U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Reports For 03/23/98 - 03/24/98 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** 33545 33763 33874 33942 33943 33944 33945 33946 33947 33948 33949 33950 33951 +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 33545 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: VERMONT YANKEE REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/15/98 | |UNIT: [1] [ ] [ ] STATE: VT |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:45 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 01/15/98 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 16:25[EST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: BROOKS |LAST UPDATE DATE: 03/23/98 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |HAROLD GRAY RDO | |AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | | | | | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | POTENTIAL FOR WATER HAMMER IN HPCI OR RCIC TURBINE EXHAUST LINES DURING | | OPERATION WITH ELEVATED SUPPRESSION POOL PRESSURE | | | | THE LICENSEE HAS DETERMINED THAT ELEVATED PRESSURE (>5 PSIG) WITHIN THE | | SUPPRESSION POOL COULD PERMIT WATER TO BE DRAWN INTO THE HIGH PRESSURE | | COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI) OR REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) EXHAUST | | LINES FOLLOWING SYSTEM OPERATION. FOR EXAMPLE, FOLLOWING A REACTOR SCRAM, | | WITH TURBINE EXHAUST PRESSURE INITIALLY GREATER THAN SUPPRESSION POOL | | PRESSURE, AND SUPPRESSION POOL PRESSURE GREATER THAN REACTOR BUILDING | | PRESSURE, AS EXHAUST LINE PRESSURE DECREASES BELOW SUPPRESSION POOL | | PRESSURE, WATER WILL BE FORCED INTO THE EXHAUST LINE BY SUPPRESSION POOL | | OVERPRESSURE. THE VACUUM RELIEF VALVES TO THE REACTOR BUILDING WILL REMAIN | | CLOSED UNTIL EXHAUST LINE PRESSURE DECREASES BELOW REACTOR BUILDING | | PRESSURE. OPERATION OF EITHER SYSTEM WHILE IN THIS CONDITION COULD LEAD TO | | WATER HAMMER AND POSSIBLE DAMAGE TO COMPONENTS SUCH AS CHECK VALVES AND | | RUPTURE DISKS. SUCH FAILURES COULD CHALLENGE FURTHER HPCI OR RCIC OPERATION | | AND CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY. | | | | IN 1973, VACUUM BREAKERS WERE INSTALLED ONTO THE HPCI AND RCIC TURBINE | | EXHAUST LINES AFTER THE HPCI TURBINE EXHAUST LINE EXPERIENCED SEVERE | | VIBRATION CAUSED BY STEAM CONDENSING IN THE EXHAUST LINE AND DRAWING COLD | | WATER INTO THE HOT PIPING. THE VACUUM BREAKERS WERE INITIALLY INSTALLED ON | | PIPING INSIDE OF THE SUPPRESSION POOL, BUT WERE RELOCATED TO PIPING OUTSIDE | | OF THE SUPPRESSION POOL DUE TO CONCERNS REGARDING CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE | | TESTING. THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED. | | | | * * * 3/4/98 1113 RETRACTION FROM WISNIEWSKI TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * * | | | | AS A RESULT OF AN ENGINEERING EVALUATION, THE LICENSEE HAS DETERMINED THAT | | PIPING STRESSES WILL REMAIN WITHIN ACCEPTABLE LIMITS. THEREFORE, BOTH THE | | HPCI AND RCIC SYSTEMS REMAIN OPERABLE. THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR HAS BEEN | | INFORMED BY THE LICENSEE. NOTIFIED R1DO (BELLAMY). | | | | * * *UPDATE, 3/23/98 AT 1559 EST BY ANDREW WISNIEWSKI TO FANGIE JONES* * * | | | | AFTER FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH THE REGION 1 NRC PERSONNEL, VERMONT YANKEE | | HAS CONCLUDED THAT THE CONDITION SHOULD BE REPORTED AS ORIGINALLY DONE ON | | 1/15/98, THEREFORE THE RETRACTION OF 3/4/98 IS WITHDRAWN. | | | | THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR AND WILL INFORM THE STATE | | OF VERMONT. THE HEADQUARTERS OPERATIONS OFFICER INFORMED THE R1DO (RICHARD | | BARKLEY). | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ !!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!! +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 33763 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: VERMONT YANKEE REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/20/98 | |UNIT: [1] [ ] [ ] STATE: VT |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:37 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 02/20/98 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 17:30[EST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: BRYAN CROKE |LAST UPDATE DATE: 03/23/98 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |JAMES LINVILLE RDO | |AUNA 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(A) UNANALYZED COND OP | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N Y 93 POWER OPERATION | 93 POWER OPERATION | | | | | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | DISCOVERY OF INADEQUATE CORRECTIVE ACTION IN RESPONSE TO INFORMATION NOTICE | | 89-55, "DEGRADATION OF CONTAINMENT ISOLATION CAPABILITY BY A HIGH ENERGY | | LINE BREAK" (HELB) | | | | DURING THE VALIDATION OF THE REACTOR BUILDING CLOSED COOLING WATER (RBCCW) | | SYSTEM DESIGN BASIS DOCUMENT, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THERE WAS INADEQUATE | | CORRECTIVE ACTION IN RESPONSE TO INFORMATION NOTICE 89-55. INITIAL | | EVALUATION SHOWED THAT THE INFORMATION NOTICE HAD POTENTIAL APPLICATION TO | | VERMONT YANKEE AND REQUIRED FURTHER EVALUATION. HOWEVER, THE VALIDATION | | TEAM FOUND THAT INFORMATION NOTICE 89-55 WAS CLOSED WITHOUT ADEQUATE | | TECHNICAL JUSTIFICATION. | | | | INFORMATION NOTICE 89-55 IDENTIFIED THAT THE ORIGINAL SAFETY EVALUATION DID | | NOT CONSIDER THAT DYNAMIC EFFECTS OF HELBs COULD IMPACT RBCCW SYSTEM | | ISOLATION INTEGRITY. A PRELIMINARY PLANT REVIEW IDENTIFIED THREE POTENTIAL | | HELB SCENARIOS (RECIRCULATION LINE BREAK, MAIN STEAM LINE BREAK, AND | | FEEDWATER LINE BREAK) WHICH COULD POTENTIALLY IMPACT RBCCW PIPING INSIDE | | CONTAINMENT. A FOLLOWUP RESPONSE AND EVALUATION TO THIS PRELIMINARY REVIEW | | WAS PERFORMED BY THE LICENSEE; HOWEVER, IT DID NOT CONSIDER SINGLE FAILURE | | AS ADVISED BY THE INFORMATION NOTICE AND WAS, THEREFORE, INADEQUATE. | | | | THE RBCCW SYSTEM IS CONSIDERED TO BE A CLOSED SYSTEM INSIDE CONTAINMENT | | AND, THEREFORE, PART OF THE CONTAINMENT ISOLATION PROVISION. THE CLOSED | | SYSTEM IS A SUPPLEMENT TO THE SINGLE ISOLATION VALVE PROVIDED IN BOTH THE | | INLET PIPING AND OUTLET PIPING. A SCENARIO POTENTIALLY EXISTS WHERE PIPE | | WHIP OR JET IMPINGEMENT EFFECTS OF HELBs IN CONTAINMENT COULD RESULT IN A | | RBCCW SYSTEM PIPE BREAK IN PRIMARY CONTAINMENT. THE SYSTEM WOULD THEN BE | | IN COMMUNICATION WITH THE CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE SHOULD EITHER OF THE | | CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES FAIL TO FULLY CLOSE DUE TO A SINGLE FAILURE. | | THE CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE COULD THEN VENT TO THE REACTOR BUILDING THROUGH | | THE RBCCW SYSTEM. | | | | IMMEDIATE ACTION TAKEN - RECOMMENDATION: THIS ISSUE IS PRESENTED AS A | | LEVEL 1 EVENT REPORT. A SCOPING TEAM NEEDS TO BE ASSEMBLED. A WALKDOWN | | PLANNED FOR THE REFUELING OUTAGE WILL DETERMINE THE ULTIMATE RESOLUTION. | | | | THERE ARE NO OPERABILITY CONCERNS. | | | | THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED OF THIS EVENT BY THE LICENSEE. | | | | * *RETRACTED AT 1559 EST ON 3/23/98 BY ANDREW WISNIEWSKI TO FANGIE JONES* * | | | | FOLLOWING FURTHER ENGINEERING EVALUATION, IT HAS BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE | | RBCCW CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE CONFIGURATION IS WITHIN THE CURRENT | | LICENSING BASES. THEREFORE THIS EVENT IS BEING RETRACTED. | | | | THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR AND WILL INFORM THE STATE | | OF VERMONT. THE HEADQUARTERS OPERATIONS OFFICER NOTIFIED THE R1DO (RICHARD | | BARKLEY). | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ !!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!! +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 33874 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: ZION REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/10/98 | |UNIT: [ ] [2] [ ] STATE: IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:33 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 03/10/98 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 15:48[CST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: CRAIG GREAVES |LAST UPDATE DATE: 03/23/98 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |GARY SHEAR RDO | |ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii) RPS ACTUATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | | | | | 2 | A N 0 REFUELING | 0 REFUELING | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | - 5 RPS ACTUATION SIGNALS RECEIVED DUE TO A FAILED INSTRUMENTATION RACK - | | | | UNIT 2 IS DEFUELED WITH THE REACTOR TRIP BREAKERS OPEN AND OUT OF SERVICE. | | | | AT 1548 CST ON 03/10/98, THE UNIT 2 PROTECTION SET 1 TROUBLE AND CHANNEL | | SET FAILURE ANNUNCIATORS ALARMED WITH SEVERAL BISTABLES RECEIVED AND THREE | | 'FIRST OUT' ANNUNCIATORS RECEIVED: PRESSURIZER LOW PRESSURE, REACTOR | | COOLANT SYSTEM TWO LOOP LOW FLOW, AND MAIN TURBINE TRIP. | | | | THE CHANNEL SET FAILURE WAS FOUND TO BE ATTRIBUTED TO THE EAGLE | | INSTRUMENTATION RACK 2 IN PROTECTION SET 1. A FAILURE IN THIS | | INSTRUMENTATION RACK CAUSED THE MAIN TURBINE IMPULSE PRESSURE CHANNEL TO | | CLEAR THE MAIN TURBINE LOW POWER PERMISSIVE SIGNAL (P-13). THIS P-13 | | PERMISSIVE SIGNAL FEEDS THE LOW POWER REACTOR TRIPS BLOCKED PERMISSIVE | | SIGNAL (P-7). CLEARING THE P-7 PERMISSIVE SIGNAL UNBLOCKS THE FIVE LOW | | POWER REACTOR TRIP SIGNALS: PRESSURIZER HIGH LEVEL, PRESSURIZER LOW | | PRESSURE, REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM TWO LOOP LOW FLOW, REACTOR COOLANT PUMP | | UNDERVOLTAGE, AND MAIN TURBINE TRIP. | | | | THE LICENSEE IS INVESTIGATING THE ROOT CAUSE OF THIS EVENT. | | | | THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | | | | * * *RETRACTED AT 1345 EST ON 3/23/98 BY ROBERT GODLEY TO FANGIE JONES* * * | | | | THE REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM SIGNAL WAS GENERATED IN THE EAGLE 21 | | PROTECTION RACK BY A CIRCUIT FAILURE AND THEREFORE THE TRIP SIGNAL WAS | | INVALID. THE REACTOR TRIP BREAKERS WERE PROPERLY REMOVED FROM SERVICE IN | | THE OPEN POSITION AND THE UNIT WAS DEFUELED. THEREFORE THIS EVENT WAS NOT | | REPORTABLE AND IS RETRACTED. | | | | THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. THE HEADQUARTERS OFFICER | | NOTIFIED THE R3DO (MIKE JORDAN). | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |FUEL CYCLE FACILITY | |EVENT NUMBER: 33942 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/23/98 | | RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 00:47 [ET]| |COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 03/22/98 | | 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 08:15[EST]| | BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 03/23/98 | | CITY: PIKETON REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+ | COUNTY: PIKE STATE: OH |PERSON ORGANIZATION| |LICENSE#: GDP-2 AGREEMENT: N |MIKE JORDAN RDO | | DOCKET: 0707002 |SUSAN SHANKMAN, NMSS EO | +------------------------------------------------+ | |NRC NOTIFIED BY: ERIC SPAETH | | |HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | LOSS OF MODERATION CONTROL - A DRY ACTIVE WASTE BAG FOUND NOT TO HAVE HOLES | | IN THE BOTTOM OF IT. | | | | NRC BULLETIN 91-01 24 HOUR NOTIFICATION | | | | ON 03/22/98 @ 0815 HOURS IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT A NUCLEAR CRITICALLY SAFETY | | APPROVAL (NCSA) REQUIREMENT WAS NOT BEING MAINTAINED IN A BOUNDARY CONTROL | | STATION (BCS) OF THE X-330 BUILDING (CASCADE PROCESS BLDG). NCSA PLANT | | 018.A01, PART "B", REQUIREMENT #4 STATES THAT DRY ACTIVE WASTE (DAW) BAGS | | SHALL HAVE HOLES IN THE BOTTOM OF EACH BAG TO ALLOW FOR SOLUTION | | DRAINAGE.AT A BOUNDARY CONTROL STATION (BCS), DAW WAS DISCOVERED IN A | | SANITARY TRASH BAG WITHOUT HOLES IN THE BOTTOM. THIS CONSTITUTES A LOSS OF | | CONTROL "B" (MODERATION) IN THE DOUBLE CONTINGENCY MATRIX FOR CONTINGENCY | | EVENT B.1.1. CONTROL "A" (MASS) WAS MAINTAINED THROUGHOUT THIS EVENT. THE | | DEFICIENCY WAS IMMEDIATELY CORRECTED BY REMOVING THE DAW. THERE WAS NO LOSS | | OF HAZARDOUS/RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL OR RADIOACTIVE/RADIOLOGICAL CONTAMINATION | | EXPOSURE AS A RESULT OF THIS EVENT. | | | | SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: | | | | DAW WAS PLACED IN A BAG THAT DID NOT HAVE HOLES IN THE BOTTOM. THE BAG WAS | | A SANITARY BAG. | | | | POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW | | CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR): | | | | IN THE EVENT THAT AN ACCUMULATION OF DAW IN A BAG COULD HAVE GREATER THAN | | SAFE MASS OF U-235, THE ACCUMULATION OF LIQUID COULD MODERATE THIS MASS. | | | | CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.): | | | | MODERATION (LOST) | | | | MASS (CONTROLLED) | | | | ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS | | LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS): | | | | LESS THAN 10% U-235 | | | | NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION | | OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: | | | | DRY ACTIVE WASTE (DAW) WAS FOUND IN A SANITARY TRASH BAG WITHOUT HOLES. THE | | NCSA REQUIRES HOLES IN DAW BAGS TO PREVENT THE ACCUMULATION OF MODERATORS | | IN THE BAG. | | | | CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: | | | | THE DAW WAS REMOVED AND PROPERLY DISPOSED OF. | | | | THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED. DOE SITE REPRESENTATIVE WAS | | INFORMED. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 33943 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: VERMONT YANKEE REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/23/98 | |UNIT: [1] [ ] [ ] STATE: VT |NOTIFICATION TIME: 09:43 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 03/23/98 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 09:00[EST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: WISNIEWSKI |LAST UPDATE DATE: 03/23/98 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |RICH BARKLEY RDO | |ADAS 50.72(b)(2)(i) DEG/UNANALYZED COND | | |AAIR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A) AIRBORNE RAD RELEASE | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N N 0 COLD SHUTDOWN | 0 COLD SHUTDOWN | | | | | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | MAIN STEAM LINE "B" & "C" INBOARD AND OUTBOARD ISOLATION VALVES FAILED | | THEIR LOCAL RATE LEAK TEST. | | | | CONTROL ROOM WAS INFORMED BY IST PERSONNEL THAT MSIVs V2-80 "B" & "C" | | (INBOARD) HAD FAILED AND V2-86 "B" & "C" (OUTBOARD) HAD ALSO FAILED THEIR | | TYPE C LOCAL LEAK RATE TEST. SINCE THESE VALVES ARE IN SERIES IN THE "B" & | | "C" MAIN STEAM LINES, THE SAFETY FUNCTION WOULD NOT BE ACCOMPLISHED IN | | THESE LINES ON A GROUP 1 ISOLATION. | | | | VALVES V2-80 "B" & "C" AND V2-86 "B" & "C" ARE DECLARED INOPERABLE. NO | | FURTHER ACTIONS A REQUIRED AS THE PLANT IS IN COLD SHUTDOWN. | | | | THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA IS ó 11.5 STANDARD CUBIC | | FEET PER HOUR (SCFH). MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVES LEAK RATES AT 24 psig | | WERE: V2-80 "B" LEAK RATE WAS 40.56 SCFH, V2-80 "C" LEAK RATE WAS > 156.71 | | SCFH, V2-86 "B" LEAK RATE WAS 32.45 SCFH, AND V2-86 "C" LEAK RATE WAS 93.29 | | SCFH. COMBINED TYPE C LOCAL LEAK RATE MAIN STEAM LINE C WAS > 250 SCFH AND | | THE COMBINED LOCAL LEAK RATE OF MAIN STEAM LINE B WAS 73.01 SCFH. | | | | NONCONFORMANCE TAGS WERE INSTALLED ON THE VALVES AND EXISTING CONTINGENCY | | WORK ORDERS EXIST FOR ALL THE MSIVs TO COMPLETELY REBUILD THEM WITH "THIRD | | GENERATION" INTERNALS. | | | | THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED OF THIS EVENT. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 33944 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: LASALLE REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/23/98 | |UNIT: [1] [2] [ ] STATE: IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:04 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5 |EVENT DATE: 03/23/98 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 10:15[CST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: DAVE SHELDON |LAST UPDATE DATE: 03/23/98 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |MIKE JORDAN RDO | |ADAS 50.72(b)(2)(i) DEG/UNANALYZED COND | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N N 0 COLD SHUTDOWN | 0 COLD SHUTDOWN | | 2 | N N 0 REFUELING | 0 REFUELING | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FAILURE OF STEAM TUNNEL DAMPERS TO CLOSE DUE TO WRONG SPRINGS. | | | | A FAILURE OF THE STEAM TUNNEL CHECK DAMPER 1VR10Y TO CLOSE, ON 1/31/98, | | UPON SHUTDOWN OF THE REACTOR BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM LED TO GATHERING | | FURTHER INFORMATION FROM TECHNO (THE VENDOR). THE SEISMIC QUALIFICATION | | REPORT 378A, DATED 3/20/98, IDENTIFIES THAT 85.5 LBS OF FORCE IS REQUIRED | | TO CLOSE THE DAMPER. IT HAS BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE 2 SPRINGS THAT ACT TO | | HELP THE CHECK DAMPER CLOSE WERE REPLACED IN THE EARLY 90'S WITH THE WRONG | | SIZE, 40.9 LBS EACH INSTEAD OF 45.5 LBS. THE SPRINGS WERE OBTAINED FROM | | VULCAN, THE VULCAN CATALOGS OF VARIOUS VINTAGES IDENTIFIES DIFFERENT FORCES | | FOR THE EXACT SAME PART NUMBER. | | | | THE PURPOSE OF THE CHECK DAMPER IS TO CLOSE ON A HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAK | | (HELB) IN THE STEAM TUNNEL. THE SPRINGS SERVE TO START THE DAMPERS CLOSING | | ON THE LOSS OF AIR VENTILATION AIR FLOW INTO THE STEAM TUNNEL. SINCE | | CURRENT PLANT CONDITIONS, COLD SHUTDOWN AND DEFUELED, PRECLUDE THE | | POSSIBILITY OF A HELB, THIS HAS NO EFFECT ON CURRENT PLANT OPERATIONS. | | HOWEVER, WITH THE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION SUPPLIED FROM THE VENDOR, IT | | APPEARS THAT THIS CONDITION MAY HAVE EXISTED FOR SOME TIME. THE EFFECTS OF | | THIS DAMPER FAILURE IS NOT BOUNDED BY THE MAIN STEAM LINE BREAK OUTSIDE OF | | CONTAINMENT ACCIDENT ANALYSIS. THE SPRINGS WILL BE REPLACED PRIOR TO PLANT | | STARTUP. | | | | THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 33945 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: SAN ONOFRE REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/23/98 | |UNIT: [ ] [2] [3] STATE: CA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:37 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] W-3-LP,[2] CE,[3] CE |EVENT DATE: 03/23/98 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 13:45[PST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: G. L. PLUMLEE |LAST UPDATE DATE: 03/23/98 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |BILL JONES RDO | |DDDD 73.71 UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | | | | | 2 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | | 3 | N N 0 COLD SHUTDOWN | 0 COLD SHUTDOWN | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | PLANT SECURITY REPORT | | | | DISCOVERY OF A COMPROMISE OF CLASSIFIED SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION. IMMEDIATE | | COMPENSATORY MEASURES WERE TAKEN UPON DISCOVERY. | | | | THE LICENSEE WILL INFORM THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 33946 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: CRYSTAL RIVER REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/23/98 | |UNIT: [3] [ ] [ ] STATE: FL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:52 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [3] B&W-L-LP |EVENT DATE: 03/23/98 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 17:10[EST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: LARRY MOFFATT |LAST UPDATE DATE: 03/23/98 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |THOMAS JOHNSON RDO | |AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | | |NLCO TECH SPEC LCO A/S | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 3 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | | | | | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | CONTAINMENT PENETRATION PRESSURE RELIEF DEVICE FAILS. | | | | PRESSURE RELIEF DEVICES HAVE BEEN INSTALLED IN ACCORDANCE WITH NRC GENERIC | | LETTER 96-06 ON CONTAINMENT PENETRATION LINES BETWEEN THE OUTSIDE OF THE | | CONTAINMENT AND THE OUTER CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE. THIS WAS DONE TO | | COLLECT LEAKAGE IN THIS PORTION OF THE CONTAINMENT PENETRATION LINE DURING | | A LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT. THE DEVICES, INSTALLED IN LATE 1997, ARE | | EXPANSION CHAMBERS WITH A VOLUME OF LESS THAN 1 CUBIC FOOT THAT CONTAIN | | RUPTURE DISCS (DIAPHRAGMS). | | | | DURING TESTING ON 3/23/98, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT ONE OF THE INSTALLED | | PRESSURE RELIEF DEVICES IS INOPERABLE DUE TO A FAILED RUPTURE DISC. THE | | PENETRATION, CARS-5, IS A LESS THAN 1 INCH SAMPLE LINE FROM THE SECONDARY | | SIDE OF THE "B" ONCE THROUGH STEAM GENERATOR. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION | | LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION ACTION STATEMENT 3.6.3 REQUIRES ISOLATION | | AND VENTING THE INOPERABLE PENETRATION AND VERIFICATION OF THE ISOLATION | | EVERY 31 DAYS. THIS DOES NOT NEGATIVELY IMPACT THE PRESENT OPERABILITY OF | | THE PLANT. | | | | FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION CONTINUES TO INVESTIGATE THE CAUSES OF THE FAILED | | RUPTURE DISCS AND WILL REPORT THIS CONDITION IN A LICENSE EVENT REPORT | | CURRENTLY BEING PREPARED FOR A PREVIOUS REPORTED EVENT (#33881 OF 3/11/98). | | | | THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 33947 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: COOK REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/23/98 | |UNIT: [1] [2] [ ] STATE: MI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:06 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 03/23/98 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 15:36[EST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: MARY BETH DEPUYDT |LAST UPDATE DATE: 03/23/98 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |MIKE JORDAN RDO | |ADAS 50.72(b)(2)(i) DEG/UNANALYZED COND | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N N 0 COLD SHUTDOWN | 0 COLD SHUTDOWN | | 2 | N N 0 COLD SHUTDOWN | 0 COLD SHUTDOWN | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | NON-SAFETY RELATED CABLES ROUTED TO SAFETY RELATED DEVICES. | | | | DURING THE RESTART READINESS REVIEW, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT NON-SAFETY | | RELATED CABLES WERE ROUTED TO SAFETY RELATED DEVICES IN THE EMERGENCY | | DIESEL GENERATOR (EDG) LOAD SHED CIRCUITRY. THE EDG SUPPLIES BOTH 4160 AND | | 600 VOLT SYSTEMS. SOME 600 VOLT NON-SAFETY RELATED BALANCE OF PLANT LOADS | | ARE SUPPLIED BY THE SAFETY RELATED 600 VOLT BUSSES SUPPLIED FROM THE EDG. | | 600 VOLT SWITCHGEAR CIRCUIT BREAKERS THAT FEED NON-SAFETY RELATED LOADS ARE | | LOAD SHED UNDER A LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER. BASED ON A REVIEW OF WIRING | | DIAGRAMS, THE CABLING FROM THE LOAD SHED RELAYS TO THE SHUNT TRIP COILS ON | | THE BREAKERS IS IDENTIFIED AS BALANCE OF PLANT CABLE. BOTH THE RELAYS AND | | SHUNT TRIP COILS ARE SAFETY RELATED. | | | | THIS CONDITION COULD RESULT IN THE 600 VOLT NON-SAFETY RELATED LOADS NOT | | BEING LOAD SHED DURING A LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER, RESULTING IN THE EDG BEING | | OVERLOADED WHEN THE 4160 VOLT LOADS ARE SEQUENCED ONTO THE BUS. | | | | THE 4 EDGs WERE DECLARED INOPERABLE. OPERATIONS, IN CONJUNCTION WITH | | ENGINEERING, IS EVALUATING THIS CONDITION TO DETERMINE APPROPRIATE ACTIONS | | TO RESTORE THE EDGs TO OPERABILITY. THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE | | CLASSIFICATION OF THE CABLE GOING TO THE 600 VOLT BUSS IS ONGOING. | | | | THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 33948 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: PRAIRIE ISLAND REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/23/98 | |UNIT: [1] [ ] [ ] STATE: MN |NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:29 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP |EVENT DATE: 03/23/98 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 17:07[CST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: D. SMITH |LAST UPDATE DATE: 03/23/98 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |MIKE JORDAN RDO | |ASHU 50.72(b)(1)(i)(A) PLANT S/D REQD BY TS | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | | | | | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | POTENTIAL FLOODING CONCERN COULD RENDER MSIVs INOPERABLE. | | | | THE LICENSEE, WHILE CONDUCTING AN ENGINEERING REVIEW, DISCOVERED A | | POTENTIAL FLOODING CONCERN. DURING A FEEDWATER LINE BREAK SCENARIO, IN THE | | AUXILIARY BUILDING, FLOODING COULD RENDER UNIT 1 MAIN STEAM ISOLATION | | VALVES (MSIV) INOPERABLE. THE PLANT HAS TAKEN IMMEDIATE MITIGATING | | MEASURES TO PREVENT AREA FLOODING, PER TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.6.E, BY | | OPENING VENT ZONE DOORS, WITH COMPENSATORY MEASURES TO ENSURE THE DOORS ARE | | SHUT IF CONDITIONS WERE TO REQUIRE IT. NO PLANT REDUCTION IN POWER WAS | | NECESSARY. | | | | THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |FUEL CYCLE FACILITY | |EVENT NUMBER: 33949 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/24/98 | | RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 03:07 [ET]| |COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 03/23/98 | | 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 09:20[EST]| | BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 03/24/98 | | CITY: PIKETON REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+ | COUNTY: PIKE STATE: OH |PERSON ORGANIZATION| |LICENSE#: GDP-2 AGREEMENT: N |MIKE JORDAN RDO | | DOCKET: 0707002 |SUSAN SHANKMAN, NMSS EO | +------------------------------------------------+ | |NRC NOTIFIED BY: KEITH WILLIAMSON | | |HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | SPACING AND MODERATION CONTROL VIOLATIONS | | | | NRC BULLETIN 91-01 24 HOUR NOTIFICATION | | | | OPERATIONS PERSONNEL DISCOVERED THAT NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY APPROVAL | | (NCSA) REQUIREMENT WAS NOT BEING MAINTAINED WITHIN THE X-333 PROCESS | | BUILDING AT 33-2-7 STAGE #8. NCSA PLANT018.A01 REQUIREMENT #4 AND #5 STATE | | THAT DRY ACTIVE WASTE (DAW) BAGS SHALL HAVE HOLES IN THE BOTTOM TO ALLOW | | FOR SOLUTION DRAINAGE AND MUST BE STORED TWO (2) FEET EDGE-TO-EDGE FROM ANY | | OTHER URANIUM BEARING MATERIAL. AT THIS LOCATION A DAW BAG WAS FOUND TO | | HAVE NO HOLES AND STORED WITHIN THE TWO (2) FEET EDGE-TO-EDGE MINIMUM | | SPACING REQUIREMENT. THIS CONSTITUTES A LOSS OF CONTROL "A" | | (MODERATION/INTERACTION) IN THE DOUBLE CONTINGENCY MATRIX FOR CONTINGENCY | | EVENT B.6.1. CONTROL "B" (MASS) WAS MAINTAINED THROUGHOUT THIS EVENT. | | CONTROL "A" WAS RE-ESTABLISHED UNDER THE DIRECTION OF NUCLEAR CRITICALITY | | SAFETY (NCS) PERSONNEL. | | | | THERE WAS NO LOSS OF HAZARDOUS/RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL OR | | RADIOACTIVE/RADIOLOGICAL CONTAMINATION EXPOSURE AS A RESULT OF THIS EVENT. | | | | THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR AND THE DOE ONSITE REPRESENTATIVE WERE NOTIFIED | | OF THIS EVENT. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |FUEL CYCLE FACILITY | |EVENT NUMBER: 33950 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/24/98 | | RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 03:14 [ET]| |COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 03/23/98 | | 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 13:45[EST]| | BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 03/24/98 | | CITY: PIKETON REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+ | COUNTY: PIKE STATE: OH |PERSON ORGANIZATION| |LICENSE#: GDP-2 AGREEMENT: N |MIKE JORDAN RDO | | DOCKET: 0707002 |SUSAN SHANKMAN, NMSS EO | +------------------------------------------------+ | |NRC NOTIFIED BY: KEITH WILLIAMSON | | |HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | VIOLATION OF MODERATION AND INTERACTION CONTROL | | | | NRC BULLETIN 91-01 24 HOUR NOTIFICATION | | | | OPERATIONS PERSONNEL DISCOVERED THAT A NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY APPROVAL | | (NCSA) REQUIREMENT WAS NOT BEING MAINTAINED WITHIN THE BOUNDARY CONTROL | | STATION (BCS) OF THE X-333 PROCESS BUILDING. NCSA PLANT062.A00 REQUIREMENT | | #5 STATES IN PART "EQUIPMENT SHALL BE SPACED A MINIMUM OF TWO (2) FEET | | EDGE-TO-EDGE". AT THE BCS IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT REMOVED PROCESS EQUIPMENT | | WITH VISIBLE CONTAMINATION WAS DOUBLED BAGGED BUT WAS NOT SPACED AS | | SPECIFIED IN THE NCSA. THIS CONSTITUTES A LOSS OF CONTROL "A" (INTERACTION) | | IN THE DOUBLE CONTINGENCY MATRIX FOR CONTINGENCY EVENT B.17.1. CONTROL "B" | | (GEOMETRY/MASS) WAS MAINTAINED THROUGHOUT THIS EVENT. THE SPACING | | DEFICIENCY WAS CORRECTED AT 1500 HOURS UNDER THE DIRECTION OF NCS | | PERSONNEL. THERE WAS NO LOSS OF HAZARDOUS/RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL OR | | RADIOACTIVE/RADIOLOGICAL CONTAMINATION EXPOSURE AS A RESULT OF THIS EVENT. | | | | THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR AND THE DOE ONSITE REPRESENTATIVE WERE NOTIFIED | | OF THIS EVENT. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |FUEL CYCLE FACILITY | |EVENT NUMBER: 33951 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/24/98 | | RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 03:18 [ET]| |COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 03/23/98 | | 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 14:00[EST]| | BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 03/24/98 | | CITY: PIKETON REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+ | COUNTY: PIKE STATE: OH |PERSON ORGANIZATION| |LICENSE#: GDP-2 AGREEMENT: N |MIKE JORDAN RDO | | DOCKET: 0707002 |SUSAN SHANKMAN, NMSS EO | +------------------------------------------------+ | |NRC NOTIFIED BY: KEITH WILLIAMSON | | |HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | 2 FOOT EDGE-TO-EDGE SPACING REQUIREMENT WAS VIOLATED | | | | NRC BULLETIN 91-01 24 HOUR NOTIFICATION | | | | OPERATIONS PERSONNEL DISCOVERED THAT A NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY APPROVAL | | (NCSA) REQUIREMENT WAS NOT BEING MAINTAINED WITHIN THE RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL | | AREA (RMA) OF THE X-333 PROCESS BUILDING. NCSA PLANT062.A00 REQUIREMENT #5 | | STATES IN PART "EQUIPMENT SHALL BE SPACED A MINIMUM OF TWO (2) FEET | | EDGE-TO-EDGE". AT THE RMA IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT REMOVED PROCESS EQUIPMENT | | WITH NO VISIBLE CONTAMINATION WAS NOT SPACED AS SPECIFIED IN THE NCSA. THIS | | CONSTITUTES A LOSS OF CONTROL "A" (INTERACTION) IN THE DOUBLE CONTINGENCY | | EVENT B.17.1. CONTROL "B" (GEOMETRY/MASS) WAS MAINTAINED THROUGHOUT THIS | | EVENT. THE SPACING DEFICIENCY WAS CORRECTED AT 1455 HOURS UNDER DIRECTION | | OF NCS PERSONNEL. THERE WAS NO LOSS OF HAZARDOUS/RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL OR | | RADIOACTIVE/RADIOLOGICAL CONTAMINATION EXPOSURE AS A RESULT OF THIS EVENT. | | | | THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR AND THE ONSITE DOE REPRESENTATIVE WERE NOTIFIED | | OF THIS EVENT. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+