U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Reports For 01/09/98 - 01/12/98 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** 33503 33507 33510 33511 33512 33513 33514 33515 33516 33517 !!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!! +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |FUEL CYCLE FACILITY | |EVENT NUMBER: 33503 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/07/98 | | RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:55 [ET]| |COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 01/07/98 | | 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 08:00[EST]| | BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 01/10/98 | | CITY: PIKETON REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+ | COUNTY: PIKE STATE: OH |PERSON ORGANIZATION| |LICENSE#: GDP-2 AGREEMENT: N |JOHN JACOBSON RDO | | DOCKET: 0707002 |LARRY CAMPER, NMSS EO | +------------------------------------------------+ | |NRC NOTIFIED BY: LARSON | | |HQ OPS OFFICER: DOUG WEAVER | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | | |NLTR LICENSEE 24 HR REPORT | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | BULLETIN 91-01 RESPONSE (24-HOUR REPORT) - LOSS OF ONE OF TWO REQUIRED | | CRITICALITY CONTROLS | | | | AT 0800 ON 01/07/98, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT A NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY | | APPROVAL (NCSA) REQUIREMENT WAS NOT BEING MET. IN THE DOUBLE CONTINGENCY | | CONTROL MATRIX OF NCSA_PLANT 045.A01, CONTROL 'A,' REQUIREMENT #5, WAS NOT | | MAINTAINED. A SMALL VACUUM PUMP WAS NOT PROPERLY STORED TWO FEET AWAY | | EDGE-TO-EDGE FROM OTHER URANIUM-BEARING EQUIPMENT OR CONTAINERS. UPON | | DISCOVERY, THE PUMP WAS CORRECTLY SPACED. CONTROL 'B' REQUIREMENTS WERE | | MAINTAINED THROUGHOUT THE EVENT. THIS LOSS OF SPACING VIOLATED ONE CONTROL | | OF THE DOUBLE CONTINGENCY CONTROL REQUIREMENTS. | | | | THE PORTSMOUTH INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | | | | * * * UPDATE AT 0828 ON 01/10/98 FROM SISLER RECEIVED BY TROCINE * * * | | | | PORTSMOUTH IS RETRACTING THIS EVENT NOTIFICATION BECAUSE IT WAS LATER | | DETERMINED THAT NCSA_PLANT 045.A01, CONTROL 'A,' REQUIREMENT #5, FOR | | SPACING WAS BEING MET. THIS CONTROL REQUIRED THAT URANIUM-BEARING | | CONTAINERS AND EQUIPMENT BE SPACED TWO FEET APART EDGE-TO-EDGE. IT WAS | | INITIALLY BELIEVED THAT THE SMALL VACUUM PUMP, WHICH IS CONSIDERED A | | URANIUM-BEARING CONTAINER, WAS SPACED LESS THAN TWO FEET AWAY FROM AN | | ASSEMBLY CONTAINING ANOTHER URANIUM-BEARING CONTAINER. EACH ASSEMBLY | | CONSISTED OF A MOTOR AND A VACUUM PUMP MOUNTED TO A BASE PLATE. ONE | | ASSEMBLY HAD BEEN REMOVED FROM A CABINET AND PLACED NEXT TO A SECOND | | ASSEMBLY PLACED INSIDE THE CABINET. THE TWO ASSEMBLIES WERE ALIGNED WITH | | THE MOTORS, WHICH WERE SPACED LESS THAN TWO FEET APART EDGE-TO-EDGE. | | HOWEVER, THE DISTANCE BETWEEN THE TWO VACUUM PUMPS WAS GREATER THAN TWO | | FEET. BECAUSE THE DISTANCE BETWEEN THE PUMPS WAS GREATER THAN TWO FEET AND | | BECAUSE THE MOTOR WAS NOT CONSIDERED TO BE A URANIUM-BEARING CONTAINER OR | | URANIUM-BEARING EQUIPMENT, PORTSMOUTH BELIEVES THAT THERE WAS NO LOSS OF | | ANY DOUBLE CONTINGENCY CONTROLS. | | | | PORTSMOUTH NOTIFIED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. THE NRC OPERATIONS CENTER | | NOTIFIED THE R3DO (CREED), NMSS EO (BELL), AND AEOD IRD (BARRETT). | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 33507 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: ZION REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/08/98 | |UNIT: [1] [2] [ ] STATE: IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 19:44 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 01/08/98 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 16:00[CST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: BASNER |LAST UPDATE DATE: 01/09/98 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |JOHN JACOBSON RDO | |AINB 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(B) POT RHR INOP | | |NLCO TECH SPEC LCO A/S | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N N 0 REFUELING | 0 REFUELING | | 2 | N N 0 COLD SHUTDOWN | 0 COLD SHUTDOWN | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | ALL FIVE UNIT 1 AND 2 EDGs WERE DECLARED INOPERABLE BUT FUNCTIONAL. | | | | THE LICENSEE DECLARED ALL FIVE UNIT 1 AND 2 EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS | | (EDG) INOPERABLE DUE TO A FAILURE TO TEST A CONTACT ASSOCIATED WITH THE EDG | | OUTPUT BREAKER AND THE ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE (ESF) BUS MAIN FEED | | BREAKER. THIS CONTACT IS DESIGNED TO ENSURE THAT THE EDG DOES NOT PARALLEL | | ITSELF WITH THE NON-ESF BUS. A PROCEDURE HAS BEEN WRITTEN TO TEST THE | | CONTACT. UNIT 2 HAS BEEN PLACED IN A 24-HOUR LIMITING CONDITION FOR | | OPERATION (LCO) TO DEPRESSURIZE THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM. THE SERVICE | | WATER, COMPONENT COOLING WATER, AND RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEMS FOR BOTH | | UNITS ARE INOPERABLE. ALL OFFSITE POWER SOURCES ARE AVAILABLE, AND ALL | | FIVE EDGs ARE FUNCTIONAL. | | | | THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | | | | * * * UPDATE AT 0124 ON 01/09/98 FROM GLENN KAHT ENTERED BY JOLLIFFE * * * | | | | THE LICENSEE SUCCESSFULLY TESTED BOTH UNIT 2 EDGs (#2A AND #2B) AND THE | | SWING EDG (#0). AT 0005 CST ON 01/09/98, THE LICENSEE DECLARED THE | | FOLLOWING EQUIPMENT/SYSTEMS OPERABLE: #2A EDG, #2B EDG, #0 EDG, SERVICE | | WATER SYSTEM, COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM, AND RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL | | SYSTEM. THE 24-HOUR LCO WAS ALSO EXITED AT THAT TIME. BOTH UNIT 1 EDGs | | (#1A AND #1B) ARE STILL INOPERABLE BUT FUNCTIONAL. | | | | THE LICENSEE PLANS TO INFORM THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. THE NRC | | OPERATIONS OFFICER NOTIFIED THE R3DO (JOHN JACOBSON). | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ !!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!! +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 33510 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: MCGUIRE REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/09/98 | |UNIT: [1] [ ] [ ] STATE: NC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:00 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 01/09/98 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 10:05[EST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: BRUCE CUNNINGHAM |LAST UPDATE DATE: 01/09/98 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |KENNETH BARR RDO | |ASHU 50.72(b)(1)(i)(A) PLANT S/D REQD BY TS | | |NLCO TECH SPEC LCO A/S | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | | | | | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | - LOSS OF UNIT 1 DRPI AND RPI ON THE OPERATOR AID COMPUTER FOR 15 SECONDS - | | | | AT 1005 ON 01/09/98, UNIT 1 LOST ALL DIGITAL ROD POSITION INDICATION AND | | CONTROL ROD POSITION INDICATION ON THE OPERATOR AID COMPUTER WITH THE UNIT | | AT 100% POWER AND WHILE SWAPPING POWER FROM THE ALTERNATE SOURCE TO THE | | NORMAL SOURCE ON A 600-VAC MOTOR CONTROL CENTER DURING MAINTENANCE | | ACTIVITIES. THE LICENSEE ENTERED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LIMITING | | CONDITION FOR OPERATION ACTION STATEMENT (LCO A/S) 3.0.3. | | | | FIFTEEN (15) SECONDS LATER, POWER WAS RESTORED TO THE DIGITAL ROD POSITION | | INDICATION AND THE CONTROL ROD POSITION INDICATION ON THE OPERATOR AID | | COMPUTER, AND THE LICENSEE EXITED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LCO A/S 3.0.3. A | | POWER REDUCTION WAS NOT STARTED. ALL SYSTEMS ARE IN NORMAL MODE. | | | | THE LICENSEE IS INVESTIGATING THE CAUSE OF THE POWER LOSS AND PLANS TO | | INFORM THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | | | | * * * UPDATE ON 01/09/98 AT 1523 FROM HUSSEY TO GOULD * * * | | | | THE LICENSEE IS RETRACTING THIS EVENT NOTIFICATION. THE RETRACTION IS | | BEING MADE BECAUSE THE PLANT DID NOT INITIATE A SHUTDOWN. IN ADDITION, | | DURING THE 15-SECOND INTERVAL, THE ROD DEMAND POSITION INDICATION SYSTEM | | WAS AVAILABLE AS AN ALTERNATE MEANS FOR ROD BANK LOCATION, AND THERE WAS NO | | INDICATION ROD MOVEMENT. WHEN THE DIGITAL ROD POSITION INDICATION RETURNED | | TO SERVICE, THE CONTROL AND SHUTDOWN BANKS WERE IN THE SAME LOCATION, AND | | THERE WERE NO OTHER INDICATIONS THAT ANY MOVEMENT OF CONTROL OR SHUTDOWN | | BANKS OCCURRED. AS SUCH, THE PLANT CONTINUED TO OPERATE WITHIN THE DESIGN | | BASIS AND WITHIN ANALYZED CONDITIONS. | | | | THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED BY THE LICENSEE. THE R2DO (BARR) | | WAS NOTIFIED BY THE NRC OPERATIONS CENTER. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 33511 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: POINT BEACH REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/09/98 | |UNIT: [ ] [2] [ ] STATE: WI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 12:49 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP |EVENT DATE: 01/09/98 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 10:00[CST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: ROSSEAU |LAST UPDATE DATE: 01/09/98 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |JOHN JACOBSON RDO | |ADAS 50.72(b)(2)(i) DEG/UNANALYZED COND | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | | | | | 2 | N N 0 COLD SHUTDOWN | 0 COLD SHUTDOWN | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | UNIT 2 CONTAINMENT ACCIDENT FAN MOTOR COOLER COOLING WATER (SERVICE WATER) | | FLOW RATES MAY BE BELOW THE MINIMUM DESIGN. (REFER TO EVENT #33516 FOR | | ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REGARDING UNIT 1.) | | | | THE LICENSEE HAS IDENTIFIED CONDITIONS, REGARDING FLOW RATES FOR UNIT 2 | | CONTAINMENT ACCIDENT FAN MOTOR COOLER (HEAT EXCHANGER) COOLING WATER, THAT | | INDICATE THAT AT LEAST ONE COOLER HAS BEEN OPERATED BELOW THE MINIMUM | | DESIGN FLOW RATE. THIS CONDITION IS THE RESULT OF COOLER SUPPLY AND RETURN | | PIPING FLOW LOSES NOT BEING ACCOUNTED FOR DUE TO THE DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE | | FLOW INDICATOR TAP LOCATIONS. WITH UNIT 2 IN COLD SHUTDOWN, THE COOLERS | | ARE NOT REQUIRED TO BE OPERABLE. | | | | PREPARATIONS ARE BEING MADE TO VERIFY UNIT 1 CONTAINMENT ACCIDENT FAN MOTOR | | COOLER FLOW RATES VIA ULTRASONIC TESTING INSTRUMENTATION. | | | | THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED BY THE LICENSEE. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 33512 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: PILGRIM REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/09/98 | |UNIT: [1] [ ] [ ] STATE: MA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:16 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] GE-3 |EVENT DATE: 01/09/98 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 13:30[EST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: PROBASCO |LAST UPDATE DATE: 01/09/98 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |LAURIE PELUSO RDO | |AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | | | | | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | DISCOVERY THAT SHUTDOWN COOLING SUCTION VALVES ARE VULNERABLE TO DAMAGE DUE | | TO HOT SHORTS | | | | AN EVALUATION (08/21/97) DETERMINED THAT THE SHUTDOWN COOLING SUCTION | | ISOLATION VALVES WERE VULNERABLE TO MECHANICAL DAMAGE FROM A POTENTIAL | | FAILURE MODE INVOLVING HOT SHORTS AND THAT THIS CONDITION WAS OUTSIDE THE | | DESIGN BASIS OF THE PLANT. THIS CONDITION COULD HAVE CAUSED A SPURIOUS | | OPERATION OF THESE MOTOR-OPERATED VALVES DURING A CONTROL ROOM OR CABLE | | SPREADING ROOM FIRE. THIS COULD RESULT IN DAMAGE TO EITHER OF THESE VALVES | | SUCH THAT THE SHUTDOWN COOLING MODE OF THE RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM | | WOULD NOT BE AVAILABLE TO SUPPORT THE SAFE SHUTDOWN OF THE PLANT. | | | | THE CAUSE OF THIS CONDITION WAS ATTRIBUTED TO THE INTRODUCTION OF A NEW | | FAILURE MODE IN NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 92-18. A TEMPORARY MODIFICATION TO | | DE-ENERGIZE BOTH VALVES BY OPENING THEIR RESPECTIVE BREAKERS TO REMOVE A | | POTENTIAL FAILURE MODE FOR A POSTULATED HOT SHORT TO DAMAGE EITHER VALVE | | WAS IMPLEMENTED ON 08/21/97. THIS EVENT WAS DETERMINED TO BE REPORTABLE ON | | 01/09/98 AT 1330. | | | | THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS INFORMED BY THE LICENSEE. THE LICENSEE ALSO | | PLANS TO INFORM THE STATE. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 33513 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: HARRIS REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/09/98 | |UNIT: [1] [ ] [ ] STATE: NC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:56 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] W-3-LP |EVENT DATE: 01/09/98 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 14:50[EST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: CASE |LAST UPDATE DATE: 01/09/98 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |KENNETH BARR RDO | |AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | | | | | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | DISCOVERY OF A CONDITION THAT WOULD PREVENT THE STEAM GENERATOR PREHEATER | | BYPASS ISOLATION VALVE FROM PERFORMING AS DESIGNED | | | | A POTENTIAL FAILURE MECHANISM EXISTS WHERE THE FAILURE OF THE NON-SAFETY | | INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM COULD RESULT IN THE INABILITY OF THE AIR-OPERATED | | STEAM GENERATOR PREHEATER BYPASS ISOLATION VALVE TO PERFORM AS DESIGNED. A | | FAILURE IN THE NON-SAFETY AIR SYSTEM COULD POTENTIALLY DEPRESSURIZE THE | | VALVE AND THE ACCUMULATOR TO LESS THAN 50 LBS, AND 50 LBS PRESSURE IS | | REQUIRED FOR A SHUTTLE VALVE TO ALLOW THE BYPASS ISOLATION VALVE TO CLOSE. | | THE PRESSURE SWITCH ASSOCIATED WITH THE ANTICIPATORY CLOSE CIRCUITRY WOULD | | NOT SEE THE PRESSURE DROP. THE CORRECTIVE MEASURES ARE STILL BEING | | EVALUATED. | | | | THE LICENSEE PLANS TO SUBMIT A JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED OPERATION AND TO | | NOTIFY THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |FUEL CYCLE FACILITY | |EVENT NUMBER: 33514 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/09/98 | | RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:52 [ET]| |COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 01/09/98 | | 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 15:00[CST]| | BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 01/09/98 | | CITY: PADUCAH REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+ | COUNTY: McCRACKEN STATE: KY |PERSON ORGANIZATION| |LICENSE#: GDP-1 AGREEMENT: Y |JAMES CREED RDO | | DOCKET: 0707001 |LARRY CAMPER/NMSS EO | +------------------------------------------------+RICHARD BARRETT/AEOD IRD | |NRC NOTIFIED BY: HALICKS | | |HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | | |NLTR LICENSEE 24 HR REPORT | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | BULLETIN 91-01 RESPONSE (24-HOUR REPORT) - LOSS OF ONE OF TWO REQUIRED | | CRITICALITY CONTROLS | | | | IT WAS DETERMINED THAT A REPORTABLE NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY (NCS) | | INCIDENT OCCURRED DUE TO VIOLATION OF ONE OF TWO CONTROLS REQUIRED FOR THE | | HANDLING OF POTENTIALLY FISSILE WASTE. THE PROCEDURE ADDRESSES THE USE OF | | SAMPLE TUBES FOR COLLECTING SMALL AMOUNTS OF URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE FROM THE | | ENRICHMENT CASCADE WITH ASSAYS GREATER THAN 1.0 wt% URANIUM-235. PART OF | | THE SAMPLING OPERATION INVOLVES THE REPLACEMENT OF A SMALL CONTAMINATED | | GASKET (APPROXIMATELY 1/4" IN DIAMETER). THE PROCEDURE DOES NOT ADDRESS | | HOW TO DISPOSE OF THE WASTE GASKETS, AND THEY HAVE ROUTINELY BEEN COLLECTED | | IN A SMALL CUP AND DISPOSED OF AS LOW-LEVEL WASTE WITH NO NCS CONTROLS. | | NCSA-GEN-15 REQUIRES THEM TO BE HANDLED AS POTENTIALLY FISSILE OR PROCESSED | | AS NCS-EXEMPT. | | | | THE DOUBLE CONTINGENCY WAS NOT SATISFIED; HOWEVER, THE GASKETS ARE SMALL | | AND MADE OF NEOPRENE WHICH PREVENTS A SIGNIFICANT AMOUNT OF URANIUM-235 | | FROM COLLECTING ON THEM. THEREFORE, THERE WAS NO POSSIBILITY OF A | | CRITICALITY. | | | | BECAUSE THERE WAS A SMALL AMOUNT OF URANIUM-235 ON THESE GASKETS AND | | BECAUSE THEY WERE DISPOSED OF WITH OTHER LOW-LEVEL WASTE SYSTEMS, THE | | HETEROGENEOUS MIXTURE WOULD NOT CONTAIN SIGNIFICANT AMOUNTS OF URANIUM. | | MASS WAS THE CONTROLLED PARAMETER, AND IT WAS CONTROLLED BY TWO MEANS | | INDEPENDENTLY. THE AMOUNT OF URANIUM WAS VERY SMALL, AND THE ENRICHMENT | | WAS A MAXIMUM OF 2.0 wt% URANIUM-235. | | | | DUE TO THE SMALL AMOUNT OF URANIUM PRESENT IN HETEROGENEOUS WASTE, THE | | POTENTIAL OF A CRITICALITY RESULTING FROM EXCEEDING THE MASS LIMIT FOR | | NCS-EXEMPT WASTE IS NOT LIKELY DUE TO THE LARGE VOLUME OF MATERIAL WHICH | | WOULD BE REQUIRED TO EXCEED THE SAFE-MASS LIMIT. THEREFORE, FAILURE TO | | INSPECT/SURVEY THE GASKETS AND PROCESS THEM PROPERLY WOULD NOT RESULT IN AN | | UNSAFE CONFIGURATION. | | | | CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INCLUDED PROPERLY DISPOSING OF THE CURRENT ACCUMULATION | | OF GASKETS IN A CONTAINER APPROVED FOR POTENTIALLY FISSILE WASTE. PADUCAH | | IS RECOMMENDING A PROCEDURE CHANGE TO INCLUDE GUIDANCE FOR HANDLING THE | | GASKETS AS POTENTIAL FISSILE WASTE. | | | | THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |FUEL CYCLE FACILITY | |EVENT NUMBER: 33515 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/10/98 | | RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 08:28 [ET]| |COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 01/09/98 | | 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 10:30[EST]| | BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 01/10/98 | | CITY: PIKETON REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+ | COUNTY: PIKE STATE: OH |PERSON ORGANIZATION| |LICENSE#: GDP-2 AGREEMENT: N |JAMES CREED RDO | | DOCKET: 0707002 |MIKE BELL/NMSS EO | +------------------------------------------------+RICHARD BARRETT/AEOD IRD | |NRC NOTIFIED BY: KURT SISLER | | |HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | | |NLTR LICENSEE 24 HR REPORT | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | BULLETIN 91-01 RESPONSE (24-HOUR REPORT) - LOSS OF ONE CRITICALITY CONTROL | | IN THE DOUBLE CONTINGENCY CONTROL MATRIX | | | | AT 1030 ON 01/09/98, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT A NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY | | APPROVAL (NCSA) REQUIREMENT WAS NOT BEING MAINTAINED IN AN AREA OF THE | | X-344 FACILITY WHERE '1S' SAMPLE CONTAINERS ARE STORED. NCSA-0344A006.A03, | | PART 'B,' REQUIREMENT #8, STATES THAT A MAXIMUM OF 50 '1S' SAMPLE | | CONTAINERS WITH <5% ENRICHMENT CAN BE STORED IN THIS AREA AT ANY GIVEN | | TIME. THIS REQUIREMENT WAS NOT MAINTAINED WHEN IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT >50 | | '1S' CONTAINERS WITH <5% ENRICHMENT WERE IN FACT STORED IN THIS AREA. | | VIOLATION OF THIS REQUIREMENT CONSTITUTES A LOSS OF CONTROL 'A' (MASS) IN | | THE DOUBLE CONTINGENCY CONTROL MATRIX FOR CONTINGENCY EVENT A/B.1.2. | | CONTROL 'B' (MODERATION) WAS MAINTAINED THROUGHOUT THIS EVENT. UPON | | DISCOVERY, CONTROL 'A' WAS IMMEDIATELY ESTABLISHED. | | | | HOO NOTES: THIS EVENT INVOLVED A TOTAL OF 77 '1S' CONTAINERS LOCATED IN 2 | | GROUPS WITHIN IN THE STORAGE AREA DESCRIBED BY THE NCSA. THESE 2 GROUPS | | WERE SPACED APPROXIMATELY 20 FEET APART. THE '1S' SAMPLE CONTAINERS IN THE | | X-344 FACILITY ARE RESTRICTED TO ó5% ENRICHMENT. THERE WAS NO LOSS OF | | HAZARDOUS/RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL OR RADIOACTIVE/RADIOLOGICAL CONTAMINATION | | EXPOSURE AS A RESULT OF THIS EVENT. | | | | PORTSMOUTH NOTIFIED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR AND A DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY | | SITE REPRESENTATIVE. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 33516 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: POINT BEACH REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/10/98 | |UNIT: [1] [ ] [ ] STATE: WI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:00 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP |EVENT DATE: 01/10/98 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 15:20[CST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: SCHROEDER |LAST UPDATE DATE: 01/11/98 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |JAMES CREED RDO | |AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | | |NLCO TECH SPEC LCO A/S | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N Y 98 POWER OPERATION | 98 POWER OPERATION | | | | | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | UNIT 1 CONTAINMENT ACCIDENT FAN MOTOR COOLER COOLING WATER FLOW RATES MAY | | BE BELOW THE MINIMUM DESIGN. (REFER TO EVENT #33511 FOR ADDITIONAL | | INFORMATION REGARDING UNIT 2.) | | | | AFTER IDENTIFYING THIS CONDITION IN UNIT 2, THE LICENSEE IDENTIFIED UNIT 1 | | AS HAVING A SIMILAR PROBLEM WITH THREE OF THE FOUR CONTAINMENT ACCIDENT FAN | | MOTOR COOLER COOLING WATER FLOW RATES. THE '1HX-15C' ACCIDENT FAN MOTOR | | COOLER WAS DETERMINED TO HAVE INSUFFICIENT SERVICE WATER FLOW ESTABLISHED | | TO IT RESULTING IN AN INOPERABLE CONDITION OF THE FAN. THIS CONDITION WAS | | THE RESULT OF HEAT EXCHANGER SUPPLY AND RETURN PIPING FLOW LOSES NOT BEING | | ACCOUNTED FOR IN THE ORIGINAL DESIGN AND INSTALLATION OF THE DIFFERENTIAL | | PRESSURE FLOW INDICATION. THE '1HX-15C' OUTLET THROTTLE VALVE HAS BEEN | | REPOSITIONED TO PROVIDE THE PROPER FLOW RATE BASED ON AN ULTRASONIC FLOW | | MEASUREMENT TO RESTORE OPERABILITY OF THIS HEAT EXCHANGER. THE '1HX-15D' | | HAS HAD ITS FLOW RATE CHECKED, AND IT IS CONSIDERED OPERABLE. HOWEVER, | | COOLERS '1HX-15A' AND '1HX-15B' STILL DO NOT HAVE ADEQUATE FLOW RATES AND | | ARE CONSIDERED INOPERABLE. THIS PLACES THE UNIT IN A 72-HOUR LIMITING | | CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO). THE LICENSEE IS CONTINUING TO INVESTIGATE | | THE FLOW RATES OF THE TWO INOPERABLE COOLERS. | | | | THE LICENSEE PLANS TO NOTIFY THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | | | | * * * UPDATE AT 0004 ON 01/11/98 FROM SCHROEDER RECEIVED BY TROCINE * * * | | | | THE '1HX-15A' AND '1HX-15B' ACCIDENT FAN MOTOR COOLER AS-FOUND FLOWS WERE | | INDETERMINATE. THE ULTRASONIC FLOW READINGS WERE NOT PROVIDING VALID | | RESULTS IN THE AS-FOUND CONDITIONS INDICATING THAT THESE TWO COOLERS MAY | | HAVE BEEN INOPERABLE. THE OUTLET THROTTLE VALVE ON '1HX-15A' HAS BEEN | | ADJUSTED TO PROVIDE THE PROPER FLOW RATE TO RESTORE OPERABILITY OF THIS | | HEAT EXCHANGER. THE '1HX-15B' MOTOR COOLER FLOW IS CURRENTLY BEING | | EVALUATED TO DETERMINE OPERABILITY. THE UNIT REMAINS IN THE 72-HOUR LCO | | DURING THIS EVALUATION WHICH MAY INCLUDE ADDITIONAL VALVE ADJUSTMENTS AND | | FLUSHING TO RESTORE OPERABILITY. | | | | THE LICENSEE PLANS TO NOTIFY THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. THE NRC | | OPERATIONS CENTER NOTIFIED THE R3DO (CREED). | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 33517 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: SAINT LUCIE REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/10/98 | |UNIT: [1] [ ] [ ] STATE: FL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 21:28 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] CE,[2] CE |EVENT DATE: 01/10/98 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 20:17[EST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: FIELDS |LAST UPDATE DATE: 01/10/98 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |KENNETH BARR RDO | |ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii) RPS ACTUATION | | |AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | M/R Y 60 POWER OPERATION | 0 HOT STANDBY | | | | | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | THE REACTOR WAS MANUALLY TRIPPED FROM 60% POWER DUE TO A PROBLEM WITH THE | | MAIN TURBINE HYDRAULIC CONTROL SYSTEM. | | | | THE REACTOR WAS MANUALLY TRIPPED PRIOR TO RECEIVING THE TURBINE/REACTOR | | TRIP SIGNAL WHEN A FAILURE INDICATION OF THE MAIN TURBINE HYDRAULIC CONTROL | | SYSTEM WAS NOTICED. ALL CONTROL ELEMENT ASSEMBLIES FULLY INSERTED, NO | | SAFETY INJECTIONS OCCURRED, AND NO SAFETY VALVES LIFTED. AUXILIARY | | FEEDWATER AUTOMATICALLY STARTED, BUT IT HAS SINCE BEEN SECURED AND RESET. | | THE PLANT IS STABLE IN HOT STANDBY WITH THE STEAM BYPASS CONTROL SYSTEM AS | | THE HEAT SINK. THE LICENSEE CURRENTLY BELIEVES THAT THE CAUSE WAS A MINOR | | DIGITAL ELECTRONIC HYDRAULIC FLUID LEAK FROM THE TURBINE TRIP TEST BLOCK | | WHICH RAPIDLY INCREASED DUE TO A POSSIBLE FAILED O-RING. (THE LEAK WAS | | NOTED ON 01/09/98 AND WAS SUBSEQUENTLY MONITORED.) THE LICENSEE IS STILL | | INVESTIGATING THE ROOT CAUSE. | | | | THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS INFORMED BY THE LICENSEE. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+