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NUCLEAR POLICY
1 Deseret news: Cheney avoids queries on Iraq WMDs
2 Las Vegas SUN: A Look at Tuesday's Developments in Iraq
3 Guardian Unlimited: Iraqi who gave MI6 45-minute claim says it was u
4 US: NYT: Mr. Cheney, Meet Mr. Kay
5 Times Herald: Failed weapons search belies Bush credibility -
6 Iraq inspectors should continue their work, Bush administration say
7 Mercury News: Bush evades Iraq WMD question, defends going to war
8 The Herald: Pressure mounting over WMD doubt
9 UK Independent: No humanitarian case for Iraq war, says rights group
10 Washington Dispatch - Opinion: Of WMD And Saddam Hussein
11 FT: Cheney backs away from Iraq WMD claim
12 FT: Cheney 'waged war' on Blair Iraq strategy
13 AU ABC: Howard defiant over Iraq war involvement.
14 asahi.com : EDITORIAL: Was threat an illusion?
15 US: FR: DOC: Trade war with France over Enriched Uranium
16 US: Capital Times Opinion: Editorial: The deceiving of the Union
17 US: Capitol Hill Blue: What Went Wrong?
18 Bennington Banner - Editorials: Bush ushers in era of 'not my fault'
19 US: SF Chronicle: To tell the truth
20 US: Heritage Foundation: Dealing with Dirty Bombs: Plain Facts, Prac
21 Guardian Unlimited: Leak against this war (D Ellberg)
22 US: CS Monitor: Nukes: Can US practice what it preaches?
23 Las Vegas SUN: Libya Nuclear Components Arrive in U.S.
24 Las Vegas SUN: Top Pakistan Nuke Scientist Investigated
25 AU SMH: Powell lets fly with criticism of Russia -
26 Washington Post: Hope on N. Korea
27 Daily Times: FO says Pakistan will remain nuclear
28 english.eastday: China applies to join Nuclear Suppliers Group
29 Boston.com: In Moscow, Powell airs concerns, hails progress
30 Guardian Unlimited: The US is now in the hands of a group of
31 asahi.com : EDITORIAL: 25 years after the shah
32 Las Vegas SUN: Pakistan and India to Start Peace Talks
NUCLEAR REACTORS
33 US: NRC: NRC to Hold Public Meeting on Environmental Review for Prop
34 US: NRC: NRC Modifies Financial Information Requirements for Power R
35 US: NRC: Sunshine Notice
36 US: JS Online: Point Beach official replaced
37 US: NRC: Notice of Finding of No Significant Impact and Availability
38 US: NRC: Notice of Finding of No Significant Impact and Availability
39 US: NRC: Notice of Availability of Environmental Assessment and Find
40 US: York Daily Record NRC: Emergency office planned -
41 SOFIA: Business in Bulgaria Votes "Yes" to Future EU Entry
NUCLEAR SAFETY
42 [du-list] Gulf Veteran: Terry Walkers New Book now out!!
43 [du-list] UK Parliamentry questions on DU
44 US: [du-list] [Fwd: ARDEN HILLS: City seeks assurances that
45 US: STLtoday: Bill seeks payments for nuclear workers
46 US: Cibola County Beacon: Filibuster stalls radiation exposure compe
NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE
47 Las Vegas SUN: Minnesota delegation hears Nevada opposition to nuke
48 US: WIEB: HL Waste meeting 1-29-04
49 US: Salt Lake Tribune: Fight to keep N-dump at bay has support
50 Las Vegas RJ: Minnesota legislators' reaction to Yucca Mountain plan
51 Las Vegas SUN: Minnesota lawmakers have Yucca concerns
52 US: EnergyPulse: Nuclear Waste Perspectives (Pro-nuke)
53 Re: Yucca Mountain high-level waste repository
54 KBVC: Utility Companies File Lawsuits to Hurry Yucca Project
55 US: KRNV: Nuclear utilities face deadline for radioactive waste laws
56 US: CBS 2: Some Concerns About Nuclear Storage Plan
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
US DEPT. OF ENERGY
57 Guards Cheating At US Nuke Weapons Storehouses During Anti-Terror Dr
58 DOE: Privacy Act of 1974; Notice To Amend An Existing System of
59 DOE: Decision To Compete Management and Operating Contracts for Los
60 Tri-City Herald: Letter asks for cleanup solution
61 Tri-City Herald: Cleanup contract division sought
62 Knox News: Tennessee delegation touts Y-12 role
63 KIFI: DOE Cites Bechtel BWXT Idaho for Falling Containers
64 Hawk Eye: Senator awaits DOE reply
65 Hawk Eye: DOE doesn÷t deliver papers
66 Hawk Eye: Grassley wants Iowan named to board
67 PISJ: DOE slaps Bechtel with $41,250 penalty
68 Tri-Valley Herald: Seeking a piece of the nuclear pie
69 Oak Ridger: BNFL tackles removal of three storage tanks
70 Oak Ridger: Y-12 security test blasted in DOE report
71 Oak Ridger: Dick Smyser: Uranium and hydrogen in ETEC's future;
72 Oak Ridger: Official ponders fate of UT-Battelle's contract to manag
73 GEM: Energy to open more nuclear lab contracts to competition
OTHER NUCLEAR
74 [du-list] DU in the news 28th Jan 04
75 Google News Alert - nuclear
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1 Deseret news: Cheney avoids queries on Iraq WMDs
[deseretnews.com]
Tuesday, January 27, 2004
In Italy, he urges nations to fight rise of such weapons
By Deb Riechmann Associated Press
ROME — Vice President Dick Cheney,
pushing his effort to persuade Europe to stand with the United
States against the spread of weapons of mass destruction, steered
clear on Monday of questions back home about whether Iraq had
such weapons before the U.S.-led invasion.
Vice President Dick Cheney and his wife, Lynne, pay their
respects at the grave of U.S. 2nd Lt. Donovan Astle at the
Sicily-Rome American Cemetery and Memorial near Rome on Monday.
Corrado Giambalvo, Associated Press
In a speech at the Senate Library in the heart of Rome,
Cheney beseeched free nations to fight proliferation of nuclear,
biological and chemical weapons and tried to allay fears of
Europeans who worry about a dominant U.S. role in the world.
"Working cooperatively against the dangers of a new era
will place demands on us all," Cheney said.
"Using military power, when no alternative remains, will
always be the most difficult decision that leaders can take. Yet
all of these great responsibilities are central to our future
success as free nations."
In his appeal for strong trans-Atlantic relations, Cheney
did not mention recent statements by David Kay, the outgoing
chief U.S. weapons inspector in Iraq, who has said that he does
not believe that deposed President Saddam Hussein had weapons of
mass destruction when war began.
The U.S. insistence that he secretly hoarded them was a
major reason President Bush ordered the attack last March, from
which many European leaders — but not Italian Premier Silvio
Berlusconi — strongly dissented.
During the past few days, Secretary of State Colin Powell
has held out the possibility that the weapons weren't there.
Cheney didn't answer a reporter's question Monday about whether
the prewar intelligence was faulty. A senior administration
official on the trip repeated what Cheney told a National Public
Radio reporter last week, that the "jury is still out" on
whether the intelligence accurately reflected what kind of
weapons were in Iraq.
Democratic candidates for president, meanwhile, say Kay's
comments reinforce claims the Bush administration exaggerated
the threat to the United States from Iraq.
"In all of our actions, the world's democracies must send
an unmistakable message: that the pursuit of weapons of mass
destruction only invites isolation and carries with it great
costs," Cheney said in his speech. "Leaders who abandon the
pursuit of those weapons will find an open path to far better
relations with governments around the world."
Countering beliefs, mainly by France and Russia, that
U.S. power should be countered by alliances such as the European
Union, Cheney said: "Our choice is not between a unipolar world
and a multipolar world. Our choice is for a just, free and
democratic world."
"Unipolar" has become code for overwhelming U.S. power.
Cheney spent all day working to boost Italy's standing in
the European community. He thanked it for helping in the war
against terrorism and in Iraq, despite widespread public
opposition to the Iraq war. Italy did not send combat troops,
but after Baghdad fell, about 3,000 Italian troops, law
enforcement officers and others were dispatched to help rebuild
the nation. A suicide bomber at their barracks killed 19
Italians in November.
On a rainy Monday evening, Cheney sealed the Bush
administration's friendship with Berlusconi with a handshake at
a palace used by the Italian Foreign Ministry. The two exchanged
pleasantries, Cheney calling Berlusconi a "close friend and a
source of wise counsel," and Berlusconi noting that Italy was
the only other country besides Switzerland that Cheney visited
during his five-day trip to Europe.
In the afternoon, before the rain began, Cheney visited
the Sicily-Rome American Cemetery and Memorial, about 30 miles
south of Rome. There he recognized the 60th anniversary of
Allied landings at Nettuno and Anzio on Jan. 22, 1944 — surprise
attacks that helped pave the way for the liberation of Rome.
About 7,860 American soldiers are buried at the cemetery, some
in unmarked graves.
Cheney visited three burial sites at the cemetery where
tall Roman pines overlook rows of graves marked by white marble
crosses, then laid a wreath at a statue honoring the fallen. The
three graves were those of 2nd Lt. Sara Vance, from West
Virginia, who died Oct. 22, 1944; 1st Lt. Robert T. Waugh, from
Maine, who died May 19, 1944; and 2nd Lt. Donovan A. Astle, from
Wyoming, who died Sept. 3, 1943.
In greeting Cheney there, the president of the Italian
Chamber of Deputies, Pier Ferdinando Casini, said, "When we say
in Italy, in Europe, there is no room for anti-Americanism,
that's our way of saying thank you."
© 2004 Deseret News Publishing Company
*****************************************************************
2 Las Vegas SUN: A Look at Tuesday's Developments in Iraq
Today: January 27, 2004 at 12:20:14 PST
By The Associated Press ASSOCIATED PRESS
A look at Tuesday's major developments in Iraq:
- A roadside bombing west of Baghdad killed three American
soldiers from the 82nd Airborne Division, and wounded one
American soldier. Two Iraqis also died.
- U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan said in Paris he was ready
to send a team to Iraq to assess prospects for early elections
once the U.S.-led coalition can guarantee security.
- President Bush defended his decision to go to war despite
chief inspector David Kay's conclusion that Saddam Hussein did
not have weapons of mass destruction, as the United States had
believed. Bush said he had "great confidence" in the
intelligence community, which had provided prewar estimates
about Saddam's arsenal. But Bush refrained from saying weapons
of mass destruction would be discovered eventually. Bush had
cited Saddam's alleged weapons as justification for the war.
- Two Iraqi men working for CNN riding in a two-car convoy were
shot and killed by unidentified assailants outside Baghdad. A
CNN cameraman in the second car was grazed in the head by a
bullet, while correspondent Michael Holmes and three other
people were unhurt.
- U.S. forces discovered a car rigged with explosives in a
parking lot near the offices of the U.S.-appointed Iraqi
Governing Council in Baghdad.
- U.S. soldiers killed three members of a suspected guerrilla
cell linked to the former Baathist regime during raids in Beiji,
a town north of Saddam Hussein's hometown of Tikrit. The cell,
Muhammad's Army, has been linked to attacks against coalition
forces.
- The Kurdish government in northern Iraq's Irbil province
threatened to close down the office of a Turkish-led
peacekeeping force if Ankara did not withdraw. Turkey sent the
force during the last decade to patrol a line separating rival
Kurdish groups.
--
*****************************************************************
3 Guardian Unlimited: Iraqi who gave MI6 45-minute claim says it was untrue
David Leigh and Richard Norton-Taylor
Tuesday January 27, 2004
The Guardian
The government's dogged insistence that Saddam Hussein was able
to deploy weapons of mass destruction within 45 minutes of the
order being given suffered two serious blows yesterday as
ministers braced themselves for the findings of the Hutton
inquiry.
As the foreign secretary, Jack Straw, was once again forced to
defend the justification for going to war, the Iraqi exile group
in London which claims to have supplied MI6 with the intelligence
about Saddam's 45-minute capability admitted that the information
might have been completely untrue.
Nick Theros, the Washington representative of Iyad Allawi, who
headed the Iraqi National Accord in exile, said it was raw
intelligence from a single source, part of a large amount of
information passed on by the INA to MI6.
He told the Guardian: "We were passing it on in good faith. It
was for the intelligence services to verify it."
The admission came as David Kay, who resigned as the coalition's
chief weapons inspector in Iraq on Friday, accused the
intelligence agencies of failing to detect that Saddam's weapons
programme was in disarray as a result of corruption and
increasingly erratic leadership.
Mr Straw admitted that it was "disappointing" that the inspectors
had not found evidence of the weapons, but said the war with Iraq
was more justified today than it had been when MPs voted for the
invasion.
"We were never saying that Saddam Hussein posed an imminent
threat to the United Kingdom... The serious and current threat
[was] to the world, and that was absolutely true, and I remain
convinced it was," he told the BBC Radio 4 programme Today.
The claim that Saddam could deploy chemical or biological weapons
within 45 minutes was highlighted by Tony Blair's preface to the
dossier issued by the government in September 2002 in the run-up
to the war.
It was also at the heart of the row between Downing Street and
the BBC after doubt was cast on its accuracy by the government
weapons scientist David Kelly.
But Mr Theros said the information now seemed to be a "crock of
shit". "Clearly we have not found WMD," he said.
Mr Theros works with his father, a former US ambassador, to
promote the political affairs of Mr Allawi, who is now a member
of the Iraqi governing council in Baghdad.
He said the Iraqi officer who claims to have been the original
source of the intelligence had in fact never seen the purported
chemical weapons crates upon which his 45-minute claim was based.
The former INA spy, who calls himself Lieutenant Colonel
al-Dabbagh, although this is not his full name, is now said to be
"in hiding".
At the time, he says, he commanded a frontline unit.
He told the Sunday Telegraph and NBC television that before the
September 2002 dossier was published he smuggled out sketchy
intelligence about WMD to MI6 via a general in Baghdad working
for the INA.
He said one of Saddam's senior officials told a meeting of air
defence commanders "probably sometime in the spring" that an
arsenal of unspecified secret weapons would be used for
battlefield defence against US invaders.
"They told us that [coalition troops] cannot pass across Iraq
because we will use everything from the knife to nuclear weapons
to defend ourselves."
The colonel says his unit later took delivery of an unspecified
number of crates which appeared to contain short-range weapons,
such as rocket-propelled grenades.
They were supposedly to be fired from civilian jeeps as a
last-ditch defence by Saddam loyalists wearing gas masks.
Sir Richard Dearlove, head of MI6, did not deny in evidence to
the Hutton inquiry that the intelligence for the 45-minute WMD
claim came second-hand from a single source who was a senior
Iraqi army officer.
Further damage to Downing Street's case for going to war came
from Dr Kay, who said yesterday that the CIA and other
intelligence agencies had failed to recognise that Iraq had all
but abandoned its efforts to produce large quantities of chemical
or biological weapons after the first Gulf war.
He told the New York Times that his team discovered that Iraq had
plunged into what he called a "vortex of corruption" around 1997
and 1998.
Iraqi scientists realised that they could go to Saddam and
present plans for weapons programmes and receive large amounts of
money, without making good their promises.
[UP]
Guardian Newspapers Limited
*****************************************************************
4 NYT: Mr. Cheney, Meet Mr. Kay
Published: January 27, 2004
[V] ice President Dick Cheney continued to insist last week that
Iraq had been trying to make weapons of mass destruction,
apparently oblivious to the findings of the administration's own
chief weapons inspector that Iraq had possessed only rudimentary
capabilities and unrealized intentions. The vice president's
myopia suggests a breathtaking unwillingness to accept a reality
that conflicts with the administration's preconceived notions.
This kind of rigid thinking helped propel us into an invasion
without broad international support and, if Mr. Cheney is as
influential as many say, could propel us into further
misadventures down the road.
Mr. Cheney has long been the administration's most alarmist
proponent of the view that Saddam Hussein had chemical and
biological weapons ready for use at any time and an active
nuclear program. He gave little ground in an interview on
National Public Radio on Thursday. He described two flatbed
trailers found in Iraq months ago as mobile biological weapons
labs and claimed they were "conclusive evidence" of Iraqi
programs to make weapons of mass destruction. The very next day,
David Kay, who had just stepped down as the top weapons
inspector, told Reuters that he now thought the much-feared
stockpiles of biological and chemical weapons had not existed on
the eve of the war. They were eliminated in the mid-1990's by
United Nations inspectors and by Iraq's own decisions, he said,
and no significant efforts to make new ones followed.
As for those trailers cited by Mr. Cheney, the consensus view,
Mr. Kay told The Times, is that they were intended to produce
hydrogen or perhaps rocket fuel, not biological weapons. Mr. Kay
had earlier called the trailer assertions an embarrassing
fiasco. So, too, with Iraq's nuclear weapons program. Mr. Cheney
once famously declared that it had been reconstituted, but Mr.
Kay called it rudimentary — hardly capable of producing a bomb
in a year or two, as the administration had implied.
Although administration officials cling to the hope of finding
some evidence of terror weapons in a cubbyhole somewhere in
Iraq, surely it is time to focus on how the intelligence could
have been so wrong and perhaps avoid making the same mistakes
with the next secretive dictator to come along. Mr. Kay largely
exonerates President Bush and blames the global intelligence
community. He believes the C.I.A. became so reliant on the
much-maligned United Nations weapons inspectors that their
withdrawal left it without spies of its own.
Mr. Kay also believes that intelligence analysts failed to
realize that Mr. Hussein became increasingly isolated and
fantasy-driven in the late 1990's, a condition that enabled
scientists to hoodwink him into approving fanciful weapons plans
that turned into corrupt moneymaking schemes. That seems hard to
believe in a land where people supposedly lived in terror of a
brutal dictator. But if it is true that Mr. Hussein wrote novels
while the American-led force geared up for war, then perhaps
both sides of this conflict were divorced from reality.
Copyright 2004 The New York Times Company | Home|
*****************************************************************
5 Times Herald: Failed weapons search belies Bush credibility -
thetimesherald.com
Opinion - Tuesday, January 27, 2004
Nine-month operation comes up empty
EDITORIAL
KEY TOPIC: Government
Amid the spectacle of Election 2004, the war in Iraq curiously
receded from the public spotlight. President Bush touched on it
briefly in his State of the Union address last week, and the
stunning Iowa Democratic caucus defeat of outspoken war critic
Howard Dean appeared to usher the war issue even further to the
sidelines.
Nevertheless, the president's justification for invading Iraq has
taken another blow. David Kay, the outgoing leader of a U.S.
weapons search team in Iraq, said he didn't believe large
quantities of chemical or biological weapons existed in that
nation.
Kay's remarks, which came after nine months of searching and at a
cost of at least $900 million, are not shocking. The failure of
the quest was obvious long ago. His admission, however, renews
the debate about the Iraq war's necessity.
More important, so does the reaction of Secretary of State Colin
Powell to Kay's comments. Powell conceded Sunday that prewar Iraq
may not have had weapons of mass destruction.
"The answer to that question is we don't know yet," he said in
response to Kay's statement.
Ironically, the secretary of state's words came nearly a year
after his address to the United Nations and provided
spy-satellite photos he said showed Iraq was in violation of a
U.N weapons ban imposed after the first Gulf War.
Kay's conclusion and Powell's retreat mark a troubling milestone
in the U.S. policy on Iraq. It follows Bush's now refuted 2003
State of the Union speech allegation that Iraqi leaders were
trying to acquire nuclear weapons-grade plutonium in Africa and
the still unproven link between the former Iraqi government and
the al-Qaida terrorist network.
The Bush administration appears to have adopted an election
strategy that de-emphasizes the war. Some pundits argue voters
care more about the economy.
American men and women of the U.S. military are defending
America's interests in Iraq. More than 500 have lost their lives
as a result.
The diminishing promise of a democratic Iraq and the attacks on
U.S.-led forces there offer constant reminders of the consequence
of America's intervention. The reasons for that attack -- the
weapons of mass destruction and the ties of Saddam Hussein's
regime to international terrorists -- remain unfounded. And the
call to war, so loud and compelling a year ago, rings more and
more hollow today.
Trust was an essential element. The Bush administration called on
the American people to trust in its belief that Iraq was a clear
and present danger. Revelations about the uncertainty of those
conclusions are difficult to downplay or dismiss.
Iraq may not be a key election issue at the moment. But
revelations such as these are bound to make it so.
Originally published Tuesday, January 27, 2004
Copyright ©2004 The Times Herald. All rights reserved
*****************************************************************
6 Iraq inspectors should continue their work, Bush administration says
[startribune.com]
Terence Hunt, Associated Press
Published January 27, 2004 WEAP27
WASHINGTON, D.C. -- The White House retreated Monday from its
once-confident claims that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction,
and Democrats swiftly sought to turn the about-face into an
election-year issue against President Bush.
The administration's switch came after retired chief U.S. weapons
inspector David Kay said he had concluded, after nine months of
searching, that Saddam Hussein did not have stockpiles of
forbidden weapons.
Asked about Kay's remarks, White House spokesman Scott McClellan
refused to repeat oft-stated assertions that prohibited weapons
eventually would be found.
McClellan said the inspectors should continue their work "so that
they can draw as complete a picture as possible. And then we can
learn -- it will help us learn the truth."
Kay, meanwhile, was called to appear at a public hearing of the
Senate Armed Services Committee on Wednesday and agreed to
attend, an aide said.
Sen. John Kerry, seeking the Democratic presidential nomination,
said Bush had misled the nation. "When the president of the
United States looks at you and tells you something, there should
be some trust," Kerry said while campaigning in New Hampshire.
"He's broken every one of those promises."
Howard Dean, another Democratic candidate, said, "The White House
has not been candid with the American people about virtually
anything with the Iraq war."
The U.S. war against terrorism is Bush's strongest suit against
Democrats, and his handling of Iraq has the approval of more than
half of Americans questioned in polls.
Senate Minority Leader Tom Daschle called for an investigation --
either by the Senate Intelligence Committee or an independent
commission -- into the "administration's role in the intelligence
failures leading up to the war with Iraq."
Vice President Dick Cheney, meeting in Rome with Italian Premier
Silvio Berlusconi, did not answer when a reporter asked whether
he thought pre-war intelligence was faulty. Cheney was one of the
administration's most forceful advocates of war and was outspoken
in describing Iraq's alleged threat.
A senior administration official on the Cheney trip said the
"jury is still out" on whether the intelligence accurately
reflected what kind of weapons were in Iraq.
"Obviously we want to compare the intelligence from before the
war with what the Iraq Survey Group learns on the ground,"
McClellan said.
Even before Kay announced his conclusion, Bush had changed his
public rationale about the war as the search for weapons proved
fruitless. He cast it as a broader war against terrorism, calling
Iraq the central front, and said democracy would spread in the
Middle East if it took hold in Iraq.
Asked by National Public Radio whether Bush owed the nation an
explanation for the discrepancies between his warnings and Kay's
findings, Kay said, "I actually think the intelligence community
owes the president, rather than the president owing the American
people."
In a weekend interview with the New York Times, Kay said U.S.
intelligence agencies failed to detect that Iraq's unconventional
weapons programs were in a state of disarray in recent years
under the increasingly erratic leadership of Saddam Hussein.
Kay said the CIA and other intelligence agencies did not realize
Iraqi scientists had sold ambitious but fanciful weapons programs
to Saddam and had then used the money for other purposes.
He also reported that Iraq attempted to revive its efforts to
develop nuclear weapons in 2001 and 2002, but never got as far
toward making a bomb as Iran and Libya.
Baghdad was actively working to produce a biological weapon using
the poison ricin until the U.S. invasion in March, Kay said.
But in general, the CIA and other agencies failed to recognize
that Iraq had all but abandoned its efforts to produce large
quantities of chemical or biological weapons after the Persian
Gulf War in 1991, he said.
Kay said the errors in pre-war intelligence assessments about
Iraq were so grave that he would recommend that the CIA and other
organizations overhaul their intelligence collection and
analytical efforts.
In response to Kay's comments, a U.S. intelligence official said
Sunday that, while some pre-war assessments may have been wrong,
"it is premature to say that the intelligence community's
judgments were completely wrong or largely wrong. There are still
a lot of answers we need."
The official added, however, that the CIA has launched an
internal review of its pre-war intelligence.
Using his team's interviews with Iraqi scientists, reviews of
Iraqi documents and examinations of facilities and other
materials, Kay said the United States was also almost certainly
wrong in its pre-war belief that Iraq had any significant
stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction.
The New York Times contributed to this report. Return to top©
Copyright 2004 Star Tribune. All rights reserved.
*****************************************************************
7 Mercury News: Bush evades Iraq WMD question, defends going to war
Iraq: The Aftermath
[mercurynews.com - The mercurynews home page]
Tuesday, Jan 27, 2004
By RON HUTCHESON Knight Ridder Newspapers
WASHINGTON - President Bush on Tuesday backed away from claims
that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, but he said he has
"great confidence" in U.S. intelligence agencies.
Breaking a four-day silence on the issue, Bush declined to answer
directly when asked if he still believes that U.S. troops will
find chemical, biological or nuclear weapons in Iraq. Instead, he
defended his decision to go to war, saying that Iraqi leader
Saddam Hussein was "a gathering threat to America and others."
After nearly nine months of searching, weapons inspector David
Kay said last week he's convinced Saddam didn't have stockpiles
of unconventional weapons or any significant program to build
them. Kay's findings undercut one of Bush's primary
justifications for ordering the U.S. invasion.
"There is no doubt in my mind that Saddam Hussein was a gathering
threat to America and others. That's what we know," Bush said
when given a chance to stand by his previous warnings. "There is
no doubt in my mind that the world is a better place without
Saddam Hussein."
Kay's conclusions have reignited the debate over the need for war
and the value of U.S. intelligence. Some of Bush's supporters
contend that he was the victim of bad intelligence. Critics
contend that he and his top war advisers deliberately distorted
intelligence information to build public support for war.
Democrats demanded an investigation.
"We need to find out what happened, why it happened, what went
wrong," said Senate Democratic Leader Tom Daschle of South
Dakota. "We have committed lives, we've committed resources and
we've made decisions based on the intelligence provided to us. We
need to know now how can we have greater confidence in the
future."
Bush indicated he would withhold judgment until weapons
inspectors complete their work in Iraq. Kay, who delivered his
resignation with his conclusion on Friday, was replaced by
Charles Duelfer, a former United Nations weapons inspector.
"First of all, I've got great confidence in our intelligence
community," Bush said. "These are unbelievably hardworking,
dedicated people who are doing a great job for America."
Bush offered his reaction to Kay's findings a day after Secretary
of State Colin Powell acknowledged the possibility that
administration officials were wrong. Powell, who told the United
Nations last year that Saddam "has chemical weapons," said he now
considers Iraq's arsenal "an open question."
Kay rejected suggestions that the Bush White House pressured U.S.
intelligence agencies to exaggerate the case against Iraq.
"Not only did the U.S. administration and U.S. intelligence, but
the French, British, Germans, the U.N. - all thought that Saddam
had weapons of mass destruction," he told NBC. "We clearly need a
renovation of our ability to collect intelligence."
Although the threat from Iraq's arsenal wasn't the only reason
Bush and his advisers offered for war, it was the argument with
the most emotional impact. Bush repeatedly raised the specter of
a devastating attack in last year's State of the Union speech.
"Year after year, Saddam Hussein has gone to elaborate lengths,
spent enormous sums, taken great risks to build and keep weapons
of mass destruction," he said. "It would take one vial, one
canister, one crate slipped into this country to bring a day of
horror like none we have ever known."
Vice President Dick Cheney was even more definitive.
"Simply stated, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has
weapons of mass destruction," he told an audience of military
veterans in August 2002. "There is no doubt that he is amassing
them to use them against our friends, against our allies and
against us."
Last May, Bush asserted that invading U.S. troops had found proof
of biological weapons in the form of two trailers that seemed to
serve as mobile laboratories.
"We found the weapons of mass destruction. We found biological
laboratories," he said in an interview with Polish television.
After examining the labs, Kay concluded that they were intended
for peaceful use.
Although Kay said he's convinced that administration officials
were wrong about Iraq's weapons programs, he said the U.S.
invasion was "absolutely prudent" because terrorists could have
exploited Iraq's past work on unconventional weapons.
"I think at the end of the inspection process, we'll paint a
picture of Iraq that was far more dangerous than even we thought
it was before the war," he said.
Even so, questions about the administration's case for war seem
certain to become an issue in the presidential campaign. Bush's
Democratic rivals say Kay's findings show that the president
misled Americans.
"There's a question of credibility," said Edward Walker,
president of the Middle East Institute and a former ambassador to
Israel, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates. "The credibility of
the administration has been stretched thin internationally."
British Prime Minister Tony Blair, a staunch ally in the war,
faces similar criticism in London. On Wednesday, Britons will get
their first look at the results of an inquiry into allegations
that Blair's government exaggerated the case for war.
The judicial inquiry was convened to examine the circumstances
that led to the suicide of David Kelly, a government employee who
told the BBC that Blair's top aides had "sexed up" the case
against Iraq. Kelly killed himself after he was identified as the
main source for the BBC story.
(Knight Ridder Newspapers correspondent William Douglas
contributed to this report.)
*****************************************************************
8 The Herald: Pressure mounting over WMD doubt
Web Issue 1928 January 26 2004
DEBORAH SUMMERS and MURRAY RITCHIE January 26 2004
PRESSURE was last night mounting on Tony Blair in the final
days before the release of the Hutton Report, as doubts grew
over the existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.
While the prime minister continued to insist intelligence
reports suggesting Saddam Hussein possessed WMD were "correct",
Colin Powell, the US secretary of state, admitted he did not
know whether illicit weapons would be found.
Lewis Moonie, a former defence minister who was part of Mr
Blair's team at the time of the conflict, said the government
may soon have to concede it was wrong on its main justification
for war.
Lord Hutton's report, due for publication on Wednesday, is not
expected to pass judgment on the issue of whether Iraq in fact
possessed WMD.
But the question is at the heart of his inquiry, sparked by the
death of Dr David Kelly. The government weapons expert committed
suicide after being "outed" as the source of BBC reports that
the intelligence community thought the government had overplayed
the threat from Saddam.
However, in a bizarre twist, a close friend and confidante of
the scientist yesterday claimed Dr Kelly would not have taken
his own life.
Despite considerable forensic evidence to the contrary, Mai
Pederson, a translator in the US Air Force, insisted she did not
believe he would commit suicide.
"His job was dangerous. He knew it could cost him his life,"
she said. "He got death threats. Iraq didn't want him on the
team. We talked often about the threats. He said he would
probably be found dead in the woods because he always walked by
himself."
Ms Pederson admitted that she refused to allow police to
release her statement to Lord Hutton and she also declined to
testify directly to the inquiry.
A poll for ITV1's Jonathan Dimbleby programme yesterday
suggested that 59% of voters think Mr Blair should resign if
Lord Hutton finds he deliberately exaggerated the WMD danger in
his September 2002 dossier on Iraq.
However, reports yesterday revealed Mr Blair had not received a
letter from Lord Hutton warning him of potential criticism in
the report, suggesting he may escape direct condemnation. But
Charles Kennedy, the Liberal Democrat leader, said it seemed
increasingly likely that the British public had been "sold a
pup" by the government over WMD and that another inquiry would
be needed if Lord Hutton's report failed to settle the issue.
David Kay, the US head of the Iraq survey group, last week quit
the body tasked with locating Saddam's alleged WMD, saying he
did not believe there were stockpiles of chemical or biological
arms in Iraq.
Asked if he agreed, Mr Powell said: "The answer to that
question is, we don't know yet."
His admission came almost a year after his high-profile
presentation to the UN Security Council in the run-up to war, in
which he showed what he said was photographic and documentary
evidence of illegal programmes.
Mohamed ElBaradei, the head of the International Atomic Energy
Agency the UN's nuclear watchdog said intelligence
suggesting Saddam had WMD was obviously "faulty".
He added: "I don't doubt that they had on their desks
intelligence that showed that Iraq had weapons of mass
destruction, but obviously their intelligence was faulty. It is
a serious case, because there was a war based on the existence
of weapons of mass destruction and now we discover that those
weapons didn't exist."
Robin Cook, the former foreign secretary, told BBC Radio 4's
Broadcasting House that Mr Blair may be the last person in
Britain to believe WMD would be found.
Dr Moonie, who was sacked from the MoD in June after the
conflict, told Scottish TV's Seven Days: "If it's the case that
the intelligence that we had was deficient, as is increasingly
looking likely … sooner or later we may well have to say: 'Yep,
the intelligence was faulty and the decisions we took were based
on the best evidence available and the best evidence available
wasn't good enough'."
Copyright © Newsquest (Herald & Times) Limited. All Rights
*****************************************************************
9 UK Independent: No humanitarian case for Iraq war, says rights group
By Kim Sengupta
27 January 2004
The United States and Britain had no justification for invading
Iraq either on the grounds of alleged threats from illicit
weapons and terrorism, or as a humanitarian mission, an
international civil rights group said yesterday.
The failure to find Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction
has left President George Bush and Tony Blair claiming that the
invasion was on humanitarian grounds, said a hard-hitting annual
report of Human Rights Watch. It said that the West had done
nothing when Saddam massacred Kurds and Shias in the past, and
there was no evidence of any continuing mass killings at the
start of the war in March 2003.
The report claimed that the US and British occupation forces had
"sidelined human rights... as a matter of secondary importance.
The rule of law has not arrived and Iraq is still beset by the
legacy of human rights abuses of the former government, as well
as new ones that have emerged under the occupation." The reasons
given for war by Mr Bush and Mr Blair - WMD and Saddam's alleged
links with international terrorism - hadnot been proved, said
Kenneth Roth, executive director of the organisation.
He pointed to recent statements by David Kay, the departing head
of the Iraq Survey Group, that WMD were unlikey to be
discovered, and said it was unlikely that the Hutton report into
the death of David Kelly would say anything different. The
document praised the American and British forces for striving to
minimise civilian casualties during the air campaign, and also
for being much more careful in the use of cluster bombs than in
previous conflicts. It condemned the Iraqi resistance for
indiscriminately bombing public areas.
The report maintained that it was "irrelevant" that the US had
"unclean hands" in its support for Saddam in the past, or that
there were other countries which suffered worse internal
repression. Neither were good enough arguments against military
intervention on proper humanitarian grounds.
However, Human Rights Watch said the US-British attack on Iraq
failed to qualify on a number of grounds normally used as a test
of justified humanitarian military action.
There were no mass killings going on; war was not the only
option - legal, economic and political measures could have been
taken; there was no evidence that humanitarian purpose was the
main one for launching the invasion; the attack did not have the
backing of the United Nations or any other multinational body,
and the situation in the country has not got better.
Mr Roth said: "The Bush administration cannot justify the war in
Iraq as a humanitarian intervention, and neither can Tony Blair
... such interventions should be reserved for stopping an
imminent or ongoing slaughter. They shouldn't be used to address
atrocities that were ignored in the past.
"Humanitarianism, even understood broadly as a concern for the
welfare of people, was at best a subsidiary motive for the
invasion of Iraq."
He said: "Over time, the principal justifications originally
given for the Iraq war lost much of their force. More than seven
months after the declared end of major hostilities, weapons of
mass destruction have not been found. No significant pre-war
link between Saddam Hussein and international terrorism has been
discovered. The difficulty of establishing stable institutions
in Iraq is making the country an increasingly unlikely staging
ground for promoting democracy in the Middle East."
Human Rights Watch criticises the US and Britain for not sending
in more troops after the invasion. This, says the report, might
have prevented the anarchy after the fall of Saddam's regime. Mr
Roth said the Pentagon had acted as if it believed that the
Iraqis would welcome the soldiers with open arms.
Human Rights Watch is a mainstream body with support across the
political spectrum. It does not have a policy of opposing
military action.
UK Independent Ltd.
*****************************************************************
10 Washington Dispatch - Opinion: Of WMD And Saddam Hussein
Exclusive commentary by Frank Salvato
Jan 27, 2004
"The intelligence community owes the president, rather than the
president owing the American people," an apology. Such were the
words expressing the thoughts of David Kay, former lead weapons
inspector for the Coalition Forces in Iraq, on the matter of no
huge stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) being found
within the Iraqi borders at this time (it should be pointed out
that he reserves the right not to conclude this as an absolute).
But we can be very certain those who did not share the
president’s assertion that Saddam Hussein’s regime was an
imminent danger will run with this one…oh will they run.
For a moment, let’s take a step back from the brink of divided
finger pointing and look at the situation in total. I know it
will be hard for the air-punching, fist waving, anti-war liberal
left to do so but if you can try to tune them out for just a bit
perhaps we can shed some light on a few things.
Ever since the Bush Administration came to grips with the fact
France, Germany and Russia were never going to condone having
their commerce with Iraq exploited it became clear the only
option left to the administration with regard to eliminating the
festering boil on the ass of US and world security, that boil
being Saddam Hussein, was a use of force. The Bush Administration
wasn’t the only administration to believe this boil was a threat
to US and world security. The Clinton, George H.W. Bush and
Reagan Administrations all championed the belief Saddam Hussein
was an imminent threat to the security of the US, the Middle East
and the world. To tally it up, the idea that Saddam Hussein had
to go was the doctrine of the United States government for over
20 years. While the air-punchers among us will contend that this
entire “mess” is the current Bush Administration’s “fault,”
history would prove otherwise through the actions of past
administrations.
As for “the right” to take the actions we did, I need go no
further than citing how many times Hussein’s forces fired on
coalition aircraft patrolling the “no-fly zones” during the Gulf
War cease-fire. These hostile acts were in direct violation of
the cease-fire agreement that suspended the Gulf War hostilities.
We have to remember, the Gulf War was never declared over;
instead a cease-fire was agreed to so Saddam Hussein’s regime
could disarm under the “watchful eye” of the UN. As we stood
poised to annihilate Hussein’s army and regime we stopped short
in an effort to save lives and gave Hussein a chance to save
face. But over 12 years and through a myriad of UN resolutions
warning there would be “severe consequences” should he not comply
with the elements of the cease-fire, Saddam Hussein employed
tactics of defiance in the face of annihilation, and obstruction
and deception in dealing with the United Nations.
This defiance, obstruction and deception, teamed with the hostile
acts against coalition aircraft nullified the cease-fire
agreement and effectively gave the United States and the
originally sanctioned Coalition Forces an undisputable green
light for the actions taken. No further resolutions were needed.
As I have contended from day one of this debate, these issues
alone were justification for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) but no
one wants to address these facts.
While Kay’s inspection teams never unearthed the towering pile of
WMD that would have satisfied critics of the war, unearthed was
the fact that Saddam Hussein’s regime was still actively pursuing
WMD. Kay stated his team found that Iraqi senior leadership "had
an intention to continue to pursue their WMD activities. That
they, in fact, had a large number of WMD-related activities," and
he offered the hypothesis that Iraqi scientists were "working on
developing weapons or weapons concepts that they had not moved
into actual production." This coupled with the uncovering of
banned equipment such as a centrifuge used to enrich uranium for
the purpose of weapons production (elements of this centrifuge
was found buried in Mahdi Obeidi’s backyard, she an Iraqi nuclear
scientist – how that can be construed as being open and honest
with weapons inspectors I will never know), testimony from
expatriated and captured Iraqi weapons scientists validating the
contention that WMD development was chief among Hussein’s desires
and banned weapons capabilities such as long-ranged missile
systems in violation of UN sanctions can only lead to the
conclusion that Saddam Hussein was throughout an imminent threat
to the safety and security of the region, the United States and
the world. Anyone who would contend otherwise could be
characterized as being naive.
The idea that UN weapons inspections were working can be viewed
as humorous. Not only couldn’t they find what Kay’s teams did,
they wandered the Iraqi desert amongst mass graves filled with
the victims of genocide and never had a clue. In the waning days
of Hussein’s regime banned missile systems were uncovered by the
UN inspectors. When questioned about these findings Hussein's
answer was that he had "forgotten about them." Now I put it to
you, if you had Hussein's totalitarian egotism would you "forget”
about the most sophisticated weaponry in your arsenal, weaponry
fully capable of carrying payloads that included bio-chemical and
nuclear elements? To believe he wasn't practicing deception and
obstructionism while trying to acquire the ultimate weaponry with
which to dominate his foes would be again amazingly naive.
While hindsight is 20/20, we must all keep in mind that an
overwhelming majority of legislators from both parties, including
John Kerry who is now trying to say he levied conditions, voted
to authorize the president to use force at his discretion based
upon the very same information President Bush was afforded! This
information came from not only our intelligence community but was
corroborated by intelligence agencies from all over the world. It
wasn't until later that questions about the British intelligence
arose; the validity of that information is still being argued to
this day. It could be argued successfully that all of the
legislators who are now pointing fingers at the president rather
than accepting their share of the culpability for accepting
corrupt information from our faulty intelligence community are
playing politics with the facts at hand. Of course these are the
same legislators who approve spending bills and then blame the
president for signing them saying that “he” is spending too much
money.
You ask, where are the WMD? That question may never be answered
although Kay alludes to information inferring they were moved in
the final days before OIF into Syria. But you can bet on one
thing, if the dissenters’ president, Bill Clinton, would have
taken military action and found laboratories and illegal
equipment, if he would have had Iraqi scientists attesting to the
existence of banned weapons programs, if he would have uncovered
the killing fields, rape rooms and torture chambers, Clinton
would have been labeled a hero. Instead, and only for political
gain, George W. Bush is being labeled a liar and a warmonger.
This, even though the same people using the same information
called for the same action at the same time.
Perhaps the liberals of this country can re-write history and
have it accepted by their followers...why I couldn't tell you.
But those who oppose killing fields, rape rooms and letting
madmen acquire world-ending weapons technology do not have that
luxury. Hussein is gone. The rape rooms are gone. The
laboratories have been closed. The killing fields are no more and
the world is a better and safer place because of it, no matter
what the spin machine of the political left offers up.
The evidence of an impending tragedy was too great to ignore. I
only wonder what the “ground zero” would have looked like had
Hussein been able to acquire the final pieces of his maniacal
puzzle. The thought of this horror could dwarf the tragedy at the
World Trade Center. I hope we never, ever see that kind of
nightmare become a reality.
Frank Salvato is a political media consultant, an editor for The
Washington Dispatch and the Managing Editor for . He has appeared
as a guest on The O’Reilly Factor, The Kevin Matthews Radio Show
(Chicago) and The Brad Messer Radio Show (San Antonio). His
pieces are occasionally featured in The Washington Times and The
London Morning Paper as well as other national and international
publications. He can be contacted by .
*****************************************************************
11 FT: Cheney backs away from Iraq WMD claim
By Stefan Wagstyl in Rome and Guy Dinmore in Washington
Published: January 27 2004 20:08 | Last Updated: January 27
2004 20:08
Dick Cheney, US vice-president, on Tuesday defended the US
decision to invade Iraq but, in a notable shift of emphasis, he
left open the question of whether Saddam Hussein had possessed
weapons of mass destruction - a claim he made repeatedly before
the war.
In his first public response to David Kay, who resigned last
Friday as the chief US arms inspector saying pre-war intelligence
was wrong, Mr Cheney said: "There's still work to be done to
ascertain exactly what's there, and I am not prepared to make a
final judgment until they have completed their work."
The vice-president had been one of the administration's most
vocal champions of the view that Iraq possessed chemical and
biological weapons. Shortly before the war he also claimed it had
"reconstituted" nuclear arms.
As voting began in the New Hampshire primary to choose the
Democratic candidate for November's presidential election, Mr
Cheney also rejected an assertion by John Kerry, front-runner in
the polls, that the administration had broken promises over the
war. "We used force only because all other options had failed,"
he said in an interview in Rome with European newspapers,
including the Financial Times.
During the interview, Mr Cheney highlighted comments by Mr Kay
which supported the case that the former Iraqi leader had sought
to develop prohibited weapons long after big stockpiles were
destroyed in the early 1990s.
He quoted Mr Kay as saying Iraq had continued "until the end" to
develop biological weapons, such as ricin, had maintained a
missile programme and had restarted its nuclear programme in
2000-1.
Meanwhile, in Washington President George W. Bush repeated his
assertion that Mr Hussein had been "a grave and gathering threat
to America and the world". Speaking to reporters during a meeting
with Aleksander Kwasniewski, the Polish president, Mr Bush
complimented Mr Kay but implicitly went against his findings by
defending the US intelligence services.
"Well, first of all, I have got great confidence in our
intelligence community," Mr Bush said while not directly
addressing the question of whether Iraq actually had prohibited
weapons.
On Tuesday, Mr Kay went further in seeking to justify the US case
for war despite his belief that Mr Hussein's programmes had
failed, in part because his scientists had cheated him. "I think,
at the end of the inspection process, we'll paint a picture of
Iraq that was far more dangerous than even we thought it was
before the war," he told NBC.
Mr Cheney repeated the conciliatory message he has delivered
during his trip to Europe, seeking international co-operation in
Iraqi reconstruction and war on terror. But he never wavered from
his insistence that the US had been right to fight the war.
© Copyright The Financial Times Ltd 2004. "FT" and
"Financial Times" are trademarks of the Financial Times. Privacy
*****************************************************************
12 FT: Cheney 'waged war' on Blair Iraq strategy
By James Blitz in London and Demetri Sevastopulo in Washington
Published: January 25 2004 21:59 | Last Updated: January 25
2004 21:59
Dick Cheney, US vice-president, "waged a guerrilla war" against
attempts by Tony Blair, the British prime minister, to secure
United Nations backing for the invasion of Iraq.
Mr Cheney remained implacably opposed to the strategy even after
George W. Bush, US president, addressed the UN on the importance
of a multilateralist approach, according to a new biography of Mr
Blair.
The US vice-president, along with the neo-conservatives in the
Bush administration, has consistently argued that the US could be
constrained by the UN's inability to reach agreement over the
need to invade Iraq.
He told the World Economic Forum in Davos at the weekend: "There
comes a time when deceit and defiance must be seen for what they
are. At that point, a gathering danger must be directly
confronted. At that point, we must show that beyond our
resolutions is actual resolve."
The extent of Mr Cheney's opposition emerges in the biography of
the British prime minister by Philip Stephens, the Financial
Times' political columnist.
In the run-up to the war, Mr Blair worked closely with Mr Bush to
try to secure prior UN backing.
But Mr Stephens writes that Mr Cheney's opposition to UN
involvement left Mr Blair uncertain whether Mr Bush would go down
the UN route until he uttered the relevant words in his speech to
the UN general assembly in September 2002. One Blair aide
remarked: "[Mr Cheney] waged a guerrilla war against the process
. . . He's a visceral unilateralist". Another agreed: "Cheney
fought it all the way - at every twist and turn, even after
Bush's speech to the UN."
In the US, Democrats have also accused Mr Cheney of putting
pressure on intelligence agencies to produce evidence Iraq had
weapons of mass destruction. On Friday, David Kay, the top US
weapons inspector in Iraq, resigned, saying he did not believe
Iraq had large stocks of biological and chemical weapons.
Mr Stephens' book reveals a string of acid interventions by Mr
Cheney during critical talks between the president and prime
minister at Camp David in September 2002. Once, he directly
rebuked Alastair Campbell, Mr Blair's communications director.
In occasional contacts with British officials, Scooter Libby, the
vice-president's chief of staff, made little secret of his boss's
scorn for multilateralism. He once jibed: "Oh dear, we'd better
not do that or we might upset the prime minister."
Mr Stephens also reveals that Mr Blair was concerned about
relations with other European leaders, particularly Jacques
Chirac, French president.
Mr Blair confided in close aides before the Iraq war that he
believed Mr Chirac was personally "out to get him" because he
feared the UK prime minister was usurping his own position as the
natural leader of Europe.
According to Mr Stephens, the prime minister came to the view
that Mr Chirac wanted to see him fall from power after receiving
intelligence reports about the French president's private
conversations.
© Copyright The Financial Times Ltd 2004. "FT" and
"Financial Times" are trademarks of the Financial Times. Privacy
*****************************************************************
13 AU ABC: Howard defiant over Iraq war involvement.
First Posted: Monday, January 26, 2004 . 3:00pm --> Last
PM John Howard stands by his decision to send troops to Iraq.
[File photo] (ABC TV) [ border=]
Howard defiant over Iraq war involvement
Prime Minister John Howard says he did the right thing in
sending Australian troops to Iraq last year, despite new claims
that the Gulf state did not have any so-called weapons of mass
destruction at the time.
Chief weapons inspector David Kay quit last week, saying he
believes Iraq probably got rid of its banned weapons some years
ago.
And United States' Secretary of State Colin Powell has now
conceded Saddam Hussein's regime may not have had any chemical
or biological weapons when it was attacked.
But Mr Howard says he has no regrets about his decision to go
to war.
"I don't apologise for what we did, it was in our view the
right thing to have done, based on the intelligence that was
available," he said.
"That intelligence was not manipulated by the Government and I
stand by completely what we did.
"Those who criticise us in the Labor Party or elsewhere ... if
their advice had been followed, Saddam Hussein would still be
running Iraq."
Earlier, Foreign Minister Alexander Downer said it was too
early to say whether Iraq had weapons of mass destruction when
Australia joined the US and Britain in attacking the Gulf state.
But Mr Downer said the hunt for weapons of mass destruction in
Iraq is continuing and until that is completed, no final
conclusions could be drawn.
"What we do know from the report that Dr Kay produced a few
months ago is that Saddam Hussein certainly continued with
chemical and biological weapons programs," he said.
"Whether we'll find any stockpiles or not just remains to be
seen."
But the Federal Opposition says it is now clear that Australia
went to war in Iraq on a false premise.
Opposition leader Mark Latham says the Australian public needs
to know the truth and Mr Howard should reveal it.
"Our Government should be open and honest with the Australian
people..." Mr Latham said.
"If you're going to send Australians off to a conflict and the
primary reason was to identify and eliminate these weapons of
mass destruction and then subsequently, that's an invalid reason
and purpose, then you've got to up front and honest - talk to
the Australian people about what went wrong."
Labor's foreign affairs spokesman, Kevin Rudd, has seized on Mr
Kay's resignation.
"For Mr Kay to come out and say quite plainly that in his view
these stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons simply did
not exist at the time Mr Howard took Australia to war against
Iraq fundamentally torpedoes the credibility of Mr Howard and Mr
Downer and Senator Hill in taking this country to war on the
argument they put to the Australian people at the time," Mr Rudd
said.
© 2004 Australian Broadcasting Corporation
*****************************************************************
14 asahi.com : EDITORIAL: Was threat an illusion?
Can we act even as the war's fairness is disputed?
The primary aim cited by the United States and Britain for the
military invasion of Iraq was to find and destroy caches of
weapons of mass destruction.
In the absence of an explicit resolution by the United Nations
Security Council, the two countries embarked on the Iraq war
anyway, reasoning that U.N. inspections would never detect such
threatening weapons.
After nine months as occupiers of Iraq, the United States and
Britain have found neither nuclear nor chemical and biological
weapons in the country. What they found, if it is worth
mentioning at all, were rusted artillery shells-thought to be
relics of the 1980s Iran-Iraq war during which chemical weapons
were used.
Was the threat an illusion? People all over the world suspect as
much, and comments by an official in the administration of
President George W. Bush appear to reveal his real feelings.
David Kay, former head of the Iraq Survey Group that searched for
weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, said he did not think there
were stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons at the start
of the war. He also said nuclear development in Iraq was in a
nascent stage.
Kay's remarks suggest that the Bush administration's argument
about the threat was wide of the mark.
U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, responding to questions
about Kay's comments, also admitted that whether Iraq actually
possessed weapons of mass destruction was an ``open question.''
Yet it was Powell who, back before the war began, showed the
Security Council satellite photos and wiretap records and talked
of Iraq's threat.
Both Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair contend that the
war can be justified for liberating Iraqis from dictatorship and
for nipping a future threat in the bud. Now we must turn our eyes
to reconstruction of Iraq, they say.
But the Charter of the United Nations, the foundation of
international order, recognizes a war only when it is fought
clearly in self-defense or when it is approved by the Security
Council. It is in the interest of neither the international
community nor the United States to justify a war after the fact
and obscure the reasons for going to war.
Whereas the U.S. government says it will continue to search for
weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, we think the possibility of
finding large quantities of weapons of mass destruction is very
small.
Why were the leaders of the United States and Britain misled by
wrong information and analysis? Were they so preoccupied with the
overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime since the 1991 Persian Gulf
War that finding caches of weapons of mass destruction became an
excuse to bring him down?
It is incumbent on the American and British governments to
thoroughly investigate the issue and explain themselves fully and
honestly to the international community.
If they do not do so, the disorder and division among countries
that emerged over the war will continue unhealed and unabated
during Iraq's postwar reconstruction. And the international
community's wariness and mistrust of the Bush strategy of
pre-emptive strikes will be intensified rather than eased.
This latest development must also pose a serious question to
Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi. Although the prime minister is
no longer parroting that ``weapons of mass destruction will be
found sooner or later,'' he still voices support for the war and
on Monday ordered the Ground Self-Defense Force's main
contingent to leave for occupied Iraq.
At a time when Americans are in an uproar over the justification
of this war, should Japan continue moving forward in a
single-minded belief that the war was justified, pretending to
be blind to the controversy in the United States?
--The Asahi Shimbun, Jan. 26(IHT/Asahi: January 27,2004) (01/27)
*****************************************************************
15 FR: DOC: Trade war with France over Enriched Uranium
FR Doc 04-1695
[Federal Register: January 27, 2004 (Volume 69, Number 17)]
[Notices] [Page 3883-3887] From the Federal Register Online via
GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr27ja04-35]
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE International Trade Administration
[A-427-818]
Notice of Preliminary Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative
Review: Low Enriched Uranium from France AGENCY: Import
Administration, International Trade Administration, Department of
Commerce. ACTION: Notice of Preliminary Results of Antidumping
Duty Administrative Review.
EFFECTIVE DATE: January 27, 2004.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Vicki Schepker or Carol
Henninger at (202) 482-1756 or (202) 482-3003, respectively;
AD/CVD Enforcement Office 5, Group II, Import Administration,
International Trade Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce,
14th Street & Constitution Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20230.
SUMMARY: The Department of Commerce is conducting an
administrative review of the antidumping duty order on low
enriched uranium from France for the period July 13, 2001 to
January 31, 2003 (the POR). We preliminarily determine that sales
of subject merchandise by Eurodif, S.A. (Eurodif), Compagnie
G[eacute]n[eacute]rale Des Mati[eacute]res Nucl[eacute]aires
(COGEMA) and COGEMA, Inc. (collectively, COGEMA/ Eurodif or the
respondent), have been made below normal value (NV). If these
preliminary results are adopted in our final results, we will
instruct U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to assess
antidumping duties on appropriate entries based on the difference
between the constructed export price (CEP) and the NV. Interested
parties are invited to comment on these preliminary results.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
On February 13, 2002, the Department issued an antidumping
duty order on low enriched uranium from France. See Notice of
Amended Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value and
Antidumping Duty Order: Low Enriched Uranium from France, 67 FR
6680 (February 13, 2002). On February 3, 2003, the Department
issued a notice of opportunity to request the first
administrative review of this order. See Antidumping or
Countervailing Duty Order, Finding, or Suspended Investigation;
Opportunity To Request Administrative Review, 68 FR 5272
(February 3, 2003). In accordance with 19 CFR 351.213(b), COGEMA/
Eurodif, a French producer of subject merchandise, requested an
administrative review of the antidumping duty order on low
enriched uranium from France on February 3, 2003. On February 28,
2003, United States Enrichment Corporation and USEC, Inc. (the
petitioner), a domestic producer of subject merchandise, also
requested an administrative review. On March 25, 2003, the
Department published a notice of initiation of the administrative
review, covering the period July 13, 2001, through January 31,
2003. See Initiation of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty
Administrative Reviews and Requests for Revocation in Part, 68 FR
14394 (March 25, 2003).
On April 4, 2003, the Department issued its antidumping
questionnaire to COGEMA/Eurodif. We received timely responses to
all sections of the initial antidumping questionnaire and
associated supplemental questionnaires. Based on a timely
allegation filed by the petitioner on June 20, 2003, we initiated
a major input investigation with regard to the respondent's
purchases of electricity from an affiliated party. On October 27,
2003, the Department published a notice extending the time limit
for the preliminary results. See Extension of the Time Limit for
the Preliminary Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative
Review, 68 FR 61184 (October 27, 2003). The time limit for the
preliminary results was subsequently further extended to January
20, 2004. See Extension of the Time Limit for the Preliminary
Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 68 FR 69994
(December 16, 2003). Scope of the Order
The product covered by this order is all low enriched uranium
(LEU). LEU is enriched uranium hexafluoride (UF[bds6]) with a
U[bdi2][bdi3][bdi5] product assay of less than 20 percent that
has not been converted into another chemical form, such as
UO[bds2], or fabricated into nuclear fuel assemblies, regardless
of the means by which the LEU is produced (including LEU produced
through the down- blending of highly enriched uranium).
Certain merchandise is outside the scope of this order.
Specifically, this order does not cover enriched uranium
hexafluoride with a U[bdi2][bdi3][bdi5] assay of 20 percent or
greater, also known as highly enriched uranium. In addition,
fabricated LEU is not covered by the scope of this order. For
purposes of this order, fabricated uranium is defined as enriched
uranium dioxide (UO[bds2]), whether or not contained in nuclear
fuel rods or assemblies. Natural uranium concentrates
(U[bds3]O[bds8]) with a U[bdi2][bdi3][bdi5] concentration of no
greater than 0.711 percent and natural uranium concentrates
converted into uranium hexafluoride with a U[bdi2][bdi3][bdi5]
concentration of no greater than 0.711 percent are not covered by
the scope of this order.
Also excluded from this order is LEU owned by a foreign
utility end-user and imported into the United States by or for
such end-user solely for purposes of conversion by a U.S.
fabricator into uranium dioxide (UO[bds2]) and/or
[[Page 3884]]
fabrication into fuel assemblies so long as the uranium dioxide
and/or fuel assemblies deemed to incorporate such imported LEU
(i) remain in the possession and control of the U.S. fabricator,
the foreign end- user, or their designed transporter(s) while in
U.S. customs territory, and (ii) are re-exported within eighteen
(18) months of entry of the LEU for consumption by the end-user
in a nuclear reactor outside the United States. Such entries must
be accompanied by the certifications of the importer and end
user.
The merchandise subject to this order is classified in the
Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS) at
subheading 2844.20.0020. Subject merchandise may also enter under
2844.20.0030, 2844.20.0050, and 2844.40.00. Although the HTSUS
subheadings are provided for convenience and customs purposes,
the written description of the merchandise is dispositive.
Verification
As provided in section 782(i)(3) of the Tariff Act of 1930,
as amended (the Act), we verified information provided by
COGEMA/Eurodif from October 6-14, 2003, October 20-24, 2003, and
October 29-30, 2003. We used standard verification procedures,
including on-site inspection of the respondents facilities and
examination of relevant sales and financial records. See
Memorandum from Vicki Schepker and Carol Henninger, International
Trade Compliance Analysts, to Gary Taverman, Director, Office 5,
Re: Verification of the Sales Response of Eurodif S.A., Compagnie
G[eacute]n[eacute]rale Des Mati[eacute]res Nucl[eacute]aires, and
COGEMA, Inc., dated December 31, 2003, (Sales Verification
Report); see also Memorandum from Ernest Gziryan, Senior
Accountant, to Neal Halper, Director, Office of Accounting, Re:
Verification Report on the Cost of Production and Constructed
Value Data Submitted by Eurodif S.A., Compagnie
G[eacute]n[eacute]rale Des Mati[eacute]res Nucl[eacute]aires, and
COGEMA, Inc. dated January 20, 2004, (Cost Verification Report);
Memorandum from Ernest Z. Gziryan, Senior Accountant, to Neal M.
Halper, Director, Office of Accounting,
Re: Verification Report on the Cost of Production Data Submitted
by EdF, dated January 20, 2004; and Memorandum from Ernest Z.
Gziryan, Senior Accountant, to Neal M. Halper, Director, Office
of Accounting, Re: Verification Report on the COP Data Submitted
by RTE, dated January 20, 2004.
Fair Value Comparisons
To determine whether sales of LEU from France were made in
the United States at less than fair value, we compared the
constructed export price (CEP) to the constructed value (CV), as
described in the Constructed Export Price and Normal Value
sections of this notice.
In accordance with section 777A(d)(1)(A)(i) of the Act, we
calculated CEPs and compared them to CV.
We note that during the POR, the respondent sold LEU pursuant
to contracts in which it undertook to manufacture and deliver LEU
for a cash payment covering only the value of the enrichment
component; for the natural uranium feedstock component, the
respondent received an amount of natural uranium equivalent to
the amount used to produce the LEU shipped (so-called separative
work unit (SWU)\1\ contracts). However, the product manufactured
and delivered by the respondent was LEU. For purposes of our
antidumping analysis, we have translated prices and costs
involved in SWU contracts to an LEU basis, increasing those
values to account for the cost of the uranium feedstock involved.
These adjustments are described in greater detail below.
\1\ SWU is a unit of measurement of the effort required to
separate the U235 and U238 atoms in uranium feed in order to
create a final product richer in U235 atoms.
Constructed Export Price
In accordance with section 772 of the Act, we calculated a
CEP. Section 772(b) of the Act defines CEP as the price at which
the subject merchandise is first sold in the United States before
or after the date of importation by or for the account of the
producer or exporter of the merchandise or by a seller affiliated
with the producer or exporter, to an unaffiliated purchaser, as
adjusted under sections 772(c) and (d) of the Act. Consistent
with this definition, we found that COGEMA/Eurodif made CEP sales
during the POR because the sales were made for the account of
COGEMA/Eurodif by the respondent's U.S. subsidiary, COGEMA, Inc.,
in the United States.
We calculated CEP based on packed prices charged to the first
unaffiliated customer in the United States. For all sales, which
involved payments on a SWU basis, we translated the prices to an
LEU basis by adding a value for the uranium feedstock used in the
production of the LEU. This value was derived from the
respondent's reported entered value of feed, which was based on
publicly available price information used for customs entry
purposes.
Section 351.401(i) of the Department's regulations provide
that the date of sale will normally be the date of invoice,
unless the material terms of sale are set on some other date.
In the instant case, the material terms of sale are set on
the date of the contract with the U.S. customer. Therefore, we
based the date of sale on that date.
The sales examined in this review represented merchandise
which entered the United States during the POR. We have not
included deliveries made of merchandise entered during the
provisional measures gap period\2\ (gap period) in our
calculation because these entries are not subject to antidumping
duties. For the purposes of the preliminary results, we have
accepted COGEMA/Eurodif's allocation methodology for linking
deliveries to entries with two exceptions. See Preliminary
Results Calculation Memorandum - Eurodif S.A., Compagnie
G[eacute]n[eacute]rale Des Mati[eacute]res Nucl[eacute]aires, and
COGEMA, Inc. from Vicki Schepker and Carol Henninger,
International Trade Compliance Analysts to Constance Handley,
Program Manager (January 20, 2004) (Preliminary Calculation
Memorandum). We verified that some entries could be definitively
linked to a particular delivery to a U.S. utility. For entries
that could not be definitively linked to a delivery,
COGEMA/Eurodif used a hierarchy to allocate LEU in inventory at
the fabricator to deliveries, starting with Eurodif- produced LEU
entered during the POR. See Sales Verification Report at 42-43.
\2\ The provisional measures referred to in section 733(d) of
the Act expired on January 9, 2002. The order was published on
February 13, 2002. Therefore, between those dates, no duties were
collected.
We made deductions from the starting price for movement
expenses in accordance with section 772(c)(2)(A) of the Act.
These include foreign inland freight from the plant to the port
of exit, international freight, marine insurance, charges for
shipment of samples, transportation expenses for the movement of
customer feed, and port charges. We also deducted any discounts
from the starting price.
In accordance with section 772(d)(1) of the Act, we deducted
from the starting price those selling expenses that were incurred
in selling the subject merchandise in the United States,
including indirect selling expenses, credit expense, and
inventory carrying costs.
In addition, in accordance with 772(d)(3) and 772(f) of the
Act, we made [[Page 3885]] a deduction for CEP profit. The CEP
profit rate is normally calculated on the basis of total revenue
and total expenses on sales in the comparison market and the U.S.
market. In this case, there were no useable home market sales of
LEU during the POR and therefore no useable home market profit
from which to derive CEP profit. Therefore, we based CEP profit
on the total expenses and total revenue derived from Eurodif's
U.S. and third-country sales of the subject merchandise.
See Preliminary Calculation Memorandum.
Finally, we made additional adjustments to CEP based upon our
findings at verification. See Preliminary Calculation Memorandum.
Normal Value A. Selection of Comparison Markets
Section 773(a)(1) of the Act directs that NV be based on the
price at which the foreign like product is sold in the home
market, provided that the merchandise is sold in sufficient
quantities (or value, if quantity is inappropriate) and that
there is no particular market situation that prevents a proper
comparison with the export price (EP) or CEP. The statute
contemplates that quantities (or value) will normally be
considered insufficient if they are less than five percent of the
aggregate quantity (or value) of sales of the subject merchandise
to the United States.
Pursuant to section 773(a)(1) of the Act, because
COGEMA/Eurodif's aggregate volume of home market sales of the
foreign like product was greater than five percent of its
aggregate volume of U.S. sales of the subject merchandise, we
determined that the home market was viable. However,
COGEMA/Eurodif has only one customer in the home market, an
affiliated party. Because we had no independent means to
determine whether prices for sales to this customer were made at
arm's length, for purposes of this review, we have based NV on
CV. See sections 351.403 and 351.405 of the Department's
regulations. Adjustments made in deriving CV are described in
detail in the Calculation of Normal Value Based on Constructed
Value section below.
B. Calculation of Normal Value Based on Constructed Value
Section 773(a)(4) of the Act provides that where NV cannot be
based on comparison market sales, NV may be based on CV. Section
773(e) of the Act provides that CV shall be based on the sum of
the cost of materials and fabrication for the foreign like
product, plus amounts for selling, general, and administrative
expenses (SG), profit, and U.S. packing costs. In accordance with
section 773(e)(2)(B)(iii) of the Act, we based general and
administrative (G) expenses on amounts derived from Eurodif's
financial statements. We based financial expenses on the
financial statements of COGEMA's parent company, AREVA, which
represents the highest level of consolidation for Eurodif. For
selling expenses, we used information on Eurodif's indirect
selling expenses from its questionnaire response and from
information obtained at verification. Where appropriate, we made
circumstance of sale (COS) adjustments to CV in accordance with
section 773(a)(8) of the Act and 19 CFR 351.410 of the
Department's regulations. For a further discussion of the
calculation of indirect selling expenses and a COS adjustment of
a proprietary nature, see the Preliminary Calculation Memorandum.
Because we could not determine whether COGEMA/Eurodif's sales
in France were made in the ordinary course of trade in the home
market, we calculated profit in accordance with section
773(e)(2)(B)(iii) of the Act and the Statement of Administrative
Action (SAA) at 841. We based CV profit on the profit rate of
Eurodif's sales of LEU in all markets other than the United
States and France. See Constructed Value Calculation Adjustments
Memorandum for the Preliminary Results from Ernest Z. Gziryan,
Senior Accountant, to Neal M. Halper, Director, Office of
Accounting (January 20, 2004) (Constructed Value Calculation
Adjustments Memorandum). The profit cap under alternative (iii)
of section 773(e)(2)(B) of the Act cannot be calculated in this
case because we do not have information allowing us to calculate
the amount normally realized by exporters or producers (other
than respondent) in connection with the sale, for consumption in
the foreign country, of the merchandise in the same general
category.
In addition to these adjustments, we included in the reported
cost the Public Service Electricity Generation Fund tax (the
``FSPPE levy'') accrued by Eurodif and recorded in the company's
books. See Constructed Value Calculation Adjustments Memorandum,
see also Cost Verification Report at 8.
In this case, electricity is considered a major input that
Eurodif obtained from its affiliated supplier,
[Eacute]lectricit[eacute] de France (EdF). See Memorandum from
Ernest Gziryan, Senior Accountant, to Gary Taverman, Director,
Office 5, Re: Petitioner's Allegation of Purchases of Major
Inputs From Affiliated Parties at Prices Below the Affiliated
Parties' Cost of Production, dated August 13, 2003. Section
773(f)(3) of the statute states that ``in the case of a
transaction between affiliated persons involving the production
by one of such persons of a major input, the administering
authority may determine the value of the major input on the basis
of the information available regarding such cost of production,
if such cost is greater than the amount that would be determined
for such input under paragraph (2).'' Section 351.407(b) of the
Department's regulations states that in applying the major input
rule, the Department will normally include the higher of the
transfer price between affiliates, the market price for the
input, or the affiliate's cost of production (COP) for the
purchased input. As such, we evaluated the affiliated supplier's
reported electricity COP. We found that EdF's books reflected a
calculated cost based on a marginal costing methodology and
resulted in different costs for the same physically identical
product - electricity. As it is the Department's long standing
practice to calculate a single average cost for producing
products of identical physical characteristics, for the
preliminary results we adjusted the reported electricity COP by
calculating one average POR cost of producing electricity and
used it in our major input analysis. We adjusted the reported
value of electricity purchased from EdF to the higher of the
transfer price, the market price or EdF's cost of production. Due
to the proprietary nature of this information, see the
Constructed Value Calculation Adjustments Memorandum for more
details.
Level of Trade/CEP Offset
In accordance with section 773(a)(1)(B) of the Act, to the
extent practicable, we determine NV based on sales in the
comparison market at the same level of trade (LOT) as the EP or
CEP transaction. The NV LOT is that of the starting-price sales
in the comparison market or, when NV is based on CV, that of the
sales from which we derive SG expenses and profit. For EP, the
U.S. LOT is also the level of the starting- price sale, which is
usually from exporter to importer. For CEP, it is the level of
the constructed sale from the exporter to the importer.
To determine whether NV sales are at a different LOT than EP
or CEP, we examine stages in the marketing process and selling
functions along the chain of distribution between the producer
and the unaffiliated customer. If the comparison-market sales are
at a [[Page 3886]] different LOT, and the difference affects
price comparability, as manifested in a pattern of consistent
price differences between the sales on which NV is based and
comparison-market sales at the LOT of the export transaction, we
make an LOT adjustment under section 773(a)(7)(A) of the Act.
Finally, for CEP sales, if the NV level is more remote from the
factory than the CEP level and there is no basis for determining
whether the difference in the levels between NV and CEP affects
price comparability, we adjust NV under section 773(a)(7)(B) of
the Act (the CEP offset provision). See Notice of Final
Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value: Certain
Cut-to-Length Carbon Steel Plate from South Africa, 62 FR 61731
(November 19, 1997).
In implementing these principles in this review, we obtained
information from the respondent about the marketing stages
involved in the reported U.S. sales, as well as in the home
market, including a description of the selling activities
performed by the respondent for each channel of distribution.
Given that all U.S. sales were CEP sales, we considered only the
selling activities reflected in the price after the deduction of
expenses and profit under section 772(d) of the Act.
In the U.S. market, the respondent sells to utility
customers. After deducting expenses associated with the selling
activities reflected in the price under section 772(d) of the Act
(i.e., the expenses of COGEMA, Inc.), we noted selling expenses
associated with strategic planning and marketing, customer sales
contact, production planning and evaluation, and contract
administration. These expenses did not vary by U.S. channel of
distribution. Therefore, we found all U.S. sales to be made at a
single LOT.
Selling expenses for CV were based on Eurodif's selling
expenses exclusive of expenses allocated to Eurodif's U.S. sales.
Eurodif performed all the selling activities for sales to its
sole customer in the French market. Therefore, we found a single
LOT of trade in the home market.
Eurodif generally performs the same kinds of selling
functions in both markets. We note that for several of the
thirteen reported categories of selling functions, Eurodif stated
that it performs the functions to the same degree for both the
CEP and the home market LOT. The respondent described different
degrees of selling activities for its home market sales and sales
to its U.S. affiliate in the following categories: sales
forecasting, visiting customers/potential customers, negotiating
contracts, receiving and booking orders/order processing,
collecting payments/invoice follow-up, and customer follow-up. We
reviewed each of the selling functions at verification and found
that Eurodif performs the same level of selling activity for
receiving and booking orders/order processing and collecting
payments/invoice follow- up for both home market and CEP sales.
See Sales Verification Report at 15-19. With regard to the
selling functions of visiting customers/ potential customers and
negotiating contracts, Eurodif had reported different levels of
activity for sales in the home market and sales to its U.S.
affiliate. We found that Eurodif performs these functions to a
similar degree for its sales in the U.S. market and in the home
market, as all of its sales in the home market are to one
customer under a long-term contract. For sales forecasting and
customer follow-up, in which Eurodif reported different levels of
activity for sales in the home market and sales to its U.S.
affiliate, we found that there are some minor differences in the
levels of these selling functions. However, these differences
alone do not constitute a basis for finding a more advanced level
of trade in the home market. We note that we did not base CV
profit on sales in France. See the Calculation of Normal Value
Based on Constructed Value section above. Since there is no
evidence on the record to indicate that the selling functions for
sales to third-country markets differ from Eurodif's selling
functions to COGEMA, Inc., we have no reason to conclude that
Eurodif's home market, third-country market and U.S. sales were
made at different levels of trade. Accordingly, we are not
granting a CEP offset adjustment.
Currency Conversion
We made currency conversions into U.S. dollars in accordance
with section 773A of the Act, based on exchange rates in effect
on the date of the U.S. sale, as certified by the Federal Reserve
Bank. Preliminary Results of Review As a result of this review,
we preliminarily determine that the following weighted-average
margin exists for the period July 13, 2001, through January 31,
2003:
Producer Weighted-Average Margin
(Percentage)
-----------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------
COGEMA/Eurodif........................................ 5.34
The Department will disclose calculations performed in
accordance with 19 CFR 351.224(b). An interested party may
request a hearing within 30 days of publication of these
preliminary results. See 19 CFR 351.310(c). Any hearing, if
requested, will be held 44 days after the date of publication, or
the first working day thereafter. Interested parties may submit
case briefs and/or written comments no later than 30 days after
the date of publication of these preliminary results. Rebuttal
briefs and rebuttals to written comments, limited to issues
raised in such briefs or comments, may be filed no later than 37
days after the date of publication. Parties who submit arguments
are requested to submit with the argument (1) a statement of the
issue, (2) a brief summary of the argument, and (3) a table of
authorities. Further, the parties submitting written comments
should provide the Department with an additional copy of the
public version of any such comments on diskette. The Department
will issue the final results of this administrative review, which
will include the results of its analysis of issues raised in any
such comments, within 120 days of publication of these
preliminary results.
Assessment
Upon completion of this administrative review, pursuant to 19
CFR 351.212(b), the Department will calculate an assessment rate
on all appropriate entries. We will calculate importer-specific
duty assessment rates on the basis of the ratio of the total
amount of antidumping duties calculated for the examined sales to
the total entered value of the examined sales for that importer.
Where the assessment rate is above de minimis, we will instruct
CBP to assess duties on all entries of subject merchandise by
that importer.
Cash Deposit Requirements
The following deposit rates will be effective upon
publication of the final results of this administrative review
for all shipments of LEU from France entered, or withdrawn from
warehouse, [[Page 3887]] for consumption on or after the
publication date, as provided by section 751(a)(1) of the Act:
(1) the cash deposit rate listed above for COGEMA/Eurodif will be
the rate established in the final results of this review, except
if a rate is less than 0.5 percent, and therefore de minimis, the
cash deposit will be zero; (2) for previously reviewed or
investigated companies not listed above, the cash deposit rate
will continue to be the company-specific rate published for the
most recent period; (3) if the exporter is not a firm covered in
this review, a prior review, or the less-than-fair-value (LTFV)
investigation, but the manufacturer is, the cash deposit rate
will be the rate established for the most recent period for the
manufacturer of the merchandise; and (4) if neither the exporter
nor the manufacturer is a firm covered in this or any previous
review conducted by the Department, the cash deposit rate will be
19.95 percent, the ``All Others'' rate established in the LTFV
investigation. These cash deposit requirements, when imposed,
shall remain in effect until publication of the final results of
the next administrative review.
This notice serves as a preliminary reminder to importers of
their responsibility under 19 CFR 351.402(f) to file a
certificate regarding the reimbursement of antidumping duties
prior to liquidation of the relevant entities during this review
period. Failure to comply with this requirement could result in
the Secretary's presumption that reimbursement of antidumping
duties occurred and the subsequent assessment of double
antidumping duties.
This determination is issued and published in accordance with
sections 751(a)(1) and 777(i)(1) of the Act.
Dated: January 20, 2004. James J. Jochum, Assistant Secretary
for Import Administration. [FR Doc. 04-1695 Filed 1-26-04; 8:45
am]
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16 Capital Times Opinion: Editorial: The deceiving of the Union
(captimes.com)
Tuesday, January 27, 2004 9:01 PM
It seems that President Bush cannot deliver a State of the Union
address without deceiving the American people. Or, at the least,
trying to deceive them.
A year ago, on the eve of the president's pre-emptive war against
Iraq, Bush told the American people and their Congress that Iraq
was busy trying to acquire materials from Africa to develop
nuclear weapons. The suggestion was that Iraqi dictator Saddam
Hussein either had or was close to obtaining the most threatening
of all weapons of mass destruction.
By summer, it was clear that Bush had been wrong. And there was
a good deal of evidence to suggest that the president, or at
least his top aides, knew that his claims about weapons of mass
destruction were inaccurate before they were inserted in his
most high-profile address prior to the beginning of the war.
No one expected Bush to apologize for being wrong, let alone for
lying, when he delivered this year's State of the Union speech.
For Bush, being president means never having to say you're
sorry. But there was a general assumption that he would try to
address the embarrassing discrepancy between his statement of
the previous year and reality.
And so he did.
In an elaborate twist of rhetoric, Bush declared, "Already, the
Kay Report identified dozens of weapons of mass
destruction-related program activities and significant amounts
of equipment that Iraq concealed from the United Nations. Had we
failed to act, the dictator's weapons of mass destruction
programs would continue to this day." That was a reference to an
interim report by David Kay, the chief U.S. weapons hunter in
Iraq.
Unfortunately for Bush, Kay stepped down three days later and
admitted that he did not believe the country had any large
stockpiles of chemical or biological weapons. Kay told the
Reuters news service that he had concluded there were no
stockpiles of WMDs to be found in Iraq and, more importantly,
that he does not now believe they were produced in the first
place. "I don't think they existed," Kay told Reuters. "What
everyone was talking about is stockpiles produced after the end
of the last (1991) Gulf War, and I don't think there was a
large-scale production program in the '90s."
On Sunday, Kay told National Public Radio that he had concluded
that U.N. inspections "got rid of" weapons of mass destruction
in Iraq long before the Bush administration began claiming that
an invasion was necessary to eliminate the WMD threat.
Kay still cuts Bush some slack, suggesting that there was an
intelligence breakdown. But it is notable that U.S. Sen. Bob
Graham, D-Fla., who was the head of the Senate Intelligence
Committee at the time, opposed the fall 2002 congressional vote
authorizing Bush to use force against Iraq. Graham said at the
time that the intelligence data he had seen did not suggest that
Iraqi WMDs posed a significant enough threat to justify a
pre-emptive war. So it appears that the breakdown may have come
when the White House decided to manipulate data to justify the
war.
Several members of Congress, including U.S. Sen. Russ Feingold,
D-Wis., and U.S. Rep. Tammy Baldwin, D-Madison, have called for
an investigation of how intelligence was used - and misused -
prior to the launch of the war.
That investigation should, of course, examine the dubious claims
that George W. Bush made in his 2003 State of the Union address.
In light of Kay's statements of the past few days, investigators
will also have to examine the dubious claims that Bush made in
his 2004 State of the Union address.
Published: 6:23 AM 1/27/04
Technical questions and comments may be directed to The Capital
Times . Please state your concern in the subject line.
Copyright 2003 The Capital Times
*****************************************************************
17 Capitol Hill Blue: What Went Wrong?
Last Updated: Jan 27th, 2004 - 08:39:02
Opinion
By DALE McFEATTERS
Jan 27, 2004, 08:38
The Bush administration's chief rationale for invading Iraq was
that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction and, left
unchecked, would inevitably use them.
The United States' outgoing weapons inspector, David Kay, says
flatly after ransacking Iraq for evidence, "The weapons do not
exist."
What happened? Apparently a massive intelligence failure.
President Bush has already been accused of willfully deceiving
the American people to justify a war he was determined to fight
in any case. But it is important to remember that the British,
French and Russian intelligence services also believed that
Saddam had covert weapons programs and hidden stockpiles of WMD.
As did the U.S. intelligence services during the Clinton
administration.
Even Saddam apparently believed he had a WMD program; he
certainly acted like he had something to hide. Iraqi scientists,
out of corruption or desperation, lied about their programs to
keep the money flowing from Baghdad. The programs were hollow
shells, the weapons nonexistent.
Even the military was fooled. Kay said Republican Guard
commanders interviewed by his search team each said that their
units did not have chemical weapons but they were convinced other
units did.
What seems likely is that the U.N.-led inspections program, much
derided by the Bush administration, really worked. By the end of
1991, Iraq's nuclear program had been dismantled and its chemical
weapons largely destroyed. In the mid-1990s, the West learned,
via a defector, of a germ warfare program but by then the Iraqis
had destroyed their biological weapons on their own. When the
inspectors were allowed back in 2002, after a four-year absence,
they found no evidence that the programs had been restarted.
Still U.S. intelligence believed in the weapons' existence, and
the Bush administration was predisposed to believe the worst.
There were other valid rationales for deposing Saddam, but the
intelligence failure on WMD is deeply troubling. "It's an issue
of the capabilities of one's intelligence service to collect
valid, truthful information," Kay told National Public Radio.
Kay was asked whether he thought Bush owed an explanation to the
American people. "I actually think the intelligence community
owes the president, rather than the president owing the American
people," he said.
Actually, we believe both of them owe us an explanation.
(Contact Dale McFeatters at McFeattersD@SHNS.com.) © Copyright
2004 by Capitol Hill Blue
*****************************************************************
18 Bennington Banner - Editorials: Bush ushers in era of 'not my fault'
January 27, 2004 Bennington, VT
President George W. Bush came to power by claiming he would usher
in an era of personal responsibility, one that would restore
honor and integrity to the highest office in the land. There are
so many ways to prove he has not lived up to those campaign
pledges in 2000.
Let's just confine ourselves to weapons, intelligence and who is
to blame. In evaluating Bush's performance it is valuable to
compare his actions and words to those of another president
confronted with conflict, President John F. Kennedy during the
Bay of Pigs invasion.
The Bay of Pigs invasion was launched in the spring of 1961.
Less than three months after he took office, Kennedy was advised
by the CIA that an invasion of Cuba could be mounted by Cuban
exiles, and the ousting of the communist Fidel Castro would be
achieved with minimal conflict.
Kennedy went ahead with the plan and on April 17, 1961, 1,400
CIA-trained Cuban exiles went to reclaim their homeland. Far from
the waltz the intelligence community predicted, the invasion was
an embarrassment.
The CIA said Castro's army would fade at the first sight of an
invasion, but the communists did not fold. The CIA said Castro
had little popular support and the rest of the Cubans were sure
to revolt once the invasion began. But Castro did have support
and no uprising accompanied the Bay of Pigs.
The disastrous invasion led to the capture of almost 1,200 Cuban
exiles by Castro.
The Kennedy administration was left holding the ball. Upon the
president's orders, a military intervention had been orchestrated
that wound up diminishing the prestige of the United States.
But it isn't the president's botched call that is remembered,
but his honor, integrity and sense of personal responsibility
following the Bay of Pigs that stands out.
Kennedy could have gone before the American people after the
fiasco and evaded, set up a smoke screen and wormed out of
responsibility. He could have blamed faulty intelligence or the
Cuban exiles, who assured the president that Castro had no
support, was weak and would crumble. But who did Kennedy blame?
He took full responsibility in a direct address to the American
people. And from that embarrassment rose one of the most beloved
presidents, at home and abroad, of all time.
Nothing is in sharper contrast to the actions and words of
Kennedy than Bush's squirming around the issue of weapons of mass
destruction in Iraq; the weapons he was assured existed by the
intelligence community; the weapons that were the reason he
mounted America's costly war; the weapons that have come up no
where.
David Kay, the former U.S. inspector in charge of finding the
weapons in Iraq, recently said not only did he not find weapons
but it is likely they never existed.
Bush, in last year's State of the Union address, pounded home to
the American people that the weapons were an imminent threat to
our population and nuclear capabilities were being aggressively
pursued in Iraq.
There is no substance to those claims - so much so that Bush's
reference to weapons in this year's State of the Union amounted
to "weapons-related programs." That is a category so wide it
could include a violent video game found in one of Uday Hussein's
palaces.
Where is the personal responsibility? It seems it falls on the
intelligence community and not Bush. He will not stand up and say
he botched the call that sent more than 500 U.S. citizens to
violent deaths in Iraq, because they were told they were
preventing a massive attack at home.
Instead of the era of personal responsibility, we are stuck in
the era of "not my fault."
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19 SF Chronicle: To tell the truth
EDITORIAL
Tuesday, January 27, 2004 [San Francisco Chronicle]
THE UNITED STATES waged a war against Iraq because President Bush
persuaded much of Congress and the American public (but not the
U.N. Security Council) that Saddam Hussein possessed a stockpile
of biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction -- and was
actively pursuing a nuclear capability.
The danger, suggested the president, was so imminent that he
could not allow the U.N.'s weapons inspectors to complete their
search or take the time to gain the support of members of the
U.N. Security Council.
Now, David Kay, the government's chief weapons inspector, has
returned from Iraq, resigned his position and stated his
conclusion that "Iraq had no stockpiles of chemical and
biological weapons at the start of the war last year ... What
everyone was talking about is stockpiles produced after the end
of the last Gulf War, and I don't think there was a large-scale
production program in the '90s."
The gradual emergence of evidence that undercuts the reasons
given for the war has placed the Bush administration on the
defensive. This was not a war of necessity.
But neither Bush nor Vice President Dick Cheney is willing to
admit, especially during an election year, that "we were wrong"
and that our intelligence was flawed.
In his State of the Union speech, Bush even insinuated that WMDs
may have existed or will ultimately be discovered when he
referred to evidence of "weapons of mass destruction-related
program activities."
Cheney, for his part, has emerged from his seclusion in an
undisclosed location and launched a media blitz to reaffirm the
original reasons for waging the war.
In a series of well-publicized interviews, Cheney has revived two
assertions already discredited by other members of the
administration.
First, he declared that there is "overwhelming evidence that
Saddam Hussein has a relationship with al Qaeda," a link that
even the president discounted last year.
Second, he argued that two flatbed trailers outfitted with tanks
-- discovered after the war -- proved that Iraq was indeed
engaged in biological weapons programs. But scientists who
studied them in Baghdad, including the late British scientist
David Kelly and Kay, had already discredited that conclusion.
Cheney's insistence on perpetuating dubious claims -- which
elicited no comment from the White House -- is countered by
Secretary of State Colin L. Powell's statement that Iraq may
never have had WMDs, or at least does not appear to have them
now. Although Powell still defends the decision to go to war, he
now argues that it was Hussein's intention to build WMDs -- not
Iraq's ability to produce them -- that justified the war.
We disagree. Many nations would like to enhance their power on
the world stage by producing WMDs.
Waging war, however, should always be a last resort to stop an
ominous threat, not a response to a theoretical danger. That is
one reason, among many moral and diplomatic concerns, why the
Bush doctrine of pre-emptive war is so dangerous and deeply
flawed. ·
©2004 San Francisco Chronicle
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20 Heritage Foundation: Dealing with Dirty Bombs: Plain Facts, Practical Solutions
James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., and Jack Spencer
Backgrounder #1723
January 27, 2004
Most assessments of America's vulnerabilities include some
mention of the nation's susceptibility to attacks by
radiological dispersal devices, or "dirty bombs." The threat is
often portrayed as a homogenous danger, but it in fact covers a
spectrum of risks, not all of which are equally serious.
Because the nature of the threat is often misconstrued, there is
no shared appreciation of the problem or how best to address it.
The reality is that the threat of a dirty bomb attack by
terrorists is a credible one, although the psychological and
economic consequences would likely far outweigh any casualties
or physical destruction. To be better prepared, the United
States should:
+ Develop national standards for emergency response,
+ Create a national system-of-systems emergency response
structure,1
+ Focus federal resources on developing national surge medical
capacity,
+ Centralize oversight of federal emergency medical response
in the Department of Health and Human Services,
+ Enhance federal expertise in emergency medical care, and
+ Establish better coordination with the
private sector.
The Demand for Dirty Bombs
Radiological dispersal devices are attractive to terrorists and
terrorist states. Abu Zubaydah, a key al-Qaeda operative
captured in Pakistan on March 28, 2002, was widely believed to
have told U.S. investigators that al-Qaeda was "interested" in
obtaining a dirty bomb. Although Zubaydah's statements are
unconfirmed, they appear to dovetail with evidence reportedly
seized by U.S. forces in Afghanistan. In addition, on May 8,
2002, the FBI arrested Abdullah al Muhajir on charges of
planning a radiological attack in the United States at the
direction of al-Qaeda operatives.2
Although it was never fielded, Saddam Hussein also sought this
capability.3 In 1987, Iraq tested a bomb weighing 1,400
kilograms that carried radioactive particles derived from
irradiated impurities in zirconium oxide.4 Further prototypes
were designed from the casings of 100 Muthanna-3 aerial chemical
bombs. They were then modified to a 400-kilogram weight so that
aircraft could carry more. Of the original 100, it is likely
that only 25 were destroyed and that the remaining 75 were sent
to the Al Qa'Qa State Establishment for an unknown fate.5
What Dirty Bombs Are, and What They Are Not
The first step in appreciating the threat of dirty bombs is to
understand that they are not nuclear weapons. Indeed, the only
difference between a dirty bomb and a conventional explosive is
that the dirty bomb is laced with some sort of radiological
material. Therefore, it is better to think of the threat not in
terms of the dirty bomb, but instead in terms of any devise that
disperses radioactive materials.
A radiological dispersal device may not even require an
explosion. It is quite possible to separate the "dirty" from the
"bomb." A terrorist could choose any number of methods to
disperse dangerous radioactive material. The dispersion method
may well be a conventional explosion, but putting radioactive
material in a trashcan or sprinkling it on a sidewalk could also
be an effective--and covert--means of contamination.
The initial destruction caused by a dirty bomb would likely
result from the explosion itself and not from the nuclear
material. Its destructive capacity would be a function of the
amount and type of explosive materials used, not of the
radioactive additives. A car bomb laced with radioactive
cobalt-60 would look no different from a car bomb without the
extra material.
Likewise, the radiological affect would be defined by the type
and amount of radioactive material. A bomb with a small amount
of radioactive material might wreak economic havoc and spread
terror, but it would have little biological effect on local
populations. On the other hand, a bomb laced with large amounts
of strontium-90 (a highly radioactive isotope found in old
Soviet power generators), highly enriched uranium, or spent
nuclear fuel from a nuclear power plant could be devastating.
However, like most threats, the highest risks are also the least
likely. Not only are the more dangerous materials much more
difficult to obtain, but the successful dispersal of a highly
radioactive material would require an extremely sophisticated
terrorist.
The Practicality of Dirty Bombs
To kill or sicken a large number of people would require a
relatively large weapon with highly radioactive material. A
truck bomb, for example, with 220 kilograms of explosive and 50
kilograms of one-year-old spent fuel rods could produce a lethal
dosage zone with a radius of about one kilometer.6 Detonating
such a device in an urban area with a large, unsheltered
population might contaminate thousands of people or more.7
Although producing such a weapon is far easier than building a
nuclear bomb, fabricating a highly effective radiological
dispersal device that could easily be transported to its target
would be difficult. Among the problems in building such a large
device is the heavy shielding required to work with a
significant amount of highly radioactive material. Otherwise, it
would melt the carrying containers and sicken or kill anyone
attempting to assemble or transport the weapon. For example, one
assessment concluded that sufficient radioactive material to
contaminate 230 square kilometers would require about 140
kilograms of lead shielding.8 While such weapons may not be
practical tools for most terrorists, the idea of martyrdom could
lead some to disregard the dangers.
Distributing radiological material as a fine aerosol (the ideal
molecule size being about one to five microns, a fraction of the
width of a human hair) would require some degree of specialized
knowledge and specialized handling and processing equipment to
mill the radioactive agent and blend it with an inert material
to facilitate dispersion and increase the risk of inhalation.
Many variables can significantly affect the effectiveness of an
attack: the distance from the radioactive source; the manner of
dispersal; weather conditions (extent of dispersal); the degree
of protection (e.g., buildings and overhead cover); and the type
of radiation. For example, Alpha particles--one type of
radiation--travel only a short distance, and most will not
penetrate the dead, outside layer of skin. They are harmful,
however, if inhaled or swallowed. Beta particles can penetrate
the skin and inflict cellular damage, but they can be blocked by
common materials such as plastic, concrete, and aluminum.
In contrast, gamma rays and neutrons are far more powerful and
do not lose energy as quickly as alpha and beta particles when
they pass through an absorber like clothing or walls. Heavy lead
shielding, great amounts of other shielding with absorbent or
scattering material (e.g., several feet of earth or concrete),
or significant distance (perhaps kilometers) may be required to
avoid high-dose exposure.9 In an urban attack, buildings might
absorb or shield significant amounts of radiation, significantly
reducing the initial prospects for casualties.
Unlike nuclear weapons, a radiological dispersal device does not
require plutonium or enriched uranium. It requires only some
form of radioactive material, which any nuclear reactor is
capable of producing. In addition, numerous medical and
industrial practices employ radioactive substances. However,
obtaining these less dangerous materials associated with
industry and the medical field would be easier than obtaining
the more dangerous materials that result from nuclear power
production.
Illicitly obtaining materials is not impossible. The United
States has significant gaps in its export rules.10 Abroad,
however, the problems are even worse. Large quantities of
relatively dangerous radioactive material remain unaccounted
for.
When assessing the risk of foreign radioactive material entering
the United States, it is important not to be misled by media
outlets that purport to demonstrate the ease with which
terrorists could smuggle these substances into the U.S.11 While
it may or may not be easy to smuggle radioactive material into
the United States, smuggling harmless depleted uranium
demonstrates no more than smuggling an illegal Persian rug.
Depleted uranium is a byproduct of the manufacturing of fuel for
nuclear reactors and nuclear weapons. Simply put, it is
leftovers after the highly radioactive uranium-235 has been
removed from uranium ore. The remaining (depleted) uranium is
very dense and produces minimal radiation.12
The Likely Impact of a Dirty Bomb
The impact of a successful dirty bomb attack on those who do not
receive an immediately lethal, incapacitating dose of radiation
is difficult to predict. Even the largest radiological dispersal
device is likely to inflict catastrophic casualties only if
long-term cancer risks are considered.13
Prompt modern medical treatment can dramatically improve
survivability after radiation injury for individuals who do not
receive an initial, lethal dose of radiation.14 In particular,
dramatic medical advances have been made in caring for
individuals with suppressed immune systems, a common byproduct
of radiation attack.
In addition, the danger of low-dose exposure from a radiological
weapon may be far less than is commonly assumed. The long-term
effect of low-dose radiation is determined by the capacity of
irradiated tissue to repair DNA damage within individual cells,
which is governed by a number of exposure, health, and genetic
factors. There is some scientific evidence that current models
may significantly overestimate the risks.15
On the other hand, due to public fears of radiation, an attack
might have a considerable disruptive effect--forcing mass
evacuations, creating economic chaos, and inflicting
environmental and property damage and significant cleanup costs.
In 1987, for example, scrap dealers in Goiânia, Brazil,
unintentionally dispersed 137 pieces of a highly radioactive
material, which required a massive environmental cleanup.16 This
is proportional to industrial accidents or environmental
incidents in the United States. However, a radiological release
that was intentional and associated with a terrorist attack
would undoubtedly have a psychological effect disproportionately
greater than the actual physical threat.
Thus, the fear factor is a major component of the radiological
threat. A radiological strike, in which the fear of the unknown
might be particularly acute, could trigger severe and widespread
reactions, including mass hysteria and serious psychological
casualties.17
The economic impact of a radiological strike should also be
considered. If contamination is extensive, just removing
irradiated material could have significant consequences. For
comparison, removing low-level radioactive waste from a
biomedical research facility to an appropriate storage facility
is extremely expensive, costing $300 or more per cubic foot.18
The economic consequences of an attack would also include the
cost of evacuating contaminated areas and housing, feeding, and
caring for displaced persons, as well as lost worker
productivity.
Given the widespread availability of radioactive material,
deception, hoaxes, and blackmail may also occur. These dangers
are hardly new. In January 1979, for example, the general
manager of a nuclear facility in Wilmington, North Carolina,
received an extortion letter with a sample of uranium dioxide
powder.19
Detecting the Presence of Radiation
Technologies to detect radiological threats are fairly mature.
Radiological monitors can identify contaminated food supplies
and detect dispersal devices. Passive detection systems are
relatively simple and safe to employ, but they can be evaded by
shielding. Active systems (i.e., detectors that x-ray or
irradiate an object with neutrons or high-energy electrons) can
overcome some attempts to evade detection. Active detection,
however, is more costly, inconvenient, and complex.20
One issue in attempting to detect radiological weapons in
transit is the problem of false positives. Many commercial items
and industrial and health care equipment employ radioactive
material. It is likely that screening will inadvertently cause
the unnecessary investigation of many items and persons. With
the U.S. transportation system handling more than 11 million
tons of freight each year, screening could significantly impede
the flow of goods and services, especially in high-traffic areas
such as airports, shipyards, and border crossings. Interspersed
in this vast amount of material are many products that include
varying amounts of radioactive material.
In some ways, searching for a radiological bomb will be like
searching for a needle in a needle stack. For example, in
September 2002, U.S. officials boarded and searched the cargo
ship Palermo Senator after detecting radiation. After several
days, the source was determined to be a harmless load of ceramic
tiles, which was emitting naturally occurring radiation.21
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) already employs a
variety of passive and active sensors to screen people and cargo
entering the United States and is developing more effective and
efficient screening systems. In addition, research on detecting
radiological sources and mitigating the effects of radiation is
a priority for the department's Science and Technology
Directorate.
Preparing for the Unthinkable
Efforts to secure the global supply of radioactive material and
prevent it from falling into the hands of terrorists should
continue.22 Improved export controls, international monitoring,
"buyback" programs, and other threat reduction measures could
reduce, if only somewhat, the global glut of high-risk
radioactive substances;23 but even with aggressive enforcement
programs, sufficient material will likely be available worldwide
over the next decades for any group wanting to mount a
radiological attack.
U.S. strategy rightly focuses on stopping terrorists before they
can successfully conduct an attack on American soil. However,
given the wide availability of radioactive material and the many
means of employing it in an attack, a determined terrorist could
conduct a successful strike. Fortunately, a great deal can be
done to mitigate the casualties, psychological affects, and
economic consequences of a radiological event. In addition, many
of the countermeasures that can be implemented are "dual-use."
In other words, they would also greatly facilitate a national
response to any kind of natural or man-made disaster.
Domestic efforts to prepare for a radiological attack should
focus on creating a truly national emergency response system
that would allow state and local governments to efficiently pool
their resources, effectively direct federal assets where they
are most needed, and appropriately engage the private sector.
Particularly with regard to a radiological response, a national
system should effectively perform four functions: provide
accurate and timely information, surge medical response to the
scene, ensure efficient and effective cleanup of the
contaminated area, and monitor health and environmental affects.
Building an effective national emergency response system could
facilitate all these actions. Specifically, the U.S. should:
+ Develop national standards for emergency response. There are
no national standards for an emergency response to a dirty bomb
attack, or for that matter to any major terrorist incident. This
is a subject of some debate. Long before September 11, experts
in the field recognized that the lack of measurable objectives
would make it difficult to establish policy goals, allocate
resources properly, and establish the right balance of local,
state, and federal roles in responding to a disaster.24 On the
other hand, many have opposed such an initiative. The National
Governors' Association, for example, has argued against
mandatory standards. The U.S. Conference of Mayors has called
for broad discretion in funding, allowing communities to adapt
resources to local needs.25
In fact, current assessments of preparedness are based on
voluntary surveys and needs assessments. Both have significant
shortfalls. They lack objective measures of preparedness and
consistent criteria for determining what personnel and equipment
are needed for emergency response. Nor do these assessments
account for the biases frequently associated with self-reported
information. Establishing broad national standards is essential
for creating a rationale national response system.
The House Select Committee on Homeland Security has unanimously
approved the Faster and Smarter Funding for First Responders Act
(H.R. 3266), which includes procedures for establishing
standards for responding to radiological attacks and other types
of attacks using weapons of mass destruction. This legislation
could serve as the foundation for establishing appropriate
national preparedness standards.26
+ Create a national system-of-systems emergency response
structure. Given the complex and demanding requirements of
responding to a radiological attack or other major terrorist
threat, the fundamental requirement of an effective national
response system may be to adopt a system-of-systems or
network-centric approach to emergency preparedness.
Network-centric operations could increase effectiveness by
networking sensors, decision makers, and emergency responders.
In essence, this means linking knowledgeable entities in the
response to emergencies from the local level to the national
level.
Such a system might produce significant efficiencies by sharing
skills, knowledge, and scarce high-value assets and by building
capacity and redundancy in the national emergency response
system, as well as gaining the synergy of providing all
responders with a common operating picture and the ability to
readily share information. Network-centric systems might be
especially valuable in responding to a radiological attack,
where responders will have to disseminate information quickly
and accurately, surge medical capacity, adapt to difficult and
chaotic conditions, and respond to unforeseen requirements.
The DHS should adopt a system-of-systems architecture to support
the National Incident Management System and focus research,
development, and acquisition programs in the emergency response
areas on those capabilities that would most contribute to
building a national emergency responder network.
+ Focus federal resources on developing national surge
capacity. Over one-third of the current federal assistance
provided to state and local government is for developing local
hospital surge capacity. This funding supports a questionable
strategy. A fixed hospital-based national emergency response
system is not the answer. It is likely that local hospitals
would be quickly overwhelmed by mass casualty attacks,
particularly radiological strikes that might see thousands of
contaminated victims as well as additional thousands of the
"worried well," or unaffected individuals who seek medical
treatment out of fear.
Federal aid should strike the right balance in ensuring that the
national, state, and local governments focus on their
appropriate responsibilities. Assistance to the state and local
levels should focus on medical surveillance, detection, and
communication so that problems can be identified quickly and
regional and national resources can be rushed to the scene.
+ Centralize medical response capabilities in the Department
of Health and Human Services (HHS). An effective national
medical response could be key to successfully mitigating
casualties from a radiological attack. Oversight of national
medical emergency programs, however, is split between HHS and
the DHS.
Bifurcating responsibility for medical response programs such as
the Metropolitan Medical Response System, National Disaster
Medical System, and National Strategic Stockpile between HHS and
the DHS is a mistake. Managing complex programs through
interagency memoranda of understanding is bureaucratic,
inefficient, and unnecessary. Clearly, transferring
responsibility and budgetary oversight of these efforts into one
department or the other would increase efficiency. HHS has the
expertise and experience--which the DHS lacks--to oversee large
medical emergency response programs.
Congress should amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to move
responsibility for overseeing the National Strategic Stockpile,
the Metropolitan Medical Response System, and the National
Disaster Medical System to HHS.
+ Enhance federal expertise in emergency medical care.The
federal government lacks an integrated approach to emergency
medicine, a key component of responding to a radiological
attack. HHS, for example, does not have a National Institute of
Emergency Medicine. Meanwhile, the Emergency Medical Services
Division, tasked with developing the federal contribution to
enhancing and guiding the emergency medical system, is a small
office within the Department of Transportation's National
Highway and Traffic Safety Administration, far removed from
other key elements of the federal emergency medical response
system in HHS and the DHS.
Congress should address the shortfall in federal expertise in
emergency medical services by moving Emergency Medical Services
Division functions to HHS and establishing an Institute for
Emergency Medicine within the National Institutes of Health that
is dedicated to spearheading emergency medical research efforts.
This institute should work closely with the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention to devise more comprehensive emergency
medical response strategies, particularly with regard to
radiological contamination.
+ Establish better coordination with the private sector. A
significant portion of the cleanup after a radiological disaster
will be conducted by the private sector. Potentially, in
addition to professional responders and volunteers, there are
about 6.5 million skilled construction workers in the United
States who could respond in the wake of a disaster.
Thousands of workers, for example, were required at the World
Trade Center to help in response and recovery operations. 27 The
response also illustrated the challenges of being unprepared to
quickly integrate civilian assets into a dangerous emergency
response environment. A safety survey of the site found that
many of these workers lacked even basic safety equipment,
including safety eyewear, dust masks, ear protection, gloves,
steel-toed boots, and hard hats. As a result, numerous injuries
occurred and long-term health concerns arose during the course
of operations.28
The DHS, in concert with state and local governments and the
private sector, should explore means to pre-train and certify
construction workers; establish a registry of qualified
contractors, firms, and unions; and link them to emergency
management agencies. The DHS also needs to determine how
technologies to speed cleanup efforts and protect workers can be
rapidly distributed or contracted from the private sector when
required.
Conclusion
A clearer understanding of the dirty bomb threat will ensure
that policymakers are prepared to coordinate public,
private-sector, and governmental responses to a dirty bomb
attack. Policymakers and the public need to understand the costs
and risks associated with dirty bombs to invest appropriate
resources for preparation and prevention efforts as well as for
consequence mitigation.
Perhaps most important is ensuring that people do not overreact
to the mere presence of radiation without full knowledge of the
extent and type of contamination. Implementing a few commonsense
policies will not only better prepare the nation for a dirty
bomb attack, but also substantially increase America's general
preparedness.
James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., is a Senior Research Fellow for
National Security and Homeland Security, and Jack Spencer is a
Senior Policy Analyst for Defense and National Security, in the
Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International
Studies at The Heritage Foundation.
1. A "system of systems" is an overarching system that allows
disparate systems to communicate and function with each other.
The term is often used in the defense industry.
2. For example, see Mark Hosenball, "How Good Is Abu Zubaydah's
Information," MSNBC News, April 27, 2002, at
www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3067224. In May 2002, authorities arrested
Jose Padilla, an American citizen who converted to Islam and
took the name Abdullah al Muhajir. Authorities claimed that al
Mujahir had "trained with the enemy, including studying how to
wire explosive devices and researching radiological dispersion
devices." See "From Brooklyn to al Qaeda?" ABC News, June 10,
2002, at
www.abcnews.go.com/sections/us/DailyNews/chicagosuspect_profile02
0610.html.
3. For an overview of the open-source data describing Iraq's
weapons of mass destruction programs before the war, see
"Appendix: A Survey of Iraq's Arsenal and Use of Weapons Of Mass
Destruction," in Baker Spring and Jack Spencer, "In Post-War
Iraq, Use Military Forces to Secure Vital U.S. Interests, Not
for Nation-Building," Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1589,
September 25, 2002, at
www.heritage.org/Research/MiddleEast/bg1589.cfm.
4. United Nations, Tenth Report of the Executive Chairman of the
Special Commission Established by the Secretary General pursuant
to Paragraph 9(b)(i) of Security Council Resolution 687 (1991),
and Paragraph 3 of Resolution 699 (1991) on the Activities of
the Special Commission, S/1995/1038, December 17, 1995, part
VII.
5. William J. Broad, "Iraq Tested Bomb Meant to Carry
Radioactive Cloud," The New York Times, April 29, 2001; United
Nations, Tenth Report of the Executive Chairman of the Special
Commission; and Federation of American Scientists, "Radiological
Weapons," updated November 03, 1998, at
www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iraq/other/radiological.htm (January 23,
2004).
6. James L. Ford, "Radiological Dispersal Devices," Strategic
Forum, Vol. 136 (March 1998), pp. 3-4.
7. In one proposed scenario, radioactive cobalt released at the
tip of Manhattan in New York City contaminated a
1,000-square-kilometer area over three states. Henry Kelly,
President, Federation of American Scientists, testimony before
the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, March 6, 2002,
at www.fas.org/ssp/docs/030602-kellytestimony.htm. In another
scenario developed by the Center for Counterproliferation
Research and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, detonation of
a device consisting of 100 kilograms of C4, 50 grams of
Cesium-137, and 2 kilograms of plutonium in a San Diego
convention center was estimated to have killed 31 and caused up
to 1,969 additional fatalities and sickened 6,569. Center for
Counterproliferation and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency,
NBC Scenarios: 2002-2010, April 2000, pp. 14 and 19.
8. Ford, "Radiological Dispersal Devices," p. 4.
9. David G. Jarret, Medical Management of Radiological
Casualties (Bethesda, Md.: Armed Forces Radiological Research
Institute, 1999), pp. 4-9, and Hanford ALARA Reference Center,
"Shielding Use and Analysis," undated, pp. 1-4, at
www.hanford.gov/alara/PDF/analysis.pdf (January 21, 2004).
10. Charles D. Ferguson et al., "Commercial Radioactive Sources:
Surveying the Security Risks," Monterey Institute of
International Studies Occasional Paper No. 11, January 2003, pp.
45 and 64, at cns.miis.edu/pubs/opapers/op11/op11.pdf.
11. Brian Ross, Rhonda Schwartz, and David Scott, "How Safe Are
Our Borders?" ABC News, September 11, 2003, at
abcnews.go.com/sections/wnt/DailyNews/sept11_uranium020911.html
(January 20, 2004).
12. Jack Spencer and Michael Scardaville, "Dispelling the Myths
About the Military Use of Depleted Uranium," Heritage Foundation
Executive Memorandum No. 721, February 20, 2001, at
www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/EM721.cfm.
13. For example, one scenario of a radiological dispersal device
attack on New York City suggests that residents in a
1,000-square-kilometer area could suffer death rates from cancer
ranging from 1 in 10 within a kilometer of the attack, to a 1 in
100 risk for those living in all of Manhattan, to 1 in 10,000
for those living up to 15 kilometers downwind of the attack. See
Kelly, testimony before the Committee on Foreign Relations.
These figures, however, are not for immediate casualties, but
for long-term cancer risks. They do not include accounting for
factors such as the protective effects of buildings, medical
treatment, or cleanup. In addition, this analysis was based on
radiation-exposure standards derived from Environmental
Protection Agency and Nuclear Regulatory Commission guidelines
and does not address the fact that these standards are somewhat
controversial and may overstate long-term threats. The modeling
used for this scenario draws on linear no-threshold theory
(LNT). See Michael Levi and Henry Kelly, "Dirty Bombs
Continued," FAS Public Interest Report, Vol. 55 (May 2002). LNT
holds that any amount of radiation dose, even those close to
zero, is harmful. Therefore, low-dose exposure is assumed to
have effects similar to those of high-dose exposure, but with
lower incidence (i.e., fewer casualties per the number exposed).
There is no scientific consensus over whether LNT is appropriate
for accurately predicting casualties. For contrasting views on
the debate, see Myron Pollycove, "The Rise and Fall of the
Linear No-Threshold (LNT) Theory of Radiation Carciogenesis,"
presentation to the Institute of Physics, 1997, at
cnts.wpi.edu/RSH/Docs/PollycovePhysics.html, and Richard
Wakeford, "Low Dose Irradiation: A Threshold Assumption Is
Inappropriate," paper presented to the Southport Conference,
1999, at www.srp-uk.org/srpcdrom/p7-3.doc.
14. Jarret, Medical Management of Radiological Casualties, pp.
8-9.
15. Health Physics Society, "Radiation Risk in Perspective:
Position Statement of the Health Physics Society," March 2001,
at www.Hps.Org/Documents/Radiationrisk.pdf; National
Radiological Protection Board, "Risk of Radiation-Induced Cancer
at Low Doses and Low Dose Rates for Radiation Protection
Purposes," Documents of the NRPB, Vol. 6, No. 1 (1995), pp. 1-7;
Animal Studies of Residual Hematopoietic and Immune System
Injury from Low Dose/Low Dose Rate Radiation and Heavy Metals,
Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute Contract Report
98-3, 1998, p. 1. See also Military Medical Operations Office,
Medical Management of Radiological Casualties Handbook, Armed
Forces Radiobiology Research Institute, December 1999, pp.
34-39, and Electronic Power Research Institute, Health Risks
Associated with Low Doses of Radiation, EPRI TR-104070, 2002.
16. For a detailed analysis of the incident, see International
Atomic Energy Agency, Dosimetric and Medical Aspects of the
Radiological Accident in Goiânia, Brazil in 1987, June 1998.
17. Defense Threat Reduction Agency et al., Human Behavior and
WMD Crisis: Risk Communication Workshop: Final Report, March
2001, at
www.bt.usf.edu/Reports/AHA-report-hospital-mass-casualties-2000.P
DF.
18. Committee on the Impact of Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Management Policy on Biomedical Research in the United States,
The Impact of Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Policy on
Biomedical Research in the United States (Washington, D.C.:
National Academy Press, 2001), p. 11, and Audeen W. Fentiman et
al., "Factors That Affect the Cost of Low-Level Radioactive
Waste Disposal," Ohio State University Information Extension
Research Low-Level Radioactive Waste Fact Sheets RER-66, at
www.ag.ohio-state.edu/~rer/rerhtml/rer_66.html (January 21,
2004).
19. S. A. Mullen, J. J. Davidson, and H. B. Jones Jr., Potential
Threat to Licensed Nuclear Activities from Insiders (Insider
Study), NUREG-0703 (Washington, D.C.: Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards,
July 1980).
20. Steve Fetter et al., "Detecting Nuclear Warheads," Science
&Global Security, Vol. 1 (1990), p. 226.
21. Admiral Thomas H. Collins, remarks before the World Shipping
Council, September 17, 2002, p. 2, at www.uscg.mil/
commandant/speeches%5Fcollins/2002%2D09%2D17worldshippingcouncil7
.doc, and David A. Howard, "Valuable Lessons from
Palermo Senator Incident," American Shipper, October 2002, at
www.americanshipper.com.
22. Mathew Bunn, "Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: A Progress
Report," Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs,
October 22, 2003.
23. Ferguson et al., "Commercial Radioactive Sources: Surveying
the Security Risks," pp. 65-66.
24. Richard A. Falkenrath, "The Problems of Preparedness:
Challenges Facing the U.S. Domestic Preparedness Program,"
executive session on domestic preparedness discussion paper,
John F. Kennedy School of Government, 2000, p. 15.
25. U.S. General Accounting Office, National Preparedness:
Integration of Federal, State, and Local and Private Sector
Efforts Is Critical to an Effective National Strategy for
Homeland Security, GAO-02-621T, April 11, 2002, p. 13.
26. James Jay Carafano, "Homeland Security Grant Bill Needs
Revision But Is a Step in the Right Direction," Heritage
Foundation Executive Memorandum No. 909, January 8, 2004, at
www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/EM909.cfm.
27. Donald Elisburg and John Moran, "Response to the World Trade
Center (WTC) Disaster: Initial WEPT Grantee Response and
Preliminary Assessment of Training Needs," National Institute of
Environmental Health Sciences, October 6, 2001, p. 7. See also
Bruce Lippy and Kerry Murray, "The Nation's Forgotten
Responders," National Clearinghouse for Worker Safety and Health
Training," December 14, 2002, pp. 17-23.
28. Elisburg and Moran, "Response to the World Trade Center
(WTC) Disaster," p. 7.
© 1995 - 2004 The Heritage Foundation
All Rights Reserved.
*****************************************************************
21 Guardian Unlimited: Leak against this war (D Ellberg)
[UP]
US and British officials must expose their leaders'
lies about Iraq - as I did over Vietnam
Daniel Ellsberg
Tuesday January 27, 2004
After 17 months observing pacification efforts in Vietnam as a
state department official, I laid eyes upon an unmistakable enemy
for the first time on New Year's Day in 1967. I was walking point
with three members of a company from the US army's 25th Division,
moving through tall rice, the water over our ankles, when we
heard firing close behind us. We spun around, ready to fire. I
saw a boy of about 15, wearing nothing but ragged black shorts,
crouching and firing an AK-47 at the troops behind us. I could
see two others, heads just above the top of the rice, firing as
well.
They had lain there, letting us four pass so as to get a better
shot at the main body of troops. We couldn't fire at them,
because we would have been firing into our own platoon. But a lot
of its fire came back right at us. Dropping to the ground, I
watched this kid firing away for 10 seconds, till he disappeared
with his buddies into the rice. After a minute the platoon ceased
fire in our direction and we got up and moved on.
About an hour later, the same thing happened again; this time I
only saw a glimpse of a black jersey through the rice. I was very
impressed, not only by their tactics but by their performance.
One thing was clear: these were local boys. They had the
advantage of knowing every ditch and dyke, every tree and blade
of rice and piece of cover, like it was their own backyard.
Because it was their backyard. No doubt (I thought later) that
was why they had the nerve to pop up in the midst of a reinforced
battalion and fire away with American troops on all sides. They
thought they were shooting at trespassers, occupiers, that they
had a right to be there and we didn't. This would have been a
good moment to ask myself if they were wrong, and if we had a
good enough reason to be in their backyard to be fired at.
Later that afternoon, I turned to the radio man, a wiry African
American kid who looked too thin to be lugging his 75lb radio,
and asked: "By any chance, do you ever feel like the redcoats?"
Without missing a beat he said, in a drawl: "I've been thinking
that ... all ... day." You couldn't miss the comparison if you'd
gone to grade school in America. Foreign troops far from home,
wearing helmets and uniforms and carrying heavy equipment,
getting shot at every half-hour by non-uniformed irregulars near
their own homes, blending into the local population after each
attack.
I can't help but remember that afternoon as I read about US and
British patrols meeting rockets and mines without warning in the
cities of Iraq. As we faced ambush after ambush in the
countryside, we passed villagers who could have told us we were
about to be attacked. Why didn't they? First, there was a good
chance their friends and family members were the ones doing the
attacking. Second, we were widely seen by the local population
not as allies or protectors - as we preferred to imagine - but as
foreign occupiers. Helping us would have been seen as
collaboration, unpatriotic. Third, they knew that to collaborate
was to be in danger from the resistance, and that the foreigners'
ability to protect them was negligible.
There could not be a more exact parallel between this situation
and Iraq. Our troops in Iraq keep walking into attacks in the
course of patrols apparently designed to provide "security" for
civilians who, mysteriously, do not appear the slightest bit
inclined to warn us of these attacks. This situation - as in
Vietnam - is a harbinger of endless bloodletting. I believe
American and British soldiers will be dying, and killing, in that
country as long as they remain there.
As more and more US and British families lose loved ones in Iraq
- killed while ostensibly protecting a population that does not
appear to want them there - they will begin to ask: "How did we
get into this mess, and why are we still in it?" And the answers
they find will be disturbingly similar to those the American
public found for Vietnam.
I served three US presidents - Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon - who
lied repeatedly and blatantly about our reasons for entering
Vietnam, and the risks in our staying there. For the past year, I
have found myself in the horrifying position of watching history
repeat itself. I believe that George Bush and Tony Blair lied -
and continue to lie - as blatantly about their reasons for
entering Iraq and the prospects for the invasion and occupation
as the presidents I served did about Vietnam.
By the time I released to the press in 1971 what became known as
the Pentagon Papers - 7,000 pages of top-secret documents
demonstrating that virtually everything four American presidents
had told the public about our involvement in Vietnam was false -
I had known that pattern as an insider for years, and I knew that
a fifth president, Richard Nixon, was following in their
footsteps. In the fall of 2002, I hoped that officials in
Washington and London who knew that our countries were being lied
into an illegal, bloody war and occupation would consider doing
what I wish I had done in 1964 or 1965, years before I did,
before the bombs started to fall: expose these lies, with
documents.
I can only admire the more timely, courageous action of Katherine
Gun, the GCHQ translator who risked her career and freedom to
expose an illegal plan to win official and public support for an
illegal war, before that war had started. Her revelation of a
classified document urging British intelligence to help the US
bug the phones of all the members of the UN security council to
manipulate their votes on the war may have been critical in
denying the invasion a false cloak of legitimacy. That did not
prevent the aggression, but it was reasonable for her to hope
that her country would not choose to act as an outlaw, thereby
saving lives. She did what she could, in time for it to make a
difference, as indeed others should have done, and still can.
I have no doubt that there are thousands of pages of documents in
safes in London and Washington right now - the Pentagon Papers of
Iraq - whose unauthorised revelation would drastically alter the
public discourse on whether we should continue sending our
children to die in Iraq. That's clear from what has already come
out through unauthorised disclosures from many anonymous sources
and from officials and former officials such as David Kelly and
US ambassador Joseph Wilson, who revealed the falsity of reports
that Iraq had pursued uranium from Niger, which President Bush
none the less cited as endorsed by British intelligence in his
state of the union address before the war. Both Downing Street
and the White House organised covert pressure to punish these
leakers and to deter others, in Dr Kelly's case with tragic
results.
Those who reveal documents on the scale necessary to return
foreign policy to democratic control risk prosecution and prison
sentences, as Katherine Gun is now facing. I faced 12 felony
counts and a possible sentence of 115 years; the charges were
dismissed when it was discovered that White House actions aimed
at stopping further revelations of administration lying had
included criminal actions against me.
Exposing governmental lies carries a heavy personal risk, even in
our democracies. But that risk can be worthwhile when a
war's-worth of lives is at stake.
· Daniel Ellsberg is the author of Secrets: a Memoir of Vietnam
and the Pentagon Papers.
Guardian Newspapers Limited
*****************************************************************
22 CS Monitor: Nukes: Can US practice what it preaches?
| csmonitor.com
Commentary > Opinion
from the January 28, 2004 edition
By Stansfield Turner
WASHINGTON In June 2002, President Bush advised the nation that
the greatest threat to US security lies in the possibility of
terrorists acquiring unconventional weapons. It would seem
logical, then, to reassess whether national security strategy is
doing all that is possible to keep weapons out of the hands of
terrorists. A good starting point: the United States' own nuclear
policies.
With respect to chemical and biological weapons, the US has
eschewed possession of them and is destroying what stocks it has.
The record is more problematic with nuclear weapons. The Bush
administration has taken policies on these weapons in two
directions that differ substantially from previous policies. A
necessary question to ask is whether these changes impede or abet
preventing terrorists from obtaining nuclear weapons.
In the spring of 2002, Presidents Bush and Putin signed the
Moscow Treaty establishing the goal of reducing inventories of
immediately deployable strategic nuclear warheads on each side to
between 1,700 and 2,200 by the end of 2012. This was in line with
the previous policy, as reflected in the START II Treaty, which
reduced both sides to 3,000 to 3,500 strategic warheads. Where
the Bush policy is different is in the slow pace of the
demobilization - no reductions from present levels are required
for 10 years - and the treaty does not require the destruction of
any warheads. It provides only that each side will retain just
1,700 to 2,200 immediately deployable warheads. It isn't clear to
the public just what that means. The US, however, has indicated
it will not destroy any of the 4,000 to 5,000 warheads above the
allowable limit that it retains. Instead it will keep them in
some condition that it can claim is not immediately deployable.
The net effect of the treaty and of US plans for dealing with it,
then, is to say that the US is placing a high premium on
maintaining access to approximately 6,000 to 7,000 strategic
nuclear warheads as a hedge against uncertainty.
A second change in policy is that the Bush administration has
gone to Congress for authorization to do research on new, less
powerful, tactical warheads. These are primarily for employment
as "bunker busters" for destroying deeply buried, hardened
targets. This, too, indicates the importance the US places on
having usable nuclear weaponry.
The issue the country must face today is whether these two new
directions are compatible with reducing the primary threat of
proliferation of nuclear weapons to terrorists. It seems obvious
that if the US, with the strongest military forces in the world,
insists on having lots of usable nuclear weapons, such weapons
must have even greater utility for powers with lesser
conventional forces. Thus, the US has reduced its leverage to
garner cooperation from other nations in the myriad actions
necessary to prevent further proliferation of nuclear weapons.
How can the US convince the world that the Iraqs and the North
Koreas must not have even one nuclear weapon when it needs 7,000?
The US looks hypocritical and isn't in a sound position to lead
the world in an antiproliferation campaign.
The US has no need for such overwhelming nuclear superiority.
Russia has acknowledged that since the collapse of the Soviet
Union it hasn't invested adequately in maintaining and replacing
its aging nuclear arsenal. Consequently, very shortly it will be
down to about 1,000 usable strategic nuclear warheads. No one
else has even 500.
And, as for needing "bunker busters": The US has such superior
conventional military forces that it could overwhelm even a North
Korea, regardless of whether its leadership hunkers underground.
And, it is worth noting that Saddam Hussein hid in a rathole, not
an impregnable bunker; and that we have not heard one word from
the administration about what were supposed to be some of the
world's best bunkers in Baghdad.
The US could always cut the supplies of electricity and water,
plus communications and even physical access to underground
bunkers, using only conventional weapons. Most bunkers are in
cities and the US would never drop a nuclear weapon, even a
"small" one, in an urban area just to destroy a bunker. Small
busters are the equivalent of about 10 million pounds of TNT,
plus radiation.
Fortuitously there is a way to show the world that the US is
willing to downplay its nuclear arsenal while at the same time
taking into account the Bush administration's concern about being
caught short. It is called "strategic escrow."
Under strategic escrow, the nuclear warheads that the US must, in
accordance with the Moscow Treaty, render operationally
undeployable would be removed from their missiles or bombers and
placed in storage at some significant distance. There would be
international observers to report if warheads were being returned
to their delivery vehicles. Surely the administration must be
planning something closely akin to this strategic escrow as a way
of retaining the 4,000 to 5,000 warheads it has above the treaty
limit.
By pursuing strategic escrow, the US would show it is serious
about curbing everyone's nuclear weaponry, even its own. That
would be the case especially if the US decided to go down to the
Russian level of 1,000 fully ready nuclear warheads or even
fewer, instead of the 1,700 to 2,200 permitted by the treaty -
and if the US did it in one to two years instead of eight.
This would better enable the US to pressure the other seven
nuclear powers to place proportional numbers of their arsenals in
escrow. Soon, with very low numbers of nuclear weapons
immediately ready to fire, the risk of unintended nuclear war
would be substantially reduced.
Most of all, though, the world community would understand how
vital curbing nuclear proliferation is to America. US leverage
over irresponsible nations that might sell nuclear components or
technology to rogue states or terrorists would be greatly
increased.
The events of 9/11 have forced America to take seriously the
awesome threat of nuclear terrorism. It would be surprising if
some adjustment in national security strategy were not needed to
cope with this new danger. Surely the mightiest military power on
earth can look at ways to reduce its power while remaining safe,
but at the same time leading the world in an antiproliferation
regime that might avert a catastrophe for all mankind.
" Adm. Stansfield Turner was director of central intelligence
from 1977 to 1981 and is now on the faculty of the University of
Maryland's graduate School of Public Affairs.
www.csmonitor.com | Copyright © 2004 The Christian Science
Monitor. All rights reserved.
*****************************************************************
23 Las Vegas SUN: Libya Nuclear Components Arrive in U.S.
Today: January 27, 2004 at 12:05:12 PST
By BARRY SCHWEID ASSOCIATED PRESS
WASHINGTON (AP) -
An American plane carrying components of Libya's nuclear weapons
and missile programs arrived Tuesday in the United States as
Moammar Gadhafi follows through on a pledge to dismantle the
program.
The plane landed at McGhee Tyson airport outside Knoxville,
Tenn., carrying about 55,000 pounds of equipment, including
stock to enrich uranium, centrifuge parts and guidance sets for
long-range missiles, White House spokesman Scott McClellan said.
The equipment likely will be evaluated at the Oak Ridge nuclear
weapons plant in Tennessee. The "most sensitive documentation"
associated with Libya's nuclear program arrived by plane last
week, McClellan said.
Also, the spokesman announced that Libya had begun destroying
chemical munitions.
Gadhafi, trying to break out of diplomatic isolation and seeking
a lifting of U.S. economic sanctions, promised last Dec. 19 to
end development of nuclear and all other weapons of mass
destruction.
"The world can see that Col. Gadhafi is keeping his commitment,"
McClellan said.
However, the White House gave no indication it was ready to ease
the U.S. economic squeeze on Libya, nor did the State Department
say Libya's designation as a supporter of terrorism would be
canceled.
"As they take these essential steps and demonstrate its
seriousness, its good faith will be returned and Libya can
regain a secure and respected place among the nations,"
McClellan said.
He said the shipments were "only the beginning of the
elimination of Libya's weapons."
Rep. Tom Lantos, the senior Democrat on the House International
Relations Committee, met Monday in Tripoli with Gadhafi for 90
minutes and reported the Libyan leader intended to follow
through on his pledge.
Lantos, in an interview, said he would urge Rep. Henry Hyde,
R-Ill., to join him in a bipartisan appeal to the Bush
administration to show "good faith" in Gadhafi by ending a ban
on travel to Libya.
Gadhafi's historic turnabout, promoted by Britain with U.S.
support, is being cited by the White House as a triumph in the
campaign to halt the spread of nuclear technology.
After Gadhafi's pledge to abandon his quest for weapons of mass
destruction, Secretary of State Colin Powell said "the next step
is to make sure we have a clear understanding of what Libya
possesses."
Powell said the administration intended to pursue aggressively
reports that Libya obtained much of its nuclear technology from
Pakistan.
"We know that there have been cases where individuals in
Pakistan have worked in these areas," Powell said.
In the interim, administration officials gave no indication they
were prepared to ease U.S. sanctions that have hurt Libya's
economy. In fact, Powell said last week he still considered
Gadhafi a dictator.
--
*****************************************************************
24 Las Vegas SUN: Top Pakistan Nuke Scientist Investigated
Today: January 27, 2004 at 10:45:11 PST
By BURT HERMAN ASSOCIATED PRESS
ISLAMABAD, Pakistan (AP) -
As Pakistan's nuclear probe enters its final stretch,
investigators have focused on a man revered as a national hero:
Abdul Qadeer Khan, father of the country's nuclear program.
Known as a self-promoting nationalist, Khan has always been
surrounded by controversy, including allegations he stole plans
from a former Dutch employer that jump-started Pakistan's
nuclear weapons program in the 1970s.
Pakistan began its probe into its nuclear program and possible
proliferation to Iran in late November after admissions made by
Tehran to the International Atomic Energy Agency, the U.N.
nuclear watchdog. Allegations also have surfaced that Pakistani
technology spread to Libya and North Korea as well.
An intelligence official familiar with the investigation told
The Associated Press on Tuesday that Khan is among a small
number of suspects in the probe, but "a final determination is
yet to be made" of his guilt.
Khan has made no public comment; a friend said the scientist
told him he had done nothing wrong.
Officials acknowledge Khan is still being questioned, and even
though he's not one of the seven scientists and security
officials still detained in the investigation, they won't rule
out that he might face charges. Acquaintances say Khan's
movement has been restricted to the capital, Islamabad.
"Nobody is above the law," Foreign Ministry spokesman Masood
Khan told reporters Tuesday.
On Monday, Information Minister Sheikh Rashid Ahmed said "one or
two people" acted for personal profit in trying to spread
nuclear technology. President Gen. Pervez Musharraf has also
acknowledged that some officials from the nuclear program may
have proliferated weapons technology for personal gain, but has
denied any official involvement.
Abdul Qadeer Khan founded the program that developed nuclear
weapons in Pakistan, the first in the Islamic world. He has been
awarded the country's highest civilian award twice - the only
person so honored.
In recognition of Khan's contribution, Pakistan's nuclear
weapons lab was renamed for him in 1981. Khan retired in 2001,
but still serves as a government adviser.
Born in present-day India in 1935 to a teacher's family, Khan
emigrated to Pakistan in 1952, five years after its partition
from India. He earned a doctorate in metallurgy in Belgium and
began working in 1972 at a Netherlands subsidiary of the
British-German-Dutch nuclear conglomerate URENCO, returning in
1976 to head Pakistan's nuclear program.
While at URENCO, Khan had access to centrifuge technology - used
to enrich uranium into the form needed to produce weapons - and
was reportedly assigned to translate highly classified documents
describing the designs in detail.
In 1983, a Netherlands court convicted Khan in absentia on a
charge of stealing confidential material from URENCO and
sentenced him to four years in prison. He denied the charge and
the conviction was later overturned on technicality.
Khan's name has come up before in allegations Pakistan spread of
nuclear technology - to Iraq. An AP report in December 2002,
citing U.N. documents, diplomats and former weapons inspectors,
said a middleman claiming to represent Khan offered to help
Baghdad build a bomb on the eve of the 1991 Gulf War.
Profit was the alleged motive for the offer, which the Iraqis
rejected. A company Khan owned in Dubai was to transfer the
equipment.
In the current investigation, a media report Sunday said
scientists' bank accounts were being traced and that one unnamed
nuclear scientist had a tens of millions of dollars in financial
and real estate holdings in Pakistan and abroad, including in
Dubai. It did not name the scientists.
Zahid Malik, a journalist and friend of Khan's who recently saw
him, said the scientist denied any wrongdoing. "He told me that
he is innocent and has not done anything against the interest of
Pakistan," Malik said.
Khan's flamboyant persona has earned him some detractors, and
he's long been viewed with skepticism in the West. But even
Pakistani media have reported on his possible role in the
scandal recently, one of the first times Khan has faced
criticism at home.
"He is used to accusations in the Western press, but he's
disturbed that there are accusations now from the Pakistani
press as well," Malik said.
Khalid Mahmood, a senior research fellow at Islamabad's
Institute of Regional Studies, said Khan's support within
Pakistan wasn't strong enough to shield him from the
investigation.
"There is a constituency, a lobby which protects him as a hero,"
Mahmood said. "This is a very limited lobby and they do not have
the ability to mobilize popular support."
Khan has backers among Pakistan's Islamist parties, who have
supported the scientists in the investigation. They accuse
Musharraf of kowtowing to the West, and fear the investigation
will lead to Pakistan giving up its nuclear weapons.
Officials say whatever the probe finds, Pakistan will never turn
over its bombs.
"Pakistan will remain a nuclear weapons state. We will continue
to enhance our nuclear capability," said Masood Khan, the
Foreign Ministry spokesman.
--
*****************************************************************
25 AU SMH: Powell lets fly with criticism of Russia -
www.smh.com.au
[Sydney Morning Herald Online]
January 28, 2004
The US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, has criticised curbs on
free elections and the news media, as well as the Russian
military campaign in Chechnya, in meetings with Russia's
President, Vladimir Putin, and in an essay published in a Russian
newspaper.
In the toughest public stance to date by a Bush Administration
official, Mr Powell said certain developments in Russian politics
and foreign policy in recent months "have given us pause".
In an essay published on Monday in the newspaper Izvestia, Mr
Powell said he had raised these concerns in seven hours of
meetings with Mr Putin and other officials at the Kremlin.
White House officials said Mr Powell's concerns included the
arrest and seizure of the assets of a prominent businessman and
political rival of Mr Putin, Mikhail Khodorkovsky. Mr Powell also
commented on parliamentary elections in which several parties
complained about a lack of access to the media.
The Bush Administration has been reluctant to criticise Russia
publicly, saying Russian officials' sensitivity to such remarks
could make them less likely to co-operate on a range of issues,
from nuclear proliferation to Iraq's reconstruction.
But growing concern about Russian actions, and increasing
criticism in Congress and among Democratic presidential
candidates about US passivity, have resulted in a change in the
Administration's stance.
Mr Powell's article increases the pressure, while avoiding a
direct confrontation between Mr Bush and Mr Putin. Their
relationship blossomed after September 11, 2001, with Moscow and
Washington co-operating in the fight against global terrorism and
resolving a dispute over the US's proposed missile defence
scheme.
Mr Powell declined to repeat his criticisms during a news
conference with Russia's Foreign Minister, Igor Ivanov, after the
meetings. State-controlled television emphasised the cooperation
between the US and Russia, and there appeared to be little public
concern in Russia. Mr Putin made no mention of the criticism that
preceded Mr Powell's arrival.
In the Izvestia essay, Mr Powell argued that Russia had yet to
achieve an "essential balance" between the executive and other
branches of government.
He questioned Russia's policies in the separatist republic of
Chechnya and its slow progress towards full democracy.
"Political power is not yet fully tethered to law," Mr Powell
wrote. "Key aspects of civil society - free media and political
party development, for example - have not yet sustained an
independent presence."
In an attempt to soothe fears of growing rivalry along Russia's
borders with former Soviet republics, Mr Powell on Monday said
the US had no plans to create military bases in Georgia.
At the same time, US officials have not ruled out a long-term
security presence in the strategically important Caucasus
republic, once a part of the Soviet Union and still a crucial
component of the Kremlin's effort to maintain an extensive sphere
of influence and counter NATO's expansion towards its western
frontier.
The New York Times, Los Angeles Times
Copyright © 2004. The Sydney Morning Herald. advertise|
*****************************************************************
26 Washington Post: Hope on N. Korea
(washingtonpost.com)
By John W. Lewis
Tuesday, January 27, 2004; Page A17
Last August, just after my ninth visit to North Korea since 1987,
the six-party talks on the Korean nuclear crisis ended in
stalemate. In the days that followed, I began organizing a return
trip by a group of people who had been studying the North's
nuclear program and the tortuous path of U.S.-North Korean
relations.
The January visit to Pyongyang fell into three principal areas:
Foreign Ministry discussions, a visit to the Nuclear Scientific
Research Center at Yongbyon, and extended meetings with officials
dealing with a variety of economic, military, scientific,
humanitarian and human rights questions. Obviously, what has
attracted the most attention is our visit to Yongbyon, but that
was only one of the directions we took.
My previous trips to North Korea had covered the years from the
distancing of Pyongyang's erstwhile allies, China and Russia,
following the Cold War, through the disastrous periods of flood,
drought and famine in the mid-1990s, to the attempts to introduce
economic reforms in 2002. The changes from 1987 to 2004 have been
dramatic, and they continue. Along the roads and in the towns,
small entrepreneurs are taking advantage of the new pricing and
market policies. The real shocker was the massive semi-private
market on Tong Il Street in Pyongyang, where potential buyers can
find quantities of meat, vegetables and fruits as well as
hardware, furniture and clothes. While life in the countryside
remains stark, similar markets are said to be springing up in
other cities, and South Korean money is flowing in to build a
huge industrial park just north of the Demilitarized Zone. A
market economy, however limited, has arrived in the North.
These changes are as important as they are dramatic. They put the
nuclear program in a new context. North Korea's desperately
needed and desired economic policies depend on opening to the
outside world and can succeed only if its nuclear weapons program
is totally dismantled, which all parties to the six-party talks
say is their goal. Last spring the nuclear program was the lead
element in Pyongyang's "military-first" strategy, but now the
program and the strategy are under pressure from economic
priorities. The West's misperception of North Korea's economic
state (stuck in the images of the mid-1990s famine) has skewed
its ability to understand the complex motivations driving
Pyongyang's leadership.
Misinterpretations and language barriers may have also raised
roadblocks to diplomacy. At the Foreign Ministry, we discussed
the contentious issue of North Korea's supposed admission on Oct.
4, 2002, to having a clandestine highly enriched uranium (HEU)
program in violation of the letter and spirit of the 1994 Agreed
Framework. There is a disagreement about whether North Korea
actually admitted to having such a program at a meeting with U.S.
officials. The disagreement concerns a difference between what
North Korea believes it said and what the United States believes
it heard. The issue is important because when it was claimed that
the North had admitted to having an HEU program, diplomacy died
for a year and North Korea advanced at full speed toward a
nuclear arsenal.
Once who said what about the enriched-uranium program has been
clarified, we will still have to deal with the facts. As one
delegation member said to the Koreans: "The key issue is the U.S.
has independent information that makes it believe the DPRK [North
Korea] has an HEU program. In the U.S., there is the widespread
view that the complete, verifiable resolution of this HEU issue
is now mandatory. This is a practical issue, and there must be a
multilateral discussion to resolve it."
In response, the vice foreign minister said the North had chosen
the plutonium path and had no facilities or scientists dedicated
to an HEU program, adding that Pyongyang was open to technical
talks on the issue -- a significant new development.
Just before we arrived in North Korea, its government reissued a
proposal for a freeze on the manufacturing, testing or
transferring of its nuclear weapons, and the Foreign Ministry
officials we met were pleased with Secretary of State Colin L.
Powell's positive initial reaction. They said that in response to
their proposal, they want the United States to take North Korea
off the list of state sponsors of terrorism, to lift political,
economic and military sanctions, and, with other neighboring
states, to provide energy, including heavy fuel oil. Our
delegation probed this proposal, which Pyongyang wants followed
by security assurances from the United States. The freeze, the
officials told us, would be an achievable first step on the way
to the complete and verifiable dismantling of the North's nuclear
program.
We expressed our view that North Korea's freeze proposal was
unbalanced -- or as Pyongyang itself was to put it: "their word
for our actions." We suggested it would be far better to begin
with their "word" that a freeze had begun in exchange for our
"word" on a security guarantee. In any case, North Korea's
diplomats stated that a compromise was quite possible.
The main challenge now is to engage North Korea and deal with our
mutual fears and threats. Neither war nor a nuclearized North
Korea is an option. The diplomacy of nuclear disarmament in this
age is starkly different from that of the Cold War. Mutual
deterrence between vastly unequal states lacks stability and
reasonable predictability. It does not exist.
The opportunity for a diplomatic solution has grown in recent
weeks. The North Korean Foreign Ministry said that if our visit
helped "even a bit" to remove the ambiguities and
misunderstandings of the crisis, it "would serve as a substantial
foundation for a peaceful settlement." We fully recognize that
this "bit" must be followed up with many more, but we believe
such a settlement is no longer a vain hope.
The writer, a professor emeritus of Chinese politics at Stanford
University's Center for International Security and Cooperation,
will discuss this article online today at 1:30 p.m. on
washingtonpost.com.
© 2004 The Washington Post Company
*****************************************************************
27 Daily Times: FO says Pakistan will remain nuclear
Wednesday, January 28, 2004
* Spokesman says no pressure on Pakistan to debrief nuclear
scientists
Staff Report
ISLAMABAD: Pakistan Foreign Office spokesman Masood Khan on
Tuesday reaffirmed that Pakistan would remain a nuclear state and
would continue enhancing its capability to maintain a competitive
edge in this regard.
Regarding the nuclear scientists and former administrators’
debriefings, he said Pakistan had to demonstrate to the
international community that no pilferage or leakage would ever
take place from Pakistan.
He, however, regretted that the focus had been on Pakistan alone
in the past. He said reports appearing in the media clearly
indicated that companies and individuals from Europe, the Persian
Gulf, North America and other parts of the world were involved.
He said the focus on Pakistan was lopsided as there was an
international black market and the world had a collective
responsibility to eliminate it.
He said debriefings were taking place as the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) had sought Pakistan’s cooperation. He,
however, pointed out that there was no intrusive involvement of
the agency.
He said the investigations were aimed at determining if these
people, motivated by personal gain or ambition, transferred
sensitive information or technology to other countries through
the black market. Investigations were also aimed at looking into
any possible financial dimension to the issue, he added.
He said investigations were being held into matters that happened
in the past. He said if something happened, it happened long ago.
He said since 1998, Pakistan had a strong command and control
system and stringent export control regime. “We have firm
custodial controls for our strategic assets. An intelligence
organisation is monitoring all activities while there are several
rings of security to ward off any possibility of proliferation or
leakage,” he added. He also said there was no pressure of any
sort on Pakistan in debriefing Pakistan’s nuclear scientists. He
said Iran had told the IAEA that it got the technology in 1987
from the black market in the Persian Gulf and Europe. He said
President Pervez Musharraf had clearly said no government in the
past had proliferated and no future government would do so.
Regarding the allegations levelled by Senator Ishaq Dar against
former chief of the army staff Gen (r) Aslam Beg of bringing an
Iranian offer of $12 billion for nuclear technology transfer, he
said there was no evidence to establish that any military or
civilian institution was involved in the proliferation. Asked to
comment on the massive arms purchases by India, he said there
should be a restraint in defence purchases and spending and there
should be a conventional balance between Pakistan and India.
There must be a strategic restraint regime between the two
countries, he added.
Responding to another question, he said Pakistan’s doors were
always open to Kashmiri leaders from across the Line of Control.
Daily Times - All Rights Reserved
*****************************************************************
28 english.eastday: China applies to join Nuclear Suppliers Group
China' permanent representative to the United Nations and other
international organizations in Vienna, Zhang Yan, submitted the
application to NSG rotating president Cho Chang-beom.
Zhang also delivered a note to Director-General of International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Mohamed M. ElBaradei, informing him
of China's intention for NSG membership.
In an interview with Xinhua, Zhang said China firmly opposes the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their carriers.
As a signatory to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, China
strictly abides by its international obligations and has never
supported, encouraged nor helped any nation in developing nuclear
weapons, the Chinese ambassador said.
In recent years, Zhang said, China has promulgated and
implemented a series of laws and regulations concerning the
control of nuclear materials and instituted strict administration
and control of nuclear exports.
He said China has held talks and consultations with the NSG in
recent years and adopted policies and mechanisms in nuclear
export control similar to those of the group.
Joining the NSG is a key step for China to play a more active
role in nuclear non-proliferation, a step conducive to its
efforts in seeking closer international cooperation in this
regard, Zhang added.
Established in 1975, the NSG is an unofficial organization of
nuclear capable countries exercising control on nuclear exports.
It has played an important role in nuclear non-proliferation and
nuclear export control. Xinhua news
. Copyright (C) 2000 www.eastday.com. All
*****************************************************************
29 Boston.com: In Moscow, Powell airs concerns, hails progress
Putin says relations are 'strong and solid'
By George Gedda, Associated Press, 1/27/2004
MOSCOW -- Visiting US Secretary of State Colin L. Powell raised
objections to Russia's curbs on press freedom and the country's
quest for military victory over Chechen rebels, but he and
President Vladimir V. Putin agreed yesterday that US-Russian
relations are on a sound footing.
In the days leading up to his visit, Powell had refrained from
criticizing Russia. But he took the unusual step of outlining,
albeit gently and sometimes indirectly, his concerns in an
opinion piece in Izvestia, perhaps the most respected daily
newspaper in the country.
The commentary competed for attention with Powell's two
appearances in Moscow, with Putin before their Kremlin meeting
and at a joint news conference later with Foreign Minister Igor
Ivanov.
Sitting across from Powell in an ornate, high-ceilinged meeting
room, Putin said he thought the fundamental base of relations
between the United States and Russia "is strong and solid despite
all technical differences that we might have on some
international issues."
Putin offered congratulations to Powell on the US success in the
recent Mars landing. He praised growing US-Russian trade and
economic ties, and noted the nations' cooperation in combating
terrorism.
For his part, Powell hailed the "great progress made in our
relations over the past three years," including reduction of the
two countries' nuclear arsenals.
Powell's tone in his appearances was somewhat different from his
Page 1 commentary in Izvestia. In an apparent reference to
executive branch domination in Russia, the article said
"essential balance" is lacking among the various branches of the
nation's government.
"Political power is not fully tethered to law," Powell wrote. He
added that such key aspects of civil society as "free media and
political party development . . . have not yet sustained an
independent presence."
Powell thus publicly stated what other US officials have said
privately, particularly in reference to the December
parliamentary elections when, they allege, media coverage was
slanted heavily in favor of Putin's United Russia Party. Some
once-competitive political parties, they say, were left
scrambling to survive in the aftermath.
Although Powell did not offer details about his concerns over
Chechnya, the Bush administration has long encouraged Moscow to
seek a political solution to the conflict in the breakaway
republic, which is mostly Muslim. The fighting has persisted
intermittently for almost a decade.
Powell said Washington recognizes Russia's territorial integrity
but added that the "sovereign integrity" of Russia's neighbors
and "their rights to peaceful and respectful relations across
their border" are no less important.
This was interpreted as an oblique reference to Russian policies
toward former Soviet republics, especially neighboring Georgia,
where Russia maintains military bases over the objections of the
Georgian government. Moscow also has been supporting two
separatist movements in Georgia.
At his news conference with Powell, Ivanov said Russia welcomes
negotiations with Georgia to try to resolve the dispute over
Russian bases.
Powell, meanwhile, said the United States does not intend to open
military bases in Georgia and soon will withdraw as many as 100
military trainers from the country.
Those assurances could make it easier politically for Putin to
cut back on Russia's troops in the country.
In response to a question, Powell said his Izvestia commentary
"was not an attempt to interfere in the dynamics of Russian
political life. It was one friend speaking to another." ©
Copyright 2004 Globe Newspaper Company. [ title=] PRINTER
*****************************************************************
30 Guardian Unlimited: The US is now in the hands of a group of
extremists
Fundamentalism has spawned an ideology of American supremacy
George Soros
Monday January 26, 2004
The invasion of Iraq was the first practical application of the
pernicious Bush doctrine of pre-emptive military action, and it
elicited an allergic reaction worldwide - not because anyone had
a good word to say about Saddam Hussein, but because we insisted
on invading Iraq unilaterally without any clear evidence that he
had anything to do with September 11 or that he possessed weapons
of mass destruction.
The gap in perceptions between America and the rest of the world
has never been wider. Abroad, America is seen as abusing the
dominant position it occupies; opinion at home has been led to
believe that Saddam posed a clear and present danger to national
security. Only in the aftermath of the Iraqi invasion are people
becoming aware they have been misled.
Even today, many people believe that September 11 justifies
behaviour that would be unacceptable in normal times. The
ideologues of American supremacy and President Bush personally
never cease to remind us that September 11 changed the world. It
is only as the untoward consequences of the invasion of Iraq
become apparent that people are beginning to realise something
has gone woefully wrong.
We have fallen into a trap. The suicide bombers' motivation
seemed incomprehensible at the time of the attack; now a light
begins to dawn: they wanted us to react the way we did. Perhaps
they understood us better than we understand ourselves.
And we have been deceived. When he stood for election in 2000,
President Bush promised a humble foreign policy. I contend that
the Bush administration has deliberately exploited September 11
to pursue policies that the American public would not have
otherwise tolerated. The US can lose its dominance only as a
result of its own mistakes. At present the country is in the
process of committing such mistakes because it is in the hands of
a group of extremists whose strong sense of mission is matched
only by their false sense of certitude.
This distorted view postulates that because we are stronger than
others, we must know better and we must have right on our side.
That is where religious fundamentalism comes together with market
fundamentalism to form the ideology of American supremacy.
We may have more difficulty in perceiving the absurdity of
pursuing supremacy by military means, because we have learned to
rely on military power and we particularly feel the need for it
when our very existence is threatened. But the most powerful
country on earth cannot afford to be consumed by fear. To make
the war on terrorism the centrepiece of our national strategy is
an abdication of our responsibility as the leading nation in the
world. The US is the only country that can take the lead in
addressing problems that require collective action: preserving
peace and economic progress, protecting the environment and so
on.
Whatever the justification for removing Saddam, there can be no
doubt that we invaded Iraq on false pretenses. Wittingly or
unwittingly, President Bush deceived the American public and
Congress and rode roughshod over our allies' opinions.
The gap between the administration's expectations and the actual
state of affairs could not be wider. We have put at risk not only
our soldiers' lives but the combat readiness of our armed forces.
We are overstretched and our ability to project our power has
been compromised. Yet there are more places where we need to
project our power than ever. North Korea is openly building
nuclear weapons; Iran is doing so clandestinely. The Taliban is
regrouping in the Pashtun areas of Afghanistan. The costs of
occupation and the prospect of permanent war weigh on our
economy, and we are failing to address festering problems both at
home and globally. If we ever needed proof that the neo-cons'
dream of American supremacy is misconceived, Iraq has provided
it.
It is hard to imagine how the plans of the defence department
could have gone more awry. We find ourselves in a quagmire that
is in some ways reminiscent of Vietnam. Having invaded Iraq, we
cannot extricate ourselves. Domestic pressure to withdraw is
likely to build, as in the Vietnam war, but withdrawing would
inflict irreparable damage on our standing in the world. In this
respect, Iraq is worse than Vietnam because of our dependence on
Middle East oil.
Nobody forced us into it; on the contrary, everyone warned us
against it. Admittedly, Saddam was a heinous tyrant and it was a
good thing to get rid of him. But at what cost? The occupying
powers serve as a focal point for attracting terrorists and
radicalising Islam. Our soldiers have to do police work in full
combat gear.
And the cost of occupation is estimated at a staggering $160bn
for the the fiscal years 2003-2004 - $73bn for 2003 and $87bn in
a supplemental request for 2004 submitted at the last minute in
September 2003. Of the $87bn, only $20bn is for reconstruction,
but the total cost of reconstruction is estimated at $60bn. For
comparison, our foreign aid budget for 2002 was $10bn.
There is no easy way out. The Bush administration is eager to get
the United Nations more involved but is unwilling to make the
necessary concessions. We have no alternative to sticking it out
and paying the price for our mistake. Eventually a different
president with a different attitude to international cooperation
may be more successful in extricating us.
The US is not the only country at the centre of the global
capitalist system, but it is the most powerful and it is the main
driving force behind globalisation. The European Union may equal
the US in population and gross national product, but it is far
less united and far less comfortable with globalisation. In
military terms, the EU does not even qualify as a power, because
members make their own decisions.
Insofar as any nation is in charge of the world order, it is the
US. That is not to suggest that other countries are exempt from
having to concern themselves with the wellbeing of the world.
Their attitudes are not without consequence, but it is the US
that matters most.
If Bush is rejected in 2004, his policies can be written off as
an aberration and America resume its rightful place in the world.
But if he is re-elected, the electorate will have endorsed his
policies and we will have to live with the consequences. But it
isn't enough to defeat Bush at the polls. The US must examine its
global role and adopt a more constructive vision. We cannot
merely pursue narrow, national self-interest. Our dominant
position imposes a unique responsibility.
© George Soros 2004
This is an edited extract from The Bubble of American Supremacy,
by George Soros, published on Thursday by Weidenfeld & Nicolson
at £12.99. To order a copy for £10.99 plus p&p, call the Guardian
book service on 0870 066 7979
Guardian Newspapers Limited
*****************************************************************
31 asahi.com : EDITORIAL: 25 years after the shah
[asahi.com]
Iran seems to be sinking into a deepening crisis.
A quarter century has passed since the shah of Iran was
overthrown and replaced by an Islamic regime in a surge of
religious fervor. In January 1979, resentment against Reza Shah
Pahlavi's dictatorship and strong-arm pursuit of Westernization
reached boiling point. It resulted in his exile and the
triumphant return of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini from 16-year
exile to lead religious revolutionaries to overthrow all vestiges
of the shah's government in February.
The revolution transformed Iran into a theocratic Islamic
republic ruled by Shiite Muslim tenets and ignited an
international resurgence of Islam that shook the world.
On the 25th anniversary of the revolution, Iran seems to have
gone down a political blind alley. A deepening sense of gloom is
evident.
While international rescue efforts are continuing, following the
disastrous earthquake in the southeastern town of Bam late last
year, ominous political developments have taken place. The
Guardian Council, bastion of hard-line conservatives, decided to
bar hundreds of reformist candidates from running for
parliamentary elections in February. Angered reformist forces
denounced the decision and suggested boycotting the elections if
the candidate bans are overturned. The power struggle between the
two camps shows signs of escalating into a serous political
crisis.
The conservatives are intent on maintaining clerical rule and
have torpedoed a number of bills for domestic reforms. These were
passed by a parliament which is dominated by lawmakers supporting
reformist President Mohammad Khatami. But hard-liners found them
to be unconstitutional or incompatible with Islamic law.
Iran generally is more democratic than most of its Arab
neighbors, given its relatively smooth presidential and
parliamentary elections. But the people's opinions and wishes
manifested in elections are too often blocked by theocratic rule
and not translated into actual policies. The current turmoil
indicates the political dysfunction has reached a critical stage.
Despite its huge oil production, Iran's economy remains in
stagnation. With no new industries emerging, the jobless rate
hovers above 20 percent. The country is eking out economic growth
thanks to high oil prices. Besides stalled progress in the
privatization of public enterprises amid the rivalry between the
conservative and the reformist camps, the country's long-standing
international isolation-caused by its policy of ``exporting''
Islamic revolution-has badly hampered the economy.
Discontent is growing, not just with hard-line clerics but also
with the reformist government and its political allies, which
have failed to produce significant tangible results. The
situation increasingly is becoming unacceptable to Iran's
relatively youthful population. Nearly 70 percent of its citizens
are under age 30 and better informed about life in the West than
previous generations due to the spread of the Internet.
President Khatami recently announced the Constitution will be
revised when the time is ripe. Unless political leaders end their
futile conflict and establish a system that can flexibly turn
public opinions into policies, the situation could become very
ugly and threaten the foundation of the current regime.
Khatami's diplomatic efforts to promote ``dialogue among
civilizations'' have improved Iran's relations with Gulf and
European industrial countries.
Ending Iran's international isolation requires real rapprochement
with the United States, which severed its diplomatic relations
with Tehran in 1980. Especially important is Tehran's convincing
response to the international community's concern about its
suspected nuclear arms program. That is also important for
stability in the entire Middle East region, including Afghanistan
and Iraq.
The U.S. administration of President George W. Bush, for its
part, should focus its policy with Iran more on supporting the
nation's efforts toward reform instead of simply denouncing
Tehran as one of the most world's dangerous regimes. Japan, for
its part, boasts about having an independent diplomacy toward
Iran based on its strong interest in securing stable energy
supply. If so, Tokyo should make greater efforts to help break
the current impasse in relations between the United States and
Iran.
--The Asahi Shimbun, Jan. 26(IHT/Asahi: January 27,2004) (01/27)
*****************************************************************
32 Las Vegas SUN: Pakistan and India to Start Peace Talks
Today: January 27, 2004 at 3:10:08 PST
By MATTHEW PENNINGTON ASSOCIATED PRESS
ISLAMABAD, Pakistan (AP) -
Senior officials of Pakistan and India will start peace talks in
Islamabad Feb. 16-18 after a gap of more than two years,
Pakistan's foreign ministry spokesman said Tuesday.
Masood Khan said the top bureaucrats from the foreign ministries
of both countries would meet in the Pakistani capital.
"The foreign secretaries meeting on the 18th of the February
will be preceded by meetings between the director generals (of
each ministry)," he told a press conference.
The leaders of Pakistan and India agreed at a regional summit in
Islamabad earlier this month to hold the peace talks.
Tuesday's announcement of the schedule for the talks was made
simultaneously in Islamabad and New Delhi.
An Indian official speaking on condition of anonymity said the
meeting would work out procedures for tackling the two nations'
55-year dispute over Kashmir and other issues.
Khan did not comment on the content of the talks, which are seen
as a preliminary to higher-level discussions that eventually aim
at resolving all issues dividing the South Asian nuclear-armed
neighbors.
The last peace talks between India's Prime Minister Atal Bihari
Vajpayee and Gen. Pervez Musharraf in Agra, India, in July 2001,
failed after both sides refused to show any flexibility over
Kashmir, which is split between them but claimed by both in its
entirety.
Pakistan and India have fought three wars, two over the divided
Himalayan region, since they achieved independence from Britain
in 1947.
They almost fought a fourth war in 2002, after an attack on
India's Parliament that India blamed on Islamic militants and
Pakistan's spy agency. Pakistan denied the charge.
However, tensions eased during 2003 after Vajpayee expressed a
willingness to seek peace, reciprocated by Musharraf.
The top officials taking part will be Indian Foreign Secretary
Shashank, who uses only one name, and Pakistani Foreign
Secretary Riaz Khokhar. These officials are the highest-ranking
below foreign ministers.
--
*****************************************************************
33 NRC: NRC to Hold Public Meeting on Environmental Review for Proposed Arkansas Nuclear
One, Unit 2 License Renewal
News Release - Region IV - 2004-00
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Office of Public Affairs, Region IV
No. IV-04-005 January 26, 2004
CONTACT: Victor Dricks
Phone: 817-860-8128
E-mail: opa4@nrc.gov
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff invites the public to
provide its comments on Tuesday, February 3, regarding an
application submitted by Entergy Operations to renew the
operating license for the Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO), Unit 2,
nuclear power plant near Russellville, Arkansas. Comments are
invited on environmental issues the public believes the NRC
should consider in its review of the application.
There will be two sessions held on February 3 at the Holiday Inn
in Russellville. The first session is scheduled for 1:30 p.m.
The second session is scheduled for 7:00 p.m. The NRC will host
an open house beginning one hour before the start of each
meeting to provide members of the public with an opportunity to
talk informally with agency staff.
Both sessions will begin with identical overviews. The NRC staff
will provide a presentation on the license renewal and
environmental review processes, the proposed scope of the
environmental review for the ANO Unit 2 application and the
proposed time frame for the review. Interested government
agencies, organizations and individuals will then have an
opportunity to offer comments or suggestions on environmental
issues they believe should be reviewed or on the proposed scope
of the review.
Under NRC regulations, the original operating license for a
nuclear power plant has a term of 40 years. The license may be
renewed for up to an additional 20 years if NRC requirements are
met. The current operating license for ANO Unit-2 is due to
expire on July 17, 2018. The Commission unanimously approved
license extension for ANO Unit-1 on June 20, 2001, following a
review of staff recommendations.
As part of its application, Entergy submitted an environmental
report. That report is available for public review in the NRC
Public Document Room at NRC headquarters, One White Flint North,
11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland. In addition, the
Pendergraft Library, located at Arkansas Tech University, 305
West Q Street, Russellville, AR 72801 has agreed to make the
report available for public inspection. The application is also
available on the NRC Web page at:
http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/licensing/renewal/applicati
ons/ano-2.html.
An existing NRC document, "Generic Environmental Impact
Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants," (NUREG-1437),
assesses the scope and impact of environmental effects that
would be associated with license renewal at any nuclear power
plant site. The NRC staff is gathering information at the
meeting for a supplement to the generic environmental impact
statement that will be specific to ANO Unit-2. It will contain a
recommendation regarding the environmental acceptability of the
license renewal action.
At the conclusion of the information-gathering process, the NRC
staff will prepare a summary of conclusions and significant
issues and will send a copy to interested persons who
participated in the scoping process. The summary will also be
available for public review at the Pendergraft Library, located
at Arkansas Tech University, 305 West Q Street, Russellville, AR
72801 and will be accessible electronically through the NRC
Public Electronic Reading Room found at
www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. Assistance in using the
electronic reading room is available by calling the NRC Public
Document Room at 1-800-397-4209, or 301-415-4737.
The NRC staff will then prepare a draft environmental impact
statement (EIS) supplement for public comment and will hold a
public meeting to solicit comments. After consideration of
comments received on the draft, the NRC will prepare a final EIS
supplement.
Members of the public may also submit written comments on the
ANO Unit-2-specific supplement to the generic environmental
impact statement. Comments should be submitted by February 20,
either by mail to the Chief, Rules and Directives Branch,
Division of Administrative Services, Mail Stop T-6-D-59, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555-0001, or
by e-mail to: ANOEIS@nrc.gov.
Last revised Tuesday, January 27, 2004
*****************************************************************
34 NRC: NRC Modifies Financial Information Requirements for Power Reactor Licenses
News Release - 2004-01
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Office of Public Affairs Telephone: 301/415-8200
Washington, DC 20555-0001 E-mail: opa@nrc.gov
No. 04-013 January 27, 2004
regulations to remove the requirement that power reactor
licensees that are not electric utilities submit financial
information in their license renewal applications. Within the
meaning of NRC regulations, an electric utility refers to any
entity that generates or distributes electricity and recovers
the cost of this electricity through rates established by a
separate regulatory authority, or by the entity itself as in the
case of a public utility district.
The NRC is also adding a requirement that a licensee changing
from an electric utility to a non-electric utility status
without a license transfer notify the NRC and submit the
financial information that is required for obtaining an initial
operating license. A non-electric utility refers to a company
that sells electricity at spot market prices and therefore does
not recover its costs through the rate-making process.
The NRC believes that its financial reviews during initial
licensing, license transfers or the transition from electric
utility to non-electric utility status, in addition to
monitoring of financial health between these reviews, provide a
sufficiently comprehensive framework to assess financial
qualifications. The agency does not believe that the license
renewal process is sufficiently unique to warrant a separate
financial review.
On June 4, 2002, the NRC published a proposed rule on changes to
the requirement for non-utilities to submit financial
information. It received comments from nine different
organizations, including a state group, three non-profit firms
and five companies in the nuclear power industry. Although all
comments were considered, no changes were made to the final
rule, which will become effective 30 days after publication in a
Federal Register notice, expected soon.
Last revised Tuesday, January 27, 2004
*****************************************************************
35 NRC: Sunshine Notice
FR Doc 04-1779
[Federal Register: January 27, 2004 (Volume 69, Number 17)]
[Notices] [Page 3957] From the Federal Register Online via GPO
Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr27ja04-135]
AGENCY HOLDING THE MEETING: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
DATES: Weeks of January 26, February 2, 9, 16, 23, March 1, 2004.
Place: Commissioners' Conference Room, 11555 Rockville Pike,
Rockville, Maryland.
Status: Public and Closed.
Matters to be Considered Week of January 26, 2004 There are no
meetings scheduled for the Week of January 26, 2004.
Week of February 2, 2004--Tentative There are no meetings
scheduled for the Week of February 2, 2004.
Week of February 9, 2004--Tentative There are no meetings
scheduled for the Week of February 9, 2004.
Week of February 16, 2004--Tentative Wednesday, February 18, 2004
9:30 a.m. Briefing on Status of Office of Chief Financial Officer
Programs, Performance, and Plans (Public Meeting) (Contact:
Edward L. New, 301-415-5646).
This meeting will be webcast live at the Web
address--http://www.nrc.gov Week of February 23, 2004--Tentative
Wednesday, February 25, 2004 9:30 a.m. Discussion of Security
Issues (Closed--Ex. 1). Thursday, February 26, 2004 9:30 a.m.
Meeting with UK Regulators to Discuss Security Issues
(Closed--Ex. 1) Week of March 1, 2004--Tentative Tuesday, March
2, 2004 9:30 a.m. Meeting with Advisory Committee on the Medical
Uses of Isotopes (ACMU) & NRC Staff (Public Meeting) (Contact:
Angela Williamson, 301-415-5030).
This meeting will be webcast live at the Web
address--http://www.nrc.govWednesday , March 3, 2004 9:30 a.m.
25th Anniversary Three Mile Island (TMI) Unit 2 Accident
Presentation (Public Meeting) (Contact: Sam Walker,
301-415-1965).
This meeting will be webcast live at the Web
address--http://www.nrc.gov 2:45 p.m. Discussion of Security
Issues (Closed--Ex. 1). Thursday, March 4, 2004 1:30 p.m.
Briefing on Status of Office of Nuclear Material Safety and
Safeguards (NMSS) Programs, Performance, and Plans--Waste Safety
(Public Meeting).
This meeting will be webcast live at the Web
address--http://www.nrc.gov *The schedule for Commission meetings
is subject to change on short notice. To verify the status of
meetings call (recording)--(301) 415- 1292. Contact person for
more information: Timothy J. Frye, (301) 415- 1651.
The NRC Commission Meeting Schedule can be found on the Internet
at: http://www.nrc.gov/what-we-do/policy-making/schedule.html
This notice is distributed by mail to several hundred
subscribers; if you no longer wish to receive it, or would like
to be added to the distribution, please contact the Office of the
Secretary Washington, DC 20555 (301) 415-1969. In addition,
distribution of this meeting notice over the Internet system is
available. If you are interested in receiving this Commission
meeting schedule electronically, please send an electronic
message to dkw@nrc.gov. Dated: January 22, 2004.
Timothy J. Frye, Technical Coordinator, Office of the Secretary.
[FR Doc. 04-1779 Filed 1-13-04; 11:15 am] BILLING CODE 7590-01-M
*****************************************************************
36 JS Online: Point Beach official replaced
Nuclear power plant under increased scrutiny
By THOMAS CONTENT
tcontent@journalsentinel.com Posted: Jan. 27, 2004
The vice president at the Point Beach Nuclear Power Plant has
been replaced, as the company that runs the plant said it seeks
an "outside perspective" to improve the plant's performance.
The change, effective late last week, comes just months after the
plant received the second of two "red" findings from the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and a month after the plant's
owner, Wisconsin Energy Corp. announced plans to extend the life
of the plant by 20 years.
The change was announced by Nuclear Management Co., the
Hudson-based nuclear operating company responsible for the daily
management of Point Beach and five other nuclear power plants in
the Upper Midwest.
It's also the latest in a series of changes in management at the
plant in recent years.
"We believe an outside perspective is needed to ensure the rate
of improvement continues in all aspects of operation at Point
Beach," said Doug Cooper, senior vice president of group
operations at Nuclear Management Co.
Fred Cayia, who had worked as site vice president of Point Beach
since last year and had been plant manager since September 2000,
has been replaced by Gary Van Middlesworth. Cayia remains with
Nuclear Management Co., spokeswoman Maureen Brown said.
Van Middlesworth, who spent much of his career with the Duane
Arnold Energy Center in Iowa, will serve as interim site vice
president while the company searches for a replacement, Nuclear
Management Co. said.
The change comes as the plant is under increased scrutiny from
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the NRC and state
regulators prepare to evaluate the pending application to extend
the plant's life by 20 years. Point Beach's two reactors are
licensed to keep running until 2010 and 2013, respectively.
Charlie Higley, executive director of the utility watchdog group
Citizens' Utility Board, said he's not sure what to make of all
the management changes at Point Beach.
On the one hand, the company could be sending a message by
responding to the red findings the NRC issued with respect to the
plant's backup feed-water system in recent years. Under the
color-coded inspection rating system, red is reserved for
findings of the highest safety significance.
On the other hand, "continuity in management is pretty important
at nuclear power plants," Higley said.
Separately, the Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant has replaced an
emergency cooling system that became clogged with lake weeds and
silt this month, Brown said.
The Kewaunee plant was shut down Jan. 16 because of the problem
and remained shut down Monday, Brown said.
From the Jan. 27, 2004 editions of the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel
Copyright 2004, Journal Sentinel Inc. All rights
*****************************************************************
37 NRC: Notice of Finding of No Significant Impact and Availability of
FR Doc E4-115
[Federal Register: January 27, 2004 (Volume 69, Number 17)]
[Notices] [Page 3955] From the Federal Register Online via GPO
Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr27ja04-132]
Environmental Assessment for Amendment of License No.
08-00408-06, Department of Justice--Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Washington, DC AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory
Commission.
ACTION: Notice of availability of environmental assessment and
finding of no significant impact.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Kathy Dolce Modes, Nuclear
Materials Safety Branch 2, Division of Nuclear Materials Safety,
Region I, 475 Allendale Road, King of Prussia, Pennsylvania
19406, telephone (610) 337-5251, fax (610) 337-5269; or by
e-mail: kad@nrc.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: I. Introduction The U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) is considering the issuance of a
license amendment to the Department of Justice--Federal Bureau of
Investigation for Materials License No. 08-00480-06, to authorize
release of its facility in Washington, DC for unrestricted use
and has prepared an Environmental Assessment (EA) in support of
this action in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR part
51. Based on the EA, the NRC has concluded that a Finding of No
Significant Impact (FONSI) is appropriate.
II. EA Summary The purpose of the proposed action is to allow for
the release of the licensee's Washington, DC facility for
unrestricted use. The Department of Justice--Federal Bureau of
Investigation was authorized by NRC from March 25, 1965, to use
radioactive materials for research and development purposes at
the site. On September 8, 2003, the Department of
Justice--Federal Bureau of Investigation requested that NRC
release the facility for unrestricted use. The Department of
Justice--Federal Bureau of Investigation has conducted surveys of
the facility and determined that the facility meets the license
termination criteria in subpart E of 10 CFR part 20.
III. Finding of No Significant Impact The NRC staff has evaluated
the Department of Justice--Federal Bureau of Investigation's
request and the results of the surveys and has concluded that the
completed action complies with the criteria in subpart E of 10
CFR part 20. The staff has prepared the EA (summarized above) in
support of the proposed license amendment to terminate the
license and release the facility for unrestricted use. The staff
has found that the environmental impacts from the proposed action
are bounded by the impacts evaluated by the ``Generic
Environmental Impact Statement in Support of Rulemaking on
Radiological Criteria for License Termination of NRC-Licensed
Facilities'' (NUREG-1496). On the basis of the EA, the NRC has
concluded that the environmental impacts from the proposed action
are expected to be insignificant and has determined not to
prepare an environmental impact statement for the proposed
action.
IV. Further Information The EA and the documents related to this
proposed action, including the application for the license
amendment and supporting documentation, are available for
inspection at NRC's Public Electronic Reading Room at
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (ADAMS Accession Nos.
ML032540763, ML033000506 and ML040150585). These documents are
also available for inspection and copying for a fee at the Region
I Office, 475 Allendale Road, King of Prussia, Pennsylvania,
19406.
Persons who do not have access to ADAMS, should contact the NRC
PDR Reference staff by telephone at 1-800-397-4209 or (301)
415-4737, or by e-mail to pdr@nrc.gov. Dated in King of Prussia,
Pennsylvania this 20th day of January, 2004.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
John D. Kinneman, Chief, Nuclear Materials Safety Branch 2,
Division of Nuclear Materials Safety, Region I.
[FR Doc. E4-115 Filed 01-26-04; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
*****************************************************************
38 NRC: Notice of Finding of No Significant Impact and Availability of
FR Doc E4-116
[Federal Register: January 27, 2004 (Volume 69, Number 17)]
[Notices] [Page 3955-3956] From the Federal Register Online via
GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr27ja04-133]
Environmental Assessment for Amendment of Materials License No.
37- 30433-01, OSI Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Notice of availability of environmental assessment and
finding of no significant impact.
[[Page 3956]]
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Betsy Ullrich, Nuclear Materials
Safety Branch 2, Division of Nuclear Materials Safety, Region I,
475 Allendale Road, King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406,
telephone (610) 337-5040, fax (610) 337-5269; or by e-mail:
exu@nrc.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: I. Introduction The U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) is considering the issuance of a
license amendment to OSI Pharmaceuticals, Inc. for Materials
License No. 37-30433-01, to authorize release of its facility in
Horsham, Pennsylvania for unrestricted use and has prepared an
Environmental Assessment (EA) in support of this action in
accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR part 51. Based on the
EA, the NRC has concluded that a Finding of No Significant Impact
(FONSI) is appropriate.
II. EA Summary The purpose of the proposed action is to allow for
the release of the licensee's Horsham, Pennsylvania facility for
unrestricted use. OSI Pharmaceuticals, Inc. was authorized by NRC
from March 9, 1998, to use radioactive materials for research and
development purposes at the site. On July 10, 2003, OSI
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. requested that NRC release the facility for
unrestricted use. OSI Pharmaceuticals, Inc. has conducted surveys
of the facility and determined that the facility meets the
license termination criteria in subpart E of 10 CFR part 20.
III. Finding of No Significant Impact The NRC staff has evaluated
OSI Pharmaceuticals, Inc.'s request and the results of the
surveys and has concluded that the completed action complies with
the criteria in subpart E of 10 CFR part 20. The staff has
prepared the EA (summarized above) in support of the proposed
license amendment to terminate the license and release the
facility for unrestricted use. The staff has found that the
environmental impacts from the proposed action are bounded by the
impacts evaluated by the ``Generic Environmental Impact Statement
in Support of Rulemaking on Radiological Criteria for License
Termination of NRC-Licensed Facilities'' (NUREG-1496). On the
basis of the EA, the NRC has concluded that the environmental
impacts from the proposed action are expected to be insignificant
and has determined not to prepare an environmental impact
statement for the proposed action.
IV. Further Information The EA and the documents related to this
proposed action, including the application for the license
amendment and supporting documentation, are available for
inspection at NRC's Public Electronic Reading Room at
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm.html (ADAMS Accession Nos.
ML031970551, ML032340661 and ML040150859). These documents are
also available for inspection and copying for a fee at the Region
I Office, 475 Allendale Road, King of Prussia, Pennsylvania,
19406. Persons who do not have access to ADAMS, should contact
the NRC PDR Reference staff by telephone at 1-800-397-4209 or
(301) 415-4737, or by e-mail to exu@nrc.gov. Dated in King of
Prussia, Pennsylvania this 15th day of January, 2004.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
John D. Kinneman, Chief, Nuclear Materials Safety Branch 2,
Division of Nuclear Materials Safety, Region I.
[FR Doc. E4-116 Filed 01-26-04;8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
*****************************************************************
39 NRC: Notice of Availability of Environmental Assessment and Finding
FR Doc E4-117
[Federal Register: January 27, 2004 (Volume 69, Number 17)]
[Notices] [Page 3956-3957] From the Federal Register Online via
GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr27ja04-134]
of No Significant Impact for License Application for Usec Inc.,
Bethesda, MD AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Notice of availability of Environmental Assessment and
Finding of No Significant Impact for license application.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Yawar Faraz, Project Manager,
Special Projects and Inspection Branch, Division of Fuel Cycle
Safety and Safeguards, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and
Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC,
20555-0001.
Telephone: (301) 415-8113; fax number: (301) 415-5390; e-mail:
yhf@nrc.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: I. Introduction The U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) is prepared to issue Material License
No. 70-7003 to United States Enrichment Corporation Inc. (USEC)
(the applicant), to authorize possession and use of source and
special nuclear material at the American Centrifuge Lead Cascade
Facility (Lead Cascade) in Piketon, Ohio. NRC has prepared an
Environmental Assessment (EA) in support of these actions in
accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR part 51. Based on the
EA, the NRC has concluded that a Finding of No Significant Impact
(FONSI) is appropriate. The license will be issued following the
publication of this notice.
II. EA Summary The purpose of the proposed action is to authorize
possession and use of source and special nuclear material at the
applicant's Lead Cascade facility in Piketon, Ohio. The Lead
Cascade facility would have up to 240 operable centrifuges for
testing in order to provide reliability information on the
machines and auxiliary systems for a commercial uranium
enrichment facility. The Lead Cascade facility would recycle
tails and product with no product withdrawals except for
sampling. The applicant proposes to install the Lead Cascade
facility in leased portions of the existing Department of Energy
(DOE) Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant (GCEP) located at the
Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant site in Piketon, Ohio. In the
mid-1980's, DOE had produced enriched uranium using hundreds of
centrifuges in it's GCEP facility.
On February 12, 2003, USEC Inc. requested that NRC approve the
proposed application. USEC Inc.'s request for the proposed action
was previously noticed in the Federal Register on April 9, 2003
(68 FR 17414), along with a notice of an opportunity to request a
hearing. No requests for a hearing were submitted to the NRC.
The NRC has prepared an EA in support of the proposed license
application. The NRC concludes that the proposed action complies
with the applicable parts of title 10, Code of Federal
Regulations (10 CFR) for adequate protection of the public health
and safety, and protection of the environment. For example, NRC
staff finds that public exposure to radiation from the proposed
action will be less than 0.0001% of the limits in 10 CFR part 20.
On the basis of the assessment, the NRC staff concludes that
environmental impacts associated with the proposed action would
not be significant and do not warrant the preparation of an
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). Accordingly, it has been
determined that a Finding of No Significant Impact is
appropriate.
III. Finding of No Significant Impact On the basis of the EA, NRC
has concluded that there are no significant environmental impacts
from the
[[Page 3957]] proposed action and has determined not to prepare
an EIS for the proposed action.
IV. Further Information The EA and the documents related to this
proposed action, including the application for the license
amendment and supporting documentation, are available for
inspection at NRC's Public Electronic Reading Room at
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (ADAMS Accession No.
ML040210751). These documents may also be examined, and/or copied
for a fee, at the NRC Public Document Room (PDR), located at One
White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD 20852.
Dated in Rockville, Maryland this 21st day of January, 2004.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Joseph G. Giitter, Chief, Special Projects and Inspection Branch,
Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards, Office of Nuclear
Material Safety and Safeguards.
[FR Doc. E4-117 Filed 01-26-04;8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
*****************************************************************
40 York Daily Record NRC: Emergency office planned -
[ydr.com]
Emergency office planned Tuesday, January 27, 2004
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission will establish an
Emergency Preparedness Project Office to enhance the
effectiveness of emergency preparedness activities for commercial
nuclear reactors. The new office will develop emergency
preparedness policies, regulations, programs and guidelines for
licensed nuclear reactors and potential new nuclear reactors.
Nader L. Mamish will direct the new organization — a
division of the commission’s Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Mamish is the executive assistant to the NRC’s Deputy
Executive Director for Homeland Protection and Preparedness.
NRC (2004-01-27) REVENUE OFFICE (2004-01-27)
Copyright © York Daily Record 2004 122 S. George St., P.O. Box
15122 York, PA 17405, (717) 771-2000
*****************************************************************
41 SOFIA: Business in Bulgaria Votes "Yes" to Future EU Entry
novinite.com
Business: 27 January 2004, Tuesday.
A total of 95% of Bulgaria's businessmen back the country's
future entry in the European Union (EU), a survey of the Alfa
Research agency showed.
Only 4% of the business representatives that took part in the
survey opposed the EU entry, while just 1% of the participants
gave no answer.
Representatives of 516 Bulgarian companies took part in the
survey Bulgaria's Foreign Ministry spokesman Lyubomir Todorov
explained when presenting the Eurobulletin Tuesday.
He explained that the business representatives answered questions
concerning the results of the country's EU entry and whether the
euro will be imposed as official currency once Bulgaria joins the
union.
The Eurobulletin a part of the Communication strategy for the
Bulgaria's EU entry preparation. It aims at presenting to the
citizens Bulgaria's progress en route to the union, Todorov
explained.
The bulletin has been published two times so far and has focused
on the reforms in the Constitution concerning the judicial power
and on the country's only nuclear plant in Kozloduy.
All Rights Reserved © Novinite Ltd., 2001-2004 - Copyright
*****************************************************************
42 [du-list] Gulf Veteran: Terry Walkers New Book now out!!
Date: Tue, 27 Jan 2004 19:04:22 -0800
'The Mother of all Battles'
ISBN: 1-904166105
By Terry Walker
The first book on Gulf War Syndrome from the UK.
You can buy it from
http://www.design-publications.co.uk/
at £9.99 plus £2.50pp
Write- up
Mother of All Battles" by Terry Walker
It was the worst and most environmentally toxic war of
the 20th century.
Following the invasion of Kuwait in 1990, Saddam
Hussein promised the “Mother of all Battles”; few in
the West believed him. Yet, for ordinary Iraqis the
conflict was catastrophic. As Iraq was repeatedly
subjected to heavy bombardment from the air, coalition
ground forces faced a significantly diminished Iraqi
army and Republican Guard. Some offered minor or token
resistance, but most surrendered with dignity.
It took the allied forces less than two months to
eject the Iraqi military from Kuwait but for many
British veterans the consequences of the Gulf War
lasted much longer.
Considerable numbers of formerly healthy men and women
have fallen ill since this period yet the government
officially denied any link between vaccines to protect
against Saddam's weapons of mass destruction and the
subsequent catalogue of illnesses and disabilities.
But the numbers of former soldiers afflicted with
illnesses continued to rise and the machinery of a
government cover-up was set in motion.
Terry Walker was one of these victims and this is his
story.
________________________________________________________________________
BT Yahoo! Broadband - Free modem offer, sign up online today and save £80
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43 [du-list] UK Parliamentry questions on DU
Date: Tue, 27 Jan 2004 19:04:20 -0800
Mr. Hancock: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what his
strategy
is for ensuring that children in Iraq do not come into contact with
depleted uranium. [148055]
Mr. Ingram: British forces are taking the following actions to
minimise
the risk posed to civilians by Depleted Uranium (DU):
1. DU fragments on the surface are being removed from the
battlefield as
they are discovered.
2. Local people have been warned through signs and leaflets that
they
should not go near, or touch, any debris they find on the battlefield.
Military vehicles known to have been hit by DU munitions within the
southern sector of Iraq under British military control have been
clearly
marked.
Mr. Hancock: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many
people are
employed in the Iraq Survey Group. [148064]
Mr. Hoon: On 16 January 2004, there were 1,272 people employed
in the Iraq
Survey Group.
Jeremy Corbyn: To ask the Secretary of State for International
Development
what studies have been made of cancer rates in Iraq (a) from 1991
to 2002
and (b) since the end of hostilities on 1 May 2003. [148270]
Hilary Benn: DFID is not aware of any studies of cancer rates
carried out
by the Iraqi Ministry of Health, Coalition Provisional Authority or
other
bodies. The ability accurately to measure localised increases in
cancer
rates-especially if there is cancer due to radiation, which can take
years
to develop-requires a well-developed national disease surveillance
system,
which Iraq does not currently have. The World Health Organisation
plans to
carry out a study to investigate the effects of the use of depleted
uranium in ordnance used by military forces, which some
individuals have
claimed has caused an increase in cancer rates in Iraq, using that
country
as a key focus. This study will be subject to funding and to an
improvement in the security situation.
******************************************************************************
***************
The Campaign Against Depleted Uranium, Bridge 5 Mill, 22a
Beswick Street,
Ancoats, Manchester, M4 7HR Tel./Fax.: +44 (0)161 273 8293
E-Mail info@cadu.org.uk Website: http://www.cadu.org.uk
Affiliation costs to CADU are £8 a year unwaged/student and £10 a
year waged. For this you will receive campaigning materials and
CADU's quarterly newsletter. Our newsletter is also available free
of charge by E-Mail (send us a message with 'Subscribe CADU
News' as the subject). Please send your cheque draft or postal
order in £ sterling to the address above.
******************************************************************************
***************
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44 [du-list] [Fwd: ARDEN HILLS: City seeks assurances that
Date: Tue, 27 Jan 2004 19:04:27 -0800
---------------------------- Original Message ----------------------------
Subject: ARDEN HILLS: City seeks assurances that uranium will be cleaned
up From: "Nukewatch"
Date: Tue, January 27, 2004 5:51 pm
To: "MICHELE NAAR OBED"
"Bobby King"
"Jeff Peterson"
"MICHAEL SPRONG"
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Wed, Jan. 21, 2004
ARDEN HILLS: City seeks assurances that uranium will be cleaned up BY
ALLEN POWELL II
St. Paul Minnesota) Pioneer Press
The city of Arden Hills plans to request a report from the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission later this week that outlines exactly what steps
have been taken to clean up radioactive waste at the Twin Cities Army
Ammunition Plant.
As plans for redevelopment of the 2,370-acre site progress, city officials
want to know how the U.S. Army and Alliant Techsystems - the company that
produced weapons on the site - disposed of waste products from depleted
uranium rods used for decades, said Aaron Parrish, Arden Hills community
development director.
The city wants to make sure residents are not in danger of being exposed
to radioactive materials.
"At this point, we're proceeding on the assumption that (the cleanup) was
done correctly," Parrish said. "This is more of a documentation and
disclosure process."
The city wants the federal commission to provide information on the extent
and nature of the contamination, what has been done to clean it up and a
final statement that the cleanup is complete, Parrish said.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission licenses companies that use radioactive
materials and monitors the cleanup of sites where those materials are
used, he said.
Decontamination of the site - where uranium rods were used to make
projectile ammunition - began in 2001 and should be completed by spring,
said Mike Fix, the plant installation director.
All residual traces of radiation must be removed before the site can be
turned over to the city, he said.
One wing of the building where the uranium rods were housed has been torn
down, and all of the building materials and equipment have been scanned to
determine levels of radionuclides, Fix said. Material at or below the
accepted levels of contamination was disposed of like normal construction
debris, he said.
The remaining materials have been placed in several large "super sacks" on
the property for transportation to a low-level radioactive landfill when
the weather warms up, he said. The sacks' winter site will be checked to
ensure that no radionuclides seeped into the ground, Fix said.
Federal officials said they were unsure how long it would take to respond
to the city's request but that the city could get the information it
sought from Alliant.
Nukewatch
P.O. Box 649
Luck, Wisc. 54853
Phone: 715-472-4185
Fax: 715-472-4184
www.nukewatch.com
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Attachment Converted: "c:\program files\eudora\attach\untitled-2.htm"
*****************************************************************
45 STLtoday: Bill seeks payments for nuclear workers
By Bill Smith Of the Post-Dispatch 01/26/2004
St. Louis area workers who took part in America's nuclear weapons
program and are now sick with cancer may be another step closer
to receiving compensation from the U.S. government, Sen.
Christopher "Kit" Bond announced Monday.
"This is absolutely tremendous; it looks very promising," said
Denise Brock of Moscow Mills, who has led the compensation fight.
At a news conference in St. Charles, Bond said he had filed
legislation that would speed $150,000 payments to Cold War-era
Mallinckrodt Co. employees who have cancer or their families.
"These are the hard-working employees who worked on the Manhattan
Project during World War II and helped America win the Cold War,"
Bond said.
Standing with about 70 former Mallinckrodt workers or relatives
of former workers, Bond said, "It is time for the federal
government to help them."
Brock's father worked in Mallinckrodt's uranium division and died
of cancer at the age of 52. She said the legislation seemed the
best hope for some justice for the workers and their families.
Two weeks ago, Bond's office sent a letter to Health and Human
Services Secretary Tommy Thompson, asking that workers at
Mallinckrodt Co., Weldon Spring, Hematite and related sites
automatically receive a $150,000 worker's compensation payment if
they suffer from any of 22 cancers caused by radiation.
Currently, St. Louis area workers are not covered for the
immediate payment under a national compensation program that took
effect in 2000.
Instead, the St. Louis workers have had to go through an often
cumbersome application process that includes "dose
reconstruction," in which scientists attempt to gauge the level
of radiation exposure to a specific worker and try to determine
whether it caused his cancer.
As of two months ago, just 259 of an estimated 2,500 area workers
had applied for the lump sum payment. Just one claim had been
paid in this area, federal records showed.
If passed, the legislation would include the St. Louis area as
part of a "special exposure cohort" and allow quicker payment to
the workers by bypassing the lengthy "dose reconstruction"
process. If the worker is no longer living, the lump sum payment
could go to a family member.
Rob Ostrander, a spokesman for Bond, said Monday that Bond's
office had heard nothing from Thompson, who has the authority to
designate St. Louis in the "special exposure" group without going
through Congress.
Brock asks people who believe they may be eligible for
compensation to call 1-866-534-0599, toll free.
St. Louis Post-Dispatch.
*****************************************************************
46 Cibola County Beacon: Filibuster stalls radiation exposure compensation act
Tuesday, January 27, 2004
U.S. Senator Pete Domenici today expressed dismay at the Senate's
failure to overcome a filibuster that would allow Congress
complete the FY2004 appropriations process with increases for
veterans and students, as well as at least $87.3 million in
specific project funding forNew Mexicocommunities and programs.
The Senate today failed to reach a 60-vote litmus test to end a
filibuster against the FY2004 Omnibus Appropriations Bill. The
package, which includes seven unfinished spending bills, remains
stuck in limbo as the Senate voted 48-45 not to proceed to a
final vote on the package.
Domenici, a senior member of the Senate Appropriations Committee,
said he is uncertain how, or if, the filibuster will be overcome.
Agencies and federal departments covered in the bill are forced
to operate at lower 2003 funding levels.
"All the special projects in this bill forNew Mexicojust won't
happen if we don't get past this filibuster. I don't see how that
will happen at this point, unless more Senators are convinced to
stop playing politics and allow this bill to become law,"
Domenici said. "There are no good reasons for us not to get our
work done. The country needs this bill. Veterans need this bill.
Public health needs this bill. Children and teachers need this
bill. We are failing them and the nation with this filibuster."
Domenici said the filibuster means that at least $8 million for
northwestNew Mexicowill remain unavailable at the local level.
This funding does not include resources these communities might
have received through programs that are national in scope.
The omnibus package includes seven appropriations bills for
FY2004, which began last Oct. 1. The bill, passed in December by
the House, includes the funding for the Radiation Exposure
Compensation Program -- $3 million in Justice Department funds
for administrative expenses to process RECA claims; plus funding
for the Radiation Exposure Compensation Act -- $2 million in
Labor Department funding to assist in education, prevention and
detection of illnesses associated with uranium mining and milling
at nuclear test sites.
Copyright © 2004Cibola County Beacon.
*****************************************************************
47 Las Vegas SUN: Minnesota delegation hears Nevada opposition to nuke dump plan
ASSOCIATED PRESS
LAS VEGAS (AP) - A delegation of Minnesota lawmakers got an
anti-nuclear earful from Nevada Gov. Kenny Guinn and state and
county officials before a scheduled Tuesday tour of the site the
federal government has picked for a national radioactive waste
dump.
The reaction was mixed among the four out-of-state lawmakers to
Monday's meeting with Nevada officials and members of Citizen
Alert, an environmental group opposed to the Yucca Mountain
project.
Minnesota state Rep. Frank Hornstein, a Democrat from
Minneapolis, said he thought Nevada's speakers made a compelling
case.
But Republican Minnesota state Rep. Michael Beard said what he
heard was, "'Not in my back yard.'"
"Their transportation discussion was overblown," said Beard, who
represents the Minneapolis suburb of Shakopee. "They're so
against this happening, they're grasping at weak arguments."
Guinn said he hoped Minnesota would be the first state to join
Nevada's opposition to the federal government's plan to entomb
77,000 tons of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste at Yucca
Mountain, a desert ridge 90 miles northwest of Las Vegas.
The governor and officials stressed fears about accidents and
terrorist attacks on the nation's most highly radioactive waste
if it is shipped to Nevada from 103 commercial reactors and
various industrial and military sites in 39 states.
Fred Dilger, Clark County's transportation coordinator, said the
Energy Department's transcontinental transportation plan lacked
specifics.
The Energy Department last month proposed building a new a
319-mile rail line across Nevada to reach Yucca Mountain by
skirting the vast Nevada Test Site and Nellis Air Force Base
bombing range.
Minnesota has two nuclear power plants, and Republican state
Sen. Pat Pariseau of Farmington said she didn't see the argument
about the safety of keeping waste at reactor sites as better
than the argument about terrorist threats to nuclear waste
transportation.
Information from: Las Vegas Review-Journal
--
*****************************************************************
48 WIEB: HL Waste meeting 1-29-04
high level waste agenda
Agenda
Meeting of the High-Level Waste Committee
of the Western Interstate Energy Board
The Westin Horton Plaza Hotel
3rd Floor Harbor Room
San Diego, California
January 29-30, 2004
casual attire (no ties)
Thursday,
January 29
7:30 a.m. Continental breakfast
8:30 a.m. States only meeting
WIEB-OCRWM cooperative agreement
>>Doug Larson (WIEB)
Selection of Committee co-chairs
Report on meeting with DOE Under Secretary Card and OCRWM
Director Chu
>>Ken Niles (OR)
Follow-up
letter to Card from four regional
groups(priority 1)
Western governors' policies
03-16 Private
Storage of Commercial Spent
Nuclear Fuel (priority 1)
02-05 Transportation
of Spent Nuclear Fuel and
High-Level Radioactive Waste (priority 1)
01-03 Assessing
the Risks of Terrorism and
Sabotage Against High-Level Nuclear
Waste
Shipments to a Geologic Repository
or Interim Storage Facility (priority 1)
Framework for HLW Committee's work
Proposed baseline plan (priority 1) (print .xls
file)
Draft "What
if" scenarios(priority
1)
Route
Selection Paper and Draft Recommendation
- (3/88) (priority 2)
Discussion
Identification of current issues of potential interest to
the committee (e.g. OCRWM
Strategic Plan, TEC rail
routing selection paper, any DOE rail record of decision (ROD),
NRC package review)
Background Information
Recent positions of other regional cooperative
agreement groups
Midwest Council of State Governments
Letter
to OCRWM
Full-Scale
Cask Testing
Comprehensive
Transportation Plan
for Yucca Mountain
5:00 p.m. Recess
Friday,
January 30
8:00 a.m. Continental breakfast
8:30 a.m. Committee Meeting
Status of repository and Nevada transportation system
Jozette Booth, OCRWM
Nevada
9:30 a.m. NWPA Transportation Program
Gary Lanthrum, OCRWM
Discussion of HLW Committee priorities
OCRWM Transportation Program
Strategic Planfor the Safe Transportation of Spent
Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste to Yucca Mountain:
A Guide to Stakeholder Interactions (priority 1)
Excerpt
of Testimony by Dr. Chu (priority 3)
Excerpt
of Testimony by Sec. of Energy Spencer
Abraham (priority 3)
Background Information
Nevada
presentation to the
NWTRB Transportation Committee on January 21, 2004
(priority 2)
Nevada’s
comments on NRC’s
draft Strategic Plan (priority 2)
12:30 pm Adjourn
*****************************************************************
49 Salt Lake Tribune: Fight to keep N-dump at bay has support
January 27, 2004
By Nicole Warburton
Special to The Tribune
Lawmakers agreed Monday that fighting a a proposal to store
high-level nuclear waste on the Goshute Reservation in Skull
Valley should continue to be a state priority.
"I'd hate to see us lose sight after being in the battle for
years," Sen. Dave Thomas, R-South Weber, said at a meeting of
the Joint Transportation, Environmental Quality and National
Guards Appropriations Subcommittee.
Members of the committee are being asked to approve $500,000
in supplemental funds for 2004 and 2005 fiscal years for legal
and technical fees of the state's ongoing attempt to halt
storage of nearly 44,000 tons of nuclear waste on the Goshute
Reservation, about 45 miles southwest of Salt Lake City.
The state has spent nearly $3.8 million since 1997 fighting
the plan by a consortium of nuclear power companies to store
waste on the Goshute reservation until a proposed federal
facility is operating at Yucca Mountain in Nevada.
This is "above and beyond the wildest dreams" of what's been
going on with Envirocare, said Rep. Joseph G. Murray R-Ogden,
inferring that the state should focus attention and money on
litigation of the Goshute proposal and not on the private
hazardous waste landfill in Tooele County involved in recent
controversy.
netter@darnfastnet.com
Copyright Salt Lake City Tribune
*****************************************************************
50 Las Vegas RJ: Minnesota legislators' reaction to Yucca Mountain plan mixed
Tuesday, January 27, 2004
By KEITH ROGERS
REVIEW-JOURNAL
Presentations by state and Clark County officials on the planned
Yucca Mountain nuclear waste repository to a group of Minnesota
legislators drew mixed reviews Monday.
One of the four out-of-state lawmakers, who today will tour the
site 100 miles northwest of Las Vegas, said he thought Nevada's
concerns about risks in transporting the waste were overstated.
"What I heard loud and clear was, `Not in my back yard,' "
Minnesota state Republican Rep. Michael Beard said after the
meeting at the Sawyer Building with Nevada legislators and
members of Citizen Alert, a statewide environmental group.
"Their transportation discussion was overblown. They're so
against this happening, they're grasping at weak arguments,"
Beard said.
His colleague, Rep. Frank Hornstein, a Democrat, said he
thought Nevada's speakers, which included Gov. Kenny Guinn, made
"a compelling presentation."
Later, Guinn said he was optimistic that at least one state has
stepped forward to hear Nevada's concerns about the federal
government's plans to entomb 77,000 tons of spent nuclear fuel
and radioactive waste in Yucca Mountain.
He said he was encouraged to know legislators outside Nevada are
starting to ask questions about the risk of accidents and
terrorist attacks involving nuclear waste that will be hauled by
"through their Spaghetti Bowls," referring to the Interstate
15-U.S. Highway 95 interchange.
Fred Dilger, Clark County's transportation coordinator, said
the DOE's transportation plan lacked specifics, amounting to no
plan.
Building a new rail line to reach Yucca Mountain through rural,
mountainous counties in Southern and central Nevada is a task
that has been underestimated, he said.
Minnesota Republican state Sen. Pat Pariseau said her state has
two nuclear power plants. In the debate of which poses the
greater danger, terrorist threats involving nuclear waste
transportation or keeping waste at reactor sites, she said she
didn't see one argument as better than another.
Copyright Las Vegas Review-Journal
*****************************************************************
51 Las Vegas SUN: Minnesota lawmakers have Yucca concerns
Today: January 27, 2004 at 10:04:06 PST
By Dan Kulin
After meeting Monday with Nevada lawmakers about plans to turn
Yucca Mountain into a nuclear waste dump, one Minnesota state
senator said maybe her state should hold onto its nuclear waste
until a safer way of transporting and storing it is found.
Another Minnesota lawmaker said he has new concerns and
questions about the safety of storing the waste at Yucca
Mountain.
A group of Minnesota state legislators in Las Vegas to tour
Yucca Mountain today met with Nevada lawmakers Monday at the
Sawyer State Office Building to talk about the plan to store
77,000 tons of highly radioactive waste 90 miles northwest of
Las Vegas beginning in 2010. Nevada is fighting the plan in U.S.
District Court.
Senate Minority Leader Dina Titus, D-Las Vegas, said the Monday
meeting showed that concern over Yucca Mountain is growing
across the country as more people realize the nuclear waste
would be traveling through their states on the way to Nevada.
"Until now it was Nevada against the rest of the country, and
now it's nice to see others getting involved. Now they see they
will be affected too," Titus said.
Gov. Kenny Guinn said it is important for others from around
the country to realize that the nuclear waste would be
transported "through your cities, your neighborhoods and past
your schools."
Guinn also said that even if Yucca Mountain opens, nuclear
reactors around the country will continue to store spent fuel
rods during the five years following their use.
Minnesota has three nuclear reactors at two power plants that
currently house their nuclear waste on site.
Fred Dilger, a Clark County planner who focuses on Yucca
Mountain issues, told the visiting lawmakers that while
"tomorrow you're going to hear that everything's fine," the
state and county disagree, saying there are technical problems
with the mountain site and transportation concerns to address.
Dilger said the waste will probably come to Yucca Mountain by
rail and truck, which will provide potential terrorists with
many places to attack the waste. He also said that because of
the sheer number of shipments coming from all over the country,
there would probably be two transportation "incidents" a year.
Assemblyman Harry Mortenson, D-Las Vegas, told the visitors any
action should wait until a safer way of dealing with the nuclear
waste is found.
"In the future, people will figure out what to do with it, and
how to deal with it safely," Mortenson said. "We'll be much
smarter in 100 years ... so keep it on site for 100 years. The
dry casks are good for at least 100 years."
Minnesota state Sen. Pat Pariseau, a Republican, said after the
meeting that maybe there isn't a safe way of dealing with the
waste at this time.
"Maybe we have to put up with it for a while," she said.
Minnesota Rep. Michael Beard, a Republican, said he's not
convinced the transportation will be a problem, but he does have
new questions about storing the waste in Yucca Mountain.
"I'm concerned that if there is a better site, why are we not
there?" he asked.
*****************************************************************
52 EnergyPulse: Nuclear Waste Perspectives (Pro-nuke)
Background, Overview and Perspectives
"Ignorance more frequently begets confidence than does
knowledge: it is those who know little, not those who know much,
who so positively assert that this or that problem will never be
solved by science." -- Charles Darwin.
Previous articles by me on this site examined the political
baggage that has held the U.S. nuclear program back and
effectively caused the Yucca mountain fiasco; showed that uranium
and thorium energy resources are assured for millions of years
and could meet most, if not all of our existing and projected
energy needs with much less environmental effect than almost any
other source of energy; and presented comparative data that
showed that nuclear power was far cleaner, much safer, and
generally was cost competitive with any other reasonable source
of energy. This and following articles will attempt to put the
issue of nuclear waste and it's assumed effects in a broader
social perspective than is usually seen.
Marie Curie, one of the early pioneers of radioactive research
and the winner of two Nobel prizes, recognized the social value
of dispelling ignorance, when she stated: 'Nothing is to be
feared. It is to be understood'. Marie Curie herself was so
radioactive from her 'bucket chemistry', and inhaling radon and
ingesting radium and other nuclides, that when she entered any
physics laboratory, it was noted that any charged electroscopes
immediately lost their charge. She died, possibly of leukemia, at
age 66, having outlived most of her generation. Nuclear wastes
must surely be one of the most difficult and thorny topics to
address in the complete absence of perspective, which is the way
they are usually addressed. The general belief seems to be that
only nuclear wastes are dangerous or socially damaging not only
now, but also into the far distant future, and that wastes from
other sources of energy are not. This general lack of
perspective, and inability to compare social risks today and over
time, is not only unnerving, but also expensive and hazardous to
society's continued health.
The issues of nuclear power, radiation, and nuclear wastes are
rife with ignorance, political manipulation, environmental
obfuscation, and fear. As a result, they are either a political
minefield, or a goldmine of emotions, depending upon which side
of these politicized issues you stand.
Rank the Risks Surprisingly, this perception of unconscionable
danger from nuclear power and its wastes (all to do with
radiation) survives, even as we are forced to accept - grudgingly
- that using fossil fuels is obviously much more dangerous and
limiting to both humanity and the environment; as the objective
statistics (Paul Scherrer Institute) tell us. However, this is
not a diatribe against fossil fuels. We need all the energy we
can get from whatever sources, though some are much better than
others. However, choices come from having options. It is not an
option to be without adequate, reliable and affordable energy.
'No energy is more dangerous than no energy.' Homi Bhabha.
Some of us seem prepared to believe that our continued high
dependence upon fossil fuels and the resulting global 'pollution'
might be changing our entire environment and climate, and
jeopardizing our very existence as a species. No small effect
indeed, if true. Despite this, we typically avoid making rational
comparison of the merits or difficulties of all of our reasonable
energy choices. Even many intelligent and honest people seem
prepared to judge the issue upon fearful allegations, hearsay,
and junk science, without acquainting themselves of the simple
facts, or of seeking a measure of balance and perspective. Such
perspective would allow a more intelligent consideration and
understanding of nuclear and radioactive wastes, and seeing where
they fit in the overall ranking of defined social risks: which is
somewhere near the very bottom, as Table 1 below, shows.
Perception and fear seem to place them near the top, but
obviously without any rational (statistically supported)
justification for doing so.
In any society that wishes to progress and achieve the longest
average life expectancy (the true measure of societal health),
logic dictates that they get their risk assessment right, and
that wealth be devoted primarily to addressing the risks towards
the top of any valid risk ranking, while spending fewer resources
further down the ranking.
The most pessimistically calculated risk figures to society or
even to individuals, (arrived at rationally by generally
professional people, rather than those who just guess), from
using nuclear power to produce electricity, and from its
radioactive wastes, are shown in Table 1, along with some of the
much more significant social risks.
The nuclear risk data (exaggerated by calculation, as there are
no obviously attributable bodies) appear because hundreds of more
socially significant risks have been omitted in order to fit
these onto the table. The 'all electricity - nuclear (NRC)'
number, was calculated by the Nuclear Regulatory commission, and
assuming that ALL electricity in the U.S. was supplied by nuclear
power, rather than the almost 20% that it supplies at this time.
Even the most pessimistic number, calculated by the Union of
Concerned Scientists, at 1.5 days LLE, confirms its overall low
effect.
One risk figure which does not appear on Cohen's original table,
as it does not yet apply to the U.S. but would, if others had
their way with our energy supply, is the risk figure that would
exist if our society did not have adequate, assured, or
affordable energy. This would plunge society into joblessness,
poverty, ill health, violence, stress, etc. An average life
expectancy typical of the third world would result in a loss of
life expectancy likely to be in excess of maybe 15,000 days,
along with the absence of a viable future for our society.
If the EPA is to be believed about radon in our homes, then the
effect on the public of radon in their homes is almost 1,000
times more dangerous than nuclear power to produce electricity
(NRC) and is about 3.5 million times more dangerous than nuclear
waste disposal (derived from the EPA). Please read that sentence
again, and think what it means in terms of perspective.
Based upon this, and carefully avoiding cost/benefit
considerations (they generally do NOT do them), the EPA might
thus consider that about $34E12 ($34 trillion of a $10
trillion-a-year economy!) should be directed at radon mitigation,
as they are prepared to see $34 billion spent to reduce the 1,000
times less risk from radiation emissions from nuclear power
facilities (Table 2). I wonder what they would like to see spent
on the social risks that are even mildly serious.
In our society we have obviously managed to turn such
risk-ranking logic on its ear, and through the crippling actions
of political intervention by way of unscientific and mostly
unjustified regulations, which avoid cost/benefit comparisons,
can actually spend the lion's share of society's resources - its
scarce wealth - (about 1 trillion dollars each year of our 10
trillion dollar economy) upon minor risks which harm few, if any
individuals, one of which risks, is high level nuclear wastes.
Some others are shown in Table 2, below:
On the benefit side of the table, where certain interventions -
especially preventive medicine - return immensely more benefit to
society than they cost, I would very firmly place EDUCATION. As
one cynic noted, if we got rid of the EPA altogether, and some
other organizations too, society would be immensely safer and
much more prosperous. As a result, the environment would be
improved too.
Social and Environmental Stupidity 101 The raw examples above
should make you wonder how society could possibly survive such an
onslaught of bureaucratic ineptitude. But that is not the end of
the story.
Depending upon how radioactive waste is defined, many commonplace
and naturally radioactive things around us could and, in some
extreme cases, have become unjustifiably labeled as unsafely
radioactive - usually because of political posturing; because of
social mischief or willful ignorance; because of an ingrained
fear of radiation; or because of the unscientific and socially
destructive Precautionary Principle, and its sister insanity of
zero tolerance (unless applied to violence). If the definition is
too restrictive, radioactive wastes can include discarded food
wastes, building materials, concrete, soil, wood, most water
supplies, beer, milk, blood, meat, fish, sewage, animal manure
and even human beings themselves.
Efforts to legislate an extreme degree of public safety
concerning radiation usually have the opposite effect, and make
society much poorer and less safe (both tend to go together).
Nonetheless, concerned and sincere individuals in some states,
various municipalities, and other local governments, at one time
or another have decided to attempt to legislate a 'zero
tolerance' to anything radioactive.
In 1979, Colorado State politicians decided to prohibit all
radioactive waste disposal (zero tolerance). Such legislators
appear not to have realized that everything is radioactive, or
were not aware of the thousands of beneficial uses of radiation
throughout society, and the difficulties that might be caused by
such legislation. They soon learned, but other states and
jurisdictions occasionally are tempted to tread the same path.
Among the many 'difficulties' would be those with transporting
and disposing of cadavers; cremation; burial; transporting
fertilizer; moving meat, eggs or milk from farms or to stores;
collecting blood donations; letting some patients out of
hospital; disposing of hospital wastes and even of using medical
supplies and some drugs; disposing of sewage; disposing of ash
from fireplaces as well as from coal-burning power plants;
garbage disposal; supplying drinking water from municipal wells;
providing medical diagnostic procedures, as well as creating
difficulties for most food transportation and use. Clearly, this
would not have been the intent of the legislators, though this
could have been the outcome. Fortunately, most such proposed
legislative changes are caught early enough before they become
politically embarrassing. But sometimes they are not.
What are Radioactive Wastes? Radioactive wastes - simply defined
- are any byproduct material which contains radioactivity above
that level typically found in naturally occurring materials, and
for which no use is presently evident.
Many such wastes are byproducts of processes that have been going
on for hundreds of years (e.g., many base-metal mining
operations, phosphate mining, gold mining). The wastes are
generally ignored, as to address them would be to overload
society with needless expense and concern, and too many
restrictions on industrial development and many social
activities.
Following the EPA radon efforts, such restrictions could have
excluded building and development upon certain geological
formations; control or extreme remediation of many natural water
supplies to millions of households; and even ventilation of
buildings. Many of the homes in large swathes of New Jersey, New
York, Pennsylvania and Connecticut (on the Reading Prong
formation), as well as other locations across the U.S. and in
many other countries are built on geological formations that are
notably radioactive and could become candidates for draconian
controls if society is not careful to limit the powers of
bureaucrats. Most of this came to light in 1984 after one
contractor at a nuclear plant tried to enter the facility after
being in his house basement before going to work. He tripped the
alarms on his way IN (common with discharged medical patients
too) and thus began an investigation. The natural radon levels in
his home basement were said (by the EPA) to be equivalent to him
receiving 80,000 chest X-rays in a year and were said to be about
675 times the maximum levels permitted in a uranium mine. They
concurred that he should evacuate his house, and despite most
homes in the area exceeding guideline standards, probably did not
recommend evacuation of the entire area as it would have involved
evacuating thousands of homes from large chunks of at least four
states, and the resulting flack would have put them out of
business along with their bosses once the epidemiology showed
that there were no observed health effects from this, no matter
how many thousands of lung cancer deaths the EPA might have been
able to calculate.
The EPA's ongoing efforts to spook the public about radon in the
U.S. have generally been unsuccessful. It is one example of a
poorly-definable radiation risk that the public generally
ignores, as it would hit each home-owner very hard in the
pocket-book. It already does, if one tries to move real estate in
these locations, though the hysteria may be diminishing a little
by now after 20 years of a lack of obvious radiation-related
deaths - just like the EMF hysteria (another risk that does not
appear anywhere on even a much-expanded table of risks) that was
in vogue a few years ago and now may also be subsiding, as the
body count does not exist.
Radioactive Wastes include wastes produced from: + Nuclear fuel
cycle operations such as mining, refining, conversion,
enrichment, fuel fabrication, power production, and spent fuel
reprocessing. Spent fuel is not true 'waste' as it can be
recycled (and will be eventually), and is recycled in some
countries; + Operational and maintenance activities at nuclear
power facilities; + Decontamination and decommissioning
activities at nuclear facilities; + Uranium and thorium mining
and processing activities and some base-metal mining operations;
+ Various industrial processes: coal burning solids and fly ash;
oil and gas drilling scale, sludges and water; water treatment
and filtration solids; geothermal deposits; phosphate fertilizer
processing residues, which are also a source of commercial
uranium; + Some low grade coals and coal ash with up to 1000 ppm
uranium (the Dakotas and Montana in the U.S.) as well as some
alum shales (Sweden), some gold mine wastes - all of which were,
or still are used as sources of commercial uranium; + Accelerator
wastes, following production of medical and research
radionuclides; + Spent sealed radiation sources, including
medical therapy devices and industrial radiography and
irradiation sources; + Institutional uses (industry, hospital,
university research) of radioisotopes; + Some hospital medical
wastes and other discarded radiological materials; + Some
hospital biological wastes, including some hospital sewage; +
Military weapons-program wastes; + A few materials that are
radioactive wastes but are not regarded as such. These include
hardwood ash in the U.S. Northeast, which contains fallout
cesium-137 and strontium-90 (the only two significant fairly-long
half-life fission nuclides) from atmospheric bomb testing since
1945. As a gentle aside, Marshall Brucer noted that the
'downwind' cows that had been exposed to a high dose of ingested
fallout radiation (about 1500 millisieverts) from the 1946
trinity bomb test, and which were presumably kept alive for
observation of their likely imminent deaths from cancer, were
quietly euthanized in 1964, because of extreme old age.
Classification of Radioactive Wastes Radioactive Wastes can be
subdivided into Low Level Wastes (LLW), Intermediate (ILW) and
High Level Wastes (HLW). Some broad definitions, internationally
accepted, are shown in Table 3, derived mostly from the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), but different
jurisdictions apply their own interpretations and guidelines,
often for political purposes, such as serving as trade barriers
(for tobacco, meat, venison and other game meats, agricultural
produce, chocolate, nuts, peat moss, etc).
What 'Radioactive Waste' Quantities are produced in Society? In
the U.S., the produced quantities of some radioactive wastes are
shown in Table 4, below. 'Technologically Enhanced', means
concentrated by some social or industrial process such as water
filtration, ventilation filters, and oil drilling or fertilizer
production.
Lint traps on clothes dryers in homes in some radon rich
locations are notably radioactive for several hours after use, as
are the air cleaners on most cars after a moderate drive, and
vacuum bags on vacuum cleaners after use, as well as the water
softening units of some household water purifiers. The public
gets more radiation dose from living close to these items than it
might ever get from true nuclear wastes, which they never get
near, but no-one would reasonably believe that these radiation
sources in the home are a serious problem, as they aren't, even
if the public knew about them, which they don't.
Many patients, following certain treatments and discharged from
many hundreds of medical facilities each day, are major sources
of significant radioactivity around most hospitals. No one cares.
Following thyroid diagnosis and treatment, thousands of patients,
each year, eliminate iodine-131 into the air, and into the sewage
systems, as well as significantly irradiating family members and
others close by if they are released from hospital too soon.
Iodine-131, originating in Montreal, Canada, is readily
detectable in the St Lawrence River at Quebec City, about 140
miles downstream. Similar situations apply at all major hospitals
across the continent and throughout advanced societies.
An individual patient who has received iodine-131 treatment to
ablate (destroy) the thyroid emits more iodine-131 into the
environment in the first few hours following treatment (breathing
and waste elimination), than an operating nuclear power facility
typically emits to the environment in a full year of continuous
operation. Public toilets in malls near major hospitals are
interesting repositories of dribbled wastes, which people scuff
around on their feet, to shops and back to their homes and
laundry hampers. It's generally more comforting to them, that
they are NOT aware of this.
The nuclear waste of most public, media or political importance,
and which generates a degree of political passion and misplaced
fear in inverse proportion to its actual risk, is spent fuel and
related radioactive wastes. Anyone who is following the YUCCA
farce must recognize the hysteria value of this issue to opposing
politicians and various environmental groups. It is not just an
expensive hole in the ground (albeit a small one), almost like
any other mine with similar concerns and safeguards - and then
some - but it is a gold plated hole in the ground that will be
milked for every last drop of emotion, bad science, and political
'pork' that can be wrung from it before any waste is brought near
it.
The 70,000 tonnes of wastes designated to be PUT INTO it over the
decades of its lifetime, is actually close to the DAILY tonnage
production of ore FROM many large base metal mines. One
consideration that is rarely addressed, is that in creating this
mine, more radioactivity (natural uranium and thorium) is likely
to be brought to the surface and released into the air space from
the volcanic tuffs removed, than is likely ever to escape from
the completed facility.
Underground disposal is essentially a knee jerk reaction to the
fear that if civilized society were to collapse totally in the
future, at least our present day nuclear wastes would be out of
their way. By the time that might happen, if ever, not only will
such wastes be essentially innocuous, but the new risks in that
collapsed society would make even the supposed chronic risks from
nuclear materials at the surface seem like a belch in a
hurricane. So much for perspective, or protecting future society.
What Radioactivity Is Typically Found In Society? Everything is
naturally radioactive and is impacted by radiation as shown
below. You should perhaps not read this list, as it might provide
too much disturbing perspective. + From the sky there are about
100,000 cosmic ray protons and neutrons, and about 400,000
secondary cosmic rays, which pass into and sometimes through us
each hour, as well as billions of neutrinos which pass through us
each hour without being slowed or stopped. + From the air we
breathe there are about 30,000 atoms of radon and radon progeny,
which disintegrate (decay) in our lungs every hour (about 8 Bq
each and every second) and deposit their energy in lung tissue.
In some regions this number of radon atoms continuously decaying
in the lungs may reach millions each hour. + From our diets there
are about 15,000,000 potassium-40 atoms, and about 7,000 uranium
atoms, which decay in each of our bodies every hour, and emit
alpha and beta particles (stopped in the body) and gamma energies
(which mostly escape to irradiate everything around us). Bananas
are an excellent source of potassium in our diets, and therefore
of radiation. Brazil nuts (as well as Brazilian beaches) are a
well-known source of natural radiation. Tobacco use is a major
source of radiation dose to smokers (up to about 80 mSv of
chronic dose in a year to the mouth and trachea of a pack-a-day
smoker) from polonium-210 (a daughter of radium-226) in the
tobacco leaf. It's the other carcinogens that kill smokers. +
From soil and building materials, there are over 200,000,000
gamma rays which pass through each of us every hour. In locations
with much higher natural radiation backgrounds, this figure may
be in the billions.
Although we cannot see or sense any of these events, it is
intriguing to consider that in light of the numbers of
interactions happening inside us and around us all of the time,
all of humanity lives immersed in a soup of natural radiation
energies.
Some of the major sources of radioactive materials and wastes
throughout society are shown in Table 5. A becquerel (Bq) is one
radioactive disintegration each second. A liter of cow's milk
(and blood and urine), with its natural potassium-40 (half-life
of 12.7 billion years), is radioactive at the level of about 50
Bq each and every second. Cheers! Human milk, blood and urine are
similar. One institute estimate points out (accurately, although
exaggerating a little) that any individual in North American
society gets more of a radiation dose from eating one banana,
than they would ever be likely to get from Yucca in a year, when
completed. The comparison indicates either, how socially safe
Yucca will be (true), and how fatuously expensive it is
considering the risks incurred or avoided (true), or how
dangerous bananas are (false).
Perspective on Radiation Dose from Radiation Uses in Society The
last century of increasing uses of radiation in society (since
1896), has shown that though radioactive materials and wastes in
modern hospitals constitute only about 1% of the radioactive
materials in society, they contribute about 99% of all
non-natural radiation doses to the public while generally saving
tens of thousands of lives each year and improving the quality of
life for hundreds of thousands of patients.
In contrast, less than 1% of public doses from non-natural
sources of radiation come from all industry and the entire
commercial nuclear power industry wastes (95%), with an even
smaller fraction of this coming from commercial power nuclear
wastes, no matter how radioactive they may be.
However, none of these nuclear wastes are associated with
significant doses to anyone, not even to the workers who manage
them, as they are strongly governed by an internationally
accepted radiation dose limit (100 millisieverts in 5 years),
which is very rarely approached by any worker, and is most
unlikely ever to be exceeded. Most workers actually receive, on
average, about the same radiation dose in a year of work (about 2
millisieverts), that they and their families get - on average -
from natural radiation exposures (about 3 millisieverts, or more
per year). The 'or more' can extend up to a few hundred
millisieverts per year (or more) from natural radiation in many
parts of the world, especially if you visit a spa or lounge on
the beaches of Brazil. If you are an astronaut - forget it, even
if you do manage to avoid the Van Allen Belts, where the
radiation dose gets up to about 15 millisieverts per hour. You
are far off the top of the picture.
What is perhaps of most interest - at least to me - is that
medical patients - millions of them - are not governed by any
radiation dose limits under treatment, and often are exposed to
radiation doses that are tens to hundreds (sometimes thousands)
of times larger than even industrial dose limits. No one gets
even slightly excited or concerned over this.
The general public needs to recognize these facts, but those who
tweak their perceptions and stir up their emotions about
extremely low radiation doses, such as those from nuclear wastes,
are unlikely to be happy that these realities are being pointed
out.
Some really interesting perspective (that word again) on
radiation and radiation doses throughout society is shown in
Table 6, below. It is a logarithmic scale of just a few doses (to
materials or people) in various processes, and medical
procedures; in nature; in industry; in the home; and from nuclear
facility operations and nuclear waste disposal future estimates.
If the plot were linear, it would need a sheet of paper many
miles long to cover the same scale range. The only item on the
table that is of widely publicized concern is the single item at
the very bottom - the potential impact in the long-term from
nuclear waste disposal. As far as most of the public, special
interest factions and politicians are concerned, the other
figures on the table don't even exist, and many of these groups
would rather that the public did not know anything about them.
Ten sieverts (grays) of acute whole-body dose would be fatal for
most humans, but this is one of the very successful (85%
recovery) treatment options for leukemia. Most localized cancers
are targeted with much higher doses to destroy them.
A targeted dose of about 100 sieverts is used to destroy the
thyroid, without the patient feeling a thing. The process is a
lot less traumatic and much safer than surgery even if the
patient gets a whole body radiation dose of about 3,000
millisieverts or more over the next few hours from the procedure.
If a radiation worker got this dose at work (rather than in the
hospital), the entire management of the facility would be heavily
fined, would probably be in jail, and the facility would likely
be closed by the NRC. And then, of course, watch for the legal
carrion feeders to swoop in.
Using radiation to sterilize hospital supplies ensures that
surgery; receiving injections; and many other medical procedures
are not the life-threatening ordeal that they used to be.
When society is able to sweep aside the remaining manipulated
mythology of food irradiation, then it is likely that we can
notably reduce the 5,000 to 9,000 deaths from food-borne illness
that the CDC estimates for the U.S. each year. Unfortunately, it
takes an outbreak of hundreds of food poisoning deaths and
injuries associated with undercooked and improperly prepared and
stored meats, fish and poultry, at one time, to capture anyone's
attention. Comparison of risk/benefits anyone?
In comparison with the use of any other source of energy, one
should be impressed by the lack of bodies from any aspect of
using nuclear power including management and disposal of its
radioactive wastes, but the acknowledgement of that simple fact,
is deafening by its silence.
[Get Copyright Clearance] Copyright 2004 CyberTech, Inc. Want
*****************************************************************
53 Re: Yucca Mountain high-level waste repository
Letter to Members of Congress from Public Interest Organizations
ALLIANCE FOR NUCLEAR ACCOUNTABILITY _ CITIZEN ALERT _ NATURAL
RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL _ NEVADA DESERT EXPERIENCE _ NEVADA
NUCLEAR WASTE TASK FORCE _ NUCLEAR INFORMATION AND RESOURCE
SERVICE _ PHYSICIANS FOR SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY _ PUBLIC CITIZEN
_ U.S. PUBLIC INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP _ SIERRA CLUB
January 26, 2004
Re: Yucca Mountain high-level waste repository
Dear Member of Congress:
As national environmental and public interest organizations, we
are writing to update you on the most recent developments
regarding the proposed high-level nuclear waste repository at
Yucca Mountain, Nevada. The Department of Energy (DOE) intends
to submit its license application to the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) by the end of this year, but as the following
issues indicate, numerous fundamental questions remain regarding
the suitability of the site to safely and permanently isolate
high-level radioactive waste. Due to the doubts and
uncertainties plaguing the Yucca Mountain project, we urge that
its budget not be increased and that no changes be made to the
funding practices.
1. Oral arguments in Yucca Mountain lawsuit heard in court. On
January 14, 2004, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia heard oral arguments on a slate of lawsuits filed
against the Yucca Mountain project. Last September, the six
cases were consolidated and deemed "complex," allowing the
three-judge panel more time to review them and lawyers more than
the usual amount of time to argue them. The lawsuits were
brought by public interest and environmental groups and the
State of Nevada against the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), and by the State of Nevada against the DOE, NRC and U.S.
government. As the attached news articles demonstrate, the
judges were particularly interested in the case against the EPA,
which charges that the EPA's radiation release standards are not
consistent with the recommendations of the National Academy of
Sciences as ordered by Congress in the 1992 Energy Policy Act.
The primary inconsistency is in the important area of whether
the regulatory period includes the time of the expected peak
dose from the repository.
The decisions, which are expected as early as this spring, could
potentially force a significant reassessment of the Yucca
Mountain project that would necessarily take years, and perhaps
even permanently derail it. Therefore, it would be inappropriate
and irresponsible to make any increases in the project's funding
or changes in funding practices, such as taking the project
"off-budget," pending the court's decisions.
2. Chairman of the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board resigned
over conflict-of-interest charges. On December 30, 2003, Michael
Corradini, chairman of the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board
(NWTRB), resigned following persistent criticism that he was
biased in favor of the Yucca Mountain repository. The NWTRB was
formed by Congress to be an independent body to review the DOE's
research at Yucca Mountain and to ensure the government's
decisions are supported by scientific evidence. Corradini's bias
in favor of Yucca Mountain was apparent even before his
appointment in June 2002. In 2001, he testified before the
Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources that Yucca
Mountain was "safe and solid" and that a stalemate over nuclear
waste disposal "is primarily a political rather than a technical
issue." Last October, Corradini co-authored an op-ed in a
Madison, Wisconsin newspaper, stating that nuclear waste "can be
stored safely at Yucca Mountain." The other nine board members,
recognizing that the panel's credibility and effectiveness were
in jeopardy, called for his resignation in April 2003.
The resignation of Corradini from the NWTRB is a welcome measure
to keep the continued role of the NWTRB as an impartial and
objective panel. As President Bush appoints a new chairman and
fills other existing and upcoming vacancies to the NWTRB this
year, Congress should call on the President to ensure that the
integrity and credibility of the Board is preserved.
3. NRC says DOE is not providing enough information on key
technical issues. The DOE announced in December that it would
answer all but one of the remaining key technical questions
about Yucca Mountain by August 2004, much sooner than originally
planned. Later that month, however, the NRC informed DOE that
they cannot evaluate the answers to questions that DOE has
already submitted, because DOE has not supplied all the
necessary technical documents. In a December 23, 2003 letter to
DOE, Janet Schlueter, chief of the NRC's High-level Waste
Branch, wrote that "DOE has not routinely provided supporting
information, most of which is also not publicly available. NRC
expects DOE to provide NRC with all information requested in the
original agreements."
The DOE has been working since September 2001 on answering 293
scientific questions, or key technical issues, that revolve
around Yucca Mountain's ability to keep radiation from
contaminating the surrounding environment. So far, answers to 83
questions have been completed and accepted by the NRC. Of the 53
responses submitted to the NRC since September 2003, only 14
"appear to have adequately addressed" the original question,
while 39 of the responses reviewed "do not appear to fully
satisfy the agreements." The letter lists about 50 documents it
still needs from the DOE to move ahead with its review of water
movement in the mountain and possible volcanic activity. Water
is a key issue for the site, because it could not only transport
radiation faster than expected, but also could lead to corrosion
of the waste containers holding the irradiated fuel.
Again, we urge that the budget for Yucca Mountain not be
increased and that no changes be made to the funding practices.
Please contact Michele Boyd with Public Citizen at (202)
454-5134 or Kevin Kamps with NIRS at (202) 328-0002 ext. 14 if
you have any questions.
Sincerely,
Susan Gordon
Director
Alliance for Nuclear Accountability
Peggy Maze Johnson
Executive Director
Citizen Alert
Karen Wayland
Legislative Director
Natural Resources Defense Council
Paul Colbert
Program Director
Nevada Desert Experience
Judy Treichel
Executive Director
Nevada Nuclear Waste Task Force
Michael Mariotte
Executive Director
Nuclear Information and Resource Service
Jaya Tiwari
Research Director
Physicians for Social Responsibility
Wenonah Hauter
Director, Critical Mass Energy and Environment Program
Public Citizen
Anna Aurilio
Legislative Director
U.S. Public Research Interest Group
Daniel Becker
Director, Global Warming and Energy Program
Sierra Club
--
********************************
Susan Gordon, Director Alliance for Nuclear Accountability
www.ananuclear.org 1914 N 34th Street, #407 Seattle, WA 98103 ph
206-547-3175 fax 206-547-7158 ANA is a national network of
organizations working to address issues of nuclear weapons
production and waste clean-up.
*****************************************************************
54 KBVC: Utility Companies File Lawsuits to Hurry Yucca Project
January 27, 2004
Steve Crupi Reporting
The U.S. Government is facing dozens of lawsuits in the battle
over Yucca Mountain. Some are from the state of Nevada trying to
block the project, but others are designed to speed it up. A
flurry of new lawsuits are coming from utility companies angry at
the Department of Energy for not opening up a national
nuclear-waste dump. Something the DOE had promised to do by 1998.
The energy department is standing by its current timetable of
opening the nuclear dump by 2010. But that's 12 years later than
power companies were promised. And this coming Saturday, the
statute of limitations for filing lawsuits runs out -- sparking a
rush to get them filed. Opponents of the dump are concerned the
lawsuits will keep the project moving forward. But Governor Kenny
Guinn isn't so sure.
Congresswoman Shelly Berkley is hoping the lawsuits don't
expedite a project she calls a dangerous waste of money. These
are lawmakers from Minnesota who paid a visit to Las Vegas in
search of more answers about how nuclear waste will be
transported across the country. Governor Guinn is hoping other
states will initiate legal action of their own to block the dump.
By the end of this week, it is expected that as many as fifty
lawsuits will have been filed by power companies against the
Department of Energy. Power companies say they've paid more than
14-billion dollars into an account to deal with nuclear waste,
but haven't gotten anything in return. So far, the lawsuits filed
don't specify the exact amount of damages the companies are
after.
All content © Copyright 2000 - 2004 WorldNow and KVBC. All
Rights Reserved.
*****************************************************************
55 KRNV: Nuclear utilities face deadline for radioactive waste lawsuits
January 27, 2004
A rush of lawsuits is expected this week from utility companies
suing the Energy Department for missing a 1998 deadline for
opening a national nuclear waste dump.
31 lawsuits were pending at the end of 2003, and another 16 have
been filed this month with the US Court of Federal Claims. More
are expected to be filed before Saturday, the end of a six-year
statute of limitations.
It all dates back to the government's promise in 1983 to take
thousands of tons of spent nuclear fuel off the utilities' hands.
Utilities have paid more than 14 billion dollars into an account
to deal with the waste, but say they haven't gotten anything in
return.
In 2002, four years past the deadline for opening a dump,
Congress endorsed President Bush's decision to build the
repository at Yucca Mountain.
Now, the Energy Department says it plans to open the dump in
2010, although Nevada is trying to stop the plan.
(Copyright 2004 by The Associated Press. All Rights Reserved.)
All content © Copyright 2001 - 2004 WorldNow and KRNV. All
Rights Reserved.
*****************************************************************
56 CBS 2: Some Concerns About Nuclear Storage Plan
Indian Point sits on the shore of the Hudson in Buchanan, N.Y.,
35 miles north of midtown Manhattan.
Some Concerns About Nuclear Storage Plan
Jan 27, 2004 5:00 pm US/Eastern
(CBS) The Indian Point Nuclear Energy Center is doing the right
thing, but the wrong way. That's according to critics who don't
like a plan for storing what they call "the most dangerous stuff
on earth."
They sit in pools of water 40 feet deep -- radioactive rods of
used-up nuclear fuel. There are so many rods, the pools at Indian
Point soon won't be able to take any more.
"We'll be running out of room, 2005, 2006," says Jim Steets from
Entergy.
Entergy, the plant owner, wants to move some of the spent fuel
rods from wet storage to dry. The rods would be moved into metal
and concrete casks, each weighing 185 tons. There could be
potentially dozens of casks stored outside on a concrete pad.
"It wouldn't be very hard to direct a airliner right into that
field of casks which would cause quite likely a major
radiological release," says plant critic Alex Matthiessen. He
says dry-cask storage is good in general but he's concerned about
the specifics of Entergy's plan.
"You need to have the most robust system for storing that fuel
that you can and what they're proposing now just doesn't cut it,"
he says.
Matthiessen's group, Riverkeeper, says the casks should be placed
in a concrete bunker, surrounded by an earthen berm. That would
greatly increase the cost, and Entergy doesn't think it's
necessary.
Fuel rod storage and transport casks have been tested extensively
and Entergy says they can take a licking, without leaking. "They
can withstand almost any kind of assault. They're like, they'd be
like big bowling pins in a sense, you know, you literally can
crash into them, knock them over and not have any impact on the
material inside," Steets told CBS 2's Tony Aiello.
Last year a whistleblower claimed that the casks Entergy wants to
use are not well-made. The NRC investigated and found that claim
to be "unsubstantiated."
Still, many are concerned about this storage plan. Entergy
promises to hold a public meeting to address concerns in the next
few months.
(MMIV, CBS Broadcasting Inc., All Rights Reserved.)
*****************************************************************
57 Deseret news: Cheney avoids queries on Iraq WMDs
[deseretnews.com]
Tuesday, January 27, 2004
In Italy, he urges nations to fight rise of such weapons
By Deb Riechmann Associated Press
ROME — Vice President Dick Cheney,
pushing his effort to persuade Europe to stand with the United
States against the spread of weapons oDeseret news: Cheney avoids queries on Iraq WMDs
[deseretnews.com]
Tuesday, January 27, 2004
In Italy, he urges nations to fight rise of such weapons
By Deb Riechmann Associated Press
ROME — Vice President Dick Cheney,
pushing his effort to persuade Europe to stand with the United
States against the spread of weapons oGuards Cheating At US Nuke Weapons Storehouses During Anti-Terror Drills
Date: Wed, 28 Jan 2004 00:00:45 -0500
Y-12 is America's main facility for processing
enriched uranium. It
stores nearly all of the country's reserve of
about
5,000 "secondaries," the thermonuclear hearts of
hydrogen bombs.
GUARDS CHEATED NUKE SECURITY DRILLS
http://snipurl.com/44g7
http://www.defensetech.org
http://www.defensetech.org/archives/000744.html
Security guards at the country's leading nuclear
storehouse have
been cheating during antiterrorism drills --
perhaps for as long as
20 years, according to a report released Monday by
the Energy
Department's inspector general.
And now, watchdogs in Congress and beyond are
questioning whether
the tons of enriched uranium at the Y-12 National
Security Complex
in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, are really safe at all.
"First off, heads should roll," said Rep.
Christopher Shays (R-
CT), who chairs the House Committee on Government
Reform's
National Security, Emerging Threats and
International Relations
Subcommittee. "I can assure you, my committee will
be following up
in a very direct way."
Y-12 is America's main facility for processing
enriched uranium. It
stores nearly all of the country's reserve of
about
5,000 "secondaries," the thermonuclear hearts of
hydrogen bombs.
When a team of Y-12 rent-a-cops racked up a
perfect score during an
antiterror drill June 26, officials there were
shocked. How could
the guards have performed so well, they wondered,
when a computer
model had predicted that the defenders would lose
at least half of
their confrontations?
The answer was simple: The guards cheated. They
had seen the
computer models of the strikes the day before they
were launched,
rendering the test "tainted and unreliable,"
according to the
report. And this wasn't the first time it had
happened...
http://www.defensetech.org/archives/000744.html
*****************************************************************
58 DOE: Privacy Act of 1974; Notice To Amend An Existing System of
FR Doc 04-1551
[Federal Register: January 27, 2004 (Volume 69, Number 17)]
[Notices] [Page 3904-3907] From the Federal Register Online via
GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr27ja04-51]
Records AGENCY: Department of Energy.
ACTION: Notice.
SUMMARY: As required by the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. 552a,
and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-130, the
Department of Energy (DOE) is publishing a notice of a proposed
amendment to an existing system of records. DOE proposes to amend
the routine use provision for DOE-13 ``Payroll and Leave
Records.'' The proposed amendment will allow disclosure of
information to the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS)
for the purpose of providing payroll services for the DOE.
DATES: The proposed amendment to an existing system of records
will become effective without further notice, on
[[Page 3905]] March 12, 2004, unless in advance of that date, DOE
receives adverse comments and determines that this amendment
should not become effective on that date.
ADDRESSES: Written comments should be directed to the following
address: U.S. Department of Energy, Abel Lopez, Director, Freedom
of Information Act and Privacy Act Group, ME-74, 1000
Independence Avenue, S.W., Washington, DC 20585. FOR FURTHER
INFORMATION CONTACT: Abel Lopez, Director, Freedom of Information
Act and Privacy Act Group, ME-74, U.S. Department of Energy, 1000
Independence Avenue, S.W., Washington, DC 20585, 202-586- 5955;
Wendy L. Miller, Director, Capital Accounting Center, ME-14, 1000
Independence Avenue, S.W., Washington, DC 20585-1290, (301)
903-5858; and Isiah Smith, Office of the General Counsel, GC-77,
U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue, S.W.,
Washington, DC 20585, (202) 586-8618.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: DOE proposes to amend the routine use
provision for an existing system of records, DOE-13 ``Payroll and
Leave Records.'' The new routine use is necessary because DOE has
entered into a cross-servicing agreement with DFAS to provide
payroll processing services to DOE. The proposed amendment will
allow disclosure of information to DFAS for the purpose of
processing DOE's payroll; the issuance of salary payments to
employees and distribution of wages; and the distribution of
allotments and deductions to financial and other institutions,
many of which are through electronic funds transfer.
The proposed routine use is compatible with the purpose for which
the information is being collected and maintained.
DOE is submitting the report required by OMB Circular A-130
concurrently with the publication of this notice. The text of
this notice contains the information required by the Privacy Act,
5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(4).
Issued in Washington, DC on January 15, 2004.
James T. Campbell, Acting Director, Office of Management, Budget
and Evaluation/Acting Chief Financial Officer.
DOE-13 SYSTEM NAME: Payroll and Leave Records.
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified.
SYSTEM LOCATION(S): U.S. Department of Energy, Headquarters, 1000
Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20585 U.S. Department of
Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Service
Center Albuquerque, P.O. Box 5400, Albuquerque, NM 87185-5400
U.S. Department of Energy, Atlanta Regional Support Office, 730
Peachtree, NE., Suite 876, Atlanta, GA 30308 U.S. Department of
Energy, Bonneville Power Administration, P.O. Box 3621, Portland,
OR 97208 U.S. Department of Energy, Boston Regional Support
Office, One Congress Street, Room 1101, Boston, MA 021144-2021
U.S. Department of Energy, Carlsbad Field Office, P.O. Box 3090,
Carlsbad, NM 88221 U.S. Department of Energy, Chicago Operations
Office, 9800 South Cass Avenue, Argonne, IL 60439 U.S. Department
of Energy, Golden Field Office, 1617 Cole Boulevard, Golden, CO
80401 U.S. Department of Energy, Idaho Operations Office, 850
Energy Drive, Idaho Falls, ID 83401 U.S. Department of Energy,
National Energy Technology Laboratory (Morgantown), P.O. Box 880,
Morgantown, WV 26507-0880 U.S. Department of Energy, National
Energy Technology Laboratory (Pittsburgh), 626 Cochrans Mill
Road, Pittsburgh, PA 15236-0940 U.S. Department of Energy,
National Petroleum Technology Office, William Center Tower One, 1
West Third Street, Suite 1400, Tulsa, OK 74103 U.S. Department of
Energy, Naval Petroleum and Oil Shale Reserves, 907 N. Poplar,
Suite 150, Casper, WY 82601 U.S. Department of Energy, Naval
Petroleum Reserves in California, 1601 New Stine Road, Suite 240,
Bakersfield, CA 93309 U.S. Department of Energy, NNSA Service
Center Nevada, P.O. Box 98518, Las Vegas, NV 89193-8518 U.S.
Department of Energy, Oak Ridge Operations Office, P.O. Box 2001,
Oak Ridge, TN 37831 U.S. Department of Energy, NNSA Service
Center Oakland, 1301 Clay Street, Oakland, CA 94612-5208 U.S.
Department of Energy, Office of Scientific & Technical
Information, P.O. Box 62, Oak Ridge, TN 37831 U.S. Department of
Energy, Ohio Field Office, P.O. Box 3020, Miamisburg, OH 45343
U.S. Department of Energy, Philadelphia Regional Support Office,
1880 John F. Kennedy Boulevard, Suite 501, Philadelphia, PA
19103-7483 U.S. Department of Energy, Pittsburgh Naval Reactors
Office, P.O. Box 109, West Mifflin, PA 15122-0109 U.S. Department
of Energy, Richland Operations Office, P.O. Box 550, Richland, WA
99352 U.S. Department of Energy, Rocky Flats Field Office, 10808
Highway 93, Unit A, Golden, CO 80403-8200 U.S. Department of
Energy, Savannah River Operations Office, P.O. A, Aiken, SC 29801
U.S. Department of Energy, Seattle Regional Support Office, 800
Fifth Avenue, Suite 3950, Seattle, WA 98104 U.S. Department of
Energy, Schenectady Naval Reactors Office, P.O. Box 1069,
Schenectady, NY 12301 U.S. Department of Energy, Southeastern
Power Administration, 1166 Athens Tech Road, Elberton, GA
30635-4578 U.S. Department of Energy, Southwestern Power
Administration, Williams Tower One, One West Third Street, Tulsa,
OK 74103 U.S. Department of Energy, Strategic Petroleum Reserve
Project Office, 900 Commerce Road East, New Orleans, LA 70123
U.S. Department of Energy, Western Area Power Administration,
P.O. Box 3402, Golden, CO 80401 U.S. Department of Energy, Office
of Repository Development, P.O. Box 364629, North Las Vegas, NV
89036-8629 CATEGORIES OF INDIVIDUALS COVERED BY THE SYSTEM:
Department of Energy (DOE), including National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA) personnel and consultants.
CATEGORIES OF RECORDS IN THE SYSTEM: Time and attendance records,
earning records, payroll actions, deduction information requests,
authorizations for overtime and night differential, and Office of
Personnel Management (OPM) retirement records.
AUTHORITY FOR MAINTENANCE OF THE SYSTEM: 42 U.S.C. 7101 et seq.;
50 U.S.C. 2401 et seq.; Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. 93-579 (5
U.S.C. 552a); General Accounting Office Policy and Procedures
Manual; Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. 104-193. PURPOSE(S): The records are
maintained and used by the DOE to document historical information
on employee wages, deductions, retirement benefits, and leave.
[[Page 3906]] ROUTINE USES OF RECORDS MAINTAINED IN THE SYSTEM,
INCLUDING CATEGORIES OF USERS AND THE PURPOSES OF SUCH USES: 1. A
record from this system may be disclosed as a routine use to the
Department of Treasury to collect withheld taxes, process payroll
payments, and issue savings bonds.
2. A record from this system may be disclosed as a routine use to
the Internal Revenue Service to process Federal income tax
payments and tax levies.
3. A record from this system may be disclosed as a routine use to
state and local governments to process State and local income tax
deductions and court ordered child support or alimony payments.
4. A record from this system may be disclosed as a routine use to
OPM to establish and maintain retirement records and benefits.
5. A record from this system may be disclosed as a routine use to
the Thrift Savings Board to update Section 401K type records and
benefits.
6. A record from this system may be disclosed as a routine use to
the Social Security Administration to establish Social Security
records and benefits.
7. A record from this system may be disclosed as a routine use to
the Department of Labor to process workmen's compensation claims.
8. A record from this system may be disclosed as a routine use to
the Department of Defense to adjust military retirement.
9. A record from this system may be disclosed as a routine use to
financial institutions to credit net deposits, savings
allotments, and discretionary allotments.
10. A record from this system may be disclosed as a routine use
to employee unions to credit accounts for employees with union
dues deductions.
11. A record from this system may be disclosed as a routine use
to health insurance carriers to process insurance claims.
12. A record from this system may be disclosed as a routine use
to the General Accounting Office to verify accuracy and legality
of disbursement.
13. A record from this system may be disclosed as a routine use
to the Department of Veterans Affairs to evaluate veteran's
benefits to which the individual may be entitled.
14. A record from this system may be disclosed as a routine use
to States' departments of employment security to determine
entitlement to unemployment compensation or other State benefits.
15. A record from the system may be disclosed as a routine use to
the appropriate local, State or Federal agency when records alone
or in conjunction with other information, indicates a violation
or potential violation of law whether civil, criminal, or
regulatory in nature, and whether arising by general statute or
particular program pursuant thereto.
16. A record from the system may be disclosed as a routine use to
a Federal, State, or local agency to obtain information relevant
to a Departmental decision concerning the hiring or retention of
an employee, the issuance of a security clearance, the letting of
a contract, or the issuance of a license, grant, or other
benefit.
The Department must deem such disclosure to be compatible with
the purpose for which the Department collected the information.
17. A record from the system may be disclosed as a routine use to
DOE contractors in performance of their contracts, and their
officers and employees who have a need for the record in the
performance of their duties. Those provided information under
this routine use are subject to the same limitations applicable
to DOE officers and employees under the Privacy Act.
18. A record from this system of records may be disclosed as a
routine use to a member of Congress submitting a request
involving the constituent when the constituent has requested
assistance from the member concerning the subject matter of the
record. The member of Congress must provide a copy of the
constituent's request for assistance.
19. A record from this system may be disclosed as a routine use
to the Office of Child Support Enforcement, Administration for
Children and Families, Department of Health and Human Services,
Federal Parent Locator System (FPLS) and Federal Tax Offset
System to locate individuals and identify their income sources to
establish paternity, establish and modify orders of support, and
for enforcement action.
20. A record from this system may be disclosed as a routine use
to the Office of Child Support Enforcement, Administration for
Children and Families, Department of Health and Human Services,
FPLS and Federal Tax Offset System, for release to the Social
Security Administration to verify social security numbers in
connection with the operation of the FPLS by the Office of Child
Support Enforcement.
21. A record from this system may be disclosed as a routine use
to the Office of Child Support Enforcement, Administration for
Children and Families, Department of Health and Human Services,
FPLS and Federal Tax Offset System, for release to the Department
of Treasury to administer the Earned Income Tax Credit Program
(Section 32, Internal Revenue Code of 1986) and verify a claim
with respect to employment in a tax return.
22. A record from this system may be disclosed as a routine use
to the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) so that DFAS
may perform payroll processing services for DOE. These services
may include the issuance of salary payments to employees and
distribution of wages; and the distribution of allotments and
deductions to financial and other institutions, many of which are
through electronic funds transfer.
POLICIES AND PRACTICES FOR STORING, RETRIEVING, ACCESSING,
RETAINING, AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS IN THE SYSTEM: STORAGE:
Records may be stored as paper records and electronic media.
RETRIEVABILITY: Records may be retrieved by name, social security
number, and payroll number.
SAFEGUARDS: Paper records are maintained in locked cabinets and
desks. Electronic records are controlled through established DOE
computer center procedures (personnel screening and physical
security), and they are password protected. Access is limited to
those whose official duties require access to the records.
RETENTION AND DISPOSAL: Records retention and disposal
authorities are contained in the National Archives and Records
Administration (NARA) General Records Schedule and DOE record
schedules that have been approved by NARA.
SYSTEM MANAGER(S) AND ADDRESS: Headquarters: Director, Office of
Management, Budget and Evaluation/Chief Financial Officer, U.S.
Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington,
DC 20585. Field Offices: The Managers of the DOE offices ``System
Locations'' listed above are the system managers for their
respective portions of this system.
NOTIFICATION PROCEDURES: In accordance with the DOE regulation
implementing the Privacy Act, at Title 10, Code of Federal
Regulations, part 1008, a request by an individual to determine
if a system of records contains information about him/her should
be directed to the Director, Headquarters Freedom of Information
[[Page 3907]] Act and Privacy Act Group, U.S. Department of
Energy, or the Privacy Act Officer at the appropriate address
identified above under ``System Locations.'' For records
maintained by Laboratory or Site Office, the request should be
directed to the Privacy Act Officer at the Operations Office that
has jurisdiction over that office or facility. The request should
include the requester's complete name, time period for which
records are sought, and the office locations(s) where the
requester believes the records are located.
RECORDS ACCESS PROCEDURES: Same as Notification Procedures above.
Records are generally kept at locations where the work is
performed. In accordance with the DOE Privacy Act regulation,
proper identification is required before a request is processed.
CONTESTING RECORD PROCEDURES: Same as Notification Procedures
above.
RECORD SOURCE CATEGORIES: The subject individual, supervisors,
timekeepers, official personnel records, and the Internal Revenue
Service.
SYSTEM EXEMPT FROM CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE ACT: None.
[FR Doc. 04-1551 Filed 1-26-04; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 6450-01-P
*****************************************************************
59 DOE: Decision To Compete Management and Operating Contracts for Los
FR Doc 04-1655
[Federal Register: January 27, 2004 (Volume 69, Number 17)]
[Notices] [Page 3904] From the Federal Register Online via GPO
Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr27ja04-50]
Alamos National Laboratory, Ames National Laboratory, Lawrence
Berkeley National Laboratory, Argonne National Laboratory, and
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Section 301(a) of the
Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act, 2004, Public Law
108-137, provides that none of the funds appropriated for fiscal
year 2004 or any previous fiscal year may be used for a
``noncompetitive management and operating contract'' unless the
Secretary of Energy, within 60 days of enactment of the Act,
publishes in the Federal Register and submits to the
Appropriation Committees of the House of Representatives and the
Senate ``a written notification, with respect to each such
contract, of the Secretary's decision to use competitive
procedures for the award of the contract, or to not renew the
contract, once the term of the contract expires.'' Pursuant to
section 301(a)(3), this requirement does not apply to ``an
extension for up to 2 years of a noncompetitive management and
operating contract, if the extension is for purposes of allowing
time to award competitively a new contract, to provide continuity
of service between contracts, or to complete a contract that will
not be renewed.'' Paragraph (b)(1) of section 301 identifies the
noncompetitive management and operating contracts subject to
Secretarial review and decision as the contracts for the
management and operation of Ames Laboratory, Argonne National
Laboratory, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory, and Los Alamos National
Laboratory. For purposes of section 301, paragraph (b)(2) of
section 301 provides that the term ``competitive procedures'' has
``the meaning provided in section 4 of the Office of Federal
Procurement Policy Act (41 U.S.C. 403) and includes the
procedures described in section 303 of the Federal Property and
Administrative Services Act of 1949 (41 U.S.C. 253) other than a
procedure that solicits a proposal from only one source.'' Public
Law 108-137 was enacted on December 1, 2003. Well before that
time, on April 30, 2003, I announced my decision to use
competitive procedures to award the Los Alamos National
Laboratory management and operating contract when its term
expires. In addition, I hereby announce my decision to use
competitive procedures described in section 301 to award the Ames
Laboratory, Argonne National Laboratory, Lawrence Berkeley
National Laboratory, and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
management and operating contracts. Decisions concerning the
precise timing and form that these competitions will take are
still under consideration and will be made in accordance with
applicable law and regulation.
Dated: January 21, 2004.
Spencer Abraham, Secretary of Energy.
[FR Doc. 04-1655 Filed 1-26-04; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 6450-01-P
*****************************************************************
60 Tri-City Herald: Letter asks for cleanup solution
This story was published Tuesday, January 27th, 2004
By Annette Cary Herald staff writer
The state of Washington and the Department of Energy need to
resolve their dispute over reclassifying high-level nuclear
waste at Hanford before it starts slowing cleanup, according to
Washington's congressional delegation.
On Monday, U.S. Rep. Doc Hastings, R-Wash., and U.S. Sens. Patty
Murray and Maria Cantwell, both D-Wash., called for talks
between Gov. Gary Locke and Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham.
At issue is how much authority state and federal agencies can
exercise over treatment, handling and removal of radioactive
wastes at Hanford, according to Hastings' office.
"The stakes are incredibly high, and the price of failure is the
continued exposure of the people and the environment to
unnecessary risks by potentially slowing the pace of cleanup
activities," said the letter sent to Locke and Abraham.
DOE has pushed for more authority to reclassify waste nationwide
in the past year. More than half the waste that could be
affected is at Hanford.
Allowing DOE to reclassify some high-level wastes could allow
more of the waste now in underground tanks at Hanford to remain
at Hanford permanently. The tanks hold 11 million gallons of
high-level wastes and 42 million gallons of low-activity wastes
from plutonium production at Hanford.
High-level waste from the tanks is to be turned into a glasslike
substance and shipped elsewhere for permanent storage, likely
Yucca Mountain in Nevada. But the least hazardous waste will be
buried at Hanford.
Since losing a lawsuit over its powers to reclassify waste, DOE
has said it needs broad reclassification authority or the 42
million gallons of low-activity waste might all have to be
treated as high-level waste at a much greater cost.
Environmental groups and the states of Washington, Idaho, Oregon
and South Carolina are skeptical about DOE's intent. They fear
if DOE were given more authority, it might leave large amounts
of highly radioactive wastes inside the tanks.
"Both Washington state and the Department of Energy have
legitimate concerns, but they also have a shared responsibility
to resolve this dispute in a constructive manner," Hastings said
in a statement. "I am increasingly concerned that as time passes
no progress is being made toward a workable solution."
The letter called for the immediate start of high-level
discussions and asked for a commitment from the state and
federal governments to continue discussions until an agreement
is reached.
"In the past when seemingly intractable problems have faced
cleanup obstacles, they have been solved by your common
commitment to rise above the obstacles to reach shared
objectives," the letter said.
© 2004 Tri-City Herald, Associated Press &Other Wire Services
*****************************************************************
61 Tri-City Herald: Cleanup contract division sought
This story was published Tuesday, January 27th, 2004
By Annette Cary Herald staff writer
The Department of Energy's draft bid process for cleaning up
Hanford's river shore favors a few large businesses and
effectively excludes small local businesses, claims the
Tri-Cities Local Business Association.
The losers will be taxpayers, who could have saved money on the
estimated $4 billion project, and the Tri-Cities, which may not
get help in growing small businesses that could remain after
Hanford cleanup money is gone, association members said Monday.
The group wants the contract broken into five to 10 individual
contracts with values in the $300 million to $400 million range.
"We don't ask for anything being handed to us," said Sid Morrison
of the association. "We just ask for the chance to compete."
The work primarily includes removing radioactively and chemically
contaminated soil from along the Columbia River shore,
demolishing and sealing old reactors and cleaning up the 300 Area
at the south end of the nuclear reservation.
Association member Dick French said the work scope has hundreds
of unrelated tasks grouped together, and most of the work is
neither highly technical nor highly hazardous.
Although small Tri-City firms are qualified to do the work,
they're unable to compete for it under the proposed bid process
and "not one dime of it is required to be done by small
businesses," French said.
The association has asked the U.S. Small Business Administration
to intervene, and a meeting with SBA officials is scheduled,
French said.
In 2002, the SBA announced recommendations to push President
Bush's goal of ensuring small businesses have fair access to
federal contracts. It said taking small contracts and bundling
them together results in only a single large business being able
to bid on contracts instead of giving many small businesses a
chance.
But the draft request for proposals for the river contract is not
an example of bundling, said Leif Erickson, chairman of the
source evaluation board for the contract.
"Bundling assumes it was once separate," he said. In fact, the
work has been assigned to a single contractor, Bechtel Hanford,
he said.
While DOE officials cannot comment on what the final request for
proposals will include, Erickson said officials are considering
the comments made on the draft solicitation, including those from
small businesses.
"As with the majority of (environmental management) contracts,
there is an important place for small business, and the river
corridor will be no different," Erickson said.
The final request for proposals is expected to be issued before
March 1.
Instructions in the draft do establish goals for small-business
participation in work that is subcontracted, Erickson said, and
bidders will have to prepare a small-business plan.
But Tri-Cities Local Business Association members believe large
contractors can get around the requirement that small businesses
be included.
They're also concerned about the 45-day deadline businesses have
to prepare proposals, believing the clock has started ticking.
But Erickson said a period of roughly 45 days will not start
until the final solicitation is released.
The contract has a complicated history. Bechtel Hanford began
managing the removal of contaminated soil and the demolition and
sealing of old reactor complexes along the Columbia River in
1994. That contract was expanded and rebid in 2002.
DOE awarded the contract to Washington Closure Co., but losing
bidder Bechtel National successfully challenged the bid award.
"The long and short of it is if you are not an original bidder,
you have no chance" because of the short time period to prepare a
bid, French said.
"We have an aggressive schedule because we have to proceed with
the contract for this work," Erickson said. "It's important
work."
© 2004 Tri-City Herald, Associated Press &Other Wire Services
*****************************************************************
62 Knox News: Tennessee delegation touts Y-12 role
By RICHARD POWELSON, powelsonr@shns.com
January 27, 2004
WASHINGTON — The U.S. government's shipment of nuclear materials
from Libya to Oak Ridge is a strong vote of confidence in the
East Tennessee facility's operations, members of Congress said
Tuesday.
U.S. Rep. Zach Wamp said this marks the third country from which
U.S. officials have accepted enriched uranium and then sent it
to the Y-12 plant in Oak Ridge for dilution and/or safe storage.
Oak Ridge also has accepted such weapons material obtained from
Russia and an undisclosed area in the Middle East, he said.
"It's very reassuring," said Wamp, a Chattanooga Republican
whose district includes Oak Ridge, "to see that our country knows
the highly skilled workforce in nuclear weapons in the country is
in Oak Ridge — (and) that safe and secure storage ... takes place
on behalf of our country at Oak Ridge."
Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist, R-Tenn., said the Oak Ridge
plant is helping to keep the world more secure from nuclear-bomb
attacks by hostile governments.
"The world is a safer, safer place," Frist said after the Libyan
weapons material arrived at McGhee Tyson Airport near Knoxville.
He called the Oak Ridge facility "one of the great nuclear labs
in this country."
Frist said it was apparent that Libya gave up the nuclear weapons
capability because its leader, Moammar Gadhafi, "got the message"
that the United States was willing to put strong pressure on
hostile countries with weapons of mass destruction.
Also, U.S. Sen. Lamar Alexander, R-Tenn., said: "Once again, the
facilities in Oak Ridge are proving central to our nation's
security. The shipment of these materials out of Libya is a
critical first step in securing nuclear materials and equipment
to make sure they don't end up in the hands of terrorists."
Wamp said he believes that Libya gave up its weapons material and
equipment after sensing "this was an opportune moment for people
in Northern Africa and the Middle East to say to the West that we
want to be cooperative and we want a more stable region."
Richard Powelson may be contacted at 202-408-2727.
Copyright © 2004 The Knoxville News Sentinel Co. All Rights
Reserved.
*****************************************************************
63 KIFI: DOE Cites Bechtel BWXT Idaho for Falling Containers
www.localnews8.com
January 26, 2004
The department of Energy is citing Bechtel BWXT Idaho for
violating safety rules.
It stems from an incident that happened last July where a column
of waste containers toppled over. Several of the containers fell
on to a forklift. Luckily, no one was injured.
The investigation says Bechtel failed to properly train workers
and comply with procedure.
The investigation also found a similar incident occurred in 2002.
DOE has proposed a civil penalty of 41-thousand dollars. Bechtel
has 30 days to respond to the violation. For more information,
visit .
*****************************************************************
64 Hawk Eye: Senator awaits DOE reply
Friday, January 23, 2004 Site updated daily at 11 a.m. CST
Deadline on Grassley's request for documents likely to be missed.
By MATTHEW LeBLANC
mleblanc@thehawkeye.com
Despite today's deadline, U.S. Department of Energy officials are
not expected to comply with a request from Sen. Charles Grassley
for documents related to the department's role in the defeat of
legislation designed to overhaul a federal workers' compensation
program.
A letter from the Iowa Republican also asks Energy Department
officials to outline the department's relationship with a
Louisiana technology company that may have had a role in a Senate
subcommittee's decision to trim the legislation from the final
version of a hotly debated energy bill.
Grassley spokeswoman Beth Pellett said Thursday that DOE
officials were not expected to turn over the documents, which
will be used to sort out the department's role in the defeat of
section 316 of the Energy and Water Appropriation Act. Grassley
asked for the documents in a Dec. 22 letter, seeking their
delivery by today.
Asked whether she expected the documents to be delivered by
today's deadline, Pellett said: "Probably not."
Section 316 was left out of the Energy bill after House and
Senate leaders met in October. The legislation would have moved
control of some compensation claims filed under the Energy
Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program from the DOE
to the Department of Labor, which Grassley and Sen. Lisa
Murkowski, R–Alaska, argued would expedite a lagging process.
"The simple fact is that we've got to do something to help these
people who worked in very hazardous conditions while they
assembled our nation's nuclear deterrent during the Cold War,"
Grassley said in a November prepared statement.
Pellett said Grassley met with DOE officials earlier this week,
but the topics of discussion were unclear.
"We are working in an expeditious and orderly manner to answer
Sen. Grassley's request," DOE spokesman Jeff Sherwood said. "We
are in contact with his staff and will provide the materials
requested by the senator in a timely manner."
From the 1940s to the mid–1970s, workers at IAAP assembled,
test–fired and disassembled components of nuclear weapons at the
19,000–acre plant west of Burlington. The work has been linked to
lung diseases and cancers among former IAAP employees.
Shortly before section 316 was deleted from the bill, Sens. Mary
Landrieu and John Breaux, both Democrats from Louisiana, sent a
letter to Energy and Water Development Subcommittee Chairman Pete
Domenici, R–N.M., asking for "careful consideration of the full
impact this amendment has" on a "key employer in our state."
The employer, later identified as New Orleans–based Science
&Engineering Associates, was hired by DOE–run Space and Naval
Warfare Information Technology Center to help process thousands
of claims filed under the EEOICP. Lobbyists have estimated that
SEA stood to lose as much as $40 million if the legislation was
passed.
Aides to Grassley say SEA may have played a role in lobbying
against the amendment.
"DOE ... publicly opposed the amendment, so we cannot imagine why
there is a continued desire to withhold information about the
conduct and manner of the opposition," Grassley and Murkowski
wrote in the Dec. 22 letter to Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham.
If the documents are not delivered, it will mark the second time
Grassley has been rebuffed by DOE officials. A Nov. 4 letter
asked for the same information.
"Given the previous period, the department had to begin compiling
the records requested in Sen. Grassley's Nov. 4, 2003, letter,
the Jan. 23, 2004, deadline should be more than enough time to
compile and deliver the requested material," Grassley and
Murkowski wrote in the Dec. 22 letter.
Workers who have illnesses covered under EEOICP can apply for a
one–time $150,000 compensation payments to cover medical costs
associated with the illnesses. Government studies have shown that
a majority of nearly 20,000 claims filed nationwide have not been
processed.
More than 1,500 former IAAP workers have filed claims under the
program, with only 37 receiving payment, according to department
statistics.
Grassley has indicated he will reintroduce legislation to
complete the switch, though it's unclear when.
The Hawk Eye 800 S. Main St., Burlington Iowa 52601 319-754-8461
Front Desk · 319-754-6824 FAX · 1-800-397-1708 Toll Free
*****************************************************************
65 Hawk Eye: DOE doesn÷t deliver papers
Monday, January 26, 2004 Site updated daily at 11 a.m. CST
Energy Department fails to meet Grassley deadline for weapons
worker documents.
By MATTHEW LeBLANC
mleblanc@thehawkeye.com
Documents detailing the Department of Energy's role in the defeat
of legislation designed to overhaul its workers' compensation
program have not made it to Sen. Charles Grassley's desk, despite
a Jan. 23 delivery deadline, aides say.
A DOE spokesman said they will be delivered "in a timely manner."
Grassley, R–Iowa, had requested the documents in a Dec. 22 letter
to Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham after it was found that a
Louisiana technology company affiliated with the DOE may have
helped sink an amendment moving workers' compensation claims to
the Department of Labor. He asked that they be delivered by Jan.
23.
"DOE told Sen. Grassley that the documents were not ready, but
they were working on them," said Beth Pellett, a spokeswoman for
Grassley.
Jeff Sherwood, a spokesman for the Energy Department, said last
week that all requested materials would be delivered. He did not
give a timeline for delivery.
Included in Grassley's request are thousands of pages of
documents detailing the DOE's relationship with New Orleans–based
Science &Engineering Associates. The firm, hired by Energy
officials to help process thousands of claims filed under the
Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program, was
mentioned by Sens. Mary Landrieu and John Breaux in a Sept. 26,
2003, letter to the Senate Energy and Water Subcommittee shortly
before lawmakers axed Grassley's amendment from the final version
of the Energy bill.
Landrieu and Breaux, both Democrats from Louisiana, cautioned
subcommittee Chairman Pete Domenici, R–N.M., that Grassley's
amendment could hurt "a key employer in our state."
Sources have said SEA stood to lose about $40 million if claims
were moved to the DOL. Those numbers have not been confirmed.
Grassley has said he will use facts gleaned from Energy documents
to examine ways to expedite a claims process government auditors
have found to be lagging. An October General Accounting Office
report states that little more than 6 percent of more than 19,000
claims filed under EEOICP have been processed.
GAO, Congress' investigative arm, also found that claims handled
by the DOL — which works with DOE under the program —had
processed nearly all of its claims.
A Nov. 4, 2003, letter asked Energy officials for the same
documents, though none were ever delivered, bringing a second,
scathing letter from Grassley and Alaska Republican Lisa
Murkowski.
"Given the previous period the (Energy) Department had to begin
compiling the records requested in Sen. Grassley's November 4,
2003, letter, the Jan. 23, 2004, deadline should be more than
enough time to compile and deliver the requested materials,"
Grassley and Murkowski wrote.
The Hawk Eye 800 S. Main St., Burlington Iowa 52601 319-754-8461
Front Desk · 319-754-6824 FAX · 1-800-397-1708 Toll Free
*****************************************************************
66 Hawk Eye: Grassley wants Iowan named to board
Monday, January 26, 2004 Site updated daily at 11 a.m. CST
In an attempt to create more government oversight on a federal
workers' compensation program, Sen. Charles Grassley has
recommended Iowa Workers' Compensation Commission member Iris J.
Post be appointed to the newly created Workers' Compensation
Assistance Advisory Committee.
The WCAAC was created earlier this month to provide reviews and
advice for the Energy Department's Office of Worker Advocacy,
which helps implement the Energy Employees Occupational Illness
Compensation Program.
"Time and time again, I have raised concerns with the processing
of claims," Grassley said in a prepared statement Friday. "I hope
the new advisory committee will help identify deficiencies as
well as provide potential legislative recommendations."
Grassley, with Sen. Lisa Murkowski, R–Alaska, introduced
legislation last year aiming to overhaul EEOICP by moving claims
responsibilities to the Department of Labor after a General
Accounting Office report showed flaws under DOE control.
Post had previously served as a member of the Advisory Committee
to the Federal Worker Advocacy Office at the DOE before it
disbanded in 2002, according to Grassley spokeswoman Beth
Pellett.
"The purpose of the committee is to provide the Secretary of
Energy and the Assistant Secretary for Environment, Safety and
Health with advice, information and recommendations on the
operation of the Office of Worker Advocacy, focusing on its case
management and physician panel processes," said Advisory
Committee Management Officer James N. Solit in a Jan. 9 issue of
the Federal Register.
The move affects more than 1,500 former Iowa Army Ammunition
Plant employees who have filed workers' compensation claims worth
$150,000 each under the EEOICP. The new advisory committee
provides oversight, which Grassley has said was lacking in the
DOE–run program.
— Matthew LeBlanc
The Hawk Eye 800 S. Main St., Burlington Iowa 52601 319-754-8461
*****************************************************************
67 PISJ: DOE slaps Bechtel with $41,250 penalty
Pocatello Idaho State Journal:
Senator's spokesman leaves for new job
Center sets free workshop Thursday on e-commerce Search Archives
WASHINGTON, DC - The Department of Energy has issued a proposed
$41,250 civil penalty to Bechtel BWXT Idaho for alleged unsafe
operating procedures at the Radioactive Waste Management Complex
at Idaho's nuclear site.
According to a press release, The Preliminary Notice of Violation
was issued because of a July 2003 incident, where a column of
low-level radioactive waste containers placed in a pit for burial
toppled over, with several containers hitting the forklift used
to stack the containers.
No one was injured, and no radioactive material was released.
Bechtel has 30 days to respond to the notice.
Copyright © 2004 Pocatello Idaho State Journal
P O Box 431 Pocatello, ID 83204-0431
*****************************************************************
68 Tri-Valley Herald: Seeking a piece of the nuclear pie
1/27/2004
Bidding opens today in first competition for weapons labs,
including Lawrence Livermore
By by Ian Hoffman, STAFF WRITER
The U.S. Department of Energy formally opens competition today
for three top federal labs the University of California has
operated since their creation in the 1940s and'50s.
A Federal Register notice will serve as the starting gun. Close
to a dozen potential bidders are jockeying for a shot at running
Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore nuclear weapons design labs and
their institutional parent, Lawrence Berkeley lab, which performs
unclassified research.
Congress last year ordered immediate contract competition for all
three labs, plus two others run by the University of Chicago and
Iowa State University.
At stake is who will operate a scientific empire as large as San
Francisco that employs 18,000 people in California and New
Mexico. Half are scientists or engineers, most of them
contributors in one way or another to the design and maintenance
of the U.S. nuclear arsenal.
The Berkeley lab, perched on a hill over UC's first campus, is
where academia and the U.S. government first joined in the name
of Big Science in the late 1930s.
Technically, the University of California's tenure in charge
there runs out Saturday. But Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham
will take the pro-forma step this week of extending UC's contract
to January 2005.
That yearlong delay suggests the competition for the Berkeley lab
contract might proceed on a faster schedule than the competitions
at Los Alamos and Livermore, where existing contracts won't
expire until September 2005.
The Energy Department is working on a schedule for the
competitions, said agency spokesman Joe Davis. The timetable will
orchestrate dates for bidders to state their interest, the Energy
Department to release bidding specifications, the submittal of
bid packages, award of the contracts and negotiations over final
details.
Few will pay as much attention to this timetable as UC executives
in Oakland, who alone of the potential bidders are preparing to
fight for all three labs.
Tri-Valley Herald All Rights Reserved
*****************************************************************
69 Oak Ridger: BNFL tackles removal of three storage tanks
Story last updated at 12:27 p.m. on January 27, 2004
By: Paul Parson | Oak Ridger Staff
paul.parson@oakridger.com
The removal of three uranium storage tanks at the Oak Ridge K-25
site turned out to be a "big" project.
"Due to the large size of the tanks - 10 feet in diameter, 48
feet tall and 35,000 pounds - and the cramped removal area, two
cranes were necessary to land the tanks directly on a low-boy
trailer," said Will Wesselman, engineering manager with BNFL Inc.
The three tanks were located in Building K-29 - one of the
three structures BNFL is under contract with the federal
government to clean up.
Each tank had extensive radiological contamination that
required removal, officials said. The tanks were used to house
uranium enriched by the gaseous diffusion process.
BNFL
Surge tank being removed from Building K-29 at the East Tennessee
Technology Park, formerly known at the K-25 site.
"The surge tanks were purged of any toxic substances, welded shut
and verified that no contamination existed on the outside," said
Wesselman.
The tanks were then transported to Building K-33 for processing.
At K-33, two crane hooks were used to manipulate the 48-foot
tanks through 26-foot-long crane access hatches.
"This was a very complicated process," said Jon Carlberg, BNFL's
support services and criticality safety manager. "BNFL worked
diligently to ensure the process was completed safely and
successfully."
According to BNFL officials, the tanks will be sent through the
company's one-of-a-kind supercompactor. The supercompactor can
process items that are up to 26 feet long, 14 feet wide and 6
feet high and compact them into material that is less than 10
inches thick in any one dimension.
*****************************************************************
70 Oak Ridger: Y-12 security test blasted in DOE report
Story last updated at 11:36 a.m. on January 27, 2004
INSPECTOR GENERAL DOCUMENT: 'We found that shortly before the
test, two participating protective force personnel were
permitted to view the computer simulations of the four
scenarios.'
By: Paul Parson | Oak Ridger Staff
The results of a security test last year at Oak Ridge's nuclear
weapons facility were "tainted and unreliable," according to the
Department of Energy's Inspector General.
It's the third time this month that security issues have been
noted at the Y-12 National Security Complex. And, it's got the
security contractor for the federal plant going on the defensive.
"There is no question in my mind that security today is much
better than it has been," said Jean "John" Burleson, senior vice
president and general manager of Wackenhut Services Inc.'s Oak
Ridge team.
Since January 2000, Wackenhut has provided security at Y-12,
which plays a major role in national security through its
production and refurbishment of weapons components, storage of
nuclear material and prevention of the spread of weapons of mass
destruction.
As part of a facility's security planning process, protective
forces undergo performance tests, which commonly involve live
exercises where they defend against a simulated attack. Because
of the high cost of the live tests - between $50,000 to $85,000
per test at Y-12 - sites use a computer program to simulate
protective force responses to various threats. Select
simulations are then validated through performance tests.
Computer simulations conducted prior to a June 2003 performance
test at Y-12 predicted that the responder protective forces
would decisively lose two of the four scenarios that comprised
the test. However, when the Y-12 protective force won all four
of the scenarios, management officials at the weapons plant
became concerned the test had been compromised.
DOE's Inspector General was asked to look into the matter. The
result of the investigation were outlined in a report released
Monday.
"We found that shortly before the test, two participating
protective force personnel were permitted to view the computer
simulations of the four scenarios," the report stated. "We
concluded that this action was improper, since it had the
potential to adversely impact the realism of the performance
test and its outcome. In short, the test results were tainted
and should not, in our judgment, be relied upon."
Burleson, however, told The Oak Ridger that last year's test
was not a standard "force-on-force" exercise and that some
advance information was necessary to do the special exercise. He
was also adamant that the test was "not compromised."
During the inspection of the June 2003 security test, DOE's
Inspector General was provided with information indicating that
inappropriate actions had occurred going back to the mid-1980s
in connection with performance tests at DOE's Oak Ridge complex.
Several different contractors have held the protective force
contract during the period in question.
Current or former protective force personnel provided a number
of examples of improper actions related to prior performance
tests, including the following:
* Management would identify the best prepared protective force
personnel and then substitute them for lesser prepared personnel
who were scheduled to participate in an exercise.
* A protective force responder would be assigned to "tail" the
aggressors and observe their movements while they were touring
Y-12 buildings and targets prior to and in preparation for an
exercise.
* Training prior to a performance test would focus on the
specific building to be targeted, and in some instances, an oral
plan would be created that deviated from the established Y-12
tactical plan to counter the attack.
* Based on specific attack information, trucks or other
obstacles would be staged at advantageous points to be used as
barricades and concealment by protective force responders for
shooting during the exercises.
"During our inspection, we learned that a Wackenhut official
had recently acknowledged to a senior department official that Š
stand-by personnel had been used in performance tests in the
past," the Inspector General report stated. "We were told,
however, that Wackenhut management had established new
procedures to address this issue after becoming aware of it
sometime in late 2000 or in 2001."
Burleson also said that prior security problems have been
remedied.
In September, Wackenhut received its highest scores to-date on
an evaluation by the NNSA, which is done every six months. The
company received more than $3 million in fees and "outstanding"
marks in several areas, including protective force training.
And, although another evaluation is expected to be released
soon, DOE's Inspector General said the NNSA should pay attention
to the report released Monday.
"We believe that the results of the [Inspector General] review
should be considered when DOE officials evaluate Wackenhut's
contractual performance and award fee," the report stated.
The NNSA's Oak Ridge office declined to comment on the report.
However, a "management comments" section of the document states
that the NNSA concurred with the report's findings.
DOE's Inspector General report comes hot on the heels of claims
by the Project On Government Oversight that Y-12 could not
adequately protect its supply of bomb-grade uranium in the event
of a terrorist attack. The watchdog group based its claims on
unnamed government sources and a recent, but unfinished review
by DOE's office of Security and Performance Assurance.
"It's blatantly untrue," said Burleson of POGO's claims that
the security review yielded bad results. "There's no danger."
In addition, the National Nuclear Security Administration
announced earlier this month that it would review "key
management practices" at all of the federal weapons facilities
it oversees within DOE. At the time the NNSA review was
announced, it was also reported that between 200 to 250 keys
turned up missing from the weapons plant last year.
Also, the Oak Ridge NNSA office recently made management
adjustments relating to its security officials while Y-12
appointed a new security chief. The Y-12 switch reportedly does
not have anything to do with security problems, though officials
would not go on the record with that information.
*****************************************************************
71 Oak Ridger: Dick Smyser: Uranium and hydrogen in ETEC's future;
Story last updated at 11:35 a.m. on January 27, 2004
acknowledging too many errors
By: Dick Smyser | Editor's License
The Roane Anderson Economic Council was founded in 1973. Gene
Joyce and Tom Hill were the founders with whom I had closest
contact. I remember conversations with Tom as to whether his
prominent part in the founding would conflict with his duties as
publisher of The Oak Ridger.
I appreciated that Tom had such concerns and that he would
share them with me. It occurs now that our discussions were an
early instance of discussions that many publishers have had with
their editors as, in more recent years, the philosophy of
"public (or civic) journalism" has been practiced and debated:
the newspaper less just a spectator and critic and more a
participant, even leader, in community projects.
The new organization was most often called just "Roane
Anderson," at the risk of being confused with the Roane Anderson
Co. that managed housing and all city services for the U.S.
Atomic Energy Commission prior to the sale of previously
government-owned homes and land and the city's forming its own
government - incorporation. It functioned as RAEC until 1994
when, extending its area of concern beyond Oak Ridge's city
limits, it changed its name to East Tennessee Economic Council.
Jim Campbell, a former editor of The Oak Ridger, is executive
director of ETEC. On Jan. 15, he briefed the Rotary Club of Oak
Ridge at its luncheon at the Elks Lodge. Jim sees uranium and
hydrogen as big in this area's commercial and industrial future.
Uranium, of course, is the cornerstone of Oak Ridge's past. But
just as this city was built in secrecy to house the scientists,
engineers and other workers who would enrich the uranium that
fueled the first nuclear weapons, now the residue and spinoffs
of those operations are poised to make new contributions to
medicine, space exploration and energy development:
*U-233 from stocks at Oak Ridge National Laboratory processed
by local private industries to provide radioisotopes to treat
cancer.
*Depleted uranium from Y-12 used in shields for the National
Air and Space Administration's Jupiter Icy Moons Orbiter.
*Technology developed here applied by the United States
Enrichment Corp. at its Oak Ridge plant to manufacture "in bulk"
gas centrifuges for the new uranium enrichment plant planned at
the former DOE gaseous diffusion plant in Piketon, Ohio.
Campbell listed ETEC's primary missions:
*Contact with other cities close to Department of Energy
operations, like Richland, Wash., Los Alamos, N.M., Savannah
River, Ga.
*Keeping Congress informed of what's happening here in East
Tennessee and particularly at Oak Ridge.
*Hosting visits by members of Congress and the State
Legislature.
*Assisting University of Tennessee-Battelle, contractor for
operations at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, to move new
technologies developed at ORNL promptly into the private sector.
Yet another major area for spinoff into private industry
locally, Campbell said, is homeland security. ORNL is developing
many new technologies, especially more sophisticated sensors to
detect explosives.
ETEC continues a tradition that dates back to its earliest
years as "Roane Anderson" - Friday morning breakfasts. At these,
held in early years at the Alexander Inn, now at the University
of Tennessee Outreach Center on the Turnpike at Rutgers Avenue
(once the A ), ETEC's directors and invited guests are kept up
to date.
And now about hydrogen. As there is increasing talk of the
United States moving to a hydrogen, as opposed to an oil,
economy, Campbell sees Oak Ridge and East Tennessee as
positioned to help refine the concept of the hydrogen-driven
automobile. Also to design and build a "Hydrogen Service
Station" where H-cars would "hydrogen up."
***
I have committed an excess of errors in this column within the
past two weeks:
Tim Burchell was not at the helm of the chartered sailboat in
which he, John Gunning, also of Oak Ridge, and two other friends
were sailing off the Florida Keys when it was rammed by a larger
fishing vessel this past fall. Tim suffered pulled neck muscles.
Fred Baker, of Charleston, S.C., was the helmsman and suffered
the ankle bone injury that I mistakenly attributed to Tim in my
Jan. 15 column.
That same column erroneously stated that Gregg Herken was one
of the Friends of Oak Ridge National Laboratory's Community
Lecturers in February of last year. He will, rather, be the
Community Lecturer on Feb. 17 - next month. Herken, author of
"Brotherhood of the Bomb: The Tangled Lives and Loyalties of
Robert Oppenheimer, Ernest Lawrence and Edward Teller," was
previously senior historian and curator at the Smithsonian
Institution's National Air and Space Museum in Washington, D.C.
He now is a key figure in the founding of the new University of
California, Merced.
The Oak Ridger was sold by the Hill family, its founders, in
late 1986, not late 1987, as stated in my column a week ago
about the 55th anniversary of The Ridger's first issue, although
the official date of the sale was Jan. 1, 1987.
The lecture by John Dobson, sidewalk astronomer, was on
Wednesday, Jan. 14.
All these and multiple misspellings, previously acknowledged,
in the Jan. 15 column and attributable, I now embarrassingly
know, to my misuse of my computer spell check which regularly
suggests that I change ORNL to ORAL, ORAU to AURA, Pollard and
Pollock to Polaroid and, in this instance, also badly mangled
the first name of Cresson Kearny and the last names of Helen
Jernigan and Eugene Wigner.
My apologies and I will strive to much more faithfully practice
my own newsroom preachment known as "Pulitzer's Dictum" (named
for Joseph Pulitzer, well-known early 20th century publisher and
founder of the Pulitzer Prizes): "Accuracy! Accuracy!!
Accuracy!!!"
Columnists David Broder and Ellen Goodman annually collect
their errors into a separate year-end "mea culpa" column. If I'm
lucky, and much more careful, perhaps the above will suffice for
me for 2004. - RDS
*****************************************************************
72 Oak Ridger: Official ponders fate of UT-Battelle's contract to manage ORNL
Story last updated at 12:13 p.m. on January 27, 2004
FEEDBACK: Battelle chief spoke highly of new lab director and
UT-Battelle's involvement with Oak Ridge High School.
By: Paul Parson | Oak Ridger Staff
paul.parson@oakridger.com
Carl Kohrt said he is optimistic that UT-Battelle will continue
operating Oak Ridge National Laboratory long past 2005.
That's when the company's contract with the federal government
ends. The Department of Energy, however, has the option of
extending the deal or putting the contract out for rebid.
"We'll know pretty soon," said Kohrt, president and chief
executive officer of Battelle, which is partnered with the
University of Tennessee to form UT-Battelle.
DOE typically notifies its contractors about the fate of a
contract about 18 months to a year before a deal ends.
UT-Battelle's $2.5 billion, five-year contract to manage ORNL
began in April 2000.
Carl Kohrt talked about the future of ORNL during a visit to the
lab Monday.
Kohrt said UT-Battelle "absolutely" has a chance to continue its
run, even if the company has to face other entities interested in
the job.
Steven Wyatt, a spokesman for DOE's Oak Ridge Operations office,
said this morning that no decision has been made on the ORNL
contract. He said it could be late spring before that happens.
For the first three years UT-Battelle served as ORNL's manager,
Bill Madia guided the company and lab. Last year, Madia left Oak
Ridge for a job with Battelle headquarters in Columbus, Ohio, and
Jeff Wadsworth replaced him as lab director in August.
Kohrt said he thinks Wadsworth is doing a good job. In fact, the
lab director has also received praise in the past from U.S. Rep.
Zach Wamp, R-3rd District, and Gerald Boyd, manager of DOE's Oak
Ridge Operations office.
"It seems like the community has embraced him," said Kohrt.
As for the former lab director, Kohrt said he didn't want to
speculate whether or not he thought Madia had a chance to be the
University of Tennessee's next president. Madia's name has
frequently been mentioned in connection with the UT post, and he
has been nominated for the position.
"Bill is an outstanding scientist and leader," said Kohrt. "If I
were UT, I'd be interested in keeping him on the list."
In addition, Kohrt said he approves of UT-Battelle's efforts to
help modernize Oak Ridge High School. The company has already
contributed around $150,000 toward the effort. That includes
paying for Heery International to do a study to help determine
whether Oak Ridge needs a new high school or if the current
building can be renovated.
*****************************************************************
73 GEM: Energy to open more nuclear lab contracts to competition
Government Executive Magazine - 1/27/04 Energy
January 27, 2004
By Amelia Gruber
agruber@govexec.com
The Energy Department plans to place four more nuclear facility
management contracts up for bids, officials announced Tuesday.
As required by a fiscal 2004 budget measure enacted last month
(H.R. 2754), Energy will open contracts to run Ames, Argonne,
Lawrence Berkeley and Lawrence Livermore laboratories to
competition. The department has already said it will place the
University of California's contract to operate Los Alamos
National Laboratory up for bids once that agreement expires in
2005.
The University of California runs Lawrence Berkeley and Lawrence
Livermore laboratories in addition to Los Alamos. University
officials were not surprised to see those facilities added to the
list of labs vulnerable to competition, university spokesman
Chris Harrington said Tuesday. While Energy Secretary Spencer
Abraham formally announced the move in a Jan. 27 Federal Register
notice, the department's 2004 budget, signed into law on Dec. 1,
2003, gave him little choice but to place the contracts up for
bids, Harrington said.
Under that legislation, Energy cannot spend 2004 budget dollars
on "noncompetitive" management contracts. The University of
California has never been forced to defend its contracts to
manage Los Alamos, Lawrence Berkeley or Lawrence Livermore.
University officials have not decided whether they will submit a
bid to renew the contracts, Harrington said. But the university
is ensuring that it would be well-positioned to compete, should
it choose to do so, he added.
As part of a continuing effort to improve management at Los
Alamos, university officials are seeking advice from industry,
Harrington said. Recently, university officials have entered into
discussions with two potential "industrial partners," he said,
that would like to "team with the university to strengthen
business and operations." They would offer expertise in areas
including financial management, procurement, supply chain
management and human resources, he said.
In 2002, two Los Alamos investigators accused lab managers of
covering up widespread government purchase card abuse and
obstructing investigations. Managers allegedly warned the
investigators, Glenn Walp and Steven Doran, that they risked
losing their jobs if they made the University of California look
bad by exposing theft and fraud.
A former computer analyst at Los Alamos in April 2003 claimed
managers at the New Mexico facility purposely thwarted an e-mail
monitoring program designed to prevent security leaks, at the
university's request.
The proposed industry partnership is one means of solidifying lab
management and would help prepare the university to compete,
should it attempt to renew its contracts, Harrington said.
University officials will likely hold off on this decision until
Energy publishes a request for proposals, he said.
Energy has not yet decided on a time line for running the
competitions, according to the Federal Register announcement.
Under the 2004 budget law, the department could extend existing
contracts up to two years in order to allow enough time to run a
competition.
Iowa State University, which runs Ames Laboratory, and the
University of Illinois, which manages Argonne National
Laboratory, will also need to defend their contracts against
competitors.
Ames laboratory is one of the smaller facilities on the list, and
is unique among the laboratories in that it is located on the
state university's campus, said spokesman Kerry Gibson. Many of
the laboratory staff members are also on the university faculty,
he said.
The university has run the lab since its founding in 1947. "Given
the logistics and the long history, I don't think that there's
really much possibility of anyone else [besides Iowa State]
running it," Gibson said. "At the same time, I think the
university is taking the contract bidding quite seriously."
*****************************************************************
74 [du-list] DU in the news 28th Jan 04
Date: Tue, 27 Jan 2004 19:04:29 -0800
DEALING with Dirty Bombs: Plain Facts, Practical Solutions
Heritage.org
... these substances into the US11 While it may or may not be easy to smuggle
radioactive material into the United States, smuggling harmless depleted
uranium ...(sic)
<http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/bg1723.cfm>
FIRE at weapons plant could result in fine for BWXT Y - 12
Oak Ridger
... Investigators concluded that the fire was caused by heat and steam
generated from unreacted calcium, excess water and depleted uranium in
an unvented container ...
<http://www.oakridger.com/stories/012704/new_20040127043.shtml>
MIDDLE East Needs Liberation , War Reparation and Justice - Not ...
Media Monitors Network
... Half a million Iraqi children became the victim of the brutal economic
sanction and Depleted Uranium over the last decade. What ...
<http://usa.mediamonitors.net/content/view/full/4348/>
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75 Google News Alert - nuclear
Date: Tue, 27 Jan 2004 19:46:41 -0800 (PST)
APPLICATION filed to join Nuclear Suppliers Group
China Daily
... As a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, China strictly
abides by its international obligations and has never supported, encouraged
nor helped ...
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LIBYAN Nuclear Weapons Program Material Flown to US
Los Angeles Times (subscription)
WASHINGTON -- Making good on his promise to dismantle his nuclear weapons
programs, Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi put about 55,000 pounds of sensitive
...
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PLANE with Libyan nuclear equipment arrives in US
Xinhua
27 (Xinhuanet) -- An American C-17 transport plane carrying components
and materials of Libya's nuclear weapons and missiles arrived in Tennessee,
in the ...
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REPORT Slams Nuclear Facility
Wired News
Security guards at the country's leading nuclear storehouse have been cheating
during antiterrorism drills -- perhaps for as long as 20 years, according
to a ...
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LIBYAN Nuclear Components Arrive in US
The Scotsman
An American plane carrying components of Libya’s nuclear weapons programme
has arrived in the United States. The plane landed ...
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NUCLEAR utilities face deadline for radioactive waste lawsuits
KRNV
A rush of lawsuits is expected this week from utility companies suing the
Energy Department for missing a 1998 deadline for opening a national nuclear
waste ...
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PAKISTAN investigates BCCI role in sale of nuclear knowhow
Financial Times (subscription)
... records of the failed Bank of Credit and Commerce International in
its investigation into the role Pakistani scientists may have played in
selling nuclear ...
PAKISTAN: nuclear secrets were sold
Taipei Times
Pakistan's government has made its clearest public statement yet that scientists
of its secretive nuclear weapons program leaked technology and would face
...
ISLAMABAD: Pakistan may charge national heroes in nuclear ...
New Straits Times
Pakistan’s probe into the sale of nuclear secrets to Iran and Libya has
narrowed to seven scientists and military officers, as speculation mounted
today that ...
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PAKISTAN defends nuclear record
BBC News
By Paul Anderson. Pakistan has defended its record as a nuclear-armed state,
saying it has strong command-and-control systems. The ...
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