U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Reports For 08/13/98 - 08/14/98 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** 34487 34637 34638 34639 34640 +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |OTHER NUCLEAR MATERIAL | |EVENT NUMBER: 34487 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |LICENSEE: BOLLING AIR FORCE BASE |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/07/98 | | CITY: SEYMOUR JOHNSON REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:06 [ET]| | COUNTY: STATE: NC |EVENT DATE: 07/07/98 | |LICENSE#: 42-23539-01AF AGREEMENT: Y |EVENT TIME: 15:50[EDT]| | DOCKET: |LAST UPDATE DATE: 08/13/98 | | +-----------------------------+ | |PERSON ORGANIZATION| | |JOHN PELLET, REG 4 RDO | | |FRED COMBS, NMSS EO | +------------------------------------------------+AL BELISLE, REG 2 RDO | |NRC NOTIFIED BY: KRISTEN SWENSON |STUART RUBIN, AEOD IRD | |HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE |FEMA, DOE, USDA, HHS FAX | +------------------------------------------------+EPA, DOT (VIA NRC) FAX | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |BAB1 20.2201(a)(1)(i) LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | LOSS OF TWO CHEMICAL AGENT MONITORS FROM SEYMOUR JOHNSON AIR FORCE BASE | | LOCATED NEAR GOLDSBORO, NORTH CAROLINA | | | | AT 1550 ON 07/07/98, SEYMOUR JOHNSON AIR FORCE BASE (LOCATED NEAR | | GREENSBORO, NORTH CAROLINA) NOTIFIED BOLLING AIR FORCE BASE (LOCATED IN | | WASHINGTON D.C.) OF THE LOSS OF TWO CHEMICAL AGENT MONITORS (EACH | | CONTAINING 250 ęCi OF AMERICIUM-241). THE CHEMICAL AGENT MONITORS WERE | | RECEIVED BY SEYMOUR JOHNSON AIR FORCE BASE ON 03/03/98. AFTER RECEIPT, THE | | MONITORS WERE STORED AND WERE NOT USED. HOWEVER, DURING AN INVENTORY THAT | | WAS PERFORMED ON 07/06/98, THE MONITORS COULD NOT BE FOUND. | | | | (REFER TO THE HOO LOG FOR AN AIR FORCE CONTACT TELEPHONE NUMBER.) | | | | * * * UPDATE 1308EDT 8/13/98 FROM MAJ. HICKS TO S.SANDIN * * * | | | | THE LICENSEE PROVIDED ADDITIONAL INFORMATION WHICH IDENTIFIED THAT THE TWO | | CHEMICAL AGENT MONITORS WERE NOT SHIPPED AS PREVIOUSLY THOUGHT. BOTH | | MONITORS HAVE BEEN ACCOUNTED FOR AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ARE BEING | | REVISED TO PREVENT A RECURRENCE OF THIS PROBLEM. NOTIFIED R4DO(SANBORN) | | AND NMSS EO(COMBS). | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 34637 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: QUAD CITIES REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/13/98 | |UNIT: [1] [ ] [ ] STATE: IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 02:28 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3 |EVENT DATE: 08/12/98 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 23:57[CDT]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: MacLennan |LAST UPDATE DATE: 08/13/98 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |MARK RING RDO | |AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | | | | | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI) SYSTEM DECLARED INOPERABLE | | | | HPCI WAS DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO AN EMERGENT ISSUE RELATED TO THE HPCI | | TURBINE TURNING GEAR. AT 1330 ON 08/12/98, UNIT 1 HPCI TURBINE WAS MANUALLY | | PLACED ON THE TURNING GEAR IN PREPARATION FOR A PLANNED SURVEILLANCE RUN. | | THE TURBINE WAS VERIFIED ON THE GEAR LOCALLY BY AN EQUIPMENT ATTENDANT. AT | | 1915, WHEN A EQUIPMENT ATTENDANT ENTERED THE ROOM IN PREPARATION FOR THE | | SURVEILLANCE, THE HPCI TURBINE WAS FOUND OFF THE TURNING GEAR. THE HPCI | | AUXILIARY OIL PUMP WAS STARTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PLANT PROCEDURES AND THE | | TURNING GEAR REENGAGED AUTOMATICALLY. THE SURVEILLANCE WAS PERFORMED, AND | | SUBSEQUENT TO THE HPCI TURBINE TRIP, THE TURNING GEAR AGAIN AUTOMATICALLY | | ENGAGED AND STARTED. HOWEVER, IT IS UNKNOWN AT THIS TIME WHETHER OR NOT | | HPCI IS STILL CAPABLE OF PERFORMING ITS DESIGN FUNCTION. IT WAS THEREFORE | | DECLARED INOPERABLE AND TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.5.A ACTION 3 ENTERED | | WHICH CONSISTS OF A 14 DAY LIMITING CONDITION OF OPERATION. ALL OTHER | | EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS AND RCIC ARE FULLY OPERABLE IF NEEDED. | | | | THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED BY THE LICENSEE OF THIS EVENT. | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 34638 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: OCONEE REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/13/98 | |UNIT: [1] [2] [3] STATE: SC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 09:43 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-LP |EVENT DATE: 08/13/98 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 09:43[EDT]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: RANDY TODD |LAST UPDATE DATE: 08/13/98 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |ED MCALPINE RDO | |AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N N 0 COLD SHUTDOWN | 0 COLD SHUTDOWN | | 2 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | | 3 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | ADDITIONAL SCENARIO DISCOVERED PERTAINING TO GENERIC LETTER 96-06 | | (ASSURANCE OF EQUIPMENT OPERABILITY AND CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY DURING A | | DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENT CONDITION). | | | | ON JANUARY 24, 1997, THE LICENSEE MADE A 50.72 NOTIFICATION TO REPORT THAT | | ANALYSIS HAD PREDICATED WATER HAMMERS IN SOME SCENARIOS IN PORTIONS OF THE | | LOW PRESSURE SERVICE WATER (LPSW) PIPING ASSOCIATED WITH FOUR NON-SAFETY | | RELATED COOLERS INSIDE CONTAINMENT. LER 269/97-02, REVISION 1, SUBMITTED | | JULY 31, 1997 ADDRESSED THAT ANALYSIS, THE APPLICABLE SCENARIOS, AND | | CORRECTIVE ACTIONS. | | | | ONE CORRECTIVE ACTION WAS TO CONTINUE THE ANALYSIS. TODAY, THE LICENSEE IS | | REPORTING THAT ANOTHER SCENARIO HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED BY ANALYSIS WHICH IS | | PREDICTED TO RESULT IN SEVERE WATERHAMMER IN LPSW PIPE INSIDE CONTAINMENT. | | IF LPSW FLOW TO ONE OF THE SAFETY-RELATED REACTOR BUILDING COOLING UNITS | | (RBCUs) HAS BEEN ISOLATED OR REDUCED BELOW APPROXIMATELY 420 gpm, AND A | | LOCA OR MAIN STEAM LINE BREAK OCCURS, THE CURRENT LEVEL OF CONSERVATISM IN | | THE WATERHAMMER ANALYSES INDICATE THAT THE PIPING MIGHT BE BREACHED. A | | POSTULATED PIPE BREAK MIGHT RESULT IN A LOSS OF CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY. | | | | THE ONLY TIMES FOLLOWING THE TIME THE WATERHAMMER ISSUE WAS INITIALLY | | REPORTED UNDER LER 269/97-02, THAT FLOW HAS BEEN ISOLATED OR SET LESS THAT | | 420 gpm WAS FOR QUARTERLY SURVEILLANCE STROKE TESTING OF THE RBCU OUTLET | | VALVES OR MAINTENANCE. THE RBCU OUTLET VALVES ARE SAFETY-RELATED AND | | RECEIVE AN ENGINEERED SAFEGUARDS (ES) SIGNAL TO OPEN, AND THE ANALYSIS | | INDICATES THAT PROPER RESPONSE TO AN ES SIGNAL WOULD BE ADEQUATE TO LIMIT | | THE WATERHAMMER TO AN ACCEPTABLE MAGNITUDE. | | | | HOWEVER, IT WAS RECOGNIZED THAT, WHILE CLOSED FOR MAINTENANCE OR TESTING, | | THESE VALVES WOULD BE SUBJECT TO SINGLE FAILURE. IF A SINGLE FAILURE | | OCCURRED, CONCURRENT WITH THE ACCIDENT SCENARIO, THE POSTULATED WATERHAMMER | | COULD CHALLENGE CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY. ALTHOUGH FLOW TO INDIVIDUAL COOLERS | | IS ONLY BRIEFLY ISOLATED DURING THE QUARTERLY TESTS, THAT THIS EVENT IS LOW | | PROBABILITY, IT IS BEING REPORTED AND WILL BE ADDRESSED IN A SUPPLEMENT TO | | LER 269/97-02. | | | | SINCE ALL RBCUs ARE CURRENTLY IN SERVICE WITH NORMAL FLOWS GREATER THAN 420 | | gpm, THERE IS NO CURRENT OPERABILITY ISSUE. THE LICENSEE HAS TAKEN | | COMPENSATORY MEASURES TO SET AN ADMINISTRATIVE MINIMUM FLOW LIMIT OF 550 | | gpm TO EACH RBCU AND TO CONTROL FLOW TO EACH RBCU BY PROCEDURE TO ASSURE IT | | IS NOT REDUCED BELOW 550 gpm WHILE CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY IS REQUIRED. | | OPERATING GUIDANCE HAS BEEN ISSUED DIRECTING OPERATORS TO ENTER TECHNICAL | | SPECIFICATION 3.0 IF THE INLET OR OUTLET VALVES MUST BE CLOSED OR IF | | ADEQUATE FLOW IS LOST FOR OTHER REASONS. | | | | ALSO, THE VALVE STROKE TEST FOR THE AFFECTED VALVES WAS PLACED ON | | ADMINISTRATIVE HOLD WHILE THE TEST PROGRAM IS REVISED. THE STROKE TEST OF | | THESE VALVES WILL BE CONDUCTED AT COLD SHUTDOWN UNDER PROVISIONS OF ASME | | SECTION XI. | | | | ADDITIONAL INFORMATION WILL BE PROVIDED IN THE SUPPLEMENT TO LICENSEE EVENT | | REPORT 269/97-02. | | | | THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED OF THIS EVENT BY THE LICENSEE. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |GENERAL INFORMATION or OTHER | |EVENT NUMBER: 34639 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |LICENSEE: ABB COMBUSTION ENGINEERING |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/13/98 | | CITY: WINDSOR REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:08 [ET]| | COUNTY: HARTFORD STATE: CT |EVENT DATE: 08/13/98 | |LICENSE#: AGREEMENT: N |EVENT TIME: 15:08[EDT]| | DOCKET: |LAST UPDATE DATE: 08/13/98 | | +-----------------------------+ | |PERSON ORGANIZATION| | |DAVID SILK RDO | | |JOHN STOLZ EO | +------------------------------------------------+EDWARD MCALPINE R2DO | |NRC NOTIFIED BY: GEORGE HESS |MARK RING R3D0 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN |GARY SANBORN R4D0 | +------------------------------------------------+VERN HODGE (VIA FAX) NRR | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |CCCC 21.21 UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | PART 21 NOTIFICATION REGARDING METHODOLOGY TO SELECT THE LIMITING ASSEMBLY | | FOR PWR THERMAL-HYDRAULIC SAFETY ANALYSES. | | | | THE FOLLOWING IS A PORTION OF A FACSIMILE RECEIVED: | | | | "COMBUSTION ENGINEERING, INC. HAS EVALUATED A DEFICIENCY IN ITS CURRENT | | SCREENING METHODOLOGY FOR DETERMINING THE LIMITING FUEL ASSEMBLY FOR | | DETAILED PWR THERMAL-HYDRAULIC SAFETY ANALYSES. THE DEFICIENCY IS THAT THE | | SCREENING METHODOLOGY BASED ON LOW INLET FLOW MAY NOT CONSISTENTLY IDENTIFY | | THE MOST LIMITING ASSEMBLY IN THE PRESENCE OF VERY FLAT CORE AND ASSEMBLY | | POWER DISTRIBUTIONS. THE CONCLUSION OF THE EVALUATION WAS THAT THE | | DEFICIENCY COULD, UNDER SOME CIRCUMSTANCES, CONSTITUTE A DEFECT AS DEFINED | | BY 10 CFR 21. THE THERMAL-HYDRAULIC ANALYSIS METHODS THEMSELVES, WHEN | | APPLIED TO THE LIMITING ASSEMBLY, YIELD VALID RESULTS AND ARE NOT AT | | ISSUE." | | | | "THE CURRENT ANALYSES OF RECORD FOR THE FOLLOWING U.S. NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS | | ARE AFFECTED BY THE DEFECTIVE SCREENING METHOD: | | | | ANO-2, | | CALVERT CLIFFS-1/2, | | PALO VERDE-1/2/3, | | SONGS-2/3, | | ST. LUCIE-2, | | WATERFORD-3, | | | | AND, POSSIBLY, FT. CALHOUN." | | | | "ABB CE DOES NOT KNOW THE APPLICABILITY FOR OTHER ABB CE DESIGNED NUCLEAR | | POWER PLANTS IN THE US, AS IT HAS NOT BEEN RECENTLY INVOLVED WITH NUCLEAR | | SAFETY ANALYSES OF NUCLEAR FUEL AT THOSE PLANTS. FOR THESE PLANTS, ABB CE | | WILL ISSUE A LETTER INFORMING THEM OF THIS CONDITION AND ADVISING THEM TO | | EVALUATE THE APPLICABILITY OF THE SITUATION. THESE PLANTS ARE: | | | | MILLSTONE-2, | | MAINE YANKEE (SHUTDOWN), | | PALISADES, AND | | ST. LUCIE-1." | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 34640 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: FITZPATRICK REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/13/98 | |UNIT: [1] [ ] [ ] STATE: NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:47 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 08/13/98 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 18:40[EDT]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: MARK FITZPATRICK |LAST UPDATE DATE: 08/13/98 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |DAVID SILK RDO | |ADAS 50.72(b)(2)(i) DEG/UNANALYZED COND | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N N 0 COLD SHUTDOWN | 0 COLD SHUTDOWN | | | | | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | THREE PRIMARY CONTAINMENT PENETRATIONS DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO | | OVERHEATING FOLLOWING A POSTULATED ELECTRICAL FAULT. | | | | UNDER CERTAIN ELECTRICAL FAULT CONDITIONS, WHEN IT IS POSTULATED THAT THE | | ASSOCIATED FEEDER BREAKER FAILS TO TRIP, OVERHEATING OF THE ASSOCIATED | | PRIMARY CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CAN RESULT. THE THREE AFFECTED ELECTRICAL | | CIRCUITS ARE NON-SAFETY RELATED. AS A CONSEQUENCE, THE AFFECTED PRIMARY | | CONTAINMENT PENETRATIONS HAVE BEEN DECLARED INOPERABLE. THE AFFECTED | | CIRCUITS AND PENETRATIONS ARE: | | | | 71ACB3 CKT 3/PENETRATION X 100 G, | | 71ACUPS CKT 5/PENETRATION X 100 F, | | 71ACUPS CKT 5/PENETRATION X 101 B. | | | | THIS CONDITION HAS EXISTED SINCE INITIAL CONSTRUCTION AND WAS IDENTIFIED | | DURING A RECENT NRC INSPECTION EXPECTED TO EXIT ON 8/14/98. THE LICENSEE | | INTENDS TO MODIFY THE ABOVE CIRCUITS BY INSTALLING FUSES. AN ONGOING | | INSPECTION IS IN PROGRESS TO IDENTIFY ANY ADDITIONAL PENETRATIONS WHICH MAY | | BE AFFECTED. THIS INSPECTION, 100% IN SCOPE, IS SCHEDULED FOR COMPLETION | | 8/14/98 AT WHICH TIME ANY DEFICIENCIES WILL BE EVALUATED ACCORDING TO | | GENERIC LETTER 91-18 AND APPROPRIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS DETERMINED. | | | | THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+