U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Reports For 12/23/1998 - 12/24/1998 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** 35176 35189 35190 !!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!! +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 35176 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: SUSQUEHANNA REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/19/1998| | UNIT: [1] [2] [] STATE: PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:19[EST]| | RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 12/19/1998| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 14:20[EST]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: DON ROLAND |LAST UPDATE DATE: 12/23/1998| | HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |HAROLD GRAY R1 | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |AINC 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(C) POT UNCNTRL RAD REL | | |NLCO TECH SPEC LCO A/S | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation | |2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | CONTROL STRUCTURE BOUNDARY DOOR INOPERABLE | | | | "At 1420 on 12/19/98, a control structure boundary door was discovered | | inoperable. The boundary door affected Control Room Emergency Outside Air | | Supply (CREOAS) System operability. LCO 3.0.3 was entered. Per Technical | | Specification bases, B 3.7.3, the control structure boundary must be | | maintained, including access doors for the CREOAS System to be operable. | | The failure of the access boundary door rendered both CREOAS subsystems | | inoperable. Per Technical Specification section 3.7.3. Action D, (CREOAS): | | With 2 CREOAS subsystems inoperable in mode 1, 2 or 3, enter LCO 3.0.3 | | immediately. This constitutes a loss of a safety function per 10 CFR 50.72 | | (b)(2)(iii)(C), Control of Radiation Release. | | | | "The CREOAS System boundary was reestablished at 14:50 at which time LCO | | 3.0.3 was exited." | | | | The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this event by the licensee. | | | | * * * Update at 1412 on 12/23/98 by Dave Steffenauer to Jolliffe * * * | | | | During this event, licensee security department personnel responded to the | | door alarm and held the door closed to maintain the control structure at a | | positive pressure with respect to the outside environment. Plant | | technicians replaced the defective door latching mechanism and successfully | | tested it within 15 minutes. | | | | The subject door is a control structure boundary, not providing direct | | access to the control room. The design basis for the CREOAS System | | specifically addresses only the control room, versus the entire control | | structure. The CREOAS System would have been able to perform its long term | | design function of providing radiation protection to control room operators | | post DBA. | | | | Upon further review of this event, the licensee concluded that this event | | does not constitute the loss of a safety function. The design of CREOAS | | System is to provide adequate radiation protection to permit the occupancy | | of the control room under accident conditions without personnel receiving a | | radiation exposure in excess of 5 Rem whole body, or its equivalent, to any | | part of the body for the duration of the accident. | | | | Reasonable operator actions to correct minor problems is allowed by NUREG | | 1022, Rev 1, Event Reporting Guidelines. | | | | Licensee engineering department personnel concluded that the malfunctioning | | door latch mechanism for this door would not have significantly affected | | control room pressure. | | | | Thus, the licensee desires to retract this event. | | | | The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. | | | | The NRC Operations Officer notified the R1DO John White. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 35189 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: SAINT LUCIE REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/23/1998| | UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: FL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:45[EST]| | RXTYPE: [1] CE,[2] CE |EVENT DATE: 12/23/1998| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 11:00[EST]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: DAVE FIELDS |LAST UPDATE DATE: 12/23/1998| | HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |PIERCE SKINNER R2 | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | - Certain initial assumptions used in Unit 1 Main Steam Line Break analysis | | determined to be non-conservative - | | | | The St Lucie Unit I NSSS vendor, Combustion Engineering, delivered | | preliminary results of a revised St. Lucie Unit 1 Main Steam Line Break | | (MSLB) analysis to FPL. The revised analysis concluded that certain initial | | assumptions used in developing the current plant design basis for peak | | containment pressure following an in-containment MSLB are non-conservative. | | Revised initial assumptions for the MSLB analysis produce preliminary | | results that indicate that the unit is in a condition outside the design | | basis for the plant as discussed below. | | | | St. Lucie Unit 1 containment MSLB design pressure as stated in the UFSAR | | analysis is 44 psig. Preliminary results of the revised analysis indicate a | | higher peak in-containment MSLB pressure of 55.946 psig. While no errors | | were discovered in the analytical code used to perform the analysis, the | | increased containment pressure resulted from certain initial assumptions | | which were changed for the revised analysis. Revised initial assumptions | | include total main feedwater flow through the Main Feedwater Isolation | | Valves (MFIVs), initial containment pressure prior to the event, and | | containment humidity effects, as primary contributors to a higher peak | | containment pressure during a MSLB event. | | | | A revised analysis of containment response for operability credits | | additional factors such as Main Feedwater Regulating Valves (MFRVs) and more | | realistic input data. Results of this analysis indicate a peak containment | | pressure of 43.339 psig, which is below the design pressure of 44 psig. | | There is no concern for continued plant operations based on these results. | | | | The plant is evaluating actions to compensate for this revised analysis. | | The licensing basis containment peak pressure Large Break Loss of Coolant | | Accident analysis is unaffected by the revised MSLB analysis. | | | | The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |General Information or Other |Event Number: 35190 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | REP ORG: COGEMA MINING, INC |NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/23/1998| |LICENSEE: COGEMA MINING, INC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:44[EST]| | CITY: LINCH REGION: 4 |EVENT DATE: 12/22/1998| | COUNTY: CAMPBELL STATE: WY |EVENT TIME: 12:00[MST]| |LICENSE#: SUA-1341 AGREEMENT: N |LAST UPDATE DATE: 12/23/1998| | DOCKET: |+----------------------------+ | |PERSON ORGANIZATION | | |BLAIR SPITZBERG R4 | | |FREDERICK COMBS NMSS | +------------------------------------------------+ | | NRC NOTIFIED BY: JOHN VASELIN, RSO | | | HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |NINF INFORMATION ONLY | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | - MONITOR WELL PLACED ON EXCURSION STATUS - | | | | A routine bi-weekly water sample collected on 12/22/98 from the Cogema | | Mining, Inc monitor well #6MW40 exceeded all three of its upper control | | limits (UCLs). A confirmation sample was collected on 12/23/98 which also | | exceeded all three UCLs. Monitor well #6MW40 was then placed on excursion | | status in accordance with license section 11.2 and its sampling frequency | | increased to weekly. Well #6MW4O is a perimeter ore zone monitor well | | located approximately 180 feet east of the Mine Unit 6 boundary at the | | Christensen Mine, Campbell County, Wyoming. The nearest community is Linch, | | Wyoming, approximately 1.5 miles to the southeast. | | | | ANALYSIS DATA | | | | Date Chloride Conductivity Alkalinity | | Uranium | | Sample (mg/I) (umhos/cm2) (mg/I) | | (mg/l U308) | | Taken (UCL 20.0) (UCL 1576) (UCL 95.2) (no | | UCL) | | ------------- --------------- -------------------- | | ---------------- ------------------ | | 12/22/98 29.4 1693 270.5 | | <0.4 | | 12/23/98 27.5 1638 264.5 | | <0.4 | | | | Health and Environmental Hazards: None | | | | Corrective Action: Over-recovery pumping of 61 gpm has begun in the well | | field area nearest mine #6MW40. | | | | A written notification will be submitted to NRC HQ Uranium Recovery Branch | | Chief within 7 days. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+