U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Reports For 08/12/98 - 08/13/98 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** 34527 34631 34632 34633 34634 34635 34636 34637 !!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!! +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 34527 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: CATAWBA REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/16/98 | |UNIT: [1] [2] [ ] STATE: SC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 19:37 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 07/16/98 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 17:05[EDT]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: J. BURGESS |LAST UPDATE DATE: 08/12/98 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |THOMAS DECKER RDO | |NLTR LICENSEE 24 HR REPORT | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | | 2 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | 24-HOUR REPORT REQUIRED BY PLANT OPERATING LICENSE | | | | THREE ELECTRICAL PENETRATIONS AND ONE MECHANICAL PENETRATION BETWEEN THE | | AUXILIARY BUILDING (A SAFETY-RELATED AREA) AND THE AUXILIARY SERVICE | | BUILDING (A NON-SAFETY-RELATED AREA) WERE DISCOVERED TO HAVE CABLES PASSING | | THROUGH THEM IN UNAPPROVED CONFIGURATIONS. THESE CONFIGURATIONS DEGRADE THE | | PENETRATIONS' ABILITY TO FUNCTION AS FIRE BARRIERS. FIRE WATCHES HAVE BEEN | | ESTABLISHED IN THESE AREAS UNTIL REPAIRS CAN BE MADE TO THE PENETRATIONS. | | | | FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE CONDITIONS 2.C(8) FOR UNIT 1 AND 2.C(6) FOR UNIT | | 2 REQUIRE THAT THE LICENSEE IMPLEMENT AND MAINTAIN ALL PROVISIONS OF THE | | APPROVED FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM AS DESCRIBED IN THE UPDATED FINAL SAFETY | | ANALYSIS REPORT. THE LICENSEE HAS DETERMINED THAT THIS CONDITION IS A | | VIOLATION OF THE FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM AND IS, THEREFORE, REPORTABLE TO | | THE NRC WITHIN 24 HOURS IN ACCORDANCE WITH LICENSE CONDITION 2.F. | | | | THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WILL BE INFORMED BY THE LICENSEE. | | | | * * * RETRACTION 1209 8/12/98 FROM WHITE TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * * | | | | THE LICENSEE'S FOLLOWUP INVESTIGATION HAS DETERMINED THAT THE PENETRATIONS | | WERE OPERABLE AND WOULD HAVE PERFORMED THEIR INTENDED FUNCTION. THEREFORE, | | THERE WAS NO VIOLATION OF THE OPERATING LICENSE AND NO EVENT NOTIFICATION | | WAS NECESSARY. THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR HAS BEEN INFORMED. NOTIFIED R2DO | | (McALPINE). | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 34631 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: INDIAN POINT REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/12/98 | |UNIT: [2] [ ] [ ] STATE: NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 12:08 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 08/11/98 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 00:00[EDT]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: MICHELLE SEVINO |LAST UPDATE DATE: 08/12/98 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |DAVID SILK RDO | |AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 2 | N N 0 HOT SHUTDOWN | 0 HOT SHUTDOWN | | | | | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FAILURE OF AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP TO START UPON DEMAND | | | | ON 8/11/98, THE LICENSEE PERFORMED A TEST WHICH REQUIRED THAT THE CONTROL | | ROOM HAND SWITCHES FOR THE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER (AFW) PUMPS TO BE PLACED IN | | PULL-TO-LOCK. UPON SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF THE TEST, AFW PUMP "21" FAILED | | TO START WHEN AN OPERATOR MANIPULATED THE CONTROL ROOM HAND SWITCH. THE | | LICENSEE IS INVESTIGATING THE CAUSE OF THE FAILURE. WHILE THE AFW SYSTEM IS | | NOT A TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.3 ECCS SYSTEM, THE LICENSEE CHOSE TO REPORT | | THIS EVENT AS IF IT WERE. | | | | THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR HAS BEEN INFORMED OF THIS EVENT BY THE LICENSEE. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 34632 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: GINNA REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/12/98 | |UNIT: [1] [ ] [ ] STATE: NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:10 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] W-2-LP |EVENT DATE: 07/27/98 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 12:00[EDT]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: BOB MECREDY |LAST UPDATE DATE: 08/12/98 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |DAVID SILK, R1 RDO | |CDEG 21.21(c)(3)(i) DEFECTS/NONCOMPLIANCE | | | |EDWARD McALPINE, R2 RDO | | |MARK RING, R3 RDO | | |GARY SANBORN, R4 RDO | | |VERN HODGE NRR | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | | | | | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | 10CFR21 - WESTINGHOUSE DB-75 CIRCUIT BREAKERS WITH MISSING TRIPPER BAR TABS | | | | THERE ARE SIX WESTINGHOUSE DB-75 CIRCUIT BREAKERS INSTALLED AT GINNA IN | | SAFEGUARDS BUSES #14 AND #16 AND ONE UNINSTALLED SAFETY RELATED SPARE. | | | | ON 03/25/98, DURING TROUBLESHOOTING ACTIVITIES, THE LICENSEE DISCOVERED | | THAT THE CENTER TRIPPER BAR TABS WERE MISSING FROM A WESTINGHOUSE DB-75 | | CIRCUIT BREAKER INSTALLED IN THE 'B' EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR (EDG) | | SUPPLY CIRCUIT BREAKER TO THE CLASS 1E SAFETY RELATED BUS #16 AT GINNA. | | | | PRIOR TO 03/25/98, GINNA MAINTENANCE TECHNICIANS HAD RETROFIT THE 'B' EDG | | DB-75 SUPPLY CIRCUIT BREAKER WITH AN AMPTECTOR SOLID STATE TRIP UNIT PER | | WESTINGHOUSE INSTRUCTION I.B. 33-850-6 THAT INSTRUCTED THE TECHNICIANS TO | | REMOVE ALL TRIPPER BAR TABS FROM THE TRIPPER BAR. SUBSEQUENTLY, THE | | WESTINGHOUSE INSTRUCTION BULLETIN WAS REVISED TO SPECIFICALLY LEAVE THE | | CENTER TRIPPER BAR TAB INSTALLED. THERE WERE NO WESTINGHOUSE NOTIFICATIONS | | TO GINNA TO REINSTALL THE CENTER TRIPPER BAR TABS ON PREVIOUSLY MODIFIED | | DB-75 CIRCUIT BREAKERS. | | | | THE ABSENCE OF THE CENTER TRIPPER BAR TAB ALLOWED TWO TRIPPER BAR BUSHINGS | | TO FALL FROM THEIR HOUSING AND IS BELIEVED, OVER TIME, TO HAVE BENT THE | | TRIPPER BAR SO THAT IT WOULD NOT FULLY RESET. THE FAILURE OF THE TRIPPER | | BAR TO FULLY RESET CAUSED THE INTERMITTENT FAILURE TO CLOSE ON THE DB-75 | | 'B' EDG SUPPLY CIRCUIT BREAKER TO BUS #16. | | | | WITH THE IDENTIFIED DEFICIENCY IN THE 'B' EDG SUPPLY CIRCUIT BREAKER, IT IS | | POSSIBLE THAT A SINGLE FAILURE COULD RENDER BOTH SAFETY TRAINS INCAPABLE OF | | PERFORMING THEIR SAFETY FUNCTIONS (BUSES #14 AND #16). THIS DEFICIENCY | | CONSTITUTES A SUBSTANTIAL SAFETY HAZARD. | | | | BETWEEN MAR 85 AND FEB 88, THE DB-75 'B' EDG SUPPLY CIRCUIT BREAKER WAS | | INSTALLED WITH THE INCORRECT MODIFICATION. IN FEB 88, THE DB-75 CIRCUIT | | BREAKER INSTALLED IN THE 'A' EDG SUPPLY BREAKER ON BUS #14 WAS INCORRECTLY | | MODIFIED IN THE SAME MANNER AS THE 'B' EDG SUPPLY CIRCUIT BREAKER. BETWEEN | | FEB 88 AND MAY 96, BOTH EDG OUTPUT CIRCUIT BREAKERS TO BUSES #14 AND #16 | | WERE INSTALLED WITH THE INCORRECT MODIFICATIONS. | | | | IN MAY 96, THE ORIGINAL SPARE DB-75 CIRCUIT BREAKER, #96-04, WAS INSTALLED | | IN THE 'A' EDG SUPPLY BREAKER POSITION. CIRCUIT BREAKER #96-04 HAD BEEN | | MODIFIED CORRECTLY PER THE CURRENT REVISION OF THE WESTINGHOUSE | | INSTALLATION INSTRUCTIONS PRIOR TO BEING INSTALLED INTO THE 'A' EDG | | SUPPLY CIRCUIT BREAKER POSITION. | | | | ON 03/25/98, THE LICENSEE INSPECTED ALL WESTINGHOUSE DB-75 CIRCUIT BREAKERS | | AT GINNA. PLANT MAINTENANCE TECHNICIANS INSTALLED CENTER TRIPPER BAR TABS | | ON THE 'B' EDG SUPPLY CIRCUIT BREAKER AND THE SPARE CIRCUIT BREAKER, | | PREVIOUSLY INSTALLED IN THE 'A' EDG SUPPLY CIRCUIT BREAKER POSITION. | | THE DB-75 CIRCUIT BREAKERS ON BUSES #14 AND #16 AND THE TWO BUS TIE CIRCUIT | | BREAKERS BETWEEN BUSES #14 AND #16 HAD BEEN CORRECTLY MODIFIED PER THE | | REVISED WESTINGHOUSE INSTRUCTIONS. | | | | ALTHOUGH THE POTENTIAL FOR FAILURE EXISTED AT GINNA, THE WESTINGHOUSE DB-75 | | CIRCUIT BREAKERS WERE TESTED WITH REGULAR SURVEILLANCE TESTS TO PROVE | | OPERABILITY AND THE FAILURE MECHANISM IS OF THE NATURE THAT DEGRADES OVER | | TIME. THE MISSING TRIPPER BAR TAB WOULD NOT IMMEDIATELY FAIL THE CIRCUIT | | BREAKER UPON REMOVAL. | | | | LICENSEE NUCLEAR ENGINEERING PERSONNEL ARE PERFORMING A VENDOR DOCUMENT | | REVIEW TO VERIFY THAT ALL WESTINGHOUSE DB-75 CIRCUIT BREAKERS ARE PROPERLY | | CONFIGURED IN ACCORDANCE WITH APPLICABLE VENDOR DOCUMENTATION. ALL LICENSEE | | CORRECTIVE ACTIONS ARE SCHEDULED TO BE COMPLETED BY 12/31/98. | | | | ON 03/25/98, THE LICENSEE DISTRIBUTED A NOTIFICATION OF THIS CONDITION TO | | INDUSTRY REPRESENTATIVES. THE CENTER TRIPPER BAR TAB INSTALLATION CAN BE | | VERIFIED BY VISUAL INSPECTION, POSSIBLY WHILE THE CIRCUIT BREAKER IS IN | | SERVICE. | | | | SPECIFIC INFORMATION FOR THIS REPORT WAS OBTAINED DURING DISCUSSIONS WITH | | WESTINGHOUSE REPRESENTATIVES ON 07/27/98. | | | | THE LICENSEE PLANS TO SUBMIT A WRITTEN 10CFR21 REPORT OF THIS CONDITION TO | | THE NRC BY 09/11/98. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 34633 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: COOK REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/12/98 | |UNIT: [1] [ ] [ ] STATE: MI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:04 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 08/12/98 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 15:30[EDT]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: MARY BETH DePUYDT |LAST UPDATE DATE: 08/12/98 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |MARK RING RDO | |ADAS 50.72(b)(2)(i) DEG/UNANALYZED COND | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N N 0 COLD SHUTDOWN | 0 COLD SHUTDOWN | | | | | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | - TOTAL AS-FOUND CONTAINMENT ICE BED BYPASS FLOW PATHS EXCEED DESIGN BASIS | | LIMIT - | | | | IN THE EVENT OF AN ACCIDENT AT COOK, STEAM AND AIR INSIDE CONTAINMENT | | FLOWING FROM THE LOWER COMPARTMENT TO THE UPPER COMPARTMENT ARE REQUIRED | | TO BE ROUTED UP THROUGH THE CONTAINMENT ICE BED. | | | | IN ORDER FOR THIS TO HAPPEN, A STRUCTURAL BARRIER, CALLED THE DIVIDER | | BARRIER, SEPARATES THE LOWER AND UPPER ICE BED CONTAINMENT COMPARTMENTS. | | THE DIVIDER BARRIER INCLUDES THE WALLS OF THE ICE COMPARTMENT, THE UPPER | | DECK, THE COMPARTMENTS ENCLOSING THE UPPER PORTION OF THE STEAM GENERATORS | | AND PRESSURIZER, THE GATE SEPARATING THE REACTOR CAVITY FROM THE REFUELING | | CANAL, AND PORTIONS OF THE WALLS OF THE REFUELING CANAL. | | | | THE DESIGN BASIS LIMITS BYPASS STEAM/AIR FLOW AROUND THE ICE BED TO A | | MAXIMUM OF 5 SQUARE FEET. THE INSTALLED BYPASS FLOW PATH THROUGH THE | | REFUELING CAVITY DRAINS IS EQUIVALENT TO 2.3 SQUARE FEET. | | | | DURING RECENT INSPECTIONS, THE LICENSEE DETERMINED THAT THE 5 SQUARE FEET | | LIMIT ON UNIT 1 HAD POTENTIALLY BEEN EXCEEDED IN THE PAST AS A RESULT OF | | MULTIPLE BYPASS FLOW PATHS THAT EXIST IN ADDITION TO THE INSTALLED BYPASS | | FLOW PATH. THE CUMULATIVE TOTAL OF THE KNOWN BYPASS FLOW PATHS IS | | CALCULATED TO BE 5.45 SQUARE FEET. AS IT CANNOT BE DETERMINED HOW LONG | | MOST OF THE IDENTIFIED CONDITIONS HAVE EXISTED, THE LICENSEE CONSERVATIVELY | | CONCLUDED THAT THE 5.45 SQUARE FEET CALCULATED CUMULATIVE BYPASS FLOW HAS | | CONCURRENTLY EXISTED. THIS SITUATION REPRESENTS AN UNANALYZED PLANT | | CONDITION REPORTABLE TO THE NRC PER 10CFR50.72. | | | | THE LICENSEE IS SEALING UNDESIRABLE BYPASS FLOW PATHS AS THEY ARE | | IDENTIFIED. THE PRESENTLY KNOWN CUMULATIVE BYPASS FLOW PATHS ARE | | 4.38 SQUARE FEET. THE LICENSEE IS EVALUATING THE SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE | | OF EXCEEDING THE BYPASS FLOW LIMIT AND PLANS TO INCLUDE THE RESULTS IN | | A WRITTEN LICENSEE EVENT REPORT TO BE SUBMITTED TO THE NRC. | | | | THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 34634 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: VERMONT YANKEE REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/12/98 | |UNIT: [1] [ ] [ ] STATE: VT |NOTIFICATION TIME: 19:56 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 08/12/98 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 18:30[EDT]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: ANDY WISNIEWSKI |LAST UPDATE DATE: 08/12/98 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |DAVID SILK RDO | |AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | | | | | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | -HPCI VALVE & SYSTEM INOPERABLE DUE TO QUESTIONABLE DC MOTOR STARTER COIL- | | | | WHILE CLOSING OUT AN EVENT REPORT, THE LICENSEE DISCOVERED THAT THE HIGH | | PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI) SYSTEM VALVE #V23-16 HAD 250 VDC COILS | | INSTALLED IN THE LOCAL DC MOTOR STARTER INSTEAD OF THE REQUIRED 125 VDC | | COILS. | | | | AT 1830 ON 08/12/98, CONTROL ROOM OPERATORS RECEIVED ADDITIONAL INFORMATION | | WHICH PLACED THE ORIGINAL OPERABILITY DETERMINATION OF THIS VALVE IN | | QUESTION. SPECIFICALLY, THE LICENSEE TESTED A SIMILAR SPARE 250 VDC | | MOTOR STARTER COIL AND IT PICKED UP AT 102.8 VDC. THE INSTALLED 250 VDC | | MOTOR STARTER COIL MAY HAVE VOLTAGE AS LOW AS 104.5 VDC APPLIED TO IT. | | IT IS INCONCLUSIVE THAT THE INSTALLED COIL WOULD OPERATE AT 104.5 VDC. | | | | CONTROL ROOM OPERATORS DECLARED THE HPCI #V23-16 VALVE INOPERABLE AND | | PLACED IT IN THE CLOSED POSITION IN ORDER FOR IT TO PERFORM ITS PRIMARY | | CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM FUNCTION. THEY ALSO DECLARED THE HPCI SYSTEM | | INOPERABLE AND ENTERED A 7 DAY LCO (TECH SPEC #3.5.E.2 AND # 3.7.D.2). | | I&C TECHNICIANS PLAN TO TEST ADS SYSTEM VALVES TO VERIFY THEIR OPERABILITY. | | | | THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |FUEL CYCLE FACILITY | |EVENT NUMBER: 34635 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/12/98 | | RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 22:53 [ET]| |COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 08/12/98 | | 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 05:15[EDT]| | BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 08/12/98 | | CITY: PIKETON REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+ | COUNTY: PIKE STATE: OH |PERSON ORGANIZATION| |LICENSE#: GDP-2 AGREEMENT: N |MARK RING RDO | | DOCKET: 0707002 |LARRY CAMPER, NMSS EO | +------------------------------------------------+ | |NRC NOTIFIED BY: STEVE MAY | | |HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | - 20-50 GALLONS OF URANYL NITRATE SOLUTION LEAKED INSIDE X-705 DECON BLDG - | | | | AT 0515 ON 08/12/98, CHEMICAL OPERATIONS PERSONNEL DISCOVERED URANYL | | NITRATE SOLUTION LEAKING FROM OVERHEAD PIPING OF THE C-LOOP PRE-EVAPORATOR | | OF THE URANIUM RECOVERY SYSTEM IN THE X-705 DECON BUILDING AND IMMEDIATELY | | SHUT THE SYSTEM DOWN. APPROXIMATELY 20 TO 50 GALLONS OF SOLUTION LEAKED | | ONTO THE BUILDING FLOOR AND WAS COLLECTED WITHIN THE FLOOR DIKE SYSTEM. | | | | THIS LEAK CONSTITUTES A LOSS OF NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY APPROVAL NCSA | | 0705.A00 CONTINGENCY EVENT 3.2 REQUIREMENT. CONTROL PARAMETER A (PIPING | | INTEGRITY - GEOMETRY) WAS LOST; CONTROL PARAMETER B (DRAINAGE HOLES - | | GEOMETRY) WAS MAINTAINED THROUGHOUT THIS EVENT. | | | | SAMPLES TAKEN OF THE SOLUTION POOLED ON THE FLOOR WITH A DEPTH LESS THAN A | | SAFE SLAB INDICATES AN ENRICHMENT OF 4.24 WT% OF U-235. | | | | PLANT PERSONNEL ARE CLEANING UP THE SPILL AND PLAN TO DETERMINE THE CAUSE | | OF THE LEAK. | | | | THERE WAS NO LOSS OF HAZARDOUS OR RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL NOR RADIOACTIVE OR | | RADIOLOGICAL EXPOSURE AS A RESULT OF THIS EVENT. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |OTHER NUCLEAR MATERIAL | |EVENT NUMBER: 34636 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |LICENSEE: PENN STATE |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/12/98 | | CITY: STATE COLLEGE REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION TIME: 23:30 [ET]| | COUNTY: STATE: PA |EVENT DATE: 08/12/98 | |LICENSE#: AGREEMENT: N |EVENT TIME: 21:50[EDT]| | DOCKET: |LAST UPDATE DATE: 08/12/98 | | +-----------------------------+ | |PERSON ORGANIZATION| | |DAVID SILK RDO | | |LARRY CAMPER EO | +------------------------------------------------+JOHN KINNEMAN REG1 | |NRC NOTIFIED BY: RON KROSNER (PEMA) |FEMA, DOE, USDA, EPA FAX | |HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON |HHS, DOT (NRC) FAX | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |NINF INFORMATION ONLY | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | 2000 GALLONS OF WATER CONTAINING TRITIUM AT 5E-05 MICROCURIES/ML LEAKED OUT | | OF A STORAGE TANK INTO THE GROUND. | | | | PENNSYLVANIA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY (PEMA) GAVE THE FOLLOWING | | INFORMATION. | | | | ABOUT 2 DAYS AGO WATER WAS TRANSFERRED FROM THE REACTOR VESSEL TO A STORAGE | | TANK SO MAINTENANCE COULD BE PERFORMED ON THE BREAZEALE REACTOR. ON | | 08/12/98 AROUND 1700 HOURS IT WAS NOTED THAT THE STORAGE TANK LEVEL HAD | | DECREASED (THE STORAGE TANK HAS BEEN USED ONLY ONCE OR TWICE IN THE LAST 10 | | TO 15 YEARS). UPON INVESTIGATION IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT APPROXIMATELY 2000 | | GALLONS OF TRITIATED WATER HAD LEAKED OUT OF THE TANK ONTO THE CONCRETE PAD | | THAT THE STORAGE TANK WAS RESTING ON AND THEN FLOWED OFF THE CONCRETE PAD | | INTO THE SOIL UNDERNEATH THE REACTOR BUILDING. PENNSYLVANIA EMERGENCY | | MANAGEMENT AGENCY WAS INFORMED THAT THE SPILL WAS CONTAINED INSIDE THE | | REACTOR BUILDING AND THAT THERE WAS NO OUTSIDE RELEASE, NO INJURIES, AND NO | | PERSONAL CONTAMINATION. THE REMAINING TRITIATED WATER REMAINING IN THE | | STORAGE TANK WAS PUMPED BACK INTO THE REACTOR POOL. PERSONNEL FROM THE | | PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION BUREAU OF RADIATION | | PROTECTION WILL BE SENT TO STATE COLLEGE TO INVESTIGATE THE INCIDENT. | | APPROXIMATELY 380 MICROCURIES OF TRITIUM LEAK OUT OF THE STORAGE TANK INTO | | THE SOIL UNDERNEATH THE REACTOR BUILDING. | | | | PEMA HAD BEEN INFORMED BY THE UNIVERSITY THAT THIS INCIDENT HAD BEEN | | REPORTED TO THE NUCLEAR REGULATOR COMMISSION AND THEY WERE CALLING TO | | VERIFY THAT THE NUCLEAR REGULATOR COMMISSION HAD BEEN NOTIFIED OF THE ABOVE | | INCIDENT. | | | | SEE HOO LOG BOOK FOR CONTACT NAMES AND PHONE NUMBERS. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 34637 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: QUAD CITIES REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/13/98 | |UNIT: [1] [ ] [ ] STATE: IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 02:28 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3 |EVENT DATE: 08/12/98 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 23:57[CDT]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: MacLennan |LAST UPDATE DATE: 08/13/98 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: | | |AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | | | | | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI) SYSTEM DECLARED INOPERABLE | | | | HPCI WAS DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO AN EMERGENT ISSUE RELATED TO THE HPCI | | TURBINE TURNING GEAR. AT 1330 ON 08/12/98, UNIT 1 HPCI TURBINE WAS MANUALLY | | PLACED ON THE TURNING GEAR IN PREPARATION FOR A PLANNED SURVEILLANCE RUN. | | THE TURBINE WAS VERIFIED ON THE GEAR LOCALLY BY AN EQUIPMENT ATTENDANT. AT | | 1915, WHEN A EQUIPMENT ATTENDANT ENTERED THE ROOM IN PREPARATION FOR THE | | SURVEILLANCE, THE HPCI TURBINE WAS FOUND OFF THE TURNING GEAR. THE HPCI | | AUXILIARY OIL PUMP WAS STARTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PLANT PROCEDURES AND THE | | TURNING GEAR REENGAGED AUTOMATICALLY. THE SURVEILLANCE WAS PERFORMED, AND | | SUBSEQUENT TO THE HPCI TURBINE TRIP, THE TURNING GEAR AGAIN AUTOMATICALLY | | ENGAGED AND STARTED. HOWEVER, IT IS UNKNOWN AT THIS TIME WHETHER OR NOT | | HPCI IS STILL CAPABLE OF PERFORMING ITS DESIGN FUNCTION. IT WAS THEREFORE | | DECLARED INOPERABLE AND TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.5.A ACTION 3 ENTERED | | WHICH CONSISTS OF A 14 DAY LIMITING CONDITION OF OPERATION. ALL OTHER | | EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS AND RCIC ARE FULLY OPERABLE IF NEEDED. | | | | THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED BY THE LICENSEE OF THIS EVENT. | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+