U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Reports For 10/20/98 - 10/21/98 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** 34810 34856 34885 34922 34936 !!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!! +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 34810 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: INDIAN POINT REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/20/98 | |UNIT: [ ] [3] [ ] STATE: NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 09:13 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 09/20/98 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 08:42[EDT]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: DECLEMENTE |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/20/98 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |DAN HOLODY RDO | |AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | | | | | 3 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | DURING TESTING, RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL HEAT EXCHANGER COMPONENT COOLING | | WATER DISCHARGE ISOLATION FAILED TO FULLY STROKE OPEN. | | | | WHILE PERFORMING TEST 3PT-Q36, VALVE AC-MOV-822A "31 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL | | HEAT EXCHANGER COMPONENT COOLING WATER DISCHARGE ISOLATION" FAILED TO FULLY | | STROKE OPEN AS REQUIRED. THE VALVE WAS SUBSEQUENTLY STROKED OPEN TWICE. | | ONCE BY HOLDING THE CONTROL SWITCH IN THE OPEN POSITION AND THEN THE SECOND | | TIME BY ALLOWING THE SWITCH TO SPRING RETURN TO AUTO. BOTH TIMES THE VALVE | | STROKED FULL OPEN AND CLOSED. A SIMILAR PROBLEM OCCURRED ON THE SAME VALVE | | ON 06/07/98 WHICH MAY INDICATE THAT THE PROBLEM, WHICH APPEARS TO BE | | INTERMITTENT, WAS NOT FULLY IDENTIFIED AT THAT TIME. BASED ON THIS, | | ONE OF THE RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL COOLING TRAINS MAY HAVE BEEN INCAPABLE | | OF PERFORMING ITS DESIGN FUNCTION FOR A PERIOD OF TIME WHILE AT POWER | | OPERATION. THE PROBLEM IS CURRENTLY UNDER FURTHER INVESTIGATION. THE | | LICENSEE ENTERED A 48 HOUR LIMITING CONDITION OF OPERATION PER TECHNICAL | | SPECIFICATION 3.3.A.4.d (ONE RHR HEAT EXCHANGER OUT OF SERVICE) AT 0115 | | EDT. | | | | THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WILL BE NOTIFIED BY THE LICENSEE. | | | | * * * RETRACTION 1327 10/20/98 FROM BRIAN ROKES TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * * | | | | "THE AUTHORITY IS WITHDRAWING THE 1 HOUR NON-EMERGENCY REPORT MADE AT 0913 | | HOURS ON SEPTEMBER 20, 1998 (LOG NO. 34810). THIS REPORT IDENTIFIED A | | CONDITION POTENTIALLY OUTSIDE THE DESIGN BASIS DUE TO A MOTOR OPERATED | | VALVE AC-MOV-822A, '31 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) HEAT EXCHANGER COMPONENT | | COOLING WATER DISCHARGE ISOLATION,' THAT MAY HAVE BEEN INOPERABLE DURING | | PAST OPERATION. A CONDITION WAS DISCOVERED DURING TESTING ON SEPTEMBER 20 | | THAT WAS SIMILAR TO A CONDITION OBSERVED ON JUNE 7, 1998. | | | | FURTHER INVESTIGATION DETERMINED THAT THE JUNE 7 EVENT WAS A RESULT OF A | | HIGH RESISTANCE ACROSS THE 'OPEN' SEAL-IN AUXILIARY CONTACT. THIS CONTACT | | WAS REPLACED, AND THE VALVE TESTED SATISFACTORILY AND DECLARED OPERABLE. | | TROUBLESHOOTING AFTER THE SEPTEMBER 20 EVENT DID NOT FIND A HIGH RESISTANCE | | ACROSS THE SEAL-IN AUXILIARY CONTACT AND THE CONTACT TESTED SATISFACTORILY. | | BASED ON TROUBLESHOOTING AND TEST RESULT, THE SEAL-IN AUXILIARY CONTACT WAS | | ELIMINATED AS A CAUSE. TROUBLESHOOTING DID DETECT A HIGH 'AUTO' CONTACT | | RESISTANCE ON THE CONTROL ROOM HAND SWITCH AND IT WAS REPLACED. THE CONTROL | | TRANSFORMER WAS ALSO SUSPECT DUE TO THE LOSS OF THE WHITE 'TWO-IS-TRUE' | | LIGHT AND POSITION INDICATION DURING MOV OPERATION, AND BASED ON CHATTERING | | OF THE CONTACTOR AND FLICKERING OF THE GREEN/RED LIGHT INDICATIONS OBSERVED | | IN THE CONTROL ROOM DURING OPERATION OF THE VALVE IN SEPTEMBER. THE CONTROL | | TRANSFORMER WAS REPLACED. DURING RETESTING NONE OF THE ABNORMAL INDICATIONS | | WERE OBSERVED AND THE VALVE OPERATED PROPERLY. THE VALVE WAS DECLARED | | OPERABLE. INVESTIGATIONS HAVE NOT IDENTIFIED ANY EVIDENCE OF EQUIPMENT | | DISCREPANCIES IN THE SEPTEMBER 20 EVENT THAT EXISTED PREVIOUSLY IN THE JUNE | | 7 EVENT. THEREFORE, IN ACCORDANCE WITH NUREG-1022, REVISION 1, THE | | COMPONENT DISCREPANCIES FOUND FOR THE SEPTEMBER 20 EVENT ARE ASSUMED TO | | HAVE OCCURRED AT THE TIME OF DISCOVERY DURING TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION | | SURVEILLANCE." | | | | THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WILL BE INFORMED BY THE LICENSEE. NOTIFIED R1DO | | (PELUSO). | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 34856 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: THREE MILE ISLAND REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/30/98 | |UNIT: [1] [ ] [ ] STATE: PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:09 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP |EVENT DATE: 09/30/98 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 13:20[EDT]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: JOHN SCHORK |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/20/98 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |JOHN CARUSO RDO | |AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | | | | | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | IMPROPERLY INSTALLED THERMOLAG FIRE BARRIER | | | | DURING THE REMOVAL OF THERMOLAG MATERIAL, A FIRE RESISTANT MATERIAL THAT | | WAS INSTALLED IN 1987 TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR PART 50, APPENDIX | | R, WORKERS OBSERVED THAT SEVERAL PORTIONS OF FIRE BARRIER "1 FHC-FB-06" | | LOCATED IN FIRE ZONE FH-FZ-1 IN THE 281' ELEVATION OF THE TMI-1 FUEL | | HANDLING BUILDING DID NOT HAVE REQUIRED FILLET OF TROWEL GRADE MATERIAL | | 330-1. THE THERMOLAG WAS BEING INSPECTED IN PREPARATION FOR ITS REPLACEMENT | | WITH MECATISS. | | | | THE CONTROL ROOM WAS NOTIFIED AND A FIRE WATCH WAS POSTED IN ACCORDANCE | | WITH THE SITE FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM PROCEDURE. REPAIRS WERE MADE TO THE | | NONCONFORMING SEAMS. AT 1320, THE PLANT REVIEW GROUP CONCLUDED A REVIEW OF | | THE NONCONFORMING CONDITION AND DETERMINED THAT THE CONDITION WAS | | IMMEDIATELY REPORTABLE TO THE NRC IN ACCORDANCE WITH 10CFR50.72(b)(1)(ii) | | AS A CONDITION OUTSIDE OF THE DESIGN BASIS OF THE PLANT AND AS A SUPPLEMENT | | TO EARLIER SIMILAR NOTIFICATIONS. THE CONDITION WAS DETERMINED TO BE | | REPORTABLE BECAUSE THE FIRE BARRIER DID NOT CONFORM TO ITS DESIGN BASIS AND | | THERE WAS REASONABLE JUSTIFICATION THAT THE NONCONFORMING CONDITION WAS NOT | | THE RESULT OF AGE-RELATED DEGRADATION BUT RATHER AN INCORRECT INSTALLATION. | | | | THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR HAS BEEN INFORMED OF THIS EVENT BY THE LICENSEE. | | | | * * * UPDATE ON 10/01/98 AT 1512 ET BY JOHN SCHORK TAKEN BY MACKINNON* * * | | | | DURING THE REMOVAL OF THERMOLAG MATERIAL, A FIRE RESISTANT MATERIAL THAT | | WAS INSTALLED IN 1987 AT THREE MILE ISLAND TO MEET THE REQUIREMENT OF | | APPENDIX "R" TO 10 CFR 50, WORKERS OBSERVED THAT SEVERAL PORTIONS OF FIRE | | BARRIER IAXC-FB-05 LOCATED IN FIRE ZONE AB-FZ-04 IN THE THREE MILE ISLAND | | UNIT 1 AUXILIARY BUILDING DID NOT HAVE A REQUIRED FILLET OF TROWEL GRADE | | MATERIAL 330-1. THE THERMOLAG WAS BEING INSPECTED IN PREPARATION TO | | REPLACE IT WITH MECATISS. SPECIFICALLY, VISUAL OBSERVATION DETERMINED THAT | | TROWEL GRADE MIX WAS NOT APPLIED TO TWO (2) SEAMS WHERE THERMOLAG | | INSULATION ABUTS THE REACTOR BUILDING EXTERIOR WALL AND ONE (1) SEAM WHERE | | THERMOLAG INSULATION ABUTS AGAINST A REACTOR BUILDING PENETRATION THERMOLAG | | INSULATION BOX AT THE TIME OF INSTALLATION OF THE THERMOLAG IN 1987. IN | | ADDITION, THERMOLAG INSTALLED AROUND A UNISTRUT WAS OBSERVED TO CONTAIN | | KAOWOOL FILLER MATERIAL AND DID NOT HAVE TROWEL GRADE MIX APPLIED TO THE | | END SEAM. | | | | THE CONTROL ROOM WAS NOTIFIED AND A FIRE WATCH WAS POSTED IN ACCORDANCE | | WITH THREE MILE ISLAND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 1038, THE SITE FIRE | | PROTECTION PROGRAM PROCEDURE. REPAIRS ARE BEING MADE TO THE NON-CONFORMING | | SEAMS. | | | | AT 1450 HOURS, THE THREE MILE ISLAND PLANT REVIEW GROUP CONCLUDED A REVIEW | | OF THE NON-CONFORMING CONDITION AND DETERMINED THAT THE CONDITION WAS | | IMMEDIATELY REPORTABLE TO THE NRC IN ACCORDANCE WITH 10 CFR | | 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) AS A CONDITION OUTSIDE THE DESIGN BASIS OF THE PLANT AND | | AS A SUPPLEMENT TO EARLIER SIMILAR NOTIFICATIONS IN EVENT REPORTS 34682, | | AUGUST 25, 1998; 34769, SEPTEMBER 14, 1998 AND 34853, SEPTEMBER 29, 1998. | | THE CONDITION WAS DETERMINED TO BE REPORTABLE BECAUSE THE FIRE BARRIER DID | | NOT CONFORM TO ITS DESIGN BASIS AND THERE WAS REASONABLE JUSTIFICATION THAT | | THE NON-CONFORMING CONDITION WAS NOT THE RESULT OF AGE-RELATED DEGRADATION | | BUT RATHER AN INCORRECT INSTALLATION. | | | | ALL OF THE EARLIER EVENT REPORTS REFERENCED ABOVE AND THIS EVENT ARE | | RELATED IN THAT THEY HAVE THE SAME GENERAL CAUSE, INADEQUATE INSTALLATION, | | AND THE SAME GENERAL CONSEQUENCES, A FIRE BARRIER BEING OUTSIDE ITS DESIGN | | BASIS. THEREFORE, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE GUIDANCE PROVIDED IN NUREG 1022 | | REV 1, EVENTS 34769, 34853 AND THIS REPORT WILL BE REPORTED IN A SUPPLEMENT | | TO LER 98-011, THAT REPORTED EVENT 34682. IN ADDITION, THERE IS SOME | | POSSIBILITY THAT ADDITIONAL SIMILAR CONDITIONS MAY BE DISCOVERED DURING THE | | COMPLETION OF THE PROJECT IN WHICH THERMOLAG IS BEING REPLACED WITH | | MECATISS. SUBSEQUENT SIMILAR EVENTS WILL BE REPORTED TO THE NRC VIA THE ENS | | SYSTEM AND BE REPORTED IN THE SUPPLEMENT TO LER 98-011 AND AS SUPPLEMENTAL | | IMMEDIATE REPORTS IN THIS EVENT REPORT 34856. THE SUPPLEMENT WILL BE ISSUED | | WHEN THE MECATISS INSTALLATION HAS BEEN COMPLETED (APPROXIMATELY MARCH 31, | | 1999). R1DO (JOHN CARUSO) NOTIFIED. | | | | THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED OF THIS UPDATE BY THE LICENSEE. | | | | * * * UPDATE 1452EDT ON 10/7/98 FROM JOHN SCHORK TO S.SANDIN * * * | | | | At 1452 hours on October 7, 1998, J. Schork, TMI PRG Chairman informed Mr. | | Steve Sandin of the NRC Operations Center by telephone that the existence | | of a condition outside the design basis of the TMI-1 plant had been | | determined by the TMI Plant Review Group at 1423 hours of October 7, 1998. | | This report is being made as a supplement to Event Report 34856 made on | | September 30, 1998. | | | | During the inspection of Thermolag material, a fire resistant material that | | was installed in 1987 at TMI to meet the requirements of Appendix R to 10 | | CFR 50, workers observed that a portion of fire barrier ICCD-FB08 located | | in fire zone CB-FA-1 in the TMI-1 Control Building had an area, size | | approximately 3.5" long and 2" wide, on the radial bend armor cable circuit | | ED 5033 A where Thermolag was missing. This non-conforming condition | | appears to be an original construction deficiency. | | | | The control room was notified and the deficiency was documented in the site | | corrective action program (CAP T1998-0867). An hourly fire watch was | | instituted in accordance with the site fire protection program procedure. | | Repairs are being made to the non-conforming seams. | | | | At 1423 hours, the TMI Plant Review Group concluded a review of the | | non-conforming condition and determined that the condition was immediately | | reportable to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(l)(ii) as a | | condition outside the design basis of the plant and as a supplement to | | earlier similar notifications in event reports 34682, August 25, 1998, | | 34769, September 14, 1998 and 34853, September 29, 1998, 34856, September | | 30, 1998. The condition was determined to be reportable because the fire | | barrier did not conform to its design basis and there was reasonable | | justification that the non--conforming condition was not the result of | | age-related degradation but rather an incorrect installation. | | | | All of the earlier event reports referenced above and this event are | | related in that they have the same general cause, inadequate installation, | | and the same general consequences, a fire barrier being outside its design | | basis. Therefore, in accordance with the guidance provided in NUREG 1022, | | Rev. 1, events 34769, 34853, 34856 and this report will be reported in a | | supplement to LER 98-011, that reported event 34682. In addition, there is | | some possibility that additional similar conditions may be discovered | | during the completion of the project in which Thermolag is being replaced | | with Mecatiss. Subsequent similar events will be reported to the NRC via | | the ENS system and be reported in the supplement to LER 98-011 and as | | supplemental immediate reports to Event Report 34856. The supplement will | | be issued when the Mecatiss installation has been completed (approximately | | March 31, 1999). | | | | The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector. | | | | * * *UPDATE ON 10/12/98 AT 1109 EDT BY RANDY CAMPBELL TO FANGIE JONES* * * | | | | THE UPDATE WAS DETERMINED TO BE REPORTABLE AT 1100 EDT ON 10/12/98. | | | | DURING THE INSPECTION OF THERMOLAG MATERIAL, A FIRE RESISTANT MATERIAL THAT | | WAS INSTALLED IN 1987 AT TMI TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF APPENDIX "R" OF 10 | | CFR50, WORKERS OBSERVED A BREACH IN THERMOLAG PROTECTING HANGER "B" FOR | | 1FHC-FB06 ELEMENT 452 LOCATED IN FIRE ZONE FH-FZ1, 281' FHB 281'ELEVATION | | SOUTH END OF NEUTRALIZER TANK ROOM OVER HIGH RAD STORAGE AREA. THE WEST | | SIDE OF THE UNISTRUT WAS NOT PROPERLY CONSTRUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH | | THERMOLAG DESIGN CRITERIA IN THAT TWO OPENINGS EXISTED INTO THE UNISTRUT | | (ONE ABOUT 1" x 0.125" AND THE SECOND ABOUT 0.25" x 0.125") WHERE TROWEL | | GRADE MATERIAL WAS NOT PROPERLY INSTALLED BETWEEN THE PIECES. THE OUTER | | SEAM WAS ALSO NOT COVERED WITH THERMOLAG TROWEL MIX FOR APPROXIMATELY 4" | | ALONG THESE JOINTS. THE CONTROL ROOM WAS NOTIFIED AND THE DEFICIENCY WAS | | DOCUMENTED IN THE SITE CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM (CAP T1998-0877) | | | | REPAIRS WERE MADE WITH TROWEL GRADE MATERIAL IN ACCORDANCE WITH 1440-Y-14 | | TO PLACE THE BARRIERS BACK INTO ITS DESIGN CONFIGURATION. INSPECTION WILL | | BE PERFORMED IN 24 HOURS TO CONFIRM THE SEAMS HAVE BEEN RESTORED TO THEIR | | DESIGN BASIS CONFIGURATION. A CAMERA IS PRESENTLY IN PLACE PROVIDING ONE | | HOUR FIRE WATCH COVERAGE WHICH WILL PROVIDE THE REQUIRED COMPENSATORY | | MEASURE IN ACCORDANCE WITH AP 1038 EXHIBIT 2 SECTION 7.3.2. THIS | | NON-CONFORMING CONDITION APPEARS TO BE AN ORIGINAL CONSTRUCTION DEFICIENCY. | | | | THERE IS SOME POSSIBILITY THAT ADDITIONAL SIMILAR CONDITIONS MAY BE | | DISCOVERED DURING THE COMPLETION OF THE PROJECT IN WHICH THERMOLAG IS BEING | | REPLACED WITH MECATISS. SUBSEQUENT SIMILAR EVENTS WILL BE REPORTED TO THE | | NRC VIA THE ENS SYSTEM AND IN THE SUPPLEMENT TO LER 98-011 AND AS | | SUPPLEMENTAL IMMEDIATE REPORTS TO EVENT REPORT NUMBER (34856). THE | | SUPPLEMENT WILL BE ISSUED WHEN THE MECATISS INSTALLATION HAS BEEN COMPLETED | | (APPROXIMATELY 03/31/99). R1DO (JIM LINVILLE) NOTIFIED. | | | | THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED BY THE LICENSEE OF THIS UPDATE. | | | | **UPDATE ON 10/13/98 AT 1332 EDT FROM R CAMPBELL TAKEN BY MACKINNON** | | | | CB-FA-1 FIRE BARRIERS (308' CONTROL BUILDING - RAD CON/CHEMISTRY AREAS) | | WERE FOUND WITH DEGRADED CONDITIONS FOR THE FOLLOWING: | | | | 1CCD-FB08 CONDUIT TO SUPPORT SEAM WAS FOUND TO BE MISSING ABOUT 0.25" BY 3" | | OF TROWEL GRADE THERMOLAG. THIS APPEARS TO BE ORIGINAL CONSTRUCTION NOT | | BUILT ACCORDING TO SPECIFICATIONS. | | 1CCD-FB10 CONDUIT TO SUPPORT 0.5" BY 0.125" AND CONDUIT TO CONDUIT 0.5" BY | | 0.125" TOP AREAS MISSING TROWEL GRADE THERMOLAG APPEARS TO BE ORIGINAL | | CONSTRUCTION NOT BUILT ACCORDING TO SPECIFICATIONS. | | 1CCD-FB11 CONDUIT TO CONDULET TOP SEAM WAS MISSING ABOUT 0.375" BY 2" OF | | TROWEL GRADE THERMOLAG. THIS APPEARS TO BE ORIGINAL CONSTRUCTION NOT BUILT | | ACCORDING TO SPECIFICATION. | | 1CCD-FB12 CONDUIT TO COUPLING SEAM WAS MISSING 0.25" BY 2" TROWEL GRADE | | THERMOLAG. THIS APPEARS TO BE ORIGINAL CONSTRUCTION NOT BUILT ACCORDING TO | | SPECIFICATIONS. AN AREA NEAR THE NORTH WALL PENETRATION 0.125" BY 0.75" WAS | | DEGRADED (NOT AN ORIGINAL CONSTRUCTION DISCREPANCY). | | 1CCD-FB14 HAS A HOLE ABOUT 0.375" BY 1" HOLE TO THE ARMOR CABLE, AND A | | FACIAL CRACK AT A CONDUIT SEAM. THIS APPEARS TO BE DEGRADED OVER TIME (NOT | | A CONSTRUCTION DISCREPANCY). | | 1CCD-FB19 HAS A DEGRADED AREA AT A VERTICAL TO HORIZONTAL JOINT THAT | | APPEARS TO BE DEGRADED OVER TIME (NOT A CONSTRUCTION DISCREPANCY). | | 1CCD-FB20 MULTIPLE BREACHES ON ELBOW NORTH END THAT APPEARS TO BE ORIGINAL | | CONSTRUCTION NOT BUILT ACCORDING TO SPECIFICATIONS. SUPPORT 1CCD-C101 HAS | | 4" BY 0.125" SEAM AND 2" BY 0.125" AT THE INNER SECTION OF 1CCD-FB20 | | MISSING TROWEL GRADE THERMOLAG. THESE APPEAR TO BE ORIGINAL CONSTRUCTION | | NOT BUILT ACCORDING TO SPECIFICATIONS. | | SOME OTHER COSMETIC REPAIRS WERE MADE WHERE MINOR CRACKS WERE OBSERVED THAT | | DID NOT GO THROUGH THE THICKNESS OF THE THERMOLAG ON VARIOUS FIRE BARRIERS | | IN THIS AREA. | | IAW AP 1038 EXHIBIT 2 SECTION 7.3.2 THIS BREACH REQUIRES COMPENSATORY | | ACTIONS INCLUDING THE START OF A 14 DAY CLOCK, ONE HOUR FIRE WATCH | | PRESENTLY BEING PERFORMED BY RAD CON BECAUSE OF DEGRADED TSI AND OTHER | | COMBUSTIBLES IN THE AREA. THIS AREA IS PROTECTED BY A SUPPRESSION SYSTEM. | | R1DO (CURT COWGILL) NOTIFIED. | | | | THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR HAS BEEN NOTIFIED OF THIS UPDATE BY THE | | LICENSEE. | | | | *** UPDATE ON 10/14/98 @ 1012 BY CAMPBELL TO SANDIN *** | | | | THE FOLLOWING FAX WAS SUBMITTED BY THE LICENSEE AS AN UPDATE TO THEIR | | FINDINGS. | | | | "CB-FA-1 FIRE BARRIER 1CCD-FB06 WAS FOUND WITH A COUPLING SEAM NOT FILLED | | WITH TROWEL GRADE THERMOLAG WHERE IT ADJOINS TO 1CCD-FB04 THAT APPEARS TO | | BE AN ORIGINAL CONSTRUCTION NOT BUILT ACCORDING TO SPECIFICATIONS. | | | | IAW AP 1038 EXHIBIT 2 SECTION 7.3.2 THIS BREACH REQUIRES COMPENSATORY | | ACTIONS INCLUDING THE START OF A 14 DAY CLOCK, ONE HOUR FIRE WATCH | | PRESENTLY BEING PERFORMED BY RAD CON BECAUSE OF DEGRADED TSI AND OTHER | | COMBUSTIBLES IN THE AREA FOR THE MECATISS WORK. A BREACH NOTICE IS | | SUBMITTED FOR THIS REPAIR. | | | | PROCEDURE 1303-12.24 DATA SHEET E2-1 IMPROPERLY SHOWS FIRE BARRIERS | | 1CCD-FB04 AND 1CCD-FB06 REVERSED. 1CCD-FB04 IS THE NORTH ENTITY AND SHOULD | | BE IDENTIFIED WITH THE LETTER "D" AND 1CCD-FB06 IS THE SOUTH ENTITY AND | | SHOULD BE IDENTIFIED WITH THE LETTER "F" FROM THE POINT WHERE THEY LEAVE | | THE EAST WALL AND RUN EAST TO WEST. | | | | THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED. | | | | THE R1DO (COWGILL) WAS NOTIFIED. | | | | * * * UPDATE 1452 10/15/98 FROM SCHORK TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * * | | | | "CB-FA-1 CONTROL BUILDING FIRE BARRIER 1CCD-FB08 HAS A BREACH AT A COUPLING | | INTERFACE TO BRACKET WHERE IT APPEARS THE TROWEL GRADE THERMOLAG WAS NOT | | INSTALLED DURING ORIGINAL CONSTRUCTION ON THE TOP SEAM ABOUT 3" x 1/16". | | | | CB-FA-1 BARRIER 1CCD-FB09 HAS A SIMILAR BREACH AT A COUPLING TO BRACKET | | INTERFACE THAT EXTENDS THE ENTIRE LENGTH (ABOUT 9") OF THE COUPLING | | INTERFACE VARYING IN WIDTH ABOUT 1/16" TO 1/4" THAT APPEARS TROWEL GRADE | | MATERIAL WAS NOT INSTALLED DURING ORIGINAL CONSTRUCTION. | | | | IAW AP 1038 EXHIBIT 2 SECTION 7.3.2 THESE BREACHES REQUIRE COMPENSATORY | | ACTIONS INCLUDING THE START OF A 14 DAY TIME CLOCK AND AN HOURLY FIRE WATCH | | SINCE THERE ARE OPERABLE FIRE DETECTORS IN THE AREA UNTIL THE BARRIERS ARE | | REPAIRED AND CONSIDERED ACCEPTABLE. A CAMERA HAS BEEN PERFORMING THIS | | FUNCTION PRIOR TO THE IDENTIFICATION OF THESE BREACHES DUE TO INCREASED | | WORK ACTIVITIES OF THE MECATISS INSTALLATION." | | | | THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR HAS BEEN INFORMED OF THIS UPDATE. NOTIFIED R1DO | | (COWGILL). | | | | * * * UPDATE AT 1602 ON 10/20/98 BY HOWARD CRAWFORD TO JOLLIFFE * * * | | | | THE LICENSEE DISCOVERED AN ADDITIONAL DEFICIENCY WITH THERMOLAG INSULATION | | INSTALLED IN 1987. THE LICENSEE PLANS TO ADDRESS THIS ADDITIONAL | | DEFICIENCY IN A SUPPLEMENT TO LER #98-011. | | | | CB-FA-1 306' CONTROL BUILDING FIRE BARRIER 1CCD-FB08 CONDUIT-TO-COUPLING | | INTERFACE HAS A 1/4" X 1/4" HOLE THROUGH TO THE ENTITY AND TROWEL GRADE | | MIX MISSING FOR ABOUT 90 DEGREES OF THE INTERFACE. THIS APPEARS TO BE AN | | ORIGINAL CONSTRUCTION DISCREPANCY. AN EXISTING FIRE WATCH FOR THIS AREA | | WAS IN PLACE PRIOR TO THIS DISCOVERY DUE TO ONGOING MECATISS FIRE BARRIER | | INSULATION INSTALLATION WORK IN THE AREA. | | | | DUE TO THE NUMBER OF DEFICIENT CONDITIONS OF A SIMILAR NATURE IDENTIFIED, | | IT IS NOW EVIDENT THAT DURING THE INSTALLATION OF THERMOLAG INSULATION AT | | TMI-1 IN 1987, THERE WERE A NUMBER OF LOCATIONS WHERE INSTALLED THERMOLAG | | INSULATION SHOULD HAVE BEEN, BUT WAS NOT, AUGMENTED WITH TROWEL GRADE MIX | | IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE DESIGN STANDARD. BECAUSE OF THE NUMEROUS PREVIOUS | | REPORTS OF SEVERAL SIMILAR DEFICIENCIES IN THERMOLAG FIRE BARRIERS TO THE | | NRC, IT IS NO LONGER PRODUCTIVE NOR NECESSARY PER 10CFR50.72 TO CONTINUE | | TO MAKE ONE HOUR REPORTS TO THE NRC REGARDING THE IDENTIFICATION OF EACH | | INDIVIDUAL SIMILAR DEFICIENCY BETWEEN THE PRESENT AND THE END OF THE | | CURRENT FIRE BARRIER UPGRADE PROJECT. | | | | THEREFORE, IN ACCORDANCE WITH DISCUSSIONS WITH TMI SENIOR RESIDENT | | INSPECTOR | | W. SCHMIDT AND NRC REGION 1 DIVISION OF REACTOR PROJECTS, PROJECTS BRANCH 7 | | CHIEF P. ESELGROTH, FUTURE SIMILAR THERMOLAG DEFICIENCIES IDENTIFIED AS | | PART OF THE CURRENT FIRE BARRIER UPGRADE PROJECT WILL NOT BE REPORTED IN | | ENS CALLS TO THE NRC. | | | | EACH IDENTIFIED DEFICIENCY WILL CONTINUE TO BE DOCUMENTED IN THE TMI-1 | | CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM AND RESPONDED TO IN ACCORDANCE WITH 10CFR50, | | APPENDIX 'B' CRITERION 18. IN ADDITION, A SUPPLEMENT TO LER #98-011 WILL | | BE SUBMITTED TO THE NRC TO PROVIDE A DETAILED REPORT IN ACCORDANCE WITH | | 10CFR50.73 REGARDING THE ACTIONS TAKEN ON AN INDIVIDUAL AND PROGRAMMATIC | | BASIS IN RESPONSE TO THE IDENTIFIED THERMOLAG DEFICIENCIES. | | | | THE LICENSEE PLANS TO NOTIFY THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | | | | THE NRC OPERATIONS OFFICER NOTIFIED THE R1DO LAURIE PELUSO. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ !!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!! +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 34885 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: DRESDEN REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/07/98 | |UNIT: [ ] [ ] [3] STATE: IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:13 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3 |EVENT DATE: 10/07/98 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 12:44[CDT]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: CAROL BARAJAS |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/20/98 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |THOMAS KOZAK RDO | |AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | | |NLCO TECH SPEC LCO A/S | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | | | | | | | | | 3 | N Y 99 POWER OPERATION | 99 POWER OPERATION | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | UNIT 3 DECLARED ITS ISOLATION CONDENSER INOPERABLE DUE TO A POTENTIAL | | FAILURE OF A REACTOR COOLANT ISOLATION VALVE. | | | | "UNIT 3 ISOLATION CONDENSER WAS DECLARED INOPERABLE AT 1244CDT ON 10/7/98, | | DUE TO THE POTENTIAL FAILURE OF THE REACTOR OUTLET ISOLATION MOV 3-1301-2 | | TO ELECTRICALLY OPERATE ON AN AUTOMATIC ISOLATION SIGNAL. PER AN | | ENGINEERING EVALUATION, THE MOV 3-1301-2 MOTOR PINION GEAR AND/OR KEY IS | | LOOSE AND DUE TO THE BEVEL OF THE TEETH ON THE MOTOR PINION GEAR, THE GEAR | | WILL TEND TO WALK IN A DIRECTION WHICH COULD CAUSE THE GEAR TO FALL OFF OF | | THE MOTOR SHAFT DURING THE CLOSING STROKE OF THE VALVE. THEREFORE, THERE | | IS A HIGH PROBABILITY THAT THE VALVE COULD FAIL TO CLOSE AS REQUIRED WHEN | | CALLED UPON TO PERFORM ITS DESIGNED SAFETY FUNCTION. TECHNICAL | | SPECIFICATION 3.5.D (ISOLATION CONDENSER) WAS ENTERED WHICH PLACED THE UNIT | | IN A 14 DAY LCO. ALL OTHER ECCS SYSTEMS ARE OPERABLE. TECHNICAL | | SPECIFICATION 3.7.D (PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES) WAS ENTERED AND | | AT 1314CDT AN IN LINE ISOLATION VALVE WAS CLOSED AND DE-ACTIVATED TO MEET | | SPECIFICATIONS. THE ISOLATION CONDENSER WAS TAKEN OUT OF SERVICE AND MOV | | 3-1301-2 REPAIRS ARE UNDERWAY." | | | | THE LICENSEE WILL INFORM THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | | | | * * * UPDATE AT 1202 ON 10/20/98 BY RILEY RUFFIN TO JOLLIFFE * * * | | | | THE CONDITION IDENTIFIED ABOVE WOULD NOT HAVE AFFECTED THE ABILITY OF THE | | ISOLATION CONDENSER TO PROPERLY OPERATE. THE VALVE WAS IN THE SAFETY | | POSITION FOR THE ISOLATION CONDENSER TO PERFORM ITS INTENDED FUNCTION. | | THE VALVE WAS INTENTIONALLY CLOSED TO COMPLY WITH THE ACTION REQUIREMENTS | | OF PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION TECH SPECS WHICH RESULTED IN THE ISOLATION | | CONDENSER BEING REMOVED FROM SERVICE. | | | | SINCE THE CONDITION OF THE VALVE WOULD NOT HAVE ADVERSELY IMPACTED THE | | ABILITY OF THE SYSTEM TO PERFORM ITS RESPECTIVE SAFETY FUNCTION. THIS | | CONDITION DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A REPORTABLE EVENT. | | | | THUS, THE LICENSEE DESIRES TO RETRACT THIS EVENT AS A CONDITION THAT ALONE | | COULD HAVE PREVENTED THE FULFILLMENT OF THE SAFETY FUNCTION. | | | | THE LICENSEE WILL INFORM THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | | | | THE HOO NOTIFIED THE R3DO MIKE JORDAN. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ !!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!! +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 34922 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: CATAWBA REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/16/98 | |UNIT: [ ] [2] [ ] STATE: SC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 09:31 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 10/15/98 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 11:00[EDT]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: GARY HAMILTON |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/20/98 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |MARK LESSER RDO | |NLTR LICENSEE 24 HR REPORT | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | | | | | 2 | N N 0 COLD SHUTDOWN | 0 HOT SHUTDOWN | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | -FIRE WATCH DISCONTINUED BEFORE FIRE DOOR WAS PROPERLY RESTORED TO SERVICE- | | | | AT 1100 ON 10/15/98, THE LICENSEE DISCOVERED THAT TAPE HAD BEEN PLACED | | OVER THE LATCHING MECHANISM OF UNIT 2 LOWER CONTAINMENT AIRLOCK ENCLOSURE | | FIRE DOOR #AX393D. THE LICENSEE IMMEDIATELY DECLARED THE DOOR INOPERABLE | | AS A CONSERVATIVE MEASURE SINCE IT WAS IN AN UNTESTED CONFIGURATION. | | THE LICENSEE REMOVED THE TAPE AND RESTORED THE DOOR TO OPERABLE STATUS. | | | | THE LICENSEE DOES NOT KNOW WHEN THE TAPE WAS PLACED ON THE DOOR LATCH. THEY | | DETERMINED THAT, ON 10/06/98, THE DOOR HAD BEEN PROPPED OPEN FOR REFUELING | | OUTAGE WORK AND AN HOURLY FIRE WATCH HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED IN ACCORDANCE | | WITH THE CATAWBA FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM. | | | | ON 10/11/98, THE DOOR WAS CLOSED AND THE FIRE WATCH WAS DISCONTINUED. | | HOWEVER, THE TAPE ON THE LATCHING MECHANISM HAD NOT BEEN REMOVED AND THE | | FIRE PROTECTION REQUIREMENT TO PROVIDE A FIRE WATCH ON THIS DOOR HAD NOT | | BEEN MET DURING THE TIME THAT THE DOOR WAS INOPERABLE. | | | | THE CATAWBA FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE REQUIRES THAT ALL PROVISIONS OF | | THE APPROVED FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM BE IMPLEMENTED AND MAINTAINED IN | | EFFECT. FAILURE TO MAINTAIN A FIRE WATCH ON AN INOPERABLE FIRE DOOR IS | | A VIOLATION OF THE CATAWBA FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM AND IS REPORTABLE TO | | THE NRC WITHIN 24 HOURS AS REQUIRED BY FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE, | | CONDITION 2.F. | | | | THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | | | | * * * UPDATE AT 1205 ON 10/20/98 BY GARY HAMILTON TO JOLLIFFE * * * | | | | LICENSEE ENGINEERING AND MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL DETERMINED THAT THE LATCHING | | MECHANISM THAT WAS TAPED WAS THE "KEY LOCK SET". THIS KEY LOCK SET | | MECHANISM IS USED BY RADIATION PROTECTION PERSONNEL TO CONTROL ACCESS INTO | | THE LOWER CONTAINMENT. THE LATCH SET USED TO ENSURE DOOR INTEGRITY FROM | | A FIRE AND PRESSURE DOOR STANDPOINT UTILIZES AN INDEPENDENT LOCKING PIN | | THAT IS RETRACTED USING A DOOR KNOB AND AUTOMATICALLY ENGAGES BY USE OF | | AN INTERNAL TRIP MECHANISM UPON DOOR CLOSURE. THIS LOCKING PIN ACTS AS | | THE REQUIRED LATCHING MECHANISM TO QUALIFY THE DOOR AS A FIRE AND PRESSURE | | DOOR. THIS LOCKING PIN MECHANISM WAS NEVER DEFEATED (i.e., TAPED), AND THE | | DOOR WAS THEREFORE NEVER INOPERABLE WITH RESPECT TO ITS BOUNDARY INTEGRITY. | | | | SINCE THE DOOR WAS NEVER INOPERABLE FROM A FIRE PROTECTION STANDPOINT, | | THERE WAS NO REQUIREMENT TO HAVE A FIRE WATCH POSTED AND NO VIOLATION OF | | THE FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM. THUS, THE LICENSEE DESIRES TO RETRACT THIS | | EVENT NOTIFICATION. | | | | THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | | | | THE NRC OPERATIONS OFFICER NOTIFIED THE R2DO PIERCE SKINNER. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 34936 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: CATAWBA REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/20/98 | |UNIT: [1] [2] [ ] STATE: SC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:11 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 10/20/98 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 14:30[EDT]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: GARY HAMILTON/CHRIS ORR |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/20/98 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |PIERCE SKINNER RDO | |AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | | 2 | N N 0 HOT STANDBY | 0 HOT STANDBY | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | -SYSTEM INTERLOCK FOR ECCS LEAK DETECTION CAPABILITY NOT INSTALLED IN PLANT | | | | AT 1430 ON 10/20/98, LICENSEE ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT PERSONNEL DISCOVERED | | THAT THE PLANT UFSAR AND SER DESCRIBE AN ELECTRICAL INTERLOCK BETWEEN THE | | LIQUID RADWASTE (LRW) SYSTEM AND THE SOLID STATE PROTECTION SYSTEM THAT | | HAD NOT BEEN INSTALLED IN THE PLANT. | | | | LEAKS FROM EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM COMPONENTS (RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL | | PUMP SEALS, CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP SEALS, VALVES, ETC) DRAIN INTO THE | | 2500 GALLON CAPACITY AUXILIARY BUILDING LRW SYSTEM SUMP. WHEN THE LEVEL | | IN THIS SUMP REACHES ITS HIGH LEVEL SETPOINT, SUMP PUMPS START TO PUMP | | THE SUMP WATER TO THE LRW SYSTEM. WHEN THE SUMP LEVEL REACHES ITS | | HIGH-HIGH LEVEL SETPOINT, A COMPUTER ALARM IS GENERATED IN THE CONTROL | | ROOM. WHEN THE SUMP LEVEL REACHES ITS EMERGENCY HIGH LEVEL SETPOINT, | | AN ANNUNCIATOR ALARMS IN THE CONTROL ROOM. | | | | THE FUNCTION OF THIS INTERLOCK IS TO DEFEAT THE NORMAL START LOGIC FOR | | THE AUXILIARY BUILDING LRW SUMP PUMPS DURING THE LONG TERM COLD LEG | | RECIRCULATION PHASE. THE RECEIPT OF A COMPUTER ALARM AND/OR AN ANNUNCIATOR | | ALARM IN THE CONTROL ROOM WOULD INDICATE A LEAK IN ONE OR MORE EMERGENCY | | CORE COOLING SYSTEM COMPONENTS. | | | | THE LICENSEE HAS IMPLEMENTED ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS TO PREVENT THE SUMP | | PUMPS FROM STARTING ON A HIGH SUMP LEVEL SIGNAL AS AN IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE | | ACTION. THEY ARE INVESTIGATING THIS CONDITION AND DETERMINING LONG TERM | | CORRECTIVE ACTIONS AND PLAN TO SUBMIT A LICENSEE EVENT REPORT TO THE NRC. | | | | THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+