if the intelligence agencies were now to carry the can for what was ultimately a political decision." Some MPs expressed fears that Mr Blair would hide behind the inquiry, just as he refused to be drawn on the Kelly affair while Lord Hutton's investigation was under way. But he is likely to want to see it completed well before the election. In a report yesterday, the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee said the US-led coalition had lost credibility over the failure to find WMD in Iraq and may have increased the risk of terror strikes. Andrew Mackinlay, a Labour member, said: "I think clearly there is a crisis of confidence now, both in Parliament and outside, about both the competence of our security and intelligence services and the analysis that was given of the raw intelligence." UK Independent Ltd. ***************************************************************** 13 Scotsman.com: 'Intelligence Bosses Ignored Experts' Doubts over Iraq's Wmd' Wednesday, 4th February 2004 By Gavin Cordon, Whitehall Editor, PA News Intelligence chiefs ignored warnings from their own leading experts that they could not be certain Iraq had chemical and biological weapons, an ex-intelligence official who gave crucial evidence to the Hutton Inquiry claimed today. Dr Brian Jones, a former branch head in the Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS), said that the most senior intelligence officials may have “misinterpreted” key evidence on Iraq’s weapons programmes. He also disclosed, in an article for The Independent, that he and a DIS colleague had formally complained about the Iraq dossier because they feared that they would be made “scapegoats” after the war when no weapons were found. Dr Jones’s disclosures came as MPs were preparing to debate Lord Hutton’s findings in the Commons and follow Tony Blair’s announcement yesterday of an inquiry into the Iraq intelligence. His article lifts the lid on the extraordinary tensions within the intelligence in the run up to the publication of the Government’s Iraq weapons dossier in September. They also cast new doubts on the role played by the Joint Intelligence Committee – which includes the heads of all the intelligence agencies – and its chairman, John Scarlett. At the time, Dr Jones headed the branch within the DIS scientific and technical directorate which was responsible for analysing all intelligence on nuclear, chemical and biological warfare. He described his team as the “foremost group of analysts in the West” on the subject. But he said that when they had warned that the dossier had overstated the case that the Iraqis still had chemical weapons (CW) and biological weapons (BW), they were overruled. DIS was told that the Secret Intelligence Service, MI6, had other intelligence to back up the claims but it was considered to be so sensitive that it was “compartmented” and not shown to the other agencies. However, Dr Jones said that did not satisfy the experts in DIS. “My belief is that right up to the publication of the dossier there was a unified view amongst not only my own staff but all the DIS experts that on the basis of the intelligence available to them the assessment that Iraq possessed a CW or BW capability should be carefully caveated,” he said. [ ***************************************************************** 14 UK Independent: How the Government's case for war has failed to add up By Paul Waugh, Deputy Political Editor 03 February 2004 Tony Blair told the Commons last week that "it is absolutely right that people can question whether the intelligence received was right and why we have not yet found WMD". Coming at the height of his perceived triumph on the Hutton report, with Labour MPs waving their order papers in support, the Prime Minister's remarks received less attention than they merited. His subtle shift on the central issue of the existence of Iraqi WMD was the first indication that Downing Street was open to the idea that its intelligence was at least questionable. During the Hutton inquiry, it emerged that before his evidence session with MPs, David Kelly was briefed by the MoD on so-called "tricky areas" such as his view of the Iraqi threat. The independent inquiry into the whole WMD affair will have to consider at least the following tricky areas of its own. 1. THE LEGALITY OF WAR Tony Blair's key political decision to raise the spectre of Iraq's alleged WMD was driven largely by the legal advice he received from the Attorney General, Lord Goldsmith QC. Lord Goldsmith made clear in his legal opinion on the eve of war that military action against Saddam could only comply with international law if the Iraqis were in breach of its UN resolutions on its banned armaments. If WMD did not exist, the legal basis for war is significantly weakened. 2. 'UNACCOUNTED FOR' STOCKS The UK and US claimed Iraq possessed weapons because it had failed to prove that it had destroyed stocks banned at the end of the 1990-91 Gulf war. But Hans Blix, the former UN chief weapons inspector, said that simply because stocks were "unaccounted for", it did not automatically follow they existed. Mr Blair, in his foreword to the September 2002 dossier, said: "Intelligence reports make clear that he [Saddam] sees ... the belief overseas that he would use these weapons as vital to his ... goal of regional domination." Mr Blair couldn't accept what now seems clear - that Saddam was bluffing. 3. IMMINENT THREAT Tony Blair insisted WMD was a "current and serious threat" and said he had received an increasing amount of intelligence across his desk throughout 2002. The most powerful case for the imminence of the threat was the claim in the Government's dossier that Saddam could deploy chemical and biological weapons within a mere 45 minutes of an order to do so. But the Hutton inquiry has shown that the 45-minute claim was single sourced and referred to battlefield weapons, not long-range missiles. Even Jonathan Powell, Mr Blair's chief of staff, said there was no case for an "imminent threat", yet Mr Blair ignored him. 4. TERRORISM George Bush claimed links between Saddam and al-Qa'ida and convinced 60 per cent of the American public that attacking Iraq was about preventing another 11 September-style attack on the US. Mr Blair and Jack Straw, the Foreign Secretary, said there was a "potential link". There has never been any evidence of a link. The Parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee found that Mr Blair had been explicitly warned by intelligence chiefs on 10 February last year that the threat of terror groups getting their hands on WMD would be "heightened by military action against Iraq". 5. DIRTY NUCLEAR BOMB The original draft of the UK dossier was cautious about the nuclear issue. The Defence Intelligence Staff warned: "Iraq could not produce sufficient weapons grade material for a single weapon for least four or five years and this only once sanctions have been removed." But Alastair Campbell, Mr Blair's communications director, said that he and the Prime Minister preferred an earlier intelligence assessment suggesting that a dirty radiological device could be produced within one to two years. The dossier was accordingly made stronger. 6. ALUMINIUM TUBES Colin Powell, the US Secretary of State, and Mr Straw said intelligence showed Iraq was attempting to import aluminium tubes that could be used to refine Uranium for a nuclear device. Mohamed ElBaradei, the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), dismissed the claim. 7. URANIUM FROM AFRICA Mr Bush quoted the dossier's claim that Iraq was seeking uranium from Niger. The IAEA found the documents on which the claim was made were fakes. The intelligence was not British; it was from a "third country". Britain still stands by the claim. 8. CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION/DUAL USE The dossier said Iraq "continued" to produce chemical weapons, but this was based on a late piece of intelligence from MI6 that has never been made public. A memo submitted to the Hutton inquiry, which was leaked to the The Independent this week, showed that the DIS had warned on 12 September that "we have no idea how many chemical weapons or the quantity of agent that Iraq has". "Mr A", a weapons expert, told Lord Hutton he agreed with Iraqi comments that the inclusion of the phosgene plant in the dossier was "a pretty stupid mistake for the British to make." 9. MOBILE BIO-LABS Gen Powell made a key part of his UN address the claim that mobile laboratories were in Iraq making biological agents for weaponisation. When asked by No 10 to provide amounts of biological agent, the DIS said "this is an impossible question". 10. THERE WAS NO COMPELLING FRESH EVIDENCE ON WMD Mr Blair and other ministers have stated that the reason they became alarmed about WMD was because of the increasing number and seriousness of intelligence reports on the issue.. Perhaps the most damaging evidence to undermine came from Donald Rumsfeld, the US Defence Secretary, last summer. He told a Senate subcommittee: "The coalition did not act in Iraq because we had dramatic new evidence of Iraq's pursuit of weapons of mass murder. We acted because we saw the existing evidence in a new light through the prism of our experience on 11 September 2001." It seems America's desire to avenge 9-11 was the real reason after all. UK Independent Ltd. ***************************************************************** 15 Washington Post: Iranians Don't Want To Go Nuclear (washingtonpost.com) By Karim Sadjadpour Tuesday, February 3, 2004; Page A19 Do the people of Iran want the bomb? Iran's recent decision to allow for tighter inspection of its nuclear facilities -- which Iran says are for civilian purposes -- was hailed by Iranian and European officials as a diplomatic victory, while analysts and officials in Washington and Tel Aviv continue to be wary of Tehran's intentions. But despite the attention given to Iran's nuclear aspirations in recent months, one important question has scarcely been touched on: How do the Iranian people feel about having nuclear weapons? Iranian officials have suggested that the country's nuclear program is an issue that resonates on the Iranian street and is a great source of national pride. But months of interviews I have done in Iran reveal a somewhat different picture. Whereas few Iranians are opposed to the development of a nuclear energy facility, most do not see it as a solution to their primary concerns: economic malaise and political and social repression. What's more, most of the Iranians surveyed said they oppose the pursuit of a nuclear weapons program because it runs counter to their desire for "peace and tranquility." Three reasons were commonly cited. First, having experienced a devastating eight-year war with Saddam Hussein's Iraq that took the lives of hundreds of thousands of their compatriots, Iranians are opposed to reliving war or violence. Many Iranians said the pursuit of nuclear weapons would lead the country down a path no one wanted to travel. Two decades ago revolutionary euphoria was strong, and millions of young men volunteered to defend their country against an Iraqi onslaught. Today few Iranians have illusions about the realities of conflict. The argument that a nuclear weapon could help serve as a deterrent to ensure peace in Iran seemed incongruous to most. "If we want peace, why would we want a bomb?" asked a middle-aged Iranian woman, seemingly concurring with an influential Iranian diplomat who contends that a nuclear weapon "would not augment Iran's security but rather heighten its vulnerabilities." Second, while a central premise of Iran's Islamic government from the time of its inception has been its steadfast opposition to the United States and Israel, for most Iranians no such nemeses exist. Iran's young populace -- more than two-thirds of the country is younger than 30 -- is among the most pro-American in the Middle East, and tend not to share the impassioned anti-Israel sentiment of their Arab neighbors. While the excitement generated on the Indian and Pakistani streets as a result of their nuclear detonations is commonly cited to show the correlation between nuclear weapons and national pride, such a reaction is best understood in the context of the rivalry between the two countries. The majority of Iranians surveyed claimed to have little desire to show off their military or nuclear prowess to anyone. "Whom would we attack?" asked a 31-year-old laborer, echoing a commonly heard sentiment in Tehran. "We don't want war with anyone." Finally, many Iranians, youth in particular, are opposed to the Islamic republic's becoming a nuclear power because they believe it would further entrench the hard-liners in the government. "I fear that if these guys get the bomb they will be able to hold on to power for another 25 years," said a 30-year-old Iranian professional. "Nobody wants that." In particular some expressed a concern that a nuclear Iran would be immune to U.S. and European diplomatic pressure and could continue to repress popular demands for reform without fear of repercussion. At the same time, most Iranians -- including harsh critics of the Islamic regime -- remain unconvinced by the allegations that their government is secretly pursuing a nuclear weapons program. Many dismiss it as another bogeyman manufactured by the United States and Israel to further antagonize and isolate the Islamic regime. "I don't believe we're after a bomb," said a 25-year-old Tehran University student. "The U.S. is always looking for an excuse to harass these mullahs." A recently retired Iranian diplomat who said he is "strongly critical" of the Islamic government agreed with this assessment, saying Iran's nuclear program "is neither for defensive nor offensive purposes . . . It's only for energy purposes." I draw two lessons from this. First, the European-brokered compromise on Iran's nuclear program, which appealed to reformists and pragmatists within the Iranian government, was also a victory of sorts for the Iranian people, who are eager to emerge from the political and economic isolation of the past two decades and are strongly in favor of increasing ties with the West. A blatant lack of cooperation with the international community would not have been well-received domestically. Second, a more aggressive reaction by the international community -- a U.S. or Israeli attempt to strike Iran's nuclear facilities -- could well have the unintended consequence of antagonizing a highly nationalistic and largely pro-Western populace and convincing Iranians that a nuclear weapon is indeed in their national interests. Such a reaction would be disastrous for U.S. interests in the region, especially given Iran's key location between Iraq and Afghanistan. Western and Israeli diplomats and analysts should know that the ability to solve the Iranian nuclear predicament diplomatically has broad implications for the future of democracy and nonproliferation in Iran and the rest of the Middle East. The goal is to bring the Iranian regime on the same page with the Iranian people. A non-diplomatic attempt to destroy Iran's nuclear facilities could do precisely the opposite. The writer, an analyst with the International Crisis Group, is a visiting fellow at the American University of Beirut. 2004 The Washington Post Company ***************************************************************** 16 [NukeNet] Next Six - Way N.Korea Nuclear Talks Set for Feb 25 Date: Tue, 03 Feb 2004 20:08:51 -0800 http://www.nytimes.com http://snipurl.com/3bdb http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/news/news-korea-north.html Next Six - Way N.Korea Nuclear Talks Set for Feb 25 By REUTERS Published: February 3, 2004 Filed at 2:34 a.m. ET SEOUL (Reuters) - North Korea announced Tuesday it would resume talks in Beijing on February 25 with the United States, China and neighboring countries seeking to resolve a crisis over Pyongyang's nuclear arms ambitions. The date for a second round of talks was given after months of intensive shuttle diplomacy since the first six-party session in August. The talks also include Russia, Japan and South Korea. ``The DPRK and the U.S., the major parties concerned to the six-way talks, and China, the host country, agreed to resume the next round of the six-way talks from February 25 after having a series of discussions,'' said the official KCNA news agency. DPRK stands for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, North Korea's official name. The announcement came a day after Pakistani officials said the father of Pakistan's atomic bomb had confessed to selling nuclear secrets to North Korea along with Libya and Iran. China confirmed the date of the talks. South Korean Deputy Foreign Minister Lee Soo-hyuck told a news conference: ``We expect the talks to last three days, but it's open-ended.'' Lee, who headed the South Korean delegation at the August talks, said the five parties excluding North Korea expected this month's session could produce a ``working group able to discuss the substantive and technical issues.'' ``There is a recognition of the need for such a working group. Whether North Korea will accept that is difficult to say, considering how sensitive North Korea's position can be,'' he said. ``UNSTABLE SITUATION'' The United States wants North Korea to commit -- at least by the end of the next round -- to dismantling any nuclear arms programs. Washington has offered then to lay out in detail how it could guarantee not to attack the state President Bush called part of an ``axis of evil'' with Iran and pre-war Iraq. North Korea has offered to freeze its nuclear activities in exchange for energy aid and diplomatic recognition from the United States as the first step in resolving the dispute. The crisis erupted in October 2002 when U.S. officials, including chief North Korea negotiator James Kelly, reported that North Korean officials had admitted at a meeting with them that Pyongyang was pursuing a clandestine nuclear weapons program. North Korea has since denied the U.S. account but Kelly reiterated last month there had been no ambiguity at the meeting. Other officials have said the U.S. case is based on the intelligence that prompted the North's initial admission. U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage said in Tokyo Monday that the stalemate over North Korea's nuclear arms program was a ``dangerous and unstable situation.'' The talks announcement came just before a delegation of North Korean officials arrived in Seoul for separate cabinet-level talks with South Korea. South Korean officials have said they intend to use the 13th round of inter-Korean ministerial talks since 2000 to urge North Korea to resolve the nuclear dispute, which has been an impediment to deeper economic exchanges seen as vital to reviving the North's struggling economy. _______________________________________________________________________ Subscribe/Unsubscribe Here: http://www.energyjustice.net/nukenet/ Change your settings at: http://chrome.nocdirect.com/mailman/listinfo/nukenet_energyjustice.net ***************************************************************** 17 Korea: Digital Chosunilbo: Urgency Brings NK to the Negotiating Table Updated Feb.3,2004 23:07 KST by Lee Ha-won (may2@chosun.com) Related Articles - Six-Party Talks to Resume Feb. 25 North Korea appears to have agreed to holding a second round of six-way talks starting February 25 because it judged any further delay would leave it in a disadvantageous position. China will hold its People's Congress in March, and has been strongly demanding that the talks happen in February. In addition, Korea, Japan, and the United States have told the North they will be willing to talk about the North's proposal for "simultaneous actions." At cabinet-level inter-Korean talks that started on Tuesday in Seoul, North Korea made the sudden announcement that it wants to hold another round of six-way talks, perhaps to create an amicable atmosphere for the talks. Since the first round of six-way talks in August 2003, Korea and the U.S. have been negotiating with North Korea on agreeing to a "joint declaration" ahead of a second round of talks. But the U.S. and the North have been so far apart on the subject, so strategy changed in December to just trying to hold immediate talks without a prior declaration. The fact that the only agreement arrived at with North Korea over the last six months of negotiations is that there will be a second round of talks demonstrates how the prospects are not bright. The government sees this, and one official said "It's news when the North agrees to coming to these talks." "Even if we can't expect much from the upcoming six-way talks," said Deputy Foreign Minister Lee Soo-Hyuck, the head of our delegation to the current cabinet-level talks in Seoul. "The position of each country will become clear." The North has been calling for something called "[North] Korea/U.S. simultaneous action" in what it suggests would be the first stage in resolving the nuclear crisis. It has announced on several occasions that aside from "stopping experimentation and production of nuclear weapons," it could also be willing to cease "the production of peaceful nuclear energy." In exchange, it wants to be removed from the United States' short list of terror-sponsoring nations, have a retraction of political, economic, and military sanctions and "blockades," and energy aid such as oil and electricity from neighboring nations. This would all happen "simultaneously." The Bush Administration has not looked on the North's proposal favorably. The U.S. is demanding the North issue a clear renouncement of nuclear weapons, since it was the North that violated the 1994 Geneva Agreement and the North that created the current crisis. Each side is expected to clash over the North's alleged highly enriched uranium (HEU) program for developing nuclear weapons. The North denies it has such a program, while the Bush Administration insists it is discussed at the next six-way talks. Korea and the U.S. have agreed to not entertaining high expectations for the talks, and have decided to work for the creation of a "six country working group." The group would meet on a smaller scale between sessions of the six-way talks, to focus on resolutions to the nuclear crisis in more detail. by Lee Ha-won (may2@chosun.com) ***************************************************************** 18 Korea: Digital Chosunilbo: U.S. Commission on Intelligence Errors to Scrutinize NK Updated Feb.3,2004 18:13 KST by Joo Yong-jung (midway@chosun.com) WASHINGTON, D.C. - A commission to be appointed by U.S President Bush to investigate the failures of prewar intelligence on Iraq will also review the possibility of other CIA errors related to weapons of mass destruction in Iran, Libya and North Korea, the Washington Post reported. WASHINGTON, D.C. - A commission to be appointed by U.S President Bush to investigate the failures of prewar intelligence on Iraq will also review the possibility of other CIA errors related to weapons of mass destruction in Iran, Libya and North Korea, the Washington Post reported. The Washington Post article entitled, Intelligence Panel Will Cast Net Beyond Iraq. Bush said Monday that the nine-member commission would look at U.S. intelligence on weapons of mass destruction programs and proliferation, in a broader sense. The secret weapons development programs of Iraq, Iran, Libya and North Korea have been a top priority for U.S security officials, but U.S intelligence agencies have successively missed key information about weapons development in the countries, the newspaper said. Bush administrations officials have been startled themselves, as the nuclear weapons programs of North Korea, Iran and Libya have been disclosed over the last few years, the Post reported. The Bush administration intends to include North Koreas weapons of mass destruction in its investigation, because it has judged that it needs to deal with suspicions over information about the Norths WMD program, as Pyongyang and Beijing have denied the existence of the Norths nuclear weapons development program, which is said to use enriched uranium. President Bush is expected to issue an executive order to constitute the commission and to announce the list of members this weekend. Former national security adviser Brent Scowcroft, former Democratic senator Bob Kerrey and former CIA director William Webster are being considered for seats on the commission, U.S. news agencies said. ***************************************************************** 19 BBC: N Korea nuclear talks date set Last Updated: Tuesday, 3 February, 2004 [North Korean spent nuclear fuel rods in Yongbyon] North Korea will discuss its nuclear programme North Korea has agreed to new six-way talks on its nuclear weapons programme, according to its state media. Discussions will begin on 25 February, involving the United States, North Korea and other major parties, KCNA news agency reported. China confirmed the date, but cautioned that resolving the nuclear stand-off would be a slow process. Talks involving the US, China, Japan, Russia and North and South Korea last August ended inconclusively. The crisis erupted in October, 2002, when US officials said North Korea admitted having an illicit nuclear weapons programme. 'Dangerous and unstable' A statement from KCNA said: "The DPRK [North Korea] and the US, the major parties concerned to the six-way talks, and China, the host country, agreed to resume the next round of the six-way talks from February 25 after having a series of discussions." China - North Korea's closest ally - has been leading diplomatic efforts to get talks started again for months. "It is an important step in peacefully resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis," said foreign ministry spokeswoman Zhang Qiyue. "Of course we all know the North Korean issue is a complicated issue. It cannot be resolved through one or two meetings," she said. On Monday, US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage said the deadlock over the nuclear crisis was a "dangerous and unstable situation". North Korea has demanded economic assistance and guarantees from the US that it will not launch an attack, but the US has insisted North Korea commit to dismantling its nuclear weapons programme first. The BBC's Jonathan Head says that once the next round of talks gets under way, negotiations are likely to focus on a detailed timetable for the concessions made by each side. Nuclear 'evidence' Last month, North Korea said it had shown its "nuclear deterrent" to an unofficial delegation from the United States. The US team confirmed they had seen the secret nuclear complex that Washington believes is being used to develop nuclear weapons. They were the first group from outside North Korea to visit the Yongbyon facility since the North expelled UN inspectors at the end of 2002. In 1994, North Korea agreed to halt activities at Yongbyon, 90 kilometres (50 miles) north of the capital, Pyongyang, under a deal with the United States. But after that agreement broke down in late 2002, North Korea claimed to have finished reprocessing 8,000 spent fuel rods being stored at Yongbyon - enough to help it build up to six more nuclear weapons. The US has also said Pyongyang admitted to harbouring a separate, enriched uranium programme. Our correspondent says given the extent of mistrust between the two sides, any negotiations may move very slowly. ***************************************************************** 20 Washington Post: North Korea Agrees to New Talks on Nuclear Program (washingtonpost.com) By Anthony Faiola Washington Post Foreign Service Tuesday, February 3, 2004; Page A15 TOKYO, Feb. 3 -- North Korea agreed early Tuesday to a new round of six-nation talks later this month aimed at resolving a standoff over its nuclear program, according to the Pyongyang government's official news services. North Korea, the United States and China recently "held several rounds of consultations and agreed to hold six-nation talks beginning February 25," according to the KCNA news agency and Radio Pyongyang. The South Korean Foreign Ministry confirmed the report. The agreement comes six months after the first round of negotiations in Beijing among the United States, North Korea, South Korea, China, Japan and Russia. Those talks broke up without any significant progress being made. Tuesday's announcement also follows a recent flurry of diplomatic activity aimed at starting new talks with the North. James Kelly, the U.S. assistant secretary of state, met with South Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki Moon in Seoul on Monday and was scheduled to arrive in Tokyo on Tuesday to discuss the North Korea issue. South Korea's official news service said the meeting later this month, like the first round of negotiations, would be held in China. It was not clear how long the talks would last, but the August round lasted three days. Analysts say expectations for a new round of talks are higher than in the past. Pyongyang has appeared ready to offer a freeze of its professed nuclear program in exchange for key demands, including economic assistance and a resumption of oil shipments. Washington has previously insisted that the North first agree to completely dismantle its nuclear program in a irreversible and verifiable manner. Before the North Korean announcement of new talks, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell expressed optimism about the possibility for advancing negotiations with Pyongyang. In an interview with Washington Post reporters and editors on Monday, he said he did not want any future meeting "to be another exchange of talking points." Powell added that the process had been slowed because North Korea appeared to have certain expectations about the visit last month by an unofficial delegation to its nuclear facility at Yongbyon. The North Koreans displayed what they described as reprocessed plutonium. "The message they should have gotten back was that 'Fine, you showed these two groups what you showed them. You didn't add -- it seemed to us anyway -- to the body of information known about your activities. Now let's get on with it and let's find a diplomatic solution.' " The current nuclear standoff between North Korea and the United States began in 2002 when the United States accused the communist government of secretly trying to enrich uranium, and the government surprised U.S. officials by admitting it in private talks. Since then, however, the Pyongyang government has insistently denied it ever acknowledged to U.S. representatives that it tried to enrich uranium for weapons use. Staff writer Glenn Kessler in Washington contributed to this report. 2004 The Washington Post Company ***************************************************************** 21 Xinhuanet: Chronology of key events in nuke issue on Korean Peninsula www.xinhuanet.com www.chinaview.cn 2004-02-03 18:37:35 BEIJING, Feb. 3 (Xinhuanet) -- The second round of the six-party talks on nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula will open in Beijing on Feb. 25, it was announced by the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) on Tuesday. The following is a chronology of key events in the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula since 1991. 1991: Dec. 31 -- The DPRK and South Korea sign a joint declaration on denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. 1992: Jan. 30 -- The DPRK and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) sign comprehensive safeguards agreement in Vienna. Feb. 19 -- In the sixth round of inter-Korean talks, the prime ministers of the DPRK and South Korea respectively read out an agreement on reconciliation, non-aggression, exchanges and cooperation, and a joint declaration on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The two documents were approved by DPRK leader Kim Il Sung and South Korean President Roh Tae-woo. 1993: March 12 -- The DPRK announces that it would withdraw from the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in three months, citing the continuance by South Korea and the United States of their "Team Spirit" joint military maneuvers and the IAEA's demand that the DPRK's military facilities be subject to inspection. The DPRK joined the NPT in late 1985. June 2-11 -- The DPRK and the United States hold formal talks for the first time in New York. In a joint statement issued at the end of the fourth round of talks, the two sides agree on assurances against the threat and use of force, including nuclear weapons, on peace and security in a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula, including impartial application of full-scope safeguards, mutual respect for each other's sovereignty, and non-interference in each other's internal affairs, and on support for the peaceful reunification on the Korean Peninsula. The DPRK announces the suspension of its withdrawal from the NPT. July 14-19 -- The DPRK and the United States hold their second formal talks in Geneva. The DPRK agrees to have dialogues with the IAEA as soon as possible and the United States says it would help the DPRK reconstruct its nuclear reactors. 1994: July 8-Aug. 12 -- The DPRK and the United States hold their third formal talks in Geneva. In a joint statement the DPRK agrees to replace the existing graphite-moderated nuclear reactors with light-water reactors. The United States promises to provide a light-water reactor and alternative energy to the DPRK. Oct. 21 -- The DPRK and the United States sign Framework Agreement in Geneva. Under the accord, the DPRK agrees to freeze its existing nuclear program in exchange for the construction of one 2,000-megawatt light-water reactor or two 1,000-megawatt ones by the United States within 10 years. Before the completion of the light-water project, the United States and other countries would provide heavy oil to the DPRK for energy compensation. Copyright 2003 Xinhua News Agency. All rights reserved. ***************************************************************** 22 USA Wants To Test Nuke Weapons Again Date: Wed, 4 Feb 2004 02:48:44 -0500 ----- Original Message ----- From: "FoE Sydney - Nuclear Campaign" To: