U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Reports For 12/12/97 - 12/15/97 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** 33369 33378 33381 33394 33395 33396 33397 33398 33399 33400 33401 33402 33403 33404 !!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!! +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 33369 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: SAN ONOFRE REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/09/97 | |UNIT: [ ] [2] [3] STATE: CA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 01:32 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] W-3-LP,[2] CE,[3] CE |EVENT DATE: 12/08/97 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 19:10[PST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: TODD COOK |LAST UPDATE DATE: 12/12/97 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: | | |DDDD 73.71 UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH | | | |BLAINE MURRAY, R4 IAT | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | | | | | 2 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | | 3 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | PLANT SECURITY EVENT - | | | | PHYSICAL ASSAULT ON A CONTRACTOR INSIDE THE UNIT 2 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER | | BUILDING. COMPENSATORY MEASURES FULLY IMPLEMENTED WITHIN LICENSEE | | SPECIFIED TIME LIMITS. THE LICENSEE WILL INFORM THE NRC RESIDENT | | INSPECTOR. REFER TO THE HOO LOG FOR ADDITIONAL DETAILS. | | | | ***RETRACTION ON 12/12/97 @ 1638 EST BY CLAY WILLIAMS TAKEN BY MACKINNON*** | | | | AFTER INVESTIGATING THE EVENT THE LICENSEE IS RETRACTING THIS EVENT IT | | BECAUSE THE ALTERCATION WAS MINOR IN NATURE AND NO OBJECTS WERE INVOLVED | | AND IT DID NOT MEET ANY REPORTING REQUIREMENTS OF 10CFR73.71(b). R4IAT (KEN | | BROCKMAN) NOTIFIED. | | | | THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WILL BE NOTIFIED OF THIS RETRACTION BY THE | | LICENSEE. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 33378 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: OCONEE REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/10/97 | |UNIT: [ ] [ ] [3] STATE: SC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:11 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-LP |EVENT DATE: 12/10/97 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 13:10[EST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: NIX |LAST UPDATE DATE: 12/12/97 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |PAUL FREDRICKSON RDO | |AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | | | | | | | | | 3 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 90 POWER OPERATION | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | THE PLANT DISCOVERED THERE EXISTS A POSSIBILITY OF THE ECCS BECOMING | | INOPERABLE DURING THE SUMP RECIRCULATING MODE. | | | | ON 12/08/1997, DURING A SELF INITIATED TECHNICAL AUDIT OF THE PLANTS ECCS, | | IT WAS DETERMINED THAT A CERTAIN INPUT WAS NOT CONSIDERED IN AN ASSUMPTION | | IN THE CALCULATIONS ASSOCIATED WITH TRANSPORTATION OF DEBRIS TO THE REACTOR | | BUILDING EMERGENCY SUMP(RBES) DURING THE RECIRCULATION MODE. INCLUSION OF | | THIS INPUT RESULTED IN A REDUCTION IN THE MINIMUM AVAILABLE SUMP WATER | | LEVEL, WHICH CAUSED INCREASED FLOW VELOCITIES AND CONSEQUENTLY INCREASED | | TRANSPORTABILITY OF DEBRIS SUCH AS INSULATION. INCREASED TRANSPORTABILITY | | OF DEBRIS COULD RESULT IN INCREASED SUMP BLOCKAGE AND REDUCED AVAILABLE | | ECCS NET PUMP SUCTION HEAD(NPSH). AS A RESULT, THIS CONDITION IS BEING | | FURTHER INVESTIGATED. | | | | THERE ARE CERTAIN MEASURES THAT CAN BE TAKEN TO INCREASE THE AVAILABLE ECCS | | NPSH. THESE MEASURES INCLUDE REMOVAL OF THE STRAINERS FROM THE FUEL | | TRANSFER CANAL, REMOVAL OF A FLANGE FROM THE REACTOR VESSEL ANNULUS DRAIN, | | AND REMOVAL OF INSULATION SUSCEPTIBLE TO TRANSPORTABILITY. | | | | SINCE UNIT 1 IS SHUTDOWN, THESE ECCS REQUIREMENTS ARE NOT CURRENTLY | | APPLICABLE, BUT WILL BE ADDRESSED PRIOR TO RESTART. UNIT 2 HAS NO | | INSULATION SUSCEPTIBLE TO TRANSPORT, THEREFORE, THERE IS GREATER CONFIDENCE | | IN THE PRELIMINARY ENGINEERING ASSESSMENT THAT ADEQUATE ECCS NPSH EXISTS ON | | UNIT 2 THAN ON UNIT 3, EVEN WITH REDUCED WATER LEVELS. | | | | UNIT 3 IS REDUCING POWER TO FACILITATE THE REMOVAL OF INSULATION, | | STRAINERS, AND FLANGES SO THAT THE AVAILABLE ECCS MARGIN WILL INCREASE. | | | | THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED. | | | | ***UPDATE ON 12/12/97 @ 1200 EST BY ED BURCHFIELD TAKEN BY MACKINNON*** | | | | AT THIS TIME, RELEVANT INSULATION HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM UNIT 3 AND IS NOT | | PRESENT ON UNIT 2. THE REACTOR VESSEL DRAIN FLANGE WAS REMOVED ON UNIT 2 | | AND VERIFIED TO NOT BE PRESENT ON UNIT 3. THE FUEL TRANSFER CANAL STRAINERS | | HAVE BEEN REMOVED FROM UNITS 2 AND 3. THE RELEVANT INSULATION, REACTOR | | VESSEL DRAIN FLANGE, AND FUEL TRANSFER CANAL STRAINERS WILL ALSO BE REMOVED | | FROM UNIT 1 PRIOR TO EXCEEDING COLD SHUTDOWN CONDITIONS. UNIT 1 IS IN COLD | | SHUTDOWN AND UNITS 2 AND 3 ARE OPERATING AT 100% FULL POWER. | | | | THE OPERABILITY EVALUATION HAS BEEN COMPLETED AND CONCLUDES THAT THE ECCS | | ON ALL THREE UNITS IS OPERABLE. THEREFORE, NO ENTRY INTO TECHNICAL | | SPECIFICATIONS IS REQUIRED. OCONEE CONSERVATIVELY REPORTED THIS EVENT ON | | UNIT 3 AS A ONE HOUR NON-EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION UNDER 10CFR50.72 | | (b)(1)(ii)(B) AS A CONDITION THAT MAY BE OUTSIDE THE DESIGN BASIS OF THE | | PLANT, IN THAT THIS CONDITION COULD POTENTIALLY RESULT IN THE INOPERABILITY | | OF THE ECCS DURING THE SUMP RECIRCULATION MODE OF A LOCA. ALTHOUGH NO | | OPERABILITY CONCERNS EXIST REGARDING THE CURRENT CONFIGURATION OF THE THREE | | OCONEE UNITS, ANALYSES ARE UNDERWAY TO EVALUATE OPERABILITY OF THE ECCS IN | | THE PAST. THESE ANALYSES WILL CONSIDER THE IMPACT OF REMOVED INSULATION AND | | FUEL TRANSFER CANAL/REACTOR VESSEL CAVITY FLOW RESTRICTIONS ON OPERABILITY | | OF THE EMERGENCY SUMP FOR ALL THREE OCONEE UNITS IN THE PAST. R2DO (PAUL | | FREDRICKSON) NOTIFIED. | | | | THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR HAS BEEN NOTIFIED OF THIS UPDATE BY THE | | LICENSEE. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ !!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!! +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 33381 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: BYRON REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/11/97 | |UNIT: [1] [2] [ ] STATE: IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 00:47 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 12/10/97 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 22:55[CST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: SCOTT FRUIN |LAST UPDATE DATE: 12/12/97 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |JAMES CREED RDO | |DSAF 73.71(b)(1) SECURITY DEGRADATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N N 0 REFUELING | 0 REFUELING | | 2 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM DEGRADATION RELATED TO AREA BOUNDARY. IMMEDIATE | | COMPENSATORY MEASURES TAKEN UPON DISCOVERY. | | | | THE LICENSEE WILL INFORM THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | | | | REFER TO THE HOO LOG FOR ADDITIONAL DETAILS. | | | | ***RETRACTION ON 12/12/97 @ 1753 EST BY M. WOLFE TAKEN BY MACKINNON*** | | | | INFORMATION NOTICE 86-83, UNDERGROUND PATHWAYS INTO PROTECTED AREAS, | | APPLIES TO THIS SITUATION IN THAT A CONTINUOUS OPERATIONAL IMPEDIMENT TO | | ENTRY EXISTED DURING THE TIME THE REPORTED CONDITION OCCURRED. THEREFORE | | THE LICENSEE IS RETRACTING THIS EVENT NOTIFICATION. R3DO (JIM CREED) | | NOTIFIED. | | | | THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED OF THIS RETRACTION BY THE LICENSEE. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 33394 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: SUSQUEHANNA REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/12/97 | |UNIT: [1] [ ] [ ] STATE: PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 01:05 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 12/11/97 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 22:30[EST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: DONALD ROLAND |LAST UPDATE DATE: 12/12/97 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |JIM TRAPP RDO | |AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | | |NLCO TECH SPEC LCO A/S | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | | | | | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FAILURE OF FLOWRATE TO REACH MINIMUM REQUIRED ON START OF HPCI. | | | | LICENSEE, DURING COMPLETION OF A SYSTEM OUTAGE WINDOW ON THE HIGH PRESSURE | | COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI) SYSTEM, MEASURED FLOW RESPONSE TIME AS 32.3 | | SECONDS, WITH AN ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA OF 5000 GPM IN 29.5 SECONDS. THE TIME | | WAS FURTHER CONFIRMED AS 32.1 SECONDS AS MEASURED BY THE GENERAL ELECTRIC | | TRANSIENT ANALYSIS AND RECORDING SYSTEM. REVIEW OF THE SYSTEM RESPONSE | | NOTED AN ANOMALOUS STROKE OF THE STEAM ADMISSION VALVE. THE VALVE STROKED | | TO 85% OPEN AND STAYED THERE FOR ABOUT 16.5 SECONDS THEN POPPED FULL OPEN. | | PREVIOUS TEST TRACES SHOW THE VALVE STROKING FULL OPEN WITHOUT STOPPING. | | | | THERE HAVE BEEN NO KNOWN ACTIVITIES PERFORMED ON THIS VALVE DURING THE WORK | | WINDOW. ENGINEERING AND VALVE TEAM PERSONNEL ARE REVIEWING THE TEST TO | | DETERMINE THE CAUSE AND REPAIRS. THE SYSTEM WILL REMAIN INOPERABLE PENDING | | THE OUTCOME OF THE EVALUATION, ALL OTHER EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS | | REMAIN OPERABLE. | | | | THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |FUEL CYCLE FACILITY | |EVENT NUMBER: 33395 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/12/97 | | RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 09:41 [ET]| |COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 12/11/97 | | 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 11:00[EST]| | BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 12/12/97 | | CITY: PIKETON REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+ | COUNTY: PIKE STATE: OH |PERSON ORGANIZATION| |LICENSE#: GDP-2 AGREEMENT: N |JAMES CREED RDO | | DOCKET: 0707002 |FRED COMBS EO | +------------------------------------------------+FRANK CONGEL IRD | |NRC NOTIFIED BY: GREG BARCH | | |HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | NRC BULLETIN 91-01 24 HOUR NOTIFICATION. | | | | A NRC INSPECTOR DISCOVERED A LOSS OF ONE NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY | | APPROVAL (NCSA) REQUIREMENT WITHIN THE X-330 PROCESS BUILDING. A MINIMUM | | OF TWO FEET EDGE-TO-EDGE MUST BE MAINTAINED BETWEEN BOP ACTUATORS BEING | | STORED, AS ALL CONTAINERS OF POTENTIALLY CONTAMINATED MATERIALS SHALL BE | | SPACED PRIOR TO NONDESTRUCTIVE ASSAY SURVEYS. THIS SPACING WAS VIOLATED, | | THE OTHER NCSA REQUIREMENTS WERE MAINTAINED. THE SPACING VIOLATION WAS | | IMMEDIATELY CORRECTED. | | | | THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 33396 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: INDIAN POINT REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/12/97 | |UNIT: [ ] [3] [ ] STATE: NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:37 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 12/12/97 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 12:50[EST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: RUSS LONG |LAST UPDATE DATE: 12/12/97 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |JIM TRAPP RDO | |AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | | | | | 3 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | A SINGLE FAILURE, LOSS OF THE TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP, | | DURING A LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER COULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF BOTH MOTOR DRIVEN | | AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMPS. | | | | THE LICENSEE HAS CONCLUDED THAT IN THE PAST, THE PLANT MAY HAVE POTENTIALLY | | BEEN OUTSIDE ITS DESIGN BASIS. IN THE PAST THE TWO MOTOR DRIVEN AUXILIARY | | FEEDWATER PUMPS HAD THEIR DISCHARGE FLOW VALVES CUTBACK CONTROLLER POWERED | | FROM A SINGLE INSTRUMENT BUS NORMALLY BACKED BY AN EMERGENCY POWER SOURCE. | | IF THE POWER TO THIS INSTRUMENT BUS WAS SWITCHED TO ITS ALTERNATE POWER | | SUPPLY WHEN THE AFWPs WERE REQUIRED TO BE OPERABLE, THEN POWER TO THE | | CUTBACK CONTROLLERS FOR BOTH AFWPs WOULD HAVE BEEN LOST DURING A POSTULATED | | EVENT BECAUSE THE ALTERNATE POWER IS DESIGNED TO BE STRIPPED FROM THE | | EMERGENCY POWER SOURCE. LOSS OF POWER TO THE CUTBACK CONTROLLERS ALLOWS | | BOTH AFWPs TO GO TO PUMP RUNOUT AND THE AFWP SUPPLY BREAKERS WOULD TRIP ON | | OVERCURRENT. WHEN CONSIDERING A SINGLE FAILURE THAT RENDERS THE STEAM | | DRIVEN PUMP INOPERABLE, COUPLED WITH THE LOSS OF THE MOTOR DRIVEN AFWPs DUE | | TO THE ABOVE SCENARIO, THEN THE FUNCTION OF AUXILIARY FEEDWATER IS LOST | | PLACING THE PLANT OUTSIDE ITS DESIGN BASIS. A MODIFICATION HAS BEEN | | INSTALLED TO PROVIDE INDEPENDENT POWER TO THE CUTBACK CONTROLLERS. A SHIFT | | ORDER WILL ENSURE THAT WHEN THE INSTRUMENT BUS IS POWERED BY THE ALTERNATE | | POWER SOURCE, THEN THE ASSOCIATED ,MOTOR DRIVEN AFWP WILL BE DECLARED | | INOPERABLE. THE ABOVE MODIFICATION WAS INSTALLED ON 10/31/97. | | | | THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WILL BE NOTIFIED OF THIS EVENT BY THE LICENSEE. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 33397 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: DRESDEN REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/12/97 | |UNIT: [ ] [2] [3] STATE: IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 20:23 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3 |EVENT DATE: 12/12/97 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 18:35[CST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: DAVID GRONEK |LAST UPDATE DATE: 12/12/97 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |JIM CREED RDO | |APRE 50.72(b)(2)(vi) OFFSITE NOTIFICATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | | | | | 2 | N Y 99 POWER OPERATION | 99 POWER OPERATION | | 3 | N Y 99 POWER OPERATION | 99 POWER OPERATION | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | OFFSITE NOTIFICATION MADE TO THE ILLINOIS EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY. | | | | AT APPROXIMATELY 1620 CST, A VEHICLE STRUCK A UTILITY POLE WHICH RESULTED | | IN A LOSS OF 138 KV LINE WHICH FEEDS THE LIFT STATION BUILDING. LOSS OF | | THIS EQUIPMENT REQUIRED PLACING THE STATION IN THE LAKE BYPASS MODE. THIS | | MODE OF OPERATION IN DECEMBER IS A VIOLATION OF THE NATIONAL POLLUTANT | | DISCHARGE ELIMINATION SYSTEM PERMIT ISSUED BY THE ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL | | PROTECTION AGENCY. THIS VIOLATION REQUIRES NOTIFICATION OF THE ILLINOIS | | EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY WHICH WAS MADE AT 1835 CST. THE PLANT WAS | | RETURNED TO THE CLOSED CYCLE MODE FOR THE LAKE WITHIN TWO HOURS OF THE | | EVENT. | | | | THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED OF THIS EVENT BY THE LICENSEE. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |GENERAL INFORMATION or OTHER | |EVENT NUMBER: 33398 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |LICENSEE: COOPER ENERGY SERVICES |NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/12/97 | | CITY: GROVE CITY REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:30 [ET]| | COUNTY: STATE: PA |EVENT DATE: 12/12/97 | |LICENSE#: AGREEMENT: N |EVENT TIME: 15:30[EST]| | DOCKET: |LAST UPDATE DATE: 12/12/97 | | +-----------------------------+ | |PERSON ORGANIZATION| | |PAUL FREDRICKSON RDO | | | | +------------------------------------------------+JOHN PELLET (REG 4) RDO | |NRC NOTIFIED BY: ANDREW STEFFAN |VERN HODGE (RVIB) NRR | |HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |CDEG 21.21(c)(3)(i) DEFECTS/NONCOMPLIANCE | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | 10 CFR 21 NOTIFICATION, ENTERPRISE DSR-4 AND DSRV-4 EMERGENCY DIESEL | | GENERATOR ADJUSTING SCREW FAILURE. | | | | ON SEPTEMBER 26, 1997, ENTERGY OPERATIONS RIVER BEND STATION REPORTED THE | | FAILURE OF AN ADJUSTING SCREW, COOPER ENERGY SERVICES PART NUMBER 1A-7840. | | THE ADJUSTING SCREW IS A BALL AND SWIVEL ASSEMBLY UTILIZED TO ALLOW FOR | | ANGULAR MOVEMENT BETWEEN THE ROCKER ARM AND INTAKE AND EXHAUST VALVE STEM | | OF THE POWER CYLINDER HEAD. THE ADJUSTING SCREW IS ASSEMBLED BY SWAGING A | | "SWIVEL PAD" ON TO A "BALL". | | | | SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION DETERMINED THAT THE SWAGING PROCESS AND TOOLING | | WAS OF A DESIGN THAT ALLOWED FOR "OVERSWAGING" OF THE PAD, REDUCING THE | | AMOUNT OF FREE ANGULAR MOVEMENT IN THE ASSEMBLY. THIS CONDITION POTENTIALLY | | CAUSED THE MATERIAL OF THE UPPER EDGE OF THE SWIVEL PAD TO BE OVER | | STRESSED, AND/OR LIMIT THE ABILITY OF THE ASSEMBLY TO ACCOMMODATE THE | | REQUIRED ANGULAR MOVEMENT WITH UNDUE STRESS. | | | | THE FAILURE OF THE ASSEMBLY WAS THE CRACKING OF THE SWIVEL PAD MATERIAL AT | | THE UPPER EDGE. THIS FAILURE HAS THE POTENTIAL TO CAUSE AN OPERABILITY | | CONCERN DUE TO THE ASSEMBLY SEPARATING AND EXCESS CLEARANCE (VALVE LASH) | | BEING ESTABLISHED WHICH COULD LEAD TO CATASTROPHIC FAILURE OF THE VALVE | | STEM OR REMAINING BALL PORTION OF THE ASSEMBLY. MULTIPLE FAILURES OF THE | | ASSEMBLY WITHOUT CATASTROPHIC FAILURE COULD ALSO REDUCE ENGINE OUTPUT DUE | | TO DECREASED VALVE LIFT. IN ADDITION, LOOSE PIECES OF THE ASSEMBLY COULD | | CAUSE SECONDARY DAMAGE IN THE ENGINE. | | | | COOPER ENERGY SERVICES HAS SUPPLIED THE 1A-7840 ADJUSTING SCREW TO THE | | FOLLOWING SITES: RIVER BEND, CATAWBA, AND KORI 3 & 4 (KOREA ELECTRIC). | | | | CORRECTIVE ACTION: | | | | THE SUBJECT ASSEMBLIES AT RIVER BEND STATION HAVE BEEN REPLACED WITH | | ACCEPTABLE ASSEMBLIES. | | | | THE SWAGING TOOLING HAS BEEN CORRECTED TO LIMIT THE AMOUNT OF "SWAGE". | | ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA ASSURING THE NECESSARY FREEDOM OF THE ASSEMBLY HAS BEEN | | DEFINED AND WILL BE VERIFIED DURING MANUFACTURE. | | | | USER RECOMMENDATIONS: | | | | UTILITIES CURRENTLY IN POSSESSION OF 1A-7840 ASSEMBLIES ARE INSTRUCTED TO | | VERIFY THAT A MINIMUM OF 18 DEGREES OF ANGULAR MOVEMENT FROM CENTERLINE IS | | AVAILABLE IN ALL DIRECTIONS, WITH NO INDICATION OF ROUGHNESS WHEN MOVING. | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |FUEL CYCLE FACILITY | |EVENT NUMBER: 33399 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/12/97 | | RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 21:56 [ET]| |COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 12/12/97 | | 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 14:00[EST]| | BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 12/12/97 | | CITY: PIKETON REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+ | COUNTY: PIKE STATE: OH |PERSON ORGANIZATION| |LICENSE#: GDP-2 AGREEMENT: N |JIM CREED RDO | | DOCKET: 0707002 |BOB PIERSON EO | +------------------------------------------------+ | |NRC NOTIFIED BY: ERIC SPAETH | | |HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | NRC BULLETIN 91-01 24 HOUR NOTIFICATION | | | | IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT COLD TRAPS CONTAINING URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE WERE | | PLACED IN THE DECONTAMINATION ROOM. PER THE NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY | | APPROVAL REQUIREMENT # 13 ONLY EMPTY CYLINDER AND TUBES ARE TO BE PLACED IN | | THE DECONTAMINATION ROOM FOR CLEANING. THE NCSA DOES NOT ADDRESS CLEANING | | OUT THE COLD TRAPS WHICH CONTAIN URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE BEFORE TAKING THEM | | INTO THE DECONTAMINATION ROOM. THE COLD TRAPS CAN CONTAIN UP TO 1000 GRAMS | | OF 5 WEIGHT % URANIUM-235. THE CALLER BELIEVES THAT THE COLD TRAPS ARE OF A | | SAFE GEOMETRY DESIGN. | | | | "AT 1400 HOURS ON 12/12/97, X-710 LAB PERSONNEL DISCOVERED A VIOLATION OF | | REQUIREMENT # 13 OF NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY APPROVAL NCSA-0710-006,A00 | | WHICH STATES "ONLY EMPTY CYLINDERS, TUBES, AND CONTAINERS SHALL BE PLACED | | IN THE DECONTAMINATION AREA FOR CLEANING." CONTROL "A" WAS LOST WHEN IT WAS | | DISCOVERED THAT COLD TRAPS WHICH WERE NOT EMPTY OF URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE WAS | | PROCESSED IN THE DECONTAMINATION AREA OF THE URANIUM SAMPLING AREA. LOSS OF | | THIS CONTROL CONSTITUTES THE LOSS OF ONE CONTROL FOR CONTINGENCY EVENT | | B.3.1 REMAINING CONTROLS WERE MAINTAINED THROUGHOUT THIS EVENT. THIS | | OPERATION WAS NOT BEING PERFORMED DURING DISCOVERY, BUT HAD BEEN PERFORMED | | RECENTLY. ALL FURTHER OPERATIONS HAVE BEEN SUSPENDED PENDING NCS | | EVALUATION. THE LOSS OF ONE (1) NCS CONTROL IS REPORTABLE TO THE NRC AS | | DEFINED IN PROCEDURE UE2-RA-RE1030, APPENDIX "D", SECTION "A", PARAGRAPH | | 4(a). THERE WAS NO LOSS OR RELEASE OF HAZARDOUS/RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL OR | | RADIOACTIVE/RADIOLOGICAL CONTAMINATION EXPOSURE AS A RESULT OF THIS EVENT." | | | | SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENT: | | | | LOSS OF ONE (1) CONTROL OF THE DOUBLE CONTINGENCY CONTROL MATRIX. | | | | POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED: | | | | IF MATERIAL FROM NON-EMPTIED CONTAINERS WAS PLACED IN UNSAFE VOLUME IN THE | | DECONTAMINATION AREA, AND SPACING WAS VIOLATED, CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR. | | | | | | CONTROL PARAMETERS: | | | | CONTROL "A": VOLUME | | CONTROL "B": INTERACTION | | | | ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL: | | | | NO URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE PRESENT DURING DISCOVERY OF THIS EVENT. TYPICALLY | | THE COLD TRAP CONTAINS 1000 GRAMS OF URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE AT 5 WEIGHT | | PERCENT. | | | | NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION | | OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: | | | | FAILURE TO MAINTAIN VOLUME CONTROL | | | | CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: | | | | FUTURE OPERATIONS HAVE BEEN SUSPENDED PENDING NCS EVALUATION. | | | | THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED OF THIS EVENT NOTIFICATION BY THE | | LICENSEE. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 33400 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: COMANCHE PEAK REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/13/97 | |UNIT: [1] [ ] [ ] STATE: TX |NOTIFICATION TIME: 05:50 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 12/12/97 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 23:57[CST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: PAUL COX |LAST UPDATE DATE: 12/13/97 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: DOUG WEAVER +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |JEFF SHACKELFORD RDO | |ASHU 50.72(b)(1)(i)(A) PLANT S/D REQD BY TS | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 91 POWER OPERATION | | | | | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | TECH SPEC REQUIRED SHUTDOWN - INOPERABLE SAFEGUARDS SEQUENCER | | | | THE LICENSEE COMMENCED A TECH SPEC REQUIRED SHUTDOWN AT 0403 CST. THE | | TRAIN "B" SAFEGUARDS SEQUENCER HAD BEEN DECLARED INOPERABLE AT 2347 ON | | 12/12/97, DUE TO A FAILED 15 VOLT LOGIC POWER SUPPLY. THE FAILED POWER | | SUPPLY WAS DISCOVERED WHILE RESTORING FROM A SURVEILLANCE TEST. ALL OTHER | | SAFEGUARDS EQUIPMENT IS OPERABLE. POWER IS CURRENTLY 91% AND RAMPING DOWN. | | | | THE TECH SPEC ALLOWS 6 HOURS TO REPAIR PLUS AN ADDITIONAL 6 HOURS TO REACH | | HOT STANDBY IF UNABLE TO REPAIR THE INOPERABLE SEQUENCER. | | | | THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 33401 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: CLINTON REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/13/97 | |UNIT: [1] [ ] [ ] STATE: IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:50 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] GE-6 |EVENT DATE: 12/13/97 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 11:30[CST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: MARSHALL FUNKHOUSER |LAST UPDATE DATE: 12/13/97 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |JIM CREED RDO | |ADAS 50.72(b)(2)(i) DEG/UNANALYZED COND | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N N 0 COLD SHUTDOWN | 0 COLD SHUTDOWN | | | | | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT SOME AVERAGE POWER RANGE MONITOR (APRM) INOP | | CIRCUITS WERE NOT BEING PROPERLY TESTED. | | | | DURING THE PERFORMANCE OF GENERIC LETTER 96-01 (TESTING OF SAFETY-RELATED | | LOGIC CIRCUITS) INVESTIGATION THE APRM INOP CIRCUITS WERE IDENTIFIED AS NOT | | BEING PROPERLY TESTED. THE IMPROVED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS SURVEILLANCE | | REQUIREMENT 3.3.1.1.15 TABLE 2.d REQUIRES THAT A LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL BE | | PERFORMED ON THE APRM INOP CIRCUITRY. CLINTON POWER STATION PROCEDURE | | 9431.12 APRM CHANNEL CALIBRATION DOES NOT FULLY TEST THE APRM POWER | | SUPPLIES TO MEET THESE REQUIREMENTS. IN THE 15 VDC TO THE 5 VDC POWER | | SUPPLY CARD IN EACH OF THE APRM CHANNELS THE 5 VDC LOW VOLTAGE ALARM OUTPUT | | TO THE APRM INOP CIRCUIT IS NOT VERIFIED. THE 5VDC LOW-HIGH ALARM CIRCUIT | | IS BALANCED DURING SPECIFIC STEPS OF THE CALIBRATION PROCEDURE. THE | | LICENSEE IS MAKING THIS NOTIFICATION BASED ON THE CIRCUITS THAT ARE NOT | | PRESENTLY IDENTIFIED AS BEING TESTED. THUS, A UNIDENTIFIED FAILURE OF THESE | | CIRCUITS MAY HAVE RESULTED IN THE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT BEING SERIOUSLY | | DEGRADED OR BEING IN AN UNANALYZED CONDITION THAT SIGNIFICANTLY COMPROMISED | | PLANT SAFETY. | | | | THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED OF THIS EVENT BY THE LICENSEE. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |FUEL CYCLE FACILITY | |EVENT NUMBER: 33402 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/13/97 | | RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 19:13 [ET]| |COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 12/12/97 | | 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 20:00[CST]| | BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 12/13/97 | | CITY: PADUCAH REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+ | COUNTY: McCRACKEN STATE: KY |PERSON ORGANIZATION| |LICENSE#: GDP-1 AGREEMENT: Y |JIM CREED RDO | | DOCKET: 0707001 |BOB PIERSON (NMSS) EO | +------------------------------------------------+ | |NRC NOTIFIED BY: RANDY BOSHELL | | |HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | NRC BULLETIN 91-01 24 HOUR NOTIFICATION. | | | | TWO FOOT SPACING BETWEEN A POTENTIALLY FISSILE NEGATIVE AIR MACHINE (NAM) | | AND A 30 GALLON DRUM CONTAINING CONTAMINATED SEAL PARTS VIOLATED. | | | | NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY APPROVAL (NCSA) GEN-09 PROVIDES NCS CONTROLS FOR | | OPERATION OF NEGATIVE AIR MACHINES (NAMs) AT PGDP. INTERACTION IS | | CONTROLLED FOR OPERATION AND STORAGE OF NAMs THROUGH A LIMIT WHICH REQUIRES | | THAT A MINIMUM 2-FT EDGE-TO-EDGE SPACING BE MAINTAINED BETWEEN NAMs AND AND | | ALL OTHER FISSILE/POTENTIALLY FISSILE MATERIALS. THE NEGATIVE AIR MACHINE | | IS USED TO TAKE SUCTION ON A GLOVE BOX IN WHICH SEALS ARE DISASSEMBLED. THE | | NAM HAS AN OPENING THAT IS APPROXIMATELY 2 FEET BY 2 FEET AND IT IS ABOUT 8 | | FEET LONG. IT IS MOUNTED ON RUBBERS WHEELS SO IT CAN BE MOVED TO OTHER | | GLOVE BOXES. IT CONTAINS HEPA FILTERS, A SUCTION MOTOR AND IT IS | | APPROXIMATELY 4.5 FEET TO 5 FEET HIGH. | | | | WHILE PERFORMING AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE INCIDENT RELATED TO THE SEAL | | DISASSEMBLY OPERATION IN C-400 (PR-EN-97-7322, NRC EVENT # 33392 REPORTED | | ON 12/11/97), NCS DISCOVERED A POTENTIALLY FISSILE NAM IN THE C-400 | | RECEIVING BOOTH. THE NAM WAS SPACED APPROXIMATELY 13 INCHES FROM A GROUP OF | | SEAL PARTS AND A 30 GALLON DRUM CONTAINING CONTAMINATED SEAL PARTS. THE | | GROUP OF SEAL PARTS CONTAINED VERY LITTLE IF ANY URANIUM CONTAMINATION. THE | | SEAL PARTS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED POTENTIALLY FISSILE ANS SHOULD HAVE BEEN | | SPACED A MINIMUM 2 FT EDGE-TO-EDGE FROM NAM. THE 30-GALLON DRUM HAD BEEN | | MOVED TO THIS LOCATION ON 12/11/97 BECAUSE IT WAS BELIEVED TO CONTAIN ONLY | | DECONTAMINATED PARTS. NEW INFORMATION WAS RECEIVED ON 12/12/97 THAT THIS | | DRUM MAY CONTAIN CONTAMINATED PARTS. A MORE DETAILED VISUAL INSPECTION OF | | THE 30-GALLON DRUM CONTENTS WAS DONE ON 12/13/97 THAT VERIFIED THE SEAL | | PARTS HAD NOT BEEN DECONTAMINATED. | | | | THE NCS EVALUATION FOR NCSA GEN-09 DEMONSTRATES THAT ANOTHER PROCESS UPSET | | WOULD BE NECESSARY IN ORDER TO RESULT IN A CRITICAL CONFIGURATION; | | THEREFORE, THIS INCIDENT DOES NOT RESULT IN A LOSS OF BOTH CONTINGENCIES | | FOR CRITICALITY SAFETY. | | | | PGDP PROBLEM REPORT NUMBER PR-EN-97-7360; PGDP REPORT NUMBER PAD-1997-163. | | | | SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: | | | | THE PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SEAL SUBCOMPONENTS DO NOT READILY | | SUPPORT LARGE ACCUMULATIONS OF URANIUM BEARING MATERIAL. THE SEAL | | SUBCOMPONENTS DO NOT CONTAIN LARGE CAVITIES THAT WOULD FACILITATE HOLDUP OF | | FISSILE MATERIAL. THEREFORE, TYPICAL SEALS WOULD CONTAIN ONLY A "DUSTING" | | OF URANIUM BEARING MATERIAL. DUE TO THE INABILITY OF THE SEAL TO CONTAIN | | LARGE AMOUNTS OF URANIUM, THE RATIO OF FISSILE MATERIAL TO METAL WOULD BE | | EXPECTED TO BE VERY LOW. LIMITS ARE ESTABLISHED TO ENSURE THAT NAMs CONTAIN | | LESS THAN A SAFE MASS DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS. BASED ON THE EXTREMELY | | SMALL AMOUNT OF URANIUM ON THE SEAL PARTS, THE SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS | | EVENT IS VERY LOW. | | | | POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED: | | | | IN ORDER FOR A CRITICALITY TO OCCUR AS A RESULT OF THIS EVENT, FISSILE | | MATERIAL, IN QUANTITIES FAR EXCEEDING TYPICAL SEAL COMPONENT HOLDUP, WOULD | | HAVE HAD TO BE PRESENT ON THE SEAL PARTS ON THE CART OR IN THE WASTE DRUM. | | ADDITIONALLY, THE NAM WOULD HAVE HAD TO CONTAIN FISSILE MATERIAL IN | | QUANTITIES MUCH GREATER THAN THAT PRESENT DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS. | | | | CONTROLLED PARAMETERS: | | | | THE STORAGE OF THE SEALS REPRESENTED AN UNAPPROVED FISSILE MATERIAL | | OPERATION WHICH WAS REPORTED PREVIOUSLY (PR-EN-97-7322, NRC EVENT NUMBER | | 33392). SINCE THE SEAL PARTS MUST BE CONSIDERED AS CONTAINING FISSILE | | MATERIAL, THIS VIOLATION REPRESENTS THE LOSS OF INTERACTION CONTROL BETWEEN | | THE NAM AND THE CONTAMINATED SEAL COMPONENTS. | | | | ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL: | | | | THE AMOUNT OF FISSILE MATERIAL ON THE SEAL SUBCOMPONENTS IS UNKNOWN; | | HOWEVER, BASED ON VISUAL INSPECTIONS, THE PARTS CONTAIN ONLY SMALL AMOUNTS | | OF SURFACE CONTAMINATION. CONTROLS ESTABLISHED FOR OPERATION OF THE NAMs | | ENSURE THAT THE TOTAL HOLDUP OF URANIUM ON THE FILTER ASSEMBLY IS LESS THAN | | A SAFE MASS DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS. THE ENRICHMENT IS LESS THAN 2 WEIGHT | | PERCENT U-235. THE EXPECTED FORM OF MATERIAL IS UO2F2 OR POSSIBLE UF | | HOLDUP. | | | | NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION | | OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: | | | | THE SPACING REQUIREMENT BETWEEN THE NAM AND OTHER FISSILE/POTENTIALLY | | FISSILE MATERIAL WAS NOT MAINTAINED. THIS IS A VIOLATION OF THE SPACING | | CONTROL ESTABLISHED THROUGH NCSA GEN-09 FOR OPERATION OF THE NAMs. | | | | CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY; | | | | THE AREA HAD ALREADY BEEN SECURED AND POSTED DUE TO PR-EN-97-7322, NRC | | EVENT NUMBER 33392. THROUGH DIRECTION FROM THE PSS AND NCS PERSONNEL, THE | | NAM WAS MOVED IN A DIRECTION AWAY FROM THE SEAL PARTS IN ORDER TO | | REESTABLISH THE REQUIRED SPACING FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF DOUBLE CONTINGENCY | | OF THE NAM OPERATION PER NCSA GEN-09 | | | | THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED OF THIS EVENT BY THE LICENSEE. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |FUEL CYCLE FACILITY | |EVENT NUMBER: 33403 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/14/97 | | RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:25 [ET]| |COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 12/13/97 | | 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 18:00[CST]| | BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 12/14/97 | | CITY: PADUCAH REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+ | COUNTY: McCRACKEN STATE: KY |PERSON ORGANIZATION| |LICENSE#: GDP-1 AGREEMENT: Y |JIM CREED RDO | | DOCKET: 0707001 |BOB PIERSON (NMSS) EO | +------------------------------------------------+ | |NRC NOTIFIED BY: W. G. HALICKS | | |HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | NRC BULLETIN 91-01 24 HOUR NOTIFICATION. | | | | WET/DRY VACUUM CLEANER WAS FOUND LESS THAN TWO FEET FROM SUB-COMPONENTS OF | | 6 CHEMICAL TRAP MEDIA VACUUM CLEANERS. | | | | ON 12/13/97 AT 1800 CST DURING WALKDOWN OF THE C-400 (CHEMICAL OPERATION | | FACILITY) RECEIVING BOOTH FOR NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY ISSUES RELATED TO | | THOSE REPORTED AS NRC NOTIFICATION EVENT NUMBERS 33392 AND 33402, SEVERAL | | POTENTIALLY FISSILE VACUUM CLEANER COMPONENTS WERE DISCOVERED IN TEMPORARY | | STORAGE IN A SMALL CONTAMINATION AREA. THE AREA CONTAINED SUB-COMPONENTS OF | | 6 CHEMICAL TRAP MEDIA VACUUM CLEANERS. ALSO INCLUDED AMONG THE GROUP WAS | | POTENTIALLY FISSILE LEGACY WET/DRY SHOP VACUUM IN VIOLATION OF THE | | GOVERNING NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY APPROVAL (NCSA). THE LEGACY VACUUM WAS | | SUSPECTED OF HAVING BEEN USED IN C-310 (PURGE AND PRODUCT BUILDING) FOR THE | | REMOVAL OF OIL-LOADED TRAP MEDIA. SINCE THE WET/DRY VACUUM IS SUSPECTED OF | | CONTAINING FISSILE MATERIAL, THIS CONDITION REPRESENTS A LOSS OF THE | | SPACING CONTROL CREDITED FOR SAFETY OF THE OPERATION. OPERATIONS PERSONNEL | | ESTABLISHED A 10-FOOT BUFFER AREA AROUND THE EQUIPMENT AND NOTIFIED NUCLEAR | | CRITICALITY PERSONNEL FOR ASSISTANCE IN RESOLVING THIS ISSUE. | | | | THIS INCIDENT IS A REPORTABLE EVENT PER UE2-RA-RE1030, REV. 2, APPENDIX D, | | CRITERIA A.4.a. AS A VIOLATION OF THE DOUBLE CONTINGENCY PRINCIPLE. IN THIS | | CASE, THE SPACING CONTROL WAS VIOLATED. THE SECOND CONTINGENCY, THE | | GEOMETRY CONTROL, REMAINED IN PLACE. | | | | THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED OF THIS EVENT BY THE LICENSEE. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |FUEL CYCLE FACILITY | |EVENT NUMBER: 33404 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/14/97 | | RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 20:55 [ET]| |COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 12/13/97 | | 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 22:00[CST]| | BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 12/14/97 | | CITY: PADUCAH REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+ | COUNTY: McCRACKEN STATE: KY |PERSON ORGANIZATION| |LICENSE#: GDP-1 AGREEMENT: Y |JIM CREED RDO | | DOCKET: 0707001 |BOB PIERSON (NMSS) EO | +------------------------------------------------+ | |NRC NOTIFIED BY: W. F. CAGE | | |HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | NRC BULLETIN 91-01 24 HOUR NOTIFICATION | | | | IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT CYLINDER WASH PUMPS USED TO WASH OUT 10 TON AND 14 | | TON CYLINDERS WERE REMOVED WITHOUT HAVING A NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY | | APPROVAL (NCSA) GOVERNING THE REMOVAL OF THE PUMPS. | | | | ON 12/13/97 AT 2200 CST, DURING A WALKDOWN OF THE BUILDING BY NUCLEAR | | CRITICALITY SAFETY PERSONNEL FOR ISSUES RELATED TO THOSE REPORTED IN NRC | | EVENT REPORTS 33392, 33402, AND 33403; IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THERE WAS NOT | | A NCSA GOVERNING THE REMOVAL OF EQUIPMENT FROM SOLUTION PROCESSES WITHIN | | THE C-400 (CHEMICAL OPERATION FACILITY) BUILDING. TWO CYLINDER WASH PUMPS | | WERE DISCOVERED SOUTH OF THE CYLINDER WASH STAND ON THE EAST SIDE OF THE | | BUILDING AND TWO PUMPS WERE DISCOVERED STORED ON A PALLET SOUTH OF THE | | SUPPLY CAGE ON THE WEST SIDE OF THE BUILDING. ADDITIONALLY, THREE MORE | | PUMPS WERE DISCOVERED IN THE MAINTENANCE AREA ON THE WEST SIDE OF THE | | BUILDING. THE ORIGIN OF THESE THREE PUMPS IS UNKNOWN. ALSO, THREE SMALL RAD | | BAGS OF PIPING AND FLANGES WERE FOUND IN THE URANIUM RECOVERY AREA. | | | | OPERATIONS PERSONNEL WERE INSTRUCTED BY NCS TO CONTROL THE PUMPS IN | | ACCORDANCE WITH NCSA GEN-27 AND PROCEDURE CP2-TS-TS2030 WHICH GOVERN THE | | SAFE HANDLING OF LEGACY PROCESS EQUIPMENT. | | | | THIS INCIDENT IS A REPORTABLE EVENT PER UE2-RA-RE1030, REV. 2, APPENDIX D, | | CRITERIA A.4.a. AS A 24-HOUR REPORTABLE EVENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH NRC | | BULLETIN 91-01, SUPPLEMENT 1. | | | | THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED OF THIS EVENT BY THE LICENSEE. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+