U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Reports For 10/22/97 - 10/23/97 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** 32943 32988 33061 33123 33129 33130 33131 33132 33133 !!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!! +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 32943 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: PALO VERDE REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/17/97 | |UNIT: [ ] [2] [ ] STATE: AZ |NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:34 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE |EVENT DATE: 09/17/97 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 03:40[MST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: DAN MARKS |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/22/97 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |WILLIAM JOHNSON RDO | |AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | | | | | 2 | N N 0 REFUELING | 0 REFUELING | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | - LOAD SEQUENCER SHED LOADS FROM 4.16 KV BUS FOR UNKNOWN REASONS - | | | | UNIT 2 IS IN MODE 6 (REFUELING) IN A REFUELING OUTAGE WITH THE FUEL IN | | THE SPENT FUEL POOL. THE 'A' TRAIN OF THE SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING SYSTEM | | IS IN SERVICE MAINTAINING NORMAL POOL TEMPERATURES. THE 'B' 4.16 KV | | CLASS 1E BUS HAD BEEN DECLARED INOPERABLE BUT WAS STILL ENERGIZED. THE | | 'B' EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR IS INOPERABLE FOR MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES. | | | | AT 0340 (MST), THE 'B' LOAD SEQUENCER SHED THE ELECTRICAL LOADS FROM THE | | ENERGIZED 'B' 4.16 KV CLASS 1E BUS FOR UNKNOWN REASONS. THE 'B' EDG DID | | NOT START SINCE IT WAS INOPERABLE. THE 'B' TRAIN OF THE FUEL BUILDING | | ESSENTIAL VENTILATION SYSTEM WAS ONE OF THE ELECTRICAL LOADS THAT WAS SHED | | FROM THE BUS. | | | | TECH SPEC LCO A/S 3.9.12.(a) REQUIRES THE LICENSEE TO RESTORE THE 'B' TRAIN | | OF THE FUEL BUILDING ESSENTIAL VENTILATION SYSTEM TO OPERABLE STATUS WITHIN | | 7 DAYS. | | | | THIS EVENT DID NOT RESULT IN ANY CHALLENGES TO THE FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER | | OR ANY RELEASES OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS. THERE WERE NO ADVERSE SAFETY | | CONSEQUENCES OR IMPLICATIONS AS A RESULT OF THIS EVENT. THIS EVENT DID NOT | | ADVERSELY AFFECT THE SAFE OPERATION OF THE PLANT OR HEALTH AND SAFETY OF | | THE PUBLIC. | | | | THE LICENSEE IS INVESTIGATING THE ROOT CAUSE OF THIS EVENT. | | | | THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | | | | * * * UPDATE AT 1530 ON 10/22/97, BY ROBERSON, TAKEN BY WEAVER * * * | | THE LICENSEE IS RETRACTING THIS EVENT. | | | | APS HAS DETERMINED THAT THE TRAIN B ESFAS LOAD SEQUENCER SENSED A FALSE | | LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER AND INITIATED A LOAD SHED OF PBB-SO4. THIS OCCURRED | | FOLLOWING THE REMOVAL OF AC POWER FROM THE TRAIN B ESFAS CABINET WHICH | | DEENERGIZED BOTH EXTERNAL CABINET COOLING FANS. ALTERNATE COOLING FAILED | | TO SUPPLY ADEQUATE FORCED AIR COOLING AND THE LOAD SEQUENCER MODULE | | LOCKED-UP. | | | | APS HAS EVALUATED THE EVENT AND DETERMINED THAT THE ESF ACTUATION WAS | | INVALID AND OCCURRED WHILE THE SYSTEM (TRAIN B BUS AND EDG-B) WAS PROPERLY | | REMOVED FROM SERVICE. THEREFORE, THE EVENT IS NOT REPORTABLE UNDER 10 CFR | | 50.72 OR 50.73. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 32988 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: COOK REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/25/97 | |UNIT: [1] [2] [ ] STATE: MI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:11 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 09/25/97 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 08:45[EDT]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: AMY OLVERA |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/22/97 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: DOUG WEAVER +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |MONTE PHILLIPS RDO | |ADAS 50.72(b)(2)(i) DEG/UNANALYZED COND | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N N 0 COLD SHUTDOWN | 0 COLD SHUTDOWN | | 2 | N N 0 COLD SHUTDOWN | 0 COLD SHUTDOWN | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | NON-SAFETY RELATED AIR HEADERS LACK OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION. | | | | DURING AN ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEERING INSPECTION, A QUESTION WAS RAISED | | REGARDING THE LACK OF OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION ON THE 20, 50, AND 85-PSIG | | CONTROL AIR HEADERS. THE SPECIFIC CONCERN IS THE POTENTIAL FOR COMMON MODE | | FAILURE OF BOTH TRAINS OF SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT SERVED BY THE AIR | | HEADERS. THE OVERPRESSURE CONDITION IS POSTULATED TO BE CAUSED BY | | REGULATOR FAILURE. | | | | ALTHOUGH SYSTEM REVIEWS HAVE FOUND NO COMPONENT FAILURE MODE WHICH WOULD | | RESULT IN THE DEVICES BEING INCAPABLE OF GOING TO THEIR FAIL-SAFE POSITION, | | A DESIGN CHANGE PACKAGE HAS BEEN PREPARED TO PROVIDE OVERPRESSURE | | PROTECTION ON THE 20, 50 AND 85 PSIG HEADERS. | | | | THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | | | | * * * 1532 OCTOBER 3, 1997, UPDATE FROM OLVERA RECEIVED BY TROCINE * * * | | | | THE LICENSEE PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING EVENT NOTIFICATION UPDATE: | | | | THE ORIGINAL REPORT IDENTIFIED THAT THERE WAS A LACK OF OVERPRESSURE | | PROTECTION ON THE 20, 50, AND 85-PSIG CONTROL AIR HEADERS. UPON FURTHER | | INVESTIGATION OF THIS MATTER, THE LICENSEE HAS IDENTIFIED 22 VALVES ON AIR | | HEADERS WHICH SUPPLY AIR AT A PRESSURE EXCEEDING THE PRESSURE RATINGS OF | | THE VALVE ACTUATORS. TWENTY OF THESE VALVES HAVE ACTUATORS THAT ARE RATED | | FOR 45 PSIG AND ARE ON AIR HEADERS SUPPLYING AIR AT 50 PSIG. TWO VALVES | | HAVE ACTUATORS RATED FOR 55 PSIG AND ARE ON HEADERS SUPPLYING AIR AT 85 | | PSIG. | | | | THE 20 VALVES ON THE 50-PSIG HEADERS ARE ALL FROM THE SAME MANUFACTURER | | WHICH HAS TESTED THIS TYPE OF VALVE TO 60 PSIG. THESE VALVES WILL REMAIN | | ON THEIR CURRENT HEADERS. THE 2 VALVES ON THE 85-PSIG HEADERS WILL EITHER | | BE PLACED ON 50-PSIG HEADERS OR A REGULATOR WILL BE INSTALLED PRIOR TO UNIT | | STARTUP. | | | | THE LICENSEE NOTIFIED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. THE NRC OPERATIONS | | CENTER NOTIFIED THE R3DO (JACOBSON). | | | | * * * UPDATE AT 1413 ON 10/17/97 BY OLVERA, TAKEN BY WEAVER * * * | | | | THIS UPDATE APPLIES TO THE FIRST UPDATE ONLY AND NOT THE ORIGINAL REPORT. | | VENDOR INFORMATION SHOWS THAT THE 20 VALVES RATED FOR 45 PSIG BUT PLACED ON | | 50 PSIG HEADERS WERE ACTUALLY TESTED BY THE VENDOR AT 60 PSIG. | | | | THE MAINTENANCE AND TESTING RECORDS FOR THE REMAINING 2 VALVES, WHICH ARE | | RATED FOR 55 PSIG AND PLACED ON 85 PSIG HEADERS, WERE REVIEWED. THESE | | VALVES ARE 1-CCR-441 AND 1-ZRV-11. | | | | 1-CCR-441 SUPPLIES COOLING WATER TO 2 CONTAINMENT PENETRATIONS AND IS | | REQUIRED TO CLOSE FOR CONTAINMENT ISOLATION. THE MAINTENANCE RECORDS | | SHOWED THAT THIS VALVE HAS EXPERIENCED DIAPHRAGM FAILURE. EACH FAILURE | | RESULTED IN THE VALVE GOING TO ITS CLOSED (SAFE) POSITION. | | | | 1-ZRV-11 IS A 3-WAY VALVE THAT, WHEN OPEN ALLOWS FIRE PROTECTION WATER TO | | FLOW TO THE SPRINKLER HEADS FOR CHARCOAL FILTERS IN A VENTILATION UNIT. | | WHEN CLOSED, THE VALVE BLOCKS WATER FLOW AND ALLOWS THE SPRINKLER SYSTEM TO | | DRAIN. THE VALVE IS A NORMALLY CLOSED, AIR-TO-OPEN COMPONENT DESIGNED TO | | FAIL CLOSED. 1-ZRV-11 DOES NOT SEE THE 85 PSIG AIR PRESSURE ON A | | CONTINUOUS BASIS. AN UPSTREAM SOLENOID VALVE 1-ZRV-11 ONLY ALLOWS AIR | | PRESSURE TO THE DIAPHRAGM ON INDICATION OF HIGH TEMPERATURE IN THE CHARCOAL | | BED. THIS VALVE HAS NO HISTORY OF PROBLEMS DURING ITS SCHEDULED TESTS | | AND HAS HAD NO HISTORY OF FAILURE. BOTH OF THESE VALVES WILL BE PLACED | | ON 50 PSIG HEADERS PRIOR TO RESTART. | | | | THE LICENSEE HAS CONCLUDED THAT THE VALVES WITH AIR PRESSURE EXCEEDING THE | | VALVE ACTUATOR'S RATING DO NOT CONSTITUTE UNANALYZED CONDITIONS WHICH | | SIGNIFICANTLY IMPACT PLANT SAFETY. THEREFORE, THE FIRST EVENT UPDATE IS | | RETRACTED. THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. THE HOO | | INFORMED THE R3DO (MCCORMICKBARGER). | | | | * * * UPDATE AT 1648 ON 10/22/97, BY OLVERA, TAKEN BY WEAVER * * * | | | | ANALYSIS OF THE OVERPRESSURIZATION OF THE CONTROL AIR HEADERS HAS BEEN | | COMPLETED. THE RESULTS ARE AS FOLLOWS: | | | | OVERPRESSURIZATION OF THE 85# HEADERS INSIDE AND OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT IN | | EITHER UNIT WOULD RESULT IN NO SIGNIFICANT SAFETY EFFECT. IT WAS | | DETERMINED THAT EITHER THE VULNERABLE VALVES WERE NORMALLY IN THE VENTED | | POSITION AND WOULD NOT SEE THE EXCESSIVE AIR PRESSURE, THE VALVES ARE | | ALLOWED A ONE-TIME PRESSURE EXCURSION TO 125# BY THE MANUFACTURER, OR THE | | VALVES WOULD SEE THE EXCESSIVE AIR PRESSURE WHICH WOULD RESULT IN DIAPHRAGM | | FAILURE AND THE VALVES WOULD GO TO THEIR SAFE POSITION. | | | | OVERPRESSURIZATION THE 50# HEADER IN EITHER UNIT INSIDE CONTAINMENT WOULD | | RESULT IN NO SIGNIFICANT SAFETY EFFECTS. THE VULNERABLE VALVES ARE | | NORMALLY IN THE VENTED POSITION AND WOULD NOT SEE THE EXCESSIVE AIR | | PRESSURE. THIS IS NOT CONSIDERED SAFETY SIGNIFICANT. | | | | OVERPRESSURIZATION OF THE 50# HEADER OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT IN EITHER UNIT | | WOULD RESULT IN THE RUPTURE OF MANY VALVE ACTUATOR DIAPHRAGMS CAUSING THE | | VALVES TO GO TO THEIR SAFE POSITION. HOWEVER, SOME OF THESE VALVE CLOSURES | | WOULD RESULT IN A UNIT TRIP SIMILAR TO THE LOSS OF CONTROL AIR SCENARIO. | | THIS IS NOT CONSIDERED SAFETY SIGNIFICANT. | | | | OVERPRESSURIZATION OF THE 20# HEADER IN EITHER UNIT WOULD LIKELY RESULT IN | | A UNIT TRIP AND COULD POTENTIALLY RESULT IN THE PARTIAL MIS-POSITIONING OF | | VALVES INCLUDING BOTH TRAINS OF RHR SYSTEM BEING INOPERABLE FOR THE | | DURATION OF THE OVERPRESSURE EVENT. THE PROBABILITY OF THIS EVENT | | OCCURRING DURING A PERIOD WHEN THE RHR VALVES ARE NEEDED TO BE FULL OPEN IS | | CONSIDERED REMOTE. | | | | IN CONCLUSION, WE HAVE DETERMINED THAT THE OVERPRESSURIZATION OF THE 50 AND | | 85# HEADERS WOULD BE OF NO SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE. OVERPRESSURIZATION OF THE | | 20# HEADER WOULD HAVE MODERATE SIGNIFICANCE DUE TO THE LOSS OF BOTH TRAINS | | OF RHR FOR THE DURATION OF THE OVERPRESSURE EVENT. OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION | | IS BEING INSTALLED ON THE 20, 50 AND 85 # HEADERS. THIS WILL BE COMPLETED | | PRIOR TO RESTART. | | | | THE LICENSEE NOTIFIED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. THE HOO NOTIFIED THE | | R3DO (WRIGHT). | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ !!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!! +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 33061 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: PERRY REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/10/97 | |UNIT: [1] [ ] [ ] STATE: OH |NOTIFICATION TIME: 07:56 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] GE-6 |EVENT DATE: 10/10/97 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 07:00[EDT]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: MARK MLACHAK |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/22/97 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |BRENT CLAYTON RDO | |AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N N 0 REFUELING | 0 REFUELING | | | | | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | REACTOR WATER CLEANUP ISOLATION DUE TO A PERSONNEL ERROR DURING THE | | PERFORMANCE OF A LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER (LOOP) TEST | | | | DURING THE PERFORMANCE OF A DIVISION 1 LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER TEST, THE LEAK | | DETECTION BYPASS SWITCH FOR REACTOR WATER CLEANUP WAS IN THE 'NORMAL' | | POSITION INSTEAD OF THE 'BYPASS' POSITION AS REQUIRED BY THE TEST. AS A | | RESULT, WHEN THE LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER SIGNAL WAS INITIATED, THE REACTOR | | WATER CLEANUP SYSTEM ISOLATED. ALL SYSTEMS FUNCTIONED AS REQUIRED, AND | | THERE WAS NOTHING UNUSUAL OR MISUNDERSTOOD. REACTOR WATER CLEANUP HAS | | SINCE BEEN RESTORED TO NORMAL OPERATION, AND THE LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER TEST | | HAS BEEN RE-COMMENCED. | | | | THE LICENSEE NOTIFIED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | | | | ***UPDATE AT 0553 ON 10/22/97 BY STETSON TO GOULD*** THE LICENSEE IS | | RETRACTING THIS EVENT SINCE THEY HAVE DETERMINED THE SYSTEM ACTUATION WAS | | INVALID, THEREFORE NOT REPORTABLE. | | | | THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED. | | | | RDO 3(WRIGHT) WAS NOTIFIED. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |FUEL CYCLE FACILITY | |EVENT NUMBER: 33123 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/20/97 | | RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 21:05 [ET]| |COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 10/20/97 | | 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 11:30[EDT]| | BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/22/97 | | CITY: PIKETON REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+ | COUNTY: PIKE STATE: OH |PERSON ORGANIZATION| |LICENSE#: GDP-2 AGREEMENT: N |GEOFFREY WRIGHT RDO | | DOCKET: 0707002 |MARGARET FEDERLINE EO | +------------------------------------------------+ | |NRC NOTIFIED BY: GREG BARCH | | |HQ OPS OFFICER: DOUG WEAVER | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |OCBB 76.120(c)(2)(ii) EQUIP DISABLED/FAILS | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | TWO CELLS HAD TEMPERATURES LOWER THAN ALLOWED. | | | | AT 1130 ON 10/20/97, OPERATIONS PERSONNEL DISCOVERED THAT CELL 33-2-10, | | LOCATED IN THE X-333 PROCESS BUILDING WAS NOT IN COMPLIANCE WITH NUCLEAR | | CRITICALITY SAFETY APPROVAL (NCSA) IN THAT THE THE CELL COOLANT TEMPERATURE | | WAS LESS THAN THE MINIMUM SAFE VALUE CONTAINED IN THE NCSA. BUILDING | | MANAGEMENT HAD OPERATIONS PERSONNEL CHECK RUNNING CELLS WITH SIMILAR | | OPERATING CONDITIONS TO SEE IF ANY OTHER CELLS WERE NOT IN COMPLIANCE WITH | | THE NCSA REQUIREMENTS. AT 1300, OPERATIONS PERSONNEL DISCOVERED THAT CELL | | 33-3-2 WAS ALSO OUT OF COMPLIANCE WITH LESS THAN THE MINIMUM SAFE COOLANT | | TEMPERATURE REQUIRED IN THE NCSA. PER THE NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY GROUP | | AND THE NCSA 00333-015.AO00, THIS NONCOMPLIANCE CONSTITUTES A LOSS OF A | | SINGLE CONTROL (CONTINGENCY) IN A DOUBLE CONTROL (CONTINGENCY) SYSTEM. THIS | | CONTROL IS IN PLACE TO PREVENT A FREEZE-OUT OF UF6 MATERIAL. OPERATIONS | | MONITORING SHOW NO DEPOSITS IN EITHER CELL. AS A RESULT OF THE NCSA | | NONCOMPLIANCE. THERE WAS NO RELEASE OF HAZARDOUS MATERIAL OR RADIOLOGICAL | | CONTAMINATION EXPOSURE ASSOCIATED WITH THIS EVENT. THE NRC RESIDENT HAS | | BEEN INFORMED OF THIS EVENT. THIS EVENT IS BEING REPORTED PER NUCLEAR | | REGULATORY EVENT REPORTING PROCEDURE UE2-RA-RE1030, APPENDIX D, CRITERIA A, | | PARAGRAPH 4a. | | | | * * * UPDATE AT 1404 ON 10/22/97, BY CRABTREE, TAKEN BY WEAVER * * * | | | | THREE ADDITIONAL CELLS HAD CELL COOLANT TEMPERATURES WHICH WERE LOWER THAN | | THE MINIMUM SAFE TEMPERATURE AS DEFINED IN THE NCSA. THIS NONCOMPLIANCE | | CONSTITUTES THE LOSS OF ONE NCS CONTROL IN A 2 CONTROL SYSTEM. THERE IS NO | | EVIDENCE OF UF6 FREEZE OUT OR FORMATION OF DEPOSITS IN ANY OF THE THREE | | CELLS AS A RESULT OF THIS NCSA NON-COMPLIANCE. | | | | THE CAUSE OF THE LOW CELL TEMPERATURES HAS BEEN TO BE OPERATOR ERROR IN | | DETERMINING THE CORRECT TEMPERATURE SETTINGS. SPECIFICALLY, OPERATORS HAVE | | BEEN INCORRECTLY APPLYING A CORRECTION FACTOR RELATED TO THE DIFFERENCE | | BETWEEN THE COMPRESSOR SUCTION AND DISCHARGE PRESSURES. | | | | THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. THE HOO INFORMED THE | | R3DO (WRIGHT) AND THE NMSS EO (GREEVES) AND IRD (GIITER). | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |FUEL CYCLE FACILITY | |EVENT NUMBER: 33129 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/22/97 | | RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:04 [ET]| |COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 10/21/97 | | 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 15:30[EDT]| | BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/22/97 | | CITY: PIKETON REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+ | COUNTY: PIKE STATE: OH |PERSON ORGANIZATION| |LICENSE#: GDP-2 AGREEMENT: N |GEOFFREY WRIGHT RDO | | DOCKET: 0707002 |JOHN GREEVES EO | +------------------------------------------------+JOSEPH GIITTER IRD | |NRC NOTIFIED BY: RON CRABTREE | | |HQ OPS OFFICER: DOUG WEAVER | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY (NCS) REQUIREMENT NOT MET | | | | THE NCSA FOR THE X-710 LAB FACILITY (UF6 DUMPING AREA STEAM BATH LOCATIONS) | | HAS TWO NCS CONTROLS. THE FIRST CONTROL REQUIRES AT LEAST NINE INCHES OF | | SPACING BETWEEN STEAM BATH CONTAINERS, AND THE SECOND CONTROL REQUIRES THE | | AVERAGE U235 ENRICHMENT IN THE DUMP CYLINDER TO BE LESS THAN 8 WT %. THE | | FIRST CONTROL WAS VIOLATED WHEN THE STEAM BATH CONTAINERS WERE DISCOVERED | | TO BE SPACED LESS THAN THE REQUIRED 9 INCHES (2 1/2" - 8"). THE SECOND | | CONTROL WAS MAINTAINED THROUGHOUT THIS EVENT. THERE WAS NO RELEASE OF | | HAZARDOUS MATERIALS OR RADIOLOGICAL CONTAMINATION EXPOSURE ASSOCIATED WITH | | THIS EVENT. PROPER SPACING HAS BEEN RE-ESTABLISHED. EVERY OTHER STEAM | | BATH CONTAINER LOCATION HAS BEEN TAGGED OUT TO PREVENT REOCCURRENCE. | | | | THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR HAS BEEN INFORMED OF THIS REPORT. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |FUEL CYCLE FACILITY | |EVENT NUMBER: 33130 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/22/97 | | RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:14 [ET]| |COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 10/21/97 | | 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 23:21[CDT]| | BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/22/97 | | CITY: PADUCAH REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+ | COUNTY: McCRACKEN STATE: KY |PERSON ORGANIZATION| |LICENSE#: GDP-1 AGREEMENT: Y |GEOFFREY WRIGHT RDO | | DOCKET: 0707001 |JOHN GREEVES EO | +------------------------------------------------+ | |NRC NOTIFIED BY: MIKE UNDERWOOD | | |HQ OPS OFFICER: DOUG WEAVER | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |NCFR NON CFR REPORT REQMNT | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | AUTOCLAVE ISOLATED ON HIGH STEAM PRESSURE | | | | THE STEAM PRESSURE CONTROL SYSTEM ACTUATED ON AUTOCLAVE 3 SOUTH IN C-333-A | | AT 2305 ON 10/21/97. ACTUATION OF THE STEAM PRESSURE CONTROL SYSTEM | | RESULTS IN THE AUTOMATIC CLOSURE OF THE STEAM VALVES SERVING THE AUTOCLAVE. | | | | AUTOCLAVE 3 SOUTH WAS THE SUBJECT OF ANOTHER EVENT REPORT BECAUSE OF A UF6 | | LEAK, REPORTED TO THE NRC ON 10/7/97. THIS AUTOCLAVE HAD BEEN SHUTDOWN AND | | WAS RESTARTED A FEW HOURS PRIOR TO THIS EVENT. | | | | SYSTEMS ENGINEERING IS INVESTIGATING THE ACUTATION. | | | | THE NRC RESIDENT HAS BEEN INFORMED OF THE EVENT. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 33131 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: SUSQUEHANNA REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/22/97 | |UNIT: [1] [2] [ ] STATE: PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:00 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 10/22/97 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 16:30[EDT]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: JERRY RADISHOFSKI |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/22/97 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: DOUG WEAVER +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |CURTIS COWGILL RDO | |AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | | 2 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | POTENTIAL FOR SUPPRESSION POOL TO BE BYPASSED DURING A LOCA | | | | CONTROL CABLING FOR BOTH DRYWELL AND SUPPRESSION CHAMBER PURGE INBOARD | | ISOLATION VALVES IS CONTAINED IN THE SAME RACEWAY. DUE TO A POSTULATED | | SINGLE FAILURE BOTH ISOLATION VALVES COULD ENERGIZE OPEN, ALLOWING THE | | DRYWELL AND SUPPRESSION CHAMBER ATMOSPHERES TO COMMUNICATE THROUGH A 6" | | LINE FOLLOWING A POSTULATED LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT (LOCA). | | | | THIS SINGLE FAILURE CONDITION WOULD RESULT IN BYPASS LEAKAGE OF THE | | POSTULATED LOCA ENVIRONMENT AROUND THE SUPPRESSION POOL, THUS LOSING THE | | BENEFITS OF BOTH THE QUENCHING OF THE BLOWDOWN ENERGY AND THE SCRUBBING OF | | ANY FISSION PRODUCTS. THIS SEQUENCE WOULD ALSO LEAD TO AN | | OVERPRESSURIZATION OF THE CONTAINMENT BEYOND THE DESIGN REQUIREMENTS, AND | | CONSEQUENTLY RADIATION RELEASES COULD EXCEED THE PRESENTLY ANALYZED LIMITS | | FOR COMPLIANCE TO 10 CFR 100. | | | | AIR SUPPLY WILL BE REMOVED FROM THE SUBJECT VALVE WHICH WILL RENDER THEM | | DEACTIVATED CLOSED IN PLACE. THIS WILL IN TURN ENSURE PRIMARY CONTAINMENT | | INTEGRITY IN ACCORDANCE WITH TECH SPECS. | | | | THE LICENSEE HAS NOTIFIED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 33132 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: DIABLO CANYON REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/22/97 | |UNIT: [1] [2] [ ] STATE: CA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:19 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 10/22/97 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 15:00[PDT]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: BRUCE LEWIS |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/22/97 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: DOUG WEAVER +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |DALE POWERS RDO | |AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | | 2 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | ATWS BLOCKING SETPOINTS SET NONCONSERVATIVELY | | | | PG&E HAS DETERMINED THAT THE EXISTING SETPOINTS FOR AUTOMATICALLY BLOCKING | | ATWS MITIGATING SYSTEM ACTUATION CIRCUITRY (AMSAC) ACTUATION ON BOTH UNITS | | IS NON-CONSERVATIVE, AND THEREFORE A CONDITION OUTSIDE THE DESIGN BASIS OF | | THE PLANT. | | | | DURING THE REVIEW OF AMSAC DESIGN DOCUMENTS AS A RESULT OF A CONDITION | | PREVIOUSLY REPORTED BY OTHER UTILITIES, PG&E DETERMINED THAT THERE WAS A | | DISCREPANCY BETWEEN THE PG&E AMSAC SUBMITTAL AND THE NRC AMSAC SER. | | SPECIFICALLY, THE AMSAC C-20 INTERLOCK IS SET TO ENABLE AMSAC AT 40% | | TURBINE POWER RATHER THAN AT 40% REACTOR THERMAL POWER AS STATED IN THE NRC | | AMSAC SER. DIABLO CANYON DOES NOT HAVE AN ANALYSIS THAT DETERMINES THE | | EFFECT OF VOIDING IN THE REACTOR VESSEL AT 48 % THERMAL POWER, WHICH | | CORRESPONDS TO 40 PERCENT TURBINE POWER. THUS, IT HAS BEEN DETERMINED THAT | | THE EXISTING C-20 INTERLOCK SETPOINT FOR AUTOMATICALLY BLOCKING/ENABLING | | AMSAC ACTUATION ON BOTH UNITS IS NON-CONSERVATIVE. THIS CONDITION HAS THE | | EFFECT OF NOT PERMITTING AN AMSAC ACTUATION UNTIL INCREASING ABOVE | | APPROXIMATELY 48 % REACTOR THERMAL POWER INSTEAD OF THE REQUIRED 40% | | REACTOR THERMAL POWER. THIS CONDITION HAS EXISTED SINCE INITIAL AMSAC | | INSTALLATION. | | | | BOTH UNITS' AMSAC SYSTEMS ARE CONSIDERED INOPERABLE. EQUIPMENT CONTROL | | GUIDELINE 4.1 HAS BEEN ENTERED, WHICH PERMITS 7 DAYS TO RESTORE AMSAC. THE | | LICENSEE WILL INFORM THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 33133 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: ZION REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/22/97 | |UNIT: [1] [2] [ ] STATE: IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 19:09 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 10/22/97 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 16:30[CDT]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: LANE OBEREMBT |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/22/97 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: DOUG WEAVER +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |GEOFFREY WRIGHT RDO | |AINA 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(A) POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N N 0 REFUELING | 0 REFUELING | | 2 | N N 0 COLD SHUTDOWN | 0 COLD SHUTDOWN | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | CONTROL ROOM HABITABILITY ASSUMPTIONS NOT MET | | | | IT HAS BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE NON-SAFETY STATION HEATING SYSTEM HAS BEEN | | RELIED UPON TO MAINTAIN THE CONTROL ROOM HVAC SYSTEM OPERABLE. FAILURE OF | | THE NON-SAFETY STATION HEATING SYSTEM DURING COLD WEATHER WOULD RESULT IN | | THE TRIP OF THE AUX BUILDING SUPPLY FANS DUE TO LOW TEMPERATURE. | | | | WITH NO AUX BUILDING SUPPLY FANS, POSITIVE PRESSURE IN THE CONTROL ROOM | | CANNOT BE ASSURED RELATIVE TO THE ADJACENT TURBINE BUILDING. SINCE NON | | SAFETY STATION HEATING SYSTEM IS LOST DURING A LOOP, A DESIGN BASIS | | ACCIDENT (LOCA WITH LOOP) COULD POTENTIALLY RESULT IN CONTROL ROOM | | IN-LEAKAGE, WHICH IS CONTRARY TO CONTROL ROOM HABITABILITY ASSUMPTIONS. | | | | THE LICENSEE WILL NOTIFY THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+