U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Reports For 11/20/97 - 11/21/97 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** 33077 33280 33290 33291 33292 33293 33294 33295 33296 33297 +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |GENERAL INFORMATION or OTHER | |EVENT NUMBER: 33077 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |LICENSEE: ABB COMBUSTION ENGINEERING |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/13/97 | | CITY: WINDSOR REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:42 [ET]| | COUNTY: STATE: CT |EVENT DATE: 08/06/97 | |LICENSE#: AGREEMENT: N |EVENT TIME: 00:00[EDT]| | DOCKET: |LAST UPDATE DATE: 11/20/97 | | +-----------------------------+ | |PERSON ORGANIZATION| | |JOHN PELLET RDO | | | | +------------------------------------------------+VERN HODGE NRR | |NRC NOTIFIED BY: HESS | | |HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |CCCC 21.21 UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | ABB COMBUSTION REPORTED A PART 21 ON CERTAIN MODELS OF POTTER & BRUMFIELD | | RELAYS. THEY HAVE IDENTIFIED THE "DEFECT" AS CONTAMINATION OF LUBRICANT | | WHICH HAS LEAD TO THE HARDENING OF THE LUBRICANT IN CERTAIN POTTER & | | BRUMFIELD PRODUCTS DIVISION MDR RELAYS(MODELS "170-1" AND "7032"). THIS | | "DEFECT" COULD RESULT IN RELAY FAILURE. THESE RELAYS ARE USED IN THE PLANT | | PROTECTION SYSTEM. THERE IS ALSO THE POTENTIAL FOR RELAY MODELS "7033" AND | | "7034" TO FAIL TO FUNCTION CORRECTLY. THESE RELAYS HAVE BEEN SUPPLIED TO | | PALO VERDE 1, 2 AND 3, ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE UNIT 2, WATERFORD 3, AND SAN | | ONOFRE 2 AND 3. ABB-CE IS CURRENTLY EVALUATING POTENTIAL CORRECTIVE | | ACTIONS WHICH WILL BE PROVIDED TO THE UTILITIES WITH ABB-CE DESIGNED | | NUCLEAR STEAM SUPPLY SYSTEMS. | | | | * * * UPDATE AT 1510 BY FAX FROM HESS ENTERED BY JONES * * * | | | | POTTER & BRUMFIELD, AS OF A CONFERENCE CALL WITH ABB ON NOVEMBER 17, 1997, | | HAS EXTENDED THE PROBLEM TO INCLUDE ALL MDR RELAY MODELS WITH DATE CODES | | 93XX THROUGH 95XX. PREVIOUSLY ONLY MODELS WITH DATE CODES OF 94XX WERE | | THOUGHT AFFECTED. POTTER & BRUMFIELD HAS COMMITTED TO COMPLETE ITS ROOT | | CAUSE ANALYSIS ON THE FAILURE MECHANISM, ISSUE A WRITTEN REPORT WITH | | DETAILED DATE CODE IDENTIFICATION, AND RECOMMENDED CORRECTIVE ACTIONS BY | | DECEMBER 1, 1997. ABB-CE WILL INFORM ITS CUSTOMERS OF THIS CHANGE. | | | | THE HEADQUARTERS OPERATIONS OFFICER INFORMED R4DO (JOE TAPIA) AND NRR (VERN | | HODGE). | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |FUEL CYCLE FACILITY | |EVENT NUMBER: 33280 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/18/97 | | RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:22 [ET]| |COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 11/15/97 | | 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 19:15[EST]| | BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 11/20/97 | | CITY: PIKETON REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+ | COUNTY: PIKE STATE: OH |PERSON ORGANIZATION| |LICENSE#: GDP-2 AGREEMENT: N |JOHN MADERA RDO | | DOCKET: 0707002 |JOE HOLONICH, NMSS EO | +------------------------------------------------+ | |NRC NOTIFIED BY: KEITH VANDERPOOL | | |HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | - 24 HOUR NRC BULLETIN 91-01 REPORT - | | | | AT 1915 ON 11/15/97, THE LICENSEE DISCOVERED THAT A NUCLEAR CRITICALITY | | SAFETY APPROVAL (NCSA) REQUIREMENT WAS NOT BEING MET IN AN AREA NEAR THE | | X-344 TOLL ENRICHMENT FACILITY WHERE LARGE UF6 CYLINDERS ARE STORED. | | | | NCSA-PLANT 004.A01, PART B, ITEM #11, STATES THAT LARGE UF6 CYLINDERS | | (2.5, 10, AND 14 TON) WHICH CONTAIN GREATER THAN 1.0% ENRICHMENT, AND | | GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 50 POUNDS URANIUM MASS SHALL NOT BE STACKED, AND | | A SPACING OF AT LEAST 20 FEET SHALL BE MAINTAINED BETWEEN STACKED ARRAYS | | OF HEEL QUANTITY CYLINDERS (CONTAINING LESS THAN 50 POUNDS URANIUM MASS) | | AND OTHER FULL UF6 CYLINDERS CONTAINING ENRICHED URANIUM. | | | | THIS CONTROL WAS LOST WHEN TWO UF6 CYLINDERS, EACH CONTAINING GREATER THAN | | 50 POUNDS URANIUM MASS, WERE FOUND IN A STACKED ARRAY, AND THE POTENTIAL | | EXISTED FOR A FULL UF6 CYLINDER TO HAVE BEEN MOVED TO WITHIN 20 FEET OF A | | STACKED ARRAY OF HEELED CYLINDERS. THE LICENSEE HAS DETERMINED THAT NO | | OTHER SIMILAR CYLINDERS ARE STORED IN THIS CONFIGURATION. | | | | AT 1740 ON 11/17/97, THE LICENSEE DETERMINED THAT THE LOSS OF THIS CONTROL | | MAKES THIS EVENT REPORTABLE TO THE NRC AS A 24 HOUR NRC BULLETIN 91-01 | | EVENT. | | | | THERE WAS NO RELEASE OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS OR RADIOLOGICAL EXPOSURE | | ASSOCIATED WITH THIS EVENT. | | | | THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | | | | ***UPDATE BY KEITH VANDERPOOL ON 11/20/97 @ 1032 EST TAKEN BY MACKINNON*** | | | | THE LICENSEE CHANGED THE EVENT TIME AND DATE TO THIS EVENT NOTIFICATION. | | THE EVENT TIME AND DATE WAS CHANGED FROM 0700 EST ON 11/16/97 TO 1915 EST | | ON 11/15/97. THE EVENT TIMES AND DATES HAVE BEEN CHANGED IN THE ABOVE | | EVENT NOTIFICATION. R3DO (JOHN MADERA) & NMSS EO (DR. COOL) NOTIFIED. | | | | THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED OF THIS UPDATE BY THE LICENSEE. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 33290 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: CALLAWAY REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/20/97 | |UNIT: [1] [ ] [ ] STATE: MO |NOTIFICATION TIME: 12:33 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 11/20/97 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 11:10[CST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: B SIMMONS |LAST UPDATE DATE: 11/20/97 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: UNUSUAL EVENT +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |JOSEPH TAPIA RDO | |AAEC 50.72(a)(1)(i) EMERGENCY DECLARED |STU RICHARDS EO | |DDDD 73.71 UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH |DAN RISHE FEMA | | |JOHN MADERA RDO | | |JOE GITTER IRD | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N Y 70 POWER OPERATION | 70 POWER OPERATION | | | | | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | BOMB THREAT OR EXTORTION THREAT | | | | THE PLANT DECLARED AN UNUSUAL EVENT DUE TO THE POSSIBILITY THAT PLANT | | SAFETY COULD BE IN JEOPARDY. IMMEDIATE COMPENSATORY MEASURES WERE TAKEN. | | REFER TO THE HOO LOG FOR ADDITIONAL DETAILS. | | | | THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR, STATE AND LOCAL | | AUTHORITIES, AND LOCAL FBI OFFICE. THE LICENSEE ALSO NOTIFIED THE CLINTON | | POWER STATION AS IT WAS MENTIONED BY THE CALLER. | | | | THE HOO NOTIFIED THE REGION 4 IAT MEMBER (D. CHAMBERLAIN), REGION 3 IAT | | MEMBER (J. CREED), AND THE NRR IAT MEMBER (R. ROSANO). | | | | * * * UPDATE AT 1850 BY SIMMONS ENTERED BY JONES * * * | | | | THE UNUSUAL EVENT (UE) WAS TERMINATED AT 1740 CST. THE LICENSEE NOTIFIED | | STATE AND LOCAL OFFICIALS AND THE NRC RESIDENT OF THE TERMINATION OF THE | | UE. ALL INVESTIGATIONS CONFIRMED THAT NO CREDIBLE SECURITY THREAT OR | | UNUSUAL CONDITION EXISTS AT THE PLANT. | | | | THE NRC OPERATIONS OFFICER NOTIFIED R4DO (JOE TAPIA), NRR EO (WILLIAM | | BECKNER), AND FEMA (STINEDRUF) | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |GENERAL INFORMATION or OTHER | |EVENT NUMBER: 33291 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |LICENSEE: US AIR FORCE |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/20/97 | | CITY: DOVER AIR FORCE REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:44 [ET]| | COUNTY: STATE: DE |EVENT DATE: 10/23/97 | |LICENSE#: AGREEMENT: N |EVENT TIME: 15:00[EST]| | DOCKET: |LAST UPDATE DATE: 11/20/97 | | +-----------------------------+ | |PERSON ORGANIZATION| | |JOSEPH TAPIA RDO | | |FRED COMBS EO | +------------------------------------------------+ | |NRC NOTIFIED BY: MAJOR M. HICKS |JOE GITTER IRD | |HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |BAB2 20.2201(a)(1)(ii) LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | REPORT OF 2 MISSING EXIT SIGNS CONTAINING TRITIUM AT DOVER AFB. | | | | FIRST SIGN WAS BEING SHIPPED TO DISPOSAL AT WRIGHT-PATTERSON AIR FORCE BASE | | (AFB), INSTEAD WAS SHIPPED FROM DOVER AFB TO DOVER AFB. THE PACKAGE WAS | | RECEIVED AND SIGNED FOR AND LOST. A THOROUGH SEARCH WAS MADE WHICH DID NOT | | LOCATE THE MISSING SIGN. FURTHER ACTION IS PENDING. | | | | SECOND SIGN WAS FOUND MISSING FROM BUILDING 501 DURING THE SEMIANNUAL | | INVENTORY. A SEARCH WAS CONDUCTED WITHOUT LOCATING THE MISSING SIGN. THE | | CONTRACTORS WHO WORK IN BUILDING 501 WERE CONTACTED AND IT WAS VERIFIED | | THAT THEY HAD NOT REMOVED THE SIGN. FURTHER ACTION IS PENDING. | | | | THE LICENSEE INFORMED REGION 4. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 33292 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: PILGRIM REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/20/97 | |UNIT: [1] [ ] [ ] STATE: MA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:10 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] GE-3 |EVENT DATE: 11/20/97 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 14:30[EST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: TOM McELHINNEY |LAST UPDATE DATE: 11/20/97 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |JACK MCFADDEN RDO | |ADEG 50.72(b)(1)(ii) DEGRAD COND DURING OP | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | | | | | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | POTENTIAL FOR SUPPRESSION POOL TO BE BYPASSED DURING A LOCA. | | | | DURING A REVIEW OF THE PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE CONTROL SYSTEM AS A | | RESULT OF A GENERAL ELECTRIC (GE) NOTIFICATION OF A POTENTIAL 10CFR21 ISSUE | | REGARDING SUPPRESSION POOL (TORUS) AIR SPACE BYPASS LEAKAGE TO THE DRYWELL | | AIR SPACE. THE POTENTIAL FOR THIS EVENT EXISTED WHILE IN THE VALVE LINEUP | | FOR INERTING THE PRIMARY CONTAINMENT BECAUSE A SINGLE FAILURE COULD OCCUR | | THAT CAUSES VALVES AO-5035A AND AO-5036A TO FAIL IN THE OPEN POSITION. | | THESE VALVES SHARE COMMON POWER SUPPLY AND ACTUATING RELAY FOR PRIMARY | | ISOLATION SIGNAL. IF A LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT (LOCA) WERE TO OCCUR WITH | | BOTH VALVES OPEN, THE SINGLE FAILURE WOULD RESULT IS A STEAM BYPASS PATH | | FROM THE DRYWELL TO THE TORUS AIR SPACE WITHOUT PASSING THROUGH THE | | DOWN-COMER AND SUBMERGED DIFFUSER. THIS OPERATING CONFIGURATION WAS | | DETERMINED TO BE OUTSIDE OF THE DESIGN BASIS OF THE PLANT. ADMINISTRATIVE | | CONTROLS HAVE BEEN PUT IN PLACE TO PRECLUDE BOTH VALVES FROM BEING OPENED | | AT THE SAME TIME. THE PROCEDURE FOR THE PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE | | CONTROL SYSTEM WILL BE REVISED TO ELIMINATE THIS VULNERABILITY. THIS EVENT | | POSED NO SIGNIFICANT THREAT TO THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY. | | | | THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | | | | NOTE SIMILAR EVENTS 33120, 33121 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 33293 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: LASALLE REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/20/97 | |UNIT: [1] [2] [ ] STATE: IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:13 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5 |EVENT DATE: 11/20/97 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 10:30[CST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: JOHN HOPMAN |LAST UPDATE DATE: 11/20/97 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |JOHN MADERA RDO | |AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N N 0 COLD SHUTDOWN | 0 COLD SHUTDOWN | | 2 | N N 0 REFUELING | 0 REFUELING | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FAILURE OF A HPCS BREAKER TO RESET DUE TO A LACK OF LUBRICATION. | | | | ON 10/07/97 WHILE PERFORMING THE UNIT 1, DIVISION 3 HIGH PRESSURE CORE | | SPRAY (HPCS) EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM (ECCS) RESPONSE TIME TEST, THE | | DIV 3 BREAKER 1432 FAILED TO CLOSE. INITIAL TROUBLESHOOTING DID NOT | | IDENTIFY THE CAUSE OF THE FAILURE. A SUBSEQUENT ATTEMPT TO CLOSE THE | | BREAKER WAS SUCCESSFUL. THE BREAKER WAS REMOVED FROM SERVICE AND A UNIT 2 | | BREAKER WAS INSTALLED, TESTED SATISFACTORY, AND DIVISION 3 WAS DECLARED | | OPERABLE. | | | | THE REMOVED BREAKER WAS SENT TO GENERAL ELECTRIC (GE) FOR DETERMINATION OF | | THE "MOST PROBABLE ROOT CAUSE". GE DETERMINED THE FAILURE OF THE MECHANISM | | TO RESET WAS DUE TO A LACK OF LUBRICATION, COMBINED WITH THE PRESENCE OF | | RESIDUAL (OLD) GREASE, ON THE LOWER LINK PIN BUSHINGS. THE BREAKER | | OVERHAUL PROCEDURE FOR 4160V, GE MAGNEBLAST, AM SERIES AIR CIRCUIT BREAKER | | LACKED STEPS TO ADDRESS REMOVAL/REPLACEMENT OF LUBRICATION FROM THIS | | PARTICULAR PORTION OF THE OPERATING MECHANISM. THE PROCEDURE DOES | | ADEQUATELY ADDRESS OTHER LUBRICATION POINTS IN THE MECHANISM. | | | | THE HPCS IS REQUIRED TO MITIGATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT, DESIGN | | BASIS LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT. IF THIS OPERATING MECHANISM DID NOT WORK | | AS REQUIRED THE HPCS WOULD NOT HAVE RESPONDED. THIS WOULD HAVE BEEN A LOSS | | OF SAFETY FUNCTION, APPLICABLE TO BOTH UNITS. | | | | THIS TYPE OF BREAKER (GE) IS ONLY USED IN DIVISION 3. DIVISION 1 AND 2 ARE | | NOT SUBJECT TO THIS FAILURE MECHANISM. | | | | THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |GENERAL INFORMATION or OTHER | |EVENT NUMBER: 33294 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |LICENSEE: US ARMY |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/20/97 | | CITY: FT CAMPBELL REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:33 [ET]| | COUNTY: STATE: KY |EVENT DATE: 11/19/97 | |LICENSE#: 12-00722-06 AGREEMENT: Y |EVENT TIME: 13:00[EST]| | DOCKET: |LAST UPDATE DATE: 11/20/97 | | +-----------------------------+ | |PERSON ORGANIZATION| | |JOHN MADERA RDO | | |JOE HOLONICH EO | +------------------------------------------------+ | |NRC NOTIFIED BY: JEFF HAVENNER | | |HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |IBAD 30.50(b)(1)(ii) MATL >5X LOWEST LIMIT | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | BROKEN COLLIMATOR WITH 10 CURIES TRITIUM. | | | | A M1A1 COLLIMATOR, CONTAINING 10 CURIES OF TRITIUM, WAS DISCOVERED WITH A | | BROKEN SOURCE AND WITH THE OUTER GLASS CONTAINER INTACT. A SWIPE OF THE | | OUTER CONTAINER INDICATED 500,000 DPM. SURVEYS OF THE COMPANY STORE ROOM, | | WHERE IT WAS STORED, AND OTHER POSSIBLE PLACES OF POTENTIAL CONTAMINATION | | ARE BEING CONDUCTED. A LIST OF POSSIBLE PERSONNEL EXPOSURES IS BEING | | DETERMINED FOR BIOASSAY. THE COLLIMATOR HAS BEEN DOUBLE BAGGED AND STORED | | IN CONTAMINATED RADIOACTIVE WASTE STORAGE. | | | | THE LICENSEE IS CONTACTING REGION 3. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 33295 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: LIMERICK REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/20/97 | |UNIT: [1] [ ] [ ] STATE: PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 19:49 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 11/20/97 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 16:14[EST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: MAGUIRE |LAST UPDATE DATE: 11/20/97 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |JACK MCFADDEN RDO | |AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | | | | | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | VALVE RECEIVED UNEXPECTED ISOLATION SIGNAL DURING TESTING. | | | | HV-059-131, "INST GAS 1" TIP PURGE PCIV, RECEIVED AN UNEXPECTED ISOLATION | | SIGNAL DURING PERFORMANCE OF AN I&C PARTIAL DIVISION IV LOGIC SYSTEM | | FUNCTIONAL TEST. AN INVESTIGATION HAS SHOWN THAT THE ACTUATION WAS CAUSED | | BY AN OMISSION IN THE TEST PROCEDURE. THE WORK PLANNING FAILED TO IDENTIFY | | THE POSSIBILITY OF THE ISOLATION. ALL ISOLATIONS HAVE BEEN RESET AND THE | | EQUIPMENT RETURNED TO PRETEST STATUS. | | | | THE LICENSEE WILL INFORM THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 33296 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: HATCH REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/20/97 | |UNIT: [ ] [2] [ ] STATE: GA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 22:49 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 11/20/97 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 20:52[EST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: R. MUSGROVE |LAST UPDATE DATE: 11/21/97 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |JACK MCFADDEN RDO | |AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | | | | | 2 | M/R Y 71 POWER OPERATION | 0 HOT SHUTDOWN | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | ESF ACTUATION FOLLOWING PLANNED SCRAM FOR SHUTDOWN. | | | | FOLLOWING A PREPLANNED SHUTDOWN FROM POWER, BY MANUAL SCRAM, DUE TO A | | PROBLEM WITH SUCTION PIPING ON THE 2A CONDENSATE BOOSTER PUMP, REACTOR | | WATER LEVEL DROPPED TO -45 INCHES RESULTING IN A GROUP 2 AND GROUP 5 | | PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION. HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI) AND | | REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) INITIATED, BUT THEY ARE NOT BELIEVED | | TO HAVE INJECTED. ALL CONTROL RODS FULLY INSERTED EXCEPT ROD 30-35, WHICH | | STOPPED AT THE 02 POSITION AND WAS DRIVEN TO FULL IN, THE 00 POSITION. | | REACTOR WATER LEVEL HAS BEEN RESTORED TO NORMAL. FURTHER INVESTIGATION IS | | BEING CONDUCTED. | | | | THE LICENSEE WILL INFORM THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | | | | *** UPDATE BY MUSGROVE ON 11/21/97 @ 0042 EST TAKEN BY MACKINNON *** | | | | ON FURTHER REVIEW OF PLANT DATA IT WAS DETERMINED THAT NEITHER HPCI OR RCIC | | INJECTED INTO THE REACTOR VESSEL. R2DO () NOTIFIED. | | | | THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED OF THIS EVENT BY THE LICENSEE. | | | | THE REASON WHY THE LICENSEE SCRAMMED FROM 71% REACTOR POWER LEVEL: | | | | THE DISCHARGE CHECK VALVE ON CONDENSATE BOOSTER PUMP "2A" WAS LEAKING AND | | EARLIER IN THE DAY IT CAUSED THE PUMP TO ROTATE BACKWARDS WHEN THE LICENSEE | | WAS TRYING TO TAKE IT OUT OF SERVICE FOR MAINTENANCE. THE LICENSEE SHUT THE | | SUCTION VALVE OF THE CONDENSATE BOOSTER PUMP TO PREVENT THE PUMP FROM | | ROTATING BACKWARDS. WHEN THE SUCTION VALVE WAS CLOSED IT CAUSED THE SUCTION | | BELLOWS (FLEX JOINT ON THE SUCTION SIDE PIPING OF THE BOOSTER PUMP WHICH IS | | MADE OF VERY THIN METAL) TO EXPAND BECAUSE IT WAS OVERPRESSURIZED. THE | | LICENSEE'S EFFORTS TO PREVENT THE SUCTION BELLOWS FROM BEING | | OVERPRESSURIZED WAS UNSUCCESSFUL. AS REACTOR POWER/PRESSURE DECREASED THE | | CONDENSATE BOOSTER PUMP DISCHARGE PRESSURE INCREASED WHICH WAS SENSED BY | | THE SUCTION BELLOWS. THE SUCTION BELLOWS IS RATED AT 300 psig. THE LICENSEE | | HAD 440 psig ON THE BELLOWS AND AS REACTOR POWER DECREASED THE CONDENSATE | | BOOSTER PUMP PRESSURE CONTINUED TO INCREASE. WHEN THE SUCTION BELLOWS | | REACHED 475 psig THE LICENSEE'S AE SAID NOT TO FURTHER INCREASE THE | | PRESSURE ON THE SUCTION BELLOWS. THEREFORE THE LICENSEE MANUALLY SCRAMMED | | THE PLANT FROM 71% REACTOR POWER LEVEL INSTEAD OF NORMALLY GOING DOWN TO | | APPROXIMATELY 20% POWER AND THEN MANUALLY SCRAM THE PLANT. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |FUEL CYCLE FACILITY | |EVENT NUMBER: 33297 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/21/97 | | RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 00:58 [ET]| |COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 11/10/97 | | 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 10:50[CST]| | BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 11/21/97 | | CITY: PADUCAH REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+ | COUNTY: McCRACKEN STATE: KY |PERSON ORGANIZATION| |LICENSE#: GDP-1 AGREEMENT: Y |JOHN MADERA RDO | | DOCKET: 0707001 |JOE HOLONICH EO | +------------------------------------------------+ | |NRC NOTIFIED BY: RANDY BOSHELL | | |HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | HOLDING DRUMS TEMPERATURE NOT MAINTAINED ABOVE 105 DEGREES F (IF | | TEMPERATURE DROPS BELOW 105 F THE URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE COULD HAVE | | SOLIDIFIED) BECAUSE THE NCSA DID NOT SPECIFY LOWER TEMPERATURE LIMIT. | | | | THIS EVENT WAS CALLED IN AS A 4 HOUR NOTIFICATION UNDER NRC BULLETIN 91-01. | | | | ON 11/10/97 A PROBLEM REPORT AND CRITICALITY SAFETY INCIDENT REPORT WERE | | ISSUED REPORTING THAT THE C-335 HOLDING DRUM TEMPERATURE WAS DISCOVERED TO | | BE 100 DEGREES F (ONLY 4 DRUMS INVOLVED AND THIS IS THE ONLY BUILDING WITH | | THESE TYPE OF HOLDING DRUMS). THIS INCIDENT REPORT STATED THAT THE | | CONDITIONS PRESENT IN THE DRUMS DID NOT ALLOW FOR URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE TO | | SOLIDIFY, i.e. URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE WAS BEING MAINTAINED IN A GASEOUS | | STATE, OR FOR THE HF TO CONDENSE (IF THE TEMPERATURE DROPS LOW ENOUGH AND | | THE PRESSURE INCREASES THE URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE IN THE DRUM COULD SOLIDIFY | | AND IF MOISTURE LEAKED INTO THE DRUM WHICH CONTAINS GREATER THAN 1% WEIGHT | | PERCENT URANIUM-235 YOU COULD HAVE A POTENTIAL FOR A CRITICALITY. THE DRUMS | | ARE AIR TIGHT). THE INCIDENT REPORT FURTHER CONCLUDED THAT THIS WAS A LEVEL | | 4 INCIDENT (LEVELS USED IN PLANT ONLY AND LEVEL 4 IS THE LOWEST LEVEL FOR A | | CRITICALITY) DUE TO THE LOSS OF AN NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY APPROVAL | | (NCSA) REQUIREMENT THAT DOES NOT VIOLATE THE DOUBLE CONTINGENCY PRINCIPLE. | | GIVEN THIS, AN EVENT NOTIFICATION WAS NOT MADE TO THE NRC. | | | | ON 11/19/97, NCS PERSONNEL FILED A PROBLEM REPORT STATING THAT THE C-335 | | URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE DRUMS CONTAIN FISSILE MATERIAL, POTENTIALLY GREATER | | THAN 1 WEIGHT PERCENT URANIUM-235, WITHOUT AN IMPLEMENTED NCSA. THE | | CURRENTLY IMPLEMENTED NCSA FOR THE URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE/R-114 SEPARATION | | SYSTEM DOES NOT SPECIFY REQUIREMENTS FOR THE URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE HOLDING | | DRUMS. | | | | RECENTLY APPROVED, BUT NOT YET IMPLEMENTED, NCSA 3971-05, REQUEST 1873, | | SPECIFIES THE CONTROLS NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN THE URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE IN | | THE HOLDING DRUMS IN THE DESIRED GASEOUS STATE. THESE CONTROLS INCLUDE | | MAINTAINING THE TEMPERATURE OF THE DRUM ROOM AT OR ABOVE 105 DEGREES F, AND | | SHOULD THE TEMPERATURE DROP BELOW 105 DEGREES F THAT ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN | | TO ENSURE THAT THE TEMPERATURE AND PRESSURE OF THE DRUMS IS MAINTAINING THE | | URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE IN A GASEOUS STATE, THUS PRECLUDING A CRITICALITY | | CONCERN. | | | | SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENT: | | | | AT THE TIME OF DISCOVERY, THE URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE WAS IN A GASEOUS STATE | | AND, THEREFORE, DID NOT PRESENT A CRITICALITY CONCERN. ACTIONS WERE | | INITIATED TO RAISE THE TEMPERATURE AND THE TEMPERATURE WAS 142 DEGREES F AT | | 2050 CST ON 11/11/97. | | | | POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR: | | | | THE PRIMARY POTENTIAL PATHWAY IS THE LOSS OF TEMPERATURE AND PRESSURE | | CONTROLS TO ALLOW THE URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE TO SOLIDIFY AND TO THEN BECOME | | MODERATED BY CONDENSATION OF HF OR BY WET AIR INLEAKAGE. | | | | CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.): | | | | THE PRIMARY CONTROL IS MAINTAINING THE URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE CONTAINED IN | | THE DRUMS IN A GASEOUS PHASE WHILE ALSO MAINTAINING MODERATION CONTROL | | THROUGH TEMPERATURE AND PRESSURE AND SYSTEM INTEGRITY. | | | | ESTIMATE AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL: | | | | ALTHOUGH NOT SAMPLED, DUE TO PAST OPERATIONS, THE POTENTIAL EXISTS FOR | | THESE DRUMS TO CONTAIN GREATER THAN 1 WEIGHT PERCENT URANIUM-235 ENRICHED | | MATERIAL IN THE GASEOUS URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE FORM. | | | | NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION | | OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: | | | | THE NCSE/A FOR THE URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE/R-114 SEPARATION SYSTEM DID NOT | | ESTABLISH CONTROLS FOR OPERATION OF THE HOLDING DRUMS ASSOCIATED WITH THE | | SYSTEM. THE PROCEDURES NECESSARY TO IMPLEMENT THE APPROVAL NCSA HAVE NOT | | BEEN COMPLETED AND APPROVED FOR USE. | | | | CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: | | | | AN NCSA WAS APPROVED AND APPLICABLE PROCEDURES ARE BEING WRITTEN TO | | IMPLEMENT THIS NEW NCSA. THE HOLDING DRUM ROOM TEMPERATURE WAS RAISED TO | | 142 DEGREES F AT 2050 CST ON 11/11/97. A LONG TERM ORDER WAS ISSUED ON | | 11/19/97 TO MONITOR THE HOLDING DRUM ROOM TEMPERATURE ONCE PER SHIFT AND | | TAKE ACTION TO ENSURE THE URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE IS MAINTAINED IN A GASEOUS | | STATE IF THE TEMPERATURE DROPS BELOW 105 DEGREES F. | | | | THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED BY THE LICENSEE OF THIS EVENT. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+