U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Reports For 03/13/97 - 03/14/97 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** 31945 31946 31947 31948 31949 +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |GENERAL INFORMATION or OTHER | |EVENT NUMBER: 31945 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |LICENSEE: COGEMA MINING COMPANY |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/13/97 | | CITY: CASPER REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:36 [ET]| | COUNTY: STATE: WY |EVENT DATE: 03/12/97 | |LICENSE#: SUA-1341 AGREEMENT: N |EVENT TIME: 00:00[MST]| | DOCKET: |LAST UPDATE DATE: 03/13/97 | | +-----------------------------+ | |PERSON ORGANIZATION| | |PELLET RDO | | | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |NRC NOTIFIED BY: VASELIN | | |HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |NLTR LICENSEE 24 HR REPORT | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | PERIMETER WELL FOR MINE FIELD #5 IS IN EXCURSION STATUS. | | | | THE LICENSEE REPORTED THAT A BIWEEKLY SAMPLE TAKEN FROM WELL #5MW16 ON | | 03/10/97, AS CONFIRMED BY A SAMPLE TAKEN ON 03/12/97, IS CURRENTLY IN AN | | EXCURSION STATUS. THE MEASURED PARAMETERS AND UPPER LIMITS ARE AS FOLLOWS: | | | | LIMIT WELL READING CONF. SAMPLE | | | | CHLORIDES (mg/l) 22.7 45.4 54.2 | | | | CONDUCTIVITY (æmho/cm) 1,004 1,460 1,733 | | | | ALKALINITY (mg/l) 134.3 400.4 516 | | | | URANIUM (mg/l) NONE <0.4 <0.4 | | | | THE LICENSEE STATED THAT THE WATER LEVEL IN THE PRODUCTION FIELD HAD | | INCREASED BY APPROXIMATELY 16 FEET FROM NORMAL AT THE TIME OF THE FIRST | | SAMPLE AND THAT THE LEVEL WAS BEING RETURNED TO NORMAL. AN INJECTION WELL | | IS SUSPECTED OF BEING THE CAUSE OF THE PROBLEM, AND IT HAS BEEN CONVERTED | | TO A PRODUCTION WELL. A WRITTEN REPORT WILL BE PROVIDED TO THE NRC REGION 4 | | OFFICE WITHIN SEVEN DAYS. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 31946 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: MCGUIRE REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/13/97 | |UNIT: [1] [ ] [ ] STATE: NC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:23 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 03/13/97 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 13:45[EST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: LARRY ABERNATHY |LAST UPDATE DATE: 03/13/97 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |AL BELISLE RDO | |ADAS 50.72(b)(2)(i) DEG/UNANALYZED COND | | |AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N N 0 REFUELING | 0 REFUELING | | | | | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | TWO FEEDWATER ISOLATION VALVES (FWIV) FOR STEAM GENERATORS 'B' AND 'D' | | FAILED TO ACTUATE DURING TESTING. | | | | THE FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF A FACSIMILE PROVIDED BY THE LICENSEE: | | | | "DEENERGIZING TRAIN 'A' AND 'B' SOLENOIDS FOR VALVES 1-CF26 AND 1-CF30 DID | | NOT RESULT IN CLOSURE OF THE ACTUATOR. THE SUBJECT VALVES ARE REQUIRED TO | | CLOSE UPON THE FOLLOWING: RECEIPT OF A SAFETY INJECTION SIGNAL TO PREVENT | | CONTINUED FEEDWATER ADDITION TO A FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR FOLLOWING A STEAM | | LINE OR FEEDWATER BREAK; SAFETY-RELATED LOW Tave WITH [A] REACTOR TRIP TO | | PREVENT OVER COOLING OF THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM; AND ON A HI-HI WATER | | LEVEL IN THE DOGHOUSES TO PREVENT FLOODING. VALVES 1CF-26 AND 1CF-30 ARE | | CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES SUBJECT TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3/4.6.3 AND | | 10 CFR [PART] 50, APPENDIX A, TO GENERAL DESIGN CRITERIA 57. THEREFORE, | | THE TWO CONTAINMENT ISOLATION/FEEDWATER ISOLATION VALVES WERE INOPERABLE. | | UNIT 1 WAS IN NO MODE WHEN THE EVENT WAS DISCOVERED. FOUR-HOUR [EMERGENCY | | NOTIFICATION SYSTEM (ENS)] NOTIFICATION OF THIS EVENT IS REQUIRED UNDER THE | | CRITERIA OF 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), ANY EVENT FOUND WHILE THE REACTOR IS | | SHUT DOWN, THAT, HAD IT BEEN FOUND WHILE THE REACTOR WAS IN OPERATION WOULD | | HAVE RESULTED IN THE NUCLEAR PLANT, INCLUDING ITS PRINCIPAL SAFETY | | BARRIERS, BEING SERIOUSLY DEGRADED OR BEING IN AN UNANALYZED CONDITION THAT | | SIGNIFICANTLY COMPROMISES PLANT SAFETY. FOUR-HOUR ENS NOTIFICATION IS ALSO | | MADE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE GUIDANCE PROVIDED BY 10 CFR 50.72(b)(iii)(D), | | ANY EVENT OR CONDITION THAT ALONE COULD HAVE PREVENTED THE FULFILLMENT OF | | THE SAFETY FUNCTION OF STRUCTURE OR SYSTEMS THAT ARE NEEDED TO MITIGATE THE | | CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT. A LICENSE EVENT REPORT WILL BE FILED AS | | REQUIRED BY 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v) AND 50.73(a)(2)(ii)." | | | | THE ACTUAL TEST WAS PERFORMED ON 02/25/97, AT 0930 EST. THE LICENSEE | | DETERMINED THAT THE ABOVE FAILURE WAS REPORTABLE AT 1345 EST ON 03/13/97. | | | | THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | | | | * * * UPDATE AT 1553 EST ON 03/13/97, FROM TOM ARLOW TO S. SANDIN * * * | | | | THE LICENSEE CORRECTED THE ORIGINAL REPORT TO SHOW THAT 1CF-26 ('B' STEAM | | GENERATOR) SHOULD BE 1CF-28 ('C' STEAM GENERATOR). THE FAILURE TO ACTUATE | | WAS IDENTIFIED DURING A ROUTINE PRE-OUTAGE TEST WHICH MONITORS NITROGEN | | ACCUMULATOR PRESSURE. SINCE THE VALVES WERE CLOSED DURING THE TEST, | | ACTUATION IS CONFIRMED BY OBSERVING A DECREASE IN ACCUMULATOR PRESSURE | | AFTER INPUTTING A TEST SIGNAL. IN THE CASE OF THE TWO FWIVs ABOVE, NO | | DECREASE IN PRESSURE WAS OBSERVED. THESE VALVES WERE PREVIOUSLY TESTED ON | | 01/17/96, WITH SATISFACTORY RESULTS. THE OTHER TWO FWIVs FOR THE 'A' AND | | 'B' STEAM GENERATORS TESTED SATISFACTORILY. | | | | THE NRC OPERATIONS CENTER NOTIFIED THE R2DO (AL BELISLE). | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 31947 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: MILLSTONE REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/13/97 | |UNIT: [1] [ ] [ ] STATE: CT |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:30 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 03/13/97 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 14:55[EST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: JAMES BAUER |LAST UPDATE DATE: 03/13/97 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |JENNY JOHANSEN RDO | |AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N N 0 COLD SHUTDOWN | 0 COLD SHUTDOWN | | | | | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | UNIT 1 EXPERIENCED A REACTOR BUILDING VENTILATION ISOLATION DUE TO LOSS OF | | THE 'B' REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (RPS) MOTOR-GENERATOR (MG) SET. | | | | THE CONTROL ROOM RECEIVED NUMEROUS ALARMS WHICH, UPON INVESTIGATION, | | REVEALED THAT THE 'B' RPS MG SET HAD TRIPPED. OPERATORS REPORTED THAT THE | | ELECTRICAL PROTECTION ASSEMBLIES ASSOCIATED WITH THE RPS MG SET WERE | | TRIPPED. THESE DEVICES REMOVED THE "B" RPS MG SET FROM ITS ASSOCIATED BUS; | | HOWEVER, THE MG SET OUTPUT BREAKER HAD FAILED TO TRIP AS DESIGNED. | | OPERATORS DEENERGIZED THE 'B' RPS MG SET BY OPENING THE SUPPLY BREAKER AND | | THEN THE OUTPUT BREAKER. AN ACRID ODOR WAS NOTICED AROUND THE VICINITY OF | | THE MG SET. THE 'B' RPS MG SET IS CURRENTLY TAGGED OUT WITH EFFORTS | | UNDERWAY TO RESTORE THE ALTERNATE POWER SOURCE, i.e., INSTRUMENT AND | | REACTOR PROTECTION TRANSFORMER, WHICH WAS REMOVED FROM SERVICE FOR | | MAINTENANCE. THE LICENSEE DOES NOT PLAN TO RESTORE POWER TO THE 'B' RPS | | BUS UNTIL TROUBLESHOOTING IS COMPLETED. LOSS OF THE 'B' RPS BUS RESULTS IN | | AN ACTUATION OF THE STANDBY GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM (SBGTS), REACTOR BUILDING | | VENTILATION ISOLATION, AND DEENERGIZATION OF VARIOUS INSTRUMENTS, INCLUDING | | THE 'B' POWER RANGE NEUTRON MONITORING SYSTEM. AT THE TIME OF THE EVENT, | | THE SBGTS WAS REMOVED FROM SERVICE AND NOT REQUIRED. THE REACTOR BUILDING | | VENTILATION SYSTEM DID ISOLATE AS REQUIRED. | | | | THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR AND SENT A RADIO PAGE TO | | INFORM BOTH STATE AND LOCAL AGENCIES. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 31948 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: INDIAN POINT REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/13/97 | |UNIT: [ ] [3] [ ] STATE: NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:46 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 03/13/97 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 16:50[EST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: JOHN DINELLI |LAST UPDATE DATE: 03/13/97 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |JENNY JOHANSEN RDO | |AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | | | | | 3 | N Y 99 POWER OPERATION | 99 POWER OPERATION | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | THE LICENSEE IDENTIFIED A CONDITION WHERE LOSS OF THE '33' EDG OR | | ASSOCIATED BUS WITH THE '35' BACKUP DC BATTERY CHARGER IN SERVICE WOULD | | PLACE THE UNIT OUTSIDE ITS DESIGN BASIS. | | | | THE FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF A FACSIMILE RECEIVED FROM THE LICENSEE: | | | | "ON MARCH 13, 1997, AT 1650 HOURS, [THE LICENSEE] DETERMINED THAT PAST | | OPERATION OF THE BACKUP DC BATTERY CHARGER HAD THE POTENTIAL OF PLACING THE | | PLANT OUTSIDE ITS DESIGN BASIS. IF A SINGLE FAILURE OCCURRED ON [THE] 33 | | EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR (EDG) OR ASSOCIATED POWER SCHEME WHILE THE | | BACKUP BATTERY CHARGER WAS USED IN LIEU OF A NORMAL CHARGER FOR THE BATTERY | | SUPPORTING ONE OF THE OTHER TWO EDGs, THEN AFTER ITS DC BATTERY DEPLETION | | (>2 HOURS), ITS EDG WOULD NOT CONTINUE TO SUPPORT SAFETY BUS LOADS UNLESS | | RESTORATION OF THEIR NORMAL CHARGER OR OF OFFSITE POWER [OCCURRED]. THIS | | CONFIGURATION IS USED TO ALLOW MAINTENANCE OF THE NORMAL BATTERY CHARGERS. | | OPERATING PROCEDURES DO NOT APPEAR TO SPECIFICALLY ADDRESS RESTORATION OF | | THIS CONFIGURATION, UPON LOSS OF [THE] 33 EDG. FURTHER USE OF THE BACKUP | | CHARGER WILL NOT BE ALLOWED UNTIL RESOLUTION. FURTHER ENGINEERING | | EVALUATION WILL BE PERFORMED." | | | | UNIT 3 HAS FOUR NORMAL BATTERY CHARGERS AND ONE BACKUP INSTALLED. THERE | | ARE NO SURVEILLANCES SCHEDULED WHICH WOULD REQUIRE REMOVAL OF A NORMAL | | BATTERY CHARGER FROM SERVICE. THE '35' BACKUP CHARGER IS TAGGED OUT WITH A | | FINAL DISPOSITION ASSIGNED TO ENGINEERING. THIS CONDITION WAS DISCOVERED | | DURING AN ENGINEERING REVIEW AS PART OF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION UPGRADE | | PROGRAM. | | | | THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 31949 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: VERMONT YANKEE REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/13/97 | |UNIT: [1] [ ] [ ] STATE: VT |NOTIFICATION TIME: 19:15 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 03/13/97 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 19:10[EST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: JIM BROOKS |LAST UPDATE DATE: 03/13/97 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |JENNY JOHANSEN RDO | |AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | | | | | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | DURING AN ENGINEERING REVIEW, THE LICENSEE CONCLUDED THAT POTENTIAL | | INTERNAL FLOODING COULD PLACE THE UNIT OUTSIDE ITS DESIGN BASIS. | | | | THE FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF A FACSIMILE RECEIVED FROM THE LICENSEE: | | | | "POTENTIAL DESIGN BASIS DEFICIENCIES WERE IDENTIFIED DURING THE IPEEE | | INTERNAL FLOODING REVIEW. THESE DEFICIENCIES ARE CATEGORIZED AS | | NON-SEISMIC EQUIPMENT WHICH CAN AFFECT SAFETY EQUIPMENT. A SUMMARY | | FOLLOWS. | | | | A BREAK IN THE FIRE SYSTEM PIPING LOCATED IN THE FRONT OFFICE BUILDING | | (FOB) CAN AFFECT EQUIPMENT IN THE SWITCHGEAR ROOMS DUE TO FLOOD WATER | | FLOWING UNDER THE WEST SWITCHGEAR ROOM DOOR. | | | | FIRE HEADER PIPING IN THE FOB CONSISTS OF 3[-INCH] AND 4[-INCH] DIAMETER | | PIPING WHICH CONNECTS TO THE TURBINE BUILDING FIRE WATER LOOP. FLOW FROM A | | MAJOR BREAK IS ESTIMATED TO BE APPROXIMATELY 5,000 GPM. A FLOOD LEVEL OF | | APPROXIMATELY 14 INCHES WILL ACCUMULATE IN APPROXIMATELY 10 MINUTES IN THE | | LOWER LEVEL OF THE FRONT OFFICE BUILDING. THE DOOR INTO THE WEST | | SWITCHGEAR ROOM ACTS TO IMPEDE FLOOD PROPAGATION TO THE WEST SWITCHGEAR | | ROOM; HOWEVER, THE EXISTING GAP ALONG THE BOTTOM OF THE DOOR WILL ALLOW | | SOME FLOW, AND [THE LICENSEE] ESTIMATE[S THAT] IT WILL TAKE APPROXIMATELY | | 20 TO 30 MINUTES TO ACCUMULATE 1 INCH OF WATER ON THE WEST SWITCHGEAR ROOM | | FLOOR. SWITCHGEAR BUS 8 SITS DIRECTLY ON THE FLOOR AND WILL BEGIN TO BE | | AFFECTED WHEN FLOOD LEVEL IS AT 1 TO 2 INCHES. EXISTING FLOOR DRAINS IN | | THE SWITCHGEAR ROOMS ARE PLUGGED (DUE TO EXTERNAL FLOODING CONCERNS). GAPS | | AT COMMON DOORS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST ROOMS ARE LARGE ALLOWING WATER IN THE | | WEST SWITCHGEAR ROOM TO FLOW INTO THE EAST SWITCHGEAR ROOM. OPENING OF THE | | DOUBLE DOORS TO THE TURBINE BUILDING (LOCATED AT THE MAIN [RADIATION | | PROTECTION] CHECK POINT) CAN RELIEVE WATER TO THE LOWER FEED PUMP ROOM. | | WHILE START OF THE FIRE PUMPS IS ALARMED IN THE CONTROL ROOM, ACTION TO | | OPEN THE TURBINE BUILDING DOUBLE DOORS IS NEEDED QUICKLY SINCE THE WATER | | LEVEL IN THE FOB WILL REACH A FEW FEET WITHIN 10 TO 20 MINUTES. | | | | GIVEN FLOODING IN THE ADMIN BUILDING DUE TO A FIRE WATER PIPE BREAK, | | PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS INDICATES THAT IT WOULD TAKE 20 TO 30 MINUTES BEFORE | | THE WEST SWITCHGEAR ROOM FLOOR WAS FLOODED TO THE 1-INCH LEVEL WHERE | | ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT MAY BECOME SUBJECT TO DAMAGE. | | | | AT APPROXIMATELY 10 MINUTES THE BASEMENT FLOOR OF THE ADMIN BUILDING MAY | | REACH 14 [INCHES] OF LEVEL. | | | | THE FOLLOWING COMPENSATORY ACTION WILL EFFECTIVELY MITIGATE THIS EVENT AND | | PREVENT SWITCHGEAR ROOM FLOODING ABOVE THE 1-INCH LEVEL. | | | | BOTH FIRE WATER PUMPS WOULD START AND ALARM IN THE CONTROL ROOM. THE | | OPERATORS SHOULD BE INSTRUCTED TO INSPECT THE ADMIN BASEMENT FOR FLOODING | | IF SUCH AN ALARM IS RECEIVED. SUBSEQUENT ACTION TO OPEN THE TURBINE | | BUILDING DOOR AND SECURE THE FIRE PUMPS CAN BE TAKEN AS NECESSARY. | | | | ALTHOUGH NOT CONTINUOUSLY MANNED, [HEALTH PHYSICS] OR OTHER PERSONNEL IN | | THE ADMIN BUILDING BASEMENT PROVIDE ADDITIONAL ASSURANCE THAT FLOODING | | WOULD BE DETECTED." | | | | THE LICENSEE PLANS TO INFORM THE STATE REPRESENTATIVE AND NRC RESIDENT | | INSPECTOR. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+