U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Reports For 02/12/98 - 02/13/98 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** 33604 33688 33701 33702 33703 33704 33705 33706 33707 33708 33709 33710 !!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!! +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 33604 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: CLINTON REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/27/98 | |UNIT: [1] [ ] [ ] STATE: IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:17 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] GE-6 |EVENT DATE: 01/27/98 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 12:30[CST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: ROBERT POWERS |LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/12/98 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |PATRICK HILAND RDO | |ADAS 50.72(b)(2)(i) DEG/UNANALYZED COND | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N N 0 COLD SHUTDOWN | 0 COLD SHUTDOWN | | | | | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FAILURE TO ASSESS IMPACT OF INCREASED COMBUSTION TEMPERATURE ON EDG | | CAPACITY | | | | DURING A REVIEW OF LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 97-022-01, "DESIGN OF DIESEL | | GENERATOR VENTILATION SUBSYSTEMS OUTSIDE AIR TEMPERATURE EXTREMES DUE TO | | DESIGN ERROR," THE LICENSEE DISCOVERED THE EFFECT OF INCREASED COMBUSTION | | AIR TEMPERATURE ON EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR (EDG) ENGINE CAPACITY. THE | | UPDATED SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT (USAR) STATES THAT PREDICTED LOADS DO NOT | | EXCEED THE CONTINUOUS RATING OF THE DIESEL GENERATORS AND LISTS THE | | CONTINUOUS LOAD RATINGS IN TABLE 8.3-13. DIESEL GENERATOR LOAD CALCULATION | | 19-AK-05, REV. 4, IS CONSISTENT WITH THE USAR, AND NO ADJUSTMENT WAS MADE | | FOR INCREASED COMBUSTION AIR TEMPERATURE. THE USAR AND CALCULATION | | 19-AK-05, REV. 4, BOTH STATE THAT THE EXPECTED LOAD FOR EDG '1A' IS >99% OF | | THE CONTINUOUS RATING, WHILE EDG '1B' IS LOADED TO 87%, AND EDG '1C' IS | | LOADED TO 92%. BASED ON THE INFORMATION IN THE VENDOR MANUAL, THE RATING | | OF THE EDGs WOULD BE REDUCED TO 98% OF RATED AT 97øF AND 94% OF RATED AT | | 112øF. | | | | THEREFORE, THE LICENSEE'S PRELIMINARY EVALUATION HAS DETERMINED THAT EDG | | '1A' CANNOT MEET ITS DESIGN BASIS LOAD AT THE MAXIMUM EXPECTED TEMPERATURE. | | EDGs '1B' AND '1C' APPEAR TO HAVE ADEQUATE MARGIN. | | | | THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WILL BE INFORMED BY THE LICENSEE. | | | | * * * UPDATE AT 1527 EST ON 02/12/98 FROM JAMES FORMAN TO S.SANDIN * * * | | | | THE LICENSEE IS RETRACTING THIS EVENT NOTIFICATION. | | | | THE FOLLOWING TEXT IS A PORTION OF A FACSIMILE RECEIVED FROM THE LICENSEE: | | | | "ON JANUARY 27, 1998, AT 1517 EST, CLINTON POWER STATION REPORTED AN EVENT | | NOTIFICATION, EVENT 33604, IN ACCORDANCE WITH 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), 4-HOUR | | NON-EMERGENCY. THIS NOTIFICATION STATED THAT PRELIMINARY INDICATIONS SHOW | | THE '1A' DIESEL GENERATOR CANNOT MEET ITS DESIGN BASIS LOAD AT THE MAXIMUM | | OUTSIDE AMBIENT AIR TEMPERATURE DUE TO DERATING OF THE DIESEL GENERATOR | | WHEN COMBUSTION AIR INLET TEMPERATURE IS ABOVE 90øF. THE NUCLEAR | | ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT HAS EVALUATED THIS CONDITION AND DETERMINED THAT THE | | '1A' DIESEL GENERATOR HAS BEEN CAPABLE OF MEETING ITS DESIGN BASIS LOAD AT | | THE MAXIMUM EXPECTED OUTSIDE AMBIENT AIR TEMPERATURE. THEREFORE, CLINTON | | POWER STATION IS RETRACTING THIS EVENT NOTIFICATION." | | | | THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. THE NRC OPERATIONS | | CENTER NOTIFIED THE R3DO (KOZAK). | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |FUEL CYCLE FACILITY | |EVENT NUMBER: 33688 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/10/98 | | RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:18 [ET]| |COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 02/09/98 | | 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 15:35[EST]| | BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/12/98 | | CITY: PIKETON REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+ | COUNTY: PIKE STATE: OH |PERSON ORGANIZATION| |LICENSE#: GDP-2 AGREEMENT: N |THOMAS KOZAK RDO | | DOCKET: 0707002 |DON COOL, NMSS EO | +------------------------------------------------+STUART RUBIN, AEOD IRD | |NRC NOTIFIED BY: SPAETH | | |HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | BULLETIN 91-01 RESPONSE (24-HOUR REPORT) | | | | WHILE REVIEWING AN OPERATIONAL DISCREPANCY FOR THE MICROFILTRATION PROCESS, | | PLANT PERSONNEL NOTED THAT AN AIR LINE IN THE SYSTEM DID NOT APPEAR TO BE | | ADEQUATELY ADDRESSED BY THE NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY APPROVAL (NCSA) OR | | THE OPERATING PROCEDURE FOR THE OPERATION. THE AIR LINE IN QUESTION | | ALLOWED ONE NCS CONTROL TO BE BYPASSED, THAT BEING A CLOSED "FILTER PRESS | | FEED INLET VALVE." THIS AIR LINE IN THE SYSTEM WAS NOT DESCRIBED IN AN | | NCSA/NCSE. FAILURE OF THE FILTER PRESS INLET FEED VALVE IS ANALYZED IN | | NCSE-0705_015.A08, PART B; CONTINGENCY ANALYSIS, SECTION B.1.1. HOWEVER, | | CONTROLS WERE NOT ESTABLISHED ON THE POTENTIAL BYPASS OF THIS VALVE. THE | | TOTAL MASS OF U-235 IN THE SYSTEM WAS CALCULATED TO BE 32 GRAMS, WHICH IS | | LESS THAN THE 350 GRAMS MAXIMUM ALLOWED FOR THE SYSTEM. UPON DISCOVERY OF | | THIS DISCREPANCY, OPERATIONS PERSONNEL IMMEDIATELY SECURED THE AIR LINE | | THUS REESTABLISHING THE CONTROL. A SECOND CONTROL, "THE FILTER PRESS BLANK | | PLATE," REMAINED IN PLACE THROUGHOUT THE EVENT. OPERATIONS PERSONNEL SHUT | | DOWN THE MICROFILTRATION OPERATION AND PLACED AN "ADMINISTRATION HOLD" ON | | USE OF THE MICROFILTRATION AND FILTER PRESS PROCEDURES. THERE WAS NO LOSS | | OF HAZARDOUS OR RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL OR RADIOACTIVE OR RADIOLOGICAL | | CONTAMINATION EXPOSURE AS A RESULT OF THIS EVENT. | | | | THIS EVENT WAS THE RESULT OF FAILURE TO ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN CONTROLS IN | | ACCORDANCE WITH THE DOUBLE CONTINGENCY PRINCIPLE. THE FILTER PRESS BACK | | PLATE PROTECTED THE UNSAFE GEOMETRY, AND THE CONCENTRATION OF SOLUTION | | WOULD HAVE TO BE HIGHER FOR CRITICALITY TO OCCUR. BACKFLOW WAS PREVENTED | | BY THE FILTER PRESS BLANK PLATE. THE HIGHEST CONCENTRATION AND ASSAY OF | | SAMPLES TAKEN WAS APPROXIMATELY 80 GALLONS OF 231 PPM U SOLUTION AT 2.94% | | ASSAY. THE FEED BLOCK VALVE WHICH WAS REQUIRED TO BE CLOSED AND REMAIN | | CLOSED WAS DEFEATED BY A BY-PASS ALLOWED BY AN AIR LINE. THE CORRECTIVE | | ACTION WAS TO SHUT THE SYSTEM DOWN AND SECURE THE AIR LINE. PORTSMOUTH IS | | INVESTIGATING THE PROBLEM. | | | | PORTSMOUTH PERSONNEL NOTIFIED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR AND PLANS TO | | NOTIFY THE SITE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY REPRESENTATIVE. | | | | * * * UPDATE AT 1233 EST ON 02/12/98 FROM SPAETH TO S.SANDIN * * * | | | | THE FOLLOWING TEXT IS A PORTION OF A FACSIMILE RECEIVED FROM PORTSMOUTH: | | | | "ON FEBRUARY 9, 1998, AT 1535, DURING A SOLUTION TRANSFER EVOLUTION AT | | MICROFILTRATION, OPERATIONS PERSONNEL DISCOVERED AN OUT OF POSITION VALVE | | ALIGNMENT ON AN AIR LINE CAUSING APPROXIMATELY 80 GALLONS OF URANIUM | | BEARING SOLUTION TO SPILL TO THE FLOOR. THE SPILL WAS CONTAINED TO THE | | OPERATIONS AREA. WHILE INVESTIGATING THE OPERATIONAL DISCREPANCY IT WAS | | NOTED THAT THE AIR LINE AND ASSOCIATED VALVES DID NOT APPEAR TO BE | | ADEQUATELY ADDRESSED BY THE NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY APPROVAL (NCSA) FOR | | THE OPERATION. THE NCSA WAS DEFICIENT IN THAT IT DID NOT IDENTIFY THE NCS | | CONTROLS NECESSARY TO COMPLY WITH THE 'DOUBLE CONTINGENCY PRINCIPLE' DURING | | THE SOLUTION TRANSFER OPERATION. THE AIR LINE ALLOWED THE 'DOUBLE | | CONTINGENCY PRINCIPLE' TO BE VIOLATED; HOWEVER, THE CONTROLS NECESSARY TO | | MEET 'DOUBLE CONTINGENCY' WERE IMMEDIATELY ESTABLISHED. THE TOTAL MASS OF | | U-235 IN THE SYSTEM WAS CALCULATED TO BE 32 GRAMS U-235, WHICH IS LESS THAN | | THE 350 GRAMS MAXIMUM ALLOWED FOR THE SYSTEM. UPON DISCOVERY OF THIS | | DISCREPANCY OPERATIONS PERSONNEL IMMEDIATELY SECURED THE AIR LINE THUS | | REESTABLISHING CONTROL. OPERATIONS PERSONNEL SHUT DOWN THE MICROFILTRATION | | OPERATION AND PLACED AN 'ADMINISTRATIVE HOLD' ON USE OF THE MICROFILTRATION | | AND FILTER PRESS PROCEDURES. THE SPILL OF THE MATERIAL DID NOT EXCEED ANY | | LEVELS OF RADIATION OR CONCENTRATION OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS IN EXCESS OF | | ANY APPLICABLE LIMIT IN THE CERTIFICATE. THIS EVENT IS REPORTABLE TO THE | | NRC PER REPORTING REQUIREMENT NRC [BULLETIN] 91-01. THIS IS AN UPDATE TO | | NRC EVENT #33688." | | | | PORTSMOUTH PERSONNEL INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR AND THE DEPARTMENT | | OF ENERGY SITE REPRESENTATIVE. THE NRC OPERATIONS CENTER NOTIFIED THE R3DO | | (KOZAK), NMSS EO (COOL) AND AEOD IRD (RUBIN). | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |HOSPITAL | |EVENT NUMBER: 33701 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |LICENSEE: GARDEN STATE CANCER CENTER |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/12/98 | | CITY: BELLEVILLE REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:24 [ET]| | COUNTY: ESSEX STATE: NJ |EVENT DATE: 06/11/97 | |LICENSE#: 29-28554-01 AGREEMENT: N |EVENT TIME: 10:00[EST]| | DOCKET: |LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/12/98 | | +-----------------------------+ | |PERSON ORGANIZATION| | |MOHAMED SHANBAKY RDO | | |SCOTT MOORE, NMSS EO | +------------------------------------------------+ | |NRC NOTIFIED BY: ROBERT DUNN | | |HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |IBAD 30.50(b)(1)(ii) MATL >5X LOWEST LIMIT | | |IBAE 30.50(b)(1)(iii) ACCESS DENIED OTHER | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | UNPLANNED CONTAMINATION DUE TO A SPILL OF APPROXIMATELY 70 MILLICURIES OF | | IODINE-131 LABELED ANTIBODY AT THE GARDEN STATE CANCER CENTER LOCATED IN | | BELLEVILLE, NEW JERSEY | | | | AT APPROXIMATELY 1000 ON JUNE 11, 1997, A SPILL INVOLVING APPROXIMATELY 70 | | MILLICURIES OF IODINE-131 LABELED ANTIBODY OCCURRED. (NOTE: THE LICENSEE | | STATED THAT THIS WAS NOT FREE IODINE. IT WAS LABELED TO AN ANTIBODY.) AS | | A RADIO-LABELING TECHNICIAN WAS BRINGING THE MATERIAL OVER TO THE CLINIC, | | IT FELL OFF OF THE CART BEING USED FOR TRANSPORT. (THE LEAD VIAL FELL | | OVER, AND THE GLASS VIAL THAT WAS INSIDE BROKE.) THE TECHNICIAN'S HANDS | | (GLOVES), SHOES, AND PANTS WERE SLIGHTLY CONTAMINATED. THE INDIVIDUAL WAS | | GIVEN SHOE COVERS AND A SET OF TYVEK COVERALLS TO WEAR. THE LICENSEE PLANS | | TO HOLD THE INDIVIDUAL'S GARMENTS IN STORAGE UNTIL THE EXPOSURE READINGS | | ARE AT OR BELOW BACKGROUND LEVELS (AT LEAST TEN HALF LIVES). THE | | TECHNICIAN WAS GIVEN INSTRUCTIONS AND ASSISTANCE IN DECONTAMINATING HIS | | HANDS. HE WASHED HIS HANDS SEVERAL TIMES WITH A COMMERCIAL DECONTAMINATING | | SOLUTION ("COUNT-OFF"), WARM WATER, AND SOAP UNTIL NO SIGNS OF | | CONTAMINATION WERE PRESENT. THIS WAS CONFIRMED BY WIPE TESTS AND SURVEY | | MEASUREMENTS. A THYROID BIOASSAY WAS ALSO PERFORMED, AND NO UPTAKE WAS | | DETECTED. | | | | THE SPILL WAS ASSESSED IMMEDIATELY BY THE RADIATION SAFETY OFFICER, AND THE | | CLEAN-UP PROCESS WAS INITIATED. THE CLEAN-UP FOLLOWED NORMAL CENTER | | POLICY. THE LIQUID MATERIAL WAS CONTAINED TO PREVENT FURTHER SPREAD OF THE | | CONTAMINATION, AND THE AREA WAS CLOSED TO ROUTINE CLINIC TRAFFIC. THE | | LIQUID MATERIAL WAS COVERED WITH ABSORBENT PADS ("CHUX") WHICH SERVED TO | | SOAK UP THE LIQUID. IT WAS DETERMINED (AFTER SEVERAL ATTEMPTS TO REMOVE | | ANY CONTAMINATION AND BASED UPON WIPE TEST RESULTS) THAT ANY RESIDUAL | | ACTIVITY REMAINING WAS NON-REMOVABLE. THE LICENSEE DECIDED TO REMOVE THE | | TILES THAT WERE CONTAMINATED IN ORDER TO DECREASE THE EXPOSURE READINGS | | FROM THE CONTAMINATION. UPON REMOVAL OF THE TILES, THE ENTIRE AREA WAS | | COVERED WITH PLASTIC SHEETING TO PREVENT ANY FURTHER POTENTIAL SPREAD OF | | THE MATERIAL. EXPOSURE RATE MEASUREMENTS WERE TAKEN POST CLEAN-UP, AND NO | | READING GREATER THAN 0.25 MILLIREM PER HOUR (AT 3 FEET) WAS FOUND. NEW | | TILES WERE INSTALLED SEVERAL DAYS LATER. | | | | AS A CORRECTIVE ACTION, THE FOLLOWING PROCEDURES HAVE BEEN IMPLEMENTED BY | | THE LICENSEE TO DECREASE THE POSSIBILITY OF FUTURE INCIDENTS. ALL | | MATERIALS BEING TRANSPORTED IN THE FACILITY ON A CART SHALL BE PLACED IN | | THE CENTER OF THE LOWER SHELF OF THE CART. ALL CONTAINERS SHALL BE TAPED | | TO DECREASE THE POSSIBILITY OF MATERIAL FALLING OUT OF THE CONTAINER. WHEN | | POSSIBLE, TWO INDIVIDUALS WILL DELIVER MATERIALS SO THAT ONE CAN MOVE THE | | CART AND ANOTHER CAN OPEN DOORS, ASSIST IN THE DELIVERY, ETC. | | | | THE EVENT WAS DETERMINED TO BE REPORTABLE BY AN NRC INSPECTOR (BHALLA). A | | NOTICE OF VIOLATION WAS ISSUED, AND THE LICENSEE HAS RESPONDED TO THIS | | VIOLATION. (REFER TO THE HOO LOG FOR A SITE CONTACT TELEPHONE NUMBER.) | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 33702 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: COMANCHE PEAK REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/12/98 | |UNIT: [1] [2] [ ] STATE: TX |NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:07 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 02/12/98 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 09:15[CST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: CHUCK COTTON |LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/12/98 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |DALE POWERS RDO | |DDDD 73.71 UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | | 2 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | AT 0730 CST, THE LICENSEE DISCOVERED A SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM DEGRADATION | | RELATED TO DETECTION. IMMEDIATE COMPENSATORY MEASURES WERE TAKEN UPON | | DISCOVERY. (REFER TO THE HOO LOG FOR ADDITIONAL DETAILS.) THIS | | NOTIFICATION WAS MADE AS A 1-HOUR REPORT IN ACCORDANCE WITH 10 CFR 71.73, | | APPENDIX G, PARAGRAPH (i)(b). | | | | THE LICENSEE PLANS TO NOTIFY THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |FUEL CYCLE FACILITY | |EVENT NUMBER: 33703 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/12/98 | | RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 12:33 [ET]| |COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 02/11/98 | | 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 16:43[EST]| | BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/12/98 | | CITY: PIKETON REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+ | COUNTY: PIKE STATE: OH |PERSON ORGANIZATION| |LICENSE#: GDP-2 AGREEMENT: N |THOMAS KOZAK RDO | | DOCKET: 0707002 |DON COOL, NMSS EO | +------------------------------------------------+STUART RUBIN, AEOD IRD | |NRC NOTIFIED BY: ERIC SPAETH | | |HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |NCFR NON CFR REPORT REQMNT | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | NON-CFR REPORT REGARDING ACTUATION OF A 'Q' SAFETY SYSTEM | | | | THE FOLLOWING TEXT IS A PORTION OF A FACSIMILE RECEIVED FROM PORTSMOUTH: | | | | "AT 1643 HOURS, [ON] 02/11/98, THE CASCADE AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING (CADP) | | SMOKE DETECTOR S64, A 'Q' SAFETY SYSTEM, ACTUATED DUE TO URANIUM | | HEXAFLUORIDE (UF6) OUT GASSING FROM CELL 31-2-6 IN THE X-330 PROCESS | | BUILDING. UPON CONFIRMATION OF OUT GASSING BY OPERATIONS, A BUILDING | | RECALL WAS INITIATED, THE PLANT EMERGENCY STAFF WAS SUMMONED, AND THE CELL | | WAS SHUT DOWN AND TAKEN OFFSTREAM." | | | | "THIS EVENT IS BEING PROCESSED AS A 'Q' SAFETY SYSTEM ACTUATION DUE TO A | | VALID SIGNAL, AS THE CADP SMOKE DETECTION SYSTEM IS DESIGNED TO ACTUATE IN | | THE PRESENCE OF UF6 (SMOKE)." | | | | "THERE WAS NO DETECTABLE LOSS OF HAZARDOUS/RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL OR | | RADIOACTIVE/RADIOLOGICAL CONTAMINATION EXPOSURE AS A RESULT OF THIS EVENT." | | | | PORTSMOUTH PERSONNEL INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR AND THE DEPARTMENT | | OF ENERGY SITE REPRESENTATIVE. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |FUEL CYCLE FACILITY | |EVENT NUMBER: 33704 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/12/98 | | RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 12:33 [ET]| |COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 02/11/98 | | 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 11:05[EST]| | BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/12/98 | | CITY: PIKETON REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+ | COUNTY: PIKE STATE: OH |PERSON ORGANIZATION| |LICENSE#: GDP-2 AGREEMENT: N |THOMAS KOZAK RDO | | DOCKET: 0707002 |DON COOL, NMSS EO | +------------------------------------------------+STUART RUBIN, AEOD IRD | |NRC NOTIFIED BY: ERIC SPAETH | | |HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | NRC 91-01 BULLETIN RESPONSE (24-HOUR REPORT) NOTIFICATION REGARDING AN | | INADEQUATE PROCEDURE | | | | THE FOLLOWING TEXT IS A PORTION OF A FACSIMILE RECEIVED FROM PORTSMOUTH: | | | | "ON 02/10/98, AN NRC INSPECTOR IDENTIFIED A PROBLEM REPORT | | (PR-PTS-97-10680) WHICH HE BELIEVED SHOULD HAVE BEEN PROCESSED AS A | | REPORTABLE EVENT ON 12/18/97. THIS PROBLEM REPORT WAS REVIEWED BY | | OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT AND NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY PERSONNEL, WHO | | DETERMINED THAT THE INCIDENT DESCRIBED IN PR-PTS-97-10680 IS REPORTABLE TO | | THE NRC AS A 24-HOUR REPORT." | | | | "ON 12/18/97 AT 1000 HOURS, ENGINEERING PERSONNEL INITIATED A PROBLEM | | REPORT (PR-PTS-97-10680) WHICH IDENTIFIED AN INADEQUATE ANALYSIS WHICH | | RESULTED IN A CONTROL CONTAINED IN THE NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY APPROVAL | | (NCSA) BEING DEEMED INADEQUATE. IN THIS INSTANCE, THE AFFECTED NCSA | | COVERED THE OPERATIONS OF THE X-705 SMALL PARTS DECONTAMINATION PIT. THE | | CONTROL TO ASSURE THAT PARTS BROUGHT INTO THIS AREA DID NOT HAVE VISIBLE | | CONTAMINATION DID NOT HAVE A PROVISION FOR INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION. THIS | | LACK OF INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION COULD HAVE ALLOWED PARTS WITH VISIBLE | | CONTAMINATION TO ENTER THIS AREA WHICH COULD HAVE RESULTED IN A LOSS OF | | THIS CONTROL. THIS ALSO COULD HAVE ALLOWED THE SECOND CONTROL (SOLUTION | | CONCENTRATION) TO BE LOST SINCE VISIBLE CONTAMINATION WOULD AFFECT SOLUTION | | CONCENTRATION MORE QUICKLY." | | | | "THERE WAS NO LOSS OF HAZARDOUS/RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL OR | | RADIOACTIVE/RADIOLOGICAL CONTAMINATION EXPOSURES AS A RESULT OF THIS | | EVENT." | | | | PORTSMOUTH PERSONNEL INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR AND THE DEPARTMENT | | OF ENERGY SITE REPRESENTATIVE. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 33705 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: VERMONT YANKEE REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/12/98 | |UNIT: [1] [ ] [ ] STATE: VT |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:17 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 02/12/98 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 13:40[EST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: BRIAN YANCROKE |LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/12/98 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |MOHAMED SHANBAKY RDO | |AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N Y 70 POWER OPERATION | 70 POWER OPERATION | | | | | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | THE LICENSEE IDENTIFIED AN OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS CONDITION INVOLVING | | NON-SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL CABLES ROUTED IN SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL | | RACEWAYS. | | | | DURING AN ENGINEERING REVIEW, THE LICENSEE IDENTIFIED SIX NON-NUCLEAR | | SAFETY ELECTRICAL CABLES ROUTED THROUGH DIVISION SI AND SII RACEWAYS WHICH | | IS CONTRARY TO THE REQUIREMENTS AS DESCRIBED IN FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS | | REPORT, SECTION 8.4.6. THE SIX CABLES ARE IDENTIFIED AS C1078T | | (ANNUNCIATION), C1078U (ANNUNCIATION), C1230A (INSTRUMENTATION), C1234X | | (125-VDC CONTROL CABLE), C1234AB (125-VDC CONTROL CABLE), AND C1130S | | (125-VDC CONTROL CABLE). THE LICENSEE PLANS ON CORRECTING THIS PROBLEM AT | | A LATER TIME AND PLANS TO REVISE THE BASIS FOR MAINTAINING OPERABILITY (BMO | | 97-13, REV. 3). | | | | THE LICENSEE PLANS TO INFORM THE STATE OF VERMONT AND THE NRC RESIDENT | | INSPECTOR. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 33706 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: HADDAM NECK REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/12/98 | |UNIT: [1] [ ] [ ] STATE: CT |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:45 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 02/12/98 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 14:00[EST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: BILL McMAHON |LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/12/98 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |MOHAMED SHANBAKY RDO | |APRE 50.72(b)(2)(vi) OFFSITE NOTIFICATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N N 0 DECOMMISSIONED | 0 DECOMMISSIONED | | | | | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | OFFSITE NOTIFICATION | | | | THE LICENSEE NOTIFIED OFFSITE AGENCIES REGARDING AN OIL SHEEN ON THE | | DISCHARGE CANAL (ESTIMATED AS 1 CUP). THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NATIONAL | | RESPONSE CENTER, CONNECTICUT DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, AND | | THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. THE NRC OPERATIONS CENTER NOTIFIED OTHER | | FEDERAL AGENCIES VIA FACSIMILE. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |FUEL CYCLE FACILITY | |EVENT NUMBER: 33707 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/12/98 | | RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:30 [ET]| |COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 02/12/98 | | 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 13:30[EST]| | BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/12/98 | | CITY: PIKETON REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+ | COUNTY: PIKE STATE: OH |PERSON ORGANIZATION| |LICENSE#: GDP-2 AGREEMENT: N |THOMAS KOZAK RDO | | DOCKET: 0707002 |CHARLEY HAUGHNEY EO | +------------------------------------------------+STUART RUBIN, AEOD IRD | |NRC NOTIFIED BY: ERIC SPAETH | | |HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | NRC 91-01 BULLETIN RESPONSE (24-HOUR REPORT) INVOLVING LOSS OF ONE CONTROL | | IN A DOUBLE CONTINGENCY MATRIX | | | | THE FOLLOWING TEXT IS A PORTION OF A FACSIMILE RECEIVED FROM PORTSMOUTH: | | | | "ON FEBRUARY 12, 1998, AT 1330, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT A NUCLEAR | | CRITICALITY SAFETY APPROVAL (NCSA) REQUIREMENT WAS NOT BEING MAINTAINED IN | | A BOUNDARY CONTROL STATION OF THE X-326 BUILDING. NCSA PLANT 018.A01, PART | | 'B,' REQUIREMENT #5, STATES THAT DRY ACTIVE WASTE (DAW) CONTAINERS WITH A | | CAPACITY OF 55 GALLONS OR LESS SHALL BE SPACED AT LEAST TWO (2) FEET | | EDGE-TO-EDGE FROM URANIUM-BEARING EQUIPMENT/MATERIAL. A 55-GALLON DAW | | CONTAINER WAS DISCOVERED LESS THAN THE TWO (2) FOOT MINIMUM SPACING FROM A | | CONTAMINATED LAUNDRY (PPE) BAG. THIS LOSS OF SPACING CONSTITUTES A LOSS OF | | ONE (1) CONTROL IN THE DOUBLE CONTINGENCY MATRIX FOR CONTINGENCY EVENT | | B.4.1. CONTROL 'B' (NO VISIBLE URANIUM AND DRUMS NOT STACKED) WAS | | MAINTAINED THROUGHOUT THIS EVENT. SPACING WAS IMMEDIATELY CORRECTED | | RE-ESTABLISHING CONTROL 'A.'" | | | | "THE LOSS OF ONE CONTROL IS REPORTABLE PER REPORTING REQUIREMENT NRC | | [BULLETIN] 91-01. THERE WAS NO LOSS OF HAZARDOUS/RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL OR | | RADIOACTIVE/RADIOLOGICAL CONTAMINATION EXPOSURE AS A RESULT OF THIS EVENT." | | | | PORTSMOUTH PERSONNEL INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR AND THE DEPARTMENT | | OF ENERGY SITE REPRESENTATIVE. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 33708 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: COOK REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/12/98 | |UNIT: [1] [2] [ ] STATE: MI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:10 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 02/12/98 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 15:45[EST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: MARK KELLY |LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/12/98 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |THOMAS KOZAK RDO | |ADAS 50.72(b)(2)(i) DEG/UNANALYZED COND | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N N 0 COLD SHUTDOWN | 0 COLD SHUTDOWN | | 2 | N N 0 COLD SHUTDOWN | 0 COLD SHUTDOWN | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | THE LICENSEE IDENTIFIED THROUGH TESTING THAT DAMAGED ICE CONDENSER ICE | | BASKETS MAY NOT BE ABLE TO WITHSTAND OPERATIONAL BASIS EARTHQUAKE AND DEAD | | WEIGHT LOADS. | | | | THE FOLLOWING TEXT IS A PORTION OF A FACSIMILE RECEIVED FROM THE LICENSEE: | | | | "A DAMAGED ICE CONDENSER ICE BASKET WAS REMOVED FROM THE UNIT 1 ICE | | CONDENSER, AND A SCOPING TEST [WAS] PERFORMED TO DETERMINE ITS ABILITY TO | | STRUCTURALLY WITHSTAND STATIC TEST LOADS EQUIVALENT TO THE OPERATIONAL | | BASIS EARTHQUAKE (OBE) AND ICE BASKET DEAD WEIGHT LOADS. FOR TEST | | QUALIFICATION PURPOSES, DEAD WEIGHT PLUS OBE LOADS ARE CONTROLLING." | | | | "WCAP 8304 SPECIFIES THAT THE ICE BASKET SHOULD BE ABLE TO WITHSTAND A | | LATERAL LOAD EQUIVALENT TO APPROXIMATELY 2,400 LBS DISTRIBUTED OVER THE | | BOTTOM 6 FEET OF THE ICE BASKET IN CONJUNCTION WITH A COMPRESSIVE LOAD OF | | 4,933 LBS." | | | | "THE SCOPING TEST RESULT SHOWED THAT THE DAMAGED ICE BASKET FAILED WITH | | PLASTIC DEFORMATION UNDER A DISTRIBUTED LATERAL LOAD OF APPROXIMATELY 2,400 | | LBS IN CONJUNCTION WITH A COMPRESSIVE LOAD OF APPROXIMATELY 2,000 LBS." | | | | "THIS ITEM WAS DISCOVERED DURING ON-SITE TESTING PERFORMED TO INVESTIGATE A | | DAMAGED ICE BASKET'S ABILITY TO MAINTAIN ITS STRUCTURAL CONFIGURATION UNDER | | ACCIDENT CONDITIONS. THIS ICE BASKET WAS SELECTED FOR TESTING DUE TO | | NOTICEABLE STRUCTURAL DAMAGE (BUCKLING TYPE FAILURE) NEAR THE BOTTOM OF THE | | BASKET." | | | | "THE ICE CONDENSERS ARE CURRENTLY INOPERABLE FOR PERFORMANCE OF MAINTENANCE | | WORK. [THE LICENSEE IS] EVALUATING THE TEST RESULTS AND ASSESSING BASKET | | DAMAGE IN BOTH UNITS TO DETERMINE THE APPROPRIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION." | | | | THE LICENSEE NOTIFIED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 33709 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: OCONEE REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/12/98 | |UNIT: [1] [2] [3] STATE: SC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:30 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-LP |EVENT DATE: 02/12/98 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 18:15[EST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: HENRY LOWERY |LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/13/98 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |ROBERT HAAG RDO | |AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | | |NLCO TECH SPEC LCO A/S | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N Y 65 POWER OPERATION | 65 POWER OPERATION | | 2 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | | 3 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | ALL BWST LEVEL INSTRUMENTS WERE DECLARED INOPERABLE PLACING ALL THREE UNITS | | IN A CONDITION OUTSIDE THE DESIGN BASIS. | | | | THE FOLLOWING TEXT IS A PORTION OF A FACSIMILE RECEIVED FROM THE LICENSEE: | | | | "FOLLOWING A [POSTULATED] LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT (LOCA) AT OCONEE (ONS), | | TO MAINTAIN REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) INVENTORY, THE EMERGENCY CORE | | COOLING SYSTEM (ECCS) TAKES ITS SUCTION FROM THE BORATED WATER STORAGE TANK | | (BWST). UPON DEPLETION OF THE BWST TO A SPECIFIED LEVEL [>2, <6 FEET], THE | | EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES INSTRUCT THE OPERATOR TO SWAP ECCS SUCTION | | TO THE REACTOR BUILDING EMERGENCY SUMP (RBES). THE BASIS FOR THE MINIMUM | | SWAPOVER BWST LEVEL IS TO ASSURE THAT THE ECCS PUMPS DO NOT LOSE SUCTION | | DUE TO VORTEXING IN THE BWST." | | | | "ON FEBRUARY 12, 1998, AT 1815 HOURS, AS A FOLLOWUP TO AN OPEN ITEM FROM A | | SELF-INITIATED TECHNICAL AUDIT OF THE HIGH PRESSURE INJECTION AND LOW | | PRESSURE INJECTION SYSTEMS, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE BWST LEVEL | | INSTRUMENTATION FOR ALL THREE ONS UNITS WAS CALIBRATED IN A NONCONSERVATIVE | | MANNER [ELEVATION ERROR]. THIS CALIBRATION RESULTED IN A BWST INDICATION A | | LEVEL OF ONE FOOT IN THE NONCONSERVATIVE DIRECTION. THEREFORE, UNDER | | CURRENT EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES, THE ECCS MAY NOT BE CAPABLE OF | | PERFORMING ITS SAFETY FUNCTION DURING THE TRANSITION TO SUMP RECIRCULATION. | | AS SUCH, ALL BWST LEVEL INSTRUMENTS WERE DECLARED INOPERABLE AT 1815 HOURS, | | AND TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.0 WAS ENTERED ON ALL THREE UNITS. PER | | TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.0, ALL THREE UNITS NEED TO BE IN HOT SHUTDOWN | | WITHIN 12 HOURS." | | | | "CURRENTLY, THE EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES ARE BEING REVISED TO REQUIRE | | THE OPERATOR TO SWAP SUCTION FROM THE BWST TO THE RBES AT A HIGHER | | INDICATED BWST LEVEL [>3, <7 FEET] TO ASSURE OPERABILITY OF THE ECCS IS | | MAINTAINED DURING A LOCA. IN ADDITION, THE BWST LEVEL INSTRUMENTS ON ALL | | THREE UNITS ARE BEING RECALIBRATED TO ELIMINATE THE ONE-FOOT ERROR." | | | | THE LICENSEE ANTICIPATES COMPLETION OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS PRIOR TO | | COMMENCING REACTOR SHUTDOWNS AND HAS INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | | | | * * * UPDATE AT 0437 ON FEBRUARY 13, 1998, FROM REGIS REPKO TO TROCINE * * | | | | THE LAST UNIT EXITED THE LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) FOR | | TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.0 AT 0222 ON FEBRUARY 13, 1998. A SUBSEQUENT | | 24-HOUR LCO WAS ENTERED FOR HAVING ONE TRAIN OF INSTRUMENTATION OUT OF | | SERVICE, AND THE LAST UNIT EXITED THIS LCO AT 0309 ON FEBRUARY 13, 1998. | | | | THE NRC OPERATIONS CENTER NOTIFIED THE R2DO (HAAG). | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 33710 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: CLINTON REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/13/98 | |UNIT: [1] [ ] [ ] STATE: IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 05:45 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] GE-6 |EVENT DATE: 02/13/98 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 04:11[CST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: RICH CHEAR |LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/13/98 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: ALERT +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |THOMAS KOZAK RDO | |AAEC 50.72(a)(1)(i) EMERGENCY DECLARED |BRUCE BOGER, NRR EO | | |JOSEPH GIITTER, AEOD RCT | | |STUART RUBIN, AEOD IRD | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N N 0 COLD SHUTDOWN | 0 COLD SHUTDOWN | | | | | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | ALERT DECLARED DUE TO A LOSS OF SHUTDOWN COOLING AND DESIRE TO ACTIVATE THE | | TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER AND OPERATIONAL SUPPORT CENTER FOR ADDITIONAL | | MANPOWER | | | | AT APPROXIMATELY 0345 CST, THE UNIT EXPERIENCED A LOSS OF NUCLEAR SAFETY | | PROTECTION SYSTEM (NSPS) DIVISION 2, AND THIS CAUSED ISOLATION OF THE | | SHUTDOWN COOLING SUCTION VALVES. AS A RESULT, THE LICENSEE ENTERED THE | | OFF-NORMAL PROCEDURE FOR RE-ESTABLISHING SHUTDOWN COOLING. THE LICENSEE | | DECLARED AN ALERT AT 0411 CST DUE TO A LOSS OF SHUTDOWN COOLING WHILE THE | | PLANT WAS IN COLD SHUTDOWN (MODE 4) AND DUE TO THE DESIRE OF THE SHIFT | | SUPERVISOR TO ACTIVATE THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER AND OPERATIONAL SUPPORT | | CENTER FOR ADDITIONAL MANPOWER PER PROCEDURE EC-02, STEP 13.6. | | | | THE LICENSEE NOTIFIED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR AND STATE AND LOCAL | | OFFICIALS. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+