U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Reports For 10/14/98 - 10/15/98 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** 34856 34911 34912 34913 34914 34915 34916 34917 +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 34856 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: THREE MILE ISLAND REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/30/98 | |UNIT: [1] [ ] [ ] STATE: PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:09 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP |EVENT DATE: 09/30/98 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 13:20[EDT]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: JOHN SCHORK |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/14/98 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |JOHN CARUSO RDO | |AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | | | | | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | IMPROPERLY INSTALLED THERMOLAG FIRE BARRIER | | | | DURING THE REMOVAL OF THERMOLAG MATERIAL, A FIRE RESISTANT MATERIAL THAT | | WAS INSTALLED IN 1987 TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR PART 50, APPENDIX | | R, WORKERS OBSERVED THAT SEVERAL PORTIONS OF FIRE BARRIER "1 FHC-FB-06" | | LOCATED IN FIRE ZONE FH-FZ-1 IN THE 281' ELEVATION OF THE TMI-1 FUEL | | HANDLING BUILDING DID NOT HAVE REQUIRED FILLET OF TROWEL GRADE MATERIAL | | 330-1. THE THERMOLAG WAS BEING INSPECTED IN PREPARATION FOR ITS REPLACEMENT | | WITH MECATISS. | | | | THE CONTROL ROOM WAS NOTIFIED AND A FIRE WATCH WAS POSTED IN ACCORDANCE | | WITH THE SITE FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM PROCEDURE. REPAIRS WERE MADE TO THE | | NONCONFORMING SEAMS. AT 1320, THE PLANT REVIEW GROUP CONCLUDED A REVIEW OF | | THE NONCONFORMING CONDITION AND DETERMINED THAT THE CONDITION WAS | | IMMEDIATELY REPORTABLE TO THE NRC IN ACCORDANCE WITH 10CFR50.72(b)(1)(ii) | | AS A CONDITION OUTSIDE OF THE DESIGN BASIS OF THE PLANT AND AS A SUPPLEMENT | | TO EARLIER SIMILAR NOTIFICATIONS. THE CONDITION WAS DETERMINED TO BE | | REPORTABLE BECAUSE THE FIRE BARRIER DID NOT CONFORM TO ITS DESIGN BASIS AND | | THERE WAS REASONABLE JUSTIFICATION THAT THE NONCONFORMING CONDITION WAS NOT | | THE RESULT OF AGE-RELATED DEGRADATION BUT RATHER AN INCORRECT INSTALLATION. | | | | THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR HAS BEEN INFORMED OF THIS EVENT BY THE LICENSEE. | | | | * * * UPDATE ON 10/01/98 AT 1512 ET BY JOHN SCHORK TAKEN BY MACKINNON* * * | | | | DURING THE REMOVAL OF THERMOLAG MATERIAL, A FIRE RESISTANT MATERIAL THAT | | WAS INSTALLED IN 1987 AT THREE MILE ISLAND TO MEET THE REQUIREMENT OF | | APPENDIX "R" TO 10 CFR 50, WORKERS OBSERVED THAT SEVERAL PORTIONS OF FIRE | | BARRIER IAXC-FB-05 LOCATED IN FIRE ZONE AB-FZ-04 IN THE THREE MILE ISLAND | | UNIT 1 AUXILIARY BUILDING DID NOT HAVE A REQUIRED FILLET OF TROWEL GRADE | | MATERIAL 330-1. THE THERMOLAG WAS BEING INSPECTED IN PREPARATION TO | | REPLACE IT WITH MECATISS. SPECIFICALLY, VISUAL OBSERVATION DETERMINED THAT | | TROWEL GRADE MIX WAS NOT APPLIED TO TWO (2) SEAMS WHERE THERMOLAG | | INSULATION ABUTS THE REACTOR BUILDING EXTERIOR WALL AND ONE (1) SEAM WHERE | | THERMOLAG INSULATION ABUTS AGAINST A REACTOR BUILDING PENETRATION THERMOLAG | | INSULATION BOX AT THE TIME OF INSTALLATION OF THE THERMOLAG IN 1987. IN | | ADDITION, THERMOLAG INSTALLED AROUND A UNISTRUT WAS OBSERVED TO CONTAIN | | KAOWOOL FILLER MATERIAL AND DID NOT HAVE TROWEL GRADE MIX APPLIED TO THE | | END SEAM. | | | | THE CONTROL ROOM WAS NOTIFIED AND A FIRE WATCH WAS POSTED IN ACCORDANCE | | WITH THREE MILE ISLAND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 1038, THE SITE FIRE | | PROTECTION PROGRAM PROCEDURE. REPAIRS ARE BEING MADE TO THE NON-CONFORMING | | SEAMS. | | | | AT 1450 HOURS, THE THREE MILE ISLAND PLANT REVIEW GROUP CONCLUDED A REVIEW | | OF THE NON-CONFORMING CONDITION AND DETERMINED THAT THE CONDITION WAS | | IMMEDIATELY REPORTABLE TO THE NRC IN ACCORDANCE WITH 10 CFR | | 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) AS A CONDITION OUTSIDE THE DESIGN BASIS OF THE PLANT AND | | AS A SUPPLEMENT TO EARLIER SIMILAR NOTIFICATIONS IN EVENT REPORTS 34682, | | AUGUST 25, 1998; 34769, SEPTEMBER 14, 1998 AND 34853, SEPTEMBER 29, 1998. | | THE CONDITION WAS DETERMINED TO BE REPORTABLE BECAUSE THE FIRE BARRIER DID | | NOT CONFORM TO ITS DESIGN BASIS AND THERE WAS REASONABLE JUSTIFICATION THAT | | THE NON-CONFORMING CONDITION WAS NOT THE RESULT OF AGE-RELATED DEGRADATION | | BUT RATHER AN INCORRECT INSTALLATION. | | | | ALL OF THE EARLIER EVENT REPORTS REFERENCED ABOVE AND THIS EVENT ARE | | RELATED IN THAT THEY HAVE THE SAME GENERAL CAUSE, INADEQUATE INSTALLATION, | | AND THE SAME GENERAL CONSEQUENCES, A FIRE BARRIER BEING OUTSIDE ITS DESIGN | | BASIS. THEREFORE, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE GUIDANCE PROVIDED IN NUREG 1022 | | REV 1, EVENTS 34769, 34853 AND THIS REPORT WILL BE REPORTED IN A SUPPLEMENT | | TO LER 98-011, THAT REPORTED EVENT 34682. IN ADDITION, THERE IS SOME | | POSSIBILITY THAT ADDITIONAL SIMILAR CONDITIONS MAY BE DISCOVERED DURING THE | | COMPLETION OF THE PROJECT IN WHICH THERMOLAG IS BEING REPLACED WITH | | MECATISS. SUBSEQUENT SIMILAR EVENTS WILL BE REPORTED TO THE NRC VIA THE ENS | | SYSTEM AND BE REPORTED IN THE SUPPLEMENT TO LER 98-011 AND AS SUPPLEMENTAL | | IMMEDIATE REPORTS IN THIS EVENT REPORT 34856. THE SUPPLEMENT WILL BE ISSUED | | WHEN THE MECATISS INSTALLATION HAS BEEN COMPLETED (APPROXIMATELY MARCH 31, | | 1999). R1DO (JOHN CARUSO) NOTIFIED. | | | | THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED OF THIS UPDATE BY THE LICENSEE. | | | | * * * UPDATE 1452EDT ON 10/7/98 FROM JOHN SCHORK TO S.SANDIN * * * | | | | At 1452 hours on October 7, 1998, J. Schork, TMI PRG Chairman informed Mr. | | Steve Sandin of the NRC Operations Center by telephone that the existence | | of a condition outside the design basis of the TMI-1 plant had been | | determined by the TMI Plant Review Group at 1423 hours of October 7, 1998. | | This report is being made as a supplement to Event Report 34856 made on | | September 30, 1998. | | | | During the inspection of Thermolag material, a fire resistant material that | | was installed in 1987 at TMI to meet the requirements of Appendix R to 10 | | CFR 50, workers observed that a portion of fire barrier ICCD-FB08 located | | in fire zone CB-FA-1 in the TMI-1 Control Building had an area, size | | approximately 3.5" long and 2" wide, on the radial bend armor cable circuit | | ED 5033 A where Thermolag was missing. This non-conforming condition | | appears to be an original construction deficiency. | | | | The control room was notified and the deficiency was documented in the site | | corrective action program (CAP T1998-0867). An hourly fire watch was | | instituted in accordance with the site fire protection program procedure. | | Repairs are being made to the non-conforming seams. | | | | At 1423 hours, the TMI Plant Review Group concluded a review of the | | non-conforming condition and determined that the condition was immediately | | reportable to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(l)(ii) as a | | condition outside the design basis of the plant and as a supplement to | | earlier similar notifications in event reports 34682, August 25, 1998, | | 34769, September 14, 1998 and 34853, September 29, 1998, 34856, September | | 30, 1998. The condition was determined to be reportable because the fire | | barrier did not conform to its design basis and there was reasonable | | justification that the non--conforming condition was not the result of | | age-related degradation but rather an incorrect installation. | | | | All of the earlier event reports referenced above and this event are | | related in that they have the same general cause, inadequate installation, | | and the same general consequences, a fire barrier being outside its design | | basis. Therefore, in accordance with the guidance provided in NUREG 1022, | | Rev. 1, events 34769,34853, 34856 and this report will be reported in a | | supplement to LER 98-011, that reported event 34682. In addition, there is | | some possibility that additional similar conditions may be discovered | | during the completion of the project in which Thermolag is being replaced | | with Mecatiss. Subsequent similar events will be reported to the NRC via | | the ENS system and be reported in the supplement to LER 98-011 and as | | supplemental immediate reports to Event Report 34856. The supplement will | | be issued when the Mecatiss installation has been completed (approximately | | March 31, 1999). | | | | The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector. | | | | * * *UPDATE ON 10/12/98 AT 1109 EDT BY RANDY CAMPBELL TO FANGIE JONES* * * | | | | THE UPDATE WAS DETERMINED TO BE REPORTABLE AT 1100 EDT ON 10/12/98. | | | | DURING THE INSPECTION OF THERMOLAG MATERIAL, A FIRE RESISTANT MATERIAL THAT | | WAS INSTALLED IN 1987 AT TMI TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF APPENDIX "R" OF 10 | | CFR50, WORKERS OBSERVED A BREACH IN THERMOLAG PROTECTING HANGER "B" FOR | | 1FHC-FB06 ELEMENT 452 LOCATED IN FIRE ZONE FH-FZ1, 281' FHB 281'ELEVATION | | SOUTH END OF NEUTRALIZER TANK ROOM OVER HIGH RAD STORAGE AREA. THE WEST | | SIDE OF THE UNISTRUT WAS NOT PROPERLY CONSTRUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH | | THERMOLAG DESIGN CRITERIA IN THAT TWO OPENINGS EXISTED INTO THE UNISTRUT | | (ONE ABOUT 1" x 0.125" AND THE SECOND ABOUT 0.25" x 0.125") WHERE TROWEL | | GRADE MATERIAL WAS NOT PROPERLY INSTALLED BETWEEN THE PIECES. THE OUTER | | SEAM WAS ALSO NOT COVERED WITH THERMOLAG TROWEL MIX FOR APPROXIMATELY 4" | | ALONG THESE JOINTS. THE CONTROL ROOM WAS NOTIFIED AND THE DEFICIENCY WAS | | DOCUMENTED IN THE SITE CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM (CAP T1998-0877) | | | | REPAIRS WERE MADE WITH TROWEL GRADE MATERIAL IN ACCORDANCE WITH 1440-Y-14 | | TO PLACE THE BARRIERS BACK INTO ITS DESIGN CONFIGURATION. INSPECTION WILL | | BE PERFORMED IN 24 HOURS TO CONFIRM THE SEAMS HAVE BEEN RESTORED TO THEIR | | DESIGN BASIS CONFIGURATION. A CAMERA IS PRESENTLY IN PLACE PROVIDING ONE | | HOUR FIRE WATCH COVERAGE WHICH WILL PROVIDE THE REQUIRED COMPENSATORY | | MEASURE IN ACCORDANCE WITH AP 1038 EXHIBIT 2 SECTION 7.3.2. THIS | | NON-CONFORMING CONDITION APPEARS TO BE AN ORIGINAL CONSTRUCTION DEFICIENCY. | | | | THERE IS SOME POSSIBILITY THAT ADDITIONAL SIMILAR CONDITIONS MAY BE | | DISCOVERED DURING THE COMPLETION OF THE PROJECT IN WHICH THERMOLAG IS BEING | | REPLACED WITH MECATISS. SUBSEQUENT SIMILAR EVENTS WILL BE REPORTED TO THE | | NRC VIA THE ENS SYSTEM AND IN THE SUPPLEMENT TO LER 98-011 AND AS | | SUPPLEMENTAL IMMEDIATE REPORTS TO EVENT REPORT NUMBER (34856). THE | | SUPPLEMENT WILL BE ISSUED WHEN THE MECATISS INSTALLATION HAS BEEN COMPLETED | | (APPROXIMATELY 03/31/99). R1DO (JIM LINVILLE) NOTIFIED. | | | | THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED BY THE LICENSEE OF THIS UPDATE. | | | | **UPDATE ON 10/13/98 AT 1332 EDT FROM R CAMPBELL TAKEN BY MACKINNON** | | | | CB-FA-1 FIRE BARRIERS (308' CONTROL BUILDING - RAD CON/CHEMISTRY AREAS) | | WERE FOUND WITH DEGRADED CONDITIONS FOR THE FOLLOWING: | | | | 1CCD-FB08 CONDUIT TO SUPPORT SEAM WAS FOUND TO BE MISSING ABOUT 0.25" BY 3" | | OF TROWEL GRADE THERMOLAG. THIS APPEARS TO BE ORIGINAL CONSTRUCTION NOT | | BUILT ACCORDING TO SPECIFICATIONS. | | 1CCD-FB10 CONDUIT TO SUPPORT 0.5" BY 0.125" AND CONDUIT TO CONDUIT 0.5" BY | | 0.125" TOP AREAS MISSING TROWEL GRADE THERMOLAG APPEARS TO BE ORIGINAL | | CONSTRUCTION NOT BUILT ACCORDING TO SPECIFICATIONS. | | 1CCD-FB11 CONDUIT TO CONDULET TOP SEAM WAS MISSING ABOUT 0.375" BY 2" OF | | TROWEL GRADE THERMOLAG. THIS APPEARS TO BE ORIGINAL CONSTRUCTION NOT BUILT | | ACCORDING TO SPECIFICATION. | | 1CCD-FB12 CONDUIT TO COUPLING SEAM WAS MISSING 0.25" BY 2" TROWEL GRADE | | THERMOLAG. THIS APPEARS TO BE ORIGINAL CONSTRUCTION NOT BUILT ACCORDING TO | | SPECIFICATIONS. AN AREA NEAR THE NORTH WALL PENETRATION 0.125" BY 0.75" WAS | | DEGRADED (NOT AN ORIGINAL CONSTRUCTION DISCREPANCY). | | 1CCD-FB14 HAS A HOLE ABOUT 0.375" BY 1" HOLE TO THE ARMOR CABLE, AND A | | FACIAL CRACK AT A CONDUIT SEAM. THIS APPEARS TO BE DEGRADED OVER TIME (NOT | | A CONSTRUCTION DISCREPANCY). | | 1CCD-FB19 HAS A DEGRADED AREA AT A VERTICAL TO HORIZONTAL JOINT THAT | | APPEARS TO BE DEGRADED OVER TIME (NOT A CONSTRUCTION DISCREPANCY). | | 1CCD-FB20 MULTIPLE BREACHES ON ELBOW NORTH END THAT APPEARS TO BE ORIGINAL | | CONSTRUCTION NOT BUILT ACCORDING TO SPECIFICATIONS. SUPPORT 1CCD-C101 HAS | | 4" BY 0.125" SEAM AND 2" BY 0.125" AT THE INNER SECTION OF 1CCD-FB20 | | MISSING TROWEL GRADE THERMOLAG. THESE APPEAR TO BE ORIGINAL CONSTRUCTION | | NOT BUILT ACCORDING TO SPECIFICATIONS. | | SOME OTHER COSMETIC REPAIRS WERE MADE WHERE MINOR CRACKS WERE OBSERVED THAT | | DID NOT GO THROUGH THE THICKNESS OF THE THERMOLAG ON VARIOUS FIRE BARRIERS | | IN THIS AREA. | | IAW AP 1038 EXHIBIT 2 SECTION 7.3.2 THIS BREACH REQUIRES COMPENSATORY | | ACTIONS INCLUDING THE START OF A 14 DAY CLOCK, ONE HOUR FIRE WATCH | | PRESENTLY BEING PERFORMED BY RAD CON BECAUSE OF DEGRADED TSI AND OTHER | | COMBUSTIBLES IN THE AREA. THIS AREA IS PROTECTED BY A SUPPRESSION SYSTEM. | | R1DO (CURT COWGILL) NOTIFIED. | | | | THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR HAS BEEN NOTIFIED OF THIS UPDATE BY THE | | LICENSEE. | | | | *** UPDATE ON 10/14/98 @ 1012 BY CAMPBELL TO SANDIN *** | | | | THE FOLLOWING FAX WAS SUBMITTED BY THE LICENSEE AS AN UPDATE TO THEIR | | FINDINGS. | | | | "CB-FA-1 FIRE BARRIER 1CCD-FB06 WAS FOUND WITH A COUPLING SEAM NOT FILLED | | WITH TROWEL GRADE THERMOLAG WHERE IT ADJOINS TO 1CCD-FB04 THAT APPEARS TO | | BE AN ORIGINAL CONSTRUCTION NOT BUILT ACCORDING TO SPECIFICATIONS. | | | | IAW AP 1038 EXHIBIT 2 SECTION 7.3.2 THIS BREACH REQUIRES COMPENSATORY | | ACTIONS INCLUDING THE START OF A 14 DAY CLOCK, ONE HOUR FIRE WATCH | | PRESENTLY BEING PERFORMED BY RAD CON BECAUSE OF DEGRADED TSI AND OTHER | | COMBUSTIBLES IN THE AREA FOR THE MECATISS WORK. A BREACH NOTICE IS | | SUBMITTED FOR THIS REPAIR. | | | | PROCEDURE 1303-12.24 DATA SHEET E2-1 IMPROPERLY SHOWS FIRE BARRIERS | | 1CCD-FB04 AND 1CCD-FB06 REVERSED. 1CCD-FB04 IS THE NORTH ENTITY AND SHOULD | | BE IDENTIFIED WITH THE LETTER "D" AND 1CCD-FB06 IS THE SOUTH ENTITY AND | | SHOULD BE IDENTIFIED WITH THE LETTER "F" FROM THE POINT WHERE THEY LEAVE | | THE EAST WALL AND RUN EAST TO WEST. | | | | THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED. | | | | THE R1DO (COWGILL) WAS NOTIFIED. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 34911 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: COOPER REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/14/98 | |UNIT: [1] [ ] [ ] STATE: NE |NOTIFICATION TIME: 00:38 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 10/13/98 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 20:05[CDT]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: CRAIG JORGENSEN |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/14/98 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |BILL JONES RDO | |ADAS 50.72(b)(2)(i) DEG/UNANALYZED COND | | |NLCO TECH SPEC LCO A/S | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N N 0 REFUELING | 0 REFUELING | | | | | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | BOTH TRAINS OF 125VDC AND 250VDC DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO INSTALLATION OF | | UNDERSIZED FUSES. | | | | "DURING DEVELOPMENT OF AN OPERABILITY EVALUATION ON THE 250VDC SWITCHGEAR | | FOR FUSES WITH AN INTERRUPTING CURRENT RATING WHICH IS LOWER THAN THE | | CALCULATED SHORT CIRCUIT CURRENT, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE INTERRUPTING | | CURRENT RATING WAS ACTUALLY 10,000 AMPS VERSUS 20,000 AMPS, AND THE 125VDC | | SWITCHGEAR WAS ALSO AFFECTED. THIS DOES NOT MEET THE DCD-5 (DESIGN | | CRITERIA DOCUMENT) REQUIREMENTS FOR WITHSTANDING AND INTERRUPTING THE | | MAXIMUM CREDIBLE SHORT CIRCUIT CURRENT. DUE TO THIS NONCONFORMANCE, THE | | SWITCHGEAR (125VDC 'A'/'B', 250VDC 'A'/'B') WERE CONSERVATIVELY DECLARED | | INOPERABLE. THIS RESULTED IN ENTRY INTO LCO'S 3.8.5, 3.8.8 AND 3.9.7. THIS | | ALSO RESULTED IN DECLARING 'A' SHUTDOWN COOLING SUBSYSTEM INOPERABLE. 'B' | | RHR LOOP WAS PREVIOUSLY TAGGED OUT FOR PLANNED MAINTENANCE." | | | | THE LICENSEE IS DETERMINING APPROPRIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS. THE "A" | | SHUTDOWN COOLING (SDC) SYSTEM, ALTHOUGH INOPERABLE, REMAINS AVAILABLE AND | | IN SERVICE. SHOULD SDC NOT BE AVAILABLE, THE LICENSEE ESTIMATES | | APPROXIMATELY 18 HOURS TO BOILING FROM AN INITIAL TEMPERATURE OF 95øF WITH | | THE CAVITY CURRENTLY FLOODED. THIS METHOD OF DECAY HEAT REMOVAL IS | | RECOGNIZED AS AN ALTERNATE FORM OF SDC. THE UNIT WAS SHUTDOWN FOR | | REFUELING ON 10/3/98. THE UNDERSIZED FUSES HAVE BEEN INSTALLED FOR AT | | LEAST A COUPLE OF YEARS AND COULD, IN THE WORST CASE, ALLOW FOR ELECTRICAL | | ARCING UNDER HIGH INTERRUPTING CURRENT LOADS. THIS COULD RESULT IN | | ISOLATION OF THE STATION BATTERY FROM THE RESPECTIVE BUSES. THE LICENSEE | | IS EVALUATING THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE APPLICABLE TECH SPEC LCO ACTION | | STATEMENTS. | | | | THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 34912 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: FERMI REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/14/98 | |UNIT: [2] [ ] [ ] STATE: MI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 09:42 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [2] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 10/14/98 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 08:10[EDT]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: JEFF GROFF |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/14/98 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |BRUCE JORGENSEN RDO | |NLTR LICENSEE 24 HR REPORT | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 2 | N N 0 REFUELING | 0 REFUELING | | | | | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | LICENSEE DISCOVERED CRACKS AND HARDENING OF A PENETRATION FIRE BARRIER SEAL | | DURING AN INSPECTION IN RESPONSE TO A PART 21 REPORT. | | | | "REVIEW AND INSPECTION OF THE FERMI-2 FIRE PROTECTION PENETRATIONS WAS | | PERFORMED AS A RESULT OF CONCERNS IDENTIFIED IN AN ILLINOIS POWER COMPANY | | PART 21 REPORT (DATED JULY 20, 1998) RECEIVED BY FERMI-2 ON AUGUST 19, | | 1998. BASED ON THE REVIEW AND INSPECTION OF PENETRATION INTEGRITY IN HIGH | | TEMPERATURE (GREATER THAN 250øF) APPLICATIONS, THE SEAL IN PENETRATION | | P-170 BETWEEN THE TORUS ROOM AND THE TURBINE BUILDING (WHICH CONTAINS THE | | HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING | | SYSTEM DRAIN LINES) WAS FOUND TO HAVE CRACKS AND EXHIBITED HARDNESS IN THE | | VICINITY OF THE PIPING. THE HARDNESS IS A PHYSICAL CHANGE OF THE SEALING | | MATERIAL, DOW CORNING SYLGARD 170, AND RESULTS IN THE TESTED CONFIGURATION | | OF THE PENETRATION SEAL TO BE CHALLENGED AND QUESTIONED AS TO ITS ABILITY | | TO QUALIFY AS A 3-HOUR RATED FIRE SEAL. THEREFORE, THIS CONDITION IS | | REPORTABLE IN ACCORDANCE WITH LICENSE CONDITION 2.C(9) OF THE FERMI-2 FIRE | | HAZARDS ANALYSIS, A PART OF THE FERMI-2 FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM. | | | | "THE PENETRATION SEALS ARE BEING REPAIRED AND REACTOR STARTUP FROM THE | | CURRENT REFUELING OUTAGE WILL NOT BE IMPACTED." | | | | THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |FUEL CYCLE FACILITY | |EVENT NUMBER: 34913 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/14/98 | | RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:04 [ET]| |COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 10/13/98 | | 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 22:43[CDT]| | BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/14/98 | | CITY: PADUCAH REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+ | COUNTY: McCRACKEN STATE: KY |PERSON ORGANIZATION| |LICENSE#: GDP-1 AGREEMENT: Y |BRUCE JORGENSEN RDO | | DOCKET: 0707001 |JOSEY PICCONE EO | +------------------------------------------------+ | |NRC NOTIFIED BY: K. A. BEASLEY | | |HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |OCBA 76.120(c)(2)(i) ACCID MT EQUIP FAILS | | |OCBB 76.120(c)(2)(ii) EQUIP DISABLED/FAILS | | |OCBC 76.120(c)(2)(iii) REDUNDANT EQUIP INOP | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | 24-HOUR REPORT INVOLVING A FAILURE IN A CONTAINMENT BOUNDARY ASSOCIATED | | WITH #2 NORTH AUTOCLAVE. | | | | "ON 10/13/98 AT 2243 CDT, WHILE PERFORMING ROUTINE EQUIPMENT CHECKS, AN | | OPERATOR DISCOVERED STEAM LEAKING FROM THE HEAD TO SHELL LOCKING RING ON | | THE POSITION #2 NORTH AUTOCLAVE IN THE C-333-A FEED FACILITY. THE CYLINDER | | IN THE AUTOCLAVE WAS IN THE HEELING PROCESS (MODE #5) AT THE TIME OF | | DISCOVERY. THE HEAD TO SHELL LOCKING RING IS PART OF THE CONTAINMENT | | BOUNDARY OF THE AUTOCLAVE HIGH PRESSURE ISOLATION SYSTEM, AND IS REQUIRED | | TO BE OPERABLE WHILE THE AUTOCLAVE IS IN MODE #5. UPON DISCOVERING THE | | STEAM LEAKING FROM THE HEAD TO SHELL LOCKING RING, THE OPERATOR DETERMINED | | THAT IT COULD NOT PERFORM ITS INTENDED SAFETY FUNCTION, AND PLACED THE | | AUTOCLAVE IN MODE #2 (AUTOCLAVE OUT OF SERVICE). THE HIGH PRESSURE | | ISOLATION SYSTEM IS NOT REQUIRED TO BE OPERABLE IN MODE #2. | | | | "THIS EVENT IS REPORTABLE AS A 24-HOUR NRC EVENT REPORT IN ACCORDANCE WITH | | 10CFR76.120(C)(2)." | | | | ENGINEERING IS CURRENTLY EVALUATING THIS FAILURE AND HAS PRELIMINARILY | | IDENTIFIED A CRUSHED SECTION OF THE AUTOCLAVE SEAL. | | | | THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |GENERAL INFORMATION or OTHER | |EVENT NUMBER: 34914 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |LICENSEE: COOPER ENERGY SERVICES |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/14/98 | | CITY: GROVE CITY REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:05 [ET]| | COUNTY: STATE: PA |EVENT DATE: 10/13/98 | |LICENSE#: AGREEMENT: N |EVENT TIME: 00:00[EDT]| | DOCKET: |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/14/98 | | +-----------------------------+ | |PERSON ORGANIZATION| | |CURT COWGILL RDO | | | | +------------------------------------------------+VERN HODGE, PCEB NRR | |NRC NOTIFIED BY: TED MILLER | | |HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |CCCC 21.21 UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | PART 21 NOTIFICATION REGARDING THE AIR START DISTRIBUTOR FILTER MICRON | | RATING EVALUATION AND INTERIM REPORT - ENTERPRISE DSR-4 AND DSRV-4 | | EMERGENCY DIESEL ENGINE. | | | | THE FOLLOWING IS A PORTION OF A FACSIMILE RECEIVED: | | | | "OUR INVESTIGATION IS OF A STARTING AIR DISTRIBUTOR FILTER ELEMENT PROVIDED | | AS REPLACEMENT PART COMPONENTS FOR THE ENTERPRISE R4 AND RV4 EMERGENCY | | DIESEL GENERATOR SYSTEM. THE COOPER-BESSEMER PART NUMBER OF THE FILTER | | CARTRIDGE IS SB-006-002. | | | | "DISCUSSION: | | | | "DURING THE COMMERCIAL GRADE DEDICATION PROCESS, FILTER ELEMENTS FROM | | MULTIPLE SUPPLIERS WERE PULLED FROM STORES AND INSPECTED FOR NUCLEAR SAFETY | | RELATED APPLICATION. THE VARIATION IN THE COLOR AND THE LACK OF SOME | | FILTER ELEMENTS HAVING THE MICRON RATING STAMPED ON THEM PROMPTED AN | | INVESTIGATION AS TO THE ACTUAL MICRON RATING. | | | | "WE ARE IN THE PROCESS OF PERFORMING INDEPENDENT LAB TESTING TO ASCERTAIN | | WHETHER FILTER ELEMENTS OF AN INCORRECT MICRON RATING HAVE BEEN PROVIDED TO | | ANY OF OUR NUCLEAR CUSTOMERS. IT IS EXPECTED THAT THIS EVALUATION WILL BE | | COMPLETED ON OR BEFORE NOVEMBER 30, 1998." | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 34915 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: DAVIS BESSE REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/14/98 | |UNIT: [1] [ ] [ ] STATE: OH |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:50 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] B&W-R-LP |EVENT DATE: 10/14/98 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 15:23[EDT]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: DONFIGLIO |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/14/98 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |BRUCE JORGENSEN RDO | |ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii) RPS ACTUATION |JOHN HANNON, NRR EO | |AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION |JOE GIITTER IRD | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | M/R Y 86 POWER OPERATION | 0 HOT STANDBY | | | | | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO LOSS OF COMPONENT COOLING WATER FLOW TO THE | | REACTOR COOLANT PUMPS. | | | | PRIOR TO THE TRIP, MAINTENANCE WAS IN PROGRESS ON BREAKER AACD1 FROM BUS | | TIE TRANSFORMER AC TO 4160V BUS D1. WHILE INSTALLING AACD1 INTO THE | | CUBICLE, 4160V BUSES D1 AND D2 TRIPPED AND LOCKED OUT, POSSIBLY DUE TO | | BUMPING A RELAY WHILE INSTALLING AACD1. EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR #2 | | STARTED ON THE BUS LOCKOUT, AND WAS EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN DUE TO NO COOLING | | WATER PUMP AVAILABLE BECAUSE OF THE BUS LOCKOUT. PLANT POWER WAS REDUCED | | FROM 100% TO APPROXIMATELY 86% TO BE WITHIN AVAILABLE CONDENSATE PUMP | | CAPACITY AND STABILIZED. DURING RECOVERY FROM THE BUS LOCKOUT, A SMALL | | COMPONENT COOLING WATER (CCW) SYSTEM LEAK (2 TO 5 gpm) WAS NOTED. THIS | | LEAK WAS LIKELY CAUSED BY THE AUTO START OF THE STANDBY PUMP WHEN THE | | OPERATING PUMP STOPPED ON THE BUS LOCKOUT. | | | | WHILE RESTORING SYSTEMS TO THEIR PREVIOUS ALIGNMENT, THE SECOND CCW PUMP | | WAS STARTED, AND THE CCW SURGE TANK LEVEL DROPPED RAPIDLY AND THE | | CONTAINMENT NORMAL SUMP LEVEL INCREASED. THE CCW VALVES TO CONTAINMENT | | AUTOMATICALLY CLOSED ON LOW SURGE TANK LEVEL TO ISOLATE THE LEAK, ISOLATING | | COOLING TO THE REACTOR COOLANT PUMPS (RCPs). AT 1523 HOURS ON 10/14/98, THE | | REACTOR WAS MANUALLY TRIPPED AND THE RCPs SHUTDOWN PER PROCEDURE. ALL | | CONTROL RODS FULLY INSERTED INTO THE CORE. AUXILIARY FEEDWATER | | AUTOMATICALLY STARTED ON THE LOSS OF THE RCPs. | | | | AFTER THE TRIP, MAIN STEAM PRESSURE HAD TO BE REDUCED FROM 995 TO 920 psig | | TO RESEAT A MAIN STEAM SAFETY VALVE (MSSV). ALL 18 MSSVs OPENED AND ALL | | CLOSED RIGHT AWAY EXCEPT ONE ON ONCE THROUGH STEAM GENERATOR #1. ONCE | | THROUGH STEAM GENERATOR (OTSG) PRESSURES WERE STABILIZED AT 900 psig. THERE | | IS NO PRIMARY TO SECONDARY LEAKS TO THE OTSGs. THE #2 MAKEUP PUMP DID NOT | | START WHEN ATTEMPTED DURING THE POST-TRIP. | | | | COOLDOWN CONTINUED DUE TO STEAM LOADS EXCEEDING DECAY HEAT, COMPOUNDED BY | | THE AUXILIARY BOILER BEING OUT OF SERVICE FOR MAINTENANCE. AT 1623 HOURS | | ON 10/14/98, THE STEAM/FEEDWATER RUPTURE CONTROL SYSTEM WAS MANUALLY | | ACTUATED TO ISOLATE BOTH OTSGs TO STOP THE COOLDOWN (DUE TO LACK OF HEAT | | LOADS FROM THE SECURED RCPs). CURRENTLY CONTROLLING REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM | | TEMPERATURE AND OTSG PRESSURE USING THE OTSG ATMOSPHERIC VENT VALVES. | | | | ALL EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS AND THE EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS ARE | | FULLY OPERABLE IF NEEDED. THE ELECTRICAL GRID IS STABLE. | | | | THE LICENSEE NOTIFIED OTTAWA COUNTY OF THIS EVENT. | | | | THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS IN CONTROL ROOM DURING THE LICENSEE'S CALL | | TO THE NRC OPERATION CENTER. | | | | SEE EVENT #34916 FOR UPDATE ON CCW LEAK. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 34916 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: DAVIS BESSE REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/14/98 | |UNIT: [1] [ ] [ ] STATE: OH |NOTIFICATION TIME: 20:49 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] B&W-R-LP |EVENT DATE: 10/14/98 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 15:24[EDT]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: ART LEWIS |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/14/98 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |BRUCE JORGENSEN RDO | |AINA 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(A) POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N N 0 HOT STANDBY | 0 HOT STANDBY | | | | | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | LETDOWN COOLER #1 RUPTURE DISC RUPTURED. | | | | UPON STARTUP OF THE COMPONENT COOLING WATER (CCW) PUMP #2, A CCW LEAK | | RESULTED. THIS PUMP STARTUP CAUSED LETDOWN COOLER #1 RUPTURE DISC TO FAIL | | WHICH CAUSED CCW SURGE TANK LEVEL DECREASE. THE CCW SURGE TANK LEVEL WAS | | NOT STOPPED AT THE DIVIDER PLATE OF 33", DUE TO NON-ESSENTIAL VALVES | | CYCLING. THE LEAK HAS BEEN ISOLATED AND SURGE TANK LEVEL RESTORED TO | | NORMAL LEVEL. THIS IS A CONDITION THAT ALONE COULD HAVE PREVENTED THE | | FULFILLMENT OF A SAFETY SYSTEM NEEDED TO SHUTDOWN THE REACTOR AND MAINTAIN | | IT IN A SAFE SHUTDOWN CONDITION. CCW IS USED TO COOL THE RESIDUAL HEAT | | REMOVAL COOLERS WHEN THE PLANT IS IN A SHUTDOWN CONDITION, etc. | | | | DUE TO THE VALVES CYCLING, IT APPEARS THAT THERE MAY HAVE BEEN A | | MAINTENANCE CONDITION THAT COULD HAVE LEAD TO THE VALVE CYCLING. A FLOW | | SWITCH WAS OUT FOR MAINTENANCE AND THE VALVES CONTINUED TO CYCLE WHICH | | CAUSED BOTH OF THE LOOPS TO FEED THE LEAK (THROUGH THE RUPTURE DISC). CCW | | SURGE TANK LEVEL WENT FROM 50" TO LESS THAN 33". THE LOWEST LEVEL THE CCW | | SURGE TANK LEVEL COULD HAVE GONE TO CANNOT BE DETERMINED BECAUSE THE CCW | | SURGE TANK LEVEL IS JUST A DIGITAL POINT (EITHER IN ALARM OR ABNORMAL). CCW | | SURGE TANK LEVEL IS NOT GIVEN OUT IN AN ANALOG VALUE. | | | | UPDATE: OTSG #1 MSSV #17B7 IS THE ONE THAT STUCK OPEN AND RECLOSED AT A | | PRESSURE OF 920 psig. | | | | THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WILL BE INFORMED BY THE LICENSEE OF THIS EVENT. | | | | SEE EVENT #34915 FOR BACKGROUND INFORMATION. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 34917 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: SEQUOYAH REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/15/98 | |UNIT: [ ] [2] [ ] STATE: TN |NOTIFICATION TIME: 05:57 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 10/15/98 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 05:01[EDT]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: MITCHEL R. TAGGART |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/15/98 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |MARK LESSER RDO | |ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii) RPS ACTUATION | | |AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | | | | | 2 | A/R Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 0 HOT STANDBY | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | AUTOMATIC TURBINE/REACTOR TRIP DUE TO INDICATION OF FAULT IN MAIN | | TRANSFORMER. | | | | "UNIT 2 EXPERIENCED A REACTOR TRIP FOLLOWING [A] PHASE 'B' MAIN BANK SUDDEN | | PRESSURE RELAY ACTUATION. ALL SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT PERFORMED AS EXPECTED. | | THE FOLLOWING REPORT IS PENDING INVESTIGATION." | | | | ALL CONTROL RODS FULLY INSERTED. NO PRIMARY OR SECONDARY RELIEFS/SAFETIES | | LIFTED DURING THE TRANSIENT. AUXILIARY FEEDWATER AUTOSTARTED AS EXPECTED. | | THE UNIT IS STABLE IN MODE 3 WITH DECAY HEAT BEING REMOVED VIA THE STEAM | | DUMP BYPASS SYSTEM TO THE MAIN CONDENSER. ALL SAFETY EQUIPMENT IS | | AVAILABLE. OFFSITE POWER IS AVAILABLE AND STABLE. THE LICENSEE ESTIMATES | | A UNIT 2 RESTART AT 0800EDT ON 10/16 AND PLANS ON MAKING A PRESS RELEASE. | | THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | | | | HOO NOTE: A REACTOR TRIP OCCURRED ON 8/27/98 INVOLVING THE SAME RELAY | | ACTUATION - SEE EVENT #34698. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+