U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Reports For 11/20/1998 - 11/23/1998 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** 35059 35061 35062 35063 35064 35065 35066 35067 35068 35069 35070 35071 !!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!! +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 35059 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: INDIAN POINT REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/19/1998| | UNIT: [2] [] [] STATE: NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:53[EST]| | RXTYPE: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 11/19/1998| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 16:05[EST]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: JOHN BALLETTA |LAST UPDATE DATE: 11/20/1998| | HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |JOHN WHITE R1 | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |ACRI 50.72(b)(1)(v) LOSS OF CR INDICATION | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |2 N Y 99 Power Operation |99 Power Operation | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | LOSS OF EMERGENCY ASSESSMENT CAPABILITY (UNAVAILABLE INDICATION ON FOUR | | CONTROL ROOM PANELS) | | | | Four supervisory control room alarm panels that monitor safety related and | | accident assessment equipment are not functioning. Illumination for these | | panels was lost while an alarm was being acknowledged. Audio is still | | available. There were no related maintenance or surveillance activities | | ongoing at the time of the event. | | | | The licensee is currently performing troubleshooting activities to determine | | the cause of the failure, and efforts to restore the panels are underway. | | The licensee is also performing increased monitoring for the parameters | | affected by the loss of indication. | | | | The unit is not currently in a technical specification limiting condition | | for operation as a result of this event. | | | | The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector. | | | | * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Update at 1916 on 11/19/98 from | | Balletta to Trocine * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * | | | | Upon review of the alarms that had failed, the licensee determined that both | | refueling water storage tank low level alarms were inoperable, and the unit | | entered Technical Specification 3.0.1 at 1630. At approximately 1715, a | | portion of the annunciators was restored in that the alarms would light when | | the annunciators were silenced. Technical Specification 3.0.1 was exited at | | that time. Everything was restored to normal at 1729. | | | | The root cause for the failure has not yet been determined, and | | troubleshooting is ongoing. | | | | There was no change in plant operating status because Technical | | Specification 3.0.1 was exited in less than 1 hour. | | | | The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector. The NRC Operations | | Officer notified the R1DO (White). | | | | * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Update at 1426 on 11/20/98 from | | Balletta to Trocine * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * | | | | The licensee is retracting this event notification. Upon further | | investigation, the licensee determined that the alarms had not failed. | | Therefore, entry into Technical Specification 3.0.1 was not required. The | | Indian Point annunciators are designed to flash and provide an audible | | signal upon alarm receipt, and the flash capability had failed. The audible | | signal was capable of providing alarm notification to the operators. Upon | | acknowledgement of the audible signal, the alarm window denoting which | | condition had caused the alarm would lock in solid as designed and provide | | the proper indication to the operators. The refueling water storage tank | | low level alarms would have been capable of providing the required | | information to the operators. | | | | During performance of the initial investigations, a test signal actuated an | | alarm, but the alarm was acknowledged before it was silenced. (A test alarm | | was acknowledged at the local panel, so the alarm cleared before it had a | | chance to be acknowledged at the actual panel that was presumed to be out of | | service.) While the investigation was ongoing, a valid alarm was received. | | Operators could hear the alarm but could not see an illuminated window | | denoting the condition which caused the alarm. When the silence button was | | pressed, the applicable alarm illuminated and locked in. | | | | The affected control room panels are currently working properly, and the | | licensee has been unable to duplicate this event. The initiating event and | | root cause has not yet been identified, but the licensee's investigation is | | ongoing. | | | | The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. The NRC Operations Center | | notified the R1DO (Bellamy). | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 35061 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: DIABLO CANYON REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/20/1998| | UNIT: [1] [2] [] STATE: CA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 08:19[EST]| | RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 11/20/1998| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 03:39[PST]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: DAVID PATTY |LAST UPDATE DATE: 11/20/1998| | HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |GREGORY PICK R4 | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation | |2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Diesel generators started on undervoltage on the startup buses. | | | | The licensee reported that all emergency diesel generators started on | | 'Startup Undervoltage' due to a differential trip on startup transformer 1-1 | | as it was being returned to service. The trip caused a loss of power to the | | startup buses of both units. The diesel generators started as designed on | | loss of startup power. The startup transformer 1-1 trip was cleared, and | | startup power was returned to normal. The cause of the differential trip is | | under investigation. | | | | The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. | | | | HOO NOTE: See event #35069. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 35062 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: KEWAUNEE REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/20/1998| | UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: WI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 12:47[EST]| | RXTYPE: [1] W-2-LP |EVENT DATE: 11/20/1998| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 10:50[CST]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: ROY SCOTT |LAST UPDATE DATE: 11/20/1998| | HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |PATRICK HILAND R3 | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |DDDD 73.71 UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |1 N N 0 Refueling |0 Refueling | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS INTO SOME VITAL AREAS | | | | The licensee discovered that a non-supervisory contractor gained access to | | the some vital areas. Immediate compensatory measures were taken upon | | discovery. (Refer to the HOO log for additional details.) | | | | The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 35063 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: INDIAN POINT REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/20/1998| | UNIT: [] [3] [] STATE: NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:21[EST]| | RXTYPE: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 11/20/1998| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 11:45[EST]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: STEVE DAVIS |LAST UPDATE DATE: 11/20/1998| | HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |RONALD BELLAMY R1 | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |APRE 50.72(b)(2)(vi) OFFSITE NOTIFICATION | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | | | |3 N N 0 Cold Shutdown |0 Cold Shutdown | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | OFFSITE NOTIFICATION OF A RAW SEWAGE SPILL OF LESS THAN 20 GALLONS | | | | At 1145 on 11/20/98, the New York State Department of Environmental | | Conservation was notified of a raw sewage spill of less than 20 gallons | | (spill report #98-10569). The raw sewage transfer pumps were found not | | running. This caused the raw sewage to back up and overflow to a storm | | drain which led to the Hudson River. The system was reset, and the spill | | was secured. | | | | The licensee also notified the NRC resident inspector. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Other Nuclear Material |Event Number: 35064 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | LICENSEE: COGEMA MINING, INC. |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/20/1998| | CITY: MILLS REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:36[EST]| | COUNTY: NATRONA STATE: WY |EVENT DATE: 11/19/1998| |LICENSE#: SUA-1341 AGREEMENT: N |EVENT TIME: 13:00[MST]| | DOCKET: |LAST UPDATE DATE: 11/20/1998| | +-----------------------------+ | |PERSON ORGANIZATION | | |GREGORY PICK R4 | | |JOE HOLONICH/MINING NMSS | +------------------------------------------------+FRED COMBS/EO NMSS | | NRC NOTIFIED BY: CRAIG W. TOAL | | | HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |NLTR LICENSEE 24 HR REPORT | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | MONITOR WELL AT THE IRIGARAY MINE SITE PLACED IN EXCURSION STATUS (24-hour | | Reportable Event per License Section 12.2) | | | | The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee: | | | | "A routine biweekly sample collected on November 17, 1998, from monitor well | | SSM41, located at the Irigaray Mine site, exceeded two of three upper | | control limits (UCL). An additional sample was then collected on November | | 18, 1998, and only exceeded one UCL. A third confirming sample was | | collected on November 19, 1998, and analysis showed that two UCL's had again | | been exceeded. SSM41 was then placed on excursion status as per license | | Section 11.2 and its sampling frequency increased to weekly. SSM41 is a | | shallow sand monitor (165 feet deep) well located within Mine Unit 4 at the | | Irigaray Mine in Johnson County, Wyoming. The nearest community is Lynch, | | Wyoming, approximately 15 miles to the southwest." | | | | "Analysis Data | | Cl UCL Cond UCL Alk UCL | | U3O8 | | Sample Date (24.9 mg/l) (2,566 µMHOS) | | (126.8 MG/L) No UCL | | | | 11/17/98 33.3 2,380 | | 128.1 < 0.4 mg/l | | 11/18/98 32.9 2,387 | | 126.8 < 0.4 mg/l | | 11/19/98 32.6 2,341 | | 128.5 < 0.4 mg/l" | | | | "Health and Environmental Hazards - None." | | | | "Corrective Action - Mine Unit 4 is currently in the stabilization phase of | | restoration." | | | | "Written Notification - A written notification will be submitted to NRC | | Uranium Recovery Branch Chief within 7 days." | | | | The licensee notified the State Department of Environmental Quality. (Refer | | to the HOO log for a licensee contact address and telephone number.) | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 35065 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/20/1998| | RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:53[EST]| | COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 11/19/1998| | 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 15:00[CST]| | BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 11/20/1998| | CITY: PADUCAH REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+ | COUNTY: McCRACKEN STATE: KY |PERSON ORGANIZATION | |LICENSE#: GDP-1 AGREEMENT: Y |PATRICK HILAND R3 | | DOCKET: 0707001 |FRED COMBS, EO NMSS | +------------------------------------------------+ | | NRC NOTIFIED BY: W. F. CAGE | | | HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | | |NLTR LICENSEE 24 HR REPORT | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | NRC BULLETIN 91-01 RESPONSE (24-HOUR REPORT) | | | | The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Paducah: | | | | "On 11/19/98 at 1500 CST, while performing an internal surveillance, | | recirculating cooling water (RCW) was discovered to have not been drained | | from the C-337, Unit-5, Cell-9 freezer/sublimer violating the R-114 | | operating requirements of Nuclear Criticality Safety Assessment (NCSA) | | CAS.001. The NCSA requires [that] the R-114 pressure be maintained at least | | 2 psi above the RCW pressure or [that personnel] isolate the RCW, drain the | | condenser/reboiler, and tag the RCW valves. C-337 Log entries indicate the | | R-114 was evacuated from this freezer/sublimer on 07/29/98." | | | | "Within 1 hour of discovery, the R-114 pressure was increased to | | re-establish the operational control. The freezer/sublimer UF6 pressure | | remained at a low pressure, indicating [that] the tube integrity had not | | been compromised." | | | | This event is being reported in accordance with Safety Analysis Report Table | | 6.9.1 as an NRC Bulletin 91-01, Supplement 1, [response]..." | | | | "SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: Although one control of double contingency | | has been lost, there has been no indication that the process condition | | (moderation control) has been lost." | | | | "POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW | | CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR): In order for a criticality to be possible, the | | R-114 tubes in the freezer/sublimer would need to leak, UF6 would need to | | migrate into the condenser/reboiler tubes in sufficient mass to cause a | | criticality, and RCW would need to be present in the condenser/reboiler in | | enough quantity to moderate the uranium." | | | | "CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.): | | Moderation is used as the primary criticality control used in Nuclear | | Criticality Safety Evaluation (NCSE) CAS.001." | | | | "ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS | | LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS): The freezer/sublimer is presently | | evacuated of UF6; however, this freezer/sublimer had previously been | | utilized at enrichment above 1.0% [U-235]." | | | | "NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION | | OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: One leg of double contingency is based on | | maintaining the integrity of the R-114 tubes within the freezer/sublimer. | | Integrity of the tubes is intact, thus this leg of double contingency was | | not violated. The second leg of double contingency is based on maintaining | | the R-114 pressure at least 2 psi above the RCW pressure or draining of the | | RCW from the system. This is accomplished by requirements to isolate the | | RCW, drain the condenser/reboiler, and [tag] the RCW valves. Since the | | R-114 system had been evacuated and the condenser/reboiler was found to | | contain RCW, the second leg of double contingency had not been met and only | | one control of the moderation process parameter was maintained. Therefore, | | double contingency was not maintained." | | | | "CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: | | Within 1 hour of discovery, the R-114 pressure was increased to re-establish | | the operational control." | | | | Paducah personnel notified the NRC resident inspector. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 35066 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: OCONEE REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/20/1998| | UNIT: [1] [2] [3] STATE: SC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:42[EST]| | RXTYPE: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-LP|EVENT DATE: 11/20/1998| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 14:36[EST]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: DAN GREENE |LAST UPDATE DATE: 11/20/1998| | HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |BRIAN BONSER R2 | |10 CFR SECTION: |DAVID MATTHEWS, EO NRR | |AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION |ROSEMARY HOGAN IRD | |NLCO TECH SPEC LCO A/S | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation | |2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation | |3 N N 0 Cold Shutdown |0 Cold Shutdown | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | LOSS OF STATION POWER TO OCONEE UNIT 3 FOR APPROXIMATELY 1 MINUTE AND | | INOPERABILITY OF BOTH TRAINS OF ONSITE EMERGENCY POWER (Refer to event | | #35058 for a similar event.) | | | | The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee: | | | | "A special test of the Keowee Emergency Power and Engineered Safeguards | | Functions (KEP/ESF) for Oconee was being performed. At 1014 hours, Keowee | | Unit 2 and the underground power path were removed from service and | | temporarily modified as part of the planned test. Subsequently, both Keowee | | units were functionally tested as part of the post-[modification] functional | | test of Keowee Unit 2. This was done to insure the temporary [modification] | | would not prevent the Keowee Units from performing their intended | | function." | | | | "During the KEP/ESF test, the SK breakers that tie the Keowee hydro units to | | the standby electrical buses closed and immediately reopened at 1248 hours. | | This was unplanned and resulted in a loss of power to the Oconee Unit 3 main | | feeder buses, [emergency core cooling system] equipment, and decay heat | | removal. The test procedure contingency plan was used to regain power to | | the main feeder buses from the startup power source. Power was regained | | [within] approximately 1 minute [and 36 seconds]. All equipment started as | | designed, and decay heat removal was restored to the reactor core." The | | licensee stated that offsite power was available but not tied in. Power was | | restored to Unit 3 when the licensee manually closed a switchyard circuit | | breaker. | | | | "During the recovery phase of the procedure, Keowee operators noticed a | | problem with the governor oil system for Keowee Hydro Unit 1. The unit was | | subsequently removed from service to investigate and repair the cause of the | | governor oil problem. This action rendered Keowee Unit 1 inoperable. | | Keowee Unit 2 was already declared technically inoperable due to the | | modification. Both Keowee hydro units were inoperable at 1436 [hours]." | | | | "In accordance with Technical Specification [(TS)] 3.7.8, the Oconee standby | | buses were energized from Lee Steam Station within 1 hour. By TS 3.7.8, | | Oconee may Operate in this configuration for up to 24 hours." | | | | "Current efforts are to remove the modification from Keowee Unit 2 to | | restore it to normal configuration. It will then be tested to demonstrate | | operability. This will place the Oconee Units under TS 3.7.2(a)1 which | | provides a 72-hour statement. Efforts are also underway to get offsite | | resources in to repair the governor oil system on Keowee Unit 1." | | | | "Efforts are underway to investigate the root cause of the SK breaker's | | unexpected opening." | | | | "...Problems encountered during the event: None." | | | | "...Engineered Safeguards Actuation: Yes, as part of the planned | | evolution." | | | | "...Reactor Protective System Actuated: No." | | | | The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 35067 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: GINNA REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/20/1998| | UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 23:49[EST]| | RXTYPE: [1] W-2-LP |EVENT DATE: 11/20/1998| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 22:59[EST]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: ROBERT SCHNALL |LAST UPDATE DATE: 11/20/1998| | HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |RONALD BELLAMY R1 | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | THE UNIT EXPERIENCED A PARTIAL LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER RESULTING IN THE | | AUTOMATIC START OF THE "B" EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR (EDG). | | | | AT 2259 EST ON 11/20/98, THE "B" EDG AUTOMATICALLY STARTED DUE TO THE LOSS | | OF VITAL BUS 16 AND NON-VITAL BUS 17. BOTH BUSES WERE DEENERGIZED WHEN | | OFFSITE POWER CIRCUIT 751 WAS LOST. THE LICENSEE RECEIVED A REPORT FROM | | SECURITY THAT SPARKING WAS OBSERVED FROM THE PARKING LOT. AN OPERATING | | CHARGING PUMP AND CONTAINMENT RECIRC FAN WAS DEENERGIZED AS A RESULT OF THIS | | EVENT. ALSO, THE UNIT BRIEFLY ENTERED A LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION | | DUE TO AN INVERTER DEENERGIZING. THE LICENSEE IS UNABLE TO PROVIDE AN | | ESTIMATE FOR RESTORATION OF CIRCUIT 751. THE UNIT IS CURRENTLY IN AN | | ABNORMAL ELECTRICAL LINEUP WITH ALL ELECTRICAL LOADS ALIGNED TO CIRCUIT 767, | | WHICH IS THE SINGLE SOURCE OF REMAINING OFFSITE POWER. THE "B" EDG HAS BEEN | | RETURNED TO STANDBY. ALL SYSTEMS FUNCTIONED AS REQUIRED. THE LICENSEE | | PLANS TO INFORM THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 35068 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: SEABROOK REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/21/1998| | UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: NH |NOTIFICATION TIME: 00:38[EST]| | RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 11/20/1998| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 22:50[EST]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: MIKE DAVID |LAST UPDATE DATE: 11/21/1998| | HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |RONALD BELLAMY R1 | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |1 N N 0 Hot Shutdown |0 Hot Shutdown | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | THE UNIT EXPERIENCED A FEEDWATER ISOLATION WHILE OPENING THE MAIN STEAM | | ISOLATION VALVES (MSIV). | | | | THE UNIT EXPERIENCED A FEEDWATER ISOLATION (P-14 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE | | ACTUATION SYSTEM (ESFAS) ACTUATION) DURING OPENING OF THE MSIVs. DURING | | OPENING OF THE MSIVs, WHICH HAD BEEN BYPASSED, A SMALL AMOUNT OF STEAM | | DEMAND CAUSED STEAM GENERATOR INDICATION TO SWELL FROM 50% TO 86% NARROW | | RANGE INDICATION RESULTING IN THE ACTUATION. THE CONDENSATE PUMPS WERE IN | | SERVICE AT THE TIME SUPPLYING FEEDWATER TO THE STEAM GENERATORS VIA THE | | MAIN FEEDWATER HEADER. ALL SYSTEMS FUNCTIONED AS REQUIRED. THE ESFAS | | ACTUATION SIGNAL WAS RESET AT APPROXIMATELY 2305 EST. THE LICENSEE IS | | ASSEMBLING AN EVENT EVALUATION TEAM TO ASSESS THIS EVENT. THE LICENSEE | | INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 35069 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: DIABLO CANYON REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/21/1998| | UNIT: [1] [2] [] STATE: CA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 05:08[EST]| | RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 11/21/1998| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 01:13[PST]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: DAVID PATTY |LAST UPDATE DATE: 11/21/1998| | HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |GREGORY PICK R4 | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation | |2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | DIESEL GENERATORS STARTED ON UNDERVOLTAGE ON THE STARTUP BUSES. | | | | THE FOLLOWING TEXT IS A PORTION OF A FACSIMILE RECEIVED FROM THE LICENSEE: | | | | "[THE] DIESEL GENERATORS STARTED ON STARTUP UNDERVOLTAGE. STARTUP | | TRANSFORMER 1-1 WAS ENERGIZED AND GOT A DIFFERENTIAL TRIP WHICH TRIPPED | | STARTUP POWER TO BOTH UNITS. THE EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS STARTED AS | | DESIGNED ON LOSS OF STARTUP POWER." | | | | "STARTUP TRANSFORMER 1-1 WAS RECLEARED, AND STARTUP POWER WAS RETURNED TO | | THE PRE-EVENT LINEUP WITH UNIT 2 SUPPLYING UNIT 1 STARTUP POWER." | | | | "THE CAUSE OF THE DIFFERENTIAL TRIP IS UNDER INVESTIGATION." | | | | THE LICENSEE PLANS TO INFORM THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | | | | HOO NOTE: SEE EVENT #35061 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 35070 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: NINE MILE POINT REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/21/1998| | UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:09[EST]| | RXTYPE: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5 |EVENT DATE: 11/21/1998| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 15:00[EST]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: KEVIN BELDEN |LAST UPDATE DATE: 11/21/1998| | HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |RONALD BELLAMY R1 | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |APRE 50.72(b)(2)(vi) OFFSITE NOTIFICATION | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | OFFSITE NOTIFICATION OF AN OIL SPILL | | | | During a routine inspection to verify locked barriers outside the protected | | area, a security guard identified an oil spill located near outfall #20. | | The guard notified the control room, and procedure EPIP-EPP11, Hazardous | | Material Response, was entered. The oil spill appeared to be entering a | | site storm drain, discharging from an outfall located outside the protected | | area, and flowing to Lake Ontario. | | | | Although the event is still under investigation, it was identified that one | | of two temporary storage tanks located on site next to the reactor building | | was slowly leaking. These tanks are currently being used for temporary | | storage of diesel fire pump fuel oil due to a modification involving | | replacement of the old tank because it does not meet the new environmental | | protection laws. The licensee stated that it appeared that the leaking | | tank's drain plug had not been installed. The leak has been secured, and | | the licensee's cleanup response is ongoing. The quantity of the leak is | | unknown at this time. | | | | The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector, Oswego County 911, Scriba | | Fire Department, and U.S. Coast Guard. The licensee plans to issue a | | media/press release. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 35071 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: SURRY REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/22/1998| | UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: VA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 07:20[EST]| | RXTYPE: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP |EVENT DATE: 11/22/1998| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 04:30[EST]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: BILL WEBSTER |LAST UPDATE DATE: 11/22/1998| | HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |BRIAN BONSER R2 | |10 CFR SECTION: |DAVID MATTHEWS NRR | |ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii) RPS ACTUATION |ROSEMARY HOGAN IRD | |AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |1 A/R Y 28 Power Operation |0 Hot Shutdown | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | UNIT 1 EXPERIENCED A REACTOR TRIP ON TURBINE TRIP DUE TO HIGH STEAM | | GENERATOR WATER LEVEL FOLLOWED BY A SPURIOUS SAFETY INJECTION. | | | | "AT 0430 HOURS, WITH SURRY POWER STATION UNIT 1 AT 28% REACTOR POWER | | FOLLOWING A REFUELING OUTAGE, THE 'B' STEAM GENERATOR STEAM FLOW INCREASED | | CAUSING THE STEAM GENERATOR FEEDWATER REGULATING VALVE (FRV) TO OPEN. THE | | CONTROL ROOM OPERATOR (CRO) TOOK MANUAL CONTROL OF THE FRV. THE 'B' STEAM | | GENERATOR REACHED THE HIGH LEVEL TURBINE TRIP SETPOINT OF 75% WHICH CAUSED | | THE TURBINE TRIP FOLLOWED BY REACTOR TRIP. ONE CHANNEL OF STEAM FLOW ON TWO | | STEAM GENERATORS WERE IN TRIP FOR TROUBLESHOOTING PRIOR TO THE REACTOR TRIP. | | WHEN THE RCS AVERAGE TEMPERATURE REACHED THE Lo Tavg SETPOINT OF 543þF DUE | | TO THE REACTOR TRIP, A SAFETY INJECTION (SI) OCCURRED. | | | | "ALL RODS INSERTED INTO THE CORE AS DESIGNED AS INDICATED BY ROD BOTTOM | | LIGHTS. ALL SI ACTUATIONS AND EQUIPMENT OPERATED AS EXPECTED. THE SHUTDOWN | | MARGIN FOR UNIT 1 WAS DETERMINED TO BE SATISFACTORY. AUXILIARY FEEDWATER | | AUTOMATICALLY INITIATED AS DESIGNED ON LOW-LOW STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL | | FOLLOWING THE TRIP. PRIMARY RCS TEMPERATURE DECREASED TO APPROXIMATELY | | 530þF FOLLOWING THE TRIP AND SI. THE SI WAS TERMINATED FOLLOWING | | VERIFICATION OF THE SPURIOUS ACTUATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROCEDURES. NO | | PRIMARY OR POWER-OPERATED RELIEF VALVES WERE ACTUATED DURING THE EVENT. NO | | SECONDARY SAFETY VALVES ACTUATED DURING THE TRANSIENT. SECONDARY | | POWER-OPERATED RELIEF VALVES WERE OPERATED MANUALLY TO CONTROL TEMPERATURE. | | NO ADVERSE RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES RESULTED. ALL ELECTRICAL BUSES | | TRANSFERRED PROPERLY FOLLOWING THE TRIP. ALL EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS | | ARE OPERABLE. NO. 1 AND NO. 3 EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS AUTOSTARTED AS | | DESIGNED DUE TO THE SI AND WERE SHUT DOWN IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROCEDURAL | | GUIDANCE. THERE WERE NO RADIATION RELEASES DUE TO THIS EVENT NOR WERETHERE | | ANY PERSONNEL INJURIES OR CONTAMINATION EVENTS. | | | | "UNIT 1 IS CURRENTLY AT HOT SHUTDOWN WITH RCS TEMPERATURE BEING MAINTAINED | | AT APPROXIMATELY 547þF. | | | | "UNIT 2 WAS NOT AFFECTED BY THIS EVENT AND REMAINS STABLE AT 100% POWER AT | | 860MWe. | | | | "THIS EVENT IS BEING REPORTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(ii)." | | | | SI INJECTED APPROXIMATELY 2000 GALLONS AT A RATE OF 450 GPM FOR ABOUT 5 | | MINUTES USING ALL THREE HIGH HEAD PUMPS AND WAS TERMINATED PRIOR TO THE | | PRESSURIZER REACHING 65% LEVEL INDICATION. SINCE THE SI WAS BASED ON HIGH | | STEAM FLOW (BISTABLES TRIPPED FOR TROUBLESHOOTING) COINCIDENT WITH Lo Tavg | | (FOLLOWING THE TRIP), ALL MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVES (MSIVs) CLOSED AS | | DESIGNED. THE CRO USED THE ATMOSPHERIC DUMP VALVES TO INITIALLY REJECT | | DECAY HEAT. THERE IS NO KNOWN STEAM GENERATOR TUBE LEAKAGE NOR WERE ANY | | PLANT RADIATION ALARMS RECEIVED. THE MSIVs HAVE BEEN BYPASSED, HOWEVER, | | DECAY HEAT IS LOW ENOUGH FOLLOWING THE REFUELING OUTAGE THAT THE IN-SERVICE | | STEAM GENERATOR BLOWDOWN SYSTEM IS PRESENTLY MAINTAINING RCS TEMPERATURE. | | THE AFW SYSTEM IS IN THE PROCESS OF BEING RESTORED TO STANDBY WITH STEAM | | GENERATORS BEING SUPPLIED FROM THE MAIN FEEDWATER SYSTEM. THE LICENSEE IS | | CONDUCTING AN INVESTIGATION TO DETERMINE THE CAUSE OF THE INITIATING EVENT, | | i.e., INCREASE IN "B" STEAM GENERATOR STEAM FLOW. THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE | | NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR AND IS UNABLE TO PROVIDE AN ESTIMATED RESTART DATE | | AT THIS TIME. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+