U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Reports For 06/19/97 - 06/20/97 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** 32367 32411 32509 32510 32511 32512 32513 32514 32515 32516 !!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!! +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 32367 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: MILLSTONE REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/21/97 | |UNIT: [ ] [ ] [3] STATE: CT |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:09 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 05/21/97 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 14:50[EDT]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: TERRY RATHBURN |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/19/97 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |LAURIE PELUSO RDO | |DDDD 73.71 UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | | | | | | | | | 3 | N N 0 COLD SHUTDOWN | 0 COLD SHUTDOWN | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | - PLANT SECURITY EVENT - | | | | POTENTIAL UNAUTHORIZED ENTRY INTO AREAS CONTAINING VITAL EQUIPMENT. | | IMMEDIATE COMPENSATORY MEASURES TAKEN UPON DISCOVERY. THE LICENSEE | | INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. REFER TO THE HOO LOG FOR DETAILS. | | | | * * * 1512EDT ON 6/19/97 FROM PATRICK ANHALT TO S.SANDIN * * * | | | | THE LICENSEE IS RETRACTING THIS EVENT BASED ON A SUBSEQUENT EVALUATION THAT | | DETERMINED NO ENTRY OF UNAUTHORIZED PERSONNEL INTO THE PROTECTED AREA OR | | VULNERABILITY OCCURRED. THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | | NOTIFIED R1DO(BELLAMY). | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ !!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!! +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 32411 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: RIVER BEND REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/29/97 | |UNIT: [1] [ ] [ ] STATE: LA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:40 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] GE-6 |EVENT DATE: 05/29/97 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 12:45[CDT]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: VERNON CARLSON |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/19/97 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |JOHN PELLET RDO | |AINC 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(C) POT UNCNTRL RAD REL | | |NLCO TECH SPEC LCO A/S | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | | | | | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | A 2-GPM HPCS RELIEF VALVE LEAK WAS FOUND DURING A SURVEILLANCE TEST. | | | | DURING A SURVEILLANCE TEST OF THE HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY (HPCS) PUMP, | | A 2-GPM LEAK WAS DISCOVERED COMING FROM RELIEF VALVE #E22-RVF035. (THE | | LEAK IS COMING THROUGH THE BELLOWS THEN OUT THE LEAKOFF PORT LOCATED ON THE | | BONNET OF THE 1" THERMAL RELIEF VALVE WHICH IS LOCATED ON THE DISCHARGE OF | | THE HPCS PUMP.) THIS IS A PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE PER | | TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, WHICH DISCHARGES INTO THE SUPPRESSION POOL. AT | | THE TIME OF THE CALL, THE LICENSEE COULD NOT EXACTLY IDENTIFY THE SOURCE OF | | THE LEAKAGE, BUT IT IS EXPECTED TO BE A LEAK OF THE SEALING BELLOWS AROUND | | THE VALVE STEM. BECAUSE THE BELLOWS IS THE ONLY BARRIER BETWEEN THE | | PRIMARY CONTAINMENT SUPPRESSION POOL AND THE SECONDARY CONTAINMENT | | AUXILIARY BUILDING, THIS IS CONSIDERED AN EVENT OR CONDITION THAT ALONE | | COULD HAVE PREVENTED THE FULFILLMENT OF THE SAFETY FUNCTION OF CONTAINMENT | | TO PREVENT THE RELEASE OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS. MITIGATING THIS EVENT IS | | THAT THE OPEN END OF THE DISCHARGE PIPING IS SUBMERGED (UNDERWATER) IN THE | | SUPPRESSION POOL. | | | | THE LICENSEE HAS ENTERED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.6.1.1, PRIMARY | | CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY. THE LICENSEE IS CURRENTLY TAKING ACTION TO REPLACE | | THE VALVE OR INSTALL A BLIND FLANGE TO RESTORE CONTAINMENT. THE LICENSEE | | SAID THAT HPCS IS STILL CONSIDERED FULLY OPERABLE. | | | | THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | | | | * * * UPDATE ON 05/30/97, @ 0624 EDT FROM KELLEY TAKEN BY MACKINNON * * * | | | | THE HPCS SYSTEM WAS DECLARED INOPERABLE PER TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.5.1 | | WHEN THE LICENSEE TAGGED IT OUT OF SERVICE TO REPLACE THE THERMAL RELIEF | | VALVE. THE LICENSEE EXITED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.6.1.1 AT 2013 CDT | | ON 05/29/97 WHEN THE RELIEF VALVE WAS REPLACED AND EXITED TECHNICAL | | SPECIFICATION 3.5.1 AT 0006 CDT ON 5/30/97 AFTER THE HPCS SYSTEM WAS | | RESTORED TO OPERABLE STATUS. | | | | THE LICENSEE WILL INFORM THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. THE OPERATIONS | | OFFICER NOTIFIED THE R4DO (JOHN PELLET). | | | | * * * UPDATE AT 1509 ON 6/19/97 BY HUSTON TAKEN BY WEAVER * * * | | | | THE LICENSEE IS RETRACTING THIS EVENT. | | | | SUBSEQUENT TO THE EVENT, RIVER BEND PERSONNEL TESTED THE SUBJECT VALVE TO | | DETERMINE THE ACTUAL LEAK RATE. BASED ON THE ACTUAL LEAK RATE, | | CALCULATIONS WERE PERFORMED TO DETERMINE IMPACT ON OVERALL CONTAINMENT LEAK | | RATE AND OFF SITE DOSES. THE RESULTS OF THESE CALCULATIONS SHOW THAT | | CONTAINMENT LEAK RATE LIMITS WERE NOT EXCEEDED, AND THUS CONTAINMENT WAS | | NOT INOPERABLE. IN ADDITION, THE LEAKAGE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT SUCH THAT 10 | | CFR 100 DOSE LIMITS WOULD HAVE BEEN EXCEEDED DURING DBA LOCA CONDITIONS. | | THUS, THE SUBJECT CONDITION DID NOT RESULT IN THE LOSS OF THE CONTAINMENT | | SAFETY FUNCTION, AND IS NOT REPORTABLE. | | | | THE HOO NOTIFIED THE RIV DUTY OFFICER (POWERS). | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 32509 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: DRESDEN REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/19/97 | |UNIT: [ ] [ ] [3] STATE: IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:16 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3 |EVENT DATE: 06/19/97 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 09:20[CDT]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: VERCELLI |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/19/97 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: DOUG WEAVER +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |ROGER LANKSBURY RDO | |AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | | |NLCO TECH SPEC LCO A/S | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | | | | | | | | | 3 | N Y 13 POWER OPERATION | 13 POWER OPERATION | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | HPCI TURBINE INOPERABLE BECAUSE OF LEAKING DRAIN VALVES | | | | "WHILE PERFORMING HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI) SYSTEM | | SURVEILLANCE DURING REACTOR STARTUP. THE HPCI TURBINE ABOVE SEAT DRAIN | | VALVES WERE LEAKING THROUGH, ADMITTING STEAM TO THE HPCI ROOM. THE HPCI | | SYSTEM WAS DECLARED INOPERABLE AND A 14 DAY TS LCO WAS ENTERED PER TS | | 3.5.A.3." | | | | ALL OTHER SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT IS OPERABLE. THE LICENSEE EXPECTS TO | | MAKE REPAIRS TODAY AND REPERFORM THE SURVEILLANCE. | | | | A RESIDENT INSPECTOR HAS BEEN INFORMED. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 32510 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: FT CALHOUN REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/19/97 | |UNIT: [1] [ ] [ ] STATE: NE |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:03 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] CE |EVENT DATE: 06/19/97 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 13:12[CDT]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: RANDY MUELLER |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/19/97 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: DOUG WEAVER +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |DALE POWERS RDO | |AINA 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(A) POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | | | | | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | APPENDIX "R" REQUIREMENTS NOT MET | | | | "CONTRARY TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 50 APPENDIX R, SECTION III.G., THE | | ABILITY OF THE FORT CALHOUN STATION TO ACHIEVE 'ALTERNATE OR DEDICATED | | SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY' IN THE EVENT OF A CABLE SPREAD ROOM FIRE MAY HAVE BEEN | | JEOPARDIZED DUE TO THE LACK OF SPECIFIC PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE CONTAINED | | WITHIN ABNORMAL OPERATING PROCEDURE AOP-6, 'FIRE EMERGENCY'." | | | | SPECIFICALLY, FIRE SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSES SHOW AND RELY UPON EVACUATION OF | | THE CONTROL ROOM AT THE CORRECT TIME (T=0) AND THE OPENING OF BREAKERS TO | | VULNERABLE EQUIPMENT, (MOVs), WITHIN 10 MINUTES OF THE CORRECT TIME, IN | | ORDER TO MEET THE 10 CFR 50 CRITERIA. IF BREAKERS ARE OPENED WITH 10 | | MINUTES OF THE TIME THEY ARE FIRST SUBJECTED TO FLAME, NO DAMAGE OR | | UNDESIRABLE SPURIOUS ACTUATIONS OF EQUIPMENT WILL OCCUR. THE 10 MINUTE | | TIME FRAME FOR ASSUMING NO DAMAGE OR SPURIOUS ACTION WOULD OCCUR IS BASED | | UPON PLANT CABLE FIRE RESISTANCE AND PROPAGATION TESTS WHICH SHOW NO | | SPURIOUS SHORTS OR DAMAGE TO CABLE CIRCUITS OCCURRED FOR 10 MINUTES FROM | | THE TIME THE CABLE IS SUBJECTED TO THE TEST FLAME. | | | | ALTHOUGH GUIDANCE CONTAINED WITHIN ABNORMAL OPERATING PROCEDURE, AOP-6, | | "FIRE EMERGENCY" IS SPECIFIC AND ENSURES NECESSARY EQUIPMENT BREAKERS ARE | | OPENED WITHIN TEN MINUTES OF CONTROL ROOM EVACUATION, THE CRITERIA | | DIRECTING OPERATIONS AS TO WHEN TO EVACUATE THE CONTROL ROOM IN THE EVENT | | OF A CONTROL ROOM OR CABLE SPREAD ROOM FIRE IS DISCRETIONARY, NOT SPECIFIC, | | AND RELIES HEAVILY ON THE KNOWLEDGE AND JUDGMENT OF THE SHIFT SUPERVISOR. | | | | INTERVIEWS WITH SELECTED SHIFT SUPERVISORS REVEALED THAT THEY WERE NOT | | AWARE OF THE NEED TO EVACUATE THE CONTROL ROOM WITHIN 10 MINUTES OF THE | | FIRST SIGN OF IMPENDING CABLE DAMAGE DUE TO A FIRE IN THE CABLE SPREAD | | ROOM. RATHER, THE DECISION OF WHEN TO EVACUATE THE CONTROL ROOM IN THE | | CASE OF A CONTROL ROOM/CABLE SPREAD ROOM FIRE WOULD BE DEPENDENT UPON THE | | FAILURE/IMPENDING FAILURE OF SPECIFIC EQUIPMENT AND/OR MONITORING DEVICES | | AND THEIR RELATIVE IMPORTANCE TO SAFETY. | | | | BASED UPON THE FACT THAT THE CONTROL ROOM IS CONTINUALLY MANNED AND THAT A | | CONTROL ROOM FIRE COULD BE QUICKLY IDENTIFIED OR LOCATED, IT IS BELIEVED | | THAT EXISTING CRITERIA FOR EVACUATION OF THE CONTROL ROOM IN THE CASE OF A | | CONTROL ROOM FIRE IS ADEQUATE AND WOULD HAVE ASSURED SAFE SHUTDOWN OF THE | | PLANT IF CONDITIONS SO WARRANTED, HOWEVER, THE CABLE SPREAD ROOM IS NOT | | MANNED AND FOR THE MOST PART CONTAINS ONLY CABLING, SO THAT THE CORRELATION | | TO EQUIPMENT THAT MAY BE DAMAGED IF THE CABLE WERE DAMAGED IS NOT EVIDENT. | | IN THE CASE OF A CABLE SPREAD ROOM FIRE, IT IS NOT ASSURED THAT THE CONTROL | | ROOM WOULD HAVE BEEN EVACUATED IN A CONSERVATIVE TIME FRAME (WITHIN 10 | | MINUTES) WHICH WOULD ASSURE NO DAMAGE OR DETRIMENTAL SPURIOUS ACTUATION TO | | MOV CIRCUITS WOULD OCCUR. | | | | THEREFORE, IT IS CONCLUDED THAT PROCEDURAL INADEQUACIES MAY HAVE RESULTED | | IN THE LOSS OF EQUIPMENT NEEDED TO MITIGATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF A CABLE | | SPREAD ROOM FIRE. | | | | GUIDANCE HAS BEEN PROVIDED TO THE LICENSED OPERATORS TO ENSURE THAT THEY | | UNDERSTAND THIS PROBLEM AND WILL TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION IN CASE OF A FIRE. | | | | THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED BY THE LICENSEE. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |OTHER NUCLEAR MATERIAL | |EVENT NUMBER: 32511 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |LICENSEE: DUPONT CHEMICALS |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/19/97 | | CITY: DEEPWATER REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:32 [ET]| | COUNTY: STATE: NJ |EVENT DATE: 05/30/97 | |LICENSE#: 29-0086-01 AGREEMENT: N |EVENT TIME: 00:00[EDT]| | DOCKET: |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/19/97 | | +-----------------------------+ | |PERSON ORGANIZATION| | |RONALD BELLAMY RDO | | | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |NRC NOTIFIED BY: MARIANNE STORY YENCKEN | | |HQ OPS OFFICER: DOUG WEAVER | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |BAB2 20.2201(a)(1)(ii) LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | LOST SOURCE | | | | THE LICENSEE REPORTED THE LOSS OF AN ELECTRON CAPTURE DETECTOR CONTAINING | | 15 mCi OF Ni-63. THE SOURCE WAS NOTED TO BE MISSING APPROXIMATELY 3 WEEKS | | AGO. THE LICENSEE HAS SEARCHED THEIR FACILITY SINCE THEN TO NO AVAIL. | | | | THE RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL IS CONTAINED IN A METAL STRIP INSIDE THE DETECTOR. | | Ni-63 IS A PURE BETA EMITTER WITH A MAXIMUM ENERGY OF 67 keV AND THEREFORE | | PRESENTS A VERY SMALL EXTERNAL RADIATION HAZARD. | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 32512 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: SOUTH TEXAS REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/19/97 | |UNIT: [1] [2] [ ] STATE: TX |NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:38 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 06/19/97 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 14:35[CDT]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: WAYNE HARRISON |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/19/97 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: DOUG WEAVER +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |DALE POWERS RDO | |NLTR LICENSEE 24 HR REPORT | | |NLCO TECH SPEC LCO A/S | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | | 2 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | PERMISSIVE P-11 INOPERABLE | | | | SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT (STP) TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION'S REQUIRE AN ANALOG | | CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST TO BE PERFORMED QUARTERLY FOR PERMISSIVE P-11. THE | | ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST REQUIRES THAT THE CHANNEL BE TESTED FROM | | THE POINT OF SIGNAL INSERTION TO THE END OF THE CHANNEL. THE UPDATED FINAL | | SAFETY REPORT COMMITS TO REG GUIDES 1.22 AND 1.118 WHICH DESCRIBE PERIODIC | | TESTING OF SAFETY SYSTEMS. BOTH OF THESE REG GUIDES REFER TO IEEE STANDARD | | 279-1977. UFSAR 7.2.2.2.3.10 "CAPABILITY FOR TESTING" CONTAINS A | | REQUIREMENT FOR THE CHECK OF INPUT RELAYS. | | | | THE BASES FOR THE P-11 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION STATES, "ON INCREASING | | PRESSURIZER PRESSURE, P-11 AUTOMATICALLY REINSTATES SAFETY INJECTION | | ACTUATION (SIA) ON LOW PRESSURIZER PRESSURE OR LOW COMPENSATED STEAMLINE | | PRESSURE SIGNALS, REINSTATES STEAMLINE ISOLATION ON LOW COMPENSATED | | STEAMLINE PRESSURE SIGNALS, AND OPENS THE ACCUMULATOR DISCHARGE ISOLATION | | VALVES. ON DECREASING PRESSURE, P-11 ALLOWS THE MANUAL BLOCK OF SIA ON LOW | | PRESSURIZER PRESSURE OR LOW COMPENSATED STEAMLINE PRESSURE SIGNALS, ALLOWS | | THE MANUAL BLOCK OF STEAMLINE ISOLATION ON LOW COMPENSATED STEAMLINE | | PRESSURE SIGNALS, AND ENABLES STEAM LINE ISOLATION ON HIGH NEGATIVE STEAM | | LINE PRESSURE RATE (WHEN STEAMLINE PRESSURE IS MANUALLY BLOCKED)." NOTE | | THAT THE P-11 PERMISSIVE FUNCTION IS ASSOCIATED WITH THE DECREASING | | PRESSURE. | | | | THE CURRENT DESIGN OF THE P-11 BISTABLE IS THAT ON A DECREASING PRESSURE, | | WHEN P-11 COMES IN, THE BISTABLE ENERGIZES. AT POWER, THE BISTABLE IS | | DEENERGIZED. TESTING OF THE ANALOG CHANNEL IS ACCOMPLISHED BY OPENING A | | CONTACT IN SERIES WITH THE BISTABLE WHICH DOES NOT ALLOW THE CHANGE IN | | STATE OF THE BISTABLE TO BE SEEN BY THE INPUT RELAY. IN SUMMARY, WHEN AT | | POWER, THE INPUT RELAY IS DEENERGIZED AND WHEN TESTING THE INPUT RELAY IS | | PREVENTED FROM ENERGIZING. | | | | BASED ON THE STP TECH SPEC REQUIREMENTS FOR ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST | | ALONG WITH THE UFSAR DESCRIPTIONS, REG GUIDE AND IEEE DEFINITIONS, AND TECH | | SPEC BASES, STP HAS DETERMINED THAT THE SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE | | ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST HAS NOT BEEN MET BECAUSE THE INPUT RELAY | | PORTION OF THE CHANNEL HAS NOT BEEN VERIFIED TO FUNCTION ON A QUARTERLY | | BASIS. AS PER TECH SPEC 4.0.3, THIS CONSTITUTES A FAILURE TO MEET THE | | OPERABILITY REQUIREMENTS. | | | | IAW TECH SPEC 4.0.3, THE PERMISSIVE P-11 WAS DECLARED INOPERABLE AND THE | | REQUIRED ACTION WAS TAKEN TO VERIFY, BY OBSERVATION, THAT THE ASSOCIATED | | ANNUNCIATOR WINDOWS WERE IN THE CORRECT STATE. | | | | THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS INFORMED. | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 32513 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: POINT BEACH REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/19/97 | |UNIT: [1] [2] [ ] STATE: WI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:41 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP |EVENT DATE: 06/19/97 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 15:30[CDT]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: JOHN JAECKLE |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/19/97 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: DOUG WEAVER +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |ROGER LANKSBURY RDO | |AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N N 0 COLD SHUTDOWN | 0 COLD SHUTDOWN | | 2 | N N 0 REFUELING | 0 REFUELING | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | AUX FEEDWATER MAY NOT WITHSTAND A LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER AND A SEISMIC EVENT | | | | A DESIGN BASES REVIEW HAS REVEALED THAT THE AFW LOW SUCTION PRESSURE | | SETPOINT MAY NOT PROVIDE ADEQUATE NET POSITIVE SUCTION HEAD PROTECTION | | FOLLOWING A SEISMIC EVENT WITH LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER. THIS CONDITION | | EFFECTS BOTH UNITS. | | | | ASSUMING THE CATASTROPHIC LOSS OF THE CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK, THE AUX | | FEEDWATER PUMPS MAY NOT TRIP SOON ENOUGH TO PREVENT THEIR DAMAGE. THE | | LICENSEE IS DETERMINING A LONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTION. THE AUX FEEDWATER | | SYSTEM IS NOT REQUIRED TO BE OPERABLE UNDER CURRENT PLANT CONDITIONS. | | | | THE LICENSEE NOTIFIED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 32514 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: FERMI REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/19/97 | |UNIT: [2] [ ] [ ] STATE: MI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 20:20 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [2] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 06/19/97 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 16:53[EDT]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: DAVID COSEO |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/19/97 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: DOUG WEAVER +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |ROGER LANKSBURY RDO | |AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | | |AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | | |NLCO TECH SPEC LCO A/S | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 2 | N Y 91 POWER OPERATION | 91 POWER OPERATION | | | | | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | HPCI EXHAUST DIAPHRAGM INSTRUMENTATION FAILED DURING TESTING - HPCI INOP | | | | AT 1653 ON 6/19/97, DURING PERFORMANCE OF A HPCI TURBINE EXHAUST DIAPHRAGM | | PRESSURE, DIVISION I FUNCTIONAL TEST, THE HPCI STEAM SUPPLY INBOARD | | ISOLATION VALVE, E4150F002, CLOSED. HPCI ISOLATION OCCURRED DUE TO AN | | INVALID HPCI EXHAUST DIAPHRAGM PRESSURE SIGNAL. HPCI WAS DECLARED | | INOPERABLE AND IS IN A 14 DAY LCO. THE STEAM SUPPLY REMAINS ISOLATED. THE | | CAUSE OF THIS EVENT IS CURRENTLY UNDER INVESTIGATION. HPCI ISOLATION IS | | NOT AN EXPECTED ACTUATION DURING THIS TEST. ALL OTHER ECCSs ARE OPERABLE. | | | | THE EXACT CAUSE OF THE ISOLATION IS NOT KNOWN, BUT IS UNDER INVESTIGATION. | | | | THE LICENSEE NOTIFIED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 32515 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: GRAND GULF REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/19/97 | |UNIT: [1] [ ] [ ] STATE: MS |NOTIFICATION TIME: 23:19 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] GE-6 |EVENT DATE: 06/19/97 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 20:14[CDT]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: GREGORY SPARKS |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/19/97 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: DOUG WEAVER +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |DALE POWERS RDO | |AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | | | | | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | BOTH DIVISIONS OF THE LOW LOW SET RELIEF FUNCTION INOPERABLE | | | | VARIOUS INSTRUMENT TESTING ON BOTH DIVISIONS I AND II RESULTED IN BOTH | | DIVISION'S LOW LOW SET FUNCTION BEING BYPASSED. THIS RESULTED IN A LOSS OF | | THE LOW LOW SET FUNCTION FOR APPROXIMATELY TEN SECONDS. | | | | TESTING ON DIVISION I INSTRUMENTATION REQUIRED THE LOW LOW SET FUNCTION OF | | DIV I TO BE BYPASSED. SEPARATE TESTING ON DIV II INSTRUMENTATION CALLED | | FOR BYPASSING THE DIV II LOW LOW SET FUNCTION. WHEN THE DIV II LOW LOW SET | | FUNCTION WAS BYPASSED, A CONTROL ROOM ALARM WAS RECEIVED, INDICATING A LOSS | | OF THE FUNCTION. OPERATORS RECOGNIZED THE CAUSE OF THE ALARM AND RESTORED | | THE FUNCTION BY TAKING DIV II OUT OF BYPASS. CURRENTLY BOTH DIVISIONS ARE | | FULLY OPERABLE. | | | | THE LICENSEE WILL NOTIFY THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |FUEL CYCLE FACILITY | |EVENT NUMBER: 32516 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/20/97 | | RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 00:43 [ET]| |COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 06/19/97 | | 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 19:45[CDT]| | BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/20/97 | | CITY: PADUCAH REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+ | COUNTY: McCRACKEN STATE: KY |PERSON ORGANIZATION| |LICENSE#: GDP-1 AGREEMENT: Y |ROGER LANKSBURY RDO | | DOCKET: 0707001 |JOE HOLONICH EO | +------------------------------------------------+ | |NRC NOTIFIED BY: HALICKS | | |HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | THE LICENSEE HAS DETERMINED THAT NO CONTROLS WERE ESTABLISHED FOR SOME | | LEGACY PROCESS EQUIPMENT TO DEMONSTRATE DOUBLE CONTINGENCY. THIS EVENT WAS | | REPORTED IN RESPONSE TO BULLETIN 91-01. | | | | THE LICENSEE'S TSR 3.11.5 REQUIRES IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DOUBLE CONTINGENCY | | PRINCIPLE FOR ALL FISSILE/POTENTIALLY FISSILE OPERATIONS, EXCEPT THOSE | | EXPLICITLY NOTED AS SINGLE CONTINGENT OPERATIONS. THE LICENSEE HAS NOT HAD | | ANY NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY(NCS) CONTROLS FOR REMOVED PROCESS EQUIPMENT. | | TWO NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY APPROVALS(NCSA) WERE WRITTEN TO ESTABLISH | | DOUBLE CONTINGENCY FOR POTENTIALLY FISSILE LEGACY PROCESS EQUIPMENT. THESE | | NCSA'S WERE WRITTEN TO BRING THIS EQUIPMENT INTO A STATE OF COMPLIANCE, BUT | | NEITHER WAS FULLY IMPLEMENTED BY 3/3/97, THEREFORE DOUBLE CONTINGENCY COULD | | NOT BE SHOWN. | | | | FOR EQUIPMENT ORIGINATING FROM OFFSITE(K-25 OR PORTSMOUTH), DOT | | REQUIREMENTS FOR SHIPPING WERE MET AND GAMMA/NEUTRON SCANS PERFORMED TO | | DATE BY THE LICENSEE HAVE NOT IDENTIFIED ANY SIGNIFICANT DEPOSITS ON THE | | EQUIPMENT. THE COMBINATION OF HISTORICAL DATA AND TRANSPORTATION | | REQUIREMENTS FOR RADIOACTIVE AND FISSILE MATERIAL SHIPPING LEAD TO THE | | CONCLUSION THAT IT IS EXTREMELY UNLIKELY THAT AN UNSAFE MASS EXISTS IN | | EQUIPMENT RECEIVED FROM OFFSITE. | | | | FOR PADUCAH GDP EQUIPMENT, THE PROCESSES THAT PRODUCE EQUIPMENT DEPOSITS DO | | NOT TEND TO FORM UNSAFE GEOMETRIES AND POTENTIALLY FISSILE LEGACY PGDP | | EQUIPMENT IS SPACED TWO FEET EDGE-TO-EDGE WITH MOVEMENT AND HANDLING OF THE | | EQUIPMENT PROHIBITED. GAMMA SCANS PERFORMED ON THIS EQUIPMENT DID NOT | | DETECT ANY SIGNIFICANT DEPOSITS. | | | | PLANS ARE BEING DEVELOPED TO QUALITATIVELY SCAN THE LEGACY EQUIPMENT FOR | | NEUTRON AND/OR GAMMA RADIATION TO VERIFY THAT NO SIGNIFICANT DEPOSITS | | EXIST. FULL CHARACTERIZATION OF DEPOSIT MASS WILL FOLLOW TO ESTABLISH | | DOUBLE CONTINGENCY. | | | | ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS ARE IN PLACE TO PREVENT MOVEMENT OF THE MATERIAL | | AND TO PRECLUDE PLACING ADDITIONAL FISSILE MATERIAL IN THE AREA TO REDUCE | | THE POSSIBILITY OF A CRITICALITY. | | | | DOUBLE CONTINGENCY WILL BE ESTABLISHED UPON COMPLETE IMPLEMENTATION OF NCSA | | GEN-27 WHICH WILL CONTROL MASS AND INTERACTION. | | | | THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS INFORMED. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+